

THE
WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES.

IN FIVE VOLUMES
VOL. I.

AMS PRESS
NEW YORK

THE
WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;

NINE OF THE DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEARLY ALL THE EXISTING GREEK MS. COMMENTARIES ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO,

AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

ΤΟΥΤΟΝ ΘΙΛΟΙΟΘΙΑΣ ΤΥΠΟΝ ΘΑΙΗΝ ΑΝ ΕΙΣ ΕΙΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΕΑΘΕΙΝ ΕΝ' ΕΥΠΡΕΪΑ
ΤΩΝ ΘΑΕ ΨΥΧΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΠΑΑΜΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΘΑΕ ΑΓΙΣΤΕΙΑΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΕΣΤΗΡΙΑΣ
ΑΡΧΗΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΙ, ΚΑΙ ΤΩΙΣ ΕΙΣΑΤΟΙΣ ΓΕΝΗΖΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ.

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TO
HIS GRACE
CHARLES HOWARD, DUKE OF NORFOLK,
EARL MARSHAL OF ENGLAND,
§c. §c.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR GRACE,

THE Philosophy of Plato, from its native dignity, and the noble birth of its author, has a double claim to the patronage of nobility. To whom, therefore, can it so properly apply for protection as to a nobleman like your Grace, who deservedly stands at the head of the Peerage, and who can look back upon a long series of ancestors whose renown is unrivalled in the annals of English history.

It is a remarkable circumstance, my Lord, that the writings of Plato were first translated into Latin by Ficinus, under the auspices of the illustrious Cosmo de Medici, and his grandson Lorenzo the Magnificent, and that the first complete translation of them into English is under the patronage of your Grace. But however great the merit may be of the support which was
given

DEDICATION.

given by the Medici to the first translation of Plato's Works into Latin, it certainly is not equal to that of your Grace in the aid which you have afforded to the following translation of them into English. For your Grace's patronage commenced at that period of the last very calamitous war, which was of all others the most unfavourable to the encouragement of literature, and continued to the present eventful period; while that of the Medici began and ended in peace. The patronage likewise of the Medici was more confined than that of your Grace: for, by giving Plato to the public in a Roman garb, unattended with his Greek interpreters in the same garb, they may be said to have acted like one who gives an invaluable casket, but without the only key by which it can be unlocked. This key, my Lord, in consequence of the handsome manner in which you have enabled me to publish my translation, I have presented to the English Reader; and in this respect also the support of your Grace is more noble, because more ample than that of Cosmo and Lorenzo.

Whatever, therefore, my Lord, may be the merit, whatever may be the fate of my labours in this arduous work, the aid which your Grace has afforded to the publication of those labours will be applauded as it deserves by every man of intrinsic worth of the present day, and will be admired and celebrated by the latest posterity. Hence, my Lord, if looking to the
unparalleled

DEDICATION.

unparalleled excellence of Plato's writings, and not to my translation of them, I may be allowed to prophesy, time, while he blots from the page of history the names of great potentates, who were distinguished for nothing, while living, but the magnitude of their sway, will for this patronage inscribe your Grace's name in the archives of Immortality.

Permit me, therefore, to add, my Lord, that however bright and however benign the star of the Medicean family might have shone on the labours of Ficinus, I consider that of the most noble family of the HOWARDS to have beamed with a more splendid and auspicious light on those of mine.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BE,

MY LORD DUKE,

YOUR GRACE'S MOST GRATEFUL

AND OBEDIENT SERVANT,

*Dec. 1, 1803,
Manor-Place, Walworth.*

THOMAS TAYLOR.

CONTENTS.

VOLUME I.

	Page
GENERAL INTRODUCTION - - -	i
<i>Explanation of certain Terms peculiar to the Platonic Philosophy</i> -	cxvii
<i>Life of Plato by Olympiodorus</i> - - -	1
<i>The First Alcibiades</i> - - - - -	9
<i>The Republic</i> - - - - -	97
<i>Additional Notes on the First Alcibiades, extracted from the MS.</i>	
<i>Commentary of Proclus on that Dialogue</i> - - -	480
<i>Additional Notes on the Republic</i> - - -	520

VOLUME II.

<i>The Laws</i> - - - - -	1 to 384
<i>The Epinomis, or the Philosopher</i> - - -	387
<i>The Timæus</i> - - - - -	413
<i>The Critias, or Atlanticus</i> - - - - -	575
<i>Additional Notes on the Timæus, extracted from the Commentary</i>	
<i>of Proclus on that Dialogue</i> - - - - -	593

CONTENTS.

VOLUME III.

	Page
<i>The Parmenides</i> - - - - -	1
<i>The Sophista</i> - - - - -	201
<i>The Phædrus</i> - - - - -	283
<i>The Greater Hippias</i> - - - - -	373
<i>The Banquet</i> - - - - -	429
<i>Additional Notes on the Parmenides, extracted from the MS.</i>	
<i>Commentary of Proclus on that Dialogue, and from the MS.</i>	
<i>of Damascius Περὶ Ἀρχῶν</i> - - - - -	531
<i>Additional Notes on the Phædrus, from Proclus on the Theology</i>	
<i>of Plato</i> - - - - -	592

VOLUME IV.



















<i>The Theætetus</i> - - - - -	1
<i>The Politicus</i> - - - - -	99
<i>The Minos</i> - - - - -	175
<i>The Apology of Socrates</i> - - - - -	193
<i>The Crito</i> - - - - -	229
<i>The Phædo</i> - - - - -	245
<i>The Gorgias</i> - - - - -	343
<i>The Philebus</i> - - - - -	461
<i>The Second Alcibiades</i> - - - - -	571

VOLUME

CONTENTS.

VOLUME V.

	Page
<i>The Euthyphro</i> - - - - -	1
<i>The Meno</i> - - - - -	27
<i>The Protagoras</i> - - - - -	101
<i>The Theages</i> - - - - -	157
<i>The Laches</i> - - - - -	179
<i>The Lysis</i> - - - - -	211
<i>The Charmides</i> - - - - -	239
<i>The Lesser Hippias</i> - - - - -	269
<i>The Euthydemus</i> - - - - -	309
<i>The Hipparchus</i> - - - - -	355
<i>The Rivals</i> - - - - -	371
<i>The Menexenus</i> - - - - -	408
<i>The Clitopho</i> - - - - -	431
<i>The Io</i> - - - - -	437
<i>The Cratylus</i> - - - - -	439
<i>The Twelve Epistles</i> - - - - -	575
<i>Additional Notes on the Cratylus, extracted from the MS. Scholia of Proclus on that Dialogue</i> - - - - -	641



GENERAL INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS

OF

PLATO.

VOL. I.

b

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

“**PHILOSOPHY**,” says Hierocles¹, “is the purification and perfection of human life. It is the purification, indeed, from material irrationality, and the mortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being the resumption of our proper felicity, and a re-ascent to the divine likeness. To effect these two is the province of *Virtue* and *Truth*; the former exterminating the immoderation of the passions; and the latter introducing the divine form to those who are naturally adapted to its reception.”

Of philosophy thus defined, which may be compared to a luminous pyramid, terminating in Deity, and having for its basis the rational soul of man and its spontaneous unperverted conceptions,—of this philosophy, august, magnificent, and divine, Plato may be justly called the primary leader and hierophant, through whom, like the mystic light in the inmost recesses of some sacred temple, it first shone forth with occult and venerable splendor². It may indeed be truly said of the whole of this philosophy, that it is the greatest good which man can participate: for if it purifies us from the defilements of the passions and assimilates us to Divinity, it confers on us the proper felicity of our nature. Hence it is easy to collect

¹ Φιλοσοφία ἐστὶ ζωῆς ἀνθρώπου καθαρσίς, καὶ τελειότης· καθαρσίς μὲν, ἀπὸ τῆς υλικῆς ἀλογίας, καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ σώματος· τελειότης δὲ, τῆς οἰκείας εὐζωίας ἀναλήψις, πρὸς τὴν θείαν ὁμοίωσιν ἐπαναγούσα. Ταῦτα δὲ πεφυκέν ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀληθεῖα· μαλίστα ἀπεργαζέσθαι· ἢ μὲν τὴν ἀμετρίαν τῶν παθῶν ἐξορίζουσα· ἢ δὲ τὸ θείον εἶδος τοῖς εὐφύως ἔχουσιν προσκτωμένη. Hierocl. in Aur. Carm. p. 9. edit. Needh.

² In the mysteries a light of this kind shone forth from the adytum of the temple in which they were exhibited.

its preeminence to all other philosophies; to show that where they oppose it they are erroneous; that so far as they contain any thing scientific they are allied to it; and that at best they are but rivulets derived from this vast ocean of truth.

To evince that the philosophy of Plato possesses this preeminence; that its dignity and sublimity are unrivalled; that it is the parent of all that ennobles man; and that it is founded on principles, which neither time can obliterate, nor sophistry subvert, is the principal design of this Introduction.

To effect this design, I shall in the first place present the reader with the outlines of the principal dogmas of Plato's philosophy. The undertaking is indeed no less novel than arduous, since the author of it has to tread in paths which have been untrodden for upwards of a thousand years, and to bring to light truths which for that extended period have been concealed in Greek. Let not the reader, therefore, be surprised at the solitariness of the paths through which I shall attempt to conduct him, or at the novelty of the objects which will present themselves in the journey: for perhaps he may fortunately recollect that he has travelled the same road before, that the scenes were once familiar to him, and that the country through which he is passing is his native land. At least, if his sight should be dim, and his memory oblivious, (for the objects which he will meet with can only be seen by the most piercing eyes,) and his absence from them has been lamentably long, let him implore the power of wisdom,

From mortal mists to purify his eyes,
That God and man he may distinctly see¹.

¹ Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλόν, ἢ πρὶν ἐπνεύ,
Ὀφρ' εὖ γινώσκῃς ἦμιν Θεοῦ, ἦδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

Iliad. V. v. 127, &c.

Let

Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin the solitary journey.

Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the Republic he calls *the good*, and in the Parmenides *the one*, is not only above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence, since every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any thing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things, but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by Plato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle, concludes as follows: "*The one* therefore *is* in no respect. So it seems. Hence it is not in such a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be *being*, and participate of *essence*: but as it appears, *the one* neither *is one*, nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any *name* belong to it, nor *discourse*, nor any *science*, nor *sense*, nor *opinion*. It does not appear that there can. Hence it can neither be *named*, nor *spoken of*, nor *conceived by opinion*, nor be *known*, nor *perceived* by any being. So it seems." And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him, but even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and most divine progeny. For that which so eminently distinguishes the philosophy of Plato from others is this, that every part of it is stamped with

with the character of science. The vulgar indeed proclaim the Deity to be ineffable; but as they have no scientific knowledge that he is so, this is nothing more than a confused and indistinct perception of the most sublime of all truths, like that of a thing seen between sleeping and waking, like Phæacia to Ulysses when sailing to his native land,

That lay before him indistinct and vast,
Like a broad shield amid the wat'ry waste¹.

In short, an unscientific perception of the ineffable nature of the Divinity resembles that of a man, who, on surveying the heavens, should assert of the altitude of its highest part, that it surpasses that of the loftiest tree, and is therefore immeasurable. But to see this scientifically, is like a survey of this highest part of the heavens by the astronomer: for he, by knowing the height of the media between us and it, knows also scientifically that it transcends in altitude not only the loftiest tree, but the summits of air and æther, the moon, and even the sun itself.

Let us therefore investigate what is the ascent to the ineffable, and after what manner it is accomplished, according to Plato, from the last of things, following the profound and most inquisitive² Damascius as our leader in this arduous investigation. Let our discourse also be common to other principles, and to things proceeding from them to that which is last; and let us, beginning from that which is perfectly effable and known to sense, ascend to the ineffable, and establish in silence, as in a port, the parturitions of truth concerning it. Let us then assume the following axiom, in which as in a secure vehicle we may safely pass from hence thither. I say, therefore, that the undigent is

¹ *Odys.* V. v. 281.

² This most excellent philosopher, whose MS. treatise *περί αρχών* is a treasury of divine science and erudition, is justly called by Simplicius *ζητινωτάτος*, most inquisitive. See a very long and beautiful extract from this work in the Additional Notes on the third volume.

naturally

naturally prior to the indigent. For that which is in want of another is naturally adapted from necessity to be subservient to that of which it is indigent. But if they are mutually in want of each other, each being indigent of the other in a different respect, neither of them will be the principle. For the unindigent is most adapted to that which is truly the principle. And if it is in want of any thing, according to this it will not be the principle. It is however necessary that the principle should be this very thing, the principle alone. The unindigent therefore pertains to this, nor must it by any means be acknowledged that there is any thing prior to it. This, however, would be acknowledged, if it had any connection with the indigent.

Let us then consider body, (that is, a triply extended substance,) endowed with quality; for this is the first thing effable by us, and is sensible. Is this then the principle of things? But it is two things, body, and quality which is in body as a subject. Which of these therefore is by nature prior? For both are indigent of their proper parts: and that also which is in a subject is indigent of the subject. Shall we say then that body itself is the principle and the first essence? But this is impossible. For, in the first place, the principle will not receive any thing from that which is posterior to itself. But body, we say, is the recipient of quality. Hence quality, and a subsistence in conjunction with it, are not derived from body, since quality is present with body as something different. And, in the second place, body is every way divisible; its several parts are indigent of each other, and the whole is indigent of all the parts. As it is indigent, therefore, and receives its completion from things which are indigent, it will not be entirely unindigent.

Further still, if it is not one but united, it will require, as Plato says, the connecting one. It is likewise something common and formless,
being

being as it were a certain matter. It requires, therefore, ornament and the possession of form, that it may not be merely body, but a body with a certain particular quality; as, for instance, a fiery or earthly body, and, in short, body adorned and invested with a particular quality. Hence the things which accede to it, finish and adorn it. Is then that which accedes the principle? But this is impossible. For it does not abide in itself, nor does it subsist alone, but is in a subject, of which also it is indigent. If, however, some one should assert that body is not a subject, but one of the elements in each, as, for instance, animal in horse and man, thus also each will be indigent of the other, viz. this subject, and that which is in the subject; or rather the common element, animal, and the peculiarities, as the rational and irrational, will be indigent. For elements are always indigent of each other, and that which is composed from elements is indigent of the elements. In short, this sensible nature, and which is so manifest to us, is neither body; for this does not of itself move the senses, nor quality; for this does not possess an interval commensurate with sense. Hence, that which is the object of sight, is neither body nor colour; but coloured body, or colour corporalized, is that which is motive of the sight. And universally that which is sensible, which is body with a particular quality, is motive of sense. From hence, it is evident that the thing which excites the sense is something incorporeal. For if it was body, it would not yet be the object of sense. Body therefore requires that which is incorporeal, and that which is incorporeal, body. For an incorporeal nature is not of itself sensible. It is, however, different from body, because these two possess prerogatives different from each other, and neither of these subsists prior to the other; but being elements of one sensible thing, they are present with each other; the one imparting interval to that which is void of interval,
but

but the other introducing to that which is formless, sensible variety invested with form. In the third place, neither are both these together the principle; since they are not unindigent. For they stand in need of their proper elements, and of that which conducts them to the generation of one form. For body cannot effect this, since it is of itself impotent; nor quality, since it is not able to subsist separate from the body in which it is, or together with which it has its being. The composite therefore either produces itself, which is impossible, for it does not converge to itself, but the whole of it is multifariously dispersed, or it is not produced by itself, and there is some other principle prior to it.

Let it then be supposed to be that which is called nature, being a principle of motion and rest, in that which is moved and at rest, essentially and not according to accident. For this is something more simple, and is fabricative of composite forms. If, however, it is in the things fabricated, and does not subsist separate from, nor prior to them, but stands in need of them for its being, it will not be unindigent; though it possesses something transcendent with respect to them, viz. the power of fashioning and fabricating them. For it has its being together with them, and has in them an inseparable subsistence; so that when they are it is, and is not when they are not, and this in consequence of perfectly verging to them, and not being able to sustain that which is appropriate. For the power of increasing, nourishing, and generating similars, and the one prior to these three, viz. nature, is not wholly incorporeal, but is nearly a certain quality of body, from which it alone differs, in that it imparts to the composite to be inwardly moved and at rest. For the quality of that which is sensible imparts that which is apparent in matter, and that which falls on sense. But body imparts interval every way extended; and nature, an inwardly proceeding na-

tural energy, whether according to place only, or according to nourishing, increasing, and generating things similar. Nature, however, is inseparable from a subject, and is indigent, so that it will not be in short the principle, since it is indigent of that which is subordinate. For it will not be wonderful, if being a certain principle, it is indigent of the principle above it; but it would be wonderful, if it were indigent of things posterior to itself, and of which it is supposed to be the principle.

By the like arguments we may show that the principle cannot be irrational soul, whether sensitive, or orectic. For if it appears that it has something separate, together with impulsive and gnostic energies, yet at the same time, it is bound in body, and has something inseparable from it; since it is not able to convert itself to itself, but its energy is mingled with its subject. For it is evident that its essence is something of this kind; since if it were liberated, and in itself free, it would also evince a certain independent energy, and would not always be converted to body; but sometimes it would be converted to itself; or though it were always converted to body, yet it would judge and explore itself. The energies, therefore, of the multitude of mankind, though they are conversant with externals, yet at the same time they exhibit that which is separate about them. For they consult how they should engage in them, and observe that deliberation is necessary, in order to effect or be passive to apparent good, or to decline something of the contrary. But the impulses of other irrational animals are uniform and spontaneous, are moved together with the sensible organs, and require the senses alone that they may obtain from sensibles the pleasurable, and avoid the painful. If, therefore, the body communicates in pleasure and pain, and is affected in a certain respect by them, it is evident that the
psychical

psychical energies (i. e. energies belonging to the soul) are exerted, mingled with bodies, and are not purely psychical, but are also corporeal; for perception is of the animated body, or of the soul corporalized, though in such perception the psychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies the corporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As the irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from itself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate: but a thing of this kind will not be the principle.

Prior then to this essence, we see a certain form separate from a subject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our soul, therefore, presides over its proper energies, and corrects itself. This, however, would not be the case, unless it was converted to itself; and it would not be converted to itself unless it had a separate essence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then say that it is the most perfect principle? But it does not at once exert all its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The principle, however, wishes to have nothing indigent: but the rational nature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may say that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential energies, always concurring with its essence, according to the self-moved, and ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent, and will be the principle. To this we reply, that the whole soul is one form and one nature, partly unindigent and partly indigent; but the principle is perfectly unindigent. Soul therefore, and which exerts mutable energies, will not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there should be something prior to this, which is in every respect immutable, according to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and energies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and such as is much honoured intellect, to which Aristotle having ascended, thought he had

discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting to that which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes (*πληρωματα*), and of which neither addition nor ablation changes any thing belonging to it? Or is not this also, one and many, whole and parts, containing in itself, things first, middle, and last? The subordinate plenitudes also stand in need of the more excellent, and the more excellent of the subordinate, and the whole of the parts. For the things related are indigent of each other, and what are first of what are last, through the same cause; for it is not of itself that which is first. Besides *the one* here is indigent of *the many*, because it has its subsistence in *the many*. Or it may be said, that this one is collective of the many, and this not by itself, but in conjunction with them. Hence there is much of the indigent in this principle. For since intellect generates in itself its proper plenitudes from which the whole at once receives its completion, it will be itself indigent of itself, not only that which is generated of that which generates, but also that which generates of that which is generated, in order to the whole completion of that which wholly generates itself. Further still, intellect understands and is understood, is intellectual of and intelligible to itself, and both these. Hence the intellectual is indigent of the intelligible, as of its proper object of desire; and the intelligible is in want of the intellectual, because it wishes to be the intelligible of it. Both also are indigent of either, since the possession is always accompanied with indigence, in the same manner as the world is always present with matter. Hence a certain indigence is naturally coessentialized with intellect, so that it cannot be the most proper principle. Shall we, therefore, in the next place, direct our attention to the most simple of beings, which Plato calls *the one being*, *ἡ ὅτι*? For as there is no separation there throughout the whole, nor any multitude, or order, or duplicity, or conversion to itself, what indigence will

will there appear to be in the perfectly united? And especially what indigence will there be of that which is subordinate? Hence the great Permenides ascended to this most safe principle, as that which is most undigent. Is it not, however, here necessary to attend to the conception of Plato, that the united is not *the one itself*, but that which is passive² to it? And this being the case, it is evident that it ranks after *the one*; for it is supposed to be *the united* and not *the one itself*. If also *being* is composed from the elements *bound* and *infinity*, as appears from the Philebus of Plato, where he calls it that which is mixt, it will be indigent of its elements. Besides, if the conception of *being* is different from that of *being united*, and that which is a whole is both united and being, these will be indigent of each other, and the whole which is called *one being* is indigent of the two. And though *the one* in this is better than *being*, yet this is indigent of being, in order to the subsistence of one being. But if *being* here supervenes *the one*, as it were, form in that which is mixt and united, just as the idiom of man in that which is collectively rational-mortal-animal, thus also *the one* will be indigent of *being*. If, however, to speak more properly, *the one* is two-fold, *this* being the cause of the mixture, and subsisting prior to being, but *that* conferring rectitude on being,—if this be the case, neither will the indigent perfectly desert this nature. After all these, it may be said that *the one* will be perfectly undigent. For neither is it indigent of that which is posterior to itself for its subsistence, since the truly one is by itself separated from all things; nor is it indigent of that which is inferior or more excellent in itself; for there is nothing in it besides itself; nor is it in want of itself. But it is one, because neither has it any duplicity with respect to itself. For not even the relation of

² See the Sophista of Plato, where this is asserted.

itself to itself must be asserted of the truly one; since it is perfectly simple. This, therefore, is the most unindigent of all things. Hence this is the principle and the cause of all; and this is at once the first of all things. If these qualities, however, are present with it, it will not be *the one*. Or may we not say that all things subsist in *the one* according to *the one*? And that both these subsist in it, and such other things as we predicate of it, as, for instance, the most simple, the most excellent, the most powerful, the preserver of all things, and the good itself? If these things, however, are thus true of *the one*, it will thus also be indigent of things posterior to itself, according to those very things which we add to it. For the principle is and is said to be the principle of things proceeding from it, and the cause is the cause of things caused, and the first is the first of things arranged posterior to it¹. Further still, the simple subsists according to a transcendency of other things, the most powerful according to power with relation to the subjects of it; and the good, the desirable, and the preserving, are so called with reference to things benefited, preserved, and desiring. And if it should be said, to be all things according to the preassumption of all things in itself, it will indeed be said to be so according to *the one* alone, and will at the same time be the one cause of all things prior to all, and will be this and no other according to *the one*. So far, therefore, as it is *the one* alone, it will be unindigent; but so far as unindigent, it will be the first principle and stable root of all principles. So far, however, as it is the principle and the first cause of all things, and is preestablished as the object of desire to all things, so far it appears to be in a certain respect indigent of the things to which it is related. It

¹ For a thing cannot be said to be a principle or cause without the subsistence of the things of which it is the principle or cause. Hence, so far as it is a principle or cause, it will be indigent of the subsistence of these.

has therefore, if it be lawful so to speak, an ultimate vestige of indigence, just as on the contrary matter has an ultimate echo of the unindigent, or a most obscure and debile impression of *the one*. And language indeed appears to be here subverted. For so far as it is *the one*, it is also unindigent, since the principle has appeared to subsist according to the most unindigent and *the one*. At the same time, however, so far as it is *the one*, it is also the principle; and so far as it is *the one* it is unindigent, but so far as the principle, indigent. Hence so far as it is unindigent, it is also indigent, though not according to the same; but with respect to being that which it is, it is undigent; but as producing and comprehending other things in itself, it is indigent. This, however, is the peculiarity of *the one*; so that it is both unindigent and indigent according to *the one*. Not indeed that it is each of these, in such a manner as we divide it in speaking of it, but it is one alone; and according to this is both other things, and that which is indigent. For how is it possible it should not be indigent also so far as it is *the one*? Just as it is all other things which proceed from it. For the indigent also is something belonging to all things. Something else, therefore, must be investigated which in no respect has any kind of indigence. But of a thing of this kind it cannot with truth be asserted that it is the principle, nor can it even be said of it that it is most unindigent, though this appears to be the most venerable of all assertions¹. For this signifies transcendency, and an exemption from the indigent. We do not, however, think it proper to call this even *the perfectly exempt*; but that which is in every respect incapable of being apprehended, and about which we must be perfectly silent, will be the most just axiom of our

¹ See the extracts from Damascius in the additional notes to the third volume, which contain an inestimable treasury of the most profound conceptions concerning the ineffable.

concep-

conception in the present investigation ; nor yet this as uttering any thing, but as rejoicing in not uttering, and by this venerating that immense unknown. This then is the mode of ascent to that which is called the first, or rather to that which is beyond every thing which can be conceived, or become the subject of hypothesis.

There is also another mode, which does not place the undigent before the indigent, but considers that which is indigent of a more excellent nature, as subsisting secondary to that which is more excellent. Every where then, that which is in capacity is secondary to that which is in energy. For that it may proceed into energy, and that it may not remain in capacity in vain, it requires that which is in energy. For the more excellent never blossoms from the subordinate nature. Let this then be previously defined by us, according to common unperverted conceptions. Matter therefore has prior to itself material form ; because all matter is form in capacity, whether it be the first matter which is perfectly formless, or the second which subsists according to body void of quality, or in other words mere triple extension, to which it is likely those directed their attention who first investigated sensibles, and which at first appeared to be the only things that had a subsistence. For the existence of that which is common in the different elements, persuaded them that there is a certain body void of quality. But since, among bodies of this kind, some possess the governing principle inwardly, and others externally, such as things artificial, it is necessary besides quality to direct our attention to nature, as being something better than qualities, and which is prearranged in the order of cause, as art is of things artificial. Of things, however, which are inwardly governed, some appear to possess being alone, but others to be nourished and increased, and to generate things similar to themselves. There is therefore another certain cause prior to the above-mentioned nature,

nature, viz. a vegetable power itself. But it is evident that all such things as are ingenerated in body as in a subject, are of themselves incorporeal, though they become corporeal by the participation of that in which they subsist, so that they are said to be and are material in consequence of what they suffer from matter. Qualities therefore, and still more natures, and in a still greater degree the vegetable life, preserve the incorporeal in themselves. Since, however, sense exhibits another more conspicuous life, pertaining to beings which are moved according to impulse and place, this must be established prior to that, as being a more proper principle, and as the supplier of a certain better form, that of a self-moved animal, and which naturally precedes plants rooted in the earth. The animal, however, is not accurately self-moved. For the whole is not such throughout the whole; but a part moves, and a part is moved. This therefore is the apparent self-moved. Hence, prior to this it is necessary there should be that which is truly self-moved, and which according to the whole of itself moves and is moved, that the apparently self-moved may be the image of this. And indeed the soul which moves the body, must be considered as a more proper self-moved essence. This, however, is two-fold, the one rational, the other irrational. For that there is a rational soul is evident: or has not every one a consensation of himself, more clear or more obscure, when converted to himself in the attentions to and investigations of himself, and in the vital and gnostic animadversions of himself? For the essence which is capable of this, and which can collect universals by reasoning, will very justly be rational. The irrational soul also, though it does not appear to investigate these things, and to reason with itself, yet at the same time it moves bodies from place to place, being itself previously moved from itself; for at different times it exerts a different impulse. Does it therefore move itself from one impulse to another? or is it moved by something else, as, for

instance, by the whole rational soul in the universe? But it would be absurd to say that the energies of every irrational soul are not the energies of that soul, but of one more divine; since they are infinite, and mingled with much of the base and imperfect. For this would be just the same as to say that the irrational energies are the energies of the rational soul. I omit to mention the absurdity of supposing that the whole essence is not generative of its proper energies. For if the irrational soul is a certain essence, it will have peculiar energies of its own, not imparted from something else, but proceeding from itself. The irrational soul, therefore, will also move itself at different times to different impulses. But if it moves itself, it will be converted to itself. If, however, this be the case, it will have a separate subsistence, and will not be in a subject. It is therefore rational, if it looks to itself: for in being converted to, it surveys, itself. For when extended to things external, it looks to externals, or rather it looks to coloured body, but does not see itself, because sight itself is neither body nor that which is coloured. Hence it does not revert to itself. Neither therefore is this the case with any other irrational nature. For neither does the phantasy project a type of itself, but of that which is sensible, as for instance of coloured body. Nor does irrational appetite desire itself, but aspires after a certain object of desire, such as honour, or pleasure, or riches. It does not therefore move itself.

But if some one, on seeing that brutes exert rational energies, should apprehend that these also participate of the first self-moved, and on this account possess a soul converted to itself, it may perhaps be granted to him that these also are rational natures, except that they are not so essentially, but according to participation, and this most obscure, just as the rational soul may be said to be intellectual according to participation, as always projecting common conceptions without distortion. It must however be observed, that the extremes are, that which is capable
of

of being perfectly separated, such as the rational form, and that which is perfectly inseparable, such as corporeal quality, and that in the middle of these nature subsists, which verges to the inseparable, having a small representation of the separable, and the irrational soul, which verges to the separable; for it appears in a certain respect to subsist by itself, separate from a subject; so that it becomes doubtful whether it is self-motive, or alter-motive. For it contains an abundant vestige of self-motion, but not that which is true, and converted to itself, and on this account perfectly separated from a subject. And the vegetable soul has in a certain respect a middle subsistence. On this account, to some of the antients, it appeared to be a certain soul, but to others, nature

Again, therefore, that we may return to the proposed object of investigation, how can a self-motive nature of this kind, which is mingled with the alter-motive, be the first principle of things? For it neither subsists from itself, nor does it in reality perfect itself; but it requires a certain other nature both for its subsistence and perfection: and prior to it is that which is truly self-moved. Is therefore that which is properly self-moved the principle, and is it indigent of no form more excellent than itself? Or is not that which moves always naturally prior to that which is moved; and in short does not every form which is pure from its contrary subsist by itself prior to that which is mingled with it? And is not the pure the cause of the comingled? For that which is coessentialized with another, has also an energy mingled with that other. So that a self-moved nature will indeed make itself; but thus subsisting it will be at the same time moving and moved, but will not be made a moving nature only. For neither is it this alone. Every form however is always alone according to its first subsistence; so that there will be that which moves only without being moved. And indeed

it would be absurd that there should be that which is moved only, such as body, but that prior both to that which is self-moved and that which is moved only, there should not be that which moves only. For it is evident that there must be, since this will be a more excellent nature, and that which is self-moved, so far as it moves itself, is more excellent than so far as it is moved. It is necessary therefore that the essence which moves unmoved should be first, as that which is moved not being motive, is the third, in the middle of which is the self-moved, which we say requires that which moves in order to its becoming motive. In short, if it is moved, it will not abide, so far as it is moved; and if it moves, it is necessary it should *remain moving* so far as it moves. Whence then does it derive the power of *abiding*? For from itself it derives the power either of being moved only, or of at the same time abiding and being moved wholly according to the same. Whence then does it simply obtain the power of abiding? Certainly from that which simply abides. But this is an immovable cause. We must therefore admit that the immovable is prior to the self-moved. Let us consider then if the immovable is the most proper principle? But how is this possible? For the immovable contains as numerous a multitude immovably, as the self-moved self-moveably. Besides an immovable separation must necessarily subsist prior to a self-moveable separation. The unmoved therefore is at the same time one and many, and is at the same time united and separated, and a nature of this kind is denominated intellect. But it is evident that the united in this is naturally prior to and more honourable than the separated. For separation is always indigent of union; but not, on the contrary, union of separation. Intellect, however, has not the united pure from its opposite. For intellectual form is coessentialized with the separated through the whole of itself. Hence that which is in a certain respect united requires

quires that which is simply united ; and that which subsists with another is indigent of that which subsists by itself ; and that which subsists according to participation, of that which subsists according to essence. For intellect being self-subsistent produces itself as united, and at the same time separated. Hence it subsists according to both these. It is produced therefore from that which is simply united and alone united. Prior therefore to that which is formal is the uncircumscribed, and undistributed into forms. And this is that which we call the united, and which the wise men of antiquity denominated *being*, possessing in one contraction multitude, subsisting prior to the many.

Having therefore arrived thus far, let us here rest for a while, and consider with ourselves, whether being is the investigated principle of all things. For what will there be which does not participate of being? May we not say, that this, if it is the united, will be secondary to *the one*, and that by participating of *the one* it becomes the united? But in short if we conceive *the one* to be something different from being, if being is prior to *the one*, it will not participate of *the one*. It will therefore be many only, and these will be infinitely infinites. But if *the one* is with *being*, and *being* with *the one*, and they are either co-ordinate or divided from each other, there will be two principles, and the above-mentioned absurdity will happen. Or they will mutually participate of each other, and there will be two elements. Or they are parts of something else consisting from both. And if this be the case, what will that be which leads them to union with each other? For if *the one* unites being to itself (for this may be said), *the one* also will energize prior to being, that it may call forth and convert being to itself. *The one*, therefore, will subsist from itself self-perfect prior to being. Further still, the more simple is always prior to the more composite. If therefore they are similarly simple, there will either be two principles,

principles, or one from the two, and this will be a composite. Hence the simple and perfectly incomposite is prior to this, which must be either one, or not one; and if not one, it must either be many, or nothing. But with respect to nothing, if it signifies that which is perfectly void, it will signify something vain. But if it signifies the arcane, this will not even be that which is simple. In short, we cannot conceive any principle more simple than *the one*. *The one* therefore is in every respect prior to *being*. Hence this is the principle of all things, and Plato recurring to this, did not require any other principle in his reasonings. For the arcane in which this our ascent terminates is not the principle of reasoning, nor of knowledge, nor of animals, nor of beings, nor of unities, but simply of all things, being arranged above every conception and suspicion that we can frame. Hence Plato indicates nothing concerning it, but makes his negations of all other things except *the one*, from *the one*. For that *the one* is he denies in the last place, but he does not make a negation of *the one*. He also, besides this, even denies this negation, but not *the one*. He denies, too, name and conception, and all knowledge, and what can be said more, whole itself and every being. But let there be the united and the unical, and, if you will, the two principles *bound* and *the infinite*. Plato, however, never in any respect makes a negation of *the one* which is beyond all these. Hence in the *Sophista* he considers it as *the one* prior to being, and in the *Republic* as *the good* beyond every essence; but at the same time *the one* alone is left. Whether however is it known and effable, or unknown and ineffable? Or is it in a certain respect these, and in a certain respect not? For by a negation of this it may be said the ineffable is affirmed. And again, by the simplicity of knowledge it will be known or suspected, but by composition perfectly unknown. Hence neither will it be apprehended by negation. And in short, so far as it is admitted

mitted to be one, so far it will be coarranged with other things which are the subject of position. For it is the summit of things which subsist according to position. At the same time there is much in it of the ineffable and unknown, the uncoordinated, and that which is deprived of position, but these are accompanied with a representation of the contraries: and the former are more excellent than the latter. But every where things pure subsist prior to their contraries, and such as are unmingled to the comingled. For either things more excellent subsist in *the one* essentially, and in a certain respect the contraries of these also will be there at the same time; or they subsist according to participation, and are derived from that which is first a thing of this kind. Prior to *the one*, therefore, is that which is simply and perfectly ineffable, without position, uncoordinated, and incapable of being apprehended, to which also the ascent of the present discourse hastens through the clearest indications, omitting none of those natures between the first and the last of things.

Such then is the ascent to the highest God according to the theology of Plato, venerably preserving his ineffable exemption from all things, and his transcendency, which cannot be circumscribed by any gnostic energy; and at the same time unfolding the paths which lead upwards to him, and enkindling that luminous summit of the soul, by which she is conjoined with the incomprehensible one.

From this truly ineffable principle, exempt from all essence, power, and energy, a multitude of divine natures, according to Plato, immediately proceeds. That this must necessarily be the case will be admitted by the reader who understands what has been already discussed, and is fully demonstrated by Plato in the *Parmenides*, as will be evident to the intelligent from the notes on that Dialogue. In addition therefore to what I have said on this subject, I shall further observe at present, that
this

this doctrine, which is founded in the sublimest and most scientific conceptions of the human mind, may be clearly shown to be a legitimate dogma of Plato from what is asserted by him in the sixth book of his Republic. For he there affirms, in the most clear and unequivocal terms, that *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, is superessential, and shows by the analogy of the sun to *the good*, that what *light* and *sight* are in the visible, that *truth* and *intelligence* are in the intelligible world. As light therefore immediately proceeds from the sun, and wholly subsists according to a solar idiom or property, so *truth*, or the immediate progeny of *the good*, must subsist according to a superessential idiom. And as *the good*, according to Plato, is the same with *the one*, as is evident from the Parmenides, the immediate progeny of *the one* will be the same as that of *the good*. But the immediate offspring of *the one* cannot be any thing else than unities. And hence we necessarily infer that, according to Plato, the immediate offspring of the ineffable principle of things are superessential unities. They differ however from their immense principle in this, that he is superessential and ineffable, without any addition; but this divine multitude is participated by the several orders of being, which are suspended from and produced by it. Hence, in consequence of being connected with *multitude* through this participation, they are necessarily subordinate to *the one*.

No less admirably, therefore, than Platonically, does Simplicius, in his Commentary on Epictetus¹, observe on this subject as follows: "The fountain and principle of all things is *the good*: for that which all things desire, and to which all things are extended, is the principle and the end of all things. *The good* also produces from itself all things, first,

¹ Page 9, of the quarto edition.

middle, and last. But it produces such as are first and proximate to itself, similar to itself; one goodness, many goodnesses, one simplicity and unity which transcends all others, many unities, and one principle many principles. For *the one*, the principle, *the good*, and deity, are the same: for deity is the first and the cause of all things. But it is necessary that the first should also be most simple; since whatever is a composite and has multitude is posterior to *the one*. And multitude and things which are not good desire *the good* as being above them: and in short, that which is not itself the principle is from the principle.

But it is also necessary that the principle of all things should possess the highest, and all, power. For the amplitude of power consists in producing all things from itself, and in giving subsistence to similars prior to things which are dissimilar. Hence the one principle produces many principles, many simplicities, and many goodnesses, proximately from itself. For since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from its one proper principle. Thus, for instance, all beautiful things, whatever and wherever they may be, whether in souls or in bodies, are suspended from one fountain of beauty. Thus too, whatever possesses symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles, are in a certain respect connate with the first principle, so far as they are principles and fountains and goodnesses, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. For what the one principle is to all beings, that each of the other principles is to the multitude comprehended under the idiom of its principle. For it is impossible, since each multitude is characterized by a certain difference, that it should not be extended to its proper principle, which illuminates one and the same form to all the individuals of that multitude. For *the one* is the leader of every multitude; and every peculiarity or idiom in the many, is derived to the many from *the one*. All

partial principles therefore are established in that principle which ranks as a whole, and are comprehended in it, not with interval and multitude, but as parts in the whole, as multitude in *the one*, and number in the monad. For this first principle is all things prior to all: and many principles are multiplied about the one principle, and in the one goodness, many goodnesses are established. This too is not a certain principle like each of the rest: for of these, one is the principle of beauty, another of symmetry, another of truth, and another of something else, but it is simply *principle*. Nor is it simply the principle of beings, but it is the principle of principles. For it is necessary that the idiom of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the principle of principles.

Such things therefore as are first produced by the first good, in consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally established in the same blessedness. They are likewise not indigent of the good, because they are goodnesses themselves. All other natures however, being produced by the one good, and many goodnesses, since they fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in the hyparxis of divine goodness, on this account they possess the good according to participation."

From this sublime theory the meaning of that antient Egyptian dogma, that God is all things, is at once apparent. For the first principle¹, as Simplicius in the above passage justly observes, is *all things prior to all*; i. e. he comprehends all things causally, this being the most transcendent mode of comprehension. As all things therefore, consi-

¹ By the first principle here, *the one* is to be understood: for that arcane nature which is beyond *the one*, since all language is subverted about it, can only, as we have already observed, be conceived and venerated in the most profound silence.

dered as subsisting causally in deity, are *transcendently more excellent* than they are when considered as effects proceeding from him, hence that mighty and all-comprehending whole, the first principle, is said to be all things *prior* to all ; priority here denoting exempt transcendency. As the monad and the centre of a circle are images from their simplicity of this greatest of principles, so likewise do they perspicuously shadow forth to us its causal comprehension of all things. For all number may be considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the centre ; this occult being the same in each with causal subsistence.

That this conception of causal subsistence is not an hypothesis devised by the latter Platonists, but a genuine dogma of Plato, is evident from what he says in the *Philebus* ; for in that Dialogue he expressly asserts, that in Jupiter a royal intellect and a royal soul subsist *according to cause*. Pherecydes Syrus too, in his Hymn to Jupiter, as cited by Kercher (in *Oedip. Egyptiac.*), has the following lines :

Ὁ Θεὸς ἐστὶ κύκλος, τετραγώνος ἢ δὴ τρίγωνος,
Κέντρος δὲ γραμμῆς, κέντρον, καὶ πάντα πρὸ πάντων.

i. e. Jove is a circle, triangle and square,
Center and line, and *all things before all*.

From which testimonies the antiquity of this sublime doctrine is sufficiently apparent.

And here it is necessary to observe that nearly all philosophers prior to Jamblichus (as we are informed by Damascius¹) asserted indeed that there is one *superessential* God, but that the other gods had an

¹ Τὶ δὲ πολλὰ λεγέιν, ὅτε καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὕτως ὑποτίθεται τοὺς πολλοὺς, οἱ πρὸ Ἰαμβλίου σχεδὸν πάντες φιλοσοφοῦντες ἐνὰ μὲν εἶναι τὸν ὑπερουσίον θεὸν λεγόντες, τοὺς ἄλλους οὐσιωδεῖς εἶναι, ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλλαμψέσιν ἐκθεομενοὺς, καὶ εἶναι τὸ τῶν ὑπερουσίων πλήθος ἐναδῶν, οὐκ αὐτοτελῶν ὑποστάσεων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐλλαμψομένων ἀπὸ τῆς μονῆς θεοῦ, καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνδιδόμενων θέσεων. Damasc. Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, MS.

essential subsistence, and were deified by illuminations from *the one*. They likewise said that there is a multitude of superessential unities, who are not self-perfect subsistences, but illuminated unions with deity, imparted to essences by the highest God. That this hypothesis, however, is not conformable to the doctrine of Plato is evident from his Parmenides, in which he shows that *the one* does not subsist in itself. (See vol. iii. p. 133.) For as we have observed from Proclus, in the notes on that Dialogue, every thing which is the cause of itself and is self-subsistent is said to be in itself. Hence as producing power always comprehends according to cause that which it produces, it is necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is caused; and that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, that which comprehends, and that which is comprehended. If therefore a subsistence in another signifies, according to Plato, the being produced by another more excellent cause (as we have shown in the note to p. 133, vol. iii.) a subsistence in itself must signify that which is self-begotten, and produced by itself. If *the one* therefore is not self-subsistent as even transcending this mode of subsistence, and if it be necessary that there should be something self-subsistent, it follows that this must be the characteristic property of that which immediately proceeds from the ineffable. But that there must be something self-subsistent is evident, since unless this is admitted there will not be a true sufficiency in any thing.

Besides, as Damascius well observes, if that which is subordinate by nature is self-perfect, such as the human soul, much more will this be the case with a divine soul. But if with soul, this also will be true of intellect. And if it be true of intellect, it will also be true of life; if of life, of being likewise; and if of being, of the unities above being.

For

For the self-perfect, the self-sufficient, and that which is established in itself, will much more subsist in superior than in subordinate natures. If therefore these are in the latter, they will also be in the former, I mean the subsistence of a thing by itself, and essentialized in itself; and such are essence and life, intellect, soul, and body. For body, though it does not subsist from, yet subsists by itself; and through this belongs to the genus of substance, and is contradistinguished from accident, which cannot exist independent of a subject.

Self-subsistent superessential natures therefore are the immediate progeny of *the one*, if it be lawful thus to denominate things, which ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the ineffable; for progeny implies a producing cause, and *the one* must be conceived as something even more excellent than this. From this divine self-perfect and self-producing multitude, a series of self-perfect natures, viz. of beings, lives, intellects, and souls proceeds, according to Plato, in the last link of which luminous series he also classes the human soul; proximately suspended from the dæmoniacal order: for this order, as he clearly asserts in the Banquet¹, “stands in the middle rank between the divine and human, fills up the vacant space, and links together all intelligent nature.” And here to the reader, who has not penetrated the depths of Plato’s philosophy, it will doubtless appear paradoxical in the extreme, that any being should be said to produce itself, and yet at the same time proceed from a superior cause. The solution of this difficulty is as follows:—Essential production, or that energy through which any nature produces something else by its very being, is the most perfect mode of production, because vestiges of it are seen in the last of things; thus fire imparts heat by its very essence, and snow coldness.

¹ See vol. iii. page 500. See also a copious account of the nature of dæmons in the note at the beginning of the First Alcibiades, vol. i.

And

And in short, this is a producing of that kind, in which the effect is that secondarily which the cause is primarily. As this mode of production therefore, from its being the most perfect of all others, originates from the highest natures, it will consequently first belong to those self-subsistent powers, who immediately proceed from the ineffable, and will from them be derived to all the following orders of beings. But this energy, as being characterized by the essential, will necessarily be different in different producing causes. Hence, from that which subsists at the summit of self-subsistent natures, a series of self-subsisting beings will indeed proceed, but then this series will be secondarily that which its cause is primarily, and the energy by which it produces itself will be secondary to that by which it is produced by its cause. Thus, for instance, the rational soul both produces itself (in consequence of being a self-motive nature), and is produced by intellect; but it is produced by intellect *immutably*, and by itself *transitively*; for all its energies subsist in time, and are accompanied with motion. So far therefore as soul contains intellect by participation, so far it is produced by intellect, but so far as it is self-motive it is produced by itself. In short, with respect to every thing self-subsistent, the summit of its nature is produced by a superior cause, but the evolution of that summit is its own spontaneous energy; and through this it becomes self-subsistent and self-perfect.

That the rational soul, indeed, so far as it is rational, produces itself, may be clearly demonstrated as follows:—That which is able to impart any thing superior and more excellent in any genus of things, can easily impart that which is subordinate and less excellent in the same genus; but *well being* confessedly ranks higher and is more excellent than *mere being*. The rational soul imparts *well being* to itself, when it cultivates and perfects itself, and recalls and withdraws itself from the contagion
of

of the body. It will therefore also impart *being* to itself. And this with great propriety ; for all divine natures, and such things as possess the ability of imparting any thing primarily to others, necessarily begin this energy from themselves. Of this mighty truth the sun himself is an illustrious example ; for he illuminates all things with his light, and is himself light, and the fountain and origin of all splendor. Hence, since the soul imparts life and motion to other things, on which account Aristotle calls an animal *αυτοκίνητον*, *self-moved*, it will much more, and by a much greater priority, impart life and motion to itself.

From this magnificent, sublime, and most scientific doctrine of Plato, respecting the arcane principle of things and his immediate progeny, it follows, that this ineffable cause is not the immediate maker of the universe, and this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the *Timæus*, not through any defect, but on the contrary through transcendency of power. All things indeed are ineffably unfolded from him *at once*, into light ; but divine media are necessary to the fabrication of the world. For if the universe was immediately produced from the ineffable, it would, agreeably to what we have above observed, be ineffable also in a secondary degree. But as this is by no means the case, it principally derives its immediate subsistence from a deity of a fabricative characteristic, whom Plato calls Jupiter, conformably to the theology of Orpheus. The intelligent reader will readily admit that this dogma is so far from being derogatory to the dignity of the Supreme, that on the contrary it exalts that dignity, and preserves in a becoming manner the exempt transcendency of the ineffable. If therefore we presume to celebrate him, for, as we have already observed, it is more becoming to establish in silence those parturations of the soul which dare anxiously to explore him, we should celebrate him as the principle of principles, and the fountain of deity, or, in the reverential language of the Egyptians,

tians, as a darkness thrice unknown. Highly laudable indeed, and worthy the imitation of all posterity, is the veneration which the great antients paid to this immense principle. This I have already noticed in the Introduction to the Parmenides; and I shall only observe at present in addition, that in consequence of this profound and most pious reverence of the first God, they did not even venture to give a name to the summit of that highest order of divinities which is denominated intelligible. Hence, says Proclus, in his MSS. Scholia on the Cratylus, “Not every genus of the gods has an appellation: for with respect to the first Deity, who is beyond all things, Parmenides teaches us that he is ineffable; and the first genera of the intelligible gods, who are united to *the one*, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly effable cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable; but it is necessary that the progression of intelligibles should terminate in this order, in which the first effable subsists, and that which is called by proper names. For there the first intelligible forms, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles, are unfolded into light. But the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence. Hence the whole of the telestic science energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other gods; for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual gods.”

With no less magnificence therefore than piety, does Proclus thus speak concerning the ineffable principle of things. “Let¹ us now if ever remove

¹ Ἀγε δὴ οὖν, εἴπερ ποτε, καὶ νῦν τὰς πολυειδέας ἀποσχιζομένους γνώσεις, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ποικίλον τῆς ζωῆς ἐξωρισμένον ἀφ’ ἡμῶν, καὶ πάντων ἐν πρεμιά γενομένων, τῶ πάντων αἰτίῳ προσώμαεν ἐγγύς. Ἐστω δὲ ἡμῖν μὴ μόνον δοξῆς, μὴδὲ φαντασίας πρεμίας, μὴδὲ πονυχία τῶν παθῶν ἡμῶν ἐμποδιζόντων τὴν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀναγωγὸν ὁρμήν

remove from ourselves multiform knowledge, exterminate all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anagogic impulse to *the first* be at peace; but let the air, and the universe itself, be still. And let all things extend us with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any thing of this kind), and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to behold him,—let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are, from which in this progression we shall consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, *not as establishing the earth and the heavens*; nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these indeed, *but among the last of things*. But prior to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and

ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ μὲν ἀνρ, ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τὸ παν τοῦτο· πάντα δὲ ἀτρεμεῖ τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρρητοῦ μεταοὐσίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνατεινέτω. Καὶ σταντες ἐκεῖ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν (εἰ δὴ τι τοιούτου ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν) ὑπερδραμοντες, καὶ οἷον ἡλιὸν ἀνίσχοντα προσκυνησαντες, μεμνηκοὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς (οὐ γὰρ θεμὶς ἀντιπεῖν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν) τὸν τοῖνυν τοῦ φωτός των νοητῶν θεῶν ἡλιὸν ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ, φασὶν οἱ ποιεῖται, προφαινομένοι ἰδόντες, καὶ αὖθις ἐκ τῆς εἵθευ ταύτης γαλήνης εἰς νοῦν καταβάντες, καὶ ἀπο νοῦ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς χρωμένοι λογισμοῖς, εἰπόμεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, ὡς ἐξηρημένον ἐν τῇ πορείᾳ ταυτῇ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τεύειν. Καὶ οἷον ὑμνησωμεν αὐτὸν οὐχ ὅτι γῆν, καὶ οὐρανὸν ὑπεστήσεν λέγοντες, οὐδ' αὖ ὅτι ψυχὰς, καὶ ζῶων ἀπαντῶν γενέσεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐσχάτοις· πρὸ δὲ τούτων, ὡς παν μὲν τὸ νοητὸν των θεῶν γένος, παν δὲ τὸ νοερὸν ἐξεφῆνε. πᾶτας δὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θεοὺς ἀπαντας, καὶ ὡς θεὸς ἐστὶ θεῶν ἀπαντῶν, καὶ ὡς εἷς ἐκᾶδων, καὶ ὡς τῶν ἀδυνάτων (lege ἀδυνάτων) ὑπεκείνη των πρῶτων, καὶ ὡς πάσης σιγῆς ἀρρητοτερον, καὶ ὡς πάσης ὑπάρξεως ἀγνωστότερον, ἅγιος ἐν ἁγίοις, τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐναποκεκρυμμένος θεός. Procl. in Plat. Theol. p. 109.

intellectual genus of gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities,—as the God of all gods, the Unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta,—as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence,—as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible gods.” Such is the piety, such the sublimity and magnificence of conception, with which the Platonic philosophers speak of that which is in reality in every respect ineffable, when they presume to speak about it, extending the ineffable parturations of the soul to the ineffable cosensation of *the incomprehensible one*.

From this sublime veneration of this most awful nature, which, as is noticed in the extracts from Damascius, induced the most antient theologists, philosophers, and poets, to be entirely silent concerning it, arose the great reverence which the antients paid to the divinities even of a mundane characteristic, or from whom bodies are suspended, considering them also as partaking of the nature of the ineffable, and as so many links of the truly golden chain of deity. Hence we find in the *Odyssey*¹, when Ulysses and Telemachus are removing the arms from the walls of the palace of Ithaca, and Minerva going before them with her golden lamp, fills all the place with a divine light,

———παροιθε δε παλλας Αθηνη.

Χρυσεον λυχνον εχουσα, φαιος περικαλλες εποiei.

Telemachus having observed that certainly some one of the celestial gods was present,

Η μαλα τις θεος ενδον, οι ουρανον ευρυν εχουσι.

Ulysses says in reply, “Be *silent*, restrain your intellect (i. e. even cease to energize intellectually), and speak not.”

Σιγα, και κατα τον νοον ισχανε, μηδ' ερεεινη.

¹ Lib. xix. v. 40.

Lastly,

Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately obvious to every one whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there can be no such thing as a trinity in the theology of Plato, in any respect analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God, according to Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from being a part of a consubistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated with any thing; but is so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is even beyond being; and he so ineffably transcends all relation and habitude, that language is in reality subverted about him, and knowledge refunded into ignorance. What that trinity however is in the theology of Plato, which doubtless gave birth to the Christian, will be evident to the intelligent from the notes on the *Parmenides*, and the extracts from *Damascius* ¹. And thus much for the doctrine of Plato concerning the principle of things, and his immediate offspring, the great importance of which will, I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for the length of this discussion.

In the next place, following *Proclus* and *Olympiodorus* as our guides, let us consider the mode according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of divine natures: for he appears not to have pursued every where the same mode of doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a divinely inspired energy, and at other times dialectically he evolves the truth concerning them. And sometimes he symbolically announces their ineffable idioms, but at other times he recurs to them from images, and discovers in them the primary causes of wholes. For in the *Phædrus* being evidently inspired, and having exchanged human intelligence for a better possession, divine mania, he unfolds many arcane dogmas concerning the *intellectual*, *liberated*, and *mundane* gods.

¹ Vol. iii. near the end. See also the notes on the seventh epistle of Plato, vol. v.

But in the *Sophista* dialectically contending about being, and the subsistence of *the one* above beings, and doubting against philosophers more antient than himself, he shows how all beings are suspended from their cause and the first being, but that being itself participates of that unity which is exempt from all things, that it is a passive¹ one, but not *the one itself*, being subject to and united to *the one*, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner too, in the *Parmenides*, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being from *the one*, through the first hypothesis of that dialogue, and this, as he there asserts, according to the most perfect division of this method. And again in the *Gorgias*, he relates the fable concerning the three fabricators, and their demiurgic allotment. But in the *Banquet* he speaks concerning the union of love; and in the *Protagoras*, about the distribution of mortal animals from the gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth concerning divine natures, and as far as to mere indication unfolding his mind to the most genuine of his readers.

Again, if it be necessary to mention the doctrine delivered through the mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns from ethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated in the *Timæus*, many in the dialogue called *Politicus*, and many may be seen scattered in other dialogues;—here likewise, to those who are desirous of knowing divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. Thus, for instance, the *Politicus* shadows forth the fabrication in the heavens. But the figures of the five elements, delivered in geometrical proportions in the *Timæus*, represent in images the idioms of the gods who preside over the parts of the universe. And

¹ It is necessary to observe, that, according to Plato, whatever participates of any thing is said to be *passive* to that which it participates, and the participations themselves are called by him *passions*.

the divisions of the essence of the soul in that dialogue shadow forth the total orders of the gods. To this we may also add, that Plato composes politics, assimilating them to divine natures, and adorning them from the whole world and the powers which it contains. All these, therefore, through the similitude of mortal to divine concerns, exhibit to us in images the progressions, orders, and fabrications of the latter. And such are the modes of theologic doctrine employed by Plato.

“ But those,” says Proclus¹, “ who treat of divine concerns in an indicative manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through images. And of those who openly announce their conceptions, some frame their discourses according to science, but others according to inspiration from the gods. And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols is Orphic, and, in short, accords with those who write fables respecting the gods. But he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical disciplines were invented by the Pythagoreans, in order to a reminiscence of divine concerns, to which, through these as images, they endeavour to ascend. For they refer both numbers and figures to the gods, according to the testimony of their historians. But the entheastic character, or he who is divinely inspired, unfolding the truth itself concerning the gods essentially, perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators. For these do not think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their idioms, to their familiars through veils, but announce their powers and their numbers, in consequence of being moved by the gods themselves. But the tradition of divine concerns according to science, is the illustrious prerogative of the Platonic philosophy. For Plato alone, as it appears to me of all those who are known to us, has attempted methodically to divide and reduce into order the regular progression of the divine genera, their mutual dif-

¹ In Plat. Theol. lib. i. cap. 4.

ference, the common idioms of the total orders, and the distributed idioms in each."

Again, since Plato employs fables, let us in the first place consider whence the antients were induced to devise fables, and in the second place, what the difference is between the fables of philosophers and those of poets. In answer to the first question then, it is necessary to know, that the antients employed fables, looking to two things, viz. nature, and our soul. They employed them by looking to nature, and the fabrication of things, as follows. Things unapparent are believed from things apparent, and incorporeal natures from bodies. For seeing the orderly arrangement of bodies, we understand that a certain incorporeal power presides over them; as with respect to the celestial bodies, they have a certain presiding motive power. As we therefore see that our body is moved, but is no longer so after death, we conceive that it was a certain incorporeal power which moved it. Hence, perceiving that we believe things incorporeal and unapparent from things apparent and corporeal, fables came to be adopted, that we might come from things apparent to certain unapparent natures; as, for instance, that on hearing the adulteries, bonds, and lacerations of the gods, castrations of heaven, and the like, we may not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning of such like particulars, but may proceed to the unapparent, and investigate the true signification. After this manner, therefore, looking to the nature of things, were fables employed.

But from looking to our souls, they originated as follows: While we are children we live according to the phantasy; but the phantastic part is conversant with figures, and types, and things of this kind. That the phantastic part in us therefore may be preserved, we employ fables, in consequence of this part rejoicing in fables. It may also be said, that a fable is nothing else than a false discourse shadowing forth the truth:

for

for a fable is the image of truth. But the soul is the image of the natures prior to herself: and hence the soul very properly rejoices in fables, as an image in an image. As we are therefore from our childhood nourished in fables, it is necessary that they should be introduced. And thus much for the first problem, concerning the origin of fables.

In the next place let us consider what the difference is between the fables of philosophers¹ and poets. Each therefore has something in which

¹ The following excellent account of the different species of fables is given by the philosopher Sallust, in his book on the Gods and the World, chap. iv.

“Of fables, some are theological, others physical, others psychical (or belonging to soul), others material, and lastly, others are mixed from these. Fables are theological which employ nothing corporeal, but speculate the very essences of the gods; such as the fable which asserts that Saturn devoured his children: for it obscurely intimates the nature of an intellectual god, since every intellect returns into itself. But we speculate fables physically, when we speak concerning the energies of the gods about the world; as when considering Saturn the same as Time, and calling the parts of time the children of the universe, we assert that the children are devoured by their parents. And we employ fables in a psychical mode, when we contemplate the energies of soul; because the intellections of our souls, though by a discursive energy they proceed into other things, yet abide in their parents. Lastly, fables are material, such as the Egyptians ignorantly employ, considering and calling corporeal natures divinities; such as Isis, earth; Osiris, humidity; Typhon, heat: or again, denominating Saturn, water; Adonis, fruits; and Bacchus, wine. And indeed to assert that these are dedicated to the gods, in the same manner as herbs, stones, and animals, is the part of wise men; but to call them gods is alone the province of madmen; unless we speak in the same manner, as when, from established custom, we call the orb of the sun and its rays the sun itself.

“But we may perceive the mixed kind of fables, as well in many other particulars, as in the fable which relates, that Discord at a banquet of the gods threw a golden apple, and that a dispute about it arising from the goddesses, they were sent by Jupiter to take the judgment of Paris, who, charmed with the beauty of Venus, gave her the apple in preference to the rest. For in this fable, the banquet denotes the supermundane powers of the gods; and on this account they subsist in conjunction with each other: but the golden apple denotes the world, which on account of its composition from contrary natures, is not improperly said to be thrown by Discord,

which it abounds more than, and something in which it is deficient from, the other. Thus, for instance, the poetic fable abounds in this, that we must not rest satisfied with the apparent meaning, but pass on to the occult truth. For who, endued with intellect, would believe that Jupiter was desirous of having connection with Juno, and on the ground, without waiting to go into the bed-chamber. So that the poetic fable abounds, in consequence of asserting such things as do not suffer us to stop at the apparent, but lead us to explore the occult truth. But it is defective in this, that it deceives those of a juvenile age. Plato therefore neglects fable of this kind, and banishes Homer from his Republic ; because youth, on hearing such fables, will not be able to distinguish what is allegorical from what is not.

Philosophical fables, on the contrary, do not injure those that go no further than the apparent meaning. Thus, for instance, they assert that there are punishments and rivers under the earth : and if we adhere to the literal meaning of these we shall not be injured. But they are deficient in this, that as their apparent signification does not injure, we often content ourselves with this, and do not explore the latent truth. We may also say that philosophic fables look to the energies of the soul. For if we were entirely intellect alone, and had no connection with phantasy, we should not require fables, in consequence of always associating with intellectual natures. If, again, we were entirely irrational,

cord, or Strife. But again, since different gifts are imparted to the world by different gods, they appear to contend with each other for the apple. And a soul living according to sense (for this is Paris), not perceiving other powers in the universe, asserts that the contended apple subsists alone through the beauty of Venus. But of these species of fables, such as are theological, belong to philosophers ; the physical and psychical to poets ; and the mixed to the mysteries * ; since the intention of all mystic ceremonies is to conjoin us with the world and the gods."

* See more concerning this species of fables in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.

and

and lived according to the phantasy, and had no other energy than this, it would be requisite that the whole of our life should be fabulous. Since, however, we possess intellect, opinion, and phantasy, demonstrations are given with a view to intellect: and hence Plato says, that, if you are willing to energize according to intellect, you will have demonstrations bound with adamant chains; if according to opinion, you will have the testimony of renowned persons; and if according to the phantasy, you have fables by which it is excited; so that from all these you will derive advantage.

Plato therefore rejects the more tragical mode of mythologizing of the antient poets, who thought proper to establish an arcane theology respecting the gods, and on this account devised wanderings, castrations, battles, and lacerations of the gods, and many other such symbols of the truth about divine natures which this theology conceals;—this mode he rejects, and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from erudition. But he considers those mythological discourses about the gods, as more persuasive and more adapted to truth, which assert that a divine nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is void of all mutation, comprehending in itself the fountain of truth, but never becoming the cause of any deception to others. For such types of theology Socrates delivers in the Republic.

All the fables therefore of Plato guarding the truth in concealment, have not even their externally-apparent apparatus discordant with our undisciplined and unpurged anticipations of divinity. But they bring with them an image of the mundane composition, in which both the apparent beauty is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more divine than this is established in the unapparent lives and powers of its causes.

In the next place, that the reader may see whence, and from what dialogues principally the theological dogmas of Plato may be collected, I

shall present him with the following translation of what Proclus^{*} has admirably written on this subject.

“ The truth (says he) concerning the gods pervades, as I may say, through all the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first philosophy, venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated, in some more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously;—conceptions which excite those that are in any respect able to partake of them, to the immaterial and separate essence of the gods. And as in each part of the universe and in nature itself, the demiurgus of all which the world contains established resemblances of the unknown essence of the gods, that all things might be converted to divinity through their alliance with it, in like manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of Plato weaves conceptions about the gods with all its progeny, and leaves nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that from the whole of its offspring, a reminiscence of total natures may be obtained and imparted to the genuine lovers of divine concerns.

“ But if it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out of many, which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the gods, I shall not err in ranking among this number the *Phædo* and *Phædrus*, the *Banquet* and the *Philebus*, and together with these the *Sophista* and *Politicus*, the *Cratylus* and the *Timæus*. For all these are full through the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato. But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the *Gorgias*, and that in the *Protagoras*; likewise the assertions about the providence of the gods in the *Laws*, and such things as are delivered about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the universe, in the tenth book of the *Republic*. Again, you may, if you

^{*} In Plat. Theol. lib. i. cap. 5, &c.

please, place in the third rank those Epistles, through which we may be able to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention is made of the three kings ; and many other divine dogmas worthy the Platonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, regarding these, to explore in them each order of the gods.

“ Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one good, and the two first principles of things (bound and infinity) together with the triad subsisting from these. For you will find all these distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Timæus you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the demiurgic monad, and the most full truth about the mundane gods. From the Phædrus you may learn all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and the liberated orders of the gods, which are proximately established above the celestial circulations. From the Politicus you may obtain the theory of the fabrication in the heavens, of the periods of the universe, and of the intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista you may learn the whole sublunary generation, and the idiom of the gods who are allotted the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions. And with respect to each of the gods, we may obtain many sacred conceptions from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus, and many from the Phædo. For in each of these dialogues more or less mention is made of divine names, from which it is easy for those who are exercised in divine concerns to discover by a reasoning process the idioms of each.

“ It is necessary, however, to evince, that each of the dogmas accords with Platonic principles, and the mystic traditions of theologists. For all the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic doctrine of Orpheus ; Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the orgies of the gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science

of the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the *Philebus*, referring the theory about the two forms of principles (bound and infinity) to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus, therefore, the Pythagorean, has left for us in writing many admirable conceptions about these principles, celebrating their common progression into beings, and their separate fabrication. Again, in the *Timæus*, endeavouring to teach us about the sublunary gods and their order, Plato flies to theologists, calls them the sons of the gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth about these divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublunary gods proceeding from wholes, according to the progression delivered by theologists of the intellectual kings. Further still, in the *Cratylus*, he follows the traditions of theologists respecting the order of the divine processions. But in the *Gorgias* he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting the triadic hypostases of the demiurgi. And, in short, he every where discourses concerning the gods agreeably to the principles of theologists; rejecting indeed the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables.

“ Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and that we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting many things into one mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain. For if this were our intention, we might indeed refer different dogmas to different treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous doctrine concerning the gods, nor will there be any dialogue which presents us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and their coordination with each other. But we shall be similar to those who endeavour to obtain a whole from parts, through
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the want of a whole prior¹ to parts, and to weave together the perfect, from things imperfect, when, on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its generation in the perfect. For the *Timæus*, for instance, will teach us the theory of the intelligible genera, and the *Phædrus* appears to present us with a regular account of the first intellectual orders. But where will be the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles? And what will be the generation of second from first natures? In short, after what manner the progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all things, and how in the generations of the gods, the orders between *the one*, and all-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince.

“ Further still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call these dogmas, which are collected from many places, Platonic, and which, as you acknowledge, are reduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato; nor are you able to evince the whole entire truth about divine natures. Perhaps, indeed, they will say, that certain persons, junior to Plato, have delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one perfect form of philosophy. You, therefore, are able to produce one entire theory about nature from the *Timæus*; but from the *Republic*, or *Laws*, the most beautiful dogmas about morals, and which tend to one form of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which contains all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated, as to boast on account of fabulous fictions, though an

¹ A whole prior to parts is that which causally contains parts in itself. Such parts too, when they proceed from their occult causal subsistence, and have a distinct being of their own, are nevertheless comprehended, though in a different manner, in their producing whole.

analysis of things of this kind abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides, things of this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic dialogues; as the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake of the political science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like manner the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; and in the Gorgias for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous narrations with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the fables, but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only exercise the intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, but that the divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the knowledge of beings, through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. For from other discourses we resemble those who are compelled to the reception of truth; but from fables we are affected in an ineffable manner, and call forth our unperverted conceptions, venerating the mystic information which they contain.

“Hence, as it appears to me, Timæus with great propriety thinks it fit that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of fables as sons of the gods, and subscribe to their always generating secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak without demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, but entheastic, or the progeny of divine inspiration; and was invented by the antients, not through necessity, but for the sake of persuasion, not regarding naked discipline, but sympathy with things themselves. But if you are willing to speculate not only the causes of fables, but of other theological dogmas, you will find that some of them are scattered in the Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others for the sake of physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses concerning bound and infinity, for the sake of pleasure, and a life according
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to intellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the *Timæus* the discourse about the intelligible gods is assumed for the sake of the proposed physiology. On which account, it is every where necessary that images should be known from paradigms, but that the paradigms of material things should be immaterial, of sensibles intelligible, and of physical forms, separate from nature. But in the *Phædrus*, Plato celebrates the supercelestial place, the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this for the sake of amatory mania ; the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes place ; and the passage to these from hence. Every where, however, the leading end, as I may say, is either physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures are introduced either for the sake of invention or perfection. How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural, and worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is violent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an adventitious order, as in a drama ? And such are the particulars which may be urged against our design.

“ To this objection I shall make a just and perspicuous reply. I say then that Plato every where discourses about the gods agreeably to antient opinions and the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of the dogmas, and thence, as from an exalted place of survey, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed. But sometimes he establishes the theological science as the leading end. For in the *Phædrus*, his subject respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading thence through all things ; and in the *Banquet* it respects the amatory order.

“ But if it be necessary to consider, in one Platonic dialogue, the all-perfect,

perfect, whole and connected, extending as far as to the complete number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have begun the assertion, and affirm against our opponents, that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions of this dialogue, will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue, all the divine genera proceed in order from the first cause, and evince their mutual suspension from each other. And those indeed which are highest, connate with *the one*, and of a primary nature, are allotted a form of subsistence characterized by unity, occult and simple; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distributed into many parts, and excel in number, but are inferior in power to such as are of a higher order; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their proper progeny. And, in short, all the axioms of the theological science appear in perfection in this dialogue; and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is nothing else than the celebrated generation of the gods, and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes¹. The Parmenides therefore enkindles in the lovers of Plato the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the aforementioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogues, and these again to the one and all perfect theory of

¹ The principle of all things is celebrated by Platonic philosophy as the cause of wholes, because through transcendency of power he first produces those powers in the universe which rank as wholes, and afterwards those which rank as parts, through these. Agreeably to this Jupiter, the artificer of the universe, is almost always called *δημιουργος των ων*, the *демиургус* of wholes. See the *Timæus*, and the Introduction to it.

the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic Timæus, they are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides; just as the Timæus is acknowledged by all who have the least degree of intelligence to contain the whole science about nature."

All that is here asserted by Proclus will be immediately admitted by the reader who understands the outlines which we have here given of the theology of Plato, and who is besides this a complete master of the mystic meaning of the Parmenides; which I trust he will find sufficiently unfolded, through the assistance of Proclus, in the introduction and notes to that dialogue.

The next important Platonic dogma in order, is that concerning ideas, about which the reader will find so much said in the notes on the Parmenides, that but little remains to be added here. That little however is as follows: The divine Pythagoras, and all those who have legitimately received his doctrines, among whom Plato holds the most distinguished rank, asserted that there are many orders of beings, viz. intelligible, intellectual, dianoëtic, physical, or, in short, vital and corporeal essences. For the progression of things, the subjection which naturally subsists together with such progression, and the power of diversity in coordinate genera, give subsistence to all the multitude of corporeal and incorporeal natures. They said, therefore, that there are three orders in the whole extent of beings, viz. the *intelligible*, the *dianoëtic*, and the *sensible*; and that in each of these ideas subsist, characterized by the respective essential properties of the natures by which they are contained. And with respect to intelligible ideas, these they placed among

divine natures, together with the producing, paradigmatic, and final causes of things in a consequent order. For if these three causes sometimes concur, and are united among themselves (which Aristotle says is the case), without doubt this will not happen in the lowest works of nature, but in the first and most excellent causes of all things, which on account of their exuberant fecundity have a power generative of all things, and from their converting and rendering similar to themselves the natures which they have generated, are the paradigms or exemplars of all things. But as these divine causes act for their own sake, and on account of their own goodness, do they not exhibit the final cause? Since therefore intelligible forms are of this kind, and are the leaders of so much good to wholes, they give completion to the divine orders, though they largely subsist about the intelligible order contained in the artificer of the universe. But dianoëtic forms or ideas imitate the intellectual, which have a prior subsistence, render the order of soul similar to the intellectual order, and comprehend all things in a secondary degree.

These forms beheld in divine natures possess a fabricative power, but with us they are only gnostic, and no longer demiurgic, through the defluxion of our wings, or degradation of our intellectual powers. For, as Plato says in the *Phædrus*, when the winged powers of the soul are perfect and plumed for flight, she dwells on high, and in conjunction with divine natures governs the world. In the *Timæus*, he manifestly asserts that the demiurgus implanted these dianoëtic forms in souls, in geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic proportions: but in his *Republic* (in the section of a line in the 6th book) he calls them images of intelligibles; and on this account does not for the most part disdain to denominate them intellectual, as being the exemplars of sensible natures. In the *Phædo* he says that these are the causes to us of reminiscence;

miniscence ; because disciplines are nothing else than reminiscences of middle dianoëtic forms, from which the productive powers of nature being derived, and inspired, give birth to all the mundane phænomena.

Plato however did not consider things definable, or in modern language abstract ideas, as the only universals, but prior to these he established those principles productive of science which essentially reside in the soul, as is evident from his *Phædrus* and *Phædo*. In the 10th book of the *Republic* too, he venerates those separate forms which subsist in a divine intellect. In the *Phædrus*, he asserts that souls, elevated to the supercelestial place, behold justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself ; and lastly in the *Phædo* he evinces the immortality of the soul from the hypothesis of separate forms.

Syrianus¹, in his commentary on the 13th book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, shows, in defence of Socrates, Plato, the *Parmenidæans*, and *Pythagoræans*, that ideas were not introduced by these divine men, according to the usual meaning of names, as was the opinion of *Chrysippus*, *Archedemus*, and many of the junior *Stoics* ; for ideas are distinguished by many differences, from things which are denominated from custom. Nor do they subsist, says he, together with intellect, in the same manner as those slender conceptions which are denominated universals abstracted from sensibles, according to the hypothesis of *Longinus*² : for if that which subsists is unsubstantial, it cannot be consubsistent with intellect. Nor are ideas according to these men

¹ See my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, p. 347. If the reader conjoins what is said concerning ideas in the notes on that work, with the introduction and notes to the *Parmenides* in this, he will be in possession of nearly all that is to be found in the writings of the antients on this subject.

² It appears from this passage of Syrianus that *Longinus* was the original inventor of the theory of abstract ideas ; and that Mr. Locke was merely the restorer of it.

notions, as Cleanthes afterwards asserted them to be. Nor is idea definitive reason, nor material form: for these subsist in composition and division, and verge to matter. But ideas are perfect, simple, immaterial, and impartible natures. And what wonder is there, says Syrianus, if we should separate things which are so much distant from each other? Since neither do we imitate in this particular Plutarch, Atticus, and Democritus, who, because universal reasons perpetually subsist in the essence of the soul, were of opinion that these reasons are ideas: for though they separate them from the universal in sensible natures, yet it is not proper to conjoin in one and the same, the reasons of soul, and an intellect such as ours, with paradigmatic and immaterial forms, and demiurgic intellections. But as the divine Plato says, it is the province of our soul to collect things into one by a reasoning process, and to possess a reminiscence of those transcendent spectacles, which we once beheld when governing the universe in conjunction with divinity. Boethius*, the peripatetic too, with whom it is proper to join Cornutus, thought that ideas are the same with universals in sensible natures. However, whether these universals are prior to particulars, they are not prior in such a manner as to be denudated from the habitude which they possess with respect to them, nor do they subsist as the causes of particulars; both which are the prerogatives of ideas: or whether they are posterior to particulars, as many are accustomed to call them, how can things of posterior origin, which have no essential subsistence, but are nothing more than slender conceptions, sustain the dignity of fabricative ideas?

In what manner then, says Syrianus, do ideas subsist according to the contemplative lovers of truth? We reply, intelligibly and tetradically (*νοητως και τετραδικως*), in *animal itself* (*εν τη αυτοζωη*), or the extremity of the

* This was a Greek philosopher, who is often cited by Simplicius in his Commentary on the Predicaments, and must not therefore be confounded with Boetius, the Roman senator and philosopher.

intelligible order¹; but intellectually and decadically (*νοερῶς καὶ δεκάδικως*), in the intellect of the artificer of the universe: for, according to the Pythagoric Hymn, “Divine number proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad which produced the mother of all things, the universal recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immovable and unwearied, and which is denominated the sacred decad, both by the immortal gods and earth-born men.” *πρὸς οὗτο γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀριθμὸς, ὡς ἔφησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, εἰς αὐτὸν ἵκνεται,*

*Μονάδης ἐκ κινήματος ἀκράτου ἐστ’ ἀν ἱκνῆται
Τετραδά ἐπὶ ἑαυτῇ, ἣ δὴ τεκε μήτερα πατὴρ,
Παίδεχθαι, προσέειραν, ὅρον περὶ πασι τίθεισαν,
Ἀτρέπον, ἀκαμάτον, δέκαδα κλείουσι μὴν ἀγνῆν
Ἀθάλαττοι τε θεοὶ καὶ γυναικεῖς ἀνθρώποι.*

And such is the mode of their subsistence according to Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato. Or if it be requisite to speak in more familiar language, an intellect sufficient to itself, and which is a most perfect cause, presides over the wholes of the universe, and through these governs all its parts; but at the same time that it fabricates all mundane natures, and benefits them by its providential energies, it preserves its own most divine and immaculate purity; and while it illuminates all things, is not mingled with the natures which it illuminates. This intellect, therefore, comprehending in the depths of its essence an ideal world, replete with all various forms, excludes privation of cause, and casual subsistence, from its energy. But as it impartsevery good and all possible beauty to its fabrications, it converts the universe to itself, and renders it similar to its own omniform nature. Its energy, too, is such as its intellection; but it understands all things, since it is most perfect. Hence there is not any thing which ranks among true beings,

¹ For an account of this order, see the Introduction to the *Timæus*, and notes on the *Parmenides*.

that is not comprehended in the essence of intellect; but it always establishes in itself ideas, which are not different from itself and its essence, but give completion to it, and introduce to the whole of things a cause which is at the same time productive, paradigmatic, and final. For it energizes as intellect, and the ideas which it contains are paradigmatic, as being forms; and they energize from themselves, and according to their own exuberant goodness. And such are the Platonic dogmas concerning ideas, which sophistry and ignorance may indeed oppose, but will never be able to confute.

From this intelligible world, replete with omniform ideas, this sensible world, according to Plato, perpetually flows, depending on its artificer intellect, in the same manner as shadow on its forming substance. For as a deity of an intellectual characteristic is its fabricator, and both the essence and energy of intellect are established in eternity, the sensible universe, which is the effect or production of such an energy, must be consubsistent with its cause, or, in other words, must be a perpetual emanation from it. This will be evident from considering, that every thing which is generated, is either generated by art, or by nature, or according to power. It is necessary, therefore, that every thing operating according to nature or art should be prior to the things produced; but that things operating according to power should have their productions coexistent with themselves; just as the sun produces light coexistent with itself; fire, heat; and snow, coldness. If therefore the artificer of the universe produced it by art, he would not cause it simply to be, but to be in some particular manner; for all art produces form. Whence therefore does the world derive its being? If he produced it from nature, since that which makes by nature imparts something of itself to its productions, and the maker of the world is incorporeal, it would be necessary that the world, the offspring of such an energy, should be incorporeal.

It

It remains, therefore, that the demiurgus produced the universe by power alone ; but every thing generated by power subsists together with the cause containing this power : and hence productions of this kind cannot be destroyed, unless the producing cause is deprived of power. The divine intellect therefore that produced the sensible universe caused it to be coexistent with himself.

This world thus depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an intelligible world, replete with the archetypal ideas of all things, considered according to its corporeal nature, is perpetually flowing, and perpetually advancing to being (*ἐν τῇ γίγνεσθαι*), and compared with its paradigm, has no stability or reality of being. However, considered as animated by a divine soul, and as receiving the illuminations of all the supermundane gods, and being itself the receptacle of divinities from whom bodies are suspended, it is said by Plato in the *Timæus* to be a blessed god. The great body of this world too, which subsists in a perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called *a whole with a total subsistence*, on account of the perpetuity of its duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. And hence Plato calls it *a whole of wholes* ; by the other wholes which are comprehended in it meaning, the celestial spheres, the sphere of fire, the whole of air considered as one great orb ; the whole earth, and the whole sea. These spheres, which are called by Platonic writers, *parts with a total subsistence*, are considered by Plato as aggregately perpetual. For if the body of the world is perpetual, this also must be the case with its larger parts, on account of their exquisite alliance to it, and in order that *wholes with a partial subsistence*, such as all individuals, may rank in the last gradation of things.

As the world too, considered as one great comprehending whole, is called by Plato a divine animal, so likewise every whole which it contains

contains is a world, possessing, in the first place, a self-perfect unity; proceeding from the ineffable, by which it becomes a god; in the second place, a divine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last place, a deified body. Hence each of these wholes is the producing cause of all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be a whole prior to parts; because, considered as possessing an eternal form which holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of subsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its being. That these wholes which rank thus high in the universe are animated, must follow by a geometrical necessity. For, as Theophrastus well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession of soul.

And now having with venturous, yet unpresuming wing, ascended to the ineffable principle of things, and standing with every eye closed in the vestibules of the adytum, found that we could announce nothing concerning him, but only indicate our doubts and disappointment, and having thence descended to his occult and most venerable progeny, and passing through the luminous world of ideas, holding fast by the golden chain of deity, terminated our downward flight in the material universe, and its undecaying wholes, let us stop awhile and contemplate the sublimity and magnificence of the scene which this journey presents to our view. Here then we see the vast empire of deity, an empire terminated upwards by a principle so ineffable that all language is subverted about it, and downwards by the vast body of the world. Immediately subsisting after this immense unknown we in the next place behold a mighty all-comprehending one, which, as being next to that which is in every respect incomprehensible, possesses much of the ineffable and unknown. From this principle of principles,

ples, in which all things causally subsist absorbed in superessential light and involved in unfathomable depths, we view a beauteous progeny of principles, all largely partaking of the ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all possessing an overflowing fullness of good. From these dazzling summits, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, we next see being, life, intellect, soul, nature and body depending; *monads* suspended from *unities*, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these monads too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of things, and which while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and returns to its leader. And all these principles and all their progeny are finally centered and rooted by their summits in the first great all-comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended in the first being; all intellects emanate from one first intellect; all souls from one first soul; all natures blossom from one first nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And lastly, all these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from which both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the principle of principles, the God of gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all.

Such, according to Plato, are the flights of the true philosopher, such the august and magnificent scene which presents itself to his view. By ascending these luminous heights, the spontaneous tendencies of the soul to deity alone find the adequate object of their desire; investigation here alone finally reposes, doubt expires in certainty, and knowledge loses itself in the ineffable.

And here perhaps some grave objector, whose little soul is indeed acute, but sees nothing with a vision healthy and sound, will say

that all this is very magnificent, but that it is soaring too high for man; that it is merely the effect of spiritual pride; that no truths, either in morality or theology, are of any importance which are not adapted to the level of the meanest capacity; and that all that it is necessary for man to know concerning either God or himself is so plain, that he that runs may read. In answer to such like cant, for it is nothing more,—a cant produced by the most profound ignorance, and frequently attended with the most deplorable envy, I ask, is then the Delphic precept, *KNOW THYSELF*, a trivial mandate? Can this be accomplished by every man? Or can any one properly know himself without knowing the rank he holds in the scale of being? And can this be effected without knowing what are the natures which he surpasses, and what those are by which he is surpassed? And can he know this without knowing as much of those natures as it is possible for him to know? And will the objector be hardy enough to say that every man is equal to this arduous task? That he who rushes from the forge, or the mines, with a soul distorted, crushed and bruised by base mechanical arts, and madly presumes to teach theology to a deluded audience, is master of this sublime, this most important science? For my own part I know of no truths which are thus obvious, thus accessible to every man, but axioms, those self-evident principles of science which are conspicuous by their own light, which are the spontaneous unperverted conceptions of the soul, and to which he who does not assent deserves, as Aristotle justly remarks, either pity or correction. In short, if this is to be the criterion of all moral and theological knowledge, that it must be immediately obvious to every man, that it is to be apprehended by the most careless inspection, what occasion is there for seminaries of learning? Education is ridiculous, the toil of investigation is idle. Let us at once confine Wisdom in the dungeons of Folly, recall Ignorance from her

her barbarous wilds, and close the gates of Science with everlasting bars.

Having thus taken a general survey of the great world, and descended from the intelligible to the sensible universe, let us still, adhering to that golden chain which is bound round the summit of Olympus, and from which all things are suspended, descend to the microcosm man. For man comprehends in himself partially every thing which the world contains divinely and totally. Hence, according to Plato, he is endued with an intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same father and vivific goddess as were the causes of the intellect and soul of the universe. He has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body composed from the four elements, and with which also it is coordinate.

With respect to his rational part, for in this the essence of man consists, we have already shown that it is of a self-motive nature, and that it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence and energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved. In consequence of this middle subsistence, the mundane soul, from which all partial souls are derived, is said by Plato, in the *Timæus*, to be a medium between that which is indivisible and that which is divisible about bodies, i. e. the mundane soul is a medium between the mundane intellect, and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. In like manner the human soul is a medium between a dæmoniacal intellect proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects, and that corporeal life which is distributed about our body, and which is the cause of its generation, nutrition, and increase. This dæmoniacal intellect is called by Plato, in the *Phædrus*, *theoretic* and *the governor of the soul*. The highest part therefore of the human soul is the summit of the dianoëtic power (το ἀνοητικὸν τῆς διανοίας), or that power

which reasons scientifically ; and this summit is our intellect. As, however, our very essence is characterized by reason, this our summit is rational, and though it subsists in energy, yet it has a remitted union with things themselves. Though too it energizes from itself, and contains intelligibles in its essence, yet from its alliance to the discursive nature of soul, and its inclination to that which is divisible, it falls short of the perfection of an intellectual essence and energy profoundly indivisible and united, and the intelligibles which it contains degenerate from the transcendently fulged and self-luminous nature of first intelligibles. Hence, in obtaining a perfectly indivisible knowledge, it requires to be perfected by an intellect whose energy is ever vigilant and unremitted ; and its intelligibles, that they may become perfect, are indigent of the light which proceeds from separate intelligibles. Aristotle, therefore, very properly compares the intelligibles of our intellect to colours, because these require the splendor of the sun, and denominates an intellect of this kind, *intellect in capacity*, both on account of its subordination to an essential intellect, and because it is from a separate intellect that it receives the full perfection of its nature. The middle part of the rational soul is called by Plato *dianoia* (διανοία), and is that power which, as we have already said, reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning, which are axioms, from intellect. And the extremity of the rational soul is *opinion*, which in his Sophista he defines to be that power which knows the conclusion of *dianoia*. This power also knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man is a biped, but it knows only the *εστι*, or *that a thing is*, but is ignorant of the *διεστι*, or *why it is* : knowledge of the latter kind being the province of the dianoëtic power.

And such is Plato's division of the rational part of our nature, which he very justly considers as the *true man* ; the essence of every thing consisting in its most excellent part.

After

After this follows the irrational nature, the summit of which is the phantasy, or that power which perceives every thing accompanied with figure and interval; and on this account it may be called *a figured intelligence* (μορφωτικὴ νοησις). This power, as Jamblichus beautifully observes, grows upon, as it were, and fashions all the powers of the soul; exciting in opinion the illuminations from the senses, and fixing in that life which is extended with body, the impressions which descend from intellect. Hence, says Proclus, it folds itself about the indivisibility of true intellect, conforms itself to all formless species, and becomes perfectly every thing, from which the dianoëtic power, and our indivisible reason consists. Hence too, it is all things passively which intellect is impassively, and on this account Aristotle calls it passive intellect. Under this subsist anger and desire, the former resembling a raging lion, and the latter a many-headed beast; and the whole is bounded by sense, which is nothing more than a passive perception of things, and on this account is justly said by Plato to be rather *passion* than *knowledge*; since the former of these is characterized by *inertness*, and the latter by *energy*.

Further still, in order that the union of the soul with this gross terrestrial body may be effected in a becoming manner, two vehicles, according to Plato, are necessary as media, one of which is ethereal, and the other aerial. and of these, the ethereal vehicle is *simple and immaterial*, but the aerial, *simple and material*; and this dense earthly body is *composite and material*.

The soul thus subsisting as a medium between natures impartible and such as are divided about bodies, it produces and constitutes the latter of these; but establishes in itself the prior causes from which it proceeds. Hence it previously receives, after the manner of an exemplar, the natures to which it is prior as their cause; but it possesses through participation,

cipation, and as the blossoms of first natures, the causes of its subsistence. Hence it contains in its essence immaterial forms of things material, incorporeal of such as are corporeal, and unextended of such as are distinguished by interval. But it contains intelligibles after the manner of an image, and receives partly their impartible forms, such as are uniform variously, and such as are immovable, according to a self-motive condition. Soul therefore is all things, and is elegantly said by Olympiodorus to be an *omniform statue* (παιμμορφον αγαλμα): for it contains such things as are first through participation, but such as are posterior to its nature, after the manner of an exemplar.

As, too, it is *always* moved, and this *always* is not eternal, but temporal, for that which is properly eternal, and such is intellect, is perfectly stable, and has no transitive energies,—hence it is necessary that its motions should be periodic. For motion is a certain mutation from some things into others. And beings are terminated by multitudes and magnitudes. These therefore being terminated, there can neither be an infinite mutation, according to a right line, nor can that which is always moved proceed according to a finished progression. Hence that which is always moved will proceed from the same to the same; and will thus form a periodic motion. Hence, too, the human, and this also is true of every mundane soul, uses periods and restitutions of its proper life. For, in consequence of being measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses a proper motion. But every thing which is moved perpetually and participates of time, revolves periodically and proceeds from the same to the same. And hence the soul, from possessing motion and energizing according to time, will both possess periods of motion, and restitutions to its pristine state.

Again, as the human soul, according to Plato, ranks among the number of those souls that *sometimes* follow the mundane divinities, in consequence

sequence of subsisting immediately after dæmons and heroes, the *perpetual* attendants of the gods, hence it possesses a power of descending infinitely into generation, or the sublunary region, and of ascending from generation to real being. For since it does not reside with divinity through an infinite time, neither will it be conversant with bodies through the whole succeeding time. For that which has no temporal beginning, both according to Plato and Aristotle, cannot have an end; and that which has no end, is necessarily without a beginning. It remains, therefore, that every soul must perform periods, both of ascensions from generation, and of descensions into generation; and that this will never fail, through an infinite time.

From all this it follows that the soul, while an inhabitant of earth, is in a fallen condition, an apostate from deity, an exile from the orb of light. Hence Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, considering our life with reference to erudition and the want of it, assimilates us to men in a subterranean cavern, who have been there confined from their childhood, and so fettered by chains as to be only able to look before them to the entrance of the cave which expands to the light, but incapable through the chain of turning themselves round. He supposes too, that they have the light of a fire burning far above and behind them; and that between the fire and the fettered men, there is a road above, along which a low wall is built. On this wall are seen men bearing utensils of every kind, and statues in wood and stone of men and other animals. And of these men some are speaking and others silent. With respect to the fettered men in this cave, they see nothing of themselves or another, or of what is carrying along, but the shadows formed by the fire falling on the opposite part of the cave. He supposes too, that the opposite part of this prison has an echo; and that in consequence of this
the

the fettered men, when they hear any one speak, will imagine that it is nothing else than the passing shadow.

Here, in the first place, as we have observed in the notes on that book, the road above, between the fire and the fettered men, indicates that there is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more elevated life. By this ascent therefore Plato signifies the contemplation of dianoëtic objects, in the mathematical disciplines. For as the shadows in the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible objects are the immediate images of dianoëtic forms, or those ideas which the soul essentially participates, it is evident that the objects from which these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are dianoëtic. It is requisite, therefore, that the dianoëtic power, exercising itself in these, should draw forth the principles of these from their latent retreats, and should contemplate them not in images, but as subsisting in herself in impartible involution.

In the next place he says, “ that the man who is to be led from the cave, will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun.” By this he signifies the contemplation of intelligibles: for the stars and their light are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of the form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are characterized by the nature of *the good*.

After the contemplation of these, and after the eye is accustomed through these to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the sun himself in the last place, in like manner, according to Plato, the idea of *the good* must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He likewise divinely adds; *that it is scarcely to be seen*; for we can only be conjoined

conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which it is beheld by the ascending soul.

In short, the soul, according to Plato, can only be restored while on earth to the divine likeness, which she abandoned by her descent, and be able after death to reascend to the intelligible world, by the exercise of the cathartic and theoretic¹ virtues; the former purifying her from the defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the vision of true being: for thus, as Plato says in the *Timæus*, “the soul becoming sane and entire, will arrive at the form of her pristine habit².” The cathartic, however, must necessarily precede the theoretic virtues; since it is impossible to survey truth while subject to the perturbation and tumult of the passions. For the rational soul subsisting as a medium between intellect and the irrational nature, can then only without divulsion associate with the intellect prior to herself, when she becomes pure from copassivity with inferior natures. By the cathartic virtues, therefore, we become *sane*, in consequence of being liberated from the passions as diseases; but we become *entire* by the reasumption of intellect and science, as of our proper parts; and this is effected by contemplative truth. Plato also clearly teaches us that our apostacy from better natures is only to be healed by a flight from hence, when he defines in his *Theætetus* philosophy to be a flight from terrestrial evils: for he evinces by this that passions are connascent with mortals alone. He likewise says in the same dialogue, “that neither can evils be abolished, nor yet do they subsist with the gods, but that they necessarily revolve about this terrene abode, and a mortal nature.” For those who are obnoxious to generation and corruption can also be

¹ In the *Phædo* Plato discourses on the former of these virtues, and in the *Theætetus* on the latter.

² ὡγής τε καὶ ολοκληρὸς γενομένης εἰς τὴν προτέραν ἀφικοῖτο εἰδὸς εἴτως.

affected in a manner contrary to nature, which is the beginning of evils. But in the same dialogue he subjoins the mode by which our flight from evil is to be accomplished. "It is necessary," says he, "to fly from hence thither: but the flight is a similitude to divinity, as far as is possible to man; and this similitude consists in becoming just and holy in conjunction with intellectual prudence¹." For it is necessary that he who wishes to run from evils, should in the first place turn away from a mortal nature; since it is not possible for those who are mingled with it to avoid being filled with its attendant evils. As therefore, through our flight from divinity, and the defluency of those wings which elevate us on high, we fell into this mortal abode, and thus became connected with evils, so by abandoning passivity with a mortal nature, and by the germination of the virtues, as of certain wings, we return to the abode of pure and true good, and to the possession of divine felicity. For the essence of man subsisting as a medium between dæmoniack natures, who always have an intellectual knowledge of divinity, and those beings who are never adapted by nature to understand him, it ascends to the former and descends to the latter, through the possession and desertion of intellect. For it becomes familiar both with the divine and brutal likeness, through the amphibious condition of its nature.

When the soul therefore has recovered her pristine perfection in as great a degree as is possible, while she is an inhabitant of earth by the exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues, she returns after death, as he says in the *Timæus*, to her kindred star from which she fell, and enjoys a blessed life. Then too, as he says in the *Phædrus*, being winged, she governs the world in conjunction with the gods. And this

¹ Διὸ δεὶ εὐθὺς ἐκείσε φυγεῖν φύγη δὲ ὁμοιωσὶς θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοιωσὶς δὲ, δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης μετὰ φρονήσεως γινώσκουσα.

indeed

indeed is the most beautiful end of her labours. This is what he calls, in the *Phædo*, a great contest, and a mighty hope¹. This is the most perfect fruit of philosophy to familiarize and lead her back to things truly beautiful, to liberate her from this terrene abode as from a certain subterranean cavern of material life, elevate her to ethereal splendors, and place her in the islands of the blessed.

From this account of the human soul, that most important Platonic dogma necessarily follows, that our soul essentially contains all knowledge, and that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life, is in reality nothing more than a recovery of what she once possessed. This recovery is very properly called by Plato reminiscence, not as being attended with actual recollection in the present life, but as being an actual repossession of what the soul had lost through her oblivious union with the body. Alluding to this essential knowledge of the soul, which discipline evokes from its dormant retreats, Plato says, in the *Sophista*, "that we know all things as in a dream, and are again ignorant of them, according to vigilant perception." Hence too, as Proclus² well observes, it is evident that the soul does not collect her knowledge from sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover *the whole* and *the one*. For it is not proper to think that things which have in no respect a real subsistence, should be the leading causes of knowledge to the soul; and that things which oppose each other and are ambiguous, should precede science which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that things which are variously mutable should be generative of reasons which are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes of definite intelligence. It is not fit,

¹ Ο μεγας αγων, και ελπις η μεγαλη.

² See the Additional Notes on the First Alcibiades, p. 500.

therefore, that the truth of things eternal should be received from *the many*, nor the discrimination of universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from irrational natures; but it is requisite, that the soul entering within herself, should investigate in herself *the true* and *the good*, and the eternal reasons of things.

We have said that discipline awakens the dormant knowledge of the soul; and Plato considered this as particularly effected by the mathematical disciplines. Hence he asserts of theoretic arithmetic, that it imparts no small aid to our ascent to real being, and that it liberates us from the wandering and ignorance about a sensible nature. Geometry too is considered by him as most instrumental to the knowledge of *the good*, when it is not pursued for the sake of practical purposes, but as the means of ascent to an intelligible essence. Astronomy also is useful for the purpose of investigating the fabricator of all things, and contemplating as in most splendid images the ideal world, and its ineffable cause. And lastly music, when properly studied, is subservient to our ascent, viz. when from sensible we betake ourselves to the contemplation of ideal and divine harmony. Unless, however, we thus employ the mathematical disciplines, the study of them is justly considered by Plato as imperfect and useless, and of no worth. For as the true end of man according to his philosophy is an assimilation to divinity, in the greatest perfection of which human nature is capable, whatever contributes to this, is to be ardently pursued; but whatever has a different tendency, however necessary it may be to the wants and conveniences of the mere animal life, is comparatively little and vile. Hence it is necessary to pass rapidly from things visible and audible, to those which are alone seen by the eye of intellect. For the mathematical sciences, when properly studied, move the inherent knowledge of the soul; awaken its intelligence; purify its dianoëtic power; call forth its
essential

essential forms from their dormant retreats; remove that oblivion and ignorance which are congenial with our birth; and dissolve the bonds arising from our union with an irrational nature. It is therefore beautifully said by Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic, "that the soul through these disciplines has an organ purified and enlightened, which is blinded and buried by studies of a different kind, an organ better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth becomes visible through this alone."

Dialectic, however, or the vertex of the mathematical sciences, as it is called by Plato in his Republic, is that master discipline which particularly leads us up to an intelligible essence. Of this first of sciences, which is essentially different from vulgar logic, and is the same with what Aristotle calls the first philosophy and wisdom, I have largely spoken in the introduction and notes to the *Parmenides*. Suffice it therefore to observe in this place, that dialectic differs from mathematical science in this, that the latter flows from, and the former is void of hypothesis. That dialectic has a power of knowing universals; that it ascends to good and the supreme cause of all; and that it considers good as the end of its elevation; but that the mathematical science, which previously fabricates for itself definite principles, from which it evinces things consequent to such principles, does not tend to the principle, but to the conclusion. Hence Plato does not expel mathematical knowledge from the number of the sciences, but asserts it to be the next in rank to that one science which is the summit of all; nor does he accuse it as ignorant of its own principles, but considers it as receiving these from the master science dialectic, and that possessing them without any demonstration, it demonstrates from these its consequent propositions.

Hence Socrates, in the Republic, speaking of the power of dialectic, says, that it surrounds all disciplines like a defensive enclosure, and
elevates

elevates those that use it, to the good itself, and the first unities; that it purifies the eye of the soul; establishes itself in true beings, and the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that which is no longer hypothetical. The power of dialectic, therefore, being thus great, and the end of this path so mighty, it must by no means be confounded with arguments which are alone conversant with opinion: for the former is the guardian of sciences, and the passage to it is through these, but the latter is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science. To which we may add, that the method of reasoning, which is founded in opinion, regards only that which is apparent; but the dialectic method endeavours to arrive at *the one* itself, always employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and at last beautifully ends in the nature of *the good*. Very different, therefore, is it from the merely logical method, which presides over the demonstrative phantasy, is of a secondary nature, and is alone pleased with contentious discussions. For the dialectic of Plato for the most part employs divisions and analyses as primary sciences, and as imitating the progression of beings from *the one*, and their conversion to it again. It likewise sometimes uses definitions and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method, and the divisive prior to this. On the contrary, the merely logical method, which is solely conversant with opinion, is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of demonstration.

The following is a specimen of the analytical method of Plato's dialectic¹. Of analysis there are three species. For one is an ascent from sensibles to the first intelligibles; a second is an ascent through things demonstrated and subdemonstrated, to undemonstrated and immediate propositions; and a third proceeds from hypothesis to unhypothetical principles. Of the first of these species, Plato has given a most

¹ Vid. Alcib. de Doctr. Plat. cap. v.

admirable specimen in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet. For there he ascends from the beauty about bodies to the beauty in souls; from this to the beauty in right disciplines; from this again to the beauty in laws; from the beauty in laws to the ample sea of beauty (*το πολυ πηλαγος του καλου*); and thus proceeding, he at length arrives at the beautiful itself.

The second species of analysis is as follows: It is necessary to make the thing investigated, the subject of hypothesis; to survey such things as are prior to it; and to demonstrate these from things posterior, ascending to such as are prior, till we arrive at the first thing, and to which we give our assent. But beginning from this, we descend synthetically to the thing investigated. Of this species, the following is an example, from the Phædrus of Plato. It is inquired if the soul is immortal; and this being hypothetically admitted, it is inquired in the next place if it is always moved. This being demonstrated, the next inquiry is, if that which is always moved, is self-moved; and this again being demonstrated, it is considered whether that which is self-moved, is the principle of motion; and afterwards if the principle is unbegotten. This then being admitted as a thing acknowledged, and likewise that what is unbegotten is incorruptible, the demonstration of the thing proposed is thus collected. If there is a principle, it is unbegotten and incorruptible. That which is self-moved is the principle of motion. Soul is self-moved. Soul therefore (*i. e.* the rational soul) is incorruptible, unbegotten, and immortal

Of the third species of analysis, which proceeds from the hypothetical to that which is unhypothetic, Plato has given a most beautiful specimen in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides. For here, taking for his hypothesis that *the one is*, he proceeds through an orderly series of negations, which are not privative of their subjects, but generative of things

things which are as it were their opposites, till he at length takes away the hypothesis, that *the one is*. For he denies of it all discourse and every appellation. And thus evidently denies of it not only that it *is*; but even negation. For all things are posterior to *the one*; viz. things known, knowledge, and the instruments of knowledge. And thus, beginning from the hypothetical, he ends in that which is unhypothetical, and truly ineffable.

Having taken a general survey, both of the great world and the microcosm man, I shall close this account of the principal dogmas of Plato, with the outlines of his doctrine concerning Providence and Fate, as it is a subject of the greatest importance, and the difficulties in which it is involved are happily removed by that prince of philosophers¹.

In the first place, therefore, Providence, according to common conceptions, is the cause of good to the subjects of its care; and Fate is the cause of a certain connexion to generated natures. This being admitted, let us consider what the things are which are connected. Of beings, therefore, some have their essence in eternity, and others in time. But by beings whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose energy as well as their essence is eternal; and by beings essentially temporal, those whose essence is always in generation, or becoming to be, though this should take place in an infinite time. The media between these two extremes are natures, which, in a certain respect, have an essence permanent and better than generation, or a flowing subsistence, but whose energy is measured by time. For it is necessary that every procession from things first to last should be effected through media. The medium, therefore, between these two extremes, must either be that which has an eternal essence, but an energy indigent of time, or, on the contrary, that

¹ See the antient Latin version of Proclus on Providence and Fate, in the 8th vol. of the Biblioth. Græc. of Fabricius.

which

which has a temporal essence, but an eternal energy. It is impossible, however, for the latter of these to have any subsistence; for if this were admitted, energy would be prior to essence. The medium, therefore, must be that whose essence is eternal, but energy temporal. And the three orders which compose this first middle and last are, the intellectual, psychical (or that pertaining to soul), and corporeal. For from what has been already said by us concerning the gradation of beings, it is evident that the intellectual order is established in eternity, both in essence and energy; that the corporeal order is always in generation, or advancing to being, and this either in an infinite time, or in a part of time; and that the psychical is indeed eternal in essence, but temporal in energy. Where then shall we rank things which, being distributed either in places or times, have a certain coordination and sympathy with each other through connexion? It is evident that they must be ranked among altermotive and corporeal natures. For of things which subsist beyond the order of bodies, some are better both than place and time; and others, though they energize according to time, appear to be entirely pure from any connexion with place.

Hence things which are governed and connected by Fate are entirely altermotive and corporeal. If this then is demonstrated, it is manifest, that admitting Fate to be a cause of connexion, we must assert that it presides over altermotive and corporeal natures. If, therefore, we look to that which is the proximate cause of bodies, and through which also altermotive beings are moved, breathe, and are held together, we shall find that this is nature, the energies of which are to generate, nourish, and increase. If, therefore, this power not only subsists in us and all other animals and plants, but prior to partial bodies there is, by a much greater necessity, one nature of the world which comprehends and is motive of all bodies; it follows, that nature must be the cause of things

connected, and that in this we must investigate Fate. Hence Fate is nature, or that incorporeal power which is the one life of the world, presiding over bodies, moving all things according to time, and connecting the motions of things that, by places and times, are distant from each other. It is likewise the cause of the mutual sympathy of mortal natures, and of their conjunction with such as are eternal. For the nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body, of which also it is a certain Fate. And as in our body some parts have a principal subsistence, and others are less principal, and the latter are consequent to the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less principal parts are consequent to the motions of the more principal, viz. the sublunary generations to the periods of the celestial bodies; and the circle of the former is the image of the latter.

Hence it is not difficult to see that Providence is deity itself, the fountain of all good. For whence can good be imparted to all things, but from divinity? So that no other cause of good but deity is, as Plato says, to be assigned. And, in the next place, as this cause is superior to all intelligible and sensible natures, it is consequently superior to Fate. Whatever too is subject to Fate, is also under the dominion of Providence; having its connexion indeed from Fate, but deriving the good which it possesses from Providence. But again, not all things that are under the dominion of Providence are indigent of Fate; for intelligibles are exempt from its sway. Fate therefore is profoundly conversant with corporeal natures; since connexion introduces time and corporeal motion. Hence Plato, looking to this, says in the *Timæus*, that the world is mingled from intellect and necessity, the former ruling over the latter. For by necessity here he means the motive cause of bodies, which in other places he calls Fate. And this with great propriety; since every body is compelled to do whatever it does, and to suffer

suffer whatever it suffers ; to heat or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But the elective power is unknown to a corporeal nature ; so that the necessary and the nonelective may be said to be the peculiarities of bodies.

As there are two genera of things therefore, the intelligible and the sensible, so likewise there are two kingdoms of these ; that of Providence upwards, which reigns over intelligibles and sensibles, and that of Fate downwards, which reigns over sensibles only. Providence likewise differs from Fate, in the same manner as deity, from that which is divine indeed, but by participation, and not primarily. For in other things we see that which has a primary subsistence, and that which subsists according to participation. Thus the light which subsists in the orb of the sun is primary light, and that which is in the air, according to participation ; the latter being derived from the former. And life is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body. Thus also, according to Plato, Providence is deity, but Fate is something divine, and not a god : for it depends upon Providence, of which it is as it were the image. As Providence too is to intelligibles, so is Fate to sensibles. And alternately as Providence is to Fate, so are intelligibles to sensibles. But intelligibles are the first of beings, and from these others derive their subsistence. And hence the order of Fate depends on the dominion of Providence.

In the second place, let us look to the rational nature itself, when correcting the inaccuracy of sensible information, as when it accuses the sight of deception, in seeing the orb of the sun as not larger than a foot in diameter ; when it represses the ebullitions of anger, and exclaims with Ulysses,

“ Endure my heart ; ”

or when it restrains the wanton tendencies of desire to corporeal delight.

light. For in all such operations it manifestly subdues the irrational motions, both gnostic and appetitive, and absolves itself from them, as from things foreign to its nature. But it is necessary to investigate the essence of every thing, not from its perversion, but from its energies according to nature. If therefore reason, when it energizes in us as reason, restrains the shadowy impression of the delights of licentious desire, punishes the precipitate motion of fury, and reproves the senses as full of deception, asserting that

“ We nothing accurate, or see, or hear : ”

and if it says this, looking to its internal reasons, none of which it knows through the body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident that, according to this energy, it removes itself far from the senses, contrary to the decision of which it becomes separated from those sorrows and delights.

After this, let us direct our attention to another and a better motion of our rational soul, when, during the tranquillity of the inferior parts, by a self-convertive energy, it sees its own essence, the powers which it contains, the harmonic reasons from which it consists, and the many lives of which it is the middle boundary, and thus finds itself to be a rational world, the image of prior natures from which it proceeds, but the paradigm of such as are posterior to itself. To this energy of the soul, theoretic arithmetic and geometry greatly contribute; for these remove it from the senses, purify the intellect from the irrational forms of life with which it is surrounded, and lead it to the incorporeal perception of ideas. For if these sciences receive the soul replete with images, and knowing nothing subtle, and unattended with material garrulity; and if they elucidate reasons possessing an irrefragable necessity of demon-

^a A line of Epicharmus. See the Phædo:

stration,

stration, and forms full of all certainty and immateriality, and which by no means call to their aid the inaccuracy of sensibles, do they not evidently purify our intellectual life from things which fill us with a privation of intellect, and which impede our perception of true being?

After both these operations of the rational soul, let us now survey her highest intelligence, through which she sees her sister souls in the universe, who are allotted a residence in the heavens, and in the whole of a visible nature, according to the will of the fabricator of the world. But above all souls she sees intellectual essences and orders. For a deiform intellect resides above every soul, and which also imparts to the soul an intellectual habit. Prior to these, however, she sees those divine monads, from which all intellectual multitudes receive their unions. For above all things united, there must necessarily be unific causes; above things vivified, vivifying causes; above intellectual natures, those that impart intellect; and above all participants, imparticipable natures. From all these elevating modes of intelligence, it must be obvious to such as are not perfectly blind, how the soul, leaving sense and body behind, surveys through the projecting energies of intellect those beings that are entirely exempt from all connexion with a corporeal nature.

The rational and intellectual soul therefore, in whatever manner it may be moved according to nature, is beyond body and sense. And hence it must necessarily have an essence separate from both. But from this again, it becomes manifest, that when it energizes according to its nature, it is superior to Fate, and beyond the reach of its attractive power; but that, when falling into sense and things irrational and corporalized, it follows downward natures, and lives with them as with inebriated neighbours, then together with them it becomes subject to the dominion of Fate. For again, it is necessary that there should be an order of beings of such a kind, as to subsist according to essence above
Fate,

Fate, but to be sometimes ranked under it according to habitude. For if there are beings, and such are all intellectual natures, which are eternally established above the laws of Fate, and also such which, according to the whole of their life, are distributed under the periods of Fate, it is necessary that the medium between these should be that nature which is sometimes above, and sometimes under the dominion of Fate. For the procession of incorporeal natures is much more without a vacuum than that of bodies.

The free will therefore of man, according to Plato, is a rational elective power, desiderative of true and apparent good, and leading the soul to both, through which it ascends and descends, errs and acts with rectitude. And hence the elective will be the same with that which characterizes our essence. According to this power, we differ from divine and mortal natures: for each of these is void of that two-fold inclination; the one on account of its excellence being alone established in true good; but the other in apparent good, on account of its defect. Intellect too characterizes the one, but sense the other; and the former, as Plotinus says, is our king, but the latter our messenger. We therefore are established in the elective power as a medium; and having the ability of tending both to true and apparent good, when we tend to the former we follow the guidance of intellect, when to the latter, that of sense. The power therefore which is in us is not capable of all things. For the power which is omnipotent is characterized by unity; and on this account is all-powerful, because it is one, and possesses the form of good. But the elective power is two-fold, and on this account is not able to effect all things; because by its inclinations to true and apparent good, it falls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would however be all-powerful, if it had not an elective impulse, and was will alone. For a life subsisting according to will alone subsists according

ing to good, because the will naturally tends to good, and such a life makes that which is characteristic in us most powerful and deiform. And hence through this the soul, according to Plato, becomes divine, and in another life, in conjunction with deity, governs the world. And thus much for the outlines of the leading dogmas of the philosophy of Plato.

In the beginning of this Introduction, I observed that, in drawing these outlines, I should conduct the reader through novel and solitary path;—solitary indeed they must be, since they have been unfrequented from the reign of the emperor Ju ti an to the present time; and novel they will doubtless appear to readers of every description, and particularly to those who have been nursed as it were in the bosom of matter, the pupils of experiment, the darlings of sense, and the legitimate descendants of the earth-born race that warred on the Olympian gods. To such as these, who have gazed on the dark and deformed face of their nurse, till they are incapable of beholding the light of truth, and who are become so drowsy from drinking immoderately of the cup of oblivion, that their whole life is nothing more than a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like men passing from one bed to another,—to such as these, the road through which we have been travelling will appear to be a delusive passage, and the objects which we have surveyed to be nothing more than phantastic visions, seen only by the eye of imagination, and when seen, idle and vain as the dreams of a shadow.

The following arguments, however, may perhaps awaken some few of these who are less lethargic than the rest, from the sleep of sense, and enable them to elevate their mental eye from the dark mire in which they are plunged, and gain a glimpse of this most weighty truth, that there is another world, of which this is nothing more than a most
obscure

obscure resemblance, and another life, of which this is but the flying mockery. My present discourse therefore is addressed to those who consider experiment as the only solid criterion of truth. In the first place then, these men appear to be ignorant of the invariable laws of demonstration properly so called, and that the necessary requisites of all demonstrative¹ propositions are these; that they exist as causes, are primary, more excellent, peculiar, true, and known than the conclusions. For every demonstration not only consists of principles prior to others, but of such as are eminently first; since if the assumed propositions may be demonstrated by other assumptions, such propositions may indeed appear prior to the conclusions, but are by no means entitled to the appellation of first. Others, on the contrary, which require no demonstration, but are of themselves manifest, are deservedly esteemed the first, the truest, and the best. Such indemonstrable truths were called by the antients axioms from their majesty and authority, as the assumptions which constitute demonstrative syllogisms derive all their force and efficacy from these.

In the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware, that universal is better than partial demonstration. For *that* demonstration is the more excellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is more extended and excellent than a partial cause; since the arduous investigation of *the why* in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at universals. Thus if we desire to know why the outward angles of a triangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the triangle is isosceles; we again ask, But why because isosceles? And if it be replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why because a triangle? To which we finally answer,

¹ See the Second Analytics of Aristotle.

Because

because a triangle is a right-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea, which embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no other more general and comprehensive than itself. Add too, that the demonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of universals the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no science. *That* demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind with the most ample knowledge; and this is alone the province of universals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows particulars likewise in capacity; but we cannot infer that he who has the best knowledge of particulars knows any thing of universals. And lastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason; but particulars are coordinated to the perceptions of sense.

But here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be true, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by an induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this I answer that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not by any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise subservient to its existence than as an exciting cause. For if scientific conclusions are indubitable, if the truth of demonstration is necessary and eternal, this universal is *truly all*; and not like that gained by abstraction, limited to a certain number of particulars. Thus the proposition that the angles of *every* triangle are equal to two right, if it is indubitably true, that is, if the term *every* in it *really* includes *all* triangles, cannot be the result of any abstraction; for this, however extended it may be, is limited, and falls far short of *universal* comprehension. Whence is it then that the dianoëtic power concludes thus confidently that the proposition is true of *all* triangles? For if it be said that the mind, after having abstracted triangle from a certain number of

particulars, adds from itself what is wanting to complete the *all*; in the first place, no man, I believe, will say that any such operation as this took place in his mind when he first learnt this proposition; and in the next place, if this should be granted, it would follow that such proposition is a mere fiction, since it is uncertain whether that which is added to complete the *all* is *truly* added; and thus the conclusion will no longer be *indubitably necessary*.

In short, if the words *all* and *every*, with which every page of theoretic mathematics is full, mean what they are conceived by all men to mean, and if the universals which they signify are the proper objects of science, such universals must subsist in the soul prior to the energies of sense. Hence it will follow that induction is no otherwise subservient to science, than as it produces credibility in axioms and petitions; and this by exciting the universal conception of these latent in the soul. The particulars, therefore, of which an induction is made in order to produce science, must be so simple, that they may be immediately apprehended, and that the universal may be predicated of them without hesitation. The particulars of the experimentalists are not of this kind, and therefore never can be sources of science truly so called.

Of this, however, the man of experiment appears to be totally ignorant, and in consequence of this, he is likewise ignorant that parts can only be truly known through wholes, and that this is particularly the case with parts when they belong to a whole, which, as we have already observed, from comprehending in itself the parts which it produces, is called a whole prior to parts. As he, therefore, would by no means merit the appellation of a physician who should attempt to cure any *part* of the human body without a previous knowledge of the whole; so neither can he know any thing truly of the vegetable life of plants,
who

who has not a previous knowledge of that vegetable life which subsists in the earth as a whole prior to, because the principle and cause of, all partial vegetable life, and who still prior to this has not a knowledge of that greater whole of this kind which subsists in nature herself; nor, as Hippocrates justly observes, can he know any thing truly of the nature of the human body who is ignorant what nature is considered as a great comprehending whole. And if this be true, and it is so most indubitably, with all physiological inquiries, how much more must it be the case with respect to a knowledge of those incorporeal forms to which we ascended in the first part of this Introduction, and which in consequence of proceeding from wholes entirely exempt from body are participated by it, with much greater obscurity and imperfection? Here then is the great difference, and a mighty one it is, between the knowledge gained by the most elaborate experiments, and that acquired by scientific reasoning, founded on the spontaneous, unperturbed, and self-luminous conceptions of the soul. The former does not even lead its votary up to that one nature of the earth from which the natures of all the animals and plants on its surface, and of all the minerals and metals in its interior parts, blossom as from a perennial root. The latter conducts its votary through all the several mundane wholes up to that great whole the world itself, and thence leads him through the luminous order of incorporeal wholes to that vast whole of wholes, in which all other wholes are centered and rooted, and which is no other than the principle of all principles, and the fountain of deity itself. No less remarkable likewise is the difference between the tendencies of the two pursuits: for the one elevates the soul to the most luminous heights, and to that great ineffable which is beyond all altitude; but the other is the cause of a mighty calamity to the soul, since, according to the elegant expression of Plutarch, it extinguishes her principal and brightest eye,

the knowledge of divinity. In short, the one leads to all that is grand, sublime and splendid in the universe; the other to all that is little, groveling¹ and dark. The one is the parent of the most pure and ardent piety; the genuine progeny of the other are impiety and atheism. And, in fine, the one confers on its votary the most sincere, permanent, and exalted delight; the other continual disappointment, and unceasing molestation.

If such then are the consequences, such the tendencies of experimental inquiries, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, and daily experience² unhappily shows that they are, there can be no other remedy for this enormous evil than the intellectual philosophy of Plato. So obviously excellent indeed is the tendency of this philosophy, that its author, for a period of more than two thousand years, has been universally celebrated by the epithet of divine. Such too is its preeminence, that it may be shown, without much difficulty, that the greatest men of antiquity, from the time in which its salutary light first blessed the human race, have been more or less imbued with its sacred principles, have been more or less the votaries of its divine truths. Thus, to mention a few from among a countless multitude. In the catalogue of those en-

¹ That this must be the tendency of experiment, when prosecuted as the criterion of truth, is evident from what Bacon, the prince of modern philosophy, says in the 104th Aphorism of his *Novum Organum*, that “*baseless fabric of a vision.*” For he there *signely* observes that wings are not to be added to the human intellect, but rather lead and weights; that all its leaps and flights may be restrained. That this is not yet done, but that when it is we may entertain better hopes respecting the sciences. “*Itaque hominum intellectui non plumæ addendæ, sed plumbum potius, et pondera; ut cohibeant omnem saltum et volatum. Atque hoc adhuc factum non est; quum vero factum fuerit, melius de scientiis sperare licebit.*” A considerable portion of lead must certainly have been added to the intellect of Bacon when he wrote this Aphorism.

² I never yet knew a man who made experiment the test of truth, and I have known many such, that was not atheistically inclined.

dued with sovereign power, it had for its votaries Dion the Siracusan, Julian the Roman, and Chosroes the Persian, emperor; among the leaders of armies, it had Chabrias and Phocion, those brave generals of the Athenians; among mathematicians, those leading stars of science, Eudoxus, Archimedes ¹ and Euclid; among biographers, the inimitable Plutarch; among physicians, the admirable Galen; among rhetoricians, those unrivalled orators Demosthenes and Cicero; among critics, that prince of philologists, Longinus; and among poets, the most learned and majestic Virgil. Instances, though not equally illustrious, yet approximating to these in splendour, may doubtless be adduced after the fall of the Roman empire; but then they have been formed on these great antients as models, and are, consequently, only rivulets from Platonic streams. And instances of excellence in philosophic attainments, similar to those among the Greeks, might have been enumerated among the moderns, if the hand of barbaric despotism had not compelled philosophy to retire into the deepest solitude, by demolishing her schools, and

¹ I have ranked Archimedes among the Platonists, because he cultivated the mathematical sciences Platonically, as is evident from the testimony of Plutarch in his *Life of Marcellus*, p. 30; • For he there informs us that Archimedes considered the being *busied about mechanics*, and in short every art which is connected with the common purposes of life, as ignoble and illiberal; and that those things alone were objects of his ambition with which the beautiful and the excellent were present, unmingled with the necessary,—*ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ μηχανικά πραγματεύεται, καὶ πᾶσαν ὅλως τέχνην χρείας ἐφαπτομένην, ἀγενή καὶ βαναυσὴν ἡγησάμενος, ἐκεῖνα καταβῆσθαι μόνον τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλοτιμίαν, οἷς τὸ καλὸν καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀνάγκαιον προσέστιν.*—The great accuracy and elegance in the demonstrations of Euclid and Archimedes, which have not been equalled by any of our greatest modern mathematicians, were derived from a deep conviction of this important truth. On the other hand modern mathematicians, through a profound ignorance of this divine truth, and looking to nothing but the wants and conveniences of the animal life of man, as if the gratification of his senses was his only end, have corrupted pure geometry, by mingling with it algebraical calculations, and through eagerness to reduce it as much as possible to practical purposes, have more anxiously sought after conciseness than accuracy, facility than elegance of geometrical demonstration.

involving

involving the human intellect in Cimmerian darkness. In our own country, however, though no one appears to have wholly devoted himself to the study of this philosophy, and he who does not will never penetrate its depths, yet we have a few bright examples of no common proficiency in its more accessible parts. The instances I allude to are Shaftesbury, Akenside, Harris, Petwin, and Sydenham. So splendid is the specimen of philosophic abilities displayed by these writers, like the fair dawning of some unclouded morning, that we have only deeply to regret that the sun of their genius sat, before we were gladdened with its effulgence. Had it shone with its full strength, the writer of this Introduction would not have attempted either to translate the works, or elucidate the doctrines of Plato; but though it rose with vigour, it dispersed not the clouds in which its light was gradually involved, and the eye in vain anxiously waited for its meridian beam.

In short, the principles of the philosophy of Plato are of all others the most friendly to true piety, pure morality, solid learning, and sound government. For as it is scientific in all its parts, and in these parts comprehends all that can be known by man in theology and ethics, and all that is necessary for him to know in physics, it must consequently contain in itself the source of all that is great and good both to individuals and communities, must necessarily exalt while it benefits, and deify while it exalts.

We have said that this philosophy at first shone forth through Plato with an occult and venerable splendour; and it is owing to the hidden manner in which it is delivered by him, that its depth was not fathomed till many ages after its promulgation, and when fathomed, was treated by superficial readers with ridicule and contempt. Plato indeed is not singular in delivering his philosophy occultly: for this was the custom of all the great antients; a custom not originating from a wish
to

to become tyrants in knowledge, and keep the multitude in ignorance, but from a profound conviction that the sublimest truths are profaned when clearly unfolded to the vulgar. This indeed must necessarily follow ; since, as Socrates in Plato justly observes, “ it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure ;” and the multitude are neither purified from the defilements of vice, nor the darkness of two-fold ignorance. Hence, while they are thus doubly impure, it is as impossible for them to perceive the splendours of truth, as for an eye buried in mire to survey the light of day.

The depth of this philosophy then does not appear to have been perfectly penetrated except by the immediate disciples of Plato, for more than five hundred years after its first propagation. For though Crantor, Atticus, Albinus, Galen, and Plutarch, were men of great genius, and made no common proficiency in philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have developed the profundity of Plato’s conceptions ; they withdrew not the veil which covers his secret meaning, like the curtains¹ which guarded the adytum of temples from the profane eye ; and they saw not that all behind the veil is luminous, and that there divine spectacles² every where present themselves to the view. This task was reserved for men who were born indeed in a baser age, but who being allotted a nature similar to their leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The most conspicuous of these are, the great Plotinus, the most learned Porphyry, the divine Jamblichus, the most acute Syrianus, Proclus the consummation of philosophic excellence, the magnificent Hierocles, the concisely elegant Sallust, and the most inquisitive Damascius. By these men, who were truly links of the golden

¹ Ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων τελετῶν, τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἦν, ὡς ὄηλοι καὶ τουνουῖαι, τὰ δὲ παραπετασμένα, προβιβῶνται, ἀθέατα τὰ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φυλάττονται. Psellus in Alleg. de Sphin.

² See my Dissertation on the Mysteries.

chain of deity, all that is sublime, all that is mystic in the doctrines of Plato (and they are replete with both these in a transcendent degree), was fired from its obscurity and unfolded into the most pleasing and admirable light. Their labours, however, have been ungratefully received. The beautiful light which they benevolently disclosed has hitherto unnoticed illumined philosophy in her desolate retreats, like a lamp shining on some venerable statue amidst dark and solitary ruins. The prediction of the master has been unhappily fulfilled in these his most excellent disciples. "For an attempt of this kind," says he[†], will only be beneficial to a few, who from small vestiges, previously demonstrated, are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they shall now learn certain excellent things." Thus with respect to these admirable men, the last and the most legitimate of the followers of Plato, some from being entirely ignorant of the abstruse dogmas of Plato, and finding these interpreters full of conceptions which are by no means obvious to every one in the writings of that philosopher, have immediately concluded that such conceptions are mere jargon and revery, that they are not truly Platonic, and that they are nothing more than streams which, though originally derived from a pure fountain, have become polluted by distance from their source. Others, who pay attention to nothing but the most exquisite purity of language, look down with contempt upon every writer who lived after the fall of the Macedonian empire; as if dignity and weight of sentiment were inseparable from splendid and accurate diction; or as if it were impossible for elegant writers to exist in a degenerate age. So far is this

[†] See the 7th Epistle of Plato.

from being the case, that though the style of Plotinus¹ and Jamblichus² is by no means to be compared with that of Plato, yet this inferiority is lost in the depth and sublimity of their conceptions, and is as little regarded by the intelligent reader, as motes in a sun-beam by the eye that gladly turns itself to the solar light.

As to the style of Porphyry, when we consider that he was the disciple of Longinus, whom Eunapius elegantly calls “a certain living

¹ It would seem that those intemperate critics who have thought proper to revile Plotinus, the leader of the latter Platonists, have paid no attention to the testimony of Longinus concerning this most wonderful man, as preserved by Porphyry in his life of him. For Longinus there says, “that though he does not entirely accede to many of his hypotheses, yet he exceedingly admires and loves the form of his writing, the density of his conceptions, and the philosophic manner in which his questions are disposed*.” And in another place he says, “Plotinus, as it seems, has explained the Pythagoric and Platonic principles more clearly than those that were prior to him; for neither are the writings of Numenius, Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus, to be compared for accuracy with those of Plotinus on this subject†.” After such a testimony as this from such a consummate critic as Longinus, the writings of Plotinus have nothing to fear from the imbecile censure of modern critics. I shall only further observe, that Longinus, in the above testimony, does not give the least hint of his having found any *polluted streams*, or corruption of the doctrines of Plato, in the works of Plotinus. There is not indeed the least vestige of his entertaining any such opinion in any part of what he has said about this most extraordinary man. This discovery was reserved for the more acute critic of modern times, who, by a happiness of conjecture unknown to the ancients, and the assistance of a good index, can in a few days penetrate the meaning of the profoundest writer of antiquity, and bid defiance even to the decision of Longinus.

² Of this most divine man, who is justly said by the emperor Julian to have been posterior indeed in time, but not in genius even to Plato himself, see the life which I have given in the History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, in the second vol. of my Proclus on Euclid.

* ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὑποθέσεων αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς προσεσθαι συμμείδεται, τὰ δὲ τυτὰν τῆς γραφῆς καὶ τὴν ἰσχυρὰν τ' ἀνδρείαν τῆς ψικιστικῆς, καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφικὸν τῆς τῶν ζητημάτων διὰ τὴν ἀποκρίσιν ἐπερὶ πολλοῦ ἀγαθῆς καὶ φιλοφ.

† ὅς μιν τὰς Πυθαγορείους καὶ Πλατωνικάς, μετὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς σαφὲς τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκευαστικὴν ἐξήγησιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἄλλος τίς τὰ Νουμηνίου, καὶ Κρόνιου, καὶ Μοδράτου καὶ Θρασυλλῆος τοῦ Πλωτίνου περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν συγγραμμάτων εἰς ἀκριβείαν.

library, and walking museum¹," it is but reasonable to suppose that he imbibed some portion of his master's excellence in writing. That he did so is abundantly evident from the testimony of Eunapius, who particularly commends his style, for its *clearness, purity, and grace*. "Hence," says he, "Porphry being let down to men like a mercurial chain, through his various erudition, unfolded every thing into perspicuity and purity²." And in another place he speaks of him as abounding with all the graces of diction, and as the only one that exhibited and proclaimed the praise of his master³. With respect to the style of Proclus, it is pure, clear and elegant, like that of Dionysius Halicarnassus, but is much more copious and magnificent; that of Hierocles is venerable and majestic, and nearly equals the style of the greatest antients; that of Sallust possesses an accuracy and a pregnant brevity, which cannot easily be distinguished from the composition of the Stagirite; and lastly, that of Damascius is clear and accurate, and highly worthy a most investigating mind.

Others again have filled themselves with a vain confidence, from reading the commentaries of these admirable interpreters, and have in a short time considered themselves superior to their masters. This was the case with Ficinus, Picus, Dr. Henry Moore, and other pseudo Platonists, their contemporaries, who, in order to combine Christianity with the doctrines of Plato, rejected some of his most important tenets, and perverted others, and thus corrupted one of these systems, and afforded no real benefit to the other.

¹ Βιβλιοθήκην τινὰ ἐμφύχον καὶ περιπατοῦν μουσεῖον.

² Ὁ γε Πορφύριος ὡς περ Ἑρμαῖκη τις σείρα καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἐπινυνουσα, διὰ ποικίλης παιδείας πάντα εἰς τὸ εὐγνωστοῦ καὶ καθαροῦ ἐξηγγελεν.

³ Πᾶσαν μὲν αὐτὸς ἀνατρεχὼν χάριν, μόνος δὲ ἀναδείκνυς καὶ ἀνακηρυττων τὸν διδασκαλόν. Eunap. in Porphy. vit.

But

But who are the men by whom these latter interpreters of Plato are reviled? When and whence did this defamation originate? Was it when the fierce champions for the trinity fled from Galilee to the groves of Academus, and invoked, but in vain, the assistance of Philosophy? When

The trembling grove confess'd its fright,
The wood-nymphs started at the sight;
Ilissus backward urg'd his course,
And rush'd indignant to his source.

Was it because that mitred sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the polluted streams of the Alexandrian school, without knowing any thing of the source whence those streams are derived? Or was it because some heavy German critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in μ , presumed to *grunt*¹ at these venerable heroes? Whatever was its source, and whenever it originated, for I have not been able to discover either, this however is certain, that it owes its being to the most profound Ignorance, or the most artful Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than obscure. For let us but for a moment consider the advantages which these latter Platonists possessed beyond any of their modern revilers. In the first place, they had the felicity of having the Greek for their native language, and must therefore, as they were confessedly learned men, have understood that language incomparably better than any man since the time in which the antient Greek was a living tongue. In the next place, they had books to consult, written by the immediate disciples of Plato, which have been lost for upwards of a thousand years, besides many Pythagoric writings from which Plato himself derived most of his more sublime dogmas. Hence

¹ Επει δε παλιν υς εγρυζε κατα τον μελωδον Αλκακιον, παλιν αναγκη επι τον Γραμματικον τευτον προκυψαι. Simplicius de Philopono, in Comment. ad Aristot. de Coelo, p. 35, 6.

we find the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, the Elcatic Zeno, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and many other illustrious philosophers of the highest antiquity, who were either genuine Platonists, or the sources of Platonism, are continually cited by these most excellent interpreters. And in the third place they united the greatest abilities to the most unwearied exertions, the greatest purity of life to the most piercing vigour of intellect. Now when it is considered that the philosophy to the study of which these great men devoted their lives, was professedly delivered by its author in obscurity; that Aristotle himself studied it for twenty years; and that it was no uncommon thing, as Plato informs us in one of his *Epistles*, to find students unable to comprehend its sublimest tenets even in a longer period than this,—when all these circumstances are considered, what must we think of the arrogance, not to say impudence, of men in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, who have dared to calumniate these great masters of wisdom? Of men, with whom the Greek is no native language; who have no such books to consult as those had whom they revile; who have never thought, even in a dream, of making the acquisition of wisdom the great object of their life; and who in short have committed that most baneful error of mistaking philology for philosophy, and words for things? When such as these dare to defame men who may be justly ranked among the greatest and wisest of the antients, what else can be said, than that they are the legitimate descendants of the suitors of Penelope, whom, in the animated language of Ulysses,

Laws or divine or human fail'd to move,
Or shame of men, or dread of gods above :
Heedless alike of infamy or praise,
Or Fame's eternal voice in future days¹.

¹ Pope's *Odyssey*, book xxii. v. 47, &c.

But

But it is now time to present the reader with a general view of the works of Plato, and also to speak of the preambles, digressions, and style of their author, and of the following translation. In accomplishing the first of these, I shall avail myself of the Synopsis of Mr. Sydenham, taking the liberty at the same time of correcting it where it appears to be erroneous, and of making additions to it where it appears to be deficient.

The dialogues of Plato are of various kinds; not only with regard to those different matters, which are the subjects of them; but in respect of the manner also, in which they are composed or framed, and of the form under which they make their appearance to the reader. It will therefore, as I imagine, be not improper, in pursuance of the admonition given us by Plato himself in his dialogue named *Phædrus*, and in imitation of the example set us by the ² antient Platonists, to distinguish the several kinds; by dividing them, first, into the most general; and then, subdividing into the subordinate; till we come to those lower species, that particularly and precisely denote the nature of the several dialogues, and from which they ought to take their respective denominations.

¹ Εαν μη τις κατ' εἶδη διακρίσθαι τὰ ὄντα, καὶ μιᾶ ἰδέᾳ δυνατός ἢ καθ' ἑκάστων περιλαμ-
βάνειν, οὐποτ' ἔσται τεχνικός λογῶν περὶ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ. Whoever is unable to divide
and distinguish things into their several sorts or species; and, on the other hand, referring every
particular to its proper species, to comprehend them all in one general idea; will never under-
stand any writings, of which those things are the subject, like a true critic, upon those high
principles of art to which the human understanding reaches. Πλατ. Φαιδρ. We have thought
proper, here, to paraphrase this passage, for the sake of giving to every part of so important a
sentence its full force, agreeably to the tenor of Plato's doctrine; and in order to initiate our
readers into a way of thinking, that probably many of them are as yet unacquainted with.

² See Διογ. Λαέρτ. βιβ. γ'.


The most general division of the writings of Plato, is into those of the Sceptical kind, and those of the Dogmatical. In the former sort, nothing is expressly either proved or asserted: some philosophical question only is considered and examined; and the reader is left to himself to draw such conclusions, and discover such truths, as the philosopher means to insinuate. This is done, either in the way of inquiry, or in the way of controversy and dispute. In the way of controversy are carried on all such dialogues, as tend to eradicate false opinions; and that, either indirectly, by involving them in difficulties, and embarrassing the maintainers of them; or directly, by confuting them. In the way of inquiry proceed those, whose tendency is to raise in the mind right opinions; and that, either by exciting to the pursuit of some part of wisdom, and showing in what manner to investigate it; or by leading the way, and helping the mind forward in the search. And this is effected by a process through opposing arguments ¹.

The dialogues of the other kind, the Dogmatical or Didactic, teach explicitly some point of doctrine: and this they do, either by laying it down in the authoritative way, or by proving it in the way of reason and argument. In the authoritative way the doctrine is delivered, sometimes by the speaker himself magisterially, at other times as derived to him by tradition from wise men. The argumentative or demonstrative method of teaching, used by Plato, proceeds in all the dialectic ways, *dividing, defining, demonstrating, and analysing*; and the object of it consists in exploring truth alone.

¹ It is necessary to observe, that Plato in the *Parmenides* calls all that part of his Dialectic, which proceeds through opposite arguments, *γυμνασια και πλανη*, an *exercise* and *wandering*.


According

According to this division is framed the following scheme, or table :



The

¹ We have, given us by Diogenes Laertius, another division of the characters, as he calls them, of Plato's writings, different from that exhibited in the scheme above. This we have thought proper to subjoin, on account of its antiquity and general reception.



The learned reader will observe the latter half of the dialogues, according to this scheme, to be described by metaphors taken from the gymnastic art: the dialogues, here termed gymnastic, being imagined to bear a similitude to that exercise; the agonistic, to the combat. In the lowest subdivision, indeed, the word *maieutic* is a metaphor of another kind, fully explained in Plato's *Theætetus*: the *maieutic* dialogues, however, were supposed to resemble giving the rudiments of the art; as the *peirastic* were, to represent a skirmish, or trial of proficiency: the *endeictic* were, it seems, likened to the exhibiting a specimen of skill; and the *anatreptic*, to presenting the spectacle of a thorough defeat, or sound drubbing.

The principal reason why we contented not ourselves with this account of the difference between the dialogues of Plato, was the capital error there committed in the first subdivision, of

course

The philosopher, in thus varying his manner, and diversifying his writings into these several kinds, means not merely to entertain with their variety; nor to teach, on different occasions, with more or less plainness and perspicuity; nor yet to insinuate different degrees of certainty in the doctrines themselves: but he takes this method, as a consummate master of the art of composition in the dialogue-way of writing, from the different characters of the speakers, as from different elements in the frame of these dramatic dialogues, or different ingredients in their mixture, producing some peculiar genius, and turn of temper, as it were, in each.

Socrates indeed is in almost all of them the principal speaker: but when he falls into the company of some arrogant sophist; when the modest wisdom, and clear science of the one, are contrasted with the confident ignorance, and blind opinionativeness of the other; dispute and controversy must of course arise: where the false pretender cannot fail of being either puzzled or confuted. To puzzle him only is sufficient, if there be no other persons present; because such a man can never be confuted in his own opinion: but when there is an audience round them, in danger of being misled by sophistry into error, then is the true philosopher to exert his utmost, and the vain sophist to be convicted and exposed.

course extending itself through the latter. This error consists in dividing the Didactic dialogues with regard to their subject-matter; while those of the Inquisitive sort are divided with respect to the manner of their composition. So that the subdivisions fall not, with any propriety, under one and the same general head. Besides, a novice in the works of Plato might hence be led naturally to suppose, that the dogmatical or didactic dialogues are, all of them, written in the same manner; and that the others, those of the inquisitive kind, by us termed sceptical, have no particular subjects at all; or, if they have, that their subjects are different from those of the didactic dialogues, and are consequently unphilosophical. Now every one of the suppositions here mentioned is far from being true.

In

In some dialogues Plato represents his great master mixing in conversation with young men of the best families in the commonwealth. When these happen to have docile dispositions and fair minds, then is occasion given to the philosopher to call forth ¹ the latent seeds of wisdom, and to cultivate the noble plants with true doctrine, in the affable and familiar way of joint inquiry. To this is owing the inquisitive genius of such dialogues: where, by a seeming equality in the conversation, the curiosity or zeal of the mere stranger is excited; that of the disciple is encouraged; and by proper questions, the mind is aided and forwarded in the search of truth.

At other times, the philosophic hero of these dialogues is introduced in a higher character, engaged in discourse with men of more improved understandings and enlightened minds. At such seasons he has an opportunity of teaching in a more explicit manner, and of discovering the reasons of things: for to such an audience truth is due, and all ² demonstration possible in the teaching it. Hence, in the dialogues composed of these persons, naturally arises the justly argumentative or demonstrative genius; and this, as we have before observed, according to all the dialectic methods.

But when the doctrine to be taught admits not of demonstration; of which kind is the doctrine of antiquities, being only traditional, and a matter of belief; and the doctrine of laws, being injunctive, and

¹ We require *exhortation*, that we may be led to true good; *dissuasion*, that we may be turned from things truly evil; *obstetrication*, that we may draw forth our unperverted conceptions; and *confutation*, that we may be purified from two-fold ignorance.

² The Platonists rightly observe, that Socrates, in these cases, makes use of demonstrative and just reasoning, (*αποδεικτικου*;) whereas to the novice he is contented with arguments only probable, (*πιθανοις*;) and against the litigious sophist often employs such as are (*εριστικαι*) puzzling and contentious. See *Αλκυ. Εισαγωγ. Κεφ. 5'*.

the matter of obedience ; the air of authority is then assumed : in the former cases, the doctrine is traditionally handed down to others from the authority of antient sages ; in the latter, is magisterially pronounced with the authority of a legislator ¹.

Thus much for the manner, in which the dialogues of Plato are severally composed, and the cast of genius given them in their composition. The form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, is of three sorts ; either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy or comedy ; or purely narrative, where a former conversation is supposed to be committed to writing, and communicated to some absent friend ; or of the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is recited, to some person present, the story of things past.

Having thus divided the dialogues of Plato, in respect of that inward form or composition, which creates their genius ; and again, with reference to that outward form, which marks them, like flowers and other vegetables, with a certain character ; we are further to make a division of them, with regard to their subject and their design ; beginning with their design, or end, because for the sake of this are all the subjects chosen. The end of all the writings of Plato is that which is the end of all true philosophy or wisdom, the perfection and the happiness of man. Man therefore is the general subject ; and the first business of philosophy must be to inquire, what is that being called man, who is to be made happy ; and what is his nature, in the perfec-

¹ It is necessary to observe, that in those dialogues, in which Socrates is indeed introduced, but sustains an inferior part, he is presented to our view as a *learner*, and not as a *teacher* ; and this is the case in the *Parmenides* and *Timæus*. For by the former of these philosophers he is instructed in the most abstruse theological dogmas, and by the latter in the whole of physiology.

tion of which is placed his happiness. As however, in the preceding part of this Introduction, we have endeavoured to give the outlines of Plato's doctrine concerning man, it is unnecessary in this place to say any thing further on that subject.

The dialogues of Plato, therefore, with respect to their subjects, may be divided into the speculative, the practical, and such as are of a mixed nature. The subjects of these last are either general, comprehending both the others; or differential, distinguishing them. The general subjects are either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy, human nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, good. The differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in which are considered two questions: one of which is, whether virtue is to be taught; the other is, whether error in the will depends on error in the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to words, or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric, poetry: of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of mind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private conduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man; or to his duty towards others in his several relations; or to the government of a civil state, and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three heads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general, sanctity, temperance, fortitude; justice, friendship, patriotism, piety; the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state, law in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public conduct, the civil laws.

Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is, a comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct, view of Plato's writings, we have attempted to exhibit to him their just and natural distinctions;

tions ; whether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or essence, their outward form or appearance, their matter, or their end : that is, in those more familiar terms, we have used in this Synopsis, their genius, their character, their subject, and their design.

And here it is requisite to observe, that as it is the characteristic of the highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are benefitted by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or less aptitude to receive it ; in like manner the dialogues of Plato are so largely stamped with the characters of sovereign good, that they are calculated to benefit in a certain degree even those who are incapable of penetrating their profundity. They can tame a savage sophist, like Thrasymachus in the Republic ; humble the arrogance even of those who are ignorant of their ignorance ; make those to become proficient in political, who will never arrive at theoretic virtue ; and, in short, like the illuminations of deity, wherever there is any portion of aptitude in their recipients, they purify, irradiate, and exalt.

After this general view of the dialogues of Plato, let us in the next place consider their preambles, the digressions with which they abound, and the character of the style in which they are written. With respect to the first of these, the preambles, however superfluous they may at first sight appear, they will be found on a closer inspection necessary to the design of the dialogues which they accompany. Thus the prefatory part of the *Timæus* unfolds, in images agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, the theory of the world ; and the first part of the *Parmenides*, or the discussion of ideas, is in fact merely a preamble to the second part, or the speculation of *the one* ; to which however it is essentially preparatory. Hence, as Plutarch says, when he speaks of Plato's dialogue on the Atlantic island : These preambles are superb gates and magnificent courts with which he purposely embellishes his great edifices,

edifices, that nothing may be wanting to their beauty, and that all may be equally splendid. He acts, as Dacier well observes, like a great prince, who, when he builds a sumptuous palace, adorns (in the language of Pindar) the vestibule with golden pillars. For it is fit that what is first seen should be splendid and magnificent, and should as it were perspicuously announce all that grandeur which afterwards presents itself to the view.

With respect to the frequent digressions in his dialogues, these also, when accurately examined, will be found to be no less subservient to the leading design of the dialogues in which they are introduced; at the same time that they afford a pleasing relaxation to the mind from the labour of severe investigation. Hence Plato, by the most happy and enchanting art, contrives to lead the reader to the temple of Truth, through the delightful groves and vallies of the Graces. In short, this circuitous course, when attentively considered, will be found to be the shortest road by which he could conduct the reader to the desired end: for in accomplishing this it is necessary to regard not that road which is most straight in the nature of things, or abstractedly considered, but that which is most direct in the progressions of human understanding.

With respect to the style of Plato, though it forms in reality the most inconsiderable part of the merit of his writings, style in all philosophical works being the last thing that should be attended to, yet even in this Plato may contend for the palm of excellence with the most renowned masters of diction. Hence we find that his style was the admiration of the finest writers of antiquity. According to Ammianus, Jupiter himself would not speak otherwise, if he were to converse in the Attic tongue. Aristotle considered his style as a medium between poetry and prose. Cicero no less praises him for the excellence of his diction than the profundity of his conceptions; and Longinus calls him,
with

with respect to his language, the rival of Homer. Hence he is considered by this prince of critics, as deriving into himself abundant streams from the Homeric fountain, and is compared by him, in his rivalry of Homer, to a new antagonist, who enters the lists against one that is already the object of universal admiration.

Notwithstanding this praise, however, Plato has been accused, as Longinus informs us, of being frequently hurried away as by a certain Bacchic fury of words to immoderate and unpleasant metaphors, and an allegoric magnificence of diction¹. Longinus excuses this by saying, that whatever naturally excels in magnitude possesses very little of purity. For that, says he, which is in every respect accurate is in danger of littleness. He adds, “and may not this also be necessary, that those of an abject and moderate genius, because they never encounter danger, nor aspire after the summit of excellence, are for the most part without error and remain in security; but that great things become insecure through their magnitude?” Indeed it appears to me, that whenever this exuberance, this Bacchic fury, occurs in the diction of Plato, it is owing to the magnitude of the inspiring influence of deity with which he is then replete. For that he sometimes wrote from divine inspiration is evident from his own confession in the *Phædrus*, a great part of which is not so much like an orderly discourse as a dithyrambic poem. Such a style therefore, as it is the progeny of divine mania, which, as Plato justly observes, is better than all human prudence, spontaneously adapts itself to its producing cause, imitates a supernatural power as far as this can be effected by words, and thus necessarily becomes magnificent, vehement, and exuberant; for such are the characteristics of its source. All judges of composition however, both

¹ Ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦτοις καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα οὐχ ἥκιστα διασυροῦσι, πολλὰκις ὡς περ ὑπὸ βᾶκχικῆς τινὸς τῶν λόγων, εἰς ἀνατρεῦς καὶ ἀπηνεῖς μεταφάσεις, καὶ εἰς ἀλληγορικὸν στομφὸν ἐκφερομένον. Longin. Περὶ Ὑψους.

antient and modern, are agreed that his style is in general graceful and pure; and that it is sublime without being impetuous and rapid. It is indeed no less harmonious than elevated, no less accurate¹ than magnificent. It combines the force of the greatest orators with the graces of the first of poets; and, in short, is a river to which those justly celebrated lines of Denham may be most pertinently applied:

Tho' deep, yet clear; tho' gentle, yet not dull;
Strong without rage, without o'erflowing full.

Having thus considered the philosophy of Plato, given a general view of his writings, and made some observations on his style, it only now remains to speak of the following arrangement of his dialogues and translation of his works, and then, with a few appropriate observations, to close this Introduction.

As no accurate and scientific arrangement then of these dialogues has been transmitted to us from the antients, I was under the necessity of adopting an arrangement of my own, which I trust is not unscientific, however inferior it may be to that which was doubtless made, though unfortunately lost, by the latter interpreters of Plato. In my arrangement, therefore, I have imitated the order of the universe, in which, as I have already observed, wholes precede parts, and universals particulars. Hence I have placed those dialogues first which rank as wholes, or have the relation of a system, and afterwards those in which these systems are branched out into particulars. Thus, after the First Alci-

¹ The reader will see, from the notes on Plato's dialogues, and particularly from the notes on the *Parmenides* and *Timæus*, that the style of that philosopher possesses an accuracy which is not to be found in any modern writer; an accuracy of such a wonderful nature, that the words are exactly commensurate with the sense. Hence the reader who has happily penetrated his profundity finds, with astonishment, that another word could not have been added without being superfluous, nor one word taken away without injuring the sense. The same observation may also be applied to the style of Aristotle.

biades, which may be called, and appears to have been generally considered by the antients, an introduction to the whole of Plato's philosophy, I have placed the Republic and the Laws, which may be said to comprehend systematically the morals and politics of Plato. After these I have ranked the Timæus, which contains the whole of his physiology, and together with it the Critias, because of its connection with the Timæus. The next in order is the Parmenides, which contains a system of his theology. Thus far this arrangement is conformable to the natural progress of the human mind in the acquisition of the sublimest knowledge: the subsequent arrangement principally regards the order of things. After the Parmenides then, the Sophista, Phædrus, Greater Hippias, and Banquet, follow, which may be considered as so many lesser wholes subordinate to and comprehended in the Parmenides, which, like the universe itself, is a whole of wholes. For in the Sophista *being itself* is investigated, in the Banquet *love itself*, and in the Phædrus *beauty itself*; all which are intelligible forms, and are consequently contained in the Parmenides, in which the whole extent of the intelligible is unfolded. The Greater Hippias is classed with the Phædrus, because in the latter the whole series of the beautiful is discussed, and in the former that which subsists in soul. After these follows the Theætetus, in which science considered as subsisting in soul is investigated; science itself, according to its first subsistence, having been previously celebrated by Socrates in one part of the Phædrus. The Politicus and Minos, which follow next, may be considered as ramifications from the Laws: and, in short, all the following dialogues either consider *more particularly* the dogmas which are *systematically* comprehended in those already enumerated, or naturally flow from them as their original source. As it did not however appear possible to arrange these dialogues which rank as parts in the same accurate order as those which

which we considered as wholes, it was thought better to class them either according to their agreement in one particular circumstance, as the *Phædo*, *Apology*, and *Crito*, all which relate to the death of Socrates, and as the *Meno* and *Protagoras*, which relate to the question whether virtue can be taught; or according to their agreement in character, as the *Lesser Hippias* and *Euthydemus*, which are *anatreptic*, and the *Theages*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*, which are *maieutic* dialogues. The *Cratylus* is ranked in the last place, not so much because the subject of it is etymology, as because a great part of it is deeply theological: for by this arrangement, after having ascended to all the divine orders and their ineffable principle in the *Parmenides*, and thence descended in a regular series to the human soul in the subsequent dialogues, the reader is again led back to deity in this dialogue, and thus imitates the order which all beings observe, that of incessantly returning to the principles whence they flow.

After the dialogues ¹ follow the *Epistles* of Plato, which are in every respect worthy that prince of all true philosophers. They are not only written with great elegance, and occasionally with magnificence of diction, but with all the becoming dignity of a mind conscious of its superior endowments, and all the authority of a master in philosophy. They are likewise replete with many admirable political observations, and contain some of his most abstruse dogmas, which though delivered enigmatically, yet the manner in which they are delivered, elucidates at the same time that it is elucidated by what is said of these dogmas in his more theological dialogues.

With respect to the following translation, it is necessary to observe, in the first place, that the number of the legitimate dialogues of Plato

¹ As I profess to give the reader a translation of the genuine works of Plato only, I have not translated the *Axiochus*, *Demodocus*, *Sisyphus*, &c. as these are evidently spurious dialogues.

is fifty-five ; for though the Republic forms but one treatise, and the Laws another, yet the former consists of ten and the latter of twelve books, and each of these books is a dialogue. Hence, as there are thirty-three dialogues, besides the Laws and the Republic, fifty-five will, as we have said, be the amount of the whole. Of these fifty-five, the nine following have been translated by Mr. Sydenham ; viz. the First and Second Alcibiades, the Greater and Lesser Hippias, the Banquet (except the speech of Alcibiades), the Philebus, the Meno, the Io, and the Rivals¹. I have already observed, and with deep regret, that this excellent though unfortunate scholar died before he had made that proficiency in the philosophy of Plato which might have been reasonably expected from so fair a beginning. I personally knew him only in the decline of life, when his mental powers were not only considerably impaired by age, but greatly injured by calamity. His life had been very stormy : his circumstances, for many years preceding his death, were indigent ; his patrons were by no means liberal ; and his real friends were neither numerous nor affluent. He began the study of Plato, as he himself informed me, when he had considerably passed the meridian of life, and with most unfortunate prejudices against his best disciples, which I attempted to remove during my acquaintance with him, and partly succeeded in the attempt ; but infirmity and death prevented its completion. Under such circumstances it was not to be expected that he would fathom the profundity of Plato's conceptions, and arrive at the summit of philosophic attainments. I saw, however, that his talents and his natural disposition were such as might have ranked him among the best of Plato's interpreters, if he had not yielded to the pressure of calamity, if he had not nourished such baneful prejudices,

¹ In the notes on the above-mentioned nine dialogues, those written by Mr. Sydenham are signed S., and those by myself T.

and

and if he had not neglected philosophy in the early part of life. Had this happened, my labours would have been considerably lessened, or perhaps rendered entirely unnecessary, and his name would have been transmitted to posterity with undecaying renown. As this unfortunately did not happen, I have been under the necessity of diligently examining and comparing with the original all those parts of the dialogues which he translated, that are more deeply philosophical, or that contain any thing of the theology of Plato. In these, as might be expected, I found him greatly deficient; I found him sometimes mistaking the meaning through ignorance of Plato's more sublime tenets, and at other times perverting it, in order to favour some opinions of his own. His translation however of other parts which are not so abstruse is excellent. In these he not only presents the reader faithfully with the matter, but likewise with the genuine manner of Plato. The notes too which accompany the translation of these parts generally exhibit just criticism and extensive learning, an elegant taste, and a genius naturally philosophic. Of these notes I have preserved as much as was consistent with the limits and design of the following work.

Of the translation of the Republic by Dr. Spens, it is necessary to observe, that a considerable part of it is very faithfully executed; but that in the more abstruse parts it is inaccurate; and that it every where abounds with Scotticisms which offend an English ear, and vulgarisms which are no less disgraceful to the translator than disgusting to the reader. Suffice it therefore to say of this version, that I have adopted it wherever I found it could with propriety be adopted, and given my own translation where it was otherwise.

Of the ten dialogues, translated by Dacier, I can say nothing with accuracy, because I have no knowledge whatever of the French language; but if any judgment may be formed of this work, from a

translation of it into English, I will be bold to say that it is by no means literal, and that he very frequently mistakes the sense of the original. From this translation therefore I could derive but little assistance; some however I have derived, and that little I willingly acknowledge. In translating the rest of Plato's works, and this, as the reader may easily see, forms by far the greatest part of them, I have had no assistance from any translation except that of Ficinus, the general excellency of which is well known to every student of Plato, arising not only from his possessing a knowledge of Platonism superior to that of any translators that have followed him, but likewise from his having made this translation from a very valuable manuscript in the Medicean library, which is now no longer to be found. I have, however, availed myself of the learned labours of the editors of various dialogues of Plato; such as the edition of the *Rivals*, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phædo*, by Forster; of the *First and Second Alcibiades* and *Hipparchus*, by Etwall; of the *Meno*, *First Alcibiades*, *Phædo* and *Phædrus*, printed at Vienna 1784; of the *Cratylus* and *Theætetus*, by Fischer; of the *Republic*, by Massey; and of the *Euthydemus* and *Gorgias*, by Dr. Routh, president of Magdalen College, Oxford. This last editor has enriched his edition of these two dialogues with very valuable and copious philological and critical notes, in which he has displayed no less learning than judgment, no less acuteness than taste. He appears indeed to me to be one of the best and most modest of philologists; and it is to be hoped that he will be imitated in what he has done by succeeding editors of Plato's text.

If my translation had been made with an eye to the judgment of the many, it would have been necessary to apologize for its literal exactness. Had I been anxious to gratify false taste with respect to composition, I should doubtless have attended less to the precise meaning
of

of the original, have omitted almost all connective particles, have divided long periods into a number of short ones, and branched out the strong and deep river of Plato's language into smooth-gliding, shallow, and feeble streams; but as the present work was composed with the hope indeed of benefiting all, but with an eye to the criticism solely of men of elevated souls, I have endeavoured not to lose a word of the original; and yet at the same time have attempted to give the translation as much elegance as such verbal accuracy can be supposed capable of admitting. I have also endeavoured to preserve the manner as well as the matter of my author, being fully persuaded that no translation deserves applause, in which both these are not as much as possible preserved.

My principal object in this arduous undertaking has been to unfold all the abstruse and sublime dogmas of Plato, as they are found dispersed in his works. Minutely to unravel the art which he employs in the composition of all his dialogues, and to do full justice to his meaning in every particular, must be the task of some one who has more leisure, and who is able to give the works of Plato to the public on a more extensive plan. In accomplishing this great object, I have presented the reader in my notes with nearly the substance in English of all the following manuscript Greek Commentaries and Scholia on Plato; viz. of the Commentaries of Proclus on the Parmenides and First Alcibiades, and of his Scholia on the Cratylus; of the Scholia of Olympiodorus on the Phædo, Gorgias, and Philebus; and of Hermeas on the Phædrus. To these are added very copious extracts from the manuscript of Damascius ¹, *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, and from the published works

of

¹ Patricius was one of the very few in modern times who have been sensible of the great merit of these writings, as is evident from the following extract from the preface to his translation of

Proclus's

of Proclus on the *Timæus*, *Republic*, and *Theology of Plato*. Of the four first of these manuscripts, three of which are folio volumes, I have complete copies taken with my own hand; and of the copious extracts from the others, those from Olympiodorus on the *Gorgias* were taken by me from the copy preserved in the British Museum: those from the same philosopher on the *Philebus*, and those from Hermeas on the *Phædrus*, and Damascius *Περὶ Ἀρχῶν*, from the copies in the Bodleian library.

And here gratitude demands that I should publicly acknowledge the very handsome and liberal manner in which I was received by the University of Oxford, and by the principal librarian, and sub-librarians of the Bodleian library, during the time that I made the above-mentioned extracts. In the first place I have to acknowledge the very polite attention which was paid to me by Dr. Jackson¹, dean of Christ-

Proclus's Theological Elements. (Ferrar. 4to. 1583.) "Extant in hoc Platonicæ Philosophiæ genere, etiam Hermiæ qui fuit Ammonii pater, commentaria elegantissima in Phædram, nec non Olympiodori cujusdam longe doctissimi excerpta quædam ex ejus commentariis in Phædonem ac Philebum, et integra in Gorgiam. Sed omnium eminentissimæ, Damascii Questiones De Principiis rerum sunt. Quæ omnia si publice viserentur, ardentissimos divinæ sapientiæ amores excitarent, in iis pectoribus, quæ non argutandi causâ, sed modo hoc unum, ut sapiant, philosophiæ operam navant. Quæ si aliquando viri alicujus verè viri, opere quamvis laborioso, glorioso tamen in lucem prodeant, apparebit tandem, quanta sapientiæ pars tenebris obruta jaceat, dum usitatam hanc in scholis solam sequimur, et amamus sapientiam. Cui rei manus dare, quantum vitæ et ocii suppetet, non deest nobis animus ingens. Utinam vita tranquillior, et fortuna adversa minus nobis contigisset, id jam forte totum confectum esset." Patricius, prior to this, enumerates the writings of Proclus, and they are included in his wish, that all the manuscript Greek commentaries on Plato were made public.

¹ I was much pleased to find that this very respectable prelate is a great admirer of Aristotle, and that extracts from the Commentaries of Simplicius and Ammonius on the Categories of that philosopher, are read by his orders in the college of which he is the head.

church.

church. In the second place, the liberty of attendance at the Bodleian library, and the accommodation which was there afforded me by the librarians of that excellent collection, demand from me no small tribute of praise. And, above all, the very liberal manner in which I was received by the fellows of New College, with whom I resided for three weeks, and from whom I experienced even Grecian hospitality, will, I trust, be as difficult a task for time to obliterate from my memory, as it would be for me to express it as it deserves¹.

With respect to the faults which I may have committed in this translation (for I am not vain enough to suppose it is without fault), I might plead as an excuse, that the whole of it has been executed amidst severe endurance from bodily infirmity and indigent circumstances; and that a very considerable part of it was accomplished amidst other ills of no common magnitude, and other labours inimical to such an undertaking. But whatever may be my errors, I will not fly to calamity for an apology. Let it be my excuse, that the mistakes I may have committed in lesser particulars, have arisen from my eagerness to seize and promulgate those great truths in the philosophy and theology of Plato, which though they have been concealed for ages in oblivion, have a subsistence coeval with the universe, and will again be restored, and flourish, for very extended periods, through all the infinite revolutions of time.

In the next place, it is necessary to speak concerning the qualifications requisite in a legitimate student of the philosophy of Plato, previous to which I shall just notice the absurdity of supposing, that a mere knowledge of the Greek tongue, however great that knowledge may be,

¹ Permit me also to mention, with gratitude for their kindness, the names of Dr. Stanley, Mr. Heber, the Rev. Mr. Coppleston, and the Rev. Abram Robertson, Savilian professor of geometry.

is alone sufficient to the understanding the sublime doctrines of Plato; for a man might as well think that he can understand Archimedes without a knowledge of the elements of geometry, merely because he can read him in the original. Those who entertain such an idle opinion, would do well to meditate on the profound observation of Heraclitus, “that *polymathy does not teach intellect*,” (Πολυμαθία νουν ου διδασκει).

By a legitimate student, then, of the Platonic philosophy, I mean one who, both from nature and education, is properly qualified for such an arduous undertaking: that is, one who possesses a naturally good disposition; is sagacious and acute, and is inflamed with an ardent desire for the acquisition of wisdom and truth; who from his childhood has been well instructed in the mathematical disciplines; who, besides this, has spent whole days, and frequently the greater part of the night, in profound meditation; and, like one triumphantly sailing over a raging sea, or skilfully piercing through an army of foes, has successfully encountered an hostile multitude of doubts;—in short, who has never considered *wisdom* as a thing of trifling estimation and easy access, but as that which cannot be obtained without the most generous and severe endurance, and the intrinsic worth of which surpasses all corporeal good, far more than the ocean the fleeting bubble which floats on its surface. To such as are destitute of these requisites, who make the study of words their sole employment, and the pursuit of wisdom but at best a secondary thing, who expect to be wise by desultory application for an hour or two in a day, after the fatigues of business, after mixing with the base multitude of mankind, laughing with the gay, affecting airs of gravity with the serious, tacitly assenting to every man's opinion, however absurd, and winking at folly however shameful and base—to such as these—and, alas! the world is full of such—the sublimest truths must appear to be nothing more than
jargon

jargon and reverie, the dreams of a distempered imagination, or the ebullitions of fanatical faith.

But all this is by no means wonderful, if we consider that two-fold ignorance is the disease of *the many*. For they are not only ignorant with respect to the sublimest knowledge, but they are even ignorant of their ignorance. Hence they never suspect their want of understanding; but immediately reject a doctrine which appears at first sight absurd, because it is too splendid for their bat-like eyes to behold. Or if they even yield their assent to its truth, their very assent is the result of the same most dreadful disease of the soul. For they will fancy, says Plato, that they understand the highest truths, when the very contrary is really the case. I earnestly therefore entreat men of this description, not to meddle with any of the profound speculations of the Platonic philosophy; for it is more dangerous to urge them to such an employment, than to advise them to follow their sordid avocations with unwearied assiduity, and toil for wealth with increasing alacrity and vigour; as they will by this mean give free scope to the base habits of their soul, and sooner suffer that punishment which in such as these must always precede mental illumination, and be the inevitable consequence of guilt. It is well said indeed by Lysis¹, the Pythagorean, that to inculcate liberal speculations and discourses to those whose morals are turbid and confused, is just as absurd as to pour pure and transparent water into a deep well full of mire and clay; for he who does this will only disturb the mud, and cause the pure water to become defiled. The words of such, as the same author beautifully observes (that is the irrational or corporeal life), in which these dire passions are nourished, must first be purified with fire

¹ In Epist. ad Hipparchum.

and sword, and every kind of instrument (that is through preparatory disciplines and the political virtues), and reason must be freed from its slavery to the affections, before any thing useful can be planted in these savage haunts.

Let not such then presume to explore the regions of Platonic philosophy. The land is too pure to admit the sordid and the base. The road which conducts to it is too intricate to be discovered by the unskilful and stupid, and the journey is too long and laborious to be accomplished by the effeminate and the timid, by the slave of passion and the dupe of opinion, by the lover of sense and the despiser of truth. The dangers and difficulties in the undertaking are such as can be sustained by none but the most hardy and accomplished adventurers ; and he who begins the journey without the strength of Hercules, or the wisdom and patience of Ulysses, must be destroyed by the wild beasts of the forest, or perish in the storms of the ocean ; must suffer transmutation into a beast, through the magic power of Circe, or be exiled for life by the detaining charms of Calypso ; and in short must descend into Hades, and wander in its darkness, without emerging from thence to the bright regions of the morning, or be ruined by the deadly melody of the Syren's song. To the most skilful traveller, who pursues the right road with an ardour which no toils can abate, with a vigilance which no weariness can surprise into negligence, and with virtue which no temptations can seduce, it exhibits for many years the appearance of the Ithaca of Ulysses, or the flying Italy of Æneas ; for we no sooner gain a glimpse of the pleasing land which is to be the end of our journey, than it is suddenly ravished from our view, and we still find ourselves at a distance from the beloved coast, exposed to the fury of a stormy sea of doubts.

Abandon then, ye groveling souls, the fruitless design ! Pursue with
avidity

avidity the beaten road which leads to popular honours and sordid gain, but relinquish all thoughts of a voyage for which you are totally unprepared. Do you not perceive what a length of sea separates you from the royal coast? A sea,

Huge, horrid, vast, where scarce in safety sails
The best built ship, though Jove inspire the gales.

And may we not very justly ask you, similar to the interrogation of Calypso,

What ships have you, what sailors to convey,
What oars to cut the long laborious way?

I shall only observe further, that the life of Plato, by Olympiodorus, was prefixed to this translation, in preference to that by Diogenes Laertius, because the former is the production of a most eminent Platonist, and the latter of a mere historian, who indiscriminately gave to the public whatever anecdotes he found in other authors. If the reader combines this short sketch of the life of Plato with what that philosopher says of himself in his 7th Epistle, he will be in possession of the most important particulars about him that can be obtained at present.

EXPLANATION
OF CERTAIN
PLATONIC TERMS.

AS some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced, in the course of the following translation, certain unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that as all arts and sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy, which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms, without at the same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader.

ANAGOGIC, ἀναγωγικός. Leading on high.

DEMIURGUS, δημιουργός. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe.

DIANOETIC. This word is derived from διανοία, or that power of the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction, that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary sense.

THE DIVINE ¹, το θεϊόν, is *being* subsisting in conjunction with *the one*. For all things except *the one*, viz. essence, life, and intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the gods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these,

¹ See Procl. in Plat. Theol. p. 64.

which

which they also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many places, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of the gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the *Laws*, but also Socrates in the *Phædrus*, calls a divine soul a god. "For," says he, "all the horses and charioteers of *the gods* are good," &c. And afterwards, still more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of *the gods*." And not only this, but he also denominates those natures gods, that are always united to the gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one series. He also frequently calls dæmons gods, though, according to essence, they are secondary to, and subsist about, the gods. For in the *Phædrus*, *Timæus*, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of gods as far as to dæmons. And what is still more paradoxical than all this, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the Elean Guest in the *Sophista*. From all this, therefore, we must infer, that with respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to participation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every divine soul is a god according to participation; but divine dæmons are gods, according to contact with the gods: and the souls of men obtain this appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first, is, as we have said, rather divine than a god: for the Athenian Guest, in the *Laws*, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as *the united* is to *the one*; *that which is intellectual*, to *intellect*; and *that which is animated*, to *soul*. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede; and the series of beings ends in *the one* itself.

DOXASTIC. This word is derived from *δόξα*, *opinion*, and signifies that which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that *every* man is a rational animal; but it knows not the *δύοι*, or *why* a thing is, but only the *οτι*, or *that* it is.

THE ETERNAL, *το αἰώνιον*, that which has a never-ending subsistence, without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it, infinite life at once total and full.

THAT

THAT WHICH IS GENERATED, *το γενητον*. That which has not the whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once, without temporal dispersion.

GENERATION, *γενεσις*. An essence composite and multiform, and conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more antient than Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes (in MS. Comment. in Parmenidem), "Fables call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes, generation." "Hence," he adds, in the Orphic writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is generation, according to its proper signification, there also there is time."

A GUEST, *ξενος*. This word, in its more ample signification in the Greek, denotes a *stranger*, but properly implies one who receives another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a *ξενος*, I have translated this word *guest*, as being more conformable to the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so many guests. Hence in the *Timæus*, the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests.

HYPARXIS, *υπαρξις*. The first principle or foundation, as it were, of the essence of a thing. Hence, also, it is the summit of essence.

IDIOM, *ιδιωμα*. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing.

THE IMMORTAL ¹, *το αθανατον*. According to Plato, there are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and the ultimate echo, as it were, of immortality, is seen in the perpetuity of the mundane wholes, which, according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in the *Politicus*, they participate from the Father of the universe. For both the being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. But the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and more perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is evident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the *Phædo*, and in the 10th book of the *Re-*

¹ See Proclus in Plat. Theol. p. 65.

public. For the immortality of partial souls has a more principal subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause of eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of daemons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable, however, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the immortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain the fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about bodies, and through which bodies participate of renewed immortality. And prior to all these is the immortality of the gods: for Diotima in the Banquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to daemons. Hence such an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For, together with the immortality of the gods, eternity subsists, which is the fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is perpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonentity. In short, therefore, the *divine immortal* is that which is generative and connective of perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as participating of life, but as supplying divine life, and deifying life itself.

IMPARTICIPABLE, *το ἀμεθεκτιν*. That which is not consubsistent with an inferior nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is an intellect which is not consubsistent with soul.

INTELLECTUAL PROJECTION, *νοερα ἐπιβολη*. As the perception of intellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to its proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term *projection*.

THE INTELLIGIBLE, *το νοητον*. This word in Plato and Platonic writers has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is exempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to be intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second place, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third place, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence, and is essentially perfective of it, is called *intelligible*: and this is the intelligible, which Timæus in Plato places in the order of a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy. But beyond these is the *divine* intelligible, which is defined according to divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as the completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that which is the hyparxis of the gods; the
second,

second, that which is true being, and the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life; and the fourth, the order belonging to soul.

Logismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato, in the *Timæus*, signifies a distributive cause of things.

ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH; WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH; THROUGH WHICH; ACCORDING TO WHICH; FROM WHICH; OF IN WHICH; viz. δι ο, προς ο, υφ' ου, δι ου, καθ' ο, εξ ου. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate the final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third the demiurgic; by the fourth the instrumental; by the fifth form; and by the sixth matter.

ORECTIC. This word is derived from *orexis*, appetite.

PARADIGM, *παράδειγμα*. A pattern, or that with reference to which a thing is made.

THE PERPETUAL, το αιδιον. That which subsists forever, but through a connection with time.

A POLITICIAN, πολιτικός. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly observes in his notes on the *Rivals*, is of a very large and extensive import, as used by Plato, and the other antient writers on politics: for it includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and democracies who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto belonging. See the *Politicus*.

PRUDENCE, *φρονησις*. This word frequently means in Plato and Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual perception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by Jamblichus.

Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its generation from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect itself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most beautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion with the gods, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this we are in the highest degree assimilated to them. The knowledge too of such

things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries to these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of works proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a certain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their nature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life of every one, to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best similitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that prudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud. Stob. p. 141.

PSYCHICAL *ψυχικός*. Pertaining to soul.

SCIENCE. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the assignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this definition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as to the principle of things. For this science considers that which is truly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and produces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition, he calls dianoëtic knowledge science; but according to the first alone, he assigns to physiology the appellation of science.

THE TELESTIC ART. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies.

THEURGIC. This word is derived from *θεουργία*, or that religious operation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible to man.

TRUTH, *ἀλήθεια*. Plato, following antient theologists, considers truth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth is characterized by unity; and is the light proceeding from *the good*, which imparts *purity*, as he says in the *Philebus*, and *union*, as he says in the *Republic*, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in dignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the intellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncoloured, and without contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is situated, as it is written in the *Phædrus*. The third kind of truth is that which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes into contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third from the intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible light, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of truth is that which is in sensibles, which is full of error and
inaccuracy

inaccuracy through sense, and the instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment.

The following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that which subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: "Truth, as the name implies, makes a conversion about the gods and their incorporeal energy; but doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images, wanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the former indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms, and real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the latter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a various subsistence; and about this its visive power is blunted. The former contemplates that which is; but the latter assumes such a form as appears to the many. Hence the former associates with intellect, and increases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from looking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and deceives." Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136.

THE UNICAL, *TO ENICION*. That which is characterized by unity.

T H E

L I F E O F P L A T O .

BY *OLYMPIODORUS*.

LET us now speak of the race of the philosopher, not for the sake of relating many particulars concerning him, but rather with a view to the advantage and instruction of his readers; since he was by no means an obscure man, but one who attracted the attention of many. For it is said that the father of Plato was Aristo, the son of Aristocles, from whom he refers his origin to Solon the legislator. Hence with primitive zeal he wrote twelve book of Laws, and eleven books on a Republic. But his mother was Perictione, who descended from Neleus the son of Codrus.

They say then that an Apolloniaccal spectre¹ had connexion with his mother Perictione, and that, appearing in the night to Aristo, it commanded him

¹ The like account of the divine origin of Plato is also given by Hesychius, Apuleius on the dogmas of Plato, and Plutarch in the eighth book of his Symposiacks. But however extraordinary this circumstance may appear, it is nothing more than one of those mythological relations in which heroes are said to have Gods for their fathers, or Goddesses for their mothers; and the true meaning of it is as follows:—According to the antient theology, between those perpetual attendants of a divine nature called *essential* heroes, who are impassive and pure, and the bulk of human souls who descend to earth with passivity and impurity, it is necessary there should be an order of human souls who descend with impassivity and purity. For, as there is no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that the last link of a superior order

him not to sleep with Perictione during the time of her pregnancy—which mandate Aristo obeyed.

While he was yet an infant, his parents are said to have placed him in Hymettus, being desirous, on his account, to sacrifice to the Gods of that mountain, viz. Pan, and the Nymphs, and the pastoral Apollo. In the mean time the bees, approaching as he lay, filled his mouth with honey-combs, as an omen that in future it might be truly said of him,

Words from his tongue than honey sweeter flowed ¹.

But Plato calls himself a fellow-servant with swans, as deriving his origin from Apollo; for according to the Greeks that bird is Apolloniæal.

When he was a young man, he first betook himself to Dionysius the grammarian for the purpose of acquiring common literature. Of this

should coalesce with the summit of one proximately inferior. These souls were called by the ancients *terrestrial* heroes, on account of their high degree of proximity and alliance to such as are *essentially* heroes. Hercules, Theseus, Pythagoras, Plato, &c. were souls of this kind, who descended into mortality, both to benefit other souls, and in compliance with that necessity by which all natures inferior to the perpetual attendants of the Gods are at times obliged to descend.

But as, according to the arcana of ancient theology, every God beginning from on high produces his proper series as far as to the last of things, and this series comprehends many essences different from each other, such as Dæmoniæal, Heroical, Nymphical, and the like; the lowest powers of these orders have a great communion and physical sympathy with the human race, and contribute to the perfection of all their natural operations, and particularly to their procreations. "Hence (says Proclus in *Cratylum*) it often appears that *heroes* are generated from the mixture of these powers with mankind; for those that possess a certain prerogative above human nature are properly denominated *heroes*." He adds: "Not only a dæmoniæal genus of this kind sympathizes physically with men, but other kinds sympathize with other natures, as nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags or serpents." See more on this interesting subject in the Notes to my translation of Pausanias, vol. iii. p. 229, &c.

Etwall, the editor of this Life, not being acquainted with the philosophical explanation of this MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION of Plato, pretends that this story originated from Plato being said to be born in the month Thargelion (with us, June), and on the very day in which Latona is reported to have brought forth Apollo and Diana.

¹ Hom. *Iliad*. lib. i. ver. 249.

Dionysius he makes mention in his dialogue called *The Lovers*—that even Dionysius the school-master might not be passed over in silence by Plato. After him he employed the argive Aristo, as his instructor in gymnastic¹, from whom he is said to have derived the name of Plato; for prior to this he was called Aristocles, from his grandfather: but he was so called from having those parts of the body the breast and forehead broad in the extreme, as his statues every where evince. According to others, however, he was called Plato from the ample and expanded character of his style; just as they say Theophrastus was so called, from his divine eloquence, his first name being Tyrtaeus.

For his preceptor in music Plato had Draco, the son of Damon; and of this master he makes mention in his *Republic*. For the Athenians instructed their children in these three arts, viz. grammar, music, and gymnastic—and this, as it seems, with great propriety. They taught them grammar, for the purpose of adorning their reason; music, that they might tame their anger; and gymnastic, that they might strengthen the weak tone of desire. Alcibiades also, in Plato, appears to have been instructed in these three disciplines; and hence Socrates says to him, “But you were unwilling to play on the pipe,” &c. He was also conversant with painters, from whom he learned the mixture of colours, of which he makes mention in the *Timæus*.

After this he was instructed by the Tragedians, who at that time were celebrated as the preceptors of Greece: but he betook himself to these writers on account of the sententious and venerable nature of tragic composition, and the heroic sublimity of the subjects. He was likewise conversant with Dithyrambic writers, with a view to the honour of Bacchus, who was called by the Greeks the inspective guardian of generation: for

¹ Some affirm that Plato so excelled in the gymnastic art, that he contended in the Pythian and Isthmian games. *Pythia et Isthmia de lucta certavit.* Apuleius de Dogmate Platonis.

the Dithyrambic measure is sacred to Bacchus, from whom also it derives its name; Bacchus being Dithyrambus, as proceeding into light from two avenues—the womb of Semele, and the thigh of Jupiter. For the antients were accustomed to call effects by the names of their causes, as in the name Dithyrambus given to Bacchus. Hence Proclus observes :

With their late offspring parents seem to mix.

But that Plato applied himself to Dithyrambics is evident from his *Phædrus*, which plainly breathes the Dithyrambic character, and is said to have been the first dialogue which Plato composed.

He was also much delighted with the comic Aristophanes and Sophron¹, from whom he learned the imitations of persons in dialogues. He is said to have been so much pleased with the writings of these men, that, on his death, they were found in his bed. Plato himself likewise composed the following epigram on Aristophanes :

The Graces, once intent to find
A temple which might ne'er decay,
The soul of Aristophanes
At length discover'd in their way.

He reproves him, however, in a comic manner in his dialogue called *The Banquet*, in which he gives a specimen of his proficiency in comedy : for here Plato introduces him celebrating Love, and in the midst of his oration seized with a hiccup, so as to be unable to finish it. Plato also composed Tragic and Dithyrambic poems, and some other poetical pieces, all which he burned as soon as he began to associate with Socrates, at the same time repeating this verse :

Vulcan! draw near; 'tis Plato asks your aid².

¹ This Sophron was a Syracusan, and contemporary with Euripides. He was an obscure writer; and his works, none of which are now extant, were in the Doric dialect.

² According to the words of Homer, *Iliad*. lib. xviii. ver. 392.

Anatolius the grammarian, once reciting this verse, very much pleased Vulcan, at that time the governor of the city. But he thus addressed him:

Vulcan † draw near; 'tis Pharos¹ asks your aid.

It is said, that when Socrates first intended to receive Plato as his disciple, he saw in a dream a swan without wings sitting on his bosom, which soon after obtaining wings flew into the air, and with the sweetness of its shrill voice allured all those that heard it. This was a manifest token of Plato's future renown.

After the death of Socrates he had another preceptor, the Heraclitean Cratylus, upon whom he also composed a dialogue, which is inscribed Cratylus, or, Concerning the rectitude of names. After he had been sufficiently instructed by this master, he again went into Italy, where finding Archytas restoring a Pythagoric school, he again had a Pythagoric preceptor of this name; and hence it is that he makes mention of Archytas. But since it is requisite that a philosopher should desire to behold the works of nature, he also went into Sicily for the purpose of viewing the eruptions of fire in Mount Ætna, and not for the sake of the Sicilian table, as you, O noble Aristides, assert.

When he was in Syracuse with Dionysius the Great, who was a tyrant, he endeavoured to change the tyranny into an aristocracy; and it was for this purpose that he visited the tyrant. But Dionysius asking him whom among men he considered as happy? (for he thought that the philosopher, employing flattery, would speak of him,) Plato answered, Socrates. Again the tyrant asked him, What do you think is the business of a politician?

¹ Pharos, as is well known, was a large tower near Alexandria, affording light to navigators in the night. Anatolius, therefore, in calling himself *Pharos* must have alluded to the etymology of his name. For *Anatolius* may be considered as being derived from *ανατολή*, the east, whence the light of the two great luminaries of heaven emerges, and *φαρος* may be said to be quasi *φανος*, because the light of torches appeared from it.

Plato answered, To make the citizens better. He again asked him the third time, What, then, does it appear to you to be a small matter to decide rightly in judicial affairs? (for Dionysius was celebrated for deciding in such affairs with rectitude.) Plato answered boldly, It is a small matter, and the last part of good conduct; for those who judge rightly resemble such as repair lacerated garments. Again Dionysius asked him the fourth time, Must not he who is a tyrant be brave? Plato replied, He is of all men the most timid; for he even dreads the razors of his barbers, lest he should be destroyed by them. With these answers Dionysius was so indignant, that he ordered him to depart at sun-rise.

The following was the cause of his second journey to Sicily. When, after the death of Dionysius the tyrant, his son succeeded to the throne, who by his mother's side was the brother of Dion, with whom Plato became acquainted in his first journey, Plato again sailed to Sicily, at the solicitations of Dion, who told him it might now be hoped that through his exertions the tyranny might be changed into an aristocracy. However, as Dionysius had been told by some of his attendants that Plato designed to destroy him, and transfer the government to Dion, he ordered him to be taken into custody, and delivered to one Pollidis of Ægina, a Sicilian merchant, to be sold as a slave. But Pollidis taking Plato to Ægina found there the Libyan Anniceris, who was then on the point of sailing to Elis, for the purpose of contending with the four-yoked car. Anniceris gladly bought Plato of Pollidis, conceiving that he should thence procure for himself greater glory than by conquering in the race. Hence Aristides observes, that no one would have known Anniceris, if he had not bought Plato.

The following circumstance was the occasion of Plato's third journey to Sicily. Dion, being proscribed by Dionysius, and deprived of his possessions, was at length cast into prison. He therefore wrote to Plato, that Dionysius had promised to liberate him, if Plato would again visit him.

But

But Plato, that he might afford assistance to his associate, readily undertook this third voyage. And thus much for the journeys of the philosopher into Sicily.

Plato likewise went into Egypt for the purpose of conversing with the priests of that country, and from them learned whatever pertains to sacred rites. Hence in his *Gorgias* he says, "Not by the dog, who is considered as a God by the Egyptians." For animals among the Egyptians effect the same things as statues among the Greeks, as being symbols of the several deities to which they are dedicated. However, as he wished to converse with the Magi, but was prevented by the war which at that time broke out in Persia, he went to Phœnicia, and, meeting with the Magi of that country, was instructed by them in magic. Hence, from his *Timæus*, he appears to have been skilful in divination; for he there speaks of the signs of the liver, of the viscera, and the like. These things, however, ought to have been mentioned prior to his journeys to Sicily.

When he returned to Athens he established a school in the Academy, separating a part of this Gymnasium into a temple to the Muses. Here Timon the misanthrope associated with Plato alone. But Plato allured very many to philosophical discipline, preparing men and also women¹ in a virile habit to be his auditors, and evincing that his philosophy deserved the greatest voluntary labour: for he avoided the Socratic irony, nor did he converse in the Forum and in workshops, nor endeavour to captivate young men by his discourses. Add too, that he did not adopt the venerable oath of the Pythagoreans, their custom of keeping their gates shut, and their ipse dixit, as he wished to conduct himself in a more political manner towards all men.

When he was near his death, he appeared to himself in a dream to be changed into a swan, who, by passing from tree to tree, caused much

¹ Two women particularly in a virile habit are said to have been his auditors, Lathbenia the Mantinenian, and Axiothia the Phliænsian.

labour to the fowlers. According to the Socratic Simmias, this dream signified that his meaning would be apprehended with difficulty by those who should be desirous to unfold it after his death. For interpreters resemble fowlers, in their endeavours to explain the conceptions of the antients. But his meaning cannot be apprehended without great difficulty, because his writings, like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and, in short, multifariously; for those two souls are said to have been generated all-harmonic: and hence the writings of both Homer and Plato demand an all-various consideration. Plato was sumptuously buried¹ by the Athenians; and on his sepulchre they inscribed the following epitaph:

From great Apollo Pæon sprung,
And Plato too we find;
The saviour of the body one,
The other of the mind.

And thus much concerning the race of the philosopher.

¹ Plato was born six years after Isocrates, in the 87th Olympiad, and 430 years before Christ. He also died on his birth-day, after having lived exactly 81 years. Hence, says Seneca, the MAGI, who then happened to be at Athens, sacrificed to him on his decease as a being more than human, because he had consummated a most perfect number, which 9 nine times multiplied produces. *Nam hoc scis puto, Platoni diligentiae suae beneficio contigisse, quod natali suo decessit, et annum unum atque octogesimum implevit, sine ullâ deductione. Ideo MAGI, qui fortè Athenis erant, immolaverunt defuncto, amplioris fuisse fortis, quam humanæ, rati, quia consummasset perfectissimum numerum, quem novem novies multiplicata componunt.* Senec. Epist. 63.

THE
FIRST ALCIBIADES,
A DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
THE NATURE OF MAN.

INTRODUCTION¹.

THE most peculiar and firm principle, says Proclus, of all the dialogues of Plato, and of the whole theory of that philosopher, is the knowledge of our own nature; for, this being properly established as an hypothesis, we shall be able accurately to learn the good which is adapted to us, and the evil which opposes this good. For, as the essences of things are different, so also are their proper perfections; and this according to a subjection of essence. For, whether *being* and *the good* proceed, as Aristotle says, from the same Vesta and first fountain, it is certainly necessary that perfection should be imparted to every thing according to the measures of essence; or whether good proceeds from a cause more antient and more characterized by unity, but essence and being are imparted to things from another cause; still, as every thing participates of being more obscurely and more clearly, in the same degree must it participate of good; first beings, in a greater and more perfect manner; but those that rank in the middle orders, secondarily; and the last of things according to an ultimate subsistence. For, how otherwise can things participate of deity and providence, and a distribution according to their desert? For it must not be admitted that intellect can lead things into order, and impart to each a convenient measure, but that *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, which is more antient than intellect, should make its communications in a disordered manner; viz. that it should impart to causes and things caused the same portion of goodness, and distribute to the same things according to being the perfections of more primary and subordinate natures. For it neither was lawful, says Timæus, nor is, for the best of natures to effect any thing but that which is most beautiful and most commensurate. But the same good is not most commensurate to first and secondary

¹ The whole of this Introduction is extracted from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on this dialogue; excepting some occasional elucidations by the translator.—T.

natures; but, as the Athenian guest says, a distribution of inequality to things unequal, and of equality to things equal, of the greater to such as are greater, and of the lesser to such as are lesser, is of all things the most musical and the best.

According to this reasoning, therefore, good is different in different beings, and a certain good is naturally co-ordinated to the essence of every thing. Hence the perfection of intellect is in eternity¹, but of the rational soul in time: and the good of the rational soul consists in an energy according to intellect, but the good of body is in a subsistence according to nature; so that he who thinks that though the nature in these is different, yet the perfection is the same, has an erroneous conception of the truth of things.

According to every order of beings, therefore, essence ought to be known prior to perfection; for perfection is not of itself, but of essence, by which it is participated. Hence, with respect to the essence of a thing, we must first consider whether it belongs to impartible essences, such as intellectual natures, or to such as are divisible about bodies, viz. corporeal forms and qualities, or to such as subsist between these. Likewise, whether it ranks among eternal entities, or such as subsist according to the whole of time, or such as are generated in a certain part of time. Again, whether it is simple, and subsists prior to composition, or is indeed a composite, but is always in the act of being bound with indissoluble bonds², or may again be resolved into those things from which it is composed. For, by thus considering every thing, we shall be able to understand in what its good consists. For, again, it is evident that the good of those natures which are allotted an impartible essence is eternal, but that the good of partible natures is conversant with time and motion; and that the good of things subsisting between these is to be considered according to the measures of subsistence and perfection; viz. that such a nature is indeed indigent of time, but of first time, which is able to measure incorporeal periods. So that the pure and genuine knowledge of ourselves, circumscribed in scien-

¹ For, the perceptions of intellect being intuitive, whatever it sees it sees collectively, at once, and without time.

² This is the case with the sensible universe, considered as a whole.

tific boundaries, must, as we have said, be considered as the most proper principle of all philosophy, and of the doctrine of Plato. For, where is it proper to begin, except from the purification and perfection of ourselves, and whence the Delphic god exhorts us to begin? For, as those who enter the Eleusinian grove are ordered by an inscription not to enter into the adyta of the temple, if they are uninitiated in the highest of the mysteries, so the inscription **KNOW THYSELF**, on the Delphic temple, manifests, as it appears to me, the mode of returning to a divine nature, and the most useful path to purification, all but perspicuously asserting to the intelligent, that he who knows himself beginning from the Vestal hearth may be able to be conjoined with that divinity who unfolds into light the whole of truth, and is the leader of a cathartic life; but that he who is ignorant of himself, as being uninitiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries, is unadapted to participate the providence of Apollo. Hence then let us also begin conformably to the mandate of the god, and let us investigate in which of his dialogues Plato especially makes the speculation of our essence his principal design, that from hence we may also make the commencement of the Platonic writing. Can we then adduce any other writing of Plato except the First Alcibiades, and the conference of Socrates which is delivered in this dialogue? Where else shall we say our essence is so unfolded? Where besides are man and the nature of man investigated? To which we may add, that it is Socrates who engages in this first conversation with Alcibiades, and that it is he who says that the beginning of perfection is suspended from the contemplation of ourselves. For we are ignorant of ourselves in consequence of being involved in oblivion produced by the realms of generation, and agitated by the tumult of the irrational forms of life. In the mean time, we think that we know many things of which we are ignorant, because we essentially possess innate reasons of things.

This dialogue therefore is the beginning of all philosophy, in the same manner as the knowledge of ourselves. Hence many logical and ethical theorems are scattered in it, together with such as contribute to the entire speculation of felicity. It likewise contains information with respect to many things which contribute to physiology, and to those dogmas which lead us to the truth concerning divine natures themselves. Hence too the
divine

divine Iamblichus assigned this dialogue the first rank, in the ten dialogues, in which he was of opinion the whole philosophy of Plato was contained.

Of the particulars exhibited in this dialogue, some precede and others follow the principal design, which is the knowledge of ourselves. For the hypothesis of twofold ignorance¹, exhortation, and the like precede; but the demonstration of virtue and felicity, and the rejection of the multitude of arts, as being ignorant of themselves, of things pertaining to themselves, and in short of all things,—and every thing else of this kind, have a consequent order. But the most perfect and leading design of the whole conversation is the speculation of our own essence. So that he will not err who establishes the care and knowledge of ourselves, as the end of the dialogue.

Again, the amatory form of life is particularly indicated by Socrates in this dialogue. For the beginning is made from hence; and he proceeds perfecting the young man till he renders him a lover of his providential care, which is the leading good of the amatory art. And in short, through all the divisions of the dialogue, he always preserves that which is adapted to an amatory life. As there are three sciences, then, which Socrates appears to have testified that he possessed, viz. the dialectic, the maieutic, (i. e. obstetric,) and the amatory, we shall find the form of the dialectic and the peculiarity of the maieutic science in this dialogue, but the effects of the amatory science predominate in it. For, when Socrates is calling forth the conceptions of Alcibiades, he still acts conformably to the amatory character; and when he employs the dialectic science, he does not depart from the peculiarity of amatory arguments. Just as in the *Theætetus* he is maieutic, is principally characterized according to this, and proceeds as far as to a purification of the false opinions of *Theætetus*; but, having effected this, he dismisses him, as being now able of himself to know the truth, which is the business of the maieutic science, as he himself asserts in that dialogue. Thus also he first indicates the amatory science in this dialogue, with which both the dialectic and maieutic are

¹ Twofold ignorance takes place when a man is ignorant that he is ignorant; and this was the case with Alcibiades in the first part of this dialogue, and is the disease of the multitude.

mingled. For every where Socrates introduces discourses adapted to the subject persons. And as every kind of good pre-substits in a divine nature, which is variously possessed by different beings according to the natural aptitude of each, in like manner Socrates, who comprehends all sciences in himself, employs a different science at different times, according to the aptitude of the recipients; elevating one through the amatory science; exciting another to the reminiscence of the eternal reasons of the soul through the maieutic science; and conducting another according to the dialectic method to the speculation of beings. Some too he conjoins to the beautiful itself, others to the first wisdom, and others to *the good itself*. For through the amatory science we are led to the beautiful; through the maieutic, by calling forth our latent reasons, we become wise in things of which we were ignorant; and through the dialectic science we ascend as far as to *the good*.

Lastly, it will be found by those who are deeply skilled in the philosophy of Plato, that each of his dialogues contains that which the universe contains. Hence, in every dialogue, one thing is analogous to *the good*, another to *intellect*, another to *soul*, another to *form*, and another to *matter*. In this dialogue therefore it must be said, that an assimilation to a divine nature is analogous to *the good*; the knowledge of ourselves to *intellect*; the multitude of the demonstrations leading us to the conclusion, and in short every thing syllogistic in the dialogue, to *soul*; the character of the diction, and whatever else pertains to the power of speech, to *form*; and the persons, the occasion, and that which is called by rhetoricians the hypothesis, to *matter*.

THE

THE
FIRST ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SCENE, (most probably) THE LYCEUM.

SOCRATES.

SON of Clinias! you wonder, I suppose, that I, who was the earliest of your admirers¹, now, when all the rest have forsaken you, am the only one who still retains unalterably the same sentiments; and yet, that for so many years I have never spoken so much as a word to you, whilst the others were pressing through crowds of people to converse with you. This reserve and distance in my behaviour have been owing to no human regards, but to an impediment thrown in my way by a dæmoniack nature², the
power

¹ Socrates, we are told by Plutarch, had discovered in the countenance of Alcibiades, then in his puerile age, the signs of an ingenuous and noble disposition. Having thence conceived expectations of the boy's becoming an extraordinary man, he had from that time, as we are told in this dialogue, been a constant observer of all his motions, sayings and actions. When Alcibiades was grown up to his full stature, he was followed and surrounded, wherever he went, by such as admired the handsomeness of his person. They flattered his vanity; but the higher opinion they raised in him of himself, the more he thought himself above them. His conduct towards them was suitable to his thoughts, was such as might become an absolute lord toward his vassals. See *Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades*.—S.

² As there is no vacuum in corporeal, so neither in incorporeal natures. Between divine essences, therefore, which are the first of things, and partial essences such as ours, which are nothing more than the dregs of the rational nature, there must necessarily be a middle rank of beings, in order that divinity may be connected with man, and that the progression of things may form an entire whole, suspended like the golden chain of Homer from the summit of Olympus.

power and force of which you shall by and by be made acquainted with. But now, seeing that this power no longer operates to hinder my approach,
I am

Olympus. This middle rank of beings, considered according to a twofold division, consists of dæmons and heroes, the latter of which is proximate to partial souls such as ours, and the former to divine natures, just as air and water subsist between fire and earth. Hence whatever is ineffable and occult in the gods, dæmons and heroes express and unfold. They likewise conciliate all things, and are the sources of the harmonic consent and sympathy of all things with each other. They transmit divine gifts to us, and equally carry back ours to the divinities. But the characteristics of divine natures are unity, permanency in themselves, a subsistence as an immovable cause of motion, transcendent providence, and which possesses nothing in common with the subjects of their providential energies; and these characteristics are preserved in them according to essence, power and energy. On the other hand, the characteristics of partial souls are, a declination to multitude and motion, a conjunction with the gods, an aptitude to receive something from other natures, and to mingle together all things in itself, and through itself; and these characteristics they also possess according to essence, power and energy. Such then being the peculiarities of the two extremes, we shall find that those of dæmons are, to contain in themselves the gifts of divine natures, in a more inferior manner indeed than the gods, but yet so as to comprehend the conditions of subordinate natures, under the idea of a divine essence. In other words, the prerogatives of deity characterize, and absorb as it were by their powerful light, whatever dæmons possess peculiar to inferior beings. Hence they are multiplied indeed, but unitedly—mingled, but yet so that the unmingled predominates—and are moved, but with stability. On the contrary, heroes possess unity, identity, permanency, and every excellence, under the condition of multitude, motion, and mixture; viz. the prerogatives of subordinate predominate in these over the characteristics of superior natures. In short, dæmons and heroes are composed from the properties of the two extremes—gods and partial souls; but in dæmons there is more of the divine, and in heroes more of the human nature.

Having premised thus much, the Platonic reader will, I doubt not, gratefully accept the following admirable account of dæmons in general, and also of the dæmon of Socrates, from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on this dialogue.

“Let us now speak in the first place concerning dæmons in general; in the next place, concerning those that are allotted us in common; and, in the third place, concerning the dæmon of Socrates. For it is always requisite that demonstrations should begin from things more universal, and proceed from these as far as to individuals. For this mode of proceeding is natural, and is more adapted to science. Dæmons therefore, deriving their first subsistence from the vivific goddess¹, and flowing from thence as from a certain fountain, are allotted an essence characterized by soul. This essence in those of a superior order is more intellectual and more perfect according to *hyparxis*²; in those of a middle order, it is more rational; and in those which rank in the third degree, and which subsist at the extremity of the dæmoni-

¹ i. e. Juno.

² i. e. the summit of essence.

I am come thus to accost you ; and am in good hopes too, that for the future the dæmon will give no opposition to my desire of conversing with

acal order, it is various, more irrational and more material. Possessing therefore an essence of this kind, they are distributed in conjunction with the gods, as being allotted a power ministrant to deity. Hence they are in one way subservient to the liberated gods¹ (*ἀπολυτοὶ θεοὶ*), who are the leaders of wholes prior to the world; and in another to the mundane gods, who proximately preside over the parts of the universe. For there is one division of dæmons, according to the twelve supercelestial gods, and another according to all the idioms of the mundane gods. For every mundane god is the leader of a certain dæmoniacal order, to which he proximately imparts his power ; viz. if he is a demiurgic god, he imparts a demiurgic power ; if immutable, an undefiled power ; if teleiurgic, a perfective power. And about each of the divinities there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons, and which are dignified with the same appellations as their leading gods. Hence they rejoice when they are called by the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hermes, &c. as expressing the idiom or peculiarity of their proper deities. And from these, mortal natures also participate of divine influxions. And thus animals and plants are fabricated, bearing the images of different gods ; dæmons proximately imparting to these the representations of their leaders. But the gods in an exempt manner supernally preside over dæmons ; and through this, last natures sympathize with such as are first. For the representations of first are seen in last natures ; and the causes of things last are comprehended in primary beings. The middle genera too of dæmons give completion to wholes, the communion of which they bind and connect ; participating indeed of the gods, but participated by mortal natures. He therefore will not err who asserts that the mundane artificer established the centres of the order of the universe in dæmons ; since Diotima also assigns them this order, that of binding together divine and mortal natures, of deducing supernal streams, elevating all secondary natures to the gods, and giving completion to wholes through the connexion of a medium. We must not therefore assent to their doctrine, who say that dæmons are the souls of men that have changed the present life. For it is not proper to consider a dæmoniacal nature *according to habitude* (*κατὰ σῆμα*) : as the same with a nature *essentially* dæmoniacal ; nor to assert that the perpetual medium of all mundane natures consists from a life conversant with multiform mutations. For a dæmoniacal guard subsists always the same, connecting the mundane wholes ; but soul does not always thus retain its own order, as Socrates says in the Republic ; since at different times it chooses different lives. Nor do we praise those who make certain of the gods to be dæmons, such as the erratic gods, according to Amelius ; but we are persuaded by Plato, who calls the gods the rulers of the universe, but subjects to them the herds of dæmons ; and we shall every where preserve the doctrine of Diotima, who assigns the middle order, between all divine and mortal natures, to a dæmoniacal essence. Let this then be the conception respecting the whole of the dæmoniacal order in common.

¹ i. e. gods who immediately subsist above the mundane deities, and are therefore called supercelestial.

with you. All this while, however, being but a spectator, I have been able tolerably well to observe and consider your behaviour with regard to

“In the next place let us speak concerning the dæmons which are allotted mankind. For of these dæmons, which as we have said rank in the middle order, the first and highest are divine dæmons, and who often appear as gods, through their transcendent similitude to the divinities. For, in short, that which is first in every order preserves the form of the nature prior to itself. Thus, the first intellect is a god, and the most antient of souls is intellectual: and hence of dæmons the highest genus, as being proximate to the gods, is uniform and divine. The next to these in order are those dæmons who participate of an intellectual idiom, and preside over the ascent and descent of souls, and who unfold into light and deliver to all things the productions of the gods. The third are those who distribute the productions of divine souls to secondary natures, and complete the bond of those that receive defluxions from thence. The fourth are those that transmit the efficacious powers of whole natures to things generated and corrupted, and who inspire partial natures with life, order, reasons, and the all-various perfect operations which things mortal are able to effect. The fifth are corporeal, and bind together the extremes in bodies. For, how can perpetual accord with corruptible bodies, and efficient with effects, except through this medium? For it is this ultimate middle nature which has dominion over corporeal goods, and provides for all natural prerogatives. The sixth in order are those that revolve about matter, connect the powers which descend from celestial to sublunary matter, perpetually guard this matter, and defend the shadowy representation of forms which it contains.

“Dæmons therefore, as Diotima also says, being many and all-various, the highest of them conjoin souls proceeding from their father, to their leading gods: for every god, as we have said, is the leader in the first place of dæmons, and in the next of partial souls. For the Demiurgus disseminated these, as Timæus says, into the sun and moon, and the other instruments of time. These divine dæmons, therefore, are those which are essentially allotted to souls, and conjoin them to their proper leaders: and every soul, though it revolves together with its leading deity, requires a dæmon of this kind. But dæmons of the second rank preside over the ascensions and descensions of souls; and from these the souls of the multitude derive their elections. For the most perfect souls, who are conversant with generation in an undefiled manner, as they choose a life conformable to their presiding god, so they live according to a divine dæmon, who conjoined them to their proper deity when they dwelt on high. Hence the Egyptian priest admired Plotinus, as being governed by a divine dæmon. To souls therefore who live as those that will shortly return to the intelligible world whence they came, the supernal is the same with the dæmon which attends them here; but to imperfect souls the essential is different from the dæmon that attends them at their birth.

“If these things then are rightly asserted, we must not assent to those who make our rational soul a dæmon. For a dæmon is different from man, as Diotima says, who places dæmons between gods and men, and as Socrates also evinces when he divides a dæmoniacal oppositely to the human nature: ‘for,’ says he, ‘not a human but a dæmoniacal obstacle

to your admirers. And I find, that, though they have been numerous, and such persons too as¹ thought highly of themselves, there is not one whom

detains me.' But man is a soul using the body as an instrument. A dæmon, therefore, is not the same with the rational soul.

"This also is evident from Plato in the *Timæus*, where he says that intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to essence is different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many instances that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a dæmon with respect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illustrious dæmon; and Plato, in the *Timæus*, calls those gods who proximately preside over, and orderly distribute the realms of generation, dæmons: 'for,' says he, 'to speak concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the ability of human nature.' But a dæmon according to analogy is that which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a god, or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the gods. And the soul that through similitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and which suspends the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon *κατὰ σχεσιν*, according to habitude, i. e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it appears to me, Socrates in the *Republic* calls those, dæmons, who have lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential dæmon is neither called a dæmon through habitude to secondary natures, nor through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain summit, or flower of essence, (*hyparxis*), by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies. In short, the rational soul is called in the *Timæus* the dæmon of the animal. But we investigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal; that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument; and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of the animal, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*. For, when the animal is no more, the dæmon which the soul was allotted while connected with the body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that dæmon while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after death, this dæmon must be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal alone. To which we may add, that, beginning from on high, it governs the whole of our composition.

"Nor again, dismissing the rational soul, must it be said that a dæmon is that which energizes in the soul: as, for instance, that in those who live according to reason, reason is the dæmon; in those that live according to anger, the irascible part; and in those that live according

¹ Amongst these was Anytus, who not long after became a bitter enemy to the great philosopher. And probably this was one of the motives of his enmity, some suspicion that Socrates had supplanted him in the favour and friendship of Alcibiades. For a suspicion of this sort always begets envy in little minds; and from envy always springs the most malicious hatred.—S.

whom you have not driven away from you by your superior¹ haughtiness and imagined elevation. The reasons of your being exalted so highly

according to desire, the desiderative part. Nor must it be said that the nature which proximately presides over that which energizes in our life, is a dæmon: as, for instance, that reason is the dæmon of the irascible, and anger of those that live according to desire. For, in the first place, to assert that dæmons are parts of our soul, is to admire human life in an improper degree, and oppose the division of Socrates in the Republic, who after gods and dæmons places the heroic and human race, and blames the poets for introducing in their poems heroes in no respect better than men, but subject to similar passions. By this accusation, therefore, it is plain that Socrates was very far from thinking that dæmons, who are of a sublimer order than heroes, are to be ranked among the parts and powers of the soul. For from this doctrine it will follow that things more excellent according to essence give completion to such as are subordinate. And in the second place, from this hypothesis, mutations of lives would also introduce multiform mutations of dæmons. For the avaricious character is frequently changed into an ambitious life, this again into a life which is formed by right opinion, and this last into a scientific life. The dæmon therefore will vary according to these changes: for the energizing part will be different at different times. If, therefore, either this energizing part itself is a dæmon, or that part which has an arrangement prior to it, dæmons will be changed together with the mutation of human life, and the same person will have many dæmons in one life; which is of all things the most impossible. For the soul never changes in one life the government of its dæmon; but it is the same dæmon which presides over us till we are brought before the judges of our conduct, as also Socrates asserts in the Phædo.

"Again, those who consider a partial intellect, or that intellect which subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, as the same with the dæmon which is assigned to man, appear to me to confound the intellectual idiom with the dæmoniacal essence. For all dæmons subsist in the extent of souls, and rank as the next in order to divine souls; but the intellectual order is different from that of soul, and is neither allotted the same essence, nor power, nor energy.

"Further still: this also may be said, that souls enjoy intellect then only when they convert themselves to it, receive its light, and conjoin their own with intellectual energy; but they experience the presiding care of a dæmoniacal nature through the whole of life, and in every thing which proceeds from fate and providence. For it is the dæmon that governs the whole of our life, and that fulfils the elections which we made prior to generation, together with the gifts of fate, and of those gods that preside over fate. It is likewise the dæmon that supplies and measures the illuminations from providence. And as souls, indeed, we are suspended from intellect,

¹ Here is painted the most distinguishing feature in the character of Alcibiades. For Plutarch assures us, that the strongest of his passions, though all of them were vehement, was a love of superiority and pre-eminence in all things. And Ælian in Var. Hist. l. 4. c. 16. represents him as the pattern of arrogance; as if no person could ever in this quality exceed him.—S.

highly in your own opinion, I am desirous of laying before you. They are these: You presume, that in no affair whatever you need assistance from

intellect, but as souls using the body we require the aid of a *dæmon*. Hence Plato, in the *Phædrus*, calls intellect the governor of the soul; but he every where calls a *dæmon* the inspector and guardian of mankind. And no one who considers the affair rightly, will find any other one and proximate providence of every thing pertaining to us, besides that of a *dæmon*. For intellect, as we have said, is participated by the rational soul, but not by the body; and nature is participated by the body, but not by the *dianoëtic* part. And further still, the rational soul rules over anger and desire, but it has no dominion over fortuitous events. But the *dæmon* alone moves, governs, and orderly disposes, all our affairs. For he gives perfection to reason, measures the passions, inspires nature, connects the body, supplies things fortuitous, accomplishes the decrees of fate, and imparts the gifts of providence. In short, he is the king of every thing in and about us, and is the pilot of the whole of our life. And thus much concerning our allotted *dæmons*.

“In the next place, with respect to the *dæmon* of Socrates, these three things are to be particularly considered. First, that he not only ranks as a *dæmon*, but also as a god: for in the course of this dialogue he clearly says, ‘I have long been of opinion that *the god* did not as yet direct me to hold any conversation with you.’

“He calls the same power, therefore, a *dæmon* and a god. And in the *Apology* he more clearly evinces that this *dæmon* is allotted a divine transcendence, considered as ranking in a *dæmoniacal* nature. And this is what we before said, that the *dæmons* of divine souls, and who make choice of an intellectual and anagogic life, are divine, transcending the whole of a *dæmoniacal* genus, and being the first participants of the gods. For, as is a *dæmon* among gods, such also is a god among *dæmons*. But among the divinities the *hyperxis* is divine; but in *dæmons*, on the contrary, the idiom of their essence is *dæmoniacal*, but the analogy which they bear to divinity evinces their essence to be godlike. For, on account of their transcendence with respect to other *dæmons*, they frequently appear as gods. With great propriety, therefore, does Socrates call his *dæmon* a god: for he belonged to the first and highest *dæmons*. Hence Socrates was most perfect, being governed by such a presiding power, and conducting himself by the will of such a leader and guardian of his life. This then was one of the illustrious prerogatives of the *dæmon* of Socrates. The second was this: that Socrates perceived a certain voice proceeding from his *dæmon*. For this is asserted by him in the *Theætetus* and in the *Phædrus*. And this voice is the signal from the *dæmon*, which he speaks of in the *Theages*: and again in the *Phædrus*, when he was about to pass over the river, he experienced the accustomed signal from the *dæmon*. What, then, does Socrates indicate by these assertions, and what was the voice through which he says the *dæmon* signified to him his will?

“In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his *dianoëtic* power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his *dæmon*, who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential attention to more imperfect souls; and according to the energy of his *dæmon*, he received the light
proceeding

from any other party : for that what you have of your own, whether of outward advantages or inward accomplishments, is so great as to be all-sufficient.

proceeding from thence, neither in his dianoëtic part alone, nor in his doxastic¹ powers, but also in his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon suddenly diffusing itself through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is moved by, the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice, therefore, did not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the dæmoniacal inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which was rather recognized by consciousness (*συνείσθησις*) than by sense: for such are the illuminations of good dæmons, and the gods.

"In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of Socrates: for it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him. This also must again be referred to the Socratic life: for it is not a property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of the guardian of Socrates. We must say, therefore, that the beneficent and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude with respect to the communication of good, did not require the exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a good charioteer alone restrains the impetus of a horse naturally well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling than an exciting dæmon. For the unaptitude of auditors, which is for the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a dæmoniacal discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his unseasonable impulses.

"But further still, it may be said, that of dæmons, some are allotted a purifying and undefiled power; others a generative; others a perfective; and others a demiurgic power: and, in short, they are divided according to the characteristic peculiarities of the gods, and the powers under which they are arranged. Each, likewise, according to his *hyparxis*, incites the object of his providential care to a blessed life; some of them moving us to an attention to inferior concerns; and others restraining us from action, and an energy verging to externals. It appears, therefore, that the dæmon of Socrates being allotted this peculiarity, viz. cathartic, and the source of an undefiled life, and being arranged under this power of Apollo, and uniformly presiding over the whole of purification, separated also Socrates from too much commerce with the vulgar, and a life extending itself into multitude. But it led him into the depths of his soul, and an energy undefiled by subordinate natures: and hence it never exhorted, but perpetually recalled him.

¹ i. e. the powers belonging to *opinion*, or that part of the soul which knows *that* a thing is, but not *why* it is.

sufficient. In the first place, you think yourself excelling in the handsomeness¹ of your person and in the fineness of your figure. And in this opinion it is evident to every one who has eyes that you are not mistaken. In the next place, you dwell on these thoughts: that you are descended from families the most illustrious in the state to which you belong²; that this state is the greatest of any in Greece; that you have friends here, and relations on your father's side, very numerous and very powerful, ready to assist you on every occasion; and that your relations on your mother's side are not inferior to them, either in power or in number. But a greater strength than from all these whom I have mentioned, taken together, you think that you derive from Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian to yourself and to your brother: Pericles, who is able to do what he pleases; and that, not only at Athens, but throughout all Greece, and with many and great families abroad. To all these advantages I shall add the greatness of your estate; though, indeed, on this advantage you seem to value yourself less³ than you do

For, what else is to recall, than to withdraw him from the multitude to inward energy? And of what is this the peculiarity except of purification? Indeed it appears to me, that, as Orpheus places the Apolloniacal monad over king Bacchus, which recalls him from a progression into Titanic multitude and a desertion of his royal throne, in like manner the dæmon of Socrates conducted him to an intellectual place of survey, and restrained his association with the multitude. For the dæmon is analogous to Apollo, being his attendant, but the intellect of Socrates to Bacchus: for our intellect is the progeny of the power of this divinity."—T.

¹ That Alcibiades, says Proclus in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, was large and beautiful, is evident from his being called the general object of the love of all Greece; and is also evident from the saying of Antisthenes, that if Achilles was not such as Alcibiades, he was not truly beautiful; and from Hermæ being fashioned according to his form. Ὅτι δὲ αὐτὸς μέγας ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐγένετο καὶ καλλὸς, ὅλοι μὲν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτὸν ἐρωμένον καλεῖσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἅπασης; ὅλοι δὲ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἰπὼν, ὡς εἰ μὴ τοῖντος ἢ ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, καὶ ἀρὰ ἦν οὕτως καλὸς; ὅλοι δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἑρμῆος πλατύνειν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ — Γ.

² For an account of the noble descent of Alcibiades, see Pausan. lib. 1. Thucyd. lib. 6. Isocrat. *περὶ ζευγὸς*. Andocid. in Orat. 4tâ.—T.

³ History testifies that Alcibiades from his childhood paid but little attention to the acquisition of wealth. Indeed, according to Plato, one of the greatest arguments of being well born is a contempt of wealth; and hence, in the Republic, he makes this to be one of the elements of the philosophic nature. For an aptitude to virtue is inconsistent with an attachment to riches. Indeed, since it is requisite that a genuine lover of virtue should despise the body, is it not much more necessary that he should despise the goods of the body?

But,

do on any other. Elevated as you are in your own mind on these accounts, you have looked down on your admirers : and they, conscious of their comparative meanness, have bowed their heads, and have retired.

But, assuming a more elevated exordium, let us consider from what conceptions souls become so much attached to beauty and magnitude of body, to nobility, and power : for these are images extended to souls of realities themselves, which the intelligent despise, but the stupid embrace with avidity. We must say, therefore, that beauty and magnitude appear in the first of the divine orders ;—the former rendering all divine natures lovely, and desirable to secondary beings ; and the latter causing them to transcend mundane wholes, and to be exempt from their proper progeny. For magnitude, according to Plato, considered as a divine idea, is that cause by which every where one thing transcends another. Of those two great principles likewise, *bound* and *infinity*, which are next in dignity and power to the ineffable principle of things, *bound* is the source of beauty, and *infinity* of magnitude. Hence the alliance of beauty to the former, as being the form of forms, and as swimming on the light of all intelligible forms ; but of magnitude to the latter, from its incomprehensibility, from its embracing all things and subduing all things. From the first principles, therefore, beauty and magnitude proceed through all the middle orders, as far as to the apparent world, which, according to Timæus, they perfectly render the greatest and the most beautiful of sensible gods. Souls therefore, according to their spontaneous innate conceptions, pre-assume that these shine forth in divine natures ; and hence they admire beauty and magnitude in mortal bodies, as possessing a resemblance of their divine originals. However, through their ignorance of the true archetypes, they are detained by, and alone admire, the obscure and fleeting imitations of real beauty and magnitude.

In the second place, with respect to nobility, this also first subsists in divine natures. For things which derive their subsistence from more elevated causes transcend according to genus those which are generated in secondary ranks. This is also evident from Homer, who makes Juno say to Jupiter :

..... thence is my race derived, whence thine :

and in consequence of this she wishes to possess an equal dominion in the universe with Jupiter. According to this conception, you may also say that in us the rational is more noble than the irrational soul, because, according to Plato in the Timæus, the artificer of the universe gave subsistence to the former—but the junior gods, or those powers that preside over the mundane spheres, to the latter. Natural succession is the image of this nobility ; to which when souls alone direct their attention, they become filled with vain conceptions, and are ignorant of what Plato asserts in the Theætetus, that it is by no means wonderful, in the infinity of time past, if he who is able to enumerate five-and-twenty noble ancestors, should find, by ascending higher in antiquity, that these progenitors were descended from as many slaves. But the stable and perpetual alliance of souls is suspended from divine natures, about which they are disseminated, and from divine powers under which they are arranged. For the attendants of more exalted deities are more noble, as likewise are those powers which are suspended from greater divinities, according to an allotment in the universe.—T.

This you are very sensible of: and therefore I well know that you wonder what I can have in my thoughts, or what hopes I can entertain, seeing that I quit you not, but continue my attachment to you still, when your other admirers have all forsaken you.

ALC. This however, Socrates, perhaps you do not know, that you have been a little beforehand with me. For I really had it in my mind to address you first, and to ask you these very questions: What can possibly be your meaning, and with what views or expectations is it, that you continually press on me, and, wherever I am, are assiduous to be there yourself? for I do in truth wonder, what your business can be with me, and should be very glad to be informed.

Soc. You will hear me then, 'tis to be supposed, with willingness and attention, if you really are desirous, as you say you are, of knowing what I have in my thoughts. I speak therefore as to a person disposed to hear, and to stay till he has heard all.

ALC. I am entirely so disposed: it is your part to speak.

Soc. But observe this: you must not wonder, if, as I found it difficult to make a beginning, I should find it no less difficult to make an end.

ALC. My good man, say all you have to say; for I shall not fail to attend to you.

Soc. I must say it then: and though it is a hard task for any man to address the person whom he loves or admires, if that person be superior to flattery, yet I must adventure boldly to speak my mind. If, Alcibiades, I had observed you satisfied with those advantages of yours, which I just now enumerated; if you had appeared to indulge the fancy of spending your whole life in the enjoyment of them; I persuade myself, that my love and admiration of you would have long since left me. But that you entertain thoughts very different from such as those, I shall now show, and shall lay your own mind open before yourself. By these means you will also plainly perceive, how constantly and closely my mind has attended to you. My opinion of you then is this: That, if any of the gods were to put this question to you,—“Alcibiades!” were he to say, “whether do you choose to live in the possession of all the things which are at present yours; or do you prefer immediate death, if you are not permitted ever to acquire things greater?” in this case, it appears to me that you would make
death

death your option. But what kind of expectations you live in, I shall now declare. You think, that, if you speedily make your appearance before the Athenian people in assembly, (and this you purpose to do within a few days,) you shall be able to convince them, that you merit higher honours than were ever bestowed on Pericles, or any other person in any age : and having convinced them of this, you think that you will arrive at the chief power in the state; and if here at home, that you will then have the greatest weight and influence abroad; and not only so with the rest of the Grecian states, but with the barbarian nations too, as many as inhabit the same continent with us. And further: if the deity whom I before spoke of, allowing you larger limits, were to say to you, that “you must be contented with being the master here in Europe; for that ’twill not be permitted you to pass over into Asia, nor to concern yourself with the administration of any affairs there;” it appears to me, that neither on these terms, thus limited, would you think life eligible; nor on any terms, indeed, that fell short of filling, in a manner, the whole world with your renown, and of being every where lord and master. I believe you deem no man that ever lived, excepting Cyrus and Xerxes, worth the speaking of. In fine, that you entertain such hopes as I have mentioned, I know with certainty, and speak not from mere conjecture. Now you, perhaps, conscious of the truth of what I have spoken, might say, What is all this to the account you promised to give me, of the reasons for which your attachment to me still continues? I will tell you then, dear son of Clinias and Dinomache! That all these thoughts of yours should ever come to an end, is impossible without my help,—so great power I think myself to have with regard to your affairs and to yourself too. For this reason, I have long been of opinion, that the god¹ did not as yet permit me to hold any conversation with you; and I waited for the time when he would give me leave. For, as you entertain hopes of proving to the people, that your value to them is equal to whatever they can give you; and as you expect that, having proved this point, you shall immediately obtain whatever power you desire; in the same manner do I expect to have the greatest power and influence over

¹ That is, the demon of Socrates. See the note at the beginning of the dialogue concerning demons.—T.

you, when I shall have proved that I am valuable to you ¹ more than any other thing is ; and that neither guardian, nor relation, nor any other person, is able to procure you the power you long for, except myself ; with the assistance, however, of the god. So long therefore as you was yet too young, and before you had your mind filled with those swelling hopes, I believe that the god would not permit me to have discourse with you, because you would not have regarded me, and I consequently should have discoursed in vain ; but that he has now given me free leave, for that you would now hearken to me.

ALC. Much more unaccountable and absurd do you appear to me now, Socrates, since you have begun to open yourself, than when you followed me every where without speaking to me a word : and yet you had all the appearance of being a man of that fort then. As to what you have said, whether I entertain those thoughts in my mind, or not, you, it seems, know with certainty : so that, were I to say I did not, the denial would not avail me, nor persuade you to believe me. Admitting it then, and supposing that I indulge the hopes you mentioned ever so much, how they may be accomplished by means of you, and that without your help they never can, are you able to prove to me ?

Soc. Do you ask me, whether I am able to prove it to you in a long harangue, such a one as you are accustomed to hear ? I have no abilities in that way. But yet I should be able, as I think, to prove to you, that those pretensions of mine are not vain, if you would be willing but to do me one small piece of service.

ALC. If that service be not difficult to be done, I am willing.

Soc. Do you think it difficult, or not, to make answers to such questions as are proposed to you ?

ALC. Not difficult.

Soc. Be ready then to answer.

ALC. Do you then propose your questions.

Soc. May I propose them, with a supposition that you have those thoughts in your mind which I attribute to you ?

¹ In the Greek text, as it is printed, the word σοι is here omitted, but seems necessary to be inserted, and the passage to be read thus, ὅτι παντός μάλλον ἀξίος σοι εἰμι, κ. τ. λ. so as to correspond, as it ought, with these words in the preceding part of the sentence, ὅτι αὐτὴ παντός ἀξίος εἰ.—S.

ALC. Be it so, if you choose it; that I may know what further you have to say.

Soc. Well then. You have it in your mind, as I said, to appear in presence of the Athenians within a short time, with intention to harangue them and give them your advice. If therefore, when you are just ready to mount the rostrum, I were to stop you, and to say thus, "Since the Athenians are here met in assembly, on purpose to deliberate on some of their affairs, what, I pray you, are to be the subjects of their deliberation, now that you rise up to give them your counsel? Must not the subjects be such as you are better acquainted with than they?" what answer would you make me?

ALC. I certainly should answer, that the subjects were such as I knew better than others who were present.

Soc. On those subjects, then, which you happen to have knowledge in you are a good counsellor?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. Have you knowledge in those things only which you have either learnt from others, or found out yourself?

ALC. What things other than those is it possible that I should have any knowledge in?

Soc. And is it possible that ever you should have learnt, or have found out, any thing which you was not willing to learn, or to search out by yourself?

ALC. It is not.

Soc. And was you ever at any time willing to learn, or did you ever at any time seek to know, any things in which you imagined yourself to be already knowing?

ALC. No, certainly.

Soc. In those things which you now happen to know, was there once a time when you did not think yourself knowing?

ALC. That must have been.

Soc. Now, what the things are which you have learnt, I tolerably well know. But if you have been taught any thing without my knowledge, tell me what. To the best of my memory, you have been taught grammar, the gymnastic exercises, and to play on stringed instruments of music:

music: for on wind-instruments, besides, you refused to learn¹. This is the sum total of all your knowledge; unless you have learnt any thing else in some place or other, which I have not discovered: and I think, that neither by day nor yet by night did you ever stir out of doors but I was acquainted with all your motions.

ALC. 'Tis true that I have not gone to any other masters than to such as taught the arts which you have mentioned.

Soc. Well then. When the Athenians are consulting together about the grammar of their language, how to write or speak it with propriety, at these times is it that you will rise up to give them your advice?

ALC. By Jove, not I.

Soc. But is it then when they are in debate about striking chords on the lyre?

ALC. By no means should I make a speech on such a subject.

Soc. It cannot be on the subject of wrestling neither: because they never use to deliberate on this subject in their public assemblies.

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. On what subject, then, of their consultations is it that you intend the giving them your advice? It cannot be when building is the subject.

ALC. No, certainly.

Soc. Because in this case a builder would give them better advice than you could.

ALC. True.

Soc. Nor yet is it when they consult together concerning divination.

ALC. It is not.

Soc. For a diviner would in this case be a better counsellor than you.

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And that, whether he was a tall or a short man²; whether his person

¹ Alleging, that the performances on such instruments were illiberal, and unbecoming to a gentleman; that they were ungraceful, and distorting to the face; and could not, like those on stringed instruments, such as the lyre, be accompanied by the voice of the performer. See Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades; and A. Gellius, lib. 15. c. 17.—S.

² These external advantages of person and of birth, in any speaker, always dazzle the eyes and imagination of the vulgar, and divert their attention, as well from the matter of the speech as from the manner in which it is spoken. The most ignorant and barbarian nations too, in all

person was handsome or deformed ; and whether his family was noble or ignoble.

ALC. How should it be otherwise ?

Soc. For to give good advice in any case whatever, belongs, I suppose, only to a person skilled in the subject, and not to a fine gentleman.

ALC. Beyond all question.

Soc. And whether the man who gives them his advice be rich or poor, it will make no difference to the Athenians, when they are consulting about the health of the city ; but they will always inquire after a physician only to consult with.

ALC. They will be right in so doing.

Soc. Now, on what subject is it, when they are met in consultation together, that you will do right in rising up and giving them your counsel ?

ALC. 'Tis when they are in consultation, Socrates, about their own affairs.

Soc. About increasing their navy, do you mean ? what sort of vessels they should provide, and in what manner they should have them built ?

ALC. I mean no such thing, Socrates.

Soc. Because you are ignorant, I presume, in the art of shipbuilding, Is not this the reason ? Or is there any other, why you would choose in such a consultation to sit silent ?

ALC. That is the only reason.

Soc. What affairs of their own then do you mean ?

ALC. I mean, Socrates, when they are deliberating about the making war, or the making peace ; or concerning any other affairs of state.

Soc. Do you mean, when they are deliberating on these points, with whom 'tis proper for them to make peace, and with whom to engage in war, and in what way 'tis proper to carry on that war ? Is this what you mean ?

all ages, have always been observed to lay the greatest stress on those circumstances, in choosing a king, a leader in war, or magistrates and counsellors in time of peace. Alcibiades was now too young and unexperienced to judge of men by better standards than those used by the vulgar and the ignorant, or to know the superior advantages of mental abilities and knowledge. The size of an understanding, the beauty of a soul, or the divine origin of the human mind, he had no more thought of, than he would have done had he been bred a plow-boy, or born a Hottentot.—S.

ALC.

ALC. It is.

Soc. And you will agree, that 'tis proper to make peace or war with those people with whom 'tis best so to do?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. And at that time when 'tis best?

ALC. By all means.

Soc. And to continue it so long as 'tis best to continue it?

ALC. To be sure.

Soc. Now, suppose that the Athenians were deliberating about the exercise of wrestling, with what sort of persons it is proper to come to close quarters, and with whom to engage at arm's length, and in what way, would you give the best counsel in this case, or would a master of the exercises?

ALC. Such a master, certainly.

Soc. Can you tell me now, what end such a master would have in his view, when he gave his counsel on these points, with whom it is proper to wrestle closely, and with whom not so? at what times it is proper, and in what manner? My meaning is to ask you these questions: Whether is it proper to wrestle closely with those persons with whom it is best so to wrestle, or is it not?

ALC. It is.

Soc. Whether as much also as is best?

ALC. As much.

Soc. Whether at those times too when 'tis best?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. But further: Ought not a finger sometimes, in fingering, to touch his lute, and to move his feet?

ALC. He ought.

Soc. Ought he not to do so at those times when 'tis best so to do?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. And to continue the doing so as long as 'tis best to continue it?

ALC. I agree.

Soc. Well now. Since you agree with me that there is a best in both these actions, in fingering the lute whilst fingering, and in the exercise of close wrestling, by what name call you that which is the best in fingering the lute?

lute? As that which is the best in wrestling I call gymnastical, what name now do you give to that which is best done in that other action?

ALC. I do not apprehend your meaning.

Soc. Try to copy after the pattern which I shall now give you. Supposing, then, that I had been asked this question, "In wrestling, how is that performed which is performed best?" I should answer, 'Tis performed in every respect rightly. Now, in wrestling, that performance is right which is according to the rules of art. Is it not?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And the art, in this case, is it not gymnastic?

ALC. Without dispute.

Soc. I said, that that which is the best in wrestling is gymnastical.

ALC. You did.

Soc. And was it not well said?

ALC. I think it was.

Soc. Come then. Do you in like manner (for it would not ill become you likewise to discourse well) say, in the first place, What is the art, to which belong the playing on the harp, the singing, and the moving at the same time, rightly all; the whole of this art, by what name is it called? Are you not yet able to tell?

ALC. Indeed I am not.

Soc. Try in this way then. What goddesses are those who preside over this art?

ALC. The muses mean you, Socrates?

Soc. I do. Consider now, what name is given to their art—a name derived from them.

ALC. I suppose you mean music.

Soc. The very thing. What then is that which is performed rightly, according to this art? Just as in the other case I told you, that whatever was performed rightly according to the rules of that other art, was gymnastical¹; in this case now, after the same manner², whatever is

¹ That is, gymnastically performed, or a gymnastic performance. We have thus translated the Greek in this place, on a supposition that the words *ἐν τῷ γυμναστικῷ* ought to be here read, instead

is performed agreeably to the rules of this art, how do you say it must be performed ?

ALC. Musically, I think.

SOC. You say well. Let us now proceed further ; and tell me, what name you give to that which is best in making war ; and what name to that which is best in making peace : just as, in the former cases, the best³ in one of them you called the more musical, in the other the more gymnastical. Try now in these cases likewise to name that which is the best.

ALC. I find myself quite unable to tell what it is.

SOC. 'Tis a shame to you that you are so. For, suppose you were speaking and giving your opinion concerning the superiority of one kind of food to another, and should say, that such or such a kind of food was the best at this season, and such or such a quantity of it ; and suppose a man should thereupon question you thus, "What do you mean by the best, Alcibiades ?" on these subjects you would be able to give him an answer, and to tell him, that by the best you meant the most wholesome ; and this you would say, notwithstanding that you do not profess to be a physician. And yet, on a subject which you profess to have the knowledge of, and rise up to give your judgment and advice on, as if you had this knowledge, are you not ashamed, when you are questioned, as I think you are, on this very subject, to be unable to give an answer, and to tell what is that which is the best ? And must not this inability appear to others shameful in you ?

instead of *τὴν γυμναστικὴν*. Let the learned reader judge, whether our supposition be well founded or not, after he has read a little further on in the original.—S.

² The sameness of manner in these two cases consists in the similitude between the two paronymies. For the paronymous terms, music, musical, and musically, exactly correspond with those of gymnastic, gymnastical, and gymnastically.—S.

³ This passage in the original, as printed severally by Aldus, Walder, Henry Peters, and Henry Stephens, runs thus :—ὡςπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ εἰλεγες τῷ ἀμεινόνι, ὅτι μυσικώτερον· καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον. But if we conjecture rightly, it should be printed thus : ὡςπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ εἰλεγες ΤΟ ΑΜΕΙΝΟΝ· ἓΝΙ, ὃ, τῇ μυσικώτερον· καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ὃ, τῇ γυμναστικώτερον. Our conjecture is favoured by the Latin translation, which Ficinus made from a MS. copy of Plato. Long since we wrote this, we have found the following emendation of this passage, made by Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, ὡςπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἑΤΕΡΩΙ εἰλεγες ΤΟ ΑΜΕΙΝΟΝ, ὅτι μυσικώτερον· κ. τ. λ. And this way of reading the sentence we should prefer to our own conjecture, but that ours is quite agreeable to the translation of Ficinus, followed herein by Dacier ; and also that the error is thus more easily accounted for, and the alteration of the text less.—S.

ALC. Certainly it must.

Soc. Consider thoughtfully now, and tell me, What is the end or aim of that which is done best in the making or the continuing of peace, and likewise in the going to war with those with whom it is proper?

ALC. Well, I do consider; but cannot think of what it is.

Soc. Know you not, when we go to war, what it is which both the parties accuse each other of during their military preparations, and what names they give to the causes of their quarrels?

ALC. I do. They accuse each other of deceiving, or of offering violence, or of taking away some of their possessions.

Soc. But observe: How do they say they have been thus treated? Try to tell me what difference there is in the manner of this treatment they give to each other.

ALC. Do you mean, whether they thus treat each other justly or unjustly?

Soc. This is the very difference I mean.

ALC. These different manners of ill treatment differ totally and entirely.

Soc. Well then. With whom would you counsel the Athenians to engage in war? whether with those who treat them ill unjustly, or with those who treat them as they deserve?

ALC. A question, this, of very serious import. For, if any man should entertain a thought of the propriety of going to war with such as act uprightly, he would not dare to own it.

Soc. Because it is not lawful, I suppose, to engage in such a war.

ALC. By no means is it so, neither seems it to be beautiful.

Soc. With a view therefore to these things¹, and to what is just, you will make your speeches to the people.

¹ *These things* evidently mean *the lawful* and *the beautiful*, mentioned immediately before. The sentence in the original, as printed, is this; *προς ταυτ' ἀγα καὶ σὺ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς λόγους ποιήσῃ*. In which the words *καὶ σὺ* are undoubtedly transposed, and should be read *σὺ καὶ*. The transposition not being discovered by Stephens obliged him to change the word *ταυτα* into *ταυτο*, as belonging to *τὸ δίκαιον*, and therefore made to agree with it. This alteration supposes *νομικον* and *καλον*, *lawful* and *beautiful*, to be words merely synonymous with *δίκαιον*, *just*, consequently superfluous, and introduced to no purpose. The transposition must have been more ancient than any MS. of Plato now remaining; for it has corrupted not only the oldest editions, but the oldest translations too; infecting of course all those which came after.—S.

ALC. There is a necessity for bringing my arguments from these topics.

Soc. That best then, concerning which I just now asked you what it was,—the best on these subjects,—whether it is proper to go to war or not, with whom it is proper, and with whom not,—at what times it is proper, and when not,—does the best on these subjects appear to be any other thing than that which is the most agreeable to justice ? or does it not ?

ALC. It appears to be no other thing.

Soc. How is this, friend Alcibiades ? Is it a secret to yourself, that you are ignorant in the science of justice ? or else, Is it a secret to me, that you have learnt it, and have gone to some master, who has taught you to distinguish between what is the most agreeable to justice, and what is the most repugnant to it ? If this which I last mentioned be the case, who is this master ? Tell me ; that I too may go and learn of him, through your recommendation.

ALC. You banter, Socrates.

Soc. Not so ; by the guardian-god of friendship to both of us, you and me, whose deity I would least of all invoke for witness to a falsehood ! If then you have any master who teaches you that science, let me know who he is.

ALC. And what if I have not ? Do you think that I could by no other means have attained the knowledge of what is just, and what is unjust ?

Soc. I think that you would, if you had discovered it by yourself.

ALC. Are you then of opinion that I could not have discovered it by myself ?

Soc. I am entirely of opinion that you might, if ever you had fought for it.

ALC. Do you presume, then, that I have never fought for it ?

Soc. I should presume that you had, if ever you had thought yourself ignorant of it.

ALC. Was there not then a time when I so thought ?

Soc.

* In the Greek, as printed, the words are these,—*Εἴτε αὖ νῦν ὅτε αὖ εἴχον ἔτι*. We here suppose that the *αὖ* immediately before *εἴχον* ought to be omitted : and our supposition is favoured by

Soc. Well said. Can you tell me, then, at what time you did not imagine yourself to know what things are just, and what are unjust? For, come, let me ask you: Was it last year, when you inquired into these subjects, and did not imagine yourself already knowing in them? or did you at that time think that you had such knowledge? Answer truly now, that our argument may come to some conclusion.

ALC. Well then. I did at that time presume myself to be knowing in those subjects.

Soc. And in all the third year back from this present, in all the fourth too, and all the fifth, did you not presume of yourself the same?

ALC. I did.

Soc. And earlier than the time I mentioned last, you was but a boy.

ALC. True.

Soc. And in your days of boyhood I am well assured that you thought yourself knowing in those subjects.

ALC. How are you so sure of that?

Soc. Often in the schools, when you was a boy, and in other places too whenever you was playing at dice, or was a party in any other play, I have heard you talking about what things were just or unjust—not as if you had any doubts on those subjects, but very strenuously and boldly pronouncing, that 'such or such a one of your play-mates was a wicked boy, and a rogue, and was guilty of a piece of injustice. Is not all this true?

ALC. Well. But what else was I to do, when any of them injured me?

Soc. Right. But if you had happened to be ignorant of this very point,

Ficinus's translation. But if this latter *αὐτὸς* is to be retained, we should render this sentence into English thus: "Was there not a time when I had no such knowledge?" as if Socrates had granted him to have such knowledge at present. But the state of mind which Socrates is here speaking of, is that of a mind, besides being ignorant, *conscious* of its ignorance, and *not presuming* itself to have knowledge.—S.

* In the Greek it would be better perhaps to read *περὶ ὅτι τυχαίαι*, than *π. ο. τυχαίαι*, as it is printed. We have in this, as well as in other places where we have made conjectural emendations of the text, translated according to them. We should not however give them a place among these notes, but for the sake of accounting to such of our readers as are learned, for the turn we have given to those passages, different from that of the Greek text as it now stands, and from that of other translations.—S.

whether

whether you was injured or not, would you say, "What in such a case was I to do?"

ALC. But, by Jove, I was not ignorant of that point; for I clearly saw that I was injured.

SOC. You thought yourself, it seems, therefore, when you was a boy, knowing in the science of what is just and what is unjust?

ALC. I did so; and knowing in it I was too.

SOC. At what time was it that you first discovered it? for certainly it was not at a time when you thought yourself knowing in it.

ALC. That, 'tis clear, could not be.

SOC. At what time then was it that you thought yourself ignorant in it? Consider: but that time you will never find.

ALC. By Jove, Socrates, I am not able to tell when.

SOC. You did not acquire that knowledge, then, by any discovery of your own?

ALC. That does not at all appear to have been the case.

SOC. And besides, you acknowledged but just before, that you did not acquire it by being taught. If then you neither discovered it of yourself, nor was taught it by any other person, how or whence have you this knowledge?

ALC. Well. But I was wrong in my answers, when I supposed that I had found out that knowledge by myself.

SOC. In what way then did you acquire it?

ALC. I learnt it, I presume, in the same way in which others do.

SOC. We are now come round again to the same question as before: From whom did you learn it? Inform me.

ALC. From the people.

SOC. To no good teachers have you recourse for the origin of your knowledge, in referring it to the people.

ALC. Why so? Are not they capable of teaching?

SOC. Not so much as what movements are proper, and what improper, to make in a game at tables. And yet the knowledge of these

¹ We have here followed the text, as it is printed by Stephens, where we read λεγεις. The other editors give us λεγεις.—S.

things is meaner and more inconsiderable, in my opinion, than the knowledge of what things are just, and what are unjust. Do not you think so too?

ALC. I do.

Soc. Incapable, therefore, as they are of teaching meaner things, can they teach things higher and of more importance?

ALC. I think they can. Nay, it is certain that they are capable of teaching many things of more importance than the movements in a game at tables.

Soc. What things do you mean?

ALC. Such as, for instance, to speak the Greek language: for I myself learnt it from them. Nor could I name any other teacher of that language that I ever had; but must refer my being able to speak it to those very persons who you say are no good teachers.

Soc. Well, my noble sir: in this matter, indeed, the people are good teachers, and as such may justly be recommended.

ALC. Why particularly in this?

Soc. Because in this they possess all the requisites necessary to every good teacher.

ALC. What requisites do you mean?

Soc. Do you not know, that those who are to teach any thing must in the first place have the knowledge of it themselves? Must they not?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And must not all those who have the knowledge of any thing agree together on that subject, and not differ in their opinions of it?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. But where they differ among themselves in their opinions, would you say that they have, all of them, knowledge in those subjects?

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. Of such things, then, how can they be good teachers?

ALC. By no means can they.

Soc. Well now, Do the people seem to you to differ among themselves about the meaning of the words stone and wood? Ask whom you will, are they not all agreed in the same opinion? And when they are bid to take up a stone,

stone, or a piece of wood, do they not all go to the same kind of things? And do they not all apprehend alike, what kind of things every other such word signifies? For I presume this is what you mean by knowledge of the Greek language: is it not?

ALC. It is.

Soc. Now, on these subjects, as we said before, do not the people of our city agree among themselves? And among the several cities of Greece is there any difference of opinion? Do the same words, in different places, signify different things?

ALC. They do not.

Soc. On these subjects, therefore, agreeably to our argument, the people should be good teachers.

ALC. It is true.

Soc. If then we had a mind to have any person instructed in this matter, we should do right in sending him, for such instruction, amongst the multitude of the people?

ALC. Quite right.

Soc. But what if we had a mind to have that person taught, not only to know men from horses by the different words denoting them in the Greek language, but, beside this, to know what horses are fit for the race, and what are unfit? is the multitude able to teach this also?

ALC. Certainly, not.

Soc. And you admit this to be a sufficient proof of their ignorance in this matter, and of their inability to teach, that they agree not in their opinions on this head?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And what if we would have him learn, not only by what word in our language men are distinguished from other things, but, further, to know what men are healthy and who are unhealthy? whether should we deem the multitude to be the proper teachers for him?

ALC. By no means.

Soc. And it would be an evidence to you of their being bad teachers on this subject, if you saw them disagreeing in their opinions?

ALC. It would.

Soc.

Soc. And how is it now on the subject of justice? Do you find the multitude agreeing one with another, or even the same person always of the same mind, concerning either men or actions, who are the honest, or what is just?

ALC. Less than on any other subject, by Jove, Socrates, are they agreed with regard to this.

Soc. What? do you then think they differ on this subject more than upon any other?

ALC. By far do they.

Soc. You have never, I suppose, seen or heard of men, in any age, who contended for their several opinions concerning the wholesome and the unwholesome in food, with so much zeal as to fight and kill one another on that account?

ALC. Never.

Soc. But concerning just and unjust in actions, that their disputes have carried them to such extremities, I am sure, if you have not seen, you have at least heard from many reports, and particularly from those of Homer; for you have heard both the *Odyssæy* and the *Iliad* read to you.

ALC. Thoroughly well, Socrates, am I versed in both.

Soc. And is not the subject of both these poems the diversity of opinions with regard to what is just and what is unjust?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And did not this diversity of opinions produce fighting and slaughter between the Greeks and Trojans, and between Ulysses and the wooers of Penelope?

ALC. True.

Soc. And I believe that the deaths of those Athenians, Lacedæmonians and Bœotians, who perished at Tanagra¹, and of those who afterwards

¹ The first battle of Tanagra, in which the Lacedæmonians prevailed over the Athenians, was uncommonly fierce, and very many were slain, of the victorious army as well as of the vanquished. For so we are expressly told by Thucydides, in lib. 1. § 108; by Plutarch, in the Life of Cymon; and by Diodorus Siculus, in lib. 11. ad ann. 3. Olympiad. 85. The next year, in a second battle at the same place, the Athenians were successful; and the gallantry of their behaviour in it was equal, says the historian last cited, to that of their exploits at Marathon and Plateæ. But the *first* battle of Tanagra seems to be here meant, and not the *second*, as Messieurs Le Fevre and Dacier imagined. For the purpose of Plato was to show, not the valour exhibited, but the blood shed, in fighting about right and wrong:—S.

died at ¹ Coronea, amongst whom was Clinias your father, were not owing to differences on any other subject than this, what was just and what unjust.

ALC. You are in the right.

Soc. Shall we say then that these people had knowledge in that subject on which they differed with so much vehemence, as in support of their different opinions to suffer from each other the utmost effects of hatred?

ALC. It appears they had not.

Soc. Do you not then refer to such a sort of teachers as you yourself acknowledge to be ignorant?

ALC. I do, it seems.

Soc. How therefore is it probable that you should have the knowledge to discern what is just from what is unjust, when your account of them is so vague, and when you appear neither to have been taught that knowledge by any other person, nor to have found it out yourself?

ALC. According to what you say, 'tis not probable.

Soc. Are you sensible that what you said last was not said fairly, Alcibiades?

ALC. What was unfair?

Soc. Your assertion that I said those things of you which were said.

ALC. What? did not you say that I had not the knowledge to discern what was just from what was unjust?

Soc. Not I, indeed.

ALC. Who was it then that said so? was it I myself?

Soc. It was.

ALC. Make that appear.

Soc. You will see it in this way ². If I ask you concerning one and two, which is the greater number, you will say that two is.

ALC. I shall.

¹ The battle of Coronea between the Athenians and the Boeotians, in the 2d year of the 83d Olympiad, was not less fierce than the first battle at Tanagra, and much more unfortunate to the Athenians; a great part of their army being slain, together with Tolmidas the commander of it in chief; and all who remained alive being taken prisoners; as we learn from Thucydides, in lib. 1. § 113; and from Diodorus, in lib. 12. ad ann. supradict.—S.

² In the way of arguing by induction; that is, by inferring some universal proposition from many particular propositions acknowledged to be true, and comprehended in that universal.—S.

Soc. How much greater is it?

ALC. Greater by one.

Soc. Now whether of us is it who says that two is a greater number or more than one by one?

ALC. It is I myself.

Soc. Did not I ask the question, and did not you give an answer to it?

ALC. True: it was so.

Soc. On this subject, then, who appears to have made any assertion? Do I, who only asked a question? or do you, who gave the answer?

ALC. I.

Soc. And if I ask you how many letters compose the name of Socrates, and you tell me, which of us is it who declares how many?

ALC. I.

Soc. In a word, whenever any question is asked, and an answer to it is given, say, who is it that makes an assertion, the party that asks the question, or the party that gives the answer?

ALC. The party that gives the answer, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. Through the whole of our past discourse was not I the party that asked the questions?

ALC. You was.

Soc. And was not you the party that gave the answers?

ALC. I was.

Soc. Well then. Whether of us two made the assertions?

ALC. From what I have admitted, Socrates, I myself appear to have been that person.

Soc. In those assertions was it not said that Alcibiades, the fine son of Clinias, had not the knowledge to discern what was just and what was unjust, but imagined that he had; and that he was about going into the assembly to give the Athenians his counsel and advice upon subjects which he knew nothing of? Is not this true?

ALC. It appears so to be.

Soc. That which Euripides^{*} says may therefore well be applied to the condition

^{*} Monf. Dacier in this place rightly refers us to the Hippolytus of the poet here cited. For in one of the scenes of that tragedy, Phædra, being ashamed to confess to her old nurse that

condition you are now in, Alcibiades. You are in danger of being found to have heard all this which has been said of you from yourself, and not from me. For, not I, but you, was the assertor of it; and you lay the blame of it on me without reason.

ALC. Indeed, Socrates, you are in the right.

Soc. Mad therefore is the undertaking, my good sir, which you entertain thoughts of attempting, to teach others what you are ignorant of yourself from your having neglected to learn it.

ALC. I believe, Socrates, that the Athenians, as well as other Grecian states, seldom deliberate in council about justice or injustice in any affair before them; because these things they presume obvious and plain to all men. Laying aside therefore the consideration of this point, they consider which way it will be most for their interest to take. For I suppose that justice and interest are not the same thing; seeing that many have found it their interest to have done things the most unjust, and that others have gained no advantage from having acted with honesty.

Soc. Well. Suppose interest to be a thing ever so different from justice, do you imagine now that you know what is a man's interest, and why this or that thing is so?

ALC. What should hinder me, Socrates, from knowing it? unless you will make a doubt of this too, by asking me, from whom I learned this knowledge, or how I discovered it myself.

Soc. How strangely you deal with me in this! If you say any thing wrong, when 'tis possible to prove it wrong by the same arguments used in

Hippolytus was the object of her love, and yet unwilling to conceal it from her, describes him, without naming him, in terms so pointed, that the nurse could not possibly mistake the person. Upon which the nurse asking her if she means Hippolytus, Phædra answers in verse 352,

σου τὰδ', οὐκ ἐμου, κλυεῖς,
This from yourself you hear, and not from me.—S.

¹ That is, in evading the proofs of your ignorance, and thus endeavouring to avoid the necessity of your confessing it.—In our translation of this short sentence, we have supposed that it ought to be immediately followed by a mark of interrogation, or rather by a mark of admiration; and ought not to be read as part of a longer sentence, either interrogative, according to the version of Serranus, or assertive, according to that of Ficinus, and all the editions of the Greek original. The version of Cornarius is herein agreeable to that our supposition.—S.

confuting what you before said amifs, you would have new matter introduced, and different arguments made ufe of, to prove you in the wrong again : as if the former proofs were worn out like old clothes, and you could no longer put them on, but one muft bring you a fresh proof never ufed before. But without taking further notice of your evafions, I fhall repeat the fame queftion, and ask you from what learning you came to know what was a man's intereft, and who taught you this knowledge; and all the other queftions asked before I ask you again, fumming them up in one. It is evident now, that your answers will amount to the very fame as they did before; and that you will not be able to fhew by what means you attained the knowledge of what is advantageous to a man; or conducive to his good; either how you found it out yourfelf, or from whom you learned it. However, feeing that you are squeamifh, and decline the tafting of the fame arguments again, I wave the inquiry into this point, whether you have or not the knowledge of what is the intereft of the Athenians. But this other point, whether the fame actions are juft and advantageous; or whether what 'tis juft to do, differs from what 'tis a man's intereft to do; why fhould not you prove, by putting queftions to me, in the fame manner as I did to you? or, if you had rather, make a difcourfe upon that fubject wholly by yourfelf.

ALC. But I know not if I fhould be able, Socrates, to make fuch a difcourfe to you.

Soc. Why, my good friend, fuppose me to be the affembly and the people. And, were you addreffing your difcourfe to them, it would be proper for you to perfuade every fingle man of them. Would it not?

ALC. It would.

Soc. Does it not belong, then, to the fame perfon to be able to perfuade one fingle man by himfelf, and to perfuade many men affembled together, in fpeaking on any fubject with which he is well acquainted? as, for inftance, a teacher of grammar is equally well able to perfuade one man and many men, when letters are the fubject of his difcourfe.

ALC. True.

Soc. And when numbers are the fubject, would not the fame perfon, who perfuades many, perfuade one as well?

ALC. He would.

Soc.

Soc. And must not this person be one who is well acquainted with numbers ? must he not be an arithmetician ?

ALC. Most certainly.

Soc. And would not you also, in speaking on any subjects, if you are able to persuade many of the truth of what you say, be able to persuade a single one ?

ALC. 'Tis probable that I should.

Soc. But these subjects it is plain must be such as you are well acquainted with.

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Is there any other difference, then, between a speaker in the assembly of the people and a speaker in such conversation as this of ours, than merely so much as this—the former endeavours to persuade a collection of many men—the latter to persuade men one by one ?

ALC. There appears to be no other.

Soc. Come then. Since it apparently belongs to the same person to persuade a multitude and to persuade a single man, practise your skill on me, and undertake to prove to me that in some cases that which is just is not a man's interest.

ALC. You are very saucy, Socrates.

Soc. And I am now going to be so saucy as to convince you of the truth of a position quite contrary to that which you decline the proving of to me.

ALC. Begin then.

Soc. Do you but answer to the questions which I shall put to you.

ALC. Not so : but do you yourself say plainly what you have to say.

Soc. Why so ? Would you not choose to be entirely well persuaded of the truth of it, if it be true ?

ALC. By all means, certainly.

Soc. And would you not, if you yourself were to assert it, have the most entire persuasion of its truth ?

ALC. I think so.

Soc. Answer then to my questions : and if you do not hear from your own mouth, that to act justly is to act for one's own advantage, believe no other person who asserts that position.

ALC.

ALC. I shall not : and I consent to answer your questions. For no harm I think will come to me that way.

Soc. You think as if you had the spirit of divination. Tell me, then : Do you say that some just actions are advantageous to the man who performs them, and that some are not so ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And do you say also, that some just actions are beautiful, and that some are not so ?

ALC. What mean you by this question ?

Soc. Whether did you ever think that a man acted basely and yet justly at the same time ?

ALC. I never thought so.

Soc. You think then that all actions which are just are also beautiful ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. But what, as to actions which are beautiful ? Whether do you think that all of these are good to the performer, or that some of them are so, and some not so ?

ALC. For my part, Socrates, I think that some beautiful actions are evil to the performer of them.

Soc. And that some base actions are good to the performer ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. Do you mean such actions as these ?—Many men by aiding in battle some friend or near relation have been wounded mortally ; whilst others, by withholding their aid when they ought to have given it, have come off safe and sound.

ALC. A just instance of what I mean.

Soc. That aid then of theirs you call beautiful with respect to their endeavouring to save those whom they ought to defend. Now such an action proceeds from fortitude, does it not ?

ALC. It does.

Soc. But evil you call it also with respect to the wounds and death which it procured them, do you not ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And are not fortitude and death two different things ?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. To aid a friend, therefore¹, is not both beautiful and evil in the same respect?

ALC. It appears that 'tis not.

Soc. Consider now whether it be not good in the same respect in which it is beautiful ; as in this particular which we mentioned. For, with respect to fortitude, you agreed with me that 'twas beautiful and handsome to give such aid. This very thing then, fortitude, consider whether it be a good or an evil. And consider it in this way ;—which kind of things would you choofe to have your own, whether good things or evil things ?

ALC. Good things.

Soc. And would you not choofe the best things too ?

ALC. Most of all things.

Soc. And would you not choofe to part with them least of all ?

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What say you then of fortitude ? at what price would you choofe to part with it ?

ALC. I would not accept of life, not I, to live a coward.

Soc. You think, then, that cowardice is evil in the utmost degree ?

ALC. That do I.

Soc. On a par, as it seems, with death.

ALC. It is so.

Soc. Are not life and fortitude the most of all things opposite to death and cowardice ?

ALC. They are.

Soc. And would you choofe to have those most of all things, and these least of all things ?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. Is it because you deem those the best of all things, and these the worst ?

ALC. For this very reason.

Soc. Viewing then the giving of aid in battle to such as are dear to us in that light in which it appears beautiful—viewing it with regard to the

¹ This is a conclusive assertion ; and not, as it is printed by Aldus and by Stephens, a question. Both of the Basil editions have it right.—S.

practice of that virtue which you acknowledge to be one of the best of things, you gave it the epithet of beautiful?

ALC. It appears I did so.

Soc. But with regard to its operating evil, the evil of death, you gave it the epithet of evil?

ALC. True.

Soc. Is it not then just and right to denominate every action thus? If, with regard to the evil which it operates, you call it evil, ought it not, with regard to the good which it operates, to be also called good?

ALC. I think it ought.

Soc. In the same respect, then, in which it is good, is it not beautiful? and in the same respect in which it is evil, is it not base?

ALC. It is.

Soc. In saying, then, that the aiding of our friends in battle is an action beautiful indeed, but that yet 'tis evil, you say exactly the same thing as if you¹ called it an action, good indeed, but yet evil.

ALC. I think you are in the right, Socrates.

Soc. Nothing therefore which is beautiful, so far as it is beautiful, is evil; nor is any thing which is base, so far as it is base, good.

ALC. Evidently it is not.

Soc. Further now consider it in this way:—whoever acts beautifully, does he not act well too?

ALC. He does.

Soc. And those who act well, are they not happy?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And are they not happy by being possessed of good things?

ALC. Most certainly,

Soc. And are they not possessed of these good things by acting well and beautifully?

ALC. They are.

Soc. To act well, therefore, is in the rank of good things?

ALC. Beyond a doubt.

¹ In translating this sentence, we have supposed that the right reading here is *προσπειρον*, and not, as it is printed, *προσπειρον*.—S.

Soc. And is not acting well a beautiful thing also ?

ALC. It is.

Soc. Again therefore we have found, that one and the same thing is both beautiful and good ?

ALC. We have.

Soc. Whatever then we should find to be a beautiful thing ¹, we shall find it to be a good thing too, according to this reasoning ?

ALC. It must be so.

Soc. And what ? are good things advantageous ? or are they not ?

ALC. They are.

Soc. Do you remember, now, what we agreed in concerning things which are just ?

ALC. I imagine that you mean this,—that those persons who do things which are just must of necessity do things which at the same time are beautiful.

Soc. And did we not agree in this too,—that those who do things which are beautiful do things which are also good ?

ALC. We did.

Soc. And good things, you say, are advantageous ?

ALC. True.

Soc. Things therefore which are just, O Alcibiades ! are things which are advantageous.

ALC. It seems they are.

Soc. Well now ; are not you the person who asserts these things ? and am not I the questioner concerning them ?

ALC. So it appears.

Soc. Whoever then rises up to speak in any council, whether it be of Athenians or Reparethians, imagining that he discerns what is just and

¹ It appears from the translations made by Ficinus and Cornarius, that the Greek of this sentence, in the manuscripts from which they translated, was written thus :—'Ο, τι αν αρα ευρωμεν καλον, και αγαθον ευρησόμεν κ. τ. λ. And we hope it will hereafter be so printed. For the absurdity of this sentence in the translation by Serranus, was evidently occasioned by his following the printed editions, and his regarding more the language of Cicero than the reasoning or philosophy of Plato.—S.

what

what is unjust, if he should say that he knows justice to be sometimes evil and detrimental, would you not laugh at his pretensions to knowledge? since you yourself are found to be the very person who asserts that the same things are both just and advantageous?

ALC. Now, by the Gods, Socrates, for my part, I know not what to say to it; but am quite like a man distracted. For sometimes I am of one opinion, just while you are putting your questions to me, and presently after am of another.

Soc. Are you ignorant now, my friend, what condition you are in?

ALC. Entirely ignorant.

Soc. Do you imagine, then, that if any person were to ask you, how many eyes you had, whether two or three,—or how many hands, whether two or four,—or any other such question,—you would sometimes answer one thing, and at other times another? or would you always give the same answer?

ALC. I confess that I am now doubtful of myself; but I do believe that I should always give the same answer.

Soc. And is not your knowledge of the subject the cause of that consistency there would be in your answers?

ALC. I believe it is.

Soc. When therefore you give contrary answers to one and the same question, without choosing to prevaricate, 'tis evident that you have no knowledge of the subject.

ALC. Probably so.

Soc. Now you say that, to questions concerning things just or unjust, beautiful or base, good or evil, advantageous or otherwise, you should answer sometimes one thing and sometimes another. Is it not then evident, that your ignorance in these subjects is the cause of this inconsistency of yours?

ALC. It appears so to me myself.

Soc. Is not this then the true state of the case? On every subject which a man has not the knowledge of, must not his soul be wavering in her opinions?

ALC. Most undoubtedly.

Soc. Well now. Do you know by what means you may mount up to heaven?

ALC. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. Is your opinion doubtful and wavering on this subject?

ALC. Not at all.

Soc. Do you know the reason why it is not? or shall I tell it you?

ALC. Do you tell me.

Soc. 'Tis this, my friend: it is because you neither know nor imagine that you know the way up to heaven.

ALC. How is that the reason? Explain yourself.

Soc. Let you and I consider it together. Concerning any affairs which you are ignorant of, and are at the same time convinced that you are so, do you waver in your opinions? For instance, in the affair of dressing meats and making sauces, you are, I presume, well acquainted with your ignorance¹.

ALC. Perfectly well.

Soc. Do you form any opinions then yourself on these affairs of cookery, and waver in those opinions? or do you leave those matters to such as are skilled in them?

ALC. I do as you mentioned last.

Soc. And what if you were in a ship under sail, would you form any opinion, whether the rudder ought to be turned toward the ship or from it, and be unsettled in that opinion for want of knowledge in the affair? or would you leave it to the pilot, and not trouble yourself about it?

ALC. To the pilot I should leave it.

Soc. Concerning affairs then which you are ignorant of, and are no stranger to your own ignorance in those respects, you are not wavering in your opinions?

ALC. I believe I am not.

Soc. Do you perceive² that errors, committed in the doing of any

¹ This sentence is assertive, and not, as it has hitherto been always printed, interrogative.—S.

² In supposing this sentence to be interrogative, we have followed the two Basil editions and Ficinus's translation, as Le Fevre has also done. But Dacier chose to follow the other editions and translations, in making it a conclusive assertion.—S.

thing, are all to be ascribed to this kind of ignorance in a man,—his imagining that he knows what he knows not?

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC. Whenever we undertake to act in any affair, it is only when we imagine we know what to do.

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And such as have no opinion of their own knowledge in the affair resign it up to others to act for them.

ALC. How should they do otherwise?

SOC. Ignorant persons of this kind live therefore without committing errors, because they give up the management of those affairs in which they are ignorant into the hands of others.

ALC. True.

SOC. What kind of persons, then, are those who err and act amiss? for certainly they are not such as know how to act.

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Since then they are neither the knowing, nor those of the ignorant who know that they are ignorant, are any other persons left than of that kind who are ignorant, but imagine themselves knowing?

ALC. None other than these.

SOC. This kind of ignorance, therefore, is the cause of wrong doings, and is the only kind which is culpable.

ALC. Very true.

SOC. And where it concerns things of greatest moment, is it not in these cases the most of any mischievous and shameful?

ALC. By far the most so¹.

SOC. Well then. Can you name any things of greater moment than those which are honest, and beautiful, and good, and advantageous?

ALC. Certainly none.

SOC. Is it not on these subjects that you acknowledge yourself to waver in your opinions?

ALC. It is.

¹ In the printed original we here read πολλή γε. But we have made no scruple of adopting the marginal reading of Harry Stephens, πολὺ γε.—S.

Soc. And, if you are thus wavering, is it not evident from our past conclusions, not only that you are ignorant in subjects of the greatest moment, but that amidst this ignorance you imagine that you know them?

ALC. I fear it is so.

Soc. Fie upon it, Alcibiades! What a condition then are you in! a condition which I am loth to name: but however, since we are alone, it must be spoken out. You are involved, my good sir, in that kind of ignorance which is the most shameful, according to the result of our joint reasoning, and according to your own confession. From this kind of ignorance it is, that you are eager to engage in politics before you have learnt the elements of that science. Indeed, you are not the only person in this sad condition; for in the same state of ignorance are the numerous managers of our civil affairs, all of them, except perhaps Pericles, your guardian, and a few more.

ALC. And, Socrates, to confirm this opinion of yours, Pericles is said to have become wise, not spontaneously or of himself: on the contrary, 'tis reported of him that he had had the advantage of enjoying the conversation of many wise men, particularly of Pythoclides and Anaxagoras¹: and even at this time, old as he is, he is intimate with Damon for this very purpose.

Soc. But what? have you ever seen a man who was wise in any art whatever, and yet was unable to make another man wise in the same art?

¹ The character of Anaxagoras, or rather that of his philosophy, is well known to be this: That he applied himself chiefly, as all of the Ionic sect did, to the study of astronomy, and of the elements of outward nature. Pythoclides and Damon, both of them, were such as the old Sophists in polymathy and extensive learning; but neither of them assumed the character of Sophist. Indeed, they were so far from making a public display of their general knowledge, like the Sophists, that, on the contrary, they endeavoured to conceal it under the mask of some other character, professing only skill in music. We learn this, so far as relates to Damon, from Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles; and with regard to Pythoclides, we are told the same by Plato himself in his Protagoras. But further, Aristotle, as cited by Plutarch, relates, in some of those works of his which are most unfortunately lost, that Pericles in fact became accomplished in music by studying it under Pythoclides. And Plutarch tells us, on his own authority, that Damon was the director and instructor of Pericles in politics, and that he was banished from Athens by the people, *ὡς μεγαλοπραγμων και φιλοτιρανικος*, as a person who busied himself in great affairs, meaning those relating to the constitution of the state, and as a friend to tyranny, meaning the arbitrary power of a single person.—S.

as, for instance, the master who taught you grammar was himself wise in that art; and in the same art he made you wise; as he also made every other person whom he undertook to teach. Did he not?

ALC. He did.

SOC. And you, who have learnt from him that kind of wisdom, would not you be able to teach it to another person?

ALC. Certainly I should.

SOC. And is not the same thing true of a music-master and of a master in the exercises?

ALC. Perfectly so.

SOC. For this undoubtedly is a fair proof of the knowledge of such as are knowing in any subject whatever, their being able to produce their scholars, and to show these to be knowing in the same.

ALC. I think so too.

SOC. Well then. Can you name to me any one whom Pericles has made a wise man? his own sons has he? to begin with them.

ALC. But what if the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, Socrates?

SOC. Clinias then, your brother?

ALC. Why should you mention Clinias, a man out of his senses?

SOC. Since Clinias then is out of his senses, and since the sons of Pericles were silly fellows, to what defect in your disposition shall we impute the little care taken by Pericles to improve you?

ALC. I presume that I myself am in the fault, that of not giving due attention to him.

SOC. But name any person else, an Athenian or a foreigner, either a slave or a free man, who is indebted to the instructions of Pericles for becoming wiser than he was: as I can name to you those, who from the lessons of Zeno¹ have improved in wisdom,—Pythodorus² the son.

¹ Zeno the Eleatic is here meant, the disciple of Parmenides.—For an account of the wisdom meant in the latter part of this sentence, see the Parmenides, and the introduction to it.—T.

² This is the same Pythodorus at whose house Plato lays the scene of his dialogue named Parmenides.—S.

of Ifolochus, and Callias¹ the son of Calliades; each of whom, at the price of a hundred minæ², paid to Zeno, became eminent for wisdom.

ALC. Now, by Jupiter, I cannot.

Soc. Very well. What then do you think of doing about yourself? whether to rest satisfied in the condition which you are now in, or to apply yourself to some means of improvement?

ALC. Concerning this, Socrates, I would consult with you. For I apprehend what you have said, and admit the truth of it. Those who have the administration of the state, except a few of them, seem indeed to me too not to have had a proper education.

Soc. Well; and what conclusion do you draw from thence?

ALC. This,—that if they, through their education, were well qualified to govern, a man who should undertake to enter the lists in contest with them, ought to come to the engagement duly prepared by discipline and exercise, as in other combats. But now, seeing that such persons as these, raw and undisciplined as they are, have attained to the management of state-affairs, what need is there for a man to exercise himself in such matters, or to give himself the trouble of acquiring knowledge in them? For I well know, that by dint of natural abilities I shall excel them by far, and get above them.

Soc. Fie upon it, my fine young gentleman! What a declaration is this which you have made! how unworthy of your personal qualities, and of the other advantages you are possessed of!

ALC. I should be glad, Socrates, to know why you think it unworthy of me, and in what respect.

Soc. You offer an affront, not only to the regard which I have for you, but to the opinion too which you have of yourself.

ALC. How so?

Soc. In that you think of entering the lists to contend with these men here at Athens.

¹ This Callias had the command of the army sent by the Athenians for the recovery of Potidæa; but he was slain in the first battle, before that city. See Thucydides, lib. 1. and Diodorus, lib. 12.—S.

² In English money, 32*l.* 18*s.* 4*d.* the very same price at which Protagoras and Gorgias valued their sophistical instructions in polymathy and false oratory.—S.

ALC.

ALC. Whom then am I to contend with?

Soc. Does this question become a man to ask who thinks his mind to be great and elevated ¹?

ALC. How do you mean? Is it not with these very persons that I am to stand in competition?

Soc. Let me ask you this question;—Whether, if you had any thoughts of commanding a ship of war, would you deem it sufficient for you to excel the mariners who were to be under your command, in the skill belonging to a commander? or, presuming yourself qualified with this due præ-excellence, would you direct your eye to those only whom you are in fact to combat against,—and not, as you now do, to such as are to combat together with you? For to these men certainly ² you ought to be so much superior, that they should never be your associates in competition against any, but your inferior assistants in combating against the enemy;—if you really think of exhibiting any noble exploits worthy of yourself and of your country.

ALC. And such a thought I assure you that I entertain.

Soc. Is it then at all worthy of you, to be contented with being a better man than your fellow-foldiers ³,—and not to have your eye directed toward the leaders of those whom you have to struggle with, studying how ⁴ to become a better man than they, and employing yourself in exercises which are proper with a view to them ⁵?

¹ Aldus erroneously printed this sentence in the Greek original without a mark of interrogation; and in this error he was blindly followed by Stephens. The Basil editions, however, both of them, are here rightly printed, in agreement with the translations by Ficinus and Cornarius, and as the sense evidently requires.—S.

² Here again the two Basil editions are right in giving us *δι' αὐτῶν*; where Aldus and Stephens have been so regardless of the sense as to print *διὰ τῶν*.—S.

³ In the Greek, as printed, we here read *στρατιωτῶν*; but perhaps we ought to read *συστρατιωτῶν*, that the word may correspond with that just before, to which it alludes, *συναγωνιστάς*.—S.

⁴ In the Greek editions *ὅπως*: but we suppose the right reading to be *ὅπως*.—S.

⁵ All the Latin translators rightly presume this sentence to be interrogative: though in all the editions of the Greek it is carelessly made assertive.—The secret meaning of Socrates in what he here says, agreeably to the tenor of all his philosophy, we apprehend to be this;—that we ought not to set before us the characters of any particular men, who are all of them full of imperfections like ourselves, for the standards of our moral conduct; but should have constantly in our view, so as to copy after, the ideal and perfect patterns of moral excellence.—S.

ALC. What persons do you mean, Socrates ?

SOC. Do you not know, that our city is every now and then at war with the Lacedæmonians, and with the Great King ?

ALC. True.

SOC. If then you have it in your mind to be the leader of this city, would you not think rightly in thinking that you will have the kings of Sparta and of Persia to contend against ?

ALC. I suspect that you are in the right.

SOC. And yet you, my good sir, on the contrary, are ¹ to fix your view on Midias, a feeder of quails ², and on other such persons, who undertake

¹ The kings of Persia were so called by the Grecians, from the time that Cyrus, heir to the then small kingdom of Persia, having succeeded to the kingdom of Media by the death of his uncle without issue, conquered Assyria, subdued Asia Minor, and acquired the dominion of all those countries which constitute the now large monarchy of Persia.—S.

² We entirely agree in opinion with Mons. Le Fevre, that this is purely ironical, and therefore not interrogative.—S.

³ The Grecian quails, being *μαχημοί* or fighting-birds, were fitly trained and fed, for the purpose of *ορνυνομαχία*, *fighting one with another*, by such sort of persons as took delight in such sort of sports. The manner of them was this : Matches being made, and wagers laid by those gentlemen quail-feeders, who were themselves owners of the birds, a circle was drawn in the quail-pit, or gaming-room, within which circle were set the combatant-birds : and in the battle, to which they were provoked by their wise masters, whichever bird drove his antagonist beyond the circle was held to be the conqueror.—Another Grecian sport with the poor quails, a sport still more boyish than the *ορνυνομαχία*, was the *ορνυνοκοπία*, in which the hardness of those birds was tried by the *στιφοκοπία*, the filip of a man's finger on their heads ; and sometimes by plucking from it a feather : the birds that endured these trials without flinching or retiring out of the circle, won the wager for their cruel masters.—See Meursius de Ludis Græcorum, pag. 45. Julius Pollux, lib. 9. cap. 7. and Suidas in vocibus *ορνυνοκοπία*, and *στιφοκοπία*.—Midias, here mentioned by Plato, was so much addicted to these sports, that in the comedy of Aristophanes, named *Ορνιθες*, the ambassador to Athens from the aerial city of the birds reports to them on his return, that several of the leading men at Athens had taken the names of different birds, and amongst them Midias that of quail.—Socrates therefore, in the passage now before us, ridicules Alcibiades, who affected the same taste for these quail matches, for thus emulating Midias, and setting up him for a pattern of his imitation.—The Romans, who copied after the Grecians in all their vices and follies more exactly than they did in their arts, sciences, and wisdom, were so fond of quail-fighting, that the wise and good Marcus Antoninus, sensible how much it was beneath his dignity as a man, an emperor, and a philosopher, acknowledges himself obliged to Diognetus the painter for dissuading him in his youth from giving into this fashionable folly. Lib. 1. § 6.—This note is intended chiefly for the benefit of our countrymen the Noble Cockers.—S.

to manage affairs of state, still wearing the badge¹ of slavery (as the women² would term it) in their souls, through their ignorance of the Muses; and not having yet thrown it off, but retaining their old sentiments, and manners still barbarian, are come to flatter the people, not to govern them. Ought you now to emulate these men whom I am speaking of, and disregard yourself? Ought you to neglect the acquiring of all such knowledge, as only is acquired through learning, when you have so great a combat to sustain? Or ought you to omit the exercising yourself in all such actions as are well performed only through practice? Should you not be furnished with all the qualifications requisite for the government of the state before you undertake to govern it?

ALC. Indeed, Socrates, I believe you are in the right: but however, I imagine the commanders of the Spartan armies, and the Persian monarch, to be just such men as the others whom you have mentioned.

Soc. But, my very good sir, consider this imagination of yours, what evils attend on it.

ALC. In what respects?

Soc. In the first place, What opinion concerning your antagonists do you think would engage you to take most care about yourself? whether the opinion of their being formidable, or the contrary?

¹ In the Greek, *ἀνδραποδῶδη τριχα*, *slavish hair*. It was the distinguishing badge of slavery in men, amongst the Grecians and the Romans, the wearing their own hair on their heads. When they had their freedom given them by their masters, their heads were shaven, and they wore from that time a cap, or narrow-brimmed hat, thence called the cap of liberty. For this point, see *ἀντι. παντων* Theodor. Marcilius in his Commentary on Persius, sat. 5. v. 82.—S.

² This seems to be perfectly well illustrated by Olympiodorus, (whose comment on this dialogue is extant in MS. abroad,) in the following passage, cited by H. Casaubon in his commentary on Persius, sat. 5. v. 116. Παροιμία ἐστὶ γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλευθερουμένων δούλων καὶ ἐπιμένοντων ἐν τῇ δουλοπρεπείᾳ, (not *δουλείᾳ*, as it is absurdly printed,) ὅτι ἐχρῆς τὴν ἀνδραποδῶδη τριχα ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τὴν δουλικὴν ἔξιν (printed *τριχα*, which is explaining *idem per idem*) ἐχρῆς. "The women had a saying, which they used to slaves made free, but still retaining the manners which belonged to slaves,—'You wear your slavish hair on your head still': that is, You still retain your slavish habits."—This proverbial saying was it seems, by the Athenian ladies, the authors of it, applied also to men whom they saw ill-bred and illiterate.—The application of it was afterwards extended further to a mobile multitude, gathered together and governed by their passions: for so we learn from Suidas, in phrase *ἀνδραποδῶδη τριχα*.—See Erasmus Adagia, pag. 426. and the Greek Proverbs collected by Schottus, with his scholia thereon, pag. 357.—S.

ALC. The opinion without doubt of their being formidable.

Soc. And do you think it would do you any harm to take care about yourself?

ALC. None at all; but on the contrary great good.

Soc. The want of this great good, then, is one of the evils which attend on that imagination?

ALC. It is true.

Soc. Consider if there be not probably another too; and that is the falsity of it.

ALC. How do you prove that?

Soc. Whether is it probable that persons, the most excellent in their natural dispositions¹, are to be found amongst those who descend from ancestors the noblest²? or is it not?

ALC. Undoubtedly it is.

¹ We are astonished to find *φύσεις* here printed in all the editions of Plato. The sense evidently requires us to read *φύσεις*: and it appears also from the Latin translation made by Ficinus, and from that also by Cornarius, that they read *φύσεις* in the manuscripts from which they made their translations.—Had Le Fevre been aware of this, he would have spared himself the trouble of writing a long note to prove that hereditary monarchs and great lords are not always the best of men.—Socrates here is not asking who probably are the best men, (for this would be to anticipate the conclusion of his reasoning, in the very beginning of it,) but, who probably have the best natural dispositions.—S.

² With this agrees the opinion of Aristotle in his Politics, lib. 3. cap. 8. *Βελτίους εἶνος τοὺς ἐκ βελτίωνων· εὐγενεῖα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ γένους*. It is likely that from the best ancestors should spring the best men. For to be well-born is to be of a good or virtuous family, (that is, nobility is family-virtue.) The reasonableness of this opinion the great master of all lyric poetry proves by analogy from brute animals in these verses of the 4th ode of his 4th book:

*Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis.
Est in juvenis, est in equis potrum
Virtus; nec imbellem feroces
Progenerant aquila columbam;*

Brave men are offsprings of the brave and good.
Heifers and horses still retain
The virtue of their fires: in vain
May one expect to find a timorous brood,
Such as the weak unwarlike dove,
Sprung from an eagle fierce, the daring bird of Jove.—S.

Soc.

SOC. And is it not probable that such as have excellent dispositions from nature, if they meet with a suitable education, should become accomplished in virtue ?

ALC. Of necessity they must.

SOC. Let us consider now, in comparing their advantages with our own, whether the kings of Sparta and of Persia seem to be descended from meaner ancestors than we are. Know we not that those are descendants of Hercules, and these of Achæmenes ? that the begetting of Hercules is attributed to Jupiter ¹, and the ancestry of Achæmenes to Perseus the son of Jupiter ?

ALC. And the family which I am of, O Socrates ! descends from Euryfaces ; and the descent of Euryfaces was from Jupiter.

SOC. And the family which I am of, my noble Alcibiades ! descends from Dædalus ; and the descent of Dædalus was from Vulcan, the son of Jupiter. But the pedigree of those with whom we set ourselves in comparison, beginning from the persons who now reign, exhibits a race of kings, all of them sons of kings, in a direct line quite up to Jupiter ; those whom I first mentioned, kings of Argos and Lacedæmon ; the others, kings of Persia perpetually, and often of all Asia ², as they are at present : whereas we are but private men, ourselves and our fathers. If you then were to boast of your ancestors, and pompously say that Salamis was the hereditary dominion of Euryfaces, or, to ascend higher in your ancestry, that Æacus governed in his native country Ægina ³, can you imagine how ridiculous you would appear in the eyes of Artaxerxes ⁴, the son of Xerxes ?

¹ The Greek, as printed, is in this place evidently deficient. For, immediately after the words το δε Ἡρακλέους τε γένος, that the words εἰς τον Δία are dropt, and ought to be restored, there needs no proof to any who are at all acquainted with the antient fables of the Greeks. They well know that Hercules was never supposed to be descended from Perseus, as he is here made to be in the printed Greek text.—S.

² Meaning the Lesser Asia, now called Natolia.—S.

³ Salamis and Ægina being but small islands in the Saronic bay, opposite to Attica.—Æacus had Ægina in sovereignty by inheritance from his mother. How it came not to descend to Euryfaces from his great-grandfather Æacus, and how his grandfather Telamon came to be lord of Salamis, may be accounted for easily from what we read in the Metamorphoses of Antoninus Liberalis, cap. 38.—S.

⁴ Artaxerxes, at the supposed time of this dialogue, was the reigning king of Persia.—S.

Consider besides, whether we may not be found inferior to those great men, not only in the pride of ancestry, but also in the care taken of our birth and breeding. Are you not sensible of the singular advantages which attend the progeny of the Spartan kings in this respect, that their wives have a guard of state appointed for them by the Ephori¹; to the end that no king of theirs may be the issue of stolen embraces, or have for his real father any other man than a descendant of Hercules²? And as to the Persian king, so greatly is he our superior with regard to this point, that none of his subjects entertain the least suspicion of his having any other father than the king his predecessor. The comfort therefore of the king of Persia is under no restraint but that of her own dread of the evil consequences, should she dishonour the king's bed. Further, when the king's eldest son, the heir apparent to the crown, is born, all the king's subjects in the city of his residence keep that day an original feast-day: and from thenceforward the anniversary of that day is celebrated with sacrifices and feasts by all Asia. But when we came first into the world, alas, Alcibiades! *our very neighbours*, as the comic poet³ says, *little knew what happened*. After this the child is

¹ These were the supreme judicial magistrates in Lacedæmon: they were also the guardians and protectors of the laws, the kingdom, and the common weal.—S.

² This Lacedæmonian law, or custom, is not, so far as we can find, recorded by any other antient writer. And such of the moderns as treat of Grecian antiquities, wherever they mention it, only cite the passage of Plato now before us. But how careful the Ephori were, not to suffer any person to sit on either of their regal thrones, who was not descended in the male line from either Eurysthene or his brother Procles, their first kings of the race of Hercules, we may conjecture from two remarkable instances; one of them recorded by Herodotus, the other by Plutarch, and both of them by Pausanias in Laconicis.—The first is the case of Demaratus, the son of Aristo, who was barred of his hereditary right to the crown, because his mother Timea was delivered of him seven months after her marriage with king Aristo: for it was thence concluded by the Ephori, that he was begotten by his mother's former husband, who had parted from her about seven months before the birth of her son.—The other case is that of Leotychidas, who was by the Ephori excluded from the succession to the crown, because king Agis, his nominal and legal father, had been absent from the queen his consort more than ten months before she was brought to bed.—It must, however, be acknowledged, that other concurring circumstances were not wanting to induce a reasonable suspicion of the queen's unfaithfulness to the king's bed in each of these cases.—S.

³ We are no less in the dark as to the name of this poet than we are to the verse of his here alluded to.—Mons. Le Fevre, in a note to his translation of this passage, refers to Plutarch's Life of Phocion, where Demades tells his son, at whose marriage kings and great lords assisted, that when he

is brought up, not by some insignificant nurse, but by the best ¹ eunuchs about the king's person. And these have it in their charge to take care of the royal infant in every respect, but especially to contrive the means of his becoming as handsome as possible in his person, by so fashioning his pliant limbs, and giving such a direction to their growth, that they may be straight : and for executing this office well they are highly honoured. When the young princes have attained the age of seven years, they are provided with horses and with riding-masters, and are initiated in the exercise of hunting. At fourteen years of age they are put into the hands of those who are called the royal preceptors. And these are chosen out from such as are deemed the most excellent of the Persians, men of mature age, four in number ; excelling severally in wisdom, justice, temperance, and fortitude. By the first of these they are taught the magic ² of Zoro-
after

he himself was married, not a soul among the neighbours knew any thing of the matter. And out of this passage in Plutarch, where neither verse nor poet is cited, the ingenious critic has made a verse, to which he supposes that Plato here alludes.—S.

¹ That eunuchs were highly valued at the court of Persia, and purchased at a great price, we learn from Herodotus, in lib. 6. where he assigns this reason for it, the reputation of their fidelity in all things committed to their trust. See other reasons in Rycaut's *Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, b. 1. ch. 9. and in *L'Esprit des Loix*, l. 15. c. 18.—S.

² The following account of magic, by Proclus, originally formed, as it appears to me, a part of the Commentary written by him on the present passage. For the MS. Commentary of Proclus, which is at present extant on this Dialogue, does not extend to more than a third part of it ; and this Dissertation on Magic, which is only extant in Latin, was published by Ficinus, the translator, immediately after his *Excerpta* from this Commentary. So that it seems highly probable that the manuscript from which Ficinus translated his *Excerpta*, was much more perfect than that which is now extant, in consequence of containing this account of the magic of the antients.

" In the same manner as lovers gradually advance from that beauty which is apparent in sensible forms, to that which is divine ; so the antient priests, when they considered that there was a certain alliance and sympathy in natural things to each other, and of things manifest to occult powers, and discovered that all things subsist in all, they fabricated a sacred science from this mutual sympathy and similarity. Thus they recognized things supreme in such as are subordinate, and the subordinate in the supreme : in the celestial regions, terrene properties subsisting in a causal and celestial manner ; and in earth celestial properties, but according to a terrene condition. For how shall we account for those plants called heliotropes, that is, attendants on the sun, moving in correspondence with the revolution of its orb ; but selenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity with her motion ? It is because all things

pray,

after ¹ the son of Oromazes ², by which magic is meant the worship of the Gods: and the same person instructs them likewise in the art of government.

He

pray, and compose hymns to the leaders of their respective orders; but some intellectually, and others rationally; some in a natural, and others after a sensible manner. Hence the sun-flower, as far as it is able, moves in a circular dance towards the sun; so that, if any one could hear the pulsation made by its circuit in the air, he would perceive something composed by a sound of this kind, in honour of its king, such as a plant is capable of framing. Hence we may behold the sun and moon in the earth, but according to a terrene quality; but in the celestial regions, all plants, and stones, and animals, possessing an intellectual life according to a celestial nature. Now the antients, having contemplated this mutual sympathy of things, applied for occult purposes both celestial and terrene natures, by means of which through a certain similitude they deduced divine virtues into this inferior abode. For indeed similitude itself is a sufficient cause of binding things together in union and consent. Thus, if a piece of paper is heated, and afterwards placed near a lamp, though it does not touch the fire, the paper will be suddenly inflamed, and the flame will descend from the superior to the inferior parts. This heated paper we may compare to a certain relation of inferiors to superiors; and its approximation to the lamp, to the opportune use of things according to time, place, and matter. But the procession of fire into the paper aptly represents the presence of divine light, to that nature which is capable of its reception. Lastly, the inflammation of the paper may be compared to the deification of mortals, and to the illumination of material natures, which are afterwards carried upwards like the enkindled paper, from a certain participation of divine feed.

“Again, the lotus before the rising of the sun folds its leaves into itself, but gradually expands them on its rising: unfolding them in proportion to the sun’s ascent to the zenith; but as gradually contracting them as that luminary descends to the west. Hence this plant, by the expansion and contraction of its leaves, appears no less to honour the sun than men by the gesture of their eye-lids and the motion of their lips. But this imitation and certain participation of supernal light is not only visible in plants, which possess but a vestige of life, but likewise in particular stones. Thus the sun-stone, by its golden rays, imitates those of the sun; but the
stone

¹ Who Zoroaster was, and in what age he lived, is totally uncertain. A great variety of different opinions on these points is found amongst learned writers; the probability of any one of which opinions above the rest, it is an idle study we think to search for; so long as it remains doubtful whether any one man existed who was distinguished by that name from other men addicted to the same studies. For the learned in the eastern languages tell us that the name Zoroaster signifies an observer of the stars. We have therefore no occasion to be puzzled with uncertainties, when we read of different men living in different ages, and different countries of the east, all of them called by the same name Zoroaster, if the name was general, and given to every man famous for his knowledge in astronomy.—S.

² This was the name given by the Persians to the supreme being, the sole author of all good to all.—S.

He who excels in the science of justice teaches them to follow truth in every part of their conduct throughout life. The person who excels in temperance enures the young prince not to be governed by sensual pleasure of any kind, that he may acquire the habits of a free man, and of a real king ;

stone called the eye of heaven, or of the sun, has a figure similar to the pupil of an eye, and a ray shines from the middle of the pupil. Thus too the lunar stone, which has a figure similar to the moon when horned, by a certain change of itself, follows the lunar motion. Lastly, the stone called helioselenus, i. e. of the sun and moon, imitates after a manner the congress of those luminaries, which it images by its colour. So that all things are full of divine natures ; terrestrial natures receiving the plenitude of such as are celestial, but celestial of supercelestial essences* ; while every order of things proceeds gradually in a beautiful descent from the highest to the lowest. For whatever is collected into one above the order of things, is afterwards dilated in descending, various souls being distributed under their various ruling divinities.

“ In the next place, there are many solar animals, such as lions and cocks, which participate, according to their nature, of a certain solar divinity ; whence it is wonderful how much inferiors yield to superiors in the same order, though they do not yield in magnitude and power. Hence, they report that a cock is very much feared, and as it were revered, by a lion ; the reason of which we cannot assign from matter or sense, but from the contemplation alone of a supernal order : for thus we shall find that the presence of the solar virtue accords more with a cock than a lion. This will be evident from considering that the cock, as it were, with certain hymns, applauds and calls to the rising sun, when he bends his course to us from the antipodes ; and that solar angels sometimes appear in forms of this kind, who, though they are without shape, yet present themselves to us who are connected with shape, in some sensible form. Sometimes too, there are dæmons with a leonine front, who, when a cock is placed before them, unless they are of a solar order, suddenly disappear ; and this, because those natures which have an inferior rank in the same order, always reverence their superiors : just as many, on beholding the images of divine men, are accustomed, from the very view, to be fearful of perpetrating any thing base.

“ In fine, some things turn round correspondent to the revolutions of the sun, as the plants which we have mentioned, and others after a manner imitate the solar rays, as the palm and the date ; some the fiery nature of the sun, as the laurel ; and others a different property. For, indeed, we may perceive the properties which are collected in the sun every where distributed to subsequent natures constituted in a solar order ; that is, to angels, dæmons, souls, animals, plants, and stones. Hence, the authors of the ancient priesthood discovered from things apparent the worship of superior powers, while they mingled some things and purified others. They mingled many things indeed together, because they saw that some simple substances possessed a divine property (though not taken singly) sufficient to call down that particular power, of which they were participants. Hence, by the mingling of many things together, they at-

* By supercelestial essences, understand natures which are not connected with a body.

king; by governing first all his own appetites, instead of being their slave. And the fourth, he who excels in fortitude forms his royal pupil to be fearless and intrepid; for that his mind, under the power of fear, would be a slave. But, Alcibiades, for your preceptor Pericles appointed one of his domestics, too old to be fit for any other service, Zopyrus of Thrace. I would recount to you the other articles of the breeding and instruction

tracted upon us a supernal influx; and by the composition of one thing from many, they produced an assimilation to that one which is above many; and composed statues from the mixtures of various substances conspiring in sympathy and consent. Besides this, they collected composite odours, by a divine art, into one, comprehending a multitude of powers, and symbolizing with the unity of a divine essence; considering, that division debilitates each of these, but that mingling them together, restores them to the idea of their exemplar.

“But sometimes one herb, or one stone, is sufficient to a divine operation. Thus, a thistle is sufficient to procure the sudden appearance of some superior power; but a laurel, raceinum, or a thorny kind of sprig, the land and sea onion, the coral, the diamond, and the jasper, operate as a safeguard. The heart of a mole is subservient to divination, but sulphur and marine water to purification. Hence, the antient priests, by the mutual relation and sympathy of things to one another, collected their virtues into one, but expelled them by repugnancy and antipathy; purifying, when it was requisite, with sulphur and bitumen, and sprinkling with marine water. For sulphur purifies from the sharpness of its odour; but marine water on account of its fiery portion. Besides this, in the worship of the Gods, they offered animals, and other substances congruous to their nature; and received, in the first place, the powers of dæmons, as proximate to natural substances and operations; and by these natural substance they convoked into their presence those powers to which they approached. Afterwards, they proceeded from dæmons to the powers and energies of the Gods; partly, indeed, from dæmoniacal instruction, but partly by their own industry, interpreting convenient symbols, and ascending to a proper intelligence of the Gods. And lastly, laying aside natural substances and their operations, they received themselves into the communion and fellowship of the Gods.”

Should it be objected by those who disbelieve in the existence of magic, that plants, animals, and stones, no longer possess those wonderful sympathetic powers which are mentioned by Proclus in the above extract, the same answer must be given as to the objectors to the antient oracles, and is as follows:—As in the realms of generation, or in other words, the sublunary region, wholes, viz. the spheres of the different elements, remain perpetually according to nature; but their parts are sometimes according, and sometimes contrary, to nature; this must be true of the parts of the earth. When those circulations, therefore, take place, during which the parts of the earth subsist according to nature, and which are justly called, by Plato, fertile periods, the powers of plants, animals, and stones, magically sympathize with superior natures; but during those circulations in which the parts of the earth subsist contrary to nature, as at present, and which Plato calls barren periods, those powers no longer possess a magic sympathy, and consequently are no longer capable of producing magical operations.—T.

given to your antagonists, if the narration would not be too long ; and besides this, the articles already mentioned are sufficient indications of those others which they infer and draw along with them. But your birth, Alcibiades, your breeding and institution, or any other circumstances attending you, scarce any one of the Athenians is at all solicitous about, unless there be some man who happens to have an especial regard for you. Further ; if you would consider the treasures of the Persian kings, the sumptuous furniture of their palaces and tables, their wardrobes of apparel, the long trains of their garments, and the fragrant of their unguents, their numerous retinue of attendants, and the rest of their magnificence, in comparing all this with what you have of the same kind yourself, you would evidently perceive how much you fall short of them, and would be ashamed at the comparison. If, on the other hand, you would consider the Lacedæmonians, their sobriety and modesty, how simple their way of living, and how easily they are satisfied, their magnanimity and observance of order, their manly endurance of pain and love of labour, their emulation to excel, and their love of honour, you would think yourself a child to them in all these excellencies. Besides this, if you make riches any part of your consideration, and in this respect imagine yourself a person of consequence, let us not pass over this point neither unexamined ; if by any means you can be made sensible in what rank you stand. If you choose then to consider the Lacedæmonians with regard to wealth, you will find that what we have here in Attica falls far short of theirs. For the lands which they possess in their own country, and in Messenia, are such as that no person here would dispute their superiority in this respect, whether he considers the quantity or the value of those lands, the number of their other slaves, besides such as the Helotes¹, or the number of their horses, and other cattle in the pasture-

¹ The Helotes, properly so called, were descended from the ancient inhabitants of Helos, a maritime town in Laconia, near the mouth of the river Eurotas, under the dominion of Menelaus at the time of the Trojan war. It was afterwards besieged and taken by the Heraclidae, and their Dorian army, who had before conquered all the rest of Laconia. The Helotes were thus made captives to their conquerors, by whom they were condemned, they and their posterity for ever, to till the lands of these Dorians (then become proprietors of the territory of Laconia) as their vassals, and in lieu of the produce to pay a certain and fixed rent to their

pasture-grounds of Messenia. But, setting aside all this, you will find that, as to gold and silver, there is not so much amongst all the Grecians as there is amongst the Lacedæmonians in private hands. For gold and silver have now for many generations been flowing into them from all parts of Greece, and often too from foreign countries; but there is no reflux any way¹. That therefore which the fox said to the lion in a fable of Æsop's, may justly

lords and masters; not unlike to tenants in villenage under the feudal laws in after ages. To the like hard conditions did these Lacedæmonians, long afterward, subject their own kindred and neighbours of Messenia, at the end of many long struggles between them; on the Lacedæmonian side, for the conquest of a country better than their own; on the other side for the preservation of their lands and liberties. The Messenians, being thus reduced to the same state of vassalage with the Helotes, were often comprehended under this latter name; as appears from Pausanias, in lib. 3, p. 201 ed. Hanov. as also appears from Thucydides, in lib. 1, p. 101. The scholiast to this great historian informs us further, that the Lacedæmonians *δια το αει διαφορης ειναι ειλωταις*, (for so this last word ought to be read, and not *αλληλοις*, as it is absurdly printed,) because of the hatred which they always bore to the Helotes, were used to call their slaves by that name, in the way of contemptuousness and contumely. But Plato in the passage now before us, uses more accuracy: for meaning to include all the vassals, by whose labour in the lands much wealth accrued to the Lacedæmonians, he calls them, not *ειλωταις*, Helotes, but *ειλωτικαις*, such as the Helotes. Just as Pausanias, in lib. 4, p. 259, means by *το ειλωτικον*, such a vassal-state as that of the Helotes. Plato, by other slaves, means such as were acquired by purchase, or by conquest unconditional, them and their offspring; and of these, such as were not employed in domestic services, but were set to work in agriculture and other country-labour: for Socrates is here speaking only of the value of the Lacedæmonian estates in land arising from such labour.—S.

¹ The Lacedæmonians were abundantly supplied with all the necessaries of life from their own lands; and being by their laws restrained from all splendour and magnificence, from all delicacy and luxury, as well in their houses and the furniture of them, as in their apparel and the provisions of their tables, they could have no occasion to purchase for their own use any foreign trinkets or commodities. Indeed sumptuary laws were almost unnecessary in their commonwealth, through the force and effect of another law, by which they were prohibited not only from using any coined money, whether of gold, silver, or copper, in their home-traffic, but even from having any such useless treasure in their houses. The only money permitted to pass current amongst them was of their own making; it consisted in pieces of iron, of a conoidal form, so peculiarly tempered as to be of no other use. These pieces, therefore, having no real value, and a nominal value no where but in Laconia, would not be taken by any foreigners in exchange for merchandize. On the other hand, all the corn and cattle produced or bred in the fertile fields and fine pastures of Messenia, all the copper and iron dug out of the rich mountains of Laconia, and manufactured by the great number of those Helotes
who

justly be applied to them ; the footsteps of money coming into Lacedæmon are easy to be discovered, as being all turned towards it ; but the tracks of money going out of it are no where to be discerned ¹. Thus it may easily be conceived, that of all the Grecians the richest in gold and silver are the Lacedæmonians, and that of all the Lacedæmonians the richest is their king. For of such comings-in a larger share, and oftener, is received by kings ² than by other men. And besides this ³, the taxes paid by the Lacedæmonians to their kings bring them in a large revenue. But whatever wealth the Lacedæmonians have, though great if compared with that of any other Grecians, yet in comparison with the riches of the Persians, and especially of their king, 'tis nothing. For I once heard a man of credit, who had been at the capital city of Persia, say, that in going up to it, he travelled almost a day's journey through a large and fertile territory, which the inhabitants of it called the Queen's Girdle ⁴; that there was another extensive tract of land called the Queen's Veil ; and that many other fair and fruitful countries were appropriated to provide the rest of the queen's apparel ⁵ ; each of those countries having its name from that part of the apparel which the revenue of it furnished. So that, were any person to tell the queen-mother, Amastris, the consort formerly of Xerxes, that the son of Dinomache had it in his head to lead an army against

who lived in the city of Sparta, and laboured not for their own profit, but for that of their masters,—all this, except the little wanted at home, was sold abroad and paid for in gold and silver : which money was by the owners either deposited in the temple at Delphi, or intrusted to the custody of their neighbours, the Arcadians ; (see Athenæus, lib. 6. p. 233.) besides much of it, perhaps, buried under ground ; (as silver is said to be at Pekin, and gold under the Stadt-house at Amsterdam) or concealed in secret places ; an instance of which kind we have in the story of Gylippus, told by Plutarch in his Life of Lyfander.—S.

¹ The fox's answer to the lion, in the well known fable to which this passage alludes, is cited by Horace, in Epist. 1. lib. 1.—S.

² Only meaning here the revenue arising from their demesne-lands ; more of which in quantity and better in quality, kings have than other men.—S.

³ That is, besides the profit arising from their demesne-lands.—S.

⁴ See the Lesser Hippas.—S.

⁵ The same custom was in antient Egypt. For we read in Herodotus, lib. 2. p. 123, edit. Gronov., that the city of Anthylla, that is, the revenue of the crown arising from the taxes imposed on it, was assigned and set apart for the supplying of the queen-consort with shoes and slippers.—S.

her

her son ;—and were she told at the same time that Dinomache's whole attire might be worth perhaps fifty minæ¹ ; supposing it to be of the most costly kind² ; and that this son of hers had land in the district of Erchia³, containing not so much as three hundred acres⁴ ;—she I suppose would wonder in what kind of things this Alcibiades could place so much confidence as to think of contending with Artaxerxes. And I imagine that she would say, it is impossible that this man should undertake such an affair with any other confidence than what he places in the prudence and skill which he is master of : for that the Grecians have nothing else worthy of account. Because if she was to hear further, that this same Alcibiades in the first place had not completed the twentieth year of his age ; in the next place that he was utterly uninstructed ; and besides this, that, when a friend of his advised him first to acquire the knowledge, the prudence, and the habits, necessary for the execution of his designs, before he offered to attack the king, he refused to hearken to this advice, and said, that even in his present condition he was prepared sufficiently ;—I believe she would be astonished, and would ask, What kind of a thing it could be then in which the youth put his confidence ? Upon this, were we to tell her,—In his handsome and fine person, in his birth and family, in his riches, and in the natural faculties of his mind,—she would think us, Alcibiades, out of our senses, when she reflected on all the advantages which her son enjoyed of the same kinds. No less do I imagine that Lampido⁵, daughter of Leotychidas, wife of Archidamus, and mother of Agis, who, all of them in their turns, succeeded to the crown of Sparta, she too would wonder, in reflecting on their greatness, were she told, that you had taken it into your head to make war against her son, so ill instructed as you are. And now do you not think it shameful, if the wives of our

¹ Equal to 161l. 9s. 2d. English money.—S.

² Meaning the most costly among such as were worn by Grecian women.—S.

³ See Meursius in his *Reliqua Attica*, cap. 5.—S.

⁴ Πλεθρα. A Greek πλεθρον contained 10,000 square feet: an English acre contains 4,840 square feet. So that the land-estate of Alcibiades, near Erchia, contained about 619 English acres.—S.

⁵ This princess is called Lampidro in the editions we have of Plutarch, probably from an antient error in the manuscripts, as Meursius in his *treatise de Regno Laconico* rightly seems to judge. By Herodotus she is called Lampito, lib. 6. p. 354, ed. Gronovii.—S.

enemies

enemies consider more prudently for us than we do for ourselves, what sort of persons we ought to be before we venture to attack such enemies? Harken therefore, my good sir, to the advice which I give you, in agreement with the Delphic inscription, **KNOW THYSELF**: since your antagonists are to be, not those whom you imagine, but these whom I have told you of: and these you never can excel in any other point than skill and application; in which articles if you are found deficient, you will fail of that reputation and renown, as well with Grecians as Barbarians, which I think you long for with more ardour than any other man does for whatever is the object of his wishes.

ALC. Can you teach me then, O Socrates, what sort of application I ought to use? for you seem to be entirely right in all which you have spoken.

Soc. Something I have indeed to say upon that subject. But let us enter into a joint consultation, you and I, about the means of becoming, both of us, better men. For when I say, there is a necessity for instruction, I mean it of myself as well as of you: since only one difference there is between you and me.

ALC. What is that?

Soc. He who is my guardian is better and wiser than Pericles, who is yours.

ALC. And who is yours, O Socrates?

Soc. A GOD, O Alcibiades! he who permitted me not before this day to enter into any discourse with you: he it is, on whose dictates to me I rely, when I am bold to say, that you will acquire the renown you long for, by no other means than through me.

ALC. You are in jest, Socrates.

Soc. Perhaps so: but I speak the truth however in good earnest when I say that we stand in need of instruction, or rather, that all men want it; but that you and I have very especial need of it.

ALC. In saying that I have need of it, you are not mistaken.

Soc. Neither am I, in saying that I myself have.

ALC. What then must we do?

Soc. We must not despair, nor give ourselves up to indolence, my friend.

ALC.

ALC. By no means, Socrates, does it become us so to do.

Soc. Indeed it does not. We must therefore consider of the affair, you and I together. Now then answer to my questions. We profess to be desirous of becoming as excellent as possible : do we not ?

ALC. We do.

Soc. In what kind of excellence ?

ALC. In that certainly which belongs to men of merit.

Soc. Of merit in what respect ?

ALC. In the management of business and affairs, undoubtedly.

Soc. But what business do you mean ? The business of a jockey ?

ALC. Clearly not.

Soc. For then we should go for instruction to those who understand the management of horses.

ALC. Certainly we should.

Soc. Do you then mean of a mariner ?

ALC. I do not.

Soc. For in that case we should apply to those who understand navigation.

ALC. Certainly so.

Soc. But what business or affairs then ? and by what sort of men are these affairs managed ?

ALC. I mean such affairs as are managed by men of honour and merit amongst the Athenians.

Soc. Men of honour and merit do you call such as have understanding, or such as are void of understanding ?

ALC. Such as have understanding.

Soc. In whatever business a man has understanding, in that has he not merit ?

ALC. He has.

Soc. And in whatever business he is void of understanding, is he not in that void of merit ?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. Whether hath a shoemaker understanding in the business of making shoes ?

ALC. He certainly has.

Soc. In this respect therefore he has merit.

ALC. He has.

Soc. Well; but is not a shoemaker void of understanding in the business of making clothes?

ALC. No doubt of it.

Soc. In this respect therefore he is void of merit.

ALC. He is so.

Soc. The same man therefore, according to this account, is at the same time void of merit and possessed of merit.

ALC. It appears so.

Soc. Would you say, then, that men possessed of merit are at the same time void of merit?

ALC. That cannot be.

Soc. What kind of men then do you mean by the men of merit?

ALC. I mean such as have abilities to govern at Athens.

Soc. Not to govern horses, I presume.

ALC. No, certainly.

Soc. But to govern men.

ALC. That is my meaning.

Soc. But what men do you mean? Men who are sick?

ALC. I do not mean these.

Soc. Men then who are going a voyage?

ALC. I mean not such men.

Soc. Men then who are gathering the harvest?

ALC. Nor such neither.

Soc. But men who do nothing do you mean? or men who do something?

ALC. Men who do something.

Soc. Who do what? try if you can make me sensible of your precise meaning.

ALC. Well then. I mean men who have commerce one with another¹;

¹ In the Greek, *συμβαλλόντων ταυτοῖς*. But we apprehend that the pronoun *ταυτοῖς* can never follow the verb *συμβαλλω*, (in connection with it,) in any sense ever given to that verb. Presuming therefore that the right reading is *συμβαλλόντων ἀλλήλοις* we have translated agreeably to this presumption. In confirmation of which we find within a few lines after, *συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.—S.

and make use of one another's aid and assistance in that kind of life which we lead in cities.

Soc. You speak then of such as have abilities to govern men, who make use of other men to aid and assist them.

Alc. I do.

Soc. Do you mean the governing of men who make use of mariners in the rowing of galleys, and give them the proper orders?

Alc. I mean no such thing.

Soc. For ability to govern such men belongs to the commander of a galley.

Alc. True.

Soc. Do you then mean the governing of men who are musicians, and lead the song to other men, making use of chorus-fingers and dancers?

Alc. I mean not this neither.

Soc. For this skill belongs to the master of the whole choir.

Alc. Right.

Soc. In speaking then of ability to govern men who make use of other men, what kind of use do you mean? or in what way?

Alc. Fellow-citizens, I mean, partakers of the same polity, and engaged in mutual commerce for mutual help and benefit. I speak of ability to govern these.

Soc. What art then is that which gives this ability? as if I were to ask you, on the subject just now mentioned—the knowing how to govern men embarked in the same voyage—What art is it that gives this knowledge?

Alc. The art of commanding ships.

Soc. And what science is that which gives the power of governing those others whom we mentioned,—those who have parts in the same song?

Alc. That which belongs, as just now you said, to the master of the whole choir.

Soc. And by what name do you call that science which gives ability to govern those who partake of the same polity?

Alc. Prudence I call it for my part, Socrates.

Soc. What? do you think then that want of prudence is proper for the commander of a ship?

Alc.

ALC. Certainly not so.

Soc. But rather that prudence is.

ALC. I think it is, so far as it regards the safety of those who are sailing in the ship.

Soc. It is well said : and that other science, that which you call prudence, what end does that regard ?

ALC. The good government and safety of the commonwealth.

Soc. And what is it which the commonwealth enjoys when it is governed best and preserved in safety ? and what is it from which it is then preserved ? as, if you were to ask me this question, What is it which the body enjoys when it is best taken care of, and preserved in safety ? and from what is it then preserved ? I would say that then it enjoys health, and is preserved from disease. Are not you of the same opinion ?

ALC. I am.

Soc. And, if you were to ask me further, What do the eyes enjoy when the best care is taken of them ? and from what are they then preserved ? I would answer in like manner as before, that they enjoyed their sight, and were preserved from blindness. So likewise of the ears ; when they are preserved from deafness, and have their hearing perfect, they are then in their best condition, and are taken the best care of.

ALC. Right.

Soc. Well, now ; what does the commonwealth enjoy, and from what is it preserved, when 'tis in its best condition, has the best care taken of it, and is best preserved ?

ALC. It seems to me, Socrates, that the members of it then enjoy mutual amity, and are preserved from enmity and factions.

Soc. By amity do you mean their being of the same mind, or of different minds ?

ALC. Their being of the same mind.

Soc. Now through what science is it that different civil states are of the same mind concerning numbers ?

ALC. Through the science of arithmetic.

Soc. Well ; and is it not through that very science that private persons are of the same mind one with another ?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And that any person too, by himself, continues always in the same mind, is it not through his possessing that science?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And through what science is it that a single individual is always of the same mind concerning a span and a cubit, whether of the two is the greater measure? is it not through the science of mensuration?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And is it not so too between different private persons and civil states?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And how concerning weights? does not the same hold true in this case?

ALC. I agree it does.

Soc. But now the sameness of mind which you speak of, what is that? What is the subject-matter of it? and through what science is it procured? I ask you likewise whether the same science which procures it for the public procures it no less for private persons; and whether it operates that effect in a man considered by himself as well as between one man and another.

ALC. Probably it does.

Soc. What science or art then is it? Do not labour for an answer, but speak readily what you think.

ALC. I think it to be such an amity and sameness of mind, that which we are speaking of, as there is between a father and a mother in loving their child, and as there is between brother and brother, and between man and wife.

Soc. Do you then think it possible, Alcibiades, for a man to be of the same mind with his wife on the subject of weaving, when he is ignorant and she is knowing in the art?

ALC. By no means.

Soc. Nor ought he neither. For 'tis a piece of knowledge belonging only to women.

ALC. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. Well ; and can a woman be of the same mind with her husband on the subject of fighting in battle among the infantry, when she has never learnt the art ?

ALC. Certainly she cannot.

Soc. For the knowledge of this you would perhaps say belonged only to men.

ALC. I should so.

Soc. Some pieces of knowledge, therefore, properly belong to women ; others to men according to your account.

ALC. No doubt can be made of it.

Soc. On those subjects therefore which are not common to both the sexes there is no sameness of mind, between husbands and their wives.

ALC. There is not any.

Soc. Neither then is there any friendship ; if friendship consist in sameness of mind.

ALC. It appears there is not.

Soc. So far therefore as women are attentive to their own business they are not beloved by their husbands.

ALC. It seems they are not.

Soc. Neither are men beloved by their wives,—so far as their minds are engaged in their own business.

ALC. It seems they are not.

Soc. Neither then do citizens live well ^a together in cities, when each of them minds only his own business.

ALC. Nay, Socrates ; for my part I imagine that they do,—so far as they are thus employed.

Soc. How say you ? What, without friendship between them, by means of which we said that civil states were in a happy condition, and without which we said they could not flourish ?

^a In all the editions of Plato, we here read simply *οἰκονομαί*. In all the MSS. therefore, from which the first of them were printed, and in those also which Ficinus and Cornarius translated, there seems to have been an omission of the word *εἰς*. We think it an omission because the same word is inserted in the very next sentence of Socrates, which the reasoning requires to correspond with this. Serranus alone, in his translation, appears to have seen the necessity of its being here restored.—S.

ALC.

ALC. But it seems to me that friendship is on this very account produced between them, because every one gives his whole attention to his own business.

Soc. It did not seem so to you just now. But how do you explain at present what you said,—that friendship was produced by sameness of mind? Whether is it possible that fellow-citizens can be all of the same mind on subjects in which some of them are knowing, and others ignorant?

ALC. It is not possible.

Soc. And do they do their duty, and act as they ought, or not, when each of them attends to his own business?

ALC. As they ought, undoubtedly.

Soc. When the citizens then of any city act as they ought, and all of them do their duty, is not friendship produced between them?

ALC. It must be so I think, Socrates.

Soc. What kind of friendship, or sameness of mind, do you then mean, in the procuring of which you say that wisdom and prudence are requisite to make us men of virtue and merit? For I can neither learn from you what it is, nor what objects it regards. But sometimes it seems to regard the same objects, and sometimes not, according to your account of it.

ALC. Now by the Gods, Socrates, I know not what I mean, myself. But am in danger of appearing to have been, of a long time, in a shameful state of mind, without being sensible of it.

Soc. Now therefore you ought to take courage. For if fifty years of your life had elapsed before you had discovered the real state of your mind, an application of it to the care of yourself would have been a difficult task for you. But you are now at the very time of life in which such a discovery should be made, to be of any advantage to you.

ALC. What then am I to do, Socrates, now that I am made sensible of my condition?

Soc. Only to answer to the questions I shall put to you, Alcibiades. And if you will so do, you and I, by the favour of God, if any credit may be given to a prophecy of mine, shall both of us be the better for it.

ALC. Your prophecy shall be accomplished, as far as the accomplishment depends on my answering to your questions.

Soc. Come on then. What is it to take care of oneself? That we may not falsely imagine, as we often do, that we are taking care of ourselves, and know not that all the while we are otherwise employed. And when is it that a man is taking that care? Whether when he is taking care of what appertains to him, is he then taking care of himself?

ALC. For my part I must own I think so.

Soc. And when is it, think you, that a man is taking care of his feet? whether is it then when he is taking care of the things appertaining to his feet?

Soc. I do not apprehend your meaning.

Soc. Do you acknowledge something to be appertaining to the hand,—a ring, for instance? Or ¹ does it appertain to any other part of the human body than a finger?

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. And does not a shoe appertain to the foot in like manner?

ALC. It does.

~~Soc.~~ Whether then at the time of our taking care of our shoes are we taking care immediately of our feet?

ALC. I do not quite apprehend you, Socrates.

Soc. Do you acknowledge that whatever be the subject of our care, a right care of it may be taken?

ALC. I do.

Soc. I ask you then, whether you think that a man takes a right care of whatever is the subject of his care, when he improves it and makes it better?

ALC. I answer Yes.

Soc. What art now is that by which our shoes are improved and made better?

ALC. The shoemaker's art.

Soc. By the shoemaker's art therefore it is that we take a right care of our shoes.

ALC. True.

¹ If, in the Greek, we here insert the particle *ἢ* or, there will be no occasion to separate these two questions of Socrates, so as to insert between them an affirmative answer of Alcibiades to the first question; as Ficinus does in his translation.—S.

Soc. And is it also by the shoemaker's art that we take a right care of our feet? or is it by that art by which we improve our feet and make them better?

ALC. It is by this art.

Soc. And do we not improve and make better our feet by the same art by which we improve and make better the rest of our body?

ALC. I believe we do.

Soc. And is not this the gymnastic art?

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. By the gymnastic art therefore we take care of the foot, and by the shoemaker's art we take care of what is appertinent to the foot.

ALC. Exactly so.

Soc. And in like manner by the gymnastic art we take care of our hands, and by the art of engraving rings we take care of what is appertinent to the hand.

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. By the gymnastic art also we take care of our bodies; but 'tis by the weaver's art and some others that we take care of things appertinent to the body.

ALC. I agree with you entirely.

Soc. By one kind of knowledge therefore we take care of things themselves, and by a different kind of knowledge we take care of things only appertinent to those things which are the principal.

ALC. It appears so.

Soc. You are not therefore taking care of yourself when you are taking care only of the appertinences to yourself.

ALC. At that time 'tis very true I am not.

Soc. For one and the same art, it seems, doth not take care of a thing itself, and of the appertinences to that thing besides.

ALC. It appears to be not the same art.

Soc. Now then, by what kind of art might we take care of ourselves?

ALC. I have nothing to answer to this question.

Soc. So much, however, we are agreed in, that it is not an art by which we improve or better any thing which is ours; but an art by which we improve and better our very selves.

ALC.

ALC. I acknowledge it.

Soc. Could we ever know what art would improve or amend a shoe, if we knew not what a shoe was?

ALC. Impossible.

Soc. Neither could we know what art would make better rings for the finger, if ignorant what a ring for the finger was.

ALC. True.

Soc. Well; and can we ever know what art would improve or make a man's self better, so long as we are ignorant of what we ourselves are?

ALC. Impossible.

Soc. Let me ask you, then, whether it happens to be an easy thing to know oneself; and whether he was some person of mean attainments in knowledge, he who put up this inscription in the temple at Pytho¹: or is it a piece of knowledge difficult to be attained, and not obvious to every one?

ALC. To me, Socrates, it has often seemed easy and obvious to every one, and often too, at other times, a thing of the greatest difficulty.

Soc. But whether in itself it be an easy thing or not, with respect to us, Alcibiades, the state of the case is this;—had we attained to that piece of knowledge, we should perhaps know what it is to take care of ourselves; but never can we know this so long as we remain ignorant of that.

ALC. These are truths which I acknowledge.

Soc. Come then. By what means might it be found what is the very self of every thing? for so we might perhaps find what we ourselves are: but so long as we continue in the dark as to that point, it will be no way possible to know ourselves.

ALC. You are certainly in the right.

¹ Pytho was another name for the city of Delphi, as we learn from Pausanias: a name more antient than the name Delphi, and on that very account retained by Homer and Apollonius of Rhodes. The passages to which we here refer may be seen cited together by Cellarius, in *Geog.* vol. i. p. 721, edit. Cantab. An air of antiquity in the diction is observed by the best critics to be one of the sources of the sublime in epic poetry. And Plato treads every where in the steps of Homer while he is searching out all the sources of sublimity in style, to maintain throughout his writings the dignity of true philosophy, and, at the same time, to preserve its simplicity, and unadulterated beauty.

Soc. Attend now, I conjure you in the name of Jupiter : With whom is it that you are at this present time discoursing ? Is it not¹ with me ?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And am not I discoursing with you ?

ALC. You are.

Soc. It is Socrates then who is discoursing and arguing.

ALC. Quite true.

Soc. And Alcibiades is attentive to his arguments.

ALC. He is.

Soc. Is it not by reason that Socrates thus argues in discourse ?

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And is not to argue in discourse the same thing as to reason ?

ALC. Quite the same.

Soc. But is not the person who uses a thing, different from the thing which he uses ?

ALC. How do you mean ?

Soc. As a shoemaker, for instance, cuts his leather with the sheers, and the paring knife, and other tools.

ALC. Well ; he does so.

Soc. Is not then the shoemaker, who cuts the leather and uses those tools in cutting it, different from the tools which he uses ?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. Are not, in like manner, the instruments on which a musician plays, different things from the musician himself ?

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. It was in this sense that just now I asked you whether you thought that, in all cases, the person who used a thing was different from the thing which he used.

ALC. I think he is.

Soc. Now then, to resume the instance of the shoemaker ; what say we ? does he cut the leather with his tools only, or also with his hands ?

¹ In the Greek we here read, — *ἀλλοι τινι ἢ ἐμοί* ; Is it with any other person than with me ? But the answer of Alcibiades being in the affirmative is sufficient to show this reading to be wrong. It may be rectified by this small alteration, *ἀλλοτὶ ἢ ἐμοί* ; Whether is it not with me ?

ALC. With his hands also.

Soc. He therefore uses also these.

ALC. He does.

Soc. And does he not use his eyes also when he is cutting the leather?

ALC. He does.

Soc. And we are agreed, that the person who makes use of any things is different from the things which he makes use of.

ALC. We are.

Soc. The shoemaker then, and the musician, are different from the hands and eyes with which they perform their operations.

ALC. It is apparent.

Soc. And does not a man use also his whole body?

ALC. Most certainly.

Soc. Now the user is different from the thing used.

ALC. True.

Soc. A man therefore is a being different from his body.

ALC. It seems so.

Soc. What sort of being then is man?

ALC. I know not.

Soc. But you know that man is some being who makes use of the body.

ALC. True.

Soc. Does any being make use of the body other than the soul?

ALC. None other.

Soc. And does it not so do by governing the body?

ALC. It does.

Soc. Further. I suppose that no man would ever think otherwise than this.

ALC. Than what?

Soc. That a man himself was one of these three things.

ALC. What three things?

Soc. Soul, or body, or a compound of them both, constituting one whole.

ALC. What besides could be imagined?

Soc. Now we agreed that the being which governs the body is the man.

ALC. We did.

Soc. What being then is the man? Doth the body itself govern itself?

ALC. By no means.

Soc. For the body we said was governed.

ALC. True.

Soc. The body then cannot be that being which we are in search of.

ALC. It seems not.

Soc. But whether does the compound being govern the body ? and whether is this the man ?

ALC. Perhaps it is.

Soc. Left of any of the three can this be so. For of two parties, one of which is the party governed, there is no possibility that both of them should govern jointly.

ALC. Right.

Soc. Since then neither the body, nor the compound of soul and body together, is the man, it remains, I think, either that a man's self is nothing at all, or, if it be any thing, it must be concluded that the man is no other thing than soul.

ALC. Clearly so.

Soc. Needs it then to be proved to you still more clearly, that the soul ¹ is the very man ?

ALC. It needs not, by Jupiter : for the proofs already brought seem to me sufficient.

Soc. If it be proved tolerably well, though not accurately, 'tis sufficient for us. For we shall then perhaps, and not before, have an accurate knowledge of man's self, when we shall have discovered what we just now passed by as a matter which required much consideration.

¹ Simplicius rightly understands Plato here to mean the rational soul. For the arguments produced in this part of the Dialogue, to show that the soul is a man's proper self, regard the rational soul only. This soul alone uses speech, as the instrument by which it makes known to others its mind and will. This alone uses argumentative speech, as an instrument to teach art and science, to correct error, to confute falsehood, and demonstrate truth. This alone uses the organical parts of the body, especially the hands and eyes, as instruments by which it operates in all the performances of the manual arts. This alone employs the whole body in its service, as the instrument of its will and pleasure; and is the sole governing and leading power in man, whether it govern well or ill, and whether it lead in the right way, or in the wrong; for the rest of the man must obey and follow. It governs well, and leads aright, through knowledge of itself; if this knowledge infer the knowledge of what is just, fair, and good, and if the knowledge of these things be the science of rational, right, and good government.—S.

ALC.

ALC. What is that ?

SOC. That of which was said some such thing as this,—that in the first place we should consider what is self itself : whereas, instead of this, we have been considering what is the proper self of every man. And this indeed for our purpose will perhaps suffice. For we could by no means ever say that any thing was more peculiarly and properly oneself, than is the soul.

ALC. Certainly, we could not.

SOC. May we not then fairly thus determine,—that we are conversing one with another, by means of reason, you and I, soul with soul ?

ALC. Quite fairly.

SOC. This therefore was our meaning when we said a little before, that Socrates discoursed with Alcibiades, making use of reason : we meant, it seems, that he directed his words and arguments, not to your outward person, but to Alcibiades himself, that is to the soul.

ALC. It seems so to me too.

SOC. He therefore enjoins a man to recognise the soul, he who gives him this injunction,—to know himself.

ALC. That is probably his meaning.

SOC. Whoever then has a knowledge only of his body ¹, has indeed attained the knowledge of what is his, but not the knowledge of himself.

ALC. Just so.

SOC. None therefore of the physicians, so far as he is only a physician,

¹ The Greek of this passage, in all the editions of Plato, is absurdly printed thus, ὅστις ἀρα τῶν τοῦ σώματος γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ' αὐτοῦ, ἐγνώκεν. The first member of which sentence being ungrammatical, Stephens, in the margin of his edition, supposes may be rectified, either by inserting the word *τι* before *τῶν*, or by changing the *τῶν* into *τὰ*. In either of these ways indeed the grammatical construction is amended, but not the sense : for thus represented, (and thus represented it is by the Latin versions of Cornarius and Serranus,) it is inconsistent with the reasoning, which requires that the body itself should be intended, and not *τὰ* (or *τι τῶν*) *τοῦ σώματος*, the garments, and other external things, or any of them, which are only appertinent to the body. Le Fevre and Dacier seem to have been well aware of this, and have rightly therefore rendered it into French by these words—*son corps*. They were led thus aright by Ficinus, who, in translating this part of the sentence, uses only the word *corpus*. Perhaps in the manuscript from which he translated, he found the right reading, which we conjecture to be this, ὅστις ἀρα τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώμα γιγνώσκει, τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχ' αὐτοῦ, ἐγνώκεν.—S.

knows himself : neither does any master of the exercises, so far as he is such a master and nothing more.

ALC. It seems they do not.

SOC. Far from knowing themselves then are husbandmen, and other artificers or workmen. For such men as these are ignorant it seems of the things which are theirs, and knowing only in subjects still more remote, the mere appertinences to those things which are theirs, so far as their several arts lead them. For they are acquainted only with things appertinent to the body, to the culture and service of which body these things administer.

ALC. What you say is true.

SOC. If therefore wisdom consist in the knowledge of oneself, none of these artificers are wise men by their skill in their respective arts.

ALC. I think they are not.

SOC. On this account it is that these arts seem mechanical and mean, and not the learning fit for a man of a virtuous merit.

ALC. Entirely true.

SOC. To return to our subject whoever then employs his care in the service of his body, takes care indeed of what is his, but not of himself.

ALC. There is danger of its being found so.

SOC. And whoever is attentive to the improvement of his wealth, is not taking care either of himself or of what is his, but of things still more remote, the mere appertinences to what is his¹.

ALC. It seems so to me too.

SOC. The man therefore who is intent on getting money, is so far not acting for his own advantage.

ALC. Rightly concluded.

SOC. It follows also, that whoever was an admirer of the outward person of Alcibiades, did not admire Alcibiades, but something which belongs to Alcibiades.

ALC. You say what is true.

SOC. But whoever is your admirer is the admirer of your soul.

¹ The two preceding notes are referable to this passage also, where, in the Greek, as printed, the like omission is made of the article *τα* before *ταυταυτων*.—S.

ALC. It appears to follow of necessity from our reasoning.

Soc. And hence it is, that the admirer of your outward person, when the flower of it is all fallen, departs and forfakes you:

ALC. So it appears.

Soc. But the admirer of a soul departs not, so long as that soul goes on to improve itself.

ALC. Probably so.

Soc. I am he then who forfakes you not, but abides by you, when, the flower of youth having left you ¹, the rest of your followers have left you and are gone.

ALC. It is kindly done of you, Socrates: and never do you forsake me.

Soc. Exert all your endeavours then to be as excellent a man as possible.

ALC. I will do my best.

Soc. For the state of your case is this:—Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, never it seems had any admirer, neither has he now, besides one only, and therefore to be cherished, this Socrates here, the son of Sophroniscus and Phænarete.

ALC. 'Tis true.

Soc. Did you not say that I had been a little beforehand with you when I accosted you; for that you had it in your mind to address me first; as you wanted to ask me, why of all your admirers I was the only one who forsook you not?

ALC. I did say so: and that was the very case.

Soc. This then was the reason: 'twas because I was the only person who admired you; the others admired that which is yours. That which is yours has already dropt its flower; and the spring-season of it is past: whereas you yourself are but beginning to flourish. If therefore the Athenian populace corrupt you not, and make you less fair, I never shall forsake you. But this is what I chiefly fear, that you may come to admire and court the populace, and be corrupted by them, and we should lose you: since many of the Athenians, men of virtuous merit too, have been thus

¹In the Greek, *ἀλγοντες του σωματος*, where the word *ανδους* seems necessary to be supplied. The same metaphor is used a few lines further on.—S.

corrupted before now. For the people of magnanimous Erechtheus has an outward person fair and engaging to behold. But we ought to strip it of all its showy drefs, and view it naked. Use therefore the caution which I give you.

ALC. What caution?

Soc. In the first place, my friend, exercise yourself; and acquire the knowledge of those things which are necessary to be learnt by every man who engages in political affairs: but engage not in them until you are thus exercised and thus instructed: that you may come to them prepared with an antidote, and suffer no harm from the poison of the populace.

ALC. What you say, Socrates, to me seems right. But explain, if you can, more clearly, how or in what way we should take care of ourselves.

Soc. Is not this then sufficiently clear to us from what has been already said? For what we are, has been tolerably well agreed on. Indeed before that point was settled we feared lest we should mistake it, and imagine that we were taking care of ourselves, when the object of our care all the while was some other thing.

ALC. This is true.

Soc. Upon that it was concluded by both of us that we ought to take care of the soul, and that to this we should direct all our attention and regard.

ALC. It was evident.

Soc. And that the care of our bodies and our possessions should be delivered over to others.

ALC. We could not doubt it.

Soc. In what way then may we attain to know the soul itself with the greatest clearness? For, when we know this, it seems we shall know ourselves. Now, in the name of the Gods, whether are we not ignorant of the right meaning of that Delphic inscription just now mentioned?

ALC. What meaning? What have you in your thoughts, O Socrates! when you ask this question?

Soc. I will tell you what I suspect that this inscription means, and what particular thing it advises us to do. For a just resemblance of it is, I think, not to be found wherever one pleases; but in one only thing, the fight.

ALC. How do you mean?

Soc.

Soc. Consider it jointly now with me. Were a man to address himself to the outward human eye, as if it were some other man; and were he to give it this counsel "See yourself;" what particular thing should we suppose that he advised the eye to do? Should we not suppose that 'twas to look at such a thing, as that the eye, by looking at it, might see itself?

ALC. Certainly we should.

Soc. What kind of thing then do we think of, by looking at which we see the thing at which we look, and at the same time see ourselves?

ALC. 'Tis evident, O Socrates, that for this purpose we must look at mirrors, and other things of the like kind.

Soc. You are right. And has not the eye itself, with which we see, something of the same kind belonging to it?

ALC. Most certainly it has.

Soc. You have observed, then, that the face of the person who looks in the eye of another person, appears visible to himself in the eye-sight of the person opposite to him, as in a mirror? And we therefore call this the pupil, because it exhibits the image of that person who looks in it.

ALC. What you say is true.

Soc. An eye therefore beholding an eye, and looking in the most excellent part of it, in that with which it sees, may thus see itself?

ALC. Apparently so.

Soc. But if the eye look at any other part of the man, or at any thing whatever, except what this part of the eye happens to be like, it will not see itself.

ALC. It is true.

Soc. If therefore the eye would see itself, it must look in an eye, and in that place of the eye, too, where the virtue of the eye is naturally seated; and the virtue of the eye is sight.

ALC. Just so.

Soc. Whether then is it not true, my friend Alcibiades, that the soul¹, if she would know herself, must look at soul, and especially at that place

¹ That is, the whole rational soul.—T.

in the soul in which wisdom¹, the virtue of the soul, is ingenerated; and also at whatever else this virtue of the soul resembles?

ALC. To me, O Socrates, it seems true.

SOC. Do we know of any place in the soul more divine than that which is the seat of knowledge and intelligence?

ALC. We do not.

SOC. This therefore in the soul resembles the divine nature. And a man, looking at this, and recognizing all that which is divine², and God and wisdom, would thus gain the most knowledge of himself.

ALC.

¹ According to Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, the being which is wise desires to be full of knowledge, and does not seek nor investigate, but possesses the intelligible, or, in other words, the proper object of intellectual vision. But according to Socrates, in the Republic, wisdom is generative of truth and intellect: and from the Theætetus it appears to be that which gives perfection to things imperfect, and calls forth the latent intellects of the soul. From hence, it is evident that wisdom, according to Plato, is full of real being and truth, is generative of intellectual truth, and is perfective according to energy of intellectual natures. In this place, therefore, Plato, with great propriety, and consistently with the above definition, calls wisdom the virtue of the soul. For the different virtues are the sources of different perfection to the soul, and wisdom, the highest virtue, is the perfection of our supreme part, intellect.—T.

² Proclus on Plato's Theology, lib. 1. cap. 3, p. 7. beautifully observes as follows on this passage: "Socrates, in the Alcibiades, rightly observes that the soul entering into herself will behold all other things, and deity itself. For, verging to her own union, and to the centre of all life, laying aside multitude, and the variety of the all manifold powers which she contains, she ascends to the highest watch-tower of beings. And as, in the most holy of mysteries³, they say that the mystics at first meet with the multiform and many-shaped genera⁴, which are hurled forth before the gods, but on entering the interior parts of the temple, unmoved, and guarded by the mystic rites, they genuinely receive in their bosom divine illumination, and divested of their garments, as they say, participate of a divine nature; the same mode, as it appears to me, takes place in the speculation of wholes⁵. For the soul, when looking at things posterior to herself, beholds only the shadows and images of beings; but when she turns to herself, she evolves her own essence, and the reasons which she contains. And at first, indeed,

¹ Viz. in the Eleusinian mysteries; for thus he elsewhere denominates these mysteries.

² Meaning evil dæmons; for the assuming a variety of shapes is one of the characteristics of such dæmons.

³ By the term *wholes*, in the Platonic philosophy, every incorporeal order of being, and every mundane sphere, are signified.

ALC. It is apparent.

Soc. And to know oneself, we acknowledge to be wisdom.

ALC. By all means.

[¹ Soc. Shall we not say, therefore, that as mirrors are clearer, purer, and more splendid than that which is analogous to a mirror in the eye, in like manner God is purer and more splendid than that which is best in our soul?

ALC. It is likely, Socrates.

Soc. Looking therefore at God, we should make use of him as the most beautiful mirror, and among human concerns we should look at the virtue of the soul; and thus, by so doing, shall we not especially see and know our very selves?

ALC. Yes.]

Soc. If then we are not wise, but are ignorant of ourselves, can we know what our good is, and what our evil?

ALC. How is it possible that we should, Socrates?

Soc. For perhaps it appears impossible for a man who knows not Alcibiades himself, to know any thing which relates to Alcibiades, as having that relation.

ALC. Impossible it is, by Jupiter.

the only, as it were, beholds herself; but when she penetrates more profoundly in the knowledge of herself, she finds in herself both intellect and the orders of beings. But when she proceeds into her interior recesses, and into the adytum, as it were, of the soul, she perceives, with her eyes nearly closed, the genus of the gods, and the unities of beings. For all things reside in us according to the peculiarity of soul; and through this we are naturally capable of knowing all things, by exciting the powers and the images of wholes which we contain."—T.

¹ The words within the brackets are from Stobæus, Serm. 21. p. 183., from whom it appears that they ought to be inserted in this place, though this omission has not been noticed by any of the editors of Plato. The original is as follows: Ἀρ' ὥσπερ κατοπτρα σαφέστερα ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνοπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερα τε καὶ λαμπροτέρα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ βελτιστοῦ, καθαρώτερον τε, καὶ λαμπροτέρου τυγχάνει ὧν; ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης. Εἰς τοὺς Θεοὺς ἀρα βλέποντες ἐκεῖνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνοπτρῷ χρῶμεθ' αὐτῷ, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴν, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸς ἀνὰ μάλιστα οὐκ ἔρρωμεν καὶ γινώσκουμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς; Ναι. The intelligent reader needs not, I trust, be told, that, without this uncommonly beautiful passage, the dialogue is defective in its most essential part.—T.

Soc. Neither then can any thing which is our own, be known by us to be our own, any other way than through the knowledge of ourselves.

ALC. How should we ?

Soc. And if we know not that which is ours, neither can we know any of the appertinences to what is ours.

ALC. It appears we cannot.

Soc. We therefore were not at all right in admitting, as we did just now, that certain persons there were, who knew not themselves, but who knew what belonged to them, and was theirs. Neither can such as know not themselves know the appertinences to what is theirs. For it seems, that 'tis the province of one and the same person, and is from one and the same science, to know himself, to know the things which are his, and to know the appertinences to those things.

ALC. I believe it will be found so.

Soc. And whoever is ignorant of what belongs to himself and is his own, must be likewise ignorant of what belongs to other men and is theirs.

ALC. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And if he is ignorant of what belongs to other men, will he not be ignorant also of what belongs to the public, and to other civil states ?

ALC. He must be so.

Soc. Such a man, therefore, cannot be a politician.

ALC. Certainly he cannot.

Soc. Neither will he be fit to manage a family.

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor will he have any certain knowledge of any thing which he is doing.

ALC. He will not.

Soc. And will not the man who knows not what he is doing, do amiss ?

ALC. Certainly so.

Soc. And doing amiss, will he not act ill, both as a private person, and as a member of the public ?

ALC. No doubt of it.

Soc. And the man who acts ill, is he not in a bad condition ?

ALC. A very bad one.

Soc. And in what condition will they be who have an interest in his conduct?

ALC. In a very bad one they too.

Soc. It is not possible therefore that any man should be happy if he be not wise and good.

ALC. It is not possible.

Soc. Those then who are bad men are in a bad condition.

ALC. A very bad one indeed.

Soc. Not even by riches therefore is a man delivered out of a miserable condition; nor by any other thing than wisdom and virtue.

ALC. Apparently so.

Soc. Fortifications therefore, and shipping, and harbours, will be of no avail to the happiness of any civil states; neither will the multitude of their people, nor the extent of their territories; if they want virtue.

ALC. Of none at all.

Soc. If then you would manage the affairs of the city well and rightly, you must impart virtue to the citizens.

ALC. Beyond question.

Soc. But can a man impart to others that which he has not himself?

ALC. How should he?

Soc. You yourself therefore in the first place should acquire virtue, as should also every other man who has any thoughts of governing, and managing, not himself only, and his own private affairs, but the people also, and the affairs of the public.

ALC. True.

Soc. Not arbitrary power therefore, nor command, ought you to procure, neither for yourself nor for the city, but justice and prudence.

ALC. It is evident.

Soc. For, if ye act justly and prudently, your own conduct, and that of the city too, will be pleasing unto God.

ALC. 'Tis highly probable.

Soc. And ye will thus act, by looking, as we said before, at that which is divine and splendid.

ALC.

ALC. Evidently so.

SOC. And, further, by directing your fight hither, ye will behold and know what is your own good.

ALC. True.

SOC. Will ye not then act both rightly and well?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. And acting thus I will insure happiness both to yourself and to the city.

ALC. You will be a safe insurer.

SOC. But acting unjustly, as looking to that which is without God, and dark, 'tis highly probable that ye will perform actions similar to what ye behold, actions dark and atheistical, as being ignorant of yourselves.

ALC. In all probability that would be the case.

SOC. For, O my friend Alcibiades! if a man have the power of doing what he pleases, and at the same time want intellect, what will be the probable consequence of such arbitrary power, to himself, if he is a private person, and to the state also, if he governs it? As in the case of a bodily disease, if the sick person, without having medical knowledge, had the power of doing what he pleased, and if he tyrannized so as that no person would dare to reprove him, what would be the consequence? Would it not be, in all probability, the destruction of his body?

ALC. It would indeed.

SOC. And in the affair of a sea voyage, if a man, void of the knowledge and skill belonging to a sea commander, had the power of acting and directing in the vessel as he thought proper, do you conceive what would be the consequence, both to himself and to the companions of his voyage?

ALC. I do; that they would all be lost.

SOC. Is it otherwise then in the administration of the state, or in any offices of command or power? If virtue be wanting in the persons who are appointed to them, will not the consequence be an evil and destructive conduct?

ALC. It must.

SOC. Arbitrary power, then, my noble Alcibiades! is not the thing which you are to aim at procuring,—neither for yourself, nor yet for the common-

commonwealth ; but virtue, if you mean either your own private happiness or that of the public.

ALC. True.

Soc. And before one acquires virtue, it is better to be under good government than it is to govern,—better not only for a child, but for a man.

ALC. Evidently so.

Soc. Is not that which is better, more beautiful also ?

ALC. It is.

Soc. And is not that which is more beautiful, more becoming¹ ?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. It becomes a bad man therefore to be a slave : for it is better for him so to be.

ALC. Certainly.

Soc. Vice therefore is a thing servile, and becoming only to the condition of a slave.

ALC. Clearly.

Soc. And virtue is a thing liberal, and becoming to a gentleman.

ALC. It is.

Soc. Ought we not, my friend, to shun every thing which is servile, and becoming only to a slave ?

ALC. The most of all things, O Socrates !

Soc. Are you sensible of the present state of your own mind ? Do you find it liberal, and such as becomes a gentleman, or not ?

ALC. I think I am very fully sensible of what it is.

Soc. Do you know then, by what means you may escape from that condition in which you are now,—not to name what it is, when it happens to be the case of a man of honour ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. By what ?

ALC. Through you, Socrates, if you please.

Soc. That is not well said, Alcibiades !

ALC. What ought I then to say ?

Soc. You ought to say, If God pleases.

¹ See the Greater Hippias.—S.

ALC. I adopt those words then for my own. And I shall add to them these further ;—that we shall be in danger, Socrates, of changing parts,—I of assuming yours,—and you of bearing mine. For it is not possible for me to avoid the following you every where from this day forward, with as much assiduity as if I was your guardian,—and you my pupil.

Soc. My friendship then for you, noble Alcibiades ! may be compared justly to a stork ; if, having hatched in your heart, and there cherished, a winged love, it is afterwards to be by this love, in return, cherished and supported.

ALC. And this you will find to be the very case : for I shall begin from henceforward to cultivate the science of justice.

Soc. I wish you may persevere. But I am terribly afraid for you : not that I in the least distrust the goodness of your disposition ; but perceiving the torrent of the times, I fear you may be borne away with it, in spite of your own resistance, and of my endeavours in your aid.

T H E
R E P U B L I C.

VOL. I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

T O

THE REPUBLIC.

THE design of Plato, says Proclus, in this dialogue, is both concerning a polity and true justice, not as two distinct things, but as the same with each other. For what justice is in one soul, that such a polity as is delineated by Plato is in a well inhabited city. Indeed, the three genera from which a polity consists are analogous to the three parts of the soul: the *guardian*, as that which consults, to reason; the *auxiliary*, as engaging in war, to anger; and the *mercenary*, as supplying the wants of nature, to the desiderative part of the soul. For, according to Plato, it is one and the same habit, which adorns a city, a house, and an individual. But if what the people are in a city, that the desiderative part is in an individual, and that which consults in the former is analogous to reason in the latter, as Plato asserts in his *Laws*, justice according to him will be the polity of the soul, and the best polity of a city will be justice. If these things then are true, he who teaches concerning justice, if he does not teach it imperfectly, will, from perceiving justice every where, teach concerning a polity: and he who speaks concerning an upright polity, if he surveys every, and not some particular, polity, will also speak concerning justice, which both subsists in one polity, and arranges the people in the soul, through our auxiliary part, according to the decision of our guardian reason.

That this was the opinion of Plato respecting these particulars will be evident from considering that, in passing from the investigation concerning justice to the discourse concerning a polity, he says the transition is to be made, not as from one thing to another naturally different, but as from small letters to such as are large and clear, and which manifest

the same things. The matter therefore of justice and a polity is different, in the same manner as that of small and large letters, but the form is the same. Hence the transition is from polity to polity;—from that which is beheld in one individual, to that which is beheld in many: and from justice to justice;—from that which is contracted to that which is more apparent. Nor ought we to wonder that Plato does not express the thing discussed in this dialogue by the name of justice, but by that of a polity, in the same manner as he signifies another subject of discussion by the appellation of laws. For it is requisite that inscriptions should be made from things more known; but the name of a polity or republic is more known, as Plato also says, than that of justice.

With respect to the form of the dialogue, it will be requisite to recollect that Plato himself in this treatise says that there are only three forms of diction, viz. the dramatic and imitative, such as that of comedy and tragedy; the narrative and unimitative, such as is employed by those who write dithyrambics, and the histories of past transactions, without prosopopœia; and a third species which is mixed from both the preceding, such as the poetry of Homer; diversifying some parts of the poem by the narration of things, and others by the imitations of persons. Such being the division of the forms of diction according to Plato, it is necessary to refer the present treatise to the mixed form of diction, which relates some things as transactions, and others as discourses, and alone preserves an accurate narration of persons and things; such as are—descending to the Piræum, praying to the goddess, beholding the festival, and the like. But in the several discourses it makes the most accurate imitation; some things being spoken in the character of old men, others fabulously, and others sophistically; and attributes a knowledge and life adapted to the different speakers. For to preserve the becoming in these particulars is the province of the highest imitation.

With respect to justice, the subject of this dialogue, such according to Plato is its universality and importance, that, if it had no subsistence, injustice itself would be sluggish and in vain. Thus, for instance, if a city were full of injustice, it would neither be able to effect any thing with respect to another city, nor with respect to itself, through the dis-
ension

ension arising from those that injure and are injured. In a similar manner too in an army, if it abounded with every kind of injustice, it would be in sedition with itself; and being in sedition with itself, it must be subverted, and become inefficacious as to the purposes of war. Thus too, a house in which there is no vestige of justice, as it must necessarily be full of dissension, will be incapable of effecting any thing, through the want of concord in its inhabitants. But that which is the most wonderful of all is this, that injustice, when inherent in one person only, must necessarily fill him with sedition towards himself, and through this sedition must render him more imbecil with respect to various endurance, and incapable of pleasing himself. Of necessity, therefore, every one who acts unjustly, if he is able to effect any thing whatever, must possess some vestige of justice; so inseparable is the union between power and justice.

From what has been said, the following syllogism arises. All injustice separate from justice is imbecil. Every thing separate from justice, being imbecil, requires justice to its possession of power. All injustice therefore requires justice in order to its possession of power.—Again, we have the following syllogism. All injustice requires justice, to be able to effect any thing. Every thing which requires justice to be able to effect any thing, is more imbecil than justice. All injustice, therefore, is more imbecil than justice. And this was the thing proposed to be shown. Hence it follows that, even in the worst habit of the soul, in which reason is blinded and appetite perverted, such habit is indeed inefficacious, in consequence of justice being most obscure in such a soul, so as to appear to have no subsistence whatever; yet such a habit has a being in a certain respect, so far as it is impossible that common conceptions can entirely desert the soul, and especially in its desire of good. So far therefore as it is impelled towards good, it participates of justice. And if it were possible that the soul could be perfectly, that is in every respect, unjust, it would perhaps perish: for this is the case with the body when perfectly diseased. But that in such a habit there is a vestige of justice is evident. For it is unwilling to injure itself, and to destroy things pertaining to itself. As it therefore preserves that which is just towards itself, it is not alone unjust; but not know-

ing how it should preserve itself, it is unjust, attempting to preserve itself through such things as are not proper.

From hence we may also collect the following porism, or corollary, which was first perceived by Amelius the fellow disciple with Porphyry of Plotinus, that from a greater injustice lesser evils are frequently produced, but from a lesser injustice greater evils. For, when injustice perfectly subdues the soul, life is inefficacious; but, when justice is associated with injustice, a certain action is the result. Nor let any one think that this assertion is false because greater evils are produced from intemperance than incontinence: for intemperance is a vice, but incontinence is not yet a complete vice; because, in the incontinent man, reason in a certain respect opposes passion; so that on this account a lesser evil arises from incontinence, because it is mingled from vice and that which is not vice.

I shall only add further at present, that the republic of Plato pre-exists, or is contained causally, in an intelligible nature,—subsists openly in the heavens,—and is, in the last place, to be found in human lives. As it therefore harmonizes in every respect with each of these, it is a polity perfect in all its parts; and may be considered as one of the greatest and most beneficial efforts of human intellect that has appeared, or ever will appear, in any of the infinite periods of time.

THE REPUBLIC,

BOOK I.

SPEAKERS.

SOCRATES,
CEPHALUS,
POLEMARCHUS,



GLAUCO¹,
ADIMANTUS,
THRASYMACHUS.

THE WHOLE IS A RECITAL BY SOCRATES.

The SCENE is in the House of CEPHALUS, at the Piræum.

SOCRATES.

I WENT down yesterday to the Piræum², with Glauco, the son of Aristo, to pay my devotion to the Goddess; and desirous, at the same time, to

¹ Glauco and Adimantus were the brothers of Plato, whom, as Plutarch justly observes in his Treatise on Brotherly Love, Plato has rendered famous by introducing them into this dialogue.

² It is necessary to observe that this form of a Republic is thrice related, according to Plato; the first time, in the Piræum, *agonistically*, or with contention; the third time, in the introduction to the *Timæus*, without persons, *synoptically*; and the second time *narratively*, with the persons and things pertaining to the narration. This second relation was made in the city, to *Timæus*, Critias, Hermocrates, &c., as we learn from Plato in the *Timæus*. Proclus, therefore, observes as follows respecting the Piræum, the place of the first conversation, that, as maritime places are necessarily full of a tumultuous and various life, the Piræum was most adapted to a discourse concerning justice, attended with tumult, and in which Socrates, not without sophistical contests, defended justice against the many-headed sophistical life. But the city, the place of the second relation, is accommodated to a life unattended with tumult, and with philosophic tranquillity retiring into itself, and quietly contemplating, in conjunction with those similar to itself, things which it had surveyed with much trouble in a tumultuous place.

to observe in what manner they would celebrate the festival¹, as they were now to do it for the first time. The procession of our own countrymen seemed to me to be indeed beautiful; yet that of the Thracians appeared no less proper. After we had paid our devotion, and seen the solemnity, we were returning to the city; when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, observing us at a distance hurrying home, ordered his boy to run and desire us to wait for him: and the boy, taking hold of my robe behind, Polemarchus, says he, desires you to wait. I turned about, and asked where he was. He is coming up, said he, after you; but do you wait for him. We will wait, said Glauco; and soon afterwards came Polemarchus, and Adimantus the brother of Glauco, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and some others as from the procession. Then said Polemarchus, Socrates! you seem to me to be hurrying to the city. You conjecture, said I, not amiss. Do you not see, then, said he, how many there are of us? Undoubtedly I do. Therefore, now, you must either be stronger than these, or you must stay here. Is there not, said I, one way still remaining? May we not persuade you that you must let us go? Can you be able to persuade such as will not hear? By no means, said Glauco. Then, as if we are not to hear, determine accordingly. But do you not know, said Adimantus, that there is to be an illumination in the evening, on horse-back, to the goddesses? On horse-back? said I. That is new. Are they to have torches, and give them to one another, contending together with their horses? or how do you mean? Just so, replied Polemarchus. And

place. And perhaps, says he, you may say that the Piræum is analogous to the realms of generation, (i. e. the sublunary region) but the city to a place pure from generation, and, as Socrates in the *Phædo* says, to the æthereal region. For generation is full of a bitter and tempestuous life, and of mighty waves under which souls are merged, whence their life is not without tumult, though they may live according to reason. But the æthereal region is the place of souls who are now allotted a pure and blameless period of existence, though they still retain the memory of the tumult in generation, and of the labours which they endured in its fluctuating empire.

¹ This festival, according to Proclus, (in *Plat. Polit.* p. 353.) was the Bendidian, in which Diana was worshipped agreeably to the law of the Thracians. For Bendis, says he, is a Thracian name. He adds, "The theologist of Thrace (Orpheus), among many names of the Moon, refers that of Bendis also to the goddesses:

Plutonian, joyful goddesses, Bendis strong."

besides, they will perform a nocturnal solemnity ¹ worth seeing. For we shall rise after supper, and see the nocturnal solemnity, and shall be there with many of the youth, and converse together : But do you stay, and do not do otherwise. It seems proper, then, said Glauco, that we should stay. Nay, if it seem so, said I, we ought to do it. We went home therefore to Polemarchus's house ; and there we found both Lyfias and Euthydemus, brothers of Polemarchus ; likewise Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, and Charmantides the Pæoneian, and Clitipho the son of Aristonimus ; Cephalus the father of Polemarchus was likewise in the house ; he seemed to me to be far advanced in years, for I had not seen him for a long time. He was sitting crowned, on a certain couch and seat ; for he had been offering sacrifice in the hall. So we sat down by him ; for some seats were placed there in a circle. Immediately, then, when Cephalus saw me, he saluted me, and said, Socrates, you do not often come down to us to the Piræum, nevertheless you ought to do it ; for, were I still able easily to go up to the city, you should not need to come hither, but we would be with you. But now you should come hither more frequently : for I assure you that, with relation to myself, as the

¹ This nocturnal solemnity was the lesser Panathenæa, which, as the name implies, was sacred to Minerva. Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 353) observes of this goddess and Diana, that they are both daughters of Jupiter, both virgins, and both light-bearers. The one (Diana) is Phosphor, as benevolently leading into light the unapparent reasons (i. e. productive principles) of nature ; the other as kindling intellectual light in the soul—

His helmet and his shield she gave to blaze

With fire unweary'd*—

and as removing those dark mists, which, when present, prevent the soul from seeing what is divine, and what is human. Both, therefore, possessing idioms of this kind, it is evident that the one presides over generation, and is the midwife of its productive principles ; but the other elevates souls, and imparts intellect and true prudence : and in the celestial regions she exerts a still greater power, supernally perfecting the whole of the lunar order. If these things, then, be true, the Bendidian festival, as well as the place in which it was celebrated, will be adapted to the first conversation, which imitates the soul becoming adorned, but not free from the tumult of generation. But the Panathenæa will be adapted to the second and third narration of a republic, which imitate the soul retiring into herself, and withdrawing her life from things below, to her own intellect, and, instead of adorning things dissimilar, associating with such as are similar to herself, and communicating in intellectual conceptions, and spectacles adapted to happy spectators.

* Δαίε οι εκ κορυβος τε και ασπιδος ακαματον πυρ. Iliad. lib. 5. l. 4.

pleasures respecting the body languish, the desire and pleasure of conversation increase. Do not fail, then to make a party often with these youths, and come hither to us, as to your friends and intimate acquaintance. And, truly, said I, Cephalus, I take pleasure in conversing with those who are very far advanced in years; for it appears to me proper, that we learn from them, as from persons who have gone before us, what the road is which it is likely we have to travel; whether rough and difficult, or plain and easy. And I would gladly learn from you, as you are now arrived at that time of life which the poets call the threshold of old-age, what your opinion of it is; whether you consider it to be a grievous part of life, or what you announce it to be? And I will tell you, Socrates, said he, what is really my opinion; for we frequently meet together in one place, several of us who are of the same age, observing the old proverb. Most of us, therefore, when assembled, lament their state, when they feel a want of the pleasures of youth, and call to their remembrance the delights of love, of drinking, and feasting, and some others akin to these: and they express indignation, as if they were bereaved of some mighty things. In those days, they say, they lived well, but now they do not live at all: some of them, too, bemoan the contempt which old-age meets with from their acquaintance: and on this account also they lament old-age, which is to them the cause of so many ills. But these men, Socrates, seem not to me to blame the real cause; for, if this were the cause, I likewise should have suffered the same things on account of old-age; and all others, even as many as have arrived at these years: whereas I have met with several who are not thus affected; and particularly was once with Sophocles the poet, when he was asked by some one, How, said he, Sophocles, are you affected towards the pleasures of love? are you still able to enjoy them? Softly, friend, replied he, most gladly, indeed, have I escaped from these pleasures, as from some furious and savage master.) He seemed to me to speak well at that time, and no less so now: for, certainly, there is in old-age abundance of peace and freedom from such things; for, when the appetites cease to be vehement, and are become easy, what Sophocles said certainly happens; we are delivered from very many, and those too insane masters. But with relation to these things, and those likewise respecting our acquaintance, there is one and the same cause;

cause; which is not old age, Socrates, but manners: for, if indeed they are discreet and moderate, even old-age is but moderately burthenfome: if not, both old age, Socrates, and youth are grievous to such. Being delighted to hear him say these things, and wishing him to discourse further, I urged him, and said, I think, Cephalus, the multitude will not agree with you in those things; but will imagine that you bear old-age easily, not from manners, but from possessing much wealth; for the rich, say they, have many consolations. You say true, replied he, they do not agree with me; and there is something in what they say; but, however, not so much as they imagine. But the saying of Themistocles was just; who, when the Seriphian reviled him, and said that he was honoured, not on his own account, but on that of his country, replied That neither would himself have been renowned had he been a Seriphian, nor would he, had he been an Athenian. The same saying is justly applicable to those who are not rich, and who bear old-age with uneasiness, That neither would the worthy man, were he poor, bear old-age quite easily; nor would he who is unworthy, though enriched, ever be agreeable to himself. But, whether, Cephalus, said I, was the greater part of what you possess, left you; or have you acquired it? Somewhat, Socrates, replied he, I have acquired: as to money-getting, I am in a medium between my grandfather and my father: for my grandfather, of the same name with me, who was left almost as much substance as I possess at present, made it many times as much again; but my father Lyfanius made it yet less than it is now: I am satisfied if I leave my sons here, no less, but some little more than I received. I asked you, said I, for this reason, because you seem to me to love riches moderately; and those generally do so who have not acquired them: but those who have acquired them are doubly fond of them: for, as poets love their own poems, and as parents love their children, in the same manner, those who have enriched themselves value their riches as a work of their own, as well as for the utilities they afford, for which riches are valued by others. You say true, replied he. It is entirely so, said I. But further, tell me this: What do you think is the greatest good derived from the possession of much substance? That, probably, said he, of which I shall not persuade the multitude. For be assured, Socrates, continued he, that after a man begins

to think he is soon to die, he feels a fear and concern about things which before gave him no uneasiness: for those stories concerning a future state, which represent that the man who has done injustice here must there be punished, though formerly ridiculed, do then trouble his soul with apprehensions that they may be true; and the man, either through the infirmity of old-age, or as being now more near those things, views them more attentively: he becomes therefore full of suspicion and dread; and considers, and reviews, whether he has, in any thing, injured any one. He then who finds in his life much of iniquity, and is wakened from sleep, as children by repeated calls, is afraid, and lives in miserable hope. But the man who is not conscious of any iniquity,

Still pleasing hope, sweet nourisher of age!
Attends—

as Pindar says. This, Socrates, he has beautifully expressed; that, whoever lives a life of justice and holiness,

Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart
Delighting, with him lives; which most of all
Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

So that he says well, and very admirably; wherefore, for this purpose, I deem the possession of riches to be chiefly valuable; not to every man, but to the man of worth: for the possession of riches contributes considerably to free us from being tempted to cheat or deceive; and from being obliged to depart thither in a terror, when either indebted in sacrifices to God, or in money to man. It has many other advantages besides; but, for my part, Socrates, I deem riches to be most advantageous to a man of understanding, chiefly in this respect. You speak most handsomely, Cephalus, replied I. But with respect to this very thing, justice: Whether shall we call it truth, simply, and the restoring of what one man has received from another? or shall we say that the very same things may sometimes be done justly, and sometimes unjustly? My meaning is this: Every one would somehow own, that if a man should receive arms from his friend who was of a sound mind, it would not be proper to restore such things if he should demand them when mad; nor would the restorer be just:

nor again would he be just, who, to a man in such a condition, should willingly tell all the truth. You say right, replied he. This, then, to speak the truth, and restore what one hath received, is not the definition of justice? It is not, Socrates, replied Polemarchus, if at least we may give any credit to Simonides. However that be, I give up, said Cephalus, this conversation to you; for I must now go to take care of the sacred rites. Is not Polemarchus, said I, your heir? Certainly, replied he smiling, and at the same time departed to the sacred rites. Tell me, then, said I, you who are heir in the conversation, what is it which, according to you, Simonides says so well concerning justice? That to give every one his due, is just, replied he; in saying this, he seems to me to say well. It is, indeed, said I, not easy to disbelieve Simonides, for he is a wise and divine man; but what his meaning may be in this, you, Polemarchus, probably know it, but I do not; for it is plain he does not mean what we were saying just now; that, when one deposits with another any thing, it is to be given back to him when he asks for it again in his madness: yet what has been deposited is in some respect, at least, due; is it not? It is. But yet, it is not at all, by any means, then, to be restored, when any one asks for it in his madness. It is not, replied he. Simonides then, as it should seem, says something different from this, that to deliver up what is due, is just? Something different, truly, replied he: for he thinks that friends ought to do their friends some good, but no ill. I understand, said I. He who restores gold deposited with him, if to restore and receive it be hurtful, and the restorer and receiver be friends, does not give what is due. Is not this what you allege Simonides says? Surely. But what? are we to give our enemies too, what may chance to be due to them? By all means, replied he, what is due to them; and from an enemy, to an enemy, there is due, I imagine, what is fitting, that is, some evil. Simonides, then, as it should seem, replied I, expressed what is just, enigmatically, and after the manner of the poets; for he well understood, as it appears, that this was just, to give every one what was fitting for him, and this he called his due. But, what, said he, is your opinion? Truly, replied I, if any one should ask him thus: Simonides, what is the art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, is called medicine? what would he answer us, do you think? That art, surely, replied he, which dispenses drugs, and prescribes

scribes regimen of meats and drinks to bodies. And what is the art, which, dispensing to certain things something fitting and due, is called cookery? The art which gives seasonings to victuals. Be it so. What then is that art, which, dispensing to certain persons something fitting and due, may be called justice? If we ought to be any way directed, Socrates, by what is said above, it is the art which dispenses good offices to friends, and injuries to enemies. To do good, then, to friends, and ill to enemies, he calls justice? It seems so. Who, then, is most able to do good, to his friends, when they are diseased, and ill to his enemies, with respect to sickness and health? The physician. And who, when they sail, with respect to the danger of the sea? The pilot. But as to the just man, in what business, and with respect to what action, is he most able to serve his friends, and to hurt his enemies? It seems to me, in fighting in alliance with the one, and against the other. Be it so. But, surely, the physician is useless, Polemarchus, to those, at least, who are not sick? It is true. And the pilot, to those who do not sail? He is. And is the just man, in like manner, useless to those who are not at war? I can by no means think that he is. Justice, then, is useful likewise in time of peace. It is. And so is agriculture, is it not? It is. Towards the possession of grain? Certainly. And is not shoemaking likewise useful? It is. Towards the possession of shoes, you will say, I imagine. Certainly. But what, now? For the use, or possession of what, would you say that justice were useful in time of peace? For co-partnerships, Socrates. You call co-partnerships, joint companies, or what else? Joint companies, certainly. Whether, then, is the just man, or the dice-player, a good and useful co-partner, for playing at dice? The dice-player. But, in the laying of tiles or stones, is the just man a more useful and a better partner than the mason? By no means. In what joint company, now, is the just man a better co-partner than the harper, as the harper is better than the just man for touching the strings of a harp? In a joint company about money, as I imagine. And yet it is likely, Polemarchus, that with regard to the making use of money, when it is necessary jointly to buy or sell a horse, the jockey, as I imagine, is then the better co-partner. Is he not? He would appear so. And with respect to a ship, the ship-wright, or ship-master? It would seem so. When then is it, with respect to the joint application of money, that

the just man is more useful than others? When it is to be deposited, and be safe, Socrates. Do you not mean, when there is no need to use it, but to let it lie? Certainly. When money then is useless, justice is useful with regard to it? It seems so. And when a pruning-hook is to be kept, justice is useful, both for a community, and for a particular person: but when it is to be used, the art of vine-dressing is useful. It appears so. And you will say that, when a buckler, or a harp, is to be kept, and not to be used, then justice is useful; but when they are to be used, then the military, and the musical art? Of necessity. And with reference to all other things, when they are to be used, justice is useless; but when they are not to be used, it is useful? It seems so. Justice, then, my friend! can be no very important matter, if it is useful only in respect of things, which are not to be used. But let us consider this matter: Is not he who is the most dexterous at striking, whether in battle or in boxing, the same likewise in defending himself? Certainly. And is not he who is dexterous in warding off and shunning a distemper, most dexterous too in bringing it on? So I imagine. And he too the best guardian of a camp, who can steal the counsels, and the other operations of the enemy? Certainly. Of whatever, then, any one is a good guardian, of that likewise he is a dexterous thief. It seems so. If therefore the just man be dexterous in guarding money, he is dexterous likewise in stealing? So it would appear, said he, from this reasoning. The just man, then, has appeared to be a sort of thief; and you seem to have learned this from Homer; for he admires Autolycus, the grandfather of Ulysses by his mother, and says that he was distinguished beyond all men for thefts and oaths. It seems, then, according to you, and according to Homer and Simonides, that justice is a sort of thieving, for the profit indeed of friends, and for the hurt of enemies. Did not you say so? No, by no means; nor indeed do I know any longer what I said; yet I still think that justice profits friends, and hurts enemies. But, whether do you pronounce such to be friends, as seem to be honest? or, such as are so, though they do not seem; and in the same way as to enemies? It is reasonable, said he, to love those whom a man deems to be honest; and to hate those whom he deems to be wicked. But do not men mistake in this; so as that many who are not honest appear so to them, and many contrariwise? They do mistake. To such, then,
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the good are enemies, and the bad are friends? Certainly. But, however, it is then just for them to profit the bad; and to hurt the good. It appears so. But the good are likewise just, and such as do no ill. True. But, according to your speech, it is just to do ill to those who do no ill. By no means, Socrates, replied he; for the speech seems to be wicked. It is just, then, said I, to hurt the unjust, and to profit the just. This speech appears more handsome than the other. Then, it will happen, Polemarchus, to many,—to as many indeed of mankind as have misjudged, that it shall be just to hurt their friends, who are really bad; and to profit their enemies, who are really good; and so we shall say the very reverse of what we affirmed Simonides said? It does, indeed, said he, happen so. But let us define again; for we seem not to have rightly defined a friend and an enemy. How were they defined, Polemarchus? That he who seems honest is a friend. But how shall we now define, said I? That he who seems, replied he, and likewise is honest, is a friend; but he who seems honest, yet is not, seems, yet is not a friend. And we must admit the distinction about an enemy to be the very same. The good man, according to this speech, will, as it seems, be the friend; and the wicked man, the enemy. Yes. Do you now require us to describe what is just, as we did before, when we said it was just to do good to a friend, and ill to an enemy? Or shall we add to the definition, and now say, that it is just to do good to a friend, when he is good; and ill to an enemy, when he is bad? This last, said he, seems to me to be perfectly well expressed. Is it, then, said I, the part of a just man to hurt any man? By all means, said he, he ought to hurt the wicked, and his enemies. But, do horses, when they are hurt, become better or worse? Worse. Whether in the virtue of dogs, or of horses? In that of horses. And, do not dogs, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of dogs, and not of horses? Of necessity. And shall we not in like manner, my friend, say that men, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of a man? Certainly. But is not justice the virtue of a man? Of necessity this likewise. Of necessity then, friend, those men who are hurt must become more unjust. It seems so. But can musicians, by music, make men unmusical? It is impossible. Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship? It cannot be. Or can the just, by justice, make men unjust? Or

in general, can the good, by virtue, make men wicked? It is impossible. For, it is not, as I imagine, the effect of heat, to make cold, but of its contrary. Yes. Nor is it the effect of drought, to make moist; but its contrary. Certainly. Neither is it the part of a good man, to hurt; but of his contrary. It appears so. But, the just is good. Certainly. Neither, then, is it the part of a just man, Polemarchus, to hurt either friend, or any other, but the part of his contrary, the unjust man.

In all respects, said he, you seem to me, Socrates, to say true. If, then, any one says that it is just to give every one his due, and thinks this with himself, that hurt is due to enemies from a just man, and profit to his friend; he was not wise who said so, for he spoke not the truth. For it has nowhere appeared to us, that any just man hurts any one. I agree, said he. Let us jointly contend, then, said I, if any one shall say that a Simonides, a Bias, a Pittacus, said so; or any other of those wise and happy men. I am ready, said he, to join in the fight. But do you know, said I, whose saying I fancy it is, That it is just to profit friends, and hurt enemies? Whose? said he. I fancy it is the saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenius the Theban; or some other rich man, who thought himself able to accomplish great things. You say most true, said he. Be it so, said I. But as this has not appeared to be justice, nor the just, what else may one assert it to be?

Thrasymachus frequently, during our reasoning, rushed in the midst, to lay hold of the discourse; but was hindered by those who sat near him, and who wanted to hear the conversation to an end. But, when we paused, and I had said these things, he was no longer quiet; but, collecting himself as a wild beast, he came upon us as if he would have torn us in pieces. Both Polemarchus and I, being frightened, were thrown into the utmost consternation: but he, roaring out in the midst: What trifling, said he, Socrates, is this which long ago possesses you; and why do you thus play the fool together, yielding mutually to one another? But, if you truly want to know what is just, ask not questions only, nor value yourself in confuting, when any one answers you any thing; (knowing this, that it is easier to ask than to answer;) but answer yourself, and tell what it is you call just. And you are not to tell me that it is what is fit; nor what is due, nor what is profitable, nor what is gainful, nor what is

advantageous; but, what you mean tell plainly and accurately; for I will not allow it, if you speak such trifles as these. When I heard this, I was astonished, and, looking at him, was frightened; and I should have become speechless, I imagine, if I had not perceived him before he perceived me. But I had observed him first, when he began to grow fierce at our reasoning; so that I was now able to answer him, and said, trembling: Thrasymachus! be not hard on us; for, if we mistake in our inquiries, Polemarchus and I, be well assured that we mistake unwittingly: for think not that, in searching for gold, we would never willingly yield to one another in the search, and mar the finding it; but that, searching for justice, an affair far more valuable than a great deal of gold, we should yet foolishly yield to each other, and not labour, friend, with the utmost ardour, that we may discover what it really is. But I am afraid we are not able to discover it. It is more reasonable, then, that we be pitied, than be used hardly by you who are men of ability. Having heard this, he laughed aloud in a very coarse manner, and said By Hercules! this is Socrates's wonted irony. This I both knew and foretold to these, here, that you never incline to answer if any one ask you any thing. You are a wise man, therefore, Thrasymachus, said I. For you knew well, that if you asked any one, How many is twelve? and, when you ask, should previously tell him, You are not, friend, to tell me that twelve is twice six; nor that it is three times four; nor that it is four times three; for I will not admit it, if you trifle in such a manner;—I fancy it is plain to you that no man would answer one asking in such a way. But if he should say to you, Wonderful Thrasymachus! how do you mean? May I answer in none of those ways you have told me; not even though the real and true answer happen to be one of them, but I am to say something else than the truth? Or, how is it you mean? What would you say to him in answer to these things? If they were alike, I should give an answer; but how are they alike? Nothing hinders it, said I; but, though they were not alike, but should appear so to him who was asked, would he the less readily answer what appeared to him; whether we forbade him or not? And will you do so now? said he. Will you say in answer some of these things which I forbid you to say? I should not wonder I did, said I, if it should appear so to me on inquiry.

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What then, said he, if I shall show you another and a better answer, besides all these about justice; what will you deserve to suffer? What else, said I, but what is proper for the ignorant to suffer? And it is proper for them to learn somewhere from a wise man. I shall therefore deserve to suffer this. You are pleasant now, said he, but together with the learning, do you pay money likewise. Shall it not be after I have got it? said I. But it is here, said Glauco; so as to money, Thrasymachus, say on; for all of us will advance for Socrates. I truly imagine so, said he, that Socrates may go on in his wonted manner; not answer himself, but, when another answers, he may take up the discourse, and confute. How, said I, most excellent Thrasymachus, can a man answer? In the first place, when he neither knows, nor says he knows; and, then, if he have any opinion about these matters, he is forbid by no mean man to advance any of his opinions. But it is more reasonable that you speak, as you say you know, and can tell us: Do not decline then, but oblige me in answering, and do not grudge to instruct Glauco here, and the rest of the company. When I had said this, both Glauco and the rest of the company entreated him not to decline it. And Thrasymachus appeared plainly desirous to speak, in order to gain applause; reckoning he had a very fine answer to make; yet pretended to be earnest that I should be the answerer, but at last he agreed. And then, This, said he, is the wisdom of Socrates: Unwilling himself to teach, he goes about learning from others, and gives no thanks for it. That, indeed, I learn from others, said I, Thrasymachus, is true; but in saying that I do not give thanks for it, you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able; and I am only able to commend them; for money I have not: and how readily I do this, when any one appears to me to speak well, you shall perfectly know this moment, when you make an answer; for I imagine you are to speak well. Hear then, said he; for I say, that what is just, is nothing else but the advantage of the more powerful. But why do not you commend? You are unwilling. Let me learn first, said I, what you say; for as yet I do not understand it. The advantage of the more powerful, you say, is what is just. What is this which you now say, Thrasymachus? For you certainly do not

mean such a thing as this: If Polydamus, the wrestler, be more powerful than we; and if beef be beneficial for his body, that this food is likewise both just and advantageous for us, who are weaker than he. You are most impudent, Socrates, and lay hold of my speech on that side where you may do it the greatest hurt. By no means, most excellent Thrasymachus said I, but tell more plainly what is your meaning. Do not you then know, said he, that, with reference to states, some are tyrannical; others democratical; and others aristocratical? Why are they not? And is not the governing part in each state the more powerful? Certainly. And every government makes laws for its own advantage; a democracy, democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannic; and others the same way. And when they have made them, they show that to be just for the governed, which is advantageous for themselves; and they punish the transgressor of this as one acting contrary both to law and justice. This, then, most excellent Socrates, is what I say, that, in all states, what is just, and what is advantageous for the established government, are the same; it hath the power. So that it appears to him who reasons rightly, that, in all cases, what is the advantage of the more powerful, the same is just. Now I have learned, said I, what you say. But whether it be true, or not, I shall endeavour to learn. What is advantageous, then, Thrasymachus, you yourself have affirmed to be likewise just; though you forbid me to give this answer; but, indeed, you have added to it that of the more powerful. Probably, said he, but a small addition. It is not yet manifest, whether it is small or great; but it is manifest that this is to be considered, whether you speak the truth; since I too acknowledge that what is just is somewhat that is advantageous: but you add to it, and say, that it is that of the more powerful. This I do not know, but it is to be considered. Consider then, said he. That, said I, shall be done. And tell me, do not you say that it is just to obey governors? I say so. Whether are the governors in the several states infallible? or are they capable of erring? Certainly, said he, they are liable to err. Do they not, then, when they attempt to make laws, make some of them right, and some of them not right? I imagine so. To make them right, is it not to make them advantageous for themselves;

themselves; and to make them not right, disadvantageous? Or what is it you mean? Entirely so. And what they enact is to be observed by the governed, and this is what is just? Why not? It is, then, according to your reasoning, not only just to do what is advantageous for the more powerful; but also to do the contrary, what is not advantageous. What do you say? replied he. The same, I imagine, that you say yourself. But let us consider better: have we not acknowledged that governors, in enjoining the governed to do certain things, may sometimes mistake what is best for themselves; and that what the governors enjoin is just for the governed to do? Have not these things been acknowledged? I think so, said he. Think, also, then, said I, that you have acknowledged that it is just to do what is disadvantageous to governors, and the more powerful; since governors unwillingly enjoin what is ill for themselves; and you say that it is just for the others to do what these enjoin. Must it not then, most wise Thrasymachus, necessarily happen, that, by this means, it may be just to do the contrary of what you say? For that which is the disadvantage of the more powerful, is sometimes enjoined the inferiors to do? Yes, indeed, Socrates, said Polemarchus, these things are most manifest. Yes, if you bear him witness, said Clitipho. What need, said I, of a witness? For Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that governors do indeed sometimes enjoin what is ill for themselves; but that it is just for the governed to do these things. For it has, Polemarchus, been established by Thrasymachus, to be just to do what is enjoined by the governors; and he has likewise, Clitipho, established that to be just, which is the advantage of the more powerful; and, having established both these things, he has acknowledged likewise, that the more powerful sometimes enjoin the inferiors and governed to do what is disadvantageous for themselves; and, from these concessions, the advantage of the more powerful can no more be just than the disadvantage. But, said Clitipho, he said the advantage of the more powerful; that is, what the more powerful judged to be advantageous to himself; that this was to be done by the inferior, and this he established as just. But, said Polemarchus, it was not said so. There is no difference, Polemarchus, said I. But, if Thrasymachus
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says so now, we shall allow him to do it. And tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you meant to say was just? The advantage of the more powerful, such as appeared so to the more powerful, whether it is advantageous, or is not. Shall we say that you spoke thus? By no means, said he. For, do you imagine I call him the more powerful who misjudges, at the time he misjudges? I thought, said I, you said this, when you acknowledged that governors were not infallible; but that in some things they even erred. You are a sycophant, said he, in reasoning, Socrates. For, do you now call him who mistakes about the management of the sick, a physician; as to that very thing in which he mistakes? or, him, who mistakes in reasoning, a reasoner, when he errs, and with reference to that very error? But, I imagine, we say, in common language, that the physician erred; that the reasoner erred, and the grammarian: Thus, however, I imagine, that each of these, as far as he is what we call him, errs not at any time: So that, according to accurate discourse (since you discourse accurately), none of the artists errs: for he who errs, errs by departing from science; and, in this, he is no artist: So that no artist, or wise man, or governor errs; in so far as he is a governor. Yet any one may say the physician erred; the governor erred: Imagine then, it was in this way I now answered you. But the most accurate answer is this: That the governor, in as far as he is governor, errs not; and, as he does not err, he enacts that which is best for himself; and this is to be observed by the governed: So that what I said from the beginning, I maintain, is just—To do what is the advantage of the more powerful. Be it so, said I, Thrasymachus! Do I appear to you to act the sycophant? Certainly, indeed, said he. For you imagine that I spoke as I did, insidiously, and to abuse you. I know it well, said he, but you shall gain nothing by it; for, whether you abuse me in a concealed manner, or otherwise, you shall not be able to overcome me by your reasoning. I shall not attempt it, said I, happy Thrasymachus! But, that nothing of this kind may happen to us again, define, whether you speak of a governor, and the more powerful, according to common, or according to accurate discourse, as you now said, whose advantage, as he is the more powerful, it shall be just for the inferior

inferior to observe. I speak of him, said he, who, in the most accurate discourse, is governor. For this, now, abuse me, and act the sycophant, if you are able. I do not shun you; but you cannot do it. Do you imagine me, said I, to be so mad as to attempt to shave a lion, and act the sycophant with Thrasymachus? You have now, said he, attempted it, but with no effect. Enough, said I, of this. But tell me, with reference to him, who, accurately speaking, is a physician, whom you now mentioned, whether is he a gainer of money, or one who takes care of the sick? and speak of him who is really a physician. He is one who takes care, said he, of the sick. But what of the pilot, who is a pilot, truly? Whether is he the governor of the sailors, or a sailor? The governor of the sailors. That, I think, is not to be considered, that he fails in the ship; nor that he is called a sailor; for it is not for his failing that he is called pilot, but for his art, and his governing the sailors. True, said he. Is there not then something advantageous to each of these? Certainly. And does not art, said I, naturally tend to this, to seek out and afford to every thing its advantage? It tends to this, said he. Is there, now, any thing else advantageous to each of the arts, but to be the most perfect possible? How ask you this? As, if you asked me, said I, whether it sufficed the body to be body, or if it stood in need of any thing,—I would say, that it stood in need of something else. For this reason is the medicinal art invented, because the body is infirm, and is not sufficient for itself in such a state; in order therefore to afford it things for its advantage, for this purpose, art has been provided. Do I seem to you, said I, to say right, or not, in speaking in this manner? Right, said he. But what now? This medicinal art itself, or any other, is it imperfect, so long as it is wanting in a certain virtue? As the eyes, when they want seeing; and the ears, hearing; and, for these reasons have they need of a certain art, to perceive, and afford them what is advantageous for these purposes? And is there, still, in art itself, some imperfection; and does every art stand in need of another art, to perceive what is advantageous to it, and this stand in need of another, in like manner, and so on, to infinity? Or shall each art perceive what is advantageous to itself; and stand in need neither of itself, nor of another, to perceive what is for its advantage, with reference to its own

own imperfection? For there is no imperfection, nor error, in any art. Nor does it belong to it to seek what is advantageous to any thing, but to that of which it is the art. But it is, itself, infallible, and pure, being in the right. So long as each art is an accurate whole, whatever it is. And consider now, according to that accurate discourse, whether it be thus, or otherwise. Thus, said he, it appears. The medicinal art, then, said I, does not consider what is advantageous to the medicinal art, but to the body. Yes, said he. Nor the art of managing horses, what is advantageous for that art; but what is advantageous for horses. Nor does any other art consider what is advantageous for itself, (for it hath no need,) but what is advantageous for that of which it is the art? So, replied he, it appears. But, Thrasymachus, the arts rule and govern that of which they are the arts. He yielded this, but with great difficulty. No science, then, considers the advantage of the more powerful, nor enjoins it; but that of the inferior, and of what is governed. He consented to these things at last, though he attempted to contend about them, but afterwards he consented. Why, then, said I, no physician, so far as he is a physician, considers what is advantageous for the physician, nor enjoins it; but what it advantageous for the sick; for it has been agreed, that the accurate physician is one who takes care of sick bodies, and not an amasser of wealth. Has it not been agreed? He assented. And likewise that the accurate pilot is the governor of the sailors, and not a sailor? It has been agreed. Such a pilot, then, and governor will not consider and enjoin what is the advantage of the pilot, but what is advantageous to the sailor, and the governed. He consented, with difficulty. Nor, yet, Thrasymachus, said I, does any other, in any government, as far as he is a governor, consider or enjoin his own advantage, but that of the governed, and of those to whom he ministers; and, with an eye to this, and to what is advantageous and suitable to this, he both says what he says, and does what he does. When we were at this part of the discourse, and it was evident to all that the definition of what was just, stood now on the contrary side, Thrasymachus, instead of replying, Tell me, said he, Socrates, have you a nurse? What, said I, ought you not rather to answer, than ask such things? Because, said he, she neglects you when your nose is stuffed, and does not wipe it when it needs it, you who

understand neither what is meant by sheep, nor by shepherd. For what now is all this? said I. Because you think that shepherds, and neatherds, ought to consider the good of the sheep, or oxen, to fatten them, and to minister to them, having in their eye, something besides their master's good and their own. And you fancy that those who govern in cities, those who govern truly, are somehow otherwise affected towards the governed than one is towards sheep; and that they are attentive, day and night, to somewhat else than tis, how they shall be gainers themselves; and so far are you from the notion of the just and of justice, and of the unjust and injustice, that you do not know that both justice and the just are, in reality, a foreign good, the advantage of the more powerful, and of the governor; but properly, the hurt of the subject, and the inferior; and injustice is the contrary. And justice governs such as are truly simple and just; and the governed do what is for the governor's advantage, he being more powerful, and ministering to him, promote his happiness, but by no means their own. You must thus consider it, most simple Socrates! that, on all occasions, the just man gets less than the unjust. First, in co-partnerships with one another, where the one joins in company with the other, you never can find, on the dissolving of the company, that the just man gets more than the unjust, but less: Then, in civil affairs, where there are taxes to be paid from equal substance; the just man pays more, the other less. But when there is any thing to be gained, the one gains nothing, but the gain of the other is great: For, when each of them governs in any public magistracy, this, if no other loss, befalls the just man, that his domestic affairs, at least, are in a worse situation through his neglect; and that he gains nothing from the public, because he is just: Add to this, that he comes to be hated by his domestics and acquaintance, when at no time he will serve them beyond what is just: But all these things are quite otherwise with the unjust; such an one, I mean, as I now mentioned; one who has it greatly in his power to become rich. Consider him, then, if you would judge how much more it is for his private advantage to be unjust than just, and you will most easily understand it if you come to the most finished injustice; such as renders the unjust man most happy, but the injured,

and those who are unwilling to do injustice, most wretched; and that is tyranny, which takes away the goods of others, both by secret fraud, and by open violence; both things sacred and holy, both private and public, and these not by degrees, but all at once. In all particular cases of such crimes, when one, committing injustice, is not concealed, he is punished, and suffers the greatest ignominy. For according to the several kinds of the wickedness they commit, they are called sacrilegious, robbers, house-breakers, pilferers, thieves. But when any one, besides these thefts of the substance of his citizens, shall steal and enslave the citizens themselves; instead of those disgraceful names, he is called happy and blest; not by his citizens alone, but likewise by others, as many as are informed that he has committed the most consummate wickedness. For such as revile wickedness, revile it not because they are afraid of doing, but because they are afraid of suffering, unjust things. And thus, Socrates, injustice, when in sufficient measure, is both more powerful, more free, and hath more absolute command than justice: and, (as I said at the beginning,) the advantage of the more powerful, is justice; but injustice is the profit and advantage of oneself. Thrasymachus having said these things, inclined to go away; like a bath-keeper after he had poured into our ears this rapid and long discourse. These, however, who were present, would not suffer him, but forced him to stay, and give an account of what he had said. I too myself earnestly entreated him, and said, divine Thrasymachus! after throwing in upon us so strange a discourse, do you intend to go away before you teach us sufficiently, or learn yourself, whether the case be as you say, or otherwise? Do you imagine you attempt to determine a small matter, and not the guide of life, by which, each of us being conducted, may lead the most happy life. But I imagine, said Thrasymachus, that this is otherwise. You seem truly, said I, to care nothing for us; nor to be any way concerned, whether we shall live well or ill, whilst we are ignorant of what you say you know: But, good Thrasymachus, be readily disposed to show it also to us, nor will the favour be ill placed, whatever you shall bestow on so many of us as are now present. And I, for my own part, tell you, that I am not persuaded, nor do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice; not although it should
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be permitted to exert itself, and be no way hindered from doing whatever it should incline. But, good Thrasymachus, let him be unjust, let him be able to do unjustly, either in secret, or by force, yet will you not persuade me at least that injustice is more profitable than justice, and probably some other of us here is of the same mind, and I am not single. Convince us then, blest Thrasymachus ! that we imagine wrong, when we value justice more than injustice. But how, said he, shall I convince you ? For, if I have not convinced you by what I have said already, what shall I further do for you ? shall I enter into your soul, and put my reasoning within you ? God forbid, said I, you shall not do that. But, first of all, whatever you have said, abide by it : or, if you do change, change openly ; and do not deceive us. For now you see, Thrasymachus, (for let us still consider what is said above,) that when you first defined the true physician, you did not afterwards think it needful that the true shepherd should, strictly, upon the like principles, keep his flock ; but you fancy that, as a shepherd, he may feed his flock, not regarding what is best for the sheep, but as some glutton, who is going to feast on them at some entertainment ; or yet to dispose of them as a merchant ; and not a shepherd. But the shepherd-art hath certainly no other care, but of that for which it is ordained, to afford it what is best : for its own affairs are already sufficiently provided for ; so as to be in the very best state while it needs nothing of the shepherd-art. In the same manner, I at least imagined, there was a necessity for agreeing with us in this, that every government, in as far as it is government, considers what is best for nothing else but for the governed, and those under its charge ; both in political and private government. But do you imagine that governors in cities, such as are truly governors, govern willingly ? Truly, said he, as for that, I not only imagine it, but am quite certain. Why now, said I, Thrasymachus, do you not perceive, as to all other governments, that no one undertakes them willingly, but they ask a reward ; as the profit arising from governing is not to be to themselves, but to the governed ? Or, tell me this now ? do not we say that every particular art is in this distinct, in having a distinct power ? And now, blest Thrasymachus, answer not differently from your sentiments, that we may make some progress. In this, said he, it is distinct. And does not each of them

afford us a certain distinct advantage, and not a common one? As the medicinal affords health, the pilot art, preservation in sailing; and the others in like manner. Certainly. And does not the mercenary art afford a reward, for this is its power? Or, do you call both the medicinal art, and the pilot art, one and the same? Or, rather, if you will define them accurately, as you proposed; though one in piloting recover his health, because sailing agrees with him, you will not the more on this account call it the medicinal art? No, indeed, said he. Nor will you, I imagine, call the mercenary art the medicinal, though one, in gaining a reward, recover his health. No, indeed. What now? Will you call the medicinal, the mercenary art, if one in performing a cure gain a reward? No, said he. Have we not acknowledged, then, that there is a distinct advantage of every art? Be it so, said he. What is that advantage, then, with which all artists in common are advantaged? It is plain it must be in using something common to all that they are advantaged by it. It seems so, said he. Yet we say that artists are profited in receiving a reward arising to them from the increase of a lucrative art. He agreed with difficulty. Has not, then, every one this advantage in his art, the receiving a reward. Yet, if we are to consider accurately, the medicinal art produces health, and the mercenary art a reward; masonry, a house, and, the mercenary art accompanying it, a reward. And all the others, in like manner, every one produces its own work, and benefits that for which it was ordained; but, if it meet not with a reward, what is the artist advantaged by his art? It does not appear, said he. But does he then no service when he works without reward? I think he does. Is not this, then, now evident, Thrasymachus, that no art, nor government, provides what is advantageous for itself; but, as I said long ago, provides and enjoins what is advantageous for the governed; having in view the profit of the inferior, and not that of the more powerful. And, for these reasons, friend Thrasymachus, I likewise said now, that no one is willing to govern, and to undertake to rectify the ills of others, but asks a reward for it; because, whoever will perform the art handsomely, never acts what is best for himself, in ruling according to art, but what is best for the governed; and on this account, it seems, a reward must be given to those who shall be willing to govern; either money, or honour; or punishment,

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if they will not govern. How say you, Socrates, said Glauco; two of the rewards I understand; but this punishment you speak of, and here you mention it in place of a reward, I know not. You know not, then, said I, the reward of the best of men, on account of which the most worthy govern, when they consent to govern. Or, do you not know, that to be ambitious and covetous, is both deemed a reproach, and really is so? I know, said he. For those reasons, then, said I, good men are not willing to govern, neither for money, nor for honour; for they are neither willing to be called mercenary, in openly receiving a reward for governing, nor to be called thieves, in taking clandestinely from those under their government; as little are they willing to govern for honour, for they are not ambitious.—Of necessity then, there must be laid on them a fine, that they may consent to govern. And hence, it seems, it hath been accounted dishonourable to enter on government willingly, and not by constraint. And the greatest part of the punishment is to be governed by a base person, if one himself is not willing to govern: and the good seem to me to govern from a fear of this, when they do govern: and then, they enter on the government, not as on any thing good, or as what they are to reap advantage by, but as on a necessary task, and finding none better than themselves, nor like them to entrust with the government: since it would appear that, if there was a city of good men, the contest would be, not to be in the government, as at present it is, to govern: And hence it would be manifest, that he who is indeed the true governor, does not aim at his own advantage, but at that of the governed; so that every understanding man would rather choose to be served, than to have trouble in serving another. This, therefore, I, for my part, will never yield to Thrasymachus; that justice is the advantage of the more powerful; but this we shall consider afterwards. What Thrasymachus says now, seems to me of much more importance, when he says that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. You, then, Glauco, said I, which side do you choose; and which seems to you most agreeable to truth? The life of the just, said he, I, for my part, deem to be the more profitable. Have you heard, said I, how many good things Thrasymachus just now enumerated in the life of the unjust? I heard, said he, but am not persuaded. Are you willing, then, that we should persuade him, (if we be able any how to find arguments),

ments), that there is no truth in what he says ? Why not, said he. If then, said I, pulling on the other side, we advance argument for argument, how many good things there are in being just, and then again, he on the other side, we shall need a third person to compute and estimate what each shall have said on either side ; and we shall likewise need some judges to determine the matter. But, if, as now, assenting to one another, we consider these things ; we shall be both judges and pleaders ourselves. Certainly, said he. Which way, then, said I, do you choose ? This way, said he. Come then, said I, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. Do you say that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice ? Yes, indeed, I say so, replied he. And the reasons for it I have enumerated. Come now, do you ever affirm any thing of this kind concerning them ? Do you call one of them, virtue ; and the other, vice ? Why not ? Is not then, justice, virtue ; and injustice, vice ? Very likely, said he, most pleasant Socrates ! after I say that injustice is profitable ; but justice is not ; What then ? The contrary, said he. Is it justice you call vice ? No, but I call it, altogether genuine simplicity. Do you, then, call injustice, cunning ? No, said he, but I call it sagacity. Do the unjust seem to you, Thrasymachus, to be both prudent and good ? Such, at least, said he, as are able to do injustice in perfection ; such as are able to subject to themselves states and nations ; but you probably imagine I speak of those who cut purses : Even such things as these, he said, are profitable if concealed ; but such only as I now mentioned are of any worth. I understand, said I, what you want to say : But this I have wondered at, that you should deem injustice to be a part of virtue and of wisdom and justice among their contraries. But I do deem it altogether so. Your meaning, said I, is now more determined, friend, and it is no longer easy for one to find what to say against it : for, if when you had set forth injustice as profitable, you had still allowed it to be vice or ugly, as some others do, we should have had something to say, speaking according to the received opinions : But now, it is plain, you will call it beautiful and powerful ; and all those other things you will attribute to it which we attribute to the just man, since you have dared to class it with virtue and wisdom. You conjecture, said he, most true. But, however, I must not grudge, said I, to pursue our inquiry so long as I conceive you speak as you think ;
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for to me you plainly seem now, Thrasymachus, not to be in irony, but to speak what you think concerning the truth. What is the difference to you, said he, whether I think so or not, if you do not confute my reasoning; None at all, said I. But endeavour, further, to answer me this likewise—Does a just man seem to you desirous to have more than another just man? By no means, said he; for otherwise he would not be courteous and simple, as we now supposed him. But what, will he not desire it in a just action? Not even in a just action, said he. But, whether would he deem it proper to exceed the unjust man and count it just? or would he not? He would, said he, both count it just and deem it proper but would not be able to effect it. That, said I, I do not ask. But, whether a just man would neither deem it proper, nor incline to exceed a just man, but would deem it proper to exceed the unjust? This last, said he, is what he would incline to do. But what would the unjust man do? Would he deem it proper to exceed the just man even in a just action? Why not, said he, he who deems it proper to exceed all others. Will not then the unjust man desire to exceed the unjust man likewise, and in an unjust action; and contend that he himself receive more than all others? Certainly. Thus, we say, then, said I, the just man does not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike. But the unjust man desires to exceed both one like, and one unlike himself. You have spoken, said he, perfectly well. But, said I, the unjust man is both wise and good; but the just man is neither. This, too, said he, is well said. Is not, then, said I, the unjust man like the wise and the good, and the just man unlike? Must he not, said he, be like them, being such an one as we have supposed; and he who is otherwise, be unlike them? Excellently. Each of them is indeed such as those he resembles. What else? said he. Be it so, Thrasymachus, Call you one man musical and another unmusical? I do. Which of the two call you wise and which unwise? I call the musical, wise, and the unmusical, unwise. Is he not good in as much as he is wise, and ill in as much as he is unwise? Yes. And what as to the physician? Is not the case the same? The same. Do you imagine, then, most excellent Thrasymachus, that any musician, in tuning a harp, wants to exceed, or deems it proper to have more skill than a man who is a musician, with reference to the intention or remission of the strings? I am not of that opinion. But what say you of exceeding a

man who is no musician? Of necessity, said he, he will deem it proper to exceed him. And what as to the physician? In presenting a regimen of meats or drinks does he want to exceed another physician in medical cases? No indeed. But to exceed one who is no physician? Yes. And as to all science and ignorance does any one appear to you intelligent who wants to grasp at or do or say more than another intelligent in the art; and not to do the same things, in the same affair, which one equally intelligent with himself doth? Probably there is a necessity, said he, it be so. But what, as to him who is ignorant; will not he want to exceed the intelligent and the ignorant both alike? Probably. But the intelligent is wise? I say so. And the wise is good? I say so. But the good and the wise will not want to exceed one like himself; but the unlike and contrary? It seems so, said he. But the evil and the ignorant wants to exceed both one like himself and his opposite? It appears so. Why, then, Thrasymachus, said I, the unjust desires to exceed both one unlike and one like himself. Do not you say so? I do, said he. But the just man will not desire to exceed one like himself, but one unlike? Yes. The just man, then, said I, resembles the wise and the good; and the unjust resembles the evil and the ignorant. It appears so. But we acknowledged that each of them was such as that which they resembled. We acknowledged so, indeed. The just man, then, has appeared to us to be good and wise; and the unjust to be ignorant and depraved. Thrasymachus now confessed all these things not easily, as I now narrate them, but dragged and with difficulty and prodigious sweat, it being now the summer season. And I then saw, but never before, Thrasymachus blush. After we had acknowledged that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice was vice and ignorance, well, said I, let this remain so. But we said likewise that injustice was powerful. Do not you remember, Thrasymachus? I remember, said he. But what you now say does not please me; and I have somewhat to say concerning it which I well know you would call declaiming if I should advance it; either, then, suffer me to say what I incline, or if you incline to ask, do it; and I shall answer you "be it so," as to old women telling stories; and shall assent and dissent. By no means, said I, contrary to your own opinion. Just to please you, said he; since you will not allow me to speak. But do you want any thing further? Nothing, truly, said I: but if you are to do thus, do; I shall ask.

ask. Ask then. This, then, I ask, which I did just now; (that we may in an orderly way see through our discourse,) of what kind is justice, compared with injustice; for it was surely said that injustice was more powerful and stronger than justice. It was so said just now, replied he. But, if justice be both virtue and wisdom, it will easily, I imagine, appear to be likewise more powerful than injustice; since injustice is ignorance; of this now none can be ignorant. But I am willing, for my own part, Thrasymachus, to consider it not simply in this manner, but some how thus. Might you not say that a state was unjust, and attempted to enslave other states unjustly, and did enslave them; and had many states in slavery under itself? Why not, said he: and the best state will chiefly do this, and such as is most completely unjust. I understand, said I, that this was your speech; but I consider this in it;—Whether this state, which becomes more powerful than the other state, shall hold this power without justice, or must it of necessity be with justice? With justice, said he, if indeed, as you now said, justice be wisdom; but, if as I said, with injustice. I am much delighted, said I, Thrasymachus, that you do not merely assent and dissent, but that you answer so handsomely. I do, it said he, to gratify you. That is obliging in you. But gratify me in this likewise, and tell me; do you imagine that a city, or camp, or robbers, or thieves, or any other community, such as jointly undertakes to do any thing unjustly, is able to effectuate any thing if they injure one another? No indeed, said he. But what, if they do not injure one another; will they not do better? Certainly. For injustice, some how, Thrasymachus, brings seditions, and hatreds, and fightings among them; but justice affords harmony and friendship. Does it not? Be it so, said he, that I may not differ from you. You are very obliging, most excellent Thrasymachus! But tell me this. If this be the work of injustice, wherever it is, to create hatred, will it not then, when happening among free men and slaves, make them hate one another, and grow seditious, and become impotent to do any thing together in company? Certainly. But what, in the case of injustice between any two men, will they not differ, and hate, and become enemies to one another, and to just men? They will become so, said he. If now, wonderful Thrasymachus, injustice be in

one, whether does it lose its power, or will it no less retain it? Let it, said he, no less retain it. Does it not then appear to have such a power as this—That wherever it is, whether in a city, or tribe, or camp, or wherever else, in the first place, it renders it unable for action in itself, through seditions and differences; and, besides, makes it an enemy to itself, and to every opponent, and to the just? Is it not thus? Certainly. And, when injustice is in one man, it will have, I imagine, all these effects, which it is natural for it to produce. In the first place, it will render him unable for action whilst he is in sedition and disagreement with himself; and next as he is an enemy both to himself, and to the just. Is it not so? Yes. But the Gods, friend, are likewise just. Let them be so, said he. The unjust man then, Thrasymachus, shall be an enemy also to the Gods; and the just man, a friend. Feast yourself, said he, with the reasoning boldly; for I will not oppose you, that I may not render myself odious to these Gods. Come then, said I, and complete to me this feast; answering as you were doing just now: for the just already appear to be wiser, and better, and more powerful to act; but the unjust are not able to act any thing with one another: and what we said with reference to those who are unjust,—that they are ever at any time able strenuously to act jointly together; this we spoke not altogether true, for they would not spare one another; being thoroughly unjust; but it is plain that there was in them justice, which made them refrain from injuring one another, and those of their party; and by this justice they performed what they did. And they rushed on unjust actions, through injustice; being half wicked; since those who are completely wicked, and perfectly unjust, are likewise perfectly unable to act. This then I understand is the case with reference to these matters, and not as you were establishing at first. But whether the just live better than the unjust, and are more happy (which we proposed to consider afterwards), is now to be considered; and they appear to do so even at present, as I imagine, at least, from what has been said. Let us, however, consider it further. For the discourse is not about an accidental thing, but about this, in what manner we ought to live.

Consider then, said he. I am considering, said I, and tell me; does
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there any thing seem to you to be the work of a horse? Yes. Would you not call that the work of a horse, or of any one else, which one does with him only, or in the best manner? I do not understand, said he. Thus then: Do you see with any thing else but the eyes? No indeed. What now, could you hear with any thing but the ears? By no means. Do we not justly then call these things the works of these? Certainly. But what, could not you with a sword, a knife, and many other things, cut off a branch of a vine? Why not? But with nothing, at least I imagine, so handsomely, as with a pruning-hook, which is made for that purpose: shall we not then settle this to be its work? We shall then settle it. I imagine, then, you may now understand better what I was asking when I inquired whether the work of each thing were not that which it alone performs, or performs in the best manner. I understand you, said he; and this does seem to me to be the work of each thing. Be it so, said I. And is there not likewise a virtue belonging to every thing to which there is a certain work assigned? But let us go over again the same things: We say there is a work belonging to the eyes? There is. And is there not a virtue also belonging to the eyes? A virtue also. Well then, was there any work of the ears? Yes. Is there not then a virtue also? A virtue also. And what as to all other things? Is it not thus? It is. But come, could the eyes ever handsomely perform their work, not having their own proper virtue; but, instead of virtue, having vice? How could they, said he, for you probably mean their having blindness instead of sight. Whatever, said I, be their virtue, for I do not ask this; but, whether it be with their own proper virtue that they handsomely perform their own proper work, whatever things are performed, and by their vice, unhandsomely? In this at least, said he, you say true. And will not the ears likewise, when deprived of their virtue, perform their work ill? Certainly. And do we settle all other things according to the same reasoning? So I imagine. Come, then, after these things, consider this. Is there belonging to the soul a certain work, which, with no one other being whatever, you can perform; such as this, to care for, to govern, to consult, and all such things; is there any other than the soul, to whom we may justly

ascribe them, and say they properly belong to it? No other. But what of this? To live; shall we say it is the work of the soul? Most especially, said he. Do not we say, then, that there is some virtue of the soul, likewise? We say so. And shall, then, the soul, ever at all, Thrasymachus, perform her works handsomely, whilst deprived of her proper virtue? or, is this impossible? It is impossible. Of necessity, then, a depraved soul must in a bad manner govern, and take care of things; and a good soul perform all these things well. Of necessity. But did not we agree that justice was the virtue of the soul; and injustice its vice? We did agree. Why, then, the just soul, and the just man, shall live well; and the unjust, ill. It appears so, said he, according to your reasoning. But, surely, he who lives well is both blessed and happy, and he who does not is the opposite. Why not? The just, then, is happy; and the unjust, miserable. Let them be so, said he. But it is not advantageous to be miserable, but to be happy. Certainly. At no time, then, blest Thrasymachus, is injustice more advantageous than justice. Thus, now, Socrates, said he, have you been feasted in Diana's festival. By you, truly, I have, Thrasymachus, said I; since you are grown meek; and have ceased to be troublesome: I have not feasted handsomely, owing to myself, and not to you: But as voracious guests, snatching still what is bringing before them, taste of it before they have sufficiently enjoyed what went before; so I, as I imagine, before I have found what we first inquired into,—what justice is,—have left this, hurrying to inquire concerning it, whether it be vice and ignorance, or wisdom and virtue. And, a discourse afterwards falling in, that injustice was more profitable than justice, I could not refrain from coming to this from the other: So that, from the dialogue, I have now come to know nothing; for whilst I do not know what justice is, I shall hardly know whether it be some virtue or not, and whether he who possesses it be unhappy or happy.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

SECOND AND THIRD BOOKS OF THE REPUBLIC,

CONTAINING

AN APOLOGY FOR THE FABLES OF HOMER.

AS a very considerable part both of the second and third books of The Republic consists in examining and reprobating the assertions of the poets and particularly the fables of Homer, concerning divine natures, it appeared to me that I could not more essentially benefit the reader than by presenting him with the following defence of Homer and divine fables in general, from the exposition of the more difficult questions in this dialogue, by that coryphæus of all true philosophers Proclus. For in this apology Homer and Plato are so admirably reconciled, that the poetry of the one and the philosophy of the other are in the highest degree honoured by the expulsion of the former from the polity of the latter. In short, it will be found, however paradoxical it may appear, that the most divine of poets ought beyond all others to be banished from a republic planned by the prince of philosophers. Such readers, too, as may fortunately possess a genius adapted for these speculations, will find that the fables of Homer are replete with a theory no less grand than scientific, no less accurate than sublime; that they are truly the progeny of divine fury; are worthy to be ascribed to the Muses as their origin; are capable of exciting in those that understand them the most exalted conceptions, and of raising the imagination in conjunction with intellect, and thus purifying and illuminating its figured eye.

Though I availed myself in this translation of the epitome made by Gefner of this apology, who seems to have consulted a more perfect
manuscript

manuscript than that from which the Basil edition was printed, yet I frequently found it necessary to correct the Greek text from my own conjecture, as the learned reader will readily perceive. Some of these emendations I have noted in the course of the translation; but as they are numerous many are omitted.

I. CONCERNING THE MODE OF THE APPARATUS OF DIVINE FABLES WITH THEOLOGISTS.—THE CAUSES OF SUCH FABLES ASSIGNED; AND A SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THEM.

Since Socrates accuses the mode of fables according to which Homer and Hesiod have delivered doctrines concerning the Gods, and prior to these Orpheus, and any other poets, who with a divine mouth, εἰθερὸν στόματι, have interpreted things which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence, it is necessary that we should in the first place show that the disposition of the Homeric fables is adapted to the things which it indicates. For it may be said, How can things which are remote from the good and the beautiful, and which deviate from order,—how can base and illegal names, ever be adapted to those natures whose essence is characterized by the good, and is consubstantial with the beautiful, in whom there is the first order, and from whom all things are unfolded into light, in conjunction with beauty and undefiled power? How then can things which are full of tragical portents and phantasms which subsist with material natures, and are deprived of the whole of justice and the whole of divinity, be adapted to such natures as these? For is it not unlawful to ascribe to the nature of the Gods, who are exempt from all things through transcendent excellence, adulteries, and thefts, precipitations from heaven, injurious conduct towards parents, bonds, and castrations, and such other particulars as are celebrated by Homer and other ancient poets? But, as the Gods are separated from other things, are united with *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things, and have nothing of the imperfection of inferior natures belonging to them, but are unmingled and undefiled with respect to all things, presubsisting uniformly according to one bound and order,—in like manner it is requisite to employ the most excellent language

language in speaking of them, and such appellations as are full of intellect, and which are able to assimilate us, according to their proper order, to their ineffable transcendency. It is also necessary to purify the notions of the soul from material phantasms, in the mystic intellectual conceptions of a divine nature; and, rejecting every thing foreign and all false opinions, to conceive every thing as small with respect to the undefiled transcendency of the Gods, and believe in right opinion alone, and the more excellent spectacles of intellect in the truth concerning the first of essences.

Let no one therefore say to us that such things harmonize with the Gods as are adapted to men, nor endeavour to introduce the passions of material irrationality to natures expanded above intellect, and an intellectual essence and life: for these symbols do not appear similar to the *hyparxes*¹ of the Gods. It is therefore requisite that fables, if they do not entirely wander from the truth inherent in things, should be in a certain respect assimilated to the particulars, the occult theory of which they endeavour to conceal by apparent veils. Indeed, as Plato himself often mystically teaches us divine concerns through certain images, and neither any thing base, nor any representation of disorder, nor material and turbulent phantasm, is inserted in his fables,—but the intellectual conceptions concerning the Gods are concealed with purity, before which the fables are placed like conspicuous statues, and most similar representations of the inward arcane theory,—in like manner it is requisite that poets, and Homer himself, if they devise fables adapted to the Gods, should reject these multiform compositions, and which are at the same time replete with names most contrary to things, but employing such as regard the beautiful and the good, should, through these, exclude the multitude from a knowledge concerning the Gods, which does not pertain to them, and at the same time employ in a pious manner fabulous devices respecting divine natures.

These are the things which, as it appears to me, Socrates objects to the fables of Homer, and for which perhaps some one besides may accuse

¹ *Hyparxis* signifies the summit of essence; and, in all the divinities except the first God, is *the one* considered as participated by essence. See the Introduction to the *Parmenides*.

other poets, in consequence of not admitting the apparently monstrous signification of names. In answer then to these objections, we reply that fables fabricate all that apparatus pertaining to them, which first presents itself to our view, instead of the truth which is established in the arcana, and employ apparent veils of conceptions invisible and unknown to the multitude. This indeed is their distinguishing excellence, that they narrate nothing belonging to natures truly good to the profane, but only extend certain vestiges of the whole mystic discipline to such as are naturally adapted to be led from these to a theory inaccessible to the vulgar. For these, instead of investigating the truth which they contain, use only the pretext of fabulous devices; and, instead of the purification of intellect, follow phantastic and figured conceptions. Is it not therefore absurd in these men to accuse fables of their own illegitimate conduct, and not themselves for the erroneous manner in which they consider them?

In the next place, do we not see that the multitude are injured by such things as are remarkably venerable and honourable, from among all other things, and which are established in and produced by the Gods themselves? For who will not acknowledge that the mysteries and perfective rites lead souls upwards from a material and mortal life, and conjoin them with the Gods, and that they suppress all that tumult which insinuates itself from the irrational part into intellectual illuminations, and expel whatever is indefinite and dark from those that are initiated, through the light proceeding from the Gods? Yet at the same time nothing can restrain the multitude from sustaining from these all-various distortions, and, in consequence of using the good, and the powers proceeding from these, according to their perverted habit, departing from the Gods, and truly sacred ceremonies, and falling into a passive and irrational life. Those indeed that accuse the mysteries for producing these effects in the multitude, may also accuse the fabrication of the universe, the order of wholes, and the providence of all things, because those that receive the gifts of these, use them badly; but neither is such an accusation holy, nor is it fit that fables should be calumniated on account of the perverted conceptions of the multitude. For the virtue and vice of things are not to be determined from those that use them perversely; but it is fit that
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every thing should be estimated from its own proper nature, and the rectitude which it contains. Hence the Athenian guest, in the *Laws of Plato*, is of opinion that even intoxication ought not to be expelled from a well-instituted city, on account of the views of the multitude and its corrupt use; for he says it greatly contributes to education, if it is properly and prudently employed. And yet it may be said that intoxication corrupts both the bodies and souls of those that are subject to it; but the legislator does not on this account detract from its proper worth, and the aid it affords to virtue.

But if any one accuses fables on account of their apparent depravity, and the base names which they employ,—since things of this kind are by no means similar to the divine exemplars of which fables are the images,—we reply in the first place, that there are two kinds of fables, those adapted to the education of youth, and those full of a divine fury, and which rather regard the universe itself than the habit of those that hear them. In the next place we must distinguish the lives of those that use fables; and we must consider that some are juvenile, and conversant with simple habits; but that others are able to be excited to intellect, to the whole genera of the Gods, to their progressions through all things, their series, and their terminations, which hasten to be extended as far as to the last of things. This being premised, we must say that the fables of *Homer* and *Hesiod* are not adapted to the education of youth, but that they follow the nature of wholes, and the order of things, and conjoin with true beings such as are capable of being led to the elevated survey of divine concerns. For the fathers of fables—perceiving that nature, fabricating images of immaterial and intelligible forms, and diversifying the sensible world with the imitations of these, adumbrated things impartible partly, but expressed things eternal through such as proceed according to time, things intelligible through sensibles, that which is immaterial materially, that which is without interval with interval, and through mutation that which is firmly established, conformably to the nature and the progression of the phenomena,—they also, devising the resemblances and images of things divine in their verses, imitated the transcendent power of exemplars by contrary and most remote adumbrations. Hence they indicated that which is supernatural in things divine by things

contrary to nature, that which is more divine than all reason, by that which is contrary to reason, and that which is expanded above all partial beauty, by things apparently base. And thus by an assimilative method they recalled to our memory the exempt supremacy of divine natures.

Besides this, according to every order of the Gods, which beginning from on high gradually proceeds as far as to the last of things, and penetrates through all the genera of beings, we may perceive the terminations of their series exhibiting such idioms as fables attribute to the Gods themselves, and that they give subsistence to, and are connective of, such things as those through which fables conceal the arcane theory of first essences. For the last of the dæmoniacal genera, and which revolve about matter, preside over the perversion of natural powers, the baseness of material natures, the lapse into vice, and a disorderly and confused motion. For it is necessary that these things should take place in the universe, and should contribute to fill the variety of the whole order of things, and that the cause of their shadowy subsistence, and of their duration, should be comprehended in perpetual genera. The leaders of sacred rites, perceiving these things, ordered that laughter and lamentations should be consecrated to such-like genera in certain definite periods of time, and that they should be allotted a convenient portion of the whole of the sacred ceremonies pertaining to a divine nature. As therefore the art of sacred rites, distributing in a becoming manner the whole of piety to the Gods and the attendants of the Gods, that no part of worship might be omitted adapted to such attendants, conciliated the divinities by the most holy mysteries and mystic symbols, but called down the gifts of dæmons by apparent passions, through a certain arcane sympathy,—in like manner the fathers of these fables, looking, as I may say, to all the progressions of divine natures, and hastening to refer fables to the whole series proceeding from each, established the imagery in their fables, and which first presents itself to the view, analogous to the last genera, and to those that preside over ultimate and material passions; but to the contemplators of true being they delivered the concealed meaning, and which is unknown to the multitude, as declarative of the exempt and inaccessible essence of the Gods. Thus, every fable is dæmoniacal according to that which is apparent in it, but

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is divine according to its recondite theory. If these things then are rightly asserted, neither is it proper to deprive the fables of Homer of an alliance to things which have a true subsistence, because they are not serviceable to the education of youth; for the end of such fables is not juvenile tuition, nor did the authors of fables devise them looking to this, nor are those written by Plato to be referred to the same idea with those of a more divinely inspired nature, but each is to be considered separately; and the latter are to be established as more philosophic, but the former as adapted to sacred ceremonies and institutions. The latter likewise are fit to be heard by youth, but the former by those who have been properly conducted through all the other parts of learning.

Socrates, indeed, sufficiently indicates this to those who are able to perceive his meaning, and also that he only blames the fables of Homer so far as they are neither adapted to education, nor accord with the restless and simple manners of youth. He likewise signifies that the recondite and occult good of fables requires a certain mystic and entheastic (i. e. divinely inspired) intelligence. But the multitude, not perceiving the meaning of the Socratic assertions, and widely deviating from the conceptions of the philosopher, accuse every such-like kind of fables. But it is worth while to hear the words of Socrates, and through what cause he rejects such a mythology: "The young person (says he) is not able to judge what is allegory, and what is not; but whatever opinions he receives at such an age are with difficulty washed away, and are generally immovable. On these accounts, care should be taken, above all things, that what they are first to hear be composed in the most handsome manner for exciting them to virtue." With great propriety, therefore, do we say that the Homeric fables do not well imitate a divine nature; for they are not useful to legislators for the purposes of virtue and education, nor for the proper tuition of youth, but in this respect indeed they do not appear at all similar to things themselves, nor adapted to those that preside over the politic science; but, after another manner, they harmonize with the Gods, and lead those who possess a naturally good disposition to the contemplation of divine natures; and the good which they contain is not disciplinative, but mystic, nor does it regard a juvenile, but an aged habit of soul. This also Socrates himself testifies, when he says, "That such

fables should be heard in secrecy, by as few as possible, after they had sacrificed not a hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice." Socrates therefore is very far from despising this kind of fables, according to the opinion of the multitude; for he evinces that the hearing of them is coordinated with the most holy initiations, and the most subtle mysteries¹. For to assert that such fables ought to be used in secret with a sacrifice the *greatest* and *most perfect*, manifests that the contemplation of them is mystic, and that they elevate the souls of the hearers to sublime speculations. Whoever therefore has divested himself of every puerile and juvenile habit of the soul, and of the indefinite impulses of the phantasy, and who has established intellect as the leader of his life, such a one will most opportunely participate of the spectacles concealed in such-like fables; but he who still requires instruction, and symmetry of manners, cannot with safety engage in their speculation.

It follows therefore, according to Socrates himself, that there is a two-fold species of fables, one of which is adapted to the instruction of youth, but the other is mystic; one is preparatory to moral virtue, but the other imparts a conjunction with a divine nature; one is capable of benefiting the many, the other is adapted to the few; the one is common and known to most men, but the other is recondite and unadapted to those who do not hasten to become perfectly established in a divine nature; and the one is co-ordinate with juvenile habits, but the other scarcely unfolds itself with sacrifices and mystic tradition. If therefore Socrates teaches us these things, must we not say that he harmonizes with Homer respecting fables? But he only rejects and reprobates them so far as they appear unadapted to the hypothesis of his discourse, and the narration of the education of youth.

But if it be requisite that legislators should in one way be conversant with mythical fictions, and those who endeavour to cultivate more imperfect habits, but in another way those who indicate by the divinely-inspired intuitive perceptions of intellect the ineffable essence of the Gods

¹ The Eleusinian, which Proclus calls the most holy of the mysteries, are likewise always denominated by him *τελεται*: and Suidas informs us that *τελεται* signifies a mysterious sacrifice, the *greatest* and *most honourable*. So that Socrates in the above passage clearly indicates that such fables belong to the most sacred of the mysteries.

to those who are able to follow the most elevated contemplations, we shall not hesitate to refer the precipitations of Vulcan to the irreprehensible science concerning the Gods, nor the Saturnian bonds, nor the castrations of Heaven, which Socrates says are unadapted to the ears of youth, and by no means harmonize with those habits which require juvenile tuition. For, in short, the mystic knowledge of divine natures can never subsist in foreign receptacles. To those therefore that are capable of such sublime speculations we must say, that the precipitation of Vulcan indicates the progression of a divine nature from on high, as far as to the last fabrication in sensibles, and this so as to be moved and perfected and directed by the demiurgus and father of all things. But the Saturnian bonds manifest the union of the whole fabrication of the universe¹, with the intellectual and paternal supremacy of Saturn. The castrations of Heaven obscurely signify the separation of the Titanic² series from the connective³ order. By thus speaking we shall perhaps assert things that are known, and refer that which is tragical and fictitious in fables to the intellectual theory of the divine genera. For whatever among us appears to be of a worse condition, and to belong to the inferior coordination of things, fables assume according to a better nature and power. Thus, for instance, a bond with us impedes and restrains energy, but there it is a contact and ineffable union with causes. A precipitation here is a violent motion from another; but with the Gods it indicates prolific progression, and an unrestrained and free presence to all things, without departing from its proper principle, but in an orderly manner proceeding from it through all things. And castrations in things partial and material cause a diminution of power, but in primary causes they obscurely signify the progression of secondary natures into a subject order, from their proper causes; things first at the same time remaining established in themselves undiminished, neither moved from themselves through the progression of these, nor mutilated by their separation, nor divided by their distribution in things subordinate. These things, which Socrates justly says are not fit to be heard by youth, are not on that account to be entirely rejected. For the same thing takes place with respect to

¹ Hence, according to the fable, Saturn was bound by Jupiter, who is the demiurgus or artificer of the universe.

² The Titans are the ultimate artificers of things.

³ See the notes to the Cratylus.

these fables, which Plato somewhere says happens to divine and all-holy dogmas: For these are ridiculous to the multitude, but to the few who are excited to intellectual energy they unfold their sympathy with things, and through sacred operations themselves procure credibility of their possessing a power connate with all that is divine. For the Gods, hearing these symbols, rejoice, and readily obey those that invoke them, and proclaim the characteristic of their natures through these, as signs domestic and especially known to them. The mysteries likewise and the greatest and most perfect of sacrifices (τελέται) possess their efficacy in these, and enable the mystics to perceive through these, entire, stable, and simple visions, which a youth by his age, and much more his manners, is incapable of receiving. We must not therefore say that such-like fables do not instruct in virtue, but those that object to them should show that they do not in the highest degree accord with the laws pertaining to sacred rites. Nor must it be said that they dissimilarly imitate divine natures, through obscure symbols, but it must be shown that they do not prepare for us an ineffable sympathy towards the participation of the Gods. For fables which are composed with a view to juvenile discipline should possess much of the probable, and much of that which is decorous in the fabulous, in their apparent forms, but should be entirely pure from contrary appellations, and be conjoined with divine natures through a similitude of symbols. But those fables which regard a more divinely inspired habit, which co-harmonize things last with such as are first through analogy alone, and which are composed with a view to the sympathy in the universe between effects and their generative causes,—such fables, despising the multitude, employ names in an all-various manner, for the purpose of indicating divine concerns. Since also, with respect to harmony, we say that one kind is poetic, and which through melodies exciting to virtue cultivates the souls of youth; but another divine, which moves the hearers, and produces a divine mania, and which we denominate better than temperance: and we admit the former as completing the whole of education, but we reject the latter as not adapted to political administration. Or does not Socrates expel the Phrygian harmony from his Republic as producing ecstasy in the soul, and on this account separate it from other harmonies which are subservient to education?

As, therefore, harmony is twofold, and one kind is adapted to erudition, but the other is foreign from it; in a similar manner, likewise, is mythology divided; into that which contributes to the proper tuition of youth, and into that which is subservient to the sacred and symbolic invocation of a divine nature. And the one, viz. the method through images, is adapted to those that philosophize in a genuine manner; but the other, which indicates a divine essence through recondite signs, to the leaders of a more mystically-perfective operation; from which Plato himself also renders many of his peculiar dogmas more credible and clear. Thus, in the *Phædo*, he venerates with a becoming silence that recondite assertion, that we are confined in body as in a prison secured by a guard, and testifies, according to the mysteries, the different allotments of the soul, when in a pure or impure condition, on its departure to Hades; and again, its habitudes, and the triple paths arising from its essence, and this according to paternal sacred institutions; all which are full of a symbolic theory, and of the ascent and descent of souls celebrated by poets, of Dionysiacal signs, and what are called Titanic errors, the *triviæ*, and wandering in Hades, and every thing else of this kind. So that Plato does not entirely despise this mode of mythologizing, but considers it as foreign from juvenile tuition, and, on this account, delivers types of theology commensurate with the manners of those that are instructed.

It likewise appears to me, that whatever is tragical, monstrous, and unnatural, in poetical fictions, excites the hearers, in an all-various manner, to the investigation of the truth, attracts us to recondite knowledge, and does not suffer us through apparent probability to rest satisfied with superficial conceptions, but compels us to penetrate into the interior parts of fables, to explore the obscure intention of their authors, and survey what natures and powers they intended to signify to posterity by such mystical symbols¹.

Since therefore fables of this kind excite those of a naturally more excellent disposition to a desire of the concealed theory which they contain, and

¹ Such fables, also, call forth our unperverted conceptions of divine natures, in which they efficaciously establish us, by untaught sacred disciplines; and, in short, they give perfection to the vital powers of the soul.

to an investigation of the truth established in the *adyta*² through their apparent absurdity, but prevent the profane from busying themselves about things which it is not lawful for them to touch, are they not eminently adapted to the Gods themselves, of whose nature they are the interpreters? For many genera are hurled forth before the Gods³, some of a dæmoniacal, and others of an angelic order, who terrify those that are excited to a participation of divinity, who are exercised for the reception of divine light, and are sublimely elevated to the union of the Gods. But we may especially perceive the alliance of these fables with the tribe of dæmons, whose energies manifest many things symbolically, as those know who have met with dæmons when awake⁴, or have enjoyed their inspiration in dreams, unfolding many past or future events. For, in all such phantasies, after the manner of the authors of fables, some things are indicated by others. Nor, of the things which take place through this, are some images, but others paradigms; but some are symbols, and others sympathize with these from analogy. If, therefore, this mode of composing fables is dæmoniacal, must we not say that it is exempt from every other variety of fables, as well that which regards nature, and interprets natural powers, as that which presides over the instruction of the forms of the soul?

² *Ἀδύτατοι* is erroneously printed in the original for *ἀδύταις*.

³ Proclus says this with reference to what took place in the mysteries, as is evident from the following extract from his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades: *Ἐν ταῖς ἁγιάταις τῶν τελετῶν πρὸ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ παρουσίας δαιμονίων χθονίων τινῶν σύμβολοι προφαίνονται, καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἐκταραττοῦσαι τοὺς τελουμένους, καὶ ἀποσπῆναι τὴν ἀχραντὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐκπροκαλουμένην· διὰ τὸ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ παρακελεύονται μὴ πρότερον εἰς ἐκείνους βλέπειν, πρὶν ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν τελετῶν φραζόμεναι δυνάμειν· οὐ γὰρ κεν οὐκ εἰς βλεπεῖν πρὶν σῶμα τελεσθεῖς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ λόγια προστίθουσιν, ὅτι τὰς ψυχὰς θελόντες αἰ τῶν τελετῶν ἀπαγῶσιν.* i. e. "In the most holy of the mysteries, before the God appears, certain terrestrial dæmons present themselves, and sights which disturb those that are to be initiated, tear them away from undefiled goods, and call forth their attention to matter. Hence the Gods exhort us not to look at these, till we are fortified by the powers which the mysteries confer. For thus they speak: It is not proper for you to behold them till your body is initiated. And on this account the oracles (i. e. the Chaldean) add, that such dæmons, alluring souls, seduce them from the mysteries." Agreeably to this, Proclus, also, in *Plat. Theol.* p. 7. observes, *Ἐν ταῖς τῶν τελετῶν ἁγιάταις φασὶ τοὺς μυσταῖς, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ πολυεῖδει καὶ πολυμορφῇ τῶν θεῶν προβέβληται γενεῶν ἅπαντα.* i. e. "In the most holy of the mysteries they say that the mystics at first meet with the multiform and many-shaped genera which are hurled forth before the gods."

⁴ For *ὑπερ*, as in the original, read *ὑπαρ*.

II. WHAT THE DIFFERENT MODES OF THEOMACHY, OR, THE BATTLES OF THE GODS, ARE, AMONG THEOLOGISTS, AND AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OCCULT TRUTH WHICH THEY CONTAIN.

And thus much concerning those forms of fables according to which other poets and Homer have delivered mystic conceptions respecting the Gods, and which are unapparent to the vulgar. After this, it follows I think that we should distinctly consider the several fables in the order in which they are mentioned by Socrates, and contemplate according to what conceptions of the soul Homer represents the Gods fighting, or doing or suffering any thing else, in his poems. And in the first place let us consider this *theomachy* as it is called, or battles of the Gods, which Homer devises, but Socrates thinks worthy of animadversion, as by no means adapted to the education of youth. For, that there is neither sedition, nor dissension and division, as with mortals, among the Gods, but peace and an inoffensive life, the poet himself testifies when he somewhere says concerning Olympus, that it is a substratum to the Gods, who possess every possible joy, and spectacles of immense beauty :

The blessed Gods in joy unceasing live.

What discord and war then can find any entrance among those who are allotted eternal delight, who are perpetually propitious, and rejoicing in the goods which they possess ? But if it be proper that discourses concerning the Gods should regard as well their providence as the nature of the beings for whom they provide, I think we may interpret as follows their opposition to each other :

In the first place, the divided progressions of all things, and their separations according to essence, supernally originate from that division of first operating causes¹ which is unknown to all things ; and subsisting according to those principles which are expanded above wholes, they dissent from each other ; some being suspended from the unifying monad *bound*, and about this determining their subsistence, but others receiving in themselves

¹ Viz. *bound* and *infinity*, which are the highest principles after the ineffable cause of all.— See the Philebus, and the Notes to my Translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

a never-failing power from that *infinity* which is generative of wholes, and is a cause productive of multitude and progression, and about this establishing their proper hyparxis. After the same manner, therefore, in which the first principles of things are separated from each other, all the divine genera and true beings have a progression orderly divided from each other; and some of them are the leaders of *union* to secondary natures, but others impart the power of *separation*; some are the causes of *conversion*, convolving the multitude of progressions to their proper principles; but others *bound the progressions*, and the subordinate *generation* from the principles. Again, some supply a *generative abundance* to inferior natures, but others impart an *immutable and undefiled purity*; some bind to themselves the cause of *separate* goods, but others, of those goods that are *consubstantial* with the beings by whom they are received. And thus in all the orders of being is such a contrariety of genera diversified. Hence *permanency*, which establishes things in themselves, is opposed to *efficacious powers*, and which are full of *life* and *motion*. Hence the kindred communion of *sameness* receives a division according to species, opposite to the separations of *difference*; but the genus of *similitude* is allotted an order contrary to *dissimilitude*, and that of *equality* to *inequality*, according to the same analogy. And the divisions of all these are supernally defined from that duad which subsists as a principle, according to which all beings are distinguished by their proper boundaries, proceed with an opposite division to each other from their generative causes, and from their connection with each other generate all the variety of secondary natures. Is it therefore any longer wonderful, if the authors of fables, perceiving such contrariety in the Gods themselves and the first of beings, obscurely signified this to their pupils, through battles? the divine genera indeed being perpetually united to each other, but at the same time containing in themselves the causes of the union and separation of all things.

We may also, I think, adduce another mode of solution: that the Gods themselves are impartibly consubstantial with each other, and subsist uniformly in each other, but that their progressions into the universe and their communications are separated in their participants, become divisible, and are thus filled with contrariety; the objects of their providential exertions not being able to receive in an unmingled manner the powers proceeding from thence, and without confusion their multi-
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form illuminations. We may likewise say, that the last orders which are suspended from divine natures, as being generated remote from first causes, and as being proximate to the subjects of their government, which are involved in matter, participate themselves of all-various contrariety and separation, and partly preside over material natures, minutely dividing those powers which subsist uniformly and impartibly in their first operating causes. Such then and so many being the modes according to which the mystic rumours of theologists are wont to refer war to the Gods themselves, other poets, and those who in explaining divine concerns have been agitated with divine fury, have ascribed wars and battles to the Gods, according to the first of those modes we related, in which the divine genera are divided conformably to the first principles of wholes. For those powers which *elevate to causes* are after a manner opposed to those that are the *sources of generation*, and the *connective* to the *separating*; those that *unite*, to those that *multiply* the progression of things; *total* genera, to such as fabricate *partibly*; and those which are *expanded above*, to those that *preside over* partial natures: and hence fables concealing the truth assert that such powers fight and war with each other. On this account, as it appears to me, they assert that the Titans were the antagonists of Bacchus, and the Giants of Jupiter; for union, indivisible operation, and a wholeness prior^{*} to parts, are adapted to those artificers that have a subsistence prior to the world; but the Titans and Giants produce the demiurgic powers into multitude, divisibly administer the affairs of the universe, and are the proximate fathers of material concerns.

We may also conceive that the Homeric fables after another manner have devised the battles of the Gods. For, in the first place, Homer exempts the demiurgic monad from all the multitude of the Gods, and neither represents him proceeding to the contrariety of generation, nor in any respect opposing it; but, while this is firmly established in itself, the number of the Gods proceeds from it, which number both abides and proceeds into the universe, and on this account is said to be divided

* The form of a thing considered according to its causal subsistence, or a subsistence in its cause, is said to be a whole prior to parts.

about the providence of the natures which it governs. In the next place, of these Gods which are distributed from their father, some abide in him, and have an unproceeding subsistence in their proper monad, which the poetry of Homer says are established in the abode of Jupiter, and together with their father providentially preside in an exempt manner over wholes. That these war against, or oppose each other, the fable does not even according to the apparent description admit. But it represents those Gods as warring against each other, who proceeding from the demiurgic monad, subside into multiform orders, become more partial, and more proximate to the objects of their government, and give completion to the angelic or dæmoniacal armies, through their abundant sympathy with subordinate natures and partial allotment of providential energy. For to these I think the passions of the subjects of their providential care are more allied, such as wounds, blows, and repercussions; and, in short, the contrariety of generation is not very remote from the administration of these Gods. That which is partial likewise in the fabrication of things secondary, and a minute distribution of providence, are adapted to such like powers, but not to those which rank as principles, and are exempt from all the objects of their providential energy, and subsist as separate causes.

Moreover, since the angelic orders are suspended from the government of the more excellent genera of Gods, and preserve the characteristics of their leaders though in a partial and multiplied manner, they are called by their names; and as they subsist analogously to the first Gods, they appear in their progressions to be the same with their more total causes. And this not only the fables of the Greeks have occultly devised,—I mean that leading Gods and their attendants should be called by the same names,—but this is also delivered in the initiatory rites of the Barbarians. For they say that angels suspended from the Gods, when invoked, particularly rejoice to be called by the appellations, and to be invested with the vehicles, of the leaders of their series, and exhibit themselves to theurgists in the place of these leading deities. If therefore we refer Minerva, Juno, and Vulcan when engaged in war below about generation, and likewise Latona, Diana, and the river Xanthus, to other secondary orders, and which are proximate to divi-

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fible and material things, we ought not to wonder on account of the communion of names. For each series bears the appellation of its monad, and partial spirits love to receive the same denomination with wholes. Hence there are many and all-various Apollos, Neptunes, and Vulcans; and some of them are separate from the universe, others have an allotment about the heavens, others preside over the whole elements, and to others the government of individuals belongs. It is not therefore wonderful if a more partial Vulcan, and who is allotted a dæmoniacal order, possesses a providential dominion over material fire, and which subsists about the earth, or that he should be the inspective guardian of a certain art which operates in brass. For, if the providence of the Gods has a subjection according to an ultimate division, being allotted a well-ordered progression supernally from total and united causes, this Vulcanian dæmon also will rejoice in the safety of that which he is allotted, and will be hostile to those causes which are corruptive of its constitution. War therefore in such like genera, a division of all-various powers, mutual familiarity and discord, a divisible sympathy with the objects of their government, verbal contentions, revenge through mockery, and other things of this kind, are very properly conceived to take place about the terminations of the divine orders. Hence fables, in representing such like powers discordant with and opposing each other on account of the subjects over which they providentially preside, do not appear to be very remote from the truth. For the passions of the things governed are proximately referred to these.

In short, since we may perceive two conceptions of battles celebrated by poets inspired by Phœbus, one of these considers the well-ordered division of the divine genera about those two principles of wholes which *the one*, the exempt cause of all things, produced, and according to the opposition of these principles represents the Gods also as acting contrary to each other. For, whether it be proper to call those first natures bound and infinity, or monad and indefinite duad, they will entirely appear to be oppositely divided with respect to each other, according to which the orders of the Gods are also separated from each other. But the other conception arises from considering the contrariety and variety about the last of things, and referring a discord of
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this kind to the powers that proximately preside over it, and thus feigning that the Gods, proceeding into a material nature, and distributed about this, war with each other. Homer, to those who consider his poems with attention, will appear to speak about the former mode of divine contention when he says,

When Saturn was by Jove all-seeing thrust
Beneath the earth:

and in another place^{*} respecting Typhon,

Earth groan'd beneath them; as when angry Jove
Hurls down the forky lightning from above,
On Arimè when he the thunder throws,
And fires Typhæus with redoubled blows,
Where Typhon, prest beneath the burning load,
Still feels the fury of th' avenging God.

For in these verses he obscurely signifies a Titanic war against Jupiter, and what the Orphic writers call precipitations into Tartarus (καταταρταρωσεις). But he particularly introduces the Gods warring with each other, and dissenting about human affairs, according to the second conception of divine battles, in which the divine and intellectual disposition of the figments adopted by the poet is worthy of the greatest admiration. For, in describing their battles (who though they are allotted a subsistence at the extremities of the divine progressions, yet are suspended from the Gods, and are proximate to the subjects of their government, and are allied to their leaders), he indicates their sympathy with inferior natures, referring a divided life, battle, and opposition from things in subjection to the powers by which they are governed; just as Orpheus conjoins with Bacchic images compositions, divisions and lamentations, referring all these to them from presiding causes. But Homer represents the alliance of these divisible spirits with the series from which they proceed, by the same names through which he celebrates the powers exempt from material natures, and employs numbers and

^{*} Iliad. lib. 2. ver. 288, &c.

figures adapted to their whole orders. For those who engage in battle are eleven in number, imitating the army of the Gods and dæmons following Jupiter, and distributed into eleven¹ parts. Of these, those that preside over the better coordination are contained in the pentad; for the odd number, the spheric², and the power of leading all secondary natures according to justice, and of extending from the middle to every number, are adapted to those who desire to govern more intellectual and perfect natures, and such as are more allied to *the one*. But those of an inferior destiny, and who are the guardians of material natures, proceed according to the hexad, possessing indeed a perfective power over the subjects of their providential care through a proper³ number; but in consequence of this number being even, and coordinate with a worse nature, they are subordinate to the other powers. Nor is it wonderful if some one should call these genera Gods, through their alliance to their leaders, and should represent them as warring through their proximate care of material natures. The opposition therefore of Neptune and Apollo signifies that these powers preside over the apparent contrariety of all sublunary wholes: and hence these Gods do not fight with each other. For parts are preserved by their containing wholes, as long as they subsist. But the opposition of Juno and Diana represents the opposite division of souls in the universe, whether rational or irrational, separate or inseparable, supernatural or natural; the former of these powers presiding over the more excellent order of souls, but the latter bringing forth and producing into light those of an inferior condition. Again, the discord of Minerva and Mars represents the division of the whole of the war in generation into providence subsisting according to intellect, and that which is perfected through necessity; the former power intellectually presiding over contraries, and the latter corroborating their natural powers, and exciting their mutual opposition. But the battle between Hermes and Latona insinuates the all-various differences of souls according to their gnostic and vital mo-

¹ See the Phædrus.

² For five is not only an odd, but also a spheric number: for all its multiplications into itself terminate in five; and therefore end where they began.

³ For six is a perfect number, being equal to the sum of all its parts.

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tions; Hermes giving perfection to their knowledge, and Latona to their lives; which two often differ from and are contrary to each other. Lastly, the battle between Vulcan and the river Xanthus adorns in a becoming manner the contrary principles of the whole corporeal system; the former assisting the powers of heat and dryness, and the latter of cold and moisture, from which the whole of generation receives its completion. But since it is requisite that all contrarieties should end in mutual concord, Venus is present, producing friendship¹ in the adverse parties, but at the same time assisting those powers that belong to the worse coordination; because these are especially adorned, when they possess symmetry and familiarity with the better order of contrary natures. And thus much concerning the divine battles of Homer.

III. IN WHAT MANNER AN APOLOGY IS TO BE MADE FOR THOSE DIVINE FABLES WHICH APPEAR TO MAKE THE GODS THE CAUSES OF EVIL.

In the next place let us consider how, since the Gods in the summit of their essence are particularly characterized by goodness, poetry makes them to be the authors of both evil and good, though it is proper to refer to them the principal cause of what is good alone. For this, Socrates, demonstrating that divinity gives subsistence to good alone, but to nothing evil, thinks worthy of animadversion in the poems of Homer. And it seems that he reprobates the battles of the Gods, as subverting divine union, but condemns what we now propose to investigate, as diminishing the goodness of the Gods. For,

Two vessels on Jove's threshold ever stand,
The source of evil one, and one of good².

To this objection, we answer that there are two coordinations of things in the world, which, as we have before observed, supernally proceed from

¹ That is to say, though Venus is not represented by Homer as actually producing friendship in the adverse Gods, yet this is occultly signified by her being present; for she is the source of all the harmony, friendship, and analogy in the universe, and of the union of form with matter.

² Iliad. lib. 24. ver. 527.

the Gods themselves. For all things are divided by the bifurmed principles¹ of things, viz. the orders of the Gods, the natures of beings, the genera of souls, physical powers, the circulations of the heavens, and the diversities of material things; and lastly human affairs, and allotments according to justice, thence receive a twofold generation. For, of these, some are of a better, and others of an inferior condition. I mean, for instance, that the natural habits of bodies, viz. beauty, strength, health, and also such things as, independent of the corporeal constitution, pertain to souls, viz. power, and honour, and riches, belong to allotments of a better condition; but those habits and circumstances which are opposite to these, belong to those of an inferior condition. These things then being necessarily divided after the above-mentioned manner, those which belong to the better portion it was usual with the ancients immediately to denominate good, but those of the contrary portion they denominated evil; yet not in the same signification as when we call an unjust and intemperate habit of the soul evil; but as impediments of energies, as darkening our natural dispositions, and disturbing the providence of the soul in its tranquil management of human affairs, they admitted them to be evil, and to be so denominated, but after a different manner from what are called the evils of the soul. Thus also they were accustomed to call disease, imbecility, and a privation of the necessaries of life, evils. And why is it necessary to adduce all poetry as a witness of the use of this name? For the Pythagoreans also, in establishing twofold coordinations² of things in all orders, did not refuse to call one of these good, and the other evil. Though, how can any one admit that the even, the oblong, and motion, are to be enumerated among those evils which we define as privations of good? How can we say that the feminine, the genus of difference and of dissimilitude, are contrary to nature? But I think this entirely evident, that, according to every progression of things, they called the subordinate series of things opposite, evil, as deserting the other series, and being neither primarily beneficent, nor

¹ Viz. *bound and infinity*.

² These twofold coordinations of the Pythagoreans are as follow: Bound, infinity: the odd, the even: the one, multitude: right hand, left hand: the masculine, the feminine: the quiescent, that which is in motion: the straight, the curved: light, darkness: good, evil: the square, the oblong. See my Translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, book 1.

distant by the same interval from the one cause of every thing beautiful and good. It is requisite therefore to suspend these twofold coordinations of good and evil in the universe from the demiurgic monad. For the divisions of the Gods, and of the genera posterior to the Gods, depend on that first principle. The cause likewise of the good and evil which happen from fate, and which are allotted to souls about generation, according to justice, must be referred to the dispensator of the universe, who also sends souls into the region of mortality. For the effects of fate are suspended from demiurgic providence, about which the series of justice also subsists, and the boundaries of which it follows, being, as the Athenian guest in Plato observes, the avenger of the divine law. Lastly, the gifts of fortune, and the distribution of all things according to justice, are determined according to the will of the father. The demiurgus and father therefore of the universe has pre-established in himself the cause of every thing good and evil, of more excellent and subordinate gifts, of prosperous events, and of such as are impediments to the energies of the soul in externals; and he governs all things according to intellect, distributing to every being such things as are fit, and referring all things to his own paternal administration. For he distributes to souls, with a view to good, both things of the better and of the inferior coordination; looking in his distribution to the perfection of the recipients.

If these things then are rightly asserted, we must admit the Homeric arrangement, which places in the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter twofold primary causes of the goods and the ills which he imparts to souls. For, of all the intellectual kings, the duad especially belongs to the demiurgus of the universe: since, according to the Oracle, "the duad is seated with him; and, by his governing all things, and disposing every thing in its proper place, he shows virtue to be victorious, and vice to be vanquished in the universe." For what difference is there between asserting these things, and comparing the demiurgus to one playing at chess, and sending souls into lives adapted to their respective natures? These two fountains therefore of a better and worse condition of things, by which the demiurgus conducts souls according to justice, the poet mythologizing denominates *tubs*¹;

¹ For $\pi\tau\iota\theta\omega$ signifies persuasion, and $\pi\iota\theta\varsigma$ is a tub.

whether indicating that divinity assigns to every thing its proper boundary through intellectual *persuasion* (for intellect, says Timæus, is the principle of necessity, persuading it to lead all things to that which is best), or the capaciousness of these principles, and their comprehending all-various effects. For the demiurgus and father of the universe contains unitedly in himself the dispersed multitude of all that he distributes to souls. So that, according to this reasoning, Plato and the Homeric poetry accord with each other. For the former says that it is not proper to make God the cause of any evil; but the other perpetually produces every thing good from thence: yet, since goods are twofold, and each kind benefits those by whom it is received, hence the Homeric poetry distributes them into twofold coordinations, and, indicating their difference with respect to each other, denominates the one as absolutely good, but places the other separate, as contrary to good. But that what is called evil by Homer is not such as that which Plato denies to be given by the Gods, the poet himself declares in the following verses¹,

The Gods on Peleus from his birth bestow'd
 Illustrious gifts
 With these God also evil join'd

What this evil is he immediately tells us:

No race succeeding to imperial sway;
 An only son, and he (alas!) ordain'd
 To fall untimely in a foreign land.
 See him in Troy the pious care decline
 Of his weak age, to live the curse of thine!

In these verses, it appears that Homer does not make divinity the cause of real evils, since he calls the loss of a son, and the being deprived of his attendance in old age, evils. But in what manner these are evils, we have above explained, viz. so far as they cause difficulty in the present life, and sorrow in the soul. For, though it is not lawful for those who philosophize in a genuine manner to call these evils, yet they appear to be impediments of a life according to virtue, to those who make choice of a

¹ Iliad. lib. 24. ver. 534, &c.

practical life. Hence the Athenian guest also contends that all such things are, in a certain respect, evil to good men, but good to such as are depraved; though he makes God to be the cause, both of these, and of every thing imparted from the universe. So that not only Homer, and Achilles in Homer assert these things, but Plato himself, and the legislator according to Plato.

IV. HOW THE POETRY OF HOMER SEEMS TO REFER A VIOLATION OF OATHS TO THE GODS :—THE TRUTH RESPECTING THIS UNFOLDED.

In the next place let us consider how leagues and oaths, according to the poetry of Homer, are violated with the will of the mighty Jupiter, and of Minerva acting in subserviency to the will of her father: for this also Socrates reprobates, as referring the principle of evils to the first of the Gods.

And here indeed it is worth while especially to doubt, how he who makes divinity to be the cause of these things, does not make him to be the cause of the greatest and real evils. For Homer cannot here be defended by saying, that he represents poverty, disease, and things of this kind, as proceeding from the Gods, but he ascribes to divinity the cause of those things which are acknowledged by all men to be evils. Timæus, indeed, in Plato, represents the demiurgus as entirely prescribing laws to souls prior to their descent into generation, that he may not be accused as the cause of their consequent evils; but these verses of Homer admit that the principle of the greatest evils is imparted to them from divinity, when they have descended, and are conversant with generation. How then shall we reply to these animadversions, so as to harmonize the doctrine of Homer with the nature of things, and the narration of Plato? We may reply as follows: That fables of this kind are not adapted to the habit of youth, as has been asserted by us before, and we shall now, and in all that follows, repeat the assertion. For it is not possible for youth to distinguish the nature of things, nor to refer the apparent signs of truth to an unapparent theory, nor to see how every thing in the universe is accomplished according to the will of divinity, through other intervening causes. But we shall show that these things are agreeable to the philosophy of Plato.

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The Athenian guest then, in the *Laws*, says, “ that God is the beginning, the middle, and end of all things, and that justice follows him, taking vengeance on those that desert the divine law : but these, as he informs us, are such as through youth and folly have their soul inflamed with insolence, and for a certain time appear to themselves to govern, but afterwards suffer the proper punishment of their conduct from justice, and entirely subvert themselves, their city, and their family.” These things are asserted by the Athenian guest politically ; but Homer ¹, relating them in a divinely inspired manner (*εὐθεστικῶς*), says that those who have often sinned, and committed the greatest crimes, are punished for their offences according to the single will of Jupiter, and are deprived of life together with their wives and children. He further informs us, that Jupiter first of all accomplishes this punishment, and in a manner exempt and unapparent to all ; but Minerva in the second place, being subservient to and cooperating with the paternal providence of Jupiter : for, as Orpheus says, “ she is the powerful queen of the intellect of Saturnian Jove ².” The same poet likewise adds, “ that his brain who violates leagues and oaths flows on the ground like wine.” In consequence, therefore, of this violation, such men subject themselves to justice, and render themselves adapted to punishment. Hence the violation of leagues and oaths is especially perpetrated by those who, prior to this, have deserved the vengeance of the Gods, who justly govern mortal affairs, and thus punish former crimes. But such are said to be moved, and led forth into energy by the Gods themselves : not that the Gods render men who are to be punished impious and unjust, but as calling into energy those that are adapted to the perpetration of such-like actions, that by once energizing according to their inward habit, and producing into light the progeny of depraved actions with which they are pregnant, they may become worthy of punishment. For we should rather say, according to Plato, that vengeance, the attendant of justice, is perfected in such, than divine justice itself ; since the just and justice are beautiful things. But both he on whom vengeance is inflicted, and he on whom it is not, are miserable. Men therefore, who have committed many and the greatest crimes, and who have a depraved habit which is parturient with greater and

¹ For ὁ δὲ ὁμῶς, as in the original, read ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρος. ² Δεῖν γὰρ Κρονίδα νοῦν κραντήρα τετυκται.

more weighty evils, in the first place sustain vengeance, which appears indeed to crush those that suffer it, leading them to the violation of oaths, but in reality brings them to suffer the punishment of their crimes, effecting that which is similar to the opening of ulcers by the surgeon's instrument, which produces an increase of pain at the time, but, by discharging the putridity and the latent humour, becomes the cause of future health. But the poetry of Homer says that this punishment, beginning supernally from Jupiter (for justice, as we have before observed, follows him, taking vengeance on those that desert the divine law), is perfected through Minerva as the medium. For the Trojans, seeing into what an evil they had brought themselves, and that their life was obnoxious to deserved punishment, rendered this inevitable to themselves, by the violation of oaths and leagues.

Again then, it must be in the first place said that the Gods were not the causes of this confused and disorderly conduct to the Trojans, but that they through their own depravity rendered themselves worthy of an energy of this kind, and among these Pandarus in an eminent degree, as being a man ambitious, avaricious, and leading an atheistical life. Hence Minerva, proceeding according to the intellect of her father, does not excite any one casually to this action, but is said to seek Pandarus¹, as particularly adapted to an avenging energy.

She ev'ry where the godlike Pandarus explor'd².

For a man who is capable of doing and suffering any thing, and who also opposes himself to divinity, through a certain gigantic and audacious habit of soul, is rare, and truly difficult to be found. As therefore physicians are not the causes of cuttings and burnings, but the diseases of those that are cured, so neither are the Gods the causes of the impiety respecting oaths and leagues, but the habits of those by whom it is committed.

In the second place, this also must be considered, that Minerva is not

¹ Pandarus seems to be derived *απο του παντα δραν*, that is, as we commonly say of a very depraved character, he was a man *capable of any thing*.

² Iliad. lib. 4. ver. 86.

said to prepare Pandarus for the deed, but only to try if he gave himself up to this energy. For divinity does not destroy the freedom of the will, not even in such as are consummately wicked :

*Lycaon's warlike son, what I suggest,
Wilt thou obey?*

But Pandarus, incited by an immoderate desire of riches and power, leaps to unjust energies, the poet all but exclaiming in the very words of Socrates in the Republic¹, "that many things are extended to souls from the universe, which astonish the stupid, and cause them to err respecting the elections of lives." As therefore the prophet extends a tyrannic life, and he who first chooses this is said to be stupid, although he by whom it was extended was entirely a divine nature; so here, when Minerva offers to the choice of Pandarus a more powerful and rich condition with impiety, or one entirely contrary to this, he makes choice of the worse. And in this case Minerva is not the cause of the election, but the improbity of him by whom the election is made. For neither is the prophet in Plato the cause of a tyrannic life, but the intemperance of him that chose it. Hence Pandarus, in obeying Minerva, is said to suffer this through his stupidity. For indeed (to speak accurately) he did not obey Minerva, but the avaricious and stupid habit of his soul. Though, is it not wonderful that Minerva, in this instance, is not the cause of wisdom, but of folly? But, says, Plotinus, "Craft is produced from a defluxion of intellect; an illumination of temperance becomes intemperance; and audacity is the gift of fortitude." For such as are the forms of life, such also from necessity must be the participations from more excellent natures. Hence some participate of intelligibles intellectually, others according to opinion, and others phantastically. Others again participate of passions impassively, others with mediocrity of passion, and others with perfect passivity. But all things are moved by the Gods, according to their respective aptitudes. So that the violation of oaths did not proceed from Jupiter and Minerva, but from Pandarus and the Trojans. This action however is suspended from the Gods, as being the forerunner of

¹ See the 10th Book.

justice,

justice, and as preparing those by whom it was perpetrated for the perfect punishment of their guilt.

Nor is a divine nature the cause of true evils to souls, but the depraved habits of these are the sources to them of their depraved energies. But every energy, though it proceeds with depravity into the universe, is under the direction of presiding Gods, and of a more total or partial providence. For it becomes, says Plotinus, an unjust action to him who does it, so far as pertains to the doing it, but just to him who suffers for it, so far as he suffers. And so far as an action of this kind is atheistical, it originates from a partial cause, which gives perfection to an action full of passion; but so far as it is good, it obtains from presiding powers its proper end. For it is necessary that the authors of the greatest crimes should some time or other be called to punishment; but this would never take place, unless their depravity received its completion. Many habits therefore, remaining unenergetic, render those by whom they are possessed incapable of obtaining their proper cure. Hence, on the Gods consulting concerning bringing the war to an end, and saving the Trojans, the Goddess who presides over justice prevents any energy of this kind, that the Trojans may more swiftly suffer the punishment of their crimes; and Minerva, who cooperates with this divinity, excites to the violation of the oath, that, energizing according to the whole of their depravity, they may receive the punishment of the whole of it. For neither was it good for them to remain without a cure, nor that their latent depravity should be healed prior to their second offences. All their unjust life therefore being unfolded, punishment follows, correcting the whole of their impious conduct.

V. THE WHOLE THEORY OF THE FABLE UNFOLDED, IN WHICH JUPITER, THROUGH THEMIS, EXCITES THE GODS TO CONTENTION.

In the next place, since Socrates mentions the judgment of the Gods in Homer, and the strife to which Jupiter excites the multitude of the Gods, through Themis elevating all of them to himself, let us also speak concerning these things. That Jupiter then is a monad separated from the universe, and the multitude of mundane Gods, and that he is able

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to produce all things from, and again convert them to himself, has often been said. But since his energy proceeding to the multitude of Gods is twofold, one of which converts and the other moves the Gods to the providence of inferior natures, poetry also describes twofold speeches¹ of Jupiter to the Gods. According to the first of these, the one and whole demiurgus of the universe is represented as communicating an unmingled purity to the multitude of the Gods, and imparting to them powers separate from all division about the world. Hence he orders all the Gods to desist from the war and the contrariety of mundane affairs. But, according to the second of these speeches, he excites them to the providence of subordinate natures, and permits their divided progressions into the universe, that they may not only be contained in one demiurgic intellect, which, as the poet says,

None can escape, or soaring run beyond—

but may energize in the subjects of their providential care, according to their own characteristics. Hence Jupiter says to them,

Each, as your minds incline, to either host
Your succour lend².

But as the progressions of the Gods are not divulged from the demiurgic monad, Themis first converts them to this monad.

But Jove to Themis gives command, to call
The Gods to council—

that, acting providentially according to the will of their father, they may also energize according to the judgment of Themis. And the poet indeed delivers to us separate speeches of the one demiurgus of the universe to the junior Gods; but Timæus represents him in one speech converting the multitude of these Gods to himself, and exciting them to the providence of mortal affairs, that they may govern all secondary

¹ For *δημιουργίας*, read *δημιουργίας*.

² *Iliad*. lib. 20.

natures according to justice. But these things in no respect differ from exciting them to war, and through Themis converting them to himself. For those who preside over generation govern the war in matter; and those who energize according to justice are suspended from the whole of Themis, of whom Justice is the daughter, and imitate the one demiurgic intellect, to whom it is not lawful to do any thing but what is most beautiful, as Timæus himself asserts.

VI. WHAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE GODS IS IN THE FABLES OF THE POET, AND WHAT DIFFERENCES OF LIVES IT OBSCURELY SIGNIFIES.

Again, it is not proper to think that the celebrated judgment of the Gods, which fables say was accomplished by Paris, was in reality a strife of the Gods with each other, under the judgment of a barbarian; but we ought to consider the elections of lives, which Plato delivers in many places, as subsisting under the Gods who are the inspective guardians of souls. And this indeed Plato clearly teaches us in the Phædrus, when he says that a royal life is the gift of Juno, a philosophic life of Jupiter, and an amatory life of Venus. Since therefore souls, from among a multitude of lives proposed to them from the universe, embrace some according to their own judgment and reject others, hence fables, transferring to the Gods themselves the peculiarities of lives, assert that not the diversities of living, but the Gods that preside over these diversities, are judged by those that choose them. According to this reasoning, Paris also is said to have been appointed a judge of Minerva, Juno and Venus; and that of three lives which were proposed to him, he chose the amatory life: and this not with prudence, but recurring to apparent beauty, and pursuing the image of that beauty which is intelligible. For he who is truly amatory, taking intellect and prudence for his guides, and with these contemplating both true and apparent beauty, is no less the votary of Minerva than of Venus. But he who alone pursues the amatory form of life by itself, and this accompanied with passion, deserts true beauty,
but

but through folly and luxury leaps to the image of beauty, lies about it in a fallen condition, and does not attain to a perfection adapted to an amatory character. For he who is truly amatory and studious of Venus, is led to divine beauty, and despises all that is beautiful in the regions of sense. Since however there are certain dæmons with the characteristics of Venus, who preside over apparent beauty, and which subsists in matter, hence he who embraces the image of beauty, is said to have Venus cooperating with him in all his undertakings.

VII. WHAT THE MUTATIONS OF THE GODS ARE, WHICH ARE INTRODUCED IN FABLES, AND IN HOW MANY WAYS, AND THROUGH WHAT CAUSES, THEY ARE DEvised.

Since a divine nature is not only beneficent, but likewise immutable, without form, simple, and always subsisting according to the same, and after the same manner, Socrates very properly considers the following verses of Homer worthy of animadversion,

The Gods at times, resembling foreign guests,
Wander o'er cities in all-various forms¹.

And again those respecting Proteus and Thetis, in which they are represented as changing their forms, and variously appearing. Indeed, that fables of this kind ought not to be heard by those who genuinely receive a political education, is perfectly evident; since it is requisite that the paradigm of a polity which is to be stable, should be immutable, and not obnoxious to all-various mutations. But here also it is requisite to collect by reasoning the divine dianoëtic conceptions of Homer, though I am not ignorant that the above verses are ascribed to one of the suitors, and that on this account the poet is free from blame. For neither should we think it right to take the opinion of Plato from what is said by Callicles or Thrasymachus, or any other sophists that are introduced in his writings; but when Parmenides or Socrates, or

¹ Odyss. lib. 17. ver. 485.

Timæus, or any other of such divine men speaks, then we think that we hear the dogmas of Plato. In like manner we should form a judgment of the conceptions of Homer, not from what is said by the suitors, or any other depraved character in his poems, but from what the poet himself, or Nestor, or Ulysses, appears to say.

If any one however is willing to ascribe this dogma concerning the mutation of the Gods to Homer himself, he will not be destitute of arguments which accord with all sacred concerns, with the greatest sacrifices and mysteries, and with those appearances of the Gods which both in dreams and true visions, the rumour of mankind has supernally received. For in all these the Gods extend many forms of themselves, and appear passing into many figures. And sometimes an unfigured light of them presents itself to the view ; at other times this light is fashioned in a human form, and at others again assumes a different shape. These things also the discipline of divine origin pertaining to sacred concerns delivers. For thus the Oracles¹ speak : "A similar fire extending itself by leaps through the waves of the air ; or an unfigured fire whence a voice runs before ; or a light beheld near, every way splendid, resounding and convolved. But also to behold a horse full of refulgent light ; or a boy carried on the swift back of a horse,—a boy fiery, or clothed with gold, or, on the contrary, naked ; or shooting an arrow, and standing on the back of the horse." And such things as the oracles add after these, not at any time attributing either internal change, or variety, or any mutation to a divine nature, but indicating its various participations. For that which is simple in the Gods appears various to those by whom it is seen, they neither being changed, nor wishing to deceive ; but nature herself giving a determination to the characteristics of the Gods, according to the measures of the participants. For that which is participated, being one, is variously participated by intellect, the rational soul, the phantasy, and sense. For the first of these participates it impartibly, the second in an expanded manner, the third accompanied with figure, and the

¹ Viz. the Chaldean Oracles. See my Collection of these Oracles in the third volume of the Monthly Magazine.

fourth with passivity. Hence that which is participated is uniform according to the summit of its subsistence, but multiform according to participation. It is also essentially immutable and firmly established, but at different times appearing various to its participants through the imbecility of their nature. And not only these things follow, but that which is without weight appears heavy to those that are filled with it: "The miserable heart by whom I am received cannot bear¹ me," says some one of the Gods. Whence Homer also perceiving the truth of these things through divine inspiration says concerning Minerva:

Loud crash'd the beechen axle with the weight,
For strong and dreadful was the power it bore².

Though here it may be said, how can that which is without weight be the cause of weight? But such as is the participant, such necessarily must that which is participated appear³. Whether, therefore, some of the Gods have appeared similar to guests, or have been seen in some other form, it is not proper to attribute the apparent mutation to them, but we should say that the phantasy is varied in the different recipients. And this is one way in which the poetry of Homer delivers multiform mutations of immutable natures.

But there is another way, when a divine nature itself, which is all-powerful and full of all-various forms, extends various spectacles to those that behold it. For then, according to the variety of powers which it possesses, it is said to be changed into many forms, at different times extending different powers; always indeed energizing according to all its powers, but perpetually appearing various to the transitive intellctions of souls, through the multitude which it comprehends. According to this mode, Proteus also is said to change his proper form

¹ Hence also Homer, *Iliad*. lib. 20. ver. 131. says, *χαλεποι δὲ θεοὶ φανεσθαι ἐναργεῖς*.—i. e. Overpowering are the Gods when clearly seen.

² *Iliad*. lib. 5.

³ A divine nature must necessarily produce the sensation of weight in the body by which it is received, from its overpowering energy; for body lies like non-entity before such a nature, and fails, and dies away, as it were, under its influence.

to those that behold it, perpetually exhibiting a different appearance. For though he is subordinate to the first Gods, and immortal indeed, but not a God; the minister of Neptune, but not allotted a leading dignity; yet he is a certain angelic intellect belonging to the series of Neptune, possessing and comprehending in himself all the forms of generated natures. Idothea has the first arrangement under him; she being a certain dæmoniacal soul conjoined to Proteus as to her proper divine intellect, and connecting her intellections with his intelligible forms. Another number of rational and perpetual souls follows, which the fable denominates Phocæ. Hence Proteus is represented as *numbering* these, poetry indicating by this the perpetuity of their nature. For the multitude of things which are generated and perish is *indefinite*. Partial souls therefore beholding Proteus, who is an intellect possessing many powers and full of forms, whilst at different times they convert themselves to the different forms which he contains, fancy that the transition of their own intellections is a mutation of the intelligible objects. Hence to those that retain him he appears to become all things—

Water, and fire divine, and all that creeps
On earth.

For such forms as he possesses and comprehends, or rather such as he perpetually is, such does he appear to become when these forms are considered separately, through the divisible conception of those that behold them.

In the third place, therefore, we say that the Gods appear to be changed, when the same divinity proceeds according to different orders, and subsides as far as to the last of things, multiplying himself according to number, and descending into subject distinctions; for then again fables say, that the divinity, which supernally proceeds into this form, is changed to that into which it makes its progression. Thus they say that Minerva was assimilated to Mentor, Mercury to the bird called the sea-gull, and Apollo to a hawk; indicating by this their more dæmoniacal orders, into which they proceed from those of a superior rank. Hence, when they describe the *divine* advents of the Gods, they endeavour

deavour to preserve them formless and unfigured. Thus, when Minerva appears to Achilles¹, and becomes visible to him alone, the whole camp being present, there Homer does not even fabulously ascribe any form and figure to the goddess, but only says that she was present, without expressing the manner in which she was present. But when they intend to signify *angelic* appearances, they introduce the Gods under various forms, but these such as are total; as for instance, a human form, or one common to man or woman indefinitely. For thus, again, Neptune and Minerva were present with Achilles:

Neptune and Pallas haste to his relief,
And thus in *human form* address the chief².

Lastly, when they relate dæmoniacal advents, then they do not think it improper to describe their mutations into individuals and partial natures; whether into particular men, or other animals. For the last of those genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods are manifested by these figures. And here you may see how particulars of this kind are devised according to the order of things. For that which is simple is adapted to a divine nature, that which is universal to an angelic, and the rational nature to both these; and that which is partial and irrational accords with a dæmoniacal nature: for a life of this kind is connected with the dæmoniacal order. And thus much concerning the modes according to which the Homeric fables devise mutations of things immutable, and introduce various forms to uniform natures.

VIII. CONCERNING THE DREAM SENT TO AGAMEMNON, WHICH APPEARS TO ACCUSE THE GODS OF FALSEHOOD, AND NOW IT MAY BE SHOWN THAT A DIVINE NATURE IS VOID OF FALSEHOOD.

It now remains that we speak concerning the dream sent by Jupiter to Agamemnon; for Socrates, at the end of his theological types, repro-

¹ *Iliad*. lib. 1.

² *Iliad*. 21. ver. 285.

bates this, because the whole of a divine and dæmoniacal nature is without falsehood, as he collects by demonstrative arguments. But Homer says that Agamemnon was deceived through this dream. Though, is it not absurd, if this dream is from Jupiter, according to the assertion of the poet, that this alone nearly, of all the particulars which are mentioned as deriving their origin from Jupiter, should be attended with fraud?

In answer to this objection, we may say what is usually asserted by most of the interpreters, that the fallacy had its subsistence in the phantasy of Agamemnon. For Jupiter in his speech to the dream, and the dream again in its address to Agamemnon, evidently indicate that it would be requisite to call together *all* the army, and to attack the enemy with *all* his forces; for this is the meaning of the word *παρυσιν*, which is used in both the speeches. But Agamemnon, not understanding the mandate, neglected the greatest part of his army, and, engaging in battle without the aid of Achilles, was frustrated in his expectations through his unskilfulness in judging of divine visions. So that Jupiter is not the cause of the deception, but he who did not properly understand the mandates of Jupiter.

We shall also add the solution given by our preceptor Syrianus, which both accedes to the meaning of Homer and the truth of things. For, if Jupiter is represented as providing for the honour of the hero Achilles, and consulting how he may destroy the greatest number of the Greeks, is it not necessary that he must previously comprehend in himself the cause of the deception? For, if Achilles had been associated with the army, the Greeks would not have been destroyed, nor would they have been punished for their unjust conduct towards him. It is better therefore to say that the deception was from divinity for the good of the deceived. For good is better than truth. And among the Gods, indeed, they are conjoined with each other: for neither is intellect without divinity, nor divinity without an intellectual essence. But in their participants they are often separated; and good is produced through falsehood, and truth is frustrated of good. Whence also Socrates himself, when he is framing laws for the guardians of his republic, orders falsehood to be employed, through the opinion of the stupid, who are not otherwise able to obtain the good which is adapted to their condition.

dition. If therefore it be said that divinity benefits some through truth, and others through falsehood, and at the same time leads all of them to good, it is by no means wonderful. For, of generated natures, some subsist without matter, but others with matter, in which fallacy is inherent; or, rather, matter is true fallacy itself. So that, in the providence of souls, if they are, as we have said, variously benefited by divinity, some immaterially through truth, but others materially through falsehood, such providential energy will be adapted to the nature of the Gods.

But, if it be requisite, this also may be asserted, that deception and falsehood are generated in the participant, and that this takes place according to the will of divinity, that he who has acted erroneously may through the deception become more worthy: just as that which is material is generated in these lower regions, but subsists according to demiurgic providence, that there may be generation and corruption in order to the completion of the universe. Divinity therefore does not deceive, but he who is deceived is deceived by himself; and this takes place, according to the will of divinity, for the good of him who sustains the deception. For, God making immaterially, that which is generated is generated materially; and he energizing impartibly, that which proceeds from this energy, receives its completion partly; and he signifying intellectually, falsehood obtains a shadowy subsistence in the being that receives what is signified. But the divine poet himself manifests, that, truth dwelling with the Gods, deception is generated from the opinion of the recipients, when he makes Jupiter commanding the dream say—

All that I order tell with *perfect truth*.

How then is there falsehood in divinity, according to Homer? And how is divinity the cause of deception? Unless it should be said he is the cause in such a manner, as that neither is the shadowy subsistence of deception in these lower regions contrary to his will. But the habit of youth is incapable of distinguishing and contemplating, how, wholes remaining void of evil, in the natures which receive them divisibly evil appears; how, natures more excellent than ours not deceiving, we are often deceived; and how, when deceived, we suffer this according to the will of providence. Hence

Socrates is not willing that young men should hear things of this kind, as being incapable of forming properly distinct opinions of things.

IX. A COMMON APOLOGY BOTH FOR THE HOMERIC AND PLATONIC FABLES, IN WHICH THEY SPEAK OF THE JUDGMENTS IN HADES, OF SOULS, AND THE DIFFERENT ALLOTMENTS WHICH THEY RECEIVE ON DEPARTING FROM THEIR BODIES, ACCORDING TO THE IDIOMS OF THE LIFE IN THE BODY.

Having then discussed these things, let us examine what is written in the third book of the Republic, and, prior to other things, what the poet either himself asserts, or introduces another asserting, mythologically concerning Hades; and let us consider whether they contain any thing of truth, and accord with the narrations of Plato. What then are we to understand, when the poet represents Achilles as preferring servitude in the present life to the possession of every thing in Hades? What is the meaning of those dreadful habitations, which are odious to the Gods, of the image and the soul, of shades wandering without intellect, of lives compared to shadows, of the lamentations of souls passing thither, of their being assimilated to bats, of smoke, a crashing noise, and such like particulars, which the poems of Homer contain? What likewise are the rivers in Hades, and those appellations which are the most tragical? For these Socrates reprobrates, but at the same time adds, what is common to all fables, "that they contribute to something else; but we (says he) are afraid for our guardians, lest from these terrible relations, they should think death to be dreadful."

However, that Socrates himself in many places uses names and ænigmas of this kind, is obvious to every one. For, that I may omit the rivers mentioned in the Phædo, the wanderings of souls, their anxieties, the three roads, the punishments, the being carried in rivers, the lamentations and exclamations there, and the supplications of injurers to the injured, of all which Plato says Hades is full;—though these things should be omitted, yet does not what we find written at the end of the Republic accord with the intention of the Homeric poetry, viz. the bellowing mouth, Tartarus, fiery dæmons, the tearing off the flesh of the tyrant Aridæus, and souls full of dust and filth? For, what is there in these which falls short of the tragical in the ex-

treme? So that for the same reason these also are to be rejected, or the Homeric doctrine is not to be reprehended. In defence of both therefore, whether some Epicurean or any other endeavours to accuse such-like fables, we say, that the habits of souls liberated from the body are different, and the places of the universe are multiform, into which they are introduced. Of these also some are so separated from mortal instruments, as neither to have any habitude to things of a worse condition, nor to be filled with the tumult which they contain, and material inanity. The vehicles of such are necessarily pure and luciform, not disturbed by material vapours, nor thickened by a terrestrial nature. But others who are not yet perfectly purified by philosophy, but are drawn down to an affection towards the testaceous body, and pursue a life conjoined with this,—these exhibit such like vehicles suspended from their essence to those who are capable of beholding them, viz. shadowy, material, drawing downwards by their weight, and attracting much of a mortal condition. Hence Socrates, in the *Phædo*, says that such souls, rolling about sepulchres, exhibit shadowy phantasms; and the poet relates that they are impelled along similar to shadows.

Further still, of those souls which yet embrace a corporeal life there are many differences. For some live a more practic life, and, not yet deserting a life of this kind, embrace an organ adapted to practical energies, from which when they are separated they are indignant; as was the case with the soul of Patroclus,

Which leaving youth and manhood wail'd its fate.

And when in Hades, they still desire an association with this organ, as did the soul of Achilles¹, because he preferred a life on earth to a separate life, according to which he was not able to energize, but very much excelled in an active life. Others again, through the infelicity of their condition, eagerly embrace the testaceous body, and think that the life conjoined with it differs in no respect from the proper life of the soul. Such as these the divine poetry of Homer assimilates to bats, as looking to that which is

¹ Heroes are divided into two kinds: those that energize according to practical, and those that energize according to intellectual virtue. Achilles was a hero of the former class, and Hercules of the latter. For an ample account of the characteristics of these two kinds, see my *Pausanias*, vol. iii. p. 229.

dark in the universe, and its very extremity, and which may be denominated a stupendous cavern; and as having the winged nature of the soul gross and terrestrial. Is it therefore wonderful that Achilles, who possessed practical virtue, should desire a life in conjunction with body, and which was capable of being subservient to his actions? For Hercules, being purified through the telestic science, and partaking of undefiled fruits, obtained a perfect restoration among the Gods; whence the poet says of him,

He with th' immortal Gods delighted lives,
And beauteous Hebe crowns his joys.—

But Achilles, since he embraces rectitude in practical affairs, and the present life, pursues also and desires an instrument adapted to this life. Plato himself, therefore, also says that souls according to the manners to which they have been accustomed, make choice of secondary lives. Is not this likewise worthy of admiration in the divine tradition of Homer—I mean the separation of the soul from its image, and intellect from the soul? Also that the soul is said to use the image¹, but that intellect is more divine than both these? And again, that the image and the soul may in a certain respect be known while yet detained in the body; and that the soul takes care of and providentially attends to the testaceous body, and, when this is not effected, desires its accomplishment; but that intellect is incomprehensible by our phantastic and figured motions? Hence Achilles, on beholding Patroclus speaking concerning the burial of his body, was led to believe that the soul and its image were in Hades, but that intellect was not there, nor prudence, by which these are used. For the energies of the irrational life hastened to adopt this position, but could not credit the reception of the intellectual soul in Hades from the visions of dreams.

Does it not also most perfectly accord with things themselves to say, that the multitude of souls depart from their bodies lamenting, and are divulsed from them with difficulty, through the alluring life and manifold pleasures which they enjoy in them? For every corporeal pleasure, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*, as if armed with a nail, fastens the soul to the body.

¹ The irrational part of the soul is the *image* of the rational, in the same manner as the rational soul is the image of intellect. Body also is the image of the irrational soul, and matter, or the last of things, is the image of body.

And

And such souls after deserting their bodies use shadowy vehicles, which are disturbed by the ponderous and terrene vapours¹ of the Sirens, and utter an uncertain voice, and a material sound, which the Homeric poetry denominates a crashing noise. For, as the instruments of ascending souls emit a harmonious sound, and appear to possess an elegant and well-measured motion, so the sound of more irrational souls descending under the earth is similar to a crashing noise, bearing an image of an appetitive and phantastic life alone. Nor must we think that the places in Hades, and the tribunals under the earth, and the rivers which both Homer and Plato teach us are there, are merely fabulous prodigies: but, as many and all-various places are assigned to souls ascending to the heavens, according to the allotments which are there; in like manner it is proper to believe that places under the earth are prepared for those souls that still require punishment and purification. These places, as they contain the various defluxions of the elements on the earth, are called by poets rivers and streams. They likewise contain different orders of presiding dæmons; some of whom are of an avenging, others of a punishing, others of a purifying, and, lastly, others of a judicial characteristic. But if the Homeric poetry calls these places

Horrid and dark, and odious to the Gods,

neither is it proper to condemn it for this. For souls are terrified through the variety and phantasy of the presiding dæmons which are there. The infernal region likewise is extended according to all-various allotments, adapted to the different habits of those that descend thither². It is also most remote from the Gods, as being the extremity of the universe, and as possessing much of material disorder, and never enjoying the splendor of the solar rays. And thus much concerning those verses which Socrates thinks should be obliterated, and should by no

¹ For *αἴμα* here read *αἶμα*.

² Instead of reading the latter part of this sentence, and the beginning of the next, as it is erroneously printed in the original, viz. *φερομένων πορρωτάτω. Τα δὲ ἐστὶ &c.* it is necessary to read, as in the translation, *φερομένων. Πορρωτάτω δὲ ἐστὶ &c.*

means

means be heard by those whom he educates: for through these, says he, the love of the soul for the body will be increased, and a separation from it will appear to be of all things most dreadful.

X. WHAT THE CAUSES ARE THROUGH WHICH THE POETRY OF HOMER ASCRIBES LAMENTATIONS BOTH TO HEROES AND GODS; AND LIKEWISE TO THE BEST OF HEROES AND THE GREATEST OF THE GODS.

It now follows that we should consider how the poetry of Homer does not represent one of us weeping and lamenting, when he also ascribes these effects of sorrow to his heroes, but makes the Gods themselves to weep, for the death of mortals whom they loved; though, according to Plato, Socrates neither wept, nor suffered any perturbation of mind, when his familiars wept on account of his approaching death; but Apollodorus, who wept abundantly, and any other who was similarly affected, were reproved by their master. But the divine poet represents his heroes immoderately lamenting the loss of their familiars. And, though some one should say that such things as the following became Priam who was a barbarian, and more irrational in his conduct:

Roll'd in the dust he suppliant call'd on all,
And nam'd them one by one¹:

yet is it not absurd that Achilles, the son of a goddess, should at one time lie supine, at another prone, and, at another on his side, and, defiling his head with dust, weep in a very puerile manner? And even if such passions were proper in men who are allotted a mortal nature, yet they ought not to be ascribed to the Gods themselves. Why then is it requisite that Thetis should say weeping:

Ah wretched me! unfortunately brave
A son I bore².

For a divine nature is established very remote from pleasure and pain. But though some one should dare to introduce the Gods affected in this

¹ Iliad. 22.

² Iliad. 18.

manner¹, yet it is not fit that the greatest of the Gods should lament and mourn both for Hector when pursued by Achilles, and for his son Sarpedon, and exclaim respecting both, Ah me! For such an imitation does not appear to be in any respect adapted to its paradigms, since it ascribes tears to things without tears, pain to things void of pain, and in short passion to things free from passion. These things Socrates reprobates in Homer, and expels from the education of youth, fearful lest some impediment should arise, through such-like assertions, to a right discipline according to virtue. For education is particularly conversant with pleasure and pain; which being increased, the legislator must necessarily be frustrated of his proper end.

To these objections we reply, that since the poet introduces heroes engaged in practical affairs, and living a life adapted to these, he very properly represents them as affected with particular events, and living conformably to such affections. For to philosophers, and those who energize cathartically, pleasures and pains, and the mixtures of these, are by no means adapted; since they are separated from these, lay aside all the trifling of mortality, and hasten to be divested of the forms of life with which they are surrounded from the elements, rapidly withdrawing themselves from material passions the offspring of generation. But pleasures, pains, sympathies, and a scene of all-various passions, are coordinated to those engaged in war, and who energize according to the passive part of the soul. And how could the vehement about actions take place, without the impulse of the appetites? Priam, therefore, and Achilles, neither being philosophers, nor willing to separate themselves from generation, nor living after the manner of the guardians of Plato's republic,—if they lament and commiserate their familiars, it is by no means wonderful. For the loss of friends, the being destitute of children, and the subversions of cities, appear to warriors to impart a great portion of misery. The accomplishment of mighty deeds, therefore, is adapted to these, as being allotted an heroic nature; and in conjunction with this the pathetic, from their being conversant with particulars.

With respect to the Gods, however, when they are said to weep for or

¹ i. e. Jupiter, who is called the *greatest* of the Gods, with reference to the mundane Gods, of whom he is the demiurgus and father. For, that he is not the first God, is evident from the Cratylus, Timæus and Parmenides of Plato; which see.

lament

lament those that are most dear to them, another mode of interpretation is to be adopted, and which was formerly admitted by the authors of fables, who indicated by tears the providence of the Gods about mortal, generated, and perishable natures. For this object of providential energy naturally calling for tears afforded a pretext to the inventors of fables; and through these they obscurely signified providence itself. Hence some one, in a hymn to the Sun, says,

Phœbus, the much-enduring race of men
Thy tears excite'.——

And on this account, in the mysteries also, we mystically assume sacred lamentations, as symbols of the providence pertaining to us from more excellent natures. Thetis therefore, and Jupiter, are said to lament those most dear to them, when in extreme danger—not that they are passively disposed after the manner of men, but because a certain separate providence proceeds from them, and gifts to particulars. And when the order of the universe concurs with this divisible providence, the preserving energy of that which provides is unimpeded; but when this order opposes, and that which is the object of a particular providence, as being a part of the universe, and allotted generation, sustains that corruption which is adapted to its nature, then fables, adducing the idiom or peculiarity of the providence which this object received according to its order, say that the powers who exert this providential energy lament, but not with exclamation: so that grief with them is a sign of the energy of a particular providence about individuals. After this manner, then, we attribute lamentations to the first Gods; since the greatest and most perfect ² of mystical sacrifices (τελεται) deliver in the arcana certain sacred lamentations of Proserpine and Ceres, and of the greatest ³ goddess herself.

But it is by no means wonderful if the last of the genera which are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, and which proximately attend to the affairs of mortals, in consequence of employing appetites and passions, and having their life in these, should rejoice in the safety of the objects of

¹ Δακρυα μὲν σθεὺς ἐστὶ πολυπλημῶν (lege πολυπλημῶν) γένος ἀνδρῶν.

² viz. the Eleusinian mysteries.

³ viz. Rhea, who is the mother of the Gods.

their providence, but be afflicted and indignant when they are corrupted, and should suffer a mutation according to passions :

The Nymphs lament when trees are leafless found;
But when the trees through fertilizing rain
In leaves abound, the Nymphs rejoice again—

says a certain poet. For all things subsist divinely in the Gods, but divisibly and dæmoniacally in the divided guardians of our nature. And thus much may suffice concerning the lamentations of the Gods.

XI. WHAT THE CAUSE IS OF THE LAUGHTER ASCRIBED TO THE GODS IN FABLES, AND WHY THE POETRY OF HOMER MAKES THE GODS TO LAUGH IMMODERATELY AT VULCAN.

Let us in the next place consider whether fables properly attribute to the Gods a passion contrary to that which we have just now discussed, viz. immoderate laughter, and which is thought worthy of reprehension by Socrates.

Vulcan ministrant when the Gods beheld,
Amidst them laughter unextinguish'd rose ¹.

What then is the laughter of the Gods? and why do they laugh in consequence of Vulcan moving and energizing? Theologists, therefore, say that Vulcan, as we have elsewhere observed, is the demiurgus and maker of every thing apparent ². Hence he is said to have constructed habitations for the Gods :

Then to their proper domes the Gods depart,
Form'd by lame Vulcan with transcendent art.

And this, in consequence of preparing for them mundane receptacles. He is also said to be lame in both his feet, because his fabrication is without

¹ Iliad. lib. i. circa finem.

² viz. He is the artificer of the whole of a corporeal nature. Proclus also, somewhere in his comment on the Timæus, assigns another reason for the fiction of Vulcan's lameness, viz. because he is the fabricator of things last in the progressions of being (for such are bodies), and which are not able to proceed into another order. I prefer this explanation to the former.

legs. For that which is moved with a motion about intellect and prudence does not, says Timæus, require feet. He is likewise said to preside over the brazier's art, and he himself energizes working in bras. Hence, in the poetry of Homer, heaven is often celebrated as brazen; and many other particulars confirm this opinion. But since every providential energy about a *sensible nature*, according to which the Gods assist the fabrication of Vulcan, is said to be the *sport* of divinity, hence Timæus also appears to me to call the mundane Gods *junior*, as presiding over things which are perpetually in generation, or becoming to be, and which may be considered as ludicrous. The authors of fables are accustomed to call this peculiarity of the providence of the Gods energizing about the world, *laughter*. And when the poet says that the Gods, being delighted with the motion of Vulcan, laughed with inextinguishable laughter, nothing else is indicated than that they are cooperating artificers; that they jointly give perfection to the art of Vulcan, and supernally impart joy to the universe. For Vulcan suspends all their mundane receptacles, and extends to the providence of the Gods whole physical powers. But the Gods, energizing with a facility adapted to their nature, and not departing¹ from their proper hilarity, confer on these powers also their characteristic gifts, and move wholes by their perfective providence. In short, we must define the laughter of the Gods to be their exuberant energy in the universe, and the cause of the gladness of all mundane natures. But, as such a providence is incomprehensible, and the communication of all goods from the Gods is never-failing, we must allow that the poet very properly calls their laughter unextinguished. And here you may again see how what we have said is conformable to the nature of things. For fables do not assert that the Gods always weep, but that they laugh without ceasing. For tears are symbols of their providence in mortal and frail concerns, and which now rise into existence, and then perish; but laughter is a sign of their energy in wholes, and those perfect natures in the universe which are perpetually moved with undeviating sameness. On which account I think, when we divide demi-urgic productions into Gods and men, we attribute laughter to the generation of the Gods, but tears to the formation of men and animals; whence

¹ Instead of καὶ τῆς οὐκείας εὐπαθείας ἀφίσταμενοι, read καὶ τῆς οὐκείας εὐπαθείας οὐχ ἀφίσταμενοι.

the poet whom we have before mentioned, in his hymn to the Sun, says,

Mankind's laborious race thy tears excite,
But the Gods, laughing, blossom'd into light.

But when we make a division into things celestial and sublunary, again after the same manner we must assign laughter to the former, and tears to the latter; and when we reason concerning the generations and corruptions of sublunary natures themselves, we must refer the former to the laughter, and the latter to the tears, of the Gods. Hence, in the mysteries also, those who preside over sacred institutions order both these to be celebrated at stated times. And we have elsewhere observed, that the stupid are neither able to understand things employed by theurgists in secrecy, nor fictions of this kind. For the hearing of both these, when unaccompanied with science, produces dire and absurd confusion in the lives of the multitude, with respect to the reverence pertaining to divinity.

XII. AN APOLOGY FOR THOSE PARTS IN THE POETRY OF HOMER, WHICH APPEAR IN ALL-VARIOUS WAYS TO EXCITE THE HEARERS TO A CONTEMPT OF TEMPERANCE.

It now follows that we should consider whether the poems of Homer are inimical to the acquisition of temperance. The greatest species therefore of temperance, says Socrates, is reverence towards governors; the next to this is a command over the pleasures and desires of the soul; and there is a third consequent to these, which we shall shortly after contemplate. Achilles appears to have erred according to the first of these, when he freely says to the commander of all the Grecian forces,

Drunkard, dog-eyed, with heart of deer !

But Ulysses according to the third of these, when, defining the most beau-

¹ Iliad. lib. 1.

tiful life, he says that he particularly approves that polity of men in which there are

The heav'n-taught poet, and enchanting strain ;
 The well-fill'd palace, the perpetual feast,
 A land rejoicing, and a people blest !
 The plenteous board high-heap'd with cates divine,
 And o'er the foaming bowl the laughing wine !

For in these verses he places the end of life in nothing else than variety of pleasure, and the gratification of desire. Such then being the objections made by Socrates to the verses of Homer, in answer to the first we say, that those guardians which he places over his city, and who are allotted such a transcendency, on account of their erudition and virtue, over those whom they govern, demand the most abundant and the greatest honour, both from their associates and all others ; as they are truly the saviours and benefactors of the whole polity over which they preside : nor is it to be supposed that the governed will ever suffer any thing unholy or unjust from them, governing as they do according to intellect and justice. But the poet neither admits that Agamemnon excels all those that are subject to him, in virtue, nor in benefiting others ; but he ranks him among those that are benefited by others, and particularly by the military science of Achilles. Very properly, therefore, does he represent him as reviled by those more excellent than himself, and consider the general good of the governed, against which Agamemnon sinned, as of more consequence than gratifying the passions of the chief. The poet therefore introduces the best of the Greeks freely speaking to Agamemnon, without regarding the multitude of soldiers that followed him, or his naval power. For virtue is every where honourable, but not the instruments of virtue. We must not therefore say, that he who employs such disgraceful epithets sins against the rulers and saviours of the whole army, when they are only superior by the multitude of those that are subject to their command, but are far inferior in virtue. For even the commander himself of so great an army, and so difficult to be numbered, acknowledges, a little after, how

¹ Odyss. lib. 10. at the beginning.

much Achilles excels him in virtue, laments his own infelicity, and says,

For I have err'd, nor this will I deny.

And,

That happy man whom Jove still honours most,
Is more than armies, and himself an host.

With respect to the words of Ulysses, we may say in their defence, that every thing of this kind is interpreted more symbolically by those who transfer to other conceptions his wanderings, and who think it proper to rank both the Phæacians and their felicity ¹ higher than human nature. For, with them the festival, the dainties, and the enchanting strain, have a different signification from that which is obvious to the multitude. It may also be said, that even those who do not depart from the apparent meaning of the poet, may nevertheless reply to such objections, and show, in the first place, that Ulysses, the wisest of the Greeks, does not think it fit that pleasure should have dominion in well-instituted polities, but worthy joy (*ευφροσυνή*). And how much these differ from each other, we may learn from Plato himself. In the second place, Ulysses approves of the whole city becoming harmonized and unanimous with itself through music, being an auditor of such melodies as lead to virtue. For it is of great consequence to the whole polity, and to true erudition and virtue, that he who exercises music among the vulgar should not be any casual person, but one who derives his knowledge of it supernally through divine inspiration, from its presiding deity. In the third place, such harmony, to those that partake of it, adds an abundance of things necessary, which the multitude in cities very much require. For Ulysses does not remarkably praise a life filled with things of this kind, but that life which is in want of nothing necessary to mortal existence. The wisest of the Greeks, therefore, appears to speak conformably to our dogmas, and to unperturbed preconceptions respecting divine felicity. But if Ulysses thought that he deserves approbation who takes away worthy delight, and the discipline subsisting through divine music, alone

¹ See these explained in my History of the Platonic Theology, annexed to my Translation of Proclus on Euclid.

regarding feasting, and immoderate enjoyments, destitute of the Muse, and directs his attention to pleasure, Socrates with great propriety says that things of this kind are remote from his polity. For it is by no means fit that immoderate pleasure, and a life adapted to gluttony, should have dominion in a city consisting of the happy.

XIII. WHAT THE CONNEXION OF JUPITER WITH JUNO OBSCURELY SIGNIFIES; WHAT THE ORNAMENT OF JUNO IS; AND WHAT THE PLACE IN WHICH THEY WERE CONNECTED. WHAT THE LOVE OF JUPITER SIGNIFIES; WHAT THE DIVINE SLEEP IS; AND, IN SHORT, THE WHOLE INTERPRETATION OF THAT FABLE.

To such objections therefore of Socrates it is not difficult to reply; but a doubt yet remains to be solved by us, greater and more difficult, respecting the connexion of Jupiter with Juno; for this Socrates reprehends, as by no means fit to be heard by youth. For, does it not appear to be perfectly impious, to suspect of the greatest of the Gods, that through his love to Juno he should be forgetful of all his former decrees, should have connexion with the goddess on the ground, not waiting to enter into her bedchamber, and should condescend to speak in the language of human lovers? For these in the first place prefer before all things a conjunction with the objects of their love; and in the next place say, that they experience the power of love more than in any former time. For Jupiter is made to speak in this manner in the following verses:

Ne'er did my soul so strong a passion prove,
Or for an earthly, or a heavenly love ¹.

And also that he loved her more

Than when, ascending to the nuptial couch,
In love they mingled, from their parents hid.

Our preceptor ² in a most divinely inspired manner has unfolded the

¹ Iliad. lib. 14.

² viz. the great Syrianus.

occult theory of this fable; from whose writings extracting as much as is sufficient to the present purpose, we shall briefly explain the several parts of the fable, and show that Homer is free from all blasphemy in the preceding verses.

All the divine orders, therefore, proceeding from the one principle of wholes, which Plato usually calls *the good*, and from those bifurmed causes proximately appearing after this principle, which Socrates in the *Philebus* denominates *bound* and *infinity*, but other wise men have venerated by other names; these orders likewise being divided and separated from each other, in a manner adapted to the Gods, through those second bifurmed principles,—the interpreters of the truth concerning the Gods usually oppose in their divisions the male to the female, the even to the odd, and the paternal to the maternal genera. But these divine orders again hastening to union and a connate communion, through the first cause, which is the leader of united goods to all beings, hence I think the authors of fables took occasion in their symbolical theory to ascribe marriage to the Gods, connexions, and a progeny from these, and also celebrated the connexions and conjunctions of their progeny, till they had perfectly contemplated the whole extent of a divine nature, diversified by such like progressions and conjunctions supernally, as far as to mundane natures. As therefore, among the Gods prior to the fabrication of the world, they celebrate the connexions of Saturn and Rhea, of Heaven and Earth, and their cogenerations, in the same manner also, among the fabricators of the universe, they inform us that the first conjunction is that of Jupiter and Juno; Jupiter being allotted a paternal dignity, but Juno being the mother of every thing of which Jupiter is the father. The former likewise produces all things in the rank of a monad, but the latter in conjunction with him gives subsistence to secondary natures, according to the prolific duad: and the former is assimilated to intelligible bound, but the latter to intelligible infinity. For, according to every order of Gods, it is requisite that there should be primary causes subsisting analogously to those two principles. But, to the union of these greatest divinities, it is necessary that there should previously subsist a oneness of transcendency of the monadic and demiurgic God, and a perfect conversion to him of the generative and dyadic cause. For the connate communion of more ex-

cellent natures is after this manner effected, more elevated causes being established in themselves, and in natures more divine than themselves, but such as are subordinate giving themselves up to those that are superior. Through these causes, as it appears to me, Juno hastening to a connexion with Jupiter, perfects her whole essence, and prepares it with all-various powers, the undefiled, the generative, the intellectual, and the unific; but Jupiter excites the divine love in himself, according to which he also fills his proximate participants with good, and extends to them a cause collective of multitude, and an energy convertive of secondary natures to himself. But the union and indissoluble conjunction of both these divinities is effected separate from the universe, and exempt from the mundane receptacles. For Jupiter elevates to this communion, Juno extending to him that which is subordinate and mundane; the Gods indeed being always united, but fables separating them from each other; and referring a connexion separate² from the universe to the will of Jupiter, but the common cooperation of these divinities proceeding into the world, to the providence of Juno. The reason of this is, that every where the paternal cause is the leader of exempt and more uniform good, but the maternal of that good which is proximate to its participants, and is multiplied according to all-various progressions. With great propriety, therefore, are sleep and wakefulness usurped separately in the symbols of fables; wakefulness manifesting the providence of the Gods about the world, but sleep a life separate from all subordinate natures; though the Gods at the same time both providentially energize about the universe, and are established in themselves. But as Timæus represents the demiurgus of wholes, at one time energizing, and giving subsistence to the earth, the heavens, the planets, the fixed stars, the circles of the soul, and the mundane intellect, but at another time abiding in himself, after his accustomed manner, and exempt from all those powers that energize in the universe; so, long before Timæus, fables represent the father of all mundane natures, at one time awake, and at another asleep, for the purpose of indicating his twofold life and energy. "For he contains intelligibles in his intellect, but introduces sense to the

² In the original *μεριστην*; but it is necessary to read *χωριστην*, as in our translation.

worlds',” says one of the Gods. According to the former energy, therefore, he may be said to be awake ; for wakefulness with us is an energy of sense ; but according to the latter to sleep, as separated from senses, and exhibiting a life defined according to a perfect intellect. It may also be said, that he consults about human affairs when awake ; for according to this life he provides for all mundane concerns ; but that when asleep, and led together with Juno to a separate union, he is not forgetful of the other energy, but, possessing and energizing according to it, at the same time contains both. For he does not, like nature, produce secondary things without intelligence, nor through intelligence is his providence in subordinate natures diminished, but at the same time he both governs the objects of his providence according to justice, and ascends to his intelligible watch-tower. The fable, therefore, indicates this exempt transcendency, when it says that his connexion with Juno was on mount Ida ; for there Juno arriving gave herself to the embraces of the mighty Jupiter. What else, then, shall we say mount *Ida* obscurely signifies, but the region of *ideas* and an intelligible nature, to which Jupiter ascends, and elevates Juno through love ;—not converting himself to the participant, but through excess of goodness imparting this second union with himself, and with that which is intelligible ? For such are the loves of more excellent natures,—they are convertive of things subordinate to things first, give completion to the good which they contain, and are perfective of subject natures. The fable, therefore, does not diminish the dignity of the mighty Jupiter, by representing him as having connexion on the ground with Juno, and refusing to enter into her bed-chamber ; for by this it insinuates that the connexion was supermundane, and not mundane. The chamber, therefore, constructed by Vulcan indicates the orderly composition of the universe, and the sensible region ; for Vulcan, as we have said before, is the artificer of the universe.

If you are also willing to consider the dress of Juno, through which she conjoined herself to the greatest of the Gods, and called forth the pa-

¹ This is a part of one of the Chaldean Oracles, to my collection of which I have already referred the reader.

ternal providence ~~of~~ Jupiter to a communion with her own prolific powers, you will, I think, in a still greater degree behold the excess of the separate union of the Gods, celebrated in this fable. For she assimilates herself all-variously to the mother of the Gods, from whom she also proceeds, and is adorned with the more partial powers of those natures which subsist in her totally, and, becoming all but another Rhea, proceeds to the demiurgus of the universe, who had then ascended to his proper intelligible. For she who is about to be conjoined with him who imitates his father, through a life separate from mundane natures, assimilates also her own perfection to the mother of all the divine orders, and thus enters into a connate communion with him. The hairs therefore of the Goddess, and her ringlets widely spreading, which she again binds, are evidently analogous to the hairs of the mother of the Gods: "for her hairs appear similar to rays of light ending in a sharp point," says some one of the Gods. And the poet calls the hairs of Juno *shining*. But her zone, with the fringes depending on and not cut off from it, resembles the whole and all-perfect girdle of Rhea. For Juno also is a vivific Goddess, and is generative of all the multitude of souls, which the number of the depending fringes symbolically indicates. Her ear-rings and her sandals represent the first and the last of the partial ¹ powers which flow from thence, some of which subsist about the highest powers of the Goddess, and thence depend, but others are situated about her lowest progressions. The ambrosia and the oil are signs of the undefiled powers of the Goddess; for the inflexible ² order of Gods subsists about her. What therefore that untamed genus of Gods and cause of purity is to Juno, that is here signified through these symbols. For ambrosia represents a power superior to all impurity and all defilement, and oil, as it produces strength, and is adapted to gymnastic exercises, properly belongs to Curetic deity. For the first Curetes are in other respects ascribed to the order of Minerva, and are said by Orpheus to be crowned with a branch of olive.

The Goddess, therefore, being perfectly furnished with such like sym-

¹ viz. Dæmoniacal powers. The dress therefore of Juno signifies her being invested with powers of this kind.

² viz. The Curetes.

bols, and becoming as it were a partial Rhea, proceeds to the demiurgus of the universe, that she may be conjoined with him according to that life by which he particularly imitates Saturn; not proceeding into the universe, but being separate from mundane natures; nor consulting about things which are here, according to the sleepless providence of wholes, but exempt from sensibles, according to divine sleep; and in this respect emulating his father, who is represented as sleeping the first of the Gods.

When Saturn tasted the deceitful food,
Loud snoring lay the God.

Since therefore Jupiter thus imitates his father Saturn, with great propriety does the dress of Juno regard the whole of Rhea; and hence Jupiter, through his similitude to Saturn, prefers a connexion on mount Ida to that which proceeds into the universe.

The girdle also, and the assistance of Venus, assimilate Juno still more to Rhea. For there also was the presubstisting monad of this Goddess, proceeding supernally from the connective divinity of Heaven, through Saturn as a medium, and illuminating the whole of an intellectual life with the light of beauty. Venus is said to carry this girdle in her bosom, as possessing its powers conspicuously extended; but Juno after a manner conceals it in her bosom, as being allotted a different idiom of hyparxis, but as possessing the girdle also, so far as she likewise is filled with the whole of Venus. For she does not externally derive the power which conjoins her with the demiurgus, but comprehends it also in herself. But the general opinion of mankind evinces the communion of these Goddesses: for they honour Juno as Nuptial and Pronuba, as beginning such like energies from herself. For she conjoins herself with the demiurgus through the girdle in herself; and hence she likewise imparts to all others a legitimate communion with each other.

But how are Jupiter and Juno said to have been at first connected with each other, concealed from their parents, but that now they are connected in a greater degree, through the excess of love with which Jupiter then loved Juno? Shall we say that the peculiarities of other goods are also twofold; and that, of union, one kind is connate to those that are united, but that the other supernally proceeds to them from more perfect

fect causes? According to the former of these, therefore, they are said to be concealed from their parents, in consequence of being allotted this union as peculiar to themselves; but according to the other they are levated to their causes, and hence this is said to be a greater and more perfect union than the former. But both these unions eternally subsisting together, with the Gods, fables separate them, in the same manner as sleep and wakefulness, progression and conversion, a communication of proper goods to things secondary, and a participation of primary causes: for these the authors of fables, concealing the truth, separate, though they are consubstantial with each other. Every thing, therefore, is asserted by Homer respecting the connexion of the great Jupiter and Juno after a theological manner; which is also testified by Socrates in the *Cratylus*, who derives the etymology of Juno from nothing else than *love*, as being, says he, lovely to Jupiter. According to an occult theory, therefore, we must not accuse Homer for writing such things concerning these mighty divinities. But if it should be objected, that things of this kind are not fit to be heard by youth, according to their apparent signification, poets the authors of such fables will say, Our fables are not for youth, nor did we write such things with a view to juvenile discipline, but with an insane mouth; for these are the productions of the mania of the Muses, of which whoever being deprived arrives at the poetic gates, will be both as to himself and his poetry imperfect. And thus much may suffice for these particulars.

XIV. WHAT THE MYTHOLOGY OF HOMER OBSCURELY SIGNIFIES CONCERNING VENUS AND MARS, AND THE BONDS OF VULCAN, WITH WHICH BOTH ARE SAID TO BE BOUND.

Let us now consider the connexion between Mars and Venus, and the bonds of Vulcan. For Socrates says that neither must these be admitted, nor must such fables be delivered to youth. Let us, therefore, concisely relate what the poetry of Homer obscurely signifies by these things. Both these divinities then, I mean Vulcan and Mars, energize about the whole world, the latter separating the contrarieties of the universe, which he

also perpetually excites, and immutably preserves, that the world may be perfect, and filled with forms of every kind; but the former artificially fabricating the whole sensible order, and filling it with physical reasons and powers. He also fashions twenty tripods about the heavens, that he may adorn them with the most perfect of many-sided¹ figures, and fabricates various and many-formed sublunary species,

Clasps, winding bracelets, necklaces, and chains².

Both these divinities require the assistance of Venus to their energies; the one, that he may insert order and harmony in contraries; and the other, that he may introduce beauty and splendour as much as possible, into sensible fabrications, and render this world the most beautiful of things visible. But, as Venus is every where, Vulcan always enjoys her according to the superior, but Mars according to the inferior, orders of things. Thus, for instance, if Vulcan is supermundane, Mars is mundane; and if the former is celestial, the latter is sublunary. Hence the one is said to have married Venus according to the will of Jupiter, but the other is fabled to have committed adultery with her. For a communion with the cause of beauty and conciliation is *natural* to the demiurgus of sensibles; but is in a certain respect foreign to the power which presides over division, and imparts the contrariety of mundane natures; for the separating are opposed to the collective genera of Gods. Fables therefore denominate this conspiring union of dissimilar causes adultery. But a communion of this kind is necessary to the universe, that contraries may be co-harmonized, and the mundane war terminate in peace. Since, however, on high among celestial natures, beauty shines forth, together with forms, elegance, and the fabrications of Vulcan, but beneath, in the realms of generation, the opposition and war of the elements, contrariety of powers, and in short the gifts of Mars, are conspicuous, on this account the sun from on high beholds the connexion of Mars and Venus, and discloses it to Vulcan, in consequence of cooperating with the whole

¹ viz. The dodecaedron, which is bounded by twelve equal and equilateral pentagons, and consists of twenty solid angles, of which the tripods of Vulcan are images; for every angle of the dodecaedron is formed from the junction of three lines.

² Iliad. lib. 18. ver. 402.

productions.

productions of this divinity. But Vulcan is said to throw over them all various bonds, unapparent to the other Gods, as adorning the mundane genera with artificial reasons, and producing one system from martial contrarieties, and the co-harmonizing goods of Venus. For both are necessary to generation. Since too, of bonds, some are celestial, but others sublunary (for some are indissoluble, as Timæus says, but others dissoluble); on this account, Vulcan again dissolves the bonds with which he had bound Mars and Venus, and this he particularly accomplishes in compliance with the request of Neptune; who being willing that the perpetuity of generation should be preserved, and the circle of mutation revolve into itself, thinks it proper that generated natures should be corrupted, and things corrupted be sent back again to generation. What wonder is it, then, if Homer says that Mars and Venus were bound by the bonds of Vulcan, since Timæus also denominates those demiurgic reasons bonds, by which the celestial Gods give subsistence to generated natures? And does not Homer speak conformably to the nature of things when he says the bonds were dissolved, since these are the bonds of generation? Indeed the demiurgus of wholes, by composing the world from contrary elements, and causing it through analogy to be in friendship with itself, appears to have collected into union the energies of Vulcan, Mars and Venus. In producing the contrarieties of the elements, too, he may be said to have generated them according to the Mars which he contains in himself; but, in devising friendship, to have energized according to the power of Venus. And in binding together the productions of Venus with those of Mars, he appears to have previously comprehended in himself, paradigmatically, the art of Vulcan. He is therefore all things, and energizes in conjunction with all the Gods. The junior artificers also, imitating their father, fabricate mortal animals, and again receive them when they are corrupted, generating, in conjunction with Vulcan, sublunary bonds, and previously containing in themselves the causes of their solution. For every where, he who comprehends in himself a bond, knows also the necessity of its solution.

XV. WHAT MUST BE SAID TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS OF SOCRATES, RESPECTING THE AVARICE ASCRIBED BY HOMER TO HIS HEROES.

Let us now consider those places in the poems of Homer, which, according to Socrates, increase the love of riches in our souls. For why does Phoenix advise Achilles to receive gifts when he lays aside his anger, but otherwise not to lay it aside? Why also does Achilles receive gifts from Agamemnon for his insolence, and refuse to restore the dead body of Hector, unless it was redeemed with money? For he who becomes an auditor of things of this kind is in danger of falling into a dire and insatiable avarice. To these objections we shall briefly say, that Phoenix advises Achilles to lay aside his anger on receiving the gifts, and Achilles, on receiving them, did lay it aside, both of them considering the gifts as an argument of the repentance of the giver; but not that they might satisfy the avaricious disposition of their soul, nor considering an increase of riches as the boundary of felicity. For they did not from the first demand these presents, but received them when they were spontaneously offered. But if Achilles restored the dead body of Hector to Priam, on its being redeemed by money, perhaps we may say that it was at that time customary to receive a ransom for the bodies of enemies. This also must be considered, that it belongs to the art of commanding an army, to cut off the riches of the enemy, but to increase the property of those who are compelled to oppose the enemy in a foreign country. But all these and such-like particulars may be defended as the transactions of those heroes who energized according to circumstances, and whose actions are to be estimated according to other manners than those of common men: they are, however, entirely unfit to be heard by those educated under the legislator of Socrates, whose geniuses are philosophic, whose erudition regards a philosophic life, and who are entirely deprived of possessions and property.

If you are willing, we may also add to what has been said respecting Achilles, that he himself accuses Agamemnon of avarice, and reprobates this passion as disgraceful.

Atrides, who in glory art the first,
And no less avaricious than renown'd !¹

¹ Iliad. lib. 1.

Besides,

Besides, he indicates to us his contempt of wealth, when he says to Agamemnon,

Thine in each contest is the wealthy prey,
Though mine the sweat and danger of the day.
Some trivial present to my ships I bear,
Or barren praises pay the wounds of war ¹.

Further still, neither would he accept the gifts at first, when they were offered by Agamemnon, because he did not think it was then fit to be reconciled to him. So that it was not the promise of riches which made him more mild to Agamemnon, by whom he had been treated with insolence; but, when he thought it was proper to lay aside his anger, he prepared himself for battle that he might revenge his friend. And when Agamemnon sent him the gifts, he neither looked at them, nor thought that any accession would thence be made to his own goods. Besides, his contempt of these things is evident from the multitude of rewards proposed by him in the funeral games: for he honoured the several champions with proper gifts; and magnificently bestowed upon Nestor, who through his age was unable to engage in the games, a golden bowl. How therefore, according to Homer, could he be avaricious, who used riches in a proper manner, who when they were present despised them, when absent did not anxiously desire them, and could endure to receive less of them than others? To which we may add, that he reprobated, in the midst of the Greeks, that passion of the soul as a disease, which aspires after immoderate wealth. How likewise can it be said that Phœnix was the teacher of avarice, who exhorts Achilles to imitate the ancient custom of the Greeks? For he says,

Thus ancient heroes, when with rage inflam'd,
By words were soften'd, and by gifts appeas'd ².

But these things, which are adapted to heroic times, and to the customs which then subsisted among heroes, were considered by Homer as deserving the highest imitation; though they are by no means adapted to the youth educated by Socrates, who are assigned no other employment by the legislator, than discipline and the study of virtue. But an attention to riches, and such things as are necessary to the pre-

¹ Iliad lib. 1.

² Iliad. lib. 9.

ervation of the life of mortals, is assigned to others who are necessary to the perfection of an inferior republic.

XVI. IN WHAT MANNER IT IS REQUISITE TO APOLOGIZE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF HEROES RESPECTING A DIVINE NATURE, WHICH APPEARS TO TAKE PLACE IN THE POETRY OF HOMER.

It now follows that we should consider how we are to answer Socrates, when he accuses Achilles of negligence respecting a divine nature. For how can he be pious and a worshipper of the Gods, who dares to say to Apollo,

Me thou hast injur'd most pernicious God ?

who also opposes the river Xanthus though a God, and presents his locks to the dead body of Patroclus, though he had promised them to the river Sperchius ? That Achilles therefore, according to Homer, was remarkably cautious respecting a divine nature, is evident from his advising the Greeks to reverence Apollo, to send a sacrifice to him, and to appease Chryses the priest of Apollo. This also follows from his readily obeying the commands of Minerva, when she appeared to him, though contrary to the impulse of his wrath. He likewise asserts that a subserviency to the Gods, and a compliance with the will of more excellent natures, is of all things the most useful ; and offers a libation and prays to Jupiter, with science adapted to the Gods. For his first purifying the bowl, and in an especial manner consecrating it to Jupiter alone, and standing in the middle of the enclosure, invoking the power that pervades every where from the middle of the universe, afford a sufficiently conspicuous argument of his piety to a divine nature, and of his knowledge of the signs adapted to the objects of worship.

But if he appears to have spoken to Apollo more boldly than is fit, it is requisite to know that the Apolloniacal orders pervade from on high, as far as to the last of things ; and some of them are divine, others angelic, and others dæmoniacal, and these multiformly divided. It must be considered, therefore, that these words were not addressed

¹ Iliad. lib. 22.

to a God, but to a dæmoniacal Apollo, and this not the first in rank, and coordinated with those that have a total dominion, but one who proximately presides over individuals; and, in short, (for why should I not speak clearly?) the guardian of Hector himself. For the poet perspicuously says,

Apollo now, before Achilles stood,
In all things like Agenor————

This Apollo, therefore, Achilles calls most pernicious, so far as he was a hindrance to his actions, by preserving his enemy uninjured. Nor does he by thus speaking sin against a God, but against a power who ranks amongst the most partial of the Apolloniad series. For it is not proper to refer either all the speeches or energies to that first Apollo, but we should also attend to his second and third progressions. Thus, for instance, we should consider who the Apollo is that fits with Jupiter and the Olympian Gods; who, that convolves the solar sphere; who the aerial Apollo is; who the terrestrial; who, that presides over Troy; and who, that is the peculiar guardian of Hector, concerning whom the poet also says,

He fled to Hades by Apollo left.

For, by looking to all these orders, we shall be able to refer the speeches of Achilles to some such partial power, who was willing to preserve the object of his care, and impede Achilles in his strenuous exertions. For the words "thou hast injured me" are very properly addressed to a dæmon of this kind, who deprives him of the end of his present labours; and the epithet "most pernicious" clearly evinces that this power is more adverse to him than any other God or dæmon. For he who preserves uninjured a principal enemy, becomes more than any one noxious to the person injured, by impeding his avenging the injury. But, as such language even to such an inferior power is not unattended with punishment, it is said that Achilles shortly after was slain by a certain power of the Apolloniad order, which Hector when he was dying thus predicts to him:

Paris and Phoebus shall avenge my fate,
And stretch thee here before this Scæan gate.

Does

Does not therefore the poetry of Homer by these things make us more modest respecting a divine nature, since we learn from it that even the most subordinate powers cannot be offended with impunity? Though I am not ignorant that those who are skilled in mystic sacrifices dare many things of this kind respecting dæmons; but perhaps they are defended by more divine natures from sustaining any such injury from subordinate powers. In the mean time justice follows other men, correcting the improbity of their speech.

It is also not difficult to reply to what is said in objection to the contest of Achilles with the river Xanthus. For he was not disobedient to the God himself, but he either contended with the apparent water which hindered his impulse against the enemy, or with some one of the indigenous powers, the associate of the Gods in battle: for Minerva and Neptune were present with him, and afforded him assistance. And it appears to me, indeed, that the poetry of Homer devises contests according to all possible diversities; sometimes relating the battles of men with men, and sometimes of the more excellent genera with each other, as in what is called *theomachy*, or the battles of the Gods; and sometimes, as in the instance before us, the oppositions of heroes to certain dæmoniacal natures; indicating to those that are able to understand things of this kind, that the first of last natures are after a manner equal to the last of such as are first, and particularly when they are guarded and moved by the Gods. Hence, not only Achilles is said to have contended with Xanthus, but Hercules also with the river Achelous, of whose life Achilles being emulous, he did not avoid similar contests.

Lastly, we may solve the third of the proposed inquiries by saying that the first and principal design of Achilles was, on returning to his country, to offer to the river Sperchius his locks, as he had promised; but when he despaired of his return, in consequence of hearing from his mother,

Soon after Hector shall thy death succeed,

was it not then necessary that he should cut off his hair in honour of his friend? For Socrates in Plato received the crowns which Alcibiades

was to have offered to a God, and was crowned with them; nor did he think that he sinned by so doing, or injured the young man. I omit to say that the hairs of Achilles were not yet sacred to the river: for he who had promised to consecrate them on his return, when deprived of this, was also deprived of the consecration of his hairs.

XVII. AN APOLOGY FOR THE UNWORTHY TREATMENT OF THE DEAD BODY OF HECTOR, AND FOR THE TWELVE TROJANS SLAIN AND BURNT ON THE FUNERAL PILE OF PATROCLUS, SINCE THESE THINGS EVIDENTLY APPEAR TO BE CRUEL, ABSURD, AND UNBECOMING THE CHARACTER OF HEROES.

It now remains that we consider the conduct of Achilles to Hector, his dragging him round the tomb of Patroclus, and his sacrificing twelve Trojan youths on his pile; for these things, says Socrates, cannot be truly ascribed to Achilles, who was the son of a Goddess, and of the most temperate Peleus descended from Jupiter, and who was educated by the wise Chiron. In the first place, then, it is said by the ancients that this was the custom of the Thesſalians, as the Cyrenæan poet also testifies, when he informs us, "that it is an ancient Thesſalian custom, to drag round the tomb of the slain the body of the slaughterer."

Achilles therefore thus acted conformably to the custom of his country, that all due honours might be paid to the funeral of Patroclus. But if Hector dragged Patroclus when a dead body, threatened to cut off his head, and cast his corpse to the Trojan dogs, which is also told to Achilles by Iris—

A prey to dogs he dooms the corpse to lie,
And marks the place to fix his head on high.¹
Rife and prevent (if yet you think of fame)
Thy friend's disgrace, thy own eternal shame!

does not Achilles, therefore, inflict a proper punishment on Hector, in dragging him round the tomb of Patroclus? For thus he both revenges the cruelty of Hector, and openly testifies his benevolence to his friend.

¹ Iliad. lib. 18.

He does not, however, accomplish what he intended; for he restores the dead body of Hector to his friends, and suffers him to be buried. He therefore who introduces such measures to his actions energizes according to the whole of justice, and the providence of the Gods. Hence the poet also says, that, by complying with the will of more excellent natures, he was rendered so mild with respect to Hector, that with his own hands he placed him on the bier.

Two splendid mantles, and a carpet spread,
They leave, to cover and inwrap the dead;
Then call the handmaids with assistant toil
To wash the body, and anoint with oil.
This done, the garments o'er the corse they spread;
Achilles lifts it to the funeral bed¹.

Achilles, therefore, performed every thing pertaining to the dead in a manner adapted to his character. For he illustriously honoured his friend by the vengeance which he inflicted on his enemy, and, afterwards becoming more mild, behaved with great philanthropy to Priam, and paid him the utmost attention and respect.

With respect to the Trojan youths that were slaughtered at the funeral pile of Patroclus, it may be said, that by this action, according to appearance, Achilles perfectly honoured his friend, and that he did nothing more to these Trojans than he was accustomed to do to other enemies, viz. slaying those whom he happened to meet. For what difference is there between dying at a funeral pyre, or in a river? Does he not indeed act better by these, whose bodies were totally destroyed by fire, than by those whose bodies were torn in pieces by savage beasts, and who suffer the same things with Lycaon? to whom Achilles says,

Lie there, Lycaon! let the fish surround
Thy bloated corse, and suck thy gory wound².

But if it be requisite to recall to our memory the more occult speculations of our preceptor respecting these particulars, we must say that

¹ Iliad. lib. 24. ² Iliad. lib. 21.

the whole transaction of Achilles concerning the pyre imitates the immortalizing of the soul (της ψυχῆς ἀποθανατισμός) by theurgists, and pertains to the separate soul of Patroclus. Hence, before the pyre was enkindled, he is said to have invoked the winds, the north and the west, that the apparent vehicle of Patroclus, through their visible motion, might obtain a convenient culture, and that the vehicle, which is more divine than this, might be invisibly purified, and restored to its proper allotment, "being drawn upwards by ærial, lunar and solar splendors," as one of the Gods somewhere asserts. It is also related of him, that he made a libation all night on the pyre :

All night Achilles hails Patroclus' soul
With large libations from the golden bowl ¹.

The poet all but proclaiming to us, in these verses, that Achilles was busily employed about the soul of his friend, and not about his visible body only, and that all things are symbolically usurped by him. For the libation from a golden bowl signifies the defluxion of souls from their fountain ; which defluxion imparts a more excellent life to a partial soul, and is able through undefiled purity to lead it from bodies to an invisible and divine condition of being. And, in short, many arguments in confirmation of this opinion may be derived from the writings of our preceptor.

Since then it appears that Achilles celebrated the funeral of Patroclus mystically, it may be not improperly said, that these twelve Trojans that were slaughtered at the pyre were coordinated as attendants with the soul of Patroclus, the ruling nature of which was both known and revered by Achilles. Hence, he chose this number as most adapted to attendants, and as sacred to the all-perfect progressions of the Gods ². By no means, therefore, did Achilles slay these Trojans from a certain dire and savage cruelty of soul, but performed the whole of this transaction in conformity with certain sacred laws pertaining to the souls of those that die in battle. Nor ought he to be accused of a proud contempt of Gods and men ; nor ought we to deny that he was the son of a Goddess and Peleus, and the disciple of Chiron, for acting in this manner. For

¹ Iliad. lib. 23. ² For τὸν Θεὸν in the original, read τῶν Θεῶν.

some of his actions he performed as regarding universal justice, others as a warrior, and others as employing sacred methods. But in all these the poet has perfectly preserved the measures of imitation. And such is the answer to all that Socrates objects to in Homer, as deserving reprehension.

But if any one should say that the fable is not to be admitted, which says that Theseus and Pirithoüs ravished Helen, and descended into Hades, perhaps these things also, which are asserted more mythologically, may be properly solved by saying that these heroes, being lovers both of unapparent and visible beauty, are fabled to have ravished Helen, and to have descended into the invisible regions; and that, when there, one of them (Pirithoüs), through the elevation, of his intellect was led back by Hercules, but that the other in a certain respect remained in Hades, from not being able to raise himself to the arduous altitude of contemplation. And though some one should contend that this is not the true meaning of the fable, it does not affect the poetry of Homer, which every where attributes, according to imitation, that which is adapted to the Gods, to the genera more excellent than human nature, and to heroic lives; indicating some things more occultly, teaching us other particulars about these things, with intellect and science, and leaving no genus of beings uninvestigated, but delivering each as energizing with respect to itself and other things, according to its own order.

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK II.

WHEN I had said these things I imagined that the debate was at an end; but this it seems was only the introduction: for Glauco, as he is on all occasions most courageous, so truly at that time did not approve of Thrasymachus in giving up the debate; but said, Socrates, do you wish to seem to have persuaded us, or to have persuaded us in reality, that in every respect it is better to be just than unjust? I would choose, said I, to do it in reality, if it depended on me. You do not then, said he, do what you desire. For, tell me, does there appear to you any good of this kind, such as we would choose to have; not regarding the consequences, but embracing it for its own sake? as joy, and such pleasures as are harmless; though nothing else arises afterwards from these pleasures, than that the possession gives us delight. There seems to me, said I, to be something of this kind. But what? is there something too, which we both love for its own sake, and also for what arises from it? as wisdom, sight, and health; for we somehow embrace these things on both accounts. Yes, said I. But do you perceive, said he, a third species of good, among which is bodily labour, to be healed when sick, to practise physic, or other lucrative employment? for we say, those things are troublesome, but that they profit us; and we should not choose these things for their own sake, but on account of the rewards and those other advantages which arise from them. There is then, indeed, said I, likewise this third kind. But what now? in which of these, said he, do you place justice? I imagine, said I, in the most handsome; which, both on its own account, and for the sake of what arises from it, is desired by the man who is in pursuit of happiness. It does not, however, said he, seem so to them any, but to be of the troublesome kind, which is pursued

fued for the sake of glory, and on account of rewards and honours; but on its own account is to be shunned, as being difficult. I know, said I, that it seems so, and it was in this view that Thrasymachus sometimes since despised it, and commended injustice; but it seems I am one of those who are dull in learning. Come then, said he, hear me likewise, if this be agreeable to you; for Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by you, like an adder, sooner than was proper: but, with respect to myself, the proof has not yet been made to my satisfaction, in reference to either of the two; for I desire to hear what each is, and what power it has by itself, when in the soul—bidding farewell to the rewards, and the consequences arising from them. I will proceed, therefore, in this manner, if it seem proper to you: I will renew the speech of Thrasymachus; and, first of all, I will tell you what they say justice is, and whence it arises; and, secondly, that all those who pursue it unwillingly, as necessary, but not as good; thirdly, that they do this reasonably; for, as they say, the life of an unjust man is much better than that of the just. Although, for my own part, to me, Socrates, it does not yet appear so; I am, however, in doubt, having my ears stunned in hearing Thrasymachus and innumerable others. But I have never, hitherto, heard from any one such a discourse as I wish to hear concerning justice, as being better than injustice: I wish then to hear it commended, as it is in itself, and I most especially imagine I shall hear this from you: wherefore, pulling oppositely, I shall speak in commendation of an unjust life; and, in speaking, shall show you in what manner I want to hear you condemn injustice, and commend justice. But see if what I say be agreeable to you. Extremely so, said I; for what would any man of intellect delight more to speak, and to hear of frequently?

You speak most handsomely, said he. And hear what I said I was first to speak of; what justice is, and whence it arises; for they say that, according to nature, to do injustice is good; but to suffer injustice is bad; but that the evil which arises from suffering injustice is greater than the good which arises from doing it: so that, after men had done one another injustice, and likewise suffered it, and had experienced both, it seemed proper to those who were not able to shun the one, and choose the other, to agree among themselves, neither to do injustice, nor to be injured: and that

that hence laws began to be established, and their compacts; and that which was enjoined by law they denominated lawful and just; and that this is the origin and essence of justice: being in the middle between what is best, when he who does injustice is not punished, and of what is worst, when the injured person is unable to punish; and that justice, being thus in the middle of both these, is desired, not as good, but is held in honour from an imbecility in doing injustice: for the man who had ability to do so would never, if really a man, agree with any one either to injure, or to be injured; for otherwise he were mad. This then, Socrates, and of such a kind as this, is the nature of justice; and this, as they say, is its origin. And we shall best perceive that these who pursue it pursue it unwillingly, and from an impotence to injure if we imagine in our mind such a case as this: Let us give liberty to each of them, both to the just and to the unjust, to do whatever they incline; and then let us follow them, observing how their inclination will lead each of them. We should then find the just man, with full inclination, going the same way with the unjust, through a desire of having more than others. This, every nature is made to pursue as good, but by law is forcibly led to an equality. And the liberty which I speak of may be chiefly of this kind; if they happened to have such a power, as they say happened once to Gyges, the progenitor of Lydus: for they say that he was the hired shepherd of the then governor of Lydia; and that a prodigious rain and earthquake happening, part of the earth was rent, and an opening made in the place where he pastured her flocks; that when he beheld, and wondered, he descended, and saw many other wonders, which are mythologically transmitted to us, and a brazen horse likewise, hollow and with doors; and, on looking in, he saw within, a dead body larger in appearance than that of a man, which had nothing else upon it but a gold ring on its hand; which ring he took off, and came up again. That when there was a convention of the shepherds, as usual, for reporting to the king what related to their flocks, he also came, having the ring: and whilst he sat with the others, he happened to turn the stone of the ring to the inner part of his hand; and when this was done he became invisible to those who sat by, and they talked of him as absent: that he wondered, and, again handling his ring, turned the stone outward, and on this became visible; and that,

that, having observed this, he made trial of the ring whether it had this power : and that it happened, that on turning the stone inward he became invisible, and on turning it outward he became visible. That, perceiving this, he instantly managed so as to be made one of the embassy to the king, and that on his arrival he debauched his wife ; and, with her, assaulting the king ¹, killed him, and possessed the kingdom. If now, there were two such rings, and the just man had the one, and the unjust the other, none, it seems, would be so adamant as to persevere in justice, and dare to refrain from the things of others, and not to touch them, whilst it was in his power to take, even from the Forum, without fear, whatever he pleased ; to enter into houses, and embrace any one he pleased ; to kill, and to loose from chains, whom he pleased ; and to do all other things with the same power as a God among men :—acting in this manner, he is in no respect different from the other ; but both of them go the same road. This now, one may say, is a strong proof that no one is just from choice, but by constraint ; as it is not a good merely in itself, since every one does injustice wherever he imagines he is able to do it ; for every man thinks that injustice is, to the particular person, more profitable than justice ; and he thinks justly, according to this way of reasoning : since, if any one with such a liberty would never do any injustice, nor touch the things of others, he would be deemed by men of sense to be most wretched, and most void of understanding ; yet would they commend him before one another, imposing on each other from a fear of being injured. Thus much, then, concerning these things. But, with reference to the difference of their lives whom we speak of, we shall be able to discern aright, if we set apart by themselves the most just man, and the most unjust, and not otherwise ; and now, what is this separation ? Let us take from the unjust man nothing of injustice, nor of justice from the just man ; but let us make each of them perfect in his own profession. And first, as to the unjust man, let him act as the able artists ; as a complete pilot, or physician, he comprehends the possible and the impossible in the art ; the one he attempts, and the other he relinquishes ; and, if he fail in any thing, he is able to rectify

¹ Gyges slew Candaules in the second year of the 16th Olympiad. Vid. Cic. de Offic. lib. 3.

it: so, in like manner, the unjust man attempting pieces of injustice in a dexterous manner, let him be concealed, if he intend to be exceedingly unjust; but, if he be caught, let him be deemed worthless: for the most complete injustice is, to seem just, not being so. We must give then to the completely unjust the most complete injustice; and not take from him, but allow him, whilst doing the greatest injustice, to procure to himself the highest reputation for justice; and, if in any thing he fail, let him be able to rectify it: and let him be able to speak so as to persuade if any thing of his injustice be spread abroad: let him be able to do by force, what requires force, through his courage and strength, and by means of his friends and his wealth: and having supposed him to be such an one as this, let us place the just man beside him, in our reasoning, a simple and ingenuous man, desiring, according to Æschylus, not the appearance but the reality of goodness: let us take from him the appearance of goodness; for, if he shall appear to be just, he shall have honours and rewards; and thus it may be uncertain whether he be such for the sake of justice, or on account of the rewards and honours: let him be stripped of every thing but justice, and be made completely contrary to the other; whilst he does no injustice, let him have the reputation of doing the greatest; that he may be tortured for justice, not yielding to reproach, and such things as arise from it, but may be immovable till death; appearing indeed to be unjust through life, yet being really just; that so both of them arriving at the utmost pitch, the one of justice, and the other of injustice, we may judge which of them is the happier. Strange! said I, friend Glauco, how strenuously you purify each of the men, as a statue which is to be judged of! As much, said he, as I am able: whilst then they continue to be such, there will not, as I imagine, be any further difficulty to observe what kind of life remains to each of them. It must therefore be told. And if possibly it should be told with greater rusticity, imagine not, Socrates, that it is I who tell it, but those who commend injustice preferably to justice; and they will say these things: That the just man, being of this disposition, will be scourged, tormented, fettered, have his eyes burnt, and lastly, having suffered all manner of evils, will be crucified; and he shall know, that he should not desire the reality but the appearance of justice: and that

it

it is much more proper to pronounce that saying of Æschylus, concerning the unjust man: for they will in reality say that the unjust man, as being in pursuit of what is real, and living not according to the opinion of men, wants not to have the appearance but the reality of injustice:

Reaping the hollow furrow of his mind,
Whence all his glorious councils blossom forth.

In the first place, he holds the magistracy in the state, being thought to be just; next, he marries wherever he inclines, and matches his children with whom he pleases; he joins in partnership and company with whom he inclines; and, besides all this, he will succeed in all his projects for gain; as he does not scruple to do injustice: when then he engages in competitions, he will both in private and in public surpass and exceed his adversaries; and by this means he will be rich, and serve his friends, and hurt his enemies: and he will amply and magnificently render sacrifices and offerings to the Gods, and will honour the Gods, and such men as he chooses, much better than the just man. From whence they reckon, that it is likely he will be more beloved of the Gods than the just man. Thus, they say, Socrates, that both with Gods and men there is a better life prepared for the unjust man than for the just. When Glauco had said these things, I had a design to say something in reply. But his brother Adimantus said—Socrates, you do not imagine there is yet enough said on the argument. What further then? said I. That has not yet been spoken, said he, which ought most especially to have been mentioned. Why then, said I, the proverb is, A brother is help at hand. So do you assist, if he has failed in any thing. Though what has been said by him is sufficient to throw me down, and make me unable to succour justice.

You say nothing, replied he. But hear this further. For we must go through all the arguments opposite to what he has said, which commend justice and condemn injustice, that what Glauco seems to me to intend may be more manifest. Now, parents surely tell and exhort their sons, as do all those who have the care of any, that it is necessary to be just; not commending justice in itself, but the honours arising from

from it; that whilst a man is reputed to be just, he may obtain by this reputation magistracies and marriages, and whatever Glauco just now enumerated as the consequence of being reputed just: but these men carry this matter of reputation somewhat further; for, throwing in the approbation of the Gods, they have unspeakable blessings to enumerate to holy persons; which, they say, the Gods bestow. As the generous Hesiod and Homer say, the one, that the Gods cause the oaks to produce to just men

Acorns at top, and in the middle bees;
Their woolly sheep are laden with their fleece²;

and a great many other good things of the same nature. In like manner, the other,

The blameless king, who holds a godlike name,
Finds his black mould both wheat and barley bear;
With fruit his trees are laden, and his flocks
Bring forth with ease; the sea affords him fish³.

But Musæus and his son tell us that the Gods give just men more splendid blessings than these; for, carrying them in his poem into Hades, and placing them in company with holy men at a feast prepared for them, they crown them, and make them pass the whole of their time in drinking, deeming eternal inebriation³ the finest reward of virtue. But some carry the rewards from the Gods still further; for they say that the offspring of the holy, and the faithful, and their children's children, still remain. With these things, and such as these, they commend justice. But the unholy and unjust they bury in Hades, in a kind of mud⁴, and compel them to carry water in a sieve; and make them, even whilst alive, to live in infamy. Whatever punishments were assigned by Glauco to the just, whilst they were reputed unjust, these they assign to the unjust, but mention no others. This now is the way in which they commend and discommend them severally: but besides this, Socrates, consider another kind of reasoning

¹ Hesiod. Oper. et Di. lib. 1.

² Hom. Odyss. lib. 19.

³ By inebriation, theological poets signify a deific energy, or an energy superior to that which is intellectual.

⁴ See the notes to Phædo.

concerning

concerning justice and injustice, mentioned both privately and by the poets: for all of them with one mouth celebrate temperance and justice as indeed excellent, but yet difficult and laborious; and intemperance and injustice as indeed pleasant and easy to attain; but, by opinion only, and by law, abominable: and they say that for the most part unjust actions are more profitable than just. And they are gladly willing, both in public and private, to pay honour to wicked rich men, and such as have power of any kind, and to pronounce them happy, but to contemn and overlook those who are any how weak and poor, even whilst they acknowledge them to be better than the others. But, of all these speeches, the most marvellous are those concerning the Gods, and virtue: as if even the Gods gave to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, and to contrary persons a contrary fate: and mountebanks and prophets, frequenting the gates of the rich, persuade them that they have a power granted them by the Gods, of expiating by sacrifices and songs, with pleasures and with feasting, if any injustice has been committed by any one, or his forefathers: and if he wishes to blast any enemy at a small expense, he shall injure the just in the same manner as the unjust; by certain blandishments and bonds, as they say, persuading the Gods to succour them: and to all these discourses they bring the poets as witnesses; who, mentioning the proneness to vice, say,

How vice at once, and easily is gain'd;
The way is smooth, and very nigh it dwells;
Sweat before virtue stands, so Heav'n ordain'd¹.

and a certain long and steep way. Others make Homer witness how the Gods are prevailed upon by men, because he says,

.... The Gods themselves are turn'd
With sacrifices and appeasing vows;
Fat off'rings and libation them persuade;
And for transgressions suppliant pray'r atones².

They show likewise many books of Musæus and Orpheus, the offspring, as they say, of the Moon, and of the Muses; according to which they

¹ Hesiod. Oper. et Di. lib. 1.

² Hom. Iliad. lib. 9.

perform their sacred rites, persuading not only private persons, but states likewise, that there are absolutions and purgations from iniquities by means of sacrifices, sports and pleasures; and this, for the benefit both of the living and of the dead: these they call the mysteries ¹ which absolve us from evils there; but they assert that dreadful things await those who do not offer sacrifice. All these, and so many things of the kind, friend Socrates, being said of virtue and vice, and their reward both with men and Gods; what do we imagine the souls of our youth do, when they hear them; such of them as are well born, and able as it were to rush into all these things which are said, and from all to deliberate, in what sort of character and in what sort of road one may best pass through life? It is likely he might say to himself, according to that of Pindar,

Whether shall I the lofty wall
Of justice try to scale;
Or, hedg'd within the guileful maze
Of vice, encircled dwell?

For, according to what is said, though I be just, if I be not reputed so, there shall be no profit, but manifest troubles and punishments. But the unjust man, who procures to himself the character of justice, is said to have a divine life. Since then the appearance surpasses the reality, as wise men demonstrate to me, and is the primary part of happiness, ought I not to turn wholly to it; and to draw round myself as a covering, and picture, the image of virtue; but to draw after me the cunning and versatile fox of the most wise Archilochus? But perhaps some one will say, It is not easy, being wicked, always to be concealed. Neither is any thing else easy (will we say) which is great. But, however, if we would be happy, thither let us go where the vestiges of the reasonings lead us. For, in order to be concealed, we will make conjurations and associations together; and there are masters of persuasion, who teach a popular and political wisdom; by which means, whilst partly by persuasion and partly

¹ The word used here by Plato is *τελεται*: and this word, as we have observed in the introduction to this book, signifies the greatest of the mysteries, or the Eleusinian. As therefore the Orphic hymns now extant are so called, there can be no doubt but that these were used in the Eleusinian mysteries: and this confirms what I have observed in my notes to Pausanias.

by force we seize more than our due, we shall not be punished. But, surely, to be concealed from the Gods, or to overpower them, is impossible.

If then they are not, or care not about human affairs, we need not have any concern about being concealed : but if they really are, and care for us, we neither know nor have heard of them otherwise than from traditions, and from the poets who write their genealogies ; and these very persons tell us, that they are to be moved and persuaded by sacrifices, and appeasing vows, and offerings ; both of which we are to believe, or neither. If then we are to believe both, we may do injustice, and of the fruits of our injustice offer sacrifice. If we be just, we shall indeed be unpunished by the Gods ; but then we shall not have the gains of injustice. But if we be unjust, we shall make gain ; and after we have transgressed and offended, we shall appease them by offerings, and be liberated from punishment. But we shall be punished in the other world for our unjust doings here ; either we ourselves, or our children's children. But, friend, will the reasoner say, the mysteries can do much ; the Gods are exorable, as say the mightiest states, and the children of the Gods, the poets ; who are also their prophets, and who declare that these things are so. For what reason, then, should we still prefer justice before the greatest injustice ; which if we shall attain to with any deceiving appearance, we shall fare according to our mind, both with reference to Gods and men, both living and dying, according to the speech now mentioned of many and excellent men ? From all that has been said, by what means, O Socrates, shall he incline to honour justice, who has any ability of fortune or of wealth, of body or of birth, and not laugh when he hears it commended ? So that, though a man were able even to show what we have said to be false, and fully understood that justice is better, he will, however, abundantly pardon and not be angry with the unjust ; for he knows, that unless one from a divine nature abhor to do injustice, or from acquired knowledge abstain from it, no one of others is willingly just ; but either through cowardice, old age, or some other weakness, condemns the doing injustice when unable to do it. That it is so is plain. For the first of these who arrives at power is the first to do injustice, as far as he is able. And the reason of all this is no other than that from whence all

this discourse proceeded, Socrates, because, O wonderful man ! among all those of you that call yourselves the commendors of justice, beginning from those ancient heroes of whom any accounts are left to the men of the present time, no one hath at any time condemned injustice, nor commended justice, otherwise than regarding the reputations, honours and rewards arising from them : but no one has hitherto sufficiently examined, neither in poetry nor in prose discourse, either of them in itself, and subsisting by its own power, in the soul of him who possesses it, and concealed from both Gods and men : how that the one is the greatest of all the evils which the soul hath within it, and justice the greatest good : for, if it had thus from the beginning been spoken of by you all, and you had so persuaded us from our youth, we should not need to watch over our neighbour lest he should do us injustice, but every man would have been the best guardian over himself, afraid lest in doing injustice he should dwell with the greatest evil. These things now, Socrates, and probably much more than these, Thrasymachus or some other might say of justice and injustice, inverting their power, disagreeably as I imagine for my own part. But I (for I want to conceal nothing from you) being desirous to hear you on the opposite side, speak the best I am able, pulling the contrary way. Do not, therefore, only show us in your reasoning that justice is better than injustice ; but in what manner each of them by itself, affecting the mind, is, the one evil, and the other good. And take away all opinions, as Glauco likewise enjoined : for, if you do not take away the false opinions on both sides, and add the true ones, we will say you do not commend justice, but the appearance ; nor condemn being unjust, but the appearance ; that you advise the unjust man to conceal himself ; and that you assent to Thrasymachus that justice is a foreign good ; the profit of the more powerful ; and that injustice is the profit and advantage of oneself, but unprofitable to the inferior. Wherefore, now, after you have acknowledged that justice is among the greatest goods, and such as are worthy to be possessed for what arises from them, and much more in themselves, and for their own sake ; such as sight, hearing, wisdom, health, and such other goods as are real in their own nature, and not merely in opinion ; in the same manner commend justice ; how, in itself, it profits the owner, and injustice hurts him. And leave to others to

commend

commend the rewards and opinions ; for I could bear with others in this way, commending justice, and condemning injustice, celebrating and reviling their opinions and rewards ; but not with you (unless you desire me), because you have passed the whole of life considering nothing else but this. Show us, then, in your discourse, not only that justice is better than injustice ; but in what manner each of them by itself affecting the owner, whether he be concealed or not concealed from Gods and men, is, the one good, and the other evil.

On hearing these things, as I always indeed was pleased with the disposition of Glauco and Adimantus, so at that time I was perfectly delighted, and replied: It was not ill said concerning you, sons of that worthy man, by the lover of Glauco, who wrote the beginning of the Elegies, when, celebrating your behaviour at the battle of Megara, he sang,

Aristo's sons ! of an illustrious man,
The race divine

This, friend, seems to be well said ; for you are truly affected in a divine manner, if you are not persuaded that injustice is better than justice, and yet are able to speak thus in its defence : and to me you seem, truly, not to be persuaded ; and I reason from the whole of your other behaviour, since, according to your present speeches at least, I should distrust you. But the more I can trust you, the more I am in doubt what argument I shall use. For I can neither think of any assistance I have to give (for I seem to be unable, and my mark is, that you do not accept of what I said to Thrasymachus when I imagined I showed that justice was better than injustice), nor yet can I think of giving no assistance ; for I am afraid lest it be an unholy thing to desert justice when I am present, and see it accused, and not assist it whilst I breathe and am able to speak. It is best then to succour it in such a manner as I can. Hereupon Glauco and the rest entreated me, by all means, to assist, and not relinquish the discourse ; but to search thoroughly what each of them is, and which way the truth lies, as to their respective advantage. I then said what appeared to me : That the inquiry we were attempting was not contemptible, but was that of one who was sharp-sighted, as I imagined. Since then, said I, we are not very expert, it seems proper to make the inquiry concerning

this matter, in such a manner as if it were ordered those who are not very sharp-sighted, to read small letters at a distance ; and one should afterwards understand, that the same letters are greater somewhere else, and in a larger field : it would appear eligible, I imagine, first to read these, and thus come to consider the lesser, if they happen to be the same. Perfectly right, said Adimantus. But what of this kind, Socrates, do you perceive in the inquiry concerning justice ? I shall tell you, said I. Do not we say there is justice in one man, and there is likewise justice in a whole state ? It is certainly so, replied he. Is not a state a greater object than one man ? Greater, said he. It is likely, then, that justice should be greater in what is greater, and be more easy to be understood : we shall first, then, if you incline, inquire what it is in states ; and then, after the same manner, we shall consider it in each individual, contemplating the similitude of the greater in the idea of the lesser. You seem to me, said he, to say right. If then, said I, we contemplate, in our discourse, a state existing, shall we not perceive its justice and injustice existing ? Perhaps, said he. And is there not ground to hope, if this exists, that we shall more easily find what we seek for ? Most certainly. It seems, then, we ought to attempt to succeed, for I imagine this to be a work of no small importance. Consider then. We are considering, said Adimantus, and do you no otherwise. A city, then, said I, as I imagine, takes its rise from this, that none of us happens to be self-sufficient, but is indigent of many things ; or, do you imagine there is any other origin of building a city ? None other, said he. Thus, then, one taking in one person for one indigence, and another for another ; as they stand in need of many things, they assemble into one habitation many companions and assistants ; and to this joint-habitation we give the name city, do we not ? Certainly. And they mutually exchange with one another, each judging that, if he either gives or takes in exchange, it will be for his advantage. Certainly. Come, then, said I, let us, in our discourse, make a city from the beginning. And, it seems, our indigence has made it. Why not ? But the first and the greatest of wants is the preparation of food, in order to subsist and live. By all means. The second is of lodging. The third of clothing ; and such like. It is so. But, come, said I, how shall the city be able to make so great a provision ? Shall not one be a husbandman, another a mason, some other a weaver ? or, shall

shall we add to them a shoemaker, or some other of those who minister to the necessities of the body? Certainly. So that the most indigent city might consist of four or five men? It seems so. But, what now? must each of those do his work for them all in common? As, the husbandman, being one, shall he prepare food for four; and consume quadruple time, and labour, in preparing food, and sharing it with others? or, neglecting them, shall he for himself alone make the fourth part of this food, in the fourth part of the time? and, of the other three parts of time, shall he employ one in the preparation of a house, the other in that of clothing, the other of shoes, and not give himself trouble in sharing with others, but do his own affairs by himself?

Adimantus said—And probably, Socrates, this way is more easy than the other. No, certainly, said I; it were absurd. For, whilst you are speaking, I consider that we are born not perfectly resembling one another, but differing in disposition; one being fitted for doing one thing, and another for doing another: does it not seem so to you? It does. But, what now? Whether will a man do better, if, being one, he works in many arts, or in one? When in one, said he. But this, I imagine, is also plain; that if one miss the season of any work, it is ruined. That is plain. For, I imagine, the work will not wait upon the leisure of the workman; but of necessity the workman must attend close upon the work, and not in the way of a by-job. Of necessity. And hence it appears, that more will be done, and better, and with greater ease, when every one does but one thing, according to their genius, and in proper season, and freed from other things. Most certainly, said he. But we need certainly, Adimantus, more citizens than four, for those provisions we mentioned: for the husbandman, it would seem, will not make a plough for himself, if it is to be handsome; nor yet a spade, nor other instruments of agriculture: as little will the mason; for he, likewise, needs many things: and in the same way, the weaver and the shoemaker also. Is it not so? True. Joiners, then, and smiths, and other such workmen, being admitted into our little city, make it throng. Certainly. But it would be no very great matter, neither, if we did not give them neatherds likewise, and shepherds, and those other herdsmen; in order that both the husbandmen
may

may have oxen for ploughing, and that the masons, with the help of the husbandmen, may use the cattle for their carriages; and that the weavers likewise, and the shoemakers, may have hides and wool. Nor yet, said he, would it be a very small city, having all these. But, said I, it is almost impossible to set down such a city in any such place as that it shall need no importations. It is impossible. It will then certainly want others still, who may import from another state what it needs. It will want them. And surely this service would be empty, if it carry out nothing which these want, from whom they import what they need themselves. It goes out empty in such a case, does it not? To me it seems so. But the city ought not only to make what is sufficient for itself; but such things, and so much also, as may answer for those things which they need. It ought. Our city, then, certainly wants a great many more husbandmen and other workmen? A great many more. And other servants besides, to import and export the several things; and these are merchants, are they not? Yes. We shall then want merchants likewise? Yes, indeed. And if the merchandise is by sea, it will want many others; such as are skilful in sea affairs. Many others, truly. But what as to the city within itself? How will they exchange with one another the things which they have each of them worked; and for the sake of which, making a community, they have built a city? It is plain, said he, in selling and buying. Hence we must have a forum, and money, as a symbol, for the sake of exchange. Certainly.

If now the husbandman, or any other workman, bring any of his work to the forum, but come not at the same time with those who want to make exchange with him, must he not, desisting from his work, sit idly in the forum? By no means, said he. But there are some who, observing this, set themselves to this service; and, in well-regulated cities, they are mostly such as are weakest in their body, and unfit to do any other work. There they are to attend about the forum, to give money in exchange for such things as any may want to sell; and things in exchange for money to such as want to buy. This indigence, said I, procures our city a race of *shopkeepers*; for, do not we call *shopkeepers*, those who, fixed in the forum, serve both in selling and buying?

buying? but such as travel to other cities we call merchants. Certainly.

There are still, as I imagine, certain other ministers, who, though unfit to serve the public in things which require understanding, have yet strength of body sufficient for labour, who selling the use of their strength, and calling the reward of it hire, are called, as I imagine, hirelings: are they not? Yes, indeed. Hirelings then are, it seems, the complement of the city? It seems so. Has our city now, Adimantus, already so increased upon us as to be complete? Perhaps. Where now, at all, should justice and injustice be in it; and, in which of the things that we have considered does it appear to exist? I do not know, said he, Socrates, if it be not in a certain use, somehow, of these things with one another. Perhaps, said I, you say right. But we must consider it, and not be weary. First, then, let us consider after what manner those who are thus procured shall be supported. Is it any other way than by making bread and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and building houses? In summer, indeed, they will work for the most part without clothes and shoes; and, in winter, they will be sufficiently furnished with clothes and shoes; they will be nourished, partly with barley, making meal of it, and partly with wheat, making loaves, boiling part and toasting part, putting fine loaves and cakes over a fire of stubble, or over dried leaves; and resting themselves on couches, strawed with smilax and myrtle leaves, they and their children will feast; drinking wine, and crowned, and singing to the Gods, they will pleasantly live together, begetting children, not beyond their substance, guarding against poverty or war.

Glauco replying says, You make the men to feast, as it appears, without meats. You say true, said I; for I forget that they shall have meats likewise. They shall have salt, and olives, and cheese; and they shall boil bulbous roots, and herbs of the field; and we set before them desserts of figs, and vetches, and beans; and they will toast at the fire myrtle berries, and the berries of the beech-tree; drinking in moderation, and thus passing their life in peace and health; and dying, as is likely, in old age, they will leave to their children another such life. If you had been making, Socrates, said he, a city of hogs, what

what else would you have fed them with but with these things? But how should we do, Glauco? said I. What is usually done, said he. They must, as I imagine, have their beds, and tables, and meats, and desserts, as we now have, if they are not to be miserable. Be it so, said I; I understand you. We consider, it seems, not only how a city may exist, but how a luxurious city: and perhaps it is not amiss; for, in considering such an one, we may probably see how justice and injustice have their origin in cities. But the true city seems to me to be such an one as we have described; like one who is healthy; but if you incline that we likewise consider a city that is corpulent, nothing hinders it. For these things will not, it seems, please some; nor this sort of life satisfy them; but there shall be beds, and tables, and all other furniture; seasonings, ointments, and perfumes; mistresses, and confections, and various kinds of all these. And we must no longer consider as alone necessary what we mentioned at the first; houses, and clothes, and shoes; but painting too, and all the curious arts must be set a-going, and carving, and gold, and ivory; and all these things must be procured, must they not? Yes, said he. Must not the city, then, be larger? For that healthy one is no longer sufficient, but is already full of luxury, and of a crowd of such as are no way necessary to cities; such as all kinds of sportmen, and the imitative artists, many of them imitating in figures and colours, and others in music: poets too, and their ministers, rhapsodists, actors, dancers, undertakers, workmen of all sorts of instruments; and what has reference to female ornaments, as well as other things. We shall need likewise many more servants. Do not you think they will require pedagogues, and nurses, and tutors, hair-dressers, barbers, victuallers too, and cooks? And further still, we shall want swine-herds likewise: of these there were none in the other city, (for there needed not) but in this we shall want these, and many other sorts of herds likewise, if any eat the several animals, shall we not? Why not? Shall we not then, in this manner of life, be much more in need of physicians than formerly? Much more. And the country, which was then sufficient to support the inhabitants, will, instead of being sufficient, become too little; or how shall we say? In this way, said he. Must we not then encroach upon the neighbouring country, if we want

to have sufficient for plough and pasture, and they, in like manner, on us, if they likewise suffer themselves to accumulate wealth to infinity; going beyond the boundary of necessaries? There is great necessity for it, Socrates. Shall we afterwards fight, Glauco, or how shall we do? We shall certainly, said he. But we say nothing, said I, whether war does any evil, or any good; but thus much only, that we have found the origin of war: from whence, most especially, arise the greatest mischiefs to states, both private and public. Yes, indeed. We shall need, then, friend, still a larger city; not for a small, but for a large army, who, in going out, may fight with those who assault them, for their whole substance, and every thing we have now mentioned. What, said he, are not these sufficient to fight? No; if you, at least, said I, and all of us, have rightly agreed, when we formed our city: and we agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one to perform many arts handsomely. You say true, said he. What, then, said I, as to that contest of war; does it not appear to require art? Very much, said he. Ought we then to take more care of the art of shoe-making than of the art of making war? By no means. But we charged the shoe-maker neither to undertake at the same time to be a husbandman, nor a weaver, nor a mason, but a shoe-maker; that the work of that art may be done for us handsomely: and, in like manner, we allotted to every one of the rest one thing, to which the genius of each led him, and what each took care of, freed from other things, to do it well, applying to it the whole of his life, and not neglecting the seasons of working. And now, as to the affairs of war, whether is it of the greatest importance, that they be well performed? Or, is this so easy a thing, that one may be a husbandman, and likewise a foldier, and shoe-maker; or be employed in any other art? But not even at cheis, or dice, can one ever play skilfully, unless he study this very thing from his childhood, and not make it a by-work. Or, shall one, taking a spear, or any other of the warlike arms and instruments, become instantly an expert combatant, in an encounter in arms, or in any other relating to war? And, shall the taking up of no other instrument make a workman, or a wrestler, nor be useful to him who has neither the knowledge of that particular thing, nor has

bestowed the study sufficient for its attainment? Such instruments, said he, would truly be very valuable.

By how much then, said I, this work of guards is one of the greatest importance, by so much it should require the greatest leisure from other things, and likewise the greatest art and study. I imagine so, replied he. And shall it not likewise require a competent genius for this profession? Why not? It should surely be our business, as it seems, if we be able, to choose who and what kind of geniuses are competent for the guardianship of the city. Ours, indeed. We have truly, said I, undertaken no mean business; but, however, we are not to despair, so long at least as we have any ability. No indeed, said he. Do you think then, said I, that the genius of a generous whelp differs any thing for guardianship, from that of a generous youth? What is it you say? It is this. Must not each of them be acute in the perception, swift to pursue what they perceive, and strong likewise if there is need to conquer what they shall catch? There is need, said he, of all these. And surely he must be brave likewise, if he fight well. Why not? But will he be brave who is not spirited, whether it is a horse, a dog, or any other animal? Or, have you not observed, that the spirit is somewhat unfurmountable and invincible; by the presence of which every soul is, in respect of all things whatever, unterrified and unconquerable? I have observed it. It is plain then what sort of a guard we ought to have, with reference to his body. Yes, and with reference to his soul, that he should be spirited. This likewise is plain. How then, said I, Glauco, will they not be savage towards one another and the other citizens, being of such a temper? No truly, said he, not easily. But yet it is necessary, that towards their friends they be meek, and fierce towards their enemies; for otherwise they will not wait till others destroy them; but they will prevent them, doing it themselves. True, said he. What then, said I, shall we do? Where shall we find, at once, the mild and the magnanimous temper? For the mild disposition is somehow opposite to the spirited. It appears so. But, however, if he be deprived of either of these, he cannot be a good guardian; for it seems to be impossible; and thus it appears, that a good guardian is an impossible thing. It seems so, said he. After hesitating and considering what had passed:

passed: Justly, said I, friend, are we in doubt; for we have departed from that image which we first established. How say you? have we not observed, that there are truly such tempers as we were not imagining, who have these opposite things? Where then? One may see it in other animals, and not a little in that one with which we compared our guardian. For this, you know, is the natural temper of generous dogs, to be most mild towards their domestics and their acquaintance, but the reverse to those they know not. It is so. This then, said I, is possible; and it is not against nature that we require our guardian to be such an one. It seems not. Are you, further, of this opinion, that he who is to be our guardian should, besides being spirited, be a philosopher likewise? How? said he; for I do not understand you. This, likewise, said I, you will observe in the dogs; and it is worthy of admiration in the brute. As what? He is angry at whatever unknown person he sees, though he hath never suffered any ill from him before; but he is fond of whatever acquaintance he sees, though he has never at any time received any good from him. Have you not wondered at this? I never, said he, much attended to it before; but, that he does this, is plain. But, indeed, this affection of his nature seems to be an excellent disposition, and truly philosophical. As how? As, said I, it distinguishes between a friendly and unfriendly aspect, by nothing else but this, that it knows the one, but is ignorant of the other. How, now, should not this be deemed the love of learning, which distinguishes what is friendly and what is foreign, by knowledge and ignorance? It can no way be shown why it should not. But, however, said I, to be a lover of learning, and a philosopher, are the same. The same, said he. May we not then boldly settle it, That in man too, if any one is to be of a mild disposition towards his domestics and acquaintance, he must be a philosopher and a lover of learning? Let us settle it, said he. He then who is to be a good and worthy guardian for us, of the city, shall be a philosopher, and spirited, and swift, and strong in his disposition. By all means, said he. Let then our guardian, said I, be such an one. But in what manner shall these be educated for us, and instructed? And will the consideration of this be of any assistance in perceiving that for the sake of which we consider every thing else? In what manner justice and injustice arise in the city, that we may not

omit a necessary part of the discourse ; nor consider what is superfluous ? The brother of Glauco said : I, for my part, greatly expect that this inquiry will be of assistance to that. Truly, said I, friend Adimantus, it is not to be omitted, though it should happen to be somewhat tedious. No, truly. Come then, let us, as if we were talking in the way of fable, and at our leisure, educate these men in our reasoning. It must be done. What then is the education ? Or, is it difficult to find a better than that which was found long ago, which is, gymnastic for the body, and music for the mind ? It is indeed. Shall we not then, first, begin with instructing them in music, rather than in gymnastic ? Why not ? When you say music, you mean discourses, do you not ? I do : but of discourses there are two kinds ; the one true, and the other false. There are. And they must be educated in them both, and first in the false. I do not understand, said he, what you mean. Do not you understand, said I, that we first of all tell children fables ? And this part of music, somehow, to speak in the general, is false ; yet there is truth in them ; and we accustom children to fables before their gymnastic exercises. We do so. This then is what I meant, when I said that children were to begin music before gymnastic. Right, said he. And do you not know that the beginning of every work is of the greatest importance, especially to any one young and tender ? for then truly, in the easiest manner, is formed and taken on the impression which one inclines to imprint on every individual. It is entirely so. Shall we then suffer the children to hear any kind of fables composed by any kind of persons ; and to receive, for the most part, into their minds, opinions contrary to those we judge they ought to have when they are grown up ? We shall by no means suffer it. First of all, then, we must preside over the fable-makers. And whatever beautiful fable they make must be chosen ; and what are otherwise must be rejected ; and we shall persuade the nurses and mothers to tell the children such fables as shall be chosen ; and to fashion their minds by fables, much more than their bodies by their hands. But the most of what they tell them at present must be thrown out. As what ? said he. In the greater ones, said I, we shall see the lesser likewise. For the fashion of them must be the same ; and both the greater and the lesser must have the same kind of power. Do not you think so ? I do, said he : but I do not at
all

all understand which you call the greater ones. Those, said I, which Hesiod and Homer tell us, and the other poets. For they composed false fables to mankind, and told them as they do still. Which, said he, do you mean, and what is it you blame in them? That, said I, which first of all and most especially ought to be blamed, when one does not falsify handsomely. What is that? When one, in his composition, gives ill representations of the nature of Gods and heroes; as a painter drawing a picture in no respect resembling what he wished to paint. It is right, said he, to blame such things as these. But how have they failed, say we, and as to what? First of all, with reference to that greatest lie, and matters of the greatest importance, he did not lie handsomely, who told how Heaven did what Hesiod says he did; and then again how Saturn punished him, and what Saturn did, and what he suffered from his son: For though these things were true, yet I should not imagine they ought to be so plainly told to the unwise and the young, but ought much rather to be concealed. But if there were a necessity to tell them, they should be heard in secrecy, by as few as possible; after they had sacrificed not a hog, but some great and wonderful sacrifice, that thus the fewest possible might chance to hear them.

These fables, said he, are indeed truly hurtful. And not to be mentioned, Adimantus, said I, in our city. Nor is it to be said in the hearing of a youth, that he who does the most extreme wickedness does nothing strange; nor he who in every shape punishes his unjust father, but that he does the same as the first and the greatest of the Gods. No truly, said he, these things do not seem to me proper to be said. Nor, universally, said I, must it be told how Gods war with Gods, and plot and fight against one another, (for such assertions are not true,)—if, at least, those who are to guard the city for us ought to account it the most shameful thing to hate one another on slight grounds. As little ought we to tell in fables, and embellish to them, the battles of the giants; and many other all-various feuds, both of the Gods and heroes, with their own kindred and relations. But if we are at all to persuade them that at no time should one citizen hate another, and that it is unholy; such things as these are rather to be said to them immediately when they are children,

by the old men and women, and by those well advanced in life ; and the poets are to be obliged to compose agreeably to these things. But Juno fettered by her son, and Vulcan hurled from heaven by his father for going to assist his mother when beaten, and all those battles of the Gods which Homer has composed, must not be admitted into the city ; whether they be composed in the way of allegory, or without allegory ; for the young person is not able to judge what is allegory and what is not : but whatever opinions he receives at such an age are with difficulty washed away, and are generally immoveable. On these accounts, one would imagine, that, of all things, we should endeavour that what they are first to hear be composed in the most handsome manner for exciting them to virtue. There is reason for it, said he. But, if any one now should ask us concerning these, what they are, and what kind of fables they are, which should we name ? And I said : Adimantus, you and I are not poets at present, but founders of a city ; and it belongs to the founders to know the models according to which the poets are to compose their fables ; contrary to which if they compose, they are not to be tolerated ; but it belongs not to us to make fables for them. Right, said he. But as to this very thing, the models concerning theology, which are they ? Some such as these, said I. God is alway to be represented such as he is, whether one represent him in epic, in song, or in tragedy. This ought to be done. Is not God essentially good, and is he not to be described as such ? Without doubt. But nothing which is good is hurtful ; is it ? It does not appear to me that it is. Does, then, that which is not hurtful ever do hurt ? By no means. Does that which does no hurt do any evil ? Nor this neither. And what does no evil cannot be the cause of any evil. How can it ? But what ? Good is beneficial. Yes. It is, then, the cause of welfare ? Yes. Good, therefore, is not the cause of all things, but the cause of those things which are in a right state ; but is not the cause of those things which are in a wrong. Entirely so, said he. Neither, then, can God, said I, since he is good, be the cause of all things, as the many say, but he is the cause of a few things to men ; but of many things he is not the cause ; for our good things are much fewer than our evil : and no other than God is the cause of

our good things; but of our evils we must not make God the cause, but seek for some other. You seem to me, said he, to speak most true. We must not, then, said I, either admit Homer or any other poet trespassing so foolishly with reference to the Gods, and saying, how

Two vessels on Jove's threshold ever stand,
The source of evil one, and one of good.
The man whose lot Jove mingles out of both,
By good and ill alternately is rul'd.
But he whose portion is unmingled ill,
O'er sacred earth by famine dire is driv'n¹.

Nor that Jupiter is the dispenser of our good and evil. Nor, if any one say that the violation of oaths and treaties by Pandarus was effected by Minerva and Jupiter, shall we commend it. Nor that dissension among the Gods, and judgment by Themis and Jupiter. Nor yet must we suffer the youth to hear what Æschylus says; how,

Whenever God inclines to raze
A house, himself contrives a cause.

But, if any one make poetical compositions, in which are these iambics, the sufferings of Niobe, of the Pelopides, or the Trojans, or others of a like nature, we must either not suffer them to say they are the works of God; or, if of God, we must find that reason for them which we now require, and we must say that God did what was just and good; and that they were benefited by being chastised: but we must not suffer a poet to say, that they are miserable who are punished; and that it is God who does these things. But if they say that the wicked, as being miserable, needed correction; and that, in being punished, they were profited by God, we may suffer the assertion. But, to say that God, who is good, is the cause of ill to any one, this we must by all means oppose, nor suffer any one to say so in his city; if he wishes to have it well regulated. Nor must we permit any one, either young or old, to hear such things told in fable, either in verse or prose; as they are neither agreeable to sanctity to be told, nor profitable to us, nor consistent with themselves.

I vote along with you, said he, in this law, and it pleases me. This,

¹ Hom. Iliad. lib. 24.

then,

then, said I, may be one of the laws and models with reference to the Gods: by which it shall be necessary that those who speak, and who compose, shall compose and say that God is not the cause of all things, but of good. Yes, indeed, said he, it is necessary. But what as to this second law? Think you that God is a buffoon, and insidiously appears, at different times, in different shapes; sometimes like himself; and, at other times, changing his appearance into many shapes; sometimes deceiving us, and making us conceive false opinions of him? Or, do you conceive him to be simple, and departing the least of all things from his proper form? I cannot, at present, at least, replied he, say so. But what as to this? If any thing be changed from its proper form, is there not a necessity that it be changed by itself, or by another? Undoubtedly. Are not those things which are in the best state, least of all changed and moved by any other thing? as the body, by meats and drinks, and labours: and every vegetable by tempests and winds, and such like accidents. Is not the most sound and vigorous least of all changed? Why not? And as to the soul itself, will not any perturbation from without, least of all disorder and change the most brave and wise? Yes. And surely, somehow, all vessels which are made, and buildings, and vestments, according to the same reasoning, such as are properly worked, and in a right state, are least changed by time, or other accidents? They are so, indeed. Every thing then which is in a good state, either by nature, or art, or both, receives the smallest change from any thing else. It seems so. But God, and every thing belonging to divinity, are in the best state. Why not? In this way, then, God should least of all have many shapes. Least of all, truly. But should he change and alter himself? It is plain, said he, if he be changed at all. Whether then will he change himself to the better, and to the more handsome, or to the worse, and the more deformed? Of necessity, replied he, to the worse, if he be changed at all; for we shall never at any time say, that God is any way deficient with respect to beauty or excellence. You say most right, said I. And this being so; do you imagine, Adimantus, that any one, either of Gods or men, would willingly make himself any way worse? It is impossible, said he. It is impossible, then, said I, for a God to desire to change himself; but each of them, being most beautiful and excellent, continues always, to the utmost

utmost of his power, invariably in his own form. This appears to me, at least, said he, wholly necessary. Let not, then, said I, most excellent Adimantus, any of the poets tell us, how the Gods,

..... at times resembling foreign guests,
Wander o'er cities in all-various forms¹.

Nor let any one belie Proteus and Thetis. Nor bring in Juno, in tragedies or other poems, as having transformed herself like a priestess, and collecting for the life-sustaining sons of Inachus the Argive River. Nor let them tell us many other such lies. Nor let the mothers, persuaded by them, affright their children, telling the stories wrong; as, that certain Gods wander by night,

Resembling various guests, in various forms,

that they may not, at one and the same time, blaspheme against the Gods, and render their children more dastardly. By no means, said he. But are the Gods, said I, such as, though in themselves they never change, yet make us imagine they appear in various forms, deceiving us, and playing the mountebanks? Perhaps, said he. But what, said I, can a God cheat; holding forth a phantasm, either in word or deed? I do not know, said he. Do not you know, said I, that what is truly a cheat, if we may be allowed to say so, both all the Gods and men abhor? How do you say? replied he. Thus, said I: That to offer a cheat to the most principal part of themselves, and that about their most principal interests, is what none willingly incline to do; but, of all things, every one is most afraid of possessing a cheat there. Neither as yet, said he, do I understand you. Because, said I, you think I am saying something venerable: but I am saying, that to cheat the soul concerning realities, and to be so cheated, and to be ignorant, and there to have obtained and to keep a cheat, is what every one would least of all choose; and a cheat in the soul is what they most especially hate. Most especially, said he. But this, as I was now saying, might most justly be called a true cheat,—ignorance in the soul of the cheated person: since a cheat in words is but

¹ *Odyss. lib. 17. ver. 485.*

a kind of imitation of what the soul feels; and an image afterwards arising, and not altogether a pure cheat. Is it not so? Entirely. But this real lie is not only hated of the Gods, but of men likewise. So it appears. But what now? With respect to the cheat in words, when has it something of utility, so as not to deserve hatred? Is it not when employed towards our enemies; and some even of those called our friends; when in madness, or other distemper, they attempt to do some mischief? In that case, for a dissuasive, as a drug, it is useful. And in those fables we were now mentioning, as we know not how the truth stands concerning antient things, making a lie resembling the truth, we render it useful as much as possible. It is, said he, perfectly so. In which then of these cases is a lie useful to God? Whether does he make a lie resembling the truth, as being ignorant of antient things? That were ridiculous, said he. God is not then a lying poet. I do not think it. But should he make a lie through fear of his enemies? Far from it. But on account of the folly or madness of his kindred? But, said he, none of the foolish and mad are the friends of God. There is then no occasion at all for God to make a lie. There is none. The divine and godlike nature is then, in all respects, without a lie? Altogether, said he. God then is simple and true, both in word and deed; neither is he changed himself, nor does he deceive others; neither by visions, nor by discourse, nor by the pomp of signs; neither when we are awake, nor when we sleep. So it appears, said he, to me, at least whilst you are speaking. You agree then, said I, that this shall be the second model, by which we are to speak and to compose concerning the Gods: that they are neither mountebanks, to change themselves; nor to mislead us by lies, either in word or deed? I agree. Whilst then we commend many other things in Homer, this we shall not commend, the dream sent by Jupiter to Agamemnon; neither shall we commend Æschylus, when he makes Thetis say that Apollo had sung at her marriage, that

A comely offspring she should raise,
From sickness free, of lengthen'd days:
Apollo, singing all my fate,
And praising high my Godlike state,
Rejoic'd my heart; and 'twas my hope,
That all was true Apollo spoke:

But

But he, who, at my marriage feast,
Extoll'd me thus, and was my guest ;
He who did thus my fate explain,
Is he who now my son hath slain.

When any one says such things as these of the Gods, we shall show displeasure, and not afford the chorus : nor shall we suffer teachers to make use of such things in the education of the youth ; if our guardians are to be pious, and divine men, as far as it is possible for man to be. I agree with you, said he, perfectly, as to these models ; and we may use them as laws.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK III.

THESE things indeed then, said I, and such as these, are, as it seems, what are to be heard, and not heard, concerning the Gods, immediately from childhood, by those who are to honour the Gods and their parents, and who are not to despise friendship with one another. And I imagine, replied he, that these things have appeared right. But, what now? If they are to be brave, must not these things be narrated to them, and such other likewise as may render them least of all afraid of death? Or, do you imagine that any one can ever be brave whilst he has this fear within him? Not I, truly, said he. But what? do you think that any one can be void of a fear of death, whilst he imagines that there is Hades, and that it is dreadful; and, that in battles he will choose death before defeat and slavery? By no means.

We ought then, as it seems, to give orders likewise to those who undertake to discourse about fables of this kind; and to entreat them not to reproach thus in general the things in Hades, but rather to commend them; as they say neither what is true, nor what is profitable to those who are to be soldiers. We ought indeed, said he. Beginning then, said I, at this verse, we shall leave out all of such kind, as this;

I'd rather, as a rustic slave, submit
To some mean man, who had but scanty fare,
Than govern all the wretched shades below.

And, that

The house, to mortals and immortals, seems
Dreadful and squalid; and what Gods abhor;

Hom. *Odys.* lib. 11.

And,

And,

O strange! in Pluto's dreary realms to find
Soul and its image, but no spark of mind.

And,

He's wife alone, the rest are flutt'ring shades.

And,

The foul to Hades from its members fled;
And, leaving youth and manhood, wail'd its fate.

And,

..... the soul, like smoke, down to the shades
Fled howling¹....

And,

As, in the hollow of a spacious cave,
The owls fly screaming; if one chance to fall
Down from the rock, they all confus'dly fly;
So these together howling went²....

We shall request Homer and the other poets not to be indignant if we raze these things, and such as these; not that they are not poetical, and pleasant to many to be heard; but, the more poetical they are, the less ought they to be heard by children, and men who ought to be free, and more afraid of slavery than of death. By all means, truly. Further, are not all dreadful and frightful names about these things likewise to be rejected? Cocytus, and Styx, those in the infernal regions, and the dead, and such other appellations, in this form, such as terrify all who hear them. These may perhaps, serve some other purpose: but we are afraid for our guardians; lest, by such a terror, they be rendered more effeminate and soft than they ought to be. We are rightly afraid of it, said he. Are these then to be taken away? They are. And they must speak and compose on a contrary model. That is plain. We shall take away likewise the bewailings and lamentations of illustrious men. This is necessary, if what is above be so. Consider then, said I, whether we rightly take away, or not. And do not we say, that the worthy man will imagine that to die is not a dreadful thing to the worthy man whose companion he is? We say so. Neither then will he lament over him, at least, as if his friend suffered something dreadful. No, indeed. And we say this likewise, that such an one is most of all sufficient in himself, for the purpose of living

¹ Hom. Il. lib. 22.

² Hom. Odys. lib. 17.

happily,

happily, and that, in a distinguished manner from others, he is least of all indigent. True, said he. It is to him, then, the least dreadful to be deprived of a son, a brother, wealth, or any other of such-like things. Least of all, indeed. So that he will least of all lament; but endure, in the mildest manner, when any such misfortune befalls him. Certainly. We shall rightly then take away the lamentations of famous men, and assign them to the women, but not to the better sort, and to such of the men as are dastardly; that so those whom we propose to educate for the guardianship of the country may disdain to make lamentations of this kind. Right, said he. We shall again then entreat Homer, and the other poets, not to say in their compositions, that Achilles, the son of a Goddess,

Lay sometimes on his side, and then anon
Supine; then grov'ling; rising then again,
Lamenting wander'd on the barren shore¹.

Nor how

..... With both his hands
He pour'd the burning dust upon his head².

Nor the rest of his lamentation, and bewailing; such and so great as he has composed. Nor that Priam, so near to the Gods, so meanly supplicated, and rolled himself in the dirt: "Calling on every soldier by his name³."

But still much more must we entreat them not to make the Gods, at least, to bewail, and say,

Ah wretched me! unfortunately brave
A son I bore.

And if they are not thus to bring in the Gods, far less should they dare to represent the greatest of the Gods in so unbecoming a manner as this:

How dear a man, around the town pursu'd,
Mine eyes behold! for which my heart is griev'd:
Ah me! 'tis fated that Patroclus kill
Sarpedon; whom, of all men, most I love⁴.

¹ Hom. Iliad. lib. 22.

² Hom. Iliad. lib. 24.

³ Hom. Iliad. lib. 22.

⁴ Hom. Iliad. lib. 18.

For, if, friend Adimantus, our youth should seriously hear such things as these, and not laugh at them as spoken most unsuitably, hardly would any one think it unworthy of himself, of himself being a man, or check himself, if he should happen either to say or to do any thing of the kind; but, without any shame or endurance, would, on small sufferings, sing many lamentations and moans. You say most true, replied he. They must not, therefore, do in this manner, as our reasoning now has evinced to us; which we must believe, till some one persuade us by some better. They must not, indeed. But, surely, neither ought we to be given to excessive laughter; for, where a man gives himself to violent laughter, such a disposition commonly requires a violent change. It seems so, said he. Nor, if any one shall represent worthy men as overcome by laughter, must we allow it, much less if he thus represent the Gods. Much less, indeed, said he. Neither, then, shall we receive such things as these from Homer concerning the Gods:

Vulcan ministrant when the Gods beheld,
Amidst them laughter unextinguish'd rose¹.

This is not to be admitted, according to your reasoning. If you incline, said he, to call it my reasoning; this, indeed, is not to be admitted. But surely the truth is much more to be valued. For, if lately we reasoned right, and if indeed a lie be unprofitable to the Gods, but useful to men, in the way of a drug, it is plain that such a thing is to be entrusted only to the physicians, but not to be touched by private persons. It is plain, said he. It belongs then to the governors of the city, if to any others, to make a lie, with reference either to enemies or citizens, for the good of the city; but none of the rest must venture on such a thing. But for a private person to tell a lie to such governors; we will call it the same, and even a greater offence, than for the patient to tell a lie to the physician; or for the man who learns his exercises, not to tell his master the truth as to the indispositions of his body: or for one not to tell the pilot the real state of things, respecting the ship and sailors, in what condition himself and the other sailors are. Most true, said he. But if you find in the city any one else making a lie,

¹ Hom. Iliad. lib. i.

..... of those who artists are,
Or prophet, or physician, or who make
The shafts of spears

you shall punish them, as introducing a practice subversive and destructive of the city, as of a ship. We must do so; if indeed it is upon speech that actions are completed. But what? shall not our youth have need of temperance? Certainly. And are not such things as these the principal parts of temperance? that they be obedient to their governors; that the governors themselves be temperate in drinking, feasting, and in venereal pleasures. And we shall say, I imagine, that such things as these are well spoken, which Diomed says in Homer:

Sit thou in silence, and obey my speech ¹.

And what follows; thus,

The Greeks march'd on in silence, breathing force;
Revering their commanders; ²

and such like. Well spoken. But what as to these? "Thou drunkard with dog's eyes, and heart of deer ³;" and all of this kind, are these, or such other juvenile things, which any private person may say against their governors, spoken handsomely? Not handsomely. For I do not imagine that when they are heard they are fit to promote temperance in youth; and though they may afford a pleasure of a different kind, it is no wonder. But what do you think? Just the same way, said he. But what of this? To make the wisest man say, that it appears to him to be the most beautiful of all things,

..... To see the tables full
Of flesh and dainties, and the butler bear
The wine in flagons, and fill up the cup ⁴:

is this proper for a youth to hear, in order to obtain a command over himself? Or yet this?

..... Most miserable it is,
To die of famine, and have adverse fate ⁵.

¹ Hom. Iliad. lib. 4.

² Hom. Iliad. lib. 4.

³ Hom. Iliad. lib. 1.

⁴ Hom. Od. lib. 12.

⁵ Hom. Iliad. lib. 6.

Or,

Or that Jupiter, through desire of venereal pleasures, easily forgetting all those things which he alone awake revolved in his mind, whilst other Gods and men were asleep, was so struck, on seeing Juno, as not even to be willing to come into the house, but wanted to embrace her on the ground; and at the same time declaring that he is possessed with such desire, as exceeded what he felt on their first connexion with each other,

.....Hid from their parents dear¹.

Nor yet how Mars and Venus were bound by Vulcan, and other such things. No, by Jupiter, said he. These things do not seem fit. But if any instances of self-denial, said I, with respect to all these things be told, and practised by eminent men, these are to be beheld and heard. Such as this:

He beat his breast, and thus reprov'd his heart:
Endure, my heart! thou heavier fate hast borne.

By all means, said he, we should do thus. Neither must we suffer men to receive bribes, nor to be covetous. By no means. Nor must we flog to them, that

Gifts gain the Gods and venerable kings.

Nor must we commend Phœnix, the tutor of Achilles, as if he spoke with moderation, in counselling him to accept of presents, and assist the Greeks; but, without presents, not to desist from his wrath. Neither shall we commend Achilles, nor approve of his being so covetous as to receive presents from Agamemnon; and likewise a ransom to give up the dead body of Hector, but not incline to do it otherwise. It is not right, said he, to commend such things as these. I am unwilling, said I, for Homer's sake, to say it, That neither is it lawful that these things, at least, be said against Achilles, nor that they be believed, when said by others; nor, again, that he spoke thus to Apollo:

Me thou hast injur'd, thou, far-darting God!
Most baneful of the powers divine! But know,
Were I posses'd of power, then vengeance should be mine².

¹ Hom. Iliad. lib. 13.

² Hom. Iliad. lib. 22.

And how disobedient he was to the river, though a divinity, and was ready to fight ; and again, he says to the river Sperchius, with his sacred locks,

Thy lock to great Patroclus I could give,
Who now is dead

Nor are we to believe he did this. And again, the dragging Hector round the sepulchre of Patroclus, and the slaughtering the captives at his funeral pile,—that all these things are true, we will not say; nor will we suffer our people to be persuaded that Achilles, the son of a Goddess, and of Peleus the most temperate of men and the third from Jupiter, and educated by the most wise Chiron was full of such disorder as to have within him two distempers opposite to one another,—the illiberal and covetous disposition, and a contempt both of Gods and of men. You say right, replied he. Neither, said I, let us be persuaded of these things ; nor suffer any to say that Theseus the son of Neptune, and Pirithous the son of Jupiter, were impelled to perpetrate such dire rapines; nor that any son of another deity, nor any hero, would dare to do horrible and impious deeds ; such as the lies of the poets ascribe to them : but let us compel the poets either to say that these are not the actions of these persons, or that these persons are not the children of the Gods ; and not to say both.

Nor let us suffer them to attempt to persuade our youth that the Gods create evil; and that heroes are in no respect better than men. For, as we said formerly, these things are neither holy nor true : for we have elsewhere shown, that it is impossible that evil should proceed from the Gods. Why not ? And these things are truly hurtful, to the hearers, at least. For every one will pardon his own depravity, when he is persuaded that even the near relations of the Gods do and have done things of the same kind : such as are near to Jupiter,

Who, on the top of Ida, have up-rear'd
To parent Jupiter an altar ;—

And,

Whose blood derived from Gods is not extinct.

On which accounts all such fables must be suppressed ; lest they create in
our

our youth a powerful habit of wickedness. We must do so, replied he, by all means. What other species of discourses, said I, have we still remaining, now whilst we are determining what ought to be spoken, and what not? We have already mentioned in what manner we ought to speak of the Gods, and likewise of dæmons and heroes; and of what relates to Hades. Yes, indeed. Should not, then, what yet remains seem to be concerning men? It is plain. But it is impossible for us, friend, to regulate this at present. How? Because, I think, we shall say that the poets and orators speak amiss concerning the greatest affairs of men: as, That most men are unjust, and, notwithstanding this, are happy; and that the just are miserable; and that it is profitable for one to do unjustly, when he is concealed; and that justice is gain indeed to others, but the loss of the just man himself: these, and innumerable other such things, we will forbid them to say; and enjoin them to sing, and compose in fable, the contrary to these. Do not you think so? I know it well, said he. If then you acknowledge that I say right, shall I not say that you have acknowledged what all along we seek for? You judge right, said he: Shall we not then grant that such discourses are to be spoken concerning men, whenever we shall have discovered what justice is; and how in its nature it is profitable to the just man to be such, whether he appear to be such or not? Most true, replied he. Concerning the discourses, then, let this suffice. We must now consider, as I imagine, the manner of discourse. And then we shall have completely considered, both what is to be spoken, and the manner how. Here Adimantus said, But I do not understand what you say. But, replied I, it is needful you should. And perhaps you will rather understand it in this way. Is not every thing told by the mythologists, or poets, a narrative of the past, present, or future? What else? replied he. And do not they execute it, either by simple narration, or imitation, or by both? This too, replied he, I want to understand more plainly. I seem, said I, to be a ridiculous and obscure instructor. Therefore, like those who are unable to speak, I will endeavour to explain, not the whole, but, taking up a particular part, show my meaning by this particular. And tell me, Do not you know the beginning of the Iliad? where the poet says that Chryses entreated Agamemnon to set free his daughter; but that he was displeased that Chryses,

when he did not succeed, prayed against the Greeks to the God. I know. You know, then, that down to these verses,

———The Grecians all he pray'd ;
But chief the two commanders, Atreus' sons——

the poet himself speaks, and does not attempt to divert our attention elsewhere ; as if any other person were speaking : but what he says after this, he says as if he himself were Chryses, and endeavours as much as possible to make us imagine that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest, an old man ; and that in this manner he has composed almost the whole narrative of what happened at Troy, and in Ithaca, and all the adventures in the whole *Odyssy*. It is certainly so, replied he. Is it not then narration, when he tells the several speeches ? and likewise when he tells what intervenes between the speeches ? Why not ? But when he makes any speech in the person of another, do not we say that then he assimilates his speech, as much as possible, to each person whom he introduces as speaking ? We say so, do we not ? And is not the assimilating one's self to another, either in voice or figure, the imitating him to whom one assimilates himself ? Why not ? In such a manner as this, then, it seems, both he and the other poets perform the narrative by means of imitation. Certainly. But if the poet did not at all conceal himself, his whole action and narrative would be without imitation. And that you may not say you do not again understand how this should be, I shall tell you. If Homer, after relating how Chryses came with his daughter's ransom, beseeching the Greeks, but chiefly the kings, had spoken afterwards, not as Chryses, but still as Homer, you know it would not have been imitation, but simple narration. And it would have been somehow thus : (I shall speak without metre, for I am no poet :) The priest came and prayed, that the Gods might grant they should take Troy, and return safe ; and begged them to restore him his daughter, accepting the presents, and revering the God. When he had said this, all the rest showed respect, and consented ; but Agamemnon was enraged, charging him to depart instantly, and not to return again ; left his sceptre and the garlands of the God should be of no avail ; and told him, that before he would restore

store his daughter she should grow old with him in Argos ; but ordered him to be gone, and not to irritate him, that he might get home in safety. The old man upon hearing this was afraid, and went away in silence. And when he was retired from the camp he made many supplications to Apollo, rehearsing the names of the God, and reminding him and beseeching him, that if ever he had made any acceptable donation in the building of temples, or the offering of sacrifices,—for the sake of these, to avenge his tears upon the Greeks with his arrows. Thus, said I, friend, the narration is simple, without imitation. I understand, said he. Understand then, said I, that the opposite of this happens, when one, taking away the poet's part between the speeches, leaves the speeches themselves. This, said he, I likewise understand, that a thing of this kind takes place respecting tragedies. You apprehend perfectly well, said I. And I think that I now make plain to you what I could not before ; that in poetry, and likewise in mythology, one kind is wholly by imitation, such as you say tragedy and comedy are ; and another kind by the narration of the poet himself : and you will find this kind most especially in the dithyrambus : and another again by both ; as in epic poetry, and in many other cases besides, if you understand me. I understand now, replied he, what you meant before. And remember too, that before that we were saying that we had already mentioned what things were to be spoken ; but that it yet remained to be considered in what manner they were to be spoken. I remember, indeed. This then, is what I was saying, that it were necessary we agreed whether we shall suffer the poets to make narratives to us in the way of imitation ; or, partly in the way of imitation, and partly not ; and, what in each way ; or, if they are not to use imitation at all. I conjecture, said he, you are to consider whether we shall receive tragedy and comedy into our city, or not. Perhaps, replied I, and something more too ; for I do not as yet know, indeed ; but wherever our reasoning, as a gale, bears us, there we must go. And truly, said he, you say well. Consider this now, Adimantus, whether our guardians ought to practise imitation, or not. Or does this follow from what is above ? That each one may handsomely perform one business, but many he cannot : or, if he shall attempt it, in grasping at many things, he shall fail in all ; so as to be remarkable in none. Why shall
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he not? And is not the reason the same concerning imitation? That one man is not so able to imitate many things well, as one. He is not. Hardly then shall he perform any part of the more eminent employments, and at the same time imitate many things, and be an imitator; since the same persons are not able to perform handsomely imitations of two different kinds, which seem to resemble each other; as, for instance, they cannot succeed both in comedy and tragedy: or, did you not lately call these two, imitations? I did; and you say true, that the same persons cannot succeed in them. Nor can they, at the same time, be rhapsodists and actors. True. Nor can the same persons be actors in comedies and in tragedies. And all these are imitations, are they not? Imitations. The genius of man seems to me, Adimantus, to be shut up within still lesser bounds than these; so that it is unable to imitate handsomely many things, or do these very things, of which even the imitations are the resemblances. Most true, said he. If therefore we are to hold to our first reasoning, that our guardians, unoccupied in any manufacture whatever, ought to be the most accurate manufacturers of the liberty of the city, and to mind nothing but what has some reference to this; it were surely proper, they neither did nor imitated any thing else; but, if they shall imitate at all, to imitate immediately from their childhood such things as are correspondent to these; brave, temperate, holy, free men, and all such things as these;—but neither to do, nor to be desirous of imitating, things illiberal or base, lest from imitating they come to be really such. Or have you not observed, that imitations, if from earliest youth they be continued onwards for a long time, are established into the manners and natural temper, both with reference to the body and voice, and likewise the dianoëtic power? Very much so, replied he. We will not surely allow, said I, those we profess to take care of, and who ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, either young or old, either reviling her husband, or quarrelling with the Gods, or speaking boastfully when she imagines herself happy; nor yet to imitate her in her misfortunes, sorrows, and lamentations, when sick, or in love, or in child-bed labour. We shall be far from permitting this. By all means, replied he. Nor to imitate man- or maid-servants in doing what belongs to servants. Nor this neither. Nor yet to imitate depraved men, as it seems, such as are dastardly,
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and do the contrary of what we have now been mentioning; reviling and railing at one another; and speaking abominable things, either intoxicated or sober, or any other things such as persons of this sort are guilty of, either in words or actions, either with respect to themselves or one another. Neither must they accustom themselves to resemble mad-men, in words or actions. Even the mad and wicked are to be known, both the men and the women; but none of their actions are to be done, or imitated. Most true, said he. But what? said I, are they to imitate such as work in brass, or any other handicrafts, or such as are employed in rowing boats, or such as command these; or any thing else appertaining to these things? How can they, said he, as they are not to be allowed to give application to any of those things? But what? shall they imitate horses neighing, or bulls lowing, or rivers murmuring, or the sea roaring, or thunder, and all such like things? We have forbidden them, said he, to be mad, or to resemble madmen. If then I understand, replied I, what you say, there is a certain kind of speech, and of narration, in which he who is truly a good and worthy man expresses himself when it is necessary for him to say any thing; and another kind again unlike to this, which he who has been born and educated in an opposite manner always possesses, and in which he expresses himself. But of what kind are these? said he. It appears to me, said I, that the worthy man, when he comes in his narrative to any speech or action of a good man, will willingly tell it as if he were himself the man, and will not be ashamed of such an imitation; most especially when he imitates a good man acting prudently and without error, and failing seldom, and but little, through diseases, or love, intoxication, or any other misfortune. But when he comes to any thing unworthy of himself, he will not be studious to resemble himself to that which is worse, unless for a short time when it produces some good; but will be ashamed, both as he is unpractised in the imitation of such characters as these, and likewise as he grudges to degrade himself and stand among the models of baser characters, disflaming it in his dianoëtic¹ part, and doing it only for amusement. It is likely, said he. He will not then make use of such a narrative as we lately mentioned, with reference to the compositions of Homer: but his composition will participate of both imitation and the

¹ See the notes at the end of the Sixth Book.

other narrative ; and but a small part of it will be imitation, in a great quantity of plain narrative. Do I seem to say any thing, or nothing at all ? You express, replied he, perfectly well what ought to be the model of such an orator. And, on the other hand, will not the man, said I, who is not such an one, the more depraved he is, be the readier to rehearse every thing whatever ; and not think any thing unworthy of him ? so that he will undertake to imitate every thing in earnest, and likewise in the presence of many ; and such things also as we now mentioned ; thunders, and noises of winds and tempests, and of axles, and wheels, and trumpets, and pipes, and whistles, and sounds of all manner of instruments, and voices of dogs too, and of sheep, and of birds. And the whole expression of all these things shall be by imitation in voices and gestures, having but a small part of it narration. This too, said he, must happen of necessity. These now, said I, I called the two kinds of diction. They are so, replied he. But has not the one of these small variations ? And if the orator afford the becoming harmony and measure to the diction, where he speaks with propriety, the discourse is almost after one and the same manner, and in one harmony ; for the variations are but small, and in a measure which accordingly is somehow similar. It is indeed, replied he, entirely so. But what as to the other kind ? Does it not require the contrary, all kinds of harmony, all kinds of measure, if it is to be naturally expressed, as it has all sorts of variations ? It is perfectly so. Do not now all the poets, and such as speak in any kind, make use of either one or other of these models of diction, or of one compounded of both ? Of necessity, replied he. What then shall we do ? said I. Whether shall we admit into our city all of these ; or one of the unmixed, or the one compounded ? If my opinion, replied he, prevail, that uncompounded one, which is imitative of what is worthy. But surely, Adimantus, the mixed is pleasant, at least. And the opposite of what you choose is by far the most pleasant to children and pedagogues, and the crowd. It is most pleasant. But you will not, probably, said I, think it suitable to our government, because with us no man is to attend to two or more employments, but to be quite simple, as every one does one thing. It is not indeed suitable. Shall we not then find that in such city alone, a shoe-maker is only a shoemaker, and not a pilot along with shoe-making, and that

the husbandman is only a husbandman, and not a judge along with husbandry; and that the soldier is a soldier, and not a money-maker besides: and all others in the same way? True, replied he. And it would appear, that if a man, who, through wisdom, were able to become every thing, and to imitate every thing, should come into our city, and should wish to show us his poems, we should revere him as a sacred, admirable, and pleasant person: but we should tell him, that there is no such person with us, in our city, nor is there any such allowed to be: and we should send him to some other city, pouring oil on his head, and crowning him with wool: but we use a more austere poet, and mythologist, for our advantage, who may imitate to us the diction of the worthy manner; and may say whatever he says, according to those models which we established by law a first, when we undertook the education of our soldiers. So we should do, replied he, if it depended on us. It appears, said I, friend, that we have now thoroughly discussed that part of music respecting oratory and fable; for we have already told what is to be spoken, and in what manner. It appears so to me likewise, said he. Does it not yet remain, said I, that we speak of the manner of song, and of melodies? It is plain. May not any one discover what we must say of these things; and of what kind these ought to be, if we are to be consistent with what is above mentioned? Here Glauco laughing said: But I appear, Socrates, to be a stranger to all these matters, for I am not able at present to guess at what we ought to say: I suspect, however. You are certainly, said I, fully able to say this in the first place, that melody is composed of three things; of sentiment, harmony, and rhythm. Yes, replied he, this I can say. And that the part which consists in the sentiment differs in nothing from that sentiment which is not sung, in this respect, that it ought to be performed upon the same models, as we just now said, and in the same manner. True, said he. And surely, then, the harmony and rhythm ought to correspond to the sentiment. Why not? But we observed there was no occasion for wailings and lamentations in compositions. No occasion, truly. Which then are the querulous harmonies? Tell me, for you are a musician. The mixed Lydian, replied he, and the sharp Lydian; and some others of this kind. Are not these, then, said I, to be rejected? for they are unprofitable even

to women, such as are worthy, and much more to men. Certainly. But intoxication is most unbecoming our guardians; and effeminacy and idleness. Why not? Which then are the effeminate and convivial harmonies? The Ionic, replied he, and the Lydian, which are called relaxing. Can you make any use of these, my friend, for military men? By no means, replied he. But, it seems, you have yet remaining the Doric, and the Phrygian. I do not know, said I, the harmonies; but leave that harmony, which may, in a becoming manner, imitate the voice and accents of a truly brave man, going on in a military action, and every rough adventure; and bearing his fortune in a determinate and persevering manner, when he fails of success, rushes on wounds, or deaths, or falls into any other distress: and leave that kind of harmony likewise, which is suited to what is peaceable; where there is no violence, but every thing is voluntary; where a man either persuades or beseeches any one, about any thing, either God by prayer, or man by instruction and admonition: or, on the other hand, where one submits himself to another, who beseeches, instructs, and persuades; and, in all these things, acts according to intellect, and does not behave haughtily; demeaning himself soberly and moderately; gladly embracing whatever may happen: leave then these two harmonies, the vehement and the voluntary; which, in the most handsome manner, imitate the voice of the unfortunate and of the fortunate, of the moderate and of the brave. You desire, replied he, to leave no others but those I now mentioned. We shall not then, said I, have any need of a great many strings, nor of the panarmonion in our songs and melodies. It appears to me, replied he, we shall not. We shall not nourish, then, such workmen as make harps and spinets, and all those instruments which consist of many strings, and produce a variety of harmony. We shall not, as it appears. But what? Will you admit into your city such workmen as make pipes, or pipers? for, are not the instruments which consist of the greatest number of strings, and those that produce all kinds of harmony, imitations of the pipe? It is plain, replied he. There are left you still, said I, the lyre and the harp, as useful for your city, and there might likewise be some reed for shepherds in the fields. Thus reason, said he, shows us. We then, replied I, do nothing dire, if we prefer Apollo, and Apollo's instruments, to Marsyas, and the instruments
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of that eminent musician. Truly, replied he, we do not appear to do it. And by the dog, said I, we have unawares cleansed again our city, which we said was become luxurious. And we have wisely done it, replied he. Come then, said I, and let us cleanse what remains; for what concerns rhythm should be suitable to our harmonies; that our citizens pursue not such rhythms as are diversified, and have a variety of cadences; but observe what are the rhythms of a decent and manly life, and, whilst they observe these, make the foot and the melody subservient to sentiment of such a kind; and not the sentiment subservient to the foot and melody. But what these rhythms are, is your business to tell, as you have done the harmonies. But by Jupiter, replied he, I cannot tell. That there are three species of which the notes are composed, as there are four in sounds, whence the whole of harmony, I can say, as I have observed it: but which are the imitations of one kind of life, and which of another, I am not able to tell. But these things, said I, we must consider with Damon's assistance: what notes are suitable to illiberality and insolence, to madness or other ill disposition; and what notes are proper for their opposites. And I remember, but not distinctly, to have heard him calling a certain warrior, composite, a dactyl, and heroic measure; ornamenting him I do not know how, making him equal above and below, in breadth and length: and he called one, as I imagine, Iambus, and another Trochæus. He adapted, besides, the lengths and shortnesses; and, in some of these, I believe, he blamed and commended the measure of the foot, no less than the numbers themselves, or something compounded of both; for I cannot speak of these things; because, as I said, they are to be thrown upon Damon. To speak distinctly, indeed, on these matters, would require no small discourse: do not you think so? Not a small one, truly. But can you determine this, that the propriety or impropriety corresponds to the good or ill rhythm? Why not? But, with respect to the good or ill rhythm, the one corresponds to handsome expression, conforming itself to it; and the other to the reverse. And, in the same way, as to the harmonious, and the discordant: since the rhythm and harmony are subservient to the sentiment, as we just now said; and not the sentiment to these. These, indeed, said he, are to be subservient to the sentiment. But what? said I, As to the manner of expression, and as to the sentiment

itself, must it not correspond to the temper of the soul? Why not? And all other things correspond to the expression. Yes. So that the beauty of expression, fine consonancy, and propriety, and excellence of numbers, are subservient to the good disposition; not that stupidity, which in complaisant language we call good temper; but the dianoëtic part, truly adorned with excellent and beautiful manners. By all means, replied he. Must not these things be always pursued by the youth, if they are to mind their business? They are indeed to be pursued. But painting too is somehow full of these things; and every other workmanship of the kind; and weaving is full of these, and carving, and architecture, and all workmanship of every kind of vessels: as is moreover the nature of bodies, and of all vegetables: for in all these there is propriety, and impropriety; and the impropriety, discord, and dissonance, are the sisters of ill expression, and depraved manners; and their opposites are the sisters, and imitations, of sober and worthy manners. 'Tis entirely so, replied he. Are we then to give injunctions to the poets alone, and oblige them to work into their poems the image of the worthy manners, or not to compose at all with us? or are we to enjoin all other workmen likewise; and restrain this ill, undisciplined, illiberal, indecent manner, that they exhibit it neither in the representations of animals, in buildings, nor in any other workmanship? or, that he who is not able to do this, be not suffered to work with us? lest our guardians, being educated in the midst of ill representations, as in an ill pasture, by every day plucking and eating much of different things, by little and little contract, imperceptibly, some mighty evil in their soul. But we must seek for such workmen as are able, by the help of a good natural genius, to investigate the nature of the beautiful and the decent: that our youth, dwelling as it were in a healthful place, may be profited on all sides; whence, from the beautiful works, something will be conveyed to the sight and hearing, as a breeze bringing health from salutary places; imperceptibly leading them on directly from childhood, to the resemblance, friendship, and harmony with right reason. They should thus, said he, be educated in the most handsome manner by far. On these accounts therefore, Glauco, said I, is not education in music of the greatest importance, because rhythm and harmony enter in the strongest manner into the inward part of the soul, and most powerfully affect it

it, introducing at the same time decorum, and making every one decent if he is properly educated, and the reverse if he is not? And moreover, because the man who has here been educated as he ought, perceives in the quickest manner whatever workmanship is defective, and whatever execution is unhandſome, or whatever productions are of that kind; and being diſgusted in a proper manner, he will praife what is beautiful, rejoicing in it; and, receiving it into his ſoul, be nourished by it, and become a worthy and good man: but whatever is baſe, he will in a proper manner deſpiſe, and hate, whilſt yet he is young, and before he is able to be a partaker of reaſon; and when reaſon comes, ſuch an one as has been thus educated will embrace it, recognizing it perfectly well, from its intimate familiarity with him. It appears to me, replied he, that education in muſic is for the ſake of ſuch things as theſe. Juſt as, with reference to letters, ſaid I, we are then ſufficiently inſtructed when we are not ignorant of the elements, which are but few in number, wherever they are concerned; and when we do not deſpiſe them more or leſs as unneceſſary to be obſerved, but by all means endeavour to underſtand them thoroughly, as it is impoſſible for us to be literary men till we do thus. True. And if the images of letters appeared any where, either in water or in mirrors, ſhould we not know them before we knew the letters themſelves? or does this belong to the ſame art and ſtudy? By all means. Is it indeed then according as I ſay? that we ſhall never become muſicians, neither we ourſelves, nor thoſe guardians we ſay we are to educate, before we underſtand the images of temperance, fortitude, liberality, and magnificence, and the other ſiſter virtues; and, on the other hand again, the contraries of theſe, which are every where to be met with; and obſerve them whereſoever they are, both the virtues themſelves, and the images of them, and deſpiſe them neither in ſmall nor in great inſtances; but let us believe that this belongs to the ſame art and ſtudy. There is, ſaid he, great neceſſity for it. Muſt not then, ſaid I, the perſon who ſhall have in his ſoul beautiful manners, and in his appearance whatever is proportionable, and correſponding to theſe, partaking of the ſame impreſſion, be the moſt beautiful ſpectacle to any one who is able to behold it? Exceedingly ſo. But what is moſt beautiful is moſt lovely. Why not? He who is muſical ſhould ſurely love thoſe men who are moſt eminently of this kind; but if

one be unharmonious he shall not love him. He shall not, replied he, if the person be any way defective as to his soul: if indeed it were in his body, he would bear with it, so as to be willing to associate with him. I understand, said I, that your favourites are or have been of this kind. And I agree to it. But tell me this, Is there any communion between temperance and excessive pleasure? How can there? said he, for such pleasure causes a privation of intellect no less than grief. But has it communion with any other virtue? By no means. But what, has it communion with insolence and intemperance? Most of all. Can you mention a greater and more acute pleasure than that respecting venereal concerns? I cannot, said he, nor yet one that is more insane. But the right love is of such a nature as to love the beautiful, and the handsome, in a temperate and a musical manner. Certainly. Nothing then which is insane, or allied to intemperance, is to approach to a right love. Neither must pleasure approach to it; nor must the lover, and the person he loves, have communion with it, where they love and are beloved in a right manner. No truly, said he; they must not, Socrates, approach to these. Thus then, as appears, you will establish by law, in the city which is to be established, that the lover is to love, to converse, and associate with the objects of his love, as with his son, for the sake of virtue, if he gain the consent: and as to every thing besides, that every one so converse with him whose love he solicits, as never to appear to associate for any thing beyond what is now mentioned; and that otherwise he shall undergo the reproach of being unmusical, and unacquainted with the beautiful. It must be thus, replied he. Does then, said I, the discourse concerning music seem to you to be finished? For it has terminated where it ought to terminate, as the affairs of music ought, somehow, to terminate in the love of the beautiful. I agree, said he. But, after music, our youth are to be educated in gymnastic. But what? It is surely necessary that in this likewise they be accurately disciplined, from their infancy through the whole of life. For the matter, as I imagine, is somehow thus: but do you also consider. For it does not appear to me that whatever body is sound, doth, by its own virtue, render the soul good; but contrariwise, that a good soul, by its virtue, renders the body the best which is possible: but how does it appear to you? In the same manner to me likewise,

replied

replied he. If then, when we have sufficiently cultivated the dianoëtic part, we shall commit to it the accurate management of the concerns of the body; shall not we, as we are only laying down models, (that we may not enlarge) act in a right manner? Entirely so. We say then, that they are to abstain from intoxication; for it is more allowable to any, than to a guardian, to be intoxicated, and not to know where he is. It were ridiculous, said he, that the guardian should stand in need of a guardian. But what as to meats? For these men are wrestlers in the noblest combat: are they not? They are. Would not then the bodily plight of the wrestlers be proper for such as these? Probably. But, said I, it is of a drowsy kind, and dubious as to health: or, do you not observe, that they sleep out their life? and, if they depart but a little from their appointed diet, such wrestlers become greatly and extremely diseased. I perceive it. But some more elegant exercise, said I, is requisite for our military wrestlers; who, as dogs, ought to be wakeful, and to see, and to hear in the most acute manner; and, in their expeditions, to endure many changes of water and of food, of heat and of cold, that so they may not have a dubious state of health. To me it appears so. Is not then the best gymnastic a kind of sister to the simple music, which we a little before described? How do you say? That the gymnastic is to be simple and moderate, and of that kind most especially which pertains to war. Of what kind? Even from Homer, said I, one may learn these things: for you know, that in their warlike expeditions, at the entertainments of their heroes, he never feasts them with fishes, and that even whilst they were by the sea at the Hellespont, nor yet with boiled flesh, but only with roast, as what soldiers can most easily procure: for, in short, one can every where more easily make use of fire, than carry vessels about. Yes, indeed. Neither does Homer, as I imagine, any where make mention of seasonings: and this is what the other wrestlers understand, that the body which is to be in good habit must abstain from all these things. They rightly understand, said he, and abstain. You do not then, friend, as appears, approve of the Syracusan table, and the Sicilian variety of meats, since this other appears to you to be right? I do not, as appears. You will likewise disapprove of a Corinthian girl, as a mistress, for those who are to be of a good habit of body. By all means, truly. And likewise of those delicacies, as they are reckoned,

of Attic confections. Of necessity. For all feeding and dieting of this kind, if we compare it to the melody and song produced in the panarmonion, and in all rhythms, shall not the comparison be just? Why not? And does not the diversity in that case create intemperance, and here disease? But simplicity, as to music, creates in the soul temperance; and, as to gymnastic, health in the body. Most true, said he. And when intemperance and diseases multiply in the city, shall we not have many halls of justice and of medicine opened? And will not the arts of justice and of medicine be in request, when many free persons shall earnestly apply to them? Why not? But can you adduce any greater argument of an ill and base education in a city, than that there should be need of physicians and supreme magistrates, and that not only for the contemptible and low handicrafts, but for those who boast of having been educated in a liberal manner? Or, does it not appear to be base, and a great sign of want of education, to be obliged to observe justice pronounced on us by others, as our masters and judges, and to have no sense of it in ourselves? Of all things, this, replied he, is the most base. And do you not, said I, deem this to be more base still; when one not only spends a great part of life in courts of justice, as defendant and plaintiff; but, from his ignorance of the beautiful, imagines that he becomes renowned for this very thing; as being dexterous in doing injustice, and able to turn himself through all sorts of windings, and, using every kind of subterfuge, thinks to escape so as to evade justice; and all this for the sake of small and contemptible things; being ignorant how much better and more handsome it were so to regulate his life as not to stand in need of a sleepy judge? This, replied he, is still more base than the other. And to stand in need of the medicinal art, said I, not on account of wounds, or some incidental epidemic distempers, but through sloth, and such a diet as we mentioned, being filled with rheums and wind, like lakes; obliging the skilful sons of Æsculapius to invent new names for diseases, such as dropsies and catarrhs. Do not you think this abominable? These are truly, replied he, very new and strange names of diseases. Such, said I, as were not, I imagine, in the days of Æsculapius: and I conjecture so from this, that when Eurypylus was wounded at Troy, and was getting Pramnian wine to drink with much flour in it, with the addition of cheese; (all which
seem

seem to be phlegmatic,) the sons of Æsculapius neither blamed the woman who presented it, nor reprehended Patroclus, who had presented the cure. And surely the potion, said he, is absurd for one in such a case. No, said I, if you consider, that, as they tell us, the descendants of Æsculapius did not, before the days of Herodicus, practise this method of cure now in use, which puts the patient on a regimen: but Herodicus being a teacher of youth, and at the same time infirm in his health, mixing gymnastic and medicine together, he made himself most uneasy in the first place, and afterwards many others besides. After what manner? said he. In procuring to himself, said I, a lingering death; for, whilst he was constantly attentive to his disease, which was mortal, he was not able, as I imagine, to cure himself; though, neglecting every thing besides, he was still using medicines; and thus he passed his life, still in the greatest uneasiness if he departed in the least from his accustomed diet; and through this wisdom of his, struggling long with death, he arrived at old age. A mighty reward, said he, he reaped of his art! Such as became one, said I, who did not understand that it was not from ignorance or inexperience of this method of cure that Æsculapius did not discover it to his descendants; but because he knew that, in all well regulated states, there was some certain work enjoined every one in the city, which was necessary to be done, and that no one was to be allowed to have the leisure of being sick through the whole of life, and to be attentive only to the taking of medicines. This we may pleasantly observe in the case of labouring people; but we do not observe it in the case of the rich, and such as are counted happy. How? said he. A smith, replied I, when he falls sick, thinks it fit to take from the physician some potion, to throw up his disease, or purge it downwards, or, by means of caustic or amputation, to be freed from the trouble: but if any one prescribe for him a long regimen, putting caps on his head, and other such things, he quickly tells him that he has not leisure to lie sick, nor does it avail him to live in this manner, attentive to his trouble, and negligent of his proper work; and so, bidding such a physician farewell, he returns to his ordinary diet; and, if he recovers his health, he continues to manage his own affairs; but if his body be not able to support the disease, he dies, and is freed from troubles. It seems proper, said he, for such an one to use the medicinal

art in this manner. Is it not, said I, because he has a certain business, which if he does not perform, it is not for his advantage to live? It is plain, replied he. But the rich man, as we say, has no such work allotted him, from which if he be obliged to refrain, life is not worth the having. He is surely said at least to have none. For you do not, said I, attend to what Phocylides says; that one ought still, whilst there is life, to practise virtue. I think, replied he, we attended to that formerly. Let us by no means, said I, differ from him in this. But let us inform ourselves whether this excessive attention to one's disease is to be the business of the rich; and that life is not worth keeping, if he does not give this attention; for that such a life is indeed a hinderance of the mind's application to masonry and other arts; but, with respect to the exhortation of Phocylides, it is no hinderance. Yes, by Jupiter, said he, it is, and that in the greatest degree when this excessive care of the body goes beyond gymnastic. Neither does it agree with attention to private œconomy, or military expeditions, or sedentary magistracies in the city. But what is of the greatest moment is, that such application to health is ill fitted for any sort of learning, and inquiry, and study, by one's self, whilst one is perpetually dreading certain pains and swellings of the head, and blaming philosophy as occasioning them; so that where there is this attention to health it is a great obstacle to the practice of virtue and improvement in it; for it makes us always imagine that we are ill, and always complain of the body. That is likely, said he. And shall we not say that Æsculapius too understood these things, when to persons of a healthful constitution, and such as used a wholesome diet, but were afflicted by some particular disease, to these and to such a constitution he prescribed medicine, repelling their diseases by drugs and incisions, and enjoined them their accustomed diet, that the public might suffer no damage? But he did not attempt, by extenuating or nourishing diet, to cure such constitutions as were wholly diseased within; as it would but afford a long and miserable life to the man himself, and the descendants which would spring from him would probably be of the same kind: for he did not imagine the man ought to be cured who could not live in the ordinary course, as he would be neither profitable to himself nor to the state. You make Æsculapius, said he, a politician. It is plain,

said I. And his sons may shew that he was so. Or do you not see, that at Troy they excelled in war, and likewise practised medicine in the way I mention? Or do not you remember, that when Menelaus was wounded by Pandarus, they

Wash'd off the blood, and soft'ning drugs applied ?

But, as to what was necessary for him to eat or drink afterwards, they prescribed for him no more than for Eurypylos; deeming external applications sufficient to heal men, who, before they were wounded, were healthful and moderate in their diet, whatever mixture they happened to have drunk at the time. But they judged, that to have a diseased constitution, and to live an intemperate life, was neither profitable to the men themselves nor to others; and that their art ought not to be employed on these, nor to minister to them, not even though they were richer than Midas. You make, said he, the sons of Æsculapius truly ingenious. It is proper, replied I; though in opposition to us the writers of tragedy, and Pindar, call indeed Æsculapius the son of Apollo, but say that he was prevailed on by gold to undertake the cure of a rich man, who was already in a deadly state; for which, truly, he was even struck with a thunderbolt: but we, agreeably to what has been formerly said, will not believe them as to both these things; but will aver, that if he was the son of the God, he was not given to filthy lucre; or, if he were given to filthy lucre, he was not a son of the God. These things, said he, are most right. But what do you say, Socrates, as to this? Is it not necessary to provide good physicians for the state? and must not these, most likely, be such who have been conversant with the greatest number of healthy and of sickly people? and these, in like manner, be the best judges, who have been conversant with all sorts of dispositions? I mean now, said I, those who are very good. But do you know whom I deem to be such? If you tell me, replied he. I shall endeavour to do it, said I; but you inquire in one question about two different things. As how? said he. Physicians, replied I, would become most expert, if, beginning from their infancy, they would, in learning the art, be conversant with the greatest number of bodies, and these the most sickly; and laboured themselves

under all manner of diseases, and by natural constitution were not quite healthful; for it is not by the body, I imagine, that they cure the body; (else their own bodies could at no time be admitted to be of an ill constitution,) but they cure the body by the soul; which, whilst it is of an ill constitution, is not capable to perform well any cure. Right, said he. But the judge, friend, governs the soul by the soul; which, if from its childhood it has been educated with depraved souls, has been conversant with them, and has itself done all manner of evil, it is not able to come out from among them, so as accurately, by itself, to judge of the evils of others, as happens in the diseases of the body; but it must in its youth be unexperienced and unpolluted with evil manners, if it means to be good and beautiful itself, and to judge soundly of what is just. And hence the virtuous in their youth appear simple, and easily deceived by the unjust, as they have not within themselves dispositions similar to those of the wicked. And surely this at least, said he, they do often suffer extremely. For which reason, said I, the good judge is not to be a young man, but an old, having been late in learning wickedness, what it is; perceiving it not as a kindred possession, residing in his own soul, but as a foreign one, in the souls of others, which he has for a long time studied, and has understood what sort of an evil it is, by the help of science rather than by proper experience. Such an one, said he, is like to be the most noble judge. And likewise a good one, said I; which was what you required. For he who has a good soul is good. But the other notable and suspicious man, who has committed much of iniquity himself, when indeed he converses with his like, being thought to be subtle and wise, he appears a notable man, being extremely cautious, having an eye to those models which he has within himself; but when he approaches the good, and the more aged, he appears foolish, suspicious out of season, and ignorant of integrity of manners, as having within no models of such a kind: but however, being more frequently conversant with the wicked than with the wise, he appears, both to himself and others, to be more wise, rather than more ignorant. This, said he, is perfectly true. We must not, therefore, said I, look for such an one to be a wise and good judge, but the former one; for indeed vice can never at all know both itself and virtue. But virtue, where the temper is instructed by time, shall attain

to the knowledge of both itself and depravity. This one, then, and not the wicked, as it appears to me, is the wise man. And I, replied he, am of the same opinion. Will you not then establish in the city such a method of medicine as we have mentioned, along with such a method of judicature as shall carefully preserve for you those of your citizens who are naturally well disposed both in mind and in body? and with respect to those who are otherwise, such as are so in their bodies, they shall suffer to die; but such as are of an evil nature, and incurable with respect to their soul, these they shall themselves put to death? This, said he, has appeared to be best, both for those who suffer it and for the city. And it is plain, said I, that your youth will be afraid of needing this justiciary, whilst they are employed in that simple music, which, we say, generates temperance. Why will they not? said he. And, according to the very same steps of reasoning, the musician who is willing to pursue gymnastic, will choose to do it so as not to require any medicine unless there be necessity. It appears so to me. And he will perform his exercises, and his labours, rather looking to the irascible part of his nature, and exciting it by labour, than to strength; and not as the other wrestlers, who eat and drink and engage in labours for the sake of bodily strength. Most right, said he. Why then, said I, Glauco, they who propose to teach music and gymnastic, propose these things, not, for what some imagine, to cure the body by the one, and the soul by the other. What then? replied he. They seem, said I, to propose them both chiefly on the soul's account. As how? Do not you perceive, said I, how those are affected as to their dianoëtic part, who have all their life been conversant with gymnastic, but have never applied to music? or how those are affected who have lived in a method the reverse of this? What, said he, do you speak of? Of rusticity, said I, and fierceness, and again of softness and mildness. I know, said he, that those who apply themselves immoderately to gymnastic, become more rustic than is proper; and those again who attend to music alone, are more soft than is becoming for them to be. And surely, said I, this rusticity, at least, may impart an irascibility of nature, and, when rightly disciplined, may become fortitude; but, when carried further than is becoming, may, as is likely, be both more fierce and troublesome. So it appears to me, said he. But what? does not the philosophic

philosophic temper partake of the mild? And when this disposition is carried too far, may it not prove more soft than is becoming; but, when rightly disciplined, be really mild and comely? These things are so. But we say that our guardians ought to have both these dispositions. They ought. Ought not then these to be adapted to one another? Why not? And the soul in which they are thus adapted is temperate and brave. Certainly. But the soul in which they are not adapted, is cowardly and savage. Extremely so. And when one yields up himself to be soothed with the charms of music, and pours into his soul through his ears, as through a pipe, those we denominated the soft, effeminate, and plaintive harmonies, and spends the whole of his life chanting and ravished with melody; such an one, at the first, if he has any thing irascible, softens it like iron, and, from being useless and fierce, renders it profitable. But when still persisting he does not desist, but enchants his soul, after this, it melts and dissolves him, till it liquefies his anger, and cuts out, as it were, the nerves of his soul, and renders him an effeminate warrior. It is certainly so indeed, said he. But if, said I, he had from the beginning a temper void of irascibility, this he quickly effectuates; but, if irascible, it renders the mind weak, and easily turned, so as instantly to be enraged at trifles, and again the rage is extinguished: so that, from being irascible, they become outrageous and passionate, and full of the morose. So indeed it happens. But what now? If one labour much in gymnastic, and feast extremely well, but apply not to music and philosophy; shall he not, in the first place, having his body in a good condition, be filled with prudence and courage, and become more brave than he was before? Certainly so. But what, when he does nothing else; nor participates in any thing which is music-like, though there were any love of learning in his soul, as it neither tastes of any study, nor bears a share in any inquiry nor reasoning, nor any thing besides which is musical, must it not become feeble, and deaf, and blind, as his perceptions are neither awakened, nor nourished, nor refined? Just so. Such an one then becomes, as I imagine, a reason-hater, and unmusical; and by no means can be persuaded to any thing by reasoning, but is carried to every thing by force and savageness, as a wild beast; and thus he lives in ignorance and barbarity, out of measure, and unpolished. It is, said he, entirely so. Corresponding then to these

these two tempers, I would say, that some God, as appears, has given men two arts, those of music and gymnastic, in reference to the irascible and the philosophic temper; not for the soul and body, otherwise than as a by-work, but for that other purpose, that those two tempers might be adapted to one another; being stretched and slackened as far as is fit. So indeed it appears. Whoever then shall in the most handsome manner mingle gymnastic with music, and have these in the justest measure in his soul, him we shall most properly call the most completely musical, and of the best harmony; far more than the man who adjusts to one another musical strings. Most reasonably, said he, Socrates. Shall we not then, Glauco, always have need of such a president for our state, if our government is to be preserved? We shall most especially have need of this. Those then may be the models of education and discipline. For why should one go over the dances, the huntings of wild beasts, both with dogs and with nets, the wrestlings and the horse-races proper for such persons? for it is nearly manifest that these naturally follow of course, and it is no difficult matter to find them. It is indeed, said he, not difficult. Be it so, said I. But what follows next? What was next to be determined by us. Was it, which of these shall govern, and be governed? What else? Is it not plain that the elder ought to be governors, and the younger to be the governed? It is plain. And is it not likewise plain, that the best of them are to govern? This too is plain. But are not the best husbandmen the most assiduous in agriculture? They are. If now our guardians are the best, will they not be most vigilant over the city? They will. Must we not for this purpose make them prudent, and able, and careful likewise of the city? We must do so. But one would seem to be most careful of that which he happens to love. Undoubtedly. And one shall most especially love that to which he thinks the same things are profitable which are so to himself, and with whose good estate he thinks his own connected; and where he is of a contrary opinion, he will be contrariwise affected. Just so. We must choose then from the other guardians such men as shall most of all others appear to us, on observation, to do with the greatest cheerfulness, through the whole of life, whatever they think advantageous for the state, and what appears to be disadvantageous they will not do by any means. These are the most proper, said he. It truly appears to me, that

that they ought to be observed through every stage of their life, if they be tenacious of this opinion, so as that neither fraud nor force make them inconsiderately throw out this opinion, that they ought to do what is best for the state. What throwing out do you mean? said he. I will tell you, said I. An opinion seems to me to depart from the dianoëtic part voluntarily or involuntarily. A false opinion departs voluntarily from him who unlearns it; but every true opinion departs involuntarily. The case of the voluntary one, replied he, I understand; but that of the involuntary I want to learn. What now? Do not you think, said I, that men are involuntarily deprived of good things; but voluntarily of evil things? Or, is it not an evil to deviate from the truth, and a good to form true opinion? Or, does it not appear to you, that to conceive of things as they really are, is to form true opinion? You say rightly indeed, replied he. They do seem to me to be deprived unwillingly of true opinion. Do they not then suffer this, either in the way of theft, enchantment, or force? I do not now, said he, understand you. I seem, said I, to speak theatrically. But, I say, those have their opinions stolen away, who are persuaded to change their opinions, and also those who forget them; in the one case, they are imperceptibly taken away by time, and in the other by reasoning. Do you now understand in any measure? Yes. And those, I say, have their opinions forced from them, whom grief or agony obliges to change them. This, said he, I understand, and you say right. And those, I imagine, you will say, are enchanted out of their opinions, who change them, being bewitched by pleasure, or seduced by fear, being afraid of something. It seems, said he, that every thing magically beguiles which deceives us. That then which I was now mentioning must be sought for: who are the best guardians of this opinion; that that is to be done which is best for the state: and they must be observed immediately from their childhood, setting before them such pieces of work in which they may most readily forget a thing of this kind, and be deluded; and he who is mindful, and hard to be deluded, is to be chosen, and he who is otherwise is to be rejected. Is it not so? Yes. And we must appoint them trials of labours and of pains, in which we must observe the same things. Right, said he. Must we not, said I, appoint them a third contest, that of the mountebank kind; and observe them as those do, who, when they lead on young horses against

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noises and tumults, observe whether they are frightened? So must they, whilst young, be led into dreadful things, and again be thrown into pleasures, trying them more than gold in the fire, whether one is hard to be beguiled with mountebank tricks, and appear composed amidst all, being a good guardian of himself, and of that music which he learned, showing himself in all these things to be in just measure and harmony. Being of such a kind as this, he would truly be of the greatest advantage both to himself and to the state. And the man who in childhood, in youth, and in manhood, has been thus tried, and has come out pure, is to be appointed governor and guardian of the state; and honours are to be paid him whilst alive, and when dead he should receive the highest rewards of public funeral and other memorials. And he who is not such an one is to be rejected. Of such a kind, Glauco, said I, as it appears to me, is to be the choice and establishment of our governors and guardians, as in a sketch, and not accurately. And I, said he, am of the same opinion. Is it not then truly most just, to call these the most complete guardians, both with reference to enemies abroad, and to friends at home; so as that the one shall not have the will, nor the other have the power to do any mischief? And the youth (whom we now called guardians) will be allies and auxiliaries to the decrees of the governors. I imagine so, replied he. What now, said I, may be the contrivance of those lies, which are made on occasion, and of which we were lately saying that it is a most generous part, in making lies, to persuade the governors themselves most especially; or, if not these, the rest of the state? What sort do you mean? Nothing new, said I, but somewhat Phœnician, which has frequently happened heretofore, as the poets tell us, and have persuaded us, but has not happened in our times, nor do I know if ever it shall happen: to persuade one of it surely requires a subtle persuasion. How like you are, said he, to one who is averse to speak! I shall appear, said I, to be averse with very good reason, after I tell it. Speak, said he, and do not fear. I speak then, though I know not with what courage, and using what expressions, I shall tell it. And I shall attempt, first of all, to persuade the governors themselves, and the soldiers, and afterwards the rest of the state, that, whatever we educated and instructed them in, all these particulars seemed to happen to them and to befall them as dreams; but that they were in truth at that time formed and educated within

the earth ; both they themselves, and their armour and their other utensils, being there likewise fabricated. And after they were completely fashioned, that the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth ; and now they ought to be affected towards the country where they are, as to their mother and nurse ; to defend her, if any invade her ; and to consider the rest of the citizens as being their brothers, and sprung from their mother earth. It was not without reason, said he, that some time since you was ashamed to tell this falsehood. I had truly reason, said I. But hear however the rest of the fable. All of you now in the state are brothers (as we shall tell them in way of fable) ; but the God, when he formed you, mixed gold in the formation of such of you as are able to govern ; therefore are they the most honourable. And silver, in such as are auxiliaries ; and iron and brass in the husbandmen and other handicrafts. As you are all of the same kind, you for the most part resemble one another : and it sometimes happens, that of the gold is generated the silver, and of the silver there is a golden descendant ; and thus every different way are they generated of one another. The God gives in charge, first of all, and chiefly to the governors, that of nothing are they to be so good guardians, nor are they so strongly to keep watch over any thing, as over their children ; to know what of those principles is mixed in their souls ; and if their descendant shall be of the brazen or iron kind, they shall by no means have compassion ; but, assigning him honour proportioned to his natural temper, they shall push him down to the craftsmen or husbandmen. And if again any from among these shall be born of a golden or silver kind, they shall pay them honour, and prefer them ; those to the guardianship, and these to the auxiliary rank : it being pronounced by the oracle, that the state is then to perish when iron or brass shall have the guardianship of it. Have you now any contrivance to persuade them of this fable ? None, said he, to persuade these men themselves ; but I can contrive how that their sons and posterity, and all mankind afterwards, shall believe it. Even this, said I, would do well towards making them more concerned about the state, and one another ; for I almost understand what you say. And this truly will lead the same way as the oracle. But let us, having armed these earth-born sons, lead them forwards under their leaders ; and when they are come into the city, let them consider where
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it is best to place their camp, so as best to keep in order those who are within, if any one should want to disobey the laws; and likewise defend against those without, if any enemy, as a wolf, should come upon the fold. And when they have marked out their camp, and performed sacrifices to the proper divinities, let them erect their tents: or, how are they to do? Just so, said he. Shall they not be such as may be sufficient to defend them, both from winter and summer? Why not? for you seem, said he, to mean houses. Yes, said I, but military ones; not such as are costly. What do you say, replied he, is the difference between the one and the other? I will endeavour, said I, to tell you; for, of all things, it is the most dreadful, and the most shameful to shepherds, to breed such kind of dogs, and in such a manner, as auxiliaries of the flocks, as either through intemperance or famine, or some other ill disposition, the dogs themselves should attempt to hurt the sheep; and, instead of dogs, resemble wolves. That is dreadful, said he, why is it not? Must we not then, by all means, take care lest our allies do such a thing towards our citizens, as they are more powerful; and, instead of generous allies, resemble savage lords? We must take care, said he. Would they not be prepared, as to the greatest part of the care, if they were really well educated? But they are so at least, replied he. And I said: That is not proper to be confidently affirmed, friend Glauco; but that is proper which we were now saying, that they ought to have good education, whatever it is, if they are to have what is of the greatest consequence towards rendering them mild, both among themselves and towards those who are guarded by them. Very right, said he. Besides then this education, any one of understanding would say, that their houses, and all their other substance, ought to be so contrived, as not to hinder their guardians from being the very best of men, and not to stir them up to injure the other citizens. And he will say true. If then they intend to be such, consider, said I, whether they ought to live and dwell in some such manner as this: First, then, let none possess any substance privately, unless there be the greatest necessity for it: next, let none have any dwelling, or store-house, into which whoever inclines may not enter: as for necessaries, let them be such as temperate and brave warriors may require; and as they are instituted by the other citizens, let them receive such a reward of their guardianship, as to have neither over-

plus nor deficiency at the year's end. Let them have public meals, as in encampments, and live in common. They must be told, that they have from the Gods a divine gold and silver at all times in their souls; and have no need of the human. And that it were profane to pollute the possession of the divine kind, by mixing it with the possession of this mortal gold; because the money of the vulgar has produced many impious deeds, but that of these men is incorruptible. And of all the men in the city, they alone are not allowed to handle or touch gold and silver; nor to bring it under their roof; nor carry it about with them; nor to drink out of silver or gold: and that thus they are to preserve themselves and the state. But whenever they shall possess lands, and houses, and money, in a private way, they shall become stewards and farmers instead of guardians, hateful lords instead of allies to the other citizens: hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they shall pass the whole of their life; much oftener and more afraid of the enemies from within than from without, they and the rest of the state hastening speedily to destruction. For all which reasons, said I, let us affirm, that our guardians are thus to be constituted with reference both to their houses and to other things. And let us settle these things by law. Shall we? By all means, said Glauco.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

THE

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK IV.

ADIMANTUS hereupon replying, What now, Socrates, said he, will you say in your own defence, if one shall say that you do not make these men very happy? for, though it is owing to these men that the city really exists, yet they enjoy no advantage in the city, such as others do who possess lands, build beautiful and large houses, purchase suitable furniture, offer sacrifices at their own expense, give public entertainments to strangers, and possess what you was now mentioning, gold and silver, and every thing which is reckoned to contribute towards the rendering men happy. But one may readily say, that, like hired auxiliaries, they seem to possess nothing in the city but the employment of keeping guard. Yes, said I; and that too only for their maintenance, without receiving, as all others do, any reward besides. So that they are not allowed so much as to travel privately any where abroad, though they should incline to it; nor to bestow money on others, nor to spend it in such other methods as those do who are counted happy. These and many such things you leave out of the accusation. But let these things too, said he, be charged against them. You ask then, what we shall say in our defence? I do. Whilst we go on in the same road, we shall find, as I imagine, what may be said: for we shall say, that it were nothing strange if these men, even in these circumstances, should be the happiest possible. Yet it was not with an eye to this that we established the city; to have any one tribe in it remarkably happy beyond the rest; but that the whole city might be in the happiest condition; for we judged, that in such an one we should most especially find justice, and injustice in the city the worst established: and that, upon thoroughly examining these, we should determine what we have for some time been in search of. Now then, as I imagine, we are forming a happy state,

state, not selecting some few persons to make them alone happy ; but are establishing the universal happiness of the whole : and we shall next consider a state which is the reverse. As if then we were painting human figures, and one approaching should blame us, saying, that we do not place the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the creature ; for that the eyes, the most beautiful part, were not painted with purple, but with black ; should we not seem to apologize sufficiently to him, by saying, Wonderful critic ! do not imagine that we ought to paint the eyes beautiful, in such a way as that they would not appear to be eyes ; and so with reference to all other parts. But consider, whether, in giving each particular part its due, we make the whole beautiful. And so now, do not oblige us to confer such a happiness on our guardians as shall make them any thing rather than guardians : for we know too, how to array the husbandmen in rich and costly robes, and to enjoin them to cultivate the ground only with a view to pleasure ; and in like manner, those who make earthen ware, to lie at their ease by the fire, to drink and feast, neglecting the wheel, and working only so much as they incline : and we know how to confer a felicity of this nature on every individual, in order to render the whole state happy. But do not advise us to act after this manner ; since, if we obey you, neither would the husbandman really be a husbandman, nor the potter be a potter ; nor would any other really be of any of those professions of which the city is composed. But, as to others, it is of less consequence ; for, when shoemakers become bad, and are degenerate, and profess to be shoemakers when they are not, no great mischief happens to the state : but when the guardians of the law and of the state are not so in reality, but only in appearance, you see how they entirely destroy the whole constitution ; if they alone shall have the privilege of an affluent and happy life. If we then are for appointing men who shall be really guardians of the city, the least of all hurtful to it ; and he who makes the objection is for having them rather as certain farmers, and as in a festival-meeting, not in a city, certain public entertainers, indulging in jollity, he must mean something else than a city : we must then consider whether we establish guardians with this view, that they may have the greatest happiness ; or if we establish them with a view to the happiness of the whole city, let us see whether this takes place ; and let us oblige these
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allies and guardians to do this, and we must persuade them they shall thus become the best performers of their own particular work; and we must act towards all others in the same manner. And thus the whole city being increased, and well constituted, let us allow the several tribes to participate of happiness as their natures admit. You seem to me, said he, to say well. Shall I appear to you, said I, to speak right in what is akin to this? What is that? Consider whether other artificers are corrupted by these things, so as to be made bad workmen. What things do you mean? Riches, said I, and poverty. As how? Thus: Does the potter, after he becomes rich, seem still to mind his art? By no means, said he. But will he not become more idle and careless than formerly? Much more so. Shall he not then become a more unskilful potter? Much more so, likewise, said he. And surely, being unable through poverty to furnish himself with tools, or any thing else requisite to his art, his workmanship shall be more imperfectly executed, and his sons, or those others whom he instructs, shall be inferior artists. How should they not? Through both these, now, poverty and riches, the workmanship in the arts is rendered less perfect, and the artists themselves become less expert. It appears so. We have then, it seems, discovered other things, which our guardians must by all means watch against, that they may in no respect escape their notice, and steal into the city. What kind of things are these? Riches, said I, and poverty: as the one is productive of luxury, idleness, and a love of novelty; and the other, besides a love of novelty, is illiberal, and productive of mischief. They are entirely so, said he. But consider this, Socrates. How shall our city be able to engage in war, since she is possessed of no money, especially if she be obliged to wage war against a great and opulent state? It is plain, said I, that to fight against one of this kind is somewhat difficult; but to fight against two is a more easy matter. How say you? replied he. First of all, now, said I, if they have at all occasion to fight, will they not, being expert in the art of war, fight against rich men? They will, said he. What then, said I, Adimantus, do not you think that one boxer, who is fitted out in the best manner possible for this exercise, is easily able to fight against two who are not expert boxers, but, on the contrary, are rich and unwieldy? He would not perhaps easily fight with both at once, said he. Would he not, said I, though he had it in his power to retire a little, and then turn

on the one who should be the furthest advanced towards him, and strike him, and by doing this frequently in the sun and heat? Might not a person of this kind easily defeat many such as these? Certainly, said he; that would be no great wonder. But do not you think that the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of the military art? I do, said he. Easily then, as it plainly appears, will our athletics combat with double and triple their number. I will agree with you, said he; for you seem to me to say right. But what if they should send an embassy to another state, informing them of the true situation of the affair, telling them, We make no use of gold or silver, neither is it lawful for us to use them, but with you it is lawful; if then you become our allies in the war, you will receive the spoils of all the other states: do you imagine that any, on hearing these things, would choose to fight against strong and resolute dogs, rather than in alliance with the dogs to fight against fat and tender sheep? I do not think it; but, if the riches of others be amassed into one state, see that it does not endanger that which is poor. You are happy, said I, that you imagine any other deserves to be called a state besides such an one as we have established. Why not? said he. We must give others, said I, a more magnificent appellation; for each of them consists of many states, and is not one, as is said in way of irony: for there are always in them two parties at war with each other, the poor and the rich; and in each of these again there are very many: to which if you apply as to one, you are mistaken entirely; but if, as to many, you put one part in possession of the goods and power of another, or even deliver up the one to the other, you shall always have the many for your allies, and the few for enemies; and, so long as your state shall continue temperately, as now established, it shall be the greatest. I do not say it shall be accounted so, but shall be really the greatest, though its defenders were no more than one thousand; for one state so great you will not easily find, either among the Greeks or Barbarians, but many which are accounted many times larger than such an one as this. Are you of a different opinion? No, truly, said he. Might not this, then, said I, be the best mark for our rulers how large to make the city, and what extent of ground to mark off for it in proportion to its bulk, without attending to any thing further? What mark? said he. I imagine, said I, this: So long as the city,

on its increafe, continues to be one, fo long it may be increafed, but not beyond it. Very right, faid he. Shall we not then lay this further injunftion on our guardians, to take care by all means that the city be neither fmall nor great, but of moderate extent, and be one city? We fhall probably, faid he, enjoin them a trifling affair. A more trifling affair ftill than this, faid I, is that we mentioned above, when we obferved, that if any defcendant of the guardians be depraved, he ought to be difmiffed to the other claffes; and if any defcendant of the others be worthy, he is to be raifed to the rank of the guardians; and this was intended to fhew that all the other citizens ought to apply themfelves each to that particular art for which he has a natural genius, that fo every one minding his own proper work may not be many, but be one; and fo likewife the whole ftate may become one, and not be many. This indeed, faid he, is ftill a more trifling matter than the other. We do not here, faid I, good Adimantus, as one may imagine, enjoin them many and great matters, but fuch as are all trifling, if they take care of one grand point, as the faying is, or rather that which is fufficient in place of the grand. What is that? faid he. Education, faid I, and nurture; for if, being well educated, they become temperate men, they will eafily fee through all thefe things, and fuch other things as we omit at prefent, refpefting women, marriages, and the propagation of the fpecies. For thefe things ought all, according to the proverb, to be made entirely common among friends. That, faid he, would be moft right. And furely, faid I, if once a republic is fet a-going, it proceeds happily, increafing as a circle. And whilft good education and nurture are preferved, they produce good geniufes; and good geniufes, partaking of fuch education, produce ftill better than the former, as well in other refpefts as with reference to propagation, as in the cafe of other animals. It is likely, faid he. To fpeak then briefly, this the guardians of the ftate muft oppofe, that it may not, efcaping their notice, hurt the conftitution; nay, above all things, they muft guard againft this, not to make any innovations in gymnafic and mufic, contrary to the eftablifhed order of the ftate, but to maintain this order as much as poffible; being afraid left, whilft a man adopts that poetical expreffion,

..... Men moft admire that fong,
Which moft partakes of novelty,

one should frequently imagine, that the poet means not new songs, but a new method of the song, and should commend this. Such a thing is neither to be commended nor admitted; for, to receive a new kind of music is to be guarded against, as endangering the whole of the constitution: for never are the measures of music altered without the greatest politic laws, according to Damon, with whom I agree. You may place me likewise, said Adimantus, among those who are of that opinion. We must erect then, said I, some barrier, as would seem, somewhere here, for our guardians themselves, with regard to music. A transgression here, said he, easily indeed steals in imperceptibly. It does, said I, in the way of diversion, and as productive of no mischief. For neither indeed does it produce any other, said he, but that becoming familiar by degrees it insensibly runs into the manners and pursuits; and from thence, in intercourse of dealings one with another, it becomes greater; and from this intercourse it enters into laws and policies with much impudence, Socrates, till at last it overturns all things, both private and public. Well, said I, let it be allowed to be so. It appears so to me, replied he. Ought not then our children, as I said at the beginning, to receive directly from their infancy an education more agreeable to the laws of the constitution? because, if their education be such as is contrary to law, and the children be of such a nature themselves, it is impossible that they should ever grow up to be worthy men, and observant of the laws. Why, is it not? said he. But when handsome amusements are appointed them from their infancy, and when, by means of the music, they embrace that amusement which is according to law (contrariwise to those others), this music attends them in every thing else, and grows with them, and raises up in the city whatever formerly was fallen down. It is true, indeed, said he. And these men, said I, discover those establishments which appear trifling, and which those others destroyed altogether. What establishments? Such as these: Silence of the younger before the elder, which is proper; and the giving them place, and rising up before them, and reverence of parents; likewise what shaving, what clothes and shoes are proper, with the whole dress of the body, and every thing else of the kind. Are you not of this opinion? I am. But to establish these things by law, would, I imagine, be a silly thing, nor is it done any where; nor would it stand,

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though established both by word and writing. For, how is it possible? It seems then, said I, Adimantus, that a man's character and conduct will always be according to his education, let him apply himself afterwards to what he will: or, does not the like always produce the like? Why not? And we may say, I imagine, that at last it arrives at somewhat complete and vigorous, either good, or what is the reverse. Why not? said he. I would not then, said I, for these reasons, as yet, undertake to settle by law such things as these. Right, said he. But what now, by the gods, said I, as to those laws relative to matters of exchange, and to their traffic one with another in the forum, and, if you please, their traffic likewise among their handicrafts, their scandals, bodily hurt, and raising of lawsuits; their institution of judges, and likewise such imposts and payments of taxes as may be necessary either in the forum or at shores; or in general whatever laws are municipal, civil, or marine, or what other laws there may be of this kind; shall we dare to establish any of these? It is improper, said he, to prescribe these to good and worthy men; for they will easily find out the most of them, such as ought to be established by law. Yes, said I, friend, if at least God grant them the preservation of the laws we formerly explained. And if not, said he, they will spend the whole of their life making and amending many such laws as these, imagining that they shall thus attain to that which is best. You say that such as these shall lead a life, said I, like those who are sick, and at the same time unwilling, through intemperance, to quit an unwholesome diet. Entirely so. And these truly must live very pleasantly; for, though they deal with physicians, they gain nothing, but render their diseases greater and more complex; and they still hope, that when any one recommends any medicine to them, they shall, by means of it, be made whole. This is entirely the situation of such diseased persons as these. But what, said I, is not this pleasant in them? to count that man the most hateful of all, who tells them the truth; that, till one give over drunkenness and gluttony, and unchaste pleasure, and laziness, neither drugs nor caustics, nor amputations, nor charms, nor applications, nor any other such things as these, will be of any avail. That, said he, is not quite pleasant; for to be enraged at one who tells us what is right, has nothing pleasant in it. You are no admirer, said I, as it would seem, of this sort of men. No, truly.

Neither then, though the whole of the city (as we were lately saying) should do such a thing, would you commend them : or, is not the same thing which is done by these people, done by all those cities, which, being ill-governed, enjoin their citizens not to alter any part of the constitution, for that whoever shall do such a thing is to be put to death ; but, that whoever shall with the greatest cheerfulness reverence those who govern in this fashion, and shall gratify them in the most obsequious manner ; and, anticipating their desires, be most dexterous in satisfying them, shall be reckoned both worthy and wise in matters of highest importance ; and be held by them in the greatest honour ? They seem to me at least, said he, to do the very same thing, and by no means do I commend them. But what again as to those who desire to have the management of such states, and are even fond of it, are you not delighted with their courage and dexterity ? I am, said he ; excepting such as are imposed on by them, and fancy that they are really politicians, because they are commended as such by the multitude. How do you mean ? Do you not pardon those men ? said I. Or do you even think it is possible for a man who cannot measure himself, when he hears many other such men telling him that he is four cubits, not to believe this of himself ? It is impossible, said he. Then be not angry in this case ; for such men as these are of all the most ridiculous, since, always making laws about such things as we now mentioned, and always amending, they imagine that they shall find some period of these frauds respecting commerce, and those other things I now spoke of, being ignorant that they are in reality attempting to destroy a hydra. They are surely, said he, doing nothing else. I imagine then, said I, that a true lawgiver ought not to give himself much disturbance about such a species of laws and police, either in an ill or well-regulated state ; in the one, because it is unprofitable and of no avail ; in the other, because any one can find out some of the laws, and others of them flow of course from the habits arising from their early education. What part then of the institutions of law, said he, have we yet remaining ? And I said, that to us indeed there is nothing remaining ; but, however, to the Delphian Apollo there remains the greatest, noblest, and most important of legal institutions. Of what kind ? said he. The institutions of temples, sacrifices, and other worship of the Gods, dæmons, and heroes ; likewise the
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depositing the dead, and what other rites ought to be performed to them, so as to make them propitious. For truly such things as these, we ourselves neither know ; nor, in founding the state, will we intrust them to any other, if we be wise ; nor will we make use of any other interpreter, except the God of the country. For this God is the interpreter in every country to all men in these things, who interprets to them sitting in the middle of the earth. And it is well established, said he, and we must do accordingly.

Thus now, son of Aristo, said I, is the city established for you. And, in the next place, having procured somehow sufficient light, do you yourself observe, and call on your brother and on Polemarchus and these others to assist us, if by any means we may at all perceive where justice is, and where injustice ; and in what respect they differ from each other : and which of them the man ought to acquire, who proposes to himself to be happy, whether he be concealed or not concealed both from Gods and men. But you say nothing to the purpose, replied Glauco ; for you yourself promised to inquire into this, deeming it impious for you not to assist the cause of justice by every possible means. It is true, said I, what you remind me of, and I must do accordingly. But it is proper that you too should assist in the inquiry. We shall do so, said he. I hope then, said I, to discover it in this manner. I think that our city, if it be rightly established, is perfectly good. Of necessity, said he. Then it is plain, that it is wise, and brave, and temperate, and just. It manifestly is so. Whichever then of these we shall find in it, shall there not remain behind that which is not found ? Why not ? For as if we were in quest of one, of any other four, in any thing whatever, if we discovered this one at the first, we would be satisfied ; but if we should first discover the other three from this itself, that which we were inquiring after would be known ; for it is plain it would be no other but that which remained. You say right, said he. Since then there are in our state those four above mentioned, shall we not inquire about them, according to the same manner ? It is plain we ought. First of all, then, to me at least, wisdom appears to be conspicuous in it ; and concerning it there appears something very uncommon. What is that ? said he. Surely this city which we have described appears to me to be wise, for its councils are wise ; are they not ?

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They are. And surely this very thing, the ability of counselling well, is plainly a certain science; for men nowhere counsel well through ignorance, but through science. It is plain. But there are many and various species of science in the state. Why, are there not? Is it then from the science of the carpenters, that the state is to be denominated wise and well-counselled? By no means from this, said he, is it said to be wise, but to be mechanical. Is then the state to be denominated wise, when it consults wisely through its knowledge in utensils of wood, how to have these in the best manner possible? Nor this neither. But what, is it for its knowledge of these in brass, or for any thing else of this kind? For none of these, said he. Nor yet for its knowledge of the fruits of the earth is it said to be wise, but to be skilled in agriculture. It seems so to me. But what, said I, is there any science among any of the citizens in this city which we have founded, which deliberates, not about any particular thing in the city, but about the whole, how it may, in the best manner, behave towards itself, and towards other cities? There is truly. What is it, said I, and among whom is it to be found? This very guardianship, said he, is it, and it is among these governors, whom we lately denominated complete guardians. What now do you denominate the state on account of this knowledge? Well-counselled, said he, and really wise. Whether then, said I, do you imagine the brass-smiths, or these true guardians, will be most numerous in the state? The brass-smiths, said he, will be much more numerous. And of all, said I, as many as, having any knowledge, are of any account, will not these guardians be the fewest in number? By much. From this smallest tribe then, and part of the state, and from that presiding and governing science in it, is the whole city wisely established according to nature; and this tribe, as it appears, is by nature the smallest, to whom it belongs to share in this science, which of all others ought alone to be denominated wisdom. You say, replied he, perfectly true. This one, then, of the four, we have found, I know not how, both what it is, and in what part of the state it resides. And it seems to me, said he, to be sufficiently described. But surely as to fortitude, at least, it is no difficult matter, both to find out itself, and the particular part of the city in which it resides, on account of which virtue the city is denominated brave. As how? Doth any one,

one, said I, call a city brave or cowardly, with reference to any other than that particular part of it which makes war and fights in its defence? No one, said he, calls it such, with reference to any other part. For I do not think, said I, that the other tribes who are in it, whether they be cowardly or brave, have power to render the city either the one or the other. No, indeed. The city then is brave likewise in one particular part of itself, because it has within it a power of such a nature as shall always preserve their opinions about things which are dreadful, that they are both these very things, and of the very same kind which the lawgiver inculcated on them in their education? Do not you call this fortitude? I have not, said he, entirely comprehended what you say; but tell it over again. I call fortitude, said I, a certain preservative. What sort of preservative? A preservative of opinion formed by law in a course of education about things which are dreadful, what these are, and of what kind: I called it a preservative at all times, because they were to retain it in pains and in pleasures, in desires and fears, and never to cast it off; and, if you are willing, I shall liken it to what in my opinion it bears a near resemblance. I am willing. Do not you know then, said I, that the dyers, when they want to dye their wool, so as to be of a purple colour, out of all the colours they first make choice of the white; and then, with no trifling apparatus, they prepare and manage it, so as best of all to take on the purest colour, and thus they dye it; and whatever is tinged in this manner is of an indelible dye; and no washing, either without or with soap, is able to take away the pure colour: but such wool as is not managed in this manner, you know what sort it proves, whether one is dyeing other colours, or this, without the due preparation beforehand. I know, said he, that they are easily washed out, and are ridiculous. Imagine then, that we too, according to our ability, were aiming at such a thing as this, when we were choosing out our soldiers, and were instructing them in music and gymnastic: and do not imagine we had any thing else in view, but that, in obedience to us, they should in the best manner imbibe the laws as a colour; in order that their opinion about what is dreadful, and about other things, might be indelible, both by means of natural temper and suitable education: and that these washes, however powerful in effacing, may not be able to wash away their dye, pleasure, which is more powerful in effecting this than all soap and ashes,

pain and fear, and desire, which exceed every other cosmetic. Such a power now, and perpetual preservation of right opinion, and such as is according to law, about things which are dreadful, and which are not, I call and constitute fortitude, unless you offer something else. But I offer, said he, nothing else: for you seem to me to reckon that such right opinion of these things, as arises without education, is both savage and fervile, and not at all according to law, and you call it something else than fortitude. You say most true, said I. I admit then, that this is fortitude. Admit it further, said I, to be political fortitude, and you shall admit rightly: but, if you please, we shall inquire about it more perfectly another time; for, at present, it is not this, but justice we were seeking; and with regard to the inquiry concerning this, it has, in my opinion, been carried far enough. You speak very well, said he. There yet remain, said I, two things in the city which we must search out: both temperance, and that for the sake of which we have been searching after all the rest, to wit, justice. By all means. How now can we find out justice, that we may not be further troubled about temperance? I truly neither know, said he, nor do I wish it to appear first, if we are to dismiss altogether the consideration of temperance; but, if you please to gratify me, consider this before the other. I am indeed pleased, said I, if I be not doing an injury. Consider then, said he. We must consider, replied I; and as it appears from this point of view, it seems to resemble a certain symphony and harmony more than those things formerly mentioned. How? Temperance, said I, is somehow a certain ornament, and a government, as they say, of certain pleasures and desires; and to appear superior to oneself, I know not how, and other such things, are mentioned as vestiges of it; are they not? These are the principal vestiges of it, said he. Is not then the expression, 'superior to oneself,' ridiculous? For he who is superior to himself must somehow be likewise inferior to himself, and the inferior be the superior; for the same person is spoken of in all these cases. Why not? But to me, said I, the expression seems to denote, that in the same man, with respect to his soul, there is one part better, and another worse; and that when the part more excellent in his nature is that which governs the inferior part, this is called being superior to himself, and expresses a commendation; but when through ill education, or any kind of converse,

that better part, which is smaller, is conquered by the crowd, the worse part; this, by way of reproach, both expresses blame, and denotes the person thus affected to be inferior to himself, and altogether licentious. So it appears, said he. Observe then, said I, our new city, and you shall find one of these in it: for you will own, it may justly be said to be superior to itself, if, where the better part governs the worse, that state is said to be temperate, and superior to itself. I observe, said he, and you say true. And surely one may find a great many and various desires and pleasures and pains more especially among children and women and domestics, and among the greatest and most depraved part of those who are called free. It is perfectly so. But the simple and the moderate desires, and such as are led by intellect, and the judgment of right opinion, you will meet with both in the few, and those of the best natural temper, and of the best education. True, said he. And do not you see those things in our city, that there too the desires of the many, and of the baser part, are governed by the desires and by the prudence of the smaller and more moderate part? I see it, said he. If then any city ought to be called superior to pleasures and desires, and to itself, this one is to be called so. By all means, said he. And is it not on all these accounts temperate? Very much so, said he. And if, in any other city, there is the same opinion in the governors and the governed about this point, who ought to govern, it is to be found in this, do not you think so? I am strongly of that opinion. In whom then of the citizens will you say that temperance resides, when they are thus affected, in the governors, or the governed? In both of them somehow, said he. You see then, said I, that we justly conjectured of late, that temperance resembles a kind of harmony. For what? Because not as fortitude and wisdom, which reside each of them in a certain part, the one of them making the city wise, and the other courageous, not after this manner doth it render the city temperate; but it is naturally diffused through the whole, connecting the weakest, and those in the middle, all in one symphony, either as to wisdom if you will, or if you will in strength, or in substance, or in any other of those things; so that most justly may we say, that this concord is temperance: a symphony of that which is naturally the worse and the better part, with reference to this, which of them ought to govern in the city, and in every individual. I am entirely,

said he, of the same opinion. Be it so then, said I. There are now three things in the city, it would seem, clearly discovered: but with respect to that other species which remains, by which the city partakes of virtue; what at all can it be? Is it not plain that it is justice? It is plain. Ought we not now, Glauco, like some huntsmen, to surround the thicket, carefully attending lest justice somehow escape, and, disappearing, remain undiscovered? For it is plain that she is somewhere here. Look, therefore, and be eager to perceive her, if any how you see her sooner than I, and point her out to me. I wish I could, said he; but if you employ me as an attendant rather, and one who is able to perceive what is pointed out to him, you will treat me perfectly well. Follow, said I, after you have offered prayers along with me. I will do so; only, said he, lead you the way. To me this seems, said I, to be a place somehow of difficult access, and shady: It is therefore dark, and difficult to be scrutinized; we must however go on. We must go, said he. I then perceiving, said, Iö! Iö! Glauco, we seem to have somewhat which appears to be a footstep; and I imagine that something shall not very long escape us. You tell good news, said he. We are truly, said I, of a slow disposition. As how? It appears, O blessed man! to have been long since rolling at our feet, from the beginning, and we perceived it not, but made the most ridiculous figure, like those who seek sometimes for what they have in their hand; so we did not perceive it, but were looking somewhere off at a distance, and in this way perhaps it escaped us. How do you say? replied he. Thus, said I, that we seem to me to have been speaking and hearing of it long since, and not to understand ourselves, that in some measure we expressed it. A long preamble, said he, to one who is eager to hear. Hear then, said I, if I say any thing. For that which we at first established, when we regulated the city, as what ought always to be done, that, as it appears to me, or a species of it, is justice. For we somewhere established it, and often spoke of it, if you remember; that every one ought to apply himself to one thing, relating to the city, to which his genius was naturally most adapted. We did speak of it. And that to do one's own affairs, and not to be pragmatical, is justice. This we have both heard from many others, and have often spoken of it ourselves. We have indeed spoken of it. This then, friend, said I, appears to be in a certain manner justice; to do one's own
affairs.

affairs. Do you know whence I conjecture this? No; but tell, said he. Besides those things we have already considered in the city, viz. temperance, fortitude, and wisdom; this, said I, seems to remain, which gives power to all these, both to have a being in the state, and, whilst they exist in it, to afford it safety; and we said too, that justice would be that which would remain, if we found the other three. There is necessity for it, said he. But if, said I, it be necessary to judge which of these, when subsisting in the city, shall in the greatest measure render it good; it would be difficult to determine whether the agreement between the governors and the governed, or the maintaining of sound opinion by the soldiers about what things are dreadful, and what are not; or wisdom and guardianship in the rulers; or whether this, when it exists in the city, renders it in the greatest measure good, viz. when child and woman, bond and free, artificer, magistrate and subject, when every one does their own affairs, and is not pragmatical. It is difficult to determine, said he: How should it not be so? This power then, by which every one in the city performs his own office, is co-rival it seems for the perfection of the city, along with its wisdom, temperance, and fortitude. Extremely so, said he. Will you not then constitute justice to be this co-rival with these, for the perfection of the city? By all means. Consider it likewise in this manner, whether it shall thus appear to you. Will you enjoin the rulers to give just decisions in judgment? Why not? But will they give just judgment, if they aim at any thing preferable to this, that no one shall have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of his own? No; but they can only give just judgment, when they aim at this. And do they not aim at this as being just? Yes. And thus justice is acknowledged to be the habitual practice of one's own proper and natural work. It is so. See then if you agree with me. If a carpenter take in hand to do the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker the work of a carpenter, or exchange either their utensils or prices; or if the same man take in hand to do both, and all else be exchanged; do you imagine the state would be any way greatly injured? Not very much, said he. But I imagine, that when one who is a craftsman, or who is born to any lucrative employment, shall afterwards, being puffed up by riches, by the mob, or by strength, or any other such thing, attempt to go into the rank of counsellor and guardian, when unworthy of it; and when these shall exchange utensils and rewards

with one another ; or when the same man shall take in hand to do all these things at once ; then I imagine you will be of opinion that this interchange of these things, and this variety of employments practised by one, is the destruction of the state. By all means. Pragmaticalness then in these three species, and their change into one another, is the greatest hurt to the state, and may most justly be called its depravity. It may so truly. But will not you say that injustice is the greatest ill of the state ? Why not ? This then is injustice. But let us again speak of it in this manner. When the craftsman, the auxiliary and the guardian-band do their proper work, each of them doing their own work in the city ; this is the contrary of the other, that is justice, and renders the city just. It seems to me, said he, to be no otherwise than thus. But let us not, said I, affirm it very strongly : but if it shall be allowed us that this species of these, when it enters into any individual, is likewise justice in him, we shall then be agreed ; (for what shall we say ?) if not, we shall consider something else. But now let us finish that speculation, which we thought proper, when we judged that, if we attempted first to contemplate justice in some of the greater objects which possess it, it would more easily be seen in one man ; and a city appeared to us to be the most proper object of this kind. And so we established the very best we could, well knowing that justice would be in a good one. Let us now transfer and apply to a single person what has there appeared to us with respect to a whole city : and, if the same things correspond, it shall be well ; but, if any thing different appear in the individual, going back again to the city, we shall put it to the proof ; and, instantly considering them, when placed by one another, and striking them, we shall make justice shine out as from flints ; and, when it is become manifest, we shall firmly establish it among ourselves. You say quite in the right way, said he, and we must do so. Why then, said I, when we denominate any thing the same, though different in degrees, is it dissimilar in that respect in which we call it the same, or is it similar ? It is similar, said he. The just man then, said I, will differ nothing from the just city, according to the idea of justice, but will be similar to it. He will be similar to it, said he. But indeed with respect to this inquiry, the city at least appeared then to be just, when the three species of dispositions in it did each of them its own work, viz. the temperate, the brave, and the wise, by virtue of their

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own proper natures, and not according to any other affections and habits. True, said he. And shall we not, friend, judge it proper, that the individual, who has in his soul the same principles (viz. temperance, fortitude, wisdom), shall, from having the same affections with those in the city, be called by the same names? By all means, said he. We have again, O wonderful man! fallen into no mean speculation concerning the soul; whether it contain in itself those three principles or not. Into no mean one, as I imagine, said he. And it is likely, Socrates, that the common saying is true, that things excellent are difficult. It appears so, said I. But know well, Glauco, that, according to my opinion, we shall never comprehend this matter accurately, in the methods we are now using in these reasonings, for the road leading to it is greater and longer: we may however, it is likely, speak of it in such a manner as may be worthy of our former disquisitions and speculations. Is not that desirable? said he. This would satisfy me for my own part, at present, at least. This, said I, shall to me too be quite sufficient. Do not then give over, said he, but pursue your inquiry. Are we not, then, under a necessity, said I, of acknowledging that there are in every one of us the same forms and manners which are in the city? for from no where else did they arrive thither. For it were ridiculous if one should imagine that the irascible disposition did not arise from the individuals in cities, who have this blemish, as those of Thrace, Scythia, and, in some measure, almost all the higher region; and the same thing may be said with respect to the love of learning, which one may chiefly ascribe to this country; or with reference to the love of riches, which we may say prevailed especially among the Phœnicians and the inhabitants of Egypt. Very much so, said he. This then is so, said I; nor is it difficult to be known. No, indeed. But this is difficult to determine, whether we perform each of these by the same power; or, as they are three, we perform one by one power, and another by another; that is, we learn by one, we are angry by another, and by a certain third we desire those pleasures relating to nutrition and propagation, and the other pleasures of affinity to these. Or do we, in each of these, when we apply to them, act with the whole soul? These things are difficult to be determined in a manner worthy of the subject. So it seems to me, said he. Let us then, in this manner, attempt to determine.

mine these things, whether they are the same with one another, or different. How are we to do it? It is plain, that one and the same thing cannot, at one and the same time, do or suffer contrary things in the same respect, and with reference to the same object; so that, if we any where find these circumstances existing among them, we shall know that it was not one and the same thing, but several. Be it so. Consider then what I am saying. Proceed, replied he. Is it possible for the same thing to stand and to be moved at once in the same respect? By no means. Let us determine this more accurately still; lest, as we proceed, we be any way uncertain about it. For, if one should say that when a man stands, yet moves his hands and his head, that the same person at once stands and is moved, we should not, I imagine, think it proper to speak in this manner; but that one part of him stood, and another part was moved. Should we not speaking this manner? In this manner. But if one who says these things should, in a more jocose humour still, and facetiously cavilling, allege that tops stand wholly, and are at the same time moved, when their centre is fixed on one point, and they are whirled about,—or that any thing else going round in a circle in the same position doth this,—we should not admit it, as it is not in the same respect that they stand still and are moved: but we should say, that they have in them the straight line and the periphery; and that, with relation to the straight line, they stood; (for towards no side they declined); but with relation to the periphery, they moved in a circle. But, when its perpendicularity declines either to the right or left hand, forwards or backwards, whilst it is at the same time whirling round; then in no respect doth it stand. Very right, said he. Nothing then of this kind shall move us, when it is said: nor shall any one persuade us, as if any thing, being one and the same thing, could do and suffer contraries at one and the same time, with reference to the same object, and in the same respect. He shall not persuade me, said he. But however, said I, that we may not be obliged to be tedious in going over all these quibbles, and in evincing them to be false, let us proceed on this supposition, that so it is; after we have agreed that, if at any time these things appear otherwise than as we now settle them, we shall yield up again all we shall gain by it. It is necessary, said he, to do so. Wouldst not you then, said I, deem these things among those which are opposite to

one another ; whether they be actions or passions, for in this there is no difference ; to assent, to wit, and to dissent, to desire to obtain a thing, and to reject it ; to bring towards oneself, and to push away ? I would deem these, said he, among the things which are opposite to each other. What then, said I, with respect to thirsting, to hungering, and in general with respect to all the passions ; and further, to desire, to will, and all these, may they not somehow be placed among those species which have now been mentioned ? As for example, will you not always say that the soul of one who has desire goes out after that which it desires, or brings near to it that which it wishes to have ? Or again, in so far as it wants something to be afforded it, like one who only sees an object, that it intimates by signs, to have it brought near, desiring the actual possession of it ? I would say so. But what, to be unwilling, not to wish, nor to desire, shall we not deem these of the same kind, as to push away from the soul, and drive off, and every thing else which is opposite to the former ? Why not ? This being the case, shall we say there is a certain species of the desires ? and that the most conspicuous are those which we call thirst and hunger ? We shall say so, replied he. Is not the one the desire of drinking, and the other of eating ? Yes. Is it then, when considered as thirst, a desire in the soul of something further than of drink ? It is according to the nature of the thirst. Is there then a thirst of a hot drink, or of a cold, of much or of little, or in short of some particular kind of drink ? for, if there be any heat accompanying the thirst, it readily occasions a desire of a cold drink ; but if cold accompanies it, then there is excited a desire of a warm drink : if the thirst be great, through many circumstances, it occasions a desire of much drink, but if small, a desire of a little drink : but the desire itself to thirst never creates the desire of any thing else, but of drink itself, as its nature prompts ; and in like manner of the appetite of hunger with relation to meat. Thus every desire, said he, in itself, is of that alone of which it is the desire ; but to be a desire of such or such a particular species, are adventitious circumstances. Let not then anyone, said I, create us any trouble, as if we were inadvertent ; that no one desired drink, but good drink ; or meat, but good meat : for indeed all men desire that which is good. If then thirst be a desire, it is of what is good ; whether it be of drink, or of whatever else it is the desire. And in the same way of
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all the other desires. Perhaps, replied he, the man who should mention these things would seem to say something material. But however, said I, whatever things are of such a nature as to belong to any genus, have a general reference to the genus; but each particular of these refers to a particular species of that genus. I have not understood you, said he. Have you not understood, said I, that greater is of such a kind as to be greater than somewhat? Yes, indeed. Is it not greater than the lesser? Yes. And that which is considerably greater than that which is considerably lesser; is it not? Yes. And that which was formerly greater than that which was formerly lesser; and that which is to be greater than that which is to be lesser? What else? said he. And after the same manner, what is more numerous with respect to what is less numerous, and what is double with reference to what is half, and all such like things; and further, what is heavier with respect to lighter, and swifter to slower, and further still, hot to cold; and all such like things, are they not after this manner? Entirely so. But what as to the sciences? Is not the case the same? For, science itself is the science of learning itself, or of whatever else you think proper to make it the science: but a certain particular science, and of such a particular kind, refers to a certain particular object, and of such a kind. What I mean is this. After the science of building houses arose, did it not separate from other sciences, so as to be called architecture? What else? Was it not from its being of such a kind as none of others were? Yes. Was it not then from its being the art of such a particular thing, that itself became such a particular art? And all other arts and sciences in like manner? They are so. Allow then, said I, that this is what I wanted to express, if you have now understood it; where things are considered as having reference to other things, generals alone refer to generals, and particulars to particulars. I do not however say that the science altogether resembles that of which it is the science; (as if, for example, the science of healthy and sickly were itself healthy and sickly; or that the science of good and evil were itself good and evil.) But as science is not constituted the science of that thing in general of which it is the science, but only of a certain quality of it (to wit, of its healthy and sickly state), so itself comes to be a certain particular science; and this causes it to be called no longer simply a science, but the medicinal science; the particular species to which

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it belongs being superadded. I have understood you, said he, and it appears to me to be so. But will not you, said I, make thirst now, whatever it be, to be one of those things which respect somewhat else, considered as what it is, and it is surely thirst? I will, said he, and it respects drink. And does not a particular thirst desire a particular drink? But thirst in general is neither of much nor of little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in one word, of any particular kind; but of drink in general alone is thirst in general naturally the desire. Entirely so, indeed. The soul of the man then who thirsts, so far as he thirsts, inclines for nothing further than to drink; this he desires, to this he hastens. It is plain. If then at any time any thing draw back the thirsting soul, it must be some different part of it from that which thirsts, and leads it as a wild beast to drink: for, have we not said that it is impossible for the same thing, in the same respects, and with the same parts of it, to do at once contrary things? It is indeed impossible. In the same manner, I imagine, as it is not proper to say of an archer, that his hands at once push out and likewise pull in the bow; but that the one hand is that which pushes out, and the other that which pulls in. Entirely so, said he. But whether may we say, that there are some who when athirst are not willing to drink? Yes, indeed, said he, there are many, and many times that is the case. What now, said I, may one say of these persons? Might it not be said, that there was in their soul somewhat prompting them to drink, and likewise something hindering them, different from the other, and superior to the prompting principle? It seems so to me, said he. Does not then the restraining principle arise from reason when it arises; but those which push, and drive forwards, proceed from passions and diseases? It appears so. We shall then, said I, not unreasonably account these to be two, and different from one another; calling the one part which reasons, the rational part of the soul; but that part with which it loves, and hungers, and thirsts, and those other appetites, the irrational and concupiscible part, the friend of certain gratifications and pleasures. We shall not, said he; but we may most reasonably consider them in this light. Let these then, said I, be allowed to be distinct species in the soul. But as to that of anger, is it a third principle, or has it affinity to one of those two? Perhaps it has, said he, to the concupiscible part. But I believe, said I, what I have somewhere heard,

how that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, as he returned from the Pyræum, perceived some dead bodies lying in the sewer, below the outside of the north wall, and had both a desire to look at them, and at the same time was averse from it, and turned himself away; and for a while he struggled with his desire, and covered his eyes; but, at last, being overcome by his appetite, with eager eyes, running towards the dead bodies, Lo now, said he, you wretched eyes! glut yourselves with this fine spectacle. I too, said he, have heard it. This speech now, said I, shows that anger sometimes opposes the appetites, as being different one from another. It shows it, indeed, said he. And do not we often perceive, said I, when the appetites compel any one contrary to reason, that he reproaches himself, and is angry at the compelling principle within him? And when the rational and concupiscible are in a state of sedition, anger in such a person becomes as it were an ally to reason: but when the appetite goes along with reason, then anger gives no opposition. You will say, I imagine, that you have perceived nothing of this kind in yourself at any time, nor yet in another. No, by Jupiter, said he. What now, said I, when one imagines he does an injury, the more generous he is, is he not so much the less apt to be angry, when he suffers hunger and cold, or any other such things, from one who inflicts, as he imagines, these things with justice? And, as I have said, his anger will not incline him to rise up against such an one. True, said he. But what? when a man imagines he is injured, does not anger in such an one burn? is he not indignant? and does he not fight, as an ally, on the side of what appears to be just? and under all the sufferings of hunger, cold, and such like, does he not bear up, and conquer; and cease not from his generous toils, till either he accomplishes them, or die, or be restrained by the rational principle within him, like a dog by the shepherd, and is rendered mild? It perfectly resembles, said he, what you say; for, in our city, we appointed the auxiliaries to be obedient, as dogs, to the rulers of the city, as to shepherds. You rightly understand, said I, what I would say. But have you besides considered this? As what? That here the reverse appears concerning the irascible from that in the former case: for there we were deeming it the same with the concupiscible; but now we say it is far from it; or that, in the sedition of the soul, it much rather joins its arms with the rational part. Entirely so, said

said he. Is it then as something different from it, or as a species of the rational? so as that there are not three species, but only two in the soul, the rational and concupiscible. Or, as there were three species which completed the city, the lucrative, the auxiliary, the legislative; so, in the soul, this irascible is a third thing, naturally an auxiliary to the rational, if it be not corrupted by bad education? Of necessity it is, said he, a third. Yes, said I, if at least it appear to be any way different from the rational, as it appeared to be distinct from the concupiscible. But that is not difficult, said he, to be seen. For one may see this, even in little children, that immediately from their infancy they are full of anger; but some appear, to me at least, never at all to participate of reason; and the most arrive at it but late. Yes, truly, said I, you say right. And one may yet further observe in the brute creatures, that what you say is really the case: and besides this, it is likewise attested by what we formerly mentioned from Homer^{*},

His breast he struck, and thus his heart reproved.

For, in that passage, Homer has plainly made one part reprehend another; the part which reasons about good and evil, reprehend the part which is unreasonably angry. You say perfectly right, said he. These things, said I, we have with difficulty agreed to; and it is now sufficiently acknowledged, that the same species of principles as are in a city are in every individual, and in the same number. They are so. Must it not therefore of necessity follow, that after what manner the city was wise, and in what respect, after the same manner, and in the same respect, is the individual wise also. Why not? And in what respects, and after what manner, the individual is brave, in the same respect, and after the same manner, is a city brave. And so in all other respects, both of them are the same as to virtue. Of necessity. And I think, Glauco, we shall say that a man is just in the same way as we said a city was so? This likewise is quite necessary. But have we not somehow forgot this, that the city was just, when every one of the three species in it did each its own work? We do not appear to me, said he, to have forgot it. We must then remember likewise, that each one of

^{*} Odyss. lib. 20. ver. 18.

us will be just, and do his own work, when he doth his own affairs within himself. We must, said he, carefully remember it. Is it not then proper that the rational part should govern, as it is wise, and hath the care of the whole soul? and that the irascible part should be obedient, and an auxiliary of the other? Certainly. Shall not then the mixture, as we observed, of music and gymnastic make these two harmonious, raising and nourishing the one with beautiful reasonings and disciplines, and unbending the other, soothing and rendering it mild by harmony and rhythm? Most perfectly, said he. And when those two are in this manner nourished, and have been truly taught, and instructed in their own affairs, let them be set over the concupiscible part, which in every one is the greater part of the soul, and in its nature most insatiably desirous of being gratified: and let them take care of this part, lest, being filled with these bodily pleasures, as they are called, it become great and vigorous, and do not its own work, but attempt to enslave and rule over those it ought not, and overturn the whole life of all in general. Entirely so, said he. And might he not, said I, by this principle, guard likewise in the best manner against enemies from without, by its influence both over the whole soul and body likewise, the one deliberating, and the other fighting in obedience to its leader, and executing with fortitude the things deliberated? It is so. And I think that we call a man brave, when, through all the pains and pleasures of life, the irascible part preserves the opinion dictated by reason concerning what is terrible, and what is not. Right, said he. And we call him wise, from that small part which governs in him, and dictates these things, having in it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each one, and for the whole community of the three themselves. Perfectly so. But what, do we not call him temperate, moreover, from the friendship and harmony of these very things, when the governing and governed agree in one, that reason ought to govern, and when they do not raise sedition? Temperance, said he, is no other than this, both as to the city and the individual. But, as we have often said, he shall be just, by these things, and in this manner. It is quite necessary. What then, said I, has any thing blunted us, that we should think justice to be any thing else than what it has appeared to be in a city? Nothing appears to me at least, said he, to have done it.

But

But in this manner, let us, by all means, confirm ourselves, if there yet remain any doubt in the soul, that can be an objection to this principle, by bringing the man into difficult circumstances. As what? Such as this: if we were obliged to declare concerning such a city, and concerning a man born and educated conformably to it, whether we thought such a one, when intrusted with gold or silver, would embezzle it; do you imagine that any one would think such a one would do it sooner than those who are not of such a kind? No one, said he. Will not such a one then be free of sacrileges, thefts, treacheries, against companions in private, or the city in public? He will be free. Nor will he ever, in any shape, be faithless, either as to his oaths, or other declarations. How can he? Adulteries, and neglect of parents, impiety against the Gods, will belong to every one else, sooner than to such an one. They will belong to every one else, truly, said he. And is not this the cause of all these things, that, of all the parts within him, each one thing does its own work, as to governing and being governed? This is it, and nothing else. Do you desire justice to be any thing else, but such a power as produces such men and cities? Not I, truly, said he, for my part. Our dream then which we conjectured is at last accomplished; that when we first began to build our city, we seemed, by some God's assistance, to have got to a beginning and pattern of justice. Entirely so. And that, Glauco, was a certain image of justice, according to which, it behoved the man who was fitted by nature for the office of a shoe-maker, to perform properly that office, and to do nothing else, and he who is a carpenter to perform that office, and all others in the same way. It appears so. And of such a kind truly was justice, as it appeared to us, I do not mean as to external action, but concerning that which is really internal, relating to the man himself, and those things which are properly his own; not allowing any principle in himself to attempt to do what belongs to others, nor the principles to be pragmatical, engaging in one another's affairs; but in reality well establishing his own proper affairs, and holding the government of himself, adorning himself, and becoming his own friend, and attuning those three principles in the most natural manner, as three musical strings, base, tenor, and treble, or whatever others may chance to intervene. Thus he will be led to combine all these together, and become of many

an entire one, temperate and attuned, and in that manner to perform whatever is done, either in the way of acquiring wealth, or concerning the management of the body, or any public affair or private bargain; and in all these cases to account and call that action just and handsome, which always sustains and promotes this habit; and to call the knowledge which presides over this action, wisdom: but to call that an unjust action which dissolves this habit, and the opinion which presides over this, folly. You say perfectly true, Socrates, said he. Be it so, said I. If then we should say that we have found out a just man and city, and what justice is in them, I do not think we should seem to be altogether telling a lie. No, by Jupiter, said he. May we say so? We may say it. Be it so, said I. But we were next, I think, to consider injustice. That is plain. Must it not then be some sedition among the three principles, some pragmatism and intermeddling in things foreign to their proper business, and an insurrection of some one principle against the whole soul, to govern in it when it does not belong to it, but which is of such a nature, as what really ought to be in subjection to the governing principle? I imagine then we shall call their tumult and mistake by such names as these, injustice, intemperance, cowardice and folly, and in general all vice. These things, said he, are so. To do injustice then, said I, and to be injurious, and likewise to do justly, all these must be very manifest, if, to wit, injustice and justice are so. As how? Because they are no way different from what is salutary or noxious: as these are in the body, so are the others in the soul. How? said he. Such things as are healthy constitute health, and such as are noxious produce disease. Yes. And must not the doing justly produce justice, and doing unjustly produce injustice? Of necessity. But to produce health, is to establish all in the body according to nature; to govern and to be governed of one another; and to produce disease, is to govern and be governed, one part by another, contrary to nature. It is indeed. Then again, to produce justice, is it not to establish all in the soul according to nature, to govern and be governed by one another? And injustice is to govern and be governed by one another, contrary to nature. Plainly so, said he. Virtue then, it seems, is a sort of health, and beauty, and good habit of the soul; and vice the disease, and deformity, and infirmity. It is so. Do not then honourable pursuits lead to

the acquisition of virtue? but dishonourable ones to that of vice? Of necessity. What remains then for us, as seems, to consider, is, whether it be profitable to do justly, and to pursue what is honourable, and to be just; whether a man under such a character be unknown or not? Or to do unjustly, and to be unjust, though one be never punished, nor by chastisement become better? But, said he, Socrates, this speculation seems now, to me at least, to be ridiculous. For if, when the nature of the body is corrupted, it be thought that life is not worth having, not even though one had all kinds of meats and drinks, all kind of wealth, all kind of dominion; when the nature of that by which we live is disordered, and thoroughly corrupted, shall life then be worth having, though one can do every thing else which he inclines, except ascertaining, how he shall be liberated from vice and injustice, and acquire justice and virtue, since, to wit, both these things have appeared as we have represented them? It would be truly ridiculous, said I. But, however, as we have arrived at such a point as enables us most distinctly to perceive that these things are so, we must not be weary. We must, by Jupiter, said he, the least of all things desist. Come then, said I, that you may likewise see how many principles vice possesses, principles which, as I imagine, are worthy of attention. I attend, said he, only tell me. And truly now, said I, since we have reached this part of our discourse, it appears to me as from a lofty place of survey, that there is one principle of virtue, but those of vice are infinite. Of which there are four, which deserve to be mentioned. How do you say? replied he. There seem to be as many species of soul as there are of republics. How many then? There are five, said I, of republics, and five of the soul. Tell, said he, what these are. I say, replied I, that this, which we have gone through, is one species of a republic; and it may have a two-fold appellation; for, if among the rulers there be one surpassing the rest, it may be called a Monarchy; if there be several, an Aristocracy. True, said he. I call this then, said I, one species; for, whether they be several, or but one, who govern, they will never alter the principal laws of the city; observing the nurture and education we have described. It is not likely, said he.

THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

THE

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK V.

I DENOMINATE then indeed both such a city and republic, and such a man as we have described, good and upright ; and if this republic be an upright one, I deem the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in cities, and the establishing the temper of soul of individuals, and that in four species of depravity. Of what kind are these ? said he. I was then proceeding to mention them in order, as they appeared to me to rise out of one another : but Polemarchus stretching out his hand (for he sat a little further off than Adimantus) caught him by the robe at his shoulder, and drew him near ; and, bending himself towards him, spoke something in a whisper, of which we heard nothing but this : Shall we let pass then ? said he, or what shall we do ? Not at all, said Adimantus, speaking now aloud. And I replied, What then will not you let pass ? You, said he, for it was to you I alluded. You seem to us to be growing negligent, and to steal a whole branch of the discourse, and that not the least considerable, that you may not have the trouble of going through it ; and you imagine that you escaped our notice, when you made this speech so simply, viz. that, both as to wives and children, it is manifest to every one that these things will be common among friends. Did not I say right, Adimantus ? Yes, said he : but this, which was rightly said, like other parts of your discourse, requires explanation : to show what is the manner of their being common ; for there may be many kinds of it. Do not omit then to tell which is the method you spoke of ; for we have been in expectation for some time past, imagining you would, on some occasion, make mention of the propagation of children, in what way they should be propagated ; and, when they are born, how they should be nurtured ; and every thing relative to what you spoke concerning wives and children

children being in common; for we imagine, that it is of considerable, nay, of the utmost importance to the state, when this is rightly performed, or otherwise. But now when you are entering on the consideration of another constitution, before you have sufficiently discussed these things, it seemed proper to us what you now heard, not to let you pass, before you went over all these things, as you did the others. And you may count me too, said Glauco, as joining in this vote. You may easily judge, Socrates, said Thrasymachus, that this is the opinion of us all. What is this, said I, you have done, laying hold of me? What a mighty discourse do you again raise, as you did at the beginning, about a republic, in which I was rejoicing as having now completed it, being pleased if any one would have let these things pass, and been content with what was then said! But you know not what a swarm of reasonings you raise by what you now challenge, which I foreseeing passed by at that time, lest it should occasion great disturbance. What then, said Thrasymachus, do you imagine that these are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reasonings? Yes, said I, but in measure. The whole of life, Socrates, said Glauco, is with the wife, the measure of hearing such reasonings as these. But pass what relates to us, and do not at all grudge to explain your opinion concerning the object of our inquiry,—What sort of community of wives and children is to be observed by our guardians, and concerning the nurture of the latter while very young, in the period between their generation and their education, which seems to be the most troublesome of all. Endeavour then to tell us in what manner it should be done. It is not easy, happy Glauco, said I, to go through these things; for there are many of them hard to be believed, whether the things we say be possible; and though they could easily be effected, whether they would be for the best might still be doubted: wherefore, dear companion, I grudge somewhat to touch on these things, lest our reasonings appear to be rather what were to be wished for, than what could take place. Do not at all grudge, said he; for your hearers are neither stupid, nor incredulous, nor ill-affected towards you. Then I said, Do you say this, most excellent Glauco, with a desire to encourage me? I do, said he. Then your discourse has a quite contrary effect, said I; for, if I trusted to myself, that I understood what I am to say, your encouragement would do well. For one who under-

stands the truth, about the greatest and the most interesting affairs, speaks with safety and confidence among the wise and friendly; but to be diffident of oneself, and doubtful of the truth, and at the same time to be haranguing as I do now, is both dreadful and dangerous; not only lest he should be exposed to ridicule (for that is but a trifling thing), but lest that, mistaking the truth, I not only fall myself, but draw my friends along with me into an error about things in which we ought least of all to be mistaken. I adore therefore Adrastia, for the sake of what, Glauco, I am going to say. For I trust it is a smaller offence to be a man-slayer without intention, than to be an impostor with regard to what is good and excellent, just and lawful: and it were better to hazard such a thing among enemies than friends; so that you must give me better encouragement. Then Glauco, laughing: But, Socrates, said he, if we suffer any thing amiss from your discourse, we shall acquit you as clear of any man-slaughter, and as no impostor: so proceed boldly. But indeed, said I, he who is acquitted at a court of justice is deemed clear of the crime, as the law says; and if it be so in that case, 'tis reasonable it should be so in this. For this reason then, said he, proceed. We must now, said I, return again to what it seems should, according to method, have been recited before; and perhaps it is right to proceed in this manner, that, after having entirely finished the drama respecting the men, we go over that which concerns the women; especially since you challenge me to proceed in this manner. For, in my opinion, men who have been born and educated in such a manner as we have described, can have no right possession and enjoyment of children and wives, but in pursuing the same track in which we have proceeded from the beginning: for we have endeavoured, in our reasoning, to form somehow men as the guardians of a flock. We have. Let us proceed then, having established likewise affairs relating to propagation and education in a manner similar to that of the males; and let us consider whether it be proper for us to do so or not. How do you mean? replied he. Thus: Whether shall we judge it proper for the females of our guardian dogs, to watch like us in the same manner as the males do, and to hunt along with them, and do every thing else in common? Or shall we judge it proper for them to manage domestic affairs within doors, as being unable for the other exercises, because of the bringing forth and the nursing the whelps; and the males to labour, and to have the whole care of the flocks?

They

They are to do all, said he, in common. Only we are to employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger. Is it possible then, said I, to employ any creature for the same purposes with another, unless you give it the same nurture and education as you give the other? It is not possible. If then we shall employ the women for the same purposes as we do the men, must we not likewise teach them the same things? We must. Were not both music and gymnastic bestowed on the males? They were. These two arts therefore, and those likewise relating to war, must be bestowed also on the women, and they must be employed about the same things. It is reasonable, said he, from what you say. Yet as these things, said I, are contrary perhaps to custom, many of these things we are now speaking of may appear ridiculous, if practised in the way we mention. Extremely so, replied he. What, said I, do you perceive as the most ridiculous part? Or is it plainly because that you see the women naked in the Palæstra wrestling with the men, and not only the young women, but even the more advanced in years, in the same manner as old men in the wrestling-schools, when they are wrinkled, and not at all handsome to the eye, yet still fond of the exercises? Yes, by Jupiter, said he. Because it might indeed appear ridiculous, at least as matters stand at present. Must we not therefore, said I, since we have entered upon this discourse, be afraid of the railleries of the men of pleasantry, whatever things they may say with regard to such a revolution being introduced, as well in gymnastic as in music, and particularly in the use of arms, and the management of horses? You say right, replied he. But since we have entered on this discourse, we must go to the rigour of the law, and beg these men not to follow their own customs, but to think seriously, and remember, that it is not long ago since these things appeared base and ridiculous to the Greeks, which are only so now to the most of the barbarians: such as to see naked men. And when first the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedæmonians, began their exercises, it was in the power of the men of humour of that time to turn all these things into ridicule. Do not you think so? I do. But I imagine, that when upon experience it appeared better to strip themselves of all these things, than to be wrapped in them, what was ridiculous indeed to the eye, was removed by the idea of the best, mentioned in our reasoning; and this too showed manifestly, that he is a fool who deems any thing ridiculous

but what is bad, and attempts to rally upon any other idea of the ridiculous but that of the foolish and the vicious, or to be serious in any other pursuit but that of the good. By all means, said he. Is not this then first of all to be agreed on, whether these things be possible or not? And we must allow it to be a matter of dispute, if any one, either in jest or earnest, incline to doubt, whether the human nature in the female sex be able, in every thing, to bear a share with the male? or if it be not in any one thing? or if it be able in some things, but not in others? and among which of these are the affairs of war? Would not the man who thus sets out in the most handsome manner conclude too, as it seems, most handsomely? By far, said he. Are you willing, then, said I, that we ourselves, instead of others, dispute about these things, that the opposite side may not be destitute of a defence? Nothing hinders, said he. Let us then say this for them: That there is no need, Socrates and Glauco, of others to dispute with you about this matter; for yourselves in the beginning of your establishment, when you established your city, agreed, that it was necessary for each individual to practise one business, according to their several genius. I think we acknowledged it; for why should they not? Does not then the genius of the male differ widely from that of the female? Why does it not differ? And is it not fit to enjoin each a different work, according to their genius? Why not? Are not you then in the wrong now, and contradict yourselves, when you say that men and women ought to do the same things, whilst their nature is extremely different? Can you in answer to these objections, admirable Glauco, make any defence? It is not quite an easy matter, said he, to do it immediately; but I will entreat you, and do now entreat you, to go through the arguments on our side, whatever they may be. These are the things, Glauco, replied I, and many other such like, which I long ago foreseeing, was both afraid and backward to touch on the law concerning the possession of wives, and the education of children. It is not easy, by Jupiter, replied he. It is not, said I. But the case is thus: If a man fall into a small fish-pond, or into the middle of the greatest sea, he must still swim in the one no less than in the other. Entirely so. Must not we swim then, and endeavour to escape from this reasoning, expecting that either some dolphin is to carry us out, or that we shall have some other remarkable deliverance? It seems we must do so, replied he. Come then, said I, let

Let us see if we can any where find an out-gate ; for we did acknowledge that different natures ought to study different things ; but the nature of man and woman is different ; yet now we say that different natures ought to study the same things : these are the things which you accuse us of. Certainly. How generous, Glauco, said I, is the power of the art of contradicting ! How ? Because, replied I, many seem to fall into it unwillingly, and imagine that they are not cavilling, but reasoning truly, because they are not able to understand the subject, by dividing it into its proper parts ; and under this arguing will pursue the opposite of their subject, using cavilling instead of reasoning. This is indeed, said he, the case with many ; but does it at present extend likewise to us ? Entirely so, said I. We seem then unwillingly to have fallen into a contradiction. How ? Because we have very strenuously and very keenly asserted, that when the nature is not the same, they ought not to have the same employments ; but we have not in any respect considered what is the characteristic of the sameness or diversity of nature, nor to what it points : we stopped then, when we had assigned different pursuits to different natures, and to the same natures the same pursuits. We have never indeed, said he, considered it. It is therefore, replied I, still in our power, as appears, to question ourselves, whether the nature of the bald, or of those who wear their hair, be the same, and not different ? And after we should agree that it was different, whether, if the bald made shoes, we should allow those who wear hair to make them ? or, if those who wear hair made them, whether we should allow the others ? That were ridiculous, replied he. Is it in any other respect, said I, ridiculous then, that we did not wholly determine the sameness and diversity of nature, but attended only to that species of diversity and sameness which respects the employments themselves ; just as we say that the physician, and the man who has a medical soul, have one and the same nature ? Do not you think so ? I do. But that the physician and architect have a different nature. Entirely. And so, replied I, of the nature of men and of women, if it appear different, in respect to any art, or other employment, we shall say, that this different employment is to be assigned to each separately. But if their nature appear different only in this, that the female brings forth, and the male begets, we shall not say that this has at all shown the man to be different from the woman in the respect we speak of. But we shall

shall still be of opinion, that both our guardians and their wives ought to pursue the same employments. And with reason, said he. Shall we not then henceforth desire any one who says the contrary, to instruct us in this point, what is that art or study respecting the establishment of a city, where the nature of the man and woman is not the same, but different? It is reasonable, truly. Possibly some one may say, as you was saying some time since, that it is not easy to tell this sufficiently on the sudden, but that it is not difficult to one who has considered it. One might indeed say so. Are you willing then that we desire such an opponent to listen to us, if by any means we shall show him that there is in the administration of the city no employment peculiar to the women? By all means. Come on then, (shall we say to him) answer us. Is not this your meaning? That one man has a good genius for any thing, and another a bad, in this respect, that the one learns any thing easily, and the other with difficulty; and the one with a little instruction discovers much in what he learns; but the other, when he obtains much instruction and care, does not retain even what he has learned: with the one, the body is duly subservient to the mind; with the other, it opposes its improvement: are there any other marks than these by which you would determine one to have a good genius for any thing, and another to have a bad one? No one, said he, would mention any other. Know you then of any thing which is managed by mankind, with reference to which the men have not all these marks in a more excellent degree than the women? Or, should we not be tedious, if we mentioned particularly the weaving art, and the dressing pot-herbs and viands, in which the female genius seems to be somewhat considerable, and is most ridiculous where it is surpassed? You say true, said he, that in the general, in every thing the one genius is superior to the other, yet there are many women who in many things excel many men: but, on the whole, it is as you say. There is not then, my friend, any office among the whole inhabitants of the city peculiar to the woman, considered as woman, nor to the man, considered as man; but the geniuses are indiscriminately diffused through both: the woman is naturally fitted for sharing in all offices, and so is the man; but in all the woman is weaker than the man. Perfectly so. Shall we then commit every thing to the care of the men, and nothing to the care of the women? How shall we do so? It is therefore, I

imagine, as we say, that one woman too is fitted by natural genius for being a physician, and another is not; one is naturally a musician, and another is not? What else? And one is naturally fitted for gymnastic, and another is not; one is fitted for war, and another is not. I at least am of this opinion. And is not one likewise a lover of philosophy, and another averse to it; one of high spirits, and another of low? This likewise is true. And has not one woman a natural genius for being a guardian, and another not? And have not we made choice of such a genius as this for our guardian men? Of such a genius as this. The nature then of the woman and of the man for the guardianship of the city is the same, only that the one is weaker, and the other stronger. It appears so. And such women as these are to be chosen to dwell with these men, and be guardians along with them, as they are naturally fit for them, and of a kindred genius. Entirely so. And must not the same employments be assigned to the same natures? The same. We are now arrived by a circular progression at what we formerly mentioned; and, we allow that it is not contrary to nature, to appoint for the wives of our guardians music and gymnastic. By all means. We are not then establishing things impossible, or such as can only be wished for, since we establish the law according to nature; and what is at present contrary to these things, is contrary to nature rather, as appears. It seems so. Was not our inquiry to hear of what was possible and best? It was. And we have agreed, that these things are possible. We have. And we must next agree, that they are best. It is plain we must. In order therefore to make a guardian woman, at least the education will not be different from that of the men, especially as she has received the same natural genius. It will not be different. What do you think then of such an opinion as this? Of what? That of imagining with yourself one man to be better, and another worse,—or do you deem them to be all alike? By no means. In the city now which we establish, whether do you judge, that our guardians with this education we have described, or shoe-makers with education in their art, will be rendered the better men? The question, replied he, is ridiculous. I understand you, said I. But what? Of all the other citizens, are not they the best? By far. But what? Will not these women too be the best of women? They will be so, replied he, by far. Is there any thing better in a city than

that

that both the women and the men be rendered the very best? There is not. This then will be effected by music and gymnastic, being afforded them according as we have described. Why will it not? We have then established a law which is not only possible, but moreover best for the state. We have. The wives, then, of our guardians must be unclothed, since they are to put on virtue for clothes; and they must bear a part in war, and the other guardianship of the city, and do nothing else. But the lightest part of these services is to be allotted to the women rather than to the men, on account of the weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at naked women, whilst performing the exercises for the sake of what is best, reaps the empty fruit of a ridiculous wisdom, and in no respect knows, as appears, at what he laughs, nor why he does it. For that ever was and will be deemed a noble saying, That what is profitable is beautiful, and what is hurtful is base. By all means. Let us say then, that we have escaped one wave; as it were, having thus settled the law with respect to the women, without being wholly overwhelmed, ordaining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common: but our reasoning has been consistent with itself, as it respects both what is possible and likewise advantageous.

It is truly no small wave you have escaped, said he. You will not, replied I, call it a great one, when you see what follows. Mention it, said he, that I may see. That law, replied I, and those others formerly mentioned, are adopted, as I imagine, by the following. Which? That these women must all be common to all these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children likewise be common; that neither the parent know his own children, nor the children their parent. This is much greater than the other, as to the incredibility, both of its being possible, and at the same time advantageous. I do not believe, replied I, that any one will doubt of its utility, at least, as if it were not the greatest good to have the women and children in common, if it were but possible. But I think the greatest question will be, whether it be possible or not? One may very readily, said he, dispute as to both. You mention, replied I, a crowd of disputes. But I thought that I should at least have escaped from the one, if its utility had been agreed on, and that it should have only remained to consider its possibility.

fibility. But you have not, said he, escaped unobserved; give then an account of both. I must then, said I, submit to a trial. But, however, indulge me thus far: allow me to feast myself, as those are wont to feast themselves who are sluggish in their dianoëtic part, when they walk alone. For men of this sort, sometimes before they find out how they shall attain what they desire; waving that inquiry, that they may not fatigue themselves in deliberating about the possibility or impossibility of it, suppose they have obtained what they desire, and then go through what remains. And they delight in running over what they will do when their desire is obtained, rendering their soul, otherwise indolent, more indolent still. I am now effeminate after this manner, and wish to defer those debates, and to inquire afterwards whether these things be possible. But at present, holding them possible, if you allow me, I will consider in what manner our rulers shall regulate these things, when they take place, that they may be done in the most advantageous manner, both to the state and the guardians. These things I shall endeavour, in the first place, to go over with your assistance, and the others afterwards, if you allow me. I allow, said he, and inquire accordingly. I imagine then, said I, that if our rulers are worthy of that name, and in like manner these who are their auxiliaries, their ministers in the government, the latter will be disposed to do whatever is enjoined them, and the former will be ready to command; enjoining them some things in direct obedience to the law, and imitating the law in whatever things are intrusted to them. It is likely, said he. Do you now, said I, who are their lawgiver, in the same manner as you have chosen out the men, choose out likewise the women, making their genius as similar as possible: and as they dwell and eat together in common; and as no one possesses any of these things privately, they will meet together; and being mingled in their exercises and other conversation, they will be led from an innate necessity, as I imagine, to mutual embraces. Do not I seem to say what will necessarily happen? Not, replied he, by any geometrical, but amatory necessity, which seems to be more pungent than the other, to persuade and draw the bulk of mankind. Much more, said I. But after this, Glauco, to mix together in a disorderly manner, or to do any thing else, is neither holy in a city of happy persons, nor will the rulers permit it. It were not just, said he. It is

plain then, that after this we must make marriages as much as possible sacred ; but the most advantageous would be sacred. By all means. How then shall they be most advantageous ? Tell me that, Glauco, for I see in your houses dogs of chase, and a great many excellent birds. Have you then indeed ever attended at all, in any respect, to their marriages, and the propagation of their species ? How ? said he. First of all, that among these, although they be excellent themselves, are there not some who are most excellent ? There are. Whether then do you breed from all of them alike ? or are you careful to breed chiefly from the best ? From the best. But how ? From the youngest or from the oldest, or from those who are most in their prime ? From those in their prime. And if the breed be not of this kind, you reckon that the race of birds and dogs greatly degenerates. I reckon so, replied he. And what think you as to horses, said I, and other animals ? is the case any otherwise with respect to these ? That, said he, were absurd. Strange, said I, my friend ! What extremely perfect governors must we have, if the case be the same with respect to the human race ! However, it is so, replied he ; but what then ? Because there is a necessity, said I, for their using many medicines : for where bodies have no occasion for medicines, but are ready to subject themselves to a regimen of diet, we reckon that a weaker physician may suffice ; but when there is a necessity for medicines, we know that a more able physician is then requisite. True ; but with what view do you say this ? With this view, replied I. It appears that our rulers are obliged to use much fiction and deceit for the advantage of the governed ; and we said somewhere, that all these things were useful in the way of medicines. And rightly, said he. This piece of right now seems not to be the most inconsiderable in marriages, and the propagation of children. How now ? It is proper, said I, from what we have acknowledged, that the best men embrace for the most part the best women ; and the most depraved men, on the contrary, the most depraved women ; and the offspring of the former is to be educated, but not that of the latter, if you desire to have the flock of the most perfect kind ; and this must be performed in such a manner as to escape the notice of all but the governors themselves, if you would have the whole herd of the guardians to be as free from sedition as possible. Most right, said he. Shall there

there not then be some festivals by law established, in which we shall draw together the brides and bridegrooms? Sacrifices too must be performed, and hymns composed by our poets suitable to the marriages which are making. But the number of the marriages we shall commit to the rulers, that as much as possible they may preserve the same number of men, having an eye to the wars, diseases, and every thing else of this kind, and that as far as possible our city may be neither too great nor too little. Right, said he. And certain lots too, I imagine, should be made so artificial, that the depraved man may, on every embrace, accuse his fortune, and not the governors. By all means, said he. And those of the youth who distinguish themselves, whether in war or any where else, ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the most ample liberty of embracing women, that so, under this pretext likewise, the greatest number of children may be generated of such persons. Right. And shall the children always as they are born be received by magistrates appointed for these purposes, whether men or women, or both? for the magistracies are in common to women as to men. They are so. And when they receive the children of worthy persons, they will carry them, I imagine, to the nursery, to certain nurses dwelling apart in a certain place of the city. But the children of the more depraved, and such others as are any way lame, they will hide in some secret and obscure place, as is proper. If they want, said he, the race of guardians to be pure. And shall not these take care likewise of their nursing, in bringing to the nursery the mothers when their breasts are full, practising every art, that no one know her own child, and in providing others who have milk, if these shall prove insufficient? And they shall likewise take care of these nurses, that they suckle a competent time: and they shall appoint the nurses and keepers to be wakeful, and to take every other necessary toil. You speak, said he, of great ease to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children. It is fit, replied I. But let us in the next place discuss that which we chiefly intended. We said that true offspring ought to be generated of persons in their prime. Are you then of opinion with me, that the proper season of vigour is twenty years to a woman, and thirty to a man? Of what continuance are these seasons? said he. The woman, replied I, beginning at twenty, is to bear children to the state until the

age of forty; and the man, after he has passed the most raging part of his course, from that period, is to beget children to the state until the age of fifty-five. This indeed is the acme, replied he, in both sexes, both of body and of mind. If then any one who is older or younger than these shall meddle in generating for the public, we shall say the trespass is neither holy nor just, as he begets to the state a child, which, if it be concealed, is born and grows up not from sacrifices and prayers, (which, upon every marriage, the priestesses and priests, and the whole of the city, shall offer, that the descendants of the good may be still more good, and from useful descendants still more useful may arise); but is born from darkness, and with a dreadful intemperance. Right, said he. And the law, said I, must be the same. If any of those men, who are yet of the age for generating, shall touch women of a proper age, without the concurrence of the magistrate, we shall consider him as having raised to the state a bastardly, illegitimate and unhallowed child. Most right, said he. And I imagine, that when the women and men exceed the age of generating, we shall permit the men to cohabit with any woman they incline, besides their daughter and mother, and those who are the children of their daughters, or those upwards from their mother: and so likewise the women to embrace any but a son and father, and the children of these, either downwards or upwards: all this liberty we will allow them, after we have enjoined them to attend carefully, in the first place, if any thing should be conceived, not to bring it to the light; but if, by any accident, it should be brought forth, to expose it as a creature for which no provision is made. All these things, said he, are reasonably said. But how shall fathers and daughters, and those other relations you now mentioned, be known of one another? They shall not be known at all, said I. But from the day on which any one is a bridegroom, whatever children are born in the tenth or in the seventh month after it, all these he shall call, the male his sons, and the female his daughters, and they shall call him father. And in the same way again, he shall call the children of these grandchildren, and they again shall call them grandfathers and grandmothers: and those who were born in that period in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they shall call sisters and brothers, so as not to touch each other, as I just now said. But the law shall allow brothers and sisters to live together, if their lot so fall out, and the

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the Pythian oracle give consent. Most right, said he. This, Glauco, and such as this, is the community of women and children, among your city guardians: and that it is both consonant to the other parts of our polity, and by far the best, we must, in the next place, establish from reason; or how shall we do? Just so, by Jupiter, said he. Did not we then agree on this at the beginning? to inquire what we can mention as the greatest good with relation to the establishment of a state, with an eye to which the lawgiver ought to enact the laws, and what is the greatest evil; and then to inquire, whether what we have hitherto gone over contributes towards leading us in the steps of this good, and away from that evil? By all means, said he. Is there, then, any greater ill to a city than that which lacerates it; and, instead of one, makes it many? Or, is there any greater good than that which binds it together, and makes it one? There is not. Does not then the communion of pleasure and pain bind them together, when the whole of the citizens as much as possible rejoice and mourn in the same manner, for the same things when they are obtained, and when they are lost? By all means so, replied he. But a separate feeling of these things destroys it, when some of the citizens are extremely grieved, and others extremely glad, at the same sufferings of the city, or of those who are in it. Why not? Does not then such an evil as the following arise from this, when they do not all jointly in the state pronounce these words, mine, and not mine? And will not that city be best regulated, when every individual, with regard to the concerns of another, in the same way with him, pronounces these words, mine, and not mine? By far. And it is such as comes nearest to one man. As when our finger is any how hurt; the whole common feeling spread through the body to the soul, with one co-ordination of its governing part, perceives it, and the entire whole mourns along with the distressed part: and so we say that the man is distressed in his finger: and the reasoning is the same as to any other part of a man, both with respect to grief, when any part is in pain; or with respect to pleasure, when any part is at ease. It is the same, said he. And to return to your question, the city which comes nearest to this is governed in the best manner: and when any one of the citizens receives any good or ill, such a city, I imagine, will most especially say, that she herself receives it, and the whole city rejoice or mourn together. Of necessity, said he, this must

must prevail in a city governed by good laws. It may be time for us to go back to our city, and consider how those things are in it which we have agreed on in our reasoning, whether they prevail most in our city, or more in some other. We must do so, replied he. What now? Are there not, in other cities, governors and people? And are there not likewise in this? There are. And will not all these call one another citizens? Why not? But besides this of citizens, what does the people call their governors in other states? Masters or lords in most states, and, in democracies, this very name, governors. But in our city, besides that of citizens, what does the people call their governors? Their preservers, said he, and helpers. And what do they call the people? Rewarders, replied he, and nourishers. And in other cities, what do the governors call their people? Slaves, replied he. And what do the governors call one another? Fellow rulers, said he. And ours, what? Fellow guardians. Can you tell, whether any one of the governors in other cities can address one of their fellow governors as his kinsman, and another as a stranger? Very many so. Does he not then reckon and call the kindred one his own, and the stranger one as not his own? Just so. But how is it with your guardians? Is there so much as any one of them, who can deem and call any one of their fellow guardians a stranger? By no means, replied he; for, with whomsoever any one meets, he reckons he meets with a brother or sister, a father or mother, a son or daughter, or the descendants or ancestors of these. You speak most beautifully, replied I. But further, tell me this likewise, whether will you only establish among them, by law, these kindred names? or will you also enjoin them to perform all their actions in conformity to these names? With respect to parents, whatever the law enjoins to be performed to parents, such as reverence, and care, and obedience. And that otherwise it will not be for his advantage, neither in the sight of Gods nor of men, as he acts what is neither holy nor just, if he do other things than these. Shall these, or any other speeches from all our citizens, resound directly in the ears of our children, both concerning their parents, whom any one shall point out to them, and concerning other relations? These things shall be said, replied he; for it were ridiculous, if friendly names alone resounded, without any actions accompanying them. Of all cities, then, there will be the greatest harmony in it, when any one individual is either well or ill,

as to the expression we lately mentioned, viz. mine is well, or mine is ill. Most true, said he. Did not we say too, that their common pleasures and pains will accompany this opinion and expression? And we said rightly. Will not then our citizens most especially have this in common which they call my own; and, having this in common, they will of all others most especially have in common pleasure and pain? Extremely so. And along with the other parts of the constitution, is not the community of women and children among the guardians the cause of these things? This is it most especially, replied he. But we agreed, that this was the greatest good of a city, likening a well established city to a body, in its being affected with the pleasure and pain of any part. And we rightly, said he, agreed on this. This community, then, of women and children among our auxiliaries, has appeared to us to be the cause of the greatest good to the city. Extremely so, replied he. And surely we agree at least with what went before; for we somewhere said, that they ought neither to have houses of their own, nor land, nor any possession; but, receiving their subsistence from others, as a reward for their guardianship, they should all spend it in common, if they intended really to be guardians. Right, said he. Do not therefore, as I say, both these things which were formerly mentioned, and still more what we now speak of, render them real guardians, and prevent the city from being lacerated, by their not at all calling one and the same thing their own; but one one thing, and another another; one drawing to his own house whatever he can possess, separate from others, and another to his, which is different from the other; and having both wives and children different, which occasion different pleasures and pains, which are private, as belonging to private persons: but being of one opinion concerning their home, and all of them pointing towards the same thing, as far as possible, to have one common feeling of pleasure and pain? Extremely so, replied he. But what? shall law-suits and accusations against one another be banished from among them, so to speak, by their possessing nothing as private property but their body, and every thing else being common, from whence they shall be liberated from all those disturbances which men raise about money, children or relations? They will of necessity be liberated from these. Neither indeed can there be reasonably among them any actions raised for violence or unseemly treatment. For,

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making the protection of their persons a necessary thing, we will own it to be handsome and just for those of equal age to help one another. Right, said he. And this law, said I, hath this right in it likewise: that if any one be in a passion, gratifying his passion in this manner, he is less apt to raise greater seditions. It is entirely so. The elder shall be enjoined both to govern and to chastise the younger. That is plain. And surely the younger, as becomes them, shall never attempt to beat the elder, or in any other way to offer violence to him, unless appointed by the governors; nor will they, I imagine, in any sort, dishonour them; for there are sufficient guardians to hinder it, both fear and reverence;—reverence on the one hand restraining them from assaulting, as it were, their parents, and fear on the other; lest others shall assist the sufferer; some as sons, others as brothers, and others as fathers. It happens so, said he. In every respect then, as far as relates to the laws, the men shall live peaceably with one another. Very much so. And while these have no seditions among themselves, there is no danger of any other city raising disturbance against these, or that they shall split into factions. There is not. As for the lesser evils, from which surely they will be freed, I do not choose, because of the impropriety of it, so much as to mention them. That flattery of the rich; that indigence and solicitude in the education of their children, and in procuring money for the necessary support of their family, which is the portion of the poor; sometimes borrowing, and sometimes being despised, and sometimes using all manner of shifts, in procuring provisions, which they give to the management of their wives and domestics: how many slavish and mean things, my friend, they suffer in all these respects, are not even worthy to be mentioned. And they are manifest, said he, to one blind. They will be delivered from all these things, and will live more blessedly than that most blessed life which those live who gain the prize in the Olympic games. How? Those are esteemed happy, on account of a small part of what these enjoy. But the victory of these is more noble, and their maintenance from the public is more complete; for the victory they gain is the safety of the whole city; and both they and their children are crowned with their maintenance, and all the other necessities of life, as laurels, and receive honour from their city while alive, and at their death an honourable funeral. The most noble
rewards!

rewards! said he. Do you remember then, said I, that in our former reasonings, I do not know who it was objected to us, that we were not making our guardians happy, who, though they had it in their power to have the whole wealth of their citizens, had nevertheless nothing at all? and we proposed to consider of this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at the present we were making our guardians only guardians, and the city itself as happy as possible, but without regarding one particular tribe in it, with a view to make it happy. I remember it, said he. What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of those who gain the prize at the Olympic games? It does not at all appear to resemble the life of the leather-cutter, the handicraft, or farmer. I do not think it, said he. But however, it is proper that I mention here what I likewise said on a former occasion, that if the guardian shall attempt to be happy in such a way as to be no longer a guardian, nor be content with this moderate, and steady, and, as we say, best life; but, being seized with a foolish and youthful opinion about happiness, shall, because he has it in his power, be driven to make himself the master of every thing in the city, he shall know that Hesiod was truly wise, in saying that the half is somehow more than the whole. If he take me, said he, for his counsellor, he will remain in such a life. You allow then, said I, that the women act in common with the men, as we have explained, with respect to education and the breeding of children, and the guardianship of the other citizens; both in remaining in the city, and in going forth to war; and that along with the men they ought to keep guard, and to hunt like dogs, and in every case to take a share in all things as far as they can; and that while they do these things they will do what is best, and no way contrary to the nature of the female, with respect to the male, by which nature they are made to act jointly with one another. I agree, said he. Does not then this, said I, remain to be discussed, whether it be possible that this community take place among men likewise, as among other animals? and how far it is possible. You have prevented me, said he, in mentioning what I was going to ask. For, with relation to warlike affairs, it is plain, I imagine, said I, how they will fight. How? said he. That they will jointly go out on their military expeditions, and besides will carry along with them such of their children

as are grown up, that, like those of other artists, they may see what it will be necessary for them to practise when they are grown up; and, besides seeing, that they may serve and administer in every thing with relation to the war, and assist both their fathers and mothers. Or, have you not observed what happens in the common arts? as for instance, that the children of the potters, ministering to them for a long time, look on before they apply themselves to the making earthen ware? Yes, indeed. Whether now are these or our guardians to instruct their children with greater care, by the practice and view of what belongs to their office? To suppose those, replied he, should take greater care than our guardians, were ridiculous. But every creature fights more remarkably in the presence of its offspring. The case is so; but there is no small danger, Socrates, when they are defeated, as is often the case in war, that when their children, as well as themselves, are cut off, it shall be impossible to raise another city. You say true, replied I; but you imagine we ought, first of all, to take care never to run any risk. No, by no means. What then, if they are at all to hazard themselves in any case, is it not where, if they succeed, they shall become better men? That is plain. But do you imagine it a small matter, and not worthy of the risk, whether children, who are destined to be military men, see affairs relating to war, or not? No; it is a matter of consequence with respect to what you mention. We must, then, first endeavour to make our children spectators of the war, but contrive for them a place of safety—and then it shall do well, shall it not? Yes. And shall not then, said I, our parents, in the first place, as being men, not be ignorant, but understand which of the camps are, and which are not dangerous? It is likely, said he. And they shall bring them into the one, but with respect to the other they will be on their guard. Right. And they will probably set governors over them, said I; not such as are the most depraved, but such as by experience and years are able leaders and pedagogues. It is very proper. But we will say many things have happened contrary to expectation. Very many. With reference therefore to such events as these, it is proper that whilst they are children they procure wings, that so, in any necessity, they may escape by flight. How do you mean? said he. They must, when extremely young, be mounted on horses, and taught to ride on horseback, and brought to see the battle,

not on high-mettled and warlike horses, but on the fleetest, and those that are the most obedient to the rein; for thus they shall, in the best manner, observe their proper work, and, on any necessity, shall escape with the greatest safety, following the aged leaders. You seem to me, said he, to say right. But what, said I, as to the affairs of war? how are you to manage your soldiers, both with respect to one another and their enemies? have I imagined rightly or not? As to what? said he. That whoever of them, said I, leaves his rank, throws away his arms, or does any such thing from cowardice, must he not be made a handicraft, or land-labourer? By all means. And shall not the man who is taken alive by the enemy be given gratis to any who incline to employ him in the country just as they please? By all means. And are you of opinion, that he who gains a character, and excels, ought, in the first place, in the expedition itself, to be crowned in some measure by every one of the youths and boys who are his fellow soldiers? or think you otherwise? I am of opinion, for my part, they ought to be crowned. But what, and get the right hand likewise? This likewise. But this further, I imagine, said I, you are not yet satisfied about. What? That they embrace and be embraced by every one. They should most of all others, said he: and I will add to this law, that whilst they are upon this expedition no one shall be allowed to refuse them, whoever they incline to embrace, that if any happen to be in love with any one, male or female, he may be the more animated to win the prizes. Very well, said I; for we have already said that there are more marriages provided for the good citizen than for others, and more frequent choice in such matters allowed them than others, that the descendants of such an one may be as numerous as possible. We have already said so, replied he. But surely, even according to Homer's opinion, it is just that such of the youth as are brave be honoured in this way. For Homer says that Ajax, who excelled in war, was rewarded with a large share at the entertainments, this being the most natural reward to a brave man in the bloom of youth, by which he at the same time acquired honour and strength. Most right, said he. We shall then obey Homer, said I, at least, in these things. And we shall honour the good, both at our sacrifices, and on all such occasions, in as far as they appear to be deserving, with hymns likewise, and with those

things we lately mentioned; and besides these things, with seats, and dishes, and full cup; that at the same time we may both honour and exercise the virtue of worthy men and women. You say most admirably well, replied he. Be it so. If any one of those who die in the army shall have distinguished himself, shall we not, in the first place, say that he is of the golden race? Most especially. And shall we not believe Hesiod, telling us, that when any of these die,

Good, holy, earthly dæmons, they become,
Expelling evils, guardians of mankind?

We shall believe him. And we shall ask the oracle in what manner we ought to bury dæmoniacal and divine men, and with what marks of distinction; and thus shall we bury them in that very manner which shall be explained. Why shall we not? And we shall in all after time reverence and worship their tombs as those of dæmons. And we shall enact by law, that the same things be performed, and in the same manner, to any who shall have been deemed to have remarkably distinguished themselves in life, when they die of old age, or any thing else? It is right, said he. But what now? How shall our soldiers behave towards enemies? As to what? First, as to bringing into slavery. Do you think it just that Greeks should enslave Greek cities? or rather, as far as they are able, not suffer any other to do it, and accustom themselves to this, to be sparing of the Grecian tribe, being greatly on their guard against being enslaved by the Barbarians? It is, said he, in general, and in every particular case, best to be sparing. Are they not to acquire any Grecian slave themselves, and to counsel the other Greeks to act in the same manner? By all means, said he. They will the more, at least, by such a conduct, turn themselves against the Barbarians, and abstain from one another. But what? To strip the dead, said I, of any thing but their arms after they conquer them, is it handsome or not? It gives a pretence to cowards not to go against the enemy who is alive, as being necessarily occupied when they are thus employed about the one who is dead; and many armies have been lost by this plundering. Very many. And does it not appear to you to

? Hesiod. Op. et Di. lib. 1.

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be illiberal and fordid, and the part of a womanish and little mind, to strip the dead body, and deem the body of the deceased an enemy, when the enemy is fled off, and there is only left behind that with which he fought? Or, do you imagine that they who act in this manner do any way different from dogs, who are in a rage at the stones which are thrown at them, not touching the man who throws them? Not in the least, said he. We must let alone then this stripping the dead, and these hinderances arising from the carrying off booty. Truly, said he, these must be banished. Nor shall we at any time bring the arms into the temples, as if we were to dedicate them, at least not the arms of Grecians, if we have any concern to obtain the benevolence of the other Greeks: but we shall rather be afraid, lest it should be a kind of profanation to bring into the temple such things as these from our own kinsman, unless the oracle shall say otherwise. Most right, replied he. But what, with reference to the laying waste Grecian lands, and burning of houses, how shall your soldiers behave towards their enemies? I should be glad, said he, to hear you signifying your opinion. Truly then, said I, in my opinion, neither of these ought to be done, but only one year's produce to be carried off. And would you have me tell you the reason why this should be done? By all means. It appears to me, that as these two words, war and sedition, are different, so they are two different things which are signified by them: I call them two different things, because the one is domestic and akin, the other foreign and strange. When hatred is among ourselves, it is called sedition; when it respects foreigners, it is called war. What you say, replied he, is no way unreasonable. But consider now, if I say this likewise reasonably: for I aver that the Greek nation is friendly and akin to itself, but is foreign and strange to the Barbarian. This too is right. When then the Greeks fight with the Barbarians, and the Barbarians with the Greeks, we shall say they wage war, and are naturally enemies; and this hatred is to be called war. But when Greeks do any such thing to Greeks, we shall say that they are friends by nature, and that Greece in such a case is distempered, and in sedition; and such a hatred is to be called a sedition. I agree, said he, to account for it in the same manner. Consider then, said I, that in the sedition now mentioned, wherever such a thing happens, and the city is disjointed, if they sequester the lands, and burn the houses of one another, how destructive

destructive the sedition appears, and neither of them seem to be lovers of their country: for otherwise they would never dare to lay waste their nurse and mother; but it would suffice the victors to carry off the fruits of the vanquished, and to consider they are to be reconciled, and not perpetually to be at war. This indeed is by much a more mild sentiment than the other. But what now? said I. Is not this city you are establishing a Greek one? It should be so, replied he. And shall not they be good and mild? By all means. And shall they not be lovers of Greeks? And shall they not account Greece akin to them? And shall they not have the same religious rites with the rest of the Greeks? By all means. A difference then with Greeks, as with kinsmen, will they not denominate a sedition, and not a war? They will. And they will behave as those who are to be reconciled. By all means. They shall then be mild and moderate, not punishing so far as to enslave or destroy, since they are moderate, and not hostile. Just so, said he. Neither then, as they are Greeks, will they sequester Grecian lands, nor burn their houses; nor will they allow that in every city all are their enemies, men, women, and children; but that always a few only are enemies, the authors of the quarrel: and on all these accounts they will neither choose to lay waste lands, as the greatest number are their friends; nor will they overturn the houses, but will carry on the war so far as till the guilty be obliged by the innocent, whom they distress, to make reparation. I agree, said he, that we ought to behave so towards our own citizens when we are set against one another; and to behave so towards the Barbarians as the Greeks at present do to one another. Let us then likewise establish this law for our guardians,—neither to lay waste the lands, nor burn the houses. Let us establish it, said he, and this further, that these things, and those too you mentioned formerly, are right: but it appears to me, Socrates, if one is to allow you to speak in this manner, that you will never remember what you formerly passed by, when you entered on all that you have now said; viz. how far such a government is possible? and in what way it is at all possible? For, if it be at all possible, I will allow that all these good things will belong to that city, and the following likewise which you have omitted;—that they will, in the best manner, fight against their enemies, and of all others least abandon one another, recognizing these names, and calling one another by these,—fathers, sons,

sons, and brothers; and if the female shall encamp along with them, whether in the same rank, or drawn up behind them, that they will strike terror into the enemies, and at the same time assist if ever there be necessity for it, I know that in this way they will entirely be invincible. And I plainly see too what advantages they have at home, which we have omitted. But speak no more about this government, as I allow that all these, and ten thousand other things, will belong to it, if it actually exist. But let us endeavour to persuade one another of this itself, whether it be possible, and in what respect it is so; and let us omit those other things. You have suddenly, said I, made an assault on my reasoning, and make no allowance for one who is fighting; for perhaps you do not advert, that, with difficulty, I am escaped from two waves, and now you are bringing upon me the greatest and most dangerous of the three. After you have seen and heard this, you will entirely forgive me; allowing, that I with reason grudged, and was afraid to mention so great a paradox, and undertake to examine it. The more, said he, you mention these things, the less will you be freed from explaining in what respect this government is possible. Proceed then, and do not delay. Must not this then, said I, in the first place, be remembered, that we are come hither in search of justice, what it is? and what injustice is? It must, said he. But what is this to the purpose? Nothing. But if we discover what justice is, shall we then judge that the just man ought in no respect to differ from it, but in every respect to be such as justice is? and shall we be satisfied if he approach the nearest to it, and, of all others, partake of it the most? We shall, said he, be thus satisfied. As a model then, said I, we were inquiring into this, what kind of thing justice is; and we likewise were in quest of a just man; and considered what sort of man he should be, if he did exist. We likewise inquired what injustice is, and what too the most unjust men—in order that, looking into these two models, what kind of men they appeared with respect to happiness and its opposite, we might be obliged to acknowledge concerning ourselves, that whoever should most resemble them in character shall have a fortune the most resembling theirs; and not for this end, to show that these things are possible or not. In this, said he, you say true. Do you imagine then that the painter is in any degree the less excellent, who having painted a model of the most beautiful man, and brought every thing

thing fully into his piece, is yet unable to show that such a man does really exist? By Jupiter, said he, I do not. What then, have we not made in our reasonings (shall we say) a model of a good city? Yes, indeed. Have we then spoken any thing the worse, do you imagine, on this account, that we are not able to show, that it is possible for a city to be established such as we have described? No, indeed, said he. This then, said I, is the truth of the case. But if truly I must now likewise, on your account, hasten to this, to show how especially, and in what respects, it is most possible, in order to this discovery, you must again grant the same things as formerly. What things? Is it possible for any thing to be executed so perfectly as it is described? or, is such the nature of practice, that it approaches not so near the truth as theory, though some may think otherwise? But whether will you allow this or not? I allow it, said he. Do not then oblige me to show you all these things, and in every respect, existing in fact, so perfectly as we have described in our reasoning; but if we be able to find out how a city may be established the nearest possible to what we have mentioned, you will say we have discovered that these things which you require are possible? Or will you not even be satisfied if this be obtained? For my own part, I should be satisfied. And I too, said he. We are now, it seems, in the next place, to endeavour to find out and to show what, at all, is the evil which is now practised in cities through which they are not established in this manner we have described; and what is that smallest change, which, if made, would bring the city to this model of government; and let us chiefly see, if this can be effected by the change of one thing, if not by the change of two, if not that, by the change of the fewest things in number, and the smallest in power. By all means, said he. Upon the change then of one thing, said I, I am able I think to show that the state can fall into this model of government. But the change is not indeed small nor easy, yet it is possible. What is it? said he. I am now come, said I, to what I compared to the greatest wave: and it shall now be mentioned, though, like a breaking wave, it should overwhelm us with excessive laughter and unbelief. But consider what I am going to say. Proceed, replied he. Unless either philosophers, said I, govern in cities, or those who are at present called kings and governors philosophize genuinely and sufficiently, and these two, the political power and philosophy,

losophy, unite in one ; and till the bulk of those who at present pursue each of these separately are of necessity excluded, there shall be no end, Glauco, to the miseries of cities, nor yet, as I imagine, to those of the human race ; nor till then shall ever this republic, which we have gone over in our reasonings, spring up to a possibility, and behold the light of the sun. But this is that which all along made me grudge to mention it, that I saw what a paradox I was to utter : for it is difficult to be convinced that no other but this republic can enjoy happiness, whether public or private. You have thrown out, Socrates, said he, such an expression and argument, as you may imagine will bring on you a great many, and these courageous to such a degree as to put off their clothes, and naked to snatch whatever weapon fortune affords each of them ; and, as if they were to perform prodigies, rush upon you in battle array. And unless, mowing them down with argument, you make your escape, you will pay for it by suffering most severe ridicule. And are not you the cause of all this ? said I. But in acting handsomely at least, replied he. However, in this affair, I will not betray you, but defend you with such things as I am able. And I am able both by my good-will and by encouraging you, and probably I will answer your questions more carefully than any other ; only do you endeavour, with the help of such an assistant, to show those who are backward to believe these things, that the case really is as you represent it. I must endeavour, said I, since even you afford so great an alliance. And here it seems to me to be necessary, if we are any how to make our escape from those you mention, accurately to define to them what kind of men these are whom we call philosophers, when we dare to assert that they alone ought to govern, in order that, when they are made perfectly manifest, any one may be able to defend himself, when he asserts that to these it naturally belongs both to apply themselves to philosophy, and likewise to take upon them the government of the state : but others are to apply themselves neither to philosophy nor government, but to obey their leader. It is proper, said he, to define them. Come then, follow me this way, if together any how we shall sufficiently explain this matter. Lead on then, said he. Will it then be needful, said I, to remind you, or do you remember it, that when we say of any one, that he loves any thing, when we speak with propriety, he must not appear to love one part of it, and not another, but to have an affection for the whole ? I need, it seems, replied he, to be put in mind ;

for I do not understand it perfectly. It might become another, Glauco, replied I, to say what you say; but it does not become a man who is a lover, to forget that all those who are in their bloom sing somehow, and give emotion to one who is amorous, and a lover, as they are deemed worthy both of respect and of being saluted. Or do you not behave in this manner towards the beautiful? One, because flat-nosed, shall be called agreeable, and be commended by you; and the hook-nose of the other, you say, is prince y; and that which is in the middle of these is according to the exactest symmetry: the black are said to be manly to behold; and the fair to be the children of the Gods:—but this appellation of pale green, do you imagine it is the invention of any other than of a flattering lover, and one who easily bears with the paleness, provided it is in the bloom of youth? And, in one word, you make all kinds of pretences, and say every thing so as never to reject any one who is of a blooming age? If you incline, said he, to judge by me of other lovers, that they act in this manner, I agree to it for the sake of the argument. And what, said I, with respect to the lovers of wine; do you not observe them acting in the same manner, cheerfully drinking every kind of wine upon every pretext? Yes, indeed. And you perceive, as I imagine, that the ambitious likewise, if they cannot obtain the command of a whole army, will take the third command; and, if they cannot be honoured by greater and better men, are content if they be honoured by the lower and more contemptible, being desirous of honour at any rate? It is perfectly so. Agree to this or not: if we say, one is desirous of any thing, shall we say that he desires the whole species, or that he desires one part of it, but not another? The whole, replied he. Shall we not then likewise say, that the philosopher is desirous of wisdom, and that not of one part only, but of the whole? True. He then who is averse to disciplines, especially if he be young, and has not at all understanding to discern what is good, and what is otherwise, shall not be called a lover of learning, nor a philosopher; in the same manner as we say of one who is disgusted with meats, that he neither hungers after nor desires meats, nor is a lover but a hater of them. And we shall say right. But the man who readily inclines to taste of every discipline, and with pleasure enters on the study of it, and is insatiable of it, this man we shall with justice call a philosopher: shall we not? On this Glauco said, There will be many such philosophers as those very absurd: for all your lovers of shows appear to

me to be of this kind, from their taking a pleasure in learning; and your story lovers are the most stupid of all to be reckoned among philosophers at least. These indeed would not willingly attend on such reasonings, and such a disquisition as this. But yet, as if they had hired out their ears to listen to every chorus, they run about to the Bacchanalia, omitting neither those of cities nor villages. Shall all these then, and others studious of such things, and those who apply to the inferior arts, be called by us philosophers? By no means, said I, but resembling philosophers. But whom, said he, do you call the true ones? Those, said I, who are desirous of discerning the truth. This likewise, said he, is right. But how do you mean? It is not easy, said I, to tell it to another; but you, I imagine, will agree with me in this. In what? That since the beautiful is opposite to the deformed, these are two things. Why are they not? And if they are two, then each of them is one. This also is granted. And the reasoning is the same concerning justice and injustice, good and evil. And concerning every other species of things the argument is the same—that each of them is one in itself, but appears to be many, being every where diversified by their communication with action and body, and with one another. You say right, said he. In this manner then, said I, I separate these, and set apart those you now mentioned, the lovers of public shows, of handicrafts, and mechanics; and then apart from these I set those of whom we discourse at present, whom alone we may properly call philosophers. How do you say? replied he. The lovers of common stories and of spectacles delight in fine sounds, colours, and figures, and every thing which is compounded of these; but the nature of beauty itself their diænoëtic part is unable to discern and admire. Indeed the case is so, said he. But as to those then who are able to approach this beauty itself, and to behold it as it is in itself, must they not be few in number? Extremely so. He then who accounts some things beautiful, but neither knows beauty itself, nor is able to follow if one were to lead him to the knowledge of it, does he seem to you to live in a dream, or to be awake? Consider now, what is it to dream? Is it not this, when a man, whether asleep or awake, imagines the similitude of a thing is not the similitude, but really the thing itself which it resembles? I for my part would aver, replied he, that such a person is really in a dream. But what now as to him who judges opposite to this, who understands what beauty is itself,

self, and is able to discern both it and such things as participate of it, and neither deems the participants to be beauty, nor beauty to be the participants? whether does such an one seem to you to live awake, or in a dream? Perfectly awake, said he. May we not then properly call this man's dianoëtic perception, as he really knows, knowledge, but that of the other, opinion, as he only opines? By all means. But what if the person who we say only opines things, but does not really know them, be enraged at us, and dispute with us, alleging that what we say is not true; shall we have any method of soothing and persuading him, in a gentle manner, by concealing that he is not in a sound state? At least there is need of it, replied he. Come now, consider what we shall say to him. Or do you incline we shall thus interrogate him? telling him, that if he knows any thing, no one envies him for it, but we shall gladly see him possessed of some knowledge; but only tell us this, does the man who has knowledge, know something or nothing? Do you now answer me for him? I will answer, said he, that he knows something. Whether something which really exists, or which does not? What does really exist: for how can that be known which has no real existence? We have then examined this sufficiently, though we might have considered it more fully; that what really is, may be really known; but what does not at all exist, cannot at all be known. We have examined it most sufficiently. Be it so. But if there be any thing of such a kind, as both to be and not to be, must it not lie between that which perfectly is, and that which is not at all? Between them. As to what really is, then, is there not knowledge? and as to that which is not at all, is there not of necessity ignorance? And for that which is between these, we must seek for something between ignorance and science, if there be any such thing. By all means. Do we say then that opinion is any thing? Why not? Whether is it a different power from science, or the same? Different. Is opinion then conversant about one thing, and science about another, by virtue of the same power, or each of them by virtue of a power of its own? This last. Is not the power of science conversant about what really exists, to know that it is? Or rather it seems to me to be necessary to distinguish in this manner. How? We shall say, that powers are a certain species of real existences, by which we can both do whatever we can do, and every being else whatever it can do. Thus, I say, that seeing and hearing are

among these powers, if you understand what I mean to call a species. I understand, said he. Hear then what appears to me concerning them. For I do not see any colour of a power, nor figure, nor any of such qualities, as of many other things, with reference to which I distinguish some things with myself, that they are different from one another. But as to power, I regard that alone about which it is conversant, and what it effects; and on this account I have called each of these a power. And the power which is conversant about and effects one and the same thing, I call the same power, but that conversant about and effecting a different thing, I call a different power: but what say you? In what manner do you call it? Just so, replied he. But come again, excellent Glauco, whether do you say that science is itself a certain power, or to what class do you refer it? I refer it to this class of power, said he, as it is of all powers the most strong. But what now? Shall we refer opinion to power, or to some other species? By no means to power, said he; for that by which we form opinions is nothing else but opinion. But you owned some time since, that science and opinion were not the same. How, said he, can ever any one who possesses intellect reduce under one, that which is infallible, and that which is not infallible? You say right, said I. And it is plain that we have allowed opinion to be a different thing from science. We have. Each of them then has naturally a different power over a different thing. Of necessity. Science has a power over being itself, in knowing real existence, how it exists. Yes. But we say that opinion opines. Yes. Whether does it know the same thing which science knows? and shall that which is known, and that which is opined, be the same? or is this impossible? Impossible, said he, from what we have allowed: since they are naturally powers of different things, and both of them are powers, opinion and science, and each of them different from the other, as we have said; from these things it cannot be, that what is opined is the same with that which is known. If then being itself be known, must it not be different from the being which is perceived by opinion? Different. Does he then who opines, opine that which has no existence? Or is it impossible to opine that which doth not exist at all? Consider now, does not the man who opines, refer his opinion to somewhat? Or is it possible to opine, and yet opine nothing at all? Impossible. But whoever opines, opines some one thing. Yes. But surely that which does not exist, cannot be called any one thing, but most properly

properly nothing at all. Certainly so. But we necessarily referred ignorance to that which does not exist, but knowledge to real existence. Right, said he. Neither therefore does he opine being, nor yet that which is not. He does not. Opinion then is neither knowledge, nor is it ignorance. It appears it is not. Does it then exceed these, either knowledge in perspicuity, or ignorance in obscurity? It does neither. But does opinion, said I, seem to you to be more obscure than knowledge, but more perspicuous than ignorance? By much, said he. But does it lie between them both then? It does. Opinion then is in the middle of these two. Entirely so. And have we not already said, that if any thing appeared of such a kind, as at the same time to be, and yet not to be, such a thing would lie between that which has really an existence, and that which does not at all exist, and that neither science nor ignorance would be conversant about it, but that which appeared to be between ignorance and science? Right. And now that which we call opinion, has appeared to be between them. It has appeared. It yet remains for us, as it seems, to discover that which participates of both these, of being, and of non-being, and which with propriety can be called neither of them perfectly, that if it appear to be that which is opined, we may justly call it so, assigning to the extremes what is extreme, and to the middle what is in the middle. Shall we not do thus? Thus. These things being determined, let this worthy man, I will say, tell and answer me, he who reckons that beauty, and a certain idea of beauty there is none, always the same, and in the same respects; but this lover of beautiful objects reckons there are many beautiful things, but can never endure to be told that there is one beautiful, and one just, and so of others. Of all these many things, excellent man! shall we say to him, is there any which will not appear deformed, and of those just which will not appear unjust, of those holy which will not appear profane? No; but of necessity, said he, the beautiful things themselves must in some respects appear even deformed, and others in like manner. But what? many things which are double, or twofold, do they less really appear to be halves than doubles? No less. And things great and small, light and heavy, shall they be denominated what we call them, any more than the opposite? No; but each of them, said he, always participates of both. Whether then is each of these many things that which it is said to be, or is it not?

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It is like their riddles at feasts, said he, and the riddle of children about the eunuch's striking the bat, puzzling one another in what manner and how far he strikes it. For all these things have a double meaning, and it is impossible to know accurately that they are, or are not, that they are both, or neither of the two. How can you do with them then? said I, or have you a better class for them than a medium between being and non-being? For nothing seems more obscure than non-being in respect of having no being at all, nor more perspicuous than being in respect of real being. Most true, said he. We have then discovered, it seems, that most of the maxims of the multitude concerning the beautiful, and those other things, roll somehow between being and non-being. We have accurately discovered it. But we formerly agreed, that if any such thing should appear, it ought to be called that which is opined, and not what is known; and that which fluctuates between the two is to be perceived by the power between the two. We agreed. Those then who contemplate many beautiful things, but who never perceive beauty itself, nor are able to follow another leading them to it; and many just things, but never justice itself, and all other things in like manner, we will say that they opine all things, but know none of the things which they opine. Of necessity, said he. But what now? Those who perceive each of the things themselves, always existing in the same manner, and in the same respect, shall we not say that they know, and do not opine? Of necessity this likewise. And shall we not say, that these embrace and love the things of which they have knowledge, and the others the things of which they have opinion? Or do we not remember, that we said they beheld and loved fine sounds and colours, and such things; but that beauty itself they do not admit of as any real being? We remember. Shall we then act wrong in calling them lovers of opinion, rather than philosophers? And yet they will be greatly enraged at us if we call them so. Not, if they be persuaded by me, said he; for it is not lawful to be enraged at the truth. Those then who admire every thing which has a real being, are to be called philosophers, and not lovers of opinion. By all means.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

THE

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK VI.

THOSE now who are philosophers, said I, Glauco, and those who are not, have, through a long compass of discourse, with difficulty discovered themselves what they severally are. Because, perhaps, it was not easy, said he, in a short one. So it appears, said I. But I still think they would have better discovered themselves, if it had been requisite to speak concerning this alone, and not to have discussed that multitude of other things, when we were to consider what difference there is between a just life and an unjust. What then, said he, are we to treat of next? What else, said I, but of that which is next in order? Since those are philosophers who are able to pass into contact with that which always subsists similarly according to the same *; but those who are not able to accomplish this, but who wander amidst many things, and such as are every way shifting, are not philosophers; which of these ought to be the governors of the city? Which way, said he, shall we determine in this, and determine reasonably? Whichever of them, said I, appear capable of preserving the laws and institutions of cities, these are to be made guardians. Right, said he. This now, said I, is certainly plain; whether a blind or quick-sighted guardian be proper for guarding any thing. Why is it not plain? said he. Whether then do those appear to you to differ from the blind, who are in reality deprived of the knowledge of each particular being, and have neither a clear paradigm in their soul, nor are able, as painters looking up to the truest paradigm, and always referring themselves thither, and contemplating it in the most accurate manner possible, to establish here too in like manner just maxims of the

* Viz an intelligible and intellectual essence.

beautiful,

beautiful, and just, and good, if there be occasion to establish them, and to guard and preserve such as are already established? No, by Jupiter, said he. They do not differ much. Shall we then appoint those to be guardians, or those who know each being, and who in experience are nothing behind those others, nor inferior to them in any other part of virtue? It were absurd, said he, to choose others, at least if these are not deficient in other things; for in this, which is almost the greatest, they excel. Shall we not then speak to this point,—In what manner the same persons shall be able to have both the one and the other of those things? By all means. It is then first of all necessary, as we observed in the beginning of this discourse, thoroughly to understand their genius; and I think if we sufficiently agree respecting it, we shall likewise agree that the same persons be able to possess both these things, and that no others but these ought to be the governors of cities. How so? Let this now be agreed among us concerning the philosophic geniuses, that they are always desirous of such learning as may discover to them that essence which always is, and is not changed by generation or corruption. Let it be agreed. And likewise, said I, that they are desirous of the whole of such learning, and that they will not willingly omit any part of it, neither small nor great, more honourable or more dishonourable, as we formerly observed concerning the ambitious, and concerning lovers. You say right, said he. Consider then, in the next place, if, besides what we have mentioned, it be necessary that this also should subsist in the genius of those who are to be such as we have described. What? That they be void of falsehood, nor willingly at any time receive a lie; but hate it, and love the truth. It is likely, said he. It is not only likely, my friend, but is perfectly necessary, that one who is naturally in love with any thing should love every thing allied and belonging to the objects of his affection. Right, said he. Can you then find any thing more allied to wisdom than truth? How can we? said he. Is it possible then that the same genius can be philosophic, and at the same time a lover of falsehood? By no means. He then who is in reality a lover of learning, ought immediately from his infancy to be in the greatest measure desirous of all truth. By all means. But we know somehow, that whoever has his desires vehemently verging to one thing, has them upon this very account weaker as to other things, as a current

diverted from its channel. Why are they not? But whosoever hath his desires running out after learning, and every thing of this kind, would be conversant, I think, about the pleasure of the soul itself, and would forsake those pleasures which arise from the body, provided he be not a counterfeit, but some real philosopher. This follows by a mighty necessity. And such an one is moderate, and by no means a lover of money. For the reasons why money is with so much trouble anxiously sought after, have weight with any other than such an one to make him solicitous. Certainly. And surely somehow you must likewise consider this when you are to judge what is a philosophic genius, and what is not. What? That it do not without your knowledge partake of an illiberal turn: for pusillanimity is most opposite to a soul which is always to pursue earnestly the whole and every thing of that which is divine and human. Most true, said he. Do you then suppose that he who possesses magnificent conceptions in his dianoëtic part, and a contemplation of the whole of time, and the whole of being, can possibly consider human life as a thing of great consequence. It is impossible, said he. Such an one then will not account death any thing terrible. Least of all. A cowardly and illiberal genius, then, will not, it seems, readily participate of true philosophy. It does not appear to me that it will. What now, can the moderate man, and one who is not a lover of money, nor illiberal, nor arrogant, nor cowardly, ever possibly be an ill co-partner, or unjust? It is impossible. And you will likewise consider this, when you are viewing from its infancy what is the philosophic soul, and what is not, whether it be just and mild, or unsocial and savage. By all means. Neither indeed, as I think, will you omit this. What? Whether it learn with facility or difficulty. Or do you expect that ever any one will love any thing sufficiently, in performing which he performs with uneasiness and with difficulty, making small progress? It cannot be. But what if he can retain nothing of what he learns, being quite forgetful, is it possible for him not to be void of science? How is it possible? And when he labours unprofitably, do you not imagine he will be obliged at last to hate both himself and such practice? Why must he not? We shall never then reckon a forgetful soul among those who are thoroughly philosophic, but we shall require it to be of a good memory. By all means. But never shall

shall we say this at least, that an unmusical and indecent genius leads anywhere else but towards intemperance. Where else? But whether do you reckon truth allied to intemperance or to temperance? To temperance. Let us require then among other things a dianoëtic part naturally temperate and graceful, as a proper guide towards spontaneously attaining the idea of each particular being. Why not? What now? Do we not in some measure seem to you to have discussed the necessary qualifications, and such as are consequent to each other, in a soul which is to apprehend being sufficiently, and in perfection? The most necessary, said he. Is it possible then for you in any measure to blame such a study as this, which a man can never be able sufficiently to apply to, unless he be naturally possessed of a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent, graceful, and the friend and ally of truth, justice, fortitude and temperance? Not even Momus himself, said he, could find fault with such a study. But, said I, will it not be to these alone, when they are perfected by education and age, that you will entrust the city? Here Adimantus said, Indeed, Socrates, no one is able to contradict you as to these things; but all who hear you at any time advancing what you do at present, are somehow affected in this manner. Being led off a little by your reasoning on each question, through their inexperience in this method of question and answer, when all these little are collected together, at the close of your reasonings, they reckon that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary of their first concessions; and like those who play at talus with such as are dexterous, but are themselves unskilful, they are in the end shut up, and can do no more; so your hearers have nothing to say, being shut up by this other kind of game, not with pieces, but with your reasonings. Though the truth at least is not by this any way advanced: I say this with reference to the present inquiry; for one may tell you that he has nothing to oppose to each of your questions by way of argument, but that in fact he sees that all those who plunge into philosophy, applying to it not with this view, that being early instructed they may be liberated from it when in their prime, but that they may continue in it much longer, become the most of them quite awkward, not to say altogether depraved; and those of them who appear the most worthy, do yet suffer thus much from this study you so much commend, that they become useless to the public.

public. When I had heard this, Do you imagine then, said I, that such as say these things are telling a falsehood? I do not know, said he, but would gladly hear your opinion. You would then hear that they appear to me to say true. How then, replied he, is it right to say that the miseries of cities shall never have an end till they be governed by philosophers, whom we are now acknowledging to be useless to them? You ask a question, said I, which needs an answer through an image. And you, said I, are not wont, I think, to speak through images. Be it so, said I. You jest now, when you have brought me on a subject which is so difficult to be explained. But attend to the image, that you may see further with what difficulty I assimilate; for the sufferings of the most worthy philosophers in the management of public affairs are so grievous, that there is not any one other suffering so severe: but in making our simile, and in apologizing for them, we must collect from many particulars, in the same manner as painters mix the figures of two different animals together, and paint a creature which is both goat and stag in one, and others of this kind. Conceive now that such an one as this is the pilot of a fleet, or of a single ship, one who exceeds all in the ship, both in bulk and in strength, but is somewhat deaf, and sees in like manner but a short way, and whose skill in sea affairs is much of the same kind. Conceive likewise that the sailors are all in sedition among themselves, contending for the pilotship, each imagining he ought to be pilot, though he never learned the art, nor is able to show who was his master, nor at what time he learned it. That besides this, all of them say that the art itself cannot be taught, and are ready to cut in pieces any one who says that it can. Imagine further, that they continually surround the pilot himself, begging, and doing every thing that he may put the helm into their hands; and that even sometimes when they are not so successful in persuading him as others are, they either kill these others, or throw them overboard; and after they have by mandragora, or wine, or some other thing, rendered the noble pilot incapable, they manage the ship with the assistance of the crew, and whilst they drink and feast in this manner, they sail as it may be expected of such people. And besides these things, if any one be dexterous in assisting them to get the government into their own hands, and in setting aside the pilot, either by persuasion or force,

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they commend such an one, calling him sailor and pilot, and intelligent in navigation; but they contemn as useless every one who is not of this kind, whilst they never in the least think that the true pilot must necessarily pay attention to the year, the seasons, the heavens, and stars, and winds, and every thing belonging to the art, if he intends to be a governor of a ship in reality: but the art and practice of governing men, whether some be willing or not, they think impossible for a man to attain in conjunction with the art of navigation. Whilst affairs are in this situation with regard to the ships, do you not think that the true pilot will be called by the sailors aboard of ships fitted out in this manner, a star-gazer, insignificant, and unprofitable to them? Undoubtedly, said Adimantus. I think then, said I, that you will not want any explanation of the image, to see that it represents how they are affected in cities towards true philosophers, but that you understand what I say. Perfectly, said he. First of all then with respect to this, if any one wonders that philosophers are not honoured in cities, teach him our image, and endeavour to persuade him that it would be much more wonderful if they were honoured. I will teach him so, replied he. And further, that it is indeed true, what you now was observing, that the best of those who apply to philosophy are useless to the bulk of mankind; but however, for this, bid them blame such as make no use of these philosophers, and not these philosophers themselves. For it is not natural for the pilot to entreat the sailors to allow him to govern them, nor for the wise to be resorting to the gates of the rich. But whoever pleasantly said this was mistaken; for this is truly the natural method, that whoever is sick, whether rich or poor, must of necessity go to the gates of the physician, and whoever wants to be governed must wait on him who is able to govern; for it is not natural that the governor who is really of any value should entreat the governed to subject themselves to his government. But you will not greatly err, when you compare our present political governors to those sailors we now mentioned, and those who are called by them insignificant and star-gazers to those who are truly pilots. Most right, said he. From hence then it would seem that the best pursuit is not likely to be held in esteem among those who pursue studies of an opposite nature; but by far the greatest and most violent accusation of philosophy

losophy is occasioned by means of those who profess to study it ; the most of whom, you say, your accuser of philosophy calls altogether depraved, and the very best of them of no advantage to the state ; and I agreed that you say the truth, did I not ? You did. And have we not fully explained the cause why the best of them are of no advantage ? We have. Would you choose then, that we should in the next place explain the reason why the most of them must of necessity be depraved, and that we endeavour to demonstrate, that of this, philosophy is by no means the cause. Entirely so. Let us attend then, and begin our reasoning, calling to mind what we formerly observed concerning the natural genius which necessarily belongs to the good and worthy.—And what was a leading part in it, if you remember, was truth, which he must by all means wholly pursue, or else be a vain boaster, and never partake of true philosophy. It was so said. Is not this one part of his character perfectly contrary to the present opinions of him ? It is very much so, replied he. Will it not then be no small defence, if we be able to show that the true lover of learning is naturally made to aspire to the knowledge of real being, and not to rest in the many particular things which are the objects of opinion, but goes on, and is not blunted, nor ceases from his love of truth till he comes into contact with the nature of every thing which *is*, by that part of the soul whose office it is to come into contact with a thing of this kind. But it is the office of that part of the soul which is allied to real being ; to which when this true lover of learning approaches, and is mingled with it, having generated intellect and truth, he will then have true knowledge, and truly live and be nourished, and then he becomes liberated from the pains of parturition, but not before. This, said he, will be a most reasonable defence. What now, will it be the part of such an one to love falsehood, or, entirely the contrary, to hate it ? To hate it, said he. But whilst truth indeed leads the way, we can never, I think, say that any band of evils follows in her train. How can we ? But, on the contrary, we may aver that she is followed by sound and moderate manners, and such as are accompanied with temperance. Right, said he. Why, now, need we go over again and range in order the whole qualities of the philosophic genius ? for you no doubt remember that there belong to men of this character fortitude, magnanimity, facility of learning, and

memory: and when you replied that every one would be obliged to agree to what we said, we quitted that subject, and turned to that which is the subject of discourse at present, on your saying that you observed some of the philosophers were insignificant, and many of them altogether depraved. And while we were examining into the cause of that calumny, we are now come to this, whence it is that many of them are depraved. And on this account we have gone over again the genius of true philosophers, and have necessarily defined what it is. It is so, said he. It is necessary now, said I, that we consider the corruptions of this genius, and in what manner it is destroyed in the most; but one small particular escapes us: who those are that they call not depraved, but useless. And next, what those geniuses are which counterfeit the philosophic nature, and pretend to its pursuit: and what is the nature of those souls who aspire to a pursuit which does not belong to them, and is above their reach: for these, by their manifold errors, have every where, and among all men, introduced this opinion of philosophy which you mention. What sort of corruptions, said he, do you mean? I shall endeavour to rehearse them, said I, if I be able. And this now, I think, every one will allow us, that such a genius, with all those qualifications we have enjoined one who is to be a perfect philosopher, rarely arises among men, and that there are but few of them: do not you think so? Entirely so. And of those few, consider how many and how great are the causes of corruption. What are they? That which is most of all wonderful to hear, that each of those things we commended in the genius of a philosopher, corrupts the soul which possesses them, and withdraws it from philosophy; fortitude, I mean, and temperance, and all those other qualifications which we have discussed. That is strange to hear, said he. And further still, said I, besides these things, all those which are commonly called good, such as beauty, riches, strength of body, a powerful alliance in the city, and every thing akin to these, corrupt and withdraw it from philosophy; for you have now a specimen of what I mean. I have, replied he, and would gladly understand more accurately what you say. Understand then, said I, the whole of it aright, and it will appear manifest, and what we formerly said will not seem to be absurd. How then, said he, do you bid me act? With respect to every kind of seed, or plant, said I, whether

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of vegetables or animals, we know, that whatever does not meet with the proper nourishment, nor season, nor place belonging to it, the more vigorous it is by nature, the more it is defective in the excellencies of its kind; for evil is more contrary to good, than to that which is not good. Why is it not? It is then reasonable, I think, that the best genius, when meeting with nourishment foreign to it, shall be more changed to what is evil, than a bad genius. It is. And shall we not, Adimantus, said I, in the same manner, say that souls naturally the best, when they meet with bad education, become remarkably depraved? Or do you think that great iniquity, and the extremest wickedness, arise from a weak genius, and not from a vigorous one ruined in its education; but that an imbecil genius will never be the cause either of mighty good or evil? I do not think it will, said he, but the case is as you say. If then this philosophic genius, which we have established, meet with suitable instruction, it will, I think, necessarily grow up, and attain to every virtue; but if, when sown in an improper soil, it grow up and be nourished accordingly, it will on the other hand become perfectly the reverse, unless some one of the Gods afford it assistance. Or do you think, with the multitude, that certain of the youth are corrupted by the sophists, and that the corruptors are certain private sophists, which is worthy of our notice? Or think you rather, that the persons who say these things are themselves the greatest sophists, conveying their instruction in the most powerful manner, and rendering young and old, men and women, such as they wish to be? When do they effect this? replied he. When many of them, said I, are set down, crowded together in an assembly, in their courts of justice, the theatre, or the camp, or any other public meeting of the people, with much tumult they blame some of the speeches and actions, and commend others, roaring and vociferating the one and the other beyond measure. And besides this, the rocks and the place where they are resounding, the tumult is redoubled, whilst they thus blame and applaud. In such a situation now, what kind of heart, as we say, do you think the youth are to have? Or what private instruction can make him withstand, so as not to be perfectly overwhelmed by such blame or applause, and, giving way, be borne along the stream wherever it carries him, and say that things are beautiful and base, according as these people say, and pursue the things they

they pursue, and become of the very same kind himself? This, said he, must by an abundant necessity happen, Socrates. But, said I, we have not yet mentioned, what must of the greatest necessity be the case. What is that? said he. That which these instructors and sophists superadd by action, not being able to persuade by speech: or, do you not know, that they punish with disgraces, and fines, and deaths, the man whom they cannot persuade? I know that, said he, extremely well. What other sophist then, or what private reasonings do you think capable, drawing opposite to these, to overpower them? I know none, said he. But is it not besides, said I, great folly even to attempt it? For there neither is, nor was, nor ever can be, a different method of attaining virtue, besides this education by these sophists. I mean a human method, my friend; for a divine one, according to the proverb, I keep out of the question: for you must know well, with respect to whatever temper is preserved, and becomes such as it ought to be in such a constitution of politics, that you will not say amiss when you say that it is preserved by a divine destiny. Nor am I, said he, of a different opinion. But further now, besides these things, said I, you must likewise be of this opinion. Of what? That each of these private hirelings, which these men call sophists, and deem the rivals of their art, teach no other things but those dogmas of the vulgar, which they approve when they are assembled together, and call it wisdom. Just as if a man had learned what were the wrathful emotions and desires of a great and strong animal he were nourishing, how it must be approached, how touched, and when it is most fierce or most mild; and from what causes, and the sounds which on these several occasions it was wont to utter, and at what sounds uttered by another, the animal is rendered both mild and savage; and, having learned all these things by associating with the animal for a long time, should call this wisdom; and, as if he had established an art, should apply himself to the teaching it; whilst yet, with reference to these dogmas and desires, he knows not in reality what is beautiful, or base, or good, or ill, or just, or unjust, but should pronounce all these according to the opinions of the great animal, calling those things good in which it delighted, and that evil with which it was vexed, and should have no other measure as to these things. Let us likewise suppose that he calls those things which are necessary, beauti-

ful and just, but that he hath never discovered himself, nor is able to show to another, the nature of the necessary and the good, how much they really differ from each other. Whilst he is such an one, does he not, by Jupiter, appear to you an absurd teacher? To me he appears so, said he. And from this man, think you, does he any way differ, who deems it wisdom to have understood the anger and the pleasures of the multitude, and of assemblies of all kinds of men, whether with relation to painting, music, or politics? For, if any one converses with these, and shows them either a poem, or any other production of art, or piece of administration respecting the city, and makes the multitude the judges of it, he is under what is called a Diomedæan^{*} necessity, which is above all other necessities, of doing whatever they commend. But to show that these things are in reality good and beautiful, have you at any time heard any of them advance a reason that was not quite ridiculous? Nor do I think, said he, I ever shall. Whilst you attend then to all these things, bear this in mind, that the multitude never will admit or reckon that there is the one beautiful itself, and not many beautifuls, one *thing itself which has a single subsistence*, and not many such things. They will be the last to do so, replied he. It is impossible then for the multitude to be philosophers. Impossible. And those who philosophize must of necessity be reproached by them. Of necessity. And likewise by those private persons, who, in conversing with the multitude, desire to please them. It is plain. From this state of things now, what safety do you see for the philosophic genius to continue in its pursuit, and arrive at perfection? And consider from

^{*} A Diomedæan necessity is a proverbial expression applied to those who do any thing from necessity; and originated from the following history: Diomed and Ulysses, having stolen the Palladium from Ilium, returned by night to their ships. But Ulysses, being ambitious that the glory of the deed might be given to him alone, endeavoured to slay Diomed, who walked before him with the Palladium. Diomed, however, by the light of the moon, beholding the shadow of the sword raised over him, caught hold of Ulysses, bound his hands, ordered him to walk before him, and, striking him on the back with the broad part of his sword, arrived among the Greeks. This note is extracted from the Greek Scholia on Plato, collected from many manuscripts by Ruhnkenius, and published at Lyons 1800. As this work is but just come to my hands, I could not avail myself of it before; but I shall endeavour to supply this deficiency in the additional notes at the end of this volume, and shall select what appears to me to be most important, as notes to this and the subsequent books and dialogues. Unfortunately, these Scholia are mostly grammatical.

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what was formerly said, for we have allowed that facility in learning, memory, fortitude, and magnanimity belong to this genius. We have. And shall not such an one, of all men, immediately be the first in every thing, especially if he has a body naturally adapted to the soul? Why shall he not? said he. And when he becomes more advanced in age, his kindred and citizens, I think, will incline to employ him in their affairs. Why will they not? And making supplications to him, and paying him homage, they will submit to him, and anticipate and flatter beforehand his growing power. Thus, said he, it usually happens. What now, said I, do you think such an one will do, in such a case, especially if he happen to belong to a great city, and be rich, and of a noble descent, and withal beautiful and of a large stature? Will he not be filled with extravagant hopes, deeming himself capable of managing both the affairs of Greeks and Barbarians, and on these accounts carry himself loftily, without any solid judgment, full of ostentation and vain conceit? Extremely so, replied he. If one should gently approach a man of this disposition, and tell him the truth, that he has no judgment, yet needs it; but that it is not to be acquired but by one who subjects himself to this acquisition, do you think that, with all these evils about him, he would be ready to hearken? Far from it, said he. If now, said I, through a good natural temper, and an innate disposition to reason, any one should somehow be made sensible, and be bent and drawn towards philosophy, what do we imagine those others will do, when they reckon they shall lose his company, and the benefit which they received from him? Will they not by every action, and every speech, say and do every thing to the man not to suffer himself to be persuaded; and to his adviser, to render him incapable by insnaring him in private, and bringing him to public trial? This, said he, must of necessity happen. Is it likely now such an one will philosophize? Not altogether. You see then, said I, that we were not wrong when we said that even the very parts of the philosophic genius, when they meet with bad education, are in some measure the cause of a falling off from this pursuit, as well as those vulgarly reputed goods, riches, and all furniture of this kind. We were not, replied he, but it was rightly said. Such then, said I, admirable friend! is the ruin, such and so great the corruption of the best genius for the noblest pursuit, and which besides but rarely happens, as we

observed; and from among such as these are the men who do the greatest mischiefs to cities, and to private persons, and likewise they who do the greatest good, such as happen to be drawn to this side. But a little genius never did any thing remarkable to any one, neither to a private person nor to a city. Most true, said he. These indeed, then, whose business it chiefly was to apply to philosophy, having thus fallen off, leaving her desolate and imperfect, lead themselves a life neither becoming nor genuine; whilst other unworthy persons, intruding themselves on philosophy, abandoned in a manner by her kindred, have disgraced her, and loaded her with reproaches, such as these you say her reproachers reproach her with: viz. that of those who converse with her, some are of no value, and most of them worthy of the greatest punishments. These things, replied he, are commonly said. And with reason, replied I, they are said. For other contemptible men seeing the field unoccupied, and that the possession of it is attended with dignities and honourable names, like persons who make their escape from prisons to temples, these likewise gladly leap from their handicrafts to philosophy; I mean such of them as are of the greatest address in their own little art. For, even in this situation of philosophy, her remaining dignity, in comparison with all the other arts, still surpasses in magnificence; of which dignity many are desirous, who by natural disposition are unfit for it, and whose bodies are not only deformed by their arts and handicrafts, but whose souls also are in like manner confused, and crushed by their servile works. Must it not of necessity be so? Undoubtedly, said he. Does it then appear to you, said I, that they are any way different in appearance from a blacksmith, who has made a little money, bald and puny, recently liberated from chains, and washed in the bath, with a new robe on him, just decked out as a bridegroom, presuming to marry the daughter of his master, encouraged by the poverty and forlorn circumstances with which he sees him oppressed? There is, said he, no great difference. What sort of a race must such as these produce? Must it not be bastardly and abject? By an abundant necessity. But what now? When men who are unworthy of instruction apply to it, and are conversant in it, in an unworthy manner, what kind of sentiments and opinions shall we say are produced? Must they not be such as ought properly to be termed sophisms, and which possess nothing genuine, or worthy of true prudence?

dence? By all means so, replied he. A very small number now, said I, Adimantus, remains of those who worthily are conversant in philosophy, who happen either to be detained somehow in banishment, and whose generous and well cultivated disposition persists in the study of philosophy, being removed from every thing which tends to corrupt it; or else when, in a small city, a mighty soul arises, who despising the honours of the state entirely neglects them, and likewise with justice despising any small thing arising from the other arts, his well-born soul returns to philosophy. These the bridle of our friend Theagis will be sufficient to restrain; for all other things conspire to withdraw Theagis from philosophy, but the care of his health excluding him from politics makes him attentive to that alone. For as to my genius, it is not worth while to mention the dæmoniacal sign; for certainly it has happened heretofore to but one other, or to none at all. And even of these few, such as are tasting, and have tasted, how sweet and blessed the acquisition of philosophy is, and have withal sufficiently seen the madness of the multitude, and how none of them, as I may say, effects any thing salutary in the affairs of cities, and that there is no ally with whom a man might go to the assistance of the just and be safe; but that he is like one falling among wild beasts, being neither willing to join them in injustice, nor able, as he is but one, to oppose the whole savage crew; but, before he can benefit the city or his friends, is destroyed, and is unprofitable both to himself and others: reasoning on all these things, lying quiet, and attending to his own affairs, as in a tempest, when the dust is driven, and the sea agitated by winds, standing under a wall, beholding others overwhelmed in iniquity, he is satisfied if he shall himself anyhow pass his life here pure from injustice and unholy deeds, and make his exit hence in good hopes cheerful and benignant. And he shall make his exit, said he, after having done none of the smallest matters. Nor the greatest neither, said I, whilst he has not met with a republic that is suitable to him; for, in a suitable one, he shall both make a greater proficiency himself, and shall preserve the affairs of private persons as well as of the public. It appears then, to me, that we have now sufficiently told whence it happens that philosophy is accused, and that it is so unjustly, unless you have something else to offer. But, said he, I say nothing further about this point. But which of the present republics do you say is adapted to philosophy? Not one indeed, said I; but

this is what I complain of, that there is no constitution of a city at present worthy of the philosophic genius, which is therefore turned and altered, as a foreign seed sown in an improper soil, which degenerates to what is usually produced in that soil. After the same manner this race, as it has not at present its proper power, degenerates to a foreign species: but should it meet with the best republic, as it is the best in itself, then shall it indeed discover that it is really divine, and that all besides are human, both as to their genius and their pursuits. But now you seem plainly to be going to ask which is this republic. You are mistaken, said he; for this I was not going to ask: but whether it was this which we have described in establishing our city, or another. As to other things, said I, it is this one, and this very thing was then mentioned, that there must always be in the city something which shall have the same regard for the republic which you the legislator have when you establish the laws. It was mentioned, said he. But it was not, said I, made sufficiently plain, through fears which pre-occupied you, when you signified that the illustration of the thing would be both tedious and difficult; and it is not indeed altogether easy to discuss what remains. What is that? In what manner a city shall attempt philosophy and not be destroyed; for all grand things are dangerous, and, as the saying is, fine things are truly difficult. But however, said he, let our disquisition be completed in making this evident. Want of inclination, said I, shall not hinder, though want of ability may. And being present, you shall know my alacrity, and consider now how readily and adventurously I am going to say, that a city ought to attempt this study in a way opposite to that at present. How? At present, said I, those who engage in it are striplings, who immediately from their childhood, amidst their domestic affairs and lucrative employments, apply themselves to the most abstruse parts of philosophy, and then they depart most consummate philosophers. I call the most difficult part, that respecting the art of reasoning. And in all after time, if, when they are invited by others who practise this art, they are pleased to become hearers, they think it a great condescension, reckoning they ought to do it as a by-work:—but when they approach to old age, besides some few, they are extinguished much more than the Heraclitean¹

¹ Heraclitus the Ephesian said that the sun descending to the western sea, and setting in it, was extinguished; and that afterwards, ascending above the earth, arriving at the east, it was again enkindled; and that this took place perpetually. See the Introduction to the *Timæus*.

sun,

fun, because they are never again rekindled. But how should they act? said he. Quite the reverse. Whilst they are lads and boys they should apply to juvenile instruction and philosophy¹, and, in taking proper care of their body, whilst it shoots and grows to firmness, provide for philosophy a proper assistant: and then, as that age advances in which the soul begins to be perfected, they ought vigorously to apply to her exercises; and when strength decays, and is no longer adapted for civil and military employments, they should then be dismissed, and live at pleasure, and, excepting a by-work, do nothing else but philosophize, if they propose to live happy, and, when they die, to possess in the other world a destiny adapted to the life they have led in this. How truly, said he, Socrates, do you seem to me to speak with zeal! Yet, I think, the greater part of your hearers will still more zealously oppose you, and by no means be persuaded, and that Thrasymachus will be the first of them. Do not divide, said I, Thrasymachus and me, who are now become friends; nor were we enemies heretofore. For we shall no way desist from our attempts, till we either persuade both him and the rest, or make some advances towards that life at which when they arrive they shall again meet with such discourses as these. You have spoken, said he, but a short time. None at all, said I, with respect at least to the whole of time: but that the multitude are not persuaded by what is said, is not wonderful; for they have never at any time seen existing what has now been mentioned, but rather such discourses as have been industriously composed, and have not fallen in spontaneously² as these do at present. But as for the man who has arrived at the model of virtue, and is rendered similar to it in the most perfect manner possible both in word and in deed, they have never at any time seen such a man, neither one nor more of the kind. Or do you think they have? By no means. Neither yet, O blessed man! have they sufficiently attended to beautiful and liberal reasonings, so as ardently to investigate the truth, by every method, for the sake of know-

¹ Socrates by philosophy here means the mathematics; and agreeably to this Plotinus also says, that youth should be taught the mathematical disciplines, in order to become accustomed to an incorporeal nature.

² This is said ironically. For truth comes spontaneously; since the soul does not resemble an unwritten, but an ever-written tablet; herself, as Proclus well observes, inscribing the characters in herself, of which she derives an eternal plenitude from intellect.

ing it, saluting only at a distance such intricate and contentious debates, as tend to nothing else but to opinion and strife, both in their courts of justice and in their private meetings. The case is just so, replied he. On these accounts then, said I, and foreseeing these things, we were formerly afraid. However, being compelled by the truth, we did assert, that neither city nor republic, nor even a man in the same way, would ever become perfect, till some necessity of fortune oblige these few philosophers, who are at present called not depraved, but useless, to take the government of the city whether they will or not, and compel the city to be obedient to them; or till the sons of those who are now in the offices of power and magistracies, or they themselves, by some divine inspiration, be possessed with a genuine love of genuine philosophy: and I aver that no one has reason to think that either of these, or both, are impossible; for thus might we justly be laughed at, as saying things which are otherwise only similar to wishes. Is it not so? It is. If then, in the infinite series of past ages, the greatest necessity has obliged men that have arrived at the summit of philosophy to take the government of a state, or such men now govern in some barbarous region, remote from our observation, or shall hereafter, we are ready in that case to contend in our reasoning, that this republic we have described has existed and subsists, and shall arise at least when this our muse shall obtain the government of the state: for this is neither impossible to happen, nor do we speak of impossibilities, though we ourselves confess that they are difficult. I am likewise, said he, of the same opinion. But you will say, replied I, that the multitude do not think so too. It is likely, said he. O blessed man! said I, do not thus altogether accuse the multitude; but, whatever opinion they may have, without upbraiding them, but rather encouraging them, and removing the reproach thrown on philosophy, point out to them the persons you call philosophers, and define distinctly, as at present, both their genius and their pursuits, that they may not think you speak of such as they call philosophers; or, if they mean the same men, you will tell them they have conceived a different opinion of the men from what you have, and give very different answers about them from yours. Or, do you think that one man can be enraged at another, who is not in a passion? or, that a man shall envy the envious, who is himself both void of envy, and is of a mild disposition?—

position?—I will prevent you, and say that I think there is in some few such a naturally bad temper, but not in the greater part of mankind. I likewise, said he, think so. Are you not then of the same opinion with me in this? That these men are the cause of the multitude being ill affected towards philosophy, who openly revile what is no way becoming them, behaving in a scoffing and distasteful manner towards the multitude, always making discourses about particular men, and doing what is least of all becoming philosophy. Certainly, said he. For somehow, Adimantus, the man at least who really applies his dianoëtic part to true being, has not leisure to look down to the little affairs of mankind, and, in fighting with them, to be filled with envy and ill nature; but, beholding and contemplating such objects as are orderly, and always subsist in the same manner, such as neither injure nor are injured by each other, but are in all respects beautiful, and according to reason, these he imitates and resembles as far as possible; or, do you think it possible by any contrivance that a man should not imitate that, in conversing with which he is filled with admiration? It is impossible, replied he. The philosopher then who converses with that which is decorous and divine, as far as is possible for man, becomes himself decorous and divine. But calumny is powerful in every thing. It is entirely so. If then, said I, he be under any necessity, not merely of forming himself alone, but likewise of endeavouring to introduce any thing he beholds there among mankind, in order to form their manners, both in private and in public life, would he prove, think you, a bad artist of temperance and of justice, and of every social virtue? Not at all, said he. But if now the multitude perceive that we say the truth of such an one, will they be angry at philosophers, and disbelieve us when we say, that the city can never otherwise be happy unless it be drawn by those painters who follow a divine original? They will not be angry, said he, if they perceive so: but what method of painting do you mean? When they have obtained, said I, the city and the manners of men as their canvases, they would first make it pure; which is not altogether an easy matter. But in this, you know, they differ from others, that they are unwilling to meddle either with a private man or city, or to prescribe laws, till once they either receive these pure, or purify them themselves. And rightly, said he. And after this, do not you think they will draw a sketch of the republic? Why

not? Afterwards, I think, as they proceed in their work, they will frequently look both ways, both to what is naturally just and beautiful, and temperate and the like; and likewise again to that which they can establish among mankind, blending and compounding their human form from different human characters and pursuits, drawing from this which Homer calls the divine likeness, and the divine resemblance subsisting among men. Right, said he. They will then, I think, strike out one thing and insert another, till they have rendered human manners, as far as is possible, dear to the Gods. It will thus, said he, be the most beautiful picture. Do we now then, said I, any way persuade these men, who, you said, were coming upon us in battle array, that such a painter of republics is the man we then recommended to them, and on whose account they were enraged at us, that we committed cities to him, and will they now be more mild when they hear us mentioning it? Certainly, said he, if they be wise: for what is there now they can further question? Will they say that philosophers are not lovers of real being and of truth? That, said he, were absurd. Or that their genius, as we described it, is not allied to that which is best? Nor this neither. What then? Whilst their genius is such as this, and meets with suitable exercises, shall it not become perfectly good and philosophic, if any other be so? or, will you say those will be more so whom we set aside? Not at all. Will they still then be enraged at us when we say that till the philosophic race have the government of the city, neither the miseries of the city nor of the citizens shall have an end, nor shall this republic, which we speak of in the way of fable, arrive in reality at perfection? Perhaps, said he, they will be less enraged. Are you willing then, said I, that we say not of them they are less enraged at us, but that they are altogether appeased, and persuaded, that if we make no more of them, they may at least consent by their blushing? By all means, said he. Let them then, said I, be persuaded of this. But is there any one who will call this into question, that those of the philosophic genius do not usually spring from kings and sovereigns? Not one, said he, would allege that. And though they were born with a philosophic genius, one may say they are under a great necessity of being corrupted; for indeed that it is a difficult matter for these geniuses to be preserved untainted, even we ourselves agree. But that

that in the infinite series of time, of the whole of the human race, there should never be so much as a single one preserved pure and untainted, is there any who will contend? How can there be any one? But surely, said I, a single one is sufficient, if he exists, and has a city subject to him, to accomplish every thing now so much disbelieved. He is sufficient, said he. And when the governor, said I, has established the laws and customs we have recited, it is not at all impossible that the citizens should be willing to obey him. Not at all. But is it wonderful or impossible, that what appears to us should also appear to others? I do not think it, said he. And that these things are best, if they be possible, we have sufficiently, as I think, explained in the preceding part of our discourse. Sufficiently indeed. Now then it seems we are agreed about our legislation; that the laws we mention are the best, if they could exist; but that it is difficult to establish them, not, however, impossible. We are agreed, said he. After this has with difficulty been brought to a conclusion, shall we not in the next place consider what follows? In what manner, and from what disciplines and studies, they shall become the preservers of our republic? and in what periods of life they shall each of them apply to the several branches of education? We must indeed consider that, said he. I acted not wisely, said I, when in the former part of our discourse I left untouched the difficulty attending the possession of women, and the propagation of the species, and the establishing governors, knowing with what envy and difficulty they must be introduced, or be carried no further than theory. For now we are under no less a necessity of discussing these things at present. What relates to women and children is already finished; and we must now go over again, as from the beginning, what refers to governors. We said, if you remember, that they should appear to be lovers of the city, and be tried both by pleasures and by pains, and appear to quit this dogma neither through toils nor fears, nor any other change; and that he who was not able to do this was to be rejected; but he who came forth altogether pure, as gold tried in the fire, was to be appointed ruler, and to have honours and rewards paid him both alive and dead. Such were the things we said whilst our reasoning passed over, and concealed itself, as afraid to rouse the present argument. You say most truly, said he, for I remember it. For I was

averse, my friend, to say, what I must now venture to assert; but now we must even dare to assert this: that the most complete guardians must be made philosophers. Let this be agreed upon, replied he. But consider that you will probably have but few of them: for such a genius as we said they must of necessity have, is wont but seldom in all its parts to meet in one man; but its different parts generally spring up in different persons. How do you say? replied he. That such as learn with facility, have a good memory, are sagacious and acute, and endued with whatever qualifications are allied to these, are not at the same time strenuous and magnificent in their dianoëtic part, so as to live orderly, with quietness and stability, but that such are carried by their acuteness wherever it happens, and every thing that is stable departs from them. You say true, replied he. With regard then to these firm habits of the mind, which are not at all versatile, and which one might rather employ as trusty, and which are difficult to be moved at dangers in war, are they not of the same temper with reference to learning? They move heavily, and with difficulty learn, as if they were benumbed, and are oppressed with sleep and yawning, when they are obliged to labour at any thing of this kind. It is so, replied he. But we said that he must partake of both these well and handsomely, or else he ought not to share in the most accurate education, nor magistracy, nor honours of the state. Right, said he. Do not you think this will but rarely happen? How should it not? They must be tried then both in the things we formerly mentioned, in labours, in fears, and in pleasures; and likewise in what we then passed over, and are now mentioning; we must exercise them in various kinds of learning, whilst we consider whether their genius be capable of sustaining the greatest disciplines, or whether it fails, as those who fail in the other things. It is proper now, said he, to consider this question at least in this manner. But what do you call the greatest disciplines? You remember in some measure, said I, that when we had distinguished the soul into three parts, we determined concerning justice, temperance, fortitude, and wisdom, what each of them is. If I did not remember, said he, it were just I should not hear what remains. Do you likewise remember what was said before that? What was it? We somewhere said, that it was possible to behold these in their most beautiful forms, but that the journey would be

tedious

tedious which he must make, who would see them conspicuously; that it was possible, however, to approach towards them in the way of our demonstrations above mentioned; and you said that these were sufficient; so what was then advanced came to be spoken far short, in my own opinion, of accuracy; but, if agreeably to you, you may say so. To me at least, said he, they seemed to be discussed in measure; and the rest seemed to think so too. But, friend, said I, in speaking of things of this kind, such a measure as leaves out any part whatever of the truth is not altogether in measure. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of any thing. Though some at times are of opinion, that things are sufficiently well when thus circumstanced, and that there is no necessity for further inquiry. Very many, said he, are thus affected through indolence. But the guardian of the city and of the laws, said I, has least of all need of that passion. It appears so, replied he. Such an one, then, my friend, said I, must make the more ample circuit, and labour no less in learning than in the exercises: otherwise, as we were now saying, he will never arrive at the perfection of the greatest and most suitable learning. But are not these, said he, the greatest? Or is there yet any thing greater than justice, and those virtues which we discussed? There is something greater, said I. And even of these we must not contemplate only the rude description, but we must not omit the highest finishing. Or is it not ridiculous in other things of small account to employ our whole labour, and strive to have them the most accurate and perfect, and not deem the highest and most important affairs worthy of our highest attention, in order to render them the most perfect? The sentiment, said he, is very just. But, however, do you think, said he, that any one will dismiss you without asking you, what indeed is this greatest discipline, and about what is it conversant, when you call it so? Not at all, said I, but do you yourself ask me; for assuredly you have not seldom heard it, and at present you either do not attend, or you intend to occasion me trouble in raising opposition. This I rather think, since you have often heard at least, that the idea of the good is the greatest discipline: which idea when justice and the other virtues employ, they become useful and advantageous. You now almost know that this is what I mean to say, and besides this, that we do not sufficiently know that idea, and that without this knowledge,

ledge, though we understood every thing else in the highest degree, you know that it is of no advantage to us: in the same manner as it would avail us nothing though we possessed any thing whatever without the possession of the good: or do you think there is any greater profit in possessing all things without the possession of the good, than in knowing all things without the knowledge of the good, knowing nothing at all that is beautiful and good? By Jupiter, not I, said he. But surely this too at least you know, that to the multitude pleasure seems to be the good; and to the more elegant it seems to be prudence. And very ridiculously, said he. How indeed can it be otherwise? replied I, if, when they upbraid us that we know not what is the good, they tell us that they know, and call it the prudence of what is good, as if we understood what they say when they pronounce the word good. Most true, said he. But what? those who define pleasure to be good, do they less err than the others? or are not these too obliged to confess that pleasures are evil? Extremely so. It happens then, I think, that they acknowledge the same things are both good and evil, do they not? Undoubtedly. Is it not evident, then, that there are great and manifold doubts about it? Why are there not? But what? is it not also evident, that with reference to things just and beautiful, the multitude choose the apparent, even though they be not really so? yet they act, and possess, and appear to possess them; but the acquisition of goods, that were only the apparent, never yet satisfied any one; but in this they seek what is real, and here every one despises what is only the apparent. Extremely so, said he. This then is that which every soul pursues, and for the sake of this it does every thing, prophesying that it is something, but being dubious, and unable to comprehend sufficiently what it is, and to possess the same stable belief respecting it as of other things; and thus are they unsuccessful also in other things, if there be in them any profit. About a thing now of such a kind, and of such mighty consequence, shall we say that even these our best men in the city, and to whom we commit the management of every thing, shall be thus in the dark? As little at least as possible, said he. I think then, said I, that whilst it is unknown in what manner the just and beautiful are good, they are not of any great value to a guardian to possess, if it be likely he shall know these, whilst he is ignorant of this; but I prophesy that no one will
arrive

arrive at the knowledge of these before he sufficiently knows what the good is. You prophesy well, said he. Shall not then our republic be completely adorned, if such a guardian be placed over it as is scientifically knowing in these things? It must of necessity, said he. But with respect to yourself, whether, Socrates, do you say that the good is science, or pleasure, or something else besides these? You was ever, said I, a worthy man, and manifestly showed of old that you was not to be satisfied with the opinions of others about these things. Nor does it appear to me just, Socrates, said he, that a man should be able to relate the dogmas of others, but not his own, after having spent so much time in inquiring about these particulars. But what, said I, does it then appear to you just for a man to speak of things of which he is ignorant, as if he knew them? By no means, said he, as if he knew them; yet however, according as he thinks, those things which he thinks he should be willing to tell us. But what, said I, have you not observed of opinions void of science how deformed they all are, and that the best of them are blind? Or do those who without intellect form right opinion seem to you, in any respect, to differ from those who are blind, and at the same time walk straight on the road? In no respect, said he. Are you willing, then, that we should examine things deformed, blind, and crooked, having it in our power to hear from others what is clear and beautiful? Do not, by Jupiter, Socrates, said Glauco, desist at the end; for it will suffice us, if in the same way as you have spoken of justice and temperance, and those other virtues, you likewise discourse concerning the good. And I too shall be very well satisfied, my friend, said I; but I am afraid I shall not be able; and, by appearing readily disposed, I shall incur the ridicule of the unmannerly. But, O blessed man! let us at present dismiss¹ this inquiry, what the good is; (for it appears to me a greater thing than we can arrive at, according to our present impulse,) but I am willing to tell you what the offspring of the good appears to be, and what most resembles it, if this be agreeable to you; and if not, I shall dismiss it. But tell us, said he; for

¹ Viz. From the genera of beings more excellent than human-nature, such as dæmons and heroes.

² Socrates says this in consequence of the inability of his auditors to understand the nature of the good: for, as it is well observed in the Greek Scholia on this part of the Republic, through the inaptitude of subordinate natures, such as are more excellent are unable to energize. *Παρα γὰρ τῶν κατωτέρων ἀνεπιτηδεύτητα τὰ κρείττονα ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐνεργεῖν.*

you

you shall afterwards explain to us what the father is. I could wish, said I, both that I were able to give that explanation, and you to receive it, and not as now the offspring only. Receive now then this child and offspring of the good itself. Yet take care however that unwillingly I deceive you not, in any respect, giving an adulterate account of this offspring. We shall take care, said he, to the best of our ability; only tell us. I shall tell, then, said I, after we have thoroughly assented, and I have reminded you of what was mentioned in our preceding discourse, and has been frequently said on other occasions. What is it? said he. That there are many things, said I, beautiful, and many good, and each of these we say is so, and we distinguish them in our reasoning. We say so. But as to the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and in like manner concerning all those things which we then considered as many, now again establishing them according to one idea of each particular, as being one, we assign to each that appellation which belongs to it; and these indeed we say are seen by the eye, but are not objects of intellectual perception; but that the ideas are perceived by the intellect, but are not seen by the eye. Perfectly so. By what part then of ourselves do we see things visible? By the sight, said he. And is it not, said I, by hearing, that we perceive what is heard; and by the other senses, all the other objects of sense? Why not? But have you not observed, said I, with regard to the artificer of the senses, how he has formed the power of sight, and of being visible, in the most perfect manner? I have not entirely perceived it, replied he. But consider it in this manner. Is there any other species, which hearing and sound require, in order that the one may hear, and the other be heard, which third thing if it be not present, the one shall not hear, and the other not be heard? There is nothing, said he. Imagine then, said I, that neither do many others (that I may not say none) require any such thing: or can you mention any one that does require it? Not I, replied he. But with reference to the sense of seeing, and the object of sight, do not you perceive that they require something? How? When there is sight in the eyes, and when he who has it attempts to use it, and when there is colour in the objects before him, unless there concur some third genus, naturally formed for the purpose, you know that the sight will see nothing, and the colours will be invisible. What is that you speak of? said he. What you call light, said I. You say true,

true, replied he. This species then is not despicable; and by no small idea are the sense of seeing, and the power of being seen, connected together; but by a bond the most honourable of all bonds, if light be not dishonourable. But it is far, said he, from being dishonourable. Whom then of the Gods in heaven can you assign as the cause of this, that light makes our sight to see, and visible objects to be seen, in the best manner? The same as you, said he, and others do; for it is evident that you mean the sun. Is not the sight then naturally formed in this manner with reference to this God? How? The sight is not the sun, nor is that the sun in which sight is ingenerated, which we call the eye. It is not. But yet I think that of all the organs of sense it is most solar-form. Very much so. And the power which it possesses, does it not possess as dispensed and flowing from hence? Perfectly so. Is not then the sun, which indeed is not sight itself, yet as it is the cause of it, seen by sight itself? It is so, said he. Conceive then, said I, that this is what I called the offspring of *the good*, which *the good* generates, analogous to itself; and that what this is in the intelligible place, with respect to intellect, and the objects of intellect, that the sun is in the visible place with respect to sight and visible things. How is it? said he: explain to me yet further. You know that the eyes, said I, when they are no longer directed towards objects whose colours are shone upon by the light of day, but by the splendour of the night, grow dim, and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no pure sight. Just so, said he. But when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, then I think they see clearly, and in those very eyes there appears now to be sight. There does. Understand then, in the same manner, with reference to the soul. When it firmly adheres to that which truth and real being enlighten, then it understands and knows it, and appears to possess intellect: but when it adheres to that which is blended with darkness, which is generated, and which perishes, it is then conversant with opinion, its vision becomes blunted, it wanders from one opinion to another, and resembles one without intellect. It has such a resemblance. That therefore which imparts truth to what is known, and dispenses the power to him who knows, you may call the idea of *the good*, being the cause of science and of truth, as being known through intellect. And as both these two, knowledge and truth, are so beautiful, when you think that *the good* is something different,

and still more beautiful than these, you shall think aright. Science and truth here are as light and sight there, which we rightly judged to be solar-form, but that we were not to think they were the sun. So here it is right to judge, that both these partake of the form of *the good*; but to suppose that either of them is *the good*, is not right, but *the good itself* is worthy of still greater honour. You speak, said he, of an inestimable beauty, since it affords science and truth, but is itself superior to these in beauty. And you never any where said that it was pleasure. Predict better things, said I, and in this manner rather consider its image yet further. How? You will say, I think, that the sun imparts to things which are seen, not only their visibility, but likewise their generation, growth and nourishment, not being itself generation¹. Why not? We may say, therefore, that things which are known have not only this from *the good*, that they are known, but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst *the good* itself is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power². Here Glauco, laughing

¹ When we consider the generation of things illuminated by the sun, we shall find that it is perfectly unbegotten. For, according to the Platonic philosophy, the sun alone of all things in the universe which are connected with a body is without generation, neither receiving any accession nor diminution. But every thing else which it illuminates receives light from a different part of it, through the motion of the solar sphere about its proper centre, which at different times sends different rays in a circle to the celestial and sublunary bodies. The sun however has generation and corruption so far as it is illuminated, just as the moon also receives augmentations and diminutions of light. So far therefore as the sun illuminates, it is unbegotten; and according to this it is assimilated to *the good*, and not so far as it is a body. See more concerning the sun in the Notes to the Cratylus.

² *The good*, which is here celebrated by Socrates as that which reigns in the intelligible place, is neither the same with that which subsists in our nature, (for we rank in an order far below intelligibles) nor with that form of things good, which is coordinate with the just and the beautiful. For, forms being twofold, some alone distinguishing the *essences* of the things fashioned by form, but others their *perfections*, the genus of essence, same and different, and the form of animal, horse and man, and every thing of this kind, give distinction to essence and subjects; but the form of *the good*, the beautiful and the just, and in like manner the form of virtue, health, strength, and every thing of a similar nature, are perfective of the beings to which they belong: and of some, essence is the leader of every thing, but of others *the good*. For, as Plato says, every thing must necessarily participate of essence; and whatever preserves, gives perfection to, or defends any being must be good. Hence, since these two are leaders, the one of forms which give subsistence to things, and the other of such as are the sources of

ing ' very much, said, By Apollo this is a divine transcendency indeed! You yourself, replied I, are the cause, having obliged me to relate what appears to

¹ The Greek Scholiast on the laughter of Glauco observes, "That this laughter is through transcendency; for *the good* is uncomparable with respect to all things. Or this laughter may be considered according to a mundane signification; for the junior and mundane Gods are obscurely signified by it; since every thing corporeal is a jest when compared with intelligibles. But to jest and laugh belong to youth. And

Amidst them laughter unextinguish'd rose

is said concerning the mundane Gods. Glauco therefore being analogous to a mundane person very properly speaks laughing. Γέλως δια την ὑπερβολὴν ἀσυγκρίτων γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς πάντα· ἄλλως τὸ γέλως, ἥτοι ἐγκόσμιος· οἱ γὰρ νεοὶ καὶ ἐγκόσμοι Θεοὶ τοῦτο (λέγε τοῦτο) αἰνιττοῦνται· παίγων γὰρ τὸ σωματικὸν πάν τοις νοήτοις παραβάλλοντον· τὸ δὲ παίζειν καὶ γέλαν τῶν νέων οἰκεῖον· καὶ τὸ,

Ἀσέβητος δ' ἄρ' ἐνερπὸ γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι.

περί των ἐγκόσμιων εἰρηται θεωρῶ· ὃ γ' οὐν γλαυκῶν ἀναλογίως ἐγκόσμιον πρῶτον εἰκότως γέλως λέγει.

their perfection; it is necessary that one of these should be subordinate to the other; I mean that *the good* which is allotted a coordination among forms that are the sources of perfection should be subordinate to *essence*, which ranks among causes whence subsistence originates, if *the good* is being and a certain being. For it is either the same with or different from essence, which the Eleatean guest in the Sophista shows to be the genus of being. And if *the good* is the same with essence, an absurdity must ensue: for being and well-being are not the same. But if *the good* is something different from essence, it must necessarily participate of essence, in consequence of that being the genus of all forms. But if genera are more ancient than forms, *the good* which ranks among forms, and is posterior to their genus, will not be *the good* which reigns over intelligibles; but this must be asserted of that good under which this and every form is arranged which possesses being, and which is the leader of the other genera of being. When therefore Plato says that *the good* reigns over intelligibles, he means that good which is superior to essence.

But to lead us up to this supreme good, he appears to employ three orders of good as so many steps in this arduous ascent; viz. that which is imparticipable and superessential, that which is imparticipable and essential, and that which is essential and participable. Of these the last is such as our nature contains; *the good* which ranks among forms is essential; and that which is beyond essence is superessential. Or we may say that *the good* which subsists in us may be considered as a habit, in consequence of its subsisting in a subject; the next to this ranks as essence, and a part of essence, I mean *the good* which ranks among forms; and the last as that which is neither a habit nor a part. When therefore Socrates says, "That to the multitude pleasure seems to be *the good*, and to the more elegant it seems to be prudence," he signifies that good which is resident in our nature, and which, from its being an impression of the ineffable principle of things, may be called the summit or flower of our essence. And when he also says that the idea of *the good* is the greatest discipline, which renders both such things as are just, and other

to me respecting it. And by no means, said he, stop, if something does not hinder you, but again discuss the resemblance relating to the sun, if you have

things which employ it, useful and profitable, and that we do not sufficiently know it,—these assertions accord with *the good* which is in us, with that which is in forms, and with that which is understood to be before all things. For the idea of *the good* signifies a participated form, a separate intelligible, and that which has a separate subsistence prior to intelligibles; since the term *idea*, according to Plato, indicates that object of desire which is established prior to all things, viz. prior to all things belonging to a certain series. Thus, for instance, *the good* in our nature is prior to every thing else pertaining to the soul; *the good* which ranks among forms is prior to every thing which is the source of essential perfection; and *the good* which reigns in the intelligible world is prior to every series, and to all things.

Again, when Socrates says, "Let us at present dismiss this inquiry what *the good* is, for it appears to me a greater thing than we can arrive at according to our present impulse," it may be inferred, that though he appears to say something concerning *the good* from an image, and to unveil something pertaining to things occult, yet he does not unfold the whole truth concerning it; and this perhaps in consequence of Thrasymachus and Clitopho being present, and not thinking it fit to disclose the most mystical truths to sophists. Hence, on his asserting afterwards that *the good* is superessential, he appeared to Glauco to speak ridiculously; and in consequence of Glauco in vain attempting the vision of that which is beyond all things, he again says that he willingly omits many things, and alone unfolds the analogy respecting the sun. But if his hearers had been adapted to such discourses, he would have disclosed to us many and truly theological particulars respecting it; and such as he discloses to us in the Parmenides concerning *the one*.

As we have said, therefore, Plato, transferring the investigation from *the good* which is in us, and concerning which those inquire who say that it is prudence or pleasure, to *the good* itself, and beginning the image respecting the sun, in the first place, he exhorts his hearers to take care that he does not give them an adulterate account of the offspring of *the good*; calling the sun the offspring, and transferring the term adulterate from the impressions in coin. He also indicates that the mode of teaching by analogy is not safe. For there is danger of introducing sophistry into the demonstration, by considering things beyond what the analogy will admit. Thus, in the present instance, if in consequence of Plato asserting that the sun is analogous to *the good*, so far as the former is the cause of light, as the latter is of truth, some one should consider the sun, no longer as the cause alone of light, but so far as it is moved, and should investigate that which is similar to this motion, in *the good*, he would no longer preserve the proper analogy. For the sun is not analogously assumed, so far as he is a thing caused, but so far as he is a cause alone; since it is impossible to assume any thing which is in all respects similar to *the good*. For every thing posterior to *the good*, by the assumption of something becomes worse than *the good*; one thing by assuming intelligence, as intellect; another by assuming motion, as soul; and another by the assumption of generation, as body. If therefore, in intellects, in souls, and in bodies, you consider that which is first in each, as analogous to *the good*, you must consider it so far only as it is similar to *the good*, viz. so far as it is the leader of its subject series, and is
imparticipable

have omitted any thing. But I omit, said I, many things. Do not omit, replied he, the smallest particular. I think, said I, that much will be omitted :

imparticipable with respect to a subordinate nature, and not so far as it is separated from *the good*. For every thing which is assumed analogously to *the good*, must necessarily possess dissimilitude in conjunction with similitude. Analogies however and ratios are not assumed according to the dissimilar, but on the contrary according to the similar.

Again, when in the beginning of this discourse about *the good*, and wishing to determine that some forms are intelligible and others sensible, he makes mention of the beautiful itself and *the good* itself, and, placing these as the forms of many things beautiful and good, he says that sensible forms are seen indeed, but are not the objects of intellect, but that ideas are the objects of intellect, and not of the sensible eye,—it is evident that he refers us to ideas, and the universal prior to the many. If therefore Plato had added nothing further, we should not have had any authority from the Republic for conceiving any other good than this, which is the first among forms that give perfection to things; but since he touches on the analogy respecting the sun, light and light, he in a wonderful manner asserts that all intelligible ideas, the beautiful itself, *the good* itself, the just itself, and not these only, but those of actions also, are illuminated by *the good*. Here therefore he ascends to the first cause of wholes, which he is unable to call by a better name than *the good*: for *the good* is the most venerable of all things, and is that which all things desire; and that which all things desire is the cause of all. Fearful however lest we should apprehend a first of such a kind as that good which is the cause of perfection alone in ideas, he shows in the first place that *the good* is beyond science and truth, in the same manner as the sun is beyond sight and light; and afterwards he evinces that it is the primary cause of intelligibles, and is superessential, in the same manner as the sun is above generation; and thus he shows that *the good itself* is the first cause of the good and the beautiful in forms, and of all intelligible essences.

But that we may not deviate from the doctrine through analogy, he says that the sun is analogous to *the good*, not according to any thing else than his being the cause of light, through which all visible things are seen: I mean, not so far as the sun has a body, and a corporeal place, and is moveable. And again, such a light is analogous to truth, not so far as it possesses interval, or all-various refractions, but so far only as it imparts the power of being seen to things visible, and light to things that see; in the same manner as truth imparts to intelligibles the power of being intellectually apprehended, and to intelligent natures the power of intellectual perception; and visible objects are analogous to intelligibles, not as subsisting in place and being moved, but as visible alone.

These things being premised, it is shown by Socrates that *the good* is beyond truth, in the same manner as the sun is beyond light: and hence it follows that *the good* does not participate of truth. For that which is above truth neither *is truly*, nor can *truly* be any thing else: so that if *the good is*, but *is not truly*, it will be that which is not *truly* being. But this is impossible. For, according to Plato, that which is not *truly* being subsists after true being. But *the good* is not true being, since it generates truth; and it must be entirely unresponsive of that which it generates. But all true being necessarily participates of truth. Hence it follows that *the good*

omitted : however, as far I am able at present, I shall not willingly omit any thing. Do not, said he. Understand then, said I, that we say these
are

is above being. For, if being is *truly* being, but *the good* gives subsistence to truth, which is inseparable from and characterizes being, it must also be above being.

Again, when Socrates says, " You know that the eyes, when they are no longer directed towards objects whose colours are shone upon by the light of day, but by the splendour of the night, grow dim, and appear almost blind, as if they had in them no pure light. But when they turn to objects which the sun illuminates, then I think they see clearly, and in those very eyes there appears now to be light : " he here makes a division in things visible into colours, light, eyes, and the sun. Afterwards he adduces things analogous to those in the objects of intellect, as follows : " Understand then in the same manner with reference to the soul : when it firmly adheres to that which truth and real being enlighten, then it understands and knows it, and appears to possess intellect : but when it adheres to that which is blended with darkness, which is generated, and which perishes, it is then conversant with opinion, its vision becomes blunted, it wanders from one opinion to another, and resembles one without intellect." Socrates, therefore, assumes being analogous to colour, truth to light, and *the good* to the sun. He also places being after truth, in the same manner as colour after light and the sun. *The good* therefore is beyond being. For he does not say that which *beings* enlighten, but that which *being* enlightens. If therefore *the good* is above being, it will also necessarily be above essence.

Having asserted these things through analogy, he adds what is still greater, that *the good* is the cause of intelligibles, not of their being understood only, but also of their essence, in the same manner as the sun is the cause to things visible, not only of their being seen, but of their generation, nourishment and increase ; and, as he is not generation, in like manner *the good* is not essence. It is evident, therefore, that *the good*, being the cause of an intelligible essence, will be in the most eminent degree superessential ; for these, as will appear from the Parmenides, are superessential essences, or, in other words, beings absorbed in the superessential. It likewise follows from this analogy that truth also is superessential : for Socrates says that this illuminates all things that are known, in the same manner as the light of the sun irradiates visible objects. Truth indeed appears to be an illumination from the superessential principle of wholes, which both intelligible and intellectual natures participate, and which unites them to themselves, and to each other. Hence it is said to impart the power of being intellectually apprehended to the former, and of intellectual vision to the latter : for these could not be conjoined without a certain common bond. As light therefore illuminates visible and visible natures, but conjoins both through similitude, imparting to both a greater light than they contained before—in the same manner that which is intellectual and that which is intelligible, being united by truth, coalesce with each other.

From hence also it will follow that *the good* cannot be known either by opinion or science. That it cannot indeed be known by opinion may be easily proved. For Plato, with great propriety, considers the object of opinion as that which is partly being, and partly non-being. It is also evident that *the good* is not the object of science. For, if every object of science is known
from

are two ; and that the one reigns over the intelligible genus and place, and the other over the visible, not to say the heavens, lest I should seem to you to

from a cause, that of which there is no cause cannot be scientifically known. And if *the good* is above truth, it will not be so known as intelligibles are known to intellectual natures. It can therefore only be known by a divine projection of the summit of the soul, a projection of that which is better than intellect, and which Plato * calls the ray of the soul. According to Plato, the soul inclining this ray should project herself to *the good* through an ablation of all things posterior to it. For he clearly says that it is necessary to take away the idea of *the good* from all things, and thus to incline towards it the ray of the soul, if we intend to perceive it, itself by itself. From these things therefore it is evident, by what kind of knowledge *the good* is known, how it is known, and how it is the last discipline, and what the dialectic method contributes to the vision of it, by leading the intellect of the soul up to it, through a scientific series of ablations.

Again, since Socrates asserts that *the good* is not only beyond essence, but likewise above that which is (*ἐπέκεινα τού οὐραίου*), it follows that it is not proper to say *the good is*; and hence neither is it proper to say that it is not; for again this assertion *that it is not* is common to other things, to which non-being is adapted. Both therefore must be said, that it is neither being nor non-being; and in consequence of this, it is called by some unknown and ineffable; since every thing is either being or non-being. Nor must we suppose, when Plato calls *the good* known, and the last discipline, and every thing of this kind, that he removes us from an indefinite energy about it, and apprehends it to be known in such a manner as beings: for these are known, and are the objects of scientific knowledge, according to that most accurate mode of science which he defines, and according to which he despises the sciences which originate from hypothesis. For thus he speaks, teaching us his conceptions about these particulars: that other sciences, or which appear to be such, make hypotheses their principles; but dialectic alone being impelled to the principle, takes away hypotheses, till it discovers that which is truly the principle, not as an hypothesis, but truly unhypothetical. But such a principle is *the one*, in which every subsistence of things known terminates. From these things, therefore, it is evident, that calling dialectic the defensive enclosure of things which appear to be sciences, and defining that which is truly science, he says that dialectic, beginning from an unhypothetic principle, considers the nature of every thing. If therefore beholding also the idiom of *the good*, and in what respect it differs from other things, this science speculates from an unhypothetic principle, this perhaps will be a certain science, and a science of *the good*, what it truly is, or is not. But if this is the principle of all things, and a principle cannot be assumed of a principle, by what contrivance can it be said that there is a certain science of *the good*? For every scientific object is apprehended from an unhypothetic principle; and that which is so appre-

* In the 7th book of this Dialogue, near the end: As man is a microcosm, this ray of his soul will evidently be analogous to truth, or superessential light, in the intelligible world: will be the summit of the soul, and that which the Platonists very properly call *the one* and the flower of our nature: for it is an illumination from the ineffable principle of all things.

to employ sophistry in the expression : you understand then these two species, the visible and the intelligible? I do. As if then you took a line, cut into two unequal parts, and cut over again each section according to the same ratio, both that of the visible species, and that of the intelligible, you will then have perspicuity and obscurity placed by each other. In the visible species you will have in one section images : but I call images, in the first place, shadows, in the next, the appearances in water, and such as subsist in bodies which are dense, polished and bright, and every thing of this kind, if you understand me. I do. Suppose now the other section of the visible which this resembles, such as the animals around us, and every kind of plant, and whatever has a composite nature. I suppose it, said he. Are you willing then that this section appear to be divided into true and untrue? And that the same proportion, which the object of opinion has to the object of knowledge, the very same

hended is properly a scientific object : but *the good* is not apprehended from an unhypothetic principle, because it has not any principle whatever. So that, if this is the definition of science, *the good* is by no means an object of scientific knowledge. From hence also it again follows that *the good* is not being, since Plato most clearly asserts that science is of being ; but that faith pertains to that which appears and is sensible, the dianoëtic power to dianoëtic objects, assimilation to things assimilated, opinion to sensibles and things assimilated, and intelligence to intelligibles. And this he not only asserts here, but in the *Timæus* also he says, " That what essence is to generation, that faith is to truth, and attributes arguments which cannot be confuted to beings, but assimilative arguments to generated natures, signifying that science is speculative of true beings. If therefore being is the object of scientific knowledge, but *the good* cannot be scientifically known, *the good* is not being.

Hence we must conclude that *the good* is only to be known by an ablation of all things from its ineffable nature ; and this is what Socrates insinuates when in the 7th book he speaks of separating the idea of *the good* from all others, and as in a battle piercing through all arguments. It is not therefore either science, or truth, or being : and if employing these things as principles we are willing to consider the consequences, we shall find that if *the good* is not being, it is neither same nor different, neither moved nor at rest, neither possesses figure nor number, is neither similar nor dissimilar, is neither equal nor unequal, nor participates of time ; all which Parmenides collects in the first hypothesis, and, having collected, adds, that there is neither science nor opinion of *the one*, for it is beyond generation and essence. So that whatever is asserted of *the one*, in the Parmenides of Plato, must also necessarily be asserted of *the good*, from what is here delivered by Plato concerning it ; and hence *the good*, according to Plato, is the same with *the one*. We not only therefore have this information from the assertions of Socrates, that *the good* is not the object of scientific knowledge, but that it may after another manner be known through arguments and ablations.

proportion

proportion has the resemblance to that of which it is the resemblance ? I am, indeed, said he, extremely willing. But consider now again the section of the intelligible, how it was divided. How ? That with respect to one part of it, the soul uses the former sections as images ; and is obliged to investigate from hypotheses, not proceeding to the beginning, but to the conclusion : and the other part, again, is that where the soul proceeds from hypothesis to an unhypothetical principle, and without those images about it, by the species themselves, makes its way through them. I have not, said he, sufficiently understood you in these things. But again, said I, for you will more easily understand me, these things having been premised. For I think you are not ignorant, that those who are conversant in geometry, and computations, and such like, after they have laid down hypotheses of the odd and the even, and figures, and three species of angles, and other things the sisters of these, according to each method, they then proceed upon these things as known, having laid down all these as hypotheses, and do not give any further reason about them, neither to themselves nor others, as being things obvious to all. But, beginning from these, they directly discuss the rest, and with full consent end at that which their inquiry pursued. I know this, said he, perfectly well. And do you not likewise know, that when they use the visible species, and reason about them, their dianoëtic power ^a is not employed about these species,

^a The rational and gnostic powers of the soul receive a triple division : for one of these is opinion, another the dianoëtic power, and another intellect. Opinion therefore is conversant with the universal in sensibles, which also it knows, as that *every* man is a biped, and that *all* colour is the object of sight. It likewise knows the conclusions of the dianoëtic energy ; but it does not know them scientifically. For it knows *that* the soul is immortal, but is ignorant *why* it is so, because this is the province of the dianoëtic power. Hence the Eleatean guest in the Sophista very properly defines opinion to be the termination of the dianoëtic power. For the dianoëtic power, having collected by a syllogistic process that the soul is immortal, opinion receiving the conclusion knows this alone *that* it is immortal. But the dianoëtic power is that which passes through as it were a certain way (*ὁδὸν τινα διανοεῖ*) by making a transition from propositions to conclusions, from which also it derives its appellation. Thus, for instance, the dianoëtic power investigates whence it is that the soul is immortal. Afterwards, beginning from things most clear, it passes on to the object of investigation, saying that the soul is self-moved ; that which is self-moved is also perpetually moved ; and this is immortal. The soul therefore is immortal. And this is the employment of the dianoëtic power. But the province of *intellect* is to dart

species, but about those of which they are the resemblances, employing their reasonings about the square itself, and the diameter itself, and not about that which they describe? And, in the same manner, with reference to other particulars, those very things which they form and describe, in which number, shadows and images in water are to be reckoned, these they use as images, seeking to behold those very things, which a man can no otherwise see than by his dianoëtic part. You say true, replied he. This then I called a species of the intelligible; but observed that the soul was obliged to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not going back to the principle, as not being able to ascend higher than hypotheses, but made use of images formed from things below, to lead to those above, as perspicuous, as objects of opinion, and distinct from the things themselves. I understand, said he, that you speak of things pertaining to the geometrical, and other sister arts. Understand now, that by the other section of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself attains, making hypotheses by its own reasoning power, not as principles, but really hypotheses, as steps and handles, that, proceeding as far as to that which is unhypothetical, viz. the principle of the universe, and coming into contact with it, again adhering to those things which adhere to the principle, it may thus descend to the end; using nowhere any thing which is sensible, but forms themselves, proceeding through some to others, and at length in forms terminating its progression¹. I understand, said he, but not sufficiently. For you seem

itself as it were to things themselves, by simple projections, like the emission of the visual rays, and by an energy superior to demonstration. And in this respect intellect is similar to the sense of sight, which by simple intuition knows the objects which present themselves to its view. That we actually possess all these gnostic powers, thus distinguished from each other, is evident from our possessing these different kinds of knowledge; for it is impossible that one and the same power could know things demonstratively, and in a manner superior and inferior to demonstration; since diversity of knowledge must arise from a diversity of gnostic energy.

It may also be proper to observe that opinion is the boundary of the rational part of the soul; and that the phantasy, or that power which apprehends things invested with figure, is the summit of the irrational part, under which anger like a raging lion, and desire like a many-headed beast, subsist.

¹ With respect to the manner in which Plato represents the distribution of all things by the section of a line, it is necessary to observe, that as the progression of all things from *the one* is continued and united, Plato presents us with an image of this continuity in one line, through
the

seem to me to speak of an arduous undertaking: but you want, however, to determine that the perception of real being, and that which is intelligible, by the science of reasoning, are more conspicuous than the discoveries made by the arts, as they are called, which have hypotheses for their first principles; and that those who behold these are obliged to behold them with their dianoëtic power, and not with their senses. But as they are not able to perceive, by ascending to the principle, but from hypotheses, they appear to you not to possess intellect respecting them, though they are intelligible in conjunction with the principle. You also appear to me to call the habit of geometrical and such like concerns, the dianoëtic part, and

the similitude and coherence of secondary natures always proceeding from such as are first, no vacuum by its intervention separating them from each other. For, as *the one* produces all things, it is necessary that their procession from him should be continued: for the continued is allied to *the one*. And the cause of this continuity is the similitude of those sections which are in a consequent to those which are in a precedent order: for similitude is oneness. On this account he assumes one line, but this he cuts into two parts, and these not equal but unequal: the parts are however two. For in the *Philebus* he exhorts those that speculate things, after *the one*, to consider two things, if they have a subsistence, if not, the number which is allied to the duad. The division therefore of all things into unequal parts, indicates the rank of the divided natures, the inequality according to continuity exhibiting an image of inequality according to hyparxis. But each of these unequal sections he cuts analogous to the first division of the line; this analogy again clearly manifesting the subjection through sameness of secondary from primary natures. For analogy is identity of ratio, and the most beautiful of bonds, as we learn in the *Timæus*, and is the judgment of Jupiter, as we are informed in the *Laws*. As therefore the universe was fabricated according to analogy, all things receiving an indissoluble friendship with each other, so all things proceed bound, and in mutual consent through analogy.

But as there are four sections of one line, two of these, which complete its larger section, Plato establishes as the genus of the intelligible, but the other two, which form the lesser division, as the genus of that which is visible. For it was necessary to assign the larger section to the intelligible, as being more excellent, and comprehending the other, but the lesser to that which is visible; for it is comprehended in the intelligible order according to cause. And that which is comprehended is every where less than that which comprehends, whether the comprehension is considered according to essence, or according to power, or according to energy; as is seen in all continued and divided natures.

I only add that Plato in this representation of the series of things, by the sections of a line, follows the Pythagoreans, Brontinus and Archytas; but his explanation is both more elegant and more extended, as the learned reader may be convinced by consulting that part of the *Anecdota Græca* of Villoison, which contains the *Treatise of Jamblichus on the common Mathematical Science*.

not intellect¹ ; the dianoëtic part subsisting between opinion and intellect. You have comprehended, said I, most sufficiently : and conceive now, that corresponding to the four sections there are these four passions in the soul ; intelligence answering to the highest, the dianoëtic part to the second ; and assign faith to the third ; and to the last assimilation. Arrange them likewise analogously ; conceiving that as their objects participate of truth, so these participate of perspicuity. I understand, said he, and I assent, and I arrange them as you say.

¹ The original here is *αλλ' οὐκ* ; but from the version of Ficinus, it appears that we should read *αλλ' οὐκ ποτε*. And the sense indeed requires this emendation.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

THE

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK VII.

AFTER these things now, said I, assimilate, with reference to erudition, and the want of erudition, our nature to such a condition as follows. Consider men as in a subterraneous habitation, resembling a cave, with its entrance expanding to the light, and answering to the whole extent of the cave. Suppose them to have been in this cave from their childhood, with chains both on their legs and necks, so as to remain there, and only be able to look before them, but by the chain incapable to turn their heads round. Suppose them likewise to have the light of a fire, burning far above and behind them; and that between the fire and the fettered men there is a road above. Along this road, observe a low wall built, like that which hedges in the stage of mountebanks on which they exhibit their wonderful tricks. I observe it, said he. Behold now, along this wall, men bearing all sorts of utensils, raised above the wall, and human statues, and other animals, in wood and stone, and furniture of every kind. And, as is likely, some of those who are carrying these are speaking, and others silent. You mention, said he, a wonderful comparison, and wonderful fettered men. But such, however, as resemble us, said I; for, in the first place, do you think that such as these see any thing of themselves, or of one another, but the shadows formed by the fire, falling on the opposite part of the cave? How can they, said he, if through the whole of life they be under a necessity, at least, of having their heads unmoved? But what do they see of what is carrying along? Is it not the very same? Why not? If then they were able to converse with one another, do not you think they would deem it proper to give names to those very things which they saw before them? Of necessity they must. And what if the opposite part of this prison had an

echo,

echo, when any of those who passed along spake, do you imagine they would reckon that what spake was any thing else than the passing shadow? Not I, by Jupiter! said he. Such as these then, said I, will entirely judge that there is nothing true but the shadows of utensils. By an abundant necessity, replied he. With reference then, both to their freedom from these chains, and their cure of this ignorance, consider the nature of it, if such a thing should happen to them. When any one should be loosed, and obliged on a sudden to rise up, turn round his neck, and walk and look up towards the light; and in doing all these things should be pained, and unable, from the splendours, to behold the things of which he formerly saw the shadows, what do you think he would say, if one should tell him that formerly he had seen trifles, but now, being somewhat nearer to reality, and turned toward what was more real, he saw with more rectitude; and so, pointing out to him each of the things passing along, should question him, and oblige him to tell what it were; do not you think he would be both in doubt, and would deem what he had formerly seen to be more true than what was now pointed out to him? By far, said he. And if he should oblige him to look to the light itself, would not he find pain in his eyes, and shun it; and, turning to such things as he is able to behold, reckon that these are really more clear than those pointed out? Just so, replied he. But if one, said I, should drag him from thence violently through a rough and steep ascent, and never stop till he drew him up to the light of the sun, would he not, whilst he was thus drawn, both be in torment, and be filled with indignation? And after he had even come to the light, having his eyes filled with splendour, he would be able to see none of these things now called true. He would not, said he, suddenly at least. But he would require, I think, to be accustomed to it some time, if he were to perceive things above. And, first of all, he would most easily perceive shadows, afterwards the images of men and of other things in water, and after that the things themselves. And, with reference to these, he would more easily see the things in the heavens, and the heavens themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun. How can it be otherwise? And, last of all, he may be able, I think, to perceive and contemplate the sun himself, not in water, nor resemblances

semblances of him, in a foreign seat, but himself by himself, in his own proper region. Of necessity, said he. And after this, he would now reason with himself concerning him, that it is he who gives the seasons, and years, and governs all things in the visible place; and that of all those things which he formerly saw, he is in a certain manner the cause. It is evident, said he, that after these things he may arrive at such reasonings as these. But what? when he remembers his first habitation, and the wisdom which was there, and those who were then his companions in bonds, do you not think he will esteem himself happy by the change, and pity them? And that greatly. And if there were there any honours and encomiums and rewards among themselves, for him who most acutely perceived what passed along, and best remembered which of them were wont to pass foremost, which latest, and which of them went together; and from these observations were most able to presage what was to happen; does it appear to you that he will be desirous of such honours, or envy those who among these are honoured, and in power? Or, will he not rather wish to suffer that of Homer, and vehemently desire

As labourer to some ignoble man
To work for hire

and rather suffer any thing than to possess such opinions, and live after such a manner? I think so, replied he, that he would suffer, and embrace any thing rather than live in that manner. But consider this further, said I: If such an one should descend, and sit down again in the same seat, would not his eyes be filled with darkness, in consequence of coming suddenly from the sun? Very much so, replied he. And should he now again be obliged to give his opinion of those shadows, and to dispute about them with those who are there eternally chained, whilst yet his eyes were dazzled, and before they recovered their former state, (which would not be effected in a short time) would he not afford them laughter? and would it not be said of him, that, having ascended, he was returned with vitiated eyes, and that it was not proper even to attempt to go above, and that whoever should attempt to liberate them, and lead them up, if ever they were able to get him into their hands, should be put to death? They would.

would by all means, said he, put him to death. The whole of this image now, said I, friend Glauco, is to be applied to our preceding discourse; for, if you compare this region, which is seen by the sight, to the habitation of the prison; and the light of the fire in it, to the power of the sun; and the ascent above, and the vision of things above, to the soul's ascent into the intelligible place; you will apprehend my meaning, since you want to hear it. But God knows whether it be true. Appearances then present themselves to my view as follows. In the intelligible place, the idea of *the good* is the last object of vision, and is scarcely to be seen; but if it be seen, we must collect by reasoning that it is the cause to all of every thing right and beautiful, generating in the visible place, light, and its lord the sun; and in the intelligible place, it is itself the lord, producing truth and intellect¹; and this must be beheld by him who is to act wisely, either privately or

¹ Every thing in this cave is analogous to things visible; the men, animals and furniture of every kind in it corresponding to the third, and the shadows in it, and the images appearing in mirrors, to the fourth section in the division of a line at the end of the preceding book. Things sensible also are imitations of things dianoëtic, or, in other words, of the objects of scientific energy, which form the second section of Plato's line. For the circle and triangle which are described upon paper are imitations of those which geometry considers; and the numbers which are beheld in things visible, of those which the arithmetician contemplates; and so with respect to every thing else. But observe that Plato here does not consider human life so far as it is essence, and is allotted a particular power, but merely with reference to erudition and the want of erudition. For in the ninth book he assimilates our essence to an animal whose nature is mingled from a man and a lion, and a certain many-headed beast. But the present image in the first place shows what human life is without erudition, and what it will be when educated conformably to the abovementioned sections, and acquiring knowledge corresponding to that arrangement. [In the next place, when Plato says that we must conceive a road above between the fire and the fettered men, and that the fire from on high illuminates the men bearing utensils, and the fettered men who see nothing but the shadows formed by the fire, it is evident that there is a certain ascent in the cave itself from a more abject to a more elevated life. By this ascent, he signifies the contemplation of dianoëtic objects, (which form the second section of his line,) in the mathematical disciplines. [For as the shadows in the cave correspond to the shadows of visible objects, and visible objects are the immediate images of dianoëtic forms, or the essential reasons of the soul, it is evident that the objects from which these shadows are formed must correspond to such as are dianoëtic. It is requisite therefore, that the dianoëtic power, exercising itself in these, should draw forth from their latent retreats the reasons of these which the contains, and should contemplate these, not in images, but as subsisting in herself in impartible involution; which when she evolves, she produces such a beautiful multitude of mathematical theorems.

After

or in public. I agree with you, said he, as far as I am able. Come now, said I, and agree with me likewise in this. And do not wonder that such as arrive

After these things, he says "that the man who is to be led from the cave will more easily see what the heavens contain, and the heavens themselves, by looking in the night to the light of the stars, and the moon, than by day looking on the sun, and the light of the sun." By this he signifies the contemplation of intelligibles: for the stars and their light are imitations of intelligibles, so far as all of them partake of the form of the sun, in the same manner as intelligibles are characterized by the nature of *the good*. These then such a one must contemplate, that he may understand their essence, and those summits of their nature by which they are disform processions from the ineffable principle of things. But if as prior to the vision of the sun it is requisite to behold the whole heaven, and all that the heavens contain; in the same manner prior to the vision of *the good*, it is necessary to behold the whole intelligible order and all that it comprehends, we may from hence collect that some things in intelligibles are analogous to the whole starry spheres*, but others to the stars which those spheres comprehend, and others again to the circles in them. Hence too, the spheres themselves, considered as wholes, may be said to be images of those Gods that are celebrated as total †; but the circles, of those that are called total, and at the same time partial ‡; and the stars, of those that are properly denominated partial § Gods.

After the contemplation of these, and after the eye is through these accustomed to the light, as it is requisite in the visible region to see the sun himself in the last place, in like manner, according to Plato, the idea of *the good* must be seen the last in the intelligible region. He likewise adds, in a truly divine manner, that it is scarcely to be seen; for we can only be conjoined with it through the intelligible, in the vestibule of which it is beheld by ascending souls. The intelligible indeed is the first participant of *the good*, and indicates from itself to those that are able to behold it, what that nature is, if it be lawful so to speak, which is the superintelligible cause of the light it contains. For the light in an intelligible essence is more divine than that in intellectual natures, in the same manner as the light in the stars is more divine than that which is in the eyes that behold them. Thus also Soerates, in the *Philebus*, says, that *the good* is apprehended with difficulty, and is scarcely to be seen, and that it is found with three monads, and these intelligible, arranged in its vestibule, truth, beauty, and symmetry. For these three produce the first being, or being itself, and through these the whole intelligible order is unfolded into light. With great propriety, therefore, does Plato assert, that the idea of *the good* is to be seen the last thing in the intelligible: for the intelligible is the seat of its vision. Hence it is seen in this, as in its first participant, though it is beyond every intelligible. And in the last place Plato exhorts him who knows *the good*, "to collect by reasoning that it is the cause to all of every thing right and beautiful, in the visible place generating light, and its lord the sun, and in the intelligible

* For an account of these see the Introduction to the *Timæus*.

† That is to say, all the Gods denominated intelligent and intellectual. See the Introduction to the *Parmenides*.

‡ That is to say, the supermundane Gods.

§ These are of a mundane characteristic.

arrive hither are unwilling to act in human affairs, but their souls always hasten to converse with things above; for it is somehow reasonable it should be so, if these things take place according to our abovementioned image. It is indeed reasonable, replied he. But what? do you think that this is any thing wonderful, that when a man comes from divine contemplations to human evils, he should behave awkwardly and appear extremely ridiculous, whilst he is yet dazzled, and is obliged, before he is sufficiently accustomed to the present darkness, to contend in courts of justice, or elsewhere, about the shadows of justice, or those statues which occasion the shadows; and to dispute about this point, how these things are apprehended by those who have never at any time beheld justice itself? This is not at all wonderful, said he. But if a man possesses intellect, said I, he must remember, that there is a twofold disturbance of the sight, and arising from two causes, when we betake ourselves from light to darkness, and from darkness to light: and when a man considers that these very things happen with reference also to the soul, whenever he sees any one disturbed, and unable to perceive any thing, he will not laugh in an unreasonable manner, but will consider, whether the soul, coming from a more splendid life, be darkened by ignorance, or, going from abundant ignorance to one more luminous, be filled with the dazzling splendour, and so will congratulate the one on its fate and life, and compassionate the life and fate of the other. And if he wishes to laugh at the soul that goes from darkness to light, his laughter would be less improper, than if he were to laugh at the soul which descends from the light to darkness. You say very reasonably, replied he. It is proper then, said I, that we judge of them after such a manner as this, if those things be true. That education is not such a thing as some announce it to be; for they somehow say, that whilst there is no science in the soul, they will insert it, as if they were inserting sight in blind eyes. They say so, replied he. But our present reasoning, said I, now shows, that this power being in the soul of every one, and the organ by which every one learns, and being in

place being itself the lord of all things, producing intellect and truth." For, if it generates the sun, it must by a much greater priority be the cause of those things which originate from the sun; and if it is the cause of essence to intelligibles, it must be celebrated as in a greater degree the cause of things of which these are the causes.

the

the same condition as the eye, if it were unable otherwise, than with the whole body, to turn from darkness to light, must, in like manner, with the whole soul, be turned from generation, till it be able to endure the contemplation of being itself, and the most splendid of being; and this we call *the good*. Do we not? We do. This then, said I, would appear to be the art of his conversion, in what manner he shall, with greatest ease and advantage, be turned. Not to implant in him the power of seeing, but considering him as possessed of it, only improperly situated, and not looking at what he ought, to contrive some method by which this may be accomplished. It seems so, replied he. The other virtues now then of the soul, as they are called, seem to be somewhat resembling those of the body (for when, in reality, they were not in it formerly, they are afterwards produced in it by habits and exercises); but that of wisdom, as it seems, happens to be of a nature somewhat more divine than any other; as it never loses its power, but, according as it is turned, is useful and advantageous, or useless and hurtful. Or have you not observed of those who are said to be wicked, yet wise, how sharply the little soul sees, and how acutely it comprehends every thing to which it is turned, as having no contemptible sight, but compelled to be subservient to wickedness: so that the more acutely it sees, so much the more productive is it of wickedness? Entirely so, replied he. But however, said I, with reference to this part of such a genius; if, immediately from childhood, it should be stripped of every thing allied to generation, as leaden weights, and of all those pleasures and lusts which relate to feastings and such like, which turn the sight of the soul to things downwards; from all these, if the soul, being freed, should turn itself towards truth, the very same principle in the same men would most acutely see those things as it now does these to which it is turned. It is likely, replied he. But what? is not this likely, said I, and necessarily deduced from what has been mentioned? that neither those who are uninstructed and unacquainted with truth can ever sufficiently take care of the city; nor yet those who allow themselves to spend the whole of their time in learning. The former, because they have no one scope in life, aiming at which they ought to do whatever they do, both in private and in public; and the latter, because they are not willing to manage civil affairs, thinking that whilst they are yet alive,

they inhabit the islands of the blessed. True, said he. It is our business then, said I, to oblige those of the inhabitants who have the best geniuses, to apply to that learning which we formerly said was the greatest, both to view *the good*, and to ascend that ascent; and when they have ascended, and sufficiently viewed it, we are not to allow them what is now allowed them. What is that? To continue there, said I, and be unwilling to descend again to those fettered men, or share with them in their toils and honours, whether more trifling or more important. Shall we then, said he, act unjustly towards them, and make them live a worse life when they have it in their power to live a better? You have again forgot, friend, said I, that this is not the legislator's concern, in what manner any one tribe in the city shall live remarkably happy; but this he endeavours to effectuate in the whole city, connecting the citizens together; and by necessity, and by persuasion, making them share the advantage with one another with which they are severally able to benefit the community: and the legislator, when he makes such men in the city, does it not that he may permit them to go where each may incline, but that himself may employ them for connecting the city together. True, said he, I forgot, indeed. Consider then, said I, Glauco, that we shall no way injure the philosophers who arise among us, but tell them what is just, when we oblige them to take care of others, and to be guardians. We will allow, indeed, that those who in other cities become philosophers, with reason do not participate of the toils of public offices in the state (for they spring up of themselves, the policy of each city opposing them, and it is just, that what springs of itself, owing its growth to none, should not be forward to pay for its nurture to any one); but you have we generated both for yourselves, and for the rest of the state, as the leaders and kings in a hive, and have educated you better, and in a more perfect manner than they, and made you more capable of sharing both in the rewards and labours attending public offices. Every one then must, in part, descend to the dwelling of the others, and accustom himself to behold obscure objects: for, when you are accustomed to them, you will infinitely better perceive things there, and will fully know the several images what they are, and of what, from your having perceived the truth concerning things beautiful, and just, and good. And thus, as a real vision, both to us and

you, shall the city be inhabited, and not as a dream, as most cities are at present inhabited by such as both fight with one another about shadows, and raise sedition about governing, as if it were some mighty good. But the truth is as follows: In whatever city those who are to govern, are the most averse to undertake government, that city, of necessity, will be the best established, and the most free from sedition; and that city, whose governors are of a contrary character, will be in a contrary condition. Entirely so, replied he. Do you think then that our pupils will disobey us, when they hear these injunctions, and be unwilling to labour jointly in the city, each bearing a part, but spend the most of their time with one another, free from public affairs? Impossible, said he. For we prescribe just things to just men. And each of them enters on magistracy from this consideration beyond all others, that they are under a necessity of governing after a manner contrary to all the present governors of all other cities. For thus it is, my companion, said I, if you discover a life for those who are to be our governors, better than that of governing, then it will be possible for you to have the city well established; for in it alone shall those govern who are truly rich, not in gold, but in that in which a happy man ought to be rich, in a good and prudent life. But if, whilst they are poor, and destitute of goods of their own, they come to the public, thinking they ought thence to pillage good, it is not possible to have the city rightly established. For the contest being who shall govern, such a war being domestic, and within them, it destroys both themselves, and the rest of the city. Most true, said he. Have you then, said I, any other kind of life which despises public magistracies, but that of true philosophy? No, by Jupiter! said he. But, however, they ought at least not to be fond of governing who enter on it, otherwise the rivals will fight about it. How can it be otherwise? Whom else then will you oblige to enter on the guardianship of the city, but such as are most intelligent in those things by which the city is best established, and who have other honours, and a life better than the political one? No others, said he. Are you willing then, that we now consider this, by what means such men shall be produced, and how one shall bring them into the light, as some are said, from Hades, to have ascended to the Gods? Why should I not be willing? replied he. This now, as it seems, is not the turning
of

of a shell¹; but the conversion of the soul coming from some benighted day, to the true re-ascent to real being, which we say is true philosophy. Entirely so. Ought we not then to consider which of the disciplines possesses such a power? Why not? What now, Glauco, may that discipline of the soul be, which draws her from that which is generated towards being itself? But this I consider whilst I am speaking. Did not we indeed say, that it was necessary for them, whilst young, to be wrestlers in war? We said so. It is proper then, that this discipline likewise be added to that which is now the object of our inquiry. Which? Not to be useless to military men. It must indeed, said he, be added if possible. They were somewhere in our former discourse instructed by us in gymnastic and music. They were, replied he. Gymnastic indeed somehow respects what is generated and destroyed, for it presides over the increase and corruption of body. It seems so. This then cannot be the discipline which we investigate. It cannot. Is it music then, such as we formerly described? But it was, said he, as a counterpart of gymnastic, if you remember, by habits instructing our guardians, imparting no science, but only with respect to harmony, a certain propriety, and with regard to rhythm, a certain propriety of rhythm, and in discourses, certain other habits the sisters of these, both in such discourses as are fabulous, and in such as are nearer to truth. But as to a discipline respecting such a good as you now investigate, there was nothing of this in that music. You have, most accurately, said I, reminded me; for it treated, in reality, of no such thing. But, divine Glauco, what may this discipline be? For all the arts have somehow appeared to be mechanical and illiberal. How should they not? And what other discipline remains distinct from music, gymnastic, and the arts? Come, said I, if we have nothing yet further besides these to take, let us take something in these which extends over them all. What is that? Such as this general thing, which all arts, and dianoëtic powers, and sciences employ, and which every one ought, in the first place, necessarily to learn. What is that? said he. This trifling thing, said I, to know completely one, and two, and three: I call this

¹ The Greek Scholia inform us that this is a proverb, said of those who do any thing quickly. It is also the name of a sport. It is likewise applied to those who rapidly betake themselves to flight, or to those who are easily changed.

summarily number, and computation. Or is it not thus with reference to these, that every art, and likewise every science, must of necessity participate of these? They must of necessity, replied he. And must not the art of war likewise participate of them? Of necessity, said he. Palamedes then, in the tragedies, shows every where Agamemnon to have been at least a most ridiculous general; or have you not observed how he says, that having invented numeration, he adjusted the ranks in the camp at Troy, and numbered up both the ships, and all the other forces which were not numbered before; and Agamemnon, as it seems, did not even know how many foot he had, as he understood not how to number them: but what kind of general do you imagine him to be? Some absurd one, for my part, replied he, if this were true. Is there any other discipline then, said I, which we shall establish as more necessary to a military man, than to be able to compute and to number? This most of all, said he, if he would any way understand how to range his troops, and still more if he is to be a man. Do you perceive then, said I, with regard to this discipline the same thing as I do? What is that? It seems to belong to those things which we are investigating, which naturally lead to intelligence, but that no one uses it aright, being entirely a conductor towards real being. How do you say? replied he. I shall endeavour, said I, to explain at least my own opinion. With reference to those things which I distinguish with myself into such as lead towards intelligence, and such as do not, do you consider them along with me, and either agree or dissent, in order that we may more distinctly see, whether this be such as I conjecture respecting it.—Show me, said he. I show you then, said I, if you perceive some things with relation to the senses, which call not intelligence to the inquiry, as they are sufficiently determined by sense, but other things which by all means call upon it to inquire, as sense does nothing sane. You plainly mean, said he, such things as appear at a distance, and such as are painted. You have not altogether, said I, apprehended my meaning. Which then, said he, do you mean? Those things, said I, call not upon intelligence, which do not issue in a contrary sensation at one and the same time; but such as issue in this manner, I establish to be those which call upon intelligence: since here sense manifests the one sensation no more than its contrary, whether it meet with it near, or at a distance. But you will understand my mean-
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ing more plain'y in this manner. These, we say, are three fingers, the little finger, the next to it, and the middle finger. Plainly so, replied he. Consider me then as speaking of them when seen near, and take notice of this concerning them. What? Each of them alike appears to be a finger, and in this there is no difference, whether it be seen in the middle or in the end; whether it be white or black, thick or slender, or any thing else of this kind; for in all these, the soul of the multitude is under no necessity to question their intellect what is a finger; for never does sight itself at the same time intimate finger to be finger, and its contrary. It does not, replied he. Is it not likely then, said I, that such a case as this at least shall neither call upon nor excite intelligence? It is likely. But what? with reference to their being great and small, does the sight sufficiently perceive this, and makes it no difference to it, that one of them is situated in the middle, or at the end; and in like manner with reference to their thickness and slenderness, their softness and hardness, does the touch sufficiently perceive these things; and in like manner the other senses, do they no way defectively manifest such things? Or does each of them act in this manner? First of all, must not that sense which relates to hard, of necessity relate likewise to soft; and feeling these, it reports to the soul, as if both hard and soft were one and the same? It does. And must not then the soul again, said I, in such cases, of necessity be in doubt, what the sense points out to it as hard, since it calls the same thing soft likewise; and so with reference to the sense relating to light and heavy; the soul must be in doubt what is light and what is heavy; if the sense intimates that heavy is light, and that light is heavy? These at least, said he, are truly absurd reports to the soul, and stand in need of examination. It is likely then, said I, that first of all, in such cases as these, the soul, calling in reason and intelligence, endeavours to discover, whether the things reported be one, or whether they be two. Why not? And if they appear to be two, each of them appears to be one, and distinct from the other. It does. And if each of them be one, and both of them two, he will by intelligence perceive two distinct; for, if they were not distinct, he could not perceive two, but only one. Right. The sight in like manner, we say, perceives great and small, but not as distinct from each other, but as something confused. Does it not? It does. In order to obtain perspicuity

spicuity in this affair, intelligence is obliged again to consider great and small, not as confused, but distinct, after a manner contrary to the sense of sight. True. And is it not from hence, somehow, that it begins to question us, What then is great, and what is small? By all means. And so we have called the one intelligible, and the other visible. Very right, said he. This then is what I was just now endeavouring to express, when I said, that some things call on the dianoëtic part, and others do not: and such as fall on the sense at the same time with their contraries, I define to be such as require intelligence, but such as do not, do not excite intelligence. I understand now, said he, and it appears so to me. What now? with reference to number and unity, to which of the two classes do you think they belong? I do not understand, replied he. But reason by analogy, said I, from what we have already said: for, if unity be of itself sufficiently seen, or be apprehended by any other sense, it will not lead towards real being, as we said concerning finger. But if there be always seen at the same time something contrary to it, so as that it shall no more appear unity than the contrary, it would then require some one to judge of it: and the soul would be under a necessity to doubt within itself, and to inquire, exciting the conception within itself, and to interrogate it what this unity is. And thus the discipline which relates to unity would be of the class of those which lead, and turn the soul to the contemplation of real being. But indeed this at least, said he, is what the very sight of it effects in no small degree: for we behold the same thing, at one and the same time, as one and as an infinite multitude. And if this be the case with reference to unity, said I, will not every number be affected in the same manner? Why not? But surely both computation and arithmetic wholly relate to number. Very much so. These then seem to lead to truth. Transcendently so. They belong then, as it seems, to those disciplines which we are investigating. For the soldier must necessarily learn these things, for the disposing of his ranks; and the philosopher for the attaining to real being, emerging from generation, or he can never become a reasoner. It is so, replied he. But our guardian at least happens to be both a soldier and a philosopher. Undoubtedly. It were proper then, Glauco, to establish by law this discipline, and to persuade those who are to manage the greatest affairs of the city to apply to computation, and

study it, not in a common way, but till by intelligence itself they arrive at the contemplation of the nature of numbers, not for the sake of buying, nor of selling, as merchants and retailers, but both for war, and for facility in the energies of the soul itself, and its conversion from generation to truth and essence. Most beautifully said, replied he. And surely now, I perceive likewise, said I, at present whilst this discipline respecting computations is mentioned, how elegant it is, and every way advantageous towards our purpose, if one applies to it for the sake of knowledge, and not with a view to traffic! Which way? replied he. This very thing which we now mentioned, how vehemently does it somehow lead up the soul, and compel it to reason about numbers themselves, by no means admitting, if a man in reasoning with it shall produce numbers which have visible and tangible bodies! For you know of some who are skilled in these things, and who, if a man in reasoning should attempt to divide unity itself, would both ridicule him, and not admit it; but if you divide it into parts, they multiply them, afraid lest anyhow unity should appear not to be unity, but many parts. You say, replied he, most true. What think you now, Glauco, if one should ask them: O admirable men! about what kind of numbers are you reasoning? in which there is unity, such as you think fit to approve, each whole equal to each whole, and not differing in the smallest degree, having no part in itself, what do you think they would answer? This, as I suppose; that they mean such numbers as can be conceived by the dianoëtic part alone, but cannot be comprehended in any other way. You see then, my friend, said I, that in reality this discipline appears to be necessary for us, since it seems to compel the soul to employ intelligence itself in the perception of truth itself. And surely now, said he it effects this in a very powerful degree. But what? have you hitherto considered this? that those who are naturally skilled in computation appear to be acute in all disciplines; and such as are naturally slow, if they be instructed and exercised in this, though they derive no other advantage, yet at the same time all of them proceed so far as to become more acute than they were before. It is so, replied he. And surely, as I think, you will not easily find any thing, and not at all many, which occasion greater labour to the learner and student than this. No, indeed. On all these accounts, then, this discipline is not to be omitted,

but the best geniuses are to be instructed in it. I agree, said he. Let this one thing then, said I, be established among us; and, in the next place, let us consider if that which is consequent to this in any respect pertains to us. What is it? said he: or, do you mean geometry? That very thing, said I. As far, said he, as it relates to warlike affairs, it is plain that it belongs to us; for, as to encampments, and the occupying of ground, contracting and extending an army, and all those figures into which they form armies, both in battles and in marches, the same man would differ from himself when he is a geometrician, and when he is not. But surely now, said I, for such purposes as these, some little geometry and some portion of computation might suffice: but we must inquire, whether much of it, and great advances in it, would contribute any thing to this great end, to make us more easily perceive the idea of the good. And we say that every thing contributes to this, that obliges the soul to turn itself towards that region in which is the most divine of being, which it must by all means perceive. You say right, replied he. If therefore it compel the soul to contemplate essence, it belongs to us; but if it oblige it to contemplate generation, it does not belong to us. We say so indeed. Those then who are but a little conversant in geometry, said I, will not dispute with us this point at least, that this science is perfectly contrary to the common modes of speech, employed in it by those who practise it. How? said he. They speak somehow very ridiculously, and through necessity: for all the discourse they employ in it appears to be with a view to operation, and to practice. Thus they speak of making a square, of prolonging, of adjoining, and the like. But yet the whole of this discipline is somehow studied for the sake of knowledge. By all means indeed, said he. Must not this further be assented to? What? That it is the knowledge of that which always is, and not of that which is sometimes generated and destroyed. This, said he, must be granted; for geometrical knowledge is of that which always is. It would seem then, generous Glauco, to draw the soul towards truth, and to be productive of a dianoëtic energy adapted to a philosopher, so as to raise this power of the soul to things above, instead of causing it improperly, as at present, to contemplate things below. As much as possible, replied he. As much as possible then, said I, must we give orders, that those in this most beautiful city of yours by no means omit geometry;

for even its by-works are not inconsiderable. What by-works? said he. Those, said I, which you mentioned relating to war; and indeed with reference to all disciplines, as to the understanding of them more handsomely, we know somehow, that the having learned geometry or not, makes every way an entire difference. Every way, by Jupiter! said he. Let us then establish this second discipline for the youth. Let us establish it, replied he. But what? shall we, in the third place, establish astronomy? or are you of a different opinion? I am, said he, of the same: for to be well skilled in the seasons of months and years, belongs not only to agriculture and navigation, but equally to the military art. You are pleasant, said I, as you seem to be afraid of the multitude, lest you should appear to enjoin useless disciplines: but this is not altogether a contemptible thing, though it is difficult to persuade them, that by each of these disciplines a certain organ of the soul is both purified and exfufcitated, which is blinded and buried by studies of another kind; an organ better worth saving than ten thousand eyes, since truth is perceived by this alone. To such therefore as are of the same opinion, you will very readily appear to reason admirably well: but such as have never observed this will probably think you say nothing at all: for they perceive no other advantage in these things worthy of attention. Consider now from this point, with which of these two you will reason; or carry on the reasonings with neither of them, but principally for your own sake, yet envy not another, if any one shall be able to be benefited by them. In this manner, replied he, I choose, on my own account principally both to reason, and to question and answer. Come then, said I, let us go back again: for we have not rightly taken that which is consequent to geometry. How have we taken? replied he. After a plain surface, said I, we have taken a solid, moving in a circle, before we considered it by itself: but if we had proceeded rightly we should have taken the third argument immediately after the second, and that is somehow the argument of cubes, and what participates of depth. It is so, replied he. But these things, Socrates, seem not yet to be discovered. The reason of it, said I, is twofold. Because there is no city which sufficiently honours them, they are slightly investigated, being difficult; and besides, those who do investigate them want a leader, without which they cannot discover them. And this leader is in the first place hard to be obtained;

obtained; and when he is obtained, as things are at present, those who investigate these particulars, as they conceive magnificently of themselves, will not obey him. But if the whole city presided over these things, and held them in esteem, such as inquired into them would be obedient, and their inquiries, being carried on with assiduity and vigour, would discover themselves what they were: since even now, whilst they are on the one hand despised and mutilated by the multitude, and on the other by those who study them without being able to give any account of their utility, they yet forcibly, under all these disadvantages, increase through their native grace: nor is it wonderful that they do so. Because truly, said he, this grace is very remarkable. But tell me more plainly what you were just now saying; for somehow that study which respects a plain surface you called geometry. I did, said I. And then, said he, you mentioned astronomy in the first place after it. But afterwards you drew back. Because, whilst I am hastening, said I, to discuss all things rapidly, I advance more slowly. For that augment by depth which was next according to method we passed over, because the investigation of it is ridiculous; and after geometry we mentioned astronomy, which is the circular motion of a solid. You say right, replied he. We establish then, said I, astronomy as the fourth discipline, supposing that to subsist which we have now omitted, if the city shall enter upon it. It is reasonable, said he. And now that you agree with me, Socrates, I proceed in my commendation of astronomy, which you formerly reproved as unseasonable. For it is evident, I conceive, to every one, that this discipline compels the soul to look to that which is above, and from the things here conducts it thither. It is probable, said I, that it is evident to every one but to me. For to me it does not appear so. How then do you think of it? replied he. In the way it is now pursued by those who introduce it into philosophy, it entirely makes the soul to look downwards. How do you say? replied he. You seem to me, said I, to have formed with yourself no ignoble opinion of the discipline respecting things above, what it is: for you seem to think, that if any one contemplates the various bodies in the firmament, and, by earnestly looking up, apprehends every thing, you think that he has intelligence of these things; and does not merely see them with his eyes; and perhaps you judge right, and I foolishly. For I, on the other hand,

am not able to conceive, that any other discipline can make the soul look upwards, but that which respects being, and that which is invisible; and if a man undertakes to learn any thing of sensible objects, whether he gaze upwards, or bellow downwards, never shall I say that he learns; for I aver he has no science of these things, nor shall I say that his soul looks upwards, but downwards, even though he should learn lying on his back, either at land or at sea. I am punished, said he; for you have justly reprov'd me. But which was the proper way, said you, of learning astronomy different from the methods adopted at present, if they mean to learn it with advantage for the purposes we speak of? In this manner, said I, that these variegated bodies in the heavens, as they are varied in a visible subject, be deemed the most beautiful and the most accurate of the kind, but far inferior to real beings, according to those orbits in which real velocity, and real slowness, in true number, and in all true figures, are carried with respect to one another, and carry all things that are within them. Which things truly are to be comprehended by reason and the dianoëtic power, but not by sight; or do you think they can? By no means, replied he. Is not then, said I, that variety in the heavens to be made use of as a paradigm for learning those real things, in the same manner as if one should meet with geometrical figures, drawn remarkably well and elaborately by Dædalus, or some other artist or painter? For a man who was skilled in geometry, on seeing these, would truly think the workmanship most excellent, yet would esteem it ridiculous to consider these things seriously, as if from thence he were to learn the truth, as to what were in equal, in duplicate, or in any other proportion. Why would it not be ridiculous? replied he. And do not you then think, that he who is truly an astronomer is affected in the same manner, when he looks up to the orbits of the planets? And that he reckons that the heavens and all in them are indeed established by the demiurgus of the heavens, in the most beautiful manner possible for such works to be established; but would not he deem him absurd, who should imagine that this proportion of night with day, and of both these to a month, and of a month to a year, and of other stars to such like things, and towards one another, existed always in the same manner, and in no way suffered any change, though they have a body, and are visible; and search by every method to apprehend the truth

truth of these things? So it appears to me, replied he, whilst I am hearing you. Let us then make use of problems, said I, in the study of astronomy, as in geometry. And let us dismiss the heavenly bodies, if we intend truly to apprehend astronomy, and render profitable instead of unprofitable that part of the soul which is naturally wise. You truly enjoin a much harder task on astronomers, said he, than is enjoined them at present. And I think, replied I, that we must likewise enjoin other things, in the same manner, if we are to be of any service as law-givers. But can you suggest any of the proper disciplines? I can suggest none, replied he, at present at least. Lation, said I, as it appears to me, affords us not one indeed, but many species of discipline. All of which any wise man can probably tell; but those which occur to me are two. What are they? Together with this, said I, there is its counter-part. Which? As the eyes, said I, seem to be fitted to astronomy, so the ears seem to be fitted to harmonious lation. And these seem to be sister sciences to one another, both as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glauco, agree with them, or how shall we do? Just so, replied he. Shall we not, said I, since this is their great work, inquire how they speak concerning them—and, if there be any other thing besides these, inquire into it likewise? But above all these things, we will still guard that which is our own. What is that? That those we educate never attempt at any time to learn any of those things in an imperfect manner, and not pointing always at that mark to which all ought to be directed: as we now mentioned with reference to astronomy. Or do not you know that they do the same thing with regard to harmony, as in astronomy? For, whilst they measure one with another the symphonies and sounds which are heard, they labour like the astronomers unprofitably. Nay, by the gods, said he, and ridiculously too, whilst they frequently repeat certain notes, and listen with their ears to catch the sound as from a neighbouring place; and some of them say they hear some middle note, but that the interval which measures them is the smallest; and others again doubt this, and say that the notes are the same as were sounded before; and both parties subject the intellect to the ears. But you speak, said I, of the lucrative musicians, who perpetually harass and torment their strings, and turn them on the pegs. But that the comparison may not be too tedious, I shall say nothing of their complaints

plaints of the strings, their refusals and stubbornness, but bring the image to an end. But I say we ought not to choose these to speak of harmony, but those true musicians whom we mentioned. For these do the same things here as the others did in astronomy; for in these symphonies which are heard, they search for numbers, but they pass not thence to the problems, to inquire what numbers are symphonious, and what are not, and the reason why they are either the one or the other. You speak, said he, of a divine work. It is then indeed profitable, said I, in the search of the beautiful and good, but if pursued in another manner it is unprofitable. It is likely, said he. But I think, said I, that the proper method of inquiry into all these things, if it reach their communion and alliance with each other, and reason in what respects they are akin to one another, will contribute something to what we want, and our labour will not be unprofitable; otherwise it will. I likewise, said he, prophesy the same thing. But you speak, Socrates, of a very mighty work. Do you mean the introduction, or what else? said I. Or do we not know that all these things are introductory to the law itself? which we ought to learn; for even those that are skilled in dialectic do not appear expert as to these things. No, by Jupiter, said he, unless a very few of all I have met with. But whilst they are not able, said I, to impart and receive reason, will they ever be able to know any thing of what we say is necessary to be known? Never will they be able to do this, replied he. Is not this itself then, Glauco, said I, the law? To give perfection to dialectic; which being intelligible, may be said to be imitated by the power of sight; which power endeavours, as we observed, first to look at animals, then at the stars, and last of all at the sun himself. So when any one attempts to discuss a subject without any of the senses, by reasoning he is impelled to that which each particular is; and if he does not desist till he apprehends by intelligence what is the good itself, he then arrives at the end of the intelligible, as the other does at the end of the visible. Entirely so, said he. What now? Do not you call this progression dialectic? What else? And now, said I, as in our former comparison you had the liberation from chains, and turning from shadows towards images, and the light, and an ascent from the cavern to the sun; and when there, the looking at images in water, from an inability at first to behold animals and plants, and the
light

light of the sun; so here you have the contemplation of divine phantasms, and the shadows of real beings, and not the shadows of images shadowed out by another light of a similar kind, as by the sun. And all this business respecting the arts which we have discussed, has this power, to lead back again that which is best in the soul, to the contemplation of that which is best in beings; as in the former case, that which is brightest in the body is led to that which is most splendid in the corporeal and visible place. I admit, said he, of these things; though truly it appears to me extremely difficult to admit of them, and in another respect it is difficult not to admit of them. But however (for we shall hear these things not only now at present, but often again discuss them), establishing these things as now expressed, let us go to the law itself, and discuss it as we have finished the introduction. Say then what is the mode of the power of dialectic¹, and into what species is it divided, and what are the paths leading to it? For these, it is likely, conduct us to that place, at which when we are arrived, we shall find a resting-place, and the end of the journey. You will not as yet, friend Glauco, said I, be able to follow; for otherwise no zeal should be wanting on my part; nor should you any longer only see the image of that of which we are speaking, but the truth itself. But this is what to me at least it appears; whether it be so in reality or not, this it is not proper strenuously to affirm; but that indeed it is somewhat of this kind may be strenuously affirmed. May it not? Why not? And further that it is the power of dialectic alone, which can discover this to one who is skilled in the things we have discussed, and that by no other power it is possible. This also, said he, we may strenuously affirm. This at least no one, said I, will dispute with us: That no other method can attempt to comprehend, in any orderly way, what each particular being is; for all the other arts respect either the opinions and desires of men, or generations, and compositions, or are all employed in the culture of things generated and compounded. Those others, which we said participated somewhat of being, geometry, and such as are connected with her, we see as dreaming indeed about being; but it is impossible for them to have a

¹ For a copious account of the dialectic of Plato, which is the same with the metaphysics of Aristotle, see the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.

true vision, so long as employing hypotheses they preserve ¹ these immovable, without being able to assign a reason for their subsistence. For where the principle is that which is unknown, and the conclusion and intermediate steps are connected with that unknown principle, by what contrivance can an assent of such a kind ever become science? By none, replied he. Does not then, said I, the dialectic method proceed in this way alone, to the principle itself, removing all hypotheses, that it may firmly establish it, and gradually drawing and leading upwards the eye of the soul, which was truly buried in a certain barbaric mire, using as assistants and circular leaders those arts we have mentioned, which through custom we frequently call sciences, but which require another appellation more clear than opinion, but more obscure than science? We have somewhere in the former part of our discourse termed it the dianoëtic power. But the controversy is not, as it appears to me, about a name, with those who inquire into things of such great importance as those now before us. It is not, said he. Do you agree then, said I, as formerly, to call the first part science, the second the dianoëtic power, the third faith, and the fourth assimilation? and both these last opinion? and the two former intelligence? And that opinion is employed about generation, and intelligence about essence? Likewise, that as essence is to generation, so is intelligence to opinion, science to faith, and the dianoëtic power to assimilation? But as for the analogy of the things which these powers respect, and the twofold division of each, viz. of the object of opinion, and of intellect, these we omit, Glauco, that we may not be more prolix here than in our former reasonings. As for me, said he, with reference to those other things, as far as I am able to follow, I am of the same opinion. But do not you call him skilled in dialectic, who apprehends the reason of the essence of each particular? And as for the man who is not able to give a reason to himself, and to another, so far as he is not able, so far will you not say he wants intelligence of the thing? Why should I not say so? replied he. And is not the case the same with reference to *the good*? Whosoever cannot define it by reason, separating the idea of *the good* from all others, and as in a battle piercing through all arguments, eagerly striving to confute,

¹ Instead of *ἑνὶ* here, I read *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*.

not according to opinion, but according to essence, and in all these marching forward with undeviating reason,—such an one knows nothing of *the good itself*, nor of any good whatever: but if he has attained to any image of *the good*, we must say he has attained to it by opinion, not by science; that in the present life he is sleeping, and conversant with dreams; and that before he is roused he will descend to Hades, and there be profoundly and perfectly laid asleep. By Jupiter, said he, I will strongly aver all these things. But surely you will not, I think, allow your own children at least whom you nourished and educated in reasoning, if ever in reality you educate them, to have the supreme government of the most important affairs in the state, whilst they are void of reason, as letters of the alphabet. By no means, replied he. You will then lay down this to them as a law: That in a most especial manner they attain to that part of education, by which they may become able to question and answer in the most scientific manner. I will settle it by law, said he, with your assistance at least. Does it then appear to you, said I, that dialectic is to be placed on high as a bulwark to disciplines? and that no other discipline can with propriety be raised higher than this; but that every thing respecting disciplines is now finished? I agree, said he. There now remains for you, said I, the distribution: To whom shall we assign these disciplines, and after what manner? That is evident, said he. Do you remember then our former election of rulers, what kind we chose? How should I not? said he. As to other things then, conceive, said I, that such geniuses as these ought to be selected. For the most firm and brave are to be preferred, and, as far as possible, the most graceful; and besides, we must not only seek for those whose manners are generous and stern, but they must be possessed of every other natural disposition conducive to this education. Which dispositions do you recommend? They must have, said I, O blessed man! acuteness with respect to disciplines, that they may not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more intimidated in robust disciplines, than in strenuous exercises of the body; for their proper labour, and which is not in common with the body, is more domestic to them. True, said he. And we must seek for one of good memory, untainted, and every way laborious: or how else do you think any one will be willing to endure the fatigue of the body, and to accomplish at the same time such

learning and study? No one, said he, unless he be in all respects of a naturally good disposition. The mistake then about philosophy, and the contempt of it, have been occasioned through these things, because, as I formerly said, it is not applied to in a manner suitable to its dignity: for it ought not to be applied to by the basely, but the legitimate. How? said he. In the first place, he who is to apply to philosophy ought not, said I, to be lame as to his love of labour, being laborious in some things, and averse to labour in others. But this takes place when a man loves wrestling and hunting, and all exercises of the body, but is not a lover of learning, and loves neither to hear nor to inquire, but in all these respects has an aversion to labour. He likewise is lame, in a different manner from this man, who dislikes all bodily exercise. You say most true, replied he. And shall we not, said I, in like manner account that soul lame as to truth, which hates indeed a voluntary falsehood, and bears it ill in itself, and is beyond measure enraged when others tell a lie; but easily admits the involuntary lie; and, though at any time it be found ignorant, is not displeased, but like a savage sow willingly wallows in ignorance? By all means, said he. And in like manner, said I, as to temperance and fortitude, and magnanimity, and all the parts of virtue, we must no less carefully attend to what is basely, and what is legitimate; for when either any private person or city understands not how to attend to all these things, they unawares employ the lame and the basely for whatever they have occasion; private persons employ them as friends, and cities as governors. The case is entirely so, said he. But we, said I, must beware of all such things; for, if we take such as are entire in body and in mind for such extensive learning, and exercise and instruct them, justice herself will not blame us, and we shall preserve both the city and its constitution: but if we introduce persons of a different description into these affairs, we shall do every thing the reverse, and bring philosophy under still greater ridicule. That indeed were shameful, said he. Certainly, said I. But I myself seem at present to be somewhat ridiculous. How so? said he. I forgot, said I, that we were amusing ourselves, and spoke with too great keenness; for, whilst I was speaking, I looked towards philosophy; and seeing her most unworthily abused, I seem to have been filled with indignation, and, as being enraged at those who are the cause of it,

to

to have spoken more earnestly what I said. No truly, said he, not to me your hearer at least. But for me, said I, the speaker. But let us not forget this, that in our former election we made choice of old men; but in this election it will not be allowed us. For we must not believe Solon, that one who is old is able to learn many things; but he is less able to effect this than to run. All mighty and numerous labours belong to the young. Of necessity, said he. Every thing then relating to arithmetic and geometry, and all that previous instruction which they should be taught before they learn dialectic, ought to be set before them whilst they are children, and that method of teaching observed, which will make them learn without compulsion. Why so? Because, said I, a free man ought to learn no discipline with slavery: for the labours of the body when endured through compulsion render the body nothing worse: but no compelled discipline is lasting in the soul. True, said he. Do not then, said I, O best of men! compel boys in their learning; but train them up, amusing themselves, that you may be better able to discern to what the genius of each naturally tends. What you say, replied he, is reasonable. Do not you remember then, said I, that we said the boys are even to be carried to war, as spectators, on horseback, and that they are to be brought nearer, if they can with safety, and like young hounds taste the blood? I remember, said he. Whoever then, said I, shall appear the most forward in all these labours, disciplines, and terrors, are to be selected into a certain number. At what age? said he. When they have, said I, finished their necessary exercises; for during this time, whilst it continues, for two or three years, it is impossible to accomplish anything else; for fatigue and sleep are enemies to learning; and this too is none of the least of their trials, what each of them appears to be in his exercises. Certainly, said he. And after this period, said I, let such as formerly have been selected of the age of twenty receive greater honours than others, and let those disciplines which in their youth they learned separately, be brought before them in one view, that they may see the alliance of the disciplines with each other, and with the nature of real being. This discipline indeed will alone, said he, remain firm in those in whom it is ingenerated. And this, said I, is the greatest trial for distinguishing between those geniuses which are naturally fitted for dialectic, and those which are not. He who perceives this alliance is.

skilled!

skilled in dialectic; he who does not, is not. I am of the same opinion, said he. It will then be necessary for you, said I, after you have observed these things, and seen who are most approved in these, being stable in disciplines, and stable in war, and in the other things established by law, to make choice of such after they exceed thirty years, selecting from those chosen formerly, and advance them to greater honours. You must likewise observe them, trying them by the power of dialectic so as to ascertain which of them without the assistance of his eyes, or any other sense, is able to proceed with truth to being itself. And here, my companion, is a work of great caution. In what principally? said he. Do not you perceive, said I, the evil which at present attends dialectic, how great it is? What is it, said he, you mean? How it is somehow, said I, full of what is contrary to law. Greatly so, replied he. Do you think then, said I, they suffer some wonderful thing, and will you not forgive them? How do you mean? said he. Just as if, said I, a certain supposititious child were educated in great opulence in a rich and noble family, and amidst many flatterers, and should perceive, when grown up to manhood, that he is not descended of those who are said to be his parents, but yet should not discover his real parents; can you divine how such an one would be affected both towards his flatterers, and towards his supposed parents, both at the time when he knew nothing of the cheat, and at that time again when he came to perceive it? Or are you willing to hear me while I preface it? I am willing, said he. I prophesy then, said I, that he will pay more honour to his father and mother, and his other supposed relations, than to the flatterers, and that he will less neglect them when they are in any want, and be less apt to do or say anything amiss to them, and in matters of consequence be less disobedient to them than to those flatterers, during that period in which he knows not the truth. It is likely, said he. But when he perceives the real state of the affair, I again prophesy, he will then slacken in his honour and respect for them, and attend to the flatterers, and be remarkably more persuaded by them now than formerly, and truly live according to their manner, conversing with them openly. But for that father, and those supposed relations, if he be not of an entirely good natural disposition, he will have no regard. You say every thing, said he, as it would happen. But in what manner does this comparison respect

those who are conversant with dialectic? In this. We have certain dogmas from our childhood concerning things just and beautiful, in which we have been nourished as by parents, obeying and honouring them. We have, said he. Are there not likewise other pursuits opposite to these, with pleasures flattering our souls, and drawing them towards these? They do not however persuade those who are in any degree moderate, but they honour those their relations, and obey them. These things are so. What now, said I, when to one who is thus affected the question is proposed, What is the beautiful? and when he, answering what he has heard from the lawgiver, is refuted by reason; and reason frequently and every way convincing him, reduces him to the opinion, that this is no more beautiful than it is deformed; and in the same manner, as to what is just and good, and whatever else he held in highest esteem, what do you think such an one will after this do, with regard to these things, as to honouring and obeying them? Of necessity, said he, he will neither honour nor obey them any longer in the same manner as formerly. When then he no longer deems, said I, these things honourable, and allied to him as formerly, and cannot discover those which really are so, is it possible he can readily join himself to any other life than the flattering one? It is not possible, said he. And from being an observer of the law, he shall, I think, appear to be a transgressor. Of necessity. Is it not likely then, said I, that those shall be thus affected who in this situation apply to reasoning, and that they should deserve, as I was just now saying, great forgiveness? And pity too, said he. Whilst you take care then, lest this compassionate case befall these of the age of thirty, ought they not by every method to apply themselves to reasoning? Certainly, said he. And is not this one prudent caution? that they taste not reasonings, whilst they are young: for you have not forgot, I suppose, that the youth, when they first taste of reasonings, abuse them in the way of amusement, whilst they employ them always for the purpose of contradiction. And imitating those who are refuters, they themselves refute others, delighting like whelps in dragging and tearing to pieces, in their reasonings, those always who are near them. Extremely so, said he. And after they have confuted many, and been themselves confuted by many, do they not vehemently and speedily lay aside all the opinions they formerly possessed? And by these means they themselves,,

selves, and the whole of philosophy, are calumniated by others. Most true, said he. But he who is of a riper age, said I, will not be disposed to share in such a madness, but will rather imitate him who inclines to reason and inquire after truth, than one who, for the sake of diversion, amuses himself, and contradicts. He will likewise be more modest himself, and render the practice of disputing more honourable instead of being more dishonourable. Right, said he. Were not then all our former remarks rightly made, in the way of precaution, as to this point, that those geniuses ought to be decent and stable, to whom dialectic is to be imparted, and not as at present, when every common genius, and such as is not at all proper, is admitted to it? Certainly, said he. Will not then the double of the former period suffice a man to remain in acquiring the art of dialectic with perseverance and application, and doing nothing else but in way of counter-part exercising himself in all bodily exercises? Do you mean six years, said he, or four? 'Tis of no consequence, said I, make it five. After this you must compel them to descend to that cave again, and oblige them to govern both in things relating to war, and such other magistracies as require youth, that they may not fall short of others in experience. And they must be still further tried among these, whether, being drawn to every different quarter, they will continue firm, or whether they will in any measure be drawn aside. And for how long a time, said he, do you appoint this? For fifteen years, said I. And when they are of the age of fifty, such of them as are preserved, and as have excelled in all these things, in actions, and in the sciences, are now to be led to the end, and are to be obliged, inclining the ray of their soul, to look towards that which imparts light to all things, and, when they have viewed *the good itself*, to use it as a paradigm, each of them, in their turn, in adorning both the city and private persons, and themselves, during the remainder of their life. For the most part indeed they must be occupied in philosophy; and when it is their turn, they must toil in political affairs, and take the government, each for the good of the city, performing this office, not as any thing honourable, but as a thing necessary. And after they have educated others in the same manner still, and left such as resemble themselves to be the guardians of the city, they depart to inhabit the islands of the blest. But the city will publicly erect for them monuments, and offer sacrifices, if the oracle assent, as to

superior

superior beings ; and if it do not, as to happy and divine men. You have, Socrates, said he, like a statuary, made our governors all-beautiful. And our governesses likewise, Glauco, said I. For do not suppose that I have spoken what I have said any more concerning the men than concerning the women,—such of them as are of a sufficient genius. Right, said he, if at least they are to share in all things equally with the men, as we related. What then, said I, do you agree, that with reference to the city and republic, we have not altogether spoken what can only be considered as wishes ; but such things as are indeed difficult, yet possible in a certain respect, and in no other way than what has been mentioned, viz. when those who are truly philosophers, whether more of them or a single one, becoming governors in a city, shall despise those present honours, considering them as illiberal and of no value ; but esteeming rectitude and the honours which are derived from it above all things ; accounting the just as a thing of all others the greatest, and most absolutely necessary ; and ministering to it, and, increasing it, thoroughly regulate the constitution of their own city ? How ? said he. As many, said I, of the more advanced in life as have lived ten years in the city they will send into the country, and, removing their children away from those habits which the domestics possess at present, they will educate them in their own manners and laws, which are what we formerly mentioned : and the city and republic we have described being thus established in the speediest and easiest manner, it will both be happy itself, and be of the greatest advantage to that people among whom it is established. Very much so indeed, said he. And you seem to me, Socrates, to have told very well how this city shall arise, if it arise at all. Are not now then, said I, our discourses sufficient both concerning such a city as this, and concerning a man similar to it ? For it is also now evident what kind of a man we shall say he ought to be. It is evident, replied he ; and your inquiry seems to me to be at an end.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK VIII.

BE it so. These things, Glauco, we have now assented to; that in this city, which is to be established in a perfect manner, the women are to be common, the children common, and likewise the whole of education. In like manner, their employments both in peace and war are to be common; and their kings are to be such as excel all others both in philosophy and in the arts of war. These things, said he, have been assented to. And surely we likewise granted, that when the governors are marching with the soldiers, and settle themselves, they shall dwell in such habitations as we formerly mentioned, which have nothing peculiar to any one, but are common to all: and besides these houses, we likewise, if you remember, agreed what sort of possessions they shall have. I remember, said he, that we were of opinion, none of them ought to possess any thing as others do at present; but, as wrestlers in war and guardians, they were to receive a reward for their guardianship from others, or a yearly maintenance on these accounts, and were to take care of themselves and the rest of the city. You say right, said I. But since we have finished this, let us recollect whence we made this digression; that we may now proceed again in the same way. That is not difficult, said he: for you were mentioning much the same things of the city with those you have done at present; saying that you considered such a city to be good, as it was at that time described, and the man to be good who resembles it; whilst yet it seems you are able to describe a better city, and a better man. And you said moreover, that all the others were wrong, if this was right. Of the other republics, you said, as I remember, there were four species, which deserved to be considered, and to have the errors in them, and the lawless people in them, observed; in order that when we have beheld the whole

of them, and when we have agreed which is the best, and which is the worst man, we may inquire whether the best man be the happiest, and the worst the most miserable, or otherwise. And when I asked you, which you call the four republics, Polemarchus and Adimantus hereupon interrupted; and you, in this manner having resumed the subject, are come to this part of the reasoning. You have recollected, said I, most accurately. Again therefore afford me the same opportunity, and, whilst I ask you the same question, endeavour to say what you then intended to assert. If indeed I am able, said I. And I am truly desirous, said he, for my part, to hear which you call the four republics. You shall hear that, said I, without difficulty. For they are these I mention, and they have names too. There is that which is commended by many, the Cretan and the Spartan. There is, secondly, that which has a secondary praise, called Oligarchy, a republic full of many evils; that which is different from this, and follows next in order, a Democracy; and then genuine Tyranny, different from all these, the fourth and last disease of a city. Or have you any other form of a republic belonging to any distinct species? For your little principalities and venal kingdoms, and such like republics, are somehow of a middle kind between these, and one may find of them as many among the barbarians as among the Greeks. They are indeed, said he, said to be very many, and very strange ones. Do you know now, said I, that there is somehow a necessity that there be as many species of men as of republics? Or do you imagine that republics are generated somehow of an oak¹, or a rock, and not of the manners of those who are in the city, to which, as into a current, every thing else likewise is drawn? By no means do I imagine, said he, they are generated from any thing but from hence. If then there be five species of cities, the species of souls in individuals shall be likewise five. Why not? We have already discussed that which resembles an Aristocracy, which we have rightly pronounced to be both good and just. We have so. Are we now, in the next place, to go over the worse species, the contentious and the ambitious man, who

¹ The Greek Scholiast on this passage observes, that the antients apprehended their ancestors were generated from oaks and rocks, because mothers used to place their infants in caverns and the trunks of trees. For men, in times of remote antiquity, were accustomed to have connexion with women near oaks or rocks.

is formed according to the Spartan republic; then him resembling an Oligarchy; and then the Democratic and the Tyrannic, that we may contemplate the most unjust, and oppose him to the most just, that our inquiry may be completed? viz. how the most finished justice is in comparison of the most finished injustice, as to the happiness or misery of the possessor? that so we may either follow injustice, being persuaded by Thrasymachus, or justice, yielding to the present reasoning? By all means, said he, we must do so. Shall we then, in the same manner as we began, consider the manners in republics, before we consider them in private persons, as being there more conspicuous? And according to this method the ambitious republic is first to be considered (for I have no other name to call it by, but it may be denominated either a 'Timocracy', or a Timarchy), and together with it we shall consider a man resembling it; afterwards we shall consider an Oligarchy, and a man resembling Oligarchy; then again, when we have viewed a Democracy, we shall contemplate a Democratic man; and then in the fourth place, when we come to Tyranny, and contemplate it, and likewise a tyrannic soul, we shall endeavour to become competent judges of what we proposed. Both our contemplation and judgment, said he, would in this manner at least be agreeable to reason. Come then, said I, let us endeavour to relate in what manner a Timocracy arises out of an Aristocracy. Or is not this plain, that every republic changes, by means of that part which possesses the magistracies, when in this itself there arises sedition; but whilst this agrees with itself, though the state be extremely small, it is impossible to be changed? It is so, indeed. How then, Glauco, shall our city be changed? Or in what shape shall our allies and rulers fall into sedition with one another, and among themselves? Or are you willing, that, like Homer, we invoke the Muses to tell us, "How first sedition rose?"—And shall we say, that whilst they talk tragically, playing with us, and rallying us as children, they yet talk seriously and sublimely? In what manner? Somehow thus. It is indeed difficult for a city thus constituted

* A government in which honours subsist with a view to possessions was called by the ancients a Timocracy. It was opposed to a Democracy, because the most wealthy and not the poor were the rulers in this government. Just as an Oligarchy was opposed to an Aristocracy, because in the former not the best, but a few only, and those the worst, governed the city.

to be changed. But as every thing which is generated is obnoxious to corruption, neither will such a constitution as this remain for ever, but be dissolved. And its dissolution is this. Not only with respect to terrestrial plants, but likewise in terrestrial animals, a fertility¹ and sterility of soul as well as of body takes place, when the revolutions of the heavenly bodies complete the periphery of their respective orbits; which are shorter to the shorter lived, and contrariwise to such as are the contrary: and with reference to the fertility and sterility of our race, although those are wise that you have educated to be governors of cities, yet will they never, by reason in conjunction with sense, observe the proper seasons, but overlook them, and sometimes generate children when they ought not. But the period to that which is divinely generated² is that which the perfect number

¹ All the parts of the universe are unable to participate of the providence of divinity in a similar manner, but some of its parts enjoy this eternally, and others temporally; some in a primary and others in a secondary degree. For the universe, being a perfect whole, must have a first, a middle, and a last part. But its first parts, as having the most excellent subsistence, must always exist according to nature; and its last parts must sometimes subsist according to, and sometimes contrary to, nature. Hence the celestial bodies, which are the first parts of the universe, perpetually subsist according to nature, both the whole spheres and the multitude co-ordinate to these wholes; (see the Introduction to the *Timæus*) and the only alteration which they experience is a mutation of figure, and variation of light at different periods: but in the sublunary region, while the spheres of the elements remain on account of their subsistence as wholes, always according to nature; the parts of these wholes have sometimes a natural and sometimes an unnatural subsistence: for thus alone can the circle of generation unfold all the variety which it contains.

The different periods in which these mutations happen, are called by Plato, with great propriety, periods of *fertility* and *sterility*: for in these periods a fertility or sterility of men, animals, and plants takes place; so that in fertile periods mankind will be both more numerous, and upon the whole superior in mental and bodily endowments to the men of a barren period. And a similar reasoning must be extended to animals and plants. The so much celebrated heroic age was the result of one of these fertile periods, in which men transcending the herd of mankind both in practical and intellectual virtue abounded on the earth.

² The Greek Scholiast on this place well observes, that Plato, by that which is divinely generated, does not mean either the whole world, though the epithet is primarily applicable to this, nor the celestial regions only, nor the sublunary world, but *every thing which is perpetually and circularly moved*, whether in the heavens or under the moon; so far as it is corporeal, calling it *generated*; (for no body is self-subsistent) but so far as it is *perpetually moved, divine*: for it imitates the most divine of things, which possess an ever-vigilant life. But with respect to the perfect

number comprehends; and to that which is generated by man, that in which the augmentations surpassing and surpassed, when they shall have received three restitutions and four boundaries of things assimilating and dissimilating, increasing and decreasing, shall render all things correspondent and effable; of which the sesquiquartian progeny, when conjoined with the pentad, and thrice increased, affords two harmonies. One of these, the equally equal, a hundred times a hundred; but the other, of equal length indeed, but more oblong, is of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of pentads, each being deficient by unity, and from two numbers that are ineffable; and from a hundred cubes of the triad. But the whole geometric number of this kind is the author of better and worse generations ¹.

Of

perfect number mentioned here by Plato, we must not only direct our attention to a perfect number in vulgar arithmetic, for this is rather numbered than number, tends to perfection, and is never perfect, as being always in generation; but we must survey the cause of this number, which is indeed intellectual, but comprehends the definite boundary of every period of the world. *Θείον γεννιήντων ου τον όλον φησι κόσμον, ει και προηγουμένως τούτων, ουτε τον εν ουρανῳ μονον, ουτε το ὑπο σελήνην, αλλα παν το αεικινητον και περιφερομενον, ειτ' εν ουρανῳ, ειθ' ὑπο σελήνην' ὡς μεν σωματικῶν γεννιήτων καλουμενον' ὠθεν γαρ σωμα αὐτοπαρατον' ὡς δ' αεικινητον, θείον' μιμεῖται γαρ τα θείωτατων (lege θείωτατα των) οὐτων ἀγρῶπων ἔχοντα ζῶντ' τον τελειον δ' αριθμον ου μονον χρῆναι ἐπὶ δακτύλων τίθεντας' ὁυτος γαρ ἐστιν ἀριθμητικον πολλων, ἡ ἀριθμος, και τελειουμενον, και ουδεποτε τελειος αει γιγνομενος' αλλα την αἰτιαν τούτου νοεραν μεν ουσαν, περιεχουσιν δε τον πεπερασμενον ὁρον τῆς του κόσμου πάσης περιόδου.*

¹ The obscurity of these numbers, which is so great as to have become proverbial among the ancients, is not elucidated in any of those invaluable remains of Grecian philosophy which have survived to the present time. And yet it may be fairly concluded that this mysterious passage was most satisfactorily unfolded by the commentaries of such men as Jamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus, on this part of the Republic, though they have unfortunately perished in the wreck of ages. The following attempt, however, may perhaps show that it is not impossible to penetrate this mystery, though deprived of such mighty aid, since it is only to be solved by the assistance of Mathematics, who at all times willingly acts ministrant to Inspiration.

In the first place then, let us consider what Plato means by augmentations surpassing and surpassed; things assimilating and dissimilating, increasing and decreasing, correspondent and effable.

Augmentations surpassing, are ratios of greater inequality, viz. when the greater is compared to the lesser, and are multiples *, superparticulars, superpartients, multiple-superpar-

* *Multiplex ratio* is when a greater quantity contains a lesser many times. *Superparticular ratio* is when the greater contains the lesser quantity once, and some part of it besides; and *superpartient ratio*, is when the greater contains the lesser quantity once, and certain parts of it likewise. Again, *multiple superparticular ratio* is when the greater contains the lesser many times and some part of it besides; and *multiple superpartient ratio* is when the greater contains the lesser many times, and also some of its parts.

ticalars

Of which when our governors being ignorant, join our couples together unreasonably, the children shall neither be of a good genius, nor fortunate.

ticulars and multiple-superpartients. But augmentations surpassed are, ratios of lesser inequality, viz. when the lesser is compared with the greater quantity, as for instance, sub-multiples, subsuperparticulars, subsuperpartients, and those which are composed from these three. Those numbers are called by Plato *assimilating* and *dissimilating*, which are denominated by arithmeticians *similar* * and *dissimilar*: but he calls those *increasing* and *decreasing*, which they denominate *abounding* † and *diminished*, or *more than perfect* and *imperfect*. Things correspondent and effable, are boundaries which correspond in ratio with each other, and can be expressed in numbers either integral or fractional, such as are these four terms or boundaries, 27, 18, 12, 8, which are in sesquialter and subsequalter ratios; since these mutually correspond in ratio, and are effable. For effable quantities are those which can be expressed in whole numbers, or fractions; and, in like manner, ineffable quantities are such as cannot be expressed in either of these, and are called by modern mathematicians *furds*.

In the next place, let us consider what we are to understand by the *sesquitertian progeny when conjoined with the pentad and thrice increased, affording two harmonies*. By the *sesquitertian progeny* then Plato means the number 95: for this number is composed from the addition of the squares of the numbers 4 and 3, which form the first sesquitertian ratio, (viz. 25) and the number 70, which is composed from 40 and 30, and therefore consists of two numbers in a sesquitertian ratio. Hence, as 95 is composed from 25 and 70, it may with great propriety be called a sesquitertian progeny. This number conjoined with 5 and thrice increased produces ten thousand and a million: for $100 \times 100 = 10000$, and $10000 \times 100 = 1000000$. But it must here be observed that these two numbers, as will shortly be seen, appear to be considered by Plato as analogous to two parallelipipedons, the former, viz. ten thousand, being formed from $10 \times 10 \times 100$, and the latter from $1000 \times 10 \times 100$. These two numbers are called by Plato two harmonies, for the following reason: Simplicius, in his Commentary on Aristotle's books *De Cælo*, informs us that a cube was denominated by the Pythagoreans *harmony*, because it consists of 12 bounding lines, 8 angles, and 6 sides; and 12, 8, 6, are in harmonic proportion: for the difference between 12 and 8 is to the difference between 8 and 6, i. e. 4 is to 2 as the first term to the third, i. e. as 12 to 6, which, as is well known, is the law of harmonic proportion. As a parallelipipedon therefore has the same number of sides, angles, and bounding lines as a cube, the reason is obvious why the numbers 10000 and 1000000 are called by Plato harmonies. Hence also it is evident why he says "that the other of these harmonies, viz. a

* Similar numbers are those whose sides are proportional, i. e. which have the same ratio; but dissimilar numbers those whose sides are not proportional.

† As perfect numbers are those which are equal to their parts collected into one, such as 6 and 28, (for the parts of the former are 1, 2, 3, which are equal to 6, and the parts of the latter are 1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 28, the aggregate of which is 28) so a diminished number is that which is greater than the sum of its parts, as 8, whose parts are 4, 2, 1, the aggregate of which is 7; and an abounding number is that which is exceeded by the sum of its parts, as 12, whose parts are 6, 4, 3, 2, 1, the sum of which is 16.

tunate. And though the former governors shall install the best of them in the office, they nevertheless being unworthy of it, and coming to have the

million, is of equal length indeed, but more oblong:" for, if we call 100 the breadth and 10 the depth both of ten thousand and a million, it is evident that the latter number, when considered as produced by $1000 \times 10 \times 100$, will be analogous to a more oblong parallelepipedon than the former.

Again, when he says "that the number 1000000 consists of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of pentads, each being deficient by unity, and from two that are ineffable, and from a hundred cubes of the triad," his meaning is as follows: The number 1000000 consists of a hundred numbers, i. e. of a hundred such numbers as 10000, each of which is composed from effable diameters of pentads, &c. But in order to understand the truth of this assertion, it is necessary to observe that there are certain numbers which are called by arithmeticians effable diameters. These also are twofold; for some are the diameters of even squares, and others of odd squares. And the diameters of effable even squares, when multiplied into themselves, produce square numbers double of the squares of which they are the diameters, with an excess of unity: Thus, for instance, the number 3 multiplied into itself produces 9, which is double of the square number 4, with an excess of unity; and therefore 3 will be the diameter of the even square 4. But the diameters of effable odd square numbers are in power double of the squares of which they are the diameters, by a deficiency of unity. Thus, the number 7 multiplied into itself produces 49, which is double of the odd square number 25 by a deficiency of unity. This being premised, it follows that the number 10000 will consist of a certain number of heptads; for 7 is the effable diameter of the square number 25: and from what follows it will be found that this number is 1386.

But the number 10000 not only consists of 1386 heptads, but Plato also adds, "from two numbers that are ineffable*," viz. from two numbers the roots of which cannot be exactly obtained, nor expressed either in whole numbers or fractions, such as the roots of the numbers 2 and 3. The numbers 15 and 13 are also of this kind; and, as we shall see, appear to be the numbers signified by Plato. In the last place he adds, "and from a hundred cubes of the triad," viz. from the number 270; for this is equal to a hundred times 27, the cube of 3. The numbers therefore that form 10000 are as below:

$$\begin{array}{r}
 1386 \\
 7 \\
 \hline
 9702 \\
 15 \\
 13 \\
 270 \\
 \hline
 10000
 \end{array}$$

viz. 1386 heptads, two ineffable numbers 15 and 13, and a hundred times the cube of 3, i. e. 270: and the whole geometric number is a million.

* As every number may be measured by unity, no number is properly speaking ineffable; but the truly ineffable belongs to continued quantity.

On

the power their fathers had, will begin to be negligent of us in their guardianship, in the first place esteeming music less than they ought, and in the next place the gymnastic exercises. Hence our youth will become less acquainted with music. And the guardians which shall be appointed from among these will not be altogether expert guardians, to distinguish, according to Hesiod and us, the several species of geniuses, the golden, the silver, the brazen, and the iron: but whilst iron is mixed with silver and brass with gold, dissimilitude arises, and unharmonious inequality. And when these arise, wherever they prevail, they perpetually generate war and enmity. To such a race of men as this, we must suppose them to say, that sedition belongs whenever it happens to rise. And we shall say that they have answered justly, replied he. And of necessity, said I, for they are Muses. What then, said he, do the Muses say next? When sedition is risen, said I, two of the species of geniuses, the iron and the brazen, will be drawn to gain, and the acquisition of lands and houses, of gold and silver. But the golden and the silver geniuses, as they are not in want, but naturally rich, will lead souls towards virtue and the original constitution; yet as they live in a violent manner, and raw contrary to one another, they will make an agreement to divide their lands and houses between them, and to dwell apart from one another: and then enslaving those who were formerly kept by them as freemen, as friends, and tutors, they will keep them as domestics and slaves, for service in war and for their own protection. This revolution, said he, seems to me thus to arise. Shall not then this republic, said I, be somewhat in the middle between an Aristocracy and Oligarchy? Certainly. And the change shall happen in this manner, and on this change what sort of life shall it lead? Or is it not plain, that in some things it shall imitate the former republic, and in others Oligarchy, as being in the middle of the two, and shall likewise have somewhat peculiar to itself? Just so, replied he. Shall they not then, in honouring their

One Massey, who published a Greek and Latin edition of the Republic, at Cambridge, in the year 1713, observes respecting this most obscure passage, "that what Plato distinctly means by it, he neither knows nor cares; since it appears to him that what affords so much difficulty has but little weight." "*Quid in hoc loco distinctè velit Plato profecto nescio, nec curo. Quod enim tantum difficultatis præbet minimum ponderis habere suspicor.*" This is in the true spirit of a verbal critic: and the reason which he assigns for this carelessness is admirable; since on the same account the higher parts of the mathematics ought to be rejected.

rulers, and in this that their military abstain from agriculture, from mechanical and other gainful employments, in their establishing common meals, and in studying both gymnastic exercises and contests of war, in all these things shall they not imitate the former republic? Yes. But in this, that they are afraid to bring wise men into the magistracy, as having no longer any such as are truly simple and inflexible, but such as are of a mixed kind; and in that they incline for those who are more forward and rough, whose natural genius is rather fitted for war than peace, and in that they esteem tricks and stratagems, and spend the whole of their time in continual war, in all these respects shall it not have many things peculiar to itself? Yes. And such as these, said I, shall be desirous of wealth, as those who live in Oligarchies, and in an illiberal manner, value gold and silver concealed in darkness, as having repositories of their own, and domestic treasuries, where they hoard and hide them, and have their houses circularly enclosed, where, as in nests altogether peculiar, they squander every thing profusely, together with their wives and such others as they fancy. Most true, said he. And will they not likewise be sparing of their substance, as valuing it highly, and acquiring it not in an open manner, but love to squander the substance of others, through their dissoluteness, and secretly indulging their pleasures? They will likewise fly from the law, as children from their father, who have been educated not by persuasion but by force, having neglected the true muse, which is accompanied with reason and philosophy, and honoured gymnastic more than music. You describe entirely, said he, a mixed republic, compounded of good and ill. It is indeed mixed, said I. One thing is most remarkable in it, from the prevalence of the irascible temper, contention, and ambition. Exceedingly, said he. Does not then, said I, this republic arise in this manner? And is it not of such a kind as this, as far as the form of a republic can be described in words where there is not perfect accuracy; as it suffices us to contemplate in description likewise the most just and the most unjust man; and it were a work of prodigious length to discuss all republics, and all the various manners of men, without omitting any thing? Very right, said he. What now will the man be who corresponds to this republic? how shall he be formed, and of what kind? I think, said Adimantus, he will be somewhat like Glauco here, at least in a love of contention. Perhaps, said I, as to this particular. But in other respects

he does not seem to me to have a natural resemblance of him. In what? He must necessarily, said I, be more arrogant, and unapt to music, but fond of it: and fond of hearing, but by no means a rhetorician: and such an one will be rough towards certain slaves, without despising them, as he does who is sufficiently educated. He will be mild towards such as are free, and extremely submissive to governors; a lover of dominion, and a lover of honour, not thinking it proper to govern by eloquence, nor any thing of the kind, but by political management and military performances, being a lover of gymnastic and hunting. This indeed, said he, is the temper of that republic. And shall not such an one, said I, despise money, whilst he is young? But the older he grows, the more he will always value it, because he partakes of the covetous genius, and is not sincerely affected towards virtue, because destitute of the best guardian. Of what guardian? said Adimantus. Reason, said I, accompanied with music, which being the only inbred preservative of virtue, dwells with the possessor through the whole of life. You say well, replied he. And surely at least such a timocratic youth, said I, resembles such a city. Certainly. And such an one, said I, is formed somehow in this manner. He happens sometimes to be the young son of a worthy father, who dwells in an ill regulated city, and who shuns honours and magistracies, and law-suits, and all such public business, and is willing to live neglected in obscurity, that he may have no trouble. In what manner then, said he, is he formed? When first of all, said I, he hears his mother venting her indignation, because her husband is not in the magistracy, and complaining that she is on this account neglected among other women, and that she observes him not extremely attentive to the acquisition of wealth, not fighting and reviling privately and publicly in courts of justice; but behaving on all these occasions indolently, and perceiving him always attentive to himself, and treating her neither with extreme respect nor contempt; on all these accounts, being filled with indignation, she tells her son that his father is unmanly, and extremely remiss, and such other things as wives are wont to cant over concerning such husbands. They are very many, truly, said Adimantus, and very much in their spirit. And you know, said I, that the domestics likewise of such families, such of them as appear good-natured, sometimes privately say the same things to the sons; and if they see any one either owing money whom the father does not sue at law, or in any other

way doing injustice, they exhort him to punish all such persons when he comes to be a man, and to be more of a man than his father. And when he goes abroad, he hears other such like things. And he sees that such in the city as attend to their own affairs are called simple, and held in little esteem, and that such as do not attend to their affairs are both honoured and commended. The young man now hearing and seeing all these things, and then again hearing the speeches of his father, and observing his pursuits in a near view, in comparison with those of others; being drawn by both these, his father watering and increasing the rational part in his soul, and these others the concupiscible and irascible; and being naturally no bad man, but spoiled by the bad conversations of others, he is brought to a mean between the two, and delivers up the government within himself to a middle power, that which is fond of contention and irascible, and so he becomes a haughty and ambitious man. You seem, said he, to have accurately explained the formation of such an one. We have now then, said I, the second republic and the second man. We have, said he. Shall we not after this say with Æschylus?

“ With different cities different men accord.”

Or, rather, according to our plan, shall we first establish the cities? By all means so, replied he. It would be an Oligarchy then, I think, which succeeds this republic. But what constitution, said he, is it you call an Oligarchy? That republic, said I, which is founded on men's valuations, in which the rich bear rule, and the poor have no share in the government. I understand, said he. Must we not relate, first, how the change is made from a Timocracy to an Oligarchy? We must. And surely at least how this change is made, said I, is manifest even to the blind. How? That treasury, said I, which every one has filled with gold destroys such a republic; for, first of all, they find out for themselves methods of expense, and to this purpose strain the laws, both they and their wives disobeying them. That is likely, said he. And afterwards, I think, one observing another, and coming to rival one another, the multitude of them are rendered of this kind. It is likely. And from hence then, said I, proceeding still to a greater desire of acquiring wealth, the more honourable they account this to be, the more will virtue be thought dishonourable:

able: or is not virtue so different from wealth, that, if each of them be placed in the opposite arm of a balance, they always weigh opposite to each other? Entirely so, replied he. But whilst wealth and the wealthy are honoured in the city, both virtue and the good must be more dishonoured. It is plain. And what is honoured is always pursued, and what is dishonoured is neglected. Just so. Instead then of contentious and ambitious men, they will at last become lovers of gain and of wealth: and they will praise and admire the rich, and bring them into the magistracy, but the poor man they will despise. Certainly. And do they not then make laws, marking out the boundary of the Oligarchic constitution, and regulating the quantity of Oligarchic power according to the quantity of wealth, more to the more wealthy, and less to the less, intimating that he who has not the valuation settled by law is to have no share in the government? And do they not transact these things violently, by force of arms, or establish such a republic after they have previously terrified them? Is it not thus? Thus indeed. This then in short is the constitution. It is, replied he. But what now is the nature of the republic, and what are the faults we ascribed to it? First of all, said I, this very thing, the constitution itself, what think you of this? For consider, if a man should in this manner appoint pilots of ships, according to their valuations, but never intrust one with a poor man, though better skilled in piloting, what would be the consequence? They would, said he, make very bad navigation. And is it not in the same manner with reference to any other thing, or any government whatever? I think so. Is it so in all cases but in a city? said I, or is it so with reference to a city likewise? There most especially, said he, in as much as it is the most difficult, and the greatest government. Oligarchy then would seem to have this, which is so great a fault. It appears so. But what? Is this fault any thing less? What? That such a city is not one, but of necessity two; one consisting of the poor, and the other of the rich, dwelling in one place, and always plotting against one another. By Jupiter, said he, it is in no respect less. But surely neither is this a handsome thing, to be incapable to wage any war, because of the necessity they are under, either of employing the armed multitude, and of dreading them more than the enemy themselves; or not employing them, to appear in battle itself truly Oligarchic,

garchic, and at the same time to be unwilling to advance money for the public service, through a natural disposition of covetousness. This is not handsome. But what? with reference to what we long ago condemned, the engaging in a multiplicity of different things, the same persons, at the same time, attending in such a republic to agriculture, lucrative employments, and military affairs, does this appear to be right? Not in any degree. But see now whether this form of republic be the first which introduces this greatest of all evils. What is that? That one shall be allowed to dispose of the whole of his effects, and another to purchase them from him, and the seller be allowed to dwell in the city, whilst he belongs to no one class in the city, and is neither called a maker of money, nor mechanic, nor horse-man, nor foot-soldier, but poor and destitute. It is the first, said he. But yet such an one shall not be prohibited in Oligarchic governments; for otherwise some of them would not be over-rich, and others altogether poor. Right. But consider this likewise. When such a rich man as this is spends of his substance, was it of any more advantage to the city with reference to the purposes we now mentioned? or did he appear to be indeed one of the magistrates, but was in truth neither magistrate of the city, nor servant to it, but a waster of substance? So he appeared, replied he. He was nothing but a waster. Are you willing then, said I, that we say of him, that as when a drone is in a bee-hive, it is the disease of the swarm; in like manner such an one, when a drone in his house, is the disease of the city? Entirely so, Socrates, replied he. And has not God, Adimantus, made all the winged drones without any sting; but these with feet, some of them without stings, and some of them with dreadful stings? And of those who are without stings, are they who continue poor to old age; and of those who have stings, are all these who are called mischievous. Most true, said he. It is plain then, said I, that in a city where you observe there are poor, there are somewhere in that place concealed thieves and purse-cutters, and sacrilegious persons, and workers of all other such evils. It is plain, said he. What then? Do not you perceive poor people in cities under Oligarchic government? They are almost all so, said he, except the governors. And do we not think, said I, that there are many mischievous persons in them with stings, whom the magistracy by diligence and by force

force restrains? We think so indeed, said he. And shall we not say, that through want of education, through bad nurture, and a corrupt constitution of state, such sort of persons are there produced? We shall say so. Is not then the city which is under Oligarchy of such a kind as this, and hath it not such evils as these, and probably more too? It is nearly so, said he. We have now finished, said I, this republic likewise, which they call Oligarchy, having its governors according to valuation. And let us now consider the man who resembles it, in what manner he arises, and what sort of man he is. By all means, said he. And is not the change from the Timocratic to the Oligarchic chiefly in this manner? How? When such a one has a son, first of all, he both emulates his father, and follows his steps; afterwards he sees him, on a sudden, dashed on the city, as on a rock, and wasting both his substance and himself, either in the office of a general, or some other principal magistracy; then falling into courts of justice, destroyed by sycophants, and either put to death, or stripped of his dignities, disgraced, and losing all his substance. It is likely, said he. When he has seen and suffered those things, friend, and has lost his substance, he instantly in a terror pushes headlong from the throne of his soul that ambitious and animated disposition, and, being humbled by his poverty, turns his attention to gain, lives meanly and sparingly, and, applying to work, collects wealth. Or do you not think that such a man will then seat in that throne the covetous and avaricious disposition, and make it a mighty king within himself, begirt with tiaras¹, and bracelets, and sceptres? I think so, said he. But he, I imagine, having placed both the rational and the ambitious disposition low on the ground on either side, and having enslaved them under it, the one he allows to reason on nothing, nor ever to inquire, but in what way lesser substance shall be made greater; and the other again he permits to admire and honour nothing but riches and the rich, and to receive honour on no other account but the acquisition of money, or whatever contributes towards it. There is no other change, said he, of an ambitious youth to a covetous one so sudden and so powerful

¹ The tiara, says the Greek Scholiast on this place, is that which is called *kurbosia*. It is an ornament for the head, which the Persian kings alone wore in an upright, but the commanders of the army in an inclined position. Some also call it *kilaris*, as Theophrastus in his treatise concerning the kingdom of the Cyprians.

as this. Is not this, then, said I, the Oligarchic man? And the change into such an one is from a man resembling that republic from which the Oligarchic republic arises. Let us consider, now, if he any way resembles it. Let us consider. Does he not, in the first place, resemble it in valuing money above all things? Why does he not? And surely at least in being sparing and laborious, satisfying only his necessary desires, and not allowing of any other expenses, but subduing the other desires as foolish. Certainly. And being, said I, an emaciated man, and making gain of every thing, a man intent on hoarding, such as the multitude extols—will not this be the man who resembles such a republic? It appears so to me, replied he. Riches then must be most valued both by the city and by such a man. For I do not think, said I, that such a man has attended to education. I do not think he has, said he; for he would not have taken a blind one¹ to be the leader of his life. But further still, consider this attentively, said I, Shall we not say that there are in him, from the want of education, the desires of the drone, some of them beggarly, and some of them mischievous, forcibly kept in by some other pursuit? Entirely so, said he. Do you know then, said I, where you will best observe their wickedness? Where? said he. In their tutelages of orphans, or in whatever else of this kind comes in their way, where they have it much in their power to do injustice. True. And is not this now manifest, that in every other commerce of life, wherever such an one acts so as to be approved, appearing to be just, and, by a certain moderate behaviour, restrains the other wrong desires within him, he does so, not from any persuasion² that it is not better to indulge them, nor from sober reason, but from necessity and fear, trembling for the rest of his substance. Entirely so, said he. And truly, said I, friend, you shall find in most of them desires partaking of the nature of the drone, where there is occasion to spend the property of others. Very much so, said he. Such a one as this, then, will not be without sedition within himself; nor be one, but a kind of double man; he will, however, have for the most part desires governing other desires, the better governing the worse. It is so. And on these

¹ Viz. wealth.

² Viz. as the Greek Scholiast well observes, not persuading himself, nor giving an orderly motion to the parts of his soul, and studying virtue on account of that which is more excellent, accounts

accounts such a one, as I imagine, will be more decent than many others, but the true virtue of a harmonized and consistent soul would far escape him. It appears so to me. And the parsimonious man will, in private life, be but a poor rival for any victory, or in any contest of the honourable kind. And being unwilling, for the sake of good reputation, or for any such contests, to spend his substance, being afraid to waken up expensive desires, or any alliance or contest of this kind, fighting with a small part of his forces in an Oligarchic manner, he is generally defeated, and increases his wealth. Very true, said he. Do we then yet hesitate, said I, to rank the covetous and parsimonious man as most of all resembling the city under Oligarchic government? By no means, said he. Democracy now, as seems, is next to be considered, in what manner it arises, and what kind of man it produces when arisen; that, understanding the nature of such a man, we may bring him to a trial. We shall in this method, said he, proceed consistently with ourselves. Is not, said I, the change from Oligarchy to Democracy produced in some such way as this, through the insatiable desire of the proposed good, viz. the desire of becoming as rich as possible? How? As those who are its governors govern on account of their possessing great riches, they will be unwilling, I think, to restrain by law such of the youth as are dissolute from having the liberty of squandering and wasting their substance; that so, by purchasing the substance of such persons, and lending them on usury, they may still become both richer, and be held in greater honour. They will be more unwilling than any other. And is not this already manifest in the city, that it is impossible for the citizens to esteem riches, and at the same time sufficiently possess temperance, but either the one or the other must of necessity be neglected? It is abundantly plain, said he. But whilst in Oligarchies they neglect education, and suffer the youth to grow licentious, they are sometimes under a necessity of becoming poor, and these such as are of no ungenerous disposition. Very much so. And these, I imagine, fit in the city, fitted both with slings and with armour, some of them in debt, others in contempt, others in both, hating and conspiring against those who possess their substance, and others likewise, being desirous of a change. These things are so. But the money-catchers still brooding over it, and not seeming to observe these; wherever they

see any of the rest giving way, they wound them by throwing money into their hands, and, drawing to themselves exorbitant usury, fill the city with drones, and the poor. How is it possible they should not? said he. Nor yet, said I, when so great an evil is burning in the city, are they willing to extinguish it, not even by that method, restraining any one from spending his substance at pleasure; nor yet to take that method, by which, according to the second law, such disorder might be removed. According to which? According to that, which after the other is secondary, obliging the citizens to pay attention to virtue; for, if one should enjoin them to traffic much in the way of voluntary commerce, and upon their own hazard, they would in a less shameful way make money in the city, and likewise less of those evils we have now mentioned would arise in it. Much less, said he. But at present, said I, by means of all these things, the governors render the governed of this kind. And do they not render both themselves and all belonging to them, and the youth likewise, luxurious and idle with respect to all the exercises of body and of mind, and effeminate in bearing both pleasures and pains, and likewise indolent? What else? As to themselves, they neglect every thing but the acquisition of wealth, and pay no more attention to virtue than the poor do. They do not indeed. After they are trained up in this manner, when these governors and their subjects meet together either on the road in their journeying, or in any other meetings, either at public spectacles¹, or military marches, either when fellow-sailors or fellow-foldiers, or when they see one another in common dangers, by no means are the poor in these cases contemned by the rich; but very often a robust fellow poor and sun-burnt, when he has his rank in battle beside a rich man bred up in the shade, and swoln with a great deal of adventitious flesh, and sees him panting for breath and in agony, do not you imagine that he thinks it is through their own fault that such fellows grow rich, and that they say to one another, when they meet in private, that our rich men are good for nothing at all? I know very well, said he,

¹ By public spectacles here, Plato means solemn festivals, which, as the Greek Scholiast on this place informs us, were called *spēktacles*, from the concourse of those that came to behold the celebration of them. For the transactions on these occasions were entirely different from those at any other period of life.

that

that they do so. For, as a diseased body needs but the smallest shock from without to render it sickly, and sometimes without any impression from without is in sedition with itself, will not in like manner a city resembling it in these things, on the smallest occasion from without, when either the one party forms an alliance with the Oligarchic, or the other with the Democratic, be sickly, and fight with itself, and, sometimes without these things from abroad, be in sedition? And extremely so. A Democracy then, I think, arises when the poor prevailing over the rich kill some, and banish others, and share the places in the republic, and the magistracies equally among the remainder, and for the most part the magistracies are disposed in it by lot. This truly, said he, is the establishment of a Democracy, whether it arise by force of arms, or from others withdrawing themselves through fear. In what manner now, said I, do these live, and what sort of a republic is this? for it is plain that a man of this kind will appear some Democratic man. It is plain, said he. Is not then the city, in the first place, full of all freedom of action, and of speech, and of liberty, to do in it what any one inclines? So truly it is said at least, replied he. And wherever there is liberty, it is plain that every one will regulate his own method of life in whatever way he pleases. It is plain. And I think that in such a republic most especially there would arise men of all kinds. How can it be otherwise? This, said I, seems to be the finest of all republics. As a variegated robe diversified with all kinds of flowers, so this republic, variegated with all sorts of manners, appears the finest. What else? said he. And it is likely, said I, that the multitude judge this republic to be the best, like children and women gazing at variegated things. Very likely, said he. And it is very proper at least, O blessed man! said I, to search for a republic in such a state as this. How now? Because it contains all kinds of republics on account of liberty; and it appears necessary for any one who wants to constitute a city, as we do at present, to come to a Democratic city, as to a general fair of republics, and choose that form which he fancies. It is likely indeed, said he, he would not be in want of models. But what now, said I, is not this a divine and sweet manner of life for the present: To be under no necessity in such a city to govern, not though you were able to govern, nor yet to be subject unless you incline, nor to be engaged in war when

others are, nor to live in peace when others do so unless you be desirous of peace; and though there be a law restraining you from governing or administering justice, to govern nevertheless, and administer justice, if you incline? It is likely, said he; it is pleasant for the present at least. But what now, is not the meekness of some of those who are condemned very curious? Or have you not as yet observed, in such a republic, men condemned to death or banishment, yet nevertheless continuing still, and walking up and down openly; and as if no one attended to or observed him, the condemned man returns like a hero? I have observed very many, said he. But is not this indulgence of the city very generous, not to mention the small regard, and even contempt, it shows for all those things we celebrated so much when we settled our city, as that unless a man had an extraordinary genius, he never would become a good man, unless when a child he were instantly educated in things handsome, and should diligently apply to all these things: how magnanimously does it despise all these things, and not regard from what kind of pursuits a man comes to act in political affairs, but honours him if he only says he is well affected towards the multitude? This contempt, said he, is very generous indeed. These now, said I, and such things as are akin to these, are to be found in a Democracy; and it will be, as it appears, a pleasant sort of republic, anarchical, and variegated, distributing a certain equality to all alike without distinction. What you say, replied he, is perfectly manifest. Consider now, said I, what kind of man such an one is in private; or, first, must we not consider, as we did with respect to the republic, in what manner he arises? Yes, said he. And does he not in this manner arise, viz. from that parsimonious one, who was under the Oligarchy as a son, I think, trained up by his father in his manners? Why not? Such a one by force governs his own pleasures, those of them which are expensive, and tend not to the acquisition of wealth, and which are called unnecessary. It is plain, said he. Are you willing then, said I, that we may not reason in the dark, first to determine what desires are necessary, and what are not? I am willing, said he. May not such be justly called necessary, which we are not able to remove, and such as when gratified are of advantage to us? For both these kinds our nature is under a necessity to pursue; is it not? Very strongly. This then we shall justly say makes the necessary part in our desires. Justly. But what

what now? Such desires as a man may banish, if he study it from his youth, and such as whilst they remain do no good, if we say of these that they are not necessary, shall we not say right? Right indeed. Let us select a paradigm of each of them, that we may understand by an example what they are. It is proper. Is not the desire of eating, so far as is conducive to health and a good habit of body; and the desire of food and victuals, of the necessary kind? I think so. The desire of food at least is indeed necessary on both accounts, as meat is advantageous, and as the want of it must bring life to an end altogether. It is. And the desire of victuals is likewise necessary, if it anyhow contribute anything towards the good habit of the body. Certainly. But what? Such desire even of these things as goes beyond these purposes, or such desire as respects other meats than these, and yet is capable of being curbed in youth, and, by being disciplined, to be removed from many things, and which is hurtful both to the body, and hurtful to the soul with reference to her attaining wisdom and temperance, may not such desire be rightly called unnecessary? Most rightly, indeed. And may we not call these expensive likewise, and the others frugal, as they are conducive towards the actions of life? Why not? In the same manner, surely, shall we say of venereal desires, and the others. In the same manner. And did we not, by him whom we just now denominated the drone, mean one who was full of such desires and pleasures, and was governed by such as are unnecessary? but that he who was under the necessary ones was the parsimonious and Oligarchic? Without doubt. Let us again mention, said I, how the Democratic arises from the Oligarchic; and to me he appears to arise in great measure thus. How? When a young man nurtured, as we now mentioned, without proper instruction, and in a parsimonious manner, comes to taste the honey of the drones, and associates with those vehement and terrible creatures who are able to procure all sorts of pleasures, and every way diversified, and from every quarter;—thence conceive there is somehow the beginning of a change in him from the Oligarchic to the Democratic. There is great necessity for it, said he. And as the city was changed by the assistance of an alliance from without with one party of it with which it was akin, will not the youth be changed in the same manner, by the assistance of one species of desires from without, to another within him which resembles it, and is allied to it?

it? By all means. And I imagine at least, if by any alliance there be given counter-assistance to the Oligarchic party within him, either any how by his father, or by others of the family, both admonishing and upbraiding him, then truly arises sedition, and oppression, and a fight within him with himself. Undoubtedly. And sometimes indeed, I think, the Democratic party yields to the Oligarchic, and some of the desires are destroyed, but others retire, on a certain modesty being ingenerated in the soul of the youth, and he again becomes cultivated. This sometimes takes place, said he. And again, I conceive, that when some desires retire, there are others allied to them which grow up, and, through inattention to the father's instruction, become both many and powerful. This is usually the case, said he. And do they not draw towards intimacies among themselves, and, meeting privately together, generate a multitude? What else? And at length, I think, they seize the citadel of the soul of the youth, finding it evacuated both of beautiful disciplines and pursuits, and of true reasoning, which are the best guardians and preservers in the dianoëtic part of men beloved of the Gods. Very much so, said he. And then indeed false and arrogant reasonings and opinions, rushing up in their stead, possess the same place in such a one. Vehemently so, said he. And does he not now again, on coming among those Lotophagi¹, dwell with them openly? And if any assistance comes from his friends to the parsimonious part of his soul, those arrogant reasonings, shutting the gates of the royal wall against it, neither give entrance to this alliance, nor to the ambassadorial admonitions of private old men; but, fighting against these, hold the government themselves. And denominating modesty stupidity, they thrust it out disgracefully as a fugitive, and temperance they call unmanliness, and, abusing it most shamefully, expel it. Persuading themselves likewise that moderation, and decent expense, are no other than rusticity and illiberality, they banish them from their territories, with many other and unprofitable desires. Vehemently so. Having emptied and purified from all these desires the soul that is detained by them, and is initiated in the great mysteries, they next lead in, with encomiums and applauses, insolence and anarchy, luxury and impudence, shining with a great retinue, and crowned.

¹ By the Lotophagi we must understand, says the Greek Scholiast, that false and arrogant reasons and opinions are allegorically signified.

And infolence, indeed, they denominate education; anarchy they call liberty; luxury, magnificence; and impudence, manhood. Is it not, said I, somehow in this manner, that a youth changes from one bred up with the necessary desires into the licentiousness and remissness of the unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures? And very plainly so, replied he. And such a one, I think, after this leads his life, expending his substance, his labour, and his time, no more on the necessary than the unnecessary pleasures: and if he be fortunate, and not excessively debauched, when he is somewhat more advanced in years, and when the great crowd of desires is over, he admits a part of those which were expelled, and does not deliver himself wholly up to such as had intruded, but regulates his pleasures by a sort of equality, and so lives delivering up the government of himself to every incidental desire as it may happen, till it be satisfied, and then to another, undervaluing none of them, but indulging them all alike. Entirely so. And such a one, said I, does not listen to true reasoning, nor admit it into the citadel, if any should tell him that there are some pleasures of the worthy and the good desires, and others of the depraved, and that he ought to pursue and honour those, but to chastise and enslave these. But, in all these cases, he dissents, and says that they are all alike, and ought to be held in equal honour. Whoever is thus affected, said he, vehemently acts in this manner. And does he not live, said I, from day to day, gratifying after this manner every incidental desire, sometimes indulging himself in intoxication, and in music, sometimes drinking water, and extenuating himself by abstinence; and then again attending to the gymnastic exercises? Sometimes too he is quite indolent and careless about every thing; then again he applies as it were to philosophy; many times he acts the part of a politician, and in a desultory manner says and does whatever happens. If at any time he affects to imitate any of the military tribe, thither he is carried; or of the mercantile, then again hither; nor is his life regulated by any order, or any necessity, but, deeming this kind of life pleasant, and free, and blessed, he follows it throughout. You have entirely, said he, discussed the life of one who places all laws whatever on a level. I imagine at least, said I, that he is multiform, and full of very different manners; and that, like the city, he is fine, and variegated, and that very many men and women would desire to imitate his life, as he

contains

contains in himself a great many patterns of republics and of manners. He does, said he. What now? Shall such a man as this be arranged as resembling a Democracy, as he may truly be called Democratic? Let him be so arranged, said he. But it yet remains that we discuss, said I, the most excellent republic, and the most excellent man, viz. Tyranny, and the Tyrant. It does, said he. Come then, my dear companion! in what manner does Tyranny arise? for it is almost plain that the change is from Democracy. It is plain. Does not Tyranny arise in the same manner from Democracy, as Democracy does from Oligarchy? How? What did Oligarchy, said I, propose as its good, and according to what was it constituted? It was with a view to become extremely rich, was it not? Yes. An insatiable desire then of riches, and a neglect of other things, through attention to the acquisition of wealth, destroys it. True, said he. And with reference to that which Democracy denominates good, an insatiable thirst of it destroys it likewise? But what is it you say it denominates good? Liberty, said I. For this you are told is most beautiful in a city which is under a Democracy, and that for the sake of liberty any one who is naturally free chooses to live in it alone. This word Liberty, said he, is indeed often mentioned. Does not then, said I, as I was going to say, the insatiable desire of this, and the neglect of other things, change even this republic, and prepare it to stand in need of a tyrant? How? said he. When a city, said I, is under a Democracy, and is thirsting after liberty, and happens to have bad cup-bearers appointed it, and becomes intoxicated with an unmixed draught of it beyond what is necessary, it punishes even the governors if they will not be entirely tame, and afford abundant liberty, accusing them as corrupted, and Oligarchic. They do this, said he. But such as are obedient to magistrates they abuse, said I, as willing slaves, and good for nothing, and, both in private and in public, commend and honour magistrates who resemble subjects, and subjects who resemble magistrates; must they not therefore necessarily in such a city arrive at the summit of liberty? How is it possible they should not? And must not this inbred anarchy, my friend, descend into private families, and in the end reach even the brutes? How, said he, do we assert such a thing as this? Just as if, said I, a father should accustom himself to resemble a child, and to be afraid of his sons, and the son accustom himself to resemble his father, and

neither to revere nor to stand in awe of his parents, that so indeed he may be free, as if a stranger were to be equalled with a citizen, and a citizen with a stranger, and, in like manner, a foreigner. It is just so, said he. These things, said I, and other little things of a like nature happen. The teacher in such a city fears and flatters the scholars, and the scholars despise their teachers and their tutors in like manner: and in general the youth resemble the more advanced in years, and contend with them both in words and deeds: and the old men, sitting down with the young, are full of merriment and pleasantry, mimicking the youth, that they may not appear to be morose and despotic. It is entirely so, replied he. But that extreme liberty of the multitude, said I, how great it is in such a city as this, when the men and women slaves are no less free than those who purchase them, and how great an equality and liberty the wives have with their husbands, and husbands with their wives, we have almost forgotten to mention. Shall we not then, according to Æschylus, said he, say whatever now comes into our mouth? By all means, said I; and accordingly I do speak thus: With reference even to brutes, such of them as are under the care of men, how much more free they are in such a city, he who has not experienced it will not easily believe: for indeed even the puppies, according to the proverb, resemble their mistresses; and the horses and asses are accustomed to go freely and gracefully, marching up against any one they meet on the road, unless he give way; and many other such things thus happen full of liberty. You tell me, said he, my dream; for I have often met with this when going into the country. But do you observe, said I, what is the sum of all these things collected together? how delicate it makes the soul of the citizens, so that, if any one bring near to them any thing pertaining to slavery, they are filled with indignation, and cannot endure it. And do you know, that at length they regard not even the laws, written or unwritten, that no one by any means whatever may become their masters? I know it well, said he. This now, friend, said I, is that government so beautiful and youthful, whence Tyranny springs, as it appears to me. Youthful truly, replied he; but what follows this? The same thing, said I, which, springing up as a disease in an Oligarchy, destroyed it; the same arising here in a greater and more powerful manner, through its licentiousness, enslaves the Democracy: and in reality, the

doing any thing to excess usually occasions a mighty change to the reverse: for thus it is in seasons, in vegetable and in animal bodies, and in republics as much as in any thing. It is probable, said he. And excessive liberty seems to change into nothing else but excessive slavery, both with a private person and a city. It is probable, indeed. It is probable then, said I, that out of no other republic is Tyranny constituted than a Democracy; out of the most excessive liberty I conceive the greatest and most savage slavery. It is reasonable, said he, to think so. But this I think, said I, was not what you was asking; but what that disease is which enslaves Democracy, resembling that which destroys Oligarchy? You say true, replied he. That then, said I, I called the race of idle and profuse men, one part of which was more brave, and were leaders, the other more cowardly, and followed. And we compared them to drones; some to such as have stings, others to such as have none. And rightly, said he. These two now, said I, springing up in any republic, raise disturbance, as phlegm and bile in a natural body. And it behoves a wise physician and law-giver of a city, no less than a wise bee-master, to be afraid of these, at a great distance principally, that they never get in; but, if they have entered, that they be in the speediest manner possible cut off, together with their very cells. Yes, by Jupiter, said he, by all means. Let us take it then, said I, in this manner, that we may see more distinctly what we want. In what manner? Let us divide in our reasoning a Democratic city into three parts, as it really is; for one such species as the above grows through licentiousness in it no less than in the Oligarchic. It does so. But it is much more fierce at least in this than in that. How? In an Oligarchy, because it is not in places of honour, but is debarred from the magistracies, it is unexercised, and does not become strong. But in a Democracy this, excepting a few, is somehow the presiding party, and now it says and does the most outrageous things, and then again approaching courts of justice, it makes a humming noise, and cannot endure any other to speak different from it; so that all things, some few excepted, in such a republic, are administered by such a party. Extremely so, said he. Some other party now, such as this, is always separated from the multitude. Which? Whilst the whole are somehow engaged in the pursuit of gain, such as are naturally the most temperate become for the most

part the wealthiest. It is likely. And hence, I think, the greatest quantity of honey, and what comes with the greatest ease, is pressed out of these by the drones. For how, said he, can any one press out of those who have but little? Such wealthy people, I think, are called the pasture of the drones. Nearly so, replied he. And the people will be a sort of third species, such of them as mind their own affairs, and meddle not with any others, who have not much substance, but yet are the most numerous, and the most prevalent in a Democracy, whenever it is fully assembled. It is so; but this it will not wish to do often, if it does not obtain some share of the honey. Does it not always obtain a share, said I, as far as their leaders are able, robbing those that have property, and giving to the people that they may have the most themselves? They are indeed, said he, sharers in this manner. These then who are thus despoiled are obliged to defend themselves, saying and doing all they can among the people. Why not? Others then give them occasion to form designs against the people, though they should have no inclination to introduce a change of government, and so they are Oligarchic. Why not? But at length, after they see that the people, not of their own accord, but being ignorant and imposed on by those slanderers, attempt to injure them,—do they not then indeed, whether they will or not, become truly Oligarchic? yet not spontaneously, but this mischief likewise is generated by that drone stinging them. Extremely so, indeed. And so they have accusations, law-suits, and contests one with another. Very much so. And are not the people accustomed always to place some one, in a conspicuous manner, over themselves, and to cherish him, and greatly increase his power? They are. And this, said I, is plain, that whenever a tyrant arises it is from this presiding root, and from nothing else, that he blossoms. This is extremely manifest. What is the beginning then of the change from a president into a tyrant? Or is it plain, that it is after the president begins to do the same thing with that in the fable, which is told in relation to the temple of Lycæan Jupiter, to whom was dedicated the wolf in Arcadia? What is that? said he. That whoever tasted human entrails which were mixed with those of other sacrifices, necessarily became a wolf. Have you not heard the story? I have. And must not he in the same manner, who being president of the people, and receiving an extremely sub-

missive multitude, abstains not from kindred blood, but unjustly accusing them, (of such things as they are wont) and bringing them into courts of justice, stains himself with bloodshed, taking away the life of a man, and, with unhallowed tongue and mouth, tasting kindred blood, and besides this, banishes and slays, and proposes the abolition of debts, and division of lands,—must not such an one, of necessity, and as it is destined, be either destroyed by his enemies, or exercise tyranny, and, from being a man, become a wolf? Of great necessity, said he. This is he now, said I, who becomes seditious towards those who have property, and, when he fails, he goes against his enemies with open force, and becomes an accomplished tyrant. It is plain. And if they be unable to expel him, or to put him to death; on an accusation before the city, they truly conspire to cut him off privately by a violent death. It is wont indeed, said he, to happen so. And, on this account, all those who mount up to tyranny invent this celebrated tyrannical demand¹, to demand of the people certain guards for their person, that the assistance of the people may be secured to them. Of this, said he, they take special care. And they grant them, I imagine, being afraid of his safety, but secure as to their own. Extremely so. And when a man who has property, and who along with his property has the crime of hating the people, observes this,—he then, my friend, according to the answer of the oracle to Cræsus,

.... To craggy Hermus flies,
Nor stays, nor fears to be a coward deemed

Because he would not, said he, be in fear again a second time. But he at least, I imagine, said I, who is caught, is put to death. Of necessity. It is plain, then, that this president of the city does not himself behave like a truly great man, in a manner truly great, but, hurling down many others, sits in his chair a consummate tyrant of the city, instead of a president. Why is he not? said he. Shall we consider now, said I, the happiness of

¹ This, says the Greek Scholiast, is said of Pisistratus, who, insidiously endeavouring to tyrannize over the citizens, gave himself many and dangerous wounds, and then presented himself to the Greeks as if he had been thus wounded by his enemies. He also requested guards for his body, and received three hundred spearmen from the city; which introducing into his house, and rendering subservient to his purpose, he tyrannized over the Athenians.

the man, and of the city in which such a mortal arises? By all means, said he, let us consider it. Does he not then, said I, in the first days, and for the first season, salute every one he meets; says he is no tyrant, and promises many things, both in private and in public; and frees from debts, and distributes land both to the people in general, and to those about him, and affects to be mild and patriotic towards all? Of necessity, said he. But when, I think, he has reconciled to himself some of his foreign enemies, and destroyed others, and there is tranquillity with reference to these, he in the first place always raises some wars, in order that the people may be in need of a leader. It is likely. And is it not likewise with this view, that, being rendered poor by payment of taxes, they may be under a necessity of becoming intent on daily sustenance, and may be less ready to conspire against him? It is plain. And, I think, if he suspects that any of those who are of a free spirit will not allow him to govern,—in order to have some pretext for destroying them, he exposes them to the enemy; on all these accounts a tyrant is always under a necessity of raising war. Of necessity. And, whilst he is doing these things, he must readily become more hateful to his citizens. Why not? And must not some of those who have been promoted along with him, and who are in power, speak out freely both towards him, and among themselves, finding fault with the transactions, such of them as are of a more manly spirit? It is likely. It behoves the tyrant, then, to cut off all these, if he means to govern, till he leave no one, either of friends or foes, worth any thing. It is plain. He must then carefully observe who is courageous, who is magnanimous, who wise, who rich; and in this manner is he happy, that willing, or not willing, he is under a necessity of being an enemy to all such as these; and to lay snares till he purify the city. A beautiful purification, said he. Yes, said I, the reverse of what physicians do with respect to animal bodies; for they, taking away what is worst, leave the best; but he does the contrary. Because it seems, said he, he must of necessity do so, if he is to govern. In a blessed necessity, then, truly, is he bound, said I, which obliges him either to live with many depraved people, and to be hated too by them, or not to live at all. In such necessity he is, replied he. And the more he is hated by his citizens whilst he does these things, shall he not so much the more want a greater number of guards, and more faithful ones? How is it possible he should not? Who then are the faithful, and from whence shall

shall he send for them? Many, said he, of their own accord, will come flying, if he give them hire. You seem, by the dog, said I, again to mention certain drones foreign and multiform. You imagine right, replied he. But those at home, would he not incline to have them also as guards? How? After he has taken away the citizens, to give the slaves their liberty, and make of them guards about his person. By all means, said he; for these are the most faithful to him. What a blessed possession, said I, is this which you mention belonging to the tyrant, if he employ such friends and faithful men, after having destroyed those former ones! But surely such at least, said he, he does employ. And such companions, said I, admire him, and the new citizens accompany him: but the worthy men both hate and fly from him. Why should they not? It is not without reason, said I, that tragedy in the general is thought a wise thing, and that Euripides is thought to excel in it. For what? Because he uttered this, which is the 'mark of a condensed conception, "That tyrants are wise, by the conversation of the wise",' and he plainly said those were wise with whom they hold converse. And he commends too, said he, Tyranny as a divine thing, and says a great many other things of it, as do likewise the other poets. Those composers then of tragedy, said I, as they are wise, will forgive us, and such as establish the government of cities in a manner nearly resembling ours, in not admitting them into our republic as being panegyrists of Tyranny. I think, said he, such of them at least as are more polite will forgive us. But going about among other cities, I think, and drawing together the crowds, and putting to sale their fine, magnificent and persuasive words, they will draw over the republics to Tyrannies and Democracies. Extremely so. And do they not further receive rewards, and are they not honoured chiefly by Tyrants, as is natural, and in the next place by Democracy? But the further on they advance towards the republics, the reverse of these, their honour forsakes them the more, as if it were disabled by an asthma to advance. Entirely so. Thus far, said I, we have digressed: but now again let us mention in what manner that army of the Tyrant, which is so beautiful, so numerous and multiform, and no way the same, shall be maintained. It is plain, said

¹ This, says the Greek Scholiast, is from the Ajax of Sophocles, but here it is said to be an iambic of Euripides. He adds, there is nothing wonderful in poets according with each other. This iambic is in the Antigone of Euripides.

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he, that if at any time there be any sacred things in the city, these they will spend, that so what they sell for may still answer their demands, and the people be obliged to pay in the lighter taxes. But what will they do when these fail them? It is plain, said he, that he and his intoxicated companions, and his associates, male and female, will be maintained out of the paternal inheritance. I understand, said I, that the people who have made the Tyrant will nourish him and his companions. They are under great necessity, said he. How do you say? replied I. What if the people be enraged, and say that it is not just, that the son who is arrived at maturity be maintained by the father, but contrariwise that the father be maintained by the son; and that they did not make and establish him for this purpose, to be a slave to his slaves when he should be grown up, and to maintain him and his slaves with their other turbulent attendants; but in order that they might be set at liberty from the rich in the city, who are also called the good and worthy, by having placed him over them? And now they order him and his companions to leave the city, as a father drives out of the house his son with his turbulent drunken companions. Then, by Jupiter, shall the people, said he, know what a beast they are themselves, and what a beast they have generated, and embraced, and nurtured, and that whilst they are the weaker they attempt to drive out the stronger. How do you say? replied I. Will the Tyrant dare to offer violence to his father, and, if he cannot persuade him, will he strike him? Yes, said he, even stripping him of his armour. You call, said I, the Tyrant a parricide and a miserable nourisher of old age: and yet, as it is probable, Tyranny would really seem to be of this kind; and according to the saying, the people defending themselves against the smoke of slavery amid free men, have fallen into the slavish fire of despotism; instead of that excessive and unseasonable liberty, embracing the most rigorous and the most wretched slavery of bond-men. These things, said he, happen very much so. What then, said I, shall we not speak modestly, if we say that we have sufficiently shown how Tyranny arises out of Democracy, and what it is when it does arise? Very sufficiently, replied he.

THE END OF THE EIGHTH BOOK.

THE

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK IX.

THE tyrannical man himself, said I, remains yet to be considered, in what manner he arises out of the Democratic, and, when he does arise, what kind of man he is, and what kind of life he leads, whether miserable or blessed. He indeed yet remains, said he. Do you know, said I, what I still want? What is it? We do not appear to me to have sufficiently distinguished with respect to the desires; of what kind they are, and how many; and whilst this is defective, the inquiry we make will be less evident. May it not be done opportunely yet? said he. Certainly. And consider what it is I wish to know about them; for it is this: Of those pleasures and desires which are not necessary, some appear to me to be repugnant to law: these indeed seem to be ingenerated in every one; but being punished by the laws, and the better desires, in conjunction with reason, they either forsake some men altogether, or are less numerous and feeble; in others they are more powerful, and more numerous. Will you inform me what these are? said he. Such, said I, as are excited in sleep; when the other part of the soul, such as is rational and mild, and which governs in it, is asleep, and the part which is savage and rustic, being filled with meats or intoxication, frisks about, and, driving away sleep, seeks to go and accomplish its practices. In such a one you know it dares to do every thing, as being loosed, and disengaged from all modesty and prudence: for it scruples not the embraces, as it imagines, of a mother, or of any one else, whether of Gods, of men, or of beasts; nor to kill any one, nor to abstain from any sort of meat,—and, in one word, is wanting in no folly nor impudence. You say most true, replied he. But I imagine, when a man is in health, and lives temperately, and goes to sleep, having excited the rational part, and feasted it with worthy reasonings

reasonings and inquiries, coming to an unanimity with himself; and allowing that part of the soul which is desiderative neither to be starved nor gluttoned, that it may lie quiet, and give no disturbance to the part which is best, either by its joy or grief, but suffer it by itself alone and pure to inquire, and desire to apprehend what it knows not, either something of what has existed, or of what now exists, or what will exist hereafter; and having likewise soothed the irascible part, not suffering it to be hurried by any thing, to transports of anger, and to fall asleep with agitated passion: but having quieted these two parts of the soul, and excited the third part, in which wisdom resides, shall in this manner take rest;—by such an one you know the truth is chiefly apprehended, and the visions of his dreams are then least of all repugnant to law. I am altogether, said he, of this opinion. We have, indeed, been carried a little too far in mentioning these things. But what we want to be known is this, that there is in every one a certain species of desires which is terrible, savage, and irregular, even in some who entirely seem to us to be moderate. And this species becomes indeed manifest in sleep. But consider if there appear to be any thing in what I say, and if you agree with me. But I agree. Recollect now what kind of man we said the Democratic one was: for he was somehow educated from his infancy under a parsimonious father, who valued the avaricious desires alone; but such as were not necessary, but rose only through a love of amusement and finery, he despised. Was he not? Yes. But, being conversant with those who are more refined, and such as are full of those desires we now mentioned, running into their manner, and all sort of insolence, from a detestation of his father's parsimony;—however, having a better natural temper than those who corrupt him, and being drawn opposite ways, he settles into a manner which is situated in the middle of both; and participating moderately, as he imagines, of each of them, he leads a life neither illiberal nor licentious, becoming a Democratic from an Oligarchic man. This was, said he, and is our opinion of such an one. Suppose now again, that when such a one is become old, his young son is educated in his manners. I suppose it. And suppose, too, the same things happening to him as to his father; that he is drawn into all kinds of licentiousness, which is termed however by such as draw him off the most complete liberty; and that his

father and all the domestics are aiding to those desires which are in the middle, and others also lend their assistance. But when those dire magicians and tyrant-makers have no hopes of retaining the youth in their power any other way, they contrive to excite in him a certain love which presides over the indolent desires, and such as minister readily to their pleasures, which love is a certain winged and large drone; or do you think that the love of these things is any thing else? I think, said he, it is no other than this. And when other desires make a humming noise about him, full of their odours and perfumes, and crowns, and wines, and those pleasures of the most dissolute kind which belong to such copartnerships; and, being increased and cherished, add a sting of desire to the drone, then truly he is surrounded with madness as a life-guard, and that president of the soul rages with phrensy; and if he find in himself any opinions or desires which seem to be good, and which yet retain modesty, he kills them, and pushes them from him, till he be cleansed of temperance, and is filled with additional madness. You describe perfectly, said he, the formation of a tyrannical man. Is it not, said I, on such an account as this, that, of old, Love is said to be a tyrant? It appears so, replied he. And, my friend, said I, has not a drunken man likewise somewhat of a tyrannical spirit? He has indeed. And surely at least he who is mad, and is disturbed in his mind, undertakes and hopes to be able to govern not only men, but likewise the Gods. Entirely so, said he. The tyrannical character then, O divine man! becomes so in perfection, when either by temper, or by his pursuits, or by both, he becomes intoxicated, and in love, and melancholy. Perfectly so, indeed. Such a one, it seems, then, arises in this manner. But in what manner does he live? As they say in their plays, replied he, that you will tell me likewise. I tell then, said I. For I think that after this there are feastings among them, and revellings, and banquetings, and mistresses, and all such things as may be expected among those where Love the tyrant dwelling within governs all in the soul. Of necessity, said he. Every day and night, therefore, do there not blossom forth many and dreadful desires, indigent of many things? Many indeed. And if they have any supplies, they are soon spent. What else? And after this there is borrowing and pillaging of substance. What else? And when every thing fails them, is there not a necessity that the desires, on the one hand, nestling in the mind, shall give frequent
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and powerful cries; and the men, on the other hand, being driven as by flings, both by the other desires, and more especially by love¹ itself, commanding all the others as its life-guards², shall rage with phrensy, and search what any one possesses which they are able, by deceit or violence, to carry away? Extremely so, said he. They must of necessity therefore be plundering from every quarter, or be tormented with great agonies and pains. Of necessity. And as with such a man his new pleasures possess more than his ancient ones, and take away what belonged to them, shall not he deem it proper in the same manner, that himself, being young, should have more than his father and mother, and take away from them, and, if he has spent his own portion, encroach on that of his parents? Why will he not? said he. And if they do not allow him, will he not first endeavour to pilfer from and beguile his parents? By all means. And where he is not able to do this, will he not in the next place use rapine and violence? I think so, replied he. But, O wonderful man! when the old man and the old woman oppose and fight, will he not revere them, and beware of doing any thing tyrannical? I, for my part, am not quite secure, said he, with reference to the safety of the parents of such an one. But by Jupiter, Adimantus, do you think that, for the sake of a newly beloved and unnecessary mistress, such a one would give up his antiently beloved and necessary mother; or, for the sake of a blooming youth newly beloved, and not necessary, give up his decayed, his necessary and aged father, the most antient of all his friends, to stripes, and suffer these to be enslaved by those others, if he should bring them into the same house? Yes, by Jupiter, I do, said he. It seems, said I, to be an extremely blessed thing to beget a tyrannical son. Not altogether so, said he. But what, when the substance of his father and mother fails such an one, and when now there is the greatest swarm of pleasures assembled in him, shall he not first break into some house, or late at night strip some one of his coat, and after this shall he not rifle some temple; and in all these actions, those desires newly loosed from slavery, and become as the guards of love, shall along with him rule over those antient opinions he had from his infancy, the established decisions

¹ Viz. the *love* of evil, when it fashions evil images in the phantasy. Schol. Græc. p. 189.

² Viz. evil desires, acting as life-guards to love, vanquish the good opinions which such men formerly possessed. Idem.

concerning good and evil; these desires which heretofore were only loose from their slavery in sleep, when he was as yet under the laws, and his father when under Democratic government, now when he is tyrannized over by love, such as he rarely was when asleep, such shall he be always when awake; and from no horrid slaughter, or food, or deed of any kind, shall he abstain. But that tyrannical love within him, living without any restraint of law or government, as being sole monarch itself, will lead on the man it possesses, as a city, to every mad attempt, whence he may support himself, and the crowd about him; which partly enters from without, from ill company, and, partly through their manners and his own, is become unrestrained and licentious. Or is not this the life of such a one? It is this truly, said he. And if there be, said I, but a few such in the city, and the rest of the multitude be sober, they go out and serve as guards to some other tyrant, or assist him for hire, if there be any war; but if they remain in peace and quiet, they commit at home in the city a great many small mischiefs. Which do you mean? Such as these: they steal, break open houses, cut purses, strip people of their clothes, rifle temples, make people slaves; and where they can speak they sometimes turn false informers, and give false testimony, and take gifts. You call these, said he, small mischiefs, if there be but a few such persons. What is small, said I, is small in comparison of great. And all those things, with regard to the tyrant, when compared with the wickedness and misery of the city, do not, as the saying is, come near the mark; for when there are many such in the city, and others accompanying them, and when they perceive their own number, then these are they who, through the foolishness of the people, establish as tyrant the man who among them has himself most of the tyrant, and in the greatest strength, within his soul. It is probable indeed, said he; for he will be most tyrannical. Will he not be so, if they voluntarily submit to him? But if the city will not allow him, in the same manner as he formerly used violence to his father and mother, so now again will he chastise his country if he be able; and bringing in other young people, he will keep and nourish under subjection to these, his formerly beloved mother- and father-country, as the Cretans say? And this will be the issue of such a man's desire. It will be entirely this, said he. But do not these, said I, become such as this, first in private, and before they govern?

govern? In the first place, by the company they keep, either conversing with their own flatterers, and such as are ready to minister to them in every thing; or, if they need any thing themselves, falling down to those they converse with, they dare to assume every appearance as friends; but, after they have gained their purpose, they act as enemies. Extremely so. Thus they pass the whole of their life, never friends to any one, but always either domineering, or enslaved to another. But liberty and true friendship the tyrannic disposition never tastes. Entirely so. May we not then rightly call these men faithless? Why not? And surely we may call them most of all unjust, if we have rightly agreed about justice, in our former reasonings, what it is. But we did rightly agree, said he. Let us finish then, said I, our worst man. He would then seem such a one awake, as we described as asleep. Entirely so. And does not that man become such a one, who being most tyrannical by natural temper, is in possession of supreme power, and the longer time he lives in tyranny, the more he becomes such a one? Of necessity, replied Glauco, taking up the discourse. And will not the man, said I, who appears the most wicked, appear likewise the most wretched; and he who shall tyrannize for the longest time, and in the greatest measure, shall he not in reality, in the greatest measure, and for the longest time, be such a one? But as many men as many minds. Of necessity, said he, these things at least must be so. And would this Tyrannic man differ any thing, said I, as to similitude, when compared with the city under tyranny, and the Democratic man when compared with the city under democracy, and after the same manner with respect to others? How should they? As city then is to city, as to virtue and happiness, will not man be to man in the same way? Why not? What then? How is the city which is tyrannized over, in respect of that under kingly government, such as we at the first described? Quite the reverse, said he; for the one is the best, and the other is the worst. I will not ask, said I, which you mean, for it is plain; but do you judge in the same way, or otherwise, as to their happiness and misery? And let us not be struck with admiration, whilst we regard the tyrant alone, or some few about him; but let us, as we ought to do, enter into the whole of the city, and consider it; and going through every part, and viewing it, let us declare our opinion. You propose rightly, said he. And it is evident to every one that there is no
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city more wretched than that which is under Tyranny, nor any more happy than that under regal power. If now, said I, I should propose the same things with respect to the men, should I rightly propose, whilst I account him worthy to judge about them, who is able, by his dianoëtic power, to enter within, and see through the temper of the man, and who may not, as a child beholding the outside, be struck with admiration of tyrannical pomp, which he makes a show of to those without, but may sufficiently see through him? If then I should be of opinion, that all of us ought to hear such a one, who, having dwelt with the man in the same house, and having been along with him in his actions in his family, is able to judge in what manner he behaves to each of his domestics, (in which most especially a man appears stripped of theatrical shows,) and likewise in public dangers; after he has observed all these things, we shall bid him declare, how the Tyrant is as to happiness and misery, in comparison of others. You would advise to these things, said he, most properly. Are you willing then, said I, that we pretend to be ourselves of the number of those who are thus able to judge, and that we have already met with such men, that we may have one who shall answer our questions? By all means. Come then, said I, consider in this manner. Recollect the resemblance of the city, and the man, to one another, and, thus considering each of them apart, relate the passions of each. Which passions? said he. To begin first, said I, with the city. Do you call the one under Tyranny, either free or enslaved? Slavish, said he, in the greatest degree possible. And yet, surely, at least, you see in it masters and free-men. I see, said he, some small part so. But the whole in it, in the general, and the most excellent part, is disgracefully and miserably slavish. If then the man, said I, resembles the city, is it not necessary that there be the same regulation in him likewise; and that his soul be full of the greatest slavery and illiberality; and that these parts of his soul, which are the noblest, be enslaved, and that some small part, which is most wicked and frantic, is master? Of necessity, said he. What now? will you say that such a soul is slavish, or free? Slavish somehow, I say. But does not then the city which is slavish, and tyrannized over, least of all do what it inclines? Very much so. And will not the soul too, which is tyrannized over, least of all do what it shall incline, to speak of the whole soul;

soul¹; but, hurried violently by some stinging passion, be full of tumult and inconstancy? How should not it be so? But whether will the city which is tyrannized over be necessarily rich or poor? Poor. And the soul under Tyranny be of necessity likewise indigent and insatiable? Just so, said he. But what? Must not such a city, and such a man, of necessity be full of fear? Very much so. Do you think you will find more lamentations, and groans, and weepings, and torments, in any other city? By no means. But with reference to a man, do you think that these things are greater in any other than in this tyrannical one, who madly rages by his desires and lusts? How can they? said he. It is then on consideration of all these things, and other such as these, I think, that you have deemed this city the most wretched of cities? And have I not deemed right? said he. Extremely so, said I. But what say you again with reference to the tyrannical man, when you consider these things? That he is by far, said he, the most wretched of all others. You do not as yet say this rightly, replied I. How? said he. I do not as yet think, said I, that he is such in the greatest degree. But who then is so? The following will probably appear to you to be yet more miserable than the other. Which? He, said I, who, being naturally tyrannical, leads not a private life, but is unfortunate, and through some misfortune is led to become a Tyrant. I conjecture, said he, from what was formerly mentioned, that you say true. It is so, said I. But we ought not merely to conjecture about matters of such importance as these, but most thoroughly to inquire into them by reasoning of this kind: for the inquiry is concerning a thing of the greatest consequence, a good life and a bad. Most right, said he. Consider then whether there be any thing in what I say; for, in considering this question, I am of opinion that we ought to perceive it from these things. From what? From every individual of private men, viz. such of them as are rich, and possess many slaves; for those have this resemblance at least of Tyrants, that they rule over many, with this difference, that the Tyrant has a great multitude. There is this difference. You

¹ The reasoning power of the soul of a tyrant, says the Greek Scholiast, p. 190, being vanquished by anger and desire, the soul does not accomplish that which it wishes; but not acting according to its better part, it is said, as speaking of the whole soul, to do what it wishes in the smallest degree: for the whole soul does not then act.

know then that these live securely, and are not afraid of their domestics. What should they be afraid of? Nothing, said I; but do you consider the reason? Yes. It is because the whole city gives assistance to each particular private man. You say right, replied I. But what now? If some God should lift a man who had fifty slaves or upwards out of the city, both him, and his wife and children, and set him down in a desert, with his other substance, and his domestics, where no freeman was to give him assistance,—in what kind of fear, and in how great, do you imagine he would be about himself, his children and wife, lest they should be destroyed by the domestics? In the greatest possible, said he, I imagine. Would he not be obliged even to flatter some of the very slaves, and promise them many things, to set them at liberty when there was no occasion for it; and appear to be himself a flatterer of servants? He is under great necessity, said he, to do so, or be destroyed. But what, said I, if the God should settle round him many other neighbours, who could not endure if any one should pretend to lord it over another; but, if they any where found such a one, should punish him with the extremest rigour? I imagine, said he, that he would be still more distressed, thus beset by every kind of enemies. And in such a prison-house is not the Tyrant bound, being such, by disposition, as we have mentioned, full of many and most various fears and loves of all kinds? And whilst he has in his soul the greatest desire, he alone of all in the city is neither allowed to go any where abroad, nor to see such things as other men are desirous of; but, creeping into his house, lives mostly as a woman, envying the other citizens if any of them go abroad, and see any good. It is entirely so, said he. And besides such evils as these, does not the man reap still more of them, who, being under ill policy within himself, (which you just now deemed to be the most wretched Tyranny,) lives not as a private person, but through some fortune is obliged to act the tyrant, and, without holding the government of himself, attempts to govern others, as if one with a body diseased, and unable to support itself, were obliged to live not in a private way, but in wrestling and fighting against other bodies? You say, Socrates, replied he, what is altogether most likely and true. Is not then, friend Glauco, said I, this condition altogether miserable? and does not the Tyrant live more miserably still, than the man deemed by
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you to live most miserably? Very much so, said he. True it is then, though one may fancy otherwise, that the truly tyrannical man is truly slavish with respect to the greatest flatteries and slaveries, and is a flatterer of the most abandoned men; nor does he ever in the smallest degree obtain the gratification of his desires, but is of all the most indigent of most things, and appears poor indeed, if a man knows how to contemplate his whole soul; and full of fear through the whole of life, being filled with anxieties and griefs, if indeed he resembles the constitution of that city which he governs. But he does resemble it. Does he not? Extremely, said he. And shall we not, besides these things, likewise ascribe to this man what we formerly mentioned, that he must necessarily be, and, by governing still, become more than formerly envious, faithless, unjust, unfriendly, unholy, and a general recipient and nourisher of all wickedness; and from all these things be most especially unhappy himself, and then render all about him unhappy likewise? No one, said he, who hath understanding will contradict you. Come now, said I, as a judge who pronounces, after considering all, so do you tell me, who, according to your opinion, is the first as to happiness, and who second, and the rest in order, they being five in all? The Regal, the Timocratic, the Oligarchic, the Democratic, and the Tyrannic. But the judgment, said he, is easy; for, as if I had entered among them, I judge of them as of public performers, by their virtue and vice, and by their happiness, and its contrary. Shall we then hire a Herald? said I. Or shall I myself declare that the son of Ariston hath judged the best and justest man to be the happiest; (and that this is the man who hath most of the regal spirit, and rules himself with a kingly power;) and that the worst and the most unjust is the most wretched; and that he again happens to be the man who is most tyrannical, who in the greatest degree tyrannizes over himself, and the city? Let it be published by you, said he. Shall I add, said I, whether they be unknown to be such or not both to all men and Gods? Add it, said he. Be it so, said I: this would seem to be one proof of ours. And this, if you are of the same opinion, must be the second. Which is it? Since the soul, said I, of every individual is divided into three parts, in the same manner as the city was divided, it will, in my opinion, afford a second proof. What is that? It is this. Of the three parts of the soul, there appear to me to be three

pleasures, one peculiar to each. And the desires and governments are in the same manner. How do you say? replied he. There is one part, we said, by which a man learns, and another by which he is irascible; the third is so multiform, we are unable to express it by one word peculiar to itself, but we denominated it from that which is greatest and most impetuous in it; for we called it the desiderative, on account of the impetuosity of the desires relative to meat, drink, and venereal pleasures, and whatever others belong to these; and we called it avaricious likewise, because it is by means of wealth most especially that such desires are accomplished. And we said rightly, replied he. If then we say that its pleasure and delight are in gain, shall we not best of all reduce it under one head in our discourse, so as to express something to ourselves, when we make mention of this part of the soul? and, calling it the covetous, and the desirous of gain, shall we not term it properly? So it appears to me, said he. But what? Do not we say that the irascible ought to be wholly impelled to superiority, victory, and applause? Extremely so. If then we term it the contentious and ambitious, will it not be accurately expressed? Most accurately. But it is evident to every one, that the part of the soul, by which we learn, is wholly intent always to know the truth; and as to wealth and glory, it cares for these least of all. Extremely so. When we call it then the desirous of learning, and the philosophic, we shall call it according to propriety. How should we not? And do not these, said I, govern in souls, one of them in some, and in others another, as it happens? Just so, said he. On this account then, we said there were three original species of men; the philosophic, the ambitious, and the avaricious. Entirely so. And that there were likewise three species of pleasures, one subject to each of these. Certainly. You know then, said I, that if you were to ask these three men, each of them apart, which of these lives is the most pleasant, each would most of all commend his own. And the avaricious will say, that in comparison with the pleasure of acquiring wealth, that arising from honour, or from learning, is of no value, unless one make money by them. True, said he. And what says the ambitious? said I. Does not he deem the pleasure arising from making money a sort of burthen? And likewise that arising from learning, unless learning bring him honour, does he not deem it smoke and trifling? It is

is so, said he. And we shall suppose the philosopher, said I, to deem the other pleasures as nothing in comparison of that of knowing the truth, how it is, and that whilst he is always employed in learning something of this kind, he is not very remote from pleasure; but that he calls the other pleasures truly necessary, as wanting nothing of the others, but where there is a necessity for it. This, said he, we must well understand. When therefore, said I, these several lives, and the respective pleasure of each, dispute among themselves, not with reference to living more worthily or more basely, or worse or better; but merely with reference to this of living more pleasantly, or on the contrary more painfully,—how can we know which of them speaks most conformably to truth? I am not quite able, said he, to tell. But consider it thus. By what ought we to judge of whatever is to be rightly judged of? Is it not by experience, by prudence, and by reason? Or has any one a better criterion than these? How can he? said he. Consider now; of the three men, who is the most experienced in all the pleasures? Whether does it appear to you that the avaricious man, in learning truth itself, what it is, is more experienced in the pleasure arising from knowledge, than the philosopher is in that arising from the acquisition of wealth? There is, said he, a great difference: for the philosopher, beginning from his childhood, must, of necessity, taste the other pleasures; but what it is to know real beings, and how sweet this pleasure is, the lucrative man has no necessity of tasting, or of becoming experienced in; but rather, when he earnestly endeavours to effect this, it is no easy matter. The philosopher then, said I, far surpasses the lucrative man, at least in experience of both the pleasures. Far indeed. But what with reference to the ambitious man? Is he more experienced in the pleasure arising from honour, than the philosopher is in that arising from intellectual energy? Honour, said he, attends all of them, if they obtain each of them what they aim at: for the rich man is honoured by many, and so is the brave, and the wise; so, as to that of honour, what sort of pleasure it is, all of them have the experience. But in the contemplation of being itself, what pleasure there is, it is impossible for any other than the philosopher to have tasted. On account of experience then, said I, he of all men judges the best. By far. And surely, along with prudence at least, he alone becomes experienced. Why should

he not? But even the organ by which these pleasures must be judged is not the organ of the lucrative, nor of the ambitious, but of the philosopher. Which is it? We said somewhere, that they must be judged of by reason, did we not? Yes. But reasoning is chiefly the organ of the philosopher. How should it not? If then the things to be determined were best determined by riches and gain, what the lucrative man commended, or despised, would of necessity be most agreeable to truth. Entirely. And if by honour, and victory and bravery, must it not be as the ambitious and contentious man determined? It is evident. But since it is, by experience, and prudence, and reason,—of necessity, said he, what the philosopher and the lover of reason commends must be the most true. Of the three pleasures, then, that is the most pleasant which belongs to that part of the soul by which we learn most, and he among us in whom this part governs lives the most pleasant life. How can it, said he, be otherwise? For the wise man, being the sovereign commender, commends his own life. But which life, said I, does our judge pronounce the second, and which the second pleasure? It is plain, that of the warlike and ambitious man; for this is nearer to his own than that of the lucrative. And that of the covetous, as it appears, is last of all. Why not? said he. These things now have thus succeeded one another in order. And the just man has twice now overcome the unjust. The third victory now, as at the Olympic games, is sacred to Olympic Jupiter, the favour; for consider, that the pleasure of the others is not every way genuine, but that of the wise man is: nor are they pure, but somehow shadowed over, as I appear to myself to have heard from one of the wise men. And this truly would be the greatest and most complete downfall of the unjust. Extremely so. But how do you mean? I shall thus trace it out, said I, whilst in searching you answer my questions. Ask then, said he. Tell me then, replied I, do we not say that pain is opposite to pleasure? Entirely so. And do we not say likewise, that to feel neither pleasure nor pain is somewhat? We say it is. That being in the middle of both these, it is a certain tranquillity of the soul with reference to them. Do you not thus understand it? Thus, replied he. Do you not remember, said I, the speeches of the diseased, which they utter in their sickness? Which? How that nothing is more pleasant than health, but that

that it escaped their notice before they became sick, that it was the most pleasant. I remember it, said he. And are you not wont to hear those who are under any acute pain say, that there is nothing more pleasant than a cessation from pain? I am wont to hear them. And you may perceive in men, I imagine, the same thing, when they are in many other such like circumstances, where, when in pain, they extol a freedom from pain, and the tranquillity of such a state, as being the most pleasant, and do not extol that of feeling joy. Because this, it is likely, said he, becomes at that time pleasant and desirable tranquillity. And when any one ceaseth, said I, to feel joy, this tranquillity from pleasure will be painful. It is likely, said he. This tranquillity, then, which we just now said was between the two, will at times become each of these, pain and pleasure. It appears so. But is it truly possible, that what is neither of the two should become both? It does not appear to me that it is. And surely at least, when any thing pleasant or any thing painful is in the soul, both sensations are a certain motion; are they not? Yes. But did not that which is neither painful nor pleasant appear just now to be tranquillity, and in the middle of these two? It appears so, indeed. How is it right, then, to deem it pleasant not to be in pain, or painful not to enjoy pleasure? It is by no means right. In these cases, then, tranquillity is not really so, said I, but it appears pleasant in respect of the painful, and painful in respect of the pleasant. And there is nothing genuine in these appearances as to the truth of pleasure, but a certain magical delusion. As our reasoning shows, said he. Consider then, said I, the pleasures which do not arise from the cessation of pains, that you may not frequently in the present discourse suppose that these two naturally thus subsist, viz. that pleasure is the cessation of pain, and pain the cessation of pleasure. How, said he, and which pleasures do you mean? There are many others, said I, but chiefly if you wish to consider the pleasures from smells; for these, without any preceding pain, are on a sudden immensely great, and, when they cease, they leave no pain behind them. Most true; said he. Let us not then be persuaded that pure pleasure is the removal of pain, or pain the removal of pleasure. Let us not. But yet, said I, those which extend through the body to the soul, and which are called pleasures, the greatest part of them almost, and the most considerable, are
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of this species, certain cessations of pain. They are so. And are not the preconceptions of pleasure and pain, which arise in the mind from the expectation of these things, of the same kind? Of the same. Do you know then, said I, what kind they are of, and what they chiefly resemble? What? said he. Do you reckon, said I, there is any such thing in nature as this, the above, the below, and the middle? I do. Do you think then that any one, when he is brought from the below to the middle, imagines any thing else than that he is brought to the above? and when he stands in the middle, and looks down whence he was brought, will he imagine he is any where else than above, whilst yet he has not seen the true above? By Jupiter, said he, I do not think that such an one will imagine otherwise. But if he should again, said I, be carried to the below, he would conjecture he was carried to the below, and would conjecture according to truth. How should he not? Would he not be affected in all these respects, from his not having experience in what is really above, and in the middle, and below? It is plain. Would you wonder then, that whilst men are inexperienced in the truth, they have unsound opinions about many other things, — and that as to pleasure and pain, and what is between these, they are likewise affected in this same manner? So that, even when they are brought to what is painful, they imagine truly, and are truly pained; but when from pain they are brought to the middle, they strongly imagine that they are arrived at fulness of pleasure. In the same manner as those who along with the black colour look at the gray, through inexperience of the white, are deceived; so those who consider pain along with a freedom from pain, are deceived through inexperience of pleasure. By Jupiter, said he, I should not wonder, but much rather if it were not so. But consider it, said I, in this manner. Are not hunger and thirst, and such like, certain emptinesses in the bodily habit? What else? And are not ignorance and folly an emptiness in the habit of the soul? Extremely so. And is not the one filled when it receives food, and the other when it possesses intellect? Why not? But which is the more real repletion, that of the less, or that of the more real being? It is plain, that of the more real. Which species, then, do you think, participates most of a more pure essence; whether these which participate of bread and drink, and meat, and all such sort of nourishment; or that species which participates of true opinion and science, and

and intellect, and, in short, of all virtue? But judge of it in this manner. That which adheres to what is always similar, and immortal, and true, and is so itself, and arises in what is such, does it appear to you to have more of the reality of being, than that which adheres to what is never similar, and is mortal, which is so itself, and is generated in a thing of this kind? This, said he, differs much from that which is always similar. Does then the essence of that which is always similar participate more of essence than of science? By no means. But what with relation to truth? Nor of this neither. If it participate less of truth, does it not likewise do so of essence? Of necessity. In short, then, do not the genera relating to the care of the body participate less of truth and essence, than those relating to the care of the soul? By far. And the body less than the soul; do you not think so? I do. Is not that which is filled with more real beings, and is itself a more real being, in reality more truly filled than that which is filled with less real beings, and is itself a less real being? How should it not? If then it be pleasant to be filled with what is suitable to nature, that which is in reality filled, and with more real being, must be made both more really and more truly to enjoy true pleasure; but that which participates of less real being, must be less truly and firmly filled, and participates of a more uncertain and less genuine pleasure. Most necessarily, said he. Such then as are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and are always conversant in feasting and such like, are carried as it appears to the below, and back again to the middle, and there they wander for life. But never, passing beyond this, do they look towards the true above, nor are carried to it; nor are they ever really filled with real being; nor have they ever tasted solid and pure pleasure; but, after the manner of brutes looking always downwards, and bowed towards earth and their tables, they live feeding and coupling; and from a lust of these things, kicking and pushing at one another with iron horns and hoofs, they perish through their unsatiableness, as those who are filling with unreal being that which is no real being, nor friendly to themselves. You pronounce most perfectly, Socrates, as from an oracle, said Glauco, the life of the multitude. Must they not then, of necessity, be conversant with pleasures mixed with pains, images of the true pleasure, shadowed over, and coloured by their position beside each other? so that both their pleasures and pains will appear vehement, and engender their
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mad passions in the foolish. Hence also they must fight about these things, as Stesichorus says those at Troy fought about the image of Helen, through ignorance of the true one. Of necessity, said he, something of this kind must take place. And what as to the irascible part of the soul? Must not other such like things happen, wherever any one gratifies it, either in the way of envy, through ambition, or in the way of violence, through contentiousness, or in the way of anger, through moroseness, pursuing a glut of honour, of conquest, and of anger, both without reason, and without intelligence? Such things as these, said he, must necessarily happen with reference to this part of the soul. What then, said I, shall we boldly say concerning all the pleasures, both respecting the avaricious and the ambitious part, that such of them as are obedient to science and reason, and, in conjunction with these, pursue and obtain the pleasures of which the prudent part of the soul is the leader, shall obtain the truest pleasures, as far as it is possible for them to attain true pleasure, and in as much as they follow truth, pleasures which are properly their own; if indeed what is best for every one be most properly his own? But surely it is most properly, said he, his own. When then the whole soul is obedient to the philosophic part, and there is no sedition in it, then every part in other respects performs its proper business, and is just, and also reaps its own pleasures, and such as are the best, and as far as is possible the most true. Certainly, indeed. But when any of the others governs, it happens that it neither attains its own pleasures, and it compels the other parts to pursue a pleasure foreign to them, and not at all true. It does so, said he. Do not then the parts which are the most remote from philosophy and reason most especially effectuate such things? Very much so. And is not that which is most remote from law and order, likewise most remote from reason? It plainly is. And have not the amorous and the tyrannical desires appeared to be most remote from law and order? Extremely so. And the royal and the moderate ones, the least remote? Yes. The tyrant then, I think, shall be the most remote from true pleasure, and such as is most properly his own, and the other shall be the least. Of necessity. And the tyrant, said I, shall lead a life the most unpleasant, and the king the most pleasant. Of great necessity. Do you know then, said I, how much more unpleasant a life the tyrant leads than the king? If you tell me, said he.

he. As there are three pleasures, as it appears, one genuine, and two illegitimate; the Tyrant in carrying the illegitimate to extremity, and flying from law and reason, dwells with slavish pleasures as his life-guards, and how far he is inferior is not easily to be told, unless it may be done in this manner. How? said he. The Tyrant is somehow the third¹ remote from the Oligarchic character; for the Democratic was in the middle between them. Yes. Does he not then dwell with the third image of pleasure, distant from him with reference to truth, if our former reasonings be true? Just so. But the Oligarchic is the third again from the Royal, if we suppose the Aristocratic and the Royal the same. He is the third. The Tyrant then, said I, is remote from true pleasure, the third from the third. It appears so. A plain surface then, said I, may be the image of tyrannical pleasure, as to the computation of length. Certainly. But as to power, and the third augment, it is manifest by how great a distance it is remote. It is manifest, said he, to the computer at least. If now, conversely, any one shall say the King is distant from the Tyrant as to truth of pleasure, as much as is the distance of 9, and 20, and 700, shall he not, on completing the multiplication, find him leading the more pleasant life, and the Tyrant the more wretched one, by this same distance? You have heaped up, said he, a prodigious account of the difference between these two men, the just and the unjust, with reference to pleasure and pain. Yet the numbers are true, said I, and corresponding to their lives, if indeed days, and nights, and months, and years, correspond to them. But these, said he, do correspond to them. If then the good and just man surpasses so far the evil and unjust man in pleasure, in what a prodigious degree further shall he surpass him in decorum of life, in beauty

¹ The following numbers are employed by Plato in this place. He considers the *Royal* character as analogous to unity, the Oligarchic to the number 3, and the Tyrannic to the number 9. As 3 therefore is triple of unity, the Oligarchic is the third from the Royal character; and in a similar manner the Tyrant is distant from the Oligarchist by the triple in number; for 9 is the triple of 3, just as 3 is the triple of 1. But 9 is a plane number, the length of which is 3, and also its breadth. And a tyrannic, says Plato, is the last image of a royal life. He also calls 3 a *power*, because unity being multiplied by it, and itself by itself, and 9 by it, there will be produced 3, 9, 27. But he calls the third augment 27, arising from the multiplication of the power 3, and producing depth or a solid number. Lastly, 27 multiplied into itself produces 729, which may be considered as a perfect multiplication, this number being the 6th power of 3; and 6 as is well known is a perfect number. Hence, as the King is analogous to 1, he is said, by Plato, to be 729 times distant from the Tyrant.

and in virtue! In a prodigious degree, by Jupiter, said he. Be it so, said I. Since now we are come to this part of our argument, let us recapitulate what we first said, on account of which we have come hither: and it was somewhere said, that it was advantageous to do injustice, if one were completely unjust, but were reputed just. Was it not so said? It was indeed. Now then, said I, let us settle this point, since we have now settled the other, with reference to acting justly and unjustly, what power each of these possesses in itself. How? said he. Let us in our reasoning fashion an image of the soul, that the man who said those things may know what he said. What kind of image? said he. One of those creatures, said I, which are fabled to have been of old, as that of Chimæra, of Scylla, of Cerberus; and many others are spoken of, where many particular natures existed together in one. They are spoken of indeed, said he. Form now one figure of a creature, various, and many-headed¹, having all around heads of tame creatures, and of wild, and having power in itself of changing all these heads, and of breeding them out of itself. This is the work, said he, of a skilful former: however, as the formation is easier in reasoning, than in wax and such like, let it be formed. Let there be now one other figure of a lion² and one of a man; but let the first be by far the greatest, and the second be the second in bulk. These are easy, said he, and they are formed. Conjoin now these three in one, so as to exist somehow with one another. They are conjoined, said he. Form now around them the external appearance of one of them, that of the man; so that to one who is not able to see what is within, but who perceives only the external covering, the man may appear one creature. This is formed around, said he. Let us now tell him, who asserts that it is profitable to this man to do injustice, but to do justice is unprofitable, that he asserts nothing else, than that it is profitable for him to feast the multiform creature, and to make it strong; and likewise the lion, and what respects the lion, whilst the man he kills with famine, and renders weak, so as to be dragged whichever way either of those drag him; and that he will also find it advantageous never to accustom the one to live in harmony with the other, nor to make them friends, but suffer them to be biting one another, and to

¹ By this many-headed beast, *desire* is signified.

² The lion signifies *anger*, and the figure of a man *reason*; for the whole soul is divided into reason, anger, and desire.

fight and devour each other. He, said he, who commendeth the doing injustice, undoubtedly asserts these things. And does not he again, who says it is profitable to do justice, say that he ought to do and to say such things by which the inner man shall come to have the most entire command of the man, and, as a tiller of the ground, shall take care of the many-headed creature, cherishing the mild ones, and nourishing them, and hindering the wild ones from growing up, taking the nature of the lion as his ally, and, having a common care for all, make them friendly to one another, and to himself, and so nourish them? He who commends justice undoubtedly says such things as these. In all respects, then, he who commends justice would seem to speak the truth, but he who commends injustice, to speak what is false; for, with regard to pleasure, and applause, and profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, and he who discommends it speaks nothing genuine. Nor does he discommend with understanding what he discommends. Not at all, said he, as appears to me at least. Let us then in a mild manner persuade him (for it is not willingly he errs), asking him, O blessed man! do not we say that the maxims of things beautiful and base become so, upon such accounts as these? Those are good which subject the brutal part of our nature most to the man, or rather perhaps to that which is divine: but those are evil which enslave the mild part of our nature to the brutal. Will he agree with us? or how? He will, if he be advised by me, said he. Is there then any one, said I, whom it avails, from this reasoning, to take gold unjustly, if something of this kind happens, if, whilst he takes the money, he at the same time subjects the best part of himself to the worst? Or, if, taking gold, he should enslave a son or daughter, and that even to savage and wicked men, shall we not say this would not avail him, not though he should receive for it a prodigious sum? But if he enslaves the most divine part of himself to the most impious and most polluted part, without any pity, is he not wretched? and does he not take a gift of gold to his far more dreadful ruin, than Euriphyle did when she received the necklace for her husband's life? By far, said Glauco; for I will answer you for the man. And do you not think that to be intemperate, has of old been discommended on such accounts as these, because that in such a one that terrible, great and multiform beast was indulged more than was meet? It is plain, said he. And are not arrogance and moroseness blamed, when the lion and the

serpentine disposition increases and stretches beyond measure? Entirely so. And are not luxury and effeminacy blamed because of the remissness and looseness of this disposition, when it engenders in the man cowardice? What else? Are not flattery and illiberality blamed, when any one makes this irascible part itself subject to the brutal crew, and, for the sake of wealth and its insatiable lust, accustoms the irascible to be affronted from its youth, and instead of a lion to become an ape? Entirely so, said he. But why is it, do you think, that mechanical arts and handicrafts are despicable? Shall we say it is on any other account than this, that when a man has the form of that which is best in his soul naturally weak, so as not to be able to govern the creatures within himself, but to minister to them, he is able only to learn what flatters them? It is likely, said he. In order then that such a one may be governed in the same manner as the best man is, do we not say that he must be the servant of one who is the best, and who has within him the divine governor? not at all conceiving that he should be governed to the hurt of the subject (as Thrasymachus imagined), but, as it is best for every one to be governed, by one divine and wise, most especially possessing it as his own within him, if not subjecting himself to it externally; that as far as possible we may all resemble one another and be friends, governed by one and the same? Rightly, indeed, said he. And law at least, said I, plainly shows it intends such a thing, being an ally to all in the city; as does likewise the government of children, in not allowing them to be free till we establish in them a proper government, as in a city; and having cultivated that in them which is best, by that which is best in ourselves, we establish a similar guardian and governor for youth, and then truly we set it free. It shows indeed, said he. In what way then shall we say, Glauco, and according to what reasoning, that it is profitable to do injustice, to be intemperate, or to do any thing base, by which a man shall indeed become more wicked, but yet shall acquire more wealth, or any kind of power? In no way, said he. But how shall we say it is profitable for the unjust to be concealed, and not to suffer punishment? or does he not indeed, who is concealed, still become more wicked? but he who is not concealed, and is punished, has the brutal part quieted, and made mild, and the mild part set at liberty. And the whole soul being settled in the best temper, in possessing temperance and justice, with wisdom, acquires a more valuable habit than the body does,

in acquiring vigour and beauty, with a sound constitution; in as far as the soul is more valuable than the body. Entirely so, said he. Shall not every one then, who possesses intellect, regulate his life in extending the whole of his powers hither, in the first place, honouring those disciplines which will render his soul of this kind, and despising all other things? It is plain, said he. And next, said I, with reference to a good habit of body and its nourishment, he will spend his life in attention to these, not that he may indulge the brutal and irrational pleasure; nor yet with a view to health, nor, principally regarding this, to become strong and healthy, and beautiful, unless by means of these he is to become temperate likewise: but he always appears to adjust the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony which is in the soul. By all means, said he, if indeed he is to be truly musical. That arrangement then, said I, and symphony arising from the possession of wealth, and that vulgar magnificence, he will not, in consequence of being astonished with the felicity of the multitude, increase to infinity, and bring on himself infinite evils. I do not think it, said he. But looking, said I, to that polity within himself, and taking care that nothing there be moved out of its place, through the greatness or smallness of his property, governing in this manner as far as he is able, he will add to his substance, and spend out of it. Entirely so, said he. He will regard honours likewise in the same manner; some he will willingly partake of, and taste, which he judges will render him a better man, but those which he thinks would dissolve that habit of soul which subsists within him, he will fly from both in private and in public. He will not then, said he, be willing to act in politics, if he takes care of this. Yes truly, said I, in his own city, and greatly too. But not probably in his country, unless some divine fortune befall him. I understand, said he. You mean in the city we have now established, which exists in our reasoning, since it is nowhere on earth, at least, as I imagine. But in heaven, probably, there is a model of it, said I, for any one who inclines to contemplate it, and on contemplating to regulate himself accordingly; and it is of no consequence to him, whether it does exist any where, or shall ever exist here. He does the duties of this city alone, and of no other. It is reasonable, said he.

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK X.

I OBSERVE, said I, with reference to many other things, that we have established a city in a right manner, beyond what all others have done, and among these establishments, I mean that respecting poetry¹ as none of the least.

¹ The following admirable account of poetry, from the Explanation of the more difficult questions in the Republic, by Proclus, will I doubt not be highly acceptable to the reader, as it both contains a most accurate and scientific division of poetry, and perfectly reconciles the principle of philosophers with the first of poets.

“There are three lives in the soul, of which the best and most perfect is that according to which it is conjoined with the Gods, and lives a life most allied, and through the highest similitude united to them; no longer subsisting from itself but from them, running under its own intellect, exciting the ineffable impression of *the one* which it contains, and connecting like with like, its own light with that of the Gods, and that which is most uniform in its own essence and life, with *the one* which is above all essence and life. That which is second to this in dignity and power, has a middle arrangement in the middle of the soul, according to which indeed it is converted to itself, descending from a divinely inspired life; and placing intellect and science as the principles of its energy, it evolves the multitude of its reasons, surveys the all-various mutations of forms, collects into sameness intellect, and that which is the object of intellect, and expresses in images an intellectual and intelligible essence. The third life of the soul is that which accords with its inferior powers, and energizes together with them, employing phantasies and irrational senses, and being entirely filled with things of a subordinate nature.

“As there are therefore these three forms of life in souls, the poetic division also supernally proceeds together with the multifarious lives of the soul, and is diversified into first, middle, and last genera of energy. For, of poetry also, one kind has the highest subsistence, is full of divine goods, and establishes the soul in the causes themselves of things, according to a certain ineffable union, leading that which is filled, into sameness with its replenishing source; the former immaterially subjecting itself to illumination, but the latter being incited to a communication of light; thus according to the Oracle ‘perfecting works, by mingling the rivers of incorruptible fire.’ It also produces one divine bond and a unifying mixture of that which is participated and the participant, establishing the whole of that which is subordinate in that which is more excellent,

least. Which? said he. That no part of it which is imitative be by any means admitted. For it appears, now most of all, and with greatest perspicuity,

excellent, and preparing that which is more divine alone to energize, the inferior nature being withdrawn, and concealing its own idiom in that which is superior. This then, in short, is a mania better than temperance, and is distinguished by a divine characteristic. And as every different kind of poetry subsists according to a different hyparxis, or summit of divine essence, so this fills the soul energizing from divine inspiration, with symmetry; and hence it adorns it last energies with measures and rhythms. As therefore we say that prophetic fury subsists according to truth, and the amatory according to beauty, in like manner we say, that the poetic mania is defined according to divine symmetry.

"The second kind of poetry which is subordinate to this first and divinely inspired species, and which has a middle subsistence in the soul, is allotted its essence, according to a scientific and intellectual habit. Hence it knows the essence of things, and loves to contemplate beautiful works and reasonings, and leads forth every thing into a measured and rhythmical interpretation. For you will find many progeny of good poets to be of this kind, emulous of those that are truly wise, full of admonition, the best counsels, and intellectual symmetry. It likewise extends the communication of prudence and every other virtue to those of a naturally good disposition, and affords a reminiscence of the periods of the soul, of its eternal reasons, and various powers.

"The third species of poetry subsequent to these, is mingled with opinions and phantasies, receives its completion through imitation, and is said to be, and is nothing else than imitative poetry. At one time, it alone uses assimilation, and at another time defends apparent and not real assimilation. It considerably raises very moderate passions, astonishes the hearers; together with appropriate appellations and words, mutations of harmonies and varieties of rhythms, changes the dispositions of souls; and indicates the nature of things not such as they are, but such as they appear to the many; being a certain adumbration, and not an accurate knowledge of things. It also establishes as its end the delight of the hearers; and particularly looks to the passive part of the soul, which is naturally adapted to rejoice and be afflicted. But of this species of poetry, as we have said, one division is *assimilative*, which is extended to rectitude of imitation, but the other is *phantastic*, and affords apparent imitation alone.

"Such then in short are the genera of poetry. It now remains to show that these are also mentioned by Plato, and to relate such particulars as are conformable to his dogmas respecting each. And in the first place we shall discuss those wonderful conceptions respecting divine poetry which may be collected by him who does not negligently peruse his writings. For, these things being previously determined, it will I think be easy to assign apt reasons respecting the subsequent species. In the *Phædrus*, then, he denominates this divine poetry, 'a possession from the Muses, and a mania, and says, that it is supernally imparted to a tender and solitary soul; but that its employment is to excite and inspire with Bacchic fury, according to odes, and the rest of poetry, and its end, to instruct posterity in celebrating the infinite transactions of the antients.' From these words, it is perfectly evident that he calls the original and first-operating cause of poetry, the gift of the Muses. For, as they fill all the other fabrications of the father of the universe, both the apparent and unapparent, with harmony and rhythmical motion, in like manner,

spicuity, that it is not to be admitted, since the several forms of the soul have been distinguished apart from one another. How do you mean?

That

manner in the souls which are possessed by them they produce a vestige of divine symmetry which illuminates divinely inspired poetry. But since the whole energy of the illuminating power is in divine advents, and that which is illuminated gives itself up to the motions proceeding from thence, and, abandoning its own habits, spreads itself under the energies of that which is divine and uniform; on this account, I think, he denominates such an illumination a *possession* and *mania*. He calls it a *possession*, because the whole illuminated soul gives itself up to the present effect of illuminating deity; and a *mania*, because such a soul abandons its own proper energies for the idioms of the illuminating powers.

"In the next place, he describes the habit of the soul possessed by the Muses; and says it ought to be *tender* and *solitary*. For a soul hard and resisting, and inobedient to divine illumination, is disposed contrary to the energy of divinely inspired possession; since it thus rather subsists from itself than from that which illuminates, and is incapable of being properly impressed with its gifts. But a soul which is possessed by other all-various opinions, and is filled with reasonings foreign from a divine nature, obscures divine inspiration, mingling with the motions thence derived its own lives and energies. It is requisite therefore that the soul which is to be possessed by the Muses should be tender and solitary, that it may be properly passive to, and perfectly sympathize with, divinity, and that it may be impassive, unreceptive, and unmingled with respect to other things.

"In the third place, therefore, he adds the common employment of such an aptitude, and of possession and mania from the Muses. For to excite and inspire with Bacchic fury, is the province both of that which illuminates and that which is illuminated, and which gives completion to the same thing; the former moving supernally, and the latter spreading itself under the moving cause. Excitation is indeed a resurrection and unperverted energy of the soul, and a conversion to divinity from a lapse into generation. But Bacchic fury is a divinely inspired motion, and an unwearied dance, as it were, towards a divine nature, giving perfection to the possessed. But again, both these are requisite, that the possessed may not incline to that which is worse, but may be easily moved to a more excellent nature.

"In the fourth place he adds, that the end of this divine poetry is to instruct posterity in celebrating the infinite deeds of the antients. Hence, he evidently testifies that human affairs become more perfect and splendid when they are delivered from a divine mouth, and that true erudition is produced in the auditors of such poetry. Not that it is adapted to juvenile tuition, but pertains to those that are already perfect in politic discipline, and require a more mystic tradition respecting divine concerns. Such poetry, therefore, instructs the hearers more than any other, when it is divine, and when its divine nature becomes manifest to its auditors. Hence Plato very properly prefers this poetry which subsists from the Muses in tender and solitary souls, to every other human art. 'For the poet, says he, who approaches to the poetic gates without such a mania, will be imperfect, and his poetry, so far as it is dictated by prudence, will vanish before that which is the progeny of fury.' In this manner, therefore, does Socrates in the *Phædrus* instruct us in the peculiarities of divine poetry, which differs

both

That I may tell it as to you, (for you will not accuse me to the composers of tragedy, and the rest of the imitative kind) all such things as these seem
to

both from divine prophecy, and the telestic art, and refer its first unfolding into light, to the Gods.

“With these things also, what he says in the *Io* accords, when he is discoursing with the rhapsodist about this species of poetry; for here he most clearly evinces that the poetry of Homer is divine, and, to others that are conversant with it, is the cause of enthusiastic energy. For when the rhapsodist says, that he can speak copiously on the poems of Homer, but by no means on the writings of other poets, Socrates assigning the reason of this says, ‘It is not from art, that you speak well concerning Homer, but because you are moved by a divine power.’ And that this is true is indeed perfectly evident. For those who do any thing by art, are able to produce the same effect in all similars; but those that operate by a certain divine power about any thing which subsists with symmetry, can no longer thus operate with respect to other things which necessarily have the same power. Whence then a power of this kind is derived to the rhapsodist, which particularly connects him with Homer, but no longer with other poets, Socrates afterwards teaches us, using the stone which is vulgarly called *Herculean*, as a most perspicuous example of the most perfect possession from the Muses. ‘This stone then,’ says he, ‘not only draws to itself iron rings, but inserts in them a power attractive of things similar, so as to enable them to draw other rings, and form a chain of rings, or pieces of iron, depending one from another.’

“Let us in the next place hear what Socrates adds similar to these things, respecting divine poetry. ‘Thus then,’ says he, ‘the Muse makes men divine; and from these men thus inspired, others catching the sacred power form a chain of divine enthusiasts.’ Here, in the first place, he speaks of the divine cause in the singular number, calling it the Muse, and not, as in the *Phædrus*, a possession from the Muses, and a mania pertaining to their whole multitude, that he may refer all the number of those that are moved enthusiastically to one monad, as it were, the primary principle of poetry. For poetry subsists uniformly and occultly in the first mover; but secondarily, and in a revolved manner, in poets moved by that monad; and lastly, and in a ministrant degree, in the rhapsodists, who are led back to this cause through poets as the media. In the next place, by extending divine inspiration supernally, as far as to the last mixtures, he evidently, at the same time, celebrates the fecundity of the first moving principle, and most clearly evinces the participation of the first participants. For that poets should be able to excite others by their poems to a divinely inspired energy, indicates that there is a most conspicuous presence in them of a divine nature. Consequent to these things, therefore, he also adds what follows respecting the possession of poets. ‘The best epic poets,’ says he, ‘and all such as excel in composing any kind of verses to be recited, frame not those their admirable poems from the rules of art, but, possessed by the Muse, they write from divine inspiration. Nor is it otherwise with the best lyric poets, and all other fine writers of verses to be sung.’ And again, afterwards, he says, ‘For a poet is a thing light and volatile, and sacred, nor is he able to write poetry till he becomes divine, and has no longer the command of his intellect.’ And lastly, he adds: ‘Hence it is that the poets indeed say many fine things, whatever their sub-

to be the ruin of the dianoëtic part of the hearers, viz. of such of them as have not a medicine to enable them to discern their peculiar nature.

From

jest be, just as you do concerning Homer; but, not doing it through any rules of art, each of them is able to succeed from a divine destiny in that species of poetry only to which he is impelled by the Muse.*

"In all these citations, therefore, Plato evidently establishes divine poetry in a divine cause, which he calls a Muse; in this emulating Homer, who at one time looks to the multitude, and at another to the union of the series of the Muses; as when he says, 'O Muses, sing,' and 'Sing me the man, O Muse.' In the middle of this principle of enthusiastic motions, and of the last echoes* of inspiration, beheld in rhapsodists according to sympathy, Plato establishes poetic mania, moving and being moved, supernally filled, and transferring to others the illumination which originates from thence, and which imparts one conjunction to the last participants with the participated monad.

"With these things also we may coharmonize what is said by the Athenian guest in the third book of the Laws concerning poetry, and what Timæus says respecting poets. For the former says, 'That the poetic genus is divinely inspired, that it composes sacred hymns, and, with certain Graces and Muses, relates many things that have been truly transacted; and the latter exhorts us to follow poets inspired by Phœbus, as 'being the sons of Gods, and knowing the concerns of their progenitors, though their assertions are not probable, and are unaccompanied with demonstrations.' From all which it is easy to understand what the opinion of Plato was concerning divine poetry, and the poets characterized according to it; and that these are especially messengers of divine names, and are in an eminent manner acquainted with the affairs of their fathers. When, therefore, he takes notice of mythical fictions, and corrects the more serious part of the writings of poets, such as those respecting bonds, castrations, loves, venercal connections, tears and laughter, we must say that he also especially testifies that these things are properly introduced, according to the theory, which is concealed in these symbols, as under veils. For he who thinks that poets are particularly worthy of belief in affairs respecting the Gods, though they speak without demonstration from divine information, must certainly admire divine fables †, through which they deliver the truth concerning divine natures. And he who calls the poetic genus divine, cannot also ascribe to it an impious and gigantic opinion respecting divine concerns. He likewise who evinces that the assertions of poets are attended with certain Graces and Muses, must entirely consider an inelegant, unharmonious, and ungraceful phantasy, as very remote from the theory of divine poets. When therefore in his Republic he establishes by law, that poetry, and the indication through fables, are not adapted to the ears of youth, he is very far from despising poetry itself, but removes the juvenile habit, as unexercised in the hearing of such things, from fiction of this kind. For, as he says in the Second Alcibiades, 'The whole of poetry is naturally enigmatical, and is not obvious to the understanding of every one.' And hence, in the Republic, he clearly says, 'That a youth is not

* For ἀποχρηματων in the original read ἀπηχρηματων.

† Instead of reading τοις εν τοις μυθοις after διαμαρτυραι I read τους ενθεους μυθους.

From what consideration, said he, do you say so? It must be spoken, said I, although a certain friendship, at least, and reverence for Homer, which

able to distinguish what is allegory, and what is not.* We must say, therefore, that he entirely admits inspired poetry, which he calls divine, and thinks it proper that those by whom it is possessed should be venerated in silence. And thus much concerning the first kind of poetry, which subsists, from a divine origin, in tender and solitary souls.

"In the next place, let us contemplate that species of poetry, which has a scientific knowledge of things, and which energizes according to intellect and prudence; which unfolds to men many names concerning an incorporeal nature, and leads forth into light many probable dogmas respecting a corporeal subsistence; investigates the most beautiful symmetry in manners, and the disposition contrary to this; and adorns all these with proper measures and rhythms. The Athenian guest says, that the poetry of Theognis is of this kind, which he praises beyond that of Tyrtaeus, because Theognis is a teacher of the whole of virtue, and which extends to the whole political life. For the one admits a fidelity which receives its completion from all the virtues, expels from politics that most true vice sedition, and leads into content the lives of those that are persuaded. But the other praises the habit of fortitude by itself alone, and exhorts to this those that neglect the other virtues. It will however be better to hear the words themselves of Plato*: 'We have, too, the poet Theognis a witness in our favour, who was a citizen of the Megarensians in Sicily. For he says,

Who faithful in insane sedition keeps,
With silver and with ruddy gold may vie.

We say therefore that such a one will conduct himself in the most difficult war, in a manner nearly as much superior to the other, as justice, temperance, and prudence, when conjoined with fortitude, are superior to fortitude alone. For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions without the whole of virtue.' Here, therefore, he admits Theognis as partaking of political science, and all the virtues.

"But in the Second Alcibiades, defining the most right and safe mode of prayer, he refers it to a certain wise poet: 'To me,' says he, 'Alcibiades, it seems probable that some wise man or other, happening to be connected with certain persons void of understanding, and observing them to pursue and pray for things which it were better for them still to be without, but which appeared to them good, composed for their use a common prayer; the words of which are nearly these: King Jupiter, grant us what is good, be it or not the subject of our prayers, and avert from us what is evil, though we should pray for it.' For the scientific man alone knows how to distinguish the separation of good and evil, and converse with a divine nature adapted to the middle habits of men. And on this account Socrates calls the poet that composed this prayer a wise man, as forming a judgment of the natures of those that prayed, neither through divine inspiration, nor right opinion, but through science alone, as regarding their habits, and preserving that which becomes the beneficent powers of the Gods. For, to convert all of them through prayer to the one royal providence of Jupiter, to suspend the sub-

* See the 1st book of the Laws.

which I have had from my childhood, restrains me from telling it; for he seems truly both to have been the first teacher and leader of all these good compositors

sistence of good from the power of divinity, to obliterate the generation of true evils through the benevolence of a more excellent nature, and, in short, to assert that these things are unknown to those that pray, but are separated by divinity according to proper boundaries, is the work of wisdom and science, and not of any thing casual. Very properly therefore do we say that such poetry is wise and scientific. For the poetry which is able to assign right opinions to middle habits, must itself subsist according to perfect science.

"In the third place, therefore, let us speak concerning imitative poetry, which, we have already said, at one time assimilates things, and at another expresses them according to appearance.—The Athenian guest clearly delivers to us the assimilative part of this poetry; but Socrates, in the Republic, describes its phantastic part: and how these differ from each other, I mean the assimilative and phantastic species of imitation; the Eleatean guest sufficiently informs us: 'For I appear,' says he, 'to perceive two species of imitation, one, the conjectural or assimilative art, which then especially takes place when some one gives birth to imitation by imparting to every particular such things as are fit, in length, breadth, and depth, according to the symmetries of its exemplar, and besides these things colours also.—THEÆ. Do not all imitators endeavour to effect this?—GUEST. Not those who perform or paint any great work. For, if they were to impart to them the true symmetry of things beautiful, you know that the parts above would appear smaller, and those below larger than is fit; through the one being seen by us afar off, and the other near.—THEÆ. Entirely so. Artists therefore, bidding farewell to truth, do not produce in images truly beautiful symmetries, but those which appear to be so.' Very properly therefore, I think, does the Eleatean guest at the end of the dialogue, wishing to bind the sophist by the definitive method, establish one part of the art effective of images to be assimilative, and the other phantastic; the one fabricating the image such as is the exemplar; the other preparing that which it produces to appear like that which it imitates. However, of assimilative poetry, the Athenian guest speaks separately in the second book of the Laws, where he treats of music which does not make pleasure its end, but a true and similar imitation of its exemplar, to which place we refer the reader.

"But Socrates speaking in this book of phantastic poetry, and having shown that a poet of this kind is the third from truth, and imitative, compares such poetry to a picture, which represents not the works of nature but of artificers, and these not such as they are, but such as they appear. Hence, he clearly evinces that the phantastic species of poetry regards pleasure alone, and the delight of those that hear it. For, of imitative poetry, the phantastic falls short of the assimilative, so far as the latter regards rectitude of imitation, but the former the pleasure produced in the multitude from the energies of the phantasy. Such then are the genera of poetry which are thought worthy of distinction by Plato; one, as better than science, another as scientific, a third as conversant with, and a fourth as falling off from, right opinion.

"These things then being determined, let us return to the poetry of Homer, and contemplate resplendent in it every poetic habit, and particularly those which regard rectitude and beauty. For when he energizes enthusiastically, is possessed by the Muses, and narrates mystic conceptions

composers of tragedy: but the man must not be honoured preferably to the truth. But what I mean must be spoken. By all means, said he. Hear me

conceptions about the Gods themselves, then he energizes according to the first and divinely inspired species of poetry. But when he relates the life of the soul, the diversities in its nature, and such political concerns as pertain to it, then he especially speaks scientifically. Again, when he presents us with forms of imitation adapted to things and persons themselves, then he employs assimilative imitation. But when he directs his attention to that which appears to the multitude, and not to the truth of things, and thus seduces the souls of his hearers, then he is a poet according to the phantastic species. To illustrate what I mean, that I may begin from the last imitation of the poet, he sometimes describes the rising and setting of the sun, not as each of these is, nor as each is effected, nor imitating this in his verses, but as it appears to us through distance. This then, and every thing of this kind may be called the phantastic part of his poetry. But when he imitates heroes warring, or consulting, or speaking according to the forms of life, some as prudent, others as brave, and others as ambitious, then I should say that this is the work of assimilative poetry. Again, when in consequence of knowing either the diversity of subsistence in the parts of the soul, he unfolds and teaches it, or the difference between the image and the soul by which it is used, or the order of the elements in the universe, viz. of earth, water, æther, heaven, or any thing else of this kind, then I should confidently assert that this originated from the scientific power of poetry. And after all these, when he teaches us concerning the demiurgic monad, and the triple distribution of wholes, or concerning the bonds of Vulcan, or the connection of the paternal intellection of Jupiter with the prolific divinity of Juno, then I should say that he is clearly enthusiastic, and that such like fables are devised by him, in consequence of his being possessed by the Muses. But Homer himself also manifests in the bard Demodocus, an energy originating from the Gods, when Ulysses says of his song, that he began it impelled by a God, that he was divinely inspired, and that the Muse loved him, or the God that is the leader of the Muses:

The Muse, Jove's daughter, or Apollo, taught
Thee aptly thus the fate of Greece to sing,
And all the Grecians, hardy deeds and toils*.

And that Homer by Demodocus intended after a manner to represent himself, and introduced him as a pattern of his own calamities, is an opinion sufficiently celebrated. And the verses,

With clouds of darkness quench'd his visual ray,
But gave him skill to raise the lofty lay,

appear directly to refer to the fabled blindness of Homer. He therefore clearly contends, that Demodocus says what he does say from divine inspiration. But it is well that we have mentioned Demodocus, and his divinely inspired song. For it appears to me that the musicians who are thought worthy of being mentioned by Homer, unfold the abovementioned genera of poetry. For Demodocus, as we have said, was divinely inspired, both in narrating divine

* *Odyss. lib. viii. ver. 488.*

me then, or rather answer me. Ask. Can you tell me perfectly, what at all imitation is? for I do not myself altogether understand what it means.

and human concerns, and is said to have suspended his music from divinity. But Phemius, the Ithacensian bard, is principally characterized according to a mere knowledge of divine and human affairs. For Penelope says to him,

Alluring arts thou know'st, and what of old
Of Gods and Heroes sacred bards have told *.

The third is the lyrist of Clytemnestra, who was as it seems an imitative poet, employed right opinion, and extended the melodies of temperance to that female. Hence, as long as he remained with her, she perpetrated no unholy deed, in consequence of her irrational life being charmed to temperance by disciplinative song. The fourth musician may be placed as analogous to the phantastic species of poetry; and this is that Thamyris with whose song the Muses being indignant, are said to have caused it to cease. For he was conversant with a music much more diversified and sensible, and calculated to please the vulgar. Hence he is said to have contended with the Muses, as preferring a more various music to that which is more simple and more adapted to those divinities, and as falling from the benevolence of the Goddesses. For the anger of the Muses does not refer any passion to them, but indicates the inaptitude of Thamyris to their participation. This then is the song which is most remote from truth, which calls forth the passions of the soul, and is phantastic, and neither possesses with respect to imitation, right opinion, or science. We may therefore behold all the kinds of poetry in Homer, but particularly the enthusiastic, according to which, we have said, he is principally characterized. Nor are we singular in this opinion; but, as we have before observed, Plato himself, in many places, calls him a divine poet, the most divine of poets, and in the highest degree worthy of imitation. But the imitative and at the same time phantastic poetry has a most obscure subsistence in Homer; since he never uses it but for the purpose of procuring credibility from the vulgar, and when it is perfectly unavoidable. As therefore, if a man entering into a well regulated city, and beholding intoxication there employed for a certain useful purpose, should neither imitate the prudence in the city, nor its whole order, but intoxication itself alone,—as in this case the city is not to be blamed as the cause of his conduct, but the peculiar imbecility of his judgment; in like manner, I think, tragic poets, being emulous of the last species of Homeric poetry, should refer the principle of their error not to Homer, but to their own impotency. Homer therefore may be called the leader of tragedy, so far as tragic poets emulate him in other respects, and distribute the different parts of his poetry; imitating *phantastically* what he asserts *affinitatively*, and adapting to the ears of the vulgar what he composes scientifically. Homer, however, is not only the teacher of tragedy (for he is this according to the last species of his poetry), but likewise of the whole of that which is imitative in Plato, and of the whole theory of that philosopher.”

Proclus concludes his apology for Homer with observing as follows: “The reason,” says he, “as it appears to me, that impelled Plato to write with such severity against Homer, and the

* *Odyss.* lib. i.

means. And shall I then any how understand it? said he. That would be no way strange, said I; since those who are dim-sighted perceive many things sooner than those who see more clearly. The case is so, said he; but whilst you are present, I should not be able to adventure to tell, even though something did appear to me. But consider it yourself. Are you willing then, that we hence begin our inquiry in our usual method? for we were wont to suppose a certain species with respect to many individuals, to which we give the same name; or do you not understand me? I understand. Let us suppose now such among the many, as you please; as, for example, there are many beds and tables, if you please. Why are there not? But the ideas¹, at least respecting these pieces of furniture,
are

imitative species of poetry, was the corruption of the times in which he lived: for philosophy was then despised, being accused by some as useless, and by others entirely condemned. On the contrary, poetry was then held in immoderate admiration; its imitative power was the subject of emulation; it was considered as adequate alone to disciplinative purposes; and poets, because they imitated every thing, persuaded themselves that they knew all things, as is evident from what Socrates says in this dialogue. Hence Plato, indignant at the prevalence of such an opinion, shows that the poetic and imitative genus wanders far from the truth, which philosophy, the saviour of souls, imparts. For, from the same benevolent wish through which he accuses the sophists and popular orators, as unable to contribute any thing to virtue, he also blames the poets, and particularly the composers of tragedy, and such imitators as devise that which may charm their hearers, and not that which may promote virtue; and who enchant, but do not instruct, the multitude. But he considers Homer as deserving a similar reprehension, because he is the leader of this species of poetry, and affords to tragedians the seeds of imitation. For thus it was requisite to recall the men of his age from astonishment respecting poetry, through an immoderate attachment to which, they neglected true discipline. With a view therefore to the instruction of the multitude, to correct an absurd phantasy, and exhort to a philosophic life, he reprobates the tragedians, who were then called public preceptors, as directing their attention to nothing sane; and, at the same time, remits his reverence for Homer, and, ranking him in the same class with tragic poets, blames him as an imitator.

"Nor is it wonderful, that the same poet should be called by him, both divine, and the third from the truth. For, so far as he is possessed by the Muses, he is divine; but, so far as he is an imitator, he is the third from the truth."

¹ We must not suppose that Plato, in speaking of the idea of a bed and table, mean to signify that there is an idea of each of these in the intellect of the demiurgus of the universe; or, in short, that there are ideas of things artificial; but he calls by the name of idea, the reason or productive principle which subsists in the dianoëtic power of the artificer: and this reason, he says, is the offspring of deity, because he is of opinion, that this very artificial principle itself

are two; one of bed, and one of table, Yes. And are we not wont to say, that the workmen of each of these species of furniture, looking towards the idea, make in this manner, the one the beds, and the other the tables which we use? and all other things after the same manner. For no one of the artists makes, at least, the idea itself; for how can he? By no means. But see now whether you call such a one as this an artist? Which? One who does all such things, as each manual artificer does. You mention some skilful and wonderful man. Not yet, at least; but you will much more say so presently; for this same mechanic is not only able to make all sorts of utensils, but he makes also every thing which springs from the earth, and he makes all sorts of animals, himself as well as others: and besides these things, he makes the earth, and heaven, and the Gods, and all things in heaven, and in Hades under the earth. You mention, said he, a perfectly wonderful sophist. You do not believe me; but tell me, does it appear to you that there is not any such artist? or that, in one respect, he is the maker of all these things, and in another he is not? or do you not perceive that even you yourself might be able to make all these things, in a certain manner at least? And what, said he, is this manner? It is not difficult, said I, but is performed in many ways, and quickly; but in the quickest manner of all, if you choose to take a mirror, and carry it round every where; for then you will quickly make the sun, and the things in the heavens, quickly the earth, quickly yourself, and the other animals, and utensils, and vegetables, and all that was now mentioned. Yes, said he, the appearances, but not however the real things. You come well, said I, and seasonably, with your remark; for I imagine that the painter too is one of these artists. Is he not? How is it possible he should not? But you will say, I think, that he does not make what he makes, true, although the painter too, in a certain manner, at least, makes a bed, does he not? Yes, said he, he too makes only

is imparted to souls from divinity. Proclus, on the *Parmenides*, well observes, that an argument of the truth of this may be derived from hence,—that Plato calls a poet the third from, or with respect to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who does not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of bed, therefore, in the *dianoëtic* part of the artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he makes as second; and that which is painted as the third. But if there was an idea of bed in the intellect of divinity, the painter would be the fourth and not the third from the truth.

the appearance. But what with reference to the bed-maker? Did you not indeed say, just now, that he does not make the form which we say exists, which is bed, but a particular bed? I said so indeed. If then he does not make that which is, he does not make real being, but some such thing as being, but not being itself: but if any one should say, that the work of a bed-maker, or of any other handicraft, were real being, he would seem not to say true. He would, said he, as it must appear to those who are conversant in such kind of reasonings. Let us not then at all wonder if this likewise happen to be somewhat obscure with reference to the truth. Let us not. Are you willing then, said I, that, with reference to these very things, we inquire concerning the imitator, who he really is? If you are willing, said he. Are there not then these three sorts of beds? One which exists in nature, and which we may say, as I imagine, God made, or who else? None, I think. And one which the joiner makes. Yes, said he. And one which the painter makes. Is it not so? Be it so. Now the painter, the bed-maker, God, these three preside over three species of beds. They are three, indeed. But God, whether it were that he was not willing, or whether there was some necessity for it, that he should not make but one bed in nature, made this one only, which is really bed; but two such, or more, have never been produced by God, nor ever will be produced. How so? said he. Because, said I, if he had made but two, again one would have appeared, the form of which both these two would have possessed, and that form would be, that which is bed, and not those two. Right, said he. God then, I think, knowing these things, and willing to be the maker of bed, really, and really existing, but not of any particular bed, nor to be any particular bed-maker, produced but one in nature. It appears so. Are you willing, then, that we call him the planter of this, or something of this kind? It is just, said he, since he has, in their nature, made both this, and all other things. But what as to the joiner? Is not he the workman of a bed? Yes. And is the painter, too, the workman and maker of such a work? By no means. But what will you say he is with relation to bed? This, said he, as it appears to me, we may most reasonably call him, the imitator of what these are the workmen of. Be it so, said I; you call him then the imitator who makes what is generated the third from nature? Entirely so, said he. And this the composer of

tragedy shall be likewise, since he is an imitator, rising as a sort of third from the King and the truth; and in like manner all other imitators. It seems so. We have agreed then as to the imitator; but tell me this concerning the painter, whether do you think he undertakes to imitate each particular thing in nature, or the works of artists? The works of artists, said he. Whether, such as they really are, or such as they appear? Determine this further. How do you say? replied he. Thus. Does a bed differ any thing from itself, whether he view it obliquely, or directly opposite, or in any particular position? or, does it differ nothing, but only appears different, and in the same way as to other things? Thus, said he, it appears, but differs nothing. Consider this too, with reference to which of the two does painting work, in each particular work; whether with reference to real being, to imitate it as it really is, or with reference to what is apparent, as it appears; and whether is it the imitation of appearance, or of truth? Of appearance, said he. The imitative art, then, is far from the truth: and on this account, it seems, he is able to make these things, because he is able to attain but to some small part of each particular, and that but an image. Thus we say that a painter will paint us a shoemaker, a joiner, and other artists, though he be skilled in none of those arts; yet he will be able to deceive children and ignorant people, if he be a good painter, when he paints a joiner, and shows him at a distance, so far as to make them imagine he is a real joiner. Why not? But this, I think, my friend, we must consider with reference to all these things; that when any one tells us of such a painter, that he has met with a man who is skilled in all manner of workmanship, and every thing else which every several artist understands, and that there is nothing which he does not know more accurately than any other person, we ought to reply to such an one, that he is a simple man, and that it seems, having met with some magician, and mimic, he has been deceived; so that he has appeared to him to know every thing, from his own incapacity to distinguish between science, and ignorance, and imitation. Most true, said he. Ought we not then, said I, in the next place, to consider tragedy, and its leader, Homer? since we hear from some, that these poets understand all arts, and all human affairs, respecting virtue and vice, and likewise all divine things; for a good poet must

must necessarily compose with knowledge, if he means to compose well what he composes, else he is not able to compose. It behoves us then to consider whether these who have met with those imitators have been deceived, and on viewing their works have not perceived that they are the third distant from real being, and that their works are such as can easily be made by one who knows not the truth (for they make phantasms, and not real beings); or whether they do say something to the purpose, and that the good poets in reality have knowledge in those things which they seem to the multitude to express with elegance. By all means, said he, this is to be inquired into. Do you think then, that if any one were able to make both of these, that which is imitated, and likewise the image, he would allow himself seriously to apply to the workmanship of the images, and propose this to himself as the best thing in life? I do not. But if he were in reality intelligent in these things which he imitates, he would far rather, I think, seriously apply himself to the things than to the imitations, and would endeavour to leave behind him many and beautiful actions, as monuments of himself, and would study rather to be himself the person commended than the encomiast. I think so, said he; for neither is the honour nor the profit equal. As to other things, then, let us not call them to account, asking Homer or any other of the poets, whether any of them were any way skilled in medicine, and not an imitator only of medical discourses, for which of the antient or latter poets is said to have restored any to health, as *Æsculapius* did? or what students in medicine has any left behind him, as he did his descendants? Nor let us ask them concerning the other arts, but dismiss them: but with reference to those greatest and most beautiful things which Homer attempts to speak of, concerning wars and armies, and constitutions of cities, and the education belonging to men, it is just, somehow, to question him, whilst we demand of him: Friend Homer, if you be not the third from the truth with regard to virtue, being the workman of an image (which we have defined an imitator to be), but the second, and are able to discern what pursuits render men better or worse, both in private and public, tell us which of the cities has been by you better constituted, as *Lacedæmon* was by *Lycurgus*, and many other both great and small cities by many others, but what city acknowledges you to have been a good lawgiver,

and to have been of advantage to them. Italy and Sicily acknowledge Charondas, and we Solon ; but will any one acknowledge you as the benefactor of any city ? I think not, said Glauco. It is not then pretended even by the Homeric themselves. But what war in Homer's days is recorded to have been well conducted by him as leader, or counsellor ? Not one. But what are his discoveries ? as among the works of a wise man there are many discoveries and inventions spoken of, respecting the arts, and other affairs ; as of Thales the Milesian, and of Anacharsis the Scythian. By no means is there any such thing. But if not in a public manner, is Homer said to have lived as a private tutor to any who delighted in his conversation, and have delivered down to posterity a certain Homeric manner of life ? in like manner as Pythagoras was remarkably beloved on this account, and, even to this day, such as denominate themselves from the Pythagorean manner of life appear to be somehow eminent beyond others. Neither is there, said he, any thing of this kind related of Homer. For Creophilus¹, Socrates, the companion of Homer, may probably appear more ridiculous still in his education, than in his name, if what is said of Homer be true. For it is said that he was greatly neglected when he lived under Homer's tuition. It is said indeed, replied I. But do you think, Glauco, that if Homer had been able to educate men, and to render them better, as being capable not only to imitate with respect to these things, but to understand them, would he not then have procured himself many companions, and have been honoured and beloved by them ? But Protagoras the Abderite, and Prodicus the Chian, and many others, are able to persuade the men of their times, conversing with them privately, that they will neither be able to govern their family, nor yet their city, unless they themselves preside over their education ; and for this wisdom of theirs, they are so exceedingly beloved, that their companions almost carry them about on their heads. Would then the men of Homer's time have left him or Hesiod to go about singing their songs, if he had been able to profit men in the way of virtue ; and not rather have

¹ According to the Greek Scholiast on this place, Creophilus was an epic poet of Chios. Some relate of him that Homer married his daughter, and that Homer dwelling in his house, he had from him the poem of the Iliad. His name, to which Socrates alludes, signifies a lover of flesh.

retained him with gold, and obliged him to stay with them? or, if they could not persuade him, would they not as scholars have followed him every where, till they had obtained sufficient education? You seem to me, said he, Socrates, to say what is in every respect true. Shall we not then establish this point,—That all the poetical men, beginning with Homer, are imitators of the images of virtue, and of other things about which they compose, but that they do not attain to the truth: but as we just now said, a painter who himself knows nothing about the making of shoes, will draw a shoemaker, who shall appear to be real to such as are not intelligent, but who view according to the colour and figures? Entirely so. In the same manner, I think, we shall say that the poet colours over with his names and words certain colours of the several arts, whilst he understands nothing himself, but merely imitates, so as to others such as himself who view things in his compositions, he appears to have knowledge: and if he says any thing about shoemaking in measure, rhythm and harmony, he seems to speak perfectly well, and in like manner if of an expedition, or of any thing else: so great an enchantment have these things naturally, since you know, I think, in what manner poetical things appear when stripped of musical colouring, and expressed apart by themselves, for you have somewhere beheld it. I have, said he. Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of people who are in their prime, but who are not beautiful, such as they appear when their bloom forsakes them? Entirely, said he. Come now, and consider this. The maker of the image, whom we call the imitator, knows nothing of real being, but only of that which is apparent. Is it not so? Yes. Let us not then leave it expressed by halves, but let us sufficiently perceive it. Say on, replied he. A painter, we say, will paint reins, and a bridle. Yes. And the leather-cutter, and the smith, will make them. Certainly. Does then the painter understand what kind of reins and bridle there ought to be? or not even he who makes them, the smith, nor the leather-cutter, but he who knows how to use them, the horseman alone? Most true. Shall we not say it is so in every thing else? How? That with reference to each particular thing, there are these three arts. That which is to use it, that which is to make it, and that which is to imitate it. Yes. Are then the virtue, and the beauty, and the rectitude of every utensil, and animal, and action, for
nothing

nothing else but for the use for which each particular was made, or generated? Just so. By a great necessity, then, he who uses each particular must be the most skilful, and be able to tell the maker what he makes good or bad, with reference to the use for which he uses it: thus, for example, a player on the pipe tells the pipe-maker concerning pipes, what things are of service towards the playing on the pipe, and he will give orders how he ought to make them, but the workman does not so. How should it be otherwise? Does not the one then, being intelligent, pronounce concerning good and bad pipes, and the other, believing him, make accordingly? Yes. With reference then to one and the same instrument, the maker shall have right opinion concerning its beauty or deformity, whilst he is conversant with one who is intelligent, and is obliged to hear from the intelligent; but he who uses it shall have science. Entirely so. But whether shall the imitator have science from using the things he paints, whether they be handsome and right, or otherwise? or shall he have right opinion from his being necessarily conversant with the intelligent, and from being enjoined in what manner he ought to paint? Neither of the two. The imitator then shall have neither knowledge, nor right opinion about what he imitates with reference to beauty or deformity. It appears not. The imitator then should be very agreeable in his imitation, with regard to wisdom, concerning what he paints. Not entirely. But however he will imitate at least, without knowing concerning each particular in what respect it is ill or good; but it is likely that he will imitate such as appears to be beautiful to the multitude, and those who know nothing. What else? We have now, indeed, sufficiently, as it appears, at least, settled these things: That the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning in those things which he imitates, but that imitation is a sort of amusement, and not a serious affair. And likewise that those who apply to tragic poetry in iambics and heroics, are all imitators in the highest degree. Entirely so. But, by Jupiter, said I, this of imitation is somehow in the third degree from the truth. Is it not? Yes. To what part then of man does it belong, having the power it possesses? What part do you speak of? Of such as this. The same magnitude perceived by sight, does not appear in the same manner, near, and at a distance. It does not. And the same things appear crooked and straight, when we look at them

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in water, and out of water, and concave and convex, through the error of the sight, as to colours. All this disturbance is manifest in the soul; and this infirmity of our nature painting attacks, and leaves nothing of magical seduction unattempted, together with the wonder-working art, and many other such-like devices. True. And have not the arts of measuring, numbering, and weighing, appeared to be most ingenious helps in these things, that so the apparent greater or less, the apparent more or heavier, may not govern us, but the numbered, the measured, and the weighed? How should it be otherwise? But this again is, at least, the work of the rational part in the soul. It is so, indeed. But whilst reason often measures and declares some things to be greater or less than other things, or equal, the contrary appears at the same time with reference to these things. Yes. But did not we say that it was impossible for the same person to have contrary opinions about the same things at the same time? And thus far we said rightly. That part of the soul, then, which judges contrary to the measure, would seem not to be the same with that which judges according to the measure. It would not. But surely, at least, that which trusts to measure and computation would seem to be the best part of the soul. Why not? That then which opposes itself to this will be some one of the depraved parts of us. Of necessity. It was this then I wished should be agreed upon, when I said that painting, and in short imitation, being far from the truth, delight in their own work, conversing with that part in us which is far from wisdom, and are its companion and friend, to no sound nor genuine purpose. Entirely so, said he. Imitation then, being depraved in itself, and joining with that which is depraved, generates depraved things. It seems so. Whether, said I, is the case thus, with reference to the imitation which is by the sight only, or is it likewise so with reference to that by hearing, which we call poetry? Likely as to this also, said he. We shall not therefore, said I, trust to the appearance in painting, but we shall proceed to the consideration of the dianoëtic part with which the imitation through poetry is conversant, and see whether it is depraved or worthy. It must be done. Let us proceed then thus: Poetic imitation, we say, imitates men acting either voluntarily or involuntarily; and imagining that in their acting they have done either well or ill, and in all these cases receiving either pain or pleasure: Does it

any more than this? No more. In all these, now, does the man agree with himself? or, as he disagreed with reference to fight, and had contrary opinions in himself of the same things at one and the same time, does he, in the same manner, disagree likewise in his actions, and fight with himself? But I recollect that there is no occasion for us to settle this at least; for, in our reasonings above, we sufficiently determined all these things, that our soul is full of a thousand such contrarieties existing in it. Right, said he. Right indeed, said I; but it appears to me necessary to discuss now, what was then omitted. As what? said he. We said somewhere formerly, said I, that a good man, when he meets with such a fortune as the loss of a son, or of any thing else which he values the most, will bear it of all men the easiest. Certainly. But let us now consider this further,—whether will he not grieve at all, or is this indeed impossible, but he will, however, moderate his grief? The truth, said he, is rather this last. But tell me this now concerning him, whether do you think that he will struggle more with grief and oppose it, when he is observed by his equals, or when he is in solitude, alone by himself? Much more, said he, when he is observed. But when alone, he will venture, I think, to utter many things, which, if any one heard him, he would be ashamed of, and he will do many things which he would not wish any one saw him doing. It is so, said he. Is it not then reason and law which command him to restrain his grief,—but what drags him to grief is the passion itself? True. As then there is in the man an opposite conduct, with regard to the same thing, at one and the same time, we must necessarily say that he has two conductors. What else? And shall we not say that one of them is ready to obey the law wherever law leads him? How? Law in a manner says that it is best in misfortunes to have the greatest tranquillity possible, and not to bear them ill; since the good and evil of such things as these is not manifest, and since no advantage follows the bearing these things ill; and as nothing of human affairs is worthy of great concern; and, besides, their grief proves a hinderance to that in them which we ought to have most at hand. What is it, said he, you speak of? To deliberate, said I, on the event; and, as on a throw of the dice, to regulate his affairs according to what casts up, in whatever way reason shall declare to be best: and not as children when they fall, to lie still, and waste the
time

time in crying; but always to accustom the soul to apply in the speediest manner to heal and rectify what was fallen and sick, dismissing lamentation. One would thus, said he, behave in the best manner in every condition. And did not we say that the best part is willing to follow this which is rational? It is plain. And shall not we say that the part which leads to the remembrance of the affliction, and to wailings, and is insatiably given to these, is irrational, and idle, and a friend to cowardice? We shall say so truly. Is not then the grieving part that which admits of much and of various imitation? But the prudent and tranquil part, which is always uniform with itself, is neither easily imitated, nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a popular assembly, where all sorts of men are assembled together in a theatre. For it is the imitation of a disposition which is foreign to them. Entirely so. It is plain, then, that the imitative poet is not made for such a part of the soul as this. Nor is his skill fitted to please it, if he means to gain the applause of the multitude. But he applies to the passionate and the multifarious part, as it is easily imitated. It is plain. May we not then, with justice, lay hold of the imitative poet, and place him as correspondent to the painter? for he resembles him, both because, as to truth, he effects but depraved things, and in this too he resembles him, in being conversant with a different part of the soul from that which is best. And thus we may, with justice, not admit him into our city which is to be well regulated, because he excites and nourishes this part of the soul, and, strengthening it, destroys the rational. And as he who in a city makes the wicked powerful, betrays the city, and destroys the best men, in the same manner we shall say that the imitative poet establishes a bad republic in the soul of each individual, gratifying the foolish part of it, which neither discerns what is great, nor what is little, but deems the same things sometimes great, and sometimes small, forming little images in its own imagination, altogether remote from the truth. Entirely so. But we have not however as yet brought the greatest accusation against it: for that is, somehow, a very dreadful one, that it is able to corrupt even the good, if it be not a very few excepted. How should it not, since it acts in this manner? But hear now, and consider; for somehow, the best of us, when we hear Homer, or any of the tragic writers, imitating some of the heroes when in grief, pouring forth long

speeches in their sorrow, bewailing and beating their breasts, you know we are delighted; and, yielding ourselves, we follow along, and, sympathizing with them, seriously commend him as an able poet whoever most affects us in this manner. I know it. But when any domestic grief befalls any of us, you perceive, on the other hand, that we value ourselves on the opposite behaviour, if we can be quiet, and endure, this being the part of a man, but that of a woman, which in the other case we commended. I perceive it, said he. Is this commendation then, said I, a handsome one, when we see such a man as one would not deign to be oneself, but would be ashamed of, not to abominate but to delight in him, and commend him? No, by Jupiter, said he; it appears unreasonable. Certainly, said I, if you consider it, in this manner. How? If you consider that the part of us, which in our private misfortunes is forcibly restrained, and is kept from weeping and bewailing to the full, being by nature of such a kind as is desirous of these, is the very part which is by the poets filled and gratified: but that part in us, which is naturally the best, being not sufficiently instructed, either by reason or habit, grows remiss in its guardianship over the bewailing part, by attending to the sufferings of others, and deems it no way disgraceful to itself, to commend and pity one who grieves immoderately, whilst he professes to be a good man. But this it thinks it gains, even pleasure, which it would not choose to be deprived of, by despising the whole of the poem. For, I think, it falls to the share of few to be able to consider, that what we feel with respect to the fortunes of others, must necessarily be felt with respect to our own. Since it is not easy for a man to bear up under his own misfortunes, who strongly cherishes the bewailing disposition over those of others. Most true, said he, And is not the reasoning the same with reference to the ridiculous? For when you hear, in imitation by comedy, or in private conversation, what you would be ashamed to do yourself to excite laughter, and are delighted with it, and imitate it, you do the same thing here as in the tragic: for that part, which, when it wanted to excite laughter, was formerly restrained by reason from a fear of incurring the character of scurrility, by now letting loose, and allowing there to grow vigorous, you are often imperceptibly brought to be in your own behaviour a buffoon. Extremely so, said he. And the case is the same as to venereal pleasures, and anger, and

the whole of the passions, as well the sorrowful as the joyful, which truly, we have said, attend us in every action; that the poetical imitation of these has the same effect upon us; for it nourishes and waters those things which ought to be parched, and constitutes as our governor, those which ought to be governed, in order to our becoming better and happier, instead of being worse and more miserable. I can say no otherwise, said he. When therefore, Glauco, said I, you meet with the encomiasts of Homer, who tell how this poet instructed Greece, and that he deserves to be taken as a master to teach a man both the management and the knowledge of human affairs; and that a man should regulate the whole of his life according to this poet, we should indeed love and embrace such people, as being the best they are able; and agree with them that Homer is most poetical, and the first of tragic writers: but they must know, that hymns to the Gods, and the praises of worthy actions, are alone to be admitted into the city. But if it should admit the pleasurable muse likewise, in songs, or verses, you would have pleasure and pain reigning in the city, instead of law, and that reason which alway appears best to the community. Most true, said he. Let these things now, said I, be our apology, when we recollect what we have said with reference to poetry, that we then very properly dismissed it from our republic, since it is such as is now described: for reason obliged us. And let us tell it further, lest it accuse us of a certain roughness, and rusticity, that there is an antient variance between philosophy and poetry; for such verses as these,

That bawling bitch, which at her mistress barks,

And

He's great in empty eloquence of fools,

And

On trifles still they plod, because they're poor;

and a thousand such like, are marks of an antient opposition between them. But nevertheless let it be said, that if any one can assign a reason why the poetry and the imitation which are calculated for pleasure ought to be in a well regulated city, we, for our part, shall gladly admit them, as we are at least conscious to ourselves that we are charmed by them. But to betray what appears to be truth, were an unholy thing. For are not you yourself,

my friend, charmed by this imitation, and most especially when you see it performed by Homer? Very much so. Is it not just, then, that we introduce it apologizing for itself, either in song, or in any other measure? By all means. And we may at least grant, somehow, even to its defenders, such as are not poets, but lovers of poetry, to speak in its behalf, without verse, and show that it is not only pleasant, but profitable for republics, and for human life; and we shall hear with pleasure, for we shall gain somewhat if it shall appear not only pleasant but also profitable. How is it possible we should not gain? said he. And if it happen otherwise, my friend, we shall do as those who have been in love when they deem their love unprofitable,—they desist, though with violence: so we in like manner, through this inborn love of such poetry that prevails in our best republics, shall be well pleased to see it appear to be the best and truest: and we shall hear it till it is able to make no further apology. But we shall take along with us this discourse which we have held, as a counter-charm, and incantation, being afraid to fall back again into a childish and vulgar love. We may perceive then that we are not to be much in earnest about such poetry as this, as if it were a serious affair, and approached to the truth; but the hearer is to beware of it, and to be afraid for the republic within himself, and to entertain those opinions of poetry which we mentioned. I entirely agree, said he. For great, friend Glauco, said I, mighty is the contest, and not such as it appears, to become a good or a bad man: so as not to be moved, either through honour, or riches, or any magistracy, or poetic imitation, ever to neglect justice, and the other virtues. I agree with you, from what we have discussed, and so I think will any other. But we have not yet, said I, discussed the greatest prize of virtue, and the rewards laid up for her. You speak of some prodigious greatness, said he, if there be other greater than those mentioned. But what is there, said I, can be great in a little time? for all this period from infancy to old age is but little in respect of the whole. Nothing at all indeed, said he. What then? Do you think an immortal being ought to be much concerned about such a period, and not about the whole of time? I think, said he, about the whole. But why do you mention this? Have you not perceived, said I, that our soul is immortal, and never perishes? On which he, looking at me, and wondering, said, By Jupiter, not I indeed. But are you able to show

show this? I should otherwise act unjustly, said I. And I think you yourself can show it, for it is in no respect difficult. To me at least, said he, it is difficult; but I would willingly hear from you this which is not difficult. You shall hear then, said I. Only speak, replied he. Is there not something, said I, which you call good, and something which you call evil? I own it. Do you then conceive of them in the same manner as I do? How? That which destroys and corrupts every thing is the evil, and what preserves and profits it is the good. I do, said he. But what? Do you not say, there is something which is good, and something which is bad, to each particular? as blindness to the eyes, and disease to every animal body, blasting to corns, rottenness to wood, rust to brass and iron, and, as I am saying, almost every thing has its connate evil, and disease? I think so, replied he. And when any thing of this kind befalls any thing, does it not render that which it befalls base, and in the end dissolves and destroys it? How should it not? Its own connate evil then and baseness destroys each particular; or, if this does not destroy it, nothing else can ever destroy it. For that which is good can never destroy any thing, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil. How can they? said he. If then we shall be able to find, among beings, any one which has indeed some evil which renders it base, but is not however able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not then know that a being thus constituted cannot be destroyed at all? So, replied he, it appears. What then? said I. Is there not something which renders the soul evil? Certainly, replied he; all these things which we have now mentioned, injustice, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance. But does then any of these dissolve and destroy it? And attend now, that we may not be imposed on, in thinking that an unjust and foolish man, when he is detected acting unjustly, is then destroyed through his injustice, which is the baseness of his soul: but consider it thus. As disease, which is the baseness of animal body, dissolves and destroys body, and reduces it to be no longer that body; so all those things we mentioned, being destroyed by their own proper evil adhering to them and possessing them, are reduced to a non-existence. Is it not so? Yes. Consider now the soul in the same manner. Does injustice, or other vice, possessing it, by possessing, and adhering to it, corrupt and deface it, till, bringing it to death, it separates it from the body? By no means, said he. But it were absurd,

said I, that any thing should be destroyed by the baseness of another, but not by its own. Absurd. For consider, Glauco, said I, that neither by the baseness of victuals, whether it be their mouldiness, or rottenness, or whatever else, do we imagine our body can be destroyed; but if this baseness in them create in the body a depravity of the body, we will say that, through their means, the body is destroyed by its own evil, which is disease. But we will never allow that by the baseness of food, which is one thing, the body, which is another thing, can ever by this foreign evil, without creating in it its own peculiar evil, be at any time destroyed. You say most right, replied he. According to the same reasoning, then, said I, unless the baseness of the body create a baseness of the soul, let us never allow that the soul can be destroyed by an evil which is foreign, without its own peculiar evil, one thing by the evil of another. There is reason for it, said he. Let us then either refute these things as not good reasoning; or, so long as they are unrefuted, let us at no time say, that the soul shall be ever in any degree the more destroyed, either by burning fever, or by any other disease, or by slaughter, not even though a man should cut the whole body into the smallest parts possible, till some one show that, through these sufferings of the body, the soul herself becomes more unjust and unholy. But we will never allow it to be said, that when a foreign evil befalls any thing, whilst its own proper evil is not within it, either the soul or any thing else is destroyed. But this at least, said he, no one can ever show, that the souls of those who die are by death rendered more unjust. But if any one, replied I, shall dare to contend with us in reasoning; and, in order that he may not be obliged to own that souls are immortal, should say, that when a man dies he becomes more wicked and unjust, we shall somehow justly demand of him to show, if he says true in telling us this, that injustice is deadly to the possessor, as a disease; and that those who embrace it are destroyed by it as by a disease destructive in its own nature—those most speedily who embrace it most, and those more slowly who embrace it less. And not as at present, where the unjust die having this punishment inflicted on them by others. By Jupiter, said he, injustice would not appear perfectly dreadful, if it were deadly to him who practises it (for that were a deliverance from evil); but I rather think it will appear to be altogether the reverse, destroying others as far as it can, but rendering

ing the unjust extremely alive, and, in conjunction with being alive, wakeful likewise; so far, as it seems, does it dwell from being deadly. You say well, replied I; for, when a man's own wickedness and peculiar evil is insufficient to kill and destroy the soul, hardly can that evil, which aims at the destruction of another, destroy a soul, or any thing else but what it is aimed against. Hardly indeed, said he, as appears to me at least. Since therefore it is destroyed by no one evil, neither peculiar nor foreign, is it not plain that, of necessity, it always is? and, if it always is, it is immortal? Of necessity, replied he. Let this then, said I, be fixed in this manner. And if it be, you will perceive that the same souls will always remain, for their number will never become less, none being destroyed, nor will it become greater; for if, anyhow, the number of immortals was made greater, you know it would take from the mortal, and in the end all would be immortal. You say true. But let us not, said I, think that this will be the case, (for reason will not allow of it) nor yet that the soul in its truest nature is of such a kind as to be full of much variety, dissimilitude, and difference, considered in itself. How do you say? replied he. That cannot easily, said I, be eternal which is compounded of many things, and which has not the most beautiful composition, as hath now appeared to us to be the case with reference to the soul. It is not likely. That the soul then is something immortal, both our present reasonings, and others too, may oblige us to own: but in order to know what kind of being the soul is, in truth, one ought not to contemplate it as it is damaged both by its conjunction with the body, and by other evils, as we now behold it, but such as it is when become pure, such it must by reasoning be fully contemplated; and he (who does this) will find it far more beautiful at least, and will more plainly see through justice, and injustice, and every thing which we have now discussed. We are now telling the truth concerning it, such as it appears at present. We have seen it, indeed, in the same condition in which they see the marine Glaucus^{*}, where they cannot easily perceive his antient nature, because

^{*} According to the Greek Scholiast, Glaucus is said to have been the son of Sisyphus and Merope, and to have become a marine dæmon. For, meeting with an immortal fountain, and descending into it, he became immortal. Not being able however to point out this fountain to certain persons, he threw himself into the sea; and once every year coursed round all shores and islands in conjunction with whales.

the antient members of his body are partly broken off, and others are worn away; and he is altogether damaged by the waves: and, besides this, other things are grown to him, such as shell fish, sea weed, and stones: so that he in every respect resembles a beast, rather than what he naturally was. In such a condition do we behold the soul under a thousand evils. But we ought, Glauco, to behold it there. Where? said he. In its philosophy; and to observe to what it applies, and what intimacies it affects, as being allied to that which is divine, immortal, and eternal; and what it would become, if it pursued wholly a thing of this kind, and were by this pursuit brought out of that sea in which it now is, and had the stones and shell fish shaken off from it, which, at present, as it is fed on earth, render its nature, in a great measure, earthy, stony, and savage, through those aliments, which are said to procure felicity. And then might one behold its true nature, whether multiform, or uniform, and every thing concerning it. But we have, I think, sufficiently discussed its passions, and forms in human life. Entirely so, replied he. Have we not now, said I, discussed every thing else in our reasonings, though we have not produced those rewards and honours of justice (as you say Hesiod and Homer do)? but we find justice itself to be the best reward to the soul; and that it ought to do what is just, whether it have or have not Gyges' ring, and, together with such a ring, the helmet¹ likewise of Pluto. You say most true, said he. Will it not now then, Glauco, said I, be attended with no envy, if, besides these, we add those rewards to justice and the other virtues, which are bestowed on the soul by men and Gods, both whilst the man is alive, and after he is dead? By all means, said he. Will you then restore me what you borrowed in the reasoning? What, chiefly? I granted you, that the just man should be deemed unjust, and the unjust be deemed to be just. For you were of opinion, that though it were not possible that these things should be concealed from Gods and men, it should however be granted, for the sake of the argument, that justice in itself might be compared with injustice in itself; or do you not remember it?

¹ The helmet of Pluto is said to be an immortal and invisible cloud, with which the Gods are invested when they wish not to be known to each other. And it is applied as a proverb to those that do any thing secretly.—Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 197.

I should,

I should, indeed, be unjust, said he, if I did not. Now after the judgment is over, I demand again, in behalf of justice, that as you allow it to be indeed esteemed both by Gods and men, you likewise allow it to have the same good reputation, that it may also receive those prizes of victory, which it acquires from the reputation of justice, and bestows on those who possess it; since it has already appeared to bestow those good things which arise from really being just, and that it does not deceive those who truly embrace it. You demand what is just, said he. Will you not then, said I, in the first place, restore me this? That it is not concealed from the Gods, what kind of man each of the two is. We will grant it, said he. And if they be not concealed, one of them will be beloved of the Gods, and one of them hated^{*}, as we agreed in the beginning. We did so. And shall we not agree, that as to the man who is beloved of the Gods, whatever comes to him from the Gods will all be the best possible, unless he has some necessary ill from former miscarriage. Entirely so. We are then to think in this manner of the just man, That if he happen to be in poverty, or in diseases, or in any other of those seeming evils, these things to him issue in something good, either whilst alive, or dead. For never at any time is he neglected by the Gods who inclines earnestly to endeavour to become just, and practises virtue as far as it is possible for man to resemble God. It is reasonable, replied he, that such an one should not be neglected by him whom he resembles. And are we not to think the reverse of these things concerning the unjust man? Entirely. Such, then, would seem to be the prizes which the just man receives from the Gods. Such they are indeed in my opinion, said he. But what, said I, do they receive from men? Is not the case thus? (if we are to suppose the truth) Do not cunning and unjust men do the same thing as those racers, who run well at the beginning, but not so at the end? for at the first they briskly leap forward, but in the end they become ridiculous, and, with their ears on their neck, they run off without any reward. But such as are true racers, arriving at the end, both receive the prizes, and are crowned. Does it not happen thus for the most part as to just men? that at the end of every action and intercourse of life they are both held in esteem, and receive

^{*} That is to say, one of these through aptitude will receive the illuminations of divinity, and the other through inaptitude will subject himself to the power of avenging dæmons.

rewards from men. Entirely so. You will then suffer me to say of these what you yourself said of the unjust. For I will aver now, that the just, when they are grown up, shall arrive at power if they desire magistracies, they shall marry where they incline, and shall settle their children in marriage agreeably to their wishes; and every thing else you mentioned concerning the others, I now say concerning these. And on the other hand I will say of the unjust, that the most of them, though they may be concealed whilst they are young, yet being caught at the end of the race, are ridiculous, and, when they become old, are wretched and ridiculed, and shall be scourged both by foreigners and citizens, and they shall afterwards be tortured, and burnt; which you said were terrible things, and you spoke the truth. Imagine you hear from me that they suffer all these things. But see if you will admit of what I say. Entirely, said he, for you say what is just. Such as these now, said I, are the prizes, the rewards and gifts, which a just man receives in his life-time, both from Gods and men; besides those good things which justice contains in itself. And they are extremely beautiful, said he, and likewise permanent. But these now, said I, are nothing in number or magnitude, when compared with those which await each of the two at death. And these things must likewise be heard, that each of them may completely have what is their due in the reasoning. You may say on, replied he, not as to a hearer who has heard much, but as to one who hears with pleasure. But, however, I will not, said I, tell you the apologue of Alcinoüs; but that, indeed, of a brave man, Erus the son of Armenius, by descent a Pamphylian; who happening on a time to die in battle, when the dead were on the tenth day carried off, already corrupted, he was taken up found; and being carried home, as he was about to be buried on the twelfth day, when laid on the funeral pile, he revived^{*}; and being revived,

^{*} In the manuscript Commentary of Proclus on this book of the Republic, five examples are given of persons that have revived after they have been for many days dead. That part of the Commentary containing these examples is preserved by Alexander Morus, in his "*Notæ ad quædam Loca Novi Fœderis*," which, as the book is scarce, I shall present to the public, for the sake both of the learned and unlearned English reader.

Proclus then, after having observed that some in his time have been seen sitting or standing on the sepulchres in which they had been buried, which, says he, is also related by the antients
of

vived, he told what he saw in the other state, and said: That after his soul left the body, it went with many others, and that they came to a certain dæmoniacal

of Aristæas, Hermodorus, and Epimenides, subjoins the following example, taken from the History of Clearchus, the disciple of Aristotle: "Cleonymus, the Athenian, who was a man fond of hearing philosophic discourses, on the death of one of his associates, becoming very forrowful, and giving himself up to despair, apparently died, and was laid out according to custom. His mother, as she was folding him in her embraces, taking off his garment, and kissing him, perceived in him a gentle breathing, and, being extremely joyful on the occasion, delayed his burial. Cleonymus in a short time after was restored to life, and told all that he saw and heard when he was in a separate state. He said that his soul appeared, as if liberated from certain bonds, to soar from its body, and that, having ascended above the earth, he saw in it places all-various, both for their figure and colour, and streams of rivers unknown to men. And that at last he came to a certain region sacred to Vesta, which was under the direction of dæmoniacal powers in indescribable female forms." Κλεωνυμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, φιληκοῦς ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων, ἑταίρων τινος αὐτοῦ τελευτήσαντος, περιελγὴς γενομένος καὶ ἀθυμῆσας, ἐλπιόφυχον τε, καὶ τεθνάναι δοῦναι, τρίτης ἡμέρας οὐσης, κατὰ τοὺς νόμους προτεθεῖς περιβαλλούσα δ' αὐτὸν ἡ μήτηρ, καὶ πάντοτε αὐτὸν ἀσπάζομένη τοῦ προσώπου θοιμάτιον ἀφελούσα, καὶ καταφιλούσα τὸν νεκρὸν, ἠθοῖτο βραχείας ἀναπνοῆς αὐτῷ τινος ἐγκείμενης. περιχαρὴ δ' αὐτῇ γενομένη ἐπισχεῖν τὸν ταφῇ τὸν δὲ Κλεωνύμου ἀναφέροντα κατὰ μικρὸν ἐγερθεῖναι, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅσα τε ἐκεῖθεν χωρὶς ἢ καὶ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἰδοὶ καὶ ἀκουσέειν. τὴν μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν φανταί παρὰ τὸν θάνατον οὖν ἐκ δεσμών δοῦναι τινὸν ἀφειμένην, τοῦ σώματος παραβάντος μετεωρὸν ἀρθῆναι, καὶ ἀρθεῖσαν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἰδεῖν τοπικοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ παντοδαπούς, καὶ τοὺς σχήμασι, καὶ τοὺς χρώμασι, καὶ δέγματα ποταμῶν ἀπροσάπτα ἀνθρώποις· καὶ τέλος ἀφικέσθαι εἰς τινὰ χωρὸν ἱερὸν τῆς Ἑστίας, ὃν περιέπειν δαιμονίων δυνάμεις ἐν γυναικείων μορφαῖς ἀπεριγήγητος.

The second example is from the historian Naumachius, "who flourished (says Proclus) in the time of our ancestors, and is of one Polycritus, who was an illustrious and principal man among the Ætolians. This Polycritus died, and returned to life in the ninth month after his death; came to the general assembly of the Ætolians, and joined with them in their consultations about what measures were best to be adopted. Hiero the Ephesian, and other historians, testify the truth of this, in that account of transactions which they sent to king Antigonus, and their other absent friends." Τὸν ἐπιφανέστατον Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Αἰτωλαρχίας τυχεύοντα, καὶ ἀποθάνειν, καὶ ἀναβῶναι μὴ μὲν μετὰ τὸν θάνατον ἐνιάτῃ, καὶ ἀφικέσθαι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, καὶ συμβουλευσαί τε αἰετὰ περὶ ὧν ἐβούλευντο· καὶ τοῦτου εἶναι μάρτυρας Ἱέρωνα τὸν Ἐφεσίον, καὶ ἄλλους ἱστορικοὺς, Ἀντιγόνῃ τε τῇ βασιλεῖ, καὶ ἄλλοις ἑαυτῶν φίλοις ἀποστέλλειν τὰ συμβεβάντα γράφοντα.

The third is as follows: "In Nicopolis also (says Proclus), not long since, the same thing happened to one Eurygnus. This man, who was buried before the city, revived fifteen days after, and said that he saw and heard many wonderful things under the earth, which he was ordered not to relate. He lived some time after this, and his conduct was more just after his revival than before." Καὶ οὐ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ Νικοπόλει, τῶν οὐ πολὺν χρόνον, Εὐρυγνὸν τὸ ὄνομα ταύτην παθεῖν, καὶ ταφέντα προ τῆς πόλεως ὑπὸ τῶν προσκηνόντων, ἀναβῶναι μετὰ πεντε καὶ δεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς ταφῆς, καὶ λεγέειν ὅτι πολλὰ μὲν ἰδοὶ καὶ ἀκουσέειν ὑπὸ γῆς θαυμάσια· κλειθεῖναι δὲ

dæmoniical place, where there were two chafins in the earth, near to each other, and two other openings in the heavens opposite to them, and that

παντα αρρητα φυλαττειν, και επιβιῶναι χρονον ουκ ολιγον, και οφθηναι δικαιοτερον μετα την αναβιῶσιν ἢ προτερον.

The fourth is of Rufus, a priest of the Theſſalonians, who lived near the time of the historian Naumachius. This man was restored to life the third day after his death, for the purpose of performing certain sacred ceremonies, which he had promised to perform, and, having fulfilled his promise, again died. Χθες, ὡς φησι, γεγονοτα Ρουφον, τον εκ Φιλιππων των εκ Μακεδονιας, της δε εν Θεσσαλονικη μισιστης αρχιερωσης αξιωθεντα· τουτον γαρ αποθανοντα τριταιον αναβιῶναι, και αναβιῶντα ειπειν οτι ὑπο των χθονιων ὑπεπεμφθη θεν, ινα τας θεας επιτελεσῃ τῷ δημῳ ας ὑπισχυμενος ευτυχανε, και μεχρι της εκεινων συμπληρωσεως επιβιῶντα αυτης αποθανειν.

The fifth and last is of one Philonæa, who lived under the reign of Philip. "She was the daughter (says Proclus) of Demoftratus and Charite, who lived in Amphipolis, and died soon after her marriage to one Craterus. She revived, however, in the sixth month after her death, and, through her love of a youth named Machates, who came to Demoftratus from his own country Pelle, had connection with him privately for many nights successively. This amour, however, being at length detected, she again died; previous to which she declared, that she acted in this manner according to the will of terrestrial dæmons. Her dead body was seen by every one, lying in her father's house; and on digging the place, which prior to this had contained her body, it was seen to be empty, by those of her kindred who came thither, through unbelief of what had happened to her. The truth of this relation is testified both by the epistles of Hipparchus and those of Arridæus, to Philip, in which they give an account of the affairs of Amphipolis:" Και του κολοφωνα τουτου ὑπαρχειν Φιλοναιον κατα τους Φιλιππου βασιλευσαντος χρῆσους· ειναι δε αυτην θυγατερα Δημοστρατου και Χαριτους των Αμφιπολιτων νεογamon τελευτησασαν, ευγαμητο δε Κρατερῳ· ταυτην δε εκτῳ μηνι μετα τον θανατον αναβιῶναι, και τῳ νεανισκῳ Μαχατῃ, παρα τοι Δημοστρατου αφικομενη εκ Πελλης της πατριδος, λαβρα συνειναι δια τον προς αυτον ερωτα πολλας εφεξης νυκτας· και φωραθεισαν αυτης αποθανειν, προειπουσαν κατα βουλησιν των επιχθονιων δαιμονων αυτη ταυτα πεπραχθαι, και ορασθαι πασι νεκραν εν τη πατρωα προκειμενην οικια, και τον προτερον δεξαμενον αυτης το σωμα τοπον ανορυχθεντα κενον οφθηναι τοις οικείοις ἐπ' αυτην ελθουσι δια την απιστιαν των γεγονοτων· και ταυτα δηλουν επιστολας τας μεν παρ' Ἰππαρχου, τας δε παρ' Αρριδαιου γραφεισας, τους τα πραγματα της αμφιπολεως εμχειρισμενους προς Φιλιππον.

Proclus then with his usual sagacity observes, concerning the cause of this phenomenon, as follows: "Many other of the antients have collected a history of those that have apparently died, and afterwards revived; and among these are, the natural philosopher Democritus, in his writings concerning Hades, and that wonderful Conotes, the familiar of Plato. * * * For the death was not, as it seemed, an entire desertion of the whole life of the body, but a cessation, caused by some blow, or perhaps a wound. But the bonds of the soul yet remained rooted about the marrow, and the heart contained in its profundity the empyreuma of life; and this remaining, it again acquired the life which had been extinguished, becoming adapted to animation." Την μεν περι των αποθανειν δεξαντων, ειπειτα αναβιῶντων, ιστοριαν αλλοι τε πολλοι των παλαιων ηβροσαν, και Δημοκριτος ὁ φυσικος εν τοις περι του αιδου γραμμασι, και τον θανμαστον εκεινον Κωννητην, του

that the judges sat between these. That when they gave judgment, they commanded the just to go to the right hand, and upwards through the heaven, fixing before them the accounts of the judgment pronounced; but the unjust they commanded to the left, and downwards, and these likewise had behind them the accounts of all they had done. But on his coming before the judges, they said, it behoved him to be a messenger to men concerning things there, and they commanded him to hear, and to contemplate every thing in the place. And that he saw here, through two openings, one of the heaven, and one of the earth, the souls departing, after they were there judged; and through the other two openings he saw, rising through the one out of the earth, souls full of squalidness and dust; and through the other, he saw other souls descending pure from heaven; and that always on their arrival they seemed as if they came from a long journey, and that they gladly went to rest themselves in the meadow, as in a public assembly, and saluted one another, such as were acquainted, and that those who rose out of the earth asked the others concerning the things above, and those from heaven asked them concern-

Πλάτωνος εταίρον, * * * * † οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος ἢ ἀποσάλευσις, ὡς εἶκοι, τῆς συμπάσης ζωῆς τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' ὑπο μὲν πλῆγῃς τινος, ἰσως τοῦ τραυματός, παρῆιτο· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οἱ περὶ τὸν μύελον ἑμμενον ἐπὶ δεσμοὶ κατερριζώμενη, καὶ ἡ καρδία το ἐμπύρευμα τῆς ζωῆς εἵχεν ἐγκείμενον τῇ βαθεὶ καὶ, τούτου μενόντος, αὐτὴς ἀνεκτίσαστο τὴν ἀπεσθῆκυαν ζωὴν ἐπιτηδείαν πρὸς τὴν ψυχασίν γενομένην.

Lastly, Proclus adds: "That it is possible for the soul to depart from, and enter into the body, is evident from him, who, according to Clearchus, used a soul-attracting wand, on a sleeping lad, and who persuaded the dæmoniack Aristotle, as Clearchus relates in his Treatise on Sleep, that the soul may be separated from the body, and that it enters into the body, and uses it as a lodging. For, striking the lad with the wand, he drew out, and as it were led his soul, for the purpose of evincing that the body was immoveable when the soul was at a distance from it, and that it was preserved uninjured. The soul being again led into the body, by means of the wand, after its entrance related every particular. From this circumstance, therefore, both other spectators; and Aristotle, were persuaded that the soul is separate from the body."

Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐξίεναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ εἰσελθεῖν δυνατόν εἰς τὸ σῶμα, ὅμοι καὶ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Κλεάρχῳ τῇ ψυχολογικῇ ραβδῷ χρησάμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ μεираκιῦ τοῦ καθευδόντος, καὶ πείσας τὸν δαιμονιῶν Ἀριστοτέλην, καθάπερ ὁ Κλεάρχος, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ὕπνου φησὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἀναχωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ὡς εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ὡς χρῆται αὐτῇ οἷον καταγωγῇ· τῇ γὰρ ραβδῷ πλῆξας τὸν παῖδα, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξελευστέον, καὶ οἷον ἀγῶν, ὅτ' αὐτῆς πόρῳ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκίνητον ἐνεδείξε τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἀβλαβῇ σωζόμενον.—Αὐτὴς ἀγορευμένη πάλιν τῆς ραβδοῦ μετὰ τὴν ἐξοδὸν ἀπαγγέλλειν ἐκαστὰ· τοιγάρ οὖν, ἐκ τούτου πιστεύεται τοὺς τε ἀλλοὺς τῆς τοιαύτης ἱστορίας θεάτας, καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην χωριστὴν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν.

† There is an unfortunate chasm here in the manuscript, of two or three lines.

ing the things below, and that they told one another; those wailing and weeping whilst they called to mind, what and how many things they suffered and saw in their journey under the earth; (for it was a journey of a thousand years) and that these again from heaven explained their enjoyments, and spectacles of immense beauty. To narrate many of them, Glauco, would take much time; but this, he said, was the sum, that whatever unjust actions any had committed, and how many soever any one had injured, they were punished for all these separately tenfold, and that it was in each, according to the rate of an hundred years, the life of man being considered as so long, that they might suffer tenfold punishment for the injustice they had done. So that if any had been the cause of many deaths, either by betraying cities or armies, or bringing men into slavery, or being confederates in any other wickedness, for each of all these they reaped tenfold sufferings; and if, again, they had benefited any by good deeds, and had been just and holy, they were rewarded according to their deserts. Of those who died very young, and lived but a little time, he told what was not worth relating in respect of other things. But of impiety and piety towards the Gods and parents, and of suicide, he told the more remarkable retributions. For he said he was present when one was asked by another, where the great Aridæus was? This Aridæus had been tyrant in a certain city of Pamphylia a thousand years before that time, and had killed his aged father, and his elder brother, and had done many other unhallowed deeds, as it was reported: and he said, the one who was asked, replied: He neither comes, said he, nor ever will come hither. For we then surely saw this likewise among other dreadful spectacles: When we were near the mouth of the opening, and were about to ascend after having suffered every thing else, we beheld both him on a sudden, and others likewise, most of whom were tyrants, and some private persons who had committed great iniquity, whom, when they imagined they were to ascend, the mouth of the opening did not admit, but bellowed when any of those who were so polluted with wickedness, or who had not been sufficiently punished, attempted to ascend. And then, said he, fierce men, and fiery to the view¹, standing by, and understanding the

¹ By these, demons of a punishing characteristic are signified.

bellowing, took them and led them apart, Aridæus and the rest, binding their hands and their feet, and, thrusting down their head, and pulling off their skin, dragged them to an outer road, tearing them on thorns; declaring always to those who passed by, on what accounts they suffered these things, and that they were carrying them to be thrown into Tartarus. And hence, he said, that amidst all their various terrors, this terror surpassed, lest the mouth should bellow, and that when it was silent every one most gladly ascended. And that the punishments and torments were such as these, and their rewards were the reverse of these. He also added, that every one, after they had been seven days in the meadow, arising thence, it was requisite for them to depart on the eighth day, and arrive at another place on the fourth day after, whence they perceived from above through the whole heaven and earth, a light extended as a pillar, mostly resembling the rainbow, but more splendid and pure; at which they arrived in one day's journey; and thence they perceived, through the middle of the light from heaven, the extremities of its ligatures extended; as this light was the belt of heaven, like the transverse beams of ships keeping the whole circumference united. That from the extremities the distaff of necessity is extended, by which all the revolutions were turned round, whose spindle and point were both of adamant, but its whirl mixed of this and of other things; and that the nature of the whirl was of such a kind, as to its figure, as is any one we see here. But you must conceive it, from what he said, to be of such a kind as this: as if in some great hollow whirl, carved throughout, there was such another, but lesser, within it, adapted to it, like casks fitted one within another; and in the same manner a third, and a fourth, and four others, for that the whirls were eight² in all, as circles one within another, having their lips appearing upwards, and forming round the spindle one united convexity of one whirl; that the spindle was driven through the middle of the eight; and that the first and outmost whirl had the widest circumference in the lip, that the sixth had the second wide, and that of the fourth is the third wide, and the fourth wide that of the eighth, and the fifth wide that of the

² By the eight whirls, we must understand the eight starry spheres, viz. the sphere of the fixed stars, and the spheres of the seven planets.

seventh,

seventh, the sixth wide that of the fifth, and the seventh wide that of the third, and the eighth wide that of the second. Likewise that the circle of the largest is variegated, that of the seventh is the brightest, and that of the eighth hath its colour from the shining of the seventh; that of the second and fifth resemble each other, but are more yellow than the rest. But the third hath the whitest colour, the fourth is reddish; the second in whiteness surpasses the sixth; and that the distaff must turn round in a circle with the whole it carries; and whilst the whole is turning round, the seven inner circles are gently turned round in a contrary motion to the whole. Again, that of these, the eighth moves the swiftest; and next to it, and equal to one another, the seventh, the sixth, and the fifth; and that the third went in a motion which as appeared to them completed its circle in the same way as the fourth. The fourth in swiftness was the third, and the fifth was the second, and it was turned round on the knees of necessity. And that on each of its circles there was seated a Syren on the upper side, carried round, and uttering one voice variegated by diverse modulations. But that the whole of them, being eight, composed one harmony. That there were other three sitting round at equal distance one from another, each on a throne, the daughters of Necessity, the Fates¹, in white vestments,

¹ In order to understand what is here delivered by Plato respecting the Fates, it is necessary to observe that there is an order of Gods immediately above those of a mundane character, which was denominated by ancient theologists liberated, and supercelestial. The peculiarity of this order is represented to us by Plato, in what he now says concerning the Fates. "In this place, therefore (says Proclus), Plato instructing us in the order of the universe, which supernally pervades through the whole of mundane natures, from the inerratic sphere, and in that order which governs human life, at different times proposing elections of different lives, and varying the measure of justice adapted to them, he refers the primary cause of this order to a monad and triad exempt from mundane wholes. And to the monad he ascribes an inspective government, extending its dominion at the same time to all heaven, and represents it as being impartibly present with all things, as governing all things indivisibly, and according to one energy, and as moving wholes with its most subordinate powers. But to the triad he assigns a progression from the monad, an energy proceeding into the universe, and a divisible fabrication. For that which is simple and united in the exempt providence of the monad is produced into multitude, through the secondary inspection of the triad.

"The one cause, therefore, (i. e. the monad) possesses more authority than the triadic multitude. For all the variety of powers in the world, the infinity of motions, and the multiform difference of reasons, is convolved by the triad of the Fates; and this triad is again extended to one

ments, and having crowns on their heads; Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Sirens; Lachesis singing the past, Clotho the present, and Atropos the future. And that Clotho, at certain

one monad prior to the three, which Socrates calls necessity, not as governing wholes by violence, nor as obliterating the self-motive nature of our life, nor as deprived of intellect and the most excellent knowledge, but as comprehending all things intellectually, and introducing bound to things indefinite, and order to things disordered. It is likewise so called by Socrates, as causing all things to be obedient to its government, and extending them to the good, as subjecting them to demiurgic laws, and guarding all things within the world, and as circularly comprehending every thing in the universe, and leaving nothing void of the justice which pertains to it, nor suffering it to escape the divine law.

"With respect to the order in which the Fates are arranged, it appears from Plato in the *Laws*, that the first is Lachesis, the second Clotho, and the third Atropos. And here it must be diligently observed, that Socrates uses the parts of time as symbols of comprehension according to cause. For that which *was*, was once future and the present, and that which now *is*, was once future; but the future is not yet the past, but has the whole of its essence in becoming the future. These three causes, therefore, or the three Fates, are analogous to these three portions of time: and of these, the most perfect, and which comprehends the others, is that which sings the past; for the past, having once been both the present and the future, may be considered as comprehending these. The next to this in perfection is the *present*, which partly comprehends, and is partly comprehended; for it comprehends the future, and is comprehended in the past. But the third is the future, which is comprehended both in the past and the present; the latter unfolding, and the former bounding, its progression. Hence Lachesis is the primary cause, comprehending in herself the others; and Clotho is allotted a superior, but Atropos an inferior order. And on this account Lachesis moves with both her hands, as in a greater and more total degree, giving completion to the more partial energies of the other two. But Clotho turns the spindle with her right hand, and Atropos with her left, so far as the former precedes with respect to energy, but the latter follows, and, in conjunction with the former, governs all things. For in mortal animals the right hand is the principle of motion; and in the wholes of the universe the motion to the right hand comprehends that to the left.

"Observe too, that as it was before said that the whole spindle is turned on the knees of Necessity, so the fable suspends the providence about partial souls from the knees of Lachesis, who, with her hands, as with her more elevated powers, perpetually moves the universe, but possesses with subjection in her knees the causes of the periods of souls.

"In the next place, let us consider the symbols with which the fable celebrates their dominion. Their walking then in the celestial circles signifies their exempt and separate government. But their being seated on thrones, and not in the circles themselves, like the Sirens, indicates that the receptacles which are first illuminated by them are established above the celestial orbs. For a throne is the vehicle and receptacle of those that are seated on it: and this perspicuously signifies that these divinities are proximately placed above the mundane Gods. Their being seated at equal distances manifests their orderly separation, their subjection proceeding according to

tain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the spindle, and along with her mother turned about the outer circle. And Atropos, in like manner, turned the inner ones with her left hand. And that Lachesis touched both of these, severally, with either hand. After they arrive here, it is necessary for them to go directly to Lachesis. That then a certain prophet first of all ranges them in order, and afterwards taking the lots, and the models of lives, from the knees of Lachesis, and ascending a lofty tribunal, he says :—The speech of the virgin Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity : Souls of a day ! The beginning of another period of men of mortal race. The dæmon shall not receive you as his lot, but you shall choose the dæmon : He who draws the first, let him first make choice of a life, to which he must of necessity adhere : Virtue is independent, which every one shall partake of, more or less, according as he honours or dishonours her : the cause is in him who makes the choice, and God is blameless. That when he had said these things, he threw on all of them the lots, and that each took up the one which fell beside him, and that he was allowed to take no other. And that when he had taken it, he knew what number he had drawn. That after this he placed on the ground before them the models of lives, many more than those we see at present. And that they were all-various. For there were lives of all sorts of animals, and human lives of every kind. And that among these there were tyrannies also, some of them perpetual, and others destroyed in the midst of their great-

analogy, and their distribution supernally derived from their mother : for that which is orderly in progression, and according to dignity in energies, is thence imparted to the Fates. The crowns on their heads indicate the purity * of their intellectual summits. Their white garments signify that the essences which participate of these divinities are intellectual, luciform, and full of divine splendour. And as it is said that one of these sings the past, the second the present, and the third the future, this indicates that all their externally proceeding energies are elegant, intellectual, and full of harmony.

“ Lastly, the Sirens signify the divine souls of the celestial spheres, who incline all things through harmonic motion to their ruling Gods. The song of these, and the well-measured motion of the heavens, are perfected by the Fates, who call forth the fabricative energy of Necessity into the universe through intellectual hymns, and convert all things to themselves through the harmonious and elegant motion of wholes.

* For crowns are of gold ; and gold, from its incorruptibility, and never admitting rust, is an image of intellectual and divine purity.

ness, and ending in poverty, banishment, and want. That there were also lives of renowned men, some for their appearance as to beauty, strength, and agility; and others for their descent, and the virtues of their ancestors. There were the lives of renowned women in the same manner. But that there was no disposition of soul among these models, because of necessity, on choosing a different life, it becomes different itself. As to other things, riches and poverty, sickness and health, they were mixed with one another, and some were in a middle station between these.

There then, as appears, friend Glauco, is the whole danger of man. And hence this of all things is most to be studied, in what manner every one of us, omitting other disciplines, shall become an inquirer and learner in this study, if, by any means, he be able to learn and find out who will make him expert and intelligent to discern a good life, and a bad; and to choose every where, and at all times, the best of what is possible, considering all the things now mentioned, both compounded and separated from one another, what they are with respect to the virtue of life. And to understand what good or evil beauty operates when mixed with poverty, or riches, and with this or the other habit of soul; and what is effected by noble and ignoble descent, by privacy, and by public station, by strength and weakness, docility and indocility, and every thing else of the kind which naturally pertains to the soul, and likewise of what is acquired, when blended one with another; so as to be able from all these things to compute, and, having an eye to the nature of the soul, to comprehend both the worse and the better life, pronouncing that to be the worse which shall lead the soul to become more unjust, and that to be the better life which shall lead it to become more just, and to dismiss every other consideration. For we have seen, that in life, and in death, this is the best choice. But it is necessary that a man should have this opinion firm as an adamant in him, when he departs to Hades, that there also he may be unmoved by riches, or any such evils, and may not, falling into tyrannies, and other such practices, do many and incurable mischiefs, and himself suffer still greater: but may know how to choose always the middle life, as to these things, and to shun the extremes on either hand, both in this life as far as is possible, and in the whole of hereafter. For thus man becomes most happy.—That then the messenger from the other world further told, how that the prophet spoke thus: Even to him who comes

last, choosing with judgment, and living consistently, there is prepared a desirable life; not bad. Let neither him who is first be negligent in his choice, nor let him who is last despair. He said, that when the prophet had spoken these things, the first who drew a lot ran instantly and chose the greatest tyranny, but through folly and insatiableness had not sufficiently examined all things on making his choice, but was ignorant that in this life there was this destiny, the devouring of his own children, and other evils; and that afterwards, when he had considered it at leisure he wailed and lamented his choice, not having observed the admonitions of the prophet above mentioned. For that he did not accuse himself, as the author of his misfortunes, but fortune and the dæmons, and every thing instead of himself. He added, that he was one of those who came from heaven, who had in his former life lived in a regulated republic, and had been virtuous by custom without philosophy. And that, in short, among these there were not a few who came from heaven, as being unexercised in trials. But that the most of those who came from earth, as they had endured hardships themselves, and had seen others in hardships, did not precipitantly make their choice. And hence, and through the fortune of the lot, to most souls there was an exchange of good and evil things. Since, if one should always, whenever he comes into this life, soundly philosophize, and the lot of election should not fall on him the very last, it would seem, from what has been told us from thence, that he shall be happy not only here, but when he goes hence, and his journey hither back again shall not be earthy, and rugged, but smooth and heavenly. This spectacle, he said, was worthy to behold, in what manner the several souls made choice of their lives. For it was pitiful and ridiculous and wonderful to behold, as each for the most part chose according to the habit of their former life. For he told, that he saw the soul which was formerly the soul of Orpheus making choice of the life of a swan, through hatred of woman-kind, being unwilling to be born of woman on account of the death he suffered from them. He saw likewise the soul of Thamyris making choice of the life of a nightingale. And he saw also a swan turning to the choice of human life; and other musical animals in a similar manner, as is likely. And that he saw one soul, in making its choice, choosing the life of a lion; and that it was the soul of Telamonian Ajax, shunning to become a man, remembering the judgment given with reference to the armour.

armour. That after this he saw the soul of Agamemnon, which, in hatred also of the human kind, on account of his misfortunes, exchanged it for the life of an eagle. And that he saw the soul of Atalante choosing her lot amidst the rest, and, having attentively observed the great honours paid an athletic man, was unable to pass by this lot, but took it. Next to this, he saw the soul of Epæus the Panopean going into the nature of a skilful workwoman. And that far off, among the last, he saw the soul of the buffoon Therſites assuming¹ the ape. And that by chance he saw the soul of Ulyſſes, who had drawn its lot last of all, going to make its choice: that in remembrance of its former toils, and tired of ambition, it went about a long time seeking the life of a private man of no business, and with difficulty found it lying somewhere, neglected by the rest. And that on seeing this life, it said, that it would have made the same choice even if it had obtained the first lot,—and joyfully chose it. That in like manner the souls of wild beasts went into men, and men again into beasts: the unjust changing into wild beasts, and the just into tame; and that they were blended by all sorts of mixtures. After therefore all the souls had chosen their lives according as they drew their lots, they all went in order to Lachesis, and that she gave to every one the dæmon² he chose, and sent him along with him to be the guardian of his life, and the accomplisher of what he had chosen.—That first of all he conducts the soul to Clotho, to ratify under her hand, and by the whirl of the vortex of her spindle, the destiny it had chosen by lot: and after being with her, he leads it back again to the spinning of Atropos, who makes the destinies irreversible. And that from hence they proceed directly under the throne of Necessity; and that after he had passed by it, as all the others passed, they all of them marched into the plain of Lethe³ amidst dreadful heat and scorching, for he

¹ The soul of a man never becomes the soul of a brute, though it may be bound to it, and as it were carried in it by way of punishment. Hence Plato says, that the soul of Therſites assumed the ape; signifying that it entered into the body of an ape when it was animated, and not before.

² See the note concerning dæmons at the beginning of the First Alcibiades.

³ By *Lethe* we must understand the whole of a visible nature, or, in other words, the realms of generation, which contain, according to Empedocles, oblivion and the meadow of Ate; and, according to the Chaldean Oracles, the light-hating world, and the winding streams, under which many are drawn. By the *dreadful heat and scorching*, Plato appears to signify the sphere of fire, through which descending souls pass. And as, through an anxious attention to mortal concerns,

he said that it is void of trees and every thing that the earth produces. That when night came on, they encamped beside the river Ameletè, whose water no vessel contains. Of this water all of them must necessarily drink a certain measure, and such of them as are not preserved by prudence drink more than the measure, and that he who drinks always forgets every thing. But after they were laid asleep, and it became midnight, there was thunder, and an earthquake, and they were thence on a sudden carried upwards, some one way, and some another, approaching to generation like stars. But that he himself was forbidden to drink of the water. Where, however, and in what manner, he came into his body, he was entirely ignorant; but suddenly looking up in the morning, he saw himself already laid on the funeral pile. And this fable, Glauco, hath been preserved, and is not lost, and it may preserve us, if we are persuaded by it; for thus we shall happily pass over the river Lethe, and shall not contaminate the soul.

But if the company will be persuaded by me; considering the soul to be immortal, and able to bear all evil, and all good, we shall always persevere in the road which leads above; and shall by all means pursue justice in conjunction with prudence, in order that we may be friends both to ourselves, and to the Gods, both whilst we remain here, and when we receive its rewards, like victors assembled together; and we shall, both here, and in that journey of a thousand years which we have described, enjoy a happy life.

concerns, things eternal are neglected, hence he says that souls descending into the plain of Lethe encamp beside the river Amelete, i. e. through a connection with body they pass into extreme negligence; and there fall asleep; signifying by this their being merged in a corporeal nature, no longer possessing vigilant energies, and being alone conversant with things analogous to the delusions of dreams. But when he says that no vessel contains the water of Amelete, this signifies that nothing can restrain the ever-flowing nature of body. This, however, it must be observed, is the condition of the soul while connected with a gross aerial body, and before its perfect descent to the earth: for the descent from celestial bodies to such as are terrene is effected through an aerial body. Souls therefore being laid asleep in this body, at midnight fall to the earth; i. e. when they enter into a terrene body they become involved in profound night.

THE END OF THE TENTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE REPUBLIC.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES
TO
THE FIRST ALCIBIADES,
AND
THE REPUBLIC.

ADDITIONAL NOTES
ON THE
FIRST ALCIBIADES.

THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE FIRST ALCIBIADES ARE
EXTRACTED FROM THE MS. COMMENTARY OF PROCLUS ON THAT
DIALOGUE.

Page 16. *Son of Clinias! you wonder, I suppose, &c.*

THE prefaces (τα προοίμια) of Plato's dialogues accord with the whole scope of them; and are neither devised by Plato for the sake of dramatic allurements, since this mode of writing is very remote from the magnitude of the philosopher's conceptions, nor are they merely historical; but each is suspended from the design of the dialogue to which it belongs.

Every thing in the dialogues of Plato, in the same manner as in the mysteries, is referred to the whole perfection of the particulars which are investigated. Agreeably to this, Plato in the very beginning of this dialogue appears to me to indicate in a beautiful manner the scope of the whole composition. For his design, as we have said, was to unfold our nature, and the whole essence according to which each of us is defined; and to unveil the Delphic mandate KNOW THYSELF through demonstrative methods. But the preface itself converts the young man to himself, and represents him as exploring his own pre-existing conceptions; and, at the same time that it converts him to himself, leads him to a survey, as from a watch-tower, of Socratic science. For an investigation of the cause through which Socrates alone, of all his lovers, does not change his love, but began to love him prior to others, and is not altered when the rest no longer love, evinces him to be a spectator of the whole life of Socrates. The forms of conversion therefore are triple. For every thing which is converted, is either converted to that which is worse than itself, through apostatizing from its proper perfection, or is led back to that

that which is better than itself, through its own life, and an energy according to nature, or it is converted to itself, according to a knowledge co-ordinate to itself, and a middle form of motion. A conversion indeed to that which is worse, is a passion of the soul whose wings suffer a defluxion, and that is now placed in oblivion both of herself, and of natures prior to herself. But a conversion both to itself and to a more excellent nature, takes place not in souls only, but in divine natures themselves, as Parmenides teaches us, when he establishes two species of conversion, and shows how a divine nature is converted to itself, and is in itself, and how it is converted to that which is prior to itself, so far as it is comprehended in another, and is united with a better nature. On this account Socrates at the end of this dialogue says, that he who is converted to and becomes a spectator of himself, will by this mean behold the whole of a divine nature, and through a conversion to himself will be led to an elevated survey of divinity, and to a conversion to that which is better than himself. These things, therefore, the preface indicates. For it leads Alcibiades from a life tending to externals to a survey of himself, and recalls him through a knowledge of himself to a love of Socratic science; since a desire to learn the cause of the conduct of Socrates is to become a lover of the pre-substisting science which he contains.

Again, Plato signifies in the preface, besides other things, that a worthy man will always employ his knowledge on objects properly co-ordinated to that knowledge; and that he will never attempt to possess a stable, definite and immutable knowledge of things contingent and mutable, nor a dubious, indefinite, and disordered apprehension of things necessary, and which always possess a sameness of subsistence. But, according to the distinction adopted by Socrates in the Republic, he will conjointly contemplate all intelligibles with simple, uniform, and intellectual knowledge; but will survey the middle reasons of things with a scientific and dianoëtic evolution and composition. Again, with the sensitive power which is the third from truth, he will touch upon proper objects of knowledge, through instruments of sense, distinguishing in a becoming manner every object of sense. And lastly, by an assimilative power he will apprehend the images of sensibles. And indeed Timæus, distinguishing cognitions analogously to the objects of knowledge, exhorts us to judge of true beings by intelligence in conjunction with reason; but
such

such things as are not beings, but are perpetually conversant with generation and corruption, by opinion and sense. He also adds, that the reasons pertaining to true beings cannot be confuted, and are indubitable; but those which belong to things borne along in the rapid flux of generation, are conjectural and contingent. For every where reasons imitate the things of which they are the interpreters.

In the third place, Socrates in the *Cratylus* says that the names of things eternal have a certain alliance with the things themselves; but that the names of things generated and corrupted are multiformly changed, and partake much of position, through the unstable lation of their subjects. If therefore the knowledge of things which subsist perpetually the same, differs from that of things contingent, and reasons are allotted an all-various mutation, and different names accord with different things, is it wonderful that Socrates, who is here discoursing concerning an unstable nature, should use the word *οἶμαι*, I opine, or suppose? which signifies that the nature of the thing known is mutable, but does not accuse the knowledge of Socrates as indefinite, mingled with ignorance, and dubious.

P. 25. *You have looked down on your admirers.*

Alcibiades, by despising those that were unworthy of his love, and admiring those that were worthy of it, testifies his great alliance to the beautiful, and that he was abundantly prepared for the reception of virtue. But perhaps some one may be desirous to learn why elevated and grand conceptions move divine lovers, and appear to deserve diligent attention. We reply, that such manners seem to possess an alliance with divine beauty. For to despise things present as shadowy representations, and of no worth, and to investigate something prior to these, which is great and wonderful and transcends the conceptions of the multitude, is an evident argument of the parturieney of the soul about the beautiful. Hence Socrates in the *Republic* represents souls which are about to descend from the heavens, as choosing a commanding and magnificent life. For they still retain the echo, as it were, of the life which is there, and, in consequence of this, convert themselves to power and dominion, and despise every thing else as trifling and of no worth. But this affection is the principle of safety to souls. For to consider human concerns as small, and vile, and not worthy of serious attention, and to investigate that form of life

which is exempt from multitude and inaccessible to the vulgar, is a sufficient viaticum for the pursuit of virtue.

P. 27. *You think that if you speedily make your appearance before the Athenian people, &c.*

The design of all that has been proximately said is to purify our dianoëtic part from two-fold ignorance, and to remove all that impedes our resumption of true science. For it is impossible for things imperfect to obtain their proper perfection in any other way than by a purification of impediments; for that which purifies every where possesses this power. But the true purification of the soul is triple; one kind proceeding through the telestic art *, concerning which Socrates speaks in the Phædrus; another through philosophy, concerning which much is said in the Phædo; for there prudence and each of the other virtues is denominated a certain purification; but the purification through this dialectic science leads to contradiction, confutes the inequality of dogmas, and liberates us from two-fold ignorance. Purification therefore being triple, Socrates here employs the third of these on Alcibiades: for those that labour under two-fold ignorance are benefited by this purification. Hence Socrates does not assert any thing of truth, till he has removed those opinions which impede the soul in her apprehension of truth. Simple ignorance indeed subsists between science and two-fold ignorance; and the first transition is from science to simple ignorance, and the proximate ascent is from simple ignorance to science. At the same time likewise this ascent separates us from opinion tending to externals, converts the soul to herself; makes her explore her own proper dogmas, remove that which impedes her knowledge, and fill up what is deficient. For, as the body when disturbed by foreign humours often corrupts its aliment, and changes the benefit arising from it into a noxious property, so the soul being disturbed through false opinion, and receiving the assistance imparted from science in a manner adapted to her own habit, produces a principle of greater false opinion and deception. The purification therefore which precedes all the arguments of Socrates is comprehended in these words; and it may be said to resemble the telestic purifications which take place previous to the operations of the

* Viz. The art pertaining to mystic rites,

mysteries,

mysteries, which liberate us from all the defilements we became connected with from generation, and prepare us for the participation of a divine nature. But this purification takes place according to the dialectic method, which leads us to contradiction, confutes that deception which darkens our dianoëtic part, and proceeds through more known and universal assumptions to indubitable conclusions, receiving the major propositions from common conceptions, and the minor from the consent of him with whom we converse. It also conjoins the extremes with each other through media; denies of the minor whatever is denied of the major terms; and thinks fit that such things as are present with things predicated should also be present with the subjects of its discussion.

P. 27. *In fine, that you entertain such hopes as I have mentioned, I know with certainty.*

From hence we may rightly understand who it is that instructs, and who is instructed. For it is fit that he who instructs should accurately know the aptitudes of those that are instructed, and conformably to these should direct his attention; since every one is not to be disciplined in a similar manner. But he who is naturally a philosopher is to be led back to an incorporeal essence in one way, he who is a lover in another, and the musician in a still different way. And again, he who through the imagination of that facility of energy which belongs to a divine nature is astonished about pleasure, is to be led back in one way; he who through the desire of being sufficient to himself desires the possession of riches, in another way; and in a still different way, he who through the conception of divine power is busily employed about apparent power. For, images every where assuming the appearance of their principles draw aside unintelligent souls; but it is requisite, departing from these, to pass on to those true and real beings. And this was the mode of the Socratic doctrine, to lead up every one to the proper object of his desire. Hence, to the lover of pleasure he pointed out that which is pleasurable with purity, and unmingled with pain; for it is evident that this will be more eligible to him who pursues pleasure, than that which is mingled with its contrary. To the lover of riches he indicated where that which is truly sufficient to itself abides, and which is in no respect filled with indigence; for this must be more ardently pursued by him who aspires after self-perfection, and avoids indigence. But to the lover of dominion

he

he showed where that which is powerful and governs is to be found, and what the nature is of the ruling form of life which is free from all subjection; for this will be considered as more honourable to the ambitious man than what is mingled with that which is to be avoided. Power therefore, self-sufficiency, and pleasure are not to be found in material things. For matter is imbecility and poverty, and is the cause of corruption and pain. But it is evident that these, if they are any where to be found, are in immaterial and separate natures. These natures therefore are the proper objects of love, and to these an ascent is to be made. After this manner, therefore, he who instructs ought to introduce discipline from the physical aptitudes in each, to each imparting safety; but he who is instructed should submit himself to his instructor, and gradually be led to the truth, departing from images and a subterranean cavern * to the light and true essence, on every side extending himself to that which is unmingled with its contrary, and dismissing that which is divisible and shadowy, but aspiring after that which is universal and impartible. For total good, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*, is neither desirable only, nor alone perfect, and sufficient and able to fill other things, but comprehends at once all these, the perfect, the sufficient, the desirable. For it extends all things to itself, and imparts to all well-being; but it is regarded by the multitude partially. Hence some of them, looking only to the desirable which it contains, pursue the pleasurable, which is the image of it; but others, surveying the perfect alone, are busily employed about riches; for in these the image of perfection subsists; and others tending to the sufficient are astonished about power; for power carries with it a phantasm of sufficiency. To dismiss therefore these partial apprehensions of the good, to look to its whole nature, and to be led back to its all-perfect plenitude, separates in a becoming manner those that are instructed from an association with images.

P. 29. *Have you knowledge in those things only which you have either learnt from others, or found out yourself?*

Plato considers *Mathesis* and *Invention* as paths of knowledge adapted to our souls. For the genera superior to our soul do not acquire their proper perfection through either of these; since they are always present, and never depart from the

* Alluding to Plato's cave in the seventh book of the *Republic*.

objects of their knowledge. Nor are natures subordinate to the human, and which are called irrational, adapted to learn any dianoëtic discipline, or to discover any thing by themselves. But the human soul containing in itself all reasons, and pre-assuming all sciences, is indeed darkened from generation, respecting the theory of what it possesses, and requires discipline and invention; that through discipline it may excite its intellections, and through invention may discover itself, and the plenitude of reasons which it contains. And these are the gifts of the Gods, benefiting it in its fallen condition, and recalling it to an intellectual life. For both, indeed, are derived from the Mercurial order; but Invention so far as Mercury is the son of Maia the daughter of Atlas; and Mathesis, so far as he is the messenger of Jupiter. For, unfolding the will of his father, he imparts to souls Mathesis; but so far as he proceeds from Maia, with whom Inquiry occultly resides, he bestows on his pupils Invention. But when Mathesis proceeds supernally to souls from more excellent natures, it is better than Invention; but when from co-ordinate natures, as from men exciting our gnostic power, it is then subordinate to Invention. Hence Invention has a middle subsistence adapted to the self-motive nature of the soul: for our self-vital and self-energetic powers become especially apparent through this. But Mathesis, according to that which is more excellent than human nature, fills the soul from the more divine causes of it; but, according to that which is subordinate to our nature, from things external to our essence, excites in an alter-motive manner our vital power. Indeed, that a certain knowledge of things is produced in us from more excellent natures, divine visions sufficiently indicate, in which the Gods unfold the order of wholes to souls, becoming the leaders of a progression to an intelligible essence, and enkindling those flames which conduct the soul on high. And thus much concerning Mathesis and Invention.

But investigations and doctrines are necessarily preceded by simple ignorance. For the scientific no longer investigate the truth, in consequence of having obtained the boundary of knowledge, according to science; nor yet those that are involved in twofold ignorance. For this very thing is two-fold ignorance, to consider that as sufficient which is neither beautiful, nor good, nor prudent, says Diotima, in the Banquet. This arises from souls descending into generation, and being essentially full of sciences, but receiving oblivion from generation, or the

regions of sense. And in consequence of possessing the reasons of things, they have as it were agitated conceptions concerning them; but being vanquished by the position of oblivion, they are incapable of expressing their conceptions, and referring them to science. Hence they contain them indigested and scarcely respiring, and on this account they are vanquished by two-fold ignorance. For they think that they know through these innate conceptions, but they are ignorant through oblivion; and hence arise deception, and an appearance of knowledge without the reality (*δοκίσις*). He therefore who is involved in two-fold ignorance is remote from an investigation of things, in the same manner as he is who possesses scientific knowledge. For neither is it the province of a wise man to philosophize, nor of him who labours under the disease of two-fold ignorance; but this evidently belongs to him who is established according to simple ignorance. For he who is ignorant in a two-fold respect, is according to this similar to the wise man; just as matter, as some one rightly observes, possesses a dissimilar similitude to divinity. For, as matter is without form, so also is divinity. Each likewise is infinite and unknown; though this is true of the one according to that which is better, and of the other according to that which is worse than all things. Thus therefore the man of science, and the ignorant in a two-fold respect, do not investigate any thing; the one in consequence of being wise, and as it were full of knowledge; and the other in consequence of not even assuming the principles of investigation, through the falsehood with which he is surrounded. But he who possesses simple ignorance subsists in a certain respect between the man of science and him who doubles his deception. For he in short who knows himself, and is converted to himself, is superior to him who is perfectly ignorant of himself; but he who on beholding himself does not perceive knowledge but ignorance, is inferior to the man of science. For, of these three characters, the man of two-fold ignorance is entirely unconverted to himself; the wise man is converted to himself, and through this conversion finds within himself the virtues and sciences, *shining forth to the view like divine statues* *; (*οὐκ ἀγαλματα θεῖα προλαμπόντα*) but the man of simple ignorance is converted indeed,

* As I have shown in my Dissertation on the Mysteries, from indubitable authority, that a skill in magic formed the last part of the sacerdotal office, it is by no means wonderful that, through this theurgic art, the statues in the temples where the mysteries were celebrated should have been rendered resplendent with divine light.

but

but beholds within ignorance, and a privation of actual science; and thus he is constituted at the beginning of mathesis and invention; either exploring himself and his own wealth, which he did not know that he possessed, or betaking himself to teachers, and by them being led to knowledge. In short, the soul according to science is assimilated to intellect, comprehending the object of knowledge in energy in the same manner as intellect comprehends the intelligible; but according to two-fold ignorance, it is assimilated to matter. For, as matter possesses all things according to mere appearance, but in reality contains nothing, and is thought to be adorned, but is not exempt from a privation of ornament; so he who possesses two-fold ignorance thinks that he knows what he does not know, and carries about with him an appearance of wisdom in things of which he is ignorant. But Socrates, when he admits that there was a time in which we did not think ourselves knowing in what we now know, is thought by some to contradict what he says in the *Phædo*, in which discoursing about discipline being reminiscence, he shows that possessing a knowledge of the equal, the just, the beautiful, and of every form, we cannot relate the time when we received this knowledge. To this objection we reply, that the knowledge of our souls is two-fold; the one indistinct, and subsisting according to mere conjecture, but the other distinct, scientific and indubitable. For, as he somewhere says, we appear to know all things as in a dream, but are ignorant of them according to vigilant perception; containing indeed the reasons of things essentially, and as it were breathing forth the knowledges of these, but not possessing them in energy and vigour. Of the conception therefore of forms subsisting in us essentially, there is no preceding time; for we perpetually possess it; but we can relate the time in which we acquired a knowledge of forms according to energy and a distinct subsistence.

P. 29. *Now what the things are which you have learnt I tolerably well know, &c.*

That these three disciplines, says Proclus, viz. mathesis, music, and gymnastic, contribute to the whole of political virtue, is evident. For gymnastic strengthens the softness of desire, and recalls its dissipated nature to a firm tone; this desiderative part of the soul being proximate to bodies. For anger is the tone of the soul, and, being oppressed with a death-like sleep through matter, requires to be strengthened and

excited. But through music the robust and savage nature of anger is softened, and rendered elegant and harmonious. But neither is gymnastic alone sufficient to erudition. For when immoderately pursued, and unaccompanied with music, it renders the manners rustic, contentious, and vehement. Nor is music alone sufficient without gymnastic: for the life of those who alone use music without the gymnastic exercises becomes effeminate and soft. It is requisite therefore, as in a lyre, that there should neither be vehemence alone, nor remission, but that the whole soul should be harmonized with respect to itself from disciplinative intension and remission. But the mathematics and dialectic excite and lead upwards our rational part: for the eye of the soul, which is blinded and buried by many other studies, is resuscitated by these, and is converted to its own essence and to the knowledge of itself. And all these are Mercurial disciplines. For this God is the inspective guardian of *gymnastic exercises*; and hence *hermæ*, or carved statues of Mercury, were placed in the Palæstræ: of *music*, and hence he is honoured as the lyrist (*λυραϊος*) among the celestial constellations: and of *disciplines*, because the invention of geometry, reasoning, and discourse is referred to this God. He presides therefore over every species of erudition, leading us to an intelligible essence from this mortal abode, governing the different herds of souls, and dispersing the sleep and oblivion with which they are oppressed. He is likewise the supplier of recollection, the end of which is a genuine intellectual apprehension of divine natures. In well instituted polities, therefore, youth are instructed by the guardians in these disciplines: and among the Athenians certain images of these were preserved; grammar having a reference to dialectic discipline; playing on the harp pertaining to music, and wrestling to gymnastic; in which those youths that were well-born were instructed. And hence Socrates says that Alcibiades had learnt these, as having had an education adapted to a well-born youth.

This also accords with the order of the universe. For our first age partakes in an eminent degree of the lunar operations; as we then live according to a nutritive and natural * power. But our second age participates of Mercurial prerogatives; because we then apply ourselves to letters, music, and wrestling. The third age is governed

* For the whole of nature, according to the antient theology, is under the government of the moon; from the deity of which it also proceeds.

by Venus; because then we begin to produce seed, and the generative powers of nature are put in motion. The fourth age is solar; for then our youth is in its vigour and full perfection, subsisting as a medium between generation and decay; for such is the order which vigour is allotted. The fifth age is governed by Mars; in which we principally aspire after power and superiority over others. The sixth age is governed by Jupiter; for in this we give ourselves up to prudence, and pursue an active and political life. And the seventh age is Saturnian, in which it is natural to separate ourselves from generation, and transfer ourselves to an incorporeal life. And thus much we have discussed, in order to procure belief that letters and the whole of education are suspended from the Mercurial series.

But it is worth while to consider on what account Alcibiades refused to learn to play on wind-instruments, though this art pertains to music. It has then been said by some, that being vain of his person from his youth, he avoided that deformity of the face which is occasioned by blowing the pipe or flute. But it is better to say, that well-instituted politics are averse to the art of playing on wind-instruments; and therefore neither does Plato admit it. The cause of this is the variety of this instrument, the pipe, which shows that the art which uses it should be avoided. For instruments called Panarmonia, and those consisting of many strings, are imitations of pipes. For every hole of the pipe emits, as they say, three sounds at least; but if the cavity above the holes be opened, then each hole will emit more than three sounds. It is however requisite not to admit all music in education, but that part of it only which is simple. Further still: of these musical instruments, some are repressive, and others motive; some are adapted to rest, and others to motion. The repressive therefore are most useful for education, leading our manners into order, repressing the turbulency of youth, and bringing its agitated nature to quietness and temperance. But the motive instruments are adapted to enthusiastic energy: and hence, in the mysteries and mystic sacrifices, the pipe is useful; for the motive power of it is employed for the purpose of exciting the dianoëtic power to a divine nature. For here it is requisite that the irrational part should be laid asleep, and the rational excited. Hence, those that instruct youth use repressive instruments, but initiators such as are motive: for that which is disciplined is the irrational part; but it is reason which is initiated, and which energizes enthusiastically.

P. 36. *How is this, friend Alcibiades, &c.*

The descent of the soul into body separates it from divine souls, from whom it is filled with intelligence, power, and purity, and conjoins it with generation, and nature, and material things, from which it is filled with oblivion, wandering, and ignorance. For, in its descent, multiform lives and various vestments grow upon it, which draw it down into a mortal composition, and darken its vision of real being. It is requisite therefore that the soul which is about to be led properly from hence to that ever-vigilant nature, should amputate those second and third powers which are suspended from its essence, in the same manner as weeds, stones and shells, from the marine Glaucus; should restrain its externally proceeding impulses, and recollect true beings and a divine essence, from which it descended, and to which it is fit that the whole of our life should hasten. But the parts or powers which are in want of perfection in us, are: the irrational life, which is naturally adapted to be adorned and disciplined through manners; the proæretic * part, which requires to be withdrawn from irrational appetites, and a connection with them; and besides these our gnostic power, which requires a reminiscence of true beings. For the part which recollects is different from that which is elegantly arranged through manners; and different from both these is the part which by admonitions and instructions becomes more commensurate. It is requisite, therefore, that discipline should accord with these three parts: and, in the first place, that it should perfect us through rectitude of manners; in the next place, through admonition and precepts; and, in the third place, that it should excite our innate reasons, and purify the knowledge which essentially subsists in our souls, through reminiscence. Such then are the genera, and such the order of perfection adapted to souls falling into bodies.

These things then being admitted, the third of these parts, viz. the rational nature, acquires perfection through discipline and invention. For the soul is essentially self-motive, but, in consequence of communicating with the body, participates in a certain respect of alter-motion. For, as it imparts to the body the last image of self-motion, so it receives the representation of alter-motion, through its habitude about the body. Through the power of self-motion therefore the soul acquires, and

* *Proæretis* (*προαιρεσις*) is a deliberative tendency to things within the reach of our ability to effect.

is inventive and prolific of reasons and sciences; but, through its representation of alter-motion, it requires to be excited by others. More perfect souls, however, are more inventive; but the more imperfect are indigent of external assistance. For, some are more self-motive, and are less replete with a subordinate nature; but others are less self-motive, and are more passive from a corporeal nature. As they advance however in perfection, are excited from body, and collect their powers from matter, they become more prolific, and more inventive of the things about which they were before unprolific and dubious, through the sluggishness and privation of life proceeding from matter, and the sleep of generation. We therefore, thus preserving the medium of a rational essence, can assign the causes of the more imperfect and perfect habits in the soul; and we say, that such are the paths of the perfection of souls. But those who do not preserve this medium, but either rise to that which is better, or decline to that which is worse, fall off from the truth respecting these particulars. For we do not admit their arguments who say, that the soul coming into a moist body, and being thence darkened, is stupid from the beginning *; but that, this moisture becoming exhaled, through the innate heat, and possessing greater symmetry, the power of intellectual prudence in the soul is rejuvenized. For this mode of perfection is corporeal and material, and supposes that the perfection of the soul is consequent to the temperament of the body; though prior to the elements, and prior to the whole of generation, the soul had a subsistence, and was a life unmingled with body and nature. Nor, again, do we assent to those who say that the soul is a portion of the divine essence †; that this portion is similar to the whole, and is always perfect; and that tumult and passions subsist about the animal. For those who assert these things make the soul ever-perfect, and ever-scientific, at no time requiring reminiscence, and always impassive, and free from the defilement of evil. Timæus, however, says, that our essence does not subsist entirely from the first genera, in the same manner as the souls superior to ours, but from such as are second and third. And Socrates, in the Phædrus, says that our powers are mingled with that which is contrary to good, and are filled with opposition to each other; and that, through this, sometimes the better and sometimes the worse parts are victorious. But what occasion is there to say more on this subject, since Socrates

* This appears to have been the opinion of Heraclitus.

† This was the opinion of the Stoics.

himself

himself says, in that dialogue, that the charioteer * becomes depraved, and that through his depravity many souls become lame, and many lose their wings, though the charioteering power (*ἡμοχωτική δύναμις*) is one of the more venerable powers of the soul? For it is this which has a reminiscence of divine natures, and which uses second and third powers as ministrant to reminiscence. These things, therefore, are clearly asserted in the Phædrus.

As we have said, then, the measures of the soul are to be preserved; and the reasons concerning its perfection are neither to be referred to it from corporeal natures, nor from such as are divine; that thus we may be fit interpreters of Plato, and not distort the words of the philosopher by forcing them to a coincidence with our own opinion. Since, therefore, the soul is at one time imperfect, and is again perfected, and becomes oblivious of divine natures, and again remembers them, it is evident that time contributes to its perfection. For how could it change from folly to wisdom, and in short to virtue from vice, unless it made these mutations in time? For all mutation subsists in time. And thus much concerning the perfection of the soul in general.

From what has been said, then, we may collect that he who knows what is just passes from ignorance to a knowledge of it; and that he neither has the reason of the just always at hand, in the same manner as the natures superior to man (for we are born at first imperfect), nor again that the knowledge of it arrives to us through the mutation of the body. For our essence is not corporeal, nor composed from material genera. It remains, therefore, that either discipline or invention must precede knowledge; and Alcibiades is very properly requested to tell who was the cause of his acquiring discipline, and whence he knows what *the just* is, if he does know. For it is necessary, as we have often said, that *discipline* should be the leader of knowledge imparted by another; and *a teacher*, of discipline. For discipline is a motion; but all motion requires a moving cause. It requires therefore a teacher, for he is the cause of discipline.

P. 37. *Can you tell me, then, at what time you did not imagine yourself to know what things are just and what are unjust?*

Proclus, in commenting on this passage, having remarked that investigation which

* That is, the dianoëtic power of the soul, or that power which reasons scientifically.

precedes

precedes invention, excites the eye of the soul, and exercises it for the perception of truth, further observes as follows: "Again, the discourse proceeds from invention to simple ignorance; for no one would attempt to investigate that which he thinks he knows. It is necessary, therefore, that simple ignorance should be the beginning of investigation. For investigation is a desire of knowledge in things of which we suspect that we are ignorant. This being the case, it is necessary that the time should be known in which we suspected that we did not know: and hence Socrates desires Alcibiades to tell him the time in which he suspected his want of knowledge. For, as we have before observed, it is necessary that all such mutations should be measured by time. Hence the dæmoniacal Aristotle, also, here admits motion in the soul, and a mutation according to time. But that an association with the body, and a transition from vice to virtue, require time, is manifest to every one. As some however have said, that the soul when subsisting by itself does not require time for its energies, but that on the contrary it generates time; this assertion I think requires some consideration. For time is two-fold; one kind being that which is consubstantial with the natural life and corporeal motion of the universe, and another kind that which pervades through the life of an incorporeal nature. This latter time, therefore, measures the periods of divine souls, and perfects the separate energies of ours. But the former, which is extended with a life according to nature, measures that life of our souls which subsists with body, but by no means that life of the soul which lives itself by itself."

P. 38. *But, by Jove, I was not ignorant of that point; for I clearly saw that I was injured.*

The young man here acknowledges that he has a suspicion of the knowledge of things just; and hence Socrates again asks him whether he learnt or discovered this knowledge. In consequence of this, Alcibiades confesses, that his knowledge was not acquired either by learning or invention, because he cannot mention any time of his ignorance, after which he either investigated or was taught justice. And it appears to me to be clearly shown by this, what that science is which we possess prior to all time, and what that is which is produced in time. For Socrates, looking to science in energy, inquires what was the time prior to this; but Alcibiades,

ades, possessing science essentially, through which he thinks that he knows what he does not know, cannot tell the time of its participation ; for we possess it perpetually. So that, if Socrates speaks about one science, and Alcibiades about another, both these assertions are true, viz. that time precedes science, and that the time prior to its presence cannot be told : for of imperfect science there is no preceding time, but of that which subsists in energy and is perfect, there is.

P. 38. *Well. But I was wrong in my answers when I supposed that I had found out that knowledge by myself, &c.*

Discipline being two-fold, and at one time proceeding from more excellent causes to such as are subordinate, according to which the demiurgus in the *Timæus* says to the junior Gods, " Learn what I now say to you indicating my desire ;" but at another time proceeding from a cause externally moving, according to which we are accustomed to inscribe certain persons as teachers ; and invention ranking between these ; for it is subordinate to the knowledge imparted to the soul from the Gods, but is more perfect than reminiscence externally derived ;—this being the case, Alcibiades had not any conception of discipline from a more excellent cause, except so far as looking to the science essentially inherent in us, in a dormant state, which is imparted from the Gods, and by which he was led to conjecture that he accurately knew the nature of the just. But coming to invention, which has a middle subsistence in the soul which also ranks as a medium, and being likewise shaken by reasoning, and shown that he had neither investigated nor could tell the time of his ignorance, which must necessarily subsist previous to inquiry, he now again comes to the second kind of discipline, and, being dubious with respect to the truly scientific teacher of things just, flies to the multitude, and their unstable life, and considers these as the leader of the knowledge of what is just. Here therefore Socrates, like another Hercules, cutting off the Hydra's heads, shows that every multitude is unworthy to be believed respecting the knowledge of things just and unjust. The reasoning, indeed, appears to contribute but little to the purification of the young man ; but, when accurately considered, it will be found to be directed to the same end. For, in the first place, Alcibiades,

being

being ambitious, suspended his opinion from the multitude, and about this was filled with astonishment. Socrates therefore shows him, first, that the opinion of the multitude possesses no authority in the judgment and knowledge of things; and that it is not proper for him to adhere to it, whose view is directed to the beautiful: and, in the second place, that the multitude is the cause of false opinion, producing in us from our youth depraved imaginations and various passions. Scientific reasoning therefore is necessary, in order to give a right direction to that part of us which is perverted by an association with the multitude; to apply a remedy to our passive part, and to purify that which is filled with impurity; for thus we shall become adapted to a reminiscence* of science. In the third place, Socrates shows, that in each of us, as he says, there is a many-headed wild beast, which is analogous to the multitude; for this is what the people is in a city, viz. the various and material form of the soul, which is our lowest part. The present reasoning therefore exhorts us to depart from boundless desire, and to lay aside the multitude of life, and our inward people, as not being a judge worthy of belief respecting the nature of things, nor a recipient of any whole science; for nothing irrational is naturally adapted to partake of science. In the fourth place, therefore, we say, that the present reasoning does not think fit to admit into science and an intellectual life an apostacy and flight from *the one*, together with diversity, and all-various division; but indicates that all these should be rejected as foreign from intellect and divine union. For it is requisite not only to fly from external, but also from the multitude in the soul; nor this alone, but also to abandon multitude of every kind.

In the first place, therefore, we must fly from "the multitude of men going along in a herd," as the oracle† says, and must neither communicate with their lives, nor with their opinions. In the next place we must fly from multiform appetites, which divide us about body, and make us to be at different times impelled to different externals; at one time to irrational pleasures, and at another to actions indefinite, and which war on each other: for these fill us with penitence and evils. We must also fly from the senses which are nourished with us, and which deceive

* In the original *αναμνησιν*; but the sense requires we should read *αναμνησιν*.

† That is, one of the Chaldaean oracles; to my collection of which I refer the reader.

our dianoëtic part : for they are multiform, at different times are conversant with different sensibles, and assert nothing sane, nothing accurate, as Socrates himself says*. We must likewise fly from imaginations, as figured, and divisible, and thus introducing infinite variety, and not suffering us to return to that which is impartible and immaterial ; but, when we are hastening to apprehend an essence of this kind, drawing us down to passive intelligence. We must fly too from opinions ; for these are various and infinite, tend to that which is external, are mingled with phantasy and sense, and are not free from contrariety ; since our opinions also contend with each other, in the same manner as imaginations with imaginations, and one sense with another. But, flying from all these divisible and various forms of life, we should run back to science, and there collect in union the multitude of theorems, and comprehend all the sciences in one according bond. For there is neither sedition nor contrariety in the sciences with each other ; but such as are secondary are subservient to those that are prior, and derive from them their proper principles. At the same time it is requisite here to betake ourselves from many sciences to one science, which is unhypothetical †, and the first, and to extend to this all the rest. But after science and the exercise pertaining to it, we must lay aside compositions, divisions, and multiform transitions, and transfer the soul to an intellectual life, and simple projections ‡. For science is not the summit of knowledge, but prior to this is intellect ; I do not only mean that intellect which is exempt from soul, but an illumination § from thence, which is infused into the soul, and concerning which Aristotle says, “ that it is intellect by which we know terms ||,” and Timæus, “ that it is ingenerated in nothing else than soul.” Ascending therefore to this intellect, we must contemplate together with it an intelligible essence ; with simple and indivisible projections surveying the simple, accurate, and indivisible genera of beings. But, after venerable intellect, it is necessary to

* In the Phædo.

† By this first of sciences Proclus means the *dialectic* of Plato, concerning which see the Parmenides.

‡ Intellectual vision is intuitive ; and hence intellect, by an *immediate projection* of its vivifying power, apprehends the objects of its knowledge. Hence too the vivifying energies of intellect are called by the Platonists νοεραὶ ἐπιβολαί, i. e. *intellectual projections*.

§ This illumination is the summit of the dianoëtic part.

|| That is, simple, indemonstrable propositions.

excite the supreme hyparxis or summit of the soul, according to which we are one, and under which the multitude we contain is united. For as by our intellect we pass into contact with a divine intellect, so by our unity, and as it were the flower of our essence, it is lawful to touch the *first one*, the source of union to all things. For the similar is every where to be comprehended by the similar; objects of science by science; intelligibles by intellect; and the most united measures of beings, by *the one* of the soul. And this is the very summit of our energies. According to this we become divine, flying from all multitude, verging to our own union, becoming one, and energizing uniformly. And thus proceeding through the gradations of knowledge, you may see the rectitude of the Socratic exhortation.

But if you are willing also to consider the admonition according to the objects of knowledge, fly from all sensible things; for they are divided from each other, are divisible, and perfectly mutable, and therefore cannot be apprehended by genuine knowledge. From these, therefore, transfer yourself to an incorporeal essence: for every thing sensible has an adventitious union, and is of itself dissipated, and full of infinity. Hence also its good is divisible and adventitious, is distant from itself and discordant, and possesses its hypostasis in a foreign seat. Having therefore ascended thither, and being established among incorporeals, you will behold the order pertaining to soul above bodies, self-motive and self-energetic, and subsisting in and from itself, but at the same time multiplied, and anticipating in itself a certain representation of an essence divisible about bodies. There likewise you will see an all-various multitude of habitudes of reasons, analogies, bonds, wholes, and parts, circles characterized by the nature of soul, a variety of powers, and a perfection neither eternal nor at once wholly stable, but evolved according to time, and subsisting in discursive energies: for such is the nature of soul. After the multitude in souls, extend yourself to intellect, and the intellectual kingdoms, that you may apprehend the union of things, and become a spectator of the nature of intellect. There behold an essence abiding in eternity, a fervid life and sleepless intellection, to which nothing of life is wanting, and which does not desire the chariot of time to the perfection of its nature. When you have surveyed these, and have also seen by how great an interval they are superior to souls, inquire whether there is any multitude there, and if intellect, since it is one, is likewise all-perfect,

and if multiform as well as uniform: for you will find that it thus subsists. Having therefore learnt this, and beheld intellectual multitude, indivisible and united, betake yourself again to another principle, and prior to intellectual essences survey the unities* of intellects, and an union exempt from wholes. Here abiding, relinquish all multitude, and you will arrive at the fountain of *the good*. You see then that the present reasoning affords us no small assistance, in exhorting us to fly from the multitude; and how it contributes to all the *salvation*† of the soul, if we direct our attention to the multitude which pervades through all things. The most beautiful principle therefore of our perfection is to separate ourselves from external multitude, and from the multitude in the appetites of the soul, and in the indefinite motions of opinion.

From hence also it is evident that souls do not collect their knowledge from sensibles, nor from things partial and divisible discover *the whole* and *the one*; but that they call forth discipline inwardly, and correct the imperfection of the phænomena. For it is not fit to think that things which have in no respect a real subsistence should be the leading causes of knowledge in the soul; and that things which oppose each other, which require the reasonings of the soul, and are ambiguous, should precede science, which has a sameness of subsistence; nor that things which are variously mutable should be generative of reasons which are established in unity; nor that things indefinite should be the causes of definite intelligence. It is not proper, therefore, that the truth of things eternal should be received from *the many*, nor the discrimination of universals from sensibles, nor a judgment respecting what is good from irrational natures; but it is requisite that the soul entering within herself should investigate in herself *the true* and *the good*, and the eternal reasons of things. For the essence of the soul is full of these, but they are concealed in the oblivion produced by generation‡. Hence the soul in investigating truth looks to externals, though she essentially contains it in herself, and, deserting her own essence, explores *the good* in things foreign to its nature. From hence, then, the beginning of the knowledge of ourselves is derived. For, if we look to the multitude of men, we shall

* For an account of these unities see the Parmenides, and the Introduction to it.

† Σωτηρία. The term *salvation* is not peculiar to the Christian religion, since long before its establishment the Heathens had their *saviour gods*.

‡ Generation signifies, according to Plato and his best disciples, the whole of a sensible nature.

never

never see the one form of them, in consequence of its being shadowed over by the multitude, division, discord, and all-various mutation of its participants; but if we convert ourselves to our own essence, we shall there survey without molestation the one reason and nature of men. Very properly, therefore, does Socrates separate far from a survey of the multitude the soul that is about to know what man truly is, and previous to a speculation of this kind purifies from impeding opinions. For multitude is an impediment to a conversion of the soul into herself, and to a knowledge of the one form of things. For, in material concerns, variety obscures unity, difference sameness, and dissimilitude similitude; since forms here do not subsist without confusion, nor are the more excellent unmingled with the baser natures.

P. 38. *To no good teachers have you recourse for the origin of your knowledge, &c.*

Proclus in commenting on this part observes: "No one ought to wonder, if, when we say that what is natural is more abundant than what is contrary to nature, and that the latter is contracted into a narrow space, but the former has dominion in the universe, yet at the same time we assert that the greater part of mankind is destitute of science, and vicious, and that but a few are scientific. For a life in conjunction with body and generation is not natural to souls; but on the contrary a separate, immaterial, and incorporeal life is properly adapted to them. When therefore they are conversant with generation, they resemble those that inhabit a pestilential region; but when they live beyond generation, they resemble, as Plato says, those that dwell in meadows. Hence, as it is not wonderful that in pestilential places the diseased should be more numerous than the healthy; in like manner we ought not to wonder that in generation souls obnoxious to passions and full of depravity abound more than those of a contrary description. But, it will be wonderful if some souls invested with these bodies, confined in these bonds, and surrounded with such mutation, should be found sober, pure, and free from perturbation. For, is it not astonishing that the soul should live immaterially in things material, and preserve itself undefiled amidst mortal natures? and that, having drunk from the envenomed cup, it should not be laid asleep by the oblivious draught? For oblivion, error, and ignorance resemble an envenomed potion, which draws down souls into the region of dissimilitude. Why therefore should you wonder that many according to life are wolves, many are swine,

swine, and many are invested with some other form of irrational animals? For the region about the earth is in reality the abode of Circe; and many souls through immoderate desire are ensnared by her enchanted bowl."

P. 39. *And must not all those who have the knowledge of any thing agree together on that subject, &c.*

Proclus on this part having observed that it is requisite to consider dissension as an argument of ignorance, and concord as an argument of knowledge, for all those that know the truth do not disagree with each other, after this adds as follows: "But this to some may appear to be false; since those that accord with each other do not all of them possess a scientific knowledge of that respecting which they agree. For, in the present time, the multitude* *through the want of science* accord with each other in denying the existence of the Gods. In answer to this doubt, we reply in the first place, that the depraved man cannot accord with himself; for it is necessary, being vicious, that he should be in sedition with his own life; perceiving indeed the truth through his rational nature, but through passions and material phantasies being led to ignorance and contention with himself. The atheist therefore and intemperate man, according to their dianoëtic part, which is adapted to a divine nature, and which is of a beneficent destiny, assert things temperate and divine; but, according to their desires and phantasies, they are atheistically and intemperately affected †. And, in short, according to the irrational soul, they introduce war in themselves, and all-various perturbation. Every vicious man therefore is discordant with himself; and this being the case, he is much more so with others. For, how can he consent with those external to himself, who is seditiously affected towards himself? All atheistical, intemperate, and unjust men, therefore, dissent with each other, and we can never be harmoniously disposed while we are unscientific.

"This however is attended with much doubt: for, if dissension is an argument of the want of science, we must say that philosophers are unscientific, since they also disagree with each other, subvert the hypotheses of each other, and patronize different systems.

* Viz. the Christians.

† Hence the *unscientific* do not *truly* accord with each other: for the rational part in them secretly dissents to what the irrational part admits.

This

This doubt may be dissolved by saying that diffension is two-fold, one kind being the diffension of the ignorant, both with themselves and with each other, and the other of the ignorant with the scientific; for both these belong to the ignorant, but by no means to the scientific, since they accord with themselves*. Nor do the scientific disagree with the unscientific; for, on the contrary, they perfect and adorn them, and call them upwards to their own order; but it is the unscientific who separate themselves from the scientific. For through the diffension in themselves they dissent from those that are better than themselves. Those that are endued with knowledge, therefore, and those that are deprived of it, do not disagree with each other; nor, in short, must it be said that the scientific differ. Hence the doubt is very far from affecting true philosophers: for these through similitude and sameness are united to each other; and being allotted a knowledge entirely exempt from the unscientific, neither are they discordant with them.

"But the cause of the concord of the scientific is, first, the definite nature of things, and the criteria of knowledge, being the same with all men; and secondly, because, in the first principles of things, intellect is united to itself, and hence every thing which participates of intellect participates of unity. Science therefore is an illumination of intellect, but concord of *the one*: for it is a union of things different. And hence it is necessary that those which participate of the same science should accord with each other; for diffension and discord fall off from *the one*."

P. 42. *Are you sensible that what you said last was not fairly said, Alcibiades? &c.*

If the principal end of this dialogue is to lead us to the knowledge of ourselves, and to show that our essence consists in forms and reasons, that it produces all sciences from itself, and knows in itself every thing divine, and the forms of nature; the present passage, which evinces that the cause of all the preceding answers and conclusions is in Alcibiades, must greatly contribute to this end. For the soul does not possess an adventitious knowledge of things, nor, like an unwritten tablet, does it externally receive the images of divine ideas. Now, therefore, Alcibiades begins to know himself, and also to know that he is converted to himself; and knowing his

* Philosophers accord with each other in proportion to their possession of science, and dissent in proportion to their privation of it. With intellectual philosophers, therefore, there is more concord than with others, because they have more of genuine science.

own energy and knowledge, he becomes one with the thing known. This mode of conversion, therefore, leads the soul to the contemplation of its essence. Hence it is necessary, that the soul should first receive a knowledge of herself; in the second place, that she should consider the powers which she is allotted; and, in the third place, how she is impelled to ascend from things more imperfect as far as to first causes. Alcibiades, therefore, is now converted through energy to energy, and, through this, to that which energizes. For, at the same time, the subject becomes apparent, which is generative of its proper energies. But, again, through energy he is converted to power, and through this again to essence: for powers are nearer to essence, and finally connect energy with essence. Hence, all these become one and concur with each other, essence being in energy, and energy becoming essential; for essence becomes intellectual in energy, and energy becomes connate to essence according to its perfection.

Again: since ignorance is involuntary to all men, and especially an ignorance of themselves and of things the most honourable; hence, to ancient and wise men, the method through arguments, which places false opinions parallel to such as are true*, appeared to be most useful for the purpose of liberating the soul from this ignorance; since it unfolds the discord of false, and the concord of true opinions with each other. For, when the passions are shown to be in opposition with opinions, and, again, the passions with each other, and after the same manner opinions, then the depravity of ignorance becomes most conspicuous; and he who is ignorant perceives his own calamity, and rejoices to be liberated from so great an evil. When therefore any one is not only convinced by arguments that he is ignorant in things of the greatest consequence, but is also confuted by himself, then he in a still greater degree rejoices in and embraces the confutation, and multiplies the remedy produced by it. If, therefore, Socrates in his dialectic conversations evinces that it is the same person who answers and is interrogated, and that the answers do not proceed from the interrogator who appears to confute; it is perfectly evident that he who is thus confuted is confuted by himself, and does not suffer this externally; so that this mode of cure is most appropriate. For by how much the more familiar it appears, by so

* This method forms an important part of the dialectic of Plato; for a full account of which, see the Introduction to the Parmenides.

much the more is the weight and pain of it diminished, and its gentleness and benefit extended; since every thing familiar or domestic is more efficacious as a remedy.

In the third place, we again say that irrational animals are governed by external impulse, being deprived of the power of governing and preserving themselves; but the human soul through its self-motive and self-energetic peculiarity is naturally adapted to energize about itself, to move itself, and to impart to itself good. The confutation therefore which originates from ourselves is adapted to the essence of the soul; and the reasoning which evinces that he who answers is the same with the speaker, evidently accords with our essence and energies. For our purification is not effected externally, but originates inwardly from the soul herself. For all evil is external and adventitious to the soul; but good is internal, as the soul is naturally boniform; and by how much the more perfect she becomes, by so much the more does she receive a self-moved life, since she becomes externally moved through body being suspended from her nature, and through a corporeal sympathy. Hence, whatever she receives externally remains situated out of her, as a phantasm, and an object of sense; but those things alone reside in her which operate from herself in herself, and which are produced by her. She is therefore purified by herself; since reason also beginning from itself ends in itself. But, if he who answers is confuted, he who is confuted is purified; and he who is purified purifies himself according to the idiom of the essence of the soul; he who answers, certainly purifies himself, and is liberated from ignorance, applying confutation to himself, which accords with the self-motive nature of the soul.

Further still: this reasoning sufficiently confirms the doctrine, that disciplines are reminiscences; for this is a great argument in favour of such a dogma, that those who answer, assert all things from themselves; and sufficiently proves that souls draw forth reasons from themselves, only require an exciting cause, and are not unwritten tablets receiving figures externally, but are ever written, the writer subsisting in the recesses of the soul. All men, however, cannot read what is written, their inward eye being buried in the oblivion of generation, through which also they become defiled with the passions. An ablation therefore of that which darkens is alone requisite; but there is no occasion for external and adventitious knowledge. For, the soul contains in herself the gates of truth, but they are barred by terrene

and material forms. If therefore any one shall accurately demonstrate that souls are indeed moved by other things, but that they draw forth from themselves scientific answers, he will from this evince the truth of the Platonic assertion, that the soul knows all things, and only requires to be externally excited in order to answer scientifically.

After another manner, likewise, the proposed theorem is adapted to Socrates. For, to purify one who requires such assistance, himself through himself, is the work of a dæmoniacal power; since dæmons do not act upon us externally, but govern us inwardly, as from the stern of a ship. Nor do they purify us as bodies, which are allotted an alter-motive nature, but they take care of us as self-motive beings. For thus they extend to us communications of good, and purifications from the passions. Socrates therefore, who with respect to Alcibiades ranks in the order of a good dæmon, shows him that he is confuted by no other than himself.

P. 43. *In those assertions, was it not said that Alcibiades, &c.*

It is rightly said by the Stoics, that the man who is void of erudition accuses others, and not himself, as the causes of his infelicity; but that he who has made some advances in knowledge refers to himself the cause of all that he does or says badly; and that he who is properly disciplined, neither accuses himself nor others; since he does not neglect any thing that is requisite, but is himself the leader of appropriate invention. For these things are now clearly indicated to us in Alcibiades; since, labouring under two-fold ignorance, he does not accuse himself, but Socrates: but afterwards, when he is transferred to simple ignorance, he accuses himself of dissension, and not his leader; and if he ever became scientific, he would neither accuse himself nor another; for then nothing in him would be dissonant and unharmonized, but all the motions of his soul would be clear, all would be effable, all intellectual. For discord in the multitude with themselves very properly happens, because they receive some things from sense, others from the phantasy, and others from opinion; some things from anger, and others from desire. For such like passions in men are not only excited from dogmas, as the Stoics say; but, on the contrary, on account of such passions and appetites, they change their opinions, and receive such as are depraved in the place of such as are worthy. These
therefore,

therefore, from many principles and powers of a worse condition, receiving in themselves multiform motions, possèss a soul dissentient and unharmonized. But the scientific from one principle prior to themselves receive the whole of knowledge: for intellect imparts to them principles; and true dogmas are the progeny of intellect, subsisting in conjunction with simplicity. From such a uniform principle, therefore, all things accord with each other.

Indeed, what is now said by Socrates very seasonably follows what has been demonstrated, and is referred to Alcibiades himself, representing him as accusing himself. For, in order to produce the most striking confutations, the antients ascribed to other persons the most severe assertions; and this method they adopted in common. Thus Homer refers the reproving of Achilles to Peleus *, and Demosthenes the reprehending of the Athenians to the Greeks in common: and in like manner Plato refers to laws and philosophy the reproving of his hearers. For confutations are diminished when they are transferred to others who are absent from us. But when he who confutes is not another, but a man confutes himself, then the confutation appears, to the confuted, to be much less painful. This therefore Socrates effects. For he represents Alcibiades confuted by Alcibiades; mitigating by this method the vehemence of the reproof, and unfolding the alliance of the reprover to the reproved.

Proclus concludes his comment on this passage, as follows: "That ignorance is a mania of an extended duration, and especially two-fold ignorance, is a paradox, but is at the same time most true. For, as he who is insane is ignorant both of

* Proclus here alludes to the following lines in the speech of Ulysses to Achilles, Iliad. lib. ix. l. 253.

ὦ πεπών, ἢ μὲν σοι γὰρ πατὴρ ἐπετελλετο Πηλεὺς

Ἡματι τῷ, ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε·

Τεκνον ἐμὸν, καρτὸς μὲν Ἀθηναίῃ τε καὶ Ἡρῇ

Δωσούς, αἱ κ' ἐβέλωνσι· σὺ δὲ μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν

Ἰσχεῖν ἐν στήθεσσι· φιλοφροσύνῃ γὰρ ἀμείνων·

Ἀγγεμέναι δ' ἐρίδος κακομηχανοῦ, ὅφρα σε μάλλον

τίσωσ' Ἀργείων ἤμην νεῖη ἤδη γέροντες.

Which are thus elegantly paraphrased by Pope:

When Peleus in his aged arms embrac'd

His parting son, these accents were his last:

"My child! with strength, with glory and success,

Thy arms may Juno and Minerva bless!

Trust that to heaven: but thou thy cares engage

To calm thy passions, and subdue thy rage:

From gentler manners let thy glory grow,

And shun contention, the sure source of woe:

That young and old may in thy praise combine,

The virtues of humanity be thine.

himself and others, this also is the case with him who labours under two-fold ignorance. And, as to the insane a physician is of no use though present, so neither is the man of science, when present, beneficial to the doubly ignorant. For these think that they are no less knowing than the truly scientific; and as the Athenian guest says, they inflame their soul with insolence, in consequence of thinking that they do not want the assistance of any one, and that they may act in every respect in the same manner as the scientific."

P. 44. *For I suppose that justice and interest are not the same thing, &c.*

The dogma, that the just is the same with the profitable, contains the whole of moral philosophy. For those who suppose these to be different, must necessarily admit, that felicity receives its completion from externals; since, in these, the profitable appears very often to be separated from the just. But those who consider both to be the same, and acknowledge that the true good of man is in the soul, must necessarily refer each of us to soul. Hence Socrates thinks, that this is the beginning of the whole of the philosophy concerning the end of man, and of the knowledge of ourselves. But the Epicureans and Stoics, who place the end of man in a life according to nature, and those who give completion to our good from things necessary, as the Peripatetics, cannot genuinely preserve the sameness of the just and the profitable. And, in like manner, this cannot be effected by those who make man to be an animated body, or a composite from body and soul. For some fly from wounds and death unjustly, that the animal may be saved; since the good of every animal consists in a subsistence according to nature; so that, in this case, the profitable differs from the just. But those who place the end of man in soul undivided of corporeal possessions, and who assert that man is a soul using the body as an instrument, these admit that the just is the same with the profitable: for they place both in the soul, and separate the passions of the instruments from those by whom they are employed.

P. 44. *Suppose interest to be a thing ever so different from justice, &c.*

Proclus in commenting on this part observes, that souls express the forms of those things to which they conjoin themselves. "Hence (says he), when they are
affiliated

assimilated to intellect, they vindicate to themselves sameness and immutability, both in their dogmas and in their life; but when they become agglutinated to generation, they always pursue what is novel and puerile, at different times are led to different opinions, and have no perception of the stable reasons of the soul. But when Socrates says, ‘One must bring you *a pure and immaculate proof* *;’ this, which is a metaphor taken from garments, indicates, that souls of a naturally more excellent disposition possessing a conception of the immaculate purity of the gods, and carrying this about them in images, are studious of apparent purity; since the essence of divine vestments is undefiled, and an immaterial purity, in which it is requisite souls should be instructed, purifying their connate vehicles, and preserving their garments uncontaminated by generation, and not being wholly attentive to the purity of their external vestments.

P. 45. *Why, my good friend, suppose me to be the assembly and the people, &c.*

Proclus here observes, that it is the province of the same science to persuade one person and many; which assertion is, as it were, a certain hymn and encomium of science. For the great excellence of science is evident in this, that according to an imitation of intellect the same science fills an individual, and, at the same time, all that receive it; that it is indivisible, and, being established in itself, perfects all its participants; and that, like intellect, it communicates itself to all, and is separate from each. These things evince that our essence is separate from body, and abides in itself, since science, which is our perfection, is allotted such a power. For corporeal powers diminish themselves in their communications; but science, remaining one and the same, sufficient to itself and undiminished, imparts itself, in a similar manner, to one and to many. Thus, too, the soul is present to the whole body and all its parts, though one part participates in it in a different manner from another.

This is said, because Alcibiades had said, just before “No harm, I think, will come to me that way,” according to opinion, and not according to science. For the *οι μαντικοί*, or the *prophetic*, are doxastic †, and not scientific; but those that are not

* In the original *τεκμηρίον καθαρόν και ἀχρυστόν*. The reader is requested to adopt the translation of these words given above, instead of the translation of Sydenham, “a fresh proof never used before,” as being more accurate.

† Viz. they are influenced by opinion.

only *μωτικοί* but *μωνταις*, *prophets*, are scientific, and possess something better than human science. It also indicates, that the impulses of more naturally excellent souls are excited in a certain respect by more excellent natures. Hence they accomplish much good contrary to expectation, though energizing without science.

P. 47. *Tell me then, do you say, that some just actions are advantageous, &c.*

The proposed inquiry concerning things just and profitable, whether they are the same, or are divided from each other according to the diversity of subjects, contributes to the whole of philosophy, and adheres to the whole truth of things. For all ethical discussion and the invention of the end of man depend on this dogma, and the speculation of our essence becomes through this especially apparent. For, if the just is, in reality, the same with the profitable, and these are not separated from each other, our good will consist in virtue alone; and neither will the particulars which are beheld about the body contribute any thing as goods to the felicity of human life; nor, by a much greater reason, will things external to the body procure the full perfection of good; but one only good is established in souls themselves, unmingled, pure, immaterial, and is neither filled with corporeal nor with external goods or evils. But if there is something just, as according to Alcibiades there is, but unprofitable, and again something profitable but unjust, then apparent goods, such as health and riches, must necessarily give completion to a happy life. For mankind perform many things for the sake of these, and, surveying the good which they contain, abandon the love of justice. And to these, indeed, those who for the sake of what is just despise the flourishing condition of the body, and the acquisition of wealth, appear to act justly, and in a manner laudable, to the multitude, but by no means profitably, because they do not perceive that the profitable is stably seated in the soul herself, but consider it as situated in things scattered, and which have an external subsistence, and are necessary rather than good. But these men give phantasy and sense the precedency to intellect and science.

Again: if the just is the same with the profitable, according to the assertion of Socrates, then the essence of man will be defined according to the soul herself; but the body will neither be a part of us, nor will give completion to our nature. For, if the body gives completion to the man, the good of the body will be human good,

and

and the beautiful will be useless not only to the body, but to the man; but the prerogatives of the parts, and such things as are contrary, will pervade to the nature of the whole, since the whole will be allotted its being in the parts. The passions of the instruments, however, do not change the habits of those that use them, though they are often impediments to their energies. So that, if the just is the same with the profitable, where the just is, there also will the profitable be. But the just subsists in the soul, so that the profitable also will be in the soul. But where our good particularly resides, there also we possess our being. For our essence is not in one thing, and our perfection according to another, but where the form of man is, there also is the perfection of man. In soul therefore is the man. For every being possesses the good conjoined with its essence; since the first being* is for the sake of *the good*, and subsists about *the good*. Where being therefore is to all things, there also well-being resides. But it is impossible for man to be body, and to possess his perfection in something else external to body. It is likewise impossible that man should be both body and soul, and that human good should at the same time be defined according to soul alone.

Further still: the desire of good preserves those by whom it is desired: for, as Socrates says in the Republic, good preserves, and evil corrupts every thing. If therefore, possessing good in the soul, we also in soul possess our being, the desire of good will be natural to us; but if our good is in soul, but our being consists from body and soul conjoined, it must necessarily happen that we shall desire the corruption of ourselves, if good is immaterial and external to the body. However, as nothing, so neither does he who doubts the truth of this position desire his own destruction. That the proposed inquiry therefore contributes to moral philosophy, and to the invention of the nature of man, is, I think, perfectly apparent.

That it also affords wonderful auxiliaries to theology we shall learn, if we call to mind that *the just* contains the whole essence of souls; for, these having their subsistence according to all analogies† conformably to justice, it is evident that these distinguish its essence and powers. But, again, *the beautiful* characterizes an in-

* *Being*, considered according to its highest subsistence, is the immediate progeny of *the good*, or the ineffable principle of things. This is evident from the second hypothesis in the Parmenides.

† This will be evident from the Timæus.

tellectual essence. Hence, as Aristotle* says, intellect is lovely and desirable; for all things that participate of intellect are beautiful; and matter, which of itself is void of beauty, because it is formless, at the same time that it is invested with figures and forms, receives also the representations of the power of beauty. Lastly, *the good* characterizes the whole of a divine essence. For every thing divine according to a divine hyparxis is good; since the Gods are the causes of being; and if they cause all things to subsist about themselves, they are essentially good, and illuminate all things with good. *The good* therefore is bound in souls according to *the just*, through *the beautiful*; and every order of souls is united to the Gods through intellectual essences as media; so that an incorporeal nature is one and uniform, and the whole of it verges to the good; but division is in the images of this nature, which are not able to express primary causes according to their indivisible essence. From these things therefore it is evident that the present demonstration contributes in no small degree to theology, and, as I may say, to the whole of philosophy.

But the whole syllogism which collects that the just is profitable is as follows: Every thing just is beautiful: Every thing beautiful is good: Every thing just, therefore, is good. But the good is the same with the profitable: Every thing just, therefore, is profitable. This syllogism is primarily in the first figure, comprehending the minor in the major terms, and evincing the major terms reciprocating with the minor. For, again, beginning from *the good*, we shall be able to form the same conclusion. Every thing good is beautiful: Every thing beautiful is just: Every thing good, therefore, is just. But the profitable is the same with the good: The just, therefore, is the same with the profitable.

In the first principles of things, indeed, *the good* is exempt from *the beautiful*, and *the beautiful* is placed above *justice*. For the first of these is prior to intelligibles, established in inaccessible retreats: the second subsists occultly in the first of intelligibles†, and more clearly in the extremity of that order‡: and the third of these subsists uniformly in the first order of intellectuals§, and secondarily at the extremity of the intellectual progression of Gods. And, again, *the good* subsists in the Gods,

* In the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, to my translation of which I refer the English reader.

† i. e. In being, the summit of the intelligible order.

‡ i. e. In intelligible intellect.

§ viz. In the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. See the Introduction to the *Parmenides*,

the beautiful in intellects, and *the just* in souls. Whence *the just* is indeed *beautiful*, but not every thing *beautiful* is *just*. And every thing *beautiful* is *good*, but *the fountain of all good* is expanded above all *beauty*. And *the just* indeed is *good*, being conjoined with *the good* through *beauty* as the medium; but *the good* is beyond both. Thus also you will find, by looking to the last of things, that the material cause, although it is good, is base, and void of beauty: for it participates indeed of *the one*, but is destitute of form. And a sensible nature possesses indeed a representation of beauty, but not of justice. For, as Socrates says in the Phædrus, "there is no splendour of justice and temperance in these sensible similitudes; but beauty has alone this privilege, that it is the most apparent, and the most lovely of all things." Hence where *the just* is, there also is *the beautiful*; and where *the beautiful*, there also is *the good*, whether you are willing to look to the first principles, or to the illuminations of them as far as to the last of things. For all things participate of *the good*; for it is the principle of all: but *the beautiful* is alone received by the participants of form; and *the just* by those natures alone that participate of soul. But in the middle centre of all things, such as the soul is, all these are connected with each other, *the good, the beautiful, the just*. And *the good* of it is *beautiful*, and *the just* is at the same time *beautiful* and *good*.

Nor is the assertion true in this triad only, but also in many other particulars. Thus, for instance, in the principles of things *being* is beyond *life*, and *life* is beyond *intellect* *. And again, in the effects of these, not every thing which participates of being participates also of life, nor every thing which participates of life participates also of intellect; but, on the contrary, all intellectual natures *live*, and *are*, and *vital* natures partake of *being*. All these however are united with each other in the soul. Hence, *being* in it is *life* and *intellect*; *life* is *intellect* and *essence*; and *intellect* is *essence* and *life*. For

* *Being, life, and intellect*, considered according to their highest subsistence, form the intelligible triad, or the first all-perfect procession from the ineffable cause of all, as is beautifully shown by Proclus in his third book On the Theology of Plato. But that *being* is beyond *life*, and *life* beyond *intellect*, is evident from this consideration, that the progressions of superior are more extended than those of inferior causes. Hence, though whatever *lives* has a *being*, and whatever possesses *intellect* *lives*, yet some things have *being* without *life* or *intellect*, and others have *being* and *life* without *intellect*. And hence, as the progressions of *being* are more extended than those of *life*, and of *life* than those of *intellect*, we conclude that *being* is superior to *life*, and *life* to *intellect*.

there is one simplicity in it, and one subsistence; nor are life and intelligence there adventitious; but its *intellect* is *vital* and *essential*, its *life* is *essentially intellectual*, and its *essence* is *vital* and *intellectual*. All things therefore are every where in it, and it is one from all things. According to the same reasoning, therefore, its *good* is replete with *beauty* and *justice*; its *beauty* is *perfect* and *good*, and *entirely just*; and *the just* in it is mingled with *beauty* and *good*. The subject indeed is one, but the reasons* are different. And again, neither must we consider the identity of those three according to reasons, nor their difference according to the subject; but we must preserve the reasons of them different from each other, and the subject one, because every where these three are consubstantial with each other, according to the energies of the soul. For, as the reasons of the virtues are different, but it is one thing which partakes of them all, and it is not possible to participate of justice and be destitute of temperance, or to participate of these without the other virtues; in like manner this triad is united with itself, and every thing *good* is at the same time full of *the beautiful*, and *the just*, and each of the latter is introduced in conjunction with the former. Hence Socrates conjoins *the just* with *the good*, through *the beautiful*: for this is their medium and bond. But the most beautiful bond, says Timæus, is that which makes itself and the things bound eminently one. *The beautiful*, therefore, much more than any other bond collects and unites those two, *the just* and *the good*. And thus much concerning the whole demonstration.

If, however, other demonstrations are requisite of this proposition, which says, Every thing just is beautiful, let us make it more evident through many arguments. Since therefore the soul is a multitude, and one part of it is first, another middle, and another last, when do we say that justice is produced in the soul? Is it when the middle, or the last part, endeavours to rule over the better part, or when the first governs the middle, and the middle the last? But, if when the worse rule over the more excellent, the worse will not be naturally such: for that to which dominion belongs is naturally more excellent, and more honourable. If, therefore, it is impossible that the same thing can be naturally better and worse, it is necessary that the just should then be beheld in souls themselves, when that which is best in them governs the whole life, and the middle being in subjection to

* By reasons here productive principles are signified.

the better part, has dominion over the last part. For then each of the parts ranks according to its desert, the one governing with royal authority, another acting as a satellite, and another ministering to the powers of the more excellent. The just therefore is naturally distributive of that which is adapted to each of the parts of the soul. It is also the cause to each of performing its proper duty, and of possessing its proper rank, and thus preserves good order about the whole soul. But order and symmetry are naturally beautiful. Justice, therefore, is the source of beauty to the soul, and is itself beautiful.

The just however is two-fold; one consisting in contracts, and which regards arithmetical equality, and the other in distributions, and which entirely requires geometric equality. In contracts, therefore, it observes arithmetical equality, that we may not act unjustly by our associate, receiving from him more than is proper; but by fitly distributing unequal things to such as are unequal, it observes geometric equality, so that such as is the difference of persons with respect to each other, such also may be the difference as to worth of the things distributed, to each other. Every thing just, therefore, is, as we have said, equal; but every thing equal is beautiful. For the unequal is base, and void of symmetry, since it is also incongruous. Every thing just, therefore, is beautiful.

In the third place, beauty no otherwise subsists in bodies, than when form rules over matter; for matter is void of beauty and base; and when form is vanquished by matter, it is filled with baseness, and a privation of form in consequence of becoming similar to the subject nature. If, therefore, in the soul our intellectual part ranks in the order of form, but our irrational part, of matter (for intellect and reason belong to the coordination of bound *, but the irrational nature to that of infinity, since it is naturally without measure and indefinite)—this being the case, it necessarily follows that beauty must be perceived in the soul when reason has dominion, and the irrational forms of life are vanquished by reason and prudence. *The just*, indeed, gives empire to reason, and servitude to the irrational nature. For it distributes to each what is fit; dominion to the ruling power, and fervile obedience to the ministrant part; since the artificer of the universe subjected

* Bound and infinite, as will be evident from the Philebus, are the two highest principles, after the ineffable principle of all.

to us the irrational nature, and prepared it as a vehicle to our reason. *The just* therefore is naturally beautiful, and is the cause of beauty to the soul.

In the fourth place, *the just* is perfect and definite; since the unjust is imperfect and indefinite, wanders infinitely and never stops, and secretly withdraws itself from the boundary of justice. *The just*, therefore, introduces measure and bound to whatever it is present to, and renders all things perfect. Hence it is the source of beauty to the soul: for the beautiful is connate with the perfect and the measured, because deformity subsists with the unmeasured and the indefinite. *The just*, therefore, is at one and the same time perfect, moderate, bounded, and beautiful; and these are not naturally separated from each other.

In the fifth place, the demiurgus adorned this universe by justice; for he bound it with the most beautiful of bonds, and rendered it indissoluble through the power of this analogy, which holds all its parts together, and makes it every where friendly to itself. But that which is similar to the universe, the most beautiful of things visible, is certainly itself beautiful. *The just*, therefore, is also according to this reasoning beautiful, from the nature of which it is by no means disjoined.—That every thing just, therefore, is beautiful, is from hence apparent.

The proposition consequent to this, that every thing beautiful is good, Socrates extends, but Alcibiades does not admit. This was owing to his considering the beautiful to be beautiful by position, and not by nature. Hence he also grants that *the just* is beautiful; for it is thus considered by the multitude, and separates *the beautiful* from *the good*. For to the former of these he gives a subsistence merely from opinion, asserting that *the beautiful* is the becoming, and what is generally admitted: but to the latter he gives a subsistence according to truth; for he does not say that *the good* is from position. This proposition, therefore, that every thing beautiful is good, we shall show to be in every respect true. This then is apparent to every one, that *the beautiful* is naturally lovely, since last beauty which is borne along in images is lovely, and agitates souls at the first view of it, in consequence of retaining a vestige of divine beauty. For this privilege, says Socrates in the Phædrus, beauty alone possesses, to be the most apparent and the most lovely of all things. Indeed, *the beautiful* (το καλον) is naturally lovely, whether it is so denominated δια το καλουν, because it calls others to itself, or δια το κηλειν, because it

charms

charms those that are able to behold it. Hence also love is said to lead the lover to beauty. But every thing lovely is desirable; for love is a robust and vehement desire of something. And whatever loves desires something of which it is indigent. But every thing desirable is good, whether it is truly or only apparently good. For many things which are not good are desirable, because they appear as good to those that desire them. It is clearly therefore shown by Socrates, in the *Meno*, that he who knows evil, such as it is in its own nature, cannot desire it. Every thing desirable therefore is good; and if it be principally desirable, it will also be principally good. But if it be only apparently desirable, such also will be its good. In short, in each of the terms this is to be added, viz. the apparent, or the true. For, if a thing is apparently beautiful, it is also apparently lovely and desirable, and its good is conjoined with beauty of such a kind. But if it is naturally beautiful, it is also naturally lovely and desirable. What then in this case will the desirable be? Shall we say, evil? But it is impossible when known that it should be desirable by any being; for all beings desire good. But there is no desire of evil, nor yet of that which is neither good nor evil; for every thing of this kind is performed for the sake of something else, and is not the end of any thing. But every thing desirable is an end; and, if any thing evil is desirable, it must be so because it appears to be good. In like manner, if any thing not beautiful is beloved, it is loved because it *appears* to be beautiful. If, therefore, every thing beautiful is lovely, but every thing lovely is desirable, and every thing desirable is good, hence every thing beautiful is good. And, reciprocally, every thing good is desirable.—This then is immediately evident. Every thing desirable is lovely: for love and desire are directed to the same object; but they differ from each other according to the remission or vehemence of the desire; since Socrates, also, in the *Banquet*, leads love to *the good* through *the beautiful*, and says that *the good* is lovely, as well as *the beautiful*. If therefore every good is desirable, every thing desirable is lovely, and every thing lovely is beautiful (for love is proximate to beauty), hence every thing good is beautiful. Let no one therefore say that *the good* is above beauty nor that the lovely is two-fold; for we do not now discourse concerning the first principles of things, but concerning *the beautiful* and *the good* which are in us. *The good*, therefore, which is in us, is at the same time both desirable and lovely.—

Hence

Hence we obtain *the good* through love, and a vehement pursuit of it. And if any one directs his attention to himself, he will perfectly perceive that this good excites in us a more efficacious love than sensible beauty. *The good* therefore is beautiful. Hence Diotima, in the Banquet, advises lovers to betake themselves, after sensible beauty, to the beauty in actions and studies, in the sciences and virtues, and, having exercised the amatory eye of the soul in these, to ascend from thence to intellect, and the primary and divine beauty which is there. Hence too we say that in these the good of the soul consists. For what is there in us more beautiful than virtue or science? Or what more base than the contraries to these?

P. 47. *But what as to actions which are beautiful, &c.*

The multitude falsely think that wounds and death are evils. For what among these can be an evil to us whose essence consists in soul? since neither do the passions of instruments change the virtues of those that use them. Neither, therefore, does the carpenter, if his saw happens to be blunted, lose his art; nor, if our felicity consisted in the carpenter's art, should we call any one unhappy who was deprived of his saw; since, as the soul has an instrument, so also we may perceive other instruments of the body, through which the body moves things external to it, the defects of which do not injure the good habit of the body. After the same manner, therefore, the passions of the body do not pervade to the soul; so that death, though it is an evil of the body, yet is not an evil of the soul. Hence, if the beauty of action is in the soul, and the evil of it in something else, it has not yet been shown that the same thing is beautiful and evil.

Again, we may also logically prove that the *essential* is one thing, and the *accidental* another; and Socrates chooses this mode of solution as more known to the young man. For a brave action is essentially beautiful, but evil, if it is so, accidentally, because it happens to him who acts bravely to die. For let death, if you will, be among the number of evils; yet a brave action, so far as it is brave and therefore beautiful, is not evil, but it is evil only accidentally. The beautiful, therefore, is one thing, and evil another; nor is a thing so far as beautiful shown to be evil, but only accidentally on account of death. We may also say that he is ignorant of the essence of man who separates *the good* from *the beautiful*, and places the former in

one thing, and the latter in another, referring *the good* to body, and *the beautiful* to the energy of the soul. Socrates, however, does not adopt this solution, because he has not yet demonstrated that our essence is separate from body. To a man therefore such as Alcibiades, who thought that the body gives completion to our essence, it was not yet possible to say that death, whether it is an evil or not, ought to be defined as one of the things accidental to man, and that he ought not to confound the good of the body with the good of man, nor refer the evil of the instrument to him by whom it is used.

And thus much from the invaluable commentary of Proclus on this dialogue. The intelligent reader will doubtless regret with me that this Manuscript Commentary is nothing more than a fragment, as it scarcely extends to more than a third part of the Dialogue. From the indefatigable genius of Proclus, there can be no doubt but that he left it entire; but, like most of his other writings which are extant, it has been dreadfully mutilated either by the barbarous fraud of monks, or the ravages of time. The reader will not, I trust, hesitate to pronounce that the former of these may have been the cause of this mutilation, when he is informed that an impostor, who calls himself Dionysius the Areopagite, and who for many centuries was believed to have been contemporary with St. Paul, has in his Treatise on the Divine Names stolen entire chapters from one of the works of Proclus, one copy of which only is fortunately preserved in manuscript. This assertion I am able to prove.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK I.

P. 104. *Are they to have torches, and give them to one another?*

IN the Panathenæan, Hephæstian, and Promethean festivals, it was customary for young men to run with torches or lamps: and in this contest he alone was victorious, whose lamp remained unextinguished in the race. As a lamp or torch, therefore, from the naturally ascending nature of fire, may be considered as a proper image of our rational part, this custom perhaps was intended to signify that he is the true conqueror in the race of life, whose rational part is not extinguished, or, in other words, does not become dormant in the career.

P. 105. Note. *This nocturnal solemnity was the lesser Panathenæa.*

As in the greater Panathenæa the veil of Minerva was carried about in which the Giants were represented vanquished by the Olympian Gods, so in the lesser Panathenæa another veil was exhibited, in which the Athenians, who were the pupils of Minerva, were represented victorious in the battle against the inhabitants of the Atlantic island*. These festivals signified the beautiful order which proceeds into the world from intellect, and the unconfused distinction of mundane contrarities. The veil of Minerva is an emblem of that one life or nature of the universe, which the Goddess weaves by those intellectual vital powers which she contains. The battle of the Giants against the Olympian Gods signifies the opposition between the last demiurgic powers of the universe (or those powers which partially fabricate and proximately preside over mundane natures) and such as are first. Minerva is said to have vanquished the Giants, because she rules over these ultimate artificers

* See the *Timæus* and *Atlantidis*.

of things by her unifying powers. And the battle of the Atlantics against the Athenians represents the distribution of the world according to the two coordinate oppositions of things. And as in this battle the Athenians were victorious, so in the universe the better coordination subdues the worse. See Procl. in Tim. p. 26, and Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 143.

P. 107. *The Seriphian.*

Seriphus, one of the islands of the Cyclades, and a city in it; whence its inhabitants were called Seriphians. Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 144.

P. 108. *As Pindar says.*

These verses of Pindar are only to be found in the fragments ascribed to him.

P. 113. *Thrasymachus.*

This Thrasymachus was a sophist, and is mentioned by Aristotle in the last book of his *Sophistical Arguments*. Nothing can more clearly show the Herculean strength of the reasoning which Socrates here employs, than that it was able to tame this savage sophist. The ability of effecting this renders Socrates *truly great*.

B O O K II.

P. 222. *Is not God essentially good?*

It is well observed by Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 355.), that when Plato says in this place, God is essentially good, he means every God; for the addition of the article either alone signifies transcendency, as when we say *the* poet (ὁ ποιητής), assigning this prerogative to the chief of poets, or the whole multitude, as when we say *the* rational man, adding the article as a substitute for *every*. Since Plato therefore says ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός, he either means the first, or every God. But that he does not mean the first only, is evident from his concluding after this, that *every God* is as much as possible most beautiful and excellent. This also shows the ignorance of modern scribblers, who pretend that Plato secretly ridiculed the doctrine of

polytheism ; which the reader must always remember signifies the existence of divine natures, the progeny of, and consequently subordinate to, one supreme deity.

B O O K III.

P. 241. *And we should send him to some other city, pouring oil on his head, and crowning him with wool.*

The Greek Scholium on this part is as follows : παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπο τῆς χρείας ἀφιεμένων· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν εὐκασιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχεῖσθαι, ὡς αὖ σχολαζόντες ἀπο τῶν ἐργῶν, καὶ μόνον σχολαζόντες θυμῷ καὶ πάλιν, τοῖς ἀπο δουλείας μεταγόμενοις ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαν, ἐρίον καταγμῆ κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ἐνδύσμενοι το ἐπισήμῳ. Ἄλλως· μύρον καταχεῖν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίωτατοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀγάλματων θεμὶς ἦν, ἐρίῳ τε στεφεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ τινὰ ἱερατικὸν νόμον, ὡς ὁ μέγας Προκλὸς φησὶν. i. e. "This is a proverb applied to those who are dismissed from business. For in festivals men poured oil on their head, as then resting from their usual avocations, and being alone at leisure for delight. Slaves also, when manumitted, wore wool rolled round their head, as a sign of their manumission. Or thus : It was lawful to pour oil on the statues in the most holy temples, and to crown them with wool, and this according to a certain sacred law, as the great Proclus says."

P. 258. *But the God when he formed you, mixed gold in the formation of such of you as are able to govern, &c.*

Plato here alludes to the different ages of mankind, which are celebrated by Hesiod, in his *Works and Days*, and which signify the different lives passed through by the individuals of the human species. Among these, the *golden age* indicates an intellectual life. For such a life is pure, impassive, and free from sorrow ; and of this impassivity and purity gold is an image, from never being subject to rust or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is very properly said to be under Saturn, because Saturn, as will be shown in the notes to the *Cratylus*, is an intellectual God. By the *silver age* a rustic and natural life is implied, in which the attention of the rational soul is entirely directed to the care of the body, but without proceeding to the extremity of vice. And by the *brazen age*, a dire, tyrannic, and cruel life, is implied, which is entirely passive, and proceeds to the very extremity of vice.

B O O K

BOOK IV.

The following extract from the exposition of the more difficult questions in the Republic, by Proclus, (p. 407) will, I doubt not, from its great excellence be very acceptable to the reader. It is concerning the demonstrations in the fourth book of the Republic, that there are three parts of the human soul, and four virtues in it. The scientific accuracy of division, solidity of judgment, and profundity of conception which Proclus has displayed in this discussion can never be sufficiently admired; and it was not without reason, though doubtless without much acquaintance with the works of this wonderful man, that a certain scurrilous writer*, who appears to be a man of no science, moderately learned, and an indifferent poet, calls him the animated rival of Plato.

“I here consider virtue not ambiguously, and in the same manner as when we ascribe virtues to things inanimate, but that which is properly so denominated. This therefore we say is vital, is the perfection of life, and is the cause of well-being, and not of being to those by whom it is possessed. But since life is two-fold, one kind being gnostic, and the other orectic, or appetitive, virtue will be a certain perfection both of the orectic and of the gnostic form of life. Hence it is requisite that there should not be one virtue only, nor yet more than one of the same species, the one not being so divided as similar parts are divided from each other, differing only in quantity; but it is necessary that there should be many and dissimilar virtues. For such as is the condition of subjects, such also must be their perfections. Hence the virtues of things differing in species must also be specifically different; but of things possessing the same species, there is one specific virtue: for there is one perfection of one essence, whether the cause of being is the same with that of well-being to things, since such as is the being which it imparts, such also is the well-being, or whether it is different. Hence Socrates in his Republic makes a distribution into three genera, viz. into guardians, auxiliaries, and mercenaries, before he indicates what the different kinds of virtue are in the best polity; and before he distributes the virtues analogously in one soul, he shows that there are three parts of the soul essenti-

* A man unknown, Author of a work called *The Pursuits of Literature*.

ally different, viz. reason, anger, and desire, knowing that perfections themselves are changed together with the diversities of subjects, and on this account that there are many virtues dissimilar in species.

“To these things also it is requisite to add, for the purpose of facilitating the objects of discussion, that there is one perfection and energy of a thing considered by itself, and another according to its habitude to something else; so that the hyparxis of a thing (or the summit of its essence) is different from the proximity or alliance which it has with another. For there is not the same perfection of man, and of a man who is a despot, as neither is man the same with a despot; nor is it the same thing to behold the soul simply, and the soul as governing the body. Hence it is not the same thing to consider the essential and the relative perfection of a thing. Neither, therefore, must we consider the energy of a thing essentially originating from itself, and solely directed to itself in the same manner as the energy of that which governs or is governed; for government, and the being governed, are certain habitudes. Nothing indeed hinders but that the same thing may perform a certain action, not as governing or as governed, but as possessing a certain essence by itself, and an energy which it is allotted consequent to its essence. Thus for instance, the rational power in us when it lives cathartically *, performs its proper work theoretically, being naturally adapted thus to live according to its essence; but in this case it does not perform the office of a governor, as the irrational parts contribute nothing to that energy which is directed to itself. Rightly, therefore, does Socrates show that every governing art imparts good to the governed; so that when the rational part extends good to itself alone, purifying and investigating itself, it does not then possess the life of a governor. Thus also when anger acts conformably to its nature, being alone moved as an appetite avenging incidental molestations, it does not then preserve the habitude of that which is governed, with respect to reason, but alone acts as anger: for the desire of vengeance is the work of anger, and not to energize in obedience to reason. In like manner the desiderative part of the soul, when it immoderately aspires after pleasure, then lives according to its own nature: for this is the work of desire, to love pleasure, not some particular, but every, pleasure, and this not as governed by reason, whose province it is to measure its appetite. So that

* For an account of the virtues superior to the political, see the Phædo, Theætetus, and Phædrus. each

each of these three may be said to act after this manner, when each performs its proper work, without any reference to a governing principle.

“Since however all the parts are conjoined with each other, and give completion to one life, it is necessary to consider them according to their relative energy, and thus to perceive the virtue and the vice of each. Hence we must define political virtue to be a habit perfective of the relative life of the parts of the soul; and its contrary, political vice, to be a habit corruptive of the vital habitude of the parts to each other. Beginning from hence also, it is requisite to see that, in the different kinds of politics, the life of every individual is two-fold, one pertaining to himself, and the other relative; and again, that in these virtue and vice have a similar subsistence. For let the guardian be one who contemplates real beings, and ascends by intellectual energy as far as to *the good itself*. He therefore so far as man performs an energy adapted to himself, but abandons a governing life. Hence Socrates does not permit him to abide in such an energy, but brings him down again to a providential care of the city, that he may be a true guardian, leaving a life according to intellect as his last energy. Again, let the auxiliary, because he is the lord of all in the city, pay no attention to the governors, but act in every thing according to casual impulse, and use his power immoderately. This man indeed, as a soldier, will accomplish the energy which is adapted to him; for this consists in fighting; but he will no longer act as one governed. For it is requisite that the governed should look to the conceptions of the governor. Hence the soldier when obedient to the governor, preserves the virtue proper to one governed, but when he opposes the governor, he corrupts his own relative virtue. Lastly, let the mercenary be one who only lives for himself, and who is alone busily employed in the acquisition of wealth. This man therefore performs his proper work, so far as he is what he is said to be, a mercenary, but he has not yet the vice or the virtue of one governed. But if he becomes a member of political society, and ranks as one who is governed, he will now live with habitude to this: and when he is obedient to the governors according to this habitude, and accumulates wealth conformably to their will, and after the manner which they define, he will possess virtue adapted to a governed mercenary; but when he deviates from the will of the governors, and does not observe their mandates, he is, so far as one governed, a depraved mercenary. In the political genera, therefore, there is a

two-

two-fold proper work, one essential, and the other relative, as in the parts of the soul. But, if in both there are, governors and the governed, virtues and vices, it is requisite to consider how the virtues and vices in the one subsist with relation to those in the other, and to show that the virtues and vices of the soul pre-subsist as the paradigms of those in the political genera. For, the parts of the soul energizing internally, render the soul better or worse; but proceeding externally, and terminating in actions, they adorn the political genera, or fill them with disorder. Hence Socrates very properly makes a transition from the parts in one soul to those in whole politics, as proceeding to things more known. For it is not possible to know in a proper manner all the inward habits of souls, and all their inward abiding energies, in any other way than by their externally proceeding energies. This then is evident. For, the guardian governing the auxiliaries, energizes externally, imitating inward reason governing anger. And, in a similar manner, the auxiliary governs the mercenary tribe, imitating in his external energy, the inward dominion of anger over desire. All dominions therefore are habitudes, both those belonging to the soul, and those that are political; but the external are imitations of the internal; and the former are secondary energies of the latter, which are primary. The true political science, therefore, subsists about the habitudes of the soul, this being that which adorns both the governors and the governed; or rather it is one habit possessing two-fold energies, the inward governing and being governed, and the external adorning political affairs.

“These things being determined, let us now consider how we shall introduce all the four virtues; and let us endeavour to make it apparent to the learner that they are four. Since, therefore, there are three parts of the soul (for from hence we must begin); but these have not an equal order, one being allied to intellect, another being naturally adapted to body, and another being arranged in the middle of both; hence, that alone governs which is naturally allied to intellect, viz. reason, and, which itself spontaneously knows, intellect; and that is alone governed, which, according to its proper order, is allied to body. This is the desiderative part of the soul, which aspires after corporeal possessions, just as reason desires intellectual good. But the irascible part is that which both governs and is governed. This part, because it is irrational, is present also with irrational animals, like the desiderative part,

part, is destitute of knowledge, and naturally requires to be governed by that which is allied to intellect; but, because it is always present with, when desire opposes reason, it is more allied to the rational part than desire, which is more remote from reason, and remarkably sympathizes with the body. For this always adheres to the body, and never abandons its life; but anger often despises the body and a life in conjunction with it, aspiring after another object of desire, which does not pertain to the body. These then, being three, one of which, reason, ought to govern only, but another, as body, to be governed only, and another to govern, and at the same time to be governed, according to an order in the middle of the extremes,—hence, the governors are two, the one primary, and the other secondary, and the things governed according to the same reasoning are also two. It is requisite, therefore, that the part which alone and primarily governs should possess one virtue perfective of governing habitude; but that the part which governs secondarily, and is governed primarily, should possess two-fold virtues perfective of two habitudes. For, as the perfections of different hyparxes are different, so also the perfections of different habitudes. But it is necessary that the part which is alone governed should possess one perfective virtue. Reason, therefore, which, as we have shown, ought only to govern, has for its ruling virtue prudence, according to which it bounds both for itself and others the measures of actions. Desire, which ought only to be governed, has for its virtue temperance, according to which it measures its appetites, converting itself to reason, from which it receives a rational impulse, through custom and discipline. But anger, which naturally governs and is governed, possesses, so far as it governs, fortitude, through which it humiliates the desiderative part, and preserves itself invulnerable from its attacks; but, so far as it is governed, it possesses temperance, through which it also desires to be disciplined by the measures of reason. If reason, however, as governing both, and as the cause of conversion to itself, and of their submitting to measure, comprehends the principle which it imparts to them, this principle will be temperance, beginning indeed from reason, but ending in desire through anger as a medium; and thus the harmony diapason * will be produced from the three, viz. from reason, anger, and desire. But of these, anger being the middle,

* The harmony diapason includes all tones, and is the same as what is called in modern music an octave or eighth. It is also a duple proportion, or that of 4 to 2.

in one part produces the symphony called diatessaron *, and in another that which is denominated diapente †; the symphony of reason to anger forming the diapente, and that of anger to desire the diatessaron. This latter the Pythagoræans denominate a syllable, as not being a perfect symphony; but they assert that the diapente ought rather to be called a symphony than this; just as we must assert that anger has a greater symphony with reason, than desire has with anger, though the interval between the latter is less than that which subsists between the former: for both these are appetites, but the other two are reason and appetite. There is more symphony, therefore, between anger and reason, though the interval is greater, than between desire and anger, though the interval is lesser. For, as we have before observed, anger naturally co-arranges itself with reason, and is more disposed to league with it in battle than with desire, when reason and desire war on each other. And hence, a greater symphony must be assigned to anger and reason, than to desire and anger. But from all these it must be said that a diapason is produced, which the Pythagoræans denominate by far the sweetest and the purest of all symphonies. For this, indeed, is truly a symphony, since among all others it alone possesses the peculiarity of which Timæus speaks, viz. that the motions of the sharper sounds ceasing, embrace those that are more flat, and embracing them conjoin the beginning with the end, and produce one motion gradually terminating from the sharp in the flat. Since, therefore, of all symphonies the diapason is alone allotted this prerogative, it will be adapted to the harmony of the soul, pervading through all the parts, conjoining the superior with the inferior motions, connascently harmonizing the intensions of the one with the remissions of the other, and truly producing one life from many. And thus in the way of digression we have shown how Socrates denominates temperance the harmony diapason.

“But if prudence is alone the virtue of the governor, but temperance is the virtue of the governed, and both temperance and fortitude form the virtue of that which governs and is at the same time governed, it is evident that the remaining virtue, justice, must belong to all the parts, to one as governing, to another as that which

* This is an interval which is called in modern music a perfect fourth, and is a sesquiquartian proportion, or that of 4 to 3.

† This is the second of the concords, and is now called a perfect fifth. It is also a sesquialter proportion, or that of 3 to 2.

is governed, and to another as that which both governs and is governed; so that through this each part energizes according to its proper order, the one as governing, the other as governed, and a third as both. And here it may be inquired how anger, since it both governs and is governed, has the virtue of temperance in common with desire so far as it is governed, but has not any virtue in common with reason so far as it governs, but possesses fortitude as its proper virtue. To this it may be replied, that there is, as we have said, a greater interval between anger and reason, according to essence, than between desire and anger, though when reason and desire oppose each other, anger is by no means the ally of the latter, but takes the part of the former. But it does this through the pertinacity of desire, through which it often contumaciously excites reason against desire, and not through any alliance with reason. So that on this account it has a common virtue with desire, so far as it is governed, but a different virtue from reason, so far as governing. For the governing power of anger is perfectly different from that of reason, which begins its government from itself. For reason first governs itself, and adorns itself, prior to other things, and does not suffer its proper appetite to remain dubious, and to tend to that which is worse. After this, it measures the appetites of the irrational parts, and recalls them to its own judgment and appetite. But anger is not governed by itself, but supernally issues its mandates to the worst part alone. For, that which is irrational is never at any time able to govern itself, nor to bound and be converted to itself. That anger, however, is more allied to desire than to reason, according to Plato, is evident: for both these are from the same fathers*, but reason is the offspring of a different father; both are mortal, and rise and perish in conjunction, but reason is immortal; both are destitute of knowledge, but reason is naturally gnostic. As therefore to be governed is common both to anger and desire, for so far as both are irrational, and require to be adorned by another, they are governed, hence they possess a common virtue which converts them to a desire of that which governs. But as the government of reason is different from that of desire

* Viz. Anger and desire, as being irrational parts, are both of them, according to Plato in the *Timæus*, the offspring of the junior Gods, but the rational part is alone the offspring of the one demiurgus of all things.

in the manner above mentioned, as governors they possess a different ruling virtue; the one gnostic, for it is reason; the other vital, for it is appetite. When, therefore, appetite governs appetite, there is need of fortitude in order to preserve appetite uninjured; but when reason rules over appetite, there is need of prudence, preparing reason to judge rightly. And on this account prudence is the ruling virtue of reason, whose province it is to know and to judge rightly, and to govern natures which possess the power of judging. Fortitude is the ruling virtue of anger, which is alone vital, and is destitute of judgment, but is an appetite wishing to have dominion over a worse appetite, the opposition of which it cannot endure. But if, as we have before observed, there is a greater interval between the higher than between the lower of these, and a greater harmony arises from the former than the latter, it is by no means wonderful: for the brevity of life obscures the harmony; since in natures whose life is more extended it is greater, and in those whose life is less extended it is evidently less. We have therefore shown that the virtues are only four, and what is the work of each. It will now, therefore, be manifest how they are to be arranged in republics. For it is evident that prudence must be especially placed in the governor who consults for the good of the city. For, of what can he who consults be in greater need than of prudence, the province of which is to perceive the good and ill in every action? But in the warring and guardian genus fortitude is requisite. For fame calls those men brave who intrepidly endure dangers, resist adversaries, and despise death. That they may subdue, therefore, all those that endeavour to subvert the republic, it is fit that they should be brave; but they ought to receive the measures of their energies from those that are the true governors, and in this be temperate, looking to their will. And in him who ranks in the last place, and provides all that is necessary, temperance is requisite, lest, being inflated by affluence, he should arrogate to himself dominion, thinking that he is sufficient to himself with respect to felicity, and should thus despise the governors, in consequence of an abundance in things necessary imparting a representation of good. Temperance, therefore, is requisite to this character, that he may be obedient to the governors, and may submit to them; as in the universe, according to Timæus, necessity follows intellect. But, all of them thus receiving
their

their proper virtue, the one acting prudently, the other temperately, and the other bravely, the employment of justice will now be known. For it prepares each, in the coordination with each other, to do its own work alone, and not, by engaging in employments foreign to its nature, to usurp the prerogatives of others, but to live in such a manner as the political science enjoins. So that the guardian may not attempt to engage in war or in agriculture, thus falling into a life unworthy of himself; nor the auxiliary to undertake the province of the merchant or the governor; nor the mercenary to occupy the place of the auxiliary or the guardian, because he provides arms for the former and necessities for the latter. So that in the political genera all the virtues have the same relation to each other as those in the parts of the soul.

These things, therefore, being admitted, let us consider how Socrates again transfers his discourse to the virtues in the political genera, and says, that he is willing to behold, as it were, in larger, what is written in smaller letters: for virtue in the habitation of one soul is more impartible than in cities, and the virtues of a whole city are images of those in one soul; and reason, as he says, requires that things more impartible in power should have dominion over those which are extended into a numerous division, and that things less according to number should yield to the power of things more according to quantity. In the political genera, therefore, Socrates wishing to behold all the virtues, in the first place orderly arranges the political genera,—I say orderly, because he first considers men solely employed about necessities, without war, unskilled in discipline, living according to nature, satisfied with as little as possible, and conducting themselves temperately: and, in the second place, he shows that when their possessions are increased, they are necessarily led through their external enemies to direct their attention to military affairs. In consequence of this, he shows that discipline then becomes necessary, men passing from a physical to a defensive life, as they could not otherwise defend themselves when unjustly injured by their neighbours. It is requisite, therefore, that there should be those who may fight in defence of the husbandmen; for the same person cannot accomplish both these, since an aptitude for agriculture is different from an aptitude for war. But as aptitudes differ, so also perfections, and it is requisite that every one should be perfected according to his own nature, if he is not to possess an adulterated and unnatural life. To which we may add, that if one and the same

person were a soldier and a husbandman, he could not attend to the seasons of his proper works, being compelled to take up arms when he ought to cultivate the land, to plough or plant when he should engage in war, to carry rural instead of warlike implements, the spade for the shield, and to be in want of necessaries by neglecting the concerns of agriculture. If, therefore, the auxiliary is one person, and he who attends to the necessaries of life another, two political genera must be established, the auxiliary and the mercenary, the latter supplying things necessary, and the former defending both himself and the other. But each of these requires a different discipline, for the manners of each are different. Socrates, therefore, instructs us in a two-fold kind of discipline, one pertaining to the soul, and the other to the body. For soldiers require a robust body, in order to endure the necessary labours of war. And as there are two kinds of discipline, one according to music and the other according to gymnastic, it appears to me that Socrates considers those to be most adapted to universal government, whose nature is more adapted to music, and who are better skilled in it than others. For it makes us more prudent, teaching us concerning gods, dæmons, heroes, and illustrious men; but this gymnastic is unable to effect. Of the truth of which I consider this to be an argument, that the whole polity, as Socrates says, is dissolved, not through a neglect of gymnastic, but of music. So that we shall not err in asserting, that those who are naturally adapted, and are more propense to music than others, are chosen as guardians by Socrates, though he alone says that the most excellent characters are to be chosen as governors, but does not add in what it is that they are most excellent.

Socrates, therefore, having established these three genera, in order to give completion to the city, indicates whence we may call the city wise, whence brave, temperate, and just. And the guardian genus, indeed, on account of its being most musical, possesses the science of good and ill; for, as we before observed, it has learnt from the discipline of music in what manner it is requisite to be wise respecting superior natures, and respecting human felicity. Hence, he says, poets also are to be compelled to compose such verses as have a tendency to these types. And if it also learns the mathematical disciplines and dialectic, it will be in a still greater degree wise and scientific. The auxiliary genus, on account of its living in arms, and in the exercise and study of warlike affairs, especially possesses fortitude. And

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the mercenary genus requires temperance: for an affluence of things necessary is especially in want of this virtue, since an abundance of these leads to an intemperate life. These three genera therefore mutually according with each other, and preserving their own energy with respect to governing and being governed, justice is the result of such a subsistence. For all men, as well those that praise as those that revile justice, say that just conduct consists in not desiring the possessions of others. Hence its enemies reprobate it, because it is content with its own property, when at the same time it ought to possess all things. And thus far, indeed, Socrates, considering justice as the founder of cities, does not reprobate its accusers: for they say that justice is that which is beautiful by law; and they honour it as a thing necessary; since no one is willing to be injured contrary to the laws, because this is the extremity of evils. But, according to these men, to act unjustly is the greatest good; and justice, having a middle subsistence, is neither good nor evil, but necessary. As we have said, therefore, though Socrates considers justice as a plenitude of good, yet he does not reprobate its accusers: for it is admitted to be that which is beautiful by law. Now, therefore, inculcating that it is truly good, and that it is beautiful by nature, he adds, that it also imparts strength to the other virtues: for each through this performs its own proper work, and none of the rest preserves a city so much as this. It is shown therefore by Socrates, that a permutation of the pursuits of the guardian, the auxiliary, and the mercenary, is the most perfect destruction of a polity.

If, therefore, justice is a standard to each of the other virtues, which the accusers of justice acknowledge to be naturally beautiful, as, for instance, to prudence, for all men naturally desire its possession, and those that blame prudence either blame it prudently, and in this case prudence is not to be blamed, rightly blaming itself, or they blame it imprudently, and in this case prudence is not blameable, not being rightly blamed,—this being admitted, it necessarily follows that justice is naturally good in the same manner as prudence, and that it is not beautiful only by law. Socrates, having indicated these particulars respecting the virtues in the political genera, passes on to the virtues of the parts of the soul, which we have said are prior to these, and discourses in a three-fold respect concerning them. For, in the first place, he shows that the diversities of men arise from no other cause than the difference

ference in their lives ; and that neither does the difference in one city, nor in whole nations, originate from any thing else than from a diversity in the life pertaining to the soul : for it is not, says he, either from an oak, or a rock, viz. it is not from the lowest nature, of which an oak is the image *, nor from an inanimate and solid body, so far as body, for this is indicated by a rock. And the Greeks indeed have a greater aptitude to wisdom (when we speak of the whole nation), the Thracians are more irascible, and the Phœnicians more mercenary than either of these. But this arises from the soul, through which in some nations reason has dominion, in others anger, and in others desire. For the character of individuals arises from their life, and a whole nation is denominated rational or irascible from that part of the soul which principally flourishes in it. They possess these diversities, therefore, either from the body or from the soul. They cannot, however, possess them from the body : for men become hot or cold, white or black, from the body, but not prudent, or brave, or temperate, or the contraries of these. It is from the soul, therefore, that they derive these distinguishing characteristics. And this is what Socrates first demonstrates.

Some one however, perhaps, may say that the differences in souls are corporeal ; for they follow the temperaments of the body, though these different powers are in the soul. It is evident, however, that he who makes this assertion grants that these diversities are in souls, though they blossom forth in consequence of the soul following the temperaments of bodies. The reasoning of Socrates therefore remains, and these lives originate from the soul, though they should be rooted in the temperament of the body. We should however be careful not to subject the soul to the nature of the body : for, in the undisciplined †, the powers of the soul follow the temperaments ; but nature, as Plato says in the *Phædo*, formed the soul to govern, and the body to be governed, in order that the whole of the de-

* An oak may be said to be an image of the lowest nature, or natural life, from the great imbecility of this life, which is evident in the slow growth of the oak.

† If Priestley, Hartley, and other modern metaphysical writers, had but known that the undisciplined are governed by the corporeal temperaments, and that men of true science govern those temperaments, they certainly would not have poisoned the minds of the unscientific with such pernicious and puerile conceptions about necessity.

siderative or irascible part might not be co-passive with the temperaments. But, in those that are well disciplined, the powers of the soul govern the temperament, so that it either is not moved by it from the beginning, or, if moved, it renders the excitation inefficacious. Socrates, therefore, as I have said, shows, in the first place, that in souls themselves there are diversities with respect to these forms of life ; and, in the second place, he demonstrates as necessary to the proposed object of inquiry, that in the soul the rational, the irascible, and the desiderative parts are not one thing. But this was necessary that he might show that those three political characters are analogous to these three parts of the soul, and that both differ from each other by the same boundaries of life. This therefore he demonstrates in the second place, previously assuming as a thing universally acknowledged, that it is impossible for the same thing, according to the same, and with reference to the same, to do or suffer contraries ; but that this may be accomplished by the same thing in a different respect. Thus, the same thing may be heated and refrigerated, be at rest and be moved, impart heat and cold, according to different parts. And the same thing, not with reference to the same but to different things, may be able to do and suffer contraries. Thus, the same thing may be capable of being illuminated and darkened with reference to other things, being illuminated by one thing and darkened by another. Thus, too, the same thing may be the cause of increase and diminution, according to the same, i. e. so far as it is the same, with reference to different things ; as nutriment, which, at the same time that it nourishes the members of the body, is itself diminished.

This being granted, Socrates considers the lives of the continent and incontinent, in which either reason and anger, or reason and desire, oppose each other. For these things take place in those who generously contend in battle through a love of honour, though desire is averse to the undertaking, and from the impulse of hunger urges to flight, but reason at the same time persuades to endurance. But, prior to these, this opposition is seen in the diseased, reason admonishing them not to drink if the body is hot with a fever, but desire calling on them to drink, and the two parts thus opposing each other. Prior to both these, however, it is seen in those that are injured, but do not revenge the injury, though they are incited to venge-

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ance by anger, as in the instance which Homer presents us with in Ulysses, when he says,

Endure, my heart! thou heavier ills hast borne.

In short, reason and anger may at the same time suffer contraries with respect to the same, when, in consequence of an injury being sustained, the latter persuades to vengeance, and the former to endurance. Reason therefore and anger are not the same: for it is impossible that the same thing can do or suffer contraries, according to the same with relation to the same. Again, reason and desire exclaim contraries, as in the instance above mentioned, with respect to drinking in a fever; but it is impossible for the same thing to do or suffer contraries according to the same with reference to the same. Reason therefore and desire are not the same. Again, anger and desire, with respect to the same thing, speak oppositely in those engaged in battle, and oppressed with hunger; but as the same thing cannot be contrarily affected with respect to the same, anger and desire are not the same. Hence these three differ from each other essentially.

Perhaps, however, some one may say that the irrational motions are energies, and another perhaps may say that they are passions; and I have heard some asserting that these motions when moderately moved are energies, but, when immoderately moved, passions. The position, however, which we have established as universally adopted, comprehends the motions of these. So that, if it should be said, one of these acts, and the other suffers, and that action and passion oppose each other, it is evident that the motions themselves must much more differ from each other: for a contrary effect is the cause of a contrary passion. So that, if any passion has an effect contrary to that of any other, the passion of the one will be contrary to that of the other. But what shall we say concerning the love of riches, and the love of pleasure? Whether do these essentially differ, or have they the same essence, but are different operative powers? For that these oppose each other, is testified by the avaricious man and the glutton; for the latter is continually gratifying himself with whatever may satisfy his appetite, and the former lives sparingly, and suffers the pain of hunger, that he may not diminish his wealth. If therefore these essentially differ, why do we not make four parts of the soul? But if these, though they oppose

oppose each other, and suffer contraries, do not essentially differ, neither will the others necessarily differ, because they are passive to contraries.

In thus doubting, however, we forget that desire is called by Socrates a many-headed beast, because the irrational life is both one and many, as being proximate to the body, which is entirely manifold and divisible; just as that which is allied to the rational * intellect is more impartible than any other of the parts belonging to the soul. The desiderative part, therefore, is essentially one and many, and on this account possesses warring powers proceeding from different essences, that through this it may be connascent with body: for this also consists from contraries. Hence this part is one, so far as it possesses one appetite, the love of body, according to which it also differs from the rational parts. For the irascible part is adverse to body, in consequence of aspiring after victory and honour, and through these often casting aside the body, and despising a life in conjunction with it. Nor is the rational part a lover of body, because the object of its appetite is true good. It remains therefore that the desiderative part alone is attached to body, whether it aspires after pleasures or riches: for both these are corporeal. For we are compelled, as Socrates says in the *Phædo*, to acquire riches, in consequence of being subservient to the body and the desires of the body; and the lover of riches never despises the body, though it may sometimes happen that he may die through his attention to wealth. So that the desiderative part, so far as it is simply a lover of body, is one; but, so far as it is a lover of riches and pleasure, is not one. Hence Plato does not say that it is many animals, but calls it one animal having many heads, and living at different times according to its different heads, but being always a lover of body. The desiderative part therefore is, as we have said, the third, as the rational part which aspires after intellect is the first, and the irascible which desires power ranks as a medium. For power subsists between intellect and the summit of essence; and a representation of this summit proceeds into the third part of the soul; whence he who alone participates of this is a lover of body. A representation of power is seen in the part prior to this; and hence this part desires power: but the image of intellect is apparent in the first part; and hence reason aspires after intellection. The last part of the soul therefore is a lover of body, and is solely intent to the preservation of the body.

* Proclus here means the *dianoëtic* power of the soul, of which intellect is the summit.

Since, however, body is two-fold, one being that in which the soul subsists, and the other that by which it is preserved, as the soul is incapable in its present state of being preserved by itself, hence it has two-fold appetites, one of leading into a natural condition the body in which it resides, and according to this appetite it becomes a lover of pleasure, all pleasure being an introduction to nature; but the other of these appetites leads it to procure that of which its containing body is indigent; and according to this appetite it becomes a lover of riches, the acquisition of wealth being desired for the sake of paying attention to the body. It is necessary, therefore, that these powers should always accord with each other,—I mean that the one should desire the preservation of the body in which it resides, and that the other should desire things necessary to its safety. But since one of these appetites aspires after that path which is natural to the body, instead of preserving it, hence through a love of pleasure it destroys it, and defiles it with ten thousand stains; but the other desires riches, not for the purpose of satisfying the necessary wants of the body, but as a principal good. This being the case, these appetites pursue different ends, which oppose each other because they are material. Hence the one by its own destruction contributes to the increase of the other. For the infinite appetite of pleasure is attended with a consumption of wealth, and an increase of wealth requires a diminution of things which contribute to the pleasures of the body. Here, therefore, in a contention concerning ends as principal goods, these appetites differ from each other. For the appetite of desire is not directed to one thing, viz. that the body may subsist according to nature, but to two things, the affluence of one of which is accomplished through the indigence of the other. Since then the end of these appetites is one according to nature, hence Socrates establishes one part of the soul in desire, though it is many-headed, which is not the case, as we have shown, with reason and anger.

Having therefore given an essential division to the parts of the soul, let us, in the third place, consider how Socrates here disposes the four virtues. If then he had been willing to speak in a manner more known to the multitude, he would have said, that prudence is the virtue of reason, fortitude of anger, justice of the desire of riches, and temperance of the love of pleasure. But now, as he thought proper to distribute them in a manner inaccessible to the multitude, and to show the analogy in the political

political genera to the virtues, he evinces that prudence is a habit perfective of that which alone ought to govern the other parts of the soul; and that fortitude is a habit perfective of that which should govern secondarily in it. And having established these two principal virtues, he says that the other virtues belong to the two ruling parts. Hence, he asserts that temperance is a habit which leads the governed into concord with the governors, with respect to governing; so that the last part may consent with the other two, and the middle with the one part prior to it. But he says that justice is a habit which prescribes to each of the parts, both the governing and governed, its proper work. For it is necessary that they should accord with each other, some in governing, and others in being governed; and that the actions of some should be adapted to governors, and of others to the governed. For to govern and to be governed, are beheld in a certain form of life which justice imparts, distributing to the governor that which is alone adapted to him, to consult for the governed, and to the governed to be obedient to the governor. After this manner Socrates discourses concerning the virtues, and it is evident that they must necessarily be such and so many.

One thing therefore only remains to be considered, viz. whence it becomes manifest, that there are only three parts of the soul which are the recipients of these virtues. For that these essentially differ from each other, Socrates has shown; but that there are these parts only, and neither more nor less, requires some consideration; since, if there are more than three, we shall also be in want of other virtues. It is admitted then, that if there are two things which possess contrary properties, there will be three media, as is proved to be the case in the elements*, two of these being received from that which has a more proximate situation, and one from the remaining element which is more remote. This being assumed, let us see what are the peculiarities of reason and body. Reason therefore is impartible, but body partible: reason is intellective, but body is destitute of intelligence. And these things are assumed, one from the essence of reason, another from life, and another from knowledge. Hence anger is impartible indeed; for it is simple in its nature, and on this

* This is shown in the *Timæus*, where it is proved that the three elements, fire, air, and water, are the connecting media of the two contrary extremes, heaven and earth.

account exhibits one polity. It also possesses an appetite of power, yet is not intellectual; but through the privation of intelligence is assimilated to body. But desire consists of many parts as well as body, and is multiform; and hence it is called a many-headed beast, and contributes to many polities. It is also orective, but not of the same things with anger, and is destitute of knowledge. It is necessary, therefore, that anger should be proximate to reason, but communicating in two peculiarities, in one with reason, and in the other with body; but that desire should be proximate to body. There are besides three things in these; two in which they agree,—appetite, and a privation of intellect; and one in which they differ,—the impartible, and the possession of many parts. Hence there is not any other part between the body and soul besides these.

It may however appear, that Socrates does not leave these parts only when he says, “Each of us is well affected when each of these three parts performs its proper office, and they are coharmonized with each other through temperance, and when this is the case with any other parts which may subsist between these.” For by this he may seem, as I have said, not to leave these parts only, but to admit that there is something in us which neither aspires after honour nor riches, but subsists between these. However, Socrates, when he indicates this, does not mean to assert that the lives of the soul are unmingled; as, for instance, that a life according to reason is unmingled with the other parts; that a life according to anger has no communion with the extremes; and that a life according to desire alone is not mingled with those prior to it; but that there are certain lives between these.—Thus, some lead a life both according to reason and anger, being lovers of learning, and at the same time ambitious. Others live according to anger and desire, being both lovers of honours and riches; and either pursue honours that they may become rich, or scatter abroad their riches that through these they may be honoured by those that admire wealth: just as those prior to these either pursue disciplines that they may be honoured for their learning,—or honour, that, being honoured by those that possess disciplines, they also may partake of them. These then are the forms of life between reason and anger, and anger and desire; and are not other parts of the soul, but become, from the mixture of these, various instead of simple. For each of

those three parts is itself by itself simple ; one part being alone a lover of discipline, despising all honour, and every thing corporeal, and being coordinated to one thing, the knowledge of truth ; but another part is ambitious and savage, despises body as a shadow, and is insatiable of one thing alone, honour ; and the third part, desire, is alone attentive to body, and the things pertaining to body, but considers those honours and disciplines to be nothing more than trifles. These, therefore, being simple and unmingled, Socrates says that the lives of the soul which are mingled from these subsist between them, all which, together with the unmingled, ought to be harmonized through the best harmony, that it may be the measure of the appetite of disciplines, of honours, and of the care of the body ; and that the appetite also of the other parts may become consonant, and may not dissent from reason. We must not therefore think that Socrates indicates the natures of other parts which contribute to the perfection of political virtue, but the mixture of these, and the generation of more various forms adapted to political characters.

From what has been demonstrated, therefore, it is evident that the soul is neither one, nor divided into more than the above-mentioned parts, except that the sensitive nature is different from all these. It is different from reason, because it is irrational, and is present with irrational animals ; and it differs from the two irrational parts, because these are orektive, but the sensitive nature is gnostike. Sense, indeed, is present with beings to whom appetite is unknown, as, for instance, to celestial natures : but the orektive part necessarily requires sense ; for appetites are accompanied with the senses. Hence an animal is characterized by the sensitive, and not by the orektive nature. For sense is present with all animals. And hence, too, Timæus says that plants have a sensation of what is pleasant and painful, and therefore he thinks proper to call them animals : for every thing which partakes of life is an animal. Sense, therefore, as I have said, being different from the three parts of the soul, is placed under all of them *.

Again : let us now consider whether the imaginative is entirely the same with the

* It is placed under reason, to which it is subservient in exciting its energies ; and it is also placed under anger and desire, to the motions of which it is subservient, so far as these motions subsist in conjunction with sense.

sensitive power. So far, therefore, as this power is directed in its energies to externals, it is sensitive; but so far as it possesses in itself what it has seen or heard, or the types which it has received from any other sense, it exerts the power of memory. Such then is imagination. Socrates also in the *Philebus*, when he says that the painter in us is different from the scribe, who through the senses writes in the soul imitations of the passions which the senses announce, no longer energizing after the same manner with sense, but itself by itself exciting the types received from them, — when he asserts this, he indicates, by arranging the painter according to the phantastic power, but the scribe according to the common sense, that these are essentially different from each other. In the *Theætetus*, also, he clearly separates that which judges concerning sensible impressions, from sense in which the seals of sensibles are expressed. But whether these essentially differ from each other or not, this is evident, that memory and sense are different, though the essence of these is divided about one subject which possesses an essential multitude; and that memory is nearer to reason than sense, because it receives types from the former as well as from the latter; sense receiving no impressions from reason. And thus much concerning things useful to political virtue, and to those that are instructed in it.

As I know, however, that Porphyry in his *mixt Problems* relates a certain conversation between Medius the Stoic and Longinus respecting the parts of the soul, I do not think it proper to let it pass unnoticed. Medius therefore having made the soul to consist of eight parts, and having divided it into that which governs, into the five senses, into that which is spermatic, and lastly into that which is vocal, Longinus asked him, why he divided the soul, being one, into eight parts? And Medius, in reply, asked Longinus, why, according to Plato, he made the soul, which is one, to be triple? This then deserves to be considered. For it is evident that the inquiry is not the same with the Stoics, who make the soul to consist of eight, as with Plato, who distributes it into three parts. For the Stoics make corporeal differences of parts; and hence it may be reasonably objected to them, how the soul is one, since it is divided into eight parts, without any connecting bond? But Plato, since he asserts that the soul is incorporeal, and incorporeal natures are united to each other without confusion, is not involved in the
same

same doubt respecting the union of its three parts. Plato may also be defended after another manner by saying that, according to him, reason is of a more divine essence, but the irrational part of a much inferior nature; and that the former connects and adorns, but that the latter is connected and adorned; just as form when conjoined with matter introduces unity, and we do not require any thing else which may unite these to each other. Reason, therefore, possessing the order of form, unites the irrational life, and no other third conjoining nature is required. If, likewise, according to Plato *, the junior Gods produce the irrational part, and the demiurgus the rational, there can no longer be any doubt respecting the source of union to reason and the irrational nature. And thus much in defence of Plato, in answer to the noble Medius.

In the last place, appetite and knowledge are contained in the rational soul. And its appetite is either directed to being, or to generation, through which it ascends to real being, and falls again into the regions of sense. The former appetite, therefore, is philosophic, and the latter is enamoured with generation. In like manner, with respect to its knowledge, that which pertains to the circle of sameness † is the knowledge of intelligibles, but that which pertains to the circle of difference is the knowledge of sensibles. Hence, through these the soul elevates herself to the vision of the former, and investigates the nature of the latter. The irrational powers, therefore, are images of these, the orectic of the rational appetites, and the gnostic of rational knowledges. Imaginative or phantastic is indeed the image of intelligible, and sensitive of doxastic knowledge. Thus, too, the appetite of the irascible part is an image of re-elevating appetite, and of the desiderative part, of that appetite which produces generation: for this supervenes body, in the same manner as the former embraces generation. And anger despises body, but looks to honour, the good of incorporeal natures. The phantasy being a figured intellection of intelligibles, wills to be the knowledge of certain things; but sense is conversant with the same object as opinion, viz. a generated nature.

* See the *Timæus*.

† That part of the soul which energizes dianoetically and scientifically is called by Plato, in the *Timæus*, *the circle of sameness*; and that which energizes according to opinion, *the circle of difference*.

B O O K V.

P. 319. *The riddle of children about the Eunuch striking the bat.*

This, according to the Greek Scholiast on this part, was the riddle of Clearchus, and is as follows: A man and not a man, seeing and yet not seeing, struck and yet did not strike, a bird and not a bird, fitting and not fitting, on a tree and yet not on a tree. That is, a Eunuch blind of one eye struck with a pumice stone the wing of a bat perched on a reed.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

INDEX

TO THE

BOOKS OF THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK I.	-	-	-	-	Page 99
II.	-	-	-	-	200
III.	-	-	-	-	228
IV.	-	-	-	-	261
V.	-	-	-	-	288
VI.	-	-	-	-	320
VII.	-	-	-	-	357
VIII.	-	-	-	-	386
IX.	-	-	-	-	416
X.	-	-	-	-	438

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THE LAWS.

VOL. II.

B

INTRODUCTION.

PLATO, in composing the following books of Laws after his Republic, appears to have acted in perfect conformity to the genius of his philosophy, which every where ascends to things more universal and thence descends to things more particular, and contends that the latter can only be accurately known by contemplating the former. As, therefore, in his Republic, or, the great polity, he assigned all things in common, so here he distributes land and a habitation, a wife and children, to every individual.

The Athenian guest, the chief speaker in this Dialogue, is Plato himself, as is well observed by the Greek Scholiast, whom we have frequently cited in the Notes to the Republic. For this guest observes, in the course of the Laws, that he had already completed two polities; so that either these must be the polities of Plato, or, if this is not admitted, Plato will be the same with the Athenian guest. Plato, therefore, travelling to Crete, met near Cnossus with Megillus the Lacedæmonian, and Clinias the Cretan, whom, together with nine others, the Cnossians had invited to their country that they might there establish a colony, build a city, and give it laws. Megillus then and Clinias, says the Scholiast, betook themselves to the sacred cavern of Jupiter, which was the most holy of all others, and in which the most venerable and arcane of the mysteries were performed *. The Athenian guest meeting with these two, and having asked them in what design they were engaged, they replied, In the establishment of laws. However, as they had been asked many things concerning laws by the guest, and had by no means satisfactorily answered his questions, and as he appeared to them to be well skilled in the subject, they request him to assist them in framing laws for the city.

The genius of Plato in composing these laws is truly admirable; for, prompted by a philanthropy of which a resemblance has from time imme-

* προσερχας δ' ὁρμημένοις ἐπὶ τοῦ τοῦ Διὸς ἀντροῦ ἱερὸν, τοῦτο γεινομενὸν ἀγίωντων, ἐν ᾧ τὰ σέπτοτατα καὶ ἀερητότατα τῶν μυστηρίων ἐπιτελεῖτο.—Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 214.

morial been rarely seen, he has devised certain exhortatory introductions, which he calls prefaces, to the several laws, that the citizens may be led by persuasion, and not by terror, to act legally, and that they may spontaneously obey the laws as paternal injunctions, and not unwillingly submit to them as the mandates of a tyrant. The observation, therefore, of Seneca¹, that ‘nothing can be more trifling, nothing more frigid, than a law with a prologue,’ is frigid and trifling in the extreme, when applied, as Seneca does apply it, to Plato’s prefaces to his Laws. But Seneca was ignorant of the benevolent intention of the divine philosopher, in this instance, and perfectly unskilled in his doctrines. Can the objections, therefore, of such a *Roman* be of any weight against such a *Greek*?

In short, Plato, in this work, appears to have most happily blended the Socratic philanthropy with the Pythagoric intellectual elevation. Hence, besides an easy accommodation to familiar discourse, and the ethical peculiarity, in the tenth book, in perfect conformity to the dogmas of the Pythagoreans, he demonstrates the existence of the Gods and Providence, and shows that the divinities possess immutable perfection. This book, indeed, may be considered as forming one of the most important parts of the writings of Plato, as it indisputably proves that he was a firm believer in the religion of his country, and that, when properly understood, the theology of the Pagans is the ne plus ultra of sublimity. An introduction, therefore, of considerable extent will be prefixed to that book, which I earnestly recommend to the diligent perusal of the liberal reader.

¹ Senec. Epist. 94.

THE LAWS.

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN GUEST,
CLINIAS the Cretan, and
MEGILLUS the Lacedæmonian.

DO you think, O guests, that a God, or some man, was the cause of the establishment of laws?

CLIN. A God, O guest, a God, as it is most just to assert: with us, indeed, Jupiter; but, with the Lacedæmonians (whence originated this our guest), I think, Apollo dictated the laws. Is it not so?

MEGIL. It is.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, do you speak according to Homer, viz. that Minos ¹ every year, for the space of nine years, went to converse with his father, and established laws for your cities, according to his conceptions?

CLIN. It is so said by us: and, likewise, that his brother Rhadamanthus (you have heard the name) was most just. We Cretans, therefore, say that he obtained this praise, from his distributing, at that time, things pertaining to justice in a proper manner.

¹ Minos was an intellectual hero, or, in other words, a hero who energized according to intellectual virtue; and, as he was illuminated by Jupiter, from whom he proceeded, he is on this account said to have conversed with his father. For an ample account of heroes, see the Notes to the Cratylus.

GUEST.

GUEST. His renown is indeed beautiful, and highly becoming the son of Jupiter. But since both you and this other have been educated in legal institutions of this kind, I persuade myself, it will not be unpleasant to us to speak and hear about the establishment of cities and laws, at the same time that we are proceeding on our journey. But the way from Cnossus to the cavern^{*} and temple of Jupiter is, as we have heard, sufficiently long; and the resting-places along the road are, as it is proper they should be during the present hot weather, shady, from their position under lofty trees. It will likewise be suitable to our age, to rest in them frequently; and thus, by the allurements of discourse, render the whole of our journey easy.

CLIN. Indeed, O guest, in the course of our journey, we shall meet in the groves with cypress trees of an admirable height and beauty, and meadows in which while we rest we may discourse.

GUEST. You speak rightly.

CLIN. Entirely so. We shall however speak with more confidence when we become spectators of these. But let us now proceed on our journey with good fortune.

GUEST. Let it be so. But inform me, why the law instituted for you public feasts, gymnastic exercises, and the custom of using arms.

CLIN. I think, O guest, that these particulars respecting us may be apprehended with perfect ease. For you see that the nature of the whole region of Crete is not plain, like that of Thessaly. On this account, with them, horses are more used, and, with us, courses on foot. For this, irregularity of the ground is more adapted to the exercise of pedestrian races. Hence, for this purpose, it is necessary that the arms should be lighter, that they may not hinder the race by their weight. But lightness of bows and arrows seems to be adapted to this purpose. All these particulars, therefore, are subservient to our use in war; and the legislator, as it appears to me, looking to this, established every thing. For he seems to have instituted public banquets, in consequence of perceiving that all men, when they engaged in war, were compelled by the thing itself, for the sake of their own defence, to feast at that time together.

^{*} According to the Greek Scholiast, not only the greatest mysteries of Jupiter but also those of the Curetes were performed in this cavern.

But he appears to me to be charged with folly by the multitude, in consequence of their not having learnt that cities are perpetually at war with each other. But if during the time of war it is necessary to feast together for the sake of defence, and that certain governors and men governed should be the armed defenders of them, this also should be done in the time of peace. For that which most men call peace, is only a name; but, in reality, war is perpetually proclaimed according to nature, by all cities, against all. And thus considering, you will nearly find that the Cretan legislator established for us all the laws, both public and private, as if looking to war; and ordered them to defend these laws in such a manner as if nothing else was useful, either of possessions or studies, unless a man became victorious in war; and as considering that all the goods of the vanquished become the property of the victors.

GUEST. You appear to me, O guest, to be well exercised for the purpose of explaining the Cretan laws. But explain this yet more clearly to me. For you seem to me to say that a city is then well established when it is so constituted as to be able to vanquish other cities in war. Is it not so?

CLIN. It is perfectly so; and I think that this our other guest will be of the same opinion.

MEGIL. How can a Lacedæmonian, O divine man, answer otherwise?

GUEST. Whether, therefore, is this right from cities towards cities, but not from one village towards another?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. Is it therefore the same?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But what then? Is it likewise the same from one house to another in the same village, and from one man to another?

CLIN. The same.

GUEST. But what shall we say of one man towards himself? Shall we consider the relation as that of an enemy to an enemy? Or, how shall we say?

CLIN. O Athenian guest! for I am not willing to call you Attic, because you appear to me rather to deserve to be called by the surname of the Goddess Minerva¹. For, rightly reducing the discourse to its principle,

¹ Alluding to Minerva being called the Goddess of Wisdom.

you render it more clear; and, by this mean, are able to find with facility that which has now been rightly asserted,—I mean, that all men are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and likewise, that each individual is an enemy to himself.

GUEST. How do you say, O wonderful man?

CLIN. This, O guest; that for a man to vanquish himself is the first and best of all victories, but to be vanquished by himself is a thing the most shameful and vile. For these things signify that there is war in each of us against ourselves.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us resume the discourse. For, since each of us is either better or worse than himself, whether shall we say that a house, a village, and a city, have this same thing in them, or not?

CLIN. Do you mean that one is better, and the other worse than itself?

GUEST. I do.

CLIN. Concerning this also you have rightly inquired. For this does not less happen to cities, but in the highest degree. For, in those in which the better vanquish the multitude and the worse, such a city is with propriety said to be better than itself, and may with the greatest justice be praised for such a victory. But the contrary must be the case with a contrary city.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, here, the worse is at any time more excellent than the better, must be left uninvestigated; (for it would require a prolix discussion;) but I understand what is at present asserted by you, thus: That sometimes citizens who are allied to each other, and of the same city, being unjust and numerous, will forcibly attack the just, being fewer in number, that they may subject them to slavery; and that, when they conquer, the city may be justly said to be inferior to itself, and at the same time depraved, but, when they are conquered, better than itself, and good.

CLIN. What is now said, O guest, is wonderful in the extreme; but, at the same time, thus to confess is most necessary.

GUEST. Come then, let us again consider this. Many brothers may be born from one father, and from one mother. Nor is it at all wonderful that the greater part of them should be unjust, and the lesser just.

CLIN. It is not wonderful.

GUEST. Nor will it be proper for me and you to investigate this, that
when

when the base vanquish, both the house and every kind of alliance may be called inferior to themselves, but better than themselves when the base are vanquished. For we do not investigate these things at present for the sake of an elegant or inelegant arrangement of words, according to the manner of many, but for the sake of discovering what is natural rectitude and error concerning laws.

CLIN. You speak most truly, O guest.

MEGIL. It appears to me, too, that what has hitherto been said is beautiful.

GUEST. Let us besides consider this: Can any one become a judge of such brothers as we have just spoken of?

CLIN. Doubtless.

GUEST. Which therefore will be the better judge? he who cuts off those that are unworthy, and orders the worthy to govern themselves? or he who causes the worthy to govern, but suffers the unworthy to live, when they are willing to be governed? But we will say that a third is a judge with respect to virtue, if such a one can be found, who, receiving one discordant alliance, will not destroy any one, but, reconciling the disagreeing parties, will establish for them laws by which they may be enabled to preserve friendship towards each other.

CLIN. Such a judge and legislator will be by far the best.

GUEST. And he will frame laws for them, by acting in a manner contrary to looking at war.

CLIN. This indeed is true.

GUEST. But what—Whether does he who aptly constitutes a city look to external war, and by this mean principally adorn the lives of the citizens, or to the war produced within the city, which is called sedition, which every one would particularly wish not to arise in his city; and that, when it arises, the city may be liberated from it with the utmost celerity?

CLIN. It is evident that he would look to the latter.

GUEST. Whether would any one choose that peace should be the result of sedition, in consequence of one part of the citizens being destroyed, and the other part being victorious, or rather that peace and friendship should be the consequence of reconciliation, and thus the mind of the citizens be necessarily directed to external wars?

CLIN. Every one would rather wish that the latter should happen to his city, than the former.

GUEST. Would not a legislator in a similar manner?

CLIN. He would.

GUEST. Does not every one establish all laws for the sake of that which is best?

CLIN. How should he not?

GUEST. But neither war nor sedition is the best of things (for to be in want of these is execrable), but mutual peace and benevolence. Nor is that victory by which a city vanquishes itself, one of the best of things, but it ranks among things necessary. But to think that the best state of a city consists in fighting and conquering, is just as if any one should think that a wearied body, when undergoing medicinal purification, then acted in the best manner, but should pay no attention to a body which was not at all indigent of medical assistance. And if any one thinks in a similar manner, either of the felicity of a city or of a private man, he will never become a politician, while he thus alone and primarily looks to external war; nor will he be an accurate legislator, unless he establishes laws respecting war for the sake of peace, rather than laws respecting peace for the sake of war.

CLIN. These things, O guest, appear in a certain respect to be rightly said. But I should wonder to find any one contending that our laws, and likewise those of the Lacedæmonians, were not with all possible attention framed for the sake of war.

GUEST. Perhaps this is the case. We ought not, however, to investigate the present affair in a contentious but in a quiet manner; the greatest diligence being employed, both by us and them, about things of this kind. Attend therefore to my discourse. In the first place, we shall adduce Tyrtaeus¹, who was by birth an Athenian, but afterwards a citizen of Lacedæmonia, and who most of all men applied himself to these particulars: "I shall not then (says he) consider that man as worthy of being mentioned, or of any

¹ Tyrtaeus was an elegiac poet, lame, and despised by the Athenians. The Oracle of Apollo, however, ordered the Lacedæmonians to use him as their general, in the war in which they were then engaged with the Messenians. Tyrtaeus therefore coming to Lacedæmon, and being inspired by the God, so animated the Lacedæmonians that they vanquished the Messenians. He flourished 684 years before Christ.

consequence, though he should be the most wealthy of all men, and should possess abundance of goods (and he enumerates almost all goods), who does not always conduct himself in the most excellent manner in warlike affairs." These poems perhaps you also have heard. For this other associate of ours is, I think, fatiated with them.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

CLIN. And these also have reached us, being brought from Lacedæmonia.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in common interrogate this poet thus: O most divine poet, Tyrtaeus! for you appear to us to be wise and good, because you have in the highest degree celebrated those who in the highest degree excel in war. I, therefore, and this Clinias the Cnossian, appear very much to agree with you in this particular. But we wish clearly to know, whether or not we speak about the same men. Inform us, therefore, whether you also as well as we are clearly of opinion, that there are two kinds of war? Or how do you say? For I think that a man much worse than Tyrtaeus would answer that there are two kinds; one, which we all denominate sedition, and which we consider as the most grievous of all wars; but the other kind, I think, is that which we all consider as milder than the former, and which we employ against those who do not belong to the city, and who are of a different tribe.

CLIN. How is it possible he should answer otherwise?

GUEST. Inform us, therefore, who were the men, and what the kind of war, in which you have so transcendently praised some, and blamed others. For you appear to have praised those that fought in external wars. Thus, you say in your poems, that you can by no means endure those who are not hardy enough to behold bloody slaughter, and to aspire after fierce battle, hand to hand. From this, O Tyrtaeus, we should infer, that you praise those who have been eminently illustrious in waging external war. Shall we say that Tyrtaeus would grant this?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But we, since these are good, shall assert that those are far better who evidently excel in the greatest war. We have too the poet Theognis¹

¹ This poet flourished about 549 years before Christ.

a witness in our favour, who was a citizen of the Megarensians in Sicily. For he says :

Who faithful in insane sedition keeps,
With silver and with ruddy gold may vie.

We say, therefore, that such a one will conduct himself in the most difficult war in a manner nearly as much superior to the other, as justice, temperance, and prudence, when conjoined with fortitude, are superior to fortitude alone. For no one can be found faithful and sound in seditions, without the whole of virtue. But, as Tyrtæus says, there are a great number of mercenaries who fight intrepidly and die willingly in battle, most of whom are ferocious, injurious, reproachful, and, with a very few exceptions, are the most stupid of all men. But to what does all this tend ? And what did he perspicuously intend to signify by these assertions ? It is evidently this, that both he who framed laws here from Jupiter, and every other legislator who profits cities in the smallest degree, establishes laws by always looking as much as possible to the greatest virtue. But it is, as Theognis says, confidence in dire events, which may be denominated perfect justice. But that which Tyrtæus so highly praises is indeed beautiful, and opportunely celebrated by the poet ; yet it may most rightly be said to be honourable, the fourth in number, and in power.

CLIN. Shall we, therefore, O guest, rank our legislator among remote legislators ?

GUEST. Not him indeed, most excellent man, but ourselves, since we are of opinion, that both Lycurgus and Minos established all the laws in Lacedæmon, and here, in consequence of especially directing their attention to war.

CLIN. In what manner then ought we to speak ?

GUEST. As truth and justice, I think, require those should speak who discourse about a divine republic ; for such ought not to be considered as looking to a certain part of virtue, and that the most abject, but as regarding the whole of virtue, and inquiring after laws, according to the species of virtue ;—not, indeed, investigating those species which many at present propose ; for, at present, every one proposes to inquire after that which he is principally in want of. Thus, one inquires about an inheritance, another about women who are left the only heirs, another about an injury,
and

and others about ten thousand things of a similar kind. But we say that inquiries about laws rank among good inquiries, when they are such as we have just now begun. And, indeed, I in every respect approve of the manner in which you have entered on the discussion of laws. For you are certainly right in beginning from virtue, and asserting that for its sake laws are framed. But you do not appear to me to be right in saying, that the legislator framed all his laws by regarding a part of virtue, and this he least; and this has been the cause of all that was afterwards said by me. Are you, however, willing I should tell you in what manner I wish you to distinguish in this affair?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. It is proper, O guest, to assert that the laws of the Cretans are not rashly approved by all men, and particularly by all the Greeks. For they are rightly framed, since they render those who use them happy; and this because they impart every good. But there are two kinds of goods, one human, and the other divine; and the former is suspended from the latter. And if any city receives the greater goods, it also possesses the lesser; but if not, it is deprived of both. But the lesser goods are those of which health is the leader, beauty the second in order, and strength for the course, and all the other motions pertaining to the body, the third. But riches rank in the fourth place, which are not blind¹, but perceive acutely, if they follow prudence. However, that which is the first leader of all divine goods is prudence². That which ranks in the second place

¹ "Theophrastus (says the Greek Scholiast) observes, that if wealth had life, it would come only to the good. For every thing desires its proper good; but this is the good of wealth, to become an instrument to the worthy: since that which is the good of any thing is the object of desire to that thing, and this also is according to nature to it. But all things aspire after a disposition according to nature. However, since wealth is without life, it now also falls among the evil." 'Ο Θεοφράστος φησιν· εἰ ζῶνι εἶχεν ὁ πλούτος, πρὸς μόνους αὐτῷ ἀπλήρεις τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· ἑκάστου γὰρ τῶν οὐκείου ἐφίεται ἀγαθοῦ· τούτου δὲ τῷ πλούτῳ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, τὸ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὄργανον γίνεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, τούτου καὶ ἐφετὸν ὑπάρχει· τούτου δ' αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν πάντα δὲ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ορεγεται διαθεσῶς· οὐν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ὁ πλούτος οὐκ ἐχει ζῶνιν, ἐμπίπτει καὶ εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς.—Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 227.

² Meaning intellectual prudence, through which we obtain a knowledge of things good and advantageous, of things beautiful and the contrary; and which, in short, is the governor of man, referring cities and houses, and the life of every individual, to a divine paradigm. Plato immediately after this calls it intellect, because it is generated from a pure and perfect intellect.

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after intellect is a temperate habit of the soul. From these mingled with fortitude, the third in order will be justice. And the fourth will be fortitude. All which are to be placed, according to nature before those human goods. A legislator, therefore, ought to follow this order, and should command the citizens to look to these divine goods in all their actions. But, of these, human should be referred to divine goods, and all divine goods to their leader intellect. After these things he ought to pay attention to the marriages of the citizens, and to the procreation and education of children, both male and female, and likewise to the young, and those who are advancing to old age. Such too, among these, as behave well, he should honour as they deserve, but should reprobate in all the conversations of these, their pains, pleasures, and desires. He should likewise consider, and act as a guardian over, the studies of all lovers; and, through the laws, praise such as are worthy, and blame the contraries to these. With respect to anger and fear, too, he will show what in each of these is laudable, and what to be avoided; likewise what perturbations are produced in the soul through misfortune, and what the means by which these are avoided in prosperity. Lastly, he will show what passions men are subject to, through disease, war, poverty, or the contraries to these; and in all such things he will teach and define what is beautiful, or otherwise, in the disposition of each. After this, it is necessary that the legislator should pay attention to the possessions and expenses of the citizens, so as to know how they are conducted, together with societies, and their dissolutions, whether voluntarily or involuntarily instituted; where justice is found among these, and where it is wanting; that by these means he may distribute honours to those that obey the laws, and punish those who cannot be persuaded to obey them. In the last place, having instituted every thing as far as to the end of every polity, it is necessary he should establish the manner in which the monuments of the dead should be raised, and what honours are to be paid to them. The legislator, having established all these particulars, should place over them guardians, some of whom conduct public affairs according to prudence, but others according to true opinion; so that intellect, binding all these together, may evince that the city follows temperance and justice, and not riches or ambition. After this manner, O guests, I have wished, and am now desirous, you would explain how all these particulars are to be found in those laws which are called

called the laws of Jupiter, in those of Pythian Apollo, and in those which Minos and Lycurgus established; and how, being assumed in a certain order, they may become evident to one who is skilled in the legislative science, either by art or from certain customs, though to us they are by no means apparent.

CLIN. How then, O guest, ought we to discuss what follows?

GUEST. It appears to me that we ought to commence our discussion from the beginning (as we began to do); considering in the first place the pursuits of fortitude, and afterwards discussing another and another species of virtue, if you are willing: and that we may discuss the first object of our inquiry, we will endeavour to establish a paradigm, and refer to it the other particulars, that by mutual converse of this kind we may beguile the tediousness of the way. But afterwards we will consider the pursuits of the whole of virtue, and evince that our present discussion, if divinity is willing, looks thitherward.

CLIN. You speak well. Endeavour therefore, in the first place, to judge for us respecting this praise of Jupiter.

GUEST. I will endeavour to do this, both for you and myself. For the discourse is common. Speak therefore. Shall we say that common banquets and gymnastic exercises were invented by the legislator, for the purposes of war?

CLIN. They were.

GUEST. And is this the case with a third or fourth thing? For, perhaps, it is proper thus to enumerate in the things pertaining to another virtue, whether it is right to call them parts, or any thing else, for the sake of perspicuity.

MEGIL. I, therefore, as well as every Lacedæmonian, should say that hunting was invented as the third thing. But we should endeavour, if possible, to discover the fourth or fifth thing. I therefore shall endeavour to evince that the fourth thing consists in the endurance of pain. For we are much exercised in this, in fighting with each other with our hands, and in certain violent seizures, each of these being attended with a multitude of wounds. Besides this we have an exercise, which is called a certain concealment¹, which is wonderfully laborious, and is undertaken for the purpose

¹ A young man was sent from the city, in order that he might not be seen for a certain time. He was therefore compelled to wander round the mountains, and could neither sleep without

purpose of strengthening our endurance. Besides, in winter, without shoes, without any covering to our body, and without servants, waiting indeed on ourselves, we wander both night and day through every region. Further still: in the exercises of naked young men, severe endurances take place among us, when we contend with the strength of suffocating heat; and there are many other things of this kind among us, which it would not be easy to enumerate.

GUEST. You speak well, O Lacedæmonian guest. But whether or not shall we place fortitude as simply consisting in a contest alone with fears and pains? or, shall we say that it likewise consists in opposing desires and pleasures, and certain vehement flatteries, which soften the minds of those who are considered as venerable persons, and besides this render them like wax?

MEGIL. I think it likewise consists in opposing all these.

GUEST. If, therefore, we call to mind what was advanced above, this our other guest said, that some city was inferior to itself, and some man to himself. Was it not so, O Cnossian guest?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Now, then, which ought we to call the inferior,—he who is subdued by pain, or he who is subdued by pleasure?

CLIN. It appears to me, he who is subdued by pleasure. And, in every respect, we should rather say that he who is vanquished by pleasures is disgracefully inferior to himself, and, prior to this, to him who is vanquished by pains.

GUEST. Did therefore the legislators of Jupiter and Apollo establish by law fortitude as lame, and consider it as alone able to oppose things on its left hand, but incapable of resisting elegancies and flatteries on its right hand? or, did they consider it as able to oppose both?

CLIN. Both, I think.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again relate what those pursuits are, in both your cities, which taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them, in the same

without fear, lest he should be detected, nor employ servants, nor carry food for his subsistence. There was also another form of exercise for the purpose of war: for, stripping every one of the young men naked, they ordered them to wander for a whole year out of the city, among the mountains, and to support themselves by theft, and other stratagems, but in such a manner that no one might detect them. Hence this was called *μυστικα*, a concealment: for they were punished if they were at any time discovered.—Schol. Gr. in Plat. p. 225.

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manner as they do not avoid pain, but bring them into the midst, and cause the citizens to vanquish them, partly by force, and partly by the allurements of honour. But, inform me where the same thing is ordained in your laws respecting pleasures, as respecting pains; and what that is which renders you similarly brave both with respect to pain and pleasures; which renders you victorious over those things which you ought to vanquish, and by no means suffers you to be inferior to your neighbouring and most grievous enemies?

MEGIL. I cannot, O guest, so easily adduce a multitude of laws opposite to pleasures, as I can a multitude opposite to pains. Nor perhaps is it easy to speak of pleasures according to great and apparent parts, but only according to such as are small.

CLIN. Nor am I able in a similar manner to render the same apparent in the Cretan laws.

GUEST. This, O best of guests, is by no means wonderful. If any one, therefore, who is desirous of perceiving that which is true and at the same time most excellent, should find something to reprehend in the laws of our respective countries, we should behave towards each other with mildness, and not with severity.

CLIN. You speak well, O Athenian guest; and therefore we ought to follow your advice.

GUEST. Indeed, Clinias, a conduct of this kind becomes men of your age.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. The next question, therefore, will be, whether or not the Læconian and Cretan polity is reprehensible. Perhaps, indeed, I can better relate what is said by the multitude on this occasion, than either of you. As to your laws, though they should be but of a moderate degree of excellence, yet you certainly have one most beautiful law, which forbids any youth from inquiring whether the laws are well or ill established, but orders them all to accord, with one voice, and with one mouth, that they are all beautifully constituted, as if they had been established by the Gods; and that, if any young man asserts the contrary, no one shall by any means listen to his discourse: but that an old man, if he has any thing to urge against them, shall relate his objections to the rulers, and his equals in age, yet not in the presence of any young man.

VOL. II.

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CLIN.

CLIN. You speak most properly, O guest: and though at the time this law was established you was absent from the thought of the founder, yet you appear to me to conjecture his intention sufficiently, as if you were a prophet, and to speak the truth in the most eminent degree.

GUEST. At present, therefore, let us be free from young men, but we, on account of our old age, are permitted by the legislator to speak about the laws among ourselves, without committing any offence.

CLIN. We are so. Do not spare, therefore, but freely reprove our laws. For it is not dishonourable to know if any thing is not beautifully established; but, by this mean, a remedy is applied, when what is asserted is received with a benevolent, and not an envious mind.

GUEST. You speak well. I shall not, however, reprehend the laws till I have diligently considered them to the utmost of my ability; or rather, I shall proceed in this affair by doubting. For you alone, of all the Greeks and Barbarians with whom we are acquainted, the legislator has ordered to abstain from the greatest pleasures and sports, and not to taste them. But with respect to pains and fears, which we have lately discussed, he was of opinion, that if any one avoided them from his infancy, when he came to endure necessary pains, fears, and labours, he would avoid those who are exercised in them, and would become their slave. This legislator ought, in my opinion, to have thought the same respecting pleasures, and to have said to himself: If the citizens should from childhood be unexperienced in the greatest pleasures, and never be taught how to sustain the attacks of pleasure, or informed that they should never be compelled to do any thing base for the sake of the sweetness with which pleasure is attended, they would be induced to act in the same manner as those who are vanquished by fear, and would become servile in a different and yet baser manner than those who are able to endure the assaults of pleasure, but yet procure pleasures for themselves, and are sometimes the worst of men. The soul of such, likewise, is partly a slave, and partly free; and they do not deserve to be called simply brave, and free. Consider, therefore, whether any thing that has been now said appears to you to be proper.

CLIN. It does. But immediately and readily to assent to things of such great importance would be the province of young men, or rather of stupid men.

GUEST. Shall we then, O Clinias and Lacedæmonian guest, after this,
discuss

discuss what we at first proposed; (for after fortitude we shall speak of temperance,) I mean, what difference there is between these polities and those which are governed by chance, in the same manner as we have now spoken about war?

MEGIL. This is not very easy to accomplish.

CLIN. Yet it appears that the common banquets, and gymnastic exercises, were beautifully invented by both polities.

GUEST. It appears, O guests, to be a difficult undertaking to introduce, in reality as well as in discourse, the indubitable, respecting polities. For it seems that, as in bodies it is not possible to accommodate any one pursuit to any one body, because the same thing is seen to injure some and benefit others, the like takes place in cities. For gymnastic exercises, public banquets, and a multitude of other things, at one time are beneficial to cities, but in seditions they are hurtful. The truth of this is evinced by the Milesians, Bœotians, and Thurians. But this antient, legal, and natural pursuit appears to have perverted the venereal pleasures, not only of men, but of beasts. And your cities may be first accused of this, and such others as have particularly applied themselves to gymnastic exercises. And whether things of this kind ought to be considered jocosely, or seriously, still we must be convinced that, when the male and female unite for the purpose of producing offspring, the pleasure attending such a conjunction appears to be imparted according to nature; but, that the conjunction of males with males, or of females with females, is contrary to nature. We must likewise assert, that he who first dared to act in this manner was induced by the incontinence of pleasure. We all of us, indeed, blame the fable of the Cretans about Ganymedes, as discoursing about these particulars. For, as they believe that their laws were given by Jupiter, they have devised this fable against Jupiter, that they may give themselves up to this pleasure, following the example of the God. But let us bid farewell to the fable. Again, with respect to those who make the laws the subject of their speculation, almost all their attention should be directed to pleasures and pains, both in the manners of cities and of individuals. For these two fountains are permitted to flow by nature; of which, he who draws whence, when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this is equally true of a city, an individual, and of every animal: but

he who draws unscientifically, and at an improper time, will, on the contrary, live unhappy.

MEGIL. These things, O guest, are so beautifully said, as to render us incapable of urging any thing against them. But, at the same time, the Lacedæmonian legislator appears to me to have very properly forbidden the avoiding of pleasure. But this our other guest can, if he pleases, assist us with respect to the Cnossian laws. For it appears to me that the institutions in Sparta about pleasures are the most beautiful of all institutions; since that through which men principally fall into the greatest pleasures, the most injurious conduct, and every kind of folly, our law exterminates from the whole of our country: nor will you see in the fields, nor in any of the Spartan cities, banquets, nor such other particulars attendant on these, as excite, according to their power, every kind of pleasure. Nor is there any one who, happening to meet with a person wanton through intoxication, would not immediately inflict on him the greatest punishment. Nor would the pretext of celebrating the festival of Bacchus absolve him from chastisement, as I once saw was the case with your people in carriages. And in Tarentum, with those of our colony, I have seen all the city intoxicated during the Bacchic festival. With us, however, there is nothing of the kind.

GUEST. O Lacedæmonian guest, all such things as these are laudable where they are attended with certain endurances; but, where they are permitted, they are of a most slothful nature. For some one, defending our institutions, would very readily reprove you by showing the licentiousness of your women. But one answer appears to liberate all such particulars, in Tarentum, with us, and with you, from not being base, but upright. For every one who answers may say to an admiring stranger, on his beholding things unusual in his own country: Wonder not, O guest, that this law is established among us, but with you a different law, perhaps about the same things. At present, however, O friends, our discourse is not about different men, but about the vice and virtue of the legislators. But let us speak more fully about all intoxication. For it is not a thing of a trifling nature; nor is the knowledge of it the province of a depraved legislator. I do not mean to inquire, whether wine ought to be drunk or not, but about intoxication itself,—whether it is to be used, as the Scythians
and

and Persians use it, and besides these the Carthaginians, Celtæ, Iberians, and Thracians, who all of them are warlike nations; or, as it is used by you; for you (as you say) entirely abstain from it. But the Scythians and Thracians use it unmingled with water, women as well as men, and pour it on their garments, thinking that thus they are engaged in a beautiful and blessed pursuit. But the Persians are very much given to other luxuries, which you reject; yet, O best of men, they are more orderly in these than the Scythians and Thracians.

MEGIL. All these, however, we shall put to flight, when we take up arms.

GUEST. O best of men, do not speak in this manner. For many flights and pursuings have taken place, and will take place, of which it is impossible to form any conjecture; on which account, we cannot at any time give an evident definition, but are involved in doubts about beautiful and base pursuits, when we speak of victory and flight in war; especially since the greater vanquish in battle, and enslave the lesser cities. Thus, the Locrians were vanquished and enslaved by the Syracusans, who appear to have possessed the best laws of all the neighbouring nations; and the Cei by the Athenians; and innumerable instances of the same kind may be found. Neglecting, therefore, the consideration of victory and being vanquished, we will endeavour to speak and persuade ourselves about every pursuit; and to show how this thing is beautiful, and that is not so. But, first of all, hear me, how we ought to consider what is good or bad in things of this kind.

MEGIL. How do you say?

GUEST. All those who introduce any dispute in their discourse, and immediately propose to praise or blame it, appear to me to act by no means in a proper manner, but to do just the same as if, any one praising a piece of bread as good, another should immediately discommend it, without either understanding its operation or utility, and without knowing after what manner, by whom, and with whom it was prepared, and the past and present habit of the bodies to whom it ought to be offered. But we appear to act in the very same manner, at present, in our discourses. For, upon only hearing intoxication mentioned, some of us immediately blamed, and others praised it; and this very absurdly. For, employing witnesses
and:

and those who praise, we likewise praised; and some of us thought that we advanced something reasonable, because we adduced a multitude of witnesses; but others, because those who make no use of wine conquer in battle. This, however, is to us ambiguous. If then we proceed in this manner in the discussion of other particulars pertaining to laws, we shall not in my opinion proceed rationally. But adducing intoxication as an instance, I will endeavour to the utmost of my ability to point out a right method for us, about all such subjects of inquiry; since innumerable nations, who are doubtful about these particulars, will verbally contend with your two cities.

MEGIL. We must not through sluggishness refuse to hear, whether we possess any right consideration about these affairs.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, thus consider. If any one should praise the employment of nurturing goats, and the possession of that species of animals, as a beautiful thing, but another should blame it, in consequence of seeing that goats are fed in cultivated places without a shepherd, and that every kind of cattle is either without a shepherd, or is under the direction of bad shepherds; should we consider the accusation of such a one as sane, or not?

MEGIL. How is it possible we could?

GUEST. But, whether will a pilot be useful in a ship, if he alone possesses the nautical science, whether he is troubled with sea sickness or not? or how shall we say?

MEGIL. This passion which you speak of is not in any respect connected with the nautical art.

GUEST. But what shall we say of the general of an army? Is he to be considered as sufficient to the purposes of commanding, if he possesses the warlike science, though, being timid in dangers, yet through intoxication he should loath fear?

MEGIL. How can he?

GUEST. But what shall we say, if he does not possess art, and is timid?

MEGIL. You speak of one in every respect depraved, and who is by no means a ruler of men, but of some extremely weak women.

GUEST. But he who praises or blames a community, which is naturally capable of being governed, and which with a proper governor is a useful society

society, but, at the same time, has either never seen it well governed, or has always beheld it without governors, can he with propriety ever praise or blame such a community?

MEGIL. How is it possible he can, who has never beheld a society well governed?

GUEST. Attend then: Do we not consider guests and banquets as one certain association out of many communities?

MEGIL. We do in the highest degree.

GUEST. Has no one, therefore, ever beheld this subsisting in a proper manner? But it is easy for you to answer, that this has never in any respect been beheld (for this is neither according to the manner of your country nor your laws). But I have met with many, and in many places, and have diligently inquired, as I may say, about all of them. And, indeed, I have scarcely seen or heard of one whole community that has been established in a proper manner; but I have seen that this has been the case with certain few and small parts, while many have, as I may say, been entirely faulty.

CLIN. How do you say, O guest? Speak still more perspicuously. For we, as you say, being unskilled in such things, and perhaps not having met with them, cannot immediately know what in them is right or wrong.

GUEST. You speak probably: but, while I speak, endeavour to learn. Do you then acknowledge, that, in all associations and communions of actions whatever, it is proper for each to have a governor?

CLIN. How is it possible I should not?

GUEST. But we have already said, that the governor of warlike affairs ought to be brave.

CLIN. We have.

GUEST. But the brave will be less disturbed by fear than the timid man.

CLIN. And this also will be the case.

GUEST. If any method could be devised by which a general of an army might be rendered neither timid, nor subject to perturbation, should we not accomplish this by all possible means?

CLIN. In the greatest degree.

GUEST. But now we do not speak of an army which is governed in the inimical associations of inimical men, in war, but of the benevolence of friends communicating with each other in peace.

CLIN.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But an association of this kind, if it is attended with intoxication, will not be without perturbation. Or, do you think it will?

CLIN. How should it be without?

GUEST. In the first place, therefore, these have need of a governor.

CLIN. Most of all.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, is it proper to choose for them, if possible, a governor who is free from perturbation?

CLIN. How can it be otherwise?

GUEST. And, indeed, as it appears, he ought to be prudent with respect to association. For he should be the guardian of their friendship, and should take care that it may be increased through this their association.

CLIN. You speak most truly.

GUEST. It is proper, therefore, to place over the intoxicated a sober and wise governor, and not the contrary. For, if the governor of the intoxicated is himself intoxicated, young, and not wise, he must be abundantly fortunate if he does not accomplish some mighty evil.

CLIN. Abundantly indeed.

GUEST. If, therefore, any one should blame drinking associations, though they should be as well instituted as possible in cities, while he accuses the thing itself, he will perhaps very properly blame them. But if he should blame all drinking associations, merely because he had seen one defective; in the first place, it is evident he is ignorant that this was not well instituted; and, in the next place, every thing after this manner will appear base, although the master and governor should be sober. Or, do you not perceive, that when the pilot is intoxicated, or any other governor, he will subvert every thing, whether it is a ship, or a chariot, or an army, or any thing else that is governed by him?

CLIN. You speak, O guest, in every respect, true. But inform me what advantage can be derived from drinking associations when they are well conducted. As that which we just now asserted, that an army well commanded would procure victory in war, which is no small good: and in the same manner we must judge of other things. But what great advantage will accrue either to individuals, or cities, from drinking associations being properly instituted?

GUEST. What great advantage can a city derive from one boy, or one company

company being properly educated? or shall we not reply to him who asks this question, that the city derives but very little advantage from the education of an individual, or a company? But, if you inquire universally about the education of youth, of what great advantage it is to a city, it is not difficult to reply, that, when boys are well educated, they will become good men; and that, in consequence of becoming good men, they will both act in other respects in a beautiful manner, and will vanquish their enemies in battle. Discipline, therefore, will give victory, but victory sometimes produces ignorance. For many becoming insolent through victory in war are filled, in consequence of their insolence, with a thousand other evils. And discipline indeed has never at any time been Cadmeian; but there have been, and will be, many victories of this kind among men.

CLIN. You seem to say, O friend, that associations for the purpose of drinking wine form a great part of discipline, if they are properly conducted.

GUEST. Certainly.

CLIN. Will you after this be able to prove that your assertion is true?

GUEST. To contend, O guest, that these things are true, since many doubt about them, is alone the province of divinity; but, if it be requisite to assert what appears to me, I think no one will be envious, since our intention, at present, is to discourse about laws and a polity.

CLIN. We will therefore endeavour to learn what is your opinion with respect to these ambiguities.

GUEST. It is proper to do so; and, besides this, that you should endeavour to learn, and I to teach, and that this should be the whole business of our discourse. But, first of all, hear what follows. All the Greeks consider this city of ours as philological, and abounding in words. But with respect to Lacedæmon and Crete, the former is considered as sparing of words, but the latter, as more remarkable for abundance of sagacity than abundance of words. But I am afraid I shall appear to you to speak much about a small affair,—I mean intoxication. An emendation of it, indeed, according to nature cannot be accomplished with perspicuity, without musical recitade, nor be sufficiently handled in discourse. But music cannot be discussed without the whole of erudition. And all this requires a multitude of words. Consider, therefore, what we shall do: whether

we shall omit these things at present, and pass on to some other question about laws.

MEGIL. Perhaps you do not know, O Athenian guest, that our family is the public guest of your city. Perhaps, therefore, a certain benevolence will immediately enter into the minds of all boys towards a city, when they hear that they are the public guests of that city; and they will consider it as another native country, which ranks in the second place after their own. And this is the case with myself at present. For I have heard the Lacedæmonian youth, as often as they praised or blamed any thing belonging to the Athenians, say, Your city, O Megillus, has been the cause of this evil, or that good. But, on hearing this, I have fought against those who blamed your city, in consequence of possessing all possible benevolence towards it. And now, indeed, your voice is grateful to me; and that which is said by many, that such of the Athenians as are good are so in a remarkable degree, appears to be most truly asserted. For they alone, without necessity, spontaneously, and from a divine allotment, are truly and not fictitiously good. Therefore, for my sake, my friend, you may boldly say whatever you please.

CLIN. And hearing and receiving, O guest, what I have to advance, you may confidently speak what you please. For you have perhaps heard, that Epimenides was a divine man, who was of our family, and who ten years prior to the Persian war came to your city through the admonition of an oracle, and performed certain sacrifices which the God had enjoined. And besides this, he told the Athenians, who were terrified at the Persian expedition, that the Persians would not come for the space of ten years; and that, when they came, they would depart without accomplishing any thing which they hoped to accomplish, and would suffer greater evils than they caused. At that time our ancestors hospitably received yours; and, in consequence of this, both myself and our parents are benevolently disposed towards you.

GUEST. You therefore, as it appears, are prepared to hear; but I am indeed prepared so far as relates to my will, but not altogether with respect to my ability. I shall however endeavour to gratify your request. In the first place then, as preparatory to our discourse, let us define what discipline is, and what power it possesses. For we say that through this the
discourse

discourse proposed by us at present must proceed, until it arrives at divinity.

CLIN. We ought entirely to act in this manner, if agreeable to you.

GUEST. While, therefore, I assert what it is proper to say discipline is, do you consider whether my assertion accords with your opinion.

CLIN. You may begin when you please.

GUEST. I say, then, that those who are hereafter to become great men ought from their very childhood to meditate both in sport, and when acting seriously, things accommodated to the objects of their pursuit. Thus, if any one is to become a good husbandman or architect, he ought from childhood, even in play, either to till the ground, or build certain puerile houses. And he who is intrusted with the education of both these should provide each of them with small instruments, which are imitations of the true ones. And besides this, he should learn such disciplines as are necessary to be previously learned. Thus, a workman should learn how to measure, or use a rule. He who is destined to be a warrior should in sport ride on horseback, or do something else of a similar kind. And the master of the children should endeavour, by sports, to turn the pleasures and desires of the children thither, where when arrived, it is proper they should receive their consummation. But we say that the head or summit of discipline is a right education, which especially leads the soul of him who sports to a love of that which it will be requisite for him to do when he has arrived at manhood, and has acquired perfection in the virtue of his art. Consider therefore, now, whether (as I said) what has been thus far asserted pleases you.

CLIN. How is it possible it should not?

GUEST. Neither, therefore, should that which we have said discipline is, be left indefinite. For now, when we blame or praise the education of particular persons, we say that such a one is endued with discipline, but another is undisciplined, although he may possess the greatest skill in cooking, or navigation, and other things of this kind. For we do not, as it appears, consider these to be discipline, but that which causes a citizen from his childhood to desire and love virtue, and through which acquiring perfection, he may know how to govern and be governed with justice. This is what our discourse defines to be education; from which it appears,

that this alone ought to be called discipline, according to our sentiments; but that the education which tends to the acquisition of wealth, or bodily strength, or any other particular wisdom, without intellect and justice, is mechanical and illiberal, and does not in any respect deserve to be called discipline. We shall not, however, contend about a word. But let what we have just now assented to remain, that those who are properly disciplined become nearly all of them good. So that it is by no means proper to despise discipline, because it is present to the most excellent men, the first of all beautiful things. And if at any time one properly disciplined should depart from right conduct, he is capable of being put in the right way; and this he may always accomplish according to his ability, through the whole of life.

CLIN. Right: and we assent to what you say.

GUEST. But we formerly granted, that those are good who are capable of governing themselves, but those bad, who do not possess this ability.

CLIN. You speak most rightly.

GUEST. We will therefore resume this assertion, that what we say may become more clear. And receive me through an image, if in any respect I may be able to manifest to you a thing of this kind.

CLIN. Only speak.

GUEST. Do we not consider each of us as one?

CLIN. We do.

GUEST. But that we contain in ourselves two counsellors, contrary to each other, and foolish, which we denominate pleasure and pain?

CLIN. This also we admit.

GUEST. With these are connected the opinions of things future, the common name of which is hope. But, properly speaking, the hope prior to pain is fear, but that which is prior to its contrary is confidence. But in all these there is a reasoning process, determining which of them is better or worse; and which, when it becomes the common dogma of the city, is denominated law.

CLIN. I can scarcely follow you. However, proceed with what remains, as if I were able to follow you.

MEGIL. I likewise am affected in the same manner.

GUEST.

GUEST. But we should thus think about these things. We should consider that each of us is reckoned a prodigy by divine animals¹, whether we were produced as their sport, or as the result of a serious operation: for of this we are ignorant. This however we know, that these passions are inherent in our nature like nerves or ropes, that they draw contrary to each other, being themselves contrary, and that they draw us to contrary actions, where virtue and vice are situated apart from each other. For reason says, that we ought always to follow one of the drawings, and should never abandon it, but through this draw in a contrary direction to the other nerves; and that this is the golden and sacred guidance of the reasoning energy, which is called the common law of the city. It adds, that the other drawings are hard, and of an iron nature; but that this is soft, as being golden. That it is besides uniform, but that the others are similar to all-various forms. It is necessary, therefore, that we should always follow the most beautiful guidance of law. For, since the energy of reasoning is beautiful and gentle, but not violent, servants have need of its guidance, that the golden race² in us may vanquish the genera of a different kind. And thus the fable, since we are beings of a wonderful nature, will be preservative of virtue; and we shall be able to understand more clearly how any one may be said to be superior and inferior to himself: and both cities and individuals, apprehending the true reason respecting these drawings, ought to live conformable to it. We shall likewise be convinced that a city, whether it receives reason from some one of the Gods, or from him who knows these particulars, will establish it as law, and employ it in its own transactions, and in its transactions with other cities. For thus vice and virtue will appear to us more clearly distinct; and this distinction becoming more conspicuous, both discipline and other studies will perhaps be rendered more apparent. This will likewise be the case with respect to the custom of drinking societies, about which it might appear despicable to discourse any further.

CLIN. Perhaps it will appear not to be unworthy of a long discourse.

¹ Plato, by divine animals, means the mundane, or, as he calls them in the *Timæus*, the junior Gods.

² Viz. the intellectual form of life, or a life according to intellect. See the Additional Notes to the Republic for an account of the different ages.

GUEST. You speak well. We will therefore endeavour to relate what appears to be praise-worthy in a custom of this kind.

CLIN. Speak then.

GUEST. If to this wonderful thing we should add intoxication, what sort of a thing shall we fashion him?

CLIN. What thing do you look to in asking this question?

GUEST. To nothing particular. But if this prodigy or wonderful thing should become connected with intoxication, what would happen to be the result? But I will endeavour to explain more clearly what I mean. For this is what I ask: Does the drinking of wine more vehemently excite pleasure, pain, anger, and love?

CLIN. It does very much so.

GUEST. Does it in a similar manner render the senses, memory, opinion, and prudence, more vehement? or does it entirely extinguish these, when any one has drunk of it to intoxication?

CLIN. It entirely extinguishes these.

GUEST. Such a one, therefore, returns to that habit of soul which he possessed when he was a boy.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Hence such a one has at that time the least possible command of himself.

CLIN. The least.

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, call such a one most depraved?

CLIN. Very much so.

GUEST. Not only then, as it appears, does an old man become twice a boy, but this is likewise the case with a man when intoxicated.

CLIN. You speak, O guest, in a most excellent manner.

GUEST. Is there any reason which can persuade us that we ought to taste this liquor, and not to the utmost of our power avoid it?

CLIN. It appears that there is; and you just now said you was prepared to show it.

GUEST. You have very properly reminded me; and I am now prepared, since you have both said that you are willing to hear me with alacrity.

CLIN. How is it possible we should not hear you, if on no other account, yet for the sake of the wonderful and the absurd which it contains,

if

if it is necessary that a man should at any time voluntarily hurl himself into every kind of depravity?

GUEST. Do you speak of the soul?

CLIN. I do.

GUEST. But what? Shall we wonder, my friend, if at any time some one should voluntarily arrive at depravity of body,—I mean leanness, deformity, and imbecility?

CLIN. How is it possible we should not?

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, think that those who go to a dispensary for the sake of obtaining medicines, are ignorant that, in a short time after they have taken the medicines, their body will for many days be so affected, that, if they were to remain in that condition to the end of life, they would not wish to live? or, Do we not know that those who undergo gymnastic exercises and labours are immediately rendered weak?

CLIN. All this we know.

GUEST. And that they willingly tend to these things, for the sake of consequent utility?

CLIN. Most beautifully said.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, necessary to think after the same manner about other pursuits?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. In the same manner, therefore, we ought to think about the employment of drinking wine, if it is admitted that this among other employments may be considered in a proper light.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. If it should, therefore, appear to us to possess any utility, which is not inferior to corporeal exercise,—in the first place, it will vanquish this, because corporeal exercise is attended with pain, but the employment of drinking wine is without pain.

CLIN. You speak very properly. But I should wonder if we were able to perceive any such thing in it.

GUEST. This, therefore, as it appears, I must now endeavour to explain to you. Tell me then, are we able to understand two species of fear, which are nearly contrary to each other?

CLIN. Of what kind are they?

GUEST.

GUEST. They are such as these. We are afraid of things evil, when we expect they will arrive.

CLIN. We are.

GUEST. And we are often afraid of opinion, thinking we shall be considered by others as depraved characters, when we do or say any thing which is not becoming; which fear, I think, both we and all others denominate shame.

CLIN. Doubtless.

GUEST. These are the two fears I spoke of,—one of which is contrary to pain, and other fears, and is also contrary to the greater part and the greatest of pleasures.

CLIN. You speak most rightly.

GUEST. Will not therefore a legislator, and every one who is in the least degree useful, reverence this fear with the greatest honour, and call it shame,—but denominate confidence the contrary to this, impudence, and consider it as the greatest evil that can befall men, both in public and private?

CLIN. You speak rightly.

GUEST. This fear, therefore, will preserve us in many other and great concerns, and nothing will so much procure for us victory and safety in war, one being opposed to one, as this. For there are two things which procure victory, confidence of the enemy, and the dread of friends with respect to base infamy.

CLIN. It is so.

GUEST. It is necessary, therefore, that each of us should become intrepid, and, at the same time, timid. But we shall show, by division, on what account we ought to become each of these.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. When we wish to render any one intrepid, we shall accomplish this by leading him, according to law, to the dread of many terrible things.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. But, what,—when we endeavour to render any one justly terrified, ought we not, by exercising him in impudence, to cause him to be victorious in contending with pleasures? Or, by contending with and vanquishing his usual mode of living, ought he not thus to obtain perfection

in

in fortitude? And will not he who is unexperienced and unexercised in contests of this kind remain, as to one half of himself, destitute of virtue? But how can any one be perfectly temperate, who has not contended with and vanquished, by reason, labour and art, in sport and in earnest, many pleasures and desires, which urge him to act impudently and unjustly; but who is impassive with respect to all such things?

CLIN. It is by no means probable that he can.

GUEST. But what,—has divinity given men any medicine of fear, so that by how much more desirous any one is of drinking it, by so much the more unhappy will he think himself from every draught; so that he will dread every thing, both present and future, and will at length, though he should be the bravest of men, be filled with every kind of dread; and, after having slept, and being freed from the potion, will again every day be equally terrified?

CLIN. And what potion of this kind, shall we say, O guest, is found among men?

GUEST. None. Yet if such a potion should be found, would it be useful to the legislator with respect to fortitude, so that we might thus speak to him respecting it: O legislator, whether you have given laws to the Cretans, or to any other nation, are you willing to make trial of your citizens with respect to fortitude and timidity?

CLIN. He would doubtless say, that he was willing.

GUEST. But what,—are you willing to do this with safety, and without great danger; or the contrary?

CLIN. Every one must acknowledge, he would wish to do this with security.

GUEST. Would you use this potion, leading them to terrors, and accusing them during their perturbation, so as to compel them to become intrepid, by exhortations and honours; disgracing him who will not be persuaded to become in all things such a one as you wish; and dismissing him with impunity who exercises himself in a proper and valiant manner, but punishing him who acts otherwise? or, Would you by no means use this potion, though you could find nothing else in it to accuse?

CLIN. Why should he not use it, O guest?

GUEST. An exercise, therefore, O friend, different from those at present,

sent, will possess a wonderful facility, both with respect to one person and a few, and as many as you shall always wish to be exercised. And whether any one, being alone in solitude, should place ignominy before his eyes, thinking that he ought not to be seen till he has made sufficient advances in virtue, and should thus exercise himself against fear, preparing this potion alone, in preference to ten thousand other things, he would do something proper: or whether some one, confiding in his own nature, and being properly prepared by meditation, should not refuse to exercise himself with many drinking associates, and should evince, in the necessary consumption of the liquor, a power so transcendent and strong, as neither greatly to err through impudence, nor to be changed through virtue, but towards the end of the liquor should depart without being intoxicated, fearing any human potion the least of all things;—in this case, he would do something well.

CLIN. Certainly. For such a one, by thus acting, would conduct himself with temperance and modesty.

GUEST. Again, let us thus address the legislator: Neither, O legislator, has any God given to mankind such a medicine, nor have we devised such a one: (for I do not consider witches at a banquet) but whether or not, is there a potion capable of producing intrepidity, together with vehement and unseasonable confidence? Or how shall we say?

CLIN. There is, and he would say that it is wine.

GUEST. But this produces contrary effects to the potion of which we have just now spoken. For, when a man drinks of it, it makes him at first immediately more cheerful than he was before; and by how much more he drinks of it, by so much more is he filled with good hope, and an opinion of his own power; till at length, as if he were a wise man, he becomes replete with all possible freedom of speech and behaviour, and intrepidly both says and does whatever he pleases.

CLIN. I think every one will admit this.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. But do we recollect that we said there were two things in our souls which ought to be cultivated;—the one, that we may possess confidence in the highest degree; but the other, which is the very contrary, that we may be afraid in the highest degree?

CLIN. I think you said this of shame.

GUEST.

GUEST. You very properly remember. But since it is necessary that fortitude and intrepidity in fear should be the subjects of meditation, let us consider whether it will be proper that the contrary should be cultivated in the contrary to fear.

CLIN. It is probable.

GUEST. In those things, therefore, in which, naturally suffering, we are remarkably confident and audacious, in these it will be proper, as it appears, to meditate how we may become in the least degree impudent and audacious, but timid with respect to daring to speak, or suffer, or do any thing base.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. Are not all these, therefore, the things in which we are thus affected, viz. anger, love, petulance, ignorance, the love of gain, and timidity; and besides these, riches, beauty, strength, and all such things as, intoxicating men through pleasure, render them delirious? In order to make an easy and innocent trial of all these, and afterwards meditate upon them, what pleasure have we more convenient than that which explores the disposition of men by means of wine, when it is attended with prudent caution? For, let us consider: whether ought we to make trial of a morose and rustic soul, from which a thousand injuries germinate, in his contracts with others, or from his being present at the shows of Bacchus, or from his soul being vanquished in venereal affairs, so as to behold the manners of his soul when his sons, daughter, and wife, are exposed to danger? In short, among ten thousand things, you will not find any thing in which in jest, and without any danger, you can so well contemplate the disposition of any one, as by wine. We ought, therefore, to think that neither the Cretans, nor any other nation, would ever doubt but that this trial of the disposition of each other is convenient, and above all others safe and easy.

CLIN. You speak truly.

GUEST. This, then, will be one of the most useful things, to know the natures and habits of souls by that art whose province it is to procure a remedy for these. But this, as I think, is the province of the politic art. Or is it not?

CLIN. It is entirely so.

THE LAWS,

BOOK II.

AFTER this, as it appears, we should consider respecting these particulars, whether this alone is beneficial, to contemplate after what manner we possess certain natures, or whether also some great advantage which deserves much attention is inherent in the proper use of drinking wine in conjunction with others. What then shall we say? Our discourse would seem to insinuate that it is inherent. But when, and after what manner, let us attentively hear, lest we should be impeded in our inquiry by this affair.

CLIN. Speak then.

GUEST. I am desirous, therefore, of again recalling to our memory our definition of proper discipline. For the safety of this, as I conjecture at present, consists in the employment we are now speaking of, when well conducted.

CLIN. You speak largely.

GUEST. I say then, that the first puerile sense of boys is pleasure and pain; and that these are first inherent in the soul, in which vice and virtue subsist. But he is happy who in old age acquires the firm possession of prudence¹ and true opinions. And that man is perfect who possesses these, and all the goods they contain. But I call discipline that virtue which first accedes to boys. When pleasure, love, pain, and hatred, are properly produced in the soul, before it is able to receive these attended with reason; if, when they are attended with reason, they accord with it in consequence of being properly accustomed by well adapted manners, then this consent is the

¹ The prudence of which Plato speaks in this place is intellectual; for this is peculiarly adapted to old age, or the Saturnian period of life.

whole of virtue. But the proper nurture of the soul, with respect to pleasure and pain, so as that it may hate what it ought to hate, immediately from the beginning to the end, and love what it ought to love,—this, if it is considered separately, and is denominated discipline, will, according to my opinion, be properly denominated.

CLIN. What you have said, O guest, formerly and at present, about discipline, appears to be well said.

GUEST. It is well, therefore. For these pleasures and pains, which when properly nurtured are disciplines, are often loosened and corrupted by men in the business of life. But the Gods, commiserating the naturally laborious race of men, ordained for them remissions of labours, and gave them the vicissitudes of festivals¹ in honour of the Gods, together with the Muses, Apollo

¹ The following account of the festivals of the ancients, from the Descriptions of Libanius, fully proves the truth of what is here asserted by Plato represents to us the liberal, philanthropic, and hospitable spirit of Paganism in the most amiable point of view, and naturally leads the truly benevolent mind to regret that such philanthropy has been for so long a period banished from the earth; that the presence of divinity is no longer considered as essentially necessary to the splendour of festivity, and that a festival at present is every thing but a solemnity!

“Solemn festivals when approaching produce desire in the human race, when present they are attended with pleasure, and when past with recollection: for remembrance places men very near the transactions themselves. The recollection also possesses a certain advantage. For, in speaking of solemn festivals, it is also necessary to speak concerning the Gods in whose honour they are instituted. Men prepare themselves for these festivals, when they approach, with joy. The multitude indeed procure such things as may furnish them with a splendid entertainment, but the worthy, those things by which they may reverence the Gods. Cattle and wine, and whatever else is the produce of the fields, are brought from the country. Garments also are purified; and every one is anxious to celebrate the festival in perfection. Those that are in want of garments are permitted to borrow such as are requisite to adorn themselves on this occasion, from those that have abundance. When the appointed day arrives, the priests open the temples, pay diligent attention to the statues; and nothing is neglected which contributes to the public convenience. The cities too are crowded with a conflux of the neighbouring inhabitants, assembled to celebrate the festival; some coming on foot, and others in ships.

“At sunrise they enter the temples in splendid garments, worshipping that divinity to whom the festival is sacred. Every master of a house therefore precedes, bearing frankincense: a servant follows him, carrying a victim; and children walk by the side of their parents, some very young, and others of a more advanced age, already perceiving the strong influence of the Gods. One having performed his sacrifice departs; another approaches to perform it. Numerous prayers are every where poured forth; and words of good omen are mutually spoken. With respect to the women,

Apollo the leader of the Muses, and Bacchus, as their associates in these celebrations; that in these festivals they might rectify the education of youth, in

women, some offer sacrifices in the temples; and others are satisfied with beholding the crowd of those that sacrifice. When such things as pertain to the divinities are properly accomplished, the tables follow, at which hymns are sung in praise of the God who is honoured in the festival. Social drinking succeeds, with songs which are partly serious and partly jocose, according to the different dispositions of the company. Some likewise feast in the temples, and others at home; and citizens request strangers to partake with them of the banquet. In the course of drinking, ancient friendships are rendered more firm, and others receive their commencement. After they have feasted, rising from table, some take the strangers and show them whatever is worthy to be seen in the city; and others sitting in the Forum gaily converse. No one is sorrowful, but every countenance is relaxed with joy. The exaction of debts gives place to festivity; and whatever might cause affliction is deferred to another time. Accusations are silent, and the judge does not pass sentence; but such things as produce pleasure alone flourish. The slave is not afraid of blows from his master, and pedagogues are mild to youth.

"In the evening they sup splendidly, at which time there are so many torches that the city is full of light. There are also many revellers, and various flutes, and the sound of pipes is heard in the narrow streets, accompanied with sometimes the same, and sometimes different songs. Then to drink even to intoxication is not perfectly disgraceful; for the occasion in a certain respect appears to take away the opprobrium. On the following day the divinity is not neglected; but many of those that worshipped on the preceding day do not again come to the shows. Those that contend in the composition of verses attend on this, but those with whom the contest is in the scenes, on the preceding day. The third day also is not far short of these; and pleasure and hilarity are extended with the time of the festival. When the solemnity ends, prayers are offered for futurity, that they, their children and families may again be spectators of it; after which the strangers depart, and the citizens accompany them."

The same author likewise in his account of the Calends observes as follows: "This festival is extended as far as the dominion of the Romans; and such is the joy it occasions, that if it were possible time could be hastened for mortals, which according to Homer was effected by Juno respecting the sun, this festival also would be hastened by every nation, city, house, and individual of mankind. The festival flourishes in every plain, on every hill and mountain, and in every lake and navigable river. It also flourishes in the sea, if at that time it happens to be undisturbed by tempest; for then both ships and merchants cut through its waves and celebrate the festival. Joy and feasting every where abound. The earth is then full of honours; in consequence of men honouring each other by gifts and hospitality. The foot-paths and the public roads are crowded with men, and four-footed animals bearing burthens, subservient to the occasion; and the ways in the city are covered, and the narrow streets are full. Some are equally delighted with giving and receiving; but others, though they do not receive any thing, are pleased with giving, merely because they are able to give. And the spring by its flowers, indeed, renders the earth beautiful; but the festival by its gifts, which pouring in from every place are every where diffused.

in conjunction with the Gods. Consider, therefore, whether it is proper to say, that our discourse at present is celebrated as true according to nature, or
how

diffused. He therefore who asserts that this is the most pleasant part of the year, will not err; so that, if the whole time of life could be passed in the same manner, the islands of the blest would not be so much celebrated by mankind as they are at present. The first appearance of the swallow is indeed pleasant, yet does not prevent labour; but this festival thinks proper to remove from the days of its celebration every thing laborious, and permits us to enjoy minds free from molestation. These days free the youth from two-fold fears, one arising from their preceptors, the other from their pedagogues. They also make slaves as much as possible free, and exhibit their power even in those in chains, removing sorrow from their countenances, and exciting some of them to mirth. They can also persuade a father who expects the death of his son, and through sorrow is wasting away, and averse to nourishment, to be reconciled to his condition, to abandon darkness, lay aside his squalid appearance, and betake himself to the bath: and what the most skilful in persuasion are unable to accomplish, that the power of the festival effects. It also conciliates citizen with citizen, stranger with stranger, one boy with another, and woman with woman. It likewise instructs men not to be avaricious, but to bring forth their gold, and deposit it in the right hands of others." He concludes with observing, "that the altars of the Gods in his time did not possess all that they did formerly, this being forbidden by the law of the Christians; but that, before this prohibition, much fire, blood, and fume of sacrifice ascended to heaven from every region, so that the banquets in honour of the Gods were then splendid during the festival."

The most remarkable circumstance in these festivals was the cause of this universal joy, which was no other than the firm persuasion that divinity was then present and propitious, as is evident from the following beautiful passage from Plutarch, in the Treatise in which he shows that pleasure is not attainable according to Epicurus: "Neither the discourses (says he) of those that wait in the temples, nor the seasons of solemn festivals, nor any other actions, or spectacles, delight us more than those things which we ourselves do concerning the Gods, when we celebrate orgies, or join in the dance, or are present at sacrifices, or the greatest of the mysteries. For then the soul is not sorrowful, abject, and languid, as if conversing with certain tyrants, or dire avengers, which it is reasonable to suppose she then would be; but where she especially thinks and rationally conceives divinity is present, there she especially banishes sorrow, and fear, and care, and lets herself loose even to intoxication, frolic and laughter. In amorous concerns, indeed, as the poet once said,

Remembrance of the joys that Venus gave,
Will fire the bosom of the aged pair.

But in public processions and sacrifices, not only the old man and the old woman, not only the poor and the plebeian, but also

The dusty thick-legg'd drab that turns the mill,

and household slaves and hirelings, are elevated with joy and gladness. Banquets and public entertainments

how shall we say? But it afferts, in short, that every youth is incapable of being at rest, either in body or voice, but that he always seeks to be moved and to speak; sometimes exulting and leaping, dancing and sporting as it were with pleasure, but at other times uttering sounds with every kind of voice. Other animals, indeed, have no sensation either of order or disorder in motions, which order is denominated rhythm and harmony; but those Gods whom we call associates in the choir have bestowed upon us a rhythmical and harmonic sense, which might agitate us with pleasure, by connecting us with each other through singing and dancing. But the word choir was denominated from joy, as its natural name. In the first place, however, it is necessary to ask, whether we admit that discipline first subsists through the Muses and Apollo? or how shall we say?

Entertainments are given both by the wealthy and kings; but those which take place at sacrifices and solemnities, when through inspiration we appear to approach very near to a divine nature, are attended with much greater joy and pleasure, in conjunction with honour and veneration. Of this, the man who denies a Providence has no portion. For it is not the abundance of wine, nor the roasting of meat, which gives delight in solemn festivals, but the good hope and belief that divinity is propitiously present, and gratefully receives what is done. From some of our festivals we exclude the flute and the crown; but when divinity is not present at the sacrifice, as the solemnity of the banquet, the rest is impious, is void of festivity, and possesses nothing of divine fury; or, rather, the whole is unpleasant, and even painful."

Ουτε διατρίβει τῶν ἐν ἱεροῖς, οὐτ' αἰροῖ τῶν ἑορτασμάτων, οὐτε πράξεις, οὐτε οὐφεί εὐφραίνουσιν ἱτεραί μάλλον ὥς ὥρμαινεν ἢ δρωμέν αυτοὶ περὶ θεῶν, ὀργιζόντες, ἢ χορεύοντες, ἢ θυσιαῖς παρόντες, ἢ τελεταῖς. ἢ γὰρ ὥς τυράννοις τίσιν ἢ δεινοῖς κολασταῖς ὁμιλοῦντα τῆνικαὶ αὐτὴ ψυχὴ περιλυτὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ταπεινὴ καὶ δυσθυμὸς, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ἐστ'· ἀλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα δοῦναι καὶ διανοεῖται παρῆναι τὸν θεόν, ἐκεῖ μάλιστα λυτὰς καὶ φόβους καὶ τὸ φροντίζειν ἀπωσάμενη, τῷ ἡδόμενῳ μέχρι μέθης καὶ παιδίας καὶ γέλωτος ἀφήσιν ἑαυτήν. Ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικαῖς ὡς ὁ ποιητικὸς εἰρήνη,

Καὶ τε γέρον καὶ γυνὴς, ἐπὶ χρύσεῳ Ἀφροδίτης
Μνήσονται, καὶ τίσιν ἐπὶ πρὸς φίλον ἦτορ.

ἐν δὲ πομπαῖς καὶ θυσιαῖς οὐ μόνον γέρον καὶ γυνὴς, οὐδὲ πεινῆς καὶ ἰδιωτῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παχυσκελὲς ἀλειτουργὸς πρὸς μὴν μινουμένη καὶ οἰκωτρὴς καὶ θῆτες ὑπογῆθους καὶ χαρμοσύνης ἀναφέρονται. πλοῦσιος τε καὶ βασιλευσὶν ἐστι-
αῖς καὶ πανδοκίαις τίνας παρῆναι· αἱ δ' ἐφ' ἱεροῖς καὶ θυποποιίας, καὶ ὅταν ἐγγίστα τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ φανεῖν
δοκῶσι, μετὰ τιμῆς καὶ σεβάσμου πολὺ διαφέρουσιν ἡδονῇ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσιν. ταύτης οὐδὲν ἀνδρὶ μετεσθίει ἀπεγνω-
μοτὶ τῆς προνοίας. οὐ γὰρ οἶνον πλήθος, οὐδὲ σπῆντις κρεῖν τὸ εὐφραίνειν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλπίς ἀγαθῆ
καὶ δόξα τοῦ παρῆναι τὸν θεόν εὐμένη, καὶ δεχέσθαι τὰ γινόμενα μεχαρισμένους· αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἑορτῶν καὶ
στεφανὸν ἀφαιρούμεν, θεοῦ δὲ θυσιᾶ μὴ παρόντος, ὥσπερ ἱερὸν δόχης, ἀθεόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνορταστον καὶ ἀνείδουσιστον
τὸ λειπομένον, μάλλον δὲ ὅλον ἀτερπὲς αὐτῇ καὶ λυπηρόν. The same author also observes, in his Treatise
on Superstition, "that holy days, temple feasts, the being initiated in mysteries, processions, with
public prayers and solemn devotions, were considered as the most agreeable things in human life."

CLIN. That it does.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is void of discipline, is with us one who has never joined a choir; but he who is disciplined is to be considered as one who has sufficiently engaged in a choir.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But the whole of a choir consists in dancing and singing.

CLIN. It is necessary it should.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is properly disciplined will be able to sing and dance in a becoming manner.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. But let us consider what it is that we have now asserted.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. We have spoken of singing and dancing in a becoming manner. But whether or not is it proper to add, that things beautiful ought to be the subjects of singing and dancing?

CLIN. This ought to be added.

GUEST. But what,—will he who considers things beautiful, as beautiful, and things base, as base, and who uses them as such,—will such a one be better disciplined for us, with respect to the choir and music, than he who is sufficiently able to become subservient to that which he considers as beautiful in body and voice, but yet does not rejoice in things beautiful, nor hate such as are void of beauty? Or he, who, though he is not altogether able to act or think rightly, with respect to his voice and body, yet acts rightly with respect to pleasure and pain; embracing such things as are beautiful, and hating such as are base?

CLIN. You speak, O guest, of a mighty difference of discipline.

GUEST. If, therefore, we three possess a knowledge of the beautiful in singing and dancing, we also know when any one is properly or improperly disciplined: but, if we are ignorant of this, we shall not be able to know what is the defence of discipline, and where it is to be found. Is not this the case?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in the next place, like dogs on the scent, investigate beautiful figure, melody, singing and dancing. For, if these elude our

purfuit, our difcourfe about proper difcipline, whether Grecian or Barbarian, will be in vain.

CLIN. It will.

GUEST. What figure, therefore, or melody, is it proper to call beautiful? Shall we fay, that in the fame and equal labours the figures and voices of a brave and timid foul are fimilar?

CLIN. How can they, fince neither are their colours fimilar?

GUEST. Well obferved, my companion. But in mufic there are both figures and melody, fince mufic is converfant with rhythm and harmony. So that melody or figure may poffefs proper rhythm or harmony, but not a proper colour, that we may fpeak in the affimilative way, as the mafters of the choir are accuftomed to affimilate. But there is a certain figure or melody of a timid, and of a brave man; and it will be proper to call thefe things in brave men, beautiful, but in the timid, bafe. And that we may not be prolix about thefe particulars, all the figures and melodies which fimplly adhere to the virtue of the foul or body, or to a certain image of it, are beautiful; but the contrary muft be afferted with refpect to the vice of the foul or body.

CLIN. You are right; and we judge that thefe particulars fubfift in this manner.

GUEST. But we muft ftill further confider, whether all of us are fimilarly delighted with all choirs, or whether this is far from being the cafe?

CLIN. It is far from being the cafe.

GUEST. What then fhall we fay is the caufe of our error? Is it becaufe not the fame things are beautiful to all? Or fhall we fay that they are the fame things, but do not appear to be the fame? For no one will fay that a vicious is better than a virtuous choir; or that he is delighted with depraved figures, but others with a mufe contrary to this. Though, indeed, moft men affert, that the rectitude of mufic confifts in a power which imparts pleafure to the foul. This, however, is neither to be endured, nor is it holy by any means to make fuch an affertion. But this is more probably the caufe of our error.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. Since the particulars refpecting choirs are imitations of manners
and

and of actions which take place in all-various fortunes and habits, those by whom the imitations of manners, whether expressed by discourse, or melody, or dancing, are approved, either from nature or custom, or from both, must necessarily rejoice in and praise these, and denominate them beautiful. But those to whom they appear contrary to nature, or manners, or custom, can neither rejoice in nor praise them, but must necessarily denominate them base. And those, again, to whom these particulars happen right by nature, but the contrary from custom; or right from custom, but the contrary from nature;—these will denominate things contrary to pleasures, laudable. For they will assert that each of these is pleasant, but at the same time base. Hence, before others, whom they consider as intelligent persons, they will be ashamed that their body should be moved after that manner, and will blush to sing, and to call such things beautiful, or deserving serious attention; but, by themselves, they will be delighted with them.

CLIN. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. Does he then suffer any injury who is delighted with base figures or melodies; or do they receive any advantage who are pleased with the contraries to these?

CLIN. It is probable.

GUEST. Is it only probable, or also necessary, that the same thing should happen as takes place when any one, being conversant with the depraved habits of depraved men, does not hate, but rejoices in and admits them; and yet blames them in jest, having a dreaming perception of his own depravity? For, in this case, it is necessary that he should be assimilated to the things in which he rejoices, although he should be ashamed to praise them. But what greater good, or evil, shall we say, can possibly happen to us than a thing of this kind?

CLIN. I think, none.

GUEST. But where laws are beautifully established, or will be in some future period of time, can we think it will be lawful for poets, in discipline and sport respecting the Muses, to teach in their poetical compositions whatever delights them, by rhythm, or melody, or verse, and to form in choirs the boys and young men of well instituted polities, either to virtue or vice?

CLIN. It is contrary to reason to suppose this would be allowed.

MEGIL. For how is it possible it should be ?

GUEST. But, in short, it is lawful to act in this manner at present in all cities, except Egypt.

CLIN. But how do you say a thing of this kind is established by law in Egypt ?

GUEST. It is wonderful to hear. For, as it appears, they formerly knew what we have now said, that young men in cities should be accustomed to beautiful figures and beautiful melodies ; and it is one of their institutions to exhibit in their temples what these are, and what the qualities which they possess ; and besides these, it is not lawful, either for painters or other artificers of figures, to introduce any that are new, or even to think of any other than those belonging to their country : nor is it lawful at present to do this, either in these particulars or in the whole of music. If you observe, therefore, you will find that paintings and sculptures there, which were executed TEN THOUSAND YEARS ago, as if they were not of such great antiquity, are neither more beautiful, nor more deformed, than paintings or carvings of the present day, but are fashioned by just the same art.

CLIN. You speak of a wonderful circumstance.

GUEST. It is, however, a circumstance pertaining to law and politics in a transcendent degree. You will likewise find other things there of a trifling nature. But this respecting music is true, and deserves attention, because the legislator could firmly give laws about things of this kind, and with confidence introduce such melodies as possessed a natural rectitude. But this must be the work of a God, or of some divine person. Just as they say there, that their melodies, which have been preserved for such a length of time, are the poems of Isis. So that, as I said, if any one is able to apprehend the rectitude of them, he ought to have the courage to reduce them to law and order. For the search of pleasure and pain, which is always directed to the use of new music, perhaps possesses no great power of corrupting the consecrated choir by an accusation of its antiquity. It appears, therefore, that the choir of the Egyptians was by no means capable of being corrupted, but that the contrary was entirely the case.

CLIN. From what you have now said, it appears that it must be so.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, confidently say, that a choir is after a certain manner properly connected with sports and music ; and, that we rejoice

joyce as often as we think that we do well, and, when we rejoice, think we do well? Is it not so?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But, rejoicing in a thing of this kind, we are incapable of being at rest.

CLIN. We are so.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, those among us that are young men prompt to dance? And do not we who are old men think that we conduct ourselves in a becoming manner in beholding these, while we rejoice in their sports, and in their celebration of sacred festivals, since lightness of body fails us at our time of life,—through the desire of which, we thus establish games for those who are able in the highest degree to excite in us the memory of our juvenile period?

CLIN. Most true.

GUEST. Shall we therefore consider that which is said by many of those who celebrate sacred festivals, as said in vain, that it is proper to reckon him most wise, and to judge that he will conquer who causes us to be delighted and to rejoice in the greatest degree? For it is proper, since we permit sport in things of this kind, that we should particularly honour him who causes the greatest number and in the greatest degree to rejoice; and, as I just now said, that we should pronounce him victor. Is this, therefore, rightly said, and will a conduct of this kind be right?

CLIN. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But, O blessed man, we should not hastily judge a thing of this kind, but, dividing it into parts, consider after this manner: If any one should at any time simply establish a certain game, but without defining whether it is gymnastic, or equestrian, or musical; and, collecting together all the inhabitants of the city, should proclaim, that he was going to establish a contest for the sake of pleasure alone, in which (without expressing the mode of contest) rewards would be assigned for him who gave the spectators the greatest delight, and that for this he would be considered as victor, and as the best of all those engaged in the contest,—what do we think would be the consequence of this proclamation?

CLIN. Of what are you speaking?

GUEST. It is proper that one should exhibit, like Homer, a rhapsody,
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another the modulation of the harp, another tragedy, and another comedy. Nor will it be wonderful, if some one, by exhibiting prodigies, should think that he is especially victorious. But, these and an innumerable multitude of other champions assembling together, can we say which of them is justly the victor?

CLIN. You ask an absurd thing. For, who can give you an answer to this question, unless he has himself been an auditor of each of the champions?

GUEST. Are you therefore willing that I myself should reply to this absurd question?

CLIN. How is it possible I should not?

GUEST. If, therefore, very little children were to judge in this affair, they would give the palm of victory to him who exhibited prodigies: or would they not?

CLIN. How should they do otherwise?

GUEST. The greater boys, however, would give the preference to those that exhibited comedies; but such women as are better educated than others, young men, and perhaps almost the whole multitude, would prefer the tragedians.

CLIN. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But perhaps we old men should hear with the most pleasure the rhapsodist when properly handling the Iliad and Odyssey, or some of the works of Hesiod, and should by far proclaim him the victor of all the others. Ought we not, therefore, after this to show who is properly the victor in these contests?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. It is evident that both I and you ought necessarily to confess, that he will be properly the victor whom those of our age judge to be so: for the skill which we derive from age appears to be every where by far the best of all political concerns.

CLIN. Doubtless.

GUEST. I therefore grant thus much to the multitude, that music ought to be judged by pleasure, yet not by the pleasure it imparts to every man,—but that, nearly, that is the most beautiful muse which delights the best of men, and such as are sufficiently disciplined; but especially when it delights a man who excels in virtue and discipline. On this account we say that judges of these

these things require virtue, because they ought to participate of prudence and fortitude. For a true judge ought not to learn how to judge from another, and thus become as it were stupefied by the clamours of the multitude, and his own ignorance. But he ought to possess fortitude, because, though he should be endued with knowledge, he ought not, through sloth and timidity, to give an unjust decision from the same mouth with which when about to judge he invoked the Gods. For a judge does not fit as a disciple, but rather, as it is just he should, as a master of the spectators, and as one who is averse to things which do not afford the spectators a fit and proper pleasure. For it was allowed by the antient and Grecian law, as by that of Sicily and Italy at present, that the multitude of spectators should decide who was victor, by holding up their hands: but this corrupted the poets themselves, who wrote according to the depraved pleasure of vulgar judges; so that the spectators both disciplined themselves and the poets. It likewise corrupted the pleasures of the theatre. For, as it is here proper that the spectators should always hear of manners better than their own, and thus obtain a more excellent pleasure, the very contrary to this takes place at present. What then does the present discourse wish to signify? Consider whether it is this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. My discourse appears to me to have thrice or four times revolved to the same thing, that discipline is the drawing and leading of youth to that which is called by the law, right reason, and which the most worthy and antient men have found by experience to be truly right. That the soul of a youth, therefore, may be accustomed by law, and by those who are persuaded by law, not to rejoice in things contrary, but to be delighted or afflicted with the same things as an old man; for the sake of this, those poetical compositions called odes, and which are truly epodes, or incantations to the soul, are composed at present, and which hastily tend to that kind of symphony of which we are speaking. But since the souls of boys are incapable of engaging in serious pursuits, sports and odes were instituted by the legislator. Just as, in curing diseased and imbecil bodies, physicians endeavour to introduce useful food in pleasant meats and drinks, but noxious food in such as are bitter, that they may be rightly accustomed to embrace the one, and hate the other. A proper legislator will persuade the poet to do the same in beautiful and laudable words; and will compel him, if he cannot
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be persuaded, that when he produces figures of temperate, brave, and, in short, of all good men, in rhythms, and melodies in harmonies, he shall produce them properly.

CLIN. By Jupiter, O gueſt, does it appear to you that this is done at preſent in other cities? For I do not know of any city in which what you ſpeak of takes place, except ours, and that of the Lacedæmonians. But in other cities there are always ſome new regulations about dancing, and the reſt of the muſic; and this not from any mutation in the laws, but from certain inordinate pleaſures, which are very far from remaining perpetually the ſame, like thoſe Egyptian regulations which you related, but continually vary.

GUEST. Moſt excellent, O Clinias! But if I have appeared to you, as you ſay, to aſſert theſe things as exiſting at preſent, I ſhall not wonder that I have done this in conſequence of not clearly unfolding my meaning. But having ſpoken about certain particulars, which I wiſhed to take place, reſpecting muſic, I perhaps appeared to you to ſpeak as if they actually exiſted at preſent. For, to blame a thing which is incurable, and which is very far advanced in error, is by no means pleaſant, though ſometimes neceſſary. But, as we are thus far agreed, will you not ſay that theſe things ſubſiſt among us, and thoſe, more than among the other Greeks?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But if they ſhould alſo take place among others, would they not be better conducted than at preſent?

CLIN. By far better, if they ſubſiſted as you juſt now ſaid they ought to ſubſiſt, and as they ſubſiſt among thoſe and with us.

GUEST. Shall we then agree at preſent, that the things aſſerted by you, in every kind of diſcipline and muſic, are theſe: that poets ſhould be compelled to aſſert that a good man, being temperate and juſt, is happy and bleſſed, whether he is large and robuſt, ſmall and weak, rich or poor; but that an unjuſt man is miſerable, and paſſes his days in ſorrow, though he ſhould be richer than Cinyras or Midas? A poet, therefore, if he ſpeaks rightly, will ſay to us: I ſhall never mention nor conſider him as a man, who does not perform with juſtice, and poſſeſs every thing which is denominated beautiful in conduct. Such a one too, being juſt, will deſire to contend with his enemies in cloſe engagement. But he who is unjuſt will
neither

neither dare to behold bloody slaughter, nor to vanquish, running, the Thracian Boreas, nor will he acquire any of those things which are denominated good. For the things which are called by the many good, are not rightly denominated. For it is said that health is the best thing; beauty the next; strength the third; and riches the fourth. And an innumerable multitude of other things are called good. Thus, to see and hear acutely, and to possess in a proper manner all such things as belong to the senses; likewise to do in a tyrannical manner whatever you please, appears to be good. And besides this, it is considered as the end of all blessedness to become in the most rapid manner immortal, while possessing all these. But you and I say that all these are the best of possessions to just and holy men, but that to unjust men they are the worst of all things, beginning the enumeration from health. For to be well, to see, hear, and possess the other senses, and, in short, to live, is the greatest evil, though a man should be immortal through the whole of time, and possess every thing that is called good, if all these are not attended with justice and every virtue. But it is a less evil to live in this manner for the shortest time. I think that your poets should speak in this manner, and that you should persuade and compel them to do so, and to instruct the youth, through rhythms and harmonies, consequent to these assertions. Do you perceive this? For I clearly assert, that the things which are called evil are good to the unjust, but evil to the just; but that things good are truly good to the good, but evil to the wicked. Do, therefore, you and I agree in what is said, or not?

CLIN. We appear partly to agree, and partly not.

GUEST. Perhaps I have not persuaded you that he is not happy, but clearly wretched, who alone possesses in himself injustice and insolence, though he should be healthy and rich, and a tyrant to the end of life; and, besides all these, should be endued with uncommon strength of body, in conjunction with immortality, and should never experience any of those things which are called evils.

CLIN. You speak most truly.

GUEST. Be it so then. But what ought we to say after this? If he is valiant, and strong, and beautiful, and rich, and accomplishes through the whole of life whatever he desires,—will he not necessarily appear to you, if he is unjust and insolent, to live in a shameful manner?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Will he not also appear to you to live badly?

CLIN. This will not in a similar manner appear to me.

GUEST. But will you not admit that he must live unpleasantly, and in a manner contrary to his interest?

CLIN. How can I admit this?

GUEST. How? If a God, my friends, should cause us to agree in sentiment, as we now nearly dissent from each other. For these things appear to me so necessary, that Crete, O friend Clinias, does not more clearly appear to be an island. And if I were a legislator, I would endeavour to compel the poets, and all the other inhabitants of the city, to speak in this manner: and I would ordain, that nearly the greatest of all punishments should be inflicted on him who should assert, in the country to which he belonged, that there are certain men of a base character who lead a pleasant life; or that some things are advantageous and lucrative, but others more just. And I would persuade my citizens to assert many other things, contrary to what are now advanced by the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, as it appears, and, indeed, by the rest of mankind. For, by Jupiter and Apollo, O best of men! if we should ask those Gods who gave us laws, whether the most just is the most pleasant life, or whether there are two certain lives, one of which is most pleasant, and the other most just:—if, in answer to our inquiry, they should say there are two lives, we might, perhaps, again ask them (if we inquire properly) which we ought to call most happy; those who lead the most just, or those who lead the most pleasant life. If they should say, those who lead the most pleasant life, their answer would be absurd. But I am desirous that a thing of this kind should not be said by the Gods, but rather by our fathers and legislators. I shall therefore put the same question to my father and legislator, and I shall suppose him to reply, that he who lives the most pleasant life is the most blessed. After this, I shall thus interrogate him: O father, do you not wish me to live most happily? But you never cease exhorting me to live most justly. He, therefore, who acts in this manner, whether he is a legislator or a father, acts I think absurdly, and speaks inconsistently. But if he should evince that the most just life is the most blessed, every one who hears him may, I think, inquire what it is which the law praises in that life as good and beautiful, and better than pleasure.

pleasure. For, what good separate from pleasure can be present to the just man? Can it be said that renown and praise, both from men and Gods, are good and beautiful, but at the same time unpleasant? and that the contrary is true with respect to infamy? We shall say, By no means, O legislator. But is neither to do an injury, nor to suffer one, unpleasant indeed, but at the same time good, or beautiful? And are other things pleasant, but shameful and base?

CLIN. How can they?

GUEST. The reason, therefore, which neither separates the pleasant and the just, nor the good and the beautiful, is persuasive, if to nothing else, yet at least to the wish to live a holy and just life. So that the discourse of the legislator will be most shameful and discordant, if he denies that these things are so. For no one will voluntarily wish to be persuaded to do that which is not attended with more joy than sorrow. But that which is beheld afar off affects every one, as I may say, and even boys, with a dark vertigo. The legislator, therefore, dispersing the darknefs, shall establish for us an opinion the contrary to this; and shall persuade the citizens, by custom, and praise, and arguments, that both things just and unjust are involved in shade; and that things unjust, which appear contrary to the just, being surveyed by the unjust and depraved man, seem to be pleasant, but things just, most unpleasant: but when they are surveyed by the just man, they appear to be entirely the contrary.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. But which of these decisions, shall we say, is most true? Whether is it that of the worse, or of the better soul?

CLIN. Necessarily, that of the better soul.

GUEST. It is necessary, therefore, that an unjust life should not only be more base and depraved, but, in reality, more unpleasant, than a just and holy life.

CLIN. It appears so, my friend, according to the present reasoning.

GUEST. A legislator, therefore, who is in the least degree useful, though what we have now asserted should not subsist in this manner,—yet, as there is not any thing else which can be more advantageous to youth, he will venture to assert it, though false, for their good; because he will thus be enabled to lead them to act justly, not by force, but willingly.

CLIN. Truth, indeed, O guest, is beautiful and stable: but it does not appear easy to persuade.

GUEST. Be it so. But that fable of the Sidonian, though improbable, yet easily persuades, as well as an innumerable multitude of others.

CLIN. What fable?

GUEST. That, teeth being once sown, armed men were produced from them. For this may serve as a great example to a legislator, that any one may persuade the souls of young men to whatever he pleases. So that he ought, by considering, to find out nothing else than by what means he may confer, through persuasion, the greatest good on the city; and should, by every possible contrivance, discover after what manner the whole of such an association may always speak one and the same thing about these particulars, through the whole of life, in odes, fables, and discourses. But if it appears to you to be otherwise, no discord will arise from this difference in opinion.

CLIN. It does not appear to me that either of us can doubt about these particulars.

GUEST. I will, therefore, continue my discourse. I say then, that it is necessary to insinuate, as by enchantment, all the choirs, which are three, into the young and tender souls of boys, together with all such other beautiful things as we have spoken of, and which yet remain for us to discuss. But the principal thing among them is this: that if the life which is pronounced by the Gods to be the most pleasant, and the best, appears to be the same with that which we have described, we shall have spoken most truly, and shall more persuade those whom we ought to persuade, than if we had asserted any thing else.

CLIN. What you say must be granted.

GUEST. In the first place, therefore, the puerile choir of Muses should enter, being about to sing things of this kind, with all possible earnestness to the whole city. In the second place, that choir which consists of men thirty years old shall invoke the God Pæan as a witness of the truth of what is said, and shall beseech him, together with the divinity Persuasion, to be propitious to the youth. But it is necessary that there should be a third choir, consisting of those who are between thirty and sixty years old. But the mythologists about the same odes, who are more advanced in years than these,

as they will no longer be able to sing to the harp, ought agreeably to a divine oracle to be dismissed.

CLIN. Who do you mean, O guest, by these third choirs? for I do not clearly understand what you wish to say about them.

GUEST. These are nearly those for whose sake most of the above assertions were made.

CLIN. We do not yet understand: endeavour therefore to speak yet clearer.

GUEST. We said, if I remember, in the beginning of this discourse, that the nature of every youth was so ardent, that it could not be at rest either in body or voice, but that it was always speaking and leaping without order; and that no other animal possessed a sense of the order of both these, but that this was alone the province of the nature of man. We likewise said, that rhythm was the name given to the order of motion, but harmony to that of the voice, when the sharp and the flat are mingled together; and that both together are denominated a choir. We still further asserted, that the Gods, commiserating our nature, gave us Apollo and the Muses as our associates in and leaders of the choir; and Bacchus (if we recollect) as the third.

CLIN. How is it possible we should not remember?

GUEST. We have therefore spoken concerning the choir of Apollo and the Muses: and hence it is necessary that we should speak respecting the third and remaining choir, or that of Bacchus.

CLIN. Inform me how you mean: for a Bacchic choir of old men appears, on the first hearing, to be very absurd; if those who form this choir exceed thirty, so as to be from fifty to sixty years old.

GUEST. You speak most truly. But I think reason is requisite, that it may appear how this may be opportunely accomplished.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Do we therefore agree in what has been previously said?

CLIN. Respecting what?

GUEST. That every man and boy, those who are free, and those who are slaves, the male and the female, and in short the whole city, should sing these things to the whole city without ceasing, according to all the varieties
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of harmony, so as that those who sing the hymns may experience an insatiable pleasure.

CLIN. How is it possible not to acknowledge that these things ought to be so?

GUEST. But by what means will the best part of the city, and which is most capable of persuading by age, in conjunction with prudence, be able, by singing the most beautiful things, to be the cause of the greatest good? or shall we foolishly omit that which will be the most principal thing in the most beautiful and most useful odes?

CLIN. In consequence of what has been just now said, it is impossible to omit it.

GUEST. How then will it be accomplished in a becoming manner? Consider, if in this way.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Every one who is more advanced in age, being full of sluggishness with respect to odes, will be less delighted with these; and by how much the older and more modest he is, by so much the more will he necessarily be ashamed to sing. Will it not be so?

CLIN. It will.

GUEST. He will therefore be still more ashamed to sing, standing upright in the theatres, before an all-various multitude of men; especially if the choir, like those that contend for victory when exercising their voice, should be compelled to sing though lean and fasting; for, thus circumstanced, they will not sing without molestation and shame, and, when they do, it will be without alacrity.

CLIN. You speak of things most necessary.

GUEST. How then shall we render them disposed to engage in odes with alacrity? Shall we not ordain by law, in the first place, that boys shall not by any means taste wine till they are eighteen years old? For we ought to teach them, that it is not proper to deduce like a river, fire to fire, into the body and soul, before they begin to engage in manly labours; but that we should dread the furious habit of youth. In the next place, we should inform them that wine is to be moderately used till they are thirty years old, and that young men should by all means avoid intoxication and abundance

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of wine. But when they have attained the fortieth year, then they may be allowed to attend feasts, to invoke the other Gods, and beseech Bacchus to be present at the mystic ceremonies and sports of the old men; for this divinity bestowed wine upon men as a remedy against the austerity of old age, that through this we might acquire a second youth, forget sorrow, and render the manners of our soul softer,—just as iron is softened by the action of fire. In the first place, therefore, will not every one who is thus affected, be willing, with more alacrity and less shame, not indeed in a great but in a moderate multitude, nor among strangers, but his familiars, to sing, and, as we have often said, to enchant?

CLIN. Very much so.

GUEST. This mode then will not be altogether improper to induce them to join with us in singing.

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But with what voice, and with what muse, will these men sing? or is it not evident that it will be with such a one as is adapted to them?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But which will be adapted to divine men? Will it not be that of choirs?

CLIN. We indeed, O guest, and these, are not able to sing any thing else than that which we have learnt in the choirs, having been accustomed thus to sing.

GUEST. It is reasonable it should be so. For you have not in reality been partakers of the most beautiful singing; and this because your government is rather military than civil. Hence your young men are like a compact multitude of colts feeding together in herds. And no one of your people, taking to himself his own offspring, commits him as it were to a groom, that his fierceness may be tamed, and that he may be gently and mildly educated, and from whom he may receive every thing proper to the discipline of youth; whence he may not only become a good soldier, but an able governor of a city, and one who, in the beginning we said, would be more warlike than the soldiers of Tyrtæus, and would always and every where, both in private and public, honour the possession of fortitude, as ranking in the fourth, and not in the first place among the virtues.

CLIN.

CLIN. I do not know, O guest of ours, for what reason you again degrade our legislators.

GUEST. It is not my intention, excellent man, to do so, if I do it; but where reason leads, there, if you are willing, we will direct our course. For if we possess a muse more beautiful than that of the choirs, and the common theatres, we will endeavour to impart this to such as we said were ashamed of that muse, and endeavoured to participate of one more beautiful.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. In the first place, then, it is proper that this should be present to all whom a certain grace follows, that either the grace itself alone should be the most approved, or a certain rectitude, or, in the third place, advantage. Thus, for example, a grace follows food and drink, and every kind of aliment, and this grace we call pleasure: but if it contributes to health, we denominate it rectitude and utility.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Thus, too, a grace follows discipline, which is also called pleasure; and the truth resulting from discipline is denominated rectitude and advantage, the beneficial and the becoming.

CLIN. It is so.

GUEST. But what? In the artificial production of similitudes, when pleasure is the result of such productions, may not such pleasure be most justly denominated a grace?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But, in short, the equality of such things, rather than pleasure, renders them such and so great.

CLIN. It is well said.

GUEST. Hence that alone can be rightly judged by pleasure, which neither affords a certain advantage, nor truth, nor similitude; nor yet again is the cause of any injury, but which alone subsists for the sake of that grace which follows other things, and which may be most beautifully denominated pleasure, when none of these attend it.

CLIN. Do you alone speak of innoxious pleasure?

GUEST. I do; I say that this is sport, when it is neither the cause of any thing detrimental or advantageous, which deserves serious consideration.

CLIN.

CLIN. You speak most truly.

GUEST. Shall we not then assert, from what has been now said, that it is fit all imitations should be judged in the least degree by pleasure and false opinion, and in like manner, all equality? For it does not follow, that because *this* thing appears to some one to be equal, or some one is delighted with *that*, that therefore *this* thing is equal, or *that* possesses symmetry; but it is so from truth, the most of all things.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do we not therefore say, that all music is assimilative and imitative?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. In the smallest degree, therefore, when any one says that music is to be judged by pleasure, is such an assertion to be admitted, and in the smallest degree is such a music to be inquired after as a serious thing, if it is any where to be found; but that music alone is to be explored which possesses similitude by its imitation of the beautiful.

CLIN. Most true.

GUEST. Those, therefore, that inquire after the most beautiful singing, and the most beautiful music, ought, as it appears, to explore not that which is pleasant in each of these, but that which is right. For the rectitude of imitation, as we have said, consists in expressing the magnitude and quality of that which it represents, such as they are.

CLIN. How should it not be so?

GUEST. But every one will acknowledge this with respect to music, that all poems are an assimilation and imitation of it. Or, do you think that all poets, auditors, and players, will not assent to this?

CLIN. Very much so.

GUEST. But it is proper, as it appears, to know respecting every poem, what kind of a thing it is, if any one wishes not to err in deciding upon it. For he who does not know what the essence of it means, nor of what it is the image, will never understand the rectitude or erroneousness of its intention.

CLIN. It is impossible he should.

GUEST. But can he who does not know the rectitude of a performance ever be able to know whether it is well or ill accomplished? I do not indeed

Speak in a manner perfectly clear ; but, perhaps, I shall thus speak with more perspicuity.

CLIN. How ?

GUEST. There are ten thousand similitudes which have reference to the fight.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. What then ? If any one is ignorant what each of the imitated bodies is, can he ever know whether it is properly presented ? as, for instance, whether the representation possesses the joints and respective members of the body, their positions, number, and quality, such as they ought to be, and besides all these, the proper colours and figures ; or, on the contrary, whether all these are exhibited in a disordered manner. Do you think that any one can at all know these particulars who is unacquainted with the animal which is imitated ?

CLIN. How should he ?

GUEST. But if any one knows that it is a man who is painted, or otherwise represented, and that he has received all his parts, colours and figures, from art, would it be necessary that he who knows this should likewise readily know whether the representation is beautiful, or whether it is in any respect defective in beauty ?

CLIN. We should all of us, O guest, as I may say, know the beautiful parts of animals.

GUEST. You speak with perfect propriety. Is it not therefore necessary, that a prudent judge should possess these three things about every image, both in painting and music ? In the first place, that he should know what the thing is ; in the second place, that it possesses rectitude ; and, in the third place, that the image is properly executed in words, melodies, and rhythms ?

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. We should not, therefore, omit to speak concerning the difficulty which is in music. For, since it is more celebrated than other images, it requires more caution than the rest. For he who errs in this will be injured in the greatest degree, since he will thus conciliate to himself depraved manners. But it is most difficult to be known, because poets are more depraved than the Muses. For these are incapable of erring to so great a degree as,
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in fashioning the words of men, to give the figure and melody of women; or, in composing the melody and figures of those who are free, to harmonize together the rhythms of slaves and the free-born; or, in exhibiting rhythms and liberal figures, to assign a melody or discourse contrary to the rhythms. Besides this, they will never place together the voices of beasts, and men, and instruments, and every kind of noise, as imitating one certain thing. But human poets combine things of this kind together in the greatest degree, and irrationally mingle them with each other, exciting such men by these means to laugh, who, as Orpheus says, "are allotted the elegance of delight." For they perceive all these particulars mingled together: and, besides this, the poets dilacerate rhythm and figures separate from melody, arranging naked words in measure; producing melody and rhythm without words; and employing the naked sound of the harp and the pipe. Among which particulars, it is very difficult to know the intention of the rhythm and harmony which subsist without words, and to which of the imitations deserving to be mentioned they are similar. But it is necessary to consider every thing of this kind as replete with rusticity; as immoderately loving swiftness without falling, and the voice of wild beasts, and on this account using the melody of the harp and the pipe for other purposes than dancing and singing. But to use either of these instruments unaccompanied with words, is full of all unskilfulness and legerdemain. But the reason of this is as follows: We do not consider that we ought not to employ our Muses when we are fifty, or thirty, years old, but we ought to find out when it is proper. Our discourse, however, appears to me, from what has been said, to signify thus much concerning the muse belonging to choirs, that it is necessary those who are fifty years old should be better instructed than others in the particulars belonging to singing. For they must necessarily possess a proper sensation and knowledge of rhythms and harmonies. Or how can they know the rectitude of melodies; to what the Doric harmony is proper or improper; and whether the rhythm which the poet has united to it is right, or not?

CLIN. It is evident that they cannot by any means.

GUEST. But the numerous vulgar are ridiculous in thinking that they sufficiently know what is well harmonized, and possesses proper rhythm, and

what is not so: for these have been *compelled* to sing and walk in rhythm. But in consequence of doing each of these ignorantly, they would not syllogize as follows: Every melody, when it possesses things which accord, subsists in a proper manner; but when it does not possess things which accord, it is defective.

CLIN. Most necessarily so.

GUEST. What then? Can he who does not understand what it possesses, and what its definition is, know, as we have said, how it properly subsists at any time in any one?

CLIN. How is it possible he should?

GUEST. This then, as it appears, we have now discovered, that those fingers which we have now called upon, and have after a manner compelled to sing voluntarily, ought from necessity to be disciplined thus far, as to be able each of them to follow the progressions of the rhythms, and the chords of the melodies, that, perceiving the harmonies and the rhythms, they may choose such as are fit to be sung by so many, and by such particular persons; and, thus singing, may themselves immediately be innocently delighted, and thus induce young men to embrace worthy manners. But, being thus far instructed, they will participate of a more accurate discipline than that which is directed to the multitude, and to poets themselves. For, in the third place, it is by no means necessary that a poet should know whether the imitation is beautiful or not; but it is nearly necessary that he should know this of harmony and rhythm. But all the three ought to be known for the sake of choosing the most beautiful, and the second; for otherwise they will never become a sufficient enchantment to youth to the acquisition of virtue. And thus, that which our discourse intended in the beginning, viz. that it might afford proper assistance to the choir of Bacchus, has been accomplished by us to the utmost of our ability. But let us consider whether this should be accomplished in this manner. For such an assembly must necessarily be tumultuous, in consequence of the computation proceeding to a greater degree, which we supposed in the beginning of our discourse must necessarily happen to drinking associations of the present day.

CLIN. It is necessary it should.

GUEST. But every one becoming lighter than himself will be elevated
and

and delighted; will be filled with freedom of speech; and in this condition will not hear him who is near him, but will consider himself sufficient both to govern himself and others.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Have we not said, that, when these things take place, the souls of the drinkers, being rendered fervid, will become more soft and juvenile, like iron heated in the fire? so that they may be easily led, as when they were young, by those who are able and know how to instruct and fashion them: but that he who is able to fashion them is the same as he who was then said to be a good legislator, by whose laws respecting compotation he may be restrained who is confident and audacious, and more impudent than is proper, and who is unwilling to endure order with respect to silence, discourse, drinking, and the muse; and may be willing to act in a contrary manner in every respect; sending out against advancing and base confidence, the most beautiful opposing fear, in conjunction with justice; which divine fear we have denominated shame and modesty.

CLIN. It is so.

GUEST. But the guardians and fabricators of these laws ought, as leaders of those that are not sober, to be themselves free from perturbation and ebriety; without which it is more difficult to fight against intoxication than to contend with enemies without unterrified leaders. But he who is unwilling to be persuaded by these, and by the leaders of Bacchus who are more than sixty years old, sustains an equal, and indeed a greater disgrace than he who is unpersuaded by the leaders of Mars.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. If such ebriety and such sport were adopted, would not such drinking associates derive great utility from thence, and be more conjoined in friendship than before, and not be enemies as at present? Would not likewise the whole of their association be according to law, in consequence of the sober being the leaders of the intoxicated?

CLIN. Certainly, if the ebriety was conducted in the manner you now speak of.

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to blame the gift of Bacchus simply, as if it were evil, and not worthy to be received into the city. For much more might yet be said to this purpose; though I should be fearful to disclose

close to the multitude the greatest good which this divinity imparts, because men when they hear it will not receive and understand it as they ought.

CLIN. What is that good?

GUEST. A certain narration and rumour has devolved to us, that this God was once disordered in his mind by his mother Juno, and that on this account he introduced the Bacchic rites, and the whole of the insane choir, that he might take vengeance on the Goddeſs. It is further reported, that for this purpose he beſtowed wine upon mankind. But I leave things of this kind to be ſaid by thoſe who think that they can aſſert them with ſafety reſpecting the Gods. Thus much, however, I know, that no animal is born with ſuch, and ſo much, intelligence as is proper to it, when it acquires a perfection of intellect. But every animal, during the time in which it has not yet obtained its proper prudence, rages and vociferates in a diſordered manner; and when any one ſlays it rapidly, it again leaps without order¹. But we may recollect that we ſaid theſe were the principles of muſic and gymnatic.

CLIN. We do recollect.

GUEST. Did we not alſo ſay, that this principle imparted to us the ſenſe of rhythm and harmony? and that Apollo, the Muſes, and Bacchus, were the cauſes of theſe?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But wine, according to the aſſertions of ſome, was given to men as a puniſhment, that they might be rendered, through it, insane. Agreeably, however, to what has now been aſſerted by us, it is on the contrary a medicine; and was imparted that the ſoul might acquire ſhame, but the body health and ſtrength.

CLIN. You have very beautifully, O gueſt, reminded us of what has been ſaid.

GUEST. But now the half of the particulars pertaining to the choir is complete. Shall we finiſh or omit the remaining part?

CLIN. What parts do you ſpeak of; and how do you divide each of them?

GUEST. According to us, the whole of the choir is the whole of diſcipline. But, of this, one part conſiſts in vocal rhythms and harmonies.

¹ Viz. in another life: for the ſoul carries with it into another the habits and manners which it poſſeſſed in the preſent life.

CLIN.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But the other in the motion of the body, which has rhythm in common with the motion of the voice, but figure peculiar to itself: but, in the former part, melody is the motion of the voice.

CLIN. Most true.

GUEST. I know not, therefore, after what manner we have denominated things pertaining to the voice, which extend as far as to the soul, and contribute to the discipline of virtue, music.

CLIN. They were rightly called so.

GUEST. But things pertaining to the body, which we have called dancing in sport, if such a motion should extend as far as to the virtue of the body, we should denominate the artificial leading of it to this purpose, gymnastic.

CLIN. Most right.

GUEST. But we appear to have spoken sufficiently of that part of music, which we have said is the half of the choir. Shall we, therefore, speak of the remaining half, or how shall we do?

CLIN. O most excellent man, who art discoursing with Cretans and Lacedæmonians, as you have spoken sufficiently about music, but gymnastic remains yet to be discussed, what do you think each of us ought to reply to your interrogation?

GUEST. I shall say that you have perspicuously answered by your question. For I understand that your present interrogation is, as I have said, an answer, and, besides this, a mandate to discuss the particulars about gymnastic.

CLIN. You apprehend my meaning excellently well; and therefore discuss these particulars.

GUEST. We shall do so: for it is not very difficult to speak about things known to both of you. And besides, you are far more skilled in this art than in that of music.

CLIN. You nearly speak the truth.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, the principle of this sport, every animal being naturally accustomed to leap? But man, as we have said, receiving a sense of rhythm, generated and brought forth dancing. And melody, recalling to mind, and exciting rhythm, these two, communicating with each other, brought forth the choir and sport.

CLIN. Most true.

GUEST.

GUEST. One part of this we have said we have already discussed, and that we should in the next place endeavour to discuss the remaining part.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. We will, therefore, first of all bring to a conclusion the choir of intoxication, if it is agreeable to you.

CLIN. Of what are you speaking?

GUEST. If any city should use drinking associations as a serious concern, with law and order, and as an exercise to the acquisition of temperance, and should not at the same time avoid other pleasures, but in a similar manner should engage in them for the sake of subduing them, after this manner it may be allowed to use all these. But if it uses drinking associations as sport, and gives permission to any one to drink when he pleases, and with whom he pleases, and to engage in any other pursuit without restraint, I should not be of this opinion, that this city, or any individual in it, ought, at any time, to make use of intoxication. But I should much prefer the law of the Carthaginians to the custom of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians. For their law forbids any one belonging to the camp to taste of wine, but orders water to be drunk during all this period. I likewise would not permit it to be drunk in the city by either male or female slaves; nor by magistrates during the year of their office; nor by pilots, nor judges, when engaged in their respective employments; nor, in short, by any one when deliberating about things of importance. Again, I would not permit it to be drunk by any one in the day-time, unless for the sake of bodily exercise or disease; nor by a man and woman at night, when they intend to beget children. And many other circumstances might be adduced, in which those who possess a sound mind, and conform to good laws, will abstain from wine. So that, according to this reasoning, no city has occasion for a multitude of vineyards. But other concerns of agriculture, and every thing respecting diet, should be orderly disposed: and wine should be nearly used in the most moderate and least degree of all things. And this, if it is agreeable to you, O guests, shall be the conclusion of my discourse respecting wine.

CLIN. Beautifully said: and it is agreeable to us it should be so.

THE LAWS,

BOOK III.

AND thus much concerning these particulars. But shall we say that civil government had a certain beginning? And may not any one behold it hence with ease, and in the most beautiful manner?

CLIN. Whence?

GUEST. Whence any one may behold the progress of cities to virtue, and at the same time to vice.

CLIN. Whence do you say?

GUEST. I think, indeed, from a length and infinity of time, and from the mutations in it.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. Do you appear to have ever understood what a multitude of time has elapsed since cities and the politic institutions of men commenced?

CLIN. This is by no means easy to understand.

GUEST. It is indeed infinite¹, and impossible to be expressed.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Will not myriads upon myriads of cities have subsisted in this time? and, in consequence of the same temporal infinity, have not as many been destroyed? and will they not every where have been governed according to every kind of polity; and at one time pass from the lesser to the greater, and at another from the greater to the lesser; and have become worse from the better, and better from the worse?

CLIN. It is necessary.

GUEST. Let us therefore assign, if we are able, the cause of this muta-

¹ From hence it is evident that they are not genuine Platonists, who contend that according to Plato the world had a beginning. See the *Timæus*.

tion : for perhaps it may exhibit to us the first generation and mutation of politics.

CLIN. You speak well. It is therefore necessary that you should readily unfold what you conceive to be the truth concerning them, and that we should at the same time follow you.

GUEST. Do antient discourses then appear to you to possess any truth?

CLIN. Of what kind?

GUEST. That there have been many destructions of the human race, through deluges, diseases, and many other things, in which a very small part of mankind was left.

CLIN. Every thing of this kind must be very probable to every one.

GUEST. Let us then consider one of these destructions out of many,—I mean that which was caused by a deluge.

CLIN. What ought we to think about this?

GUEST. That those who then escaped the destruction were nearly mountain shepherds, a few dormant sparks of the human race, preserved on the summits of mountains.

CLIN. Evidently so.

GUEST. But such as these must necessarily have been ignorant of other arts, and of those artifices in cities of men towards each other, with a view to prerogative and contention, and other base ends.

CLIN. It is likely.

GUEST. But we shall also suppose that the cities which were situated in plains, and those bordering on the sea, entirely perished at that time.

CLIN. We will suppose so.

GUEST. We must assert, therefore, that all instruments were destroyed at that time, together with every invention pertaining to art, politic discipline, or any other certain wisdom.

CLIN. For how, O most excellent man, if these particulars remained through the whole of time in the same perfection as at present, could any thing new have ever been invented? It is because an innumerable multitude of years was unknown to the inventors. But one or two thousand years have elapsed since some things were invented by Dædalus, others by Orpheus, and others by Palamedes. The particulars indeed respecting music were discovered by Marsyas and Olympus; but those relating to the lyre by Amphion.
And

And a multitude of other things were, as I may say, invented by others but yesterday.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, O Clinias, that you have omitted to mention the friend who was yesterday present?

CLIN. Do you mean Epimenides?

GUEST. I do. For he far excelled all among you in inventions; and, as you say, brought to perfection in reality what Hesiod had formerly divined in his writings.

CLIN. We do say so.

GUEST. We must assert, therefore, that when that devastation by a deluge took place, human affairs were in a state of infinite and dreadful solitude; that a prodigious part of the earth was unprolific; and other animals having perished, some herds of oxen, and a few goats, which were rarely found, supplied those men with food that escaped the devastation.

CLIN. Doubtless.

GUEST. But are we of opinion that there was then any memory of a city, politic discipline, and legislation, which is the subject of our present discourse?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. From these people, therefore, thus circumstanced, all the particulars which exist at present derived their subsistence; viz. cities and politics, arts and laws, many vices and many virtues.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. Can we be of opinion, O wonderful man, that as those who then existed were ignorant of many beautiful things pertaining to citizens, and many of a contrary nature, they could ever become perfect either in virtue or vice?

CLIN. You speak well; and I understand what you say.

GUEST. In consequence, therefore, of the progression of time, and the increase of the human race, all things advanced to the condition of all things at present.

CLIN. Most right.

GUEST. But this was probably not effected suddenly, and in a short, but in a very extended period of time.

CLIN. It is very proper it should be so.

GUEST. For I think that fear would prevent all the inhabitants from descending from their elevated abodes to the plains.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Would not likewise those who lived at that time be delighted in beholding each other, on account of their paucity? And would they not have nearly lost, as I may say, all the artificial means of passing over to each other, either by land or sea? I do not therefore think it would be very possible for them to mingle with each other. For iron and brass and all metals would have perished, confused together; so that it would be impossible to separate and bring them into light. Hence trees would be but rarely cut down. For, if any instrument should happen to be left on the mountains, these rapidly wearing away would vanish; and no other could be made, till the metallic art should again be discovered by men.

CLIN. How indeed could it?

GUEST. But in how many generations afterwards do we think this would take place?

CLIN. It is evident, in a great many.

GUEST. The arts therefore which are employed about iron and brass, and all such things, must at the same time be involved in darkness, and indeed in a still greater degree.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Sedition, therefore, together with war, must at that time be every where extirpated.

CLIN. How so?

GUEST. In the first place, they will be benevolent towards and love each other, on account of their solitude. In the next place, food will not be the cause of war to them: for pastures will be rare; a few only perhaps remaining from the first, in which the inhabitants of that time will for the most part live. For they will not by any means be in want of milk and animal food. Further still, hunting will supply them with food, neither of a bad kind nor in a small quantity. They will likewise possess abundance of clothing, beds and habitations, together with apparatus pertaining to fire, and such as has no occasion for fire. The plastic too and weaving arts will not be indigent of iron. But divinity imparted all these together with these arts to men, that, if at any time they should fall into so great a calamity,

mity, they might be able to propagate the human race. On this account, at that time they were not very poor, nor were they compelled by poverty to quarrel with each other. But neither could they ever become rich, because they were without silver and gold. But in any association where neither riches nor poverty take up their abode, in this the most just manners will nearly be found. For neither insolence nor injustice, neither emulation nor envy, can subsist in such a society. From these causes, and through their innocence which we have spoken of, they were good. For, whenever they heard that any thing was beautiful or base, they thought, in consequence of their innocence, that it was most truly said to be so, and were persuaded. For no one was suspected of lying, through his wisdom, as is the case at present; but, believing all that was asserted about Gods and men to be true, they lived conformably to what they heard; on which account they were altogether such as we a little before represented them to be.

CLIN. These things appear both to me and this other to be so.

GUEST. We say moreover, that many generations living in this manner, both of those prior to the deluge and of those at present, they must be less skilful and less learned both in warlike and other arts, which at present are exercised by land and sea; likewise in judicial affairs and seditions, which men have devised both in words and works, with every possible subtilty of contrivance, in order to injure and act unjustly towards each other. That besides this they must be more innocent, brave, and at the same time modest, and in every respect more just. But of these things we have already assigned the cause.

CLIN. You speak with rectitude.

GUEST. These things, therefore, have been asserted by us; and we shall speak of every thing consequent to these particulars, for the sake of understanding what occasion they had at that time for laws, and who was their legislator.

CLIN. You have spoken well.

GUEST. Were they, therefore, neither indigent of laws, nor was any such thing adopted at that time? For men of that period were unacquainted with letters, but lived following the manners and laws, as they were called, of their ancestors.

CLIN. It is probable.

GUEST. But the manner of their polity was this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. All of that period appear to me to have called a polity, a dynasty, which even at present subsists in many places, both among the Greeks and Barbarians. And Homer says that it was adopted in the habitation of the Cyclops; for he thus speaks:

“By these no statutes and no rights are known,
No council held, no monarch fills the throne;
But high on hills or airy cliffs they dwell,
Or deep in caves whose entrance leads to hell.
Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care,
Heedless of others, to his own severe.”

CLIN. Homer appears to you to have been an elegant poet. We have also met with other pieces, though not many, of his composing, extremely elegant. For we Cretans do not very much make use of foreign poems.

MEGIL. We however do make use of them. And Homer appears to me to excell poets of this kind, though he does not describe a Laconic, but rather throughout his poems an Ionic life. At present, indeed, he appears to give a good testimony to your discourse, mythologically referring the ancient condition of mankind to rusticity.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. For he testifies the truth of our assertion: and we shall therefore admit him as one who indicates that polities of this kind once subsisted.

CLIN. It is well said.

GUEST. Were not polities of this kind formed from families and kindred dispersed through the want arising from these devastations,—polities, in which the oldest person rules over the rest, on account of their origin being derived from father and mother; and who following these like birds produce one herd, are obedient to paternal mandates, and are governed in a kingdom, the most just of all?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But after this, more of them collecting together into one body, they will form larger cities: and first of all betaking themselves to agri-

culture, at the roots of mountains they will make certain enclosures from hedges, as defensive walls against the attacks of wild beasts, and thus produce one common and mighty habitation.

CLIN. It is probable that this would be the case.

GUEST. But is not this also probable?

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That since these more increased habitations are composed from such as are lesser and first, each of the small ones should be present, having at the same time its most ancient governor, according to alliance, together with its own proper manners; and this on account of their living separate from each other, and having had different parents and preceptors, by whom they have been accustomed to reverence the Gods, and attend to themselves, the more modest by the more modest, the braver by the more brave, and so in all the rest, according as each has fashioned their sons and grandsons, who, as we have said, will bring with them to this greater habitation the peculiar laws under which they have lived.

CLIN. How is it possible this should not be probable?

GUEST. It is likewise necessary that every one should be pleased with his own laws in the first place, and with those of others in the second place.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But we appear to be ignorant that we are entering as it were on the beginning of legislation.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. After these things, therefore, it is necessary that those who thus assemble together should choose among themselves in common some who know the legal institutions of all of them, and that they should openly show such of these as they most approve of, to the common rulers and guides of the people, as to kings, who themselves approving these institutions will be called legislators. But, having appointed their rulers, they will form in this mutation of their polity a certain aristocracy, composed from dynasties, or a certain kingdom.

CLIN. This will doubtless afterwards be the case.

GUEST. In the next place, therefore, let us speak of a third form of polity, in which all the forms and passions of politics, and at the same time of cities, happen to be found.

CLIN.

CLIN. Of what kind is this? That which Homer signifies, asserting that the third was thus produced after the second:

“ Dardania's walls he rais'd ; for Ilion then
 (The city since of many-languag'd men)
 Was not. The natives were content to till
 The shady foot of Ida's fount-full hill :”

These verses, and those above, about the Cyclops, are in a certain respect divinely written, and are conformable to nature. For the poetic genus is divine, being agitated with sacred fury, celebrating many things which have happened according to truth, and handling each of them with certain graces and muses.

CLIN. And this very much so.

GUEST. We will therefore now proceed to consider the preceding fable : for, perhaps, something of our intention may be signified by it. Will it not be proper to do so ?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We say then that Troy was built from elevated places, in a large and beautiful plain, upon a hill not very lofty, and having many rivers which rush from mount Ida.

CLIN. So it is said.

GUEST. Must not we think that this happened a long time after the deluge ?

CLIN. How could it be otherwise ?

GUEST. A dreadful oblivion, therefore, of the devastation we are now speaking of, must, as it appears, have been then present with them, as they thus built their city under many rivers, and which descended from lofty places, and were not afraid to trust themselves to hills of no great altitude.

CLIN. It is perfectly evident, therefore, that they existed a long time after this devastation.

GUEST. And I am of opinion that many other cities were at that time inhabited, in consequence of the increase of mankind.

CLIN. Certainly.

* Il. xx. ver. 216.

GUEST.

GUEST. And these indeed fought against Troy; and perhaps by sea, all of them now intrepidly using that element.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. But the Achæians, who warred on Troy, subverted it in the tenth year.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. In this time, therefore, or the space of ten years, in which Troy was besieged, many evils happened to the besiegers through the seditions of the young men, who received the commanders, when returning to their cities and houses, neither in a becoming nor just manner, but so that many were slain, and many were exiled. Those that were exiled, however, returned, changing their names, and being called Dorians instead of Achæians, through one Dorieus, who at that time collected together the exiles. And hence you Lacedæmonians mythologize about, and thoroughly discuss, all these particulars.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. Hence, as, while discoursing about laws in the beginning of this conversation, we made a digression to music and intoxication, so now we are led to the same thing as it were by divinity; and our discourse presents us as it were with a handle for this purpose. For it has brought us to that politic discipline which you said was properly instituted both in Lacedæmon and Crete, as by fraternal laws. But now we obtain this prerogative from the wandering of our discourse, that, while we pass through certain polities and habitations, we behold a first, second, and third city, following each other, according to our opinion, in immense extensions of a certain time. But now this fourth city, or if you please nation, presents itself to us, which was once inhabited, and is so at present; from all which, if we are able to understand what is beautiful or the contrary, respecting its being inhabited, and what laws of the inhabitants preserve what is preserved, or corrupt what is corrupted among them, and what change of political institutions renders the city happy, we shall think, O Megillus and Clinias, that we have done enough. But all these particulars must be discussed by us from the beginning, unless we call to account what has been said.

MEGIL. If, O guest, any God will promise us that, if we enter a second time on the business of legislation, we shall hear neither worse nor fewer

things than what have now been said, I would make a long journey, and the present day would appear to me to be short, though the God is now turning from the summer to the winter solstice.

GUEST. It is proper, as it appears, to consider these things.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. Let us then be present in thought at that time when Lacedæmon, and Argos, and Messene, and the cities which were in alliance with them, were, O Megillus, in subjection to your ancestors. For then, as it is said in the fable, they thought proper, having triply divided their army, to inhabit three cities, Argos, Messene, and Lacedæmon.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. And Temenus, indeed, was made king of Argos, but Cresphontes of Messene, and Eurysthenes in conjunction with Patrocles of Lacedæmon.

CLIN. They were so.

GUEST. But all these took an oath that they would give assistance, if any one should destroy any of these dominions.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But inform me, by Jupiter, whether their kingdom or government was ever destroyed by any one; or whether it was not subverted by others, but by themselves? or shall we say, that a little before, when we entered on this discourse, we thought it was so, but have now forgotten it?

MEGIL. By no means.

GUEST. Now, therefore, we shall be more able to establish a thing of this kind; for we are led to the same conclusion, as it appears, by the history of past transactions; so that we do not pursue in our discourse any vain thing, but that which has happened and is true. But the following particulars have taken place: Three kingdoms, and three cities, having a kingly government, mutually swore, respecting the laws which they had established about governing and being governed, that kings should not reign by violence as time and race continued to advance, and that the people, while the kings observed their oath, should not at any time destroy the kingdoms, nor endeavour that they might be subverted by others; but that kings should defend both kings and the people when injured, and the people, both kings and the people. Was it not so?

MEGIL. It was.

GUEST. That therefore which is of the greatest importance in the establishments of politics was present with the legislators in these three cities, whether the kings themselves gave laws, or any other persons.

MEGIL. What was this?

GUEST. That two cities should always rise up against one which would not be persuaded to obey the established laws.

MEGIL. It is evident.

GUEST. This also many advise legislators, that they should establish such laws as the people and the multitude will willingly admit; which is just as if some one should advise the masters of gymnastic exercises, or physicians, to take care of and cure the bodies under their direction in an agreeable manner.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. It is, however, often a desirable circumstance, when with no great degree of pain any one is able to procure for bodies a good habit and health.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. This also was at that time present with them, and contributed in no small degree to the facility of establishing laws.

MEGIL. What was that?

GUEST. The legislators had not to procure an equality of possessions, which causes the greatest of all accusations, and which takes place in other cities established by laws, when any one endeavours to disturb the possession of land, or to dissolve what is due; perceiving that equality can never sufficiently subsist unless these things take place. For against him who endeavours to disturb every thing of this kind, all men exclaim, that he must not move things which are immoveable. Imprecations likewise are uttered against him who introduces divisions of land, and the cancelling of debts; so that every man is involved in difficulty on this account. This, however, was not the case with the Dorians. For land was distributed to them, without envy or controversy; and they had no large and antient debts.

MEGIL. True.

GUEST. How therefore came it to pass, O most excellent men, that their settlement in houses and legislation came to be so bad?

MEGIL. How do you mean? and of what is it you accuse them?

GUEST. That three house-establishments taking place, two of them swiftly corrupted the polity and the laws, and one alone, which was your city, remained.

MEGIL. You ask a question which it is not very easy to answer.

GUEST. But it is proper that, considering and exploring this at present, concerning laws, with aged and prudent sport, we should accomplish the journey we have undertaken without molestation.

MEGIL. We ought certainly to do as you say.

GUEST. Can we therefore speculate concerning laws in a more beautiful manner, than by considering the laws which adorned cities of this kind? or can we think of any cities and habitations more illustrious and larger than these?

MEGIL. It is not easy to speak of others that are preferable to these.

GUEST. It is nearly evident, therefore, that, thus prepared, they would not only be able sufficiently to defend Peloponnesus, but all Greece, if it should be injured by any of the Barbarians; in the same manner as those that dwelt about Ilion, who, trusting to the power of the Assyrians descended from Ninus, dared to excite war against Troy. For the form of that government, which was still preserved, was by no means despicable. And as we at present fear a mighty king¹, in like manner all at that time feared that collected coordination of people. For the destruction of Troy a second time raised a great accusation against them; because the Trojan power was a portion of the Assyrian government. Against all these, therefore, the army at that time was divided into three cities, under the brother kings, the offspring of Hercules, and appeared to be beautifully regulated, and far more so than that which came against Troy. For, in the first place, they were of opinion that the commanders who descended from Hercules were better than those that derived their origin from Pelops; and in the next place, that this army far surpassed in virtue that which came against Troy. For these conquered, but those were vanquished by

¹ Viz. the king of Persia, who, as is well known, was usually called *the great king*.
these,

these, the Achæians by the Dorians. Ought we not thus to think, and that at that time they prepared themselves for battle with this intention?

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. It is probable, therefore, that they would consider this their constitution to be firmly established, and that it would endure for a long time, in consequence of their mutually undergoing many dangers and labours, and being under the orderly government of one race, their kings being brothers. And besides this, it is further probable that they used many prophets, and among these the Delphic Apollo.

MEGIL. It is highly probable.

GUEST. But these particulars, which appear to be thus great, glided away, as it seems, at that time rapidly, except, as we just now said, a small part situated about the place of your abode; and this part has not ever ceased warring on the two other parts even to the present day. For, if the several parts of the constitution at that time had unanimously conspired to one end, they would have possessed an irresistible power in war.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. How, therefore, and on what account, was it dissolved? Does it not deserve to be considered what fortune subverted a constitution so great, and of such a kind?

MEGIL. Indeed, he who considers any thing else will not be able to understand either other laws or politics, which preserve beautiful and great concerns, or on the contrary destroy them, if he neglects these things.

GUEST. It seems, therefore, that we have been fortunately led to this consideration, which is so well adapted to our purpose.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, all men ignorant, and at present we ourselves, while each of us thinks that he beholds a certain beautiful thing, and which will produce admirable effects, when any one is not ignorant how it should be properly used? But we ourselves, perhaps, neither think rightly about this, nor according to nature. And shall we not say, that all men err respecting all other things about which they think in a similar manner?

MEGIL. How do you say? And about what especially are you now speaking?

GUEST. O, good man, I now laugh at myself. For, looking to that army:
about:

about which we have been speaking, it appeared to me to be very beautiful, and that a wonderful possession would fall to the lot of the Greeks, as I have said, if any one should at that time have used it in a proper manner.

MEGIL. Did you not say all these things well and prudently ; and, did not we properly praise them ?

GUEST. Perhaps so. But I think that every one who perceives any thing great, and which is endued with much power and strength, will be immediately convinced, that if he knows it to be used by its possessor, being such and so great, its possessor will be happy through accomplishing many and admirable things.

MEGIL. Is not this therefore right ? or, how do you say ?

GUEST. Consider now to what he looks, who, in praising every thing of this kind, speaks rightly. And in the first place concerning that of which we are now speaking, how will those commanders of that time, who knew properly how to marshal an army, fortunately make use of occasion ? Will it not be from their establishing it in safety, and preserving it perpetually, so that they themselves may be free, and that they may rule over others whom they please ? And, in short, that both they and their progeny may obtain from all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, whatever they desire ? Will they not desire it for the sake of these things ?

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. He, therefore, who beholding either great wealth, or the illustrious honours of a family, or any thing else of this kind, says the very same things, will he not say so looking to this, as if through this kind he should obtain all that he desires, or the greater part, and such as are of the most consequence ?

MEGIL. It appears so.

GUEST. But there is one common desire of all men, which is signified by our present discourse.

MEGIL. What is that ?

GUEST. That all things should especially happen according to every one's mandate ; but, if not all, at least human affairs.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Since, therefore, all of us perpetually wish a thing of this kind, both when we are adults and advanced in years, we necessarily pray for this to the end of life.

MEGIL.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. But we also pray that our friends may obtain the same things as ourselves.

MEGIL. Certainly.

GUEST. But the son is a friend to the father, viz. the boy to the man.

MEGIL. How can it be otherwise?

GUEST. But many of those things which the boy prays may happen to himself, the father will beseech the Gods to grant that they may not happen according to the prayers of his son.

MEGIL. Do you say that this will be the case when he who prays is foolish, and while he is yet a youth?

GUEST. Yes; and when he is a father, either very old or very young, while he knows nothing of things beautiful and just, but, being affected like Theseus to the unfortunate Hippolytus, when dying, will pray with great alacrity. But if the son knows what is beautiful and just at the same time, does it appear to you that he will join in prayer with the father?

MEGIL. I understand what you say. For you appear to me to assert, that we ought not to pray, nor endeavour that all things may be conformable to our wish, but that our will rather may be obedient to our prudence; and that both cities and each of us ought to pray for, and endeavour to obtain, the possession of intellect.

GUEST. Certainly. And that the politician who is a legislator ought always to establish legal orders, looking to this, as I remember to have said before, and as I now remind you. For, in the beginning of this conversation, you gave it as your opinion, that a good legislator ought to establish all laws for the sake of war; but I said that this was to exhort him to compose laws according to one virtue only, when, at the same time, there are four virtues; and that he ought to look to every virtue, but especially towards the first, which is the leader of them all, and which is prudence, intellect and opinion, with love and desire attendant on these. But our discourse returns again to the same thing; and what I then said, I now again say, either if you please jesting or seriously—I assert then, that it is dangerous to pray without the possession of intellect, but that in this case it is better the contrary to what we ask should come to pass. If you are of opinion that these things are asserted by me seriously, consider them to be so. For I now entirely expect

to

to find you consenting to what we a little before advanced, that timidity was not the cause of the destruction of kings, and of the whole of that constitution, nor yet the ignorance in warlike concerns of the governors and governed, but the whole of depravity, and especially ignorance about the greatest of human affairs. That these things thus happened at that time, and must so happen now, if they any where subsist, and that in following times they will no otherwise happen, I will endeavour, if you please, to discover, taking reason for our guide, and unfold it to you as friends to the utmost of my ability.

CLIN. To praise you, O guest, in words, would be troublesome, but we shall vehemently praise you in the thing itself. For we shall cheerfully follow you in what you have to say, and in so doing a liberal and true encomiast is particularly apparent.

GUEST. You speak most excellently, O Clinias! and we shall do as you say.

CLIN. These things will be so, if God pleases. Only speak.

GUEST. We say then, proceeding according to the remaining road of our discourse, that the greatest ignorance destroyed that power at that time, and that at present the same thing is naturally capable of effecting this. So that, if this be the case, the legislator ought to endeavour as far as he is able to impart prudence to cities, and exterminate in the highest degree ignorance.

CLIN. It is evident.

GUEST. What then may be justly called the greatest ignorance? Consider whether you agree with me in what I am going to say. For I establish it to be such as this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. When any one does not love, but hates that which appears to him to be beautiful, or good; but loves and embraces that which appears to him to be base and unjust. I assert that this dissonance of pain and pleasure, with rational opinion, is *extreme* ignorance. But it is the *greatest*, because it belongs to *the multitude* of the soul. For that part of the soul which is conversant with pain and pleasure corresponds to the common people and the multitude in a city. When, therefore, the soul opposes sciences or opinions, or reason, all which naturally govern, this I call ignorance: and it then takes place in a city when the multitude will not be persuaded by the rulers

and the laws. The same thing happens to one man, when though beautiful reasons reside in his soul, yet he does not at all act conformably, but does every thing contrary to them. I should establish all these most inordinate ignorances as belonging to a city, and to every citizen, but not as belonging to the artificers, if, O guest, you understand what I say.

CLIN. We understand you, my friend, and assent to what you say.

GUEST. Let this then be thus fixed, that to citizens who are after this manner ignorant, nothing pertaining to government is to be committed, but that they are to be reproached as ignorant, though they should be very skilful in argument, and possess every thing pertaining to the elegance and celerity of the soul. On the other hand, that those who are affected in a contrary manner are to be called wise, though, as it is said, they should neither know their letters, nor how to swim, and dominion should be given to these as to prudent persons. For how, O friends, can the least form of prudence subsist without consent?

CLIN. It cannot.

GUEST. But the most beautiful and greatest of mutual agreements may be most justly called the greatest wisdom; of which he participates who lives according to reason. But he who is void of this, who destroys his own house, and is in no respect a favour to the city, but every thing of a contrary nature,—such a one appears to be ignorant with respect to these particulars. These things, therefore, as I just now said, must subsist in this manner.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But ought there not, necessarily, to be in cities governors and the governed?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Be it so. But of what kind, and how many, are the axioms respecting governing and being governed in great and small cities, and in a similar manner in families? Is not this one of them, that father and mother, and universally a begetter should rule over the thing begotten? Will not this be every where a right axiom?

CLIN. Very much so.

GUEST. But the next in order is this, that the ingenious should rule over

the ignoble. The third, that the more aged ought to govern, and the younger to be governed.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But the fourth will be, that slaves should be governed, and masters govern.

CLIN. How can it be otherwise?

GUEST. The fifth will be, I think, that the better character should rule over the worse.

CLIN. You speak of a dominion which is extremely necessary.

GUEST. And of a dominion, which for the most part subsists in all animals, and is according to nature, as the Theban Pindar says. But the greatest axiom, as it appears, will be the sixth, which orders the unscientific to follow, but the prudent to lead and govern. And this government, O most wise Pindar, I should nearly say was not contrary but according to the nature of law, subsisting spontaneously and not by violence.

CLIN. You speak most rightly.

GUEST. The seventh government we shall produce to a certain allotment, speaking of a thing grateful to divinity, and subsisting with good fortune. And we shall say it is most just, that he who is chosen by lot should govern, but that he who is rejected should be governed.

CLIN. You speak most truly.

GUEST. We shall say then jocosely to some one of those who proceed with great facility to the establishment of laws, Do you see, O legislator, how many axioms there are respecting governors, and how they are naturally contrary to each other? For now we have discovered a certain fountain of seditions, which it is necessary you should cure. But, in the first place, consider with us how, and in what respect, the kings of Argos and Messene, acting contrary to these axioms, destroyed the power of the Greeks, which at that time was wonderful. Was it not because they were ignorant of that which is most rightly said by Hesiod, That the half is often more than the whole? That is to say, when the possession of the whole is noxious, but that of the half is moderate: for, in this case, he considered the moderate as more than the immoderate, as being better than the worse.

CLIN. Most right.

GUEST. But will this, when happening to kings, destroy each of them, prior to its happening to the people?

CLIN. It is probable that this is mostly the disease of kings, who live proudly through luxuries.

GUEST. It is evident, therefore, in the first place, that the kings at that time arrogated to themselves authority over the established laws, and that their actions did not accord with what they had celebrated both in discourse and by an oath. But dissonance, as we have said, being the greatest ignorance, though appearing to be wisdom, subverted all those particulars through confusion and bitter unskillfulness.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. Be it so then. But why is it necessary that the legislator of that time should be fearful respecting the generation of this passion? Shall we say, by the Gods, that to know this is a thing of no great wisdom, and that it is not difficult to assert; but that, if any one at that time had foreseen it, he would have been more wise than we are?

MEGIL. How do you say?

GUEST. We may now, O Megillus, understand that which was formerly transacted by you, and, in consequence of knowing this, easily relate what ought then to have been accomplished.

MEGIL. Speak yet more clearly.

GUEST. This then will be most clear.

MEGIL. What?

GUEST. If any one gives a greater power to lesser things, so as to neglect mediocrity,—as, for instance, fails to ships, food to bodies, and dominion to souls,—he would subvert all things. For, becoming insolent, some of these would rush to diseases, and others to injustice, the offspring of insolence. What then do we mean to say? It is this, my friends, that the nature of a mortal soul is such, that no one of these can, when young and unrestrained, bear the greatest dominion without having its dianoëtic power filled with folly, which is the greatest disease; and that, besides this, it will hate its nearest friends; which circumstance, when happening, will swiftly destroy it, and obscure the whole of its power. To be afraid of this, in consequence of knowing the moderate, is the province of great legislators. Hence, that which it is easy to see was at that time transacted appears to be this.

MEGIL. What?

GUEST. Some God, as it seems, took care of you; who, foreseeing future events, planted for you a twofold generation of kings, from one, and by this mean more contracted you to the moderate. And further still, after this a certain human nature, mingling with a certain divine power, and perceiving the effervescence of your government, conjoined the prudent power of old age with the proud strength of noble birth, equalling the decision of men eighty years old, in affairs of the greatest concern, with the power of kings. But your third favour, perceiving your distended and raging government, hurled upon it, as a bridle, the power of the Ephori, and led it near the power which is determined by lot. Hence, your kingdom being mingled from such things as are proper, and possessing measure, was both preserved itself, and became the cause of safety to others. For the faction of Aristodemus had never taken place under the government of Temenus and Cresphontes, and other legislators of that time; for they were not then sufficiently skilled in legislation. For, had they been so, they never would have thought that a juvenile soul, when receiving a dominion from which it might be possible to become a tyrant, should be kept within the bounds of moderation by oaths. But now a God has shown you what kind of government is necessary; and such a one ought especially to subsist. But that these things should be known by us, (as I said before) now they have been accomplished, is not a thing replete with wisdom. For it is not difficult to see from a paradigm a thing which has been transacted. But if any one could then have foreseen these particulars, and had been able to moderate the governments, and to form one from the three, he would have preserved all the beautiful conceptions of that time, and neither the Persian fleet, nor any other which has been despised by us as of no account, would have failed with hostile intentions into Greece.

CLIN. You speak the truth.

GUEST. Hence, O Clinias, they made a shameful resistance. I say shameful, not because those who at that time vanquished by sea and land did not conquer in a becoming manner, but what I call shameful at that time is this: in the first place, because one of those three cities only fought in defence of Greece, but the other two were so basely corrupted, that one of them hindered Lacedæmon from assisting Greece, by warring against it with all
its

its strength; and the other obtaining the chief authority in those times, respecting distribution, or about Argos, would neither hear, nor give any assistance when called upon to repell the Barbarian. But many things might be adduced relative to the transactions of those times, about that war, by which the conduct of the two cities towards Greece might be accused as shameful. For those who assert that they defended Greece do not speak rightly; since, unless the common opinion of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had resisted the approaching slavery, all things would nearly have been mingled together, the race of Greeks with Greeks, the Barbarians with Greeks, and the Greeks with Barbarians; just as at present, in consequence of the Persians tyrannizing, Greece being separated in a disorderly manner is badly inhabited. These are the things, O Clinias and Megillus, which we have to urge against antient politicians and legislators, and likewise those of the present day, that, exploring the causes of these, we may discover what else ought to be done. Such as is that which we now assert, that it is not proper to establish great nor unmingled governments; considering this, that a city ought to be free and prudent, and a friend to itself; and that a legislator ought to give laws looking to these particulars. But we must not wonder, if we often propose other things, and assert that the legislator ought to regard these in giving laws, though they are not the same with what we have previously delivered. But it is proper to infer, that when we say the legislator ought to look to temperance, or prudence, or friendship, our design is not different, but the same: and you must not be disturbed on finding us using many other words of this kind.

CLIN. We shall endeavour to do so by repeating your discourse. But now inform us what you meant by saying that a legislator ought to look to friendship, liberty, and prudence.

GUEST. You shall now hear. There are as it were two mothers of politics, from which he who says that others are produced will speak rightly. It is necessary to call one of these a monarchy, but the other a democracy. The race of the Persians possesses the summit of the one, but that of the other is possessed by us. But all other forms of politics are nearly, as I have said, variously composed from these. It is proper, therefore, and necessary, that a city should participate of both these, if it is to be free, and friendly in conjunction with prudence. But this our discourse wishes to ordain, when
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it says, that a city can never be beautifully governed while it is destitute of these.

CLIN. For how can it?

GUEST. When, therefore, the one embraces monarchy, but the other liberty, more than is proper, neither will preserve the mediocrity of these. Your cities however, Laconia and Crete, possess it more than others. And this was the case with the Athenians and Persians formerly, but now they possess less of this mediocrity. But shall we discuss the causes of this, or not?

CLIN. Entirely so, if we wish to accomplish our proposed design.

GUEST. Let us hear therefore. The Persians under the reign of Cyrus, possessing more of the mediocrity of slavery and freedom, were in the first place themselves free; and in the next place they were the lords of many others. For the governors imparted liberty to the governed, and by leading them to equality the soldiers had a greater friendship for the commanders, and conducted themselves with alacrity in dangers. And if any one among them was prudent, and able to give advice, as the king was not envious, but permitted liberty of speech, and honoured those who were able to advise, he openly exhibited the common power of prudence. And at that time he gave them all things, through liberty, friendship, and a communion of intellect.

CLIN. It appears that the particulars which you have now mentioned thus subsisted at that time.

GUEST. How then came that government to be almost destroyed under the reign of Cambyfes, and again nearly restored under that of Darius? Are you willing that we should speak as if we used divination?

CLIN. Certainly; for this will contribute to our design.

GUEST. Respecting Cyrus, therefore, I thus divine; that in other particulars he was a good commander, and a lover of his country, but that he did not at all apply himself to right discipline, nor attend to œconomy.

CLIN. But why must we say so?

GUEST. He appears from his youth to have passed his life in the army, and to have committed the education of his sons to women. But these educated them as persons happy and blessed from their childhood, and as indigent of nothing. Hence, as being sufficiently happy, they forbade any
one

one to oppose them in any respect, and compelled every one to praise all their words and actions. After this manner were they educated by certain women.

CLIN. You speak, as it seems, of a fine education.

GUEST. Of a feminine one indeed, introduced by royal women, who became suddenly rich; and which took place during a scarcity of men, who through wars, and a multitude of dangers, had not leisure to attend to the education of youth.

CLIN. It is probable that this was the case.

GUEST. But the father of these children possessed cattle and sheep, and herds of men, and of many other animals; but he was ignorant that those to whom he was to leave all these, were not instructed in their paternal or Persian art (the Persians being shepherds, the offspring of a rough country, and the methods being hard by which they rendered the shepherds very strong, able to pass the night out of doors, to be vigilant, and to fight if there was occasion). But he suffered women and Median eunuchs to educate his sons, who corrupted discipline through what is called felicity. Hence they came to be such as it is likely those must be who are educated without reproof. The sons, therefore, on the death of Cyrus taking possession of the government, and being full of luxury and unacquainted with reproof, in the first place, one slew the other in consequence of indignantly bearing equality: and in the next place, Cambyfes, raging through intoxication and ignorance, destroyed the kingdom through the Medes, and a certain person who was then called the eunuch, and who despised his folly.

CLIN. These things also are reported; and it appears that they nearly happened in this manner.

GUEST. And it is likewise said, that the government came again to the Persians through Darius and seven others.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But let us behold, following the order of discourse. For Darius was neither the son of a king, nor educated in a luxurious manner. But coming to the government, and receiving it as the seventh, he divided it into seven parts, of which at present some small dreams remain. He likewise was of opinion that men should live under laws which contribute to a certain common equality; and made that distribution legitimate, which
Cyrus

Cyrus had promised the Persians; thus imparting friendship and communion to all the Persians, and alluring the vulgar among them by money and gifts. Being thus beloved by his soldiers, he subdued regions not less in number than Cyrus had left. After Darius, Xerxes reigned, who was again educated in a royal and luxurious manner. But, O Darius! we may, perhaps, most justly say you was not warned by the evil conduct of Cyrus, but educated Xerxes in the same manners in which Cyrus educated Cambyfes. He, therefore, as being the offspring of the same discipline, acted in a manner similar to Cambyfes. And, indeed, from this time scarcely any of the Persian kings were truly great, except in name. But the cause of this, according to my reasoning, was not fortune, but a vicious life, which the sons of those who were remarkably rich and tyrannical for the most part lived. For neither boy, nor man, nor old man, can ever become illustrious in virtue from such an education. And these are the things which we say should be considered by a legislator, and by us at present. But it is just, O Lacedæmonians, to confer this praise upon your city, that you never distribute any remarkable honour or nutriment to either a poor or rich man, to a king or a private person, which the oracle of some God has not from the first ordered you to distribute. For it is not proper that he who excels in riches, or swiftness, or beauty, or strength, without the possession of some virtue, should obtain the highest honours in a city; nor even if he possesses some virtue, if it is not attended with temperance.

CLIN. What do you mean by asserting this, O guest?

GUEST. Is not fortitude one part of virtue?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, judge, on hearing what I shall advance. Would you be pleased with any domestic or neighbour who was excessively brave, yet not temperate, but the contrary?

CLIN. Predict better things of me.

GUEST. But what? Would you be pleased with one who was an artist, and wise in things of this kind, but at the same time unjust?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But justice is never produced without temperance.

CLIN. How can it be otherwise?

GUEST. But neither did he who was just now considered by us as wise, because

cause he possessed pleasures and pains, according with and following right reason, become so without temperance.

CLIN. Certainly not.

GUEST. But, further still, we should also consider this, that we may behold how honours are properly or improperly distributed in cities.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. Whether temperance, if it subsists alone in the soul without every other virtue, can with justice become either honourable or dishonourable?

CLIN. I know not what to answer.

GUEST. You speak modestly. And I think you would reply, that in this case it would subsist inharmoniously.

CLIN. You have very properly answered for me.

GUEST. Be it so then. But the addition which we made use of, of honourable and dishonourable, did not deserve a reply, but ought rather to have been passed over in irrational silence.

CLIN. You appear to me to speak concerning temperance.

GUEST. I do. But that which is of more advantage to us than other things, if it is especially honoured with an addition, it will be most rightly honoured; that which is second in utility, when honoured in a secondary manner; and thus every thing will be properly honoured when it receives consequent honours in the order of succession.

CLIN. This will be the case.

GUEST. What then? Shall we not say that it is the province of the legislator to distribute these?

CLIN. And very much so.

GUEST. Are you willing that we should invest him with the power of distributing all things, both pertaining to every work, and to trifling particulars? And shall we not endeavour to give a triple division, since we also are in a certain respect desirous of laws; dividing things greatest, second, and third, apart from each other?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. We say then that a city, in order that it may be preserved, and may be happy to the utmost of human power, ought necessarily to distribute honours and dishonours in a proper manner.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Proper distribution, therefore, is this, to establish the goods pertaining to the soul, as the most excellent and first in rank, temperance at the same time being present with the soul: but as second in rank, things beautiful and good pertaining to the body; and in the third place, things pertaining to possessions and riches. If any legislator or city proceeds without these, and either causes riches to be honoured, or through honours renders something which is posterior, prior, they will act neither in a holy nor in a political manner. Shall these things be said by us, or how?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. A consideration of the Persian polity caused us to speak more copiously about these particulars. But we found that they became still worse; and we say that this was owing to their depriving the people of liberty in an immoderate degree. Likewise, by introducing the despotic more than was proper, they destroyed friendship and society in the city. But, these being corrupted, the deliberation of the rulers is not directed to the governed and the people, but to the advantage of their own government. Indeed, for the sake of a trifling benefit which might accrue to themselves, cities have been entirely subverted, and friendly nations destroyed by fire. Hence, hating in an hostile manner, and without pity, they are also hated. And when there is occasion for the people to fight for them, and they assemble for this purpose, they do not find in them a general consent to undergo danger, and fight with alacrity. But though they possess myriads, and indeed innumerable subjects, yet they are all useless for the purposes of war. Hence, as if they were in want of men, they procure some for hire; and thus think they shall be safe under the protection of mercenary and foreign soldiers. Besides all this, they are compelled to be unlearned, asserting seriously, that whatever is called honourable or beautiful in the city is a mere trifle when compared to silver and gold.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. But we have spoken sufficiently concerning the affairs of the Persians, which do not subsist in a proper manner, through excessive slavery and despotism.

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. But, after this, it is proper in a similar manner to discuss the Attic polity,

polity, that it may appear how perfect liberty, exempt from all government, is in no small degree worse than that which is moderately in subjection to others. For at that time in which the Persians invaded Greece, and perhaps nearly all Europe, our polity was antient, and we had certain governments composed of four divisions. A certain shame, too, at that time was a despot, through which we were then desirous to live in subjection to the laws. Besides this, the magnitude of that military force, which spread itself over the land and sea, produced an immense fear, and caused us to be in still greater subjection to the governors and laws then existing. And from these causes the highest degree of friendship subsisted between us. For nearly ten years before the naval battle in Salamis, Datis, being sent by Darius, led a Persian army against the Athenians and Eretrians in order to reduce them to slavery; Darius at the same time threatening him with death unless he enslaved these nations. Datis, therefore, in a very short time entirely subdued them with an innumerable multitude of forces; and a certain dreadful rumour reached our city, that not one of the Eretrians had escaped, but that the soldiers of Datis had bound the hands of the Eretrians together, and plundered all their city. This rumour, whether true or not, terrified both the other Greeks, and also the Athenians, who in consequence of this sending ambassadors to every part of Greece for the purpose of procuring assistance, no one aided them except the Lacedæmonians. And even they, indeed, whether they were hindered by being engaged in a war at that time against Messene, or by some other circumstance (for we are unacquainted with the true reason), did not come till one day after the battle at Marathon. After this, mighty preparations and innumerable threats of the king are said to have taken place. In the mean time Darius is said to have died, who was succeeded in the government by his son, at that time extremely young, and who in no respect abandoned his father's undertaking. But the Athenians were of opinion, that the whole of his preparation would be directed against them, on account of the battle at Marathon. And hearing that mount Athos was dug through, the Hellespont joined, and a great multitude of ships collected, they thought that there was no safety for them by land or by sea. For they were unwilling to confide in the assistance of any one, recollecting that, when on the first invasion of the Persians the Eretrians were vanquished, no one gave them assistance, or exposed themselves

to danger by fighting in their defence. But it appeared to them that the same thing would then take place by land. And again, when they looked to the sea, they saw that all safety was excluded there, since more than a thousand ships were coming against them. They perceived, therefore, only one mean of safety, and that was slender and dubious. For, looking back upon former transactions, and considering how they had fought without any prospect of success,—being borne along by this hope, they found their only refuge was in themselves and the Gods. This, therefore, united all of them in friendship with each other. I mean the fear which was then present, together with that which before this the laws had produced in those that were obedient to them. This in our former discourse we have frequently called shame, and to which we have said all those must be subservient who desire to become worthy characters. For he who is a slave to this is free and intrepid. Unless this fear, therefore, had been then present, they would never, collecting themselves together, have defended their temples, their tombs, and their country, together with their other familiars and friends, as at that time they defended them, but we should have been widely separated from each other.

MEGIL. And very much so, O guest. You likewise speak very properly, and in a manner becoming both yourself and your country.

GUEST. Be it so, O Megillus! For it is just to discourse with you about the particulars which happened at that time, because you retain the nature of your parents. But do you and Clinias consider whether we say any thing accommodated to legislation. For I do not discuss these things for the sake of fables: but behold on what account I speak. For, in a certain respect, the same thing happens to us which happened to the Persians: for they led the people to every kind of slavery; but we, on the contrary, invite the multitude to every kind of freedom. But how and what we shall speak respecting this affair, our former discourses after a manner beautifully demonstrate.

MEGIL. You speak well. But endeavour to signify to us in a still clearer manner what you have now said.

GUEST. Be it so. The people, O friends, with us, according to ancient laws, were not the lords of any thing, but after a manner they were voluntarily subservient to the laws.

MEGIL.

MEGIL. What laws do you speak of?

GUEST. Those which were then established about music, that we may show from the beginning how liberty came to be bestowed in an extreme degree. For then music was divided by us into certain species and figures; and one species of the ode consisted in prayers to the Gods, which are called by the name of hymns. But another species of the ode, contrary to this, may be said especially to consist in lamentations. Again, another species consists in pæons: another celebrates the generation of Bacchus, and is, I think, called dithyrambos: and another species is denominated laws pertaining to the harp. These, and some others, being established, it was not lawful to use one species of melody instead of another. But the authority of knowing these, and, at the same time, judging respecting them, and condemning them when improper, was not invested in the pipe, nor in the ignorant clamours of the multitude, as at present, nor yet in those who express their applause by clapping their hands,—but in men illustrious for their erudition, and who were permitted to hear to the end in silence. But boys, pædagogues, and the numerous vulgar, were admonished to behave orderly by a rod. These things being established in so orderly a manner, the multitude of citizens willingly submitted to be governed, and did not dare to judge in a tumultuous manner. But after this, in the course of time, the poets themselves became the leaders of this unlawful privation of the muse. These, indeed, naturally possessed the poetic genius, but were unskilled to a degree of folly in what is just and lawful respecting music. They likewise celebrated the orgies of Bacchus, and pursued pleasure more than was becoming. Besides this, they mingled lamentations with hymns, and pæons with dithyrambic compositions. They imitated with harps the sound of the pipe, and mingled all things with all, involuntarily deceiving through their ignorance of music. For they asserted that it did not possess any rectitude whatever; but that any one, whether he was a worthy or a worthless man, might judge with the greatest rectitude from the pleasure which it produced in the hearer. Composing, therefore, poems of this kind, and thus speaking publicly, they caused the multitude to act in an unlawful and daring manner with respect to music, by persuading them that they were sufficient judges of harmony. Hence theatres, from being silent, came to be noisy, as if capable of hearing what in the muses was beautiful, or the contrary:

and

and thus, instead of an aristocracy, a certain depraved theatrical dominion was produced. For, if only a democracy of free men had subsisted, nothing very dire would have taken place: but now, through music, an opinion came to us of the wisdom of all men in all things, and a transgression of law in conjunction with liberty followed. For they became intrepid, as if endued with knowledge; and this privation of fear produced impudence. For when the opinion of a more excellent person, through confidence, is not dreaded, this is nearly base impudence, and is produced from a certain liberty vehemently daring.

MEGIL. You speak most true.

GUEST. An unwillingness to become subservient to governors is the consequence of this liberty: and this is attended with a desertion of the service and admonitions of father, mother, and elders. After this follows, as now being near the consummation of the whole, disobedience to the laws. When arrived at this extremity, oaths and faith, and the cultivation of the divinities, are neglected. Hence they exhibit and imitate that antient Titanic nature, which is celebrated by poets; and again returning to the manners of that period, they lead a life involved in difficulties, and find no end to their evils. But on what account have these things been said by us? It appears to me that discourse, like a horse, should be restrained on every side, lest, having its mouth unbridled, and rushing onward, we should at length, according to the proverb, fall from an ass. It is proper therefore to ask, on what account these things have been said.

MEGIL. It is so.

GUEST. On what account, therefore, have we asserted these things?

MEGIL. On what account?

GUEST. We have said that a legislator ought to give laws regarding three things; that the city which receives his laws be free, friendly to itself, and endued with intellect. Was not this what we said?

MEGIL. Entirely so.

GUEST. For the sake of these things we adduced two species of government, one most despotic, and the other most free; and we have considered which of these was rightly administered. But, receiving a certain mediocrity in each, in the one of despotism, and in the other of liberty, we have seen that a prosperous condition of affairs will by these means be produced; but

that the contrary will be the case when each is carried to an extreme, the one of slavery, and the other of liberty.

MEGIL. You speak most true.

GUEST. But, for the sake of these things, we considered the nature of the Doric army, the roots of the Dardan mountains, and the maritime habitation. We likewise considered, on the same account, those first men who escaped the devastation of the deluge; and discoursed about music and intoxication, and things yet prior to these. For all these particulars have been discussed, for the purpose of perceiving how a city may be inhabited in the best manner, and how every private individual in it may lead the most excellent life. But if by all this we have accomplished any thing of consequence, what can be said against us, O Megillus and Clinias?

CLIN. I seem to myself, O guest, to perceive something. For it appears that we have fortunately discussed all these particulars. For I nearly am at present in want of them; and both you and Megillus here have very opportunely met with me. For I will not conceal from you that which has now happened to me, but I will make it serve as an omen. The greatest part of Crete, then, endeavours at present to establish a certain colony, and commits the management of it to the Cnossians. But the city of the Cnossians appoints me and nine others to manage this affair; and at the same time orders us to establish those laws which please us Cretans, and which may be collected from other nations. And if those of other nations shall appear to be better than our own, it enjoins us not to reject them because they are foreign. We shall now, therefore, bestow this favour both upon ourselves and you. For, making a selection out of what has been said, we shall establish a city in our discourse, and consider it from the first time of its being inhabited. For thus a consideration of the object of our inquiry will take place, and which at the same time may be useful to me in the establishment of my future city.

GUEST. You do not announce war, O guest. Unless, therefore, it should not be agreeable to Megillus, be persuaded that I shall give you every assistance in my power.

CLIN. You speak well.

MEGIL. You may likewise depend on my assistance.

GUEST. You both speak in the most becoming manner. Let us therefore endeavour, in the first place, to build a city in discourse.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

THE LAWS,

BOOK IV.

COME then, what kind of a city is it proper to think this should be? I do not now ask about its present or future name (for this, perhaps, may be owing to its colonization, or some particular place; or, perhaps, the surname of some river or fountain, or of the Gods there resident, may have given a denomination to the new city by its celebrity); but this is rather what I wish to ask concerning it, whether it is situated near the sea, or on the main land?

CLIN. The city, of which we are now speaking, O guest, is distant from the sea about eighty stadia.

GUEST. Are there any ports near it, or is it entirely without a port?

CLIN. It is furnished with ports, O guest, in the greatest possible degree.

GUEST. Strange! What do you say? But is this region likewise all-prolific, or is it indigent of some things?

CLIN. It is nearly indigent of nothing.

GUEST. Is any city situated near it?

CLIN. Not very much so; on which account it became colonized. For, an ancient expulsion of the inhabitants having taken place in this city, the country was rendered desolate for an immense space of time.

GUEST. But how is it circumstanced with respect to plains, mountains, and woods?

CLIN. It is similar to the whole of the rest of Crete.

GUEST. Do you mean to say that it is more rough than plain?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. It is not therefore incurably unfit for the acquisition of virtue. For, if it was situated near the sea, and abounded with ports, but was not all-prolific,

all-prolific, but indigent of many things, it would require for itself some mighty favour, and certain divine legislators, that it might be preserved from many various and depraved manners to which it would be naturally disposed. But now its distance of eighty stadia becomes its consolation. It is indeed situated nearer the sea than is becoming, on which account it abounds as you say with ports ; but, at the same time, this is a desirable circumstance. For the vicinity of the sea to this region renders it every day pleasant, though this proximity is in reality extremely salt and bitter. For, filling it with the desire of gain, through merchandize, it produces in the souls of the inhabitants craft and unfaithfulness ; and thus renders the city both unfaithful and unfriendly to itself, and in a similar manner to other nations. As a consolation, however, under these disadvantages, it possesses an all-prolific soil ; but, being rough, it is evident that it will not be abundantly, though it is all-prolific. For, if this were the case, in consequence of great exportation, it would again possess gold and silver coin in abundance ; a greater evil than which cannot, as I may say, exist, if one thing is compared with another, nor can any thing in a city be more adverse to the possession of generous and just manners, as, if we recollect, we said before.

CLIN. We do recollect ; and we allow that what was then and is now said is right.

GUEST. But what ? Does this region possess materials proper for building ships ?

CLIN. It has not any fir-trees which deserve to be mentioned, nor yet any pines. It likewise has not many cypress trees ; and very few plane- or pitch-producing trees are to be found in it, which shipwrights necessarily use in constructing the interior parts of ships.

GUEST. In this respect likewise the nature of the country is not badly disposed.

CLIN. How so ?

GUEST. Because it is good for a city to be incapable of easily imitating its enemies in base imitations.

CLIN. On account of which of the things that have been advanced do you speak in this manner ?

GUEST. Observe me, O divine man ! I am looking to that which was asserted in the beginning about the Cretan laws, which you said regarded one particular, viz. war ; but I said that such laws, because they were estab-

blished with a view to virtue, were well established; but because they regarded only a part, and not the whole of virtue, I did not altogether approve of them. Do you therefore observe me in the present business of legislation, and consider whether I legally establish any thing tending to virtue, or to any part of virtue. For it is with me a fundamental position, that he only establishes laws in a proper manner, who, like an archer, always directs his attention thither where alone something of the beautiful in conduct will always follow, but who leaves all other things, whether riches or any thing else of this kind, when they subsist without beautiful manners. But I call the imitation of enemies then vicious, when any one residing near the sea is injured by enemies, as in the following instance. For I will relate a circumstance to you, though not with any intention of calling to mind a past injury. Minos, in consequence of possessing great power by sea, imposed a heavy tribute on the Attic region. But the Athenians at that time had not ships of war as at present; nor did their country abound in wood well adapted for building ships. Hence they could not, through nautical imitation, becoming themselves sailors, immediately at that time defend themselves against their enemies. And they would have done better if they had often lost seven young men, instead of suffering that which happened to them. For, instead of fighting on land, and in a legal manner, in consequence of becoming sailors they were accustomed to leap running in close array into the ships, and again rapidly to abandon them; and appeared to themselves to act in no respect base, in not daring to die, and wait for the attacks of the enemy. But they had a plausible pretext at hand, asserting that, by throwing away their arms, they could not be accused of shameful flight. They say, that language of this kind came to be adopted in consequence of naval engagements; language by no means worthy of infinite praise, but the contrary. For it is never proper to be accustomed to base manners, and especially for the best part of the citizens. But it appears from Homer, that a conduct of this kind is not beautiful. For Ulysses reproves Agamemnon for exhorting the Greeks, who at that time were engaged in fight against the Trojans, to draw their ships to the sea. But Ulysses thus reproves him:

“ Is this a general’s voice, that calls to flight
While war hangs doubtful, while his soldiers fight ?

What

What more could Troy? What yet their fate denies
 Thou giv'st the foe: all Greece becomes their prize.
 No more the troops (our hoisted sails in view,
 Themselves abandon'd) shall the fight pursue;
 But thy ships flying, with despair shall see,
 And owe destruction to a prince like thee ¹."

Homer therefore knew that three-banked galleys prepared for flight were bad in naval engagements. For lions, by using manners of this kind, might be accustomed to fly from stags. Besides this, the naval powers of cities do not together with safety bestow honours on the most beautiful of war-like concerns. For, in consequence of naval affairs subsisting through piloting, the government of fifty men, and rowing, men of all-various descriptions and of no great worth being employed for these purposes, no one can bestow honours upon individuals in a proper manner. Though deprived of this, how can a polity be in a good condition?

CLIN. It is nearly impossible. But, O guest, we Cretans say that the naval battle at Salamis of the Greeks against the Barbarians preserved Greece.

GUEST. And, indeed, many both of the Greeks and Barbarians assert the same thing. But we, my friend, viz. I and Megillus here, say, that the pedestrian battle at Marathon and Plataeæ was the one the beginning, and the other the end, of safety to the Greeks. And, in short, that we may speak of the battles which at that time preserved us, some of them were advantageous, but others not so, to the Greeks. For to the battle at Salamis I add that at Artemisium. But now, looking to the virtue of a polity, let us consider the nature of the region, and the order of the laws; not thinking, with the vulgar, that to be preserved, and to exist, is alone to mankind the most honourable of all things, but to become and continue to be the most excellent characters during the whole period of their existence. And this I think has been said by us in the former part of our discourse.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We will therefore alone consider this, if we are in that path which is best for a city, respecting habitations, and the establishment of laws.

CLIN. And we are very much so.

GUEST. Inform me, therefore, as that which is consequent to these things,

¹ Iliad. lib. xiv.

who the people are that are to inhabit your colony; whether such as are willing from every part of Crete, so as that a great multitude will be collected from its several cities; or whether they are such as are chosen for the purpose of cultivating the land? For you do not collect such of the Greeks as are willing; though I see that some of you from Argos, and Ægina, and other parts of Greece, inhabit this region. But inform me at present whence you will derive this army of citizens.

CLIN. I think it will be procured from the whole of Crete. And it appears to me that those from Peloponnesus will be received for inhabitants, in preference to the other Greeks. For, what you said just now you said truly: I mean, that these are from Argos: for the race which is most celebrated here at present is Gortynic, because it migrated hither from the Peloponnesian Gortyna.

GUEST. This establishment of a colony, therefore, is not similarly easy to cities, since it does not take place after the manner of a swarm of bees, one race of friends proceeding from one region, and from friends, in order to form a settlement, being as it were besieged by a certain narrowness of land, or forced by other inconveniences of a similar nature. But it sometimes happens that a part of a city, being violently urged by seditions, is compelled to settle in some other place. And sometimes a whole city is forced to fly, in consequence of being vanquished in war. It is, therefore, partly easy for these to be colonized, and governed by laws, and partly difficult. For, when a colony is of one race, speaking the same language, and obeying the same laws, it is united by a certain friendship, and has a communion of priests, and every thing else of a similar kind; but it will not easily endure different laws, and a polity foreign to its own. But such a colony, having been forced to sedition through the badness of its laws, and still desiring through custom those pristine manners by which it was corrupted, becomes, in consequence of this, refractory and disobedient to its colonizer and legislator. But when a colony is composed of all-various tribes, it will perhaps be more willingly obedient to certain new laws; but to conspire together, and, like horses under one yoke, to blow as it is said the same blast, requires a long time, and is extremely difficult. But legislation and the establishment of cities are the most perfect of all things with respect to the virtue of men.

CLIN.

CLIN. It is probable ; but inform me in a yet clearer manner why you asserted this.

GUEST. O good man, I appear to myself, while praising and speculating about legislators, to have said something vile. But, if we have spoken opportunely, there will be no difficulty in the affair. Though, indeed, why should I be disturbed ? for nearly all human affairs appear to subsist in this manner.

CLIN. Of what are you speaking ?

GUEST. I was about to say, that no man ever at any time established laws, but that fortunes and all-various events, taking place in an all-various manner, gave us all our laws. For either war by its violence has subverted politics and changed laws, or the anxiety of severe poverty. Diseases also have caused many innovations ; and these have often been produced through pestilences, and unseasonable times enduring for many years. He who considers all these things will think it fit to exclaim, as I just now did, that no mortal ever established any laws, but that all human affairs are nearly governed by fortune. But he who asserts all this respecting navigation, piloting, medicine, and military command, will appear to speak well. This also may be properly asserted respecting these things.

CLIN. What ?

GUEST. That divinity, and, together with divinity, fortune and opportunity, govern all human affairs. But a third of a milder nature must be admitted,—I mean, that art ought to follow these. For I am of opinion, that it would make a great difference, during a storm, whether you possessed the pilot's art, or not. Or how do you say ?

CLIN. That it would.

GUEST. Will not the same consequence ensue in other things ? But, indeed, we must attribute the same thing to legislation ; that, other things concurring which are requisite to the living happily in a country, a legislator endued with truth ought not to be wanting to such a city.

CLIN. You speak most true.

GUEST. Ought not, therefore, he who possesses art in each of the above-mentioned particulars, to pray that something may be properly present with him through fortune, that he may not wholly trust to art ?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST.

GUEST. And would not all the rest that we have just now mentioned speak in this manner, if any one should call upon them to disclose their prayer?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And I think that a legislator also will do the same.

CLIN. So I think.

GUEST. Come then, legislator (for we will now address him), What, and after what manner, shall we give you a city, so that from the things which are left in it you may be able sufficiently to govern the city? What will he rightly assert after this? Shall we not say, that the legislator will thus speak?

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Thus. Give me a city governed by a tyrant, he will say. But let the tyrant be a young man, of a good memory, docile, brave, and naturally magnificent. And let that which, we said before, ought to follow all the parts of virtue, take place in the soul of the tyrant, in order that some advantage may be derived from other things being present.

CLIN. Our guest, O Megillus, appears to me to say that temperance should follow the other virtues. Is it not so?

GUEST. I speak, O Clinias, of popular temperance¹, and not of that which any one extolling would call prudence; but I mean that temperance which immediately and naturally blossoms forth in boys and savage animals, so that some are incontinent with respect to pleasures, but others continent. And this temperance, when subsisting separate from the multitude of things which are called good, I do not consider as worthy to be mentioned. Do you understand me?

CLIN. Perfectly.

GUEST. This nature, therefore, our tyrant must possess in addition to the other natures we have mentioned, if the city is to receive a polity, through which it may live most happily in the swiftest and best manner possible. For no disposition of a polity can ever be more rapid or more excellent than this.

¹ Plato here means that temperance which belongs to the physical virtues, or those virtues which we possess from our birth, and may be said to be the forerunners of the moral, political, cathartic, and theoretic virtues; for an account of which see the Notes to the Phædo.

CLIN.

CLIN. But how, O guest, and by what arguments, may any one who asserts this persuade himself that he speaks properly?

GUEST. It is easy to understand, O Clinias, that this is naturally so.

CLIN. How do you say? Do you not mean to assert, if the tyrant is a young man, temperate, docile, of a good memory, brave, magnificent, and fortunate?

GUEST. Add nothing else, except that he proves to be a legislator worthy of praise, and that a certain fortune leads him to this. For, this taking place, every thing will nearly be accomplished by a divine nature, which it brings to pass when it is willing that any city should be eminently prosperous. But this will happen in the second degree, when two such characters are the governors: in the third degree, when three: and the difficulty of a prosperous government will be increased in proportion to the number of such governors. But, on the contrary, the facility will be increased in proportion to the paucity of such governors.

CLIN. You appear to assert that the best city is produced from a tyranny, in conjunction with a most excellent legislator and a modest tyrant; and that it is easily and rapidly changed into the former from the latter: that the best city in the second degree is produced from an oligarchy; and in the third degree, from a democracy. Or how do you say?

GUEST. Not this, by any means. But that the first is produced from a tyranny; the second, from a royal polity¹; the third, from a certain democracy; and in the fourth place, an oligarchy² will be able to receive a generation of this kind with the utmost difficulty. For, in this mode of government, the powerful are very numerous. But we say that these things will then take place, when a true legislator, and who is naturally such, shall be found; and when a certain strength shall happen to him in common with those in the city, who are able to accomplish that which is of the greatest consequence. But where the governors are the fewest in number, and at the same time the most strong, as in a tyranny, there this mutation is accustomed to take place in a rapid and easy manner.

¹ According to Plato, a *royal polity* is produced when every thing is administered according to reason, and the supreme governor is the best of men.

² An oligarchy takes place when a few only, and those the worst, govern the city. See the Republic.

CLIN. How do you mean? For I do not understand you.

GUEST. And yet I think you have heard this, not once, but often. But perhaps you never saw a city under the dominion of a tyrant.

CLIN. Nor am I desirous of such a spectacle.

GUEST. But you may see that in it which we have just now spoken of.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That a tyrant who wishes to change the manners of a city has no occasion either of great labour, or a long time, for the accomplishment of his purpose. For, if he wishes to exhort the citizens to the study of virtue, it is necessary that he should be the first who proceeds in the road leading to it; but if to the contrary, he should first set them the example. For he ought to express all things in himself by acting; praising and honouring some things, but blaming others, and disgracing those who in their several actions are disobedient to his commands.

CLIN. How is it possible not to be of opinion that the other citizens will rapidly follow him who is endued with such persuasion and force?

GUEST. No one will be able to persuade us, O friends, that a city will change its laws swiftly and easily by any thing else than the command of its governors. For this does not happen at present by any other means, nor ever will. Indeed, this is neither difficult for us, nor impossible to be accomplished. But another thing is difficult to be accomplished, and rarely takes place in a long time; though, when it happens, it produces in the city in which it is found ten thousand advantages, and, indeed, every good.

CLIN. Of what are you speaking?

GUEST. When a divine love of temperate and just pursuits is inherent in certain mighty authorities, whether they govern according to a monarchy, according to transcendency in wealth, or nobility of race. Or when any one restores the nature of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in strength of speaking, and still more in the temperance of his life. This man, therefore, they say, was born in the Trojan times, but by no means in ours. If, then, such a man either formerly was, or will be, or at present subsists among us, he must himself live in a blessed manner, and those must be blessed who hear the words proceeding from his temperate mouth. In a similar manner we must reason respecting all power; as that, when the greatest power in a man falls into the same with acting prudently and temperately,

ately, then the generation of the best polity and the best laws is produced, but never otherwise. These things, therefore, which are spoken as if they were a certain fable, have been uttered in an oracular manner: and it has been shown, that it is partly difficult for a city to have good laws; and that partly, if what we have spoken of should take place, it would happen the most rapidly of all things, and in the shortest time.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us therefore now endeavour, adapting these things to your city, like old men to boys, to fashion laws in discourse.

CLIN. Let us endeavour to do this, and no longer delay.

GUEST. But let us invoke Divinity in constituting the city. And may he hear, and hearing be present with us, in a propitious and benevolent manner, adorning, in conjunction with us, the city and the laws!

CLIN. May he, therefore, come!

GUEST. But what kind of polity have we in our mind to impart to the city?

CLIN. Inform me yet more clearly what you wish to say; whether it is a certain democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or a royal government. For we do not think that you will speak of a tyranny.

GUEST. Come, then, which of you is willing first to answer me, and declare which of these is the government of his country?

MEGIL. Is it more just that I, who am the elder, should speak first?

CLIN. Perhaps so.

MEGIL. When I consider then, O guest, the polity in Lacedæmon, I cannot tell you what it ought to be called; for it appears to me to be similar to a tyranny. For the power of the ephori in it is wonderfully tyrannical. Though sometimes it appears to me to be the most similar of all cities to a democracy. But yet, again, not to say that it is an aristocracy is perfectly absurd. There is also a kingdom for life in it, and which is said to be the most ancient of all kingdoms, both by all men and by us. I therefore, being thus suddenly asked, cannot, as I have said, definitely inform you which of these polities it is.

CLIN. I too, O Megillus, appear to be affected in the same manner as yourself. For I am perfectly doubtful which of these I should call the polity in Cnossus.

GUEST. For you, O'most excellent men, truly participate of politics ; but those which are now so called are not politics, but habitations of cities, in which one part is subject to the dominion of another, and each is denominated from the power of the despot. But if a city ought to be denominated after this manner, it is fit that it should be called by the name of a divinity, who is the true ruler of those that are endued with intellect.

CLIN. But who is this God ?

GUEST. Shall we then for a little while make use of a fable, in order that we may unfold in a becoming manner the object of our inquiry ? Will it not be proper to do so ?

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. A long time then prior to those habitations of cities which we have before discussed, a certain government and habitation is said to have subsisted under Saturn ¹; a government extremely happy, and of which the present aristocracies are an imitation.

MEGIL. It is proper, as it appears, to attend to this vehemently.

GUEST. It appears so to me ; and on this account I have introduced it into our discourse.

MEGIL. It is well done : and you will act very properly by proceeding with the fable as far as is necessary to your design.

GUEST. I shall do as you say. We learn, then, from the report of the blessed life of the inhabitants of that time, that they possessed all things in abundance, and spontaneously produced ; of which the following is said to be the cause : Saturn, well knowing (as we have already observed) that no human nature, when endued with absolute dominion, is so sufficient to itself as not to be filled with insolence and injustice, in consequence of understanding this, placed over our cities, as kings and governors, not men, but dæmons of a more divine and excellent kind ; just as we do at present with flocks of sheep and herds of tame cattle. For we do not make oxen governors of oxen, nor goats of goats ; but we ourselves rule over them, as being of a better race. In a similar manner this God, who is a lover of mankind, placed over us the race of dæmons, as being more excellent than our species. But these taking care of our concerns, with great facility both

¹ Saturn is a deity with an intellectual characteristic.—See the Notes to the Cratylus.

to themselves and us, imparted to us peace and shame, liberty and abundance of justice, and rendered the human race exempt from sedition, and happy. This our present discourse, therefore, employing truth, asserts, that such cities as are not governed by a divinity, but by some mortal, will never be exempt from evils and labours: but it is of opinion that we ought, by all possible means, to imitate the life which is said to have been under Saturn; and that, being obedient to as much of immortality as is inherent in our nature, we should govern both publicly and privately our houses and cities, calling law the distribution of intellect. For, if one man, or a certain oligarchy, or democracy, possessing a soul aspiring after pleasures and desires, and requiring to be filled with these, but not being able to retain them, should be tormented with an insatiable vicious disease;—such a one, when governing either a city or an individual, would trample on the laws; and, as we just now said, under such a dominion there could be no possibility of obtaining safety. But it is necessary to consider, O Clinias, whether we ought to be persuaded by this discourse, or not.

CLIN. It is necessary that we should be persuaded.

GUEST. You understand, therefore, that they say there are as many species of laws as of politics. But we have already related how many species of politics there are said to be by the multitude. Nor should you think that our present inquiry is about something vile, but that it is about a thing of the greatest moment. For, to what the just and the unjust ought to look, again becomes to us a thing of an ambiguous nature. For they say that the laws ought not to look either to war, or to the whole of virtue, but rather to that which is advantageous to the subsistence of a polity, so that it may always govern, and never be dissolved: and they say that the definition of the just will thus be naturally beautiful.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Because it is advantageous to that which is more excellent.

CLIN. Speak yet more clearly.

GUEST. That which has dominion, say they, always establishes the laws in a city. Is not this what they say?

CLIN. You speak truly.

GUEST. Do you think, therefore, say they, that ever at any time, whether the people are victorious, or any other polity, or a tyranny, he who

establiſhes the laws will voluntarily eſtabliſh them, looking to any thing elſe in the firſt place than his own advantage, viz. the ſtability of his dominion ?

CLIN. For how ſhould he ?

GUEST. He, therefore, who tranſgreſſes theſe laws when eſtabliſhed, will be puniſhed by the legiſlator (who will denominate his laws juſt) as acting unjuſtly.

CLIN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. This, therefore, will always be the caſe, and in this manner the juſt will ſubſiſt.

CLIN. According to this doctrine it will be ſo.

GUEST. For this is one of thoſe iniquities which take place about government.

CLIN. What iniquities ?

GUEST. It is one of thoſe which we then conſidered when we diſcourſed about governors and the governed. And we then ſaid, that parents ought to rule over their progeny, the older over the younger, the noble over the ignoble ; and other things, in ſhort, ſome of which, if you remember, were a hindrance to others, among which this was one. We likewiſe mentioned that Pindar ſaid, it was both according to nature and juſt that the moſt powerful ſhould lead.

CLIN. Theſe things, indeed, were then ſaid.

GUEST. But conſider to what perſons our city ought to be committed. For a circumſtance of this kind takes place ten thouſand times in certain cities.

CLIN. Of what kind ?

GUEST. When a conteſt about dominion happens, thoſe who are victorious ſo vehemently uſurp the affairs of the city, as not to communicate any part of the government to the vanquiſhed, nor to their progeny ; always being careful leſt any one of theſe, if inveſted with authority, ſhould cauſe an inſurrection, through a remembrance of the evils which he had formerly ſuffered. At preſent, we doubtleſs ſay, thoſe are neither policies, nor upright laws, which are not eſtabliſhed in common for the ſake of the whole city. But thoſe who eſtabliſh theſe for the ſake of any parts of the city, we denominate ſeditious, but not citizens; and we ſay that the things

things which they call just are called so by them in vain. But these things are asserted by us on this account, because we shall not give your city any magistrate who is rich, or who possesses any thing else of this kind, such as strength or magnitude, or illustrious birth; but we shall give it one who will be most obedient to the legislator, and who will surpass all in the city in this respect. We likewise say that the greatest attention to the worship of the Gods must be attributed to the first in power; the second degree of attention to him who is second in authority; and that every thing consequent to this must be distributed in an orderly manner. But those that are called governors I have now denominated servants to the laws, not for the sake of innovation with respect to names, but because I think that the city will obtain safety from this more than from any thing; and that by neglecting it the contrary will take place. For I see that destruction hangs over that city in which law does not govern the magistrates, but magistrates the law. But in that city in which the law possesses absolute dominion over the governors, and the governors are slaves to the law, I behold safety, and such other goods as the Gods impart to cities.

CLIN. By Jupiter, it is so, O guest! For, through your age, you perceive acutely.

MEGIL. For every man, while he is young, perceives these things obtusely; but, when old, most acutely.

CLIN. Most true.

GUEST. But what is next to be done? Ought we not after this to consider the inhabitants of our city as having arrived, and being present, and to finish the remaining part of our discourse to them?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, thus address them: Divinity¹, O men, according

¹ Plato here, as it is well observed in the Greek Scholium on this place, by *Divinity*, means the Demiurgus of the universe; and, by the *antient saying*, appears to allude to these Orphic verses:

Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσση, διὸς δ' ἐν παντὶ τεύχεται.
Ζεὺς πρὸ βῆνι γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστεροεντός.

i. e. "Jupiter is the beginning and the middle; and all things were fabricated from Jupiter. Jupiter is the profundity of the earth, and of the starry heavens." He is the beginning, indeed,

cording to an antient saying, containing in himself the beginning, end, and middle of all things, bounds by a circular progression that which is direct according to nature. But justice always follows him, the punisher of those who desert the divine law, and which will be followed in a humble and composed manner by him who intends to be happy in future. But he who is elevated by arrogance, either because he excels in riches or honours, or in the form of his body, having his soul inflamed with insolence in addition to his youthfulness and privation of intellect, as one who is not in want either of a governor or a leader, but is himself sufficiently able to lead others,—such a one is left destitute of divinity. But being thus left destitute, and meeting with others similar to himself, he exults, at the same time causing a general confusion. And to many, indeed, he appears to be a person of consequence; but in no long time afterwards, suffering an unblameable punishment from justice, he entirely subverts himself, his house, and his country. Since these things, therefore, are thus disposed, what ought a prudent man to do, or to think, and from what ought he to abstain, both in action and thought?

CLIN. It is evident, that every man ought to think how he may be of the number of those who follow divinity.

GUEST. What action, therefore, is friendly to and attendant on divinity? One indeed, and which possesses an antient reason, is this, that the similar will be friendly to the similar which is moderate; but that the immoderate are neither friendly to each other nor to the moderate. But divinity, indeed, is in the most eminent degree the measure to us of all things, and much more, as it is said, than any man. He, therefore, who becomes friendly to a nature of this kind must necessarily become such to the utmost of his power. But, according to this reasoning, every temperate man is a friend to divinity, for he is similar to him. But the intemperate man is dissimilar, different, and unjust; and other things from the same

as the producing cause; but the end, as the final cause of the universe. He is the middle, as being equally present to all things, though all things participate him differently. But by *that which is direct according to nature*, Plato signifies desert according to justice, and undeviating energy, and as it were by one rule. And by a *circular progression*, he signifies the eternal, and that which is perpetually after the same manner, and according to the same; for circulation in sensibles possesses this property. See the Notes on the Cratylus, for a further account of Jupiter.
reasoning

reasoning will take place in a similar manner. But we should understand that which is consequent to these things, and which in my opinion is *the most beautiful*, and *THE MOST TRUE* ¹ of all assertions, that for a good man to sacrifice to and be conversant with the GODS, is of all things the most beautiful, the best, and the most useful to the possession of a happy life; and that, besides this, it is *in the highest degree becoming*; but the contraries of these things naturally happen to the vicious man. For the vicious man is unpurified in his soul, but the contrary character is pure. But to receive gifts from one who is defiled, can never become either a good man or a God. In vain, therefore, do the unholy bestow much labour about the Gods; but such labour is most opportune to all holy men. Such then is the scope which we ought to regard. What therefore shall we say the arrows are, and what the impulse by which they will be most properly directed? In the first place we must say, that he who after the Olympian Gods, and those who preside over the city, honours the terrestrial Gods, by attributing to them things even, secondary, and on the left hand, will in the most proper manner reach the mark of piety. But to the Gods superior to these he will attribute things according to the odd number, and dissonant to the particulars we have just now mentioned. But after these Gods a wise man will celebrate the orgies of dæmons, and after these of heroes. In the next place, statues must follow of the household Gods, which must be severally sacrificed to according to law. After these things, such honours as are lawful must be paid to living parents. For to these the first, greatest, and most antient of all debts are to be paid. For every one ought to think, that the whole of his possessions belongs to those by whom he was begotten and educated, and that he ought to supply their wants from these to the utmost of his power; beginning in the first place from his external possessions; in the second place, supplying them from those of his body; and, in the third place, from those of his soul: imparting all these, in order to discharge the debt which he owes his parents for the care they have be-

¹ This passage, among many others in the writings of Plato, sufficiently proves that philosopher to have been a firm believer in the religion of his country; and that he did not secretly despise it, as has been asserted with no less impudence than ignorance by certain sophistical priests, whose little soul (in the language of Julian) was indeed acute, but saw *nothing* with a vision healthy and sound.

flowed upon him, and the pangs of labour which his mother formerly endured on his account. He must support them too in old age, when they want assistance in the highest degree. It is likewise requisite through the whole of life to speak of our parents in the most honourable manner, because there is a most heavy punishment for light and winged words. For Nemesis, the angel of justice, is the inspector of all men in things of this kind. It is necessary, therefore, to be submissive to them when they are angry and full of rage, whether their anger shows itself in words or in deeds, as not being ignorant that a father may very properly be angry with his son, when he thinks that he has been injured by him. But, on the death of parents, the most decent and beautiful monuments are to be raised to them; not exceeding the usual magnitude, nor yet less than those which our ancestors erected for their parents. Every year, too, attention ought to be paid to the decoration of their tombs. They ought likewise to be continually remembered and revered—and this with a moderate expense, adapted to the condition of our fortune. By always acting, therefore, and living in this manner, we shall each of us be rewarded according to our deserts, both by the Gods and those natures superior to our own, and shall pass the greatest part of our life in good hope. But the course of the laws themselves will show in what manner we ought to behave towards our offspring, relations, friends, fellow-citizens, and strangers, so as to conduct ourselves piously towards all these, and render our life pleasant, and adorned according to law; and this it will accomplish, partly by persuading, and partly by punishing through violence and justice, such manners as will not submit to persuasion; and thus, through the favouring will of the Gods, will render our city blessed and happy. But what a legislator whose conceptions are the same as mine ought necessarily to say of these things, but which cannot be adapted to the form of law, it appears to me an example should be presented, both to the legislator and those to whom he gives laws; and that, having discussed what remains to the utmost of our ability, we should after this commence the thesis of laws. Such things, indeed, cannot be easily comprehended in one description, so as to explain the manner in which they subsist; but we may thus be able to assert something stable respecting them.

CLIN. Inform me how.

6

GUEST.

GUEST. I should wish them to be obedient to virtue : and it is evident that the legislator should endeavour to accomplish this in the whole of legislation.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What has been said, therefore, appears to me to contribute something to that end ; so that, if the soul of the hearer is not perfectly savage, it will attend with greater mildness and benevolence : hence, though we should not accomplish any great but a small matter, by rendering the hearer more benevolent, and by this means more docile, we ought to be perfectly satisfied. For facility is rare, nor is there an abundance of those who endeavour to become the most worthy characters in the greatest degree, and in the shortest time. But many proclaim Hesiod to be wise for asserting that the road to vice was smooth, and easy to be passed through, as being very short : “ but (says he) the immortal Gods have placed sweat before virtue, and the road which leads to it is long and arduous, and, at first, rough ; but, when we arrive at the summit, the path which before was difficult becomes easy ¹.”

CLIN. And it appears to be well said.

GUEST. Entirely so. But I am willing to explain to you the intention of my discourse.

CLIN. Explain it then.

GUEST. We will thus therefore direct our discourse to the legislator. Inform us, O legislator, whether, if you knew what we ought to do and say, you would not say so ?

CLIN. He necessarily would.

GUEST. Did we not a little before hear you saying, that a legislator ought not to suffer poets to say just what they pleased ? For they are ignorant that, when they assert any thing contrary to the laws, it will injure the city.

CLIN. You speak truly.

GUEST. But if we should thus speak to him respecting the poets, shall we have spoken moderately ?

CLIN. On what account do you ask this question ?

GUEST. There is an ancient saying, O legislator, which is common among

¹ Hesiod. Op. et Di. lib. i.

us, and is confirmed by all other nations, that a poet, when he sits on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right senses, but, like a fountain, readily pours forth the influx which he has received: and that, his art being imitative, he is often compelled, when representing men that are contrary to each other, to contradict himself; and does not know whether these things, or those, are true. But a legislator must not act in this manner in law, viz. he must not assert two different things about one thing, but always make one assertion about one thing. And you may perceive the truth of this from what you have just now said. For, since of sepulchres some exceed, others are deficient, and others are moderate, you, having chosen the last of these, have ordered them to be adopted, and have simply praised them. But I, if my wife was remarkably rich, and should order me to bury her, I would celebrate in a poem her magnificent sepulchre: but a parsimonious and poor man would praise a tomb which was, in some respect or other, deficient; and he who is moderately rich would praise a moderate sepulchre. But it is not proper that you should only speak of the moderate as you did just now, but that you should inform us what the moderate is, and how far it extends; for otherwise you will not as yet understand that a discourse of this kind is a law.

CLIN. You speak most true.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, will he who presides for us over the laws order nothing of this kind in the beginning of the laws, but immediately inform us what ought to be done, and what not, and, having appointed a fine, will turn himself to the establishing of another law, adding nothing of exhortation and persuasion to the promulgators of the laws? Just as different physicians cure in a different manner. But we will recall to our mind the methods which they employ; that, as boys entreat the physician to cure them in the gentlest manner, so we may implore the legislator to cure us by the mildest means. That I may explain, however, what I mean—we say that some are physicians, and others the servants of physicians; and these last we likewise call, in a certain respect, physicians. Do we not?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. And do we call them so, whether they are free, or servants, who, through the orders of their masters, have acquired the art of medicine, both according to theory and experience, but are not naturally physicians

cians like those who are free, who have both learnt the art from themselves, and instructed their children in it? Or do you consider these as forming two kinds of physicians?

CLIN. Why should I not?

GUEST. Do you, therefore, understand, that when in a city both servants and those who are free are sick, servants are for the most part cured by servants, who visit the multitude of the sick, and are diligently employed in the dispensaries; and this without either assigning or receiving any reason respecting the several diseases of the servants, but what they have found by experience to be efficacious they tyrannically prescribe for their patients, as if they possessed accurate knowledge; and thus, in an arrogant manner, hurry from one diseased servant to another; by this mean facilitating their master's attention to the sick? But the freeborn physician, for the most part, heals and considers the diseases of those who are freeborn; and this, by exploring the disease from the beginning, and proceeding according to nature; conversing both with the sick man and his friends, and, at the same time, learning something himself from the sick, and teaching him something, so as not to order him to do any thing till he has persuaded him of its propriety. But after this he always endeavours, in conjunction with persuasion, to lead him in a gentle manner to health. Which of these appears to be the better physician and exerciser, he who in this manner heals and exercises, or he who in that? He who accomplishes one power in a twofold manner, or he who accomplishes it in one way, and this the worse and more rustic of the two?

CLIN. The twofold method, O guest, is by far the more excellent.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that we should consider this twofold and simple method as taking place in the establishment of laws?

CLIN. How is it possible I should not be willing?

GUEST. Inform me then, by the Gods, what the first law will be which the legislator will establish. Will he not first of all adorn by his mandates the principle of the generation of cities?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But are not the mutual mixture and communion of marriages the principle of generation to all cities?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Nuptial laws, therefore, being first of all established, they will appear to be well established with respect to the rectitude of every city.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. We will, therefore, first of all speak of the simple law, which, perhaps, will subsist in the following manner. Every one should marry from thirty to thirty-five years of age; but he who did not should be fined both with money and disgrace; with money to a certain amount, and with disgrace of this or that particular kind. Let this then be the simple law respecting marriages; but let the following be the twofold law. Every one should marry from thirty to thirty-five, considering, at the same time, that the human race participates from a certain nature of immortality, of which every one is naturally desirous in the extreme. For the endeavour of mankind not to remain after death without a name is a desire of this kind. The human race, therefore, is something connate with the whole of time, following and being conjoined with it to the end, becoming immortal by leaving children of children, and participating of immortality through being one and the same by generation. For a man willingly to deprive himself of this, is by no means holy. But he intentionally deprives himself of this who neglects children and wife. He, therefore, who is persuaded by this law shall be liberated from the punishment of a fine. But he who is not obedient to it, and who is not married when he is thirty-five years of age, shall be fined every year a certain sum of money, that his solitary life may not appear to be profitable and pleasant to him; and that he may not partake of those honours which the younger in a city pay to the elder. These laws being compared with each other, it will be possible to judge of every particular law, whether it ought to be double, and of the smallest extension, on account of mingling threats with persuasions; or whether, alone employing threats, it should become simple in length.

MEGIL. Agreeably to the Laconic mode, O guest, the shorter ought always to be preferred. But if any one should order me to become a judge of these writings, I should, if it were left to my choice, adopt the longer law for a city. And according to this paradigm, if these two laws were proposed, I should choose the same respecting every law. It is, however, proper that the laws which we have now instituted should be approved by
Clinias;

as we now say. With respect to what remains, you appear to me to order that it should be led forth into light.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But, after these things, it is proper to discourse in common about our souls, bodies, and possessions, together with serious pursuits and remissions of labour, in such a manner that both the speaker and the hearers may, to the utmost of their power, be partakers of discipline. After what has been said, therefore, these things are to be truly spoken and heard by us.

CLIN. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK V.

LET every one then hear who has already heard what we have said respecting the Gods, and our dear progenitors. For, after the Gods, a man's soul is the most divine of all his possessions, as being his most intimate property. But a man's possessions are in every respect twofold. And the more excellent, and the better, possess dominion, but the inferior, and worse, are subject to command. The former, therefore, are always to be honoured before the latter. Hence, I properly exhort every man, when I say that he ought to honour his own soul in the second place, after our lords, the Gods, and their attendants. But, in short, no one honours his soul properly, though he appears to do so. For honour is, in a certain respect, a divine good: but nothing evil is honourable. He, therefore, who thinks that he enlarges his soul by certain discourses or gifts, when, at the same time, he does not render it better than it was before, appears indeed to honour it, but by no means does so. For every man, from his very childhood, thinks himself sufficient to know all things, and that he honours his soul by praising it, and by freely permitting it to do whatever it pleases. But we now say that he who acts in this manner injures, and does not honour, his soul. And yet it is necessary, as we have said, that it should be honoured in the second place after the Gods. Nor does he honour it who does not consider himself as the cause of his own errors, and of his numerous and mighty vices, but lays the blame upon others, and is always careful to exonerate himself. Such a one appears, indeed, to honour it, though this is far from being the case: for he injures it. Nor does he in any respect honour his soul who gratifies himself with pleasures contrary to reason, and the praise of the legislator: for he dishonours it, by filling it with vice and repentance. Nor yet does a man honour

honour his soul, when he does not strenuously endure labours that are praised, fear and pain, but sinks under them: for by doing all these things he dishonours his soul. Nor, again, does he honour his soul, who thinks that to live is a thing in every respect good: for by such a conception he dishonours it. For he assents to him who thinks that every thing in Hades pertaining to the soul is bad; nor does he oppose and teach him, that he is ignorant whether, on the contrary, the things about the Gods that dwell there are not the greatest of all goods. Nor yet, when any one honours a certain corporeal beauty before virtue, is it at all different from truly and entirely dishonouring the soul. For such a one falsely asserts, that the body is more honourable than the soul. For nothing earth-born is more honourable than things Olympian. But he who entertains an opinion different from this, respecting the soul, is ignorant that he neglects this admirable possession. Nor, again, does he adorn his soul with gifts, who desires to possess riches in an unbecoming manner, or who is not grieved when he possesses them unjustly; but such a one entirely fails of accomplishing this. For he gives up that which is honourable, and at the same time beautiful, in his soul, for the sake of a little gold; when at the same time all the gold, which is both upon and under the earth, is in no respect of equal worth with virtue. In short, he who is not willing, by all possible means, to abstain from such things as the legislator ranks among the base and vicious, and to pursue to the utmost of his power such things as he places among the good and beautiful, does not perceive that, in all these things, he renders his soul, which is a most divine possession, in the highest degree dishonourable and base. For, in short, no one considers what is the greatest punishment of evil conduct; which is the becoming similar to vicious men. But he who becomes similar to them avoids good men and good assertions, separates himself from the good, becomes agglutinated to the vicious, and earnestly desires their conversation. But, in consequence of intimately associating with these, he must necessarily do and suffer such things as they naturally do and say to each other. Such a passion, therefore, is not justice (for the just and justice are beautiful), but punishment; this being a passion attendant on injustice, of which both he who is a partaker, and he who does not partake, are miserable:—the one, because he is not cured; but the other, because, while many are saved, he perishes. But, that I may sum

up the whole, our honour consists in following things of a more excellent nature, and in rendering such things as are worse, but yet are capable of being made better, as good as possible. No possession, therefore, belonging to a man is more naturally adapted to fly from evil, and to investigate and choose that which is the best of all things, than soul; nor, when it has chosen, to associate with it in common for the remainder of life. On this account, it must be honoured in the second degree. But every one will understand, that the third honour according to nature is that of the body. It is however requisite to contemplate these honours, and to consider which of them are true, and which adulterated. And this is the business of a legislator. But he appears to me to announce, what, and what kind of honours these are; as, that the body is honourable, not when it is beautiful, or strong, or swift, nor yet when it is large or healthy, (though under these circumstances it appears to be so to many,) nor when it has the contraries of these. But those things which, being in the middle, touch upon the whole of this habit, are by far more moderate and safe. For the former render the soul arrogant and confident, but the latter humble and servile. The like takes place with respect to the possession of riches and property of every kind. For the possession of each of these, in a transcendent degree, produces hatred and sedition, both among cities and individuals. But slavery is for the most part the consequence of a deficiency of these. No one, therefore, should apply himself to the acquisition of wealth for the sake of his children, that he may leave them rich in the extreme: for this will neither be better for them, nor for the city. For the property of young men, which is neither attended with adulation, nor indigent of things necessary, is the most harmonious, and the best of all. For, symphonizing and harmonizing with us in all things, it renders our life free from pain. It is proper, therefore, to leave children, not abundance of gold, but of modesty. But we think that we shall accomplish this by reproofing impudent young men. This, however, is not to be accomplished by exhorting young men in the manner adopted at present,—I mean, by telling them that they ought to be modest in every thing; but a prudent legislator will rather advise old men to behave modestly before youth, and above all things to take care that no young man, at any time, either sees or hears them doing or saying any thing base. For, where old men are void of shame, there young
men

Clinias; for the city belongs to him for whose use these laws have been conceived by us.

CLIN. You speak well, O Megillus.

GUEST. To pay great attention, therefore, either to prolixity or brevity of writing is foolish in the extreme. For I think that the best writings, and not the longest or the shortest, are to be preferred. But, in the laws which we have just now spoken of, the one is not by the double alone more conducive to virtue than the other; but that which we said respecting the twofold kind of physicians was most properly adduced. This, however, no legislator appears at any time to have considered. For, as it is possible to use two things in the establishment of laws, viz. persuasion and force, they alone employ one of these in managing the crowd who are void of erudition. For they do not mingle persuasion with force, but alone employ unmingled violence. But I, O blessed man, perceive that a third thing also should take place respecting laws, but which is not at present adopted.

CLIN. Of what are you speaking?

GUEST. Of something arising, through a certain divinity, out of things which we have now discussed. For we began to speak about laws in the morning, and it is now noon; and, reposing in this all-beautiful retreat, we have discoursed of nothing else than laws. And we appear to me to have entered just now on the business of legislation; but all that has been said before by us was nothing more than a preface to laws. But to what purpose do we say this? It is because I wish to say, that of all discourses, and other things which participate of sound, that is the preface, and, as it were, prelude, which possesses any artificial argumentation, and is useful to the intended discussion. And, indeed, of the laws, as they are called, of the ode belonging to the harp, and of every muse, prefaces precede which are wonderfully elaborate. But of true laws, which we say are political, no one has ever at any time led forth into light a preface either spoken or written; as if there were not naturally any such thing. But our present conversation appears to me to signify that there is one. The laws, however, which we just now called twofold, are not simply so; but the law, and the preface of the law, are a certain two. However, that which we assimilated to a tyrannic mandate, and to the mandates of servile physicians, is mere, or unmingled, law. But that which was said prior to this, and was called persuasive, was
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in reality persuasive, but, with respect to discourse, had the power of a preface. For, that the mandate of the legislator, which is law, might be received more benignantly, and, through this, in a more docile manner, the whole of that discourse, which was calculated to persuade, was introduced by me. Hence, according to my decision, that discourse is a preface, and cannot properly be called a discussion of law. But, after this, what is it I am desirous should be said by me? It is this: that a legislator ought to introduce prefaces prior to all laws, and prior to each particular law, so far as they differ from each other, in the same respect as the two which we have just now mentioned.

CLIN. For my part, I should never exhort a man skilled in these things to establish laws in any other manner.

GUEST. You appear, therefore, to me, O Clinias, to speak well, so far as you say there should be a preface to all laws; and that, on commencing the business of legislation, it is requisite to prefer to every discourse an exordium naturally accommodated to the several laws. For that which is to be said after this is not a thing of small importance, nor is the difference trifling, whether such things are commemorated in a clear, or in an obscure, manner. If, therefore, we should order legislators to preface in a similar manner about great and small laws, we should not act properly. For this is not to be done either in every song or in every discourse; because, though it may naturally belong to all, yet it is not useful to all. A thing of this kind, however, is to be allowed the rhetorician, the singer, and the legislator.

CLIN. You appear to me to speak most true. But let us make no longer delay, but return to our proposed discourse, and begin, if it is agreeable to you, from those things which, not as prefacing, were asserted by you above. Again, therefore, as those that are engaged in sports say, let us revolve better things from a second beginning, as finishing a preface, and not a casual discourse, as was the case just now. Let us begin, then, acknowledging that we preface. And the particulars, indeed, respecting the honour of the Gods, and reverence of our ancestors, have been sufficiently discussed. Let us, therefore, endeavour to speak about what follows, till it shall appear to you that our preface is complete. And after this you may enter on the business of laws.

GUEST. About the Gods, therefore, and the attendants on the Gods, together with parents both when living and dead, we then sufficiently prefaced,

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men must necessarily be most impudent ; since the most excellent discipline, both of young and old, consists, not in admonishing, but in acting through the whole of life agreeably to the admonitions of others. But he who honours and venerates the whole of his kindred, who participate of the same blood, and the same household Gods, will deservedly find those Gods propitious to him in the procreation of children. And besides this, he will obtain the benevolence of his friends and associates through life, who consider the attention which they pay him greater and more venerable than they do, but his own kindness towards them less than they do. But he will by far behave in the best manner, both towards his country and fellow citizens, who prefers the glory of being subservient to the laws of his country, to conquest in the Olympian games, and to all warlike and peaceful contests ; and who is subservient to them in the most becoming manner through the whole of life. The associations, too, with strangers should be considered as things most holy. For nearly all the crimes of strangers towards strangers are more noticed by avenging Deity than those of citizens towards each other. For, a stranger being destitute both of companions and kindred is an object of greater commiseration both to men and Gods. He, therefore, who is more capable of taking vengeance is more readily disposed to give assistance. But the hospitable dæmon and divinity of every one, being the attendants of hospitable Jupiter, are capable of taking vengeance in the most eminent degree. Every one, therefore, who is endued with the least portion of consideration, should be very fearful through the whole of life of acting in an inhospitable manner. But, of all crimes which are committed both towards strangers and natives, those are the greatest which are committed towards suppliants. For the Divinity with whom the suppliant forms a covenant, becomes eminently the guardian of him in his affliction. So that no one who injures suppliants will go unpunished. And thus far we have nearly discussed the duties of children towards their parents, of a man towards himself, and the things belonging to himself ; likewise of his duty towards his country, friends, kindred, strangers, and fellow citizens. It now follows that we show what qualities a man ought to possess so as that he may pass through life in the most becoming manner ; and so that, not law, but praise and blame, instructing every one, they may by these means be rendered more benevolent and obedient to those who are about to establish laws. And these are the things

which after this must be subjects of our discourse. But *truth is the leader of every good both to Gods and men*: of which he who in futurity will be blessed and happy, must participate from the beginning, that for the greatest part of time he may pass through life in truth. For such a one is faithful. But he is unfaithful who is a friend to voluntary falsehood. And he who is a friend to involuntary falsehood is deprived of intellect: neither of which is an object of emulation. For he who is unfaithful and void of discipline is unfriendly. And in progress of time, his character being known, near the end of life there is prepared for him the grievous solitude of old age. So that, whether his associates and children live or not, he nearly leads, in either case, an orphan life. Indeed, he is honourable who acts in no respect unjustly: but he who does not suffer the unjust to act unjustly, deserves more than double the honour of the former character. For the former is of equal worth with one man, but the latter, with many men; since he announces to the governors the injustice of others. But he who punishes injustice, in conjunction with the governors, to the utmost of his power, such a one will be proclaimed a great and perfect man in the city; for he will be victorious in virtue. It is proper also to give the same praise to temperance and prudence. And he who possesses other goods, and is not only able to possess them himself, but to impart them to others, is to be honoured as one who has attained the summit of excellence. But he who is not able to accomplish this, and yet is willing, is to be ranked in the second place: and the envious man, and he who will not impart any good for the sake of friendship, are to be blamed. We ought not, however, to dishonour the possessor on account of the possessor, but should endeavour to obtain it with all our might. Every one too should contend with us for virtue, without envy. For every character of this kind enlarges cities, in consequence of striving himself, and not impeding others through calumny. But the envious man, while he thinks to surpass others by detraction, tends less himself to true virtue, and renders those who mutually tend to it despondent, by blaming them unjustly. Hence, depriving the city of strenuous exertions in the acquisition of virtue, he, at the same time, lessens its renown. It is proper, besides, that a man should be ardent in every thing, and particularly that he should be mild. For it is impossible to avoid the unjust actions of others, which are either difficult to be cured, or are entirely incurable by any other means than contest,

test, defence, victory, and by suffering no remission in punishment. But it is impossible for any soul to accomplish this without generous ardour.

With respect to such unjust actions as are curable, it is requisite to know, in the first place, that no unjust man is voluntarily unjust. For no one would, at any time, willingly possess any of the greatest evils, and much less in those things respecting himself which are most honourable. But soul, as we have said, is in reality in all things the most honourable. No one, therefore, would at any time voluntarily receive the greatest evil in that which is most honourable, and live through the whole of life possessing it. But the unjust man, and he who is vicious, are in every respect miserable. It is proper, however, to pity him who is capable of being cured, and to restrain our anger against him, lest, by an effeminate effervescence of anger, we should exhibit all the bitterness of wrath. But it is requisite to employ anger against those who are incontinently and incurably bad. Hence, we have said that every good man ought to be ardent, and at the same time mild. But an evil, which is the greatest of all evils, is implanted in the souls of many men, which (every one pardoning himself) they do not devise any means of avoiding. And this is what is usually said, that every man is naturally a friend to himself, and that it is proper a thing of this kind ought to be. But, *in reality, a vehement love of self is to every man the cause of all his errors.* For he who loves is blind with respect to the object of his love. So that he who thinks he ought always to be honoured in preference to truth, judges of things just, good, and beautiful, in a depraved manner. For it is proper that he who is destined to be a great man should neither love himself, nor the things pertaining to himself, but that he should love just actions, whether they are accomplished by himself or by another. In consequence of this error, every man's ignorance appears to himself to be wisdom. Hence, in short, though we do not know any thing, we are of opinion that we know all things. But, not permitting others to do that of which we ourselves are ignorant, we are compelled to err from their conduct. On this account every man ought to avoid the vehement love of himself, and to follow one better than himself, without paying any attention to shame. There are also certain lesser things, which are often said, and which, as they are not less useful than what has been already asserted, it is proper, recollecting ourselves, to mention. For, as if something was
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always flowing away from us, it is necessary that, on the contrary, there should be a perpetual influx of something. But recollection is an influx of prudence which had deserted us. It is proper, therefore, to restrain unbecoming laughter, and that every man should announce to every man the propriety of concealing all joy and sorrow, and of keeping the body in a becoming habit, whether the dæmon of any one establishes him in felicity, *or whether his fortune is such that he is obliged, with dæmons opposing him, to engage in actions of an elevated and arduous nature.* But it is proper always to hope for those things which divinity imparts to the good; and when we are oppressed with heavy labours, we should hope that Divinity will diminish their weight, and change the present condition of our circumstances into one more favourable; and with respect to good things, the contraries of these, that they will always be present with us, with good fortune. With these hopes every one ought to live, and with the recollection of all these things; not with a parsimonious recollection, but always, both seriously and in sport, perspicuously reminding each other and ourselves of these particulars. And now we have nearly said all that is proper respecting those divine duties which every one ought to perform, but we have not yet spoken concerning human duties. It is, however, necessary so to do: for we speak to men, and not to Gods. But pleasures, pains, and desires, are naturally in the highest degree human, from which it is necessary that the whole mortal animal should, with the greatest earnestness, be suspended. And it is requisite to praise the most becoming life, not only because in its form it excels in glory, but because, if any one is willing to taste of it, and not when a youth to fly from it, he will also excel in that which we all are in search of, I mean the possession of more joy than sorrow through the whole of life. That this will clearly be the case, if any one tastes of it in a proper manner, will readily and vehemently be apparent; but how this may be accomplished, and whether it is inherent in us naturally, or contrary to nature, it is requisite now to consider. We ought, however, to consider one life compared with another, the more pleasant and the more calamitous, in this manner. We wish that pleasure may be present with us, but we neither choose nor wish for pain. And we never wish for a middle condition instead of pleasure, but we desire it in preference to pain. We also wish for less pain with more pleasure, but we do not desire less pleasure with greater pain. But we can clearly show
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that we are unwilling to possess each of these in an equal manner. All these both differ and at the same time do not differ in multitude and magnitude, in intensity, equality, and such things as are contrary to all these, with respect to the choice of each. And as these particulars are thus circumstanced, we wish for that life in which many of both these greatly and vehemently subsist, but in which pleasures transcend; but we do not desire that life in which the contraries to these are inherent. Nor, again, do we wish for that life in which a few of these, of a trifling and solitary nature, subsist, and in which afflictive circumstances transcend; but we desire that life in which the contraries to these are found. However, as we have said before, we ought to consider that life as subsisting in an equilibrium, in which these possess equal power. For we desire the life which surpasses in the things with which we are pleased; and we are unwilling to possess that which exceeds in the contraries to these. But it is necessary to consider all our lives as naturally bound in these; and besides this, what the things are which we naturally desire. If, therefore, we should say that we wish for any thing besides these, we must say that it is through an ignorance and unskilfulness in lives. What then, and of what kind are those lives, in preferring which it is necessary that he who perceives what is the object of desire, and voluntary, and what are the contraries to these, should prescribe a law to himself, that thus having chosen that which is friendly, pleasant, the best, and the most beautiful, he may lead the most blessed life possible to man? We call then one life temperate, another prudent, another brave; and we rank in the fourth place a healthy life. We likewise establish four other lives contrary to these, viz. the imprudent, the timid, the intemperate, and the diseased. He, therefore, who knows what a temperate life is, will assert that it is mild in all things, and that it imparts quiet pains, quiet pleasures, placid desires, and loves not insane; but that an intemperate life is impetuous in all things, so that it imparts vehement pains, vehement pleasures, strenuous and furious desires, and the most insane loves. But in a temperate life the pleasures surpass the pains, and in an intemperate life the pleasures are surpassed by the pains, in magnitude, multitude, and density. Hence, the one of these lives is necessarily more pleasant to us, according to nature, but the other is more painful. And nature does not permit him, who wishes to live pleasantly, to live voluntarily in an intemperate manner. But it is evident,

evident, if what we have now asserted is right, that every intemperate man is necessarily unwillingly so. For the vulgar every where live indigent of temperance, either through the privation of discipline, or through incontinence, or through both. The same things are to be considered respecting a diseased and healthy life : as, that they possess pleasures and pains, but that the pleasures surpass the pains in a healthy life, but the pains the pleasures in diseases. Our will, however, in the choice of lives, does not consent that pain may transcend pleasure ; but we judge the life in which it is surpassed to be more pleasant. And we say that the temperate man possesses in every respect things fewer, less, and more attenuated than the intemperate, the prudent than the imprudent, the brave than the timid ; and that the one surpasses in pleasures, but the other in pains ; so that the brave man surpasses the timid in pleasures, and the prudent the imprudent. And, in short, the life which participates of virtue, either pertaining to the body or the soul, is more pleasant than the life which participates of depravity ; and besides this, it transcends other lives in beauty and rectitude, in virtue and glory ; so that he who possesses it lives more happily than he who possesses the contrary life, in every respect, and totally. Here then let the preface to laws end.

But, after the preface, it is necessary that law should follow ; or rather, according to truth, the laws of a polity are to be written. As, therefore, things which are woven are not all woven from the same threads, but there is a difference in the quality of the threads, for some are more firm and strong, but others softer and of a more yielding nature ; in like manner it is necessary to judge of those that have great dominion in cities, and those that act only in every thing from trifling discipline. There are, however, two forms of a polity : the one, the establishment of governors ; the other, that which gives laws to the governors themselves. But prior to all these things it is necessary to consider as follows : When a shepherd and herdsman, one who takes care of horses, and others of this kind, engage in their respective offices, they never attempt to take any care of them till they have first administered a purification adapted to each of them. And, besides this, choosing out the healthy and the sick, the noble and the ignoble, they send the former to other herds, but take care of the latter ; considering that otherwise their labour would be vain about those bodies and souls which a depraved nature
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and aliment have corrupted; since, without separating in each of these herds the healthy and diseased manners and bodies from each other, they would perish by contagion. The attention, however, which is paid to other animals is indeed less, and is alone worthy to be mentioned for the sake of an example. But the legislator ought to pay the greatest attention to men, and should investigate and assert that which is accommodated to every one, both respecting purification and all other actions. For that which concerns the purification of a city should subsist as follows: As there are many purifications, some of them are easy, but others difficult; and he who is both a tyrant and a legislator may be able to use such purifications as are difficult, and such as are the best. But the legislator who establishes a new polity and laws without the assistance of a tyrant, may rejoice, if he is able to purify with the mildest of purifications. The best purification is however painful; just as those medicines which unite justice with punishment, produce at length in the offending party either exile or death. For it is customary to free the city from those men who have perpetrated the greatest crimes, when they are found to be incurable, and have in the greatest degree injured the city; but with us the following is a milder purification. For those that through want of food readily offer themselves to certain leaders, in order to assault those that are not in want, these, as being naturally the disease of a city, should be benignantly sent away¹, under the honourable appellation of a colony. Every legislator, therefore, should do this in the beginning of his legislation. But more difficult things than these happen to us at present. For it is not necessary to devise at present either a colony or any select purification: but as if there was a conflux of water, partly from fountains and partly from torrents, into one lake, it is necessary to observe how the confluent water will be most pure; partly by drawing, partly by deducing it into another channel, and partly by diverting its course. But labour and danger, as it appears, are to be found in every political establishment. However, since we are now engaged in discourse, and not in action, our selection is accomplished, and purification

¹ The laws of Plato, being perfectly equitable, consider the good of the offender in the punishments which they enjoin, and not the good of the community alone; but our laws, especially in crimes pertaining to money, alone consider the good of the community. This is one among many of the baneful effects of commerce.

takes place according to our desire. For, having by every kind of persuasion, and for a sufficient length of time, examined those evil men who endeavour to enter our city in order to govern it, we shall forbid their entrance. But we shall admit the good, rendering them benevolent and propitious to the utmost of our power. The felicity, however, which has happened to us ought not to be concealed. For, as we say that the colony of the Heraclidæ was happy, because it escaped the dire and dangerous strife respecting the division of land and the discharge of debts, about which a city of the antients being compelled to give laws, it did not permit any thing to be immovable, nor yet after a manner was it possible for any thing to be moved; in like manner, the same thing appears nearly to have happened to us. But, in short, prayer alone remains, and a trifling mutation cautiously and slowly made in a great length of time; so that, in these mutations, the citizens, together with many debtors, will possess abundance of land, with which they will give assistance to many, humanely imparting their land to the indigent, and contenting themselves with moderate possessions. They will likewise consider poverty as consisting, not in a diminution of property, but in an insatiable desire of acquiring more. For this is the greatest beginning of safety to a city; and upon this, as a stable foundation, every politic ornament, which is accommodated to an establishment of this kind, may be raised. But when this mutation is debile, no political action will afterwards be easily accomplished by the city. This, indeed, as we have said, we should avoid; but, at the same time, it may more properly be said, that, if we do not avoid it, we should show by what means this flight may be accomplished. We say then, that it is to be accomplished by cultivating justice, and banishing the desire of gain: but, besides this, there is no other, either broad or narrow, passage for flight. Let this then be established by us as a prop of the city. For it is necessary that the possessions which the citizens prepare for themselves should be blameless; or, that those should desist from advancing any further in the acquisition of property, who have an antient enmity towards each other, and who participate but a small degree of intellect. But those to whom Divinity imparts, as it does to us at present, the establishment of a new city, in which the inhabitants have no enmity towards each other,—if through the distribution of land and habitations hatred should arise among them,—in this case it will not be human ignorance, but
 ignorance

ignorance accompanied with every vice. What then will be the mode of proper distribution? In the first place, the quantity of the number ought to be determined. In the next place, it should be agreed into how many and what kind of parts the distribution to the citizens should be made. In the third place, the land and habitations should be distributed equally, in the most eminent degree. But the quantity of the multitude cannot otherwise be properly assigned than by paying attention to the land and cities of the neighbouring inhabitants. And the land, indeed, should be as much as is sufficient to afford nutriment for so many moderate men; but of more than this there is no occasion. But the number of these moderate persons should be sufficient to defend themselves against the incursions of their unjust neighbours, and likewise to give assistance to their neighbours when injured. Having then considered these things, we may be able to define both actually and verbally the land and the neighbouring inhabitants. But now, for the sake of a scheme and description, that the thing itself may be accomplished, our discourse proceeds to legislation. The number of the husbandmen, and those that defend the distribution of the land, should be five thousand and forty, this being a number adapted for the purpose. In like manner the land and the habitation should be distributed into the same parts, so that the man and his portion of land may accord in distribution. And in the first place, indeed, the whole number should be divided into two parts, and afterwards into three. It is likewise naturally capable of a division into four, five, and so in succession as far as to ten. Thus much, indeed, ought to be understood by every legislator respecting numbers; I mean, that he should understand what, and what kind of number will be most useful to all cities. But we say that that number is best adapted for this purpose, which possesses in itself many distributions, and these orderly disposed. For every number is not allotted sections into all things. But the number five thousand and forty, both for the purposes of war and peace, for all conventions and communions, for tributes and distributions, cannot be cut into more than one of sixty parts; but you may continue the division of it from one as far as to ten. These things, however, ought to be more firmly considered at leisure, by those to whom they are committed by the law; for they cannot subsist otherwise than in this manner. But it is necessary that they should be mentioned to the founder of a city, for the sake of what

follows. For, whether any one establishes a new city from the beginning, or whether he restores an antient one that has perished,—if he is endued with intellect, he will not attempt to make any alterations in any thing which ought to be performed respecting the Gods, their temples, and their sacred concerns, or the names of certain Gods or dæmons, which ought to be given to temples; whether these ceremonies are derived from Delphi, or Dodona, or Ammon, or from certain antient discourses, by which some persons have been persuaded; or whether they have been the result of divine visions and inspiration. For, in consequence of being persuaded of their truth, the antients established sacrifices mixed with mystic ceremonies; whether these originated from the natives themselves, or whether they are of Tyrrhene, or Cyprian, or of any other origin. But, from these antient discourses and rumours, they consecrated statues, altars and temples, and placed each in a sacred grove. In all these the legislator should not make the smallest innovation; but should attribute to each of the parts, a God, a dæmon, or a certain hero. And in the distribution of the land, he should in the first place select a portion for illustrious groves and other sacred purposes, so that the inhabitants of each of the parts, assembling at stated times, may with facility prepare themselves for their respective employments, so as during the sacrifices to associate benevolently with and recognize each other. For *nothing is more advantageous to a city than for the citizens to be known to each other; since, where each has no light in the manners of each, but darkness¹, there neither honours nor governors are properly appointed, nor can any one obtain, in a becoming manner, the justice which is due to him.* But every man, one towards one, ought earnestly to endeavour in all cities, that he may never appear insincere to any one, but may be always artless and true, and that, being such, no other person may deceive him. But the throw which follows this, in the establishment of laws, like that of chefs-men, according to the proverb, from a temple, since it is unusual, may perhaps cause him who hears it at first to wonder. But to him who has reasoned upon, and tried it, it will appear that the city will thus, in the second place, be inhabited in the best manner. Some one, however, perhaps, will not approve of this city, because it does not employ a tyrannic legislator. It

¹ As in London, and all great modern cities.

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will, indeed, be most proper to speak of the best polity, and likewise of a second and third, and then leave it to every one's option to choose that which pleases him the most. We therefore shall act in this manner; and, after we have spoken of a polity which is first, of one which is second, and of another which is the third in virtue, we shall leave it to the option of Clinias, and any other who may be present at the selection of these, to attribute to his country whichever of them he pleases. The first city and polity, therefore, and the best laws, subsist there where through the whole city that antient proverb takes place in the most eminent degree, that all things are common among friends. This then must be asserted, whether it now is or ever was adopted, that women, children, and all possessions should be common; and that private property should by all possible means be exterminated from life. Things too which are private by nature should every where, as much as possible, become common; such as the eyes, the ears, and the hands. For seeing, hearing, and acting, should be employed for common advantage. In like manner, all men should praise and blame the same things, rejoice in and be afflicted with the same circumstances, and as much as possible adopt such laws as will unite the city in the most eminent degree. No one can establish any bound of virtue more transcendently proper than this. The inhabitants of such a city, whether they are Gods¹ or sons of the Gods, by living together in this manner, will lead a joyful life. On this account it is not proper to consider any other paradigm of a polity, but, inspecting this, we ought to explore such a one to the utmost of our power. But this, which is the subject of our present discussion, if it should subsist, would most nearly approach to immortality. And if it does not rank in the first, it certainly will in the second place. However, if Divinity is willing, we will after this discuss the polity, which is the third in order. Let us now then consider the nature of this polity, and how it may be established. In the first place, land and houses should be distributed to them, and they should not be suffered to cultivate the ground in common; since a thing of this kind is greater than their generation, nutrition, and education will admit. Land, however, and houses, should be distributed to

¹ Viz Gods according to similitude. For, as intellect is called a God by Plato, according to union, and soul according to participation, so the most exalted characters among men are called by him Gods according to similitude.

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them with this intention, that each may consider the portion allotted him, as common to the whole city. But, this region being their country, they ought to reverence it in a greater degree than children their mother; for, being a goddess, she is the sovereign mistress of mortals. The same should be our conceptions of the indigenous Gods and dæmons. But that these things may subsist in this manner, through the whole time, the following particulars are to be considered: As many Vestal hearths as are distributed to us at present, so many ought always to be distributed, and neither more nor fewer in number. But a thing of this kind will be firmly established in every city, if every one always leaves that child to whom he is most attached, the only heir of his allotted portion, his successor, and cultivator of the Gods, of his race, his country, of the living, and the dead. But those who have more children than one should for this purpose portion the females according to the established law; but commit the males to the care of those citizens that have no children of their own, and this in a very benevolent manner. However, if benevolence is wanting, or each of the citizens has a numerous progeny of male or female children, or on the contrary but a few children, owing to the barrenness of the women, then that greatest and most honourable governor whom we have established, must consider what is proper to be done in either of these cases, and, whether there is an abundance or a defect of children, must devise some method by which five thousand and forty habitations alone may always remain. But there are many methods by which this may be accomplished. For procreation may be restrained, which is the cause of this abundance; and, on the contrary, by diligent attention, an increase of offspring may be obtained, when it is requisite. For what we are speaking of may be accomplished by honour and disgrace, and by the admonitory discourses of the old to the young. Lastly, every defect arises from the number of five thousand and forty houses not being preserved. But, if our city should have a superabundance of citizens, through the familiarity of those that dwell together, and by this means it should be oppressed with poverty, that ancient device must be adopted which we have often mentioned, that a friendly colony should be sent from friends; for it appears that this will be advantageous to the city. But if, on the contrary, at any time an inundation of diseases, or the ravages of war, should reduce the citizens to a less than the established number, such

citizens as have been educated in an adulterated manner are not to be voluntarily admitted to supply the place of those that are wanting. But it is said that even Divinity is not able to force necessity. We should say, therefore, that our present discourse speaks in an exhortatory manner as follows: O best of all men, who honour according to nature similitude and equality, fameness, and general consent, never relax in honouring these, both according to the number, and all the power of things beautiful and good. And, in the first place, preserve through the whole of life the above-mentioned number. In the next place, do not despise the moderate elevation and magnitude of the possessions which were first distributed to you, by buying and selling with each other. For, if you act in this manner, neither Divinity, the distributor of your allotted portion, nor the legislator will be your associate in war. For now the law announces in the first place, that he who is willing to receive the allotted portion shall receive it, but that he who is unwilling shall be deprived of it: and this, because in the first place the land is sacred to all the Gods; and in the next place, because the priests and priestesses pray during the first, second, and third sacrifices, that both the buyers and sellers of allotted houses and lands may be properly disposed in such transactions. But they should write on cypress monuments in temples, for the benefit of posterity. And besides this, for the purpose of preserving these, they should commit them to the care of that magistrate who appears to have the most acute vision, that those may be detected who act fraudulently, and that he who is disobedient both to law and divinity may be punished. But, according to the proverb, no vicious man will ever understand how much all cities will be benefited by acting in the manner we have prescribed, but he only who is skilful and of equitable manners. In this city there is no ardent pursuit of gain; nor is it lawful for any one to apply himself to the acquisition of illiberal wealth, because the disgraceful mechanic art, as it is called, which is employed for this purpose, subverts liberal manners. Riches, therefore, are not to be accumulated by any such means. Besides this, another law follows all these, which forbids any private person the possession of either silver or gold. But because there is daily occasion for money for the sake of commutation, which is nearly necessary to artificers, and to all those that have similar wants, in order to pay the wages of mercenaries, servants, and husbandmen—for the sake of these things

things we permit the use of money in the city, but order it to be such as may be honoured by our citizens, but despised by other men. For the sake of war, indeed, and travelling to other countries, as when ambassadors are sent to foreign nations, or for some other necessary purpose, the city should possess a quantity of the common coin of Greece. But when any necessity obliges a private person to leave the city, having begged permission of the magistrates, he shall be suffered to depart; but the foreign coin, which he possesses on his return, he shall change for that of his own country. And if any one is detected converting the money of another city to his own private use, such money shall become public property. He who has been an eye witness of such conduct, but has not divulged it, shall be disgraced, and pay the same fine as he who endeavoured to enrich himself with foreign coin. Besides, no one shall be permitted to give or receive a marriage portion, nor to deposit money with a man who cannot be trusted, nor to put money out to use. And it shall be lawful for him with whom money is deposited at interest, to pay neither interest nor principal. That a conduct of this kind is best for a city, will be rightly judged by him who always refers these particulars to the intention of the legislator. But we say that the intention of a politician who is endued with intellect, is not that which the multitude say is the intention of a good legislator,—I mean, that the city may be greater and richer than others, and that it may for the most part have dominion over the land and sea. To which they add, that he who establishes laws properly, ought to wish that the city may be the best, and the most happy. But of these, some are capable of taking place, but others not. The legislator, therefore, will wish that the possible, but he will not wish that the impossible, may take place. For in the latter case his wish would be vain; neither, therefore, would he attempt it. For it is nearly necessary that they should be happy, and at the same time worthy. This then will be the object of his wish. But it is impossible that they should be rich in the extreme, and at the same time good; I mean rich in the vulgar acceptance of the word. For the vulgar call those rich, who being few in number possess a great quantity of money, which even a bad man may possess. If this be the case, I should never grant them, that a rich man, who is not at the same time worthy, can be truly happy. But I assert that it is impossible a man can be at the same time eminently good, and eminently rich. Some
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one, however, may perhaps say, Why not? Because we say, The possession which is obtained both from just and unjust conduct is more than double of that which is alone justly obtained; and that the expenses which are neither becoming nor base are doubly less than those which are becoming, and which are performed in a becoming manner. He, therefore, who acts in a contrary manner will never be richer than him who acquires more than double, and spends less than half. But of these, the one is worthy, but the other not worthy, because he is parsimonious. Sometimes, indeed, this latter character is perfectly vicious; but, as we have just now said, is never good. For he who receives both justly and unjustly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, is indeed rich, because he is parsimonious: but he who is perfectly vicious, as being for the most part prodigal, is extremely poor. And he who spends in a becoming manner, and alone acquires justly, will never at any time become remarkably rich, nor yet excessively poor; so that our assertion is right, that very rich are not good men. But, if they are not good, they are not happy. With us, however, the establishment of laws looks to this, that the citizens may become most happy, and in the highest degree friends to each other. But the citizens will never be friends where there is much judicial controversy and unjust transactions with each other, but where the least of these is found. We have said too, that there ought to be neither gold nor silver in the city, nor yet an anxious pursuit of gain through mechanical arts and usury, or base cattle, but that wealth should be acquired from such things as agriculture imparts and affords; yet in such a manner, as that it may not compel the citizens to neglect those things for the sake of which riches are desired: but these are the soul and body, which without gymnastic and the other disciplines will never be of any worth. On this account, we have said more than once, that an attention to money ought to be honoured in the last place. For, since all the concerns in which every man is seriously engaged are three, an attention to riches properly ranks in the last and third place: but the concerns of the body possess the middle; and those of the soul the first place. And, indeed, the polity which we are now considering will be governed by proper laws, if it distributes honours in this manner. But if any one of the laws which are established in it shall appear to prefer the health of the body to temperance, or riches to both health and temperance, it will appear to be improperly established. A legislator, therefore,

ought often to signify his intention to the people in this manner : I am desirous that this particular thing should take place, which if it does, my intentions will succeed ; but if it does not, they will be rendered frustrate. And thus, perhaps, he might both liberate himself and others from the burthen of legislation ; but never by any other means. He, therefore, who receives an allotted portion should possess it on the conditions we have mentioned. But this will take place in a becoming manner, when each person who becomes an inhabitant of the colony possesses every thing else equally. Since, however, this is not possible, but one coming to settle in it will possess more money, and another less, it is requisite, for the sake of many advantages, and of equality in the city, that property should be unequally possessed : that, in consequence of each receiving magistracies, tributes, and distributions, according to the honour annexed to each, and not according to his own virtue only, and that of his ancestors, nor yet according to the strength or beauty of his body, but receiving these equalized as much as possible, viz. unequally, but commensurably distributed, they may not disagree with each other. For the sake of these things, it is requisite that there should be four divisions in magnitude of possessions ; and that these should be called first, second, third, and fourth divisions, or should receive some other appellations : so that, both when they remain in possession of the same property, and when they become most rich from being poor, or poor from being rich, each may pass to the possession of property accommodated to each. For this purpose, I shall lay down the following scheme of law :

We say, that in a city which in future is to be void of that greatest disease, which may be more properly called discord, or sedition, none of the citizens should either be extremely poor, or extremely rich : for both these produce both. It is therefore now requisite that a legislator should say what is the bound of each. Let, then, the bound of poverty be the honour of the allotted distribution, which ought to be stable, and which no magistrate, nor any one who loves honour for the sake of virtue, will ever suffer to become less to any one. The legislator, establishing the measure of these distributions, will permit the double, triple, and quadruple of this to be possessed. But, if any one possesses more than these, whether they are found, or bestowed, or procured by mechanical arts, or possessed by any other such like fortune,—if he imparts what remains to the city, and to the Gods, the guardians of the

city, he will act in a blameless and laudable manner. But he who accuses one that is not obedient to this law shall obtain the half of his possessions; and, at the same time, the half of the accuser's property shall be dedicated to the Gods. An account too shall be openly given, in writing, of all such property as surpasses the allotted portion, to the magistrates who are appointed guardians by law, that all the judgments respecting riches may be easy and extremely clear. In the next place, the city ought to be built as much as possible in the middle of the country, and in a place possessing other things accommodated to the city, which it is not difficult to understand and relate. After this, it should be divided into twelve¹ parts, the temple of Vesta, Jupiter, and Minerva, being first of all raised under the appellation of the Acropolis, or tower of the city. This temple should be circularly enclosed; and from this enclosure, the city and all the region should be divided into twelve parts. But the twelve parts ought to be equalized in such a manner, that the portion of the prolific land may be small, but that of the unprolific great: and the allotted portions should be five thousand and forty. Again, each of these should receive a twofold division. The two divisions, likewise, should be associated allotments, and each should participate of the near and remote distributions, viz. the division near the city should communicate with that which is situated in its extremity; that which is at the second distance from the city, with that which is the second from its extremity; and after this manner with all the rest. It should likewise be so contrived in the twofold divisions of which we are now speaking, respecting the fecundity and barrenness of the region, that there should be an equality of distribution in multitude and paucity. It is likewise necessary that the streets should be divided into twelve parts, and, indeed, every other possession, equality being preserved in the greatest degree, and a description made of every particular. After this, the twelve allotments should be attributed to the twelve Gods; each allotted portion being denominated after, and consecrated to, its presiding deity, and called a tribe. The twelve sections too of the city ought to be divided in the same manner as the rest of the region, viz. so that each section shall have two habitations, one near the middle, and the other near

¹ The reason why Plato adopts this division is, because the number 12 is an image of all-perfect progression, being composed from the multiplication of 3 by 4, both which numbers, according to the Pythagoreans, are images of perfection.

the extremity. And thus much respecting the habitations. This, however, we ought by all means to consider, that all the particulars which we have just now spoken of will never so opportunely concur as they have happened to do in our discourse; and that the inhabitants will not be indignant at living together in this manner, but will be satisfied with their allotted and moderate portion of wealth through the whole of life. The procreation too of children will take place with each in the manner we have mentioned: and they will be deprived of silver and gold, and other things, which it is evident, from what has been said, the legislator will forbid. Besides this, the habitations will be circularly enclosed in the middle of the city and the region, as we have mentioned above. All which particulars have nearly been asserted by us as dreams: and we have fashioned, as it were, from wax a certain city and citizens. But these particulars in a certain respect have not been badly asserted. It is now proper, therefore, to attend to the legislator, addressing us in the following manner:—You must not consider me, O friends, as ignorant that what has been now said has been after a manner truly asserted. But I think it will be most just in each of the following particulars, that he who exhibits a paradigm, according to whose similitude that which he wishes to accomplish should be formed, ought not to omit any thing which is most beautiful and true. And he to whom it is impossible something of these should happen, should desist from attempting to accomplish this; but he should devise some means by which he may produce that which is most proximate and allied to these; and should permit the legislator to bring his wish to an end. This being done, he should consider, in common with him, which of the abovementioned particulars contributes, and which is adverse, to legislation. For even an artificer of the most trifling thing ought every where to produce a work in consent with itself, if he wishes to obtain praise for its execution. But now, after the distribution of the twelve parts, we should consider, that since these twelve parts contain in themselves many distributions, and things consequent to, and produced from, these, as far as to five thousand and forty; whence they possess tribes, and towns, and streets, warlike orders and discipline, money, dry and wet measures, and weights;—all these the law should establish commensurate and according with each other. Besides this, we ought not to fear lest we should be thought to bestow too much attention on things of a trifling nature, when we order
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that no one shall possess furniture of any kind which is destitute of the proper measure, and consider the divisions and varieties of the numbers as useful to all things; to such particulars as are various in themselves, and such as receive a variety in length and depth, or in sounds and motions, whether the motions are upwards and downwards, in a right line, or circular. For the legislator, looking to all these, should enjoin all the citizens to preserve this order to the utmost of their power. For no one discipline belonging to youth possesses such a mighty power, in æconomies, politics, and all arts, as the study of numbers. And that which is greatest of all is, that this discipline excites even the sleepy, and those that are naturally rustic, and renders them docile, of a good memory, and sagacious; benefiting them, by a divine art, beyond what their own nature is able to accomplish. All which things, when they are possessed sufficiently and usefully, illiberality and avarice being extirpated from the mind of their possessor, become beautiful and properly adapted studies: but, when these are not extirpated, instead of wisdom they secretly produce that which is called craft; as we see at present is the case with the Egyptians, Phœnicians, and many other nations, through the illiberality of their pursuits and possessions; whether things of this kind were occasioned by a depraved legislator, or by adverse fortune, or by any other similar nature. For, O Megillus and Clinias, this ought not to be concealed from us, that there is a great difference in places¹, with respect to producing men of a more or less excellent character; and that laws should be established accommodated to such places. For some places, through all-various winds and

¹ It is well observed by Proclus, "that a change is produced in different nations from the places themselves which each inhabits; from the temperament of the air, and from habitude to the heavens; and still more partially from spermatie reasons. But they most especially differ according to the gregarious government of the Gods, and the diversities of inspective guardians; through which (says he) you will find colours, figures, voices, and motions changed in different places. Hence emigrants often change their colour and their voice, when they settle in other countries; just as plants are changed with the quality of the region, if they happen to be transplanted into a foreign land." Δει γινώσκειν ὅτι τοῖς διαφοροῖς ἐθνεσὶν ἡ ἐξάλλαξις γίνεται μὲν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς τοποὺς αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐκάστα κατοικεῖ, καὶ παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἀέρων κρατεῖς, καὶ παρὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν σχέσιν, καὶ ἐτι μερικώτερον, εἰ βουλεῖ, παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικὸν λόγους· πολὺ δ' ἀνμειλίστα διαφέρειν εἰσὶς αὐτὰ, κατὰ τὴν ἀγγελοσκομικὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπιστάσιν, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐφεσῶν διαφοροτήτας, παρ' ἅς καὶ χρωματὰ, καὶ σχηματὰ, καὶ φωνὰς, καὶ κινήσεις ἐξαλλαττομένης εὐροῖς ἀν ἐν τοῖς διαφοροῖς τοποῖς, ὥς τε καὶ τοὺς ἀποικοῦς πολλὰκις μεταβάλλειν, τὸ τε χρῶμα καὶ τὴν φωνήν, ὅταν εἰς ἄλλους ἀφικῶνται τοποὺς· καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ τῇ ποιότητι τῆς χώρας συμμεταβάλλονται, καὶ εἰς ἀλλοτρίας γῆν μεταβλήντα τυγχάνῃ. Procl. in Tim. p. 31.

forms, are inhabited with difficulty ; others through water ; others through nutriment from the earth, which not only imparts to bodies food of a more and less excellent nature, but is no less able to accomplish this, with respect to souls. But those places in a country possess the greatest difference, in which there are a certain divine inspiration, and allotments of dæmons who are either always propitious to the inhabitants, or the contrary. Which things the legislator, who is endued with intellect, considering as much as it is possible for man to speculate things of this kind, will thus endeavour to establish laws. And this must be done by you, O Clinias ! for, before you cause the city to be inhabited, you must direct your attention to these particulars.

CLIN. But, O Athenian guest ! you speak in an all-beautiful manner : and, therefore, this must be done by me.

END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK VI.

AFTER all that has now been said, the next thing that remains for you to do will be the establishment of magistrates in the city.

CLIN. It will so.

GUEST. These two species are found to subsist respecting the ornament of a polity. In the first place, the establishment of magistrates, how many there ought to be, and in what manner they ought to be appointed. In the next place with respect to the laws, which are to be given to the several magistrates, what, how many, and what kind will be accommodated to each. But, previous to choosing the magistrates, let us mention some particulars pertaining to the election of them.

CLIN. What particulars are these?

GUEST. These. It must be perfectly evident that, since legislation is a great work, he who does not appoint proper magistrates in a well regulated city, though the laws are well established, will find no advantage derived from them, but abundance of ridicule; and such a one will be the mean of oppressing the city with the most weighty injuries and calamities.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We will therefore consider this, as now happening to you, O friend, respecting this polity and city. For you see it is necessary, that those who undertake in a proper manner the office of magistrates should from their youth have been sufficiently tried, as likewise their race, till the time of election. In the next place, that those who are to choose the magistrates should be educated in legitimate manners, so that they may be able to judge in a proper manner, who should be admitted, and who rejected. But with respect

respect to those that have recently met together, as they are unacquainted with each other, and, besides this, are void of erudition, how can they ever be able to choose magistrates in a blameless manner?

CLIN. They nearly never will be able.

GUEST. But the contest, as they say, does not easily admit of excuses. This then must now be accomplished both by you and me; since you have willingly undertaken the office of establishing a city for the Cretans, and are, as you say, the tenth in this employment; and I have promised to assist you in the present fabulous narration. I shall not therefore willingly leave this discourse without a head. For, wandering every where in this condition, it would appear deformed.

CLIN. You have spoken most excellently, O guest.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, accomplish this to the utmost of our power.

CLIN. Let us, indeed, do by all means as we have said.

GUEST. Be it so, if Divinity is willing, that in this respect we may vanquish old age.

CLIN. But it is reasonable to suppose that he is willing.

GUEST. It is reasonable. Following him, therefore, let us attend to this.

CLIN. To what?

GUEST. In how bold, and at the same time dangerous, a manner our city will at present be established.

CLIN. To what circumstance adverting do you thus speak?

GUEST. To the easy and intrepid manner in which we have given laws to unskilful men, and have ordered them to receive such laws. Thus much, indeed, O Clinias, is nearly perfectly evident, even to one who is not very wise, that no one will easily admit these laws at first. But if we wait so long till boys tasting of, and being sufficiently disciplined in, the laws, and accustomed to them, are able to give their votes in conjunction with the whole city, and this by a certain manner and device is properly accomplished, I then should think that a city so disciplined would remain after the present time abundantly secure.

CLIN. It is reasonable to suppose this will be the case.

GUEST. Let us consider, therefore, whether we can afford assistance sufficient for this purpose. For I say, O Clinias, that the Cnossians, far more
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than the other Cretans, ought not only to make an expiation about the region which you have now caused to be inhabited, but should be strenuously careful that the first magistrates may be appointed as much as possible in the most secure and best manner. In appointing others, indeed, there will be less labour; but it will be most necessary that the guardians of the laws should be chosen with the utmost attention.

CLIN. What method then shall we adopt in order to accomplish this?

GUEST. The following. I say, O sons of Crete, that the Cnossians, since they are the most antient of many cities, ought to choose in common from themselves, and those that settle with them in the same habitation, thirty-seven men in all; nineteen indeed of these from the inhabitants, but the rest from Cnossus itself. The Cnossians should give these to your city, and should cause you to be a citizen of this colony, and one of the eighteen men; and this, either by employing persuasion or moderate force.

CLIN. But what? Will not you, O guest, and Megillus, partake with us of this polity?

GUEST. The Athenians, O Clinias, are men of lofty thought, and so also are the Spartans, and each dwell at a great distance. But, both by you and the other inhabitants, every thing will be elegantly possessed, conformably to what you have just now said. However, in the course of time, and the polity remaining, the magistrates should be chosen in the following manner: All such as are capable of bearing arms, whether horsemen or footmen, and when age has given them sufficient strength to engage in war, all these should give their vote; and the election should be made in that temple which is considered by the city as the most honourable. But every one, from whatever part of the country he may come, should place the name which he derived from his father, and that of his tribe and nation, written on a small table on the altar of the God. He should likewise, in a similar manner, write on it his own name. But it shall be lawful for every one to take away that table which does not appear to him to be properly written, and place it in the forum, where it shall remain for not less than thirty days. After this, the magistrates shall expose to the view of the whole city three hundred approved tables; and in a similar manner the city shall approve out of these whichever it pleases. In the second place, they shall again show to every one a hundred chosen out of these: and, in the third

place, every one shall name out of the hundred men that person whom he most approves. But the thirty-seven men shall declare those to be the magistrates who are chosen by the greatest number of votes. Who, therefore, O Clinias and Megillus, will establish all these things for us in the city, respecting magistrates, and the examination of them? Do we, therefore, understand, that in cities so constituted from the first, there ought to be such persons, but that they will never be found among those that are chosen for magistrates? It is however necessary that these should not be men of a depraved character, but of the most exalted virtue. For the beginning, according to the proverb, is the half of the whole work; and all men praise him who begins a thing well. But, as it appears to me, the beginning is more than the half, and that no one has sufficiently praised it when properly accomplished.

CLIN. You speak most properly.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we know this, we should not pass over it in silence, and leave it involved in obscurity. Indeed, at present, I have nothing to say respecting it, except this one necessary and advantageous thing.

CLIN. What is it?

GUEST. I say, that no one is the father or mother of this city which we are about to establish, except the city which gives it inhabitants. Nor am I ignorant that there often has been, and will be, strife between colonies and their parent countries. At present, therefore, as a child, who, though he sometimes opposes his parents, yet, through his indigence of education, loves and is beloved by them, and, always flying to his own, finds in them alone protection; in like manner, I say, the Cnossians will be readily disposed to give assistance to the new city, and the new city to the Cnossians. I repeat then what I have just now said (for there is no harm in twice saying that which is well said), that the Cnossians ought carefully to attend to all these particulars, and choose no fewer than a hundred of the oldest and best men out of the colony, and another hundred from the Cnossians themselves. I say too, that these coming to the new city should be careful that the magistrates are established according to the laws, and that they are approved of when established. When these things are accomplished, the Cnossians should return to Cnossus, but the new city should endeavour to preserve

preserve and render itself prosperous. But the thirty-seven men, whom we have chosen, should both at present and in futurity attend to the following particulars: In the first place, they should establish guardians of the laws; and, in the next place, of those writings in which every one must give an account to the magistrates of the multitude of his possessions. The greatest estate should be that of four minæ; the second, of three; and the third of two minæ; but the fourth should consist of one mina. But if any one shall be found to possess more than he has given an account of in writing, all such overplus shall become public property; and, besides this, it shall be lawful for any one to accuse him as acting in neither a becoming nor legal manner, when he is found to despise the laws, through the love of gain. He likewise who is desirous of accusing such a one shall accuse him to the guardians of the laws, under the appellation of one addicted to base gain. And he who happens to be condemned shall not partake of the public property; but, when any distribution is made in the city, he shall possess nothing but his first allotment. It shall likewise be signified in writing, that such a one is condemned as long as he lives; and the writing shall be placed where any one who is willing may read it. The guardian of the laws shall not govern more than twenty years, and shall not hold this office if he is less than fifty years of age. But, if he is sixty years old when he enters on this employment, he shall only govern for ten years. It shall likewise be established, that he who has lived more than seventy years shall not hold an office of such great importance. These three mandates, therefore, are to be attended to, respecting the guardians of the laws. But, as the laws advance, any one may order these men what they ought to attend to, in addition to what we have already said.

Let us now, therefore, speak about the election of other magistrates. For, after these, it is necessary that the commanders in chief of the army should be chosen, and such as are ministrant to these in war, as, for instance, the masters of the horse, the military tribunes, and those who orderly arrange the foot; and who may very properly be called, as they are in common, governors of tribes. The guardians of the laws, therefore, should draw out of the city the commanders of all these, and should approve all such as, being of a proper age, either have been, or now are, engaged in war. But if it shall appear that any one of those who are not drawn out is better
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than some one of those that are, it shall be lawful to choose the former in preference to the latter, on condition that this preference is confirmed by an oath; and the choice, when he is named, shall be determined by the greater number of votes. Three amongst these, who are found to have the most votes, shall be chosen as the commanders of the army, and as those that are to take care of warlike concerns, just in the same manner as the guardians of the laws were chosen. These shall appoint twelve præfects of the military orders, and assign one to each tribe. It shall likewise be here lawful to prefer one who is not nominated, to one who is, in the same manner as was observed respecting the election of the commanders in chief. But this assembly, before the præfects are deliberately chosen, shall be held by the guardians of the laws in a place the most holy and best adapted for the purpose. Here the foot and the horse shall be seated separate from each other; and in the third place, after these, the rest of those who are employed in warlike concerns. And every one, indeed, shall give his vote in the choice of commanders in chief and masters of the horse. The præfects of the bands shall be chosen by those alone that carry shields, but the commanders of tribes by all the horse. The commanders in chief shall choose for themselves the light-armed soldiers, the archers, and the rest of this kind. In the next place there remains for us the establishment of the masters of the horse. These, therefore, must be appointed by those who appoint the commanders in chief; and the election must be conducted in a similar manner. But the horse shall give their vote, the foot being placed opposite to them; and those two that have the most votes shall be the commanders of all the horse. Disputes about votes shall be allowed to take place twice; but, if any one doubts about them a third time, the votes shall be determined by those whose province it is to fix the measure of voting. The council shall consist of thirty twelves; for the number three hundred and sixty will be found accommodated to the distributions. And it is capable of being distributed into four parts by ninety, so that ninety counsellors may be obtained from each of the divisions of land. And in the first place all the counsellors will necessarily be obtained from the largest possessions; and he who is unwilling to be chosen shall be fined; and after information has been given respecting him, he shall be noted. On the following day the same method shall be adopted with possessions of the second rank. And
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on the third day, whoever is willing shall be obtained from possessions of the third order. This mode with respect to three orders of possessions is necessary; but the fourth and smallest possession should be exempt from fine, if any one whose property is of this order is unwilling to act as a counsellor. On the fourth day all shall be obtained from the fourth and smallest order of possessions; but he who is unwilling to be chosen from third and fourth possessions shall be exempt from fine. But he who refuses from possessions of the second and first order shall be fined, so as that he who belongs to the second rank shall undergo a fine triple of the first fine, and he who belongs to the first quadruple. On the fifth day the magistrates shall exhibit to the view of all the citizens the names of the counsellors. Every man belonging to these shall act as a counsellor; or, if any one refuses to act in that capacity, he shall be fined the first fine. But the half of those that are elected out of all the possessions, viz. one hundred and eighty, shall be chosen by lot as counsellors for a year. The election, therefore, subsisting in this manner, will be a medium between a monarchical and democratic polity, which medium a polity ought always to preserve. For slaves and despots can never become friends, nor the depraved and worthy, when they are equally honoured. For, by unequal things, such as are equal will become unequal, unless they partake of measure; because, through both these, polities are filled with seditions. That antient saying, indeed, being true, that equality produces friendship, is asserted with the greatest propriety and elegance. But, as it is not very evident what the equality is which is able to accomplish this, we are on this account vehemently disturbed. For, as there are two equalities which have the same appellation, but are in reality nearly contrary to each other in many respects, every city and every legislator may sufficiently employ one of these in the distribution of honours by lot, viz. the equality consisting in measure, weight, and number¹; but it is not easy for every one to perceive the most true and the best equality. For it is the judgment of Jupiter, and but little of it is at all times employed by men; though as much of it as is employed either by cities or private persons produces every good. For it distributes more to the greater, and

¹ Viz. arithmetical equality, which takes place when a series of numbers have the same common difference; as 1, 2, 3, 3, 4, &c. or 1, 3, 5, 7, &c.

things smaller to the less¹; imparting to each that which is moderate according to the nature of each. It likewise always attributes greater honours to those who are greater in virtue, but less to such as are less in virtue and discipline; and imparts to each the becoming according to reason. For this is, doubtless, always with us the politically just itself; which we ought at present to aspire after, and, looking to this equality, O Clinias, establish our now rising city. Whoever, likewise, establishes any other city ought to give laws with his eye directed to this, and not to a few tyrants, or to one, or to any strength of the people, but always to the just itself. And this is what has just now been said by us, viz. a distribution of the equal, according to nature, to unequal particulars. But it is, indeed, necessary, that every city should make use of these two equalities, which are similar in denomination, if it wishes to continue entirely free from sedition. For the equitable and the lenient judgment of the perfect and accurate, when it takes place contrary to upright judgment, is broken. On this account it is, perhaps, necessary to use election by lot, for the sake of avoiding the moroseness of the multitude, and to invoke on this occasion divinity and good fortune, and beseech them to direct the lot to that which is most just. In this manner, then, it is necessary to use both the equalities; but that equality which is indigent of fortune ought to be used on very few occasions. These things, O friends, must be accomplished by the city which is to be established on a sure foundation. But as a ship, while sailing on the sea, requires a perpetual guard both night and day; in like manner a city, while situated in the tempest of other cities, subject to all-various stratagems, and in danger of captivity, is continually indigent of protection. Hence, the magistrates and guardians of a city ought mutually to succeed each other from night to day, and from day to night, so as that this interchange of office may never cease. But the multitude is not able to accomplish any of these things with celerity. It is, however, necessary that the multitude of the counsellors should be permitted to employ the greatest part of their time in properly managing their own private affairs; but that a twelfth part of them,

¹ The true equality which Plato here speaks of is geometric equality, which is identity of ratio, and according to which the merits of individuals are to be estimated; so that as merit is to merit, so should gift be to gift. The equality, therefore, here is that of ratio, and not of number; as, for instance, in the numbers 2, 4, 6, 12, which form a geometric proportion.

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a distribution being made into twelve months, should succeed each other, one by one, in the office of guardians. These should readily attend to every one, whether coming from the city or elsewhere, whether he wishes to give any information, or to ask respecting those particulars about which a city ought either to ask or answer other cities, or receive answers from them. And this, for the sake of those all-various innovations which are always accustomed to happen ; so as to prevent them, as much as possible, from not happening ; and that, when they do happen, the city may perceive them with the utmost celerity, and apply a remedy. This ought always to be accomplished by an assembly of the governors of the city, together with a dissolution of the difficulties which suddenly happen to the city and the laws. All these particulars must be under the direction of the twelfth part of the council, who are to cease from their office eleven parts of the year. But this part of the council ought always to defend the city in common with the other magistrates. And the particulars, indeed, respecting the city, when subsisting in this manner, will be orderly disposed. But what care, and what order, must there be of all the rest of the region ? Will it not be necessary, since all the city, and the whole region, is distributed into twelve parts, that there should be inspectors of the roads, habitations, edifices, ports, forum, fountains, sacred groves, and temples, and other things of this kind belonging to the city ?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We must say, then, that there ought to be purifiers of the temples, and priests and priestesses. But that three species of magistrates ought to be chosen for the purpose of taking care of the roads and buildings, and the ornaments belonging to things of this kind, and of preventing men from being injured by each other, or by wild beasts ; and that, both within the walls and in the suburbs of the city, every thing may be conducted in a proper manner. And those that take care of the abovementioned particulars should be called *ædiles* ; but those that attend to the ornament of the forum, *præfects* of the market ; and those that take care of the ornament of the temples, priests. But the priesthood which is paternal, whether sustained by men or women, is by no means to be moved. If nothing of this kind happens to none, or but to a few, which is likely to be the case with the inhabitants of a new city, then priests, priestesses, and the purifiers of temples are to be appointed.

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But all these things are to be instituted partly by election, and partly by lot. In every region too, and city, the common people, and those that are not common, should mingle in a friendly manner with each other, that they may be concordant in the highest degree. The particulars, therefore, pertaining to the priests are to be committed to the care of Divinity, that, as it pleases him, so the lot may be referred to a divine fortune. But he who is allotted the priesthood ought always to be examined, and proved to be in the first place a man of integrity, and legitimately begotten; in the next place, one from a pure habitation, and who is free from slaughter, and all crimes of this kind against divine natures, and whose father and mother have lived with similar purity. The laws too relative to divine concerns ought to be procured from Delphi; and, interpreters of them being appointed, these should be used. But the priesthood should not be of longer continuance than a year; nor should he be less than sixty years of age who is to attend to divine concerns for us, sufficiently, according to sacred laws. The same things are to be established respecting priestesses. The four tribes should appoint thrice four interpreters; three being taken from each tribe: and three being approved, that are chosen by the greatest number of votes, the other nine must be sent to Delphi, that one may be chosen out of each triad. But the examination and approbation of these, and their age, must be such as that of the priests which was mentioned above. These should be established as interpreters for life; and, on the decease of any one of them, the four tribes to which he belonged must choose another in his place. There ought likewise to be, in each of the temples, dispensators of the sacred money, who should possess absolute authority over the sacred groves, and their fruits, and over things let out to hire: and three should be chosen for the greatest temples out of the three largest possessions; but two for the smaller temples, and one for such as are the most elegant. The choice, too, and examination of these should be made in the same manner as in the election of the leaders of the army. And such are the particulars which should take place respecting sacred concerns. But the utmost care should be taken that nothing is left without a guard. The guards of the city, too, should be these: the commanders in chief of the army, the præfects of the military orders, the masters of the horse, the governors of tribes, the dispensators, the inspectors of roads and buildings, and the magistrates who preside over

the markets, when all these are properly chosen. The rest of the region should be defended as follows:—The whole region was divided by us, as much as possible, into twelve parts. But one tribe being allotted to each division, it should choose every year five, as it were, inspectors of the lands, and governors of tribes. Each of these should choose out of his own tribe twelve young men, not less than five-and-twenty years of age, and not more than thirty. Each of these should be allotted each part of the region for the space of a month, that all of them may be skilful and knowing in every part of the region. But the guardians and governors should defend and govern the city for the space of two years. And when first they are allotted their respective divisions, they should change their places every month, and the governors of the guard should lead them to the places next in order, and to the right hand parts in a circular progression. But I mean by the right hand parts, those which are towards the east. Afterwards, in the second year, they should change to the left hand parts, that they may not only be skilled in the nature of the country for one part of the year, but may know, for the most part, what happens in every season, to every part of the country. In the third year, five other inspectors of the land, and governors of the guard, should be chosen, as curators of the twelve young men. But the following care should be bestowed in the several occupations in each place. First, that the region may be, in the highest degree, well fortified against the incursions of the enemy; trenches being dug where they are requisite, and buildings raised for the purpose of restraining those who may endeavour to injure the country and its possessions. Animals subject to the yoke, and the servants belonging to each place, should be employed for this purpose, when they are not engaged in their usual respective employments; those that preside over these disposing every part of the country in such a manner, that it may be difficult of access to the enemy, but easy to friends, animals subject to the yoke, and cattle. They should likewise take care that the waters from Jupiter¹ do not injure the country, but that they may rather be useful to it, when descending from lofty mountains into hollow valleys; and this by restraining their course in edifices and ditches; so that, being received and imbibed by these places, they may produce streams and fountains for all the

¹ Viz. rain.

subject lands and places, and may thus render the most dry parts of the country moist, and abounding with water. They should likewise adorn fountains and rivers with trees and edifices; and, conducting streams through metal pipes, should cause them to be distributed in great abundance. In like manner, they should send these streams into thickets and sacred groves, as an ornament to the temples of the Gods. But every where, in things of this kind, young men ought to procure gymnastic exercises, both for themselves and the aged, preparing senile hot baths, and placing dry wood in abundance; that an easy remedy may by these means be obtained for the diseased, and the bodies of husbandmen, when wearied with labour, may be refreshed; which remedy is, indeed, far better than any which can be adopted by a physician who is not very skilful in his art. These things, therefore, and every thing of this kind, should be introduced into these places, as both ornamental and useful, in conjunction with sport by no means unpleasant. But let the attention which is to be paid to things of this kind be as follows:—Sixty men should each of them defend their own place, not only on account of enemies, but for the sake of those who call themselves friends. And if any one, whether he is a servant or free, injures his neighbour, or any other citizen, if the offence is small, he shall be judged by those five governors, but if great, by seventeen men, together with the twelve, and shall be fined as far as to three minæ. But no judge or magistrate ought to be exempt from giving an account of his conduct when called upon, except such as like kings bring things to a conclusion. Besides this, the præfects of the land, if they behave insolently towards the subjects of their care, by enjoining them unequal tasks, or taking any thing by force from the husbandmen, or if they receive any thing which is given through flattery, or distribute justice unjustly, in consequence of yielding to adulation;—in any of these cases, they shall be disgraced by the whole city. But for other injuries which they may commit in their office, they shall voluntarily be fined by the inhabitants of the same village, and by their neighbours, as far as to one mina. If, however, they are unwilling, either for greater or smaller injuries, to pay the proper fine, in consequence of believing that, during their transigrations from place to place every month, they shall escape punishment,—in this case, they shall be sentenced by a common judgment to pay the injured person the double of his loss. But both the governors and the præfects of the land

land shall live for the space of two years in the following manner: In the first place, the convivial associations in the different places shall be in common. But he who is absent from these for one day or night, without orders from the governors, and without being compelled by any necessity,—if the five men condemn him, and write in the forum that he has abandoned his guard, he shall be disgraced, as betraying his part of the polity. He shall likewise be chastised with stripes by any one who may meet him; and whoever is willing to punish him shall do it with impunity. All the sixty men, likewise, should carefully observe whether any one of the governors acts in this manner: and he who perceives or hears that any one of these does so, but yet does not accuse him, shall be subject to the same punishment as the offending governor; and, being more severely punished by the young men, shall be despised by all their magistrates. The guardians of the laws too should diligently attend to all these particulars, either that they may not take place, or that, when they do, the offenders may be properly punished. But every man ought to think respecting all men, that he who has never been a servant will never be a master worthy of praise. So that he who has acted in a becoming manner as a servant, ought to glory in his conduct more than he who has properly exercised the authority of a master:—in the first place, as having been properly subservient to the laws, which is the same as being a servant to the Gods; and in the next place, to old men who have conducted themselves in an honourable manner towards youth. After this, the præfects of the lands should, during the space of these two years, live on humble and poor food. For, when the twelve magistrates think proper to assemble together with the five, they should not join with themselves the other servants and slaves, nor employ husbandmen, and the inhabitants of the same village, for their own private concerns, but alone for public utility. In other particulars, they may attend to their own advantage. Besides this, they should explore every part of the region in summer and winter, armed, for the sake of perpetually defending and becoming acquainted with every place. For it appears, that for all men to have an accurate knowledge of every place is a discipline inferior to no study. And for the sake of this, young men ought to apply themselves to hunting with dogs, and the capture of wild beasts, no less than for the sake of any other pleasure or advantage which is derived from pursuits of this kind. Every man too should, to the

utmost of his power, apply himself to that study, which may either be called concealments, or inspection of the lands, or by any other name at pleasure, if he is desirous that the city should be sufficiently secure.

After this, it follows that we should speak concerning the election of the governors of the markets, and the præfects of cities. Three præfects of cities, therefore, should follow the governors of markets, who are to be sixty in number; and should preside over the twelve parts of the city according to a triple distribution, in imitation of those twelve parts. These should inspect the roads about the city, and the public ways which lead from the country to the city: likewise the buildings, taking care that all of them are raised according to law; and the streams of water which are sent by the guardians into the city, that they may be deduced into pure fountains, and such as are sufficient for use, and may become both an ornament and advantage to the city. These too ought to be such as are capable, when at leisure, of employing their attention on public affairs. On this account, every man should nominate from the largest estate him whom he wishes to be a præfect of the city. And out of six that have the most votes, three shall obtain this office by lot. Lastly, when they have been examined and approved, they shall discharge the duties of their office according to the laws which are prescribed to them. After this, the governors of markets shall be chosen, five in number, from possessions of the second and first order; and they shall be elected in the same manner as the præfects of the city. For out of ten that have the most votes, five shall be chosen by lot, and, when they are approved, shall be declared to be governors. But every individual shall give his vote. And he who is unwilling to vote, if he is brought before the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachms, and shall, besides this, be considered as a bad man. Likewise, every one shall be permitted to enter into the assembly and common convention; and all those shall be compelled to do this whose possessions are of the first and second order. And he who is absent from these shall be fined ten drachms. But those whose possessions are of the third and fourth order shall not be compelled to be present at the common convention. Hence, if any one is absent from these, he shall not be fined, unless the governors shall find it necessary to order all the citizens to assemble. But the office of the governors of markets consists in preserving the forum in that order which is established by law; and in taking care of
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the temples and fountains about the forum, and that no one acts unjustly with respect to them: likewise in punishing him who acts unjustly, with stripes and bonds if he is a slave and a stranger; but if it is a native who acts in a disorderly manner, with respect to things of this kind, he shall be condemned by these governors to a fine of one hundred drachms: but they shall not be allowed to condemn him to a greater fine, as far as to the double of this, unless the governors of the city are present on the occasion. The governors of the city too should adopt the same mode of fining and punishing in their department; fining offenders as far as to a mina by their own authority, but the double of this in conjunction with the governors of markets. After this it will be proper that the governors of music and gymnastic should be established, so as that there may be a twofold order of each of these; some of them being appointed for the sake of discipline, and others for the sake of exercise. And the law is desirous of asserting with respect to those who preside over discipline, that they should be careful of the ornament pertaining to exercises and doctrines, erudition, and the attention requisite to things of this kind; and likewise of the conduct of males and females, both at home and abroad. Those who reward the *athletæ* should have the care of gymnastic exercises and music. And these should be twofold; one kind being employed about music, and the other about gymnastic exercise. The same persons should preside over the agonistic exercises of both men and horses. But, with respect to music, some should preside over the monody, and the imitative art, viz. over the rhapsodists, harpers, pipers, and all of this kind, but others over the singing of the choir. And in the first place, with respect to the sport of the choir, where men, boys, and girls are exercised in the dance, and in the whole order of music, the governors of this ought to be properly chosen. But one governor will be sufficient for these, who is not less than forty years of age. One also will be sufficient for the monody, who is not less than thirty years old, and who must perform the office of an introducer, and be able to judge sufficiently the merits of the contending parties. But the governor and moderator of the choir ought to be chosen in the following manner: Those who are attached to things of this kind should go to the assembly, and, if they did not go, should be fined: and the guardians of the law should be the judges in this case. No one, however, should compel others to join this assembly if they are not willing. The candidates should
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be chosen from among skilful persons ; and the skilfulness or unskilfulness of the candidate should be the only thing attended to in his examination. But he who, out of ten that have the most votes, is approved of on being examined, shall, according to law, preside for one year over the choir. The election and approbation respecting the monody, and the melody of the pipe, should be accomplished in a similar manner ; and he who is finally chosen should preside over these for a year ; his election at the same time being confirmed by the judges. After these things, it is proper that the dispensators of rewards to the gymnastic exercises, both of horses and men, should be chosen in the following manner from possessions of the third and second order. Three estates should be compelled to the election of these, but the smallest estate should be exempt from fine ; and three being selected out of twenty that have the most votes, are after examination to be chosen as dispensators. But if any one happens to be rejected, according to any election by lot, and judgment of the magistrate, another shall be chosen in his place, and the examination of him performed in a similar manner. There now remains the governor, who is to take care of the whole of the above-mentioned discipline, both of males and females. Let there then be but one governor of this kind established by law. Let him be not less than fifty years of age ; one who is the father of lawful children of both sexes, but, if not of both, at least of one sex. But both he who chooses and he who is chosen ought to think that this magistrate is by far the greatest of the chief magistrates in the city. For the first blossom of every plant, when it tends in a becoming manner to the virtue of its nature, possesses the highest power of arriving at its proper end ; and this is true, both with respect to other plants, and to tame and savage animals. But we say that man is a tame animal ; who, when he partakes of proper discipline, in conjunction with a prosperous nature, is wont to become a most divine and mild animal : but when he is not sufficiently or not properly educated, he is the most savage of all the animals which the earth produces. On this account the legislator ought not to suffer the education of youth to be a secondary thing, or to be attended to in a careless manner. But, in the first place, he who is desirous of bestowing a proper attention upon youth, ought to choose out of the citizens him who is the most excellent in all things, and establish him as one who is to educate children with the utmost attention and care. All

the magistrates, therefore, except the counsellors and præfects, coming into the temple of Apollo (the guardians of the laws privately receiving the votes), shall each of them choose him whom they consider as calculated to educate youth in the best manner. And he who has most votes, after he has been approved of by the magistrates that choose him (the guardians of the laws being excepted), shall act in this capacity for five years. And in the sixth year another shall be chosen to succeed him in a similar manner. But if any public magistrate dies before he has governed more than thirty days, another shall be similarly chosen by those to whom this province belongs. And, when any one who is the guardian of orphans dies, the kindred of both father and mother, as far as to cousins, who may at that time be present, shall appoint another within the space of ten days, or each shall be fined every day a drachma till they have appointed another guardian. But every city will become a privation of a city, in which courts of justice are not properly established; and a mute judge, and who in his interrogations does not speak more than the litigants, will never be sufficient to us for the purpose of deciding justly. On this account, neither can judges when they are many judge well, nor when they are few and of a depraved character. But it is proper that the object of inquiry should be clearly enunciated by both parties. Time however, delay, and frequent interrogation contribute to the resolution of doubts. On this account litigants ought first of all to betake themselves to their neighbours and friends, and discuss with them the subject of their complaints. But, if they are not able to determine their cause sufficiently by the assistance of these, they should go to another court of justice. And, if they cannot be reconciled by the two former, a third shall bring the affair to a conclusion. In a certain respect, indeed, the establishments of courts of justice are the elections of magistrates; for every magistrate is necessarily a judge of certain things. But every judge is not a magistrate; though, in a certain respect, a judge on the day in which he acts as a judge, is no contemptible magistrate. Considering, therefore, the judges as magistrates, let us show which of them will be adapted to our purpose, of what things they are to be judges, and how many for every particular. Let then the most principal court of justice be that which they exhibit among themselves, when they choose certain judges by common consent. But let there be two criteria of the rest: the one, when, any private

vate person accusing another of acting unjustly, and leading him to justice, he is willing that he should be judged; the other, when any one thinks that the public minister has been injured by some one of the citizens, and is willing to assist the community at large. Let us say then who are the judges, and what kind of men they ought to be. In the first place, there should be a common court of justice for all those that contend the third time with each other; and this should subsist in the following manner: All the magistrates, as well those that govern for a year as those that govern for a longer time, ought to assemble into one temple, on the day before the first day of that month in which after the summer solstice the new year begins. Here taking an oath, and making a first-fruit offering as it were, out of every order of magistrates, they should choose one judge, who appears likely to be the best in every magistracy, and to judge the citizens on the following year in the best and most holy manner. When the judges are chosen, the examination and approbation should be made by those that chose them. And if any one is rejected, another shall be chosen in a similar manner. But the persons approved shall judge those that fled from other courts of justice, and give their decision openly. The counsellors, however, and the other magistrates that chose these, must necessarily be hearers and spectators of these decisions. With respect to men of another description, any one of these who is willing may be present. But, if any person accuses any one of these judges, as voluntarily judging unjustly, he shall accuse him before the guardians of the law; and he who is condemned in consequence of such accusation shall pay the half of the fine to the injured party. But if he shall appear to deserve a greater fine, the judges by whom he is condemned shall determine what he ought to suffer, or to restore, either to the community, or to the person who has suffered the injury. With respect to public accusations, it is necessary in the first place that the multitude should participate of the decision. For, when any one acts unjustly towards a city, all the citizens are injured; and hence the multitude will justly be indignant, when they are excluded from such judgments. The beginning likewise and end of such a decision ought to be referred to the people, but the examination of the particulars in which the litigants accord, to the three greatest magistrates. But if they cannot agree, the council itself shall judge the election of each of them. It is requisite likewise that all men should participate to the utmost of their power

power of private judgments. For he who is deprived of the power of judging with others must be considered as in no respect participating of the city. On this account courts of justice must necessarily subsist in the tribes, and the judges should immediately give sentence by lot, uncorrupted by entreaties. And, finally, that court of justice should judge of all these particulars which we have said should be established incorrupt to the utmost of human power, for the purpose of determining those disputes which can neither be decided by neighbours nor by the courts of justice belonging to the tribes. And thus, concerning courts of justice, which we say can neither easily be indubitably called magistrates, nor yet denied to be such, this description, which is as it were externally induced, has asserted some things, and nearly left others undiscussed. For, towards the end of legislation, the accurate position, and at the same time division of judicial laws, will be by far most properly discussed. We shall, therefore, till then defer the consideration of these. But the establishment of other magistrates has nearly taken up the greatest part of legislation. The accurate, however, respecting all civil and politic administrations will not become perspicuous, till the discussion, receiving from the beginning things secondary, middle, and all its parts, has arrived at the end. For at present, indeed, proceeding as far as to the election of magistrates, it becomes a sufficient end of what has been previously delivered, so that the beginning of the position of laws is no longer indigent of sluggishness and delay.

CLIN. All that you have asserted above is entirely, O guest, agreeable to my sentiments; but your discourse will be still more pleasing to me, when you have conjoined the beginning of what is now to be said, with the end of what has been already asserted.

GUEST. Thus far then we have played in a becoming manner the game of prudent old men.

CLIN. You appear to have evinced a beautiful pursuit of men.

GUEST. It is probable. But do we understand whether this appears to you as it does to me?

CLIN. What do you allude to?

GUEST. Do you know that the art of painting has no boundary with respect to the several animals, but never ceases adorning, either by inumbrating or deumbrating, or by whatever name a thing of this kind may be

called by painters, that the picture may continually become more beautiful and conspicuous?

CLIN. I scarcely understand what you say, since I am by no means conversant with this art.

GUEST. This will be no detriment to you. But we will employ this similitude which fortune has presented to us. If then some one should design to paint a most beautiful animal, and which might not become worse but better by length of time, do you not perceive that in consequence of such a one being a mortal, unless he leaves behind him a successor who may prevent the damages which the picture might sustain from time, by frequently retouching the piece, or who may supply what was omitted by the artist, through the imbecility of his art, and thus daily render the picture more splendid, the laboured piece will last but a short time?

CLIN. True.

GUEST. What then? Does not this appear to you to be the wish of the legislator? In the first place, that laws may be written for him as accurate as possible? In the next place, can you think that in the course of time, and after having made an actual trial of the thing, any legislator can be so insane as not to know that many things must necessarily be left, which will require amendment from some successor; that a polity may by no means become worse, but always better and more adorned?

CLIN. It is probable. For how is it possible he should not wish a thing of this kind?

GUEST. If then any legislator possesses any method by which both in words and in reality he can teach another, whether he is a man of greater or of less consequence, how laws ought to be preserved and corrected, he will not cease speaking about a thing of this kind till he has accomplished his purpose.

CLIN. For how is it possible he should?

GUEST. Ought not this, therefore, to be done, both by you and me, at present?

CLIN. Of what are you speaking?

GUEST. As we are about to establish laws of which we have chosen the guardians, but we ourselves are in the decline of life, and the guardians are with respect to us young men, it will, as we have said, be necessary that at
the

same time we should both establish laws, and endeavour to make these very men, as much as possible, both legislators and guardians of the laws.

CLIN. Undoubtedly, since we are sufficient for the purpose.

GUEST. Let us then cheerfully endeavour to effect this.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. We will, therefore, thus address them: O friends, favours of the laws, we have necessarily left many things unfinished, respecting the several particulars of which we have established laws, and which are not indeed inconsiderable; and we have endeavoured to the utmost of our power not to leave the whole unexplained by a certain circumscription. This deficiency it is your business to supply. But it is proper you should hear where you ought to look in order to accomplish a thing of this kind. For Megillus, I, and Clinias, have often said the same things to each other, and we are agreed among ourselves that we have spoken in a becoming manner. We are likewise desirous that you should both be favourable to our undertaking, and become our disciples; at the same time looking to those things which, we have agreed among ourselves, a guardian of the laws and a legislator ought to make the objects of his consideration. But this agreement, which has one head or summit, is this: That we should endeavour to find the means by which a man may become a worthy character, possessing that virtue of the soul which is accommodated to his nature, either from a certain study, or certain manners, or from some kind of possession or desire, or opinion; or, lastly, from certain disciplines; and this, whether the nature of the inhabitant of our city is male or female, youthful or aged. Likewise, that every one, through the whole of life, should tend with all possible earnestness to this of which we are now speaking; neglecting at the same time every thing which may become an impediment to this acquisition. Besides this, too, he should be disposed to die for his country if it is necessary, rather than either to see it entirely subverted, and becoming subject to the yoke of bondage, governed by bad men, or desert it by flight. For every thing of this kind is to be endured rather than the polity should be changed, which men of a worse character are naturally disposed to effect. These things have been already mutually assented to by us, and do you now, looking to both these, praise and blame the laws; blaming such as are not able to accomplish these particulars, but, embracing and receiving in a benevolent

manner such as are, live in them. But it is proper that you should bid farewell to other studies which tend to other things that are called good. Let this, then, be the beginning to us of the subsequent laws, commencing from sacred concerns. For we ought in the first place to resume the number five thousand and forty, because it had, and now has, convenient distributions, both the whole number, and that which was assigned to the tribes; which we established as the twelfth part of the whole, this producing with the greatest rectitude the number four hundred and twenty. And as the whole number has twelve distributions, so also that of the tribes. But it is proper to consider each division as a sacred gift of divinity, as following both the order of months and the period of the universe. On this account, that which is connate should lead every city, rendering them sacred. Some, indeed, are perhaps more properly distributed than others, and more prosperously dedicate their distributions to the Gods. But we now say, that the number five thousand and forty is most properly chosen, as that which has all distributions as far as to twelve, beginning from one, except that into eleven parts. This, however, has the easiest remedy. For it will be restored to health, if two houses are distributed to the other part. But that these things are true, may be evinced with facility when at leisure. Believing, therefore, in the present conception and discourse, let us distribute this number; and ascribing a God, or a son of the Gods, to each part, likewise dedicating altars, and things pertaining to these, let us make two conventions for the purpose of sacrificing every month; accommodating twelve to the distribution of the tribes, and twelve to the division of the city. But all this should be done, in the first place, for the sake of the Gods, and things pertaining to the Gods; in the second place, for the sake of our familiarity with, and knowledge of, each other; and likewise for the sake of every kind of association. For it is necessary, in the communion and mixture of marriages, that ignorance should be taken away, so as that every one may know with whom he is connected, and that all deception in things of this kind may, as much as possible, be taken away. For the sake of this, therefore, it is necessary that sports should be instituted, boys and girls together forming a choir, mutually beholding and being beheld by each other, being properly paired, as to their age, and having as much of their bodies naked as modesty will permit. All these should be taken care of, and properly ornamented

namented by the governors of choirs, and likewise by the legislators, in conjunction with the guardians of the laws, that they may supply what we have left deficient. But it is necessary, as we have said, respecting all such things as are small and numerous, that some particulars should be omitted by the legislator, in which the magistrates becoming every year skilful, and being admonished by experience, they may be able every year to supply what is deficient; till it shall appear that these discussions and legal institutes have obtained a sufficient bound. The space of ten years, therefore, will be a length of time both moderate and sufficient for obtaining an experience in sacrifices and choirs, and every other particular. But in order to accomplish this, he who supplies these deficiencies should live in common with the legislator: and on his death, the several magistrates having informed the guardians of the laws of his decease, must supply his place in correcting what is amiss, till every thing shall appear to have attained the consummation of excellence. When this period arrives, having given stability to these institutes, they are to be used in conjunction with other laws which the legislator has ordained from the beginning; respecting which, nothing should ever be voluntarily changed. But if any necessity shall, at any time, appear to urge a mutation, all the magistrates ought to consult together on this occasion, all the people should be assembled, and all the oracles of the Gods explored. If all these accord, then a change in the laws may be made, but by no means unless this is the case; but that which impedes, shall always obtain dominion according to law. Whenever, therefore, any one who has arrived at five-and-twenty years of age, beholding and being beheld by others, believes that he has found one of his own disposition, and adapted for the communion and procreation of children, he shall marry within thirty-five years of age. But, in the first place, let him hear how the becoming and adapted are to be investigated. For it is requisite, as Clinias says, prior to the laws, to give a preface accommodated to each.

CLIN. You very properly remind us, O guest; and your discourse appears to me to be both seasonable and highly fitting.

GUEST. You speak well. Let us, therefore, speak as follows: O young man, born of good parents, it is proper to contract those marriages which appear honourable to prudent men. But these exhort neither to avoid marriage with the poor, nor to pursue with avidity marriage with the rich, but, *cæteris paribus*, always honouring the inferior, to enter into communion with

it.

it. For, both to the city and the families which are united, this will be advantageous. For the equable and commensurate infinitely surpasses the immoderate with respect to virtue. He, therefore, who in all his actions is more rash and hafty than is becoming, should desire that the daughter of parents of more composed manners may be united to him in marriage: but he who is naturally of a contrary disposition should enter into alliance with a contrary character. And in every marriage this one thing should be observed, that every one should enter into such a matrimonial connexion as is advantageous to the city, and not such a one as is most pleasant to himself. For every one always naturally tends to that which is most similar to himself; whence the whole city becomes anomalous both in wealth and manners, when it partakes in the highest degree of those things which we are unwilling should happen to ourselves. If, then, in our discourse we should order by law that the rich should not marry with the rich, nor the powerful with the powerful, but should compel those whose manners are more hafty to marry those whose manners are more slow, and the more slow to marry with the more hafty, we should not only appear ridiculous to, but excite the anger of, the multitude. For it is not easy to understand that a city ought to be like a cup, in which the mad wine, when first poured forth, effervesces; but, being corrected by another deity¹, who is a sober God, and thus obtaining a beautiful conjunction, it becomes a good and moderate drink. But no one, as I may say, is able to see this taking place in the formation of children by the mingling of the sexes. On this account, therefore, we should not compel the citizens to things of this kind by law, but endeavour to charm them into the persuasion, that they ought to prefer equability in the natural disposition of their children to the equality of the most opulent alliance; and that we ought to deter, by disgrace, him who makes riches the object of his pursuit in marriage, and not compel him to a contrary mode of conduct by a written law. Let these, then, be the exhortations respecting marriages, together with what we have previously asserted,—I mean, that we ought to aspire after perpetuity of nature, by always leaving behind us children of children, as servants of divinity, instead of ourselves. All these particulars, therefore, and still more than these, some one may with propriety preface, respecting the manner in which marriages

¹ Viz. water,

ought to be conducted. But he who cannot willingly be persuaded to act in this manner, but lives in the city alienated, without connexion, and unmarried, for five-and-thirty years, such a one shall be fined every year. And if he possesses the largest estate, he shall be fined one hundred drachms; if that which is second in order, seventy; if that which is third, sixty; and if that which is fourth in order, thirty drachms. Let all these fines be sacred to Juno. And let him who does not pay his fine every year be made a debtor of ten times that sum. Let this money too be exacted by the dispenser of the Goddeſs; which unless he exacts, he himself shall be the debtor. He, therefore, who is unwilling to marry, shall be thus punished with respect to a fine; but with respect to honour as follows: In the first place, let him be deprived of all honour from his juniors, nor let any young man voluntarily obey him in any thing. In the next place, if he should attempt to chastise any one, every one shall be permitted to assist and defend the injured person. And he who does not in this case give assistance, shall be considered by the law as a timid and vicious citizen. Concerning the marriage portion we have spoken before, and we again say, that equal things are to be given for equal things, since neither he who receives, nor he who bestows, will grow old in the want of money. For in this city every one is supplied with necessaries. Besides, women will be less insolent, and men will have less of humble and illiberal slavery, through riches. And he who is obedient to this law will accomplish one among the number of things beautiful; but he who is disobedient to it, and either gives or receives more than the worth of fifty drachms for the sake of a garment, shall either pay one mina, or three half minæ, or two minæ, according to the magnitude of his possessions. He who possesses the largest estate shall pay another such sum to the public treasury: and whatever is given or received shall be sacred to Juno and Jupiter. But the exactors of this money should be the dispensators of these divinities, just as we said, when we spoke of those that refused to marry, that their fine should be exacted by the dispensators of Juno, who, if they neglected to exact it, should pay it themselves. With respect to suretiship, the first shall be that of a father, the second, that of a grandfather, and the third, that of brothers by the same father. If no one of these survives, the suretiship shall, in a similar manner, be equally valid on the mother's side. But if, through an unusual fortune, none of these should survive, the

authority in this affair must always be vested in the nearest kindred, in conjunction with the guardians. If any thing preparatory to initiation, or other sacred operation, shall be found necessary for things future, present, or past, pertaining to marriage, it will be proper to interrogate the interpreters of sacred concerns; and each person, being persuaded by these, should think that he has accomplished every thing sufficiently. With respect to nuptial feasts, not more than five male and five female friends should be invited; and as many of both sexes of kindred and familiars. But the expenses on this occasion should not exceed the possessions. He, therefore, who has the largest estate shall spend one mina, another half a mina, and so on in succession, according to every one's respective property. And he who is obedient to the law in this respect ought to be praised by all men; but he who is disobedient shall be chastised by the guardians of the laws, as one who is ignorant of the becoming, and unskilled in the laws respecting the sponsal mufes. To drink, however, to intoxication, is never at any time becoming, nor safe, except in the festivals of that God who is the giver of wine. Neither, therefore, is it proper that this should take place at the nuptial feast, when the bride and bridegroom ought particularly to be in a sound state of mind, as having changed the former condition of their life in no small degree; and in order, at the same time, that offspring may always be produced as much as possible from prudent parents. For it is nearly immanifest what night or day may generate offspring in conjunction with divinity. Children, therefore, ought not to be begotten when the body is in a relaxed and diffuent state through ebriety, but when it is compact, stable, and quiet. But he who is filled with wine hurries and is hurried away every where, being agitated with insane fury both in body and soul. Hence, he who is intoxicated, as being delirious, must disseminate in a vicious manner. So that it is probable such a one will beget offspring anomalous, unfaithful, and void of rectitude, both in their manners and corporeal frame. Hence, it is requisite to guard against intoxication, both through the whole year, and through the whole of life, but especially at the time of procreation, and neither to do such things as spontaneously introduce disease, nor such as participate of insolence or injustice. For, these being necessarily impressed in the souls and bodies of the offspring in a foetal state, the impressions become worse than their originals. But especially on the wedding day and night

night it is requisite to abstain from all such things. For the principle and divinity¹ established in men preserves all things, when he is allotted that honour which is accommodated to his nature by the respective individuals by whom he is employed. But it is proper that the bridegroom should consider one of the two houses assigned by lot as set apart for the procreation and education of children; and that he should celebrate his nuptials in that house, and reside there with his children separate from his father and mother. For, where there is a certain desire in friendship, it agglutinates and binds together all the manners; but where association is attended with satiety, and has not any desire through time, it causes a mutual separation through transcendency of repletion. Hence, leaving his parents and kindred, the bridegroom should depart as it were to a colony, observing, and being at the same time observed by, them; procreating and educating children; transmitting to others, like a lamp, the life which he received from others, and always honouring the Gods according to law. In the next place, it is requisite to consider which among the number of possessions is the most elegant. With respect to many of these, therefore, it is neither difficult to understand nor to possess them; but with respect to servants the difficulty is extreme. But we may assign the cause of this in a certain respect properly, and in a certain respect not properly. For our assertions concerning slaves are contrary to, and yet conformable to, use.

MEGIL. How do you mean? For we do not, O guest, understand what you assert at present.

GUEST. And it is very reasonable, O Megillus, to suppose you do not. For that servitude of the Lacedæmonians which is called *Hilotia* is nearly the source of the greatest doubt and contention to all Greece; because it appears to some to be well instituted, and to others not. But the slavery of the *Heraclidæ* is a subject of less contention than that of the *Mariandyni*². And besides this, the nation of the *Thessalians* is servile. However, looking to these, and all such particulars as these, what ought we to do respecting

¹ Plato, by the divinity in men, means intellect; for this is the divine part of our nature.

² *Mariandynum* was a place near *Bithynia*, where, according to the poets, *Hercules* dragged *Cerberus* out of *Hades*. Perhaps, therefore, the contention which Plato alludes to, was that of the inhabitants of *Mariandynum* respecting the particular spot where *Hercules* performed this achievement.

the possession of servants? As the subject, therefore, is so ambiguous, you very properly asked me what I meant. But my meaning is this:—We know that we all say that it is requisite to possess slaves of the most benevolent and best dispositions. For many slaves, conducting themselves in every respect with more virtue towards certain persons than brothers and sons, have preserved their masters, together with their possessions and the whole of their habitations. We know that these things are said of certain slaves.

MEGIL. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The contrary to this, likewise, is asserted, viz. that nothing in the soul of a slave is in a healthy condition, and that the race of slaves is not to be believed in any particular. The wisest of the poets too seems to be of this opinion, when he says respecting Jupiter:

“Jove fixed it certain, that whatever day
Makes man a slave takes half his mind away.”

In consequence of these different conceptions, some place no confidence in slaves, but with spurs and whips, as if they had to manage wild beasts, not thrice but often, enslave the souls of their servants; but others act entirely contrary to these.

CLIN. Undoubtedly. Since, then, the opinions respecting slaves are so different, how shall we act in our region as to the possession and correction of them?

GUEST. It appears to me, O Clinias, since man is an animal difficult to be managed, and one that by no means patiently endures that the necessary distinction between a slave and one who is free and a master should be made in reality,—that on this account he is a difficult possession. The truth of this is actually evinced in the frequent rebellions of the Messenians, and by the mighty evils which happen to those cities that possess many servants of the same language; and further still, by the all-various thefts which are committed by pirates about Italy. All which particulars, when they are considered, may render it doubtful what ought to be done in things of this kind. Two methods, therefore, alone remain to be adopted, namely, that those who are to act with ease in the capacity of slaves should not be of the same

¹ *Odyss. lib. ii.*

country, and that as much as possible they should be discordant with each other. And in the second place, that they should be properly educated, not only for their own sakes, but much more for the sake of their masters. But the proper education of these consists in not behaving insolently, but in acting less unjustly towards them, if possible, than towards our equals. For he is perfectly manifest who reverences justice naturally and not fictitiously, and who truly hates to act unjustly towards those men whom he might easily injure. He, therefore, who is never defiled by acting in an unjust and unholy manner, with respect to the manners and actions of slaves, will be most sufficient to sow the seeds of virtue. The same thing may with rectitude be asserted of a despot, and a tyrant, and of all authority, when exercised by the more powerful over the more imbecil. But slaves ought justly to be always punished, and not to be made effeminate by admonishing them like those that are free. Every thing too that is said to a slave should nearly be a command, nor should they ever in any respect be jested with, whether they are of the male or of the female sex. Many, however, very foolishly jest with their slaves; and, thus making them effeminate, render it more difficult to their slaves to be governed, and to themselves to govern.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. After this manner, therefore, servants may be acquired as much as possible sufficient both in multitude and aptitude to assist in the necessary employments of life. But, after this, it is requisite to describe the habitations.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. In a new city, therefore, and which had never before been inhabited, edifices are in the first place to be attended to, and particularly the temples and walls of the city. The buildings too of the city, O Clinias, ought to precede the marriages. But, now since the city is raised in discourse, we may very properly admit these particulars to subsist in the manner we have delivered them. When, indeed, the city is raised in reality, we shall attend to the buildings prior to the marriages, if divinity is willing, and afterwards accomplish every thing pertaining to matrimonial connections. We shall now, therefore, in a cursory manner, discuss these particulars.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. The temples, therefore, ought to be built round all the forum,
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and the city should be built in a circle, in elevated places, for the sake of defence and purity. The houses of the governors and judges should be situated near the temples; and in these, as most holy places, sentence should be given and received; partly, as about holy concerns, and partly because the temples of the judicial Gods are there situated. Courts of judgment too should be built in this place, in which proper sentence shall be passed on murder and other crimes which deserve death. With respect to the walls, O Megillus, I agree with the Spartans, that they should be permitted to lie sleeping on the earth, and not be raised. For that poetical assertion respecting them is deservedly praised, that walls ought to be of brass and iron, rather than of earth. With us, indeed, the custom of sending young men every year into the fields to dig trenches and raise buildings, for the purpose of restraining the incursions of the enemy, may justly be considered as extremely ridiculous. We likewise inclose our city with walls, which in the first place by no means contributes to the health of the citizens; and, in the next place, it usually produces an effeminate disposition in the souls of the inhabitants. For it incites them to fly within these for shelter, and not repel the enemy; and leads them to think that the safety of the city does not consist in guarding it perpetually both night and day, but that, sleeping under the protection of walls and gates, they shall be truly safe; as if they were born for sloth, and not to labour. They are, indeed, ignorant that ease is truly produced from labour; and, as it appears to me, labour is again the natural result of safe ease. But, if there is any occasion of walls for men, the houses of individuals should be so raised from the first, that the whole city, by its equality and similitude, may be one wall, and that all the houses may have a sufficiently secure passage to the different roads of the city. And in this case, indeed, the city, having the form of one house, will be no unpleasant spectacle, and will be in every respect adapted to the ease of its guards and the safety of the whole. The citizens who are to inhabit this region should be particularly careful that these things are constructed in this manner from the first. They should also take care that ædiles are provided, compelling them to be chosen, and punish with fines those that neglect this office. Attention too should be paid to the purity of every thing in the city; and that no private person occupies any public property, either by building or digging. They should likewise take care that the waters from
Jupiter

Jupiter may be imparted with facility to the inhabitants; and that every part, both within and without the city, may be fit to be inhabited. But all these particulars the guardians of the law, becoming skilled in by experience, must legally establish, together with such others as the law omits, through its incapacity of providing for all things. But since these things, the buildings about the forum, the particulars respecting gymnasia, theatres, and all that pertains to discipline, are instituted, let us now proceed to marriages, as following next in the business of legislation.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. Marriages, therefore, O Clinias, must be instituted for us in the manner we have described above. But, after this, the mode of living which should be adopted prior to the procreation of children must not continue a less time than a year. However, it is by no means easy to say, after what manner a bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which transcends the multitude of cities. But, as many things that have been already advanced are difficult, this will appear to the vulgar still more difficult to determine. Nevertheless, O Clinias, that which appears to be right and true must be asserted.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is of opinion that things public and common only, in a city, should be established by law, but does not think it requisite that the necessary concerns of private persons should be attended to, but that they should be permitted to live as they please; and that it is not necessary every thing should subsist in an orderly manner; but that, private affairs being neglected by the law, men should only live legally in public and common concerns;—he who thinks in this manner does not think rightly. But on what account are these things asserted by us? On this: Because we say that the bridegrooms in our city ought to live at public tables, at other times no less than prior to their nuptials. And, indeed, when first eating in public was instituted by you, Lacedæmonians, it appeared a wonderful thing; being legally established, in consequence of a certain war, or something else endued with the same power, and which the paucity of men rendered necessary. But this mode of eating in public having been adopted by necessity, when it was found to contribute greatly to the safety of the city it was established by law.

CLIN.

CLIN. It appears that this was the case.

GUEST. As I said, therefore, this was at first a thing of a wonderful nature, and dreadful to enjoin; but, at present, the legal establishment of it would not be attended with the like difficulty. But that which follows this is both arduous to relate and accomplish. It is a thing which is naturally capable of taking place in a proper manner, but which by no means subsists at present, and in establishing which the legislator would appear like jugglers to pluck fire, and to accomplish ten thousand other impossible things.

CLIN. What is this, O guest, which you appear to be so vehemently afraid of mentioning?

GUEST. You shall hear, that I may not any longer needlessly detain you. For every thing in the city that participates of order and law produces every good. But such things as are deprived of order, or are badly disposed, dissolve the multitude of those things which are orderly disposed. And this happens with respect to the subject of our present discussion. For, O Clinias and Megillus, the public banquets of the men are instituted for you in a beautiful, and, as I said, wonderful manner, from a certain divine necessity; but those of the women are by no means properly left unestablished by law, and not led forth into light. For the female sex is another kind of men, more occult and fraudulent than we are, through the imbecility of its nature. But the legislator did not act rightly in omitting it, on account of the difficulty of managing it in an orderly manner. For, this being neglected, many things in your city will be dissolved, which would subsist far better than at present if it was regulated by law. For the particulars relative to women are not only the half (as they may appear to be) of human concerns, if they are left in a disordered manner; but, by how much the feminine is worse than the masculine nature with respect to virtue, by so much it surpasses in multitude the double. This, therefore, must be resumed and corrected; and all employments and studies should be established as common, both to men and women, as that which will more contribute to the felicity of the city. But at present mankind are so unhappily circumstanced in this respect, that no prudent man would even mention a thing of this kind, in other places where eating in common is by no means approved. How then can any one attempt, without rendering himself ridiculous, to force women to eat and drink openly? For there is not any thing which the sex would more
difficultly

difficultly endure than this. For, being accustomed to live timorously, and obscurely, when forced into light they will make every possible resistance, and greatly overpower the legislator. Women, therefore, as I have said, will not elsewhere endure even the most rational discourse, without extreme vociferation ; but here perhaps they will. If then it is agreeable to you, for the sake of conversation, lest our discourse about every kind of polity should be incomplete, I am desirous of informing you, how good and becoming a thing this is,—if, as I said, it is agreeable to you to hear it :— if not, I shall dismiss it.

CLIN. But, O guest, we are wonderfully desirous of hearing it.

GUEST. Let us then hear it. But you must not wonder if I appear to you to derive what I shall say from an elevated source. For we are now at leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering every thing pertaining to laws.

CLIN. Rightly said.

GUEST. Again, therefore, we will recur to what was first asserted by us. For it is highly proper that every man should know, that the generation of men either never had any beginning, nor ever will have an end, but always was and always will be ; or that, if it had a beginning, the length of time from its commencement is immense.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What then ? Should not we think that there have been all-various establishments and subversions of cities, studies and employments of every kind, some attended with and others without order, and all-various desires of food and drink, in every part of the earth ; likewise all-various revolutions of seasons, in which animals have undergone a prodigious number of mutations ?

CLIN. It is reasonable to think so.

GUEST. What then ? Shall we believe that vines at a certain period rose into existence, and in a similar manner olives, and the gifts of Ceres and Proserpine ; and that a certain Triptolemus supplied things of this kind ? And shall we not think that during the time in which these had no existence animals devoured each other, as at present ?

CLIN. We ought doubtless to think so.

GUEST. But we see at present that men sacrifice each other in many places ;

places; and we hear, on the contrary, that there was a time when we did not dare to taste the flesh of oxen, and when we did not sacrifice animals to the Gods, but cakes, and fruits moistened with honey, and other pure offerings of a similar kind: but we entirely abstained from flesh; considering it as neither holy to feed on it, nor to defile the altars of the Gods with blood. But we then lived an Orphic¹ life, feeding on all inanimate substances, but on the contrary abstaining from all animals.

CLIN. These things, as you say, are every where reported, and persuade belief.

GUEST. But some one may say, What is the meaning of all this?

CLIN. You very properly conjecture what is likely to be the case, O guest.

GUEST. I shall endeavour, therefore, if I am able, O Clinias, to unfold what is consequent to this.

CLIN. Speak then.

GUEST. I behold all things suspended to men, from a triple indigence and desire, through which virtue is produced if they are properly conducted, but the contrary if they are improperly burdened. These are, from the very period of their birth, meat and drink, of which every animal having an innate love, it is full of fury, and refuses to listen to him who says that something else is to be done besides replenishing the pleasures and desires, with which all such things as these are conversant, and perpetually avoiding every kind of pain. But a third, and this the greatest indigence, and the most acute desire, afterwards excites us, producing in mankind the most fiery furies. This is the desire of propagating the species, which burns with unbounded insolence. These three diseases should be turned from that which is called most pleasant, to that which is best, by three the greatest of all things; viz. *fear*, *law*, and *true reason*; at the same time employing the muses, and the agonistic Gods, in order to extinguish this influx and increase. But after marriages we should place the procreation of children, and, after this, education and discipline. For, our discourse proceeding in this manner, the law will perhaps at length lead us to public banquets, when we have arrived at associations of this kind; and then perhaps we shall see more clearly than before, whether this mode of eating in public ought to be adopted by women

¹ The Orphic sacrifices were unbloody, as the hymns of Orpheus which are now extant abundantly testify.

alone, or by men, together with the particulars preceding this mode, and which are not yet legally established. These things, as I just now said, we shall then behold more accurately, and establish respecting them more becoming and convenient laws.

CLIN. You speak with the greatest rectitude.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, preserve in our memory what we have just now said: for perhaps we shall have occasion for it hereafter.

CLIN. What are the things which you exhort us to remember?

GUEST. Those which we defined by three words; viz. meat, drink, and the astonishment about venereal concerns.

CLIN. We shall by all means, O guest, be careful to remember these things.

GUEST. It is well. But let us proceed to matrimonial concerns, and instruct the bride and bridegroom in what manner children ought to be procreated; and if we cannot persuade them to comply with our instructions, we will threaten them with certain laws.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. It is proper that the bride and bridegroom should consider, that children are to be exhibited to the city, as much as possible, the most beautiful and the best. But all men who produce any thing in common, when they attend both to themselves and the work, produce the whole beautiful and good: but when they do not attend, or are not endued with intellect, the contrary takes place. The bridegroom, however, should attend both to the bride and to the procreation of children: and in a similar manner the bride should attend to the bridegroom, especially at that time when children are not yet begotten by them. Certain women chosen by us shall be inspectors of this particular, whether many or few, just as it may seem fit to the governors. These shall assemble every day in the temple of Lucina, and continue there for the third part of an hour. Here they shall inform each other, if they have seen any married man or woman looking to any thing else than what the sacrifices and sacred ceremonies pertaining to marriage order to be done. Let the procreation of children and the inspection of the women above mentioned continue for ten years, but not for a longer time, when there is an easy flux of generation. But if some continue unprolific for this space of time, after having consulted

with their kindred, and the women that superintend them, they shall be divorced in such a manner as is advantageous to both. However, if any altercation ensues respecting what is proper and advantageous to each, ten guardians of the law, chosen by the contending parties, shall take cognizance of and determine the affair. After this, the inspecting women shall enter into the houses of the young men, and, partly by admonitions and partly by threats, liberate them from their error and ignorance. But if they are unable to accomplish this, they shall speak to the guardians of the law, who shall then take the affair into consideration. If they too are incapable of applying a remedy, they shall make the people acquainted with the case; at the same time giving in the offenders' names in writing, and affirming by an oath that they are unable to render them better. But let him whose name is committed to writing be disgraced, unless he can confute his accusers in the court of judgment. If he is unable to do this, he shall neither engage in a matrimonial connection, nor in the procreation of children. And in case he attempts it, any one that pleases shall punish him with impunity. The same laws too must be established respecting women. For such shall not participate of female egressions and honours, and shall not be permitted to go to weddings, and labours, if they are in a similar manner condemned in a court of justice. But when children are begotten according to law, if any one has connection with another man's wife, or a woman with any man but her husband, while children are begotten by them, let them be punished in the manner mentioned above when they did not beget children. In the next place, let the married men and women that live temperately with respect to all such things as these, be honoured, but those that live in a contrary manner be disgraced. And if the greater part of the citizens conduct themselves with moderation in things of this kind, let these particulars be passed over in silence, without being established by law. But if the conduct of the greater part is disordered in things of this kind, let them be legally established, and a judgment made of such conduct according to the established laws. The first year is the beginning of the whole of life to every one. This ought to be written in paternal temples, as the beginning of life, both to boys and girls. In every tribe, too, the number of the governors that are reckoned by years should be written on a white wall. Next to these, the names of those that are living

in the tribe should always be written; and on their decease their names should be blotted out. The boundary of marriage for girls should be from sixteen to twenty years of age; and this should be the longest definite time: but for boys, from thirty to thirty-five. The time for acting in the capacity of magistrates should be limited: for women, to forty years of age; but for men, to thirty. With respect to war, men should engage in it from twenty to sixty years of age; but women, when it shall appear necessary to employ them for warlike purposes, and after they have brought forth children, to the fiftieth year of their age: at the same time being mindful to prescribe the possible and the becoming to each.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

THE LAWS,

BOOK VII.

CHILDREN, therefore, both male and female, being begotten, we shall act with the greatest propriety in speaking in the next place about their education and discipline; for to pass this over in silence is perfectly impossible. However, when it is discussed, it will appear to us to be rather similar to a certain doctrine and admonition than to laws. For the numerous small and unapparent circumstances which happen privately, and in every house, since they easily take place through the pain, pleasure and desire of the respective individuals, contrary to the intention of the legislator, render the manners of the citizens all-various, and not similar to each other. But this is an evil to cities. For, on account of their smallness and frequency, to punish them by a legal fine would be unbecoming, and at the same time uncemly. It would likewise be the means of destroying written laws, in consequence of men being accustomed to act contrary to law in things small and numerous. So that it is difficult indeed to establish laws concerning them, and impossible to pass them over in silence. But I will endeavour to render what I say manifest, leading forth an example, as it were, into light; for what is said at present seems to be involved in obscurity.

CLIN. You speak most truly.

GUEST. That a proper education, therefore, appears to be capable of rendering both souls and bodies most beautiful and excellent, has been rightly asserted by us.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But I think that the most beautiful bodies are simply those which immediately from infancy grow in the most proper manner.

CLIN.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what? Do we not understand this, that the first blossom of every animal is by far the greatest and most abundant; so that it is the source of contention to many, that human bodies at twenty do not receive twice the increase in length which they had at five years of age?

CLIN. True.

GUEST. What then? When there is an influx of abundant increase without many and moderate labours, do we not know that it produces ten thousand maladies in bodies?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Many labours, therefore, are then necessary, when abundant nutriment is introduced into bodies.

CLIN. What do you say, O guest? Shall we order those who are but just born, and the youngest, to undergo the greatest labours?

GUEST. By no means: but still prior to these, those that are nourished in their mother's womb.

CLIN. How do you say, O best of men? Do you really speak of those that are yet carried in the womb of their mother?

GUEST. I do. But it is not at all wonderful that you should be ignorant of the exercise of such as these; which, though it appears to be absurd, I am willing to unfold to you.

CLIN. By all means, do so.

GUEST. By us, indeed, a thing of this kind can be more readily comprehended, because children there engage in certain sports more than is proper. For, with us, not only children, but certain old men, nourish the young of birds, and exercise them in fighting with each other; but they are far from thinking that the labours, in which by exercising they excite them, are moderate. For, besides this, taking each of them by the wing, they walk many stadia with the lesser young in their hands, and the larger under their arms; and this, not for the sake of the good habit of their own bodies, but for that of the birds. And by this, indeed, they signify thus much to him who is capable of understanding what is said, that all bodies are benefited by motion and agitation when not continued to weariness, whether these are produced from themselves, or by carriages, or by the sea, or horses, or by whatever other means bodies are moved. Hence, through these

these vanquishing the nutriment of food and drink, they are able to impart to us health, beauty, and strength. This being the case, what shall we say we ought to do in the next place? Are you willing that we should say, laughing, while we are establishing laws, that the pregnant woman should take the exercise of walking, and, after she is delivered, fashion the infant like wax, while he is moist, and during the space of two years bind him with rollers? Likewise, that we should compel the nurses, by legal fines, to carry the children either into the fields, or to the temples, or their acquaintance, till they are sufficiently able to stand alone? And that then they should be careful lest their legs become distorted through the violence of resting on them; and, for this purpose, should carry them in their arms till they are three years old? That the nurses, likewise, ought to be as strong as possible; and that there should be more than one for each child? And, lastly, that a punishment shall be ordained by a written law for neglect in each of these particulars? Or shall this by no means be the case? For that which we just now mentioned will happen to us in great abundance.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. We shall expose ourselves to abundant laughter, because the effeminate and servile manners of the nurses will be unwilling to obey us.

CLIN. For whose sake, therefore, shall we say these things ought to be asserted?

GUEST. For the sake of the manners of the masters and free persons in the city, who, perhaps, when they hear these things, will rightly conceive, that unless private affairs are properly conducted in cities, it is in vain to expect that such as are common can have any stability by the promulgation of laws; and who, in consequence of such a conception, will use as laws what we have just now advanced. And further still, by a proper use of these assertions they will govern both their families and the city in such a manner as to render them happy.

CLIN. What you say is very likely to be the case.

GUEST. We should not, therefore, desist from a legislation of this kind till we have delivered the particulars of those studies which pertain to the souls of very young children, and thus bring our discourse to a conclusion in the same manner as when we spoke concerning their bodies.

CLIN. Perfectly right.

GUEST.

GUEST. Let us receive this, therefore, as an element with respect to both the body and soul of very young children, that nutrition and motion, when applied every night and day, are profitable to all juvenile bodies and souls, but especially to the most youthful; so that, if it were possible, they should be in such a condition as if they were always sailing on the sea. But as this is impossible, it is requisite to approach as near to this as we are able in our treatment of infants. Indeed, that we ought to do so, may be conjectured from this, that both the nurses of infants, and those who are initiated in the remedies of the Corybantes, know experimentally that it is useful. For, when mothers are desirous that their children who sleep with difficulty may sleep soundly, they do not attempt to accomplish this by quiet, but, on the contrary, by gently moving them in their arms; nor yet by silence, but by singing to them. And, in short, they charm their children by the melody of their voice, as if by that of a pipe; just in the same manner as the remedies of mad Bacchanalians employ this choir, and, at the same time, Muse of motion.

CLIN. What then, O guest, is especially the cause of this to us?

GUEST. It is not very difficult to know.

CLIN. How so?

GUEST. Both these passions consist in fear: and they are certain terrors arising from a depraved habit of the soul. When, therefore, any one externally causes an agitation in passions of this kind, the exterior vanquishes the interior dreadful and insane motion: but, being vanquished, a tranquil quiet takes place in the soul, and the leaping of the heart, which was troublesome to endure, subsides. And thus it entirely causes some to receive the benefit of sleep; but it recalls others, who are awake, from insane to prudent habits, by dancing and the melody of the pipe, in conjunction with those divinities to whom suppliants sacrifice. And these things, in short, possess a certain probable reason.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But if these things possess such a power, this ought to be understood concerning them, that every soul that has been familiar with fear from infancy will have been more accustomed to endurance. Every one, however, will acknowledge that this is an exercise of timidity, and not of fortitude.

CLIN.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, on the contrary, we should say that he is exercised in fortitude who, from his infancy, has made it his study to vanquish all the fears and terrors which befall us.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. We may say, therefore, that this one thing greatly contributes to a part of the virtue of the soul, viz. the all-perfect gymnastic exercise of children in motions.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. And besides this, a placid or morose disposition becomes no small part of goodness or depravity of soul.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we should endeavour to relate to the utmost of our ability, after what manner we should wish that each of these may be implanted in infants.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. This, then, is a dogma with us, that luxury renders the manners of youth morose, irascible, and vehemently agitated by things of a trifling nature; but that, on the contrary, excessive and rustic servitude causes them to be abject, illiberal, haters of mankind, and unfit for society.

CLIN. But how will the whole city be able to educate infants, who are incapable of understanding what is said to them, and who cannot taste of any discipline whatever?

GUEST. Thus. Every animal, as soon as it is born, is accustomed to utter certain sounds with a loud voice: and this is particularly the case with the human species, which to vociferation adds weeping.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Nurses, therefore, being desirous to know what infants are in want of, conjecture this by the things which they offer to them. For that which causes them to be silent they consider as offered to them in a becoming manner, but that as improperly offered at which they cry and make a noise. For, in children, vociferation and tears are indications by no means fortunate of the things which they love and hate. But the time in which this takes place is not less than the space of three years, which is no small portion of life to pass through well or ill.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Does not a child at that period appear to you to be morose, and by no means kind, and for the most part full of lamentation and tears, more than becomes one that is good?

CLIN. It appears so to me.

GUEST. What then? If some one should endeavour, by all possible means, that during this period of three years the child may in as small a degree as possible be affected with sorrow, fear, and pain, should we not think that by this means his soul would be rendered more cheerful and kind?

CLIN. It is evident it would, O guest, and especially if the child should be supplied with many pleasures.

GUEST. This I cannot grant you, O wonderful Clinias. For with us an action of this kind would be the most pernicious of all things. But let us see whether we may assert a certain thing.

CLIN. Inform us what it is.

GUEST. Our discourse, at present, is about a thing of no small importance. Do you, O Megillus, attend and decide for us. For my discourse asserts that an upright life ought neither to pursue pleasures, nor entirely avoid pain, but should embrace the medium between these, which we just now denominated benignity; and which, from a certain oracular rumour, we all of us aptly call the habit of divinity. We say too, that he who is desirous of becoming a divine man ought to pursue this habit, so that he may neither be wholly hurried away to pleasures in a rash manner (for in this case he would not be free from pain), nor yet suffer any other to act in this manner, whether he is an old or a young man, of the male or female sex. But he will least of all suffer this to be the case with infants. For all the manners then, through custom, inhere in every one in the most firm and powerful manner. And further still, if it were not that I should appear to jest, I should say that pregnant women ought more than other women so to be managed, that during the year of their pregnancy they may neither be engaged in certain numerous and insane pleasures, nor be agitated by pain, but lead a benignant, benevolent, and mild life.

CLIN. There was no occasion for you, O guest, to ask Megillus, which of us spoke in the more proper manner; for I agree with you, that all men ought to fly from a life of unmingled pleasure and pain, and that they should

always pursue a certain middle condition. You have, therefore, both spoken and heard in a becoming manner.

GUEST. With very great rectitude, therefore, O Clinias. But, besides these things, let us all three consider this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That all these particulars which are now discussed by us are called by many unwritten laws, and that those which are denominated the laws of a country are no other than all these. And further still, that what we just now said, that these particulars ought neither to be called laws, nor yet suffered to be passed over in silence, was beautifully asserted. For these are the bonds of every polity, subsisting between all laws that are as yet and will be hereafter written, and being as it were altogether the laws of a country, and such as are in every respect antient. These, when established in a becoming manner, and rendered familiar, will invest the written laws with every kind of safety. But when they are established in an unbecoming manner, confusion will be the consequence: just as in edifices, when the pillars by which they are supported are taken away, the whole falls to the ground, some things lie under others, and those parts of the structure which were beautifully raised on the pillars become a heap of ruins, through the falling of their supporters. In consequence of considering this, O Clinias, it is proper that you should bind your city on all sides, as being a new city, and that to the utmost of your power you should not omit any thing either great or small, which may be called laws, or manners, or studies: for by all these a city is bound together; but no one of these can be stable without the rest. So that it is not proper to wonder, if, in consequence of many and at the same time small things appearing to us to be legal, or this being the case with a conflux of customs, the laws should become more extended.

CLIN. You speak properly; and we shall think in this manner.

GUEST. If any one, therefore, accurately accomplishes these things, in both male and female children of three years old, and does not negligently make use of what has been said, he will procure no small advantage to such as are recently educated. But these things will be accommodated to the disposition of children of three, four, five, and six years of age. Luxury too should be removed from them; and they should be chastized, but not in an ignominious manner. But, as we said respecting slaves, that they should
neither

neither be chastized with infolence, as this would excite them to anger, nor yet be suffered to go unpunished, as this would render them delicate ; the same mode of conduct should be observed towards those that are free. Sports, however, are to children certain spontaneous things, which when they engage in, they nearly of themselves invent. All children then of this age should assemble in the temples of the respective districts, from three to six years of age ; the nurses of these still keeping a watchful eye over their orderly behaviour and incontinence. But one out of each of the twelve women should be placed over the nurses, and the whole herd, for the space of a year ; and her province must consist in taking care that every thing prescribed by the guardians of the law is executed in an orderly manner. These should be chosen by the women that preside over marriages ; one out of each tribe, and of the same age with themselves. She who is established in this office should go every day to a temple, and always punish the person that acts unjustly, viz. a male and female slave and a stranger of either sex, herself, by means of certain servants of the city ; but a citizen, when she is doubtful respecting his punishment, must be taken by her to the ædiles to receive his sentence. But when the punishment which a citizen deserves is not dubious, she herself shall inflict it. After children are six years of age, the males should be separated from the females ; boys should associate with boys, and girls in a similar manner with each other. It is likewise proper that the attention of each should be directed to disciplines ; the males being sent to the masters of equestrian exercises, of bows, darts, and slings ; likewise the females, if discipline of this kind is allowed them ; and especially that they may become acquainted with the use of arms. But now almost all men are ignorant how things of this kind are circumstanced.

CLIN. What do you mean ?

GUEST. That things on the right hand seem to differ naturally from those on the left, with respect to the several actions of the hands. For the feet, and the inferior parts of the body, do not appear to possess any difference with respect to labour. But in the hands we each of us become as it were lame, through the ignorance of our nurses and mothers. For each of the members naturally possesses nearly equal power ; but they not properly using them, through custom we make a difference between them. For, indeed, in certain employments there is no great difference in the use of the hands.

Thus, using the lyre with the left hand, and the plectrum with the right, is a thing of no consequence ; and so in other things of a similar nature. But not to use these examples in other particulars is nearly folly. The law of the Scythians, indeed, evinces the truth of these observations. For they not only hold the bow in their left hand, and the arrow in the right, but similarly employ both hands for both these. And there are many other examples of this kind in charioteers and others. From all which we may learn, that those who render the left hand more imbecil than the right act contrary to nature. This, as I have said, is a thing of no great consequence in horned plectra, and such-like instruments ; but in battle, where it is necessary to use iron, bows, and spears, it is of great consequence. But it is by far of the greatest importance when it is requisite to use arms against arms. There is, indeed, a great difference between one that learns and one that does not learn, and between him who is exercised and him who is not exercised. For, as he who is perfectly exercised in the pancratium, or in boxing, or wrestling, is not incapable of fighting from his left-hand parts, but becomes lame and confused in his motions when any one, causing him to change his position, compels him to exercise himself from his right-hand parts ;—the same thing, in my opinion, ought to appear proper in arms, and in every thing else. For he who possesses a twofold power, viz. of defending himself, and vanquishing others, ought not to suffer, to the utmost of his power, either of these to remain indolent and without skill. And if any one had the nature of Geryon or Briareus, since in this case he would be capable of using a hundred hands, he ought with all these hands to hurl a hundred darts. All these particulars ought to be under the direction of the male and female governors ; the female governors inspecting the sports and nutriment of the children, but the male their disciplines, that, all the boys and girls having the perfect use of both their feet and both their hands, they may as much as possible in no respect injure nature by custom. But it will happen that twofold disciplines must be used ; gymnastic, for particulars pertaining to the body ; and music, for such as pertain to the good condition of the soul. Again, however, gymnastic is twofold ; dancing and wrestling. And of dancing, one kind imitates the diction of the muse, preserving the magnificent in conjunction with the liberal ; but another kind, for the sake of the good habit, lightness, and beauty of the parts and members of the body,

body, aptly bends and stretches each, imparting to them rhythmical motion, disseminating, and at the same time following the whole order of dancing. With respect to wrestling, that which Antæus or Cercyon adopted among their arts, for the sake of useless contention, or the boxing employed by Epeus ¹ or Amycus ², since they are of no use in battle, they do not deserve to be mentioned. But the particulars respecting proper wrestling, by clinging round the neck, or with the hands, or round the sides, when desire of victory and a good habit of body are applied for the sake of strength and health,—these, as they are useful to every purpose, are not to be omitted; but both masters and disciples are to be enjoined, that, when we establish the laws respecting these, all such particulars may be benevolently imparted to the one, and gratefully received by the other. Nor must such imitations in choirs as are fit to be imitated be omitted; in this place, indeed, the armed sports of the Curetes; but, in Lacedæmon, of the Dioscuri. Our virgin too and mistress Minerva, being delighted with the sport of the choir, does not think it fit to play with empty hands; but, being perfectly adorned with complete armour, she in this manner completes the dance. It will be proper that all the boys and girls should imitate the goddess in this respect, honouring her benevolence, in the necessity of war, and for the sake of festivals. It will likewise be proper that boys, immediately before they go to battle, should supplicate and make sacred processions in honour of all the Gods, being at the same time adorned with arms and horses, and performing their supplications to the Gods and the sons of the Gods, sometimes swifter, and sometimes slower in dancing, and as they proceed to battle. Contests too, and preludes of contests, should be used, for no other purpose than for the sake of these things. For these, both in peace and war, are useful to a city and to private families. But other labours, sports, and exercises respecting the body are not, O Megillus and Clinias, liberal. And thus that gymnastic, which I said in our former discourse ought to be discussed, is nearly now absolved. But, if you have any thing better than this, speak, and do not withhold it.

¹ Epeus was the son of Endymion, and brother to Pæon, who reigned in a part of Peloponnesus. His subjects were called from him Epei. He conquered in boxing at the funeral games in honour of Patroclus.

² Amycus was the son of Neptune, by Melia, and was famous for his skill in the management of the cestus.

CLIN. It is not easy, O guest, omitting these, to have any thing better to say about gymnastic and contest.

GUEST. It follows, therefore, that we should speak about the gifts of the Muses and Apollo, which we formerly thought we had so sufficiently discussed, that the particulars about gymnastic alone remained; but now it is evident that there is something respecting these which should be mentioned before every thing else. Of this, therefore, we will in the next place speak.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. Hear me, therefore; for you have heard me in what has been already discussed. But at the same time it is requisite that both the speaker and hearer should be cautious in mentioning that which is vehemently wonderful and unusual. This also should be the case at present. For I am now going to assert something which cannot be mentioned without fear; but at the same time, assuming courage, I shall not desist.

CLIN. What is this, O guest?

GUEST. I say, that all cities are ignorant that the stability or mutation of sports is the principal thing respecting the promulgation of laws. For when it is so ordered, that the same persons always use, and are delighted with, the same sports, according to the same, and in a similar manner, legal institutions are then permitted to remain established in quiet. But when sports are changed, and innovations made in them, so that young men are perpetually engaged in new sports, both in the figures of their bodies and other apparatus; continually form a different opinion of the becoming and unbecoming in these particulars; and in the highest degree honour the inventors of new figures, colours, and every thing else of this kind;—when this is the case, we say, and say with the greatest rectitude, that a greater mischief cannot befall the city. For it secretly changes the manners of the youthful part of the inhabitants, and causes them to despise that which is ancient, and honour that which is new. But I again say, that there is not any thing more detrimental to all cities than this assertion and dogma. Hear, however, what a mighty evil I say it is.

CLIN. Do you speak of blaming ancient institutions in cities?

GUEST. Entirely so.

CLIN. You shall not, therefore, find us depraved auditors of this discourse, but as much as possible most benevolent.

GUEST.

GUEST. It is reasonable to suppose that you will be so.

CLIN. Only speak, therefore.

GUEST. Come then, let us hear this with greater attention, and thus speak among ourselves. We find then, that mutation in all things, except such as are evil, is in the highest degree pernicious at all times in the diet of bodies, in the manners of souls, and, in short, in every thing except, as I just now said, in things evil. So that, if any one directs his attention to bodies, and considers them as accustomed to certain kinds of food, drink, and labours, he will find that at first they are disturbed by them, but afterwards by the long continued use of these acquire flesh, become friendly, accustomed, and familiar to all this diet, and are disposed in the best manner with respect to health and pleasure. He will likewise find, that if at any time they are forced to change any part of their approved diet, at first they are disturbed by disease, and do not recover their health till they are accustomed to the new food. The same thing must be considered as taking place in the thoughts of men, and the natures of souls. For every soul reverences and fears to make any change in the laws in which it has been educated, when by a certain divine good fortune those laws have remained for a long time unmoved, so that no one either recollects or has ever heard that they subsisted otherwise than at present. The legislator, therefore, ought to devise some method by which this may be accomplished in the city. But I have discovered the following method: All men, as I have said before, consider the sports of youth when changed, as nothing more than mere sports, and are far from thinking that they are of the greatest consequence. Hence, they do not resist this mutation, but comply with it. Nor do they consider, that the children who engage in these new sports necessarily become different men from what they would have been if their old sports had remained; but, becoming different, that they will pursue a different life, and thus be accustomed to different studies and laws. Hence, no one fears that what I just now called the greatest evil will by these means happen to cities. Mutations, therefore, respecting figures are less noxious. But frequent innovations in praising and blaming manners are, in my opinion, the greatest of all evils, and the most to be dreaded.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What then? Shall we believe in our former discourse, in which
we

we said that the particulars respecting rhythm, and every kind of music, were imitations of the manners of better and worse men? Or how shall we say?

CLIN. Our opinion is in no respect different from this:

GUEST. We say, therefore, that we should endeavour, by every possible contrivance, that neither children in our city may desire other imitations in dancing and singing, nor any one may persuade them to this innovation by introducing all-various pleasures.

CLIN. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. Has any one then of us any art better calculated for this purpose than that of the Egyptians?

CLIN. What art are you speaking of?

GUEST. That every kind of dancing and melody should be consecrated; instituting, in the first place, festivals at certain times of the year, in honour of the several Gods, the sons of Gods, and dæmons; and after this, the sacrifices to the different divinities, together with the ode and choirs with which the sacrifices are to be honoured. After these things are established, all the citizens in common should sacrifice to the Fates, and to all the other Gods, and dedicate their several odes to each of the Gods and their attendants. But if any one introduces other hymns and choirs in honour of the Gods than those which are instituted by law, the priests and priestesses, together with the guardians of the laws, shall, in a holy and legitimate manner, repulse him in his undertaking. And he who is repulsed, if he is not willingly restrained, shall suffer the punishment of his impiety through the whole of life, from any one who is willing to inflict it.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But since we are arrived thus far in our discourse, we should be affected in a becoming manner.

CLIN. About what are you speaking?

GUEST. All men, not only the old but the young, when they see or hear any thing unusual, do not immediately assent to that which is dubious respecting it, directly, as it were, running to embrace it; but, standing still, as if situated in a place where three roads meet, and not very much seeing the right way, inquire, and do not proceed any further till they have a firm assurance respecting the road they should take. We too should act in a

similar manner at present. For, as we have now fallen upon an unusual and wonderful discourse respecting laws, we ought necessarily to make every possible inquiry, and not readily decide, being such men as we are, on things of such great importance, or attempt to assert any thing immediately, as if the subject was perfectly clear.

CLIN. You speak most truly.

GUEST. We will, therefore, give the subject time, and then firmly decide upon it, when it has been sufficiently considered by us. But lest we should in vain leave the order consequent to laws unfinished, let us proceed to the end of them. For, perhaps, if divinity is willing, and this discussion obtains its completion, what is at present dubious may become sufficiently clear.

CLIN. You speak most excellently, O guest, and we shall do as you say.

GUEST. We say, then, that this wonderful thing must be granted,—I mean, that odes must be established for us by law; just as the antients, as it appears, proclaimed respecting singing to the harp. So that they, perhaps, did not entirely dissent from what is said by us at present; but in a dream, as it were, or roused to a vigilant state, they either dreamt or prophesied this. Let this then be the decree respecting it:—No one shall dare to sing any thing besides the public and sacred songs, or make any alteration in the whole choir of the young men, or utter any thing contrary to the other laws. And he who complies with this decree shall be liberated from fine; but he who does not comply, as we said just now, shall be punished by the guardians of the laws, and by the priests and priestesses. Let these things, therefore be now established for us in discourse.

CLIN. Let them be established.

GUEST. But after what manner can any one so establish them by law as that he may not appear perfectly ridiculous? It appears to me that it will be the safest way to fashion them first of all in our discourse like certain images. I say, then, that one of the images is as follows: The sacrifice being performed, and the victims burnt according to law, if some private person, a son for instance, or a brother, should approach the altars and sacred rites blaspheming with every kind of blasphemy, could we not say that he uttered a sorrowful and bad omen and prophecy, both to his father and the rest of his kindred?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. This, therefore, in short, must nearly take place in all our cities. For, when any magistrate performs any sacrifice in common, not one choir, but a multitude of choirs assemble on the occasion; and standing not far from the altars, but sometimes close to them, they utter every kind of blasphemy respecting the sacred concerns, exciting the souls of the hearers with words, rhythms, and the most lamentable harmonies: and he who causes the city to weep most abundantly immediately after the sacrifice is finished, bears away the palm of victory. Shall we not abrogate this law? And if, at any time, it is necessary that the citizens should hear lamentations of this kind, it should not be on certain sacred, but rather on inauspicious days: and then it will be proper that rather certain foreign choirs, conducted by hire, should sing on this occasion, as is the case at funerals, where those who are hired for the purpose walk before the dead with a certain *Caric Muse*¹. A thing of this kind may very properly be adopted about such odes as these. A long robe too will be proper for funeral odes, and not crowns or golden ornaments. But, in short, every thing of a nature contrary to these should be employed on this occasion, that I may dismiss all further discourse about these particulars with the utmost celerity. I again, therefore, ask if it is agreeable to you, that this first image should be established for odes?

CLIN. What kind of image?

GUEST. A good omen. And, indeed, the genus of the ode should every where, and in every respect, be employed in prognosticating well. Or shall I not at all ask your opinion, but thus establish it?

CLIN. By all means, establish it: for this law will vanquish by the unanimous votes of all men.

GUEST. What then, after good omination, will be the second law of music? Will it not be, that prayers should be offered to the respective Gods to whom we sacrifice?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But the third law, I think, will be, that since poets know that

¹ That is, says the Greek Scholiast, a lamentable Muse: for the Carians appear to be of a mournful disposition, and for hire lament over the dead bodies of foreigners.

prayers are petitions addressed to the Gods, they ought to be careful in the highest degree, lest they should ignorantly request what is evil, as if it were good. For I think the condition of him who prays in this manner would be ridiculous.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Did we not a little before agree, that neither silver nor gold ought to be considered as riches in our city?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Of what then shall we say this discourse is the paradigm? Is it not of this, that not every genus of poets is sufficient to know, in the highest degree, things good and evil? If, therefore, any poet, either in prose or verse, shall compose for us improper prayers, he shall be made by the citizens to pray for the contrary to what he asked in his prayers, in things of the greatest importance: though, as we have already said, we shall not find many offences greater than this. But we shall establish this as one of the laws and forms respecting the Muse.

CLIN. Which? Speak to us more clearly.

GUEST. That a poet shall not compose any thing, either beautiful or good, different from the legal and just institutions of the city. Nor shall he be permitted to show what he has composed to any private person, before the judges and guardians of the law, appointed for this purpose, have seen and approved it. But it has nearly been shown by us, who those are whom we have chosen to preside over music and discipline. Shall I then, as usual, ask whether this law, formula, and third image, is to be established for us? Or how does it appear to you?

CLIN. That it should be established, undoubtedly.

GUEST. After these things, it will be most proper that hymns, and encomiums of the Gods, should be sung mingled with prayers; and after the Gods, in a similar manner, that proper prayers, with encomiums, should be offered to dæmons and heroes.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, after this law, the following will take place without envy. It will be proper that those citizens who have accomplished beautiful and laborious works, pertaining either to bodies or souls, and who have been obedient to the laws, should after their decease be celebrated.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But to honour those who are yet alive, with encomiums and hymns, and before, having completely run the race of life, they have arrived at a beautiful end, is not safe. Let all these particulars be established for us, common both to men and women that have been illustriously good. But it will be proper that odes and dancings should be established in the following manner :—There are many antient and beautiful poems about music, and in a similar manner about dancing. Out of these to choose that which is becoming and adapted to an established polity, cannot be the means of exciting envy. The electors of these shall not be less than fifty years old. These shall choose that poem out of the antient poems which appears to be sufficient for the purpose. But that which is insufficient, or altogether unfit, they shall either entirely reject, or commit to poets and musicians to be properly corrected, employing for this purpose their poetical abilities. They shall not apply to these for the gratification of desire, or for pleasures, except in a very few cases; but, the will of the legislator being made known, all dancing, every ode, and every choir, shall be instituted according to their determination. For every employment about a Muse, which is conducted in an orderly manner, though a sweet Muse is not added, is ten thousand times better than every disorderly pursuit of a Muse. The pleasant, however, is common to all the Muses. For every one considers that to be pleasant with which he has been conversant from infancy to mature age. And if he has been familiar with a prudent and orderly Muse, when he hears one of a contrary character, he hates, and calls it illiberal. But he who has been educated in familiarity with a common and sweet Muse, calls the contrary to this frigid and unpleasant. So that, as I just now said, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant has any peculiar privilege. But the case is different with respect to emolument and detriment: for the one renders those who are educated in it better, and the other worse.

CLIN. It is well said.

GUEST. Further still, it will be proper to separate the songs which are adapted to the women from those which are adapted to the men, defining them by a certain formula, and accommodating them to harmonies and rhythms. For to be dissonant from the whole of harmony, or foreign from rhythm, attributing to melodies nothing adapted to each of these, is a dire circumstance.

circumstance. It is necessary, therefore, that the figures of these should be established by law, and both be properly attributed to both. But that which is accommodated either to men or women ought to be rendered manifest from the difference of the nature of each. That which is magnificent, therefore, and verges to fortitude, must be called virile : but that which more inclines to the ornamental and the moderate must be delivered, both in law and in discourse, as of a more feminine nature. This, then, is the order. In the next place, let us declare after what manner, by whom, and when, each of these are to be accomplished. But as a shipwright, when he lays down that which is the principle in the construction of a ship, describes the form of the keel ; in like manner, I appear to myself to do the same thing. For, while I endeavour to distinguish the figures of lives according to the manners of souls, I in reality lay down the keels of them, and very properly consider by what device, and after what manner, we may transport in the best manner life over this sea of life. Human affairs, indeed, are not worthy of great attention ; yet it is necessary that they should be attended to. But this is not an unfortunate circumstance. Since, however, we are here, if we can in a certain respect accomplish this in a convenient manner, it will, perhaps, be sufficient for us. But some one may, perhaps, very properly inquire what it is that I now say.

CLIN. Some one may.

GUEST. I say, then, that a thing of a serious nature ought to be seriously studied, but that this ought by no means to be the case with that which is not of a serious nature. And that divinity, indeed, is naturally worthy of every blessed study, but that man, as I said before, was fashioned to be a certain sport¹ of divinity. This, indeed, is truly the most excellent thing which he possesses. It is necessary, therefore, that every man and woman, pursuing this mode, and engaging in the most beautiful sports, should thus pass through life, thinking, in a manner, entirely contrary to what they do at present.

CLIN. How ?

¹ Ancient theologists and intellectual philosophers were accustomed to call the energy of divinity proceeding into the sensible universe sport, on account of the delusive, fictitious, and ever-gliding nature of matter, and the forms which it contains. So that in this sense man, considered as connected with body, may be said to be the sport of divinity.

GUEST.

GUEST. Now, indeed, they think that serious pursuits ought to subsist for the sake of sports. For they consider that warlike concerns, which are things of a serious nature, ought to be well disposed for the sake of peace. But neither does sport naturally belong to war, nor was there ever any discipline in it which deserves to be mentioned, nor is there at present, nor will be. But we say that this is a thing of a most serious nature,—I mean, that every one ought to pass through life, for the most part, and in the most excellent manner, in peace. What the proper manner, therefore, is of sporting through life, and what the sports are which should be employed in sacrifices, in singing and dancing, so that the Gods may be rendered propitious, and enemies opposed and vanquished in battle; likewise, by what songs and dances both these may be accomplished;—of all these particulars we have delivered the formulæ, and, as it were, cut the paths in which we should proceed. The poet too appears to speak well when he says: “You will conceive, O Telemachus, some things from yourself, but others the dæmon will suggest to you. For I do not think that you were born and nourished with unfavourable Gods’.” Such too ought to be the conceptions of our pupils. For they should think that what we have already said has been sufficiently said; and that the dæmon and divinity will suggest other things to them respecting sacrifices and choirs, viz. what divinities they ought to render propitious in their sports, and when; at the same time living in a natural manner, and being themselves, for the most part, prodigies, but participating certain small portions of truth.

MEGIL. You vilify, O guest, in every respect the human race.

GUEST. You should not wonder at this, O Megillus, but pardon me. For, looking to divinity, and being affected with the view, I have said that which I just now said. But let our race not be any thing despicable (if it is agreeable to you), but worthy serious attention. After these things the public buildings for gymnastic exercises and disciplines have been spoken of, and placed in a tripartite manner in the middle of the city. The gymnasia too of the horses have, in a similar manner, been assigned a tripartite distribution in the suburbs of the city, together with ample places adorned for the sake of the young men, that in these they may exercise themselves with

† *Odyss.* lib. iii.

the bow and arrow, and in other jaculations; and may be properly disciplined and attended to. If, therefore, we did not then sufficiently speak about these particulars, let us now discourse about them in conjunction with the laws.

Of all these, then, foreign masters should be hired, who residing in these ample places may teach every one that shall come to be instructed, the warlike and musical disciplines; not only instructing those whom their parents wish to be taught, and rejecting others, but, as it is said, teaching every man and boy to the utmost of their power, as being those who from necessity discipline the city rather than children. My law too asserts the same things about females as about males; and says, that the former ought to be equally exercised with the latter. Nor shall I be afraid to say, that both the gymnastic and equestrian disciplines are adapted to women as well as to men. For I am persuaded of this through hearing antient fables. But, in short, even at present, I know that there are innumerable myriads of women about Pontus, called Sauromantides, who are ordered equally to use, and equally to be exercised in, horses, bows, and other arms, in common with the men. But besides this I reason in the following manner about these particulars: I say, if it is possible that these things may subsist in this manner, the custom of our country, which excludes women from engaging with all their strength in the same pursuits as men, is the most foolish of all customs. For thus every city is nearly rendered half instead of double, from the same effects and labours. Though, indeed, this is a wonderful error of the legislator.

CLIN. So it appears. Yet, O guest, many of the things asserted by us at present are contrary to the custom of a polity.

GUEST. But we ought to permit the subject of our discourse to be well discussed; and, when discussed, it is requisite to select that which appears to be best.

CLIN. You have spoken very elegantly, and you have made me reprove myself for what I just now said. Speak, therefore, after this, whatever is agreeable to yourself.

GUEST. That is agreeable to me, O Clinias, which I said above; that, if it should appear these things could not be sufficiently accomplished, they

may perhaps be contradicted in discourse. But now, if some one is by no means disposed to admit this law, he ought to inquire after something else. Nevertheless our exhortation will not cease to assert that women ought in the highest degree, in our city, to participate in common with the men of discipline and other particulars. For in a certain respect it is requisite to think as follows on this subject. Admit that women are not to participate in common with men, in every thing pertaining to life, will it not be necessary that another order should be assigned to them?

CLIN. It will be necessary.

GUEST. What other order then among those which exist at present, shall we assign them in preference to that of our communion? Shall we adopt that of the Thracians and many other nations, who use women for the purposes of agriculture, and in the place of herdsmen and shepherds, in the very same manner as they use their slaves? Or shall we adopt the custom of our country, and that of all our neighbouring cities? For, with us, all possessions, as they are called, are collected together into one habitation, and the care of provisions, shuttles, and every thing pertaining to the manufacture of wool, is committed to women. Or shall we, O Megillus, choose a medium between these, the Laconic mode? so that virgins shall engage in gymnastic exercises and music; but women, during the time of peace, shall take care of the manufacture of wool, at the same time leading an active, but by no means a depraved and abject life? And further still, shall they bestow a certain kind of middle attention to the care of provisions and the education of children, but shall not engage in war; so that, if it should be necessary at any time to defend the city and their children, they may neither be able to use bows like certain Amazons, nor be skilled in any other kind of jaculation, nor yet to imitate the Goddesses with spear and shield, and make a generous resistance for their besieged country, so as to be able, when beheld in a certain order, at least to terrify the enemy, if they can accomplish nothing greater than this? But, if they live in this manner, they will by no means dare to imitate the Sauromantides, who will appear to these women to be men. Let him, therefore, who is willing to praise your legislators for these things, praise them: but my opinion respecting them will never alter. For a legislator ought to be a perfect and not a half character,

rafter, who suffers the female sex to be lost in luxury, and to use improper diet, but takes consummate care of the male sex, and thus nearly leaves for the city the half instead of the double of a happy life.

MEGIL. What shall we do, O Clinias? Shall we suffer our guest thus to censure the Spartans?

CLIN. Certainly. For, since liberty of speech is given to him, he must be suffered to go on, till laws have in every respect been sufficiently discussed.

MEGIL. You speak very properly.

GUEST. It is, therefore, nearly my province to endeavour to discuss what is subsequent to this.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. What then will be the mode of life by which necessities may be moderately procured for men? so that arts may be left to others, but agriculture committed to slaves, who may procure the first fruits of the earth, so as to be sufficient for men that live in a moderate manner; likewise, that eating in common may be adopted, the men being placed apart, and their domestics situated near them; also the female offspring, together with their mothers. Further still, that male and female governors may be placed over these public banquets, so as to dissolve them every day, and inspect the behaviour of all those that eat in common; and who may return home after the governor and the rest have made libations to those Gods to whom that day or night is dedicated. To men governed in this orderly manner, will no necessary work, and which is in every respect adapted to them, be left? But is it necessary that each of them should live after the manner of cattle, paying attention to nothing but growing fat? This therefore, we say, is neither just nor beautiful: nor is it possible that a man who lives in this manner can obtain that which is adapted to his nature. But to a sluggish animal, and which grows fat through indolence, it belongs to be torn in pieces by another animal who is vehemently exercised by fortitude and labours. If, therefore, we investigate these things with the accuracy which we employ at present, we shall perhaps find that they will never take place as long as women and children, private houses, and every thing else of this kind, are made to be private property. But those particulars which are secondary to these, and have just now been mentioned by us, if they take place, should be established in a very moderate manner. We say then that a work remains

for those that live in this manner, which is neither the smallest nor the most vile, but the greatest of all things which are ordained by a just law. For, as he who aspires after victory, in the Pythian or Olympian games, neglects every other pursuit, so his soul is filled with a double, or more than a double employment, who devotes himself in the most proper manner to the virtue of the soul and body. For no other employment ought to become an impediment to a proper attention to the body, and to the disciplines and manners of the soul. But, indeed, every night and every day are scarcely sufficient for him who does this, to accomplish his end in a perfect and sufficient manner. Since these things, therefore, naturally subsist in this manner, the whole time of employment ought to be always orderly assigned to liberal men, in a continued succession, from one rising of the sun to another. The legislator, indeed, will appear ungraceful, who says many and trifling things about domestic government, and among these about the necessity of nocturnal vigilance, in order that the whole city may be continually defended with accuracy. For it ought to be considered as base, and not liberal, by all men, for any citizen to pass the whole night in sleep, and not to be always the first that is roused and seen by all his domestics; whether it is proper to call a thing of this kind a law or an institute. Besides this, it ought to be reckoned base by female slaves, for the mistress to be roused by them, instead of being herself the first to rouse the rest, viz. both male and female slaves, her children, and in short, if possible, the whole house. All free persons, therefore, rising by night, should perform the many necessary political and æconomic duties of their stations; the governors, those pertaining to the city, and masters and mistresses, those pertaining to their families. For much sleep is neither naturally adapted to bodies nor to souls, nor to the actions of these. For he who is asleep is of no more worth than that which is destitute of life; but, whoever among us is careful in the highest degree that he may live and be wise, will be vigilant for the greatest part of his time, sleeping no longer than is necessary to the preservation of health. But much of this will not be requisite for him who is familiar with good habits. Magistrates, indeed, who are vigilant by night in cities, are a terror to evil men, whether they are enemies or citizens, but are admired and honoured by the just and the wise; and are both useful to themselves and the whole city. The night being passed through in this manner, besides all the above-men-

tioned

tioned advantages, produces likewise a certain fortitude in the souls of the citizens. On the dawn of day it will be proper that boys should go to their masters. For neither cattle nor any thing else should live without a shepherd; nor boys without certain teachers, nor slaves without masters: but *a boy is the most difficult to manage of all wild beasts*. For, in consequence of the fountain of prudence in him not being yet perfect, he becomes insidious and vehement, and the most insolent of wild beasts. On this account it is necessary to bind him with a multitude of chains: and as soon as he is freed from his nurse and mother, he should be committed to the care of pedagogues, on account of his childishness and infancy, and afterwards to preceptors, that, as a free-born animal, he may be instructed in proper disciplines. But if the boy is born a slave, let it be lawful for any free-born man to punish the child, pedagogue, and preceptor, whenever he detects them acting improperly. But whoever is present on this occasion, and does not justly punish the offenders, shall in the first place be subject to the greatest reproach; and, in the next place, he who was chosen by the guardians of the law to preside over boys, shall take notice whether he whom we have mentioned does not chastize these offenders, when it is fit they should be chastized, or does not chastize them in a proper manner. For he must be an acute inspector, and one who diligently attends to the education of boys, and regulates their natures, always converting them to that which is legally good. But in what manner will the law furnish us with sufficient instruction in this particular? For this has not yet been delivered either clearly or sufficiently, but only in a partial manner. It is however necessary, that to the utmost of our power nothing should be left incomplete, but that every thing should be unfolded, that our discourse may be to others both an interpreter and a nourisher. We have, therefore, already spoken concerning the form of a choir of singing and dancing, which among these are to be chosen, corrected, and dedicated to divinity. But we have not yet spoken concerning prose compositions, which of these, and in what manner, O most excellent superintendant of boys, they are to be delivered to those under your tuition. Though you have in our discourse the particulars which they ought to learn and study, respecting war. For the things, my friend, pertaining to letters have in the first place been sufficiently discussed by the legislator. In the next place, those pertaining to the lyre, and such as are of a memorable nature,

nature, which we said it was necessary to mention, together with warlike and æconomical concerns. After this, the legislator discussed those particulars respecting the periods of divine bodies, viz. of the stars, the sun, and the moon, which ought to be established by every city. But of what particulars are we speaking? I answer, Of the order of days with respect to the periods of months, and of months with respect to years, that seasons, sacrifices, and festivals, receiving that which is accommodated to them, and being disposed in a natural order, may render the city alive and vigilant, attributing proper honours to the Gods, and causing men to be more wise about the worship of divinity. These things, O friend, have thus been sufficiently discussed for you by the legislator. Attend, therefore, to what follows: We say that all has not been said about letters that might be said, because it has not yet been determined whether he who is to become a moderate citizen ought to possess an accurate knowledge of discipline, or by no means apply to it. In a similar manner, too, respecting the lyre. Boys, therefore, of ten years of age should apply to letters for nearly the space of three years. And those who are thirteen years old should bestow in like manner three years on the study of the lyre. Nor shall it be lawful for a father to keep his children to these studies for a shorter or longer space of time, nor for a child to apply to them, whether he is a lover or a hater of discipline. But he who is not obedient to the law in this respect, let him be deprived of those youthful honours which we shall shortly mention. However, in the first place, hear what masters ought to teach, and youth to learn, during this period. They should labour at letters till they are able to read and write. But we should not be at all concerned that those who are not naturally quick make neither rapid nor beautiful advances in allotted portions of time. With respect to those monuments of the poets destitute of the lyre, which are partly written in measure, and are partly without the sections of rhythm, O ye best of all guardians of the laws, what use will ye permit to be made of those writings, which, being destitute of rhythm and harmony, are deceitful compositions, and are left us by certain men of this description? It appears to me, that the legislator himself will very much doubt what is to be done in this case.

CLIN. What is this, O guest, which you appear to say, doubting with yourself?

GUEST.

GUEST. Your question is very pertinent, O Clinias. But to you, who speculate in common with me respecting laws, it is necessary that I should speak both that which appears certain, and that which appears dubious.

CLIN. What, therefore, do you now say respecting these? And what is it that moves you to speak in this manner?

GUEST. I will tell you. For it is by no means easy to speak contrary to what has been often said by ten thousand mouths.

CLIN. But what? Does it appear to you that the few and inconsiderable particulars which have been above mentioned by you respecting laws, are contrary to the sentiments of the multitude?

GUEST. You have spoken this with the greatest truth. For, as it appears to me, you exhort me to proceed confidently in this road, though it is arduous and odious to many, and advance through the path of laws which our present discourse has unfolded, without omitting any particular. And, perhaps, a journey of this kind will be pleasing to no less a multitude of a different description; but, if to a less, it will not be a worse multitude.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. I shall not therefore desist. I say, indeed, that we have many poets who have written in hexameter, and many who have written in trimeter¹ verse; among which the intention of some has been serious in these compositions, but of others jocose. An innumerable multitude too of such as are skilled in these writings have often said, that children who are properly educated must be abundantly nourished with those poetical compositions by often hearing them read; and, in short, must be made learned by committing all the poets to memory. But others say, that a selection should be made of the principal things in all the poets, and that certain entire sentences collected for this purpose should be committed to memory, if any one among us is desirous of becoming a wise and good man through much experience and skill in a multitude of particulars. Do you, therefore, now order me to explain what is beautifully said, and what not, among these assertions?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Shall I, in one word, therefore say what I think sufficient about all these? I am of opinion, indeed, that every one will allow me to say,

¹ A trimeter is an Iambic verse of three measures, or six feet.

that many things are beautifully asserted by the poets, and many things quite the contrary. But, if this be the case, I say that polymathy is dangerous to youth.

CLIN. How then, and what would you advise the guardian of the law to do?

GUEST. Of what are you speaking?

CLIN. Of the paradigm, by looking to which the guardian of the laws may permit some things to be learnt by all boys, and may forbid others. Speak, and do not be remiss in answering this question.

GUEST. O good Clinias, I appear in a certain respect to be fortunate.

CLIN. About what?

GUEST. Because I am not entirely destitute of a paradigm. For, now looking to the particulars which we have discussed from the rising of the sun to the present hour, *but not in my opinion without divine inspiration*, it appears to me that they are similar to a certain poetry. Nor perhaps is it wonderful that I should be very much delighted, on beholding our assertions collected as it were together in one. For, of all those above-mentioned numerous sentences which I have learnt and heard, those which we have collected in the present discourse appear to me to be the most moderate, and most fit to be heard by youth. So that I think I cannot propose a better paradigm to the guardian of the laws, and to the preceptor of youth, than this, that they should exhort the masters to teach boys these things, together with such particulars as are consequent and similar to these, whether they are written in prose or verse, or are simply asserted without being written, but are conformable to these laws, and are, therefore, by no means to be neglected, but committed to writing. And, in the first place, the teachers themselves should be compelled to learn and praise these assertions: but those teachers must not act in the capacity of teachers by whom they are not approved. And, finally, boys must be committed to the care of those preceptors by whom these assertions are approved and praised. And thus much concerning letters, and the masters of letters.

CLIN. We do not appear to me, O guest, to have wandered from the design of our discourse: but whether or not we are right upon the whole, is perhaps difficult to determine.

GUEST. But this, O Clinias, will become more apparent (as it is proper

it should) when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of this discussion of laws.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Should we not, after having discussed the particulars about letters, speak concerning the master of the harp?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If we call to mind what has been already said by us, we assigned to the masters of the harp the province of imparting discipline and every kind of instruction about things of this sort.

CLIN. Of what kind of things are you speaking?

GUEST. We said, I think, that the Dionysiacal fingers of sixty years of age ought to become remarkably acute in their perception of rhythms, and the compositions of harmonies; so that, in those melodies which imitate the passions of the soul, they may be able to distinguish good from bad imitations,—rejecting the latter, but singing to and enchanting the souls of youth with the former, and thus inciting them through imitations to the possession of virtue.

CLIN. You speak most truly.

GUEST. It is requisite, therefore, for the sake of these things, that both the harper and his pupil should use the sounds of the lyre, and likewise for the sake of the distinction of the chords; rendering sounds consonant to sounds. But it shall not be lawful to exhibit to those who, through the quickness of their apprehension, would in three years experience the utility of music, the different sounds, and variety of the lyre; the chords themselves producing certain melodies, and others being produced by the poet who composes the melody, so as to connect the dense with the rare, the swift with the slow, the acute with the grave, and the consonant with the dissonant, and in a similar manner harmonizing to the sounds of the lyre all the varieties of rhythms. For contraries when confused with each other are difficult to be learnt. But it is proper that youth should be taught with the greatest possible facility. For the necessary disciplines which they must acquire are neither small nor few. However, our discourse as it advances in conjunction with time will show what these are. And such are the particulars respecting music, which must be attended to by the master of youth. But the particulars respecting those melodies and words
which

which ought to be taught by the masters of choirs, we have already discussed. These we said ought to be consecrated in festivals, in an accommodated manner, so as that they may be advantageous to the city, in conjunction with prosperous pleasure.

CLIN. These things too have been delivered by you, conformable to truth.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is chosen as governor respecting the Muse, must attend to these particulars in conjunction with benevolent fortune. But, as we have delivered what remained to be discussed respecting music, we shall do the same respecting dancing, and the whole of gymnastic pertaining to the body. For it is necessary that both boys and girls should learn to dance, and to be exercised. Is it not?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. Dancing-masters therefore must be chosen for boys, and dancing-mistresses for girls, that they may not be unaptly exercised in this art.

CLIN. Be it so.

GUEST. Again, we call that man who engages in a variety of employments, the curator of youth, and who, since he attends to both music and gymnastic, cannot have much leisure.

CLIN. How is it possible that, being advanced in years, he can attend to so many things?

GUEST. Easily, my friend. For the law has permitted, and will permit him to choose, as his associates in these employments, such men and women among the citizens as he pleases. But he knows who ought to be chosen, and will desire to choose worthy associates, as prudently knowing and reverencing the magnitude of government, and being well convinced that all our affairs will fail prosperously over the sea of life when youth are properly educated. But, when this is not the case, the consequence neither deserves to be mentioned, nor shall we mention it, as in the highest degree venerating the lovers of prophets in a new city. Much, therefore, has been said by us respecting dancing and all gymnastic motions. For we consider as gymnastic, all corporeal exercises in war, such as that of the bow, and every kind of hurling, likewise with the shield, and all the battles with arms; together with tactic evolutions, the conducting of armies, the positions of camps, and such particulars as pertain to equestrian disciplines. For it is proper that there should be common teachers of all these, procured by hire

hire for this purpose by the city, and that both boys and girls, men and women, should be their disciples, that they may be skilled in all these particulars. And girls indeed should apply themselves to every kind of dancing and fighting in armour; but women to military evolutions, and the taking up and laying down of arms, if on no other account, yet that, if at any time there should be occasion for all the men leaving the city to march to battle, the women may be able sufficiently to defend the children and the rest of the city. Or, on the contrary, that they may take up arms for the city, if it should be attacked by foreign enemies, with a certain mighty strength and violence, whether they are Greeks or Barbarians; this being an event that may easily happen. For it is certainly a great fault in a polity, to educate women in so shameful a manner as to be inferior even to birds, who fight for their offspring with the strongest of savage animals, are willing to die, and expose themselves to every danger in their defence. But women, according to the present mode of education, in time of danger immediately run to sacred places, and fill all the altars and temples, and thus give rise to an opinion that man is naturally the most timid of all animals.

CLIN. By Jupiter, O guest, this is both disgraceful and detrimental to a city.

GUEST. We will, therefore, establish this as a law, that women shall not neglect warlike concerns, but that all the citizens, both male and female, shall pay attention to them.

CLIN. I agree with you that it should be so.

GUEST. With respect to wrestling, therefore, we have said some things, but we have not discussed that which I should call the greatest thing, nor is it easy to discuss it without uniting gesticulation to the discussion. This, therefore, we shall then determine when our discourse, following things, indicates something clear about other particulars of which we have spoken, and shows that such a wrestling is, in reality, of all motions most allied to contention in battle: and, besides this, that such wrestling ought to be studied for the sake of war, but not war for such wrestling.

CLIN. This assertion of yours is beautiful.

GUEST. Thus much, therefore, may suffice at present concerning wrestling. But with respect to every other motion of the body, the greatest part of which may be properly denominated a certain dancing, it must be divided

into two species; one of which imitates that which is venerable in more beautiful bodies, but the other, that which is depraved in baser bodies. And again, of each of these there are two species. For, of the worthy motion, one kind takes place when beautiful bodies and brave souls are entangled in war and violent labours: but the other, in the prosperous condition of the temperate soul in moderate pleasures. And he who calls a dancing of this kind pacific, denominates it according to nature. But of these, the dancing in battle, which is different from the pacific, may be properly called Pyrrhic; which imitates the avoiding of all blows and hurlings by declinations, every kind of yielding, leaping on high, and dropping on the ground; and likewise attempts to imitate the motions contrary to these, tending to efficacious figures, in the hurling of bows and spears, and in all kinds of blows. But the rectitude and proper tone both of good bodies and souls takes place for the most part when an imitation is employed which is advantageous to the members of the body. This, therefore, should be admitted as proper, but the contrary to this, as improper. This also should be considered in the pacific dancing of every one, viz. whether, engaging in beautiful dancing, according to nature, he conducts himself in the choirs in a manner conformable to those who are subservient to good laws. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the ambiguous from the unambiguous dancing. What then is this, and how is each to be distinguished? The ambiguous dancing is Bacchic, and belongs to those that follow the Bacchuses, viz. the Nymphs, Pans, Silenuses, and Satyrs, who, as they say, imitate those that are intoxicated with wine, and perform purifying and certain mystic ceremonies. The whole of this kind of dancing cannot easily be defined, either as pacific, or adapted to war; nor, in short, is it easy to say what is the intention of it. But it appears to me that it may with the greatest rectitude be distinguished as follows: We must place the military dancing separate from that which is pacific, and assert that this kind of dancing is not adapted to war. Leaving it, therefore, thus situated, let us return to the military and pacific dancing, which may be praised as indubitably ours. But that kind of the pacific Muse which subsists in an opinion of a prosperous condition, and which honours the Gods and the sons of the Gods, in dancing, may receive a twofold division. For one kind is adopted when we have escaped certain labours and dangers, and have obtained good;
and

and this contains greater pleasures. But the other kind subsists when the goods which we before possessed continue to be safe, and become increased; in which case the pleasures are of a milder nature. But in things of this kind every man, with respect to the motions of the body, is moved in a greater degree when the pleasures are greater, but in a less degree when they are less. And he who is more modest, and more exercised in fortitude, is moved in a less degree. But he who is timid, and unexercised in temperance, sustains greater and more vehement mutations of motion. And, in short, every one that emits a sound, whether in singing or in speaking, is not entirely able to accomplish this with a quiet body. On this account the imitations of words by figures of the body produced the whole of the art of dancing. Some of us, therefore, in all these move elegantly, but others inelegantly. And as many of the antient names ought to be praised by us as posited well, and according to nature; in like manner, it is proper to believe that he, whoever he was, rightly and musically denominated the dancings of prosperous men, who conduct themselves moderately with respect to pleasures; and that, assigning all of them a name according to reason, he denominated them *modulations*. Likewise, that he established two kinds of beautiful dancing; calling the military dancing *Pyrrhic*, and the pacific *modulation*, giving to each a becoming and adapted name. These things, indeed, the legislator ought to explain by representations: but the guardian of the laws ought to investigate dancing; when he has discovered it, unite it with the rest of music; and in all festivals distribute that which is adapted to each of the sacrifices; so consecrating every thing in order, that no innovation may be made either in dancing or singing, but that, both the city and citizens persevering as much as possible after the same manner in the same pleasures, they may live well and happily. And thus we have determined what the particulars respecting the choirs of beautiful bodies and generous souls ought to be. But it is necessary to contemplate and know the motions of base bodies and thoughts, and those motions which are conversant with the defamations of laughter, in words, singing, dancing, and the reviling imitations of all these. For it is not possible that serious things can be learnt without such as are ridiculous, or contraries without all contraries, if any one is desirous of becoming prudent. But it is impossible to do both, if we wish to participate even a small portion of virtue. These things,

things, however, ought to be learnt, lest through ignorance we should either do or say something ridiculous, which is at all times unbecoming. Servants, therefore, and hired strangers, should be appointed to imitate things of this kind: but no free person should ever study, or be seen learning them, neither woman nor man; but some novelty of imitation about them should always present itself to the view. And thus let the sports pertaining to laughter, which we all denominate comedy, be established both in discourse and law. But if any of the tragic poets, who, as they say, write about things of a serious nature, should thus interrogate us:—O guests, will you allow us, or not, to come to your city and region, and present you with our poetry? or how are you determined to act about things of this kind? what answer, then, shall we give to these divine men about these particulars? For it appears to me that we should reply as follows: O most excellent of strangers, we ourselves are, to the utmost of our power, poets of the most beautiful and best tragedy. For the whole of our polity is an imitation of the most beautiful and most excellent life, which we say is, in reality, the most true tragedy¹. You, therefore, are poets, and we also are poets of the same description, being your competitors and antagonists in the most beautiful drama, which, as we hope, true law alone is naturally capable of effecting. But do not think that we shall easily suffer you to fix your scenes in the market-place, and, introducing players of elegant utterance, who speak louder than we do, to discourse to our children, wives, and the vulgar, about things for the most part different from those which they have heard from us. For we ourselves, and the whole city, would be nearly perfectly insane, if we should permit you to do what we have just now mentioned, before the magistrates have seen what you have composed, and have judged whether it is fit or not to be spoken before the people. Now, therefore, O boys, offspring of soft Muses, we shall, in the first place, show your odes, together with ours, to the governors; and if the things said by you shall appear to be the same, or better than those which are said by us, we will give the choir to you: but if this should not be the case, we shall never, O friends, be able to give you the choir. Let these particulars, therefore, be instituted by law

¹ For he who leads the most excellent life will, like another Ulysses, purify his soul from the dominion of the passions, those baneful suitors, whose aim is to dethrone reason and debauch philosophy. He who destroys these secret foes may be justly said to perform the most true tragedy.

respecting

respecting every choir, together with the discipline and manners of choirs, those pertaining to slaves being separated from those pertaining to masters, if it is agreeable to you.

CLIN. How is it possible it should not be so?

GUEST. Three disciplines, however, still remain for the freeborn. One of these is computation, and the particulars respecting numbers. But the second is that which measures length, breadth, and depth. And the third is that which contemplates the circuit of the stars, and the order in which they are naturally formed to move with relation to each other. With respect to all these particulars, it is not proper that the multitude should labour in obtaining an accurate knowledge of them, but a certain few, of whom we shall speak when we arrive at the end of our discussion. But it is shameful for the multitude not to know such particulars among these as are necessary, and which, in a certain respect, are asserted with the greatest rectitude. However, it is neither easy, nor altogether possible, to investigate all things accurately: but whatever is necessary among them must not be rejected. Indeed, it appears that he who first spoke proverbially respecting divinity, looking to these things, said, that God was never at any time seen contending with necessity; which I think must be understood of such necessities as are divine. For, if this was asserted of human necessities, to which the multitude looking speak in this manner, it would be by far the most stupid of all assertions.

CLIN. What are those necessities of disciplines, O guest, which are not human, but divine?

GUEST. It appears to me that they are those, which he who does not practise, nor in any respect learn, will never become either a God, a dæmon, or a hero among men, so as to be able to be a consummately diligent curator of mankind. But he will be very far from becoming a divine man who is neither able to know one, nor two, nor three, nor, in short, the even and the odd, nor in any respect knows how to number, nor is capable of numbering night and day, but is unskilled in the revolutions of the moon, the sun, and the other stars. He, therefore, who is of opinion that all these are disciplines not necessary for one who is about to know the most beautiful disciplines, will think in a very stupid manner. But what the nature is of each

each of these, how many they are, and when they are to be learnt; likewise, what that is which is to be learnt with some other, and what without others, together with all the mixture of these,—these are the things which ought in the first place to be learnt; and, with these disciplines as leaders, a transition is to be made to other things. For, thus necessity subsists naturally, which we say no divinity opposes at present, nor ever will oppose.

CLIN. What you assert at present, O guest, appears to be truly asserted, and according to nature.

GUEST. So it is, O Clinias: but it is difficult to establish laws respecting these things, when previously disposed in this manner. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, we will establish laws concerning them in a more accurate manner at some other time.

CLIN. You appear to me, O guest, to be afraid of our ignorance in things of this kind; and, indeed, not improperly. However, endeavour to speak, and do not conceal any thing on this account.

GUEST. I fear, indeed, what you now say: but I am much more afraid of those who have, indeed, touched upon these disciplines, but in a depraved manner. For, the being ignorant of all things is by no means a circumstance vehemently dire, nor yet the greatest evil; but much skill and great erudition, when improperly employed, are much more pernicious.

CLIN. True.

GUEST. Freeborn men, therefore, ought to learn those things which a great multitude of boys in Egypt learn, together with their letters. For, in the first place, with the Egyptians the art of reckoning is so inartificially devised for children, that they learn it in sport, and with pleasure. For a distribution is made of apples and crowns to many, and at the same time to a few, the same numbers being adapted for the purpose. The sitting together too of the pugilists and wrestlers, and the alternate and consequent order of their conjunction, are determined by numbers. Likewise, when they play, mingling together vessels of gold, brass, and silver, and other things of this kind, or distributing them separate, they adapt, as I said before, to their sports the use of necessary numbers; and thus render their pupils fit to conduct armies, to fix camps, and become good economists; and, in short, to be more useful and vigilant than other men. In the next place,

place, since a certain ridiculous and base ignorance respecting the measures of length, breadth, and depth, is naturally inherent in all men, they take care to liberate them from this.

CLIN. Of what kind of ignorance are you now speaking?

GUEST. O friend Clinias! I formerly heard, but after a long time began to wonder at, the manner in which we are affected about these things; and it appears to me, that it is not human, but rather the passion of certain swine and cattle. I therefore not only blush for myself, but for all the Greeks.

CLIN. About what? Inform us, O guest, what it is you mean.

GUEST. I will tell you. Or, rather, I will point it out to you interrogating. And do you answer me a trifling question. Do you know what length is?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And what breadth is?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. And do you know that these are two things, and that the third of these is depth?

CLIN. How is it possible that I should not?

GUEST. Does it not, therefore, appear to you that all these may be measured by each other?

CLIN. It does.

GUEST. I mean length by length, and breadth by breadth; and that, in a similar manner, depth is naturally capable of being measured by depth.

CLIN. Very much so.

GUEST. But, if some among these can neither do this vehemently, nor remissly, but some are able, and others not¹, and yet you think it can be effected by all, in what manner are you circumstanced with respect to these?

CLIN. Badly, it is evident.

GUEST. But again, do not all the Greeks, after a manner, think that length, breadth, and depth, can be mutually measured by each other?

CLIN. Entirely so.

¹ That is to say, some quantities are incommensurable, and others not.

GUEST. But if this is by no means possible, and yet all the Greeks, as I have said, think that it is possible, is it not fit, that, being ashamed of all them, we should thus address them : O best of the Greeks, this is one of the things which we said it was base not to know ; but is it not in every respect beautiful to know things necessary to be known ?

CLIN. How is it possible it should be otherwise ?

GUEST. And further still, there are other things allied to these, in which many errors are produced in us, the sisters of the above-mentioned errors.

CLIN. What are these ?

GUEST. The reason why some things are commensurate and others incommensurate with each other. For it is necessary that these things should be known, or that he should be in every respect depraved who is ignorant of them. In these things, therefore, we should always be mutually engaged. For this aged game will be much more pleasant, and more worthy of a free-born man, than that of chess.

CLIN. Perhaps so. It appears, therefore, that the game of chess, and these disciplines, are very different from each other.

GUEST. These things, then, I say, O Clinias, ought to be learnt by youth. For they are neither noxious nor difficult : and when they are learnt in conjunction with sport, they will be advantageous, but never detrimental to the city. But, if any one says otherwise, let us hear him.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If, then, it should appear that these things are so, it is evident that we should embrace them ; but if it should appear that they are not so, that we should reject them.

CLIN. Evidently so. Ought not, therefore, O guest, these to be now established by us as necessary disciplines, that the particulars pertaining to laws may not be discussed by us in vain ?

GUEST. Let them, indeed, be established, but as pledges from another polity, which may be dissolved if they should in no respect please us who establish them, or you for whom they are established.

CLIN. The condition you propose is just. But, consider after this the discipline of the stars, whether this being chosen for youth pleases us, or the contrary.

CLIN.

CLIN. Only speak.

GUEST. A great prodigy takes place in these, and which can by no means be endured.

CLIN. What is this?

GUEST. We say that the greatest God, and the whole world, ought not to be investigated, and that the causes of things ought not to be diligently and anxiously explored; because a conduct of this kind is not holy. It appears, however, that the very contrary to this is proper.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. What I have said is a paradox, and some one may think it is not adapted to old men: but when any one is of opinion that a discipline is beautiful, true, and advantageous to a city, and likewise in every respect friendly to divinity, it is perfectly impossible he should not mention it.

CLIN. You speak probably. But shall we find a thing of this kind about the discipline of the stars?

GUEST. O good man, all we Greeks, as I may say, conceive falsely of THOSE MIGHTY DIVINITIES THE SUN AND MOON.

CLIN. Of what kind of falsehood are you speaking?

GUEST. We say that the sun and moon never move in the same path, and that this is likewise the case with certain other stars which move together with these, and therefore we denominate them planets.

CLIN. By Jupiter, O guest, what you say is true. For, in the course of my life, I have often seen the morning and the evening star, and certain other stars, by no means moving in the same track, but entirely wandering. But we all know that the sun and moon perpetually wander.

GUEST. These are the things, therefore, O Megillus and Clinias, which we say our citizens and boys ought to learn respecting the celestial Gods, so far as this, that they may not blaspheme in speaking of them, but may celebrate them in a proper manner, by piously sacrificing and praying to their divinities.

CLIN. This indeed is right, if in the first place it is possible to learn that which you speak of; and in the next place, if we should not at present speak properly about these particulars, yet we shall when we are instructed in them. This being admitted, I grant that a thing of this kind should be

thus far learnt. Do you, therefore, endeavour to evince that these things are so, and we will follow you as your disciples.

GUEST. It is not easy to learn what I say, nor is it again in every respect difficult, nor does it require a great length of time. As a proof of this, I myself have heard these things, neither recently nor formerly, and yet I am able to render them manifest in a short time; though, if they were difficult, I who am aged should not be able to explain them to you, who are likewise aged.

CLIN. True. But what is this discipline which you call admirable, which you say it is fit youth should learn, but we are ignorant of? Endeavour to speak about it with the utmost perspicuity.

GUEST. I will endeavour. The dogma then, O best of men, respecting the sun and moon and the other stars, that they have at any time wandered, is not right; but the very contrary of this is true. For each of them perpetually passes through, in a circle, one and the same path, and not many paths; though they appear to pass through many. But that which is swiftest in them is not rightly conceived to be slowest, nor contrarily the contrary. And these things, indeed, naturally subsist in this manner; but we are of opinion that they subsist otherwise. If then, beholding in the Olympic games the course of horses or of men that run the longest race, we should call the swiftest the slowest, and the slowest the swiftest, and, making our encomiums, should celebrate the vanquished as the victor, I do not think that we should adapt our encomiums properly, nor in a manner agreeable to the racers. But now, when we err in the same manner respecting the Gods, shall we not think that, as such a conduct in the instance just alleged is ridiculous and not right, this is likewise true in the present case?

CLIN. It is ridiculous indeed.

GUEST. We are not, therefore, acceptable to divinity, when in hymning the Gods we celebrate them falsely.

CLIN. Most true, if these things are so.

GUEST. If, therefore, we can show that they are so, all these particulars as far as to this are to be learnt; but, if we cannot show it, they must be dismissed. Let these things then be thus determined.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST.

GUEST. It is proper, therefore, now to say, that the legal institutions respecting the disciplines of erudition have obtained their consummation. But it is requisite to conceive in a similar manner respecting hunting, and every thing else of this kind. For it appears that the office of a legislator is something more than that of merely establishing laws, and that he ought to make use of that medium which naturally subsists between admonition and the laws, and which has often occurred to us in the course of our discussion, and especially when we spoke concerning the education of children. For we said there were many things pertaining to this which could not be established by law, and that it was folly to attempt it: but laws being thus written, and the whole of a polity established, that is not the perfect praise of a citizen excelling in virtue, which says that he submits to the laws in the best manner, and is persuaded by them in the highest degree; but the praise is more perfect which asserts that he is one who leads a pure life, in consequence of being obedient to the writings of the legislator, in which he establishes, praises, and blames laws. For this is the most proper praise of a citizen. And the legislator, in reality, ought not only to write laws, but should subjoin to them what appears to him to be beautiful and not beautiful. The citizen too, that has arrived at the summit of virtue, should no less observe these, than those particulars which are punishable by the laws. But we will adduce for this purpose, as a witness, the subject of our present discussion; for it will render our intention more manifest. For hunting is a thing of a great extent, and which is now nearly comprehended in one name. For there is much hunting of aquatic, much of aerial, and still more of terrestrial animals, not only of wild beasts but of men; and, of this last, one kind respects war, and another friendship; and the one is laudable, but the other blameable. The thefts too of robbers and camps are huntings. The legislator, therefore, who establishes laws about hunting, can neither leave these unnoticed, nor impose fines and menacing laws on each, in a certain order. What then is to be done respecting things of this kind? The legislator ought to praise and blame what is laudable and blameable in hunting, with a view to the labours and studies of youth. And young men, when they hear, should be obedient to him, and should not suffer either pleasure or labour to prevent them from acting contrary to the directions of the legislator. But they should rather honour what is said and

enjoined with praise, than what is established with threatenings and fines. These things being premised, the praise and blame of hunting will follow in a becoming manner. For that hunting is to be praised which improves the souls of young men, but that which has a contrary tendency is to be blamed. Let us therefore discuss what follows, calling as follows upon young men through prayer: O friends, may never any desire or love of marine fishing, or of fishing with a hook, seize you; nor, in short, of labouring to catch any aquatic animals with a bow net, either by day or by night! May you likewise be void of all inclination to piracy, by which you would become unjust and atrocious hunters of men on the sea! And may you never in the least desire to commit theft in the region and city to which you belong, or to hunt birds, which, though a fascinating, is not a very liberal pursuit! The hunting, therefore, of pedestrial animals alone remains for our athletæ. But, of this, that kind which is performed by sleeping in turns, and is called nocturnal, as it belongs to sluggish men, is not worthy of praise. Nor yet that which during a remission of labours vanquishes the fierce strength of wild beasts by nets and snares, and not by patient endurance. That hunting, therefore, of wild beasts alone remains as the best of all, which is accomplished by horses, dogs, and corporeal strength and skill. For those that are anxious to obtain divine fortitude will vanquish savage animals by hunting them in the course, and with wounds, darts, and their own hands. And thus much may suffice respecting the praise and blame of all these particulars. However, let the law be this: No one shall impede these truly sacred hunters from hunting wherever they please. But no one shall suffer any person to engage in nocturnal hunting with nets and dogs. Fowling shall be permitted in uncultivated places and in mountains; but any one who may happen to be present shall forbid it in cultivated and sacred places. A fisherman shall not be suffered to hunt, either in ports or sacred rivers, marshes, or pools; but in other places he may be permitted to hunt so long as he does not use a mixture of juices. Now, therefore, it is proper to say, that the legal institutions respecting discipline have obtained their completion.

CLIN. You speak well.

THE LAWS,

BOOK VIII.

IT now follows that we should legally establish festivals, in conjunction with the Delphic oracles, and show what are the sacrifices, and who the divinities to whom it will be better for the city to sacrifice. But when and what number of sacrifices should be performed, it is perhaps nearly our business to establish by law.

CLIN. Perhaps so, as to the number.

GUEST. Let us therefore first speak as to the number. I should establish then three hundred and sixty-five; so that some one of the magistrates may always sacrifice to some God or daemon for the city, and for their possessions. But, the interpreters being assembled together with the priests, priestesses, prophets, and guardians of the laws, all these shall ordain such particulars as were necessarily omitted by the legislator. For it is requisite that these should take notice of things omitted. For the law indeed says that there should be twelve festivals to the twelve Gods, from whom each tribe is denominated, and that the citizens should perform sacred rites to each of these monthly, together with choirs, musical contests, and gymnastic exercises, in such a manner as is properly adapted both to the Gods themselves and the several seasons. Female festivals too must be orderly disposed in such a manner, that it may appear which should be celebrated with, and which without men. Further still, the festivals of the terrestrial, and such as are denominated celestial Gods, together with the attendants on these, must not be mingled with each other, but must be separated in the twelfth month, which is sacred to Pluto, that they may be legitimately celebrated. For a God of this kind must not be indignantly treated, but honoured by warlike
men,

men, as always being the best of divinities to the race of men. For *the communion between, is not better than the solution of soul and body, as I affirm, speaking seriously.* Besides, it is requisite that those who intend to distinguish these things sufficiently, should think that this our city is such with respect to vacation of time, and the possession of things necessary, as no other city is found to be at present. But it is requisite that it should live well in the same manner as an individual of the human species. To those however that live happily, this must necessarily be present the first of all things,—I mean, that they neither injure others, nor are injured by others. But, of these, the former is not very difficult; but the latter is difficult in the extreme, and cannot be perfectly acquired otherwise than by becoming perfectly good¹. The same thing also takes place in a city. For, when it is good, its life is pacific; but, when depraved, it is infested with external and internal war. But, this being nearly the case, cities should not exercise themselves in war during the time of war, but in a life of peace. It is necessary, therefore, that a city endued with intellect should every month exercise itself in war, for not less than the space of one day, but more frequently as it may seem fit to the magistrates, and this without fearing either heat or cold; and that the magistrates, together with women and boys, should be exercised in it, that every inhabitant of the city may be prepared when it shall appear to the governors proper to lead forth all the people. For this purpose, too, certain beautiful games are to be devised, together with sacrifices, that certain festive battles may take place, perspicuously imitating in the highest degree the contentions of war. It is likewise necessary that the rewards of valour should be distributed to each of these; and that the victors should be praised, and the vanquished blamed; in a degree corresponding to the manner in which they have conducted themselves in the contests, and through the whole of life. However, let not every one be a poet of things of this kind. But in the first place let him be a poet who is not less than fifty years of age; and in the next place who not only sufficiently possesses the poetic muse, but who has accomplished something beautiful and illustrious. The poems, therefore, of good and honourable

¹ For a perfectly good man cannot be injured; because he who is injured is deprived of some good: but virtue is the proper good of a truly worthy man, and this cannot be taken away.

men in the city, and who have performed illustrious actions, should be sung, though they may not be naturally musical. But let the judgment of these be given to the instructors of youth, and to the other guardians of the laws. These shall attribute this honour to worthy men, that they alone shall be allowed freedom of speech in the Muses; but they shall not grant this liberty to others. No one, therefore, shall dare to sing a Muse which is not approved by the guardians of the laws, though it should be sweeter than the hymns of *Thamyris* and *Orpheus*: but such sacred poems shall be sung as have been examined and approved, and are dedicated to the Gods; together with the poems of worthy men, in which certain persons are praised or blamed, and which are judged to do this with moderation. The same things ought in a similar manner to take place, both among men and women, respecting war, and poetic liberty of speech. But it is requisite that the legislator should thus reason with himself: In properly arranging the whole city, what citizens shall I educate? Ought they not to be the *athletæ* of the greatest contests, who have ten thousand antagonists? Entirely, some one speaking with propriety may say. But what? If we should educate pugilists, or pancratiasts, or others of this kind, shall we lead them forth to the contest before they have contended with any one? Or, if we were pugilists, should we not have learned to fight, and laboured in it, many days prior to the contest, imitating all such particulars as we should adopt in a real contest when we contend for victory? And should we not, as approaching in the nearest manner possible to a similitude of real contention, instead of thongs, gird ourselves with the cestus, that we may be able sufficiently both to give wounds and with premeditation avoid them? And if it should happen that there are none with whom we can contend, should we not, without dreading the laughter of the foolish, dare to suspend an inanimate image, and exercise ourselves against it? And if we were in want both of animate and inanimate adversaries, should we not venture to contend even with our own shadows? Or, would any one say that this particular motion of the hand was devised for any other purpose?

CLIN. For nearly no other purpose, O guest, than that which you have just now mentioned.

GUEST. What then? Will the warlike part of the city dare to engage in the greatest of contests, worse prepared than combatants of this kind? I mean,

mean, when they are to fight for life for their children, possessions, and the whole of the city. Will not, therefore, the legislator be afraid lest these mutual gymnastic exercises should appear to certain persons ridiculous? And will he not establish by law, that military concerns should be engaged in every day in an inferior degree, without arms, exciting to this purpose the choirs, and the whole of gymnastic exercise? Will he not likewise order, that both greater and lesser gymnastic exercises should be performed every month at least, that each may contend in taking possession of places, or acting on the defensive in every part of the city; truly imitating every thing pertaining to war, and fighting with balls and with darts, which approach as near as possible to true and dangerous darts? And this, that the sportive contests of the citizens with each other may not be entirely destitute of fear, but may excite terror, and thus, after a manner, evince who is magnanimous, and who is not? For, thus he may be able in a proper manner to honour some, and disgrace others, and render the whole city through the whole of life useful for true contention. But, if any one should happen to die in these contests through involuntary slaughter, let it be established that the homicide, when he has made an expiation according to law, shall be considered in future as pure. For the legislator ought to think that, in the place of a few who may happen to die, others again will succeed not worse than the slain: but that fear becoming, as it were, extinct in all these, he will no longer be able to distinguish the better from the worse; which is, in no small degree, a greater evil to the city than the involuntary destruction of a few individuals.

CLIN. We agree with you, O guest, that these things ought to be legally established, and attended to by all the city.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, all of us know the reason, why in cities at present there is scarcely any such choir and contest, or, at least, in a very small degree? Shall we say that this happens through the ignorance of the multitude and of the legislators?

CLIN. Perhaps so.

GUEST. By no means, O blessed Clinias! But it is proper to say that there are two causes of this, and those very sufficient.

CLIN. What are they?

GUEST. One is, that, through the love of riches every thing else being at
all

all times neglected, the soul of every citizen is incapable of applying to any thing but the daily accumulation of wealth. Hence every one with the greatest alacrity learns and exercises himself in that discipline or study which leads to this, but ridicules other things. It is proper therefore to say, that this is one reason why citizens are unwilling to engage seriously in this, or any other beautiful and excellent pursuit; but, through an insatiable desire of silver and gold, every man willingly embraces every art and artifice, both the more beautiful and the more base, that he may become rich, acts both in a holy and unholy manner, and is not indignant at any kind of conduct, however base, by which he may be able like a wild beast to eat and drink abundantly, and enjoy venereal pleasures to satiety.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. This, therefore, I assign as one reason why cities are prevented from being sufficiently exercised in any thing else beautiful, and in warlike particulars: but those that are naturally modest have their attention directed to merchandize, navigation, and servile offices; and those that are naturally brave, to theft, house-breaking, sacrilege, warlike stratagems, and tyranny. These indeed are naturally well disposed, but become unfortunate through this pernicious custom.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. Why should I not call those in every respect unfortunate, who are compelled by hunger through the whole of life to torment their own soul?

CLIN. This, therefore, is one reason. But what do you assign, O guest, as the second reason?

GUEST. You have very properly admonished me.

CLIN. One reason, as you say, is the insatiable desire of riches, in the accumulation of which all men are so busily engaged, that they have not leisure to attend in a proper manner to warlike concerns. Let it be so. But inform us what is the second reason.

GUEST. Do I appear to you to have dwelt too long upon the first reason, through an incapacity of assigning the second?

CLIN. You do not. But you appear to us to reprobate through hatred a custom of this kind more than is becoming.

GUEST. You accuse me, O guests, in a most proper manner. You shall therefore hear what is consequent to this.

CLIN. Only speak.

GUEST. I say, therefore, that those polities which we have often mentioned in the preceding part of our discourse are the causes of this, viz. a democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny. For no one of these is a polity, but all of them may with the greatest rectitude be called seditions; because in these the willing never rule over the willing, but over the unwilling, and this always with a certain violence. And as in these the governor fears the governed, he never at any time suffers men to become voluntarily good, rich, strong, brave, or altogether warlike. These two reasons are nearly the causes of all things in cities, but particularly of those which we have enumerated. But the polity to which we are now giving laws avoids both these. For it possesses the greatest leisure; its inhabitants are free, and I think will from these laws be lovers of money in the smallest degree. So that it seems probable, and may reasonably be concluded, that such an establishment of a polity alone of all that exist at present can bring to perfection that warlike discipline, and warlike sport, which we have already rightly discussed.

CLIN. It is well said.

GUEST. Does it not follow, therefore, that we should now speak concerning all gymnastic contests; so that such of them as are conducive to war may be studied, and the rewards of victory assigned them; but such as are not, may be dismissed? But it is better to relate from the beginning what these are, and establish them by law. And, in the first place, should we not establish the particulars pertaining to the course, and to swiftness?

CLIN. We should establish them.

GUEST. The celerity of the body, therefore, is universally the most warlike of all things; one kind being of the feet, and the other of the hands; that of the feet consisting in flying and pursuing; but that of the hands being indigent of strength and vigour in fighting and wrestling.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But neither of them without arms possesses the greatest utility.

CLIN. For how should they?

GUEST. The crier, therefore, must first announce to us the race of the stadium in the contests, as at present: but he who runs the stadium must enter armed. For we do not place rewards for one that contends unarmed. In the first place, therefore, he that runs the stadium must enter armed. In
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the second place, he that runs the twofold course, viz. from the barriers to the goal, and from the goal to the barriers. In the third place, the equestrian racer. In the fourth place, he who runs twenty-four stadia. And, in the fifth place, he who is lighter armed, whom we shall order to run for the space of sixty stadia to a certain temple of Mars. Afterwards we shall enjoin another, who is heavier armed, to run a shorter and smoother space of ground. And again, another who is an archer, and has all the apparatus belonging to archery, shall, contending, proceed through mountains and all-various places, for a hundred stadia, to the temple of Apollo and Diana. Having established the contest, therefore, we must wait for these till they arrive, and bestow on the several victors the rewards of victory.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. These contests we must conceive to have a tripartite division: one of boys; another of beardless youths; and a third of men. And for the beardless youths we shall establish two out of three parts of the course: but for boys the halves of these, who shall contend with archers and armed men. With respect to females, for naked girls not yet fit for marriage, we shall establish the stadium, the twofold course, the equestrian course, and the long course, or that of four-and-twenty stadia. But those that are thirteen years of age shall not, prior to their marriage, contend in the course longer than their twentieth, nor shorter than the eighteenth year of their age. At the same time care must be taken that their clothing is adapted for the purpose. And thus much concerning the contests of men and women in the course. As to the particulars respecting strength, instead of wrestling, and such things as are adopted at present, such as are more difficult must be instituted. And one should contend with one, two with two, and so on, as far as to ten with ten. But the things which the victor ought neither to suffer nor do, and the number of these, must be legally established by those that are skilled in the contests of arms; in the same manner as, in wrestling, those that preside over this exercise determine what is beautifully performed in wrestling, or the contrary. Let the same things too be legally established respecting women till they are married. But it is requisite that the whole of the peltastic¹ should be opposed to the pancratic contest; and that those who

¹ Viz. fighting with bucklers.

engage in this contest should use bows, half-mooned shields, darts, and the hurling of stones both from the hand and slings. Laws too shall be established respecting these particulars, by which the rewards of victory shall be given to those that behave well in these contests. After these things, it is requisite we should establish laws respecting equestrian contests. But we have not much occasion for horses in Crete; so that the Cretans must necessarily pay less attention to the rearing of horses, and contests with them. For no one of you is in any respect a curator of chariots, or ambitious of acquiring renown through them. So that it would be foolish to establish contests of this kind. We must, however, establish an equestrian sport with single horses, with colts that have not yet shed their teeth, with those that are situated between these, and with those that have attained the perfection of their nature, according to the condition of the country. Let, therefore, contention and desire of victory with these be according to law; and let a common judgment of all these contests, and of those that contend with arms, be attributed to the governors of tribes, and the masters of horses. But it will not be proper to give laws to the unarmed, neither in gymnastic exercises nor in these contests. However, he who hurls an arrow or a dart on horseback is not useless for Crete. So that let there be strife and contention with these for the sake of sport. But it is not fit to force women by law to engage in this contest. However, if nature is not averse to girls or virgins contending in this manner, in consequence of their former disciplines and habits, it may be admitted. And thus much may suffice for gymnastic contest and discipline, whether it is such as takes place in contests, or such as we daily engage in under proper masters. We have likewise, in a similar manner, discussed the greater part of music. But the particulars respecting rhapsodists, and those that follow these, together with those contests of choirs which must necessarily take place in festivals, days, months and years being assigned to the Gods and their attendants,—how all these are to be disposed, and whether they are to be instituted for three or for five years, must be referred to the conceptions imparted by the Gods respecting their order. Then also it is proper that the contests of music should alternately take place, according as the *athletæ*, the instructor of youth, and the guardians of the laws, assembling together for this purpose, shall determine. For these shall order when, and with whom, the several contests in all dancing

dancing and singing assemblies shall take place. But of what kind each of these ought to be, both with respect to the odes and harmonies mingled with rhythms and dancing, has been often said by the first legislator; conformably to which, succeeding legislators should establish contests in such a manner that they may be properly adapted to the several sacrifices and stated times; and should ordain sacred festivals for the city. With respect to these, therefore, and other such particulars, it is not difficult to know what legitimate order they should be allotted; nor would the transferring of them be greatly advantageous or detrimental to the city. There are, however, some particulars of no small consequence, which it is so difficult to establish, that divinity alone is equal to the task; but now they require some bold man who, honouring in the highest degree liberty of speech, will declare what appears to be best for a city and citizens, and will establish it in such a manner, as to introduce into the corrupted souls of the citizens that which is becoming and consequent to the whole polity. He will, likewise, assert things contrary to their most ardent desires; and this without any human assistance, and singly following reason alone.

CLIN. What is it you now say, O guest? for I do not understand you.

GUEST. It is likely. But I will endeavour to speak to you in a yet clearer manner. For, when my discourse led me to discipline, I saw the youth of both sexes associating in a benevolent manner with each other. But I was alarmed, as it was reasonable to suppose I should, when I considered who would use a city in which young men and women are delicately educated, and never engage in those vehement and sordid labours which in the highest degree extinguish petulance, but through the whole of life are at leisure for sacrifices, festivals, and choirs. How, therefore, in this city will they abstain from those desires which hurl many of both sexes into the extremity of danger, so that those things may be forbidden by law which reason orders us to abstain from? Indeed, it is not wonderful if the laws which were above established vanquish a multitude of desires. For the law which forbids the possession of riches in an immoderate degree, contributes not a little to the acquisition of temperance: and the whole of discipline possesses laws accommodated to this purpose. And, besides this, the eye of the governors is compelled not to look elsewhere, but always to observe youth. These things, therefore,

therefore, possess measure with respect to such other desires as are human. But the unnatural connexion with boys and girls, with women as if they were men, and with men as if they were women, whence innumerable evils arise both to individuals of the human species and to whole cities, how can any one prevent? And what medicine can be found by which the danger in each of these may be avoided? This is by no means easy, O Clinias. For, in other things, and these not a few, all Crete and Lacedæmon will afford us no small assistance in establishing laws foreign from the manners of the multitude; but, with respect to amatory affairs, they will entirely oppose us. For, if any one, following nature, should establish the law which existed prior to the times of Laius¹, and should assert it was proper not to have connexion with men and boys as if they were females, adducing as a witness the nature of wild beasts, and showing that, among these, males are not connected with males, because this is unnatural, perhaps he would use a probable reason, but he would by no means accord with our cities. In addition to this, likewise, he would not agree with them in that particular which we have said ought always to be observed by a legislator. For he ought always to observe among legal institutions, what contributes to virtue, and what does not contribute. Thus, for instance, he should consider whether what we have just now asserted would, when legally established, be beautiful, or at least not base, and how far it would contribute to the acquisition of virtue. Whether, when it takes place, it will produce the habit of fortitude in the soul of him who is persuaded, or a species of temperance in the soul of him who persuades? Or shall we say that no one will be persuaded of these things, but rather of every thing contrary to them? For every one will blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures, and is incapable of endurance. But will not every one reprobate the similitude of the image in him who imitates the female sex? What man, therefore, will legally establish such a thing as this? Scarcely no one who has true law in his mind. How, therefore, do we say it is true, that the nature of friendship, desire, and the love which we have spoken of, must be necessarily beheld by him who would properly consider these things? For,

¹ A son of Labdacus, and king of Thebes. He was the father of Œdipus, by whom he was slain.

since they are two, and there is another third species arising from both, and which is comprehended in one name, the greatest doubt and darkness are produced.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. We call a friend one who is similar to the similar according to virtue, and equal to the equal. We likewise denominate him a friend who is indigent of a rich man, though he is contrary to him in genus. But, when each of these friendships becomes vehement, we call it love.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. The friendship, therefore, which arises from contraries is dire and rustic, and is not often mutual: but that which arises from similars is mild and mutual through life. But as to that which is mixed from these, in the first place, it is not easy to learn what his wish may be who possesses this third love: and, in the next place, being drawn by both to that which is contrary, he himself is doubtful what he should do; the one exhorting him to use the flower of his age, and the other dissuading him from it. For, he who is a lover of body, and hungers after its flower, as if it were ripe fruit, endeavours to be satiated with it, and confers no honour on the manners of the soul of his beloved. But he who possesses a careless desire of body, and rather beholds than loves it with his soul, such an one, since he is a lover of soul in a becoming manner, considers the satiety of body, with respect to body, as disgraceful; but, reverencing and cultivating temperance, fortitude, magnificence, and prudence, he always wishes to live chastely with a chaste lover. But the love which is mixed from both these is the love which we just now discussed, as ranking in the third place. Since, therefore, there are three kinds of love, ought the law to forbid all of them, and prevent them from subsisting in us? Or, is it not manifest we should be willing that the love which is of virtue, and which desires that youth may arrive at the summit of excellence, should subsist in the city; but that, if possible, we should expel the other two? Or how shall we say, O friend Megillus?

MEGIL. You have spoken, O guest, about these particulars in a manner perfectly beautiful.

GUEST. I was right in my conjecture, O friend, that you would accord with me in sentiment. But it is not proper that I should inquire what your

law conceives about things of this kind, but that I should receive what you admit; and, after this, that I should endeavour to persuade Clinias to be of our opinion. Let, however, that which you have granted me be admitted, and let us now diligently discuss the laws.

MEGIL. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. I possess an art at present relative to the establishment of this law, which is partly easy, and partly in every respect difficult.

MEGIL. How do you say?

GUEST. We know even at present many men, who, though they act illegally, yet in a becoming manner and diligently abstain from a connection with beautiful persons, and this not involuntarily, but for the most part willingly.

MEGIL. When does this take place?

GUEST. When any one has a beautiful brother or sister. The same law too, though unwritten, sufficiently defends a son or a daughter, and prevents their parents from having any connection with them, either openly or secretly. Indeed, it prevents the vulgar from even desiring a connection of this kind.

MEGIL. True.

GUEST. A small word, therefore, extinguishes all such pleasures.

MEGIL. What word is that?

GUEST. That which says these things are by no means holy, but that they are odious to divinity, and the most base of all base things. But does not this take place, because the contrary to this is never asserted, but each of us from our childhood hears the same things said both jocosely and seriously; and often in tragedies, when a Thyestes¹ or Œdipus is introduced, or a certain Macareus², who being secretly connected with their sisters, but detected, immediately suffered death, as the punishment of their offence?

MEGIL. This is said with the greatest rectitude. For rumour possesses a certain wonderful power; since no one attempts even to breathe in a manner contrary to law.

GUEST. That which we just now said, therefore, was right; that it was

¹ A son of Pelops and Hippodamia, and grandson of Tantalus. He debauched Ærope, the wife of his brother Ægeus.

² A son of Æolus, who debauched his sister Canace, and had a son by her.

easy for a legislator, who wished to enslave some one of those desires which in a remarkable degree enslave men, to know in what manner this must be accomplished. For, if this rumour becomes consecrated among slaves and the free-born, men and women, and the whole city, it will cause this law to be most firm and stable.

MEGIL. Entirely so. But how can it be brought to pass that all men shall willingly speak in this manner?

GUEST. Your question is a very proper one. For this is what I said, that I had an art relative to this law, by which men might be induced to use copulation according to nature, and in order to produce offspring. Let them, therefore, abstain from connection with males, and not designedly cut off the race of men, nor disseminate in rocks and stones, where the prolific nature of that which is sown can never take root. Let them, likewise, abstain from every feminine field in which the seed is unwilling to germinate. This law, if it was established, and possessed the same authority in other things as in the connection of parents, would produce innumerable benefits. For, in the first place, it would be established according to nature. And, in the next place, it would restrain men from amatory fury and madness, from all adulteries, and the immoderate use of meats and drinks. It would likewise cause men to be familiar and friendly with their wives; and many other benefits would arise if this law was diligently observed by every one. But, perhaps, some very young man, and who is full of seed, on hearing that this law is to be established, will immediately revile us, as framing laws which are foolish, and impossible to be observed, and will fill every place with his vociferations. It was in consequence of looking to this, that I said I possessed a certain art, which was partly easy and partly difficult, by which this law might be firmly established. For it is easy to understand that this is possible, and in what manner it is possible. For we have said that, when this legal institution is sufficiently consecrated, it will subdue every soul, and entirely cause them, through fear, to be obedient to the established laws. But at present it appears to be impossible that it should ever take place: just as the institution of eating in common is considered as a thing impossible to be perpetually observed by a whole city; yet it is adopted by you, though it appears impossible to persuade women to this, nor does it seem to be naturally

adapted to your cities. Hence, through the strength of this belief, I said that both these could not without great difficulty be legally established.

MEGIL. And you was right in saying so.

GUEST. Are you, therefore, willing that I should endeavour to mention to you a thing endued with a certain persuasive power, and which is not beyond human ability to accomplish?

CLIN. Undoubtedly, we are willing.

GUEST. Will, therefore, any one more easily abstain from venereal concerns, and be willing to observe in a moderate manner, and not like the vulgar, the order imposed on him, when his body is in a good condition, or when it is badly affected?

CLIN. Doubtless, when his body is in a good condition.

GUEST. Have we not, therefore, heard of the Tarentine Iccus, who, for the sake of Olympic and other contests which he applied himself to, through a desire of victory and art, and in conjunction with temperance and fortitude, never had any connection either with a woman or boy during the whole time of his exercise? The same thing too is reported of Cryllon, Astyllus¹, Diopompus, and many others; though their souls were much worse disciplined than those of your and my fellow citizens, O Clinias, and their bodies much more luxurious.

CLIN. You give a true account of what the antients say respecting the conduct of these athletes.

GUEST. What then? Could they for the sake of victory in wrestling, in the course, and such like things, have the courage to abstain from that affair which is called blessed by the multitude; and shall our youth be incapable of a similar continence, for the sake of a far more excellent victory, which we sing to them from their very childhood, as a thing most beautiful, in fables, in prose and in verse, and charm them into a persuasion of this, as it is fit we should?

CLIN. What victory are you speaking of?

GUEST. Of the victory over pleasure,—that, being continent in this, they may live happily: for, if they are vanquished by pleasure, the very contrary

¹ Astyllus is mentioned by Pausanias as a victor in the Olympic repeated course. See vol. ii. of my translation, p. 119.

will take place. Besides this, will not the dread lest it should be a thing by no means holy, enable them to subdue those things which others worse than themselves subdue?

CLIN. It is probable it will.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we have arrived thus far about this law, and have fallen into doubt through the depravity of many, we now say with confidence, that our citizens ought not to be worse than birds, and many wild beasts: for many herds of these live a single, pure, and incorrupt life till the time of procreating offspring; and when they arrive at this age, the male benevolently uniting with the female, and the female with the male, they live for the remainder of their time in a holy and just manner, firmly abiding in the first compacts of friendship. But it is requisite that our citizens should be better than wild beasts. If, therefore, they are corrupted by other Greeks, and the greater part of Barbarians, and are incapable of restraining themselves when they see and hear that the Venus which is called inordinate is capable of accomplishing in them that which is greatest,—in this case, it is requisite that the guardians of the laws, becoming legislators, should devise for them a second law.

CLIN. What law would you advise should be established for them, if they reject the present?

GUEST. Evidently that which follows this, O Clinias.

CLIN. What law do you mean?

GUEST. That they should especially cause the strength of pleasures to be unexercised, altering the course of its infusion and aliment through labours of the body. But this will take place if the use of venereal pleasures is not attended with impudence. For, these being more rarely used through shame, the mistress of them will possess a more imbecil dominion. Custom, therefore, and an unwritten law, should privately persuade them to act in this manner, and dissuade them from a contrary mode of conduct as base. For thus, in the second place, we shall preserve the becoming; and one race of men comprehending three genera, will compel those of a depraved nature, and who, we have confessed, are their inferiors, not to act in an illegal manner.

CLIN. What three genera are these?

GUEST. Those that venerate divinity, the lovers of honour, and those that

do not desire corporeal beauty, but are lovers of the beautiful manners of the soul. And these things, perhaps, which are now asserted by us, are like prayers in a fable. But they will by far subsist in the most excellent manner, if they should be adopted by all cities. Perhaps, too, if divinity pleases, we may by force accomplish one of the two in amatory affairs: either that no one shall dare to touch any free and well-born woman besides his wife, or have any connection with concubines, or disseminate contrary to nature in the barren soil of males: or else we must entirely take away connection with males; and if any one has connection with other women than those which came to his house in conjunction with the Gods, and sacred marriages, whether such women are bought, or acquired by any other means,—such an one, unless he is concealed from all men and women, may perhaps with propriety be deprived by law of all the honours in the city, as being one who is truly a foreigner. This law, whether it is proper to call it simple or twofold, should be established respecting all venereal and amatory concerns, which are transacted by us with each other through such-like desires, and this both in a proper and improper manner.

MEGIL. I very much approve, O guest, of this law: but let Clinias here inform us what is his opinion respecting these things.

CLIN. I shall do so, O Megillus, when it appears to me that a proper opportunity presents itself for this purpose: but let us now permit our guest to proceed forward in his discussion of laws.

MEGIL. Right.

GUEST. But we have now proceeded so far, that we are nearly arrived at the establishment of eating in common; which in other places we have said it is difficult to establish, but no one will suppose but that it ought to be adopted in Crete. After what manner, however, must it be established? Shall we say as here, or as in Lacedæmon? or is there a third mode better than both these? It appears to me to be difficult to discover this third mode, and that when found it will not be productive of any great good. For what we have now instituted appears to have been accomplished in an elegant manner. After this, it follows that we should speak respecting the apparatus of food, and show in what manner it should be procured for our citizens. Food then in other cities is all-various, and procured from many places, but especially from two places. For food is obtained for the
greatest

greatest part of the Greeks from the earth and sea; but to our citizens from the earth alone. This, therefore, will be easy for the legislator. For much less than half of the laws will be sufficient; and these will be more adapted to free-born men. For the legislator of this city will have nothing to do with naval and mercantile affairs, or with inn-keepers, publicans, victualling-houses, miners, borrowing money, usury, and ten thousand other things of this kind. But he will only have to give laws to husbandmen, shepherds, the curators of bees, and the guardians and superintendants of things of this kind: and his principal business as a legislator will consist in attending to marriages, the procreation, education, and discipline of children, and the establishment of magistrates in the city. It is, therefore, now necessary that we should direct our attention to nutriment, and to those who by their own labour procure it. Let the laws, therefore, called *georgic* be first established. And let this be the first law of Jupiter *Terminalis*¹: No one shall move the boundaries of land, neither that of a neighbouring fellow-citizen, nor of a neighbouring stranger, if he should possess the extremities of the land; but he should consider that the saying, 'This is to move things immoveable', is true. And every one should rather wish to move a mighty rock, than a boundary, or small stone, which terminates friendship and hatred by an oath. For *Omophylus*² Jupiter is a witness of the one, and *Hospitable Jupiter* of the other; and these divinities are roused in conjunction with the most hostile battles. He, too, who is obedient to the law shall be free from condemnation: but he who despises it shall be obnoxious to a twofold punishment; one, and that the first, from the Gods; but the second from the law. For the law says that no one shall voluntarily move the boundaries of his neighbour's land. But of him who does move them, any one that is willing may inform the husbandmen, who shall lead him to the court of judgment. Here he shall be condemned by the judges to make restitution, as one who distributes land privately and by force, and shall be otherwise punished in such manner as the judges shall determine. But, in the next place, many and small injuries of neighbours, when often taking place, produce great enmities, and render vicinity difficult and vehemently bitter. On this account a neighbour ought to be extremely cautious of injuring his

¹ i. e. Jupiter the guardian of bounds.

² i. e. Jupiter the guardian of a tribe or kindred.

neighbour, both in other things, and in every thing pertaining to agriculture. For to do an injury is by no means difficult, but is in the power of every man; but to profit is not in the power of every one. But he who, passing beyond his own boundaries, cultivates his neighbour's land, shall make a restitution, and, suffering the punishment of his impudence and illiberality, shall pay the injured person the double of his loss. Of all such like particulars, husbandmen should be the judges and censors. And of such as are greater, as I have said before, the whole order of the twelfth part; but of the lesser, those that preside over the guardians of these. And if any one distributes cattle, the husbandmen, considering the injury, shall judge and condemn accordingly. Likewise, if any one usurps a swarm of bees belonging to another, alluring the bees by the sound of brass, and thus rendering them familiar to him, he shall make a restitution to the injured person. And if any one sets fire to certain materials, without paying any attention to his neighbour's property, he shall pay that fine which the magistrates think fit to impose. In like manner, he who in planting does not leave the measure of his neighbour's land, shall be punished in such a manner as would be said to be sufficient by many legislators; whose laws we ought to use, and not think that the many and trifling particulars which are instituted by any casual legislator are to be adopted by a greater moderator of a city. For ancient and beautiful laws respecting water are established for husbandmen, which yet do not deserve to be recited. But he who wishes to deduce water to his own place, should so deduce it from common fountains as not to cut off the apparent fountain of any private person. He may likewise be permitted to conduct the water where he pleases, except through houses, or certain temples, or sepulchres, at the same time being cautious not to do any damage, except what may arise from the derivation of the stream. But if the natural dryness of the ground in certain places should be incapable of retaining the waters from Jupiter, and there should be a defect of necessary drink, any one may dig in his own ground till he comes to chalky earth. And if in this depth he meets with no water, he may draw as much from his neighbours as his necessities require. But if there should be a scarcity of water with his neighbours, the quantity that should be daily used must be determined by the prefects of the land. However, if the waters from Jupiter abound, and those that inhabit or cultivate the lower places restrain the flux
of

of the water, so as to injure those in the higher grounds; or, on the contrary, if the inhabitants of the higher places, inconsiderately permitting the waters to flow, injure the inhabitants of the lower grounds, and disagreement arises between the two respecting this particular,—then, in the city, the city surveyor, but, in the country, he who presides over the land, shall order what each ought to do in this case. But he who is not obedient to this order shall suffer the punishment of his envy and moroseness, and shall give the injured person the double of his loss. A participation of the fruits of autumn should be made by all men as follows:—The God of autumn imparts to us two gracious gifts; one Dionysiacal, which does not require to be concealed; but another, to which concealment is natural. Let this law then be established respecting autumnal fruits. Whoever tastes of the rustic fruit of grapes, or of figs, before the time of vintage, which concurs with Arcturus, shall be fined fifty drachms sacred to Bacchus, if he has gathered these fruits from his own land; but if from that of his neighbour's, a mina; and if from other lands, two parts of a mina. Grapes and figs, which we denominate generous, may be gathered by any one, after what manner and when he pleases, if they are his own; but not when they belong to another, unless he obtains leave of the possessor; and this in conformity to the law which says that no one shall move that which he has not deposited, and that he who does so shall be fined. But if a slave, not complying with the orders of his master, gathers fruits of this kind, he shall receive as many lashes with a whip as the number of the grapes and figs which he gathered. When a native has bought any generous autumnal fruits, he may eat them if he pleases; but if a stranger as he passes along desires to eat these autumnal fruits, whether he is alone or with one companion, he may eat them as hospitable property: but the law forbids strangers from eating those fruits which are called rustic. If any one ignorantly gathers these, or if they are gathered by a slave, the slave shall be punished with stripes; but the free person shall be dismissed with an admonition that he may gather other autumnal fruits, but that those from which raisins, wine, and dry figs are made, are not fit to be gathered. With respect to pears, apples, pomegranates, and all such fruits, let it not be considered as base to gather them secretly. But if any one who is less than thirty years of age is detected gathering them, let him be chastised, but without wounds; and let not the free-born

man

man suffer any punishment for inflicting this chastisement. Let it likewise be lawful for a stranger to partake of these fruits in the same manner as of generous autumnal fruits. If any person more advanced in years tastes of these, but does not take them away, let him, in the same manner as a stranger, be permitted to partake of all these: but if he is not obedient to the law, let him be considered as one who does not contend for virtue;—if any one gives information of this to the judges of these particulars. Again, water is the most nutritive of every thing pertaining to gardens, but it is easily corrupted. For neither the earth, the sun, nor the air, which together with water nourish things germinating from the earth, can be easily corrupted either by medicaments, turnings aside, or thefts: but all such things as these are able to take place respecting the nature of water; and on this account it requires the assistance of law. Let this, then, be the law respecting it: If any one voluntarily corrupts water belonging to another person by medicaments, or ditches, or thefts, whether such water is fontal or collected, he shall be taken before the *ædiles*; and, if convicted, he shall be punished adequately to his offence. With respect to the conveyance of all seasonable fruit, let it be lawful for any one who is willing, to carry his own fruit any where, so long as he does not injure any one, or so long as a gain arises to himself triple of the damage which his neighbour has sustained. Let the magistrates be the inspectors of these things, and of all such injuries as are either committed by violence or secretly, against a person himself, or his property. Let all such particulars be laid before the magistrates, if the injury does not exceed three *minæ*; but if it does, let the case be brought before the common courts of justice, and let him who has committed the injury be punished. But if any magistrate shall be found to condemn an accused person unjustly, let him be considered as a debtor to the injured person of twice the loss which he sustained. And, in short, let the unjust conduct of the magistrates be brought before the common courts of justice by any person that is willing. But as there are ten thousand small legal institutions, according to which punishments ought to be inflicted respecting the allotments of justice, citations, and the persons cited, whether the citation ought to be made between two, or between many;—all such particulars as these must not be left destitute of law, nor yet do they seem worthy to be noticed by an aged legislator. Let young men, therefore, give laws

laws respecting these, imitating prior legal institutions, understanding small things from such as are great, and becoming experienced in the necessary use of them till every thing shall appear to be sufficiently established. After this, causing these institutions to be immovable, let them be used as such.

With respect to other artificers, it is requisite to act as follows: In the first place, let no citizen labour about artificial works, nor yet a servant of any citizen. For a citizen who preserves the common ornament of the city, is engaged in an art which requires long continued exercise, and, at the same time, many disciplines, and the possession of it is not to be obtained by indolent application. But to labour accurately in two studies, or two arts, nearly surpasses the ability of human nature. Nor can any one sufficiently exercise one art, and at the same time direct his attention to one who exercises another. This, therefore, ought first of all to take place in the city, that no one shall at the same time be a coppersmith and a builder; and that a builder shall not attend more to the coppersmith's, than to his own, art, under a pretext that, because he has many servants who work for him, he very properly bestows more attention upon them, that greater gain may thence accrue to him from his own art: but every artist in the city shall exercise one art only, and from this derive his support. This law the ædiles should particularly attend to; and should punish with disgrace and infamy any one who inclines a citizen to a certain art more than to the study of virtue, till they have converted the citizen to his right course. But, if any stranger is found to apply himself to two arts, he shall be punished with bonds, fines, and expulsions from the city, and shall be compelled to exercise one art alone. With respect to the wages of workmen, and the destruction of works, and the injuries which workmen may either suffer or commit, the ædiles shall judge of these as far as to fifty drachms. Offences which merit a greater fine than this, shall be judged according to law in the common courts of justice. There shall, likewise, be no revenue in the city arising from the exportation and importation of goods. But, with respect to frankincense, and other foreign aromatics, from which fumigations are made to the Gods, together with purple, and other dyed colours, which are not produced in this region, or any other article of foreign importation, let no one introduce any of these, nor yet again export any thing which the region necessarily requires. All these particulars must be attended

to, and taken care of, by the twelve guardians of the laws, five of the elder being excepted. With respect to arms, and all warlike instruments, if there should be a necessity of any foreign art, whether relative to plants, or metals, or bonds, or animals which are subservient to war, the care of the importation and exportation of these must be committed to the masters of the horse, and the generals of the army; but the guardians of the law must establish respecting these becoming and sufficient laws. No victualling-houses shall be suffered, either in the city or in any part of the region for the sake of accumulating wealth. But it appears that the mode established by the law of the Cretans of distributing the food which is the produce of the country, is a proper one: for a general distribution into twelve parts is made of the whole produce of the land, which also is consumed. Every twelfth part of barley, wheat, all autumnal fruits, and vendible animals, should be triply divided according to proportion; one part being given to free-born persons, another to the servants of these, and a third part to artificers and strangers, whether such strangers have taken up their residence in the city through the want of necessary sustenance, or for the sake of any advantage to the city, or any individual in it. This third part, therefore, of all necessaries, should be alone vendible from necessity; but nothing belonging to the two other parts should be necessarily sold. How, therefore, are these to be distributed in the most proper manner? In the first place, it is evident that we should distribute them partly equally, and partly unequally.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. It is necessary that every land should produce and nourish things better or worse than each of these.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As, therefore, there are three parts, let no more be distributed either to masters or slaves, or strangers, but let the distribution be made to all, according to the same equality of similitude. But let each citizen since he receives two parts, have the power of distributing both to slaves and free-born persons, as much, and such things, as he pleases. It is however proper that a greater quantity than these should be distributed in measure and number, and that a distribution should be made after an account is taken of all the animals which derive their nourishment from the earth. After this, it is necessary that habitations should be separately assigned them in an
orderly

orderly manner. But the following order will be adapted to things of this kind. There ought to be twelve streets in the middle, and one in each of the twelve parts; and in each street a forum, and temples of the Gods, and of dæmons the attendants of the Gods, should be raised; and whether there are statues of certain inhabitants of Magnesia, or of other antients whose memory is preserved, to these the honours of antient men should be paid. The temples of Vesta, Jupiter, Minerva, and of him who is the leader of each of the other divinities that preside over the twelve parts, should be every where established. But first of all buildings should be raised about these temples in the highest place, as well defended receptacles for the guards: but the rest of the region should be distributed for the artificers into thirteen parts. And one part of these shall reside in the city, this part being distributed into the twelve parts of the whole city; but another part shall be circularly distributed about the environs of the city. In every street artificers shall reside that are adapted to the purposes of husbandmen. The governors of the husbandmen, too, shall take care of all these particulars, and of such things as each place may require; and shall provide such places as will be most advantageous to the husbandmen. The ædiles in like manner shall take care of the artificers in the city. Things pertaining to the forum ought likewise to be taken care of by the præfects of the markets. After attention to sacred things, they should be careful, in the first place, that no one acts unjustly in buying or selling; and, in the next place, they should punish every one that deserves punishment, as being the inspectors of modesty and insolence. With respect to things vendible, they should, in the first place, consider, whether the citizens sell to foreigners in a manner conformable to law. But let the law be this: On the first day of the month, those that take care of foreigners shall exhibit a part of what is to be sold; viz. in the first place a twelfth part of the corn: and foreigners during the space of the whole month shall buy corn, and such things as pertain to corn, in the first market. But on the twelfth day of the month, the selling and buying of moist articles shall take place through the whole of the month. And on the twenty-third day of the month, let such animals be sold as may be wanted, together with such articles as husbandmen require, viz. skins and garments of every kind, whether knit or woven. But it is necessary that strangers should buy the possessions of others. However, let there be no buying

or selling of wheat or barley, distributed into barley-meal, or of any other aliment, either among the citizens or their slaves. In the markets of the strangers, a stranger may sell and exchange to artificers and their slaves, wine and food, and in like manner distributed flesh, which is generally called cauponation. A stranger, too, may be permitted to buy every day the whole materials of fire, from the inspectors of places, and sell it again to other strangers, for as much as he pleases, and when he pleases. Let every other useful article be sold in the common forum, in such places as the guardians of the laws, and præfects of the markets, together with the ædiles, shall appoint. Here let money be exchanged for things, and things for money; no one committing the exchange to another, but performing it by himself. However, if any one thinks proper to commit it to another, whether restitution is made to him or not, he must be contented, because no notice is taken in the courts of justice of such contracts. But if that which is bought or sold, has been bought or sold at a greater or less price than the law fixes upon vendible commodities, the quantity by which it exceeds the just price shall be taken an account of in writing by the guardians of the laws, and the contrary shall be expunged. Let the same things be enjoined respecting the registering of the property possessed by the inhabitants of the city. Let it likewise be lawful for any one to migrate to our city on certain conditions, viz. so that he is skilled in, and exercises, some art, and does not continue more than twenty years from the day of his being registered; during which time he shall not be forced to pay any tribute for buying and selling, nor be under any restraint, except that of conducting himself temperately. But when the twenty years are expired, he shall receive his own property and depart. However, if it should so happen during this time, that the city should be greatly benefitted by him, and he is desirous of continuing longer, or of settling for life in the city, let his request be complied with, if agreeable to the inhabitants of the city. With respect to the sons of the emigrants that are artists and fifteen years of age, let the time of their continuance in the city commence from their fifteenth year, so that they may stay, if they please, twenty years after this period, or longer if agreeable to the inhabitants. But if they choose to leave the city, they may depart after their registers, which were committed to the care of the magistrates, are obliterated.

THE LAWS,

BOOK IX.

AS judicial affairs are consequent to all the preceding particulars, the discussion of them at present will be agreeable to the natural order of laws. But we have partly shown what the particulars are respecting which judgments ought to take place, viz. respecting agriculture and the like; though we have not as yet distinctly spoken of the greatest judgments, and shown what punishments they ought to inflict, and who should be the judges. It therefore follows that we should now speak of these.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But it is after a manner base that the city which we say will be properly inhabited, and furnished with every thing adapted to the study of virtue, should observe all such laws as we are now about to establish. For to suppose that, in such a city, a man capable of the greatest iniquity will be born, so that it will be necessary to give laws by anticipation, and enjoin threatenings, if such a character should arise, and this for the sake of preventing the greatest enormities, and that when they are committed, they may be legally punished,—to suppose this will, as I have said, be in a certain respect base. But since we do not, like the antient legislators, give laws to heroes the sons of the Gods, these legislators at the same time being themselves descended from the Gods, but being ourselves men, we at present give laws to those that are born from the seed of men;—since this is the case, we may justly be afraid lest any one of our citizens should be so naturally intractable and untamed, as not to be liquefied; just as leguminous substances, when blasted by thunder, cannot be subdued by fire. The first law, therefore, which we shall establish, though it is not agreeable to us to do so, is respecting sacrilege, if any
one

one shall dare to commit it. Indeed, we neither wish, nor do we very much fear, that a citizen, when properly educated, will ever labour under this disease. But the servants of these, strangers, and the slaves of strangers, will attempt many things of this kind; for the sake of which especially, and at the same time fearing for all the imbecility of human nature, I shall speak about the law of sacrilege, and all other such particulars as are either difficult to be cured or entirely incurable. The preface, however, to these particulars, according to what has been formerly assented to, ought to be as short as possible. Some one, therefore, may thus address him who is excited by a vicious desire both day and night to plunder temples, mingling at the same time admonitions with his speech: O wonderful man, neither a human nor a divine evil moves and excites you now to sacrilege, but a certain execrable fury, arising in men from antient and unpurified offences, which you ought to dread with all your might. Learn, then, what this dread is. When any such opinion attacks you, betake yourself to expiations, betake yourself, in a suppliant manner, to the temples of those Gods that avert evils from mankind; and betake yourself to an association with good men. Among these partly hear, and endeavour yourself to say, that every man ought to honour things beautiful and just. But fly without turning back from an association with the vicious. And if, in consequence of your acting in this manner, the disease ceases, you have done well; but if not, considering that in this case it is better to die, liberate yourself from life. Since, therefore, we have sung these exordia to those whose thoughts lead them to deeds impious and destructive to the city, it is proper to dismiss him in silence who is obedient to the law: but to him who will not be persuaded, it is necessary, after the preface, to sing in a higher strain. He, then, who is detected in the act of sacrilege, if he is either a slave or a stranger, shall have his calamity written in his face and hands, and after he has received as many lashes with a whip as the judges shall think proper, he shall be driven naked beyond the borders of the region. For, perhaps, being brought to his right mind by this punishment, he will become a better man. For no punishment subsisting according to law is inflicted with an evil intention. But one of two things is nearly always effected: for he who suffers punishment either becomes better or less depraved. If, however, a citizen shall at any time appear to have perpetrated any thing of this kind, or some mighty and
arcane

arcane crime towards the Gods, or his parents, or his country, the judge shall pronounce such an one to be incurable, in consequence of considering, that though he has been well nourished and disciplined from his childhood, yet he has not abstained from the greatest vices. But death to such a man is the least of evils. Such an one, therefore, that others may be benefited by his example, being stigmatized with infamy, and expelled beyond the boundaries of the region, shall there be put to death. But let his children and race be honoured and praised, if they avoid his manners, as those that bravely fly from evil to good. It will not, however, be proper that the riches of any such person should become public property, in a polity in which the same and equal allotments ought to be perpetually preserved. But when any one perpetrates such things as are to be punished with a fine, he shall be fined as much as he possesses above his allotted portion, but the lot itself shall remain entire. The guardians of the laws, however, considering this affair accurately from written accounts, should always give a clear statement of it to the judges, that no one may be deprived of his allotments through want of money. If any one should appear to deserve a greater fine, and no one of his friends is willing to be bound for him, and procure his liberty, such an one shall be punished with lasting and apparent bonds, and with certain reproaches. But let no one offence ever by any means pass unpunished, nor any fugitive; but let him either be punished with death, or bonds, or stripes, or certain squalid seats, or with standing, or being exhibited in temples at the extremity of the region, or by fines, in the manner we have before mentioned. Let the guardians of the laws too be established the judges of death; and let the best among them be chosen for this purpose, who in the preceding year had acted in the capacity of magistrates. But the citations and accusations of these, and such like particulars, together with the manner in which they ought to take place, should be attended to by junior legislators. The manner, however, in which suffrages ought to be conducted, it is our business to determine. Let them, therefore, be given openly. But, prior to this, let the judge sit before the accuser and defendant, and as near to them as possible, in a grave and dignified manner. Let all the citizens too that are at leisure, diligently attend as the hearers of such causes. And, in the first place, let the accuser speak, and afterwards the defendant. After this, let the senior judge diligently and sufficiently examine what was said: and, after the elder judge,

judge, all the other judges in order ought to consider what is worthy of discussion in the speeches of the accuser and defendant. But he who does not think there is any thing worthy of discussion in either of the speeches, should refer the investigation of it to another. And, lastly, such things as shall appear to be well said, being committed to writing, and signed by all the judges, shall be placed in the temple of Vesta. And again, assembling the next day into the same place, they shall in a similar manner examine and judge, and put their signatures to what shall appear to have been well said. When this has been thrice accomplished, and the proofs and witnesses have been sufficiently examined, each judge bearing in his hand a sacred pebble, and swearing before Vesta that he has judged to the utmost of his ability justly and truly, a judgment of this kind shall be thus brought to a conclusion.

After crimes respecting the Gods, it is requisite to speak of those which pertain to the dissolution of a polity. He, therefore, who subjects government to the power of a man, enslaves the laws, makes the city subservient to factious societies, and, accomplishing all this by force, excites illegal seditions. It is proper to consider a character of this kind as the greatest of all enemies to the whole city. But he who, though he is not the author of any thing of this kind, yet possesses the greatest authority in the city, but takes no notice of these conspiracies, or if he does notice them, through timidity, suffers his injured country to be unrevenged,—a citizen of this kind ought to be considered as the second in wickedness. Every man who is of the smallest utility in a city should inform the judges of these particulars, and bring him to judgment who endeavours by stratagem to produce a violent and illegal mutation of the polity. But let the same judges give sentence in these cases as decided in sacrilege; and let the whole process be conducted in a similar manner. Let the suffrage too which vanquishes in multitude, be the sentence of death. And, in short, let not the disgrace and punishment of the father attend the children, unless the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, of some one in succession, have deserved death. These, with their possessions, except as much as pertains to the lot, shall be sent to their antient paternal city. But as to those citizens who shall happen to have more children than one, and these not less than ten years of age, ten out of their number must be chosen by lot, which the father, or
paternal

paternal or maternal grandfather, shall approve; and after they are chosen, their names must be sent to Delphi. Then, with a better fortune, the possessions and habitation assigned by lot shall be restored to him whom the Delphic God approves.

CLIN. And very properly so.

GUEST. Let there be yet a third common law, respecting judges, and the mode of judgment, against those that are accused of treason. In a similar manner let there be one law respecting the abiding of children in, and their egression from, their country; just as we instituted one respecting the betrayer of his country, the man who commits sacrilege, and he who by violence destroys the laws of the city. With respect to theft too, whether in great or small matters, let one law, and one punishment, be ordained for every kind of theft. For, when any one is condemned for thieving, if his own possessions, besides his allotted portion, are sufficient, he shall make a twofold restitution: and if he does not, he shall be fettered till he has either paid the appointed sum, or persuaded him to whom he is indebted to excuse him from paying it. But if any one is convicted of public theft, he shall then be freed from his bonds, when he has either persuaded the city, or made a twofold restitution.

CLIN. How is it that we say, O guest, there is no difference whether the theft is small or great, and whether it is from sacred or not sacred places, and such other dissimilarities as subsist about the whole of thieving? For, since thefts are various, the legislator ought to attend to their varieties, and inflict similar punishments on dissimilar offences.

GUEST. You most excellently repulse me, O Clinias, who am, as it were, hurrying along, and you likewise recall into my memory what I have formerly thought, that the particulars respecting the establishment of laws have never been by any means properly determined.

CLIN. But how, again, do we say this?

GUEST. We did not adopt a bad image when we said, that all those of the present day that submitted to laws were similar to those slaves who are cured by slaves. For it is well to know this, that if at any time one of those physicians who meddle with the medical art from experience alone, without reason, should meet with a free-born physician discoursing with a free-born patient, and very nearly philosophising, by investigating in a rational

tional manner the beginning of his disease, and afterwards discoursing about all the nature of bodies, he would readily and vehemently laugh, and would address the free-born physician in language not at all different from what is generally used towards most physicians. For he would say to him, O stupid fellow, you do not cure the sick man, but you discipline him as if he wanted to become a physician, and not to be well.

CLIN. And would he not speak properly by speaking in this manner?

GUEST. And may it not also be very properly objected against us, that whoever discusses laws in the manner we do at present, disciplines the citizens, but does not give them laws?

CLIN. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But at present a fortunate circumstance happens to us.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. That there is no necessity for us to establish laws, but that, entering voluntarily on the business of legislation, we have endeavoured to perceive in every polity what is best and most necessary, and after what manner it might take place. And now, as it seems, it is permitted us if we please to consider what is best, or, if we had rather, what is most necessary, respecting laws. We may choose, therefore, whichever is most agreeable to us.

CLIN. We propose, O guest, a ridiculous choice, and we manifestly become similar to those legislators who are compelled by a certain mighty necessity to give laws immediately, and are not permitted to defer this till tomorrow. But it is lawful for us to speak through divine assistance, just as it is permitted those who gather stones, or any other materials of a building, to collect abundantly, and at leisure, such things as are adapted to the future building. Like builders, therefore, who do not raise structures from necessity, but at leisure, let us lay down some things, and join together others, so that it may be rightly said that some things pertaining to the laws are placed as foundations, and that other particulars are raised on them as foundations.

GUEST. For thus indeed, O Clinias, our synopsis of laws will be more natural. But, by the Gods, let us consider this respecting legislators.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. That there are writings and written discourses in cities respecting
a variety

a variety of particulars, and that there are writings and discourses of the legislator.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, shall we direct our attention to the writings of poets and others ; writings which, whether in verse or in prose, are composed respecting the mode of conduct in life ; but by no means apply ourselves to the writings of legislators ? Or shall we direct our attention to these beyond all others ?

CLIN. To these far beyond others.

GUEST. But will it not be necessary that the legislator should only consult writings respecting things beautiful, good, and just, and that he should teach what is the nature of these, and how they should be studied by those that intend to be happy ?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But it is shameful that Homer, Tyrtaeus, and other poets, should have written more beautifully respecting life and the studies of men than Lycurgus, Solon, and other legislators. Or, is it not proper that writings respecting laws should be by far the most beautiful and best of all writings in a city : but that other writings should be consonant to these ; or, if they are discordant, that they should be treated with ridicule ? We ought, therefore, to conceive, that laws should be so written for cities that the legislator in composing them shall appear to have assumed the person of a father and mother, and the writings themselves ought to be full of benevolence and prudence, and not like those of a tyrant and despot, commanding, threatening, and written on walls. Let us consider, therefore, whether we should endeavour to speak in this manner respecting laws, whether we are able or not. Let us, however, attempt it with alacrity, and, proceeding in this way, patiently endure whatever difficulties we may have to encounter. And may our journey be prosperous ! which it will be if Divinity pleases.

CLIN. You speak well. Let us, therefore, do as you say.

GUEST. In the first place, then, let us accurately consider, as we began to do, respecting sacrilege, every kind of theft, and all injuries. And let us not be indignant if, while delivering laws in an intermediate manner, we establish some things, and deliberate about others. For we are becoming to be legislators, but are not yet, though, perhaps, we soon shall be. But

if it is agreeable to you, as I have said, to consider respecting the particulars I have mentioned, let us consider them.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. However, respecting all beautiful and just things, we should endeavour to consider this, in what manner we now accord, or dissent from ourselves: for we acknowledge that we desire, though we may not be able, to excel most others.

CLIN. What kind of disagreements among ourselves do you speak of?

GUEST. I will endeavour to inform you. With respect to justice entirely, just men, things, and actions, we all of us, in a manner, agree that all these are beautiful. So that, if any one should strenuously affirm that just men, through the habit of justice, are all-beautiful, though they should be deformed in body, there is scarcely any one who by thus speaking would be considered as speaking in a disorderly manner. Is not this true?

CLIN. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But let us see whether all such things as partake of justice are beautiful: for all our passions are nearly equal to our actions.

CLIN. How so?

GUEST. Whatever action is just, so far as it participates of the just, so far also it nearly participates of the beautiful.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If a passion, therefore, which participates of the just, is acknowledged by us to be beautiful on this account, our discourse by such an assertion would not be rendered dissonant.

CLIN. True.

GUEST. But if we should agree that a passion is just, but at the same time base, the just and the beautiful would be dissonant, in consequence of asserting that just things are most base.

CLIN. How is this?

GUEST. It is not at all difficult to understand. For the laws which a little before have been established by us, appear to announce things perfectly contrary to the present assertions.

CLIN. After what manner?

GUEST. We established it as just, that he who committed sacrilege should die; and likewise the enemy of well-established laws; and, as we were
about

about to establish many other laws of this kind, we desisted, on perceiving that these were passions infinite both in multitude and magnitude : and that they were the most just, but at the same time the most base, of all the passions. Do not things just and beautiful after this manner appear at one time to be the same, and at another to be most contrary ?

CLIN. They do appear so.

GUEST. By the multitude, therefore, things beautiful and just, which are so dissonant with each other, are denominated things separate.

CLIN. It appears so, O guest.

GUEST. Let us therefore again, O Clinias, see how we accord with ourselves respecting these things.

CLIN. What concord and what particulars are you speaking of ?

GUEST. I think it has clearly been shown by me in the foregoing discourse.

CLIN. How ?

GUEST. However, if it has not been already shown by me, yet consider me as now speaking about it.

CLIN. After what manner ?

GUEST. That all vicious men are in all things involuntarily vicious ; and that, if this is the case, this also must necessarily follow.

CLIN. What ?

GUEST. That the unjust is a vicious man ; and that the vicious man is involuntarily such. But the voluntary can by no means be done in an involuntary manner. He, therefore, who acts unjustly, will appear to act so in an involuntary manner to him who considers injustice as a thing involuntary. This also too is now acknowledged by me. For I have agreed, that all men act unjustly involuntarily, though some one, for the sake of contention or ambition, may say that unjust men are involuntarily unjust, but yet many act unjustly voluntarily. This, however, is not my assertion. After what manner, then, shall I accord with my own assertions, if any one, O Clinias and Megillus, should thus interrogate me ? If these things are so, O guest, what would you advise us respecting the city of the Magnesians ? Shall we give laws to them, or not ? I say, undoubtedly. Do you distinguish injuries then by the voluntary and involuntary ? And do you ordain greater punishments for voluntary offences and injuries, than for such as are involuntary ?

involuntary? Or do you punish all offences equally, as considering that no injuries are voluntarily committed?

CLIN. You speak properly, O guest. But what use shall we make of what has now been said?

GUEST. You interrogate well. In the first place, then, we shall use what has been said for the following purpose.

CLIN. What purpose?

GUEST. Let us call to mind that it was well said by us above, that there is great confusion and dissonance among us respecting things just. Resuming this, therefore, we again ask ourselves whether, since we have neither solved the doubt about these things, nor defined what is their difference, though in all cities, by all legislators that have ever existed, voluntary and involuntary injuries are considered as forming two species of injuries, and laws are established conformable to this opinion,—whether, therefore, since this is the case, ought we to dismiss what we have now advanced, after we have asserted that it is, as it were, divinely said, without offering any arguments to show the rectitude of such assertions? Certainly not. But it is in a manner necessary, that before we establish laws we should evince that these two things have a subsistence, and what is the difference between them; that, when any one establishes a punishment for either, every one may understand, and be able to judge, whether it is established in a becoming manner, or not.

CLIN. You appear to us, O guest, to speak well. For it is fit we should do one of two things, viz. either not say that all unjust actions are involuntary, or first of all evince by defining that this is properly asserted.

GUEST. One of these two things, therefore, I can by no means endure, I mean the denying that I think it is so, (for this would neither be legal nor holy). But after what manner these are two, if they by no means differ with respect to voluntary and involuntary, but with respect to something else, we should endeavour to evince.

CLIN. By all means, O guest: for we cannot otherwise understand the nature of these.

GUEST. Let it be so. Do not, therefore, many damages take place among citizens in their communications and associations with each other, in which the voluntary and involuntary abound?

CLIN.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, does any one, considering all damages as injuries, think, in consequence of this, that they are attended with twofold injuries, one kind being voluntary, and the other involuntary? For the involuntary damages of all men are neither in number, nor magnitude, less than the voluntary. But consider whether I say any thing to the purpose, or not. For, do I not say, O Clinias and Megillus, that when some one unwillingly hurts another, he acts unjustly, but involuntarily injures one who is unwilling to be injured? And do I legally establish this as an involuntary injury? Indeed I do not at all consider a damage of this kind as an injury, whether it is of a greater or less magnitude. But we often say that he who assists another in an improper manner acts unjustly, if his assistance is not victorious. For, my friends, it is not proper, neither if any one imparts any thing, nor if, on the contrary, he takes any thing away, to call such an action simply just or unjust: but the legislator should consider whether he who benefits, or is the cause of detriment to another, is endued with worthy manners, and employed those manners justly. And he should look to these two things, viz. injustice, and detriment. He should likewise, as much as possible, legally indemnify the person that has sustained a damage, restore what has been lost, raise what has fallen, and repair the ravages of death and wounds. Lastly, he should always endeavour that the discords arising from damages may, by means of the laws, terminate in friendship.

CLIN. These things are well said.

GUEST. Unjust damages, therefore, and emoluments, if any one happens to derive emolument from injuring another, ought to be cured, if they are such as are capable of being cured, as diseases inherent in the soul. But it is requisite to say, that the cure of injustice verges to this.

CLIN. To what?

GUEST. That the law may discipline every one who does an injury, whether it be great or small, and may entirely compel him, either that he shall never afterwards dare to do the like voluntarily, or by far less frequently, through the dread of the consequent punishment. In whatever manner any one may accomplish this, whether by works or words, pleasure or pain, honour or infamy, fines or gifts, so as that men may either love, or at least not hate, the nature of justice, but may hate injustice,—this is the business of the

the most beautiful laws. But those whom the legislator perceives to be incurable with respect to these particulars, he should punish in the extreme, as knowing that death is better than life to all such as these; and that when they are liberated from life they will doubly benefit others. For they will serve as a warning to others not to act unjustly, and the city, by their death, will be freed from bad men. On this account *it will be necessary for the legislator to punish INCURABLE offences with death, but BY NO MEANS on any other account.*

CLIN. These things appear to have been spoken by you in a very sufficient manner; but we should gladly hear you relating still more clearly the difference between injustice and detriment.

GUEST. I shall endeavour, therefore, to do and say as you request me. For it is evident that you have both said to, and heard from, each other thus much respecting the soul, that anger naturally residing in it, whether as a certain passion, or a certain part, and being contentious and invincible, subverts many things through irrational violence.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Besides this, too, we do not call pleasure the same as anger, but we say that it possesses dominion from a contrary power, and that it persuades us, with a violent deception, to do whatever it pleases.

CLIN. And very much so.

GUEST. He, likewise, who says that ignorance is the third cause of crimes will not be deceived. But he will be a better legislator who gives this a twofold division: considering one kind as simple, and the cause of light offences; but the other twofold, when any one is void of discipline, not only from being detained by ignorance, but by an opinion of wisdom, so as to think that he has a perfect knowledge about things of which he is entirely ignorant. Things of this kind, therefore, when followed by power and strength, are to be established as the causes of mighty and rustic crimes; but when followed by imbecility, as in this case they become the crimes of children and old men, they are to be considered as crimes, and laws are to be established for those that commit them; but, at the same time, they should be reckoned the mildest of all crimes, and as deserving the most abundant indulgence.

CLIN. You speak reasonably.

GUEST. We nearly, therefore, all of us speak of pleasure and anger, as things to which some of us are superior, and by which others of us are vanquished : and this is truly the case.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But we never have at any time heard that one of us is superior to ignorance, and another vanquished by it.

CLIN. Most true.

GUEST. But we say that all these allure us to their will, and often, at the same time, draw us to things contrary.

CLIN. Often, indeed.

GUEST. But I will now explain to you clearly what I call the just and the unjust, without any variety of distinction. For I entirely denominate injustice to be the tyranny of anger, fear, pleasure, and pain, envy and desire in the soul, whether such a tyrant injures any one, or not. But the opinion of that which is best, whether it is the conception of cities, or of certain private individuals, if, possessing dominion in the soul, it adorns the whole man, though it may in a certain respect lead him into error,—this I denominate justice, and call every thing which is performed from this opinion, just. And I further add, that the whole life of those who are obedient to a principle of this kind will be most excellent. But a damage of this nature is considered by the multitude as involuntary injustice. However, our business at present is not a contention about names. But since we have evinced that there are three species of crimes, let us, in the first place, still more diligently recall these into our memory. Of pain, therefore, which we denominate anger and fear, there is one species for us.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But of pleasure and desires there is a second species; a third of hopes and a desire of true opinion about that which is best. This third species being divided into two parts, five species will be produced, for which laws are to be established, differing from each other in two genera.

CLIN. What are these?

GUEST. The one, every thing which is performed through violent and according actions; the other, which takes place with darkness and deception in a secret manner. And sometimes actions are attended with both these; which, if they are treated in a proper manner, ought to be restrained by the severest laws!

CLIN. It is just they should.

GUEST. But let us now return whence we have digressed, and finish the establishment of laws. The particulars then which we proposed to discuss were respecting sacrilege, betrayers of their country, and those who corrupted the laws, by dissolving the polity governed by those laws. Some one may perhaps commit one or other of these through insanity, disease, excessive old age, or youthfulness, which last does not in any respect differ from the other causes which we have enumerated. If it shall appear that any one thus affected has perpetrated one of these crimes, when the judges are chosen, and the crime is divulged, either by the guilty person or the inspector of the deed, he shall be judged to have acted contrary to law; and he shall be entirely fined a simple fine for the injury which he has committed. But let him be exempt from other punishments, unless, having committed manslaughter, his hands are not pure from murder: for, in this case, departing to another country, he shall be exiled for a year. If he returns before the time prescribed by the law, or shall be detected within the borders of the country, he shall be imprisoned for two years in the public gaol by the guardians of the laws, but liberated from his bonds after this period. However, as we began with murder, let us endeavour to establish laws consummately for every species of it. And, in the first place, let us speak concerning violent and involuntary homicide. If any one, therefore, in a contest, and public gymnastic exercises, shall involuntarily slay his friend, whether his death happens immediately, or some time after, from the wounds which he has received; or, if a man kills his friend in battle in a similar manner, or in warlike exercises instituted by the magistrates, whether with naked bodies, or with certain arms in imitation of warlike exercises,—in all these cases let him be purified according to the law about these particulars received from Delphi. But let all physicians who, in endeavouring to cure, have unwillingly been the death of any one, be considered as pure according to law. If any one with his own hand unwillingly slays another, whether with his own naked body, or with an instrument or dart, or from administering drink or food, or by the hurling of fire, or tempest, or the privation of breath, whether he does this with his own body, or through the means of other bodies, let him be entirely considered as one that slays with his own hand, and suffer the following punishments: If he kills a slave belonging

belonging to another person, thinking that it is his own, he shall indemnify the master of the dead slave, or be fined the double of the worth of such slave : but his worth shall be determined by the judges. The homicide, too, in this case shall use greater and more numerous purifications than those who commit murder in gymnastic exercises ; and the proper interpreters of these things shall be those whom the Delphic God approves. But if any one kills his own slave, when he is purified according to law, let him be liberated from murder. If any one involuntarily slays a free-born person, let him be purified with the same purifications as he who cuts off a slave. And let him not despise one of the antient sayings. For it is said, that a free-born person who is violently put to death, will soon after his death be angry with his murderer ; and being filled with fear and terror through his violent dissolution, and perceiving the person that slew him living after his usual manner, he will terrify, and, being disturbed himself, disturb with all his might his murderer and his actions, memory at the same time contributing to oppose him. On this account, it is requisite that a homicide should be exiled from every part of his country for a whole year. But, if it is a stranger who is slain, the homicide shall be expelled from the country of the stranger for the same length of time. And if any one is willingly obedient to this law, he who is the nearest relation of the deceased, and who was an inspector of all the particulars relative to the murder, shall pardon the homicide ; with whom if he is entirely reconciled, it will be perfectly sufficient. But with respect to him who is not obedient to this law, and who, in the first place, being unpurified, dares to go to the temples of the Gods, and sacrifice ; and, in the next place, is unwilling to be exiled for the above-mentioned time, such a one the nearest relative of the deceased shall accuse to the judges, and he shall suffer double the punishments which are due to the crime. If the nearest relative of the deceased does not call him to an account, the defilement, as it were, revolving on such a one, or, in other words, the slain person directing his anger towards him, he shall be accused by any one that pleases, and shall be compelled by law to leave his country for five years. But if a stranger involuntarily slays a stranger in the city, whoever is willing shall accuse him by the same laws. If an inhabitant slays a stranger, he shall be exiled for one year. And, universally, if a stranger slays a stranger, who is an inhabitant and a citizen, besides his purification he shall be banished

banished for the whole of his life from the country in which laws of this kind have dominion. And if he returns illegally, the guardians of the laws shall punish him with death; and his property, if he has any, shall be given to the nearest relation of the deceased. However, if any one involuntarily returns before the limited time, being driven on the coast by a storm at sea, in this case, let him fix a tent on the shore, so that his feet may touch the water, and watch for a fit opportunity of sailing. But, if he should be forcibly brought into the city by any one, let him be liberated by the first magistrate he may meet with, and sent back with safety into exile. Again, if any one with his own hand shall slay a free-born person, being incited by anger to the deed, a thing of this kind ought, in the first place, to receive a twofold distinction. For he commits murder through anger, who suddenly and unintentionally kills a man by blows, or any other such like means, so that immediately after the impulse penitence follows the deed. And he likewise murders another in anger, who having been previously defamed by ignominious words or deeds, and, endeavouring to be avenged, afterwards voluntarily slays the person by whom he has been injured, and is not penitent for the deed. Murder, therefore, as it appears, must receive a twofold distribution; and both of them nearly are produced by anger. But they may most justly be said to subsist between the voluntary and the involuntary. In reality, indeed, they are but images of the voluntary and involuntary. For, he who retains his anger, and does not immediately and suddenly, but with stratagem, at some distance of time, avenge himself, is similar to one who murders voluntarily. But he who does not conceal his anger, but immediately follows its impulse without premeditation, is similar to one who murders involuntarily. However, he is not altogether involuntary, but an image of one that acts involuntarily. On this account, it is difficult to determine respecting murders committed through anger, whether they should be established by law as voluntary or involuntary actions. The best and the truest method, therefore, that can be adopted is, to consider both these kinds of murder as images, and to divide them apart from each other, so as to class the one under premeditated, and the other under unpremeditated actions. Severer punishments, therefore, are to be ordained for those that commit murder through anger, with premeditation; but milder punishments for those that murder without deliberation, and suddenly. For, that which is
similar

similar to a greater evil should receive a greater punishment, but that which is similar to a lesser evil, a lesser punishment. Let it, therefore, be thus established by our laws.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. But again returning to the subject we say, that if any one with his own hand slays a free-born person, but was incited to the deed by a certain anger, without premeditation, in other respects let him suffer the same punishment as it is proper he should suffer who kills a man without anger; but let him, from necessity, be exiled for two years, as a punishment for his anger. But he who commits murder through anger, but with deliberation, shall be punished in other respects in the same manner as the former character; but he shall be banished for three years instead of two, that his anger, which is greater, may be punished for a longer time. And let this be the universal establishment respecting these particulars. For it is difficult to give laws about such things with accuracy. For, sometimes, murder of this kind, which is considered by the law as of a more atrocious, will prove to be of a milder, nature; and sometimes that which is of a milder, will be considered as of a more atrocious, nature; according as the murder is committed in a more savage or a more gentle manner. But, for the most part, they will happen agreeably to the above-mentioned mode. Of all these particulars, therefore, the guardians of the laws should be inspectors. When the time of the banishment of these offenders is expired, the guardians of the laws must send twelve judges to the boundaries of the region, for the purpose of considering, in a still clearer manner, the actions of the exiles during this time; and that they may determine in a proper manner respecting their modesty and reception. But the exiles shall acquiesce in the judgment of these magistrates. And if again, on returning from banishment, any one of these, being impelled by anger, shall commit the same offence, he shall be perpetually banished: and if he returns from his exile, he shall be punished in the same manner as a stranger for returning from exile. Let him who kills his slave purify himself. But if he kills the slave of another person in anger, let him pay to the master of the slave double the worth of his loss. If any homicide is not obedient to the laws respecting murder, but, while he is unpurified, defiles by his presence the forum, gymnasia, and other sacred places,—whoever is willing may bring before a court of judgment

ment both the homicide, and the relation of the deceased who has neglected to avenge the dead, and compel him to pay a double fine, and suffer in other respects a double punishment. And let the offending party consider the fine as legal. If a slave kills his master in anger, the kindred of the deceased shall be allowed to slay the homicide in whatever manner they please, and shall be pure from murder, so long as they do not by any means preserve the life of the slave. But if a slave does not kill his own master, but some other free-born person, in anger, he shall be given up by his master to the kindred of the deceased, who shall, from necessity, put him to death in whatever manner they please. If a father or mother shall in anger slay a son or daughter, by blows, or any other violent manner (a thing which will happen, though but rarely), let them be purified after the same manner as other homicides, and be exiled for three years. And after they return from exile, the husband shall be divorced from the wife, and the wife from the husband: and they shall never afterwards beget children together, nor shall either of these dwell together with him whose son or brother either of them slew, nor communicate with him in sacred rites. But he who is impious with respect to these things, and does not obey these laws, shall be obnoxious to the charge of impiety by any one that is willing. If a man slays his wife, or a wife her husband, in anger, they shall be purified in a similar manner with other homicides, and shall be exiled for three years. But, on returning from exile, let not either of them be permitted to join with their children in sacred rites, nor ever eat at the same table with them. And, if either the father or the child is disobedient to this law, let them be obnoxious to the charge of impiety by any one that is willing. If a brother slays either a brother or a sister, or sister a brother or a sister, in anger, let them be purified and exiled in the same manner as parents that slay their children; and, on their return from exile, let them not eat at the same table, or join in sacred rites, with those whom they have deprived of brothers, or sisters, or sons. And if any one is disobedient to this law, he shall with justice be obnoxious to the charge of impiety. If any one, through incontinent anger, is so enraged with his parents as to dare to slay one of them in his insane fury,—if the dying parent, before he expires, shall voluntarily absolve his murderer from the deed, then, being purified in the same manner as those who commit murder voluntarily, and performing such other things as they perform,

form, let him be considered as pure. But if the dying parent does not absolve him, let him be obnoxious to many laws. For he must be subject to the extreme punishments of whipping, and, in a similar manner, of impiety and sacrilege, because he has expelled the soul of his begetter. So that, if it were possible that a man could die frequently, it would be most just that a parricide or matricide should suffer many deaths. For, how is it possible that he who is not permitted by any law to destroy his parents, who led forth his nature into light, even though he should find that he was going to be slain by them, but is enjoined by the legislator to endure all things rather than perpetrate a deed of this kind,—how is it possible, I say, that such a one can in any other way be properly punished? Let death, therefore, be ordained as the punishment of him who in anger slays either his father or mother. But if a brother slays a brother in his own defence, being attacked by him, through sedition taking place between them, or any other such means, let him be pure in the same manner as one who slays an enemy. And if a citizen slays a citizen, or a stranger a stranger, in his own defence, let him be similarly pure; as, likewise, if, in defending himself, a citizen slays a stranger, or a stranger a citizen, or a slave a slave. But if a slave, in his own defence, slays a free-born person, let him be obnoxious to the same laws as him who slays his father. Let the same thing also be understood respecting the absolution from murder in all these cases as was said concerning the absolution from parricide. If any dying person, therefore, among these, previous to his death, willingly absolves his murderer from voluntary murder, purifications shall be administered to the homicide, and he shall be exiled for a year. And thus we appear to have spoken sufficiently respecting murders committed by violence, involuntarily, and in anger. Let us now speak concerning such as are voluntary, and perpetrated with every kind of injustice, and from stratagems, through the tyranny of pleasures, desires, and envy.

CLIN. You speak properly.

GUEST. Again, therefore, in the first place, let us speak to the utmost of our power concerning the causes of these. The greatest cause, then, is desire, which has dominion in a soul rendered savage by venereal incentives. It is this which abundantly, and in the most vehement manner, inflames the minds of the multitude, and which, through a depraved nature and want of discipline,

discipline, generates ten thousand loves of infinite riches. But we say that the want of discipline is the cause why both among the Greeks and Barbarians riches are praised in a vicious manner. For they place these in the first, though they belong to the third, rank of things good; and, through this opinion, destroy both themselves and posterity. For, to speak the truth to all cities respecting riches, is the most beautiful and the best of all things. But the truth is, that riches subsist for the sake of the body, and the body subsists for the sake of the soul. Since, therefore, those things are good for the sake of which riches naturally subsist, they will rank in the third place after the virtue of the body and soul. This reason, therefore, will inform us as a teacher, that he who desires to be happy ought not to seek after wealth indiscriminately, but in a just and temperate manner. For thus murders would not be committed in cities, which require to be purified by murders. But now, as I said in the beginning of this discussion, this is one and the greatest cause of the greatest punishments of voluntary murder. The second is the habit of an ambitious soul, which generates envy; and this is bitter to those that dwell together, and especially to him by whom it is possessed, and afterwards to the best persons in the city. But cowardly and unjust fears rank in the third place, which produce many murders, when such things have been transacted by any one, or are at present transacted, as no one wishes to be conscious have taken place, or do take place. On this account they take away by death those that might give information of such transactions, when they cannot prevent them from making a discovery by any other means. And thus much for a preface to all these particulars. To which may be added, what many who are studious respecting the mysteries have heard about things of this kind, of the truth of which they are vehemently persuaded,—I mean, that such actions are punished in Hades, and that the perpetrators of them, again returning hither, necessarily suffer punishment according to nature, and end their days by suffering the very same kind of death which they caused another to suffer. For him, therefore, who from this preface is persuaded, and is in every respect afraid of such a punishment, there is no occasion to establish a law respecting voluntary murder: but for him who will not be persuaded by it let the following law be ordained. He who designedly and unjustly slays with his own hand his fellow-citizen, shall, in the first place, be expelled from temples, from the
forum,

forum, from ports, and from every general assembly, that he may not defile any of these by his presence; and this, whether any one forbids him from these places or not. For the law forbids him, and forbids him as a perpetual injunction to the whole city. But the male or female relative, as far as to a cousin, of the deceased, who does not prosecute such a one in a proper manner, nor expel him from these places, shall first of all receive in himself the defilement, together with the hatred of the Gods, agreeably to the imprecation of the law. And, in the second place, he shall be obnoxious to any one who is willing to revenge the dead. He who is willing to do this, having performed every thing respecting washings, and such other particulars as Divinity has caused to be legal in cases of this kind, and uttered such things as must be previously announced, let him proceed, and compel the homicide to suffer the punishment of his deed according to law. But that these things ought to take place through certain prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods, who attend to such particulars, and are careful that murder may not be perpetrated in cities, will easily be apparent to the legislator. However, who these Gods are, and in what manner these judgments may be introduced, so as to take place with the utmost rectitude with respect to a divine nature, the guardians of the laws, together with the interpreters and diviners, must promulgate. But let the judges of these particulars be those to whom we have given the power of punishing sacrilege. Let him too who is condemned, be punished with death; and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered person, on account of his having acted in an impudent, as well as an impious manner. If he makes his escape, being unwilling to stand his trial, let him be perpetually exiled. And if he is ever detected in any part of the country in which he has committed the murder, he who first meets with him, whether he was the murderer of one of his kindred, or fellow-citizens, shall slay him with impunity; or shall deliver him bound to those magistrates that preside as judges over these affairs, that he may by them be put to death. But if any one should stand forth in his defence, he shall be bound for his appearance, and shall procure three bondsmen, whom the judges shall think sufficient, for the purpose. If he is either unwilling or incapable of doing this, he shall be bound by the magistrates, and properly secured, that he may be punished for his interference. If any one slays another, not with his own hand, but by consulta-

tion and stratagem, and yet, though he is the cause of the murder, and not purified in his soul, shall reside in the city where the deed was committed, such a one, being condemned, shall be similarly punished, except that he shall not be permitted to procure bondsmen, but shall be allowed his proper sepulchre. Let other things respecting him take place in the same manner as above. Let the same particulars too be established respecting strangers towards strangers, citizens and strangers towards each other, and slaves towards slaves, in murder committed with the homicide's own hand; and in that which is committed by consultation and stratagem, excepting that these latter homicides shall be obliged to give bondsmen, in the same manner as those that murder with their own hands. If a slave voluntarily murders a free-born person, whether with his own hand, or through consultation, and is condemned, the public executioner shall lead him to the tomb of the murdered person, or to a place where he may see the tomb. Here he shall be whipt as long as the person that apprehended him pleases, and if he survives the whipping, he shall be put to death. But if any one kills a slave who has not in any respect acted unjustly, through fear lest he should disclose his base and vicious actions, or through some similar cause, he shall be punished in the same manner as if he had slain a citizen. However, if cases should happen for which it is very difficult to establish laws, at the same time that it is impossible not to deliver laws respecting them, such as the voluntary, and, in every respect, unjust, murdering of kindred, whether the homicide accomplishes this with his own hand, or by consultation and stratagem, (murders which frequently take place in cities badly inhabited and governed, and sometimes in a region where no one would expect to find them)—in such cases as these, it will be proper that what was lately mentioned by us should be repeated. For, perhaps, some one, on hearing these things, may be induced more willingly to abstain from the most impious of all murders. For a fable, or a discourse, or by whatever other name it may be proper to call it, is clearly delivered by ancient priests, that Justice, the avenger and inspector of the murdering of kindred, uses the law of which we have just now spoken. Hence, they say, she has ordained that he who commits any such action shall necessarily suffer the same things as he has committed. So that, if any one has ever murdered his father, he shall himself, in certain periods of time, be violently put to death by his children. And, if any one has murdered

dered his mother, he shall, in succeeding times, partake from necessity of a feminine nature, and be deprived of life by his offspring. For they add that, when common blood is defiled, there is not any other purification, nor can the stain be washed away by other means, than by the guilty soul suffering murder for murder, and in a similar manner, and laying asleep the anger of all the kindred of the murdered person. It is proper, therefore, that men should be restrained from crimes of this kind, through the fear of those punishments which are inflicted by the Gods. But if such a miserable calamity should happen to any, as that they should designedly and voluntarily dare to deprive father or mother, brothers or children, of life, let the following law respecting things of this kind be established by the mortal legislator. By a public declaration they shall be expelled from all sacred places, and shall be obliged to give bondsmen, in the same manner as was mentioned above. And when any one is condemned for murder of this kind, he shall be put to death both by the servants of the judges and the magistrates, and shall be driven naked out of the city to an appointed place, where three roads meet. Then all the magistrates, for the sake of the whole city, carrying each of them a stone, shall hurl it at the head of the dead body, and thus expiate the whole city. After this, carrying the dead body to the boundaries of the region, and hurling it thence, they shall leave it unburied, according to law.—But what ought he to suffer who slays his nearest, and, as it is said, most friendly, relative? I mean the man who kills himself, and by violence deprives himself of the allotment of fate; being neither compelled to do this by the judgment of the city, nor by a grievous and inevitable chance of fortune, nor by any extreme shame or poverty; but, through indolence and effeminate timidity, unjustly punishes himself. What purifications, and what mode of interment, ought to be legally established respecting such a one, Divinity knows: but the nearest relatives of the deceased must inquire what these are from the interpreters of the Gods, and the laws about these. As to their sepulture, let them be buried in solitary places, where no one else is buried, and in those parts of the region which are the boundaries of the twelve divisions, and which are desolate and without a name. Let them, likewise, be buried in an ignoble manner, neither making their tombs conspicuous by the erection of pillars, or the inscription of their names. If a beast of burthen, or any other animal, shall kill a man, unless this happens in

some public contest, the relations of the person so killed shall avenge his death: and the præfects of the land shall do whatever the relation or relations of the deceased command. But the punishment shall consist in driving the animal beyond the boundaries of the region, and there slaying him. If any inanimate thing deprives a man of life, except thunder, or any other such-like dart sent from Divinity, by either falling on the man, or the man falling on it, he who is nearest of kin to the deceased shall appoint his neighbour to be a judge in this case, and shall make an expiation both for himself and the whole of his kindred. But the thing condemned shall be exterminated the region, in the same manner as animals that are homicides. If any one is found dead, and it is not manifest by whom he was slain, but cannot be discovered after the most diligent search, proclamations must be employed as in other murders, and the crier must proclaim in the forum, that whoever has slain this or that person, as being guilty of murder, must not approach any sacred places, nor reside in any part of the region where the deed was committed: for, if he is detected within the boundaries of the said region, he shall be put to death, and, being hurled beyond them, left unburied. Let this one law, therefore, be established as the principal one respecting murder. And thus much may suffice about things of this kind. Let the following, then, be the particular cases in which he who commits murder will be pure. If any one detects a thief entering his house by night, for the purpose of robbing it, and slays him, let such an one be pure. In like manner, let him be pure who slays a highwayman in his own defence. And if any one uses force respecting venereal concerns towards a free-born woman or boy, let him be put to death with impunity, either by the injured party, or by the father, brothers, or sons of the person so injured. Likewise, if a man meets with any one offering violence to his wife, and kills him, let him be pure, according to law. And if any one, in assisting his father, or mother, or children, or brothers, or wife, in doing that which is by no means unholy, should slay some one, let him be in every respect pure. And thus far we have given laws concerning that education and discipline of the living soul, which if it is fortunately endued with, it may be suffered to live, but of which if it is unfortunately deprived, it must be put to death: and we have likewise ordained such punishments as murders deserve. We have spoken too respecting the nutrition and discipline of bodies.

It

It now remains that we should define, to the utmost of our power, what violent, voluntary, and involuntary actions are, and how many they are in number, and what are the punishments accommodated to each. For these, as it appears, will be properly discussed after those. But even the vilest legislator will place the consideration of wounds, and mutilations from wounds, after murder. Wounds, therefore, are to be divided in the same manner as murders. For some of them are inflicted involuntarily; others through anger; some through fear; and some voluntarily and from design. Respecting all these, the following observations must be premised. It is necessary that laws should be established for men, and that they should live according to law, or they would in no respect differ from the most savage animals. But this is owing to the nature of men, which is never found to be sufficient of itself to know what is advantageous to a human polity; and, when it does know this, is never always able to do and wish that which is best. For it is, in the first place, difficult to know that not private but public advantage must necessarily be attended to by the political and true art; (for that which is common binds, but that which is private dilacerates, cities,) and that it is more advantageous, both to the public and individuals, that common concerns should be well established, than such as are private. In the second place, though some one should know sufficiently from art, that these things naturally subsist in this manner, yet, after this, if he should govern the city with an unrestrained authority, he would be incapable of persevering in this dogma, and of living in the opinion that common advantage should be nourished in a city, and private follow the general good. But the mortal nature will always impel him to prerogative and private advantage: for this nature avoids pain, and pursues pleasure, in an irrational manner; prefers both these to that which is more just and excellent; and, producing darkness in itself, fills at length both itself and the whole city with evils of every kind. Indeed, if any man, through a divine destiny, should be naturally sufficient to comprehend what is the public good, he would require no laws for the government of himself; for neither any law, nor any order, is better than science; nor is it lawful that intellect should be subservient and a slave to any thing, but that it should be the ruler of all things, if it is thus true, and really free by nature. But now, with respect to such an intellect as this, it cannot be said, that it is not by any means any where to be found, but it should

should be said that it is but rarely seen. That which ranks, therefore, in the second place, must be chosen, viz. order and law; of which many things are indeed perceived, but it is impossible to view all that pertains to them. And thus much we have said for the sake of these things.—Now, let us ordain what he who wounds or injures another ought to suffer or pay. For it is easy for every one to comprehend properly, whether any one is wounded or not, who it is that is wounded, in what part, and after what manner. For there are an innumerable multitude of particulars of this kind, and which very much differ from each other. It is, therefore, alike impossible, to refer all, or no one of these, to courts of justice. For this one thing, in all these, must necessarily be referred to the decision of justice. I mean, whether each of these was done, or not. That nothing, indeed, should be determined by courts of justice respecting the fine for injuries of this kind, but that all things, both small and great, should be determined by law, is nearly impossible.

CLIN. What then shall we say after this?

GUEST. That some things should be referred to courts of justice, but that others should be determined by the legislator himself.

CLIN. What are the particulars then which the legislator must decide, and what those which must be decided by courts of justice?

GUEST. With the greatest propriety, after these things, the following assertions may be made: That, in a city in which the courts of justice are depraved and dumb, the opinions of the judges concealed, and sentence privately passed; and in which something still more dire than this takes place, when each of the judges decides, not in silence, but in the midst of tumult, as in a theatre, the rhetoricians praising and blaming with loud exclamations;—then a heavy calamity befalls the whole city. If, therefore, from a certain necessity, any one should be compelled to give laws to such courts of justice, it would not be a fortunate circumstance; but, at the same time, he who is forced to give them, should commit only the smallest fines to the judges, but should clearly ordain the greatest part of them himself. But, in a city, in which courts of justice are established with as great propriety as possible, and the judges are well educated, and examined with the greatest accuracy; in such a city, it will be proper and becoming to refer many things to the decision of such judges, respecting the punishment of such as are condemned. No one, therefore, should be indignant with us, that we do not
now

now promulgate to these, such things as are the greatest and most numerous, which judges that are educated in the vilest manner may be able to perceive; and who likewise may be capable of punishing every offence in a proper manner. But, as we are of opinion that those for whom we promulgate laws, will not be in the smallest degree inelegant judges of these things, we shall commit most things to their decision. However, as we have often said, in the former part of this discussion, that a description and formulæ of punishments ought to be given as examples to judges, which are never to be transgressed, and this we ourselves have accomplished,—this was then both rightly asserted and performed, and must be observed at present, as we are again returning to the laws. Let the written law, therefore, be established respecting wounds. If any one, thinking in conjunction with his will to slay his friend, (if his friend is one of those whom the law forbids him to injure) wounds, but is not able to kill him, such an one, as neither deserving pity nor regard, we shall compel to suffer the punishment of murder, no otherwise than if he had actually slain his friend: except we should reverence his fortune, if it should not be entirely bad, and also the dæmon who, commiserating both him and the wounded person, may become an averter of evil to both, and may cause the wound of the one not to be incurable, and the fortune and calamity of the other to be devoted to the Furies. Giving thanks, therefore, to this dæmon, and not opposing him, we shall take away the punishment of death from him that inflicted the wound, but order him to be exiled for life in a neighbouring city, and there enjoy the fruits of all his possessions. If the wounded person, however, has suffered any loss, he shall make him a proper restitution, and such an one as the court of justice shall determine. But those judges that decide in cases of murder shall decide in this case. If a child designedly wounds his parent, or a slave his master, the punishment shall be death. And if a brother designedly wounds a brother or sister, or a sister a sister or brother, the punishment shall in like manner be death. But if a woman wounds her husband with an intention of slaying him, or a husband his wife with the same design, let each be perpetually banished. And, with respect to their property, if their sons or daughters are at that time but children, let persons be appointed to manage their affairs, and take care of the orphan children. But if their sons or daughters are adults, let them not be compelled to provide

vide for their exiled parent, but let them be permitted to take possession of his or her property. If any one who has no children happens to fall into calamities of this kind, let his kindred, as far as to cousins, both of the male and female side, assemble, and, consulting together with the guardians of the laws and priests, in the house of the exiled person, let one family out of the five thousand and forty houses of the city be appointed as his heir : at the same time considering that no house out of this number is so much the property of its inhabitant, and his kindred, as of the city at large. It is requisite, indeed, that the city should possess its own houses, to the utmost of its power, in the most holy and prosperous manner. When any house, therefore, is at the same time both unfortunate and impious, in consequence of its possessor leaving no children behind him, and of having been condemned for voluntary murder, or any other crime towards the Gods, or his fellow citizens, the punishment of which according to law is evidently death, or perpetual exile ;—when this is the case, in the first place, let the house be purified and expiated according to law ; and, in the next place, let the kindred, as we just now said, assembling together with the guardians of the laws, consider what family in the city is most renowned for virtue, and at the same time fortunate, and consisting of a numerous progeny. Let one of the children belonging to this family be adopted by the father of the deceased, and by his grandfather and great grandfather, beseeching, at the same time, Divinity that he may be a parent, master, and minister of holy and sacred rites, with better fortune than his predecessor. Having prayed after this manner, let him be appointed heir according to law. But let the guilty person be suffered to lie without a name, without children, and without any lot, in consequence of being oppressed by such calamities as these. Boundary, however, as it appears, is not in all things mingled with boundary. But where there is a common confine, this, being previously hurled in the middle of both boundaries, subsists between both. And we have said that crimes committed through anger are of this kind, subsisting between voluntary and involuntary crimes. If then any one is condemned for wounding another through anger, if the wound shall prove to be curable, he shall pay the double of the loss sustained ; but if incurable, he shall make a four-fold restitution. If the wound shall prove to be curable, but at the same time becomes the cause of great shame and disgrace to the wounded person, he shall likewise pay

pay a fourfold fine. But if any one, in wounding another, not only injures the wounded person, but the city, by rendering him incapable of assisting his country against the enemy, he shall be similarly fined, and, besides this, make restitution to the city for its loss. Besides, too, his own military duties, he shall perform those of the wounded person; or, in case of non-compliance, he shall be accused according to law, by any one that is willing, for neglect of military duty. He shall likewise make a double, triple, or quadruple restitution, according to the decision of the judges. If one near relation in a similar manner wounds another, the parents and kindred, as far as to the male and female cousins assembling together, shall decide the case among themselves, and shall deliver the offender to his parents to be punished according to nature. But if the punishment should be doubtful, it shall be determined by the kindred on the male side. And if they are incapable of deciding the case, they shall betake themselves at last to the guardians of the laws. When children inflict any such wounds on their parents, the judges shall be those that have passed beyond their sixtieth year, and whose children are truly their own, and not such as are adopted. He that in this case is condemned shall be put to death, or suffer some greater punishment, or one that is not much less; but no one of his kindred shall be permitted to judge him, though he should be of the age prescribed by law. But if a slave wounds any free-born person in anger, his master shall deliver him to the wounded person, that he may punish him in whatever manner he pleases: but if his master does not deliver him, he himself shall make a compensation for the injury. If any one has a suspicion that the slave and wounded person acted from mutual compact, he shall acquaint the judges with his suspicion; and if he does not prove that his suspicion was true, he shall be fined triple of the damage sustained; but if he does prove it, let him be obnoxious to slavery, who has acted thus artfully with a slave. But let him who involuntarily wounds another, pay a simple fine. For no legislator is sufficient to govern fortune. Let the judges also be such as were appointed for children when guilty of wounding their parents, and let these determine the proper punishment. All the above-mentioned passions, indeed, are violent; and every kind of striking likewise is violent. It is necessary, therefore, that every man and every woman should always think about things of this kind, that an elderly person is to be honoured in no

small degree beyond a younger person; that they are so by the Gods; and must be so by men who design to be saved and be happy. To see, therefore, an elderly struck by a young man in a city, is shameful, and odious to Divinity. But it seems fit that every young man, when struck by an old man, should patiently endure it, through a reverence of his age. Let it, therefore, be thus: Every one shall reverence both in word and deed a person older than himself; and in such a manner, that whoever is more than twenty years of age, whether male or female, may be revered as a father or mother; and so that every young person may abstain from offering violence to any who are capable of begetting or bringing forth children, through regard to the Gods that preside over births. In a similar manner, let no violence be offered to a stranger, whether he has resided for some time in the city, or has but recently taken up his abode in it. For, whether he excites contention, or resists an injury, let no one dare to chastize him with blows. But if a stranger should dare wantonly to strike a citizen, let him who thinks he ought to be punished bring him before the præfects of the city, but not strike him himself, that, by thus refraining from a stranger, he may be far from daring to strike a fellow-citizen. The præfects of the city, reverencing the hospitable God, shall examine the affair; and if it shall appear that the stranger has acted unjustly, the citizen shall give him as many lashes with a whip, as the blows which he received from him, that he may prevent him from daring to do the like in future. But if it shall appear that the stranger has not acted unjustly, after threatening and disgracing the person that brought him before the præfects of the city, let both be dismissed. If one person strikes another of the same age with himself, or who is a little older, but without children, or if an old man strikes an old man, or one youth another, the injured parties may defend themselves according to nature, without weapons, with their naked hands. But if any one who is more than forty years of age shall dare to strike another, either while the person he strikes is attacking another, or defending himself, let him be called rustic, illiberal, and servile; and he may be considered as sufficiently punished by this reproach. And if any one is obedient to these admonitions, he will be of a tractable disposition: but let him who cannot be persuaded by them, and who despises this exordium, receive with alacrity the following law: If any one strikes another who is older than himself by twenty years or
more,—

more,—in the first place, let him who happens to be present at the time, if he is neither of an equal age, nor younger, prevent any further violence; or, if he does not prevent it, let him be considered as unworthy according to law. But if he is of the same age with, or younger than, the person struck, let him defend him as if he was his brother or father, or as if he was his superior. And, besides this, let him be obnoxious to judicial punishment, who, as we have said, dares to strike a person older than himself: and if he is condemned, let him be punished with bonds, for not less than a year; or for a longer time, if it shall seem proper to the judges by whom he is condemned. If a stranger or an inhabitant shall strike one who is twenty years older than himself, let the same law have the same power, with respect to those that are present giving him assistance. And let him who in this case shall be condemned, if he is a stranger, and not an inhabitant of the city, be punished with bonds for the space of two years. But if he is an inhabitant of the city, and is not obedient to the laws, let him be punished with bonds for three years, if the court of justice does not determine that he shall be punished for a longer time. Let whoever happens to be present on this occasion, and does not give assistance according to law, be fined. And if he possesses one of the first and largest estates, let him be fined a mina; but if his estate is of the second rank, fifty drachms; if of the third, thirty; and if of the fourth, twenty. Let the court of justice too respecting all such particulars consist of the generals of the army, the præfects of the military orders, the governors of tribes, and the masters of the horse. But with respect to laws, as it appears, some are instituted for the sake of worthy men, that they may be instructed by them, how they may associate with each other in a benevolent manner; but others for the sake of those who, avoiding discipline, and being of an intractable nature, are disposed to rush into every kind of vice. It is for these that what follows is asserted, and that the legislator necessarily establishes laws; at the same time wishing, that there may never be any occasion to use them. Whoever, therefore, dares to strike his father or mother, or the progenitors of these, neither dreading the anger of the Gods above, nor the punishments which are said to be inflicted under the earth, but, as one who thinks he knows that of which he is perfectly ignorant, despises assertions which are both antient and assented to by all men, and in consequence of this acts unlawfully,—such a one

requires the most extreme remedy. Death, therefore, is not the last remedy, but the punishments which are inflicted in Hades are rather ultimate remedies; and which, though they are most truly said to exist, yet are incapable of averting souls of this kind from evil. For, if they were capable, there never would be found any who would impiously dare to strike their parents. It is requisite, therefore, that the punishments for crimes of this kind in the present life, should be as much as possible in no respect inferior to those which are inflicted in Hades. Let the following law, therefore, be established: If any one who is not insane shall dare to strike his father or mother, or their fathers or mothers,—in the first place, let any one who is present (as was mentioned before) give assistance. And if it is an inhabitant that gives assistance, let him be called to take the principal seat in the games; but if he does not give assistance, let him be perpetually banished from the region. If he is not an inhabitant, but gives assistance, let him be praised; but if he does not give assistance, let him be blamed. If a slave gives assistance, let him be made free; but if he does not assist, let him receive a hundred lashes with a whip. And if this happens in the forum, let the punishment be inflicted by the præfects of the market; but if in any other part of the city, by the ædiles. In like manner, if it should happen beyond the city, let him be punished by the governors of the husbandmen. If any citizen is present when a parent is struck by his child, whether such citizen is a boy, a man, or a woman, let him give assistance, at the same time exclaiming that such conduct is impious. But if he does not give assistance, let him be obnoxious to Jupiter Omognius¹ and Patroïus². Lastly, if any one is condemned for striking his parents, let him, in the first place, be perpetually banished from the city to some other region; and, in the next place, let him be expelled from all sacred places and ceremonies; from which if he will not abstain, let him be punished with blows by the magistrates that take care of rural affairs, and entirely in such a manner as they please. And if he returns from exile, let him be punished with death. If any free-born person shall eat or drink with such a one, or have any transactions with him, or voluntarily touch him, if he should happen to meet with him,—such a one shall neither be suffered to enter into any temple, or forum, nor in short into the

¹ Viz. who presides over nations and families.

² Paternal.

city,

city, till he is purified ; for he should think that he has had communication with an execrable fortune. But if, being unper-suaded by the law, he illegally defiles sacred places, and the city,—whatever magistrate, perceiving this, does not punish such an one, let him be accused as guilty of one of the greatest crimes. If a slave strikes a free-born person, whether he is a stranger or a citizen, let any one who is present give assistance, or be punished with the above-mentioned fine, according to the value of his estate. Those who are present, therefore, shall succour the injured person, and deliver to him the offender bound. Then the injured person, receiving him in this condition, shall give him as many lashes with a whip as he pleases ; observing, at the same time, not to injure his master, to whom he shall afterwards deliver him, to be possessed according to law. But let the law be this : If a slave strikes a free-born person, without being ordered to do so by the magistrates, his master, on receiving him bound from the person he has injured, shall not free him from his bonds till the slave has persuaded the injured person that he deserves to be released from them. Let the same laws be adopted for women, in their conduct towards each other, with respect to all these particulars ; and for women towards men, and men towards women.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

INTRO-

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE TENTH BOOK OF THE LAWS.

THE following book may be justly considered as forming one of the most important parts of the works of Plato, as it demonstrates the existence of divine natures, the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of things; and shows that they provide for all things, and govern the universe with justice. It is also important in another point of view, as it incontestably proves that Plato firmly believed in the religion of his country; though this has often been denied by those who, being ignorant of its real nature, have had no conceptions of its unequalled sublimity. As Proclus, therefore, with his usual depth and fecundity of conception, has admirably elucidated Plato's doctrine on these three important subjects, in his first book *On the Theology of Plato*, the following translation from that book is subjoined for the benefit of the reader:

I. In the Laws these three things are asserted by Plato: That there are Gods, that they providentially attend to all things, and that they conduct all things according to justice, and receive no perversion from subordinate natures. That these, then, are the principal of all theological dogmas, is obvious to every one. For, what is more principal than the *hyparxis* of the Gods, or than beneficent providence, or immutable and undeviating power? through which the Gods produce secondary natures uniformly, and preserve and convert them to themselves with perfect purity: they indeed governing others, but being in no respect passive to things subordinate, nor changed together with the variety of the objects of their providential energy. We shall learn, however, in what manner these things are naturally distinguished, if we endeavour first to comprehend by a reasoning process the scientific

scientific method of Plato in each of these subjects, and, prior to the rest, by what irreprehensible arguments he proves that there are Gods; and, in the next place, consider the problems which are suspended from this.

Of all beings, then, it is necessary that some should move only, that others should be moved only, and that the natures which subsist between these should both be moved and move; and this in such a manner, that either they must necessarily be moved by others, and move others, or be self-motive. These four hypotheses¹ succeed each other in an orderly progression. For, prior to that which is moved only, and is passive to other primary causes, is that which moves others, and is moved by others; and beyond this is the self-motive nature, originating from itself, and, in consequence of moving itself, imparting to others also the representation of being moved. And after all those which participate of efficient or passive motion the immovable nature succeeds. For every thing self-motive, as possessing its perfection in a life attended with mutation and interval, is suspended from another more ancient cause, which always subsists according to the same things, and after the same manner, and whose life is not according to time, but in eternity: for time is the image of eternity. If, therefore, all things which are moved by themselves are moved according to time, but the eternal form of motion is beyond that which is borne along according to time, the self-motive nature will be the second in order, and not the first among beings. And again, that which moves others, and is moved by others, must necessarily be suspended from a self-motive nature: and not this only, but likewise every alter-motive composition or constitution of things, as the Athenian guest demonstrates. For, says he, if every thing which is moved should stop², there will not be that which is first moved, unless the self-motive natures have a subsistence in beings. For the immovable is by no means naturally adapted to be moved, nor would it then be that which is first moved. And the alter-motive nature will require another moving power. The self-motive nature, therefore, alone, as beginning its energy from itself, will

¹ *Hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις)* is an individual subsistence.

² The force of this argument for the existence of a self-motive nature is very great. If all motion were to stop, whence could it again originate? Not from the immovable; for it is a mover only, and therefore cannot be that which is first moved. Nor could motion originate from the alter-motive nature; for this, as its name implies, derives its motion from another.

move itself, and others also, in a secondary degree. For a nature of this kind imparts to things alter-motive the power of being moved, in the same manner as the immovable inserts in all things the power of moving. And again, in the third place, that which is moved only, we must primarily suspend from the natures which are moved by another, but which move others. For it is requisite that both other things, and the series of natures which are moved, and which extends supernally as far as to the order of things last, should be filled with their proper media. All bodies, therefore, belong to things which are naturally adapted to be moved only, and to be passive. For they are effective of nothing, on account of possessing an hypostasis endued with interval, and participating of magnitude and bulk; since whatever is effective and motive of other things naturally makes and moves in consequence of employing an incorporeal power.

Of incorporeal natures, however, some are divisible about bodies, and others are exempt from such a distribution about the last of things. The natures, therefore, which are divided about the bulks of bodies, whether they consist in qualities, or in material forms, belong to the natures which are moved by another, but which move others. For these, because they have an incorporeal allotment, participate of the power of moving; but again, because they are divided about bodies, and, in consequence of this, are deprived of the power of verging to themselves, are distributed together with their subjects, and are replete with sluggishness from these, they require a moving power which is not borne along to foreign seats, but possesses an hypostasis in itself. Where, then, shall we have that which moves itself? For things which are extended into bulks and intervals, or which are divided in these, and consist about them inseparably, must of necessity either be alone moved, or move in consequence of being moved by others. But it is requisite, as we have before said, that the self-motive nature should be prior to these, which is established in itself, and not in others, and which fixes its energies in itself, and not in things subordinate to itself. There is, therefore, some other nature exempt from bodies, both in the heavens and the much-mutable elements, from which the power of being moved is primarily imparted to bodies. If, then, it be requisite to discover what such an essence is, we shall act rightly in following Socrates, and considering what that nature is, which, by being present to things alter-motive, imparts

imparts to them a representation of self-motion, and to which of the above-mentioned natures we should ascribe the power of being moved from themselves. For all inanimate things are alone alter-motive, and their passive properties are naturally derived from a power externally moving and impelling.

If, therefore, the self-motive is more antient than the alter-motive essence, but soul is primarily self-motive, from which the image of self-motion pervades to bodies, soul will be beyond bodies, and the motion of every body will be the progeny of soul, and of its internal motion. Hence, it is necessary that the whole of heaven, and all the bodies it contains, possessing such a variety of motion, and these moved according to nature (for to every body of this kind a circular motion is natural ¹), should have ruling souls, essentially more antient than bodies, moving in themselves, and supernally illuminating bodies with the power of being moved. With respect to these souls, therefore, which orderly distribute the whole world, and its parts, and move and vitalize every thing corporeal, and which, of itself, is destitute of life, inspiring the cause of motion,—with respect to these, it is necessary that they should either move all things rationally, or according to a contrary mode, which it is not lawful to assert. But if this world, and every thing which has an orderly subsistence in it, and which is equably moved and perpetually borne along according to nature, are referred to an irrational soul, which both moves itself and other things, neither the order of the periods, nor motion essentially bounded according to one reason, nor the position of bodies, nor any thing else which is generated according to nature, will have a stable cause, and which is able to arrange every thing according to the same things, and after the same manner. For every thing irrational is naturally adapted to be adorned by another, since, of itself, it is indefinite and inordinate. But to commit all heaven to a thing of this kind, and a circulation which revolves according to the same reason, and after the same manner, by no means accords with the nature of things, nor with our undisciplined conceptions. If, on the contrary, an intellectual and rational soul governs all things, and if every thing which eternally revolves is under the dominion of such a soul, and there is nothing of wholes destitute of soul

¹ See the Introduction to my Translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

(for, as Theophrastus somewhere observes, no body that is honourable is deprived of this power),—if this be the case, whether has it this intellectual¹, perfect, and beneficent nature, according to participation, or according to essence? For, if according to essence, every soul must necessarily be of this kind, if each, according to its own nature, is self-motive. But if it is intellectual according to participation, there will be another intellect in energy more antient than soul, which will possess intellection essentially, and which comprehends in itself, by its very essence, an uniform knowledge of wholes; since it is also necessary that the soul which is essentialized according to reason, should possess a subsistence according to intellect through participation, and that an intellectual nature should be twofold,—one primarily in a divine intellect itself, and another secondarily in soul, and proceeding from this divine intellect.

You may also add, if you are willing, the presence of intellectual illumination in body. For whence is the whole of this heaven either spheric, or carried in a circle, and is rolled round the same according to one definite order? How is it always immutably allotted the same idea and power according to nature, unless it participate of the effective nature of form according to intellect? For soul is the supplier of motion; but the cause of a stable condition, and which leads back the fluctuating mutation of things which are moved, to sameness, and to a life bounded according to one reason, and a circulation subsisting after the same manner, must evidently be superior to soul.

Body, therefore, and the whole of this sensible essence, belong to alter-motive natures; but soul is self-motive, binding in itself all corporeal motions; and prior to this is immovable intellect. Nor must you conceive that this immovable nature of intellect is such as that which we say is sluggish, void of life, and without spirit; for it is the leading cause of all motion, and the fountain of all life, as well of that which is converted to itself, as of that which has its hypostasis in other natures. Through these causes the world is called by Timæus an animated intellectual animal. It is denominated an animal from its own nature, and the life which pervades to it from soul, and which is divided about it; but animated, from the presence of a divine

² Intuitive perception is the characteristic of intellect, as discursive energy of the rational soul.

soul

soul in it; and intellectual, from the government of intellect. For a sufficient supply of life, the government of soul, and the communication of intellect, connectedly contain the whole of heaven.

But if this intellect is intellect according to essence, since the very being of intellect consists in intellection, and Timæus, demonstrating this, calls it divine, for he says that soul¹, receiving a divine intellect, is rightly and prudently disciplined,—if this be the case, it is necessary that the whole of heaven should be suspended from the deity² of this intellect, and that motion should be present to this universe from soul, but perpetual permanency and a subsistence after the same manner from intellect, and one union, concord in itself, sympathy and an all-perfect measure, from a unity through which intellect is uniform, soul is one, and every being is a whole and perfect, according to its nature. It is also necessary that every thing secondary, together with the perfection in its own proper nature, should also participate from an order established above it of another more excellent idiom. For that which is corporeal, being alter-motive, derives the appearance of self-motive power from soul, and is through it an animal. But soul, being self-motive, participates of life according to intellect, and, energizing temporally, possesses unceasing energy and ever-vigilant life from its vicinity to intellect. And intellect, possessing its life in eternity, and in an essence ever in energy, and fixing all its intelligence collectively in itself, is perfectly divine, through a cause prior to itself, or, in other words, from the unity which it participates. For, as Plotinus says, it has twofold energies, some as intellect, and others as being inebriated with nectar³: and, in another place, that this intellect is a God, through that prior to itself which is not intellect. Just as soul, by that summit of itself which is above soul, is intellect; and body, through a power prior to body, is soul.

All things, therefore, as we have said, are suspended from unity through intellect and soul as media. And intellect is, indeed, uniform, or has the form of unity; but soul is mentiform, or has the form of intellect; and the body of the world is vital. Every thing, in short, is suspended from that which is prior to itself. And, with respect to the things posterior to

¹ i. e. the soul of the world.

² See the Introduction to the Parmenides.

³ That is, as energizing super-intellectually through its unity, which is the blossom of its essence, and which abides in unproceeding union in the ineffable cause of all.

those above mentioned, one enjoys a divine nature more nearly, and another more remotely. And deity, indeed, is prior to an intellectual essence, in which, as in a vehicle, it first rides; but intellect is most divine, as being deified prior to other things. Soul is divine, so far as it requires an intellectual medium; and the body which participates of such a soul, so far as it participates, is, indeed, divine (for the illumination of divine light supernally pervades as far as to the last dependance), but, simply considered, is not divine. But soul, by looking to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.

The same reasoning, also, must be adopted with respect to each of the whole spheres, and the bodies which they contain. For all these imitate the whole of heaven, since they have a perpetual allotment. And the sublunary elements are not entirely mutable according to essence, but abide, according to their *wholenesses*¹, in the universe, and comprehend in themselves partial animals: for every *wholeness* has, in conjunction with itself, more partial hypostases. As, therefore, in the heavens the number of the stars proceeds in conjunction with the whole spheres, and as, in earth, a multitude of terrestrial partial animals subsists, together with its wholeness,—in like manner, I think it is necessary, that in the wholes which are situated between heaven and earth, every element should be filled with its proper numbers. For how, in the extremes, can wholes, which subsist prior to parts, be arranged with their parts, unless there is also the same analogy in the media?

But if each of the spheres is an animal, is perpetually established after the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, so far as it has life always primarily participating of soul, but, so far as it preserves its own order immutably in the world, is comprehended by intellect, and so far as it is one and a whole, being the leader of its proper parts, is illuminated by divine union,—if this be the case, not only the universe, but each of its perpetual parts, is animated, endued with intellect, and as much as possible similar to the whole. For each of these is a universe, with respect to its kindred multitude. In short, there is one wholeness with a corporeal form of the universe, but many others under this, depending on this one; one

¹ Each of the elements is a *wholeness* from the possession of one perfect form which remains perpetually the same.—See the Introduction to the *Timæus*.

soul of the world, and after this others orderly distributing, in conjunction with it, its whole parts with inviolable purity; one intellect, and an intellectual number under this participated by these souls; and one God who connectedly contains all mundane and supermundane natures, and a multitude of other Gods who distribute intellectual essences, the souls suspended from these, and all the parts of the world. For, it is impossible that every progeny of nature should be generative of things similar to itself, but that wholes, and the first things in the universe, should not in a much greater degree extend in themselves the exemplar of such like propagation. For the similar is more allied to, and more naturally accords with, the similar, from the reason of cause, than with the dissimilar; and, in like manner, the same than the different, and bound than the infinite. And thus much concerning the first particular, or the existence of the Gods.

II. Let us now direct our attention to the second thing demonstrated in the following book, viz. that the Gods providentially attend both to wholes and parts. That which is self-motive, then, is the principle of motion and being to all mundane natures; and life proceeds from soul, together with local and other motions. A progression, likewise, into being is derived from this; and, by a much greater priority, from an intellectual essence, which binds in itself the life of things self-motive, and precedes, according to cause, all temporal energy. But in a still greater degree is this progression into being derived from an hyparxis, characterized by unity, which contains both intellect and soul, fills with total goods, and proceeds to the last of things. For all the parts of the world are not able to participate of life, nor of intellect and gnostic power; but all things participate of *the one*, as far as to matter itself, wholes and parts, things according to nature and the contraries to these, and nothing is destitute of a cause of this kind; nor can any thing which participates of being be deprived of *the one*. If, therefore, the Gods, who are characterized by unity, produce all things, and contain all things in their unknown comprehending powers, how is it possible that they should not also contain a providence, supernally pervading as far as to the most partial natures? For it is every where fit that offspring should enjoy the care of their causes. But all alter-motive are the progeny of self-motive natures; and things which subsist in time, either according to the whole or a part of the whole of time, are the effects of things eternal; because perpetual

petual being is the cause of being which sometimes has a subsistence. Divine and single genera, likewise, presubsist as causes of the subsistence of all multiplied natures; and, in short, there is no multitude of essences or powers which is not allotted its generation from *the one*. It is necessary therefore, that all these should partake of the providence of preceding causes, being vivified, indeed, by the Gods that are connected with souls, and circularly moved according to temporal periods; but participating the permanent establishment of forms from the intellectual Gods¹; and receiving in themselves the presence of union, measure, and the distribution of good, from the first² Gods. Hence it is necessary, either that the Gods should know their productions, because a providential care of their own offspring is natural to them, and that they should not only give subsistence to secondary natures, and impart life, essence, and union, but also comprehend the primary cause of the good in these; or, that, being Gods, they should be ignorant, which it is not lawful to assert, of what is proper to every thing. For what ignorance can there be of things beautiful, with the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those who are allotted an *hyperexis* bounded in the nature of the good?

Indeed, if the Gods are ignorant of their progeny, neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect, nor are intellects carried in souls, nor prior to these do the unities of the Gods contract all knowledge in themselves, which we have granted from preceding demonstrations. But, if the Gods know their progeny, being the fathers, leaders, and rulers, of all things in the world, and to these, being such, the care of the things governed, consequent to, and generated by, them, pertains,—whether shall we say that these, knowing the law according to nature, are able to give completion to it, or, that through imbecility of providence they are deprived of their possessions or progeny, or whatever else you may think proper to call them? For, if through imbecility they abandon the care of all things, what is the cause of this imbecility? For they do not move things externally, nor are other things the causes of essence, while the Gods merely assume the government of what others have produced, but as from the stern of a ship they direct all

¹ It is necessary here in the original, after the word *καταστασις*, to add *ἐκ τῶν νοερῶν θεῶν*.

² Viz. from the intelligible Gods, who are wholly characterized by the supersensual. See the Introduction to the *Parmenides*.

things,

things, imparting being, containing the measures of life, and distributing the powers of energy to energizing natures. Whether also are they incapable of providentially attending to all things at once, or do not leave any part destitute of their presiding care? And if they are not curators of all things in the world, whether do they provide for greater things, but neglect lesser? Or do they take care indeed of lesser things, but pay no attention to such as are greater? For, if we similarly deprive them of a providential attention to all things through imbecility, how, attributing to them that which is greater, viz. the production of all things, can we avoid granting what is naturally consequent to this, that they providentially attend to their offspring? For it is the province of a power which makes a greater thing, to direct also a lesser. But if the Gods take care of lesser things, but neglect greater, how can this mode of providence be right? For the more allied and the more similar are naturally more adapted to the communication of good, which the Gods impart. And, if the first of mundane natures are thought worthy of providential attention and of the perfection emanating from the Gods, but the Divinities are incapable of proceeding as far as to the last of things, what is that which will restrain their being present to all things? What will interrupt their unenvying energy? How can those who are capable of effecting greater things, be imbecil with respect to dominion over lesser? Or how will those who produce the essence even of the minutest things, through impotency not be the lords of their perfection? For all these things oppose our natural conceptions. It remains, therefore, that the Gods must know what is adapted to every thing, and possess a power perfective of, and a dominion which rules over, all things. But if they know what is according to nature, and this, to those that generate all things, is to take care of all things, an abundance of power is not deprived of this providential attention.

It may also be inquired, whether the will of providence is in the Gods? or whether this alone is wanting to their knowledge and power, and that, on this account, things are deprived of their care? For if, knowing what is adapted to themselves, and being able to fill the objects of their knowledge, they are not willing to provide for their own progeny, they will be indigent of goodness, will be no longer unenvious, and, by such an hypothesis, we shall subvert the hyarxis according to which they are essentialized. For the very being of the Gods is constituted in goodness, and in this they possess their
hypostasiss.

hypostasis. But to provide for subject natures, is to impart to them a certain good. By depriving the Gods therefore of providence, do we not at the same time deprive them of goodness? And, depriving them of goodness, do we not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis? By every necessity⁷, therefore, goodness is consequent to the very being of the Gods. And this being admitted, it follows that they do not depart from a providential attention to secondary natures, through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance; and again, as consequent to this, it must be admitted, that they possess the most excellent knowledge, undefiled power, and unenvying will.

Thus providing, therefore, for all things, they appear to be in no respect deficient in the supply of goods. Let no one, however, suppose a providence of such a kind, as to extend the Gods about secondary natures, and deprive them of their exempt transcendence, or ascribe to them, who are established far remote from all mortal molestation, a busy energy, and laborious life. For their blessedness is not willing to be defiled with the difficulty of administration; since the life also of worthy men is attended with facility of energy, and is free from molestation and pain. But all labours which are the consequence of perturbation, arise from the impediments of matter. If, however, it be requisite to define the mode in which the providence of the Gods energizes, we must establish it to be spontaneous, undefiled, immaterial and ineffable. For they do not govern all things in the same manner as men when they providentially attend to their own affairs, viz. by inquiring what is fit, investigating the good of any particular by dubious reasonings, directing their view to externals, and following effects; but, previously assuming in themselves the measures of wholes, producing from themselves the essences of things, and looking to themselves, in a silent path, they lead, perfect, and fill all things with good, neither producing similar to nature, which alone energizes by its very essence without free deliberation, nor like partial souls, who energize in conjunction with will, and are deprived of essential operation, but they comprehend both these in profound union. And they will, indeed, what they are able to effect by their very essence; but, being able to accomplish, and producing all things by their very essence, they contain, in unenvying will, the cause of production. What busy energy, there-

⁷ In the original instead of *πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην*, we find *πᾶσαν ἀρετήν*.

fore, what molestation, what punishment of Ixion, can be said to give completion to the providence of the Gods, unless to impart good in any way is laborious to a divine nature? But that which is according to nature is not laborious to any thing: for it is not laborious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor, in short, to bodies to energize according to their proper powers. Nor, prior to bodies, is it laborious to natures to nourish, or generate, or increase; for these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, to souls: for many of the energies of these are from free deliberation; and they move many things and excite many motions by their very essence, through their presence alone. So that, if the communication of good is natural to the Gods, providence also is natural to them; and this we should say is effected by the Gods with facility, and by their very essence alone. But if these things are not natural to the Divinities, neither will they be naturally good: for good imparts good; just as life gives subsistence to another life, and intellect to intellectual illumination. And whatever is primary in every nature generates that which has a secondary subsistence.

What, however, is most illustrious in the Platonic theology is this, that neither does it convert the exempt essence of the Gods to secondary natures, through the care of things subordinate, nor diminish their providential presence to all things, through their undefiled transcendence; but, at the same time that it assigns to them that which is separate in hypostasis, and unmingled with every deterior nature, it celebrates them as extending to all things, and as taking care of and adorning their proper progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through all things is not corporeal, like that of light through the air, nor divisible about bodies, as that of nature, nor converted to things subordinate, as that of a partial soul; but it is separate from, and unconverted to, body, is immaterial, unmingled, unrestrained, uniform, primary, and transcendently exempt. In short, such¹ a mode of divine providence must be understood in the present case; since it is evident that there is a peculiar mode of providence according to every order of the

¹ Viz. This general mode of providence is applicable to all the Gods; but a peculiar mode is also united with it. For the providence of superior Gods is more universal, but that of the inferior Deities more particular. In short, the providence of the Gods is varied according to the subjects, times, and places of its energy; not that the diversity of the latter produces, but, on the contrary, proceeds from, the variety of the former.

Gods. For soul is said to provide for things secondary in one way, and intellect in another; but Deity, which is prior to intellect, transcendently provides for all that intellect and soul provide. And of the Gods themselves there is one providence of the sublunary, and another of the celestial. And of those beyond the world there are many orders; but the mode of providence is varied in each.

III. In the third place, let us consider how we are to understand the immutability of a divine nature, which conducts all things according to justice, without departing from undeviating rectitude, both in the providence of all other things and of human affairs. This, then, I think, must be apparent to every one, that every where that which governs according to nature, and pays every attention to the felicity of the governed, must lead and direct them to that which is best. For neither will the pilot, in governing sailors and a ship, have any other principal end than the safety of those that sail in the vessel, and of the vessel itself; nor will the physician, being the curator of the sick, either cut the body, or administer medicines for the sake of any thing else than the health of the subjects of his care; nor can it be said that the general or guardian looks to any other end, than the latter the liberty of those whom he preserves, and the former that of his soldiers. Nor does any other, to whom the government and care of any thing are committed, endeavour to subvert the good of his charge, over which he presides, and, aiming at which, he disposes every thing pertaining to the objects of his government in a becoming manner. If, therefore, we grant that the Gods are the governors of all things, and acknowledge that their providence is extended to all things, goodness being the characteristic of their nature, and that they possess every virtue, how is it possible for them to neglect the felicity of the subjects of their providential energy? Or how can they be inferior to other leaders in the providence of things subordinate? since the Gods always look to that which is better, and establish this as the end of all their government; but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than virtue, being perverted by the gifts of the depraved. In short, whether you are willing to call them leaders, or governors, or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will not appear to be indigent of any one of such-like appellations. For all things venerable and honourable subsist in them primarily: and, on this account, here also some things are naturally more venerable
and

and honourable than others, because they bear an ultimate resemblance of the Gods. But what occasion is there to insist any further on this? For we hear, I think, paternal, guardian, ruling, and Pæonian powers celebrated by those who are skilled in divine concerns. How is it possible, therefore, that the images of the Gods, when subsisting according to nature, and aiming at their proper end, should provide for the well-being of the subjects of their government, but that the Gods themselves, with whom the whole of good, real and true virtue, and an innoxious life, reside, should not direct their government to the virtue and vice of men? And how do they evince^{*} that virtue is victorious, but that vice is vanquished in the universe? Indeed, by admitting that they attend to the worship of the depraved, we must also admit that they corrupt the measures of justice, subvert the boundary of undeviating science, and evince that the gifts of vice are more honourable than the pursuits of virtue. Such a mode of providence, however, is neither profitable to those that lead, nor to those that are led. For to those that have become vicious there will be no liberation from guilt, because offenders always endeavour to anticipate justice, and decline the measures of desert. But it will be necessary that the Gods (which it is not lawful to assert) should regard the vice of the subjects of their providence, neglect their true safety, and be alone the causes of shadowy goods. This universe, too, must be filled with disorder and incurable perturbation, depravity abiding in it, and must be in a condition similar to that of badly-governed cities; though, is it not perfectly impossible that parts should be governed according to nature rather than wholes, human affairs than things divine, and images than primary causes?

So that if rulers among men rule with rectitude, honouring some and disgracing others, and every where directing the works of vice by the measures of virtue,—by a much greater necessity must the Gods, who are the leaders of wholes, be immutable; for men, through a similitude to the Gods, are allotted this virtue. But, if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the safety and well-being of those who are governed by them, imitate in a greater degree the providence of the Gods, we shall forget that, at the same time, we entirely abolish the truth concerning the Gods, and the transcendency of

^{*} Proclus here alludes to the Chaldaean Oracles, of one of which the sentence, "Virtue is victorious, but vice is vanquished in the universe," is a part, as appears from his Commentary on the Republic, p. 376.

virtue. For this I think is obvious to every one, that what is more similar to the Gods is more blessed than that which is deprived of them through dissimilitude and diversity. So that, if here, indeed, the uncorrupted and undeviating form of providence is honourable, in a much greater degree must it be honourable with the Gods. But if with them mortal gifts are more venerable than the divine measures of justice,—with men, also, earth-born will be more sufficient than Olympian goods to perfect felicity, and the blandishments of vice than the works of virtue. Through these demonstrations, therefore, Plato, in this book, delivers to us the *hyperaxis* of the Gods, their providential care extending to all things, and their immutable energy, which things are, indeed, common to all the Gods, but have a leading dignity and a primary subsistence according to nature in the doctrine concerning the divinities. For this triad appears supernally pervading from the occult genera as far as to the most partial progressions, in the divine orders; since a uniform *hyperaxis*, a power providential of all secondary natures, and an intellect undeviating and immutable, subsist in all the Gods, as well in those prior to the world, as in those of a mundane characteristic.

THE LAWS,

BOOK X.

AFTER the laws respecting wounds, let the following general law be established respecting violence of every kind; that no one shall carry or take away any thing belonging to another, or use his neighbour's property, if he has not obtained the consent of its possessor. For all the above-mentioned evils have depended, depend at present, and will depend on a thing of this kind. But the greatest of the remaining evils are the intemperance and insolence of young men. The first of these consists in insolent and injurious behaviour towards sacred concerns. And the intemperance and insolence of young men are particularly mighty evils when they take place in public and holy affairs, or in any common part of the tribes, or any other communions of this kind. But the second of these crimes, and which rank in the second place, are those committed towards private sacred concerns and sepulchres. Those of the third rank, separate from the above-mentioned particulars, consist in insolent behaviour towards parents. The fourth kind of insolence takes place when any one, despising the magistrates, takes away or uses any thing belonging to them, contrary to their intention. The fifth consists in unjustly calling to account the political conduct of any citizen. And for each of these a common law must be established. For, with respect to sacrilege, we have summarily said in what manner it ought to be punished, if it is committed with violence and secrecy. Let us now speak concerning the punishment which those ought to suffer who speak or act in an insolent manner towards the Gods, premising first of all the following particulars, as an atonement. He who believes that there are Gods, conformably to the laws, will never at any time voluntarily act in an impious manner, or speak illegally.

illegally. But he who does so will suffer one of these three things: either he will not believe that there are Gods; or he will believe that there are, but that they take no care of human affairs; or, in the third place, he will believe that they are easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers.

CLIN. What then shall we do, and what shall we say to them?

GUEST. O good man! let us, in the first place, hear what I prophesy they will jocosely say in contempt of us.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. They will, perhaps, in a reviling manner thus address us:— O Athenian guest, you Lacedæmonian, and you Cnossian, you speak the truth. For some of us are by no means of opinion that there are Gods; others among us believe that they take no care of human affairs; and others, that they may easily be appeased by sacrifices and prayers, agreeably to what you said. But we think it proper, in the same manner as it appeared proper to you respecting laws, that before you threaten us severely you should endeavour to persuade and teach us that there are Gods, adducing for this purpose sufficient arguments; and likewise, that they are beings too excellent to be allured in an unjust manner by any gifts. For, now often hearing these, and other such particulars, asserted by the best of poets, rhetoricians, prophets, priests, and ten thousand others, the greater part of us do not turn from acting unjustly, but we endeavour by such conduct to obtain a remedy for our evils. But from legislators who confess themselves not to be rustic, but mild, we think it reasonable to expect that they should endeavour to persuade us that there are Gods; so that, though they may not speak better than others respecting the existence of the Divinities, yet they may speak better with respect to truth. And perhaps, indeed, we may be persuaded by you. If, therefore, we speak in a proper manner, comply with our request.

CLIN. It appears therefore easy, O guest, to show the truth of this assertion, that there are Gods.

GUEST. How?

CLIN. In the first place, the earth and sun, all the stars, and the seasons so beautifully adorned and distinguished by months and years, evince the truth of this assertion. To which we may add, that all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, believe that there are Gods.

GUEST.

GUEST. O blessed man, I am afraid for the depraved, (for I will not ever say that I am ashamed of them,) lest you should despise them. For you are ignorant with respect to the cause of the difference between them and others, and think that their souls are impelled to an impious life through the incontinence alone of pleasures and desires.

CLIN. But what other cause is there, O guest, besides this?

GUEST. One, of which you are nearly entirely ignorant, through living remote from such characters.

CLIN. What is it?

GUEST. A certain ignorance of a very grievous nature, and which appears to be the greatest prudence.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. There are certain writings among us, partly in verse and partly in prose, which, as I understand, you have not, through the virtue of your polity. The most antient of these writings assert, respecting the Gods, that the nature of Heaven, and of the other Divinities, was first generated; and at no great distance from the beginning of these compositions, the generation of the Gods, and their discourses with each other, are related. It is not easy to censure these writings, on account of their antiquity, whether they may be properly adapted to the hearers of them, or not. But I shall never praise them as useful, nor as in every respect speaking properly respecting the reverence and honour which is due to parents. Let us, therefore, dismiss and bid farewell to the writings of the antients, and speak of them in such a manner as is pleasing to the Gods. But let us accuse such assertions of junior wise men as are the causes of evil. Their assertions, then, produce the following effect:—When you and I, as arguments that there are Gods, adduce the sun and moon, the stars, and the earth, as Gods and Divine natures,—others, persuaded by these wise men, will say that they are earth and stones, incapable of paying any attention to human affairs, though they are celebrated as Divinities in discourses well calculated to procure persuasion.

CLIN. Such an assertion, O guest, would be of a dangerous nature, even if I was the only one that heard it; but now, since it is heard by many, it is still more dangerous.

GUEST. What then ought we to say, and what ought we to do? Shall

we

we apologize as if we were accused by some impious person for acting in a dire manner by establishing laws as if there were Gods? Or shall we bid farewell to these, and again return to the discussion of laws, that this our preface to the laws may not become more extended than is proper? For our discourse will be far from being short, if we sufficiently exhibit what is necessary to men prone to impiety; wish to deter them from wickedness; to render them indignant with what is base; and afterwards to establish laws in a proper manner.

CLIN. But, O guest, we have often said in the course of this short time, that in the present discussion brevity is not to be preferred to prolixity. For nothing (according to the saying) pursues us urging. But it would be ridiculous, and at the same time base, to prefer that which is shorter to that which is best. For it will be a thing of no small consequence if our discourse shall possess any persuasive arguments that there are Gods, that they are good, and that they honour justice far more than men. For this will be nearly the most beautiful and excellent preface to all our laws. Without any molestation, therefore, and delay, let us, to the utmost of our power, omit nothing which may tend to persuade that these things are so.

GUEST. What you have just now said appears to me to call us to prayer, since you excite yourself with alacrity to the ensuing discourse, and do not admit of any further delay. *But how can any one, without anger, speak concerning the existence of the Gods, as if it was a thing of a doubtful nature?* For it necessarily follows that we must be indignant with, and hate, those who are the causes to us of the present discussion. These, indeed, might be persuaded there are Gods, from what they heard while children, and while they were yet nourished with milk from their nurses and mothers, as it were in songs, both in sport and in earnest, in sacrifices and prayers. For in these they must have seen and heard in the sweetest manner their parents supplicating the Gods with the greatest earnestness for themselves and children, and proclaiming, by their prayers and supplications, that there are indubitably Gods. Besides this, too, they must have heard and seen both Greeks and Barbarians, during the rising and setting of the sun and moon, supplicating and adoring, as well when their affairs were prosperous as when they were adverse; by all which they might be led to conclude that there are Gods, without any suspicion to the contrary. But with respect to those
who

who despise every thing of this kind, though not from one sufficient argument, as every one who possesses the least degree of intellect will acknowledge, and on this account compel us to speak as we do at present, how shall we be able to correct them in mild language, and at the same time, in the first place, teach them that there are Gods? Let us, however, dare the attempt. For it is not proper that, at the same time they are insane through the voracity of pleasure, we should be transported through anger with such characters as these. Laying aside all anger, therefore, let us previously address those who are thus vitiated in their dianoëtic part, and mildly speak to one of them as follows: O boy, you are as yet a youth; but time, as it advances, will cause you to change your opinions, and think in many respects contrary to what you do at present. Wait, therefore, till that period, that you may be able to judge concerning things of the greatest consequence. But to possess right conceptions respecting the Gods, though to you at present it appears to be a thing of no consequence, is of the greatest importance as to living well, or the contrary. If, therefore, I announce to you what follows as one of the things of the utmost consequence, I shall by no means speak falsely. Not you alone, nor your friends, are the first that have entertained this opinion respecting the Gods, but there always have been a greater or less number who have laboured under this disease. I will, therefore, tell you what happens to most of them, viz. that they do not remain in this opinion, that there are no Gods, from youth to old age. Two opinions, indeed, respecting the Gods remain, though not in many, yet in a few,—I mean, that there are Gods, but that they take no care of human affairs; or, if they do, that they may be easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. If, therefore, you will be persuaded by me, wait, considering whether this is the case or not, till you possess as clear information in this particular as can possibly be obtained. And in order to this, interrogate others, and particularly the legislator. But at the present time do not dare to act in any respect impious towards the Gods. For he who establishes laws for you will endeavour, both now and hereafter, to teach you how these things subsist.

CLIN. What has been said thus far, O guest, is most beautiful.

GUEST. Entirely so, O Megillus and Clinias; but we are ignorant that we have fallen upon a wonderful assertion.

CLIN. What kind of assertion do you mean?

GUEST. That which in the opinion of many is the wisest of all assertions.

CLIN. Speak yet clearer.

GUEST. Some then say, with respect to all things that have been, are, and will be, that some subsist from nature, others from art, and others through fortune.

CLIN. And they speak well.

GUEST. It is fit, indeed, that wise men should speak properly. Following them, therefore, let us consider what they meant by this assertion.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. It appears (say they) that the greatest and most beautiful things are produced by nature and fortune, but lesser things by art; which receiving from nature the generation of great and primary works, fashions and fabricates all smaller works, which we all of us denominate artificial.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. I will speak still clearer. They say¹ that fire and water, earth and air, subsist from nature and fortune, and not from art. That the bodies also, which are posterior to these, viz. of the earth, the sun, the moon, and the stars, are generated through these, which are entirely destitute of soul. They add, that, all things being casually borne along by the impulse of fortune, they became in a certain respect properly harmonized together, viz. the hot with the cold, the dry with the moist, the soft with the hard; and, in short, that all things of a contrary temperament were, from necessity, through fortune mingled together. That, besides this, the whole of heaven, with all that it contains, all animals and plants, and the seasons of the year, were produced after this manner: not (say they) through intellect, or any divinity, nor yet through art, but, as we have said, from nature and fortune. That afterwards mortal art was generated from these by mortals, and that through its assistance certain posterior disciplines were produced, which do not very much partake of truth, but are certain images allied to each other; such as painting, music, and the sister arts, beget. They add, that if there are any arts which produce any thing of a serious nature, they are such as commu-

¹ Plato here alludes to those natural philosophers Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Archelaus; the first of whom asserted, that the universe was constituted by a certain rash chance rather than by a divine intellect; and the other two, that the celestial orbs have nothing in them more divine than the sublunary elements.

nicate their own power with that of nature ; such as are the arts of medicine, agriculture, and gymnastic : and that the political art communicates in a certain small part with nature, but very much with art. So that, according to them, the whole of legislation does not consist from nature, but art, and its positions are not true.

CLIN. How do you say ?

GUEST. O blessed man, they say in the first place, that the Gods do not subsist from nature, but from art and certain laws, and that these are different in different nations, according as the legislators by mutual agreement have determined. They likewise assert, that things beautiful or becoming are not the same by nature as by law ; and that things just have not any natural subsistence whatever, but that men always dissent among themselves respecting these, and are perpetually changing them. That, when they are changed by them, they then possess authority, deriving their subsistence from art and laws, and not from any certain nature. These, my friends, are the particulars which are taught young men from the writings of the wise, both in prose and verse, and by which they learn that the most just is that which is obtained by violence. Hence, young men fall into impiety so as to believe that there are not Gods, such as the law ordains us to conceive have an existence. Hence, too, seditions arise, through which men are drawn to a life consisting in vanquishing others, and refusing subjection to others according to law, as if it was a life naturally proper.

CLIN. O guest, what a circumstance have you related, and what a pest to young men, both publicly to cities, and to private families !

GUEST. You speak truly, O Clinias. What then ought a legislator to do in this case ? Ought he only to threaten every one in the city, that they shall be punished unless they assert and believe that there are Gods, such as the law says there are ; and unless they conceive they ought to act in such a manner with respect to things beautiful and just, and every thing else of the greatest consequence, and whatever pertains to virtue and vice, as the writings of the legislator enjoin ? If, therefore, any refuse to obey his laws, ought he to punish some with death, others with stripes and bonds, others with infamy, and others with poverty and exile ? but ought he to pay no attention to persuasion and gentle methods, at the same time that he is establishing laws ?

CLIN. By no means, O guest. But if any persuasion, though small, respecting things of this kind can be obtained, a legislator who is of the least worth ought by no means to be weary, but, as it is said, with the most strenuous exertions of his voice, should give assistance to the antient law, by asserting that there are Gods, and such other things as you have discussed; and should give his suffrage both to nature and art, that they have a natural subsistence, or a subsistence not inferior to that of nature, since they are the progeny of intellect, according to the dictates of right reason, as you appear to me to assert, and as I believe.

GUEST. O most prompt Clinias, is it not difficult to follow by a reasoning process things asserted by the multitude, and which are of a very extended nature?

CLIN. But what, O guest? Shall we patiently endure to discourse in so prolix a manner about intoxication and music, and shall we not be equally ready to speak about the Gods, and such-like particulars? Besides, such an undertaking will be of the greatest assistance to legislation, when prudently conducted, since those written mandates pertaining to the laws, which have always been subject to reprehension, will thus entirely remain undisturbed. So that we ought not to be terrified if those things should at first be difficult to hear, which, when often repeated, may be apprehended even by one whom, from his inaptitude to learning, it is difficult to instruct. These things, therefore, though they may be prolix, yet, if they are useful, they are not to be considered as of no consequence; nor does it appear to me to be holy not to assist these assertions to the utmost of our power.

MEGIL. O guest Clinias, you appear to me to speak most excellently.

GUEST. He does very much so indeed.

MEGIL. Let us, therefore, do as he says. For, if assertions of this kind were not, as I may say, scattered among all men, there would be no occasion of arguments to prove that there are Gods: but now this is necessary. Since, therefore, the greatest laws are corrupted by vicious men, to whom does it pertain to give assistance to them more than to the legislator?

CLIN. To no one.

GUEST. But inform me again, O Clinias, (for it is proper that you should partake of this discourse,) does it not appear that he who asserts the above-mentioned particulars considers fire and water, earth and air, as the first of all

all things, and that he denominates these very things nature, but is of opinion that soul was produced afterwards from these? Indeed, it not only appears to be so, but is truly signified to us by the very assertions themselves.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Whether or no, therefore, by Jupiter, have we found, as it were, a certain fountain of the stupid opinion of those men who have ever touched upon physical inquiries? Consider, investigating the whole affair. For it will be of no small consequence if it shall appear that those who meddle with impious assertions, and thus rule over others, do not employ good, but vicious arguments. To me, therefore, this appears to be the case.

CLIN. You speak well: but endeavour to show that it is so.

GUEST. But I shall appear to employ unusual arguments.

CLIN. Let not this make you sluggish, O guest. For I understand that you are of opinion we shall wander from the business of legislation, if we engage in a disputation of this kind. But if it is not possible to show by any other method than this that the laws speak properly concerning the Gods, let us, O wonderful man, adopt it.

GUEST. I will enter, therefore, on this discourse, which, as it appears, is so unusual. Those discourses, then, which render the soul impious, assert that the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things is not the first, but was produced afterwards; and that what was posterior is prior. On this account they err respecting the true essence of the Gods.

CLIN. I do not yet understand.

GUEST. Almost all men, O my associate, appear to be ignorant what the soul is, and what power it possesses, both with respect to other things and its generation; I mean, that it ranks among things first, that it had a subsistence prior to all bodies, and that more than any other nature it rules over the mutation and all the ornament of bodies. If this is the case, does it not necessarily follow, that things allied to soul will have an origin prior to those pertaining to body, soul itself being more ancient than body?

CLIN. It is necessary.

GUEST. Opinion, therefore, diligent attention, intellect, art, and law, will be prior to things hard and soft, heavy and light. Besides this, too, great and primary works and actions, which are produced by art, will rank among things first; but natural productions, and nature herself, (which they do not properly

properly denominate,) will be things posterior, and in subjection to art and intellect.

CLIN. How ?

GUEST. They are not willing to say that the generation about things first is nature, though it would be right to call it so ; and they place bodies in the first rank of beings. But if soul shall appear to belong to the first order of things, and not fire or air, it may nearly be said with the greatest rectitude, that soul was generated ¹ prior to body ; that, if these things subsist in this manner, they will subsist naturally, viz. if any one evinces that soul is more antient than body ; but that this will by no means be the case if they subsist otherwise.

CLIN. You speak most true.

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, after this manner proceed to what follows ?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But let us by all means guard against and avoid fraudulent arguments, lest these, which are of a juvenile nature, should deceive by false persuasion us who are advanced in years, and thus render us ridiculous ; and lest we should appear to attempt greater things, and wander from such as are smaller. Consider, therefore, if it were necessary that we three should pass over a very rapid river, and I, who am the youngest of the three, and have tried many rivers, should say it is proper that I should first of all endeavour to pass over it by myself, leaving you in safety, and should consider whether or not it may be passed over by you, who are more aged than myself ; that afterwards, this being agreeable to you, I should either call you to ford the river in conjunction with me, or, if it should be too deep for you, encounter the danger by myself ;—consider, I say, if in this case I should not appear to speak to the purpose. In like manner, since the discourse we are now entering on is of a more vehement nature, and perhaps nearly inaccessible by your strength, lest it should cause in you a dark giddiness, by leading you to questions to which you are unaccustomed, and afterwards overwhelm you with disgrace and sorrow, it appears to me that I ought, in the present case, first to interrogate myself, while you hear in safety, and, after this, again answer myself ; proceeding in this manner till the whole of this dis-

¹ Plato, when he uses the word *generation*, in speaking of the soul, does not mean to imply a *temporal origin*, but an *eternal procession from an eternally energizing cause*.

course respecting the soul is finished, and it is shown that soul is prior to body.

CLIN. You appear to us, O guest, to speak most excellently: do, therefore, as you say.

GUEST. Come then, let us invoke Divinity; for, if it is ever proper to do so, it will be requisite in the present case; and let us beseech the Gods with the greatest earnestness to assist us in demonstrating their existence. Holding, therefore, as by a certain secure rope, let us ascend into the present reasoning. And it appears to me that, by the following interrogations respecting these things, I shall most securely answer my opponent. If any one then should ask me, O guest, do all things stand still, and is nothing moved? Or, does the very contrary to this take place? Or, are some things moved, but others stand still? To this I should reply, Some things are moved, and others stand still. Do not, therefore, the things which stand still, abide in a certain place, and are not the things which are moved, moved in a certain place? Undoubtedly. And some things do this in a certain respect in one seat, but others in more than one. Do you mean we shall say that some things which abide, receiving the power in the middle, are moved in one, in the same manner as the periphery of circles, which are said to stand still, revolves? I do. But we understand that in this revolution a motion of this kind, leading round the greatest and the least circle, distributes itself analogously in small and large circles, and is itself, according to proportion, less and more. On this account it becomes the fountain of all wonderful things, proceeding homologous according to slowness and swiftness, in large and small circles, and thus accomplishing what to some one it might appear impossible to accomplish. You speak most true. But by things moving in many things, you appear to me to mean such as are moved locally, always passing from one place to another. And sometimes, indeed, they obtain the basis of one certain centre, and sometimes of more than one¹, by being rolled round. Each too meeting with each, they are cut by those that stand still. But when they meet with each other, and are borne along

¹ Viz. That which changes its place changes the centre of place, to which the circumference of the moving body is compared; and sometimes, besides changing the centre, it preserves after a manner the same centre, when, not being fixed, but transferred from one place to another, it is carried round by a certain equal circumference.

in an opposite direction, then the parts situated in the middle, and those between these, becoming one, they are mingled together. I acknowledge that these things are as you say. Besides this, too, the things which are mingled together are increased; but when they are separated, they are then corrupted, when the permanent habit of each remains; but when it does not remain, it is dissolved through both. But the generation of all things takes place when a certain passion is produced, viz. when the principle¹ receiving increase arrives at a second transition, and from this to that which is near it; and when it has arrived as far as to three, it possesses sense in things sentient. Every thing, therefore, is generated by this mutation and transition. However, a thing truly is, when it abides: and when it is changed into another habit, it becomes entirely corrupted. Have we not therefore, O friends, enumerated all the forms of motion, except two?

CLIN. Of what kind are those?

GUEST. They are nearly those, O excellent man, for the sake of which the whole of our present discussion is undertaken.

CLIN. Speak more clearly.

GUEST. Was not the present discussion undertaken for the sake of soul?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Let one motion then be that which is able to move other things, but is always incapable of moving itself²: but let the other be that which is always able to move both itself³ and other things, by mingling and separating, by increase, and the contrary, and by generation and corruption; and this motion is different from all the other motions.

CLIN. Be it so, therefore.

GUEST. Shall we not, then, place that motion as the ninth, which always moves another, and is moved by another; but call that the tenth⁴ motion,

¹ By the principle here, Plato means a motive and seminal nature. This nature by alteration proceeds through three degrees, i. e. into length, breadth, and depth, and finally arrives at vitality and sensation.

² This motion belongs to nature.

³ This is the motion of soul.

⁴ Plato in this book distinguishes the genus of motions into ten species, viz. circulation about an immoveable centre, local transition, condensation, rarefaction, increase, decrease, generation, corruption, mutation or alteration produced in another by another, and mutation produced from a thing itself, both in itself and in another. This last is the tenth motion, of which he now speaks, and is the motion of soul.

which

which moves both itself and others, which is adapted to all actions and passions, and which is truly denominated the mutation and motion of all things?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But which of the ten motions shall we with the greatest rectitude judge to be the most robust, and by far the most efficacious of all motions?

CLIN. It is necessary to say, that the motion which is able to move itself is infinitely to be preferred to the rest, and that all the others are posterior to this.

GUEST. You speak well. Must not, therefore, one or two of the things which have not at present been rightly asserted by us be transposed?

CLIN. What things do you mean?

GUEST. We did not altogether speak properly respecting the tenth motion.

CLIN. Why so?

GUEST. Because, according to reason, it is the first in generation and strength; but that which follows this is the second, though it has been just now absurdly called by us the ninth.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. Thus. When one thing moves another, and something else always moves this, will there ever among such things as these be any thing which is first moved? But how is it possible that a thing which is moved by another can ever be the first of things changed? It is certainly impossible. But when a thing moving itself causes mutation in something else, and this latter in some other, and ten thousand things are thus moved in succession,—whether or no in this case will there be any other principle of all the motion than the mutation of that which moves itself?

CLIN. You speak most excellently. These things, therefore, must be granted.

GUEST. Further still, let us thus interrogate and answer ourselves. If all generated natures should, after a manner, stand still, as many of those we are now addressing dare to say they do, which among the above-mentioned motions would necessarily first take place?

CLIN. Doubtless that which moves itself. For the motion depending on another could not by any means take place till it had previously undergone some mutation.

GUEST. We must say, therefore, that the principle of all motions, and which first subsists in things abiding and in motion, is that which moves itself; and that this is necessarily the most antient and the most powerful mutation of all things: but that the second is that which is changed by another, and at the same time moves others.

CLIN. You speak most true.

GUEST. Since we have, therefore, arrived thus far in our discourse, let us also answer the following question.

CLIN. What is that?

GUEST. If we should see this first motion taking place in a terrene, aquatic, or fiery-formed body, whether simple or mixed, what passion should we say was inherent in a thing of this kind?

CLIN. Do you ask me, whether that which moves itself should be said to live?

GUEST. I do.

CLIN. Undoubtedly it should.

GUEST. But what? When we see soul inherent in any thing, do we admit that it lives through any thing else than this?

CLIN. Through nothing else.

GUEST. Consider then, by Jupiter, are you willing to understand three things respecting every thing?

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. One of these is essence, another the reason or definition of essence, and a third the name. And likewise the interrogations respecting every being are two.

CLIN. How two?

GUEST. Sometimes each of us, when a name is proposed, inquires the reason of the denomination; and sometimes, when the reason is proposed, we inquire after the name. Are you, therefore, willing that we should now speak of a thing of this kind?

CLIN. Of what kind?

GUEST. A twofold distinction is found in other things, and in number. Thus, for instance, in number, the name indeed is the even, but the definition is one number divided into two equal parts.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. My meaning is this. Do we signify the same thing in each, when, being asked concerning the name, we assign the reason, or, when, being asked the reason, we assign the name; since we denominate one and the same thing by name, even, but, by reason or definition, a number divided into two equal parts?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what is the definition of that which is called soul? Have we any other than that which was just now mentioned by us, I mean a motion capable of moving itself?

CLIN. Do you say, that the being moved by itself is the definition of that essence which we all denominate soul?

GUEST. I do say so. But if this be the case, do we yet desire it should be more sufficiently shown, that soul is the same with the first generation and motion of things which now are, have been, and shall be; and, again, of all the contraries to these; since it appears that soul is the cause of all mutation and motion to all things?

CLIN. Certainly not. For it has been sufficiently shown, that soul is the most antient of all things, and is the principle of motion.

GUEST. Will not, therefore, the motion which subsists through another in another, but which is never the cause of a thing moving itself, be the second in order? and ought it not to be placed after the former motion, by whatever interval of numbers any one may choose to assign, since it is truly the mutation of an inanimate body?

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. We have said, therefore, with rectitude, propriety, and in the most perfect manner, that soul was generated prior to body, but that body is posterior and secondary, soul naturally possessing dominion, and body subjection.

CLIN. With the greatest truth, therefore.

GUEST. But do we recollect, that it was acknowledged by us above, that if soul should appear to be more antient than body, the things pertaining to soul would also be more antient than those pertaining to body?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Disposition, therefore, manners, volitions, reasonings, true opinions, attention, and memory, must have been generated prior to the length,

breadth,

breadth, depth, and strength of bodies, on account of the priority of soul to body.

CLIN. Necessarily so.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, after this necessary to acknowledge, that soul is the cause of things good and beautiful, evil and base, just and unjust, and of all contraries, since we establish it to be the cause of all things?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Is it not also necessary to assert, that soul, which governs all things, and which resides in all things that are in any respect moved, governs likewise the heavens?

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But does one soul, or many, govern them?

MEGIL. Many: for I will answer for you.

GUEST. We should not, therefore, establish less than two, one beneficent, and the other of a contrary¹ nature.

CLIN. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. Soul, therefore, by its motions, leads every thing in heaven, earth, and the sea; and the names of these motions are—to will, to consider, take care of, consult, form true and false opinions, rejoicing, grieving, daring, fearing, hating, loving; together with all such primary motions as are allied to these, and which, receiving the secondary motions of bodies, lead all things to increase and decay, separation and concretion, and to things consequent to these, such as heat and cold, gravity and levity, the hard and the soft, the white and the black, the sour, sweet, and bitter; and, lastly, to all things which, soul employing, when it perpetually receives a divine intellect, as being in this case a goddess, disciplines all things with rectitude and felicity; but when it is conjoined with folly, it produces every thing contrary to these. Shall we admit that these things subsist in this manner, or shall we yet doubt whether they do not in a certain respect subsist differently?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, shall we say, that the genus of soul which is

¹ Plato, by an evil soul, here means the nature or natural life suspended from the rational soul of the world, and which is the proximate *vis matrix* of bodies. As this life, without the governing influence of the rational soul of the world, would produce nothing but confusion and disorderly motions, it may be said, when considered as left to itself, to be evil.

prudent, and full of virtue, governs heaven and earth, and the whole period of generated nature, or that which possesses neither of these? Are you willing, therefore, that we should answer this question as follows?

CLIN. How?

GUEST. Thus, O wonderful man. If the whole path of the heavens, and the local motion of all the natures it contains, possess a nature similar to the motion, circulation, and reasonings of intellect, and proceed in a manner allied to these, it must evidently be granted, that the most excellent soul takes care of the whole world, and leads it according to a path of this kind.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. But if it proceeded in a mad and disordered manner, it must be led by an evil soul.

CLIN. And this also is rightly asserted.

GUEST. What nature, then, does the motion of intellect possess? To this question indeed, O friends, it is difficult to answer prudently. It is, therefore, just, that I should now answer for you.

CLIN. You speak well.

GUEST. Let us not, therefore, looking as it were to the sun in an opposite direction, and thus introducing night in midday, answer the present question, as if we could ever sufficiently behold and know intellect with mortal eyes: for, by looking to the image of the object of our interrogation, we shall see with greater security.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. Let us receive from among those ten motions, as an image, that to which intellect is similar. This motion I will recall into your memory, and answer for you in common.

CLIN. You speak in the most beautiful manner.

GUEST. We must remember, therefore, it was asserted by us above, that of all things that exist, some are moved, and others abide.

CLIN. It was so.

GUEST. But, of things which are moved, some are moved in one place, but others are borne along in more than one.

CLIN. They are so.

GUEST. But it is necessary that these motions, which are always borne along in one, should be moved about a certain middle, in imitation of circles fashioned

fashioned by a wheel, and that they should be, in every respect, as much as possible allied and similar to the circulation of intellect.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. That both of them are moved according to the same, in a similar manner, in the same, about the same, and towards the same, according to one reason and order. If, therefore, we should say that intellect, and the motion which is borne along in one, are similar to the local motions of a sphere fashioned by a wheel, we should not by any means be bad artificers in discourse of beautiful images.

CLIN. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. The motion, therefore, which is never borne along in a similar manner, nor according to the same, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor towards the same, neither in ornament, nor in order, nor in one certain reason, will be allied to all folly.

CLIN. It will, with the greatest truth.

GUEST. Now, therefore, it will be no longer difficult to assert openly, that since it is soul which leads all things in a circular¹ manner, it must necessarily follow that the circulation of the heavens must be led round, taken care of, and adorned, either by the most excellent soul, or the contrary.

CLIN. O guest, from what has been said, it is not holy to say otherwise than that either one soul, or many souls, possessing every virtue, cause the circulation of the heavens.

GUEST. You understand my arguments, O Clinias, most excellently: but listen still further to this.

CLIN. To what?

GUEST. If soul convolves the sun, moon, and the other stars, is not each of these convolved by a soul² of its own?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We shall, therefore, discourse about one soul, in such a manner, that what we say may be accommodated to all the stars.

¹ The reader must carefully remember that soul leads all things circularly, from its possession of a divine intellect; for Plato has just before shown, that a circular is an image of intellectual motion.

² Aristotle also, in the twelfth book of his *Metaphysics*, shows, that each of the heavenly bodies possesses a divine intellect, which is the source of its motions; to my Translation of which I refer the reader.

CLIN.

CLIN. What soul is that?

GUEST. Every man perceives the body of the sun, but no one its soul; nor, indeed, does any one perceive the soul of any other body, either of a living or of a dead animal; but there is every reason to believe that this genus of things is naturally incapable of being seen by any of the corporeal senses, but is of an intelligible nature. Let us, therefore, by intellect alone, and the dianoëtic energy, apprehend this respecting it.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. If soul is the leader of the sun, we shall perhaps not err in asserting, that it accomplishes this by one of these three modes.

CLIN. What modes?

GUEST. That either, residing within this apparent circular body, it entirely rolls it along, in the same manner as our soul moves us, or that, in a certain respect being situated externally, and connecting itself with a body of fire or air, according to the assertions of some, it violently impels body with body; or, in the third place, being itself destitute of body, it governs this visible orb through possessing certain other powers transcendently admirable.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. This then is necessary,—that all things should be governed by this soul, according to one of these modes. But whether this soul residing in the sun, as in a chariot, imparts light to all things, or whether it is situated externally, or in whatever other manner it may be connected with this visible orb, it is better that all men should consider it as a God. Or, how shall we say?

CLIN. *This must certainly be acknowledged by every one who has not arrived at the extremity of folly.*

GUEST. *But with respect to all the stars, and the moon, years, months, and the seasons, shall we speak in any other manner than this—That since a soul and souls, good from the possession of every virtue, appear to be the causes of all these, they should be called Gods, whether being resident in bodies, and thus becoming animals, they adorn all heaven, or in whatever other manner they may accomplish this? And, in the next place, can he who assents to these things deny that all things are full of Gods?*

CLIN. No one, O guest, is so insane as to deny this.

GUEST. Assigning, therefore, certain boundaries at present to him, O Clinias

nias and Megillus, who does not believe that there are Gods, let us dismiss him.

CLIN. What boundaries do you mean ?

GUEST. Either that he must teach us we do not speak rightly, in asserting that soul is the first generation of all things, together with such other particulars as are consequent to this ; or, if he is incapable of asserting any thing better than we have asserted, that he shall be persuaded by us, and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods. Let us, therefore, now see whether we have spoken sufficiently or not, in our arguments that there are Gods, to those who deny their existence.

CLIN. Your arguments, O guest, are very far from being insufficient.

GUEST. Let this, then, be the conclusion of our discourse to these. But let us cure, in the following manner, him who believes that there are Gods, but that they take no care of human affairs.—O most excellent man ! we shall say, because you think that there are Gods, a certain nature allied to Divinity leads you to honour, and believe in that which is connate with yourself ; but the prosperous condition of evil and unjust men, both in private and public, who, though they are not truly happy, yet are considered to be so in the highest degree in the inelegant opinion of the multitude, and are improperly celebrated as such in poetical, and a variety of other compositions ;—this it is which leads you to impiety. Or, perhaps, on seeing impious men leaving behind them, after having arrived at old age, grandchildren in the greatest honours, you are disturbed : Or from hearing, or perhaps being yourself an eye-witness, of some who, though they have acted in a most impious and dire manner, yet, by means of such actions, have arrived from slender possessions and small power to tyrannies and the greatest wealth. It is evident that, in all such cases as these, you are unwilling to blame the Gods as the causes of them, through your alliance with their nature, but, at the same time, being led by a certain privation of reason, and not being able to be indignant with the Gods, you have arrived at the present condition, so as to believe in their existence, but that they despise and neglect human affairs. That the present dogma, therefore, may not lead you to greater impiety, but that you may be removed further from it, we shall endeavour, to the utmost of our power, to convince you of its fallacy, conjoining the following discourse with the former, which we employed against those

those who entirely denied the existence of the Gods. But do you, O Megillus and Clinias, take upon you to answer for the young man, as you did before; and if any thing difficult should happen to take place in our discourse, I, taking hold of you as I just now did, will pass over the river.

CLIN. Rightly said. Do you, therefore, act in this manner; and we to the utmost of our power will do as you say.

GUEST. But, perhaps, it will not be difficult to evince that the Gods pay no less attention to small things than to such as transcend in magnitude. For it was just now asserted by us, that they are good from the possession of every virtue, and that, in consequence of this, a providential concern for all things is in the highest degree accommodated to their nature.

CLIN. This was vehemently asserted.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in common investigate that which follows this,—I mean, what the virtue of the Gods is, since we acknowledge that they are good. Do we not then say, that to be temperate, and to possess intellect, are things pertaining to virtue, but the contraries of these to vice?

CLIN. We do say so.

GUEST. But what? Does not fortitude belong to virtue, and timidity to vice?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. And do not we say that some of these are base, and others beautiful?

CLIN. It is necessary we should.

GUEST. And must we not say that such among these as are base belong to us, but that the Gods participate neither any thing great, nor any thing small, of such-like particulars?

CLIN. And this also every one will acknowledge.

GUEST. But what? Do we place negligence, indolence, and luxury, as belonging to the virtue of the soul? Or how do you say?

CLIN. How can we?

GUEST. As belonging, therefore, to the contrary?

CLIN. Yes.

GUEST. The contraries, therefore, to these belong to that which is contrary.

CLIN. To that which is contrary.

GUEST. What then? Will not he who possesses these contraries be con-

sidered by all of us as luxurious, negligent, and indolent, and, according to the poet ¹, similar to a drone bee, without a sting?

CLIN. The poet speaks with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. It must not, therefore, be said, that Divinity possesses manners that are odious to him, nor must we permit any one to make such an assertion.

CLIN. By no means. For how can it be said?

GUEST. But will he to whom it belongs in the most eminent degree to do and take care of any thing, will the intellect of such a one take care of great, but neglect small things? And shall we not in every respect err by praising such an assertion? But let us consider as follows: Will not he who acts in this manner, whether he is a God or a man, be influenced by two species of action?

CLIN. What are those two?

GUEST. I will tell you: Either because he thinks the neglect of small things is of no consequence to the whole; or, if he thinks it is of consequence, yet he pays no attention to them, through indolence and luxury. Or is it possible that negligence can take place in any other way? For, when any one is incapable of taking care of all things, and, in consequence of this, neglects either such as are small, or such as are great, he is not in this case said to be negligent, whether it is a man or a God who is thus destitute of power.

CLIN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But now let those two answer us three, who, though they both of them acknowledge there are Gods, yet one of them considers the divinities as easy to be appeased, but the other as neglecting small affairs. Let us, therefore, thus address these in the first place: You both acknowledge that the Gods know, see, and hear all things, and that nothing which is either an object of sense or science can be concealed from them. Do you not say that this is the case? Or how do you say?

CLIN. That this is the case.

GUEST. But what? Are they not able to accomplish all things which both mortals and immortals are able to accomplish?

¹ Hesiod.

CLIN.

CLIN. How is it possible they should not acknowledge this?

GUEST. We, that are five in number, also agree that the Gods are good and most excellent.

CLIN. Very much so.

GUEST. Must we not, therefore, acknowledge that it is impossible for them ever to act in an indolent and luxurious manner, since they are such as we have granted them to be? For, in us, indolence is the offspring of timidity, but sluggishness, of indolence and luxury.

CLIN. You speak most true.

GUEST. But the Gods cannot be negligent through indolence and sluggishness; for timidity is not present with them.

CLIN. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. It remains, therefore, that if they neglect a few things, and such as are small in the universe, they must either do so because they know that things of this nature ought by no means to be taken care of, or because they are ignorant that they ought to be taken care of; for, can there be any other alternative?

CLIN. None.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, O most excellent and best of men, shall we consider you as saying that the Gods neglect these in consequence of being ignorant that they ought to be taken care of; or that, like the most depraved of men, they know that this is proper, but are prevented from acting agreeably to their knowledge, through being vanquished by certain pleasures or pains?

CLIN. But how could this be possible?

GUEST. Besides, human affairs participate of an animated nature, and at the same time man is the most religious of all animals.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. We likewise say that all mortal animals are the possessions of the Gods, in the same manner as all heaven.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, any one says, that these things are considered either as small or great by the Gods, it is not proper, since they are the most provident and best of beings, that they should neglect their possessions. But further still, in addition to these things, let us consider this.

CLIN. What?

GUEST. Respecting sense and power, whether they are not naturally contrary to each other, with reference to facility and difficulty.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. Small things are seen and heard with greater difficulty than such as are large. But to carry, govern, and take care of a few things, and such as are small, is in every respect more easy than to carry, govern, and take care of the contraries to these.

CLIN. It is by far more easy.

GUEST. But since it is the province of a physician to take care of a certain whole, and he is both willing and able to do this, will this whole ever be in a good condition if he neglects parts, and such things as are small?

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But neither will things numerous and mighty ever be well conducted either by pilots, or commanders of an army, or certain political characters, or any others similar to these, without an attention to things few and small. For builders say, that great stones cannot be well placed without small ones.

CLIN. For how can they?

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to think that divinity is more vile than mortal artificers: for these, by how much the more skilful they are, by so much the more accurately and perfectly, from one art, do they accomplish things small and great pertaining to their peculiar works. Since this is the case, can it be supposed that divinity, who is most wise, and who is both willing and able to energize providentially, will alone take care of great things, but by no means of such as are small, which it is easy to take care of, like one indolent, or timid, or sluggish through labour?

CLIN. We can by no means admit this opinion, O guest, concerning the Gods; for this would be forming a conception neither holy nor true.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, to me, that we have now sufficiently spoken to him who accuses the Gods of negligence.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But we have hitherto forced him by our arguments to change his opinion.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST.

GUEST. It appears, however, to me that he yet requires to be enchanted by certain words.

CLIN. What words, O good man?

GUEST. We should persuade the young man, that he who takes care of the whole has constituted all things with a view to the safety and virtue of the whole, every part of which, as much as possible, suffers and acts in a manner accommodated to its nature; that over each of these parts rulers are placed, who always cause that which is smallest in every action and passion to receive its ultimate distribution; among which parts, O miserable creature, thou art one, and which, though *diminutive in the extreme*, continually directs its views to *The All*. But you are ignorant that every generated nature subsists for the sake of the whole, that the universe may enjoy a blessed life, and not for your sake, but that you subsist for the sake of the universe. For every physician, and every artificial fabricator, effects all things for the sake of the whole, and regards that which is best in common; fashioning a part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of a part. You, however, are indignant, in consequence of not knowing how that which is best with respect to yourself happens both to the universe and yourself, according to the power of common generation. But since a soul which is connected at different times with different bodies undergoes all various mutations, either through itself, or through some other soul, nothing else remains to be done by the *dice-player* than to transfer manners when they become better, into a better place, but, when they become worse, into a worse place, according to the proper condition of each, that they may obtain convenient allotments.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. I appear to myself to speak with reference to the facility with which the Gods take care of all things. For if any one, always looking to the whole, fashions any thing, and transforms all things, with a view to this, such as animated water from fire, and not many things from one, or one thing from many, participating of a first, second, or third generation, there will be an infinite multitude of transposed ornaments. But now there is an admirable facility in the power that provides for the universe.

CLIN. How, again, do you say?

GUEST. Thus. Since our king beholds all our actions, and these are animated,

mated, containing much virtue and much vice, and since both soul and body are generated indestructible¹, though not eternal, like the Gods according to *law*², (for there never would be any generation of animals if either soul or body was destroyed,) and besides, since that which is good in the soul is always naturally disposed to assist, but that which is evil in it to injure,—our king, perceiving all these things, devised in what manner each of the parts should be situated, so that virtue might vanquish in the universe, but vice be subdued, in the most eminent degree, and in the best and most facile manner. He devised, therefore, how each particular should be generated with reference to the universe, what seat it should reside in, and what places it should be allotted: but he left to our will the causes of this or that generation. For where the desire of any soul is, and such as is its condition, there each of us nearly resides, and such for the most part each of us subsists.

CLIN. It is likely.

GUEST. Every thing, therefore, that participates of soul is changed, and possesses in itself the cause of this mutation; but, when changed, it is borne along according to the order and law of fate. And those souls whose manners are less changed, have a less extended progression; for they proceed no further than the superficies of the region. But those whose manners are more changed, and are more unjust, fall into depth, and into the places beneath, which are denominated Hades, and the like, where they are vehemently terrified, and conversant with dreams, both living and when freed from body. A greater soul, however, when it participates either of virtue or vice, becoming in this case strong, through its own will, and converse with other natures, if, mingling with divine virtue, it becomes eminently divine, then it is translated into another better place, which is entirely holy: but if it mingles itself with the contrary to divine virtue, then its life is transferred into a contrary place. This then, O boy and young man, who think that you are neglected by the Gods, is the judgment of the Olympian divinities;—that he who is more depraved shall depart to more depraved souls, but he

¹ Body, when corrupted, is resolved into the elementary wholes from which it originated, but is never destroyed.

² *Law* here signifies intellectual distribution. So that the Gods according to *law* are those divine natures which proceed from the intellect of the fabricator of the universe. These Gods are thus denominated in the Golden Verses of Pythagoras.

who is better, to such as are better, both in life, and in all deaths, and that he shall both suffer and do such things as ought to be done by similars to similars. But neither you nor any other should pray that you may be exempt from this judgment of the Gods. For those who ordained this established it more firmly than all judgments, and as that which ought to be venerated in every respect. Indeed, you will never be neglected by this judgment; not though you were so small, that you could descend into the profundities of the earth, or so elevated, that you could fly into heaven. But you will suffer from these divinities the punishment which is your due, whether you abide here, or depart to Hades, or whether you are removed to a place still more rustic than these. My discourse to you, likewise, will be the same respecting those impious men whom you have seen rising into consequence from small beginnings, and whom you have considered as having passed from felicity to misery. For it has appeared to you that, in the actions of these, as in a mirror, the negligence of all the Gods was visible; and this, from your being ignorant in what manner the end of such characters contributes to the good of the whole. But can you think, O most courageous of all men, that it is not necessary to know this, which he who is ignorant of, will neither be able to perceive, nor discourse about, the felicity of life, and an unhappy fortune. If, therefore, Clinias, and the whole of this aged company, are able to persuade you that you do not know what you say respecting the Gods, divinity will assist you in a beautiful manner; but if you still require some further reason, hear, if in any respect you possess intellect, what we shall say to our third antagonist. For, that there are Gods, and that they take care of men, I should say, has been not altogether badly demonstrated. But that the Gods can be moved by the gifts of certain unjust men, must not be granted to any one, but confuted in every possible way to the utmost of our power.

CLIN. You speak most beautifully; and we shall do as you say.

GUEST. Come, then, by the Gods themselves, if they are moved by gifts, in what manner are they moved; and what kind of beings must they in this case be? For it is necessary that they must possess sovereign authority who continually govern all heaven.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. But to what rulers are they similar, or what rulers are similar to them,

them, that we may be able to compare small things with great? Whether will the charioteers of two-yoked cars that contend in the course be such as these, or the pilots of ships? Perhaps, however, they may be assimilated to certain commanders of armies, or to physicians, who are cautious respecting the war of diseases about bodies, or to husbandmen, who fear for their plants during the stormy seasons, or to shepherds and herdsmen. For, since we have granted that the universe is full of much good, and much evil, though not of more evil than good, we say that a thing of this kind is an immortal war, and requires an admirable defence. But the Gods, and, at the same time, dæmons, fight for us; and we are the possession both of Gods and dæmons. Injustice and insolence, however, together with imprudence, corrupt us. And, on the contrary, justice and temperance, in conjunction with prudence, which reside in the animated powers of the Gods, preserve us. But that something of these resides in us, though for a short time, may be clearly seen from this; for certain souls residing on the earth, and possessing an unjust gift, are evidently savage towards the souls of guardians, whether they are dogs, or shepherds, or in every respect the highest of all rulers. These they attack, persuading them by flattering words and specious enchantments, (according to the rumours of the wicked,) that it is lawful for them to usurp an unjust authority among men, without any disagreeable consequences to themselves. This fault, which we denominate prerogative, is called, in fleshly bodies, disease; in the seasons of the year, pestilence; and in cities and politics, by changing the word, injustice.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. According to this reasoning, therefore, it is necessary to say, that he who asserts that the Gods always pardon unjust men, when a part of their unjust acquisitions is offered to them, asserts at the same time that they are like dogs, to whom wolves give a small portion of their rapine, and who, becoming mild by gifts, permit them to plunder the herds. Is not this the assertion of those who consider the Gods as easily appeased?

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But will not he be the most ridiculous of all men, who assimilates the Gods to any of the above-mentioned guardians? Shall we say, therefore, that they resemble pilots, who giving themselves up to the libation of wine, and the odour of flesh, destroy both the ships and the sailors?

CLIN.

CLIN. By no means.

GUEST. But neither do they resemble charioteers, who, when orderly arranged in the course, through being corrupted by gifts, yield the victory to the two-yoked cars of their opponents.

CLIN. For such an assertion produces a dire image.

GUEST. But neither do they resemble the commanders of an army, nor physicians, nor husbandmen, nor shepherds, nor certain dogs seduced by wolves.

CLIN. Prophecy better things. For how is it possible they can resemble any of these?

GUEST. But are not all the Gods the greatest of all guardians, and guardians of the greatest affairs?

CLIN. Very much so.

GUEST. Shall we say, then, that those who are the guardians of the most beautiful things, and who, as guardians, are transcendent in virtue, are worse than dogs, and men of a moderate character, who never betray justice by receiving in an unholy manner gifts from unjust men?

CLIN. By no means; for such an assertion is not to be borne. And he who entertains such an opinion may most justly be considered as the worst and most impious of men.

GUEST. We may say, then, that we have sufficiently demonstrated the three things which we proposed to evince, viz. that there are Gods; that they take care of all things; and that they are not in any respect to be moved by gifts, contrary to what is just.

CLIN. Undoubtedly; and we assent to these reasons.

GUEST. And besides this, in a certain respect we have spoken more vehemently, through the contention of vicious men. But, O friend Clinias, we have employed a discourse of a contentious nature, lest our adversaries, thinking that they had vanquished, should imagine they had a license to do whatever they pleased, conformably to their conceptions respecting the Gods. Through an earnest desire of preventing this, we have spoken in a more novel manner. But if, during this short time, we have offered any thing calculated to persuade these men that they should hate themselves, and embrace contrary manners, the exordium of our laws respecting impiety will have been beautifully delivered.

CLIN. Let us hope that this will be the case; but if it should not, the legislator is not to be accused for this kind of discourse.

GUEST. After the preface, therefore, the discourse which is the interpreter of the laws will properly follow, proclaiming to all impious persons, that they must depart from their depraved manners, and betake themselves to such as are pious. But for those who will not be persuaded by these arguments, let the following law of impiety be established:—If any one speaks or acts impiously, let any one who is present defend the cause of piety, and give information to the magistrates of the affair: and those magistrates that are first made acquainted with it, shall bring the offender before the court of justice appointed by law for the determination of such cases. But if any magistrate, on hearing the affair, does not act in this manner, let him be accused of impiety by any one who is willing to punish him, for the sake of the laws. And if any one is condemned, let the court of justice punish him for the several impieties he has committed. Let bonds, then, be the punishment of all impious conduct. And let there be three prisons in the city: one common for most crimes about the forum, for the sake of securing a multitude of persons; another situated about the place where a nocturnal assembly is held, and which is to be denominated the prison for the correction of manners; and a third in the middle of the region, and in that part which is most solitary and rustic, calling it by the name of the prison of punishment. With respect to impiety, there are three causes of it, as we have already mentioned; and since two things take place from each of such-like causes, there will be six genera of crimes against the Gods, which require neither an equal nor a similar punishment. For some, who though they do not in any respect believe there are Gods, yet, from naturally possessing a just disposition, hate the vicious, and, through being indignant with injustice, neither commit unjust actions themselves, nor associate with, but avoid, unjust men, and love the just. But others, besides the opinion that all things are destitute of the Gods, fall into incontinence of pleasures and pains, at the same time possessing strong memories and acuteness with respect to disciplines. The opinion that there are no Gods, is a passion common to both these; but they differ in this, that the one is the cause of less, and the other of more, evil than other men. The one of these speaks with the greatest freedom concerning the Gods, sacrifices and oaths; and, as he ridicules

cules others, will perhaps render others like himself, unless he is punished. But the other who is of the same opinion, is considered by the vulgar as ingenious, and is full of fraud and stratagem. From these characters many diviners are produced, and such as are excited to every kind of incantation. Sometimes, too, from these tyrants, public speakers, and commanders of armies, are formed; and those who in their private mysteries act insidiously, and deceive men by sophistical devices. Of these, indeed, there are many species; but two of them deserve the establishment of laws: of which the ironic produces crimes that deserve more than one or two deaths; but the other requires admonition and bonds. In a similar manner, too, the opinion that the Gods are negligent, produces two characters; and the opinion that they are easily appeased, another two. Since, therefore, the impious are thus distinguished, those who become such through folly, without a vicious disposition and corrupt manners, the judge shall confine in the prison for correction, for not less than five years. But, during this time, let no one of the citizens converse with them, except those that participate of the nocturnal assembly, who associate for the purpose of admonishing and procuring safety to the soul. When the period arrives that they are to be liberated from their bonds, if any one among them shall appear to be more modest in his manners, let him dwell together with the modest; but if it appears that he is not, and he is again condemned for the same crime, let him be punished with death. With respect to such as, in addition to their believing that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, or easily appeased, are of a savage disposition, despising mankind, alluring the souls of many while living, and asserting that they can allure the souls of the dead; likewise, pretending that they can persuade the Gods by sacrifices, prayers, and incantations, and endeavouring by these means to destroy private persons, whole families, and cities, for the sake of their riches,—among such as these, whoever shall be condemned, let him be fettered in the prison which is in the middle of the region, and let no free-born person be ever allowed to visit him, but let the food appointed for him by the guardians of the laws be brought to him by servants. But, when he dies, let him be hurled beyond the boundaries of the region, and left without a tomb. And, if any free-born person shall bury him, let him sustain the punishment of impiety by any one who is willing to inflict it. If he leaves behind him children sufficient for

the purposes of the city, let the guardians of orphans take no less care of these than of others, and from the very day on which their father was condemned. But it is proper that a common law should be established for all these, which may cause the multitude to behave less impiously towards the Gods, both in word and deed, and may render them less void of intellect, through not permitting them to make innovations in sacred concerns. Let the following law, then, be simply established for all of them:—No one shall have a temple in any private house. But when any one intends to sacrifice, let him go to public buildings raised for this purpose, and present his offerings to those priests and priestesses who take care of these particulars in a pure and holy manner. Here let him pray, together with these, and any other who is willing to join him in prayer. Let these things be adopted, because it is not easy to establish temples and statues of the Gods; but to effect a thing of this kind properly, is the work of a mighty dianoëtic power. But it is usual, with women particularly, and all such as are imbecile, or in danger, or want, or, on the contrary, when they receive an abundance of any thing, always to consecrate that which is present, vow sacrifices, and promise statues to the Gods, dæmons, and the sons of the Gods; being terrified by spectres when awake, and, in a similar manner, recollecting many visions in dreams; for all which they endeavour to obtain remedies, and for this purpose fill all the pure places in houses and streets with altars and temples. For the sake of all these particulars, it is requisite that the law we have just mentioned should be established; and besides this, for the sake of the impious, lest they, fraudulently usurping these in their actions, and raising temples and altars in private houses, should think to make the Gods propitious by sacrifices and prayers; thus infinitely increasing their injustice, and provoking the indignation of the Gods, both against themselves, and those that permitted them to act in this manner, though men of a better character. For by this means the whole city becomes subject to the punishment of impiety, and, in a certain respect, justly. Divinity, indeed, does not blame the legislator; for the law established by him says, that no one shall possess temples of the Gods in private houses. But if it shall appear that any one possesses temples, and performs orgies in any other places than such as are public, he who detects him shall announce the affair to the guardians of the laws. And if such a one, whether a man or a woman, shall be found not to have committed

mitted any great or impious crimes, he shall be obliged to carry his private sacred concerns to public temples : and if he does not immediately comply with the law, let him be fined till he does. But, if any one acting impiously shall appear to have committed, not the impious deed of boys, but of impious men, whether by sacrificing to the Gods in private or in public temples, let him be condemned to death, as one who has sacrificed impurely. However, the guardians of the laws must judge whether his impiety is puerile or not, and thus, when he is brought before a court of justice, must inflict on him the punishment of impiety.

THE END OF THE TENTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK XI.

IT now remains that we should speak of mutual compacts, and the order which they ought to receive. But a thing of this kind is, in a certain respect, simple. I mean, that no one shall touch my property, nor move the least thing belonging to me, without my consent. And I, if I am endued with a sound mind, shall act in the same manner with respect to the property of others. In the first place, then, we shall speak about such treasures, as some one may deposit both for himself and those belonging to him, who is not descended from my parents, and which I should never pray that I might find, nor, if I did find, should move, nor be induced to partake of, by those who are called diviners. For I should never be so much benefited by the possession of riches, when obtained after this manner, as I should excel in the virtue of the soul, and in justice, by not receiving them. For thus I should acquire one possession instead of another, a better in that which is better; preferring the prior possession of justice in the soul, to wealth. For it is well said of many particulars, that things immovable should not be moved; and it may be said of this, as being one of them. It is likewise proper to be persuaded by what is commonly asserted about these things, that such particulars do not contribute to the procreation of children. But he who takes no care of children, and neglects the legislator, and, therefore, takes away that which neither he nor his grandfather deposited, such a one corrupts the most beautiful and simple law, which was established by a man by no means ignoble, and which says, You shall not take away that which you have not deposited. What then ought he to suffer, who despises these two legislators, and who takes away that which he did not himself deposit, and which is not a small affair,

affair, but a mighty treasure? Divinity, indeed, knows what punishment he ought to suffer from the Gods. But let us declare what he ought to suffer from men. Let him who first perceives him, give information of the affair:—if it happens in the city, to the ædiles; if in the forum, to the præfects of the markets; and, if in any other part of the region, to those that take care of the land, and the governors of these. When the affair becomes apparent, let the city send to Delphi, and let what the God determines, both respecting the money and him that has moved it, be performed by the city conformable to the oracle. And if he who gives the information is free-born, let him be considered as a virtuous character; but, if he does not give information, as a vicious character. If he who reveals the affair is a slave, it will be proper that he should be made free by the city, and that the city should pay his master the price of his manumission; but, if he does not reveal it, let him be punished with death. Let a similar law follow this, respecting things small and great. If a man leaves any property, whether willingly or unwillingly, let him who may happen to meet with it suffer it to remain; considering that the dæmon who presides over roads defends things of this kind, which are dedicated to Divinity by law. When any one, being unper-suaded by this law, takes away such property to his own house, if he is but of little worth, being a slave, let him receive many lashes with a whip, from any one not less than thirty years of age who may happen to meet him. But, if he is free-born, besides being considered as illiberal, and void of law, let him pay as a fine ten times the worth of what he took away to its proper owner. When any one accuses another of holding his property, whether it be much or little, and the person who detains it acknowledges that it is in his possession, but denies that it is his who demands it,—if a written account of the affair is given to the magistrates according to law, he who detains it shall be called before a magistrate, and if it shall appear to be the property of the accuser, it shall be restored to him. But if it shall be found to belong to neither, but to some absent person, if its possessor will not engage to restore it to the absent person, let him be compelled to deposit it. If a written account of the affair is not given to the magistrates, let the property be deposited with the three oldest magistrates till sentence is passed. And, if the subject of dispute is an animal, let him who upon trial is cast, pay the magistrates the expence of its keeping; but let the affair be decided by the magistrates

within

within the space of three days. If any one leads away another as a slave, who is going to be manumitted, let him who leads him be dismissed; but he who is thus led away, if he can procure three respectable bondsmen, shall be considered as free; but otherwise not. But if any one is led away in any other manner, let him by whom he is thus led be obnoxious to the charge of using violence, and be condemned to restore double the loss to the person led away. Every one, too, may be permitted to lead away his free-man, if he is not served by him, or not sufficiently. The attention, however, which such a one ought to pay his master consists, in the first place, in going thrice every month to his master's house, and announcing that he is prepared to do whatever is just, and in his power; and, in the second place, that he may perform, with respect to matrimony, whatever shall appear requisite to his master. But it shall not be lawful for him to possess greater wealth than the person by whom he was liberated: but, if he does possess more, let the excess be given to his master. Let a freed person not remain in the city more than twenty years, but, in the same manner as strangers, let him after this period depart, taking with him the whole of his property, unless he can persuade the magistrates and his liberator to the contrary. But if the possessions of a freed person, or of any other stranger, exceed those of the third estate, let him, on the thirtieth day after this has been discovered to be the case, take his property and depart; and let him not, though he should request it, be permitted by the magistrates to stay any longer. Let him who disobeys this law be brought before a court of justice; when condemned, be punished with death; and let his riches become public property. Let the judges of the tribes take cognizance of these cases, unless the litigants have previously settled the affair among themselves by means of their neighbours or arbitrators. If any one asserts that a certain animal, or any thing else, is his own property, let him who possesses it take it either to the seller, or to him who properly and justly gave it, or who after some other manner delivered it of his own authority. And let it remain with a citizen, or an inhabitant of the city, for thirty days, but with a stranger for five months, so that the middle of these may be that month in which the sun is turned from the summer to the winter tropic. Let whatever one person changes with another through buying or selling, be exchanged in a place appointed for each in the forum, and let every thing pertaining to buying and selling be transacted

be transacted in this place, and no where else. Likewise, let there be no delay either in buying or selling. But, if the commutation is made in other places, let no judgment according to law be passed upon it. With respect to feasts, in which every man pays his own share, if any difference should arise in settling the payment of the shares, let the parties so transact with each other as about a thing which is not noticed by the courts of justice. Let a seller, who receives no less than fifty drachms as the price of his commodity, be obliged to wait ten days in the city, and let the buyer know the place of his abode; and this for the sake of those complaints and legitimate abatements which usually happen about things of this kind. But let lawful and unlawful abatements take place as follows: When any one sells a slave who labours under a consumption, or the stone, or the strangury, or that which is called the sacred disease, or any other disease which is immanifest to many, is of long continuance and difficult to cure, whether of the body or mind, if a physician or a master of gymnastic buys him, no abatement shall be made; nor yet when the seller informs the buyer of the true condition of the article of sale. But if an artist sells to an ignorant person any thing of this kind, the buyer shall be permitted to return the person bought by him, who labours under any disease but the sacred, within six months: but if he labours under this disease, he shall be permitted to return him within a year. Affairs of this kind shall be decided by physicians chosen by the common consent of the litigants. He who in these cases is condemned, shall pay to the buyer double the price for which he sold him. But if one ignorant person sells any thing to another, let the return and judgment be made in the same manner as was mentioned above; and let him who is condemned pay a simple fine. If any one sells a homicide to another, if the transaction takes place between two skilful persons, let no return be made; but if between a skilful and ignorant person, let a return then be made when the buyer perceives the case. But let the affair be decided by the five youngest guardians of the laws. If it shall appear that the seller was not ignorant that the person he sold was a homicide, let the house of the buyer be purified according to the law of the interpreters, and let the seller pay him triple the price of the homicide. Let him who changes money for money, or for animals, or any thing else, give and receive every thing unadulterated, agreeably to the injunctions of law. About the whole of this vice, how-

ever, it is requisite to lay down a preface, in the same manner as in other laws. Every man, indeed, ought to consider adulteration, lying, and deception, as forming one genus, about which it is usual for the multitude to say, though very erroneously, that when each of these is opportunely adopted, the result is frequently proper. But as they leave the occasion, the where, and the when, disorderly and indefinitely, they often by this assertion both injure themselves and others. The legislator, however, should not suffer this indefinite to be unnoticed, but greater or lesser boundaries ought always to be clearly determined. Let them, therefore, now be determined. Let no one tell a lie, or deceive, or adulterate any thing, calling at the same time on the Gods, unless he is desirous of becoming odious to Divinity. This, however, will be the case with him, in the first place, who, swearing falsely, despises the Gods; and, in the second place, with him who speaks falsely before those that are better than himself. But the good are more excellent than the bad, and, in short, the elder than the younger. On this account, parents are better than their offspring, men than women and children, and governors than the governed. All these ought to be revered in every government, and especially in political governments, for the sake of which we have engaged in the present discussion. For he who adulterates any thing in the forum, lies and deceives, and, calling on the Gods, swears falsely before the guardians of the forum, and violates their laws, neither fearing men, nor reverencing the Gods. To be careful, indeed, not to contaminate the names of the Gods, is in every respect beautiful; for they ought not to be used in common like other names, but every thing pertaining to the Gods should be preserved in a pure and holy manner. Let the following law, therefore, be established for those who will not be persuaded to act in this manner:—He who sells any thing in the forum shall not be suffered to fix two prices to any article; but when he has fixed a simple price, if he does not sell it, he shall take it away, and be allowed to bring it back again on the same day, without valuing it at a higher price than before. Let praise, and taking an oath, never be employed in selling. And if any one is disobedient to this law, any citizen, not less than thirty years of age, who detects him in swearing, shall strike him with impunity; and if he neglects to do this, let him be considered as a betrayer of the laws. But let him who detects any one selling an adulterated article, and incapable of being persuaded by what

we have now said, expose the fraud of such a one, if he is able, before a magistrate; and let a slave, or an inhabitant, bring with him the adulterated article. Let a citizen, who neglects to accuse such a one, be pronounced a bad man, as one who defrauds the Gods: but, if he accuses him, let him dedicate the adulterated article to the Gods who preside over the forum. Let him who openly sells things of this kind, besides being deprived of the adulterated article, receive publicly as many lashes with a whip as there are drachms in the sum for which he sold the article; a crier at the same time proclaiming in the forum the cause of his being whipped. Let the præfects of the markets, and the guardians of the laws, endeavour to detect all the adulterations and evil practices of the sellers, by making inquiry of men skilled in vendible articles, and cause to be written on a pillar before the forum what a seller ought to do, and what not, so that men of this kind may clearly know how to act according to law in disposing of their respective articles. As to the particulars relating to the ædiles, we have spoken of these sufficiently above. But if it should appear that any thing is wanting to these, let them supply the deficiency by communicating with the guardians of the laws, and afterwards let them write their first and second legal institutions on a pillar.

After adulteration it follows that we should speak of cauponation¹. But about the whole of this we shall first of all give our advice, and the reasons for such advice, and afterwards establish a law respecting it. For all cauponation in a city does not subsist for the sake of injuring the city, but naturally for the sake of the contrary. For how is it possible that he should not benefit the city who causes money, from being possessed in an incommensurate and anomalous manner, to be possessed equably, and with commensuration? It is requisite to say, that the power of money, the merchant, the mercenary character, and the inn-keeper, will accomplish this for us. For these, and others of this kind, whether they act in a more becoming or a more base manner, endeavour to supply the indigence of others, and render possessions equal. But let us consider the reason why this appears neither beautiful nor becoming, and why it is calumniated; that though we may not procure a remedy for the whole by law, yet we may for a part.

¹ The keeping an inn or victualling-house.

CLIN. This affair, as it appears, is of no trifling nature, and requires no small degree of virtue.

GUEST. How do you say, O friend Clinias? A small part of mankind naturally, and who are educated in the best manner, are able, when they are in want, or influenced by the desire of certain things, to conduct themselves with moderation, and, when they have it in their power to acquire great wealth, behave soberly, and prefer moderation to excess. But the vulgar conduct themselves in a manner perfectly contrary to these. For they desire without measure; and when it is permitted them to become moderately, they choose to become immensely rich. On this account, all such as are conversant with cauponation and merchandize are calumniated, and subject to shameful disgrace. For, if any one (which never did take place, nor ever will) should compel (though indeed it is ridiculous to mention it) the best of men to keep an inn for a certain time, or victualling-house, or do any thing of this kind; or if certain most excellent women, through the necessity of fate, should engage in such employments, we should know that they were honest and laudable, and that, when they are conducted according to uncorrupt reason, all such characters as these should be honoured as sustaining the part of mothers and nurses. But now, since inns and victualling-houses are raised in solitary places, and at a great distance from cities, they serve as places of shelter for those that are caught in a storm, and afford a cool retreat to those that are oppressed with heat. They do not, however, dismiss those that take refuge in them like friends, with hospitable gifts, but cruelly compel them to ransom themselves, as if they were enemies and captives, and plunder them of all their possessions. These, and other base actions of this kind, subject those employments to calumny which are calculated to assist the indigent. A legislator, therefore, ought always to devise a remedy for these. For it is a true and ancient saying, that it is difficult to fight against two things, as is evident in diseases, and many other particulars. And in the present case, indeed, there is an opposition against two things, poverty and riches; the latter of which corrupt the soul of men through luxury, and the former leads them through pain to impudence. What remedy, therefore, can be devised for this disease in a polity endued with intellect? In the first place, we must endeavour to the utmost, that it may use cauponation in the smallest degree; and, in the next place, we must

must assign cauponation to those men whose manners, when corrupt, will be no great pest to the city; and, in the third place, some method must be devised by which the souls of these men may not easily be filled with impudence and illiberality. But, after what has now been said, a certain law respecting these things presents itself to us, with good fortune. The city of the Magnesians, which Divinity first raised, is by Divinity again inhabited. Among these there is a law, that no husbandmen who belong to the forty-five thousand houses shall either voluntarily or involuntarily be an inn-keeper or a merchant, or act in the capacity of a servant to any private person, unless that person becomes in his turn a servant to him; a father and mother, with their progenitors, all his elders; and such as being free live in an independent manner, being excepted. It is not, however, easy to determine by law who is free, or the contrary; yet such as these are distinguished from the nobles by the hatred and love which they bear towards them. But let him who through a certain art is engaged in illiberal cauponation be accused before those who hold the first rank in virtue, by any one that is willing, as a disgrace to his family. And if it shall appear that he has defiled his paternal house by any unworthy employment, let him, after having been fettered for a year, abstain from such employment. If, after this, he engages in it again, let him be fettered for two years. And let him always be confined in bonds as often as he is detected, twice as long as the preceding time. But a second law orders that all such as are not citizens, together with foreigners, shall exercise cauponation. And a third law ordains, that the foreigner or inhabitant who engages in this art, shall either be a most excellent character, or vicious in the smallest degree. It is proper, likewise, that the guardians of the law should consider that they are not only guardians of those who are easily prevented from acting in an illegal and vicious manner, viz. those who are well-born and educated; but that they are much more guardians of those who are different from these, and who engage in employments by which they are strongly impelled to improbity. Since, however, cauponation is abundantly various, the guardians of the laws should assemble together with those that are skilled in the several species of it; and, as we observed a little before concerning adulteration, which is allied to this art, they should, in the first place, establish such things as appear necessary to the city. Afterwards, having inquired into the cost and emolument attending

ing this art, they should attend to the moderate gain resulting from it, and establish its expenses and emoluments. And some particulars should be attended to by the præfects of the markets, others by the ædiles, and others by the præfects of the land. After this manner nearly will cauponation be advantageous to every one, and injure those by whom it is exercised in the city in the smallest degree. The genus of artificers is sacred to Vulcan and Minerva, who furnish our lives by their arts. But those individuals are sacred to Mars and Minerva who preserve the works of artificers by other arts of an assistant and defensive nature. The genus of these is, indeed, justly sacred to these Gods: and all these providentially take care of the region and people. Some of them, too, preside over warlike contests; but others effect the generation of instruments, and works for hire. Reverencing, therefore, the Gods that are the authors of these arts, it will not be proper to deceive them, by lying about things of this kind. If any artificer does not complete his work in a prefixed time, through a vicious disposition, but, paying no reverence to the divinity who is the giver of life, through a blindness of intellect, thinks that his kindred God will pardon him, such a one, in the first place, will be punished by the God himself; and, in the second place, let it be established by law, that he shall be fined the worth of the work which he has not finished in the proper time, and that, beginning again, he shall complete it in the time first agreed upon. Let the same law too consult for the artificer as for the seller of vendible articles. Let care be taken, therefore, that he does not ask more than the worth of his work, but let his demand be most simple, and accommodated to its worth. For an artist knows the worth of his work. In cities, therefore, consisting of free men, it is not proper that an artist should endeavour to deceive the simple by art, which is naturally clear and void of falsehood. Hence, when this is the case, the injurer shall make a proper recompense to the injured person. If any one, in paying an artist for his work, does not pay him according to the agreement, despising Jupiter the guardian of the city, and Minerva who communicates with the polity, and, being influenced by a little gain, dissolves mighty communions; in this case, let the law assist the union of the city, in conjunction with the Gods. Let him, therefore, who, having ordered a work to be executed for him, does not pay for it in the appointed time, be fined double the price agreed upon. And let judgment be passed on things of this kind

kind in the courts of justice belonging to the tribes. As we have, however, made mention of artificers, and as commanders of armies and military arts are artificers of safety to a city, it is but just that we should also speak of these. If, therefore, any one of these undertakes any public work, whether voluntarily or from command, and executes it in a becoming manner, let the law confer upon him the honour of unceasing praise, which is the reward of warlike men. But the law may be justly blamed which does not reward him who conducts himself well in military affairs. Let the following law, therefore, be established for these, mingled with praise, and which does not compel, but consults the multitude of the citizens: that such good men shall be honoured in the second place, as have been saviours of the whole city, whether by their valour, or by warlike devices; for the first honour must be given to those who have been remarkably obedient to the written laws of good legislators. We have, therefore, now nearly spoken sufficiently of the greatest compacts among men, except those pertaining to orphans, and the guardians of orphans. It is, therefore, necessary in the next place to speak of these. The beginning of all these is the desire of the testator, and the fortune of those that make no will. I have said it is necessary to speak of these, O Clinias, in consequence of looking to the difficulty respecting them: for it is not possible to leave them in a disordered manner. For testators would desire many things differing from each other, and contrary to the laws, to the manners of the living, and to their ancestors, if any one should simply give them permission to make their wills in whatever manner they pleased, and should ordain, that every will made near the end of life shall be properly executed. For most men, when they consider themselves as about to die, are affected with stupidity and remissness.

CLIN. What induces you to say this, O guest?

GUEST. A man when about to die, O Clinias, is morose, and is full of such language as is terrible to legislators, and difficult for them to endure.

CLIN. How so?

GUEST. Desiring to be the lord of all things, it is usual for him to speak with anger.

CLIN. What does he say at this time?

GUEST. It is a dire thing, says he, O Gods, if it is not permitted me to leave my property in whatever manner I please, and to bequeath some more,
and

and others less, according as they were evidently well or ill affected towards me in my diseases, in my old age, and in other all-various fortunes.

CLIN. Does he not therefore, O guest, appear to you to speak well?

GUEST. Aptient legislators, O Clinias, appear to me to have been effeminate, and to have looked to a trifling part of human affairs in the establishment of laws.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. That, being terrified at this language of the dying man, they made a law, that every one should be permitted to make his will as he pleased. But both you and I could answer the dying in your city in a more elegant manner.

CLIN. How?

GUEST. O friends, (we should say) who have but a short time to live, it is difficult for you to know your affairs, and likewise to know yourselves, according to the inscription of the Delphic temple. I, therefore, being a legislator, consider that neither yourselves, nor these possessions, are your own, but that they belong to the whole of your race, both past and to come, and that both the whole of your race and possessions, by a much greater priority, belong to the city. This being the case, if any one, through flattery, either when you are diseased, or in your old age, should persuade you to make your will in an improper manner, I should not admit such a will to be voluntarily made. But, looking to that which is best both for the whole city, and the whole of your race, I shall establish laws in such a manner as that the advantage of individuals may give way, as it is fit it should, to that of the public. Do you, therefore, be mild and benevolent towards us, as human nature requires you should. It will be our part to take care to the utmost of our power of every thing belonging to you, and not in a partial manner, by neglecting some things and attending to others. Let this then, O Clinias, be the consolation which we address in a prefatory manner to the living and the dead. But let the law be as follows:—Let him who makes a will, and has children, in the first place appoint that child his heir whom he thinks most deserving. And, in the next place, let him signify which of his children he chooses to consign over to the care of another person. If any one of his children shall remain without an hereditary portion, and there is reason to expect that this child will be sent into a colony

a colony according to law, let the father be permitted to leave him from his other possessions as much as he pleases, except the paternal allotment, and every thing pertaining to it. But if there are many children thus circumstanced, let the father bequeath them, as he pleases, whatever remains beyond the allotment. However, if any one of these possesses a house, let him not leave such a one any money. In like manner, let him not bequeath a daughter any thing if she is betrothed to a man; but let him bequeath her something if she is not betrothed. If any allotment in the region belonging to sons or daughters shall be found after the will has been made, let it be left to the heir of the person that made the will. If the testator has no sons, but daughters, let him signify in writing what men he would wish as husbands for his daughters, and as sons for himself. And if the son of any one, whether natural or adopted, happens to die before he has arrived at manhood, let the testator mention this circumstance in the will, and signify who he wishes should be his son in his stead, with more auspicious fortune. If any one who has no children makes a will, let him be permitted to leave the tenth part of his possessions, beyond the allotment, to any one that he pleases. Let him bequeath all the rest benignantly, without blame, and according to law, to the son whom he adopts. If the children of any dying person require tutors, and the father in his will has mentioned those whom he wishes to undertake this office, let such persons enter on this employment according to his wish, if it is agreeable to them. But, if such a one has either died intestate, or has not mentioned the tutors in his will, let the next of kin undertake this office,—two on the father's side, two on that of the mother, and one from among the friends of the deceased. In this case, too, let the guardians of the law appoint the tutors. And let the whole care pertaining to orphans devolve on fifteen of the guardians of the laws that are older than the rest. And this number being divided into three parts, let three of them every year undertake this office, till the five periods are accomplished in a circle. Let the greatest care likewise be taken that this mode may never fail. If any one dies intestate, and leaves behind him children that require a guardian, let them be provided for by the same laws. But if any one dies unexpectedly, and leaves behind him daughters, let him pardon the legislator if he disposes of his daughters in consequence of looking to two things, viz. proximity of race, and the

preservation of the allotment. The third thing which a father ought to attend to is, the choosing a proper son for himself, and a husband for his daughter : but this he omits, because the consideration of it belongs to impossibilities. Let the following law, therefore, be established about things of this kind :—If any one, dying intestate, leaves behind him daughters, let the brother on the father's or mother's side, if he is without an allotment, take care both of the daughter and the allotment of the deceased. But, if his brother is not living, let his brother's son undertake this office, if his age is sufficient for the purpose. If no one of these survives, let the charge devolve on the son of his sister ; and let the fourth after these be his father's brother ; the fifth, the son of this brother ; and the sixth, the son of his father's sister. Let a similar process be always adopted when a man leaves behind him daughters, viz. through brothers and cousins ; first, the males, and afterwards the females, in the same family. But let the judge determine the fitness or unfitness of the time of marriages, by looking at the males naked, and at the females naked, as far as to the navel. If there is a want of kindred, as far as to the sons of brothers and grandfathers, whatever citizen the girl shall choose, with the consent of her tutors, shall become the heir of the deceased, and the husband of his daughter. Further still, if there should happen to be but few inhabitants in the city, and the virgin should wish to make some one who is sent into a colony her father's heir, let this person, if he belongs to her family, proceed to the allotment according to the order of law. But if he is a citizen, but not related to her, let him marry her if he pleases, according to her own choice, and that of her guardians ; and, returning home, let him take possession of the hereditary estate. If any one dies intestate, and without children, either of the male or female sex, let other particulars take place according to the above-mentioned law, but let the males and females of the family enter as kindred the desolate house, as those to whom the allotment properly belongs. In the first place, let the sister enter ; afterwards the daughter of the brother ; in the third place, the daughter of the sister ; in the fourth place, the sister of the father ; in the fifth place, the daughter of the father's brother ; and, in the sixth place, the daughter of the father's sister. Let these live together with those according to proximity and what is right, in the manner we have established above. But let not the weighty nature of laws of this kind escape

us, and let us not be insensible to the difficulty of ordering a relation of a deceased person to marry a relation. For he who introduces such a law as this, does not appear to consider that ten thousand impediments may arise respecting mandates of this kind, so as to render persuasion to a compliance with them ineffectual. For many had rather suffer any thing than marry a person whose body is either diseased or maimed, and whose dianoëtic part is not in a sound state. The legislator, therefore, will, perhaps, appear to some, though improperly, to pay no attention to these. Let this, then, be as it were a common preface, both for the legislator, and those that are governed by his laws. Those, indeed, for whom laws are made, ought to pardon the legislator, because, while he is taking care of public concerns, he cannot at the same time attend to private calamities. We should also pardon those for whom laws are made, if they are sometimes incapable of perfectly complying with the mandates of the legislator, through his ignorance of private calamities.

CLIN. In what manner then, O guest, will it be most proper to act in this case?

GUEST. Arbiters, O Clinias, must necessarily be chosen for laws of this kind, and for those that are governed by them.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. It will sometimes happen, that a rich young man given to luxury will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his father's brother, though rich, in consequence of aspiring after a greater marriage; and sometimes he will necessarily be unwilling to comply with the law which forces him to marry a girl who is disordered either in body or mind, considering this as the greatest of all calamities. Let, therefore, the following law respecting these particulars be established by us:—If any accuse the established laws on account of wills or marriages, or any thing else, asserting that the legislator, if he were living, would not compel them to act in such a manner, or to marry such a person; and if any relation or tutor should affirm that the legislator left fifteen guardians of the laws as arbiters and fathers of the orphans,—in this case, let the litigants apply to these, and abide by their decision. But, if it shall appear that the guardians of the law exercise greater authority than they ought, let the affair be brought before select judges; and, when determined, let him who is condemned be branded

with infamy,—this being a punishment, to him who possesses intellect; of a more weighty nature than a very considerable fine. After this, a second generation, as it were, follows with respect to orphans. For education and discipline follow the first generation, of which we have spoken. But, after the second, it is necessary to devise some means by which orphans may be oppressed with calamity as little as possible. In the first place, then, we say, that guardians of the laws should be appointed for them in the place of parents, and not worse than these; and that they should take care of them every year as if they were their own offspring. Let this, then, be our preface respecting the education of orphans, and the appointment of tutors for them. For we appear to me to have spoken opportunely above, when we asserted, that the souls of the dead possessed a certain power, through which they bestowed a providential attention to human affairs. This, indeed, is true, but the confirmation of it requires a long discourse. It is likewise proper to believe in other traditions respecting things of this kind, which are both numerous and very antient. Legislators, too, unless they are perfectly insane, ought to believe in the truth of these traditions. Since, therefore, these things naturally subsist after this manner, those that attend to the desolate condition of orphans should, in the first place, fear the Gods above; and, in the next place, the souls of the deceased, who naturally take a particular care of their offspring, and who are, therefore, propitious to those that honour them, but hostile towards those that despise them. Add, too, that the souls of those that are living, but are in old age, and who in a city happy through good laws possess the greatest honours, and whose children and grandchildren live a pleasant life, through paying them a proper attention,—these acutely hear and perceive things of this kind, and are benevolent to those that behave justly to orphans, but in the highest degree indignant with those that injure them. For they consider the deposit of orphans as the greatest and most holy of all deposits. It is requisite, therefore, that the tutor and magistrate who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, should direct his attention to these particulars, and bestow as much care on the discipline and education of orphans as of his own offspring. He, therefore, who is persuaded by this preface to the law, and who acts in no respect unjustly towards orphans, will evidently be exempt from all anger of the legislator about things of this kind. But let him who is unpersuaded by it, and injures any

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one who is deprived of either father or mother, suffer twice the punishment he would have sustained from injuring one, both of whose parents were living.

The laws which follow relate to the tutors of orphans, and the attention which magistrates should pay to the tutors. If, therefore, they possessed a paradigm of the education of free children, the tutors both taking care of these and their own concerns, and if they had laws respecting these sufficiently distinct, we should not without reason establish certain laws for tutors, as very much differing from others, and distinguish, by various pursuits, the life of orphans from that of those who are not orphans. But now, with respect to every thing of this kind, the privation of parents does not with us differ much from paternal government, but is unwilling to equalize honour, dishonour, and providential care. Hence the law, through its attention to orphans, consoles and threatens. And further still, it will be very opportune for it to threaten as follows:—He who takes care either of a female or a male, and who from among the guardians of the law is appointed to observe the tutor of these, shall possess the same affection for the orphans intrusted to his care as if they were his own offspring; nor shall he bestow less attention to their affairs, but even more, than to his own. Let every one, therefore, take care of orphans conformably to this law. But, if any one acts contrary to this law in affairs of this kind, let such a tutor be condemned by a magistrate. And if it shall appear to the kindred of the orphans, or to any other of the citizens, that the tutor has acted negligently or viciously, let him be brought before a court of judgment, and make a four-fold restitution of the loss sustained, and let one half be given to the boy, and the other to the accuser. When an orphan arrives at puberty, if he thinks that he has been neglected by his tutor, let him be permitted to call his tutor to an account for five years from the time that his tutorship is finished. And if any tutor is condemned, let a court of justice determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. If any magistrate shall appear to have injured an orphan through negligence, let a court of justice determine the restitution which he ought to make. But, if he shall appear to have injured the orphan through injustice, besides making a restitution, let him be deprived of the office of a guardian of the law; and let another common guardian of the city be appointed in his place by the region and the city.

city. Greater discord takes place between fathers and sons, and sons and fathers, than is proper, in which fathers think that the legislator ought to permit them to renounce their sons by a public crier, so as that they may no longer be their sons according to law: and sons are of opinion that they ought to be allowed to accuse their fathers of madness, when they are disgracefully circumstanced through disease or old age. These things usually take place when the manners of men are perfectly corrupt. For, if the half only of these evils took place, as that the parents alone, or the children alone, were vicious, calamities which are the progeny of such a mighty hatred would have no existence. Indeed, in any other polity, a son, when abandoned by his father, would not necessarily be deprived of the city. But, in a city governed by these laws, he who is given up by his father must necessarily take up his abode in some other place. For no one is allowed to unite himself with any family of the five thousand and forty houses. On this account it is necessary, that the son who is abandoned by his father should not only be driven from his father, but from his whole race. It is proper, therefore, in things of this kind, to act according to the following law:—When any one, through anger by no means fortunate, whether he is justly enraged or not, desires to be liberated from an alliance with him whom he has begotten and educated, let him not be permitted to accomplish his desire either in an improper manner or directly. But, in the first place, let him assemble his own relations, as far as to his cousins, and, in a similar manner, those of his son on the mother's side. When they are assembled, let him accuse his son to them, and show them that he deserves to be expelled from all his kindred. Let the son also be permitted to defend himself, and endeavour to prove that he does not deserve to suffer any thing of this kind. And if the father persuades them that his accusation is just, and all the relations, both male and female, except the father, mother, and the son himself, vote for his being abandoned; when this is the case, let a father be permitted to renounce his son, but by no means when this is not the case. If any citizen wishes to adopt a son whom his father abandons, let him not be restrained from adopting him by any law. For the manners of youth naturally sustain many mutations in life. But, if no one in the space of ten years wishes to adopt such a son, let those whose province it is to send offspring into a colony, take care that this rejected son is made an inhabitant of such a colony
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in a proper manner. If a certain disease, old age, or severity of manners, or all these together, more than any thing else, render a man insane, and this is concealed from every one except his domestics; and if such a one dissipates his substance, as being the master of it, but his son is unwilling to accuse his father of madness, in this case let the following law be established:—In the first place, let the son go to the oldest guardians of the law, and inform them of his father's calamity. Afterwards, let these, when they have sufficiently considered the affair, consult whether the father should be proscribed, or not: and, if they agree that he should be proscribed, let them be both witnesses and patronizers of the cause. But, if the father is condemned, let him not afterwards possess any authority over his own affairs, but dwell at home for the rest of his life like a child. If a husband and wife, through the wretchedness of their manners, live in discord with each other, let ten men who subsist in the middle of the guardians of the laws, and, in a similar manner, ten women who are curators of marriages, take care of things of this kind. And if they are able to procure a reconciliation, let their decision be valid. But, if their minds are too vehemently inflamed to admit of a reconciliation, let them seek, to the utmost of their power, after such persons as are adapted to reside with each. It appears, indeed, that the manners of such as these are far from being mild; and, on this account, we should endeavour to adapt to them more profound and gentle manners. And such, indeed, as are without children, or have but a few, and disagree, let these be compelled to marry again, for the sake of procreating children. But let such as, having a sufficient number of children, disagree, be divorced, and united with others, for the sake of that attention which old age requires. If a woman dies, and leaves behind her male and female children, let the law not compel, but persuade, the husband to educate his children without marrying again. But if there are no children, let him be compelled to marry again, till he has procreated children sufficient both for his family and the city. But, if a man dies, and leaves behind him a sufficient number of children, let the mother of the children educate them, remaining a widow. If she appears, however, to be too young to live in a state of health without a husband, let her kindred, in conjunction with the women that take care of marriages, consult what is fit to be done both for her and the children. And if both these are in want of children, let them marry for the
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the sake of having children. But let an accurate sufficiency of children be a male and female according to law. When it is allowed that any offspring is the progeny of the begetter, but it is necessary to have recourse to a court of justice in order to know which of the parents the child ought to follow, let the following mode be adopted:—If a female slave has connection with a slave, or with a free-born person, or with a freed-man, let the offspring be the property of the master of the female slave. But if a free-born woman is with child from a slave, let the master of the slave, in a similar manner, be the master of the offspring. If any master has a child by his own slave, or any mistress is pregnant from her slave, and this becomes apparent, let the women send the offspring of the woman, together with the father, into another region: but let the guardians of the law banish the offspring of the man, together with the mother of such offspring. However, neither will Divinity, nor any man who is endued with intellect, ever advise any one to neglect his parents. Indeed, the assertion, that it is proper to know how to worship the Gods, will be a proper preface with respect to the honouring and dishonouring of parents. Antient laws concerning the Gods are among all men established in a twofold manner. For, clearly perceiving some of the Gods¹, we honour them; but we fabricate images of others; and while we rejoice in these images though inanimate, we think that the animated Gods themselves will be benevolent and propitious to us for the attention which we pay to these. He, therefore, whose father or mother, or the fathers or mothers of these, reside in his house, worn out with old age, like precious furniture, such a one will never think that any other such image, or one more efficacious, can ever reside in his house, if he pays that reverential regard to it which he ought.

CLIN. Of what proper reverential regard are you speaking?

GUEST. I will tell you. For things of this kind, O friends, deserve to be heard.

CLIN. Only speak.

GUEST. We say that Oedipus, being dishonoured by his children, imprecated on them those things which every one is perfectly acquainted with, and has heard were inflicted by the Gods. Amyntor, too, is said to have

¹ Meaning the celestial orbs, which, in consequence of being divine animals, from the participation of divinity, are called Gods.

curfed his fon Phoenix in anger, and Thefeus, Hippolytus, and innumerable other fathers, innumerable other fons. From which it becomes apparent, that the Gods hear the prayers of parents againft their children. For it is moft juft that nothing fhould be fo noxious to a child as the imprecation of his parent. Nor let any one think that the prayers of his father and mother are alone heard by the Gods according to nature, when they are defpifed by him, for they are alfo heard when they are honoured by, and are vehemently dear to, him. On this account, when in their prayers they earneftly invoke the Gods to blefs their children, ought we not to think that they are fimilarly heard by them, and that the Gods equally impart to them fuch things as are good? For otherwife they would not be juft diftributors of what is good, which we fay becomes the Gods the leaft of all things.

CLIN. Certainly.

GUEST. We fhould think, therefore, as we obferved a little before, that we cannot poffefs any image which is more honoured by the Gods, than our fathers and grandfathers, mothers and grandmothers, when worn out with age. When any one honours thefe, divinity rejoices: for, otherwife, he would not hear their prayers. The image, indeed, of our progenitors ought to be confidered by us, as far more wonderful than inanimate images. For animated images when they are revered by us, pray for us, but do the very contrary when they are defpifed by us. But inanimate images do neither of thefe. So that he who behaves properly to his father, grandfather, and all of this kind, fuch a one poffeffes the moft powerful of all images with refpect to procuring divine benevolence.

CLIN. You fpeak moft beautifully.

GUEST. Every one, therefore, endued with intellect will fear and honour the prayers of his parents, as knowing that they have often been profitable and noxious to many. Thefe things, then, are thus eftablifhed by nature. By good men, therefore, their aged progenitors when living to the extremity of life, will be confidered as a treasure; and, if they die before they arrive at that period, they will be vehemently defired by them. On the contrary, they will be terrible in the extreme to the vicious. Let every one, therefore, perfuaded by thefe affertions, honour his parents according to law. But if any one is deaf to thefe exordia, for fuch the following law will be properly eftablifhed. If any one then, in this city, reverences his parents lefs

than he ought, and does not pay them more attention than he does his sons, grandsons, and himself; neglecting to comply with their will in all things beyond that of others, let parents who are so neglected, give information of the affair themselves, or by some other, to three of the oldest guardians of the law, and likewise to three of the women that have the care of marriages. And let these, after they have investigated the affair, punish the offender; if he is a young man, indeed, with stripes and bonds, if he is not more than thirty years of age; and let the same punishment be inflicted on a woman, if she is forty years of age. But if they are older than this, and yet do not cease to neglect their parents, but afflict them, let them be brought before a court of justice, and be tried by those citizens who surpass all the rest in age: and, if they are condemned, let the court of justice determine what they ought to suffer, without omitting any punishment which ought to be inflicted on such an occasion. If any one, however, who is afflicted by his children, is unable to tell his condition, let any free person who hears of his case, announce it to the governors; or let him, if he omits to do this, be considered as a vicious person, and be accused by any one that is willing of the injury sustained. But if a slave gives information of this affair, let him be made free. And if he is the slave either of the afflicting or afflicted person, let him be made free by the magistrate who is acquainted with the affair. But if he is the slave of any other citizen, let his ransom be paid for to his master, by the public. Let the magistrates, likewise, be careful that no one injures a person of this kind, on account of his giving information. With respect to injuries by poisons, we have already made a division of such of these as are deadly: but we have not yet distinguished other injuries, whether they are committed by means of drink or meat, or unctions, voluntarily, and with premeditation. For there are two kinds of poisons pertaining to the human species. For, as we just now clearly said, bodies are naturally injured by bodies: and, in the next place, by enchantments, incantations and bindings, some who dare to injure others, are persuaded that they are able to accomplish their purpose through these, and others, that nothing is so easy as to be injured by those that possess the power of witchcraft. These particulars, therefore, and all that pertains to things of this kind, it is neither easy to know how they naturally subsist, nor, if any one does know, to persuade others. But the minds of men being dubious as to things of this kind,

kind, it is not worth while to endeavour to persuade them that, if at any time they see waxen images, whether in gates, in places where three roads meet, or on the tombs of their parents, they should despise every thing of this kind, as they have no clear notions concerning them. Giving a twofold division, therefore, to the law respecting enchantments, in the first place, we shall exhort, admonish, and advise men, not to attempt any thing of this kind; nor terrify the multitude, who are frightened like children; nor compel the legislator and judge to procure a remedy for such fears of mankind. For, in the first place, he who endeavours to hurt another by poison, if he does not possess medical science, cannot know what he does with respect to bodies. The same may be said of him who endeavours to injure another by enchantment, unless he happens to be a diviner, or an interpreter of portents. Let the following law, therefore, be established respecting poisons. He who employs poison, not for the purpose of killing a man, but cattle, or swarms of bees, or in order to injure them some other way than by procuring their death, if he happens to be a physician, and is condemned for poisoning, let him be punished with death; but if he is unskilled in medicine, let a court of justice determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. But if any one by bonds, or allurements, or certain incantations, or such like enchantments, is found endeavouring to injure another, if he is a diviner, or an interpreter of prodigies, let him be put to death. But if any one is accused of witchcraft, without being a diviner, let his punishment in a similar manner be determined by a court of justice. Let him who injures another by fraud or force, pay a great fine, if the injury is great, but a smaller fine, if the injury is small; and let restitution in all cases be equivalent to the loss sustained. And, in all injuries, let the injurer be fined till he is amended. If it shall appear that any one was impelled to injure another, by a folly foreign to his nature, through the imprudence of youth, let him be sentenced to pay a lighter fine; but if by his own proper folly, or through the incontinence of pleasures and pains, or through fear, envy, certain desires, or anger difficult to cure, a heavier fine. At the same time observing, that offenders are not to be punished because they have acted ill, (for what is done, can never become undone,) but that afterwards both offenders, and those that see them punished, may hate injustice, or may be in a considerable degree liberated from a calamity of this kind. For the

fake of all these particulars, and looking to all these, the laws, like good archers, should consider this as a mark, viz. the magnitude of punishment, and the proper desert in each offence. A judge, therefore, ought to act in this manner, as the minister of the legislature, since it is permitted him by law to establish what punishment offenders ought to suffer: and, like a painter, he should diligently copy his original. This, indeed, O Megillus and Clinias, should be done by us at present, in the most beautiful and best manner; and we should establish what punishments ought to be inflicted, both on base actions committed by fraud, and those committed by violence; and this in such a manner as the Gods, and the sons of the Gods, will permit us to establish. Let no one then who is insane be openly seen in the city, but let the relations of the insane person keep him secure at home, in the best manner they are able. If they do not, let them be fined. And let him who possesses the largest estate be fined a hundred drachms, if he is negligent in securing an insane person, whether he be a slave, or free. But let him who possesses the next estate to this, be fined four out of five parts of a mina; he who possesses a third estate, three parts of a mina: and, he who possesses a fourth estate, four parts. Many, indeed, are rendered insane by various means. Some, as those of whom we have just spoken, through disease. Others through anger, and the vicious education of a depraved nature; who, being incited by a trifling enmity, talk loudly, and blaspheme each other. But nothing of this kind ought to take place in a city governed by good laws. With respect to every kind of slander, therefore, let the following law be established. Let no one slander another. But when one person in discourse with another is doubtful of any particular, let him with whom he discourses instruct both him and those that are present in the truth of the case, and entirely abstain from slander. For men, when they slander each other with base words, are to be considered as effeminate. And, in the first place, from words, which are a light thing, hatred and grievous enmities are often produced in reality. For he who is gratified with anger, which is a thing of an unpleasant nature, and is filled with it as with noxious aliment,—such a one, being rendered as rustic and savage in this part of his soul as he was once gentle and mild through discipline, leads a morose life, and receives from anger this bitter grace. Hence, nearly all men from
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things of this kind, utter something ridiculous to their adversaries; and he who accustoms himself to a thing of this kind, either errs in every respect, or destroys many parts of magnanimity. On this account, therefore, let no one ever speak in this manner in a temple, or where public sacrifices are performed; or in places of contest, or the forum, or in a court of justice, or in any common assembly. But let the magistrate, who is present at the time, freely punish any one who acts in this manner: and, if he neglects to do so, let him be considered as one who pays no attention to the laws nor the mandates of the legislator, and let him never be permitted to contend for the rewards which are conferred on virtue. But, if any one uses slander in other places, either by provoking, or answering, let any more elderly person who is present, in defence of the law, restrain with blows those who are incited by a foreign and vicious anger; or, if they do not, let them be punished in the manner mentioned above. We say, too, at present, that he who is entangled with slander will not be able to refrain from sometimes speaking ridiculously; and this is what we condemn when it takes place through anger. But what then? Shall we admit the jests and ridiculous slanders which comedians employ against the citizens, if they are not accompanied with anger? Or shall we give this affair a twofold division, viz. into the jocular and the serious? And, indeed, any one may be permitted jocosely to employ ridicule without anger. But let no one be allowed to employ it, as we said before, when inflamed with anger. Let us now, therefore, establish by law to whom this may be allowed, and to whom not. Let not then a composer of comedies, or of iambic or musical melody, be permitted either in words or images to slander any citizen, either in anger or without anger. And, if any one disobeys this law, let those that determine the rewards of contests drive him from the region the very same day, or they shall be fined three minæ, sacred to the God to whom the contest belongs. But let the others, whom we mentioned above, be permitted to employ ridicule without anger, and in sport; but let them not be permitted to do this seriously, and in anger. Let the determination, too, of this affair be committed to him who takes care of the whole discipline of youth. And let him who composes any thing be permitted to make it public, if it is approved of by this curator of youth: but if he does not approve of it, let not the author be permitted to show it to any one, or instruct in it either a slave or a free-

born person. Or, if he does, let him be considered as a vicious character, and as one who disobeys the laws. But he deserves commiseration who, when temperate, or possessing some other virtue, or a part of virtue, is oppressed with a certain calamity, either from hunger, or something of a similar kind; but this cannot be said universally of any one who falls into such-like misfortunes. Hence it will, indeed, be a wonderful circumstance if a man of this kind is so entirely neglected as to arrive at extreme poverty, whether he is a slave, or free, in a polity and city which is moderately inhabited. On this account, the following law may be safely established by the legislator. Let there be no beggars in the city. But if any one attempts to procure food by prayers which cannot be satisfied, let the præfects of the forum expel him from the forum, and the governor of the ways and buildings from the city: and let the magistrate who presides over the lands expel him from every other part of the region, that the whole country may be pure from an animal of this kind. If a male or a female slave injures the property of another person undeservedly, whether through inexperience, or intemperate conduct, let the master of such slave either make satisfaction to the injured person, or deliver up to him the injurer. But if the master of the slave contends that the affair happened through the mutual craft of the injurer and injured, that the slave might be taken from him, let him charge with the crime of malice the person who says he has been injured; and, if he convicts him, let him receive from him double the price at which a court of justice had valued the slave. If the master of the slave is convicted, let him both make the injured person a recompense for his loss, and deliver up the slave. And, if a heifer, horse, or dog, or any other animal, injures any neighbouring property, let the master of the animal in a similar manner make restitution for the loss. If any one refuses to bear witness willingly, let him be cited by him who is in want of his evidence; and when cited, let him attend at a proper time, and bear witness to the best of his knowledge. But if he says that he is ignorant of the affair, let him swear that he is ignorant of it by the three Gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis, and be dismissed. Let him who, when called to bear witness, does not attend, be obnoxious to the injury, according to law. If any judge is cited to give evidence, let him not, in giving evidence, pass sentence on the case. Let a free woman be permitted to bear witness, de-

send a cause, and obtain justice, if she is more than forty years of age, and is unmarried. But, if she is married, let her be permitted to bear witness only. Let a male and female slave, and a boy, be alone permitted to bear witness and defend a cause in cases of murder, if they can give sufficient security for their appearance at the trial, if they should happen to be accused of bearing false witness. If any one accuses another of bearing false witness, let each of the litigants consider the testimony, both in whole and part, before sentence is passed. But let the magistrates preserve in writing the accusations of bearing false witness made by both, and bring them forward for the purpose of determining the false witnesses. If any one shall be found to have given false witness twice, let the law no longer compel him to bear witness again. But if he shall be found to have given false witness thrice, let him not be permitted ever to bear witness again. And if he dares after this to bear witness, let any one who is willing give information of him to a magistrate. Afterwards, let the magistrate deliver him to a court of justice, and, if he is convicted, let him be put to death. When in any lawsuit false witnesses are detected, and are found to be the means of an opponent gaining his cause, if more than half of the witnesses are condemned, let no judgment be passed from their evidence. But it is proper in this case diligently to inquire, whether or not any sentence should be passed; that, in whatever manner the cause may be determined, by this means justice may be done. Since, however, there are many beautiful things in the life of man, in most of them dire calamities are, as it were, naturally inherent, through which they are stained and defiled. But why should not justice among men be beautiful, which renders all human affairs mild? And this being beautiful, why should it not be beautiful to patronize the cause of another? This, then, being the case, a certain evil calumny gives a beautiful name to an art, which, it says, was first devised in judicial affairs; by means of which, in litigations, and the patronizing of causes, any one may vanquish another, whether the cause is just or not. They add, that the gift of this art, and of the arguments proceeding from it, consists in bestowing rewards from money. This, therefore, whether it is an art, or a certain exercise void of art, must by no means be planted in our city; but, reverencing the legislator, it should be persuaded not to speak contrary to justice, and should be sent to some other region. Those, then, that are persuaded by these

these arguments we pass over in silence: but let the following law be announced for those that are unper-suaded by them:—If it shall appear that any one endeavours to give a contrary direction to the power of justice in the souls of the judges, and either excites or patronizes many unseasonable law suits, let any one who is willing charge him with acting basely in judicial matters, or with patronizing a bad cause. And let the cause be tried in a select court of justice. If, too, he is condemned, let the court of justice determine whether he acted in this manner through avarice or love of contention. And if through a love of contention, let the judges appoint him a certain time, beyond which he shall neither plead any cause himself, nor patronize that of another. But if through avarice, if he is a stranger, let him depart from the city without ever returning to it again, or if he neglects to do this, let him be put to death. If he is a citizen, in consequence of thus improperly honouring money, let him be immediately put to death. Likewise, let him be put to death who has been found by a court of justice to have acted twice in this manner.

THE END OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK.

THE

THE LAWS,

BOOK XII.

IF an ambassador or a crier deceives the city in any thing committed to his charge, or does not announce what he is sent to proclaim ; or again, when returning from friends or enemies, does not truly relate the message he received from them, let a written information be drawn up against such a one, as irreligiously despising, contrary to law, the denunciations and mandates of Hermes and Jupiter. And if he is condemned, let the judges determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. The theft of money is, indeed, illiberal, but rapine is base. But no one of the sons of Jupiter will ever do any thing of this kind, in consequence of being delighted either with fraud or force. Let no one, therefore, acting in a disorderly manner through poets, or certain mythologists, be falsely persuaded that if he thieves either by fraud or force, he does not act basely, but does that which the Gods themselves have done. For this is neither true nor becoming : but he who illegally acts in this manner, is neither a God, nor a son of the Gods. But it is proper that these things should be known by the legislator rather than by all poets. He, therefore, who is persuaded by this our discourse, is happy, and will be happy through the whole of time ; but he who is unpersuaded by it, must be restrained by the following law :—If any one commits any public theft, whether it is great or small, he ought to suffer the same punishment. For he who takes away a thing of small consequence, thieves with the same desire, though with less force. But he who moves any thing of greater consequence, and does not restore it to its proper place, is wholly unjust. The law, however, thinks it proper that the one should be less punished than the other, not on account of the smallness of the theft,

but because, perhaps, one of these characters may be cured, but the other is incurable. If a slave, or a stranger, is accused and condemned of any public theft, let sentence be passed on him what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay, as if it were probable that he might be cured. But if any citizen, who has been properly educated, is convicted of having committed any public theft, or violence, whether he is detected in the fact or not, let him be punished with death, as one who is nearly incurable. For the sake of war, indeed, many consultations and many laws are very properly instituted. The greatest of all things, however, consists in this, that neither any male or female be at any time without a governor, nor the soul of any citizen be ever accustomed, either seriously or in sport, to do any thing from itself alone; but that in all war, and in all peace, it perpetually looks to a governor, and lives following his mandates, so as to comply with them in the smallest particular; to stand when he commands, walk, engage in gymnastic exercises, wash, eat, rise by night for the purpose of keeping guard and giving signals; and in dangers themselves, neither to pursue nor give way to any one, without the mandate of the governors. And, in one word, that it should never be taught to do or know any thing separate from others; but that the life of all men should, in the highest degree, in all things be collected into one, subsist together, and be common. For nothing will ever be more excellent, better, or more artificial than this, for the purpose of procuring safety and victory in war. In peace, too, men should be accustomed from their childhood to govern others, and to be governed by others. But anarchy should be expelled from all life, both from that of men, and of beasts that are in subjection to men. All choirs, too, should be celebrated, with a view to the best mode of conducting war; and all facility, dexterity, and promptitude, should be studied for the sake of this. On this account, too, we ought to accustom ourselves to endurance of hunger and thirst, cold and heat, and a hard bed. And, what is greatest of all, for the sake of this we should be careful not to corrupt the power of the head and feet by the tegument of foreign clothing, which destroys the generation and nature of our proper hairs and shoes. For these extremities, when preserved, possess the greatest power of the whole body, but the contrary when they are not preserved. And one of these is in the highest degree subservient to the whole body; but the other is endued with a principal authority, naturally

rally possessing all its principal senses. And this praise of a warlike life ought to be heard by young men. But the law is as follows:—Let every one engage in war who is chosen for this purpose, or is deputed a certain part. But, if any one, through a certain vice, deserts his post without leave from his commander, let him be accused of desertion, when he returns, to the principal officers of the army. Let him be judged, too, by all the military orders, by the horse and the foot separately, and in a similar manner by the rest. And let the foot be introduced to the foot, the horse to the horse, and each of the other orders to those of the same rank with themselves. If any one is condemned, let him afterwards be prohibited from engaging in any military contest, or accusing another of neglect of military duty. And besides this, let a court of justice determine what he ought to suffer, or what fine he ought to pay. After this, when the trial for desertion is finished, let the commanders again assemble each of these orders, that military rewards may be conferred on those who have conducted themselves strenuously in battle. But any one who is willing may judge of the victory among those of the same rank with himself, so as that he neither produces arguments nor witness of any former battle, but alone considers the battle which has then been fought. Let a crown of olive, too, be the reward of the military champion. And afterwards, let those that have obtained these crowns suspend them in the temples of the warlike Gods, with any inscription they please, that they may be a testimony through the whole of life of the military virtue of the most valiant, and those that were valiant in the second and third degree. But, if any one engages in battle, and leaves the army before he is dismissed by his commanding officers, let him be tried by the same judges as the deserter was tried by, whom we mentioned above, and, if condemned, let him be similarly punished. It is proper, however, that one man, when he is about to judge another, should be fearful lest he should either voluntarily or involuntarily inflict punishment falsely. For justice is said, and is truly said, to be a bashful virgin. But falsehood is naturally odious to bashfulness and justice. In other things, therefore, it is requisite to be cautious with respect to judging erroneously, but particularly as to throwing away armour in battle. For, it may happen that some one may be erroneously considered as base for an action of this kind, and may be punished for it undeservedly. For it is by no means easy to determine properly in this case. At the same

time it is necessary that the law should endeavour to define according to parts. Employing a fable, therefore, we say, if Patroclus should have been carried to his tent without arms, and scarcely alive, as is frequently the case, and if his arms, which, as the poet says, were given to Peleus by the Gods on his marriage with Thetis, should be in the possession of Hector, would evil men in this case reproach the son of Menætiüs, as if he had thrown away his arms? Further still, if any persons, being hurled from lofty places, either into the sea, or into places consisting of an abundant conflux of water produced through tempests, or into many other places of this kind, which might easily be adduced to free them from a suspicion of cowardice,—if, being hurled into these, they should lose their arms, ought they in this case to be blamed? But we ought to endeavour, to the utmost of our power, to separate the greater and the most grievous evil from the contrary. In slandering, therefore, the very words employed for the purpose, possess a certain division. For, as the throwing away arms cannot be justly asserted in all cases, but the losing them may; in like manner, he is not to be similarly called a thrower away of his shield who loses it by force, as he who voluntarily throws it away. For they totally and universally differ from each other. Let the following law, therefore, be established:—If any one, being assaulted by enemies, and having arms, does not defend himself against them, but voluntarily drops them, or throws them away, preferring a base life, in conjunction with infamy, to a beautiful and happy death, accompanied with fortitude, let sentence be passed on such a one, as a thrower away of arms, but let the judge neglect to consider the losing of arms mentioned above. For it is requisite always to punish the vicious, that they may become better, but not the unfortunate. For no advantage would be derived from an action of this kind. But what punishment will be adapted to him who is condemned for throwing away his arms in a cowardly manner? For, it is impossible to change a man of this kind into a contrary character, as they report Divinity once changed the Thessalian Cæneüs from the nature of a woman into that of a man. For a contrary generation would, after a manner, be the most adapted of all others to him who throws away his shield,—I mean, that he should be punished by being changed from a man into a woman. But now, since this is impossible, let us devise a punishment which approaches the nearest to this, I mean that, in consequence of his great love
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of life, he shall never afterwards engage in any dangerous enterprize, but, as being a vicious character, live as long as possible, covered with disgrace. Let, then, the following law be established for these:—When a man is condemned for shamefully throwing away his warlike arms, let neither any general of an army, nor any other military officer, ever employ him as a soldier, nor admit him into the army. But if any such officer does admit him, let the judge who inquires into the reasons of conduct punish him as follows: If he possesses the largest estate, let him be fined ten minæ; if the second in rank, five minæ; if the third, three; and, if the fourth, one mina. But he who was condemned for throwing away his armour, besides being excluded from engaging in manly dangers, through his cowardice, shall, if he possesses the largest estate, be in like manner fined ten minæ; if the second, five; if the third, three; and, if the fourth, one mina. But, with respect to those magistrates who inquire into the reasons of conduct, what ought we to determine; some magistrates being chosen by a yearly lot, but others for many years, and by selection? For who will be a sufficient judge of the reasons of conduct, if it should happen that any magistrate, being bent by the weight of his government, should say or do any thing unworthy of his office? It is, indeed, by no means easy to find one adequate to the purpose. For, since one magistrate surpasses another in virtue, how shall we discover him who transcends all the rest. At the same time, we should endeavour to find certain divine men who may act for us as judges of the reasons of conduct. For the case is as follows:—There are many occasions for dissolving a polity, as there are of a ship, or a certain animal, of which, though there is one dispersed nature, yet we denominate them tones, transverse enclosures, extensions of nerves, and call them by many other names. But this is an occasion, by no means the smallest, of the preservation and dissolution of a polity. For, if the judges who require of the magistrates the reason of their conduct, are better than the magistrates, and this is managed in such a manner as to take away all occasion of complaint, the whole region and city will thus flourish and be happy. But, if an inquiry is made into the conduct of the magistrates in a different manner, then, that judgment being dissolved by which all political affairs are connected in one, a divulsion of all government takes place, and magistrates no longer verging to the same thing, they cause the city from being one, to be many, and filling;

filling it with seditions, bring it rapidly to destruction. On this account, it is necessary that those who inquire into the reasons of conduct should, in a wonderful manner, be endued with every virtue. We shall, therefore, thus devise the fabrication of these. Let the whole city assemble every year after the summer solstice, to a sacred grove common to the Sun and Apollo, in order to elect three men, which every one shall judge to excel all others except himself; and let these be not less than fifty years of age. Afterwards, let the half of those who are chosen by the greatest number of votes be selected, if they form an even number; but if they form an odd number, then, leaving out one who had the fewest votes, let the half of the remainder be taken, and a judgment formed by the number of votes. If some happen to have an equal number of votes, and the half of these is more than three, let the excess be taken away, and the juniors rejected. Afterwards, out of these, let an election be made by votes, till three, whose votes are unequal, are obtained. But if all these, or two of them, have equal votes, then, committing the affair to good fate and fortune, let the three be distinguished by lot; and let him who is victor, together with the second and third, be crowned with leaves of olive. Afterwards, the rewards being conferred, let it be proclaimed to all men, that the city of the Magnesians having again obtained safety from Divinity, consecrates three of its best citizens as common first fruits to Apollo and the Sun, conformably to an ancient law. Let these, too, in the first year, choose twelve examiners of the reasons of conduct, and continue to do this till each has accomplished his seventy-fifth year; and afterwards, let three always be added every year. Let these accurately observe all the magistrates, who are to be divided into twelve parts, with all possible free examination. Let them reside, too, at the time in which they act as examiners of the reasons of conduct, in the grove sacred to the Sun and Apollo, in which they were elected. Here, each inquiring into every thing by himself, and all examining in common, let them signify by public writings in the forum what each of the magistrates ought to suffer, or be fined, according to their decision. But if any one of the magistrates does not acknowledge that he has been condemned justly, let him go to the chosen judges appointed to examine the reasons of conduct, and if he is acquitted by these, let him accuse, if he is willing, the examiners of the reasons of conduct; but, if he is condemned by the chosen judges also, and was before by the other judges

judges condemned to death, let him die, as necessity requires. But if he was sentenced by them to pay a fine, the double of which he is capable of paying, let him be fined the double of it.

It is, however, now requisite to hear what the accusations of these judges will be, and after what manner they will take place. The first places, then, in all public spectacles should always be given to those who are appointed by the common consent of the whole city to preside over all others as long as they live. And further still, when it is found necessary to send magistrates to inspect the common sacrifices, spectacles, and other sacred rites of the Greeks, let them be sent from these. Likewise, let these alone in the city be adorned with a crown of laurel; and let them all be priests of Apollo and the Sun. Let him, too, be the high-priest every year from among these, who in the former year was judged to excel the other priests; and let his name every year, as long as the city is inhabited, become the measure of the number of time. But when these priests die, let care be taken that their funerals and sepulchres surpass those of the other citizens. Let every one, too, on this occasion have a white robe, and let there be no weeping and lamentation. Let there be also two choirs, one consisting of fifteen girls, and the other of as many boys; and let each of these surround the bier, praising the priests, as it were, in a hymn, and each by turns celebrating their felicity in songs through the whole day. On the morning following, let a hundred young men, who are engaged in gymnastic exercises, carry the bier to the sepulchre which the relations of the deceased have chosen. And, in the first place, let the unmarried young men march before the bier armed in a warlike manner, together with horses and horsemen; the foot with their light arms, and others in a similar manner. But let boys, going before the bier, sing a paternal song; and let them be followed by girls, and women who are no longer capable of bearing children. After these, let priests and priestesses follow, as to a pure sepulchre, though they are forbidden to go to other sepulchres; if the Pythian deity likewise assents. Let the sepulchre, too, for these be built under the earth; and let it be a long arch composed of valuable and undecaying stones, and containing on each side beds of stone. In this let them place the blessed deceased, and plant a grove of trees in a circular order round the monument, except in one part, that the sepulchre may be always enlarged when it is requisite. Every year,
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too, let musical, gymnastic and equestrian contests be instituted in honour of these deceased priests. And such are the honours which ought to be paid to those whose judgments concerning the reasons of conduct are not condemned. But, if any one of these, confiding too much in his decision, should make the imbecility of human nature apparent, and become depraved after his decision, let him be accused by any one who is willing; and let the following law respecting the mode of his accusation be established:—In the first place, let him be brought before a court of justice, and let the guardians of the laws at the same time be present. Afterwards, let the colleagues of the accused be present; and, lastly, let the court of justice be composed of select judges. Then, let his accuser signify in writing that he who is accused is an unworthy character, and that he does not deserve either the rewards, or to act in the capacity, of a magistrate. If, therefore, he is condemned, let him be deprived of magistracy, of a sepulchre, and of those other rewards which pertain to his office. But if his accuser has not a fifth part of votes, let him who possesses the largest estate be fined twelve minæ; he who possesses the second, eight; the third, six; and the fourth, two minæ. Rhadamanthus, indeed, deserves to be admired with respect to his decision of judicial affairs. For he perceived that the men of that time evidently believed that there were Gods, and this very properly, because at that time many of them were the progeny of the Gods; and he is said to have been one of these. He appears, therefore, to have conceived that causes ought not to be referred to any human judge, but to the Gods; and, on this account, causes were decided by him in a simple and rapid manner. For, causing the litigants in every case to take an oath, he determined causes rapidly and with safety. But now, as we have said, a certain part of mankind denies that there are Gods; others conceive that they take no care of us; and the opinion of the greatest and worst part is, that they may be appeased by trifling sacrifices and abundance of flattery, and that those who thus appease them, may with impunity defraud others of great sums of money. Hence, the art of Rhadamanthus in judicial affairs will not be adapted to men of the present time. The opinions of men, therefore, respecting the Gods being changed, it is necessary that laws also should be changed. A prudent legislator, therefore, in judicial contests, will not suffer the litigants to take an oath, that as well the intention of the accuser, as the entreaty of the defendant,

dant, may be committed to writing without an oath. For if every one in the city should be freely permitted to take an oath, in consequence of many cases being every day brought before the judges, almost every one would be perjured, through connections arising from feasting together, and other associations, and from private meetings. Let it, therefore, be established by law, that he who is about to be judged shall swear to the judge, and that he who appoints the public magistrates shall either appoint them through oaths, or by suffrages. Likewise, that the judge of choirs, and all music, together with the presidents and those that confer rewards on gymnastic and equestrian exercises, shall take an oath; and, in short, in all cases in which, according to the opinion of men, perjury is not attended with gain. But let those cases in which any one may derive great advantage from perjury be judged without an oath. Likewise, in judicial cases, let not the litigants by any means be permitted either to swear for the sake of persuading, or imprecate themselves and their family, or employ base supplications or feminine excitations to pity; but let them always in an honourable manner teach and learn that which is just. But if they do not act in this manner, let the magistrates again bring them back to the affair in hand, as those who speak foreign to the purpose. When strangers, like us, quarrel among themselves, let them be permitted, if they are willing, to take an oath. For, as they are not allowed to grow old in the city, there is no reason to fear lest they should corrupt others. In the same manner, let justice be executed among free men, if any one of these is not persuaded by the city in things which are neither punished with blows, nor bonds, nor death. If any one does not attend at the celebration of a choir, or solemn procession, or any other common adornings of this kind, or public office, such as take place for the sake of pacific sacrifice or warlike tributes,—in all these cases let the damage be repaired as soon as possible; or let the pledge be taken to him to whom the city and law have committed it, and when the limited time is expired let the pledge be sold, and the money applied to public use. But, if there is occasion for a greater fine, let the magistrates bring those that refuse to pay it before a court of justice, and compel them to pay the fine enacted by the laws. It is necessary, however, to consult what ought to be done with a city which does not apply itself to the acquisition of wealth, except that which arises from agriculture, since it neither exports nor im-

ports commodities, nor admits foreigners. The legislator, therefore, ought to consult about these particulars, employing, in the first place, persuasion to the utmost of his power. The mixture, indeed, of different nations naturally causes a mixture of all-various manners; and the association of strangers with strangers produces innovations which injure in the highest degree cities that are well governed through good laws. But, to the greater part of cities, as being by no means well governed, it is of no consequence if as well the old as the young travel into other countries whenever they please, and receive foreigners in their own country. But, on the contrary, in these never to receive strangers, and never to visit foreign countries, would appear rustic and savage to other men, who would call the city by opprobrious names, such as, that it is the enemy of strangers, and that its manners are arrogant and morose. The appearing, however, to be good, or not good, to others, ought never to be considered as a thing of small importance. For the multitude, though deprived of virtue themselves, are capable of distinguishing the worthy from the unworthy: and in certain vicious characters there is something divine, and a power of conjecturing well. So that many, and even some that are vicious in the extreme, are able to distinguish, both in words and opinions, the better from the worse sort of men. On this account, the multitude of cities are very properly exhorted not to despise the good opinion of the multitude. For it is a thing of the greatest rectitude and magnitude, when a man is truly good himself, that he should aspire after a renowned life; since, without this, a man will by no means become perfect. On this account, it will be proper that the city which is to be inhabited about Crete should endeavour to obtain the most beautiful and excellent reputation for virtue among other men. But there is every reason to hope, that this city in a short time will be beheld both by the Sun and other Gods, in well-governed cities and regions, living according to reason. Let the following law, therefore, be established respecting travelling into other regions and places, and the reception of guests:—In the first place, let it not be lawful for him who is less than forty years of age by any means to travel; and further still, let no person be permitted to travel privately; but let cryers, ambassadors, or certain speculators, be allowed to travel publicly. Leaving a country, however, in order to wage war, is not to be considered as political travelling. It is likewise requisite that certain persons should be
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sent to Pythian Apollo, to Olympian Jupiter, and also to Nemea and Isthmus, for the purpose of communicating in the sacrifices and contests sacred to these Gods. But let as much as possible many, and these such as are the most beautiful and the best, be sent on this occasion, who may procure for the city renown, and glory corresponding to warlike glory in sacred concerns, and things pertaining to pacific communions. And when they return home, let them teach the young men, that the legal institutions of other nations, respecting political affairs, are inferior to their own. If any speculators, likewise, who abound in leisure, are desirous of surveying the affairs of other men, let no law belonging to the guardians of the laws restrain them from executing their desire. For a city, when ignorant of good and evil men, cannot, in consequence of being unsociable, be sufficiently mild and perfect. Nor, again, can it preserve its laws by manners alone, without a knowledge of them. For among the multitude of mankind, there are always some divine men, not indeed many, but who in the highest degree deserve to be associated with: and these do not spring up in well-governed cities, more than in their contraries. Every one, therefore, who is an inhabitant of a well-governed city, and whose manners are uncorrupt, ought, leaving his country, to tread in the steps of these men, exploring both by land and sea, that when he returns to his country he may give stability to such legal institutions as are beautifully ordained, and correct such as are in any respect deficient. For without such a speculation and inquiry a city can never continue perfect, nor yet if the explorers speculate badly.

CLIN. How, therefore, can both these take place?

GUEST. Thus. In the first place, let a speculator of this kind not be more than fifty years of age. In the next place, let him be approved both in other respects, and for the purposes of war, if he intends to leave to other cities an example of the guardians of laws. But, when he is more than sixty years of age, let him no longer travel as a speculator. Let him, therefore, return when he pleases, within the space of ten years, and on his return go to the assembly of those that examine the laws. But let this assembly be composed of the old and the young; and let it be held every day from necessity, before the dawn of day, till the sun rises. And, in the first place, let it be composed of those priests who receive rewards, as being more excellent than the rest; in the next place, of twelve of the senior guardians of the

laws; and, in the last place, of the president of all erudition, together with the young, and those who no longer act in this capacity. Let not any one of these be alone, but let him go with some young man whom he may choose, between thirty and forty years of age. Let these, when they assemble, always discourse concerning the laws and their own city; and, if they have heard any thing excellent respecting these, let them communicate it to each other. Let them also discourse concerning such disciplines as appear to conduce to this speculation, and which those who are skilled in will be enabled to understand more clearly; but those who are not skilled in them will more darkly comprehend the things pertaining to laws. Afterwards, let such particulars among these as are approved of by the more aged, be learnt with the greatest assiduity by the younger. If any young man of the assembly shall appear to be an unworthy character, let the whole assembly blame him by whom he was brought thither. But let the whole city defend and honour those young men whose conduct in the assembly is approved. If such young men as go to the assembly are worse than others, let them be more disgraced than others. Let him who speculates the legal institutions of other men immediately go to this assembly on his arrival from foreign parts; and if he has discovered any thing among others, respecting the establishment of laws, or discipline, or education, or has himself found out any thing pertaining to these, let him communicate it to the whole assembly. If, too, it shall appear that he has returned neither worse nor better than he was before, let him be praised for having done his best: but if he returns much better, let him while living be greatly honoured, and, when dead, let all the assembly pay him those honours which are his due. But if it shall appear that he has returned corrupted, though he pretends to be wise, let him not dare to associate with any young or old person. And if he is obedient to the magistrates, let him live as a private man; but if not, let him be put to death. Likewise, if, when he ought to be brought before a court of justice, any magistrate neglects to bring him, let such magistrate be disgraced when a contention takes place about rewards. Let him, therefore, who travels, travel in this manner, and let him be such a person as we have described. But, in the next place, foreigners ought to be kindly received. There are four kinds of foreigners, then, of whom we ought to make mention. The first is, of those who are always summerly, and most of whom, like birds, fly
over

over the sea in summer to other cities, for the sake of acquiring riches. It is proper that these should be received in the forum, in the ports and public buildings, beyond the city, by the magistrates who preside over these places; such magistrates at the same time taking care that no innovation is made by any of these foreigners. Let justice, too, be properly distributed to them, and no association be held with them, beyond what is absolutely necessary. The second kind is, of those who travel for the sake of beholding what Muses are received by different cities. It is proper that all such as these should have habitations near the temples, properly constructed for hospitable purposes. Priests, too, and the purifiers of temples, ought to take care of these, that after they have staid a sufficient time, and have seen and heard all that they came to see and hear, they may depart without any detriment either to themselves or others. Let the priests, too, be the judges of these. And, if any one of them commits an injury, or is injured, let the priests fine the offending party as far as to fifty drachms. But it is proper that greater offences should be punished by those that preside over the markets. The third kind of foreigner that ought to be publicly received, is he who is sent from another region on some public affair. Him let the generals of the army, the masters of the horse, and the military tribunes, alone receive. And let him be alone taken care of by him with whom he resides together with the chief magistrates. The fourth genus of foreigners is indeed rare. Some one, however, may come from another region with the same design that our speculators travel into foreign parts. Let such a one then be received on the following conditions. In the first place, he must not be less than fifty years of age. In the next place, he must come with an intention either of beholding what is remarkably beautiful in other cities, or of instructing other cities in things of this kind. Let such a one, therefore, approach, unbidden, to the gates of the rich and the wise, since he comes under this description himself. And let him go to the house of him who takes care of the whole of discipline, believing that one who is victorious in virtue will be considered by such a character as a sufficient guest. Likewise, when he has learnt from others, and has taught others, what he considers as fit to be learnt and taught, let him depart like a friend from friends with gifts and becoming honours. All foreigners, both male and female, ought to be received according to these laws, and, in a similar manner
reverencing

reverencing hospitable Jupiter, we should send men from our city. For foreigners ought not to be expelled with food and victims, (as the inhabitants of the Nile do at present,) nor yet are they to be driven away by savage edicts. Let every surety be responsible for another in a conspicuous manner; and let the whole transaction be acknowledged in writing, before not less than three witnesses, if the security is within a hundred drachms. But, if it is beyond a thousand, let there be five sureties at least. Let the surety, if he is a shopkeeper, be one that acts justly in his business, or else let him by no means be considered as worthy of belief. If any one desires to search in the house of another person for something belonging to himself, let him first of all swear by the legal Gods that he hopes to find there what he is in search of. In the next place, let him enter the house naked, or with no other clothing than a tunic, and ungirded. Then let him be permitted to search the house, and examine every thing, whether sealed or unsealed. But, if any one refuses admittance to him who desires to search his house, let him who is forbidden access bring an action against him who refuses him admittance, for the value of what he has lost; and, if such person is condemned, let him be obliged to pay twice the value of the loss sustained. If the master of the house on such an occasion happens to be absent, let those that are present permit only such things as are unsealed to be examined; and let the person that searches the house seal with his own signet the things already sealed, and leave for five days any person he pleases as a guard in the house. But if the master of the house is absent for a longer time than this, let him who desires to search the house take the ædiles along with him, break open such things as are sealed, and, after he has examined them in conjunction with the domestics and ædiles, seal them again. With respect to things of an ambiguous nature, let not a limited time for the determination of them be left dubious: for by this means there will be no altercation about houses and land. But if any one is in possession of other things, and it appears that he has used them openly for the space of a year, in the city, in the forum, and in temples, and no one has laid claim to them during that time, in this case let no one be permitted afterwards to demand those things as his own. But if such person used such things, neither in the city, nor in the forum, but openly in the fields, and the proper owner of them is not found in five years, let no one be suffered to demand them

them after the expiration of this time. But if such person uses these things at home in the city, let the period of laying claim to them be limited to three years. But if he uses them secretly in the fields, let it be limited to ten years. And, if he used them in another district, let the person who has lost them be permitted to lay claim to them at any time. If any one forcibly hinders another, whether a plaintiff or defendant, from having recourse to justice, if it is a slave that he hinders, whether his own or belonging to another person, let no notice be taken of the affair, and let the legal process be stopt: but if it is a free-born person, besides the legal process being stopt, let him by whom he was forcibly detained be imprisoned for a year, and let any one who is willing accuse him of mancipation. If any one forcibly prohibits a gymnastic or musical antagonist, or an opponent in any other contest, from contending in his art, let any one who is willing inform those that confer rewards on the victors in these exercises, of the affair; and these shall be the means of procuring admittance to the contests to such as are willing to engage in them. But if it should happen that they are incapable of procuring them admittance, if he who impedes is himself victorious, let the reward of his victory be given to the person he impeded, and let the name of the person so impeded be inscribed as victor in whatever temples he pleases. But let not the person that impedes be suffered to suspend an offering, or make any inscription of a victory of this kind. Likewise, let him be accused of having done an injury, whether he vanquishes in contending, or is vanquished. If any one receives stolen goods knowingly, let him suffer the same punishment as the person that stole them. Let death, too, be the punishment of him that harbours an exile. For every one should reckon him as a friend or an enemy, who is considered as such by the city. If any one of his own accord makes peace with, or denounces war against, certain persons, without general consent, let death be the punishment of such a one. But if any part of a city makes peace, or denounces war, by itself, let the generals of the army bring the authors of this action before a court of justice; and, when condemned, let their punishment be death. Let those that serve their country in any respect do this without gifts. And let no occasion or arguments ever induce us to believe that we ought to receive gifts for good offices, but not for such as are bad. For it is neither easy to know when actions are good or bad, nor to endure patiently

patiently when this knowledge is obtained. It is, therefore, more safe to listen to, and be persuaded by, the law, which says that no one shall serve his country for the sake of gifts. Let him, therefore, who is unpersuaded by this law, when condemned, be punished with death. Let public tributes, too, be disposed as follows: In the first place, every one's possessions must be considered as subsisting for the sake of many utilities. In the next place, let those of the same tribe carry a written account of the annual fruits to the præfects of the land; so that, in consequence of there being two tributes, the republic may choose every year whichever of the two they please, viz. either a part of all the estates, or the annual crop, exclusive of such things as contribute to aliment. It is likewise proper that moderate offerings to the Gods should be dedicated by moderate men. Earth, therefore, which is the hearth of habitation, is the sacred possession of all the Gods. Let no one then consecrate the same thing a second time to the Gods. But gold and silver in other cities, both privately and in temples, are an invidious possession. Ivory, too, as belonging to a body deprived of soul, is not a pure offering to the Gods. And iron and brass are the instruments of war. Let, therefore, any one dedicate whatever he pleases, from wood, so as it is fashioned from one piece of wood, and, in a similar manner, any thing formed from stone, in the common temples. With respect to things woven, let nothing of this kind be dedicated which exceeds the monthly work of a woman. White colours will be adapted to the Gods, both in other things, and in such as are woven. But nothing dyed should be offered, except it belongs to warlike ornaments. The most divine gifts, however, are such birds and pictures as a painter has finished in one day. And let all other offerings be similar to these. Since, therefore, we have divided the parts of all the city, in such a manner as is proper, and have spoken in the best manner we are able respecting the laws which ought to be established in all the greatest compacts, it now remains that we should speak concerning judgments. In the first place, therefore, let there be select judges for the courts of justice, and such as are chosen in common by plaintiffs and defendants. These, indeed, may more properly be called arbiters than judges. In the next place, let those of the same street and tribe, when divided according to a twelfth part, be appointed as judges. Let the contending parties, if they cannot be reconciled by the former judges, go to these, and litigate with
greater

greater loss. Here, if the defendant is a second time condemned, let him pay the fifth part of the prescribed fine. But if any one accuses these judges, and wishes to dispute the affair in a third court of justice, let him refer the cause to select judges. And if he is again condemned by these, let him pay the sum that is owing, and the half of it besides. But if the plaintiff, being repulsed by the first judgment, is not satisfied, but appeals to a second,—if he vanquishes let him receive a fifth part, but if he is vanquished let him lose the same part. And if he goes to a third court of justice, not being satisfied with the former judgments, let the defendant, if vanquished, pay (as we have said) the sum that is owing, and the half of it besides; but let the plaintiff pay the half only. With respect to the allotments of courts of justice, the perfection and establishment of things ministrant to the magistrates, the times in which each of these ought to take place, the particulars respecting votes, the delays, terms, citations and repulses which take place in judicial affairs, and whatever else necessarily pertains to these,—all this we have already discussed. However, according to the proverb, what is beautiful and right may be spoken twice and thrice. All such legal particulars, therefore, as are small and easy to be discovered, when omitted by an aged legislator, ought to be filled up by a junior legislator. And thus much may suffice concerning private courts of justice. But such as are public and common, and which are employed by magistrates to proper purposes, are found in many cities established in no unbecoming manner by equitable men. Whence it is requisite that the guardians of the laws should procure such things as are adapted to this new polity, by reasoning, correcting, and exploring them, till they appear to them to be sufficiently established; and then bringing them to a conclusion, that they should seal them as things immovable, and use them through the whole of life. With respect to the silence of judges, the praises which are given them, or the contrary, and likewise concerning things just, good, and becoming, which differ in other cities, we have already spoken, and shall again speak in the end. But it is requisite that he who in future will be an equitable judge should look to all these particulars, and being in possession of them, when committed to writing, should make them the object of his study. For written laws are more calculated to make him who learns them better, than all other disci-

ciplines, if they are properly established. For, indeed, divine and admirable law does not rashly possess a name adapted to intellect¹. And besides this, the writings of the legislator afford us a perspicuous examination of the assertions of others respecting praise and blame, which are partly transmitted to us in verse, and partly in prose, and which likewise daily take place in all other associations, when men contend with each other through emulation, and concessions which are vain in the extreme. These a good judge should always keep in his possession, as remedies against the poison of other discourses, correcting by them both himself and the city; confirming and praising the good, and recalling, to the utmost of his power, such of the evil as are curable from ignorance, intemperance, timidity, and, in short, from all injustice. For, if they are incapable of being cured, those judges, and governors of the judges, that put them to death, as the only remedy to souls in such a condition, may be often said, with justice, to deserve praise from the whole city. After annual judgments are finished, let them use the following laws:—In the first place, let the magistrate who exercises the office of a judge consign over all the money of the debtor to the victor, leaving him only sufficient for necessary uses. And let this take place immediately after the giving of votes, the affair being announced by a cryer, and in the hearing of the judges. In the next place, if, after sentence is passed, one month has elapsed and a second commenced, and the vanquished person has not voluntarily paid what is due to the victor, let the judicial magistrate deliver up the money of the debtor to the victor. But if the debtor has not sufficient money to discharge the debt, and he is deficient not less than a drachm, let not the debtor be suffered to go to law with any other person till he has paid all that is due to the victor; but let any other person be permitted to go to law with him. If any one, when condemned by a magistrate, unjustly takes any thing from him, let the injured magistrate take the offender before the court of justice of the guardians of the laws. And if he is condemned by these, let him be punished with death, as one who subverts the whole city and the law. But a man who is born and educated, and who begets and educates children, under these laws, who engages moderately in

¹ For νόμος, law, is properly *νοῦ διανομήν*, a distribution of intellect.

contracts,

contracts, is punished if he acts unjustly, and sees those punished that injure him, and, lastly, who grows old together with the laws,—such a one will end his days according to nature.

With respect to the funeral rites of the dead, whether male or female, and the particulars which pertain to the infernal and supernal Gods, let them be instituted according to the answers of the interpreters. Let there be no sepulchres in cultivated places, neither large nor small. But let that place alone receive the bodies of the dead which is useless for other purposes, and will in the smallest degree injure the living. For no one, either living or dying, should impede the fecundity of mother earth, and thus deprive some living person of aliment. Likewise, let no tomb be raised higher than five men are able to raise in five days. Let the stone column, too, be no larger than are sufficient to admit an encomium of the dead in four heroic verses; and let the dead be laid out no longer a time than is sufficient to evince that they are truly dead. But, with respect to human affairs of this kind, an interval of three days before the burial will be nearly sufficient. It is likewise proper to believe the legislator in other things; and when he asserts that the soul is in *every respect* different from the body; and that, in the present life, it causes each of us to be that which each of us is; but, that body follows each of us like an image; and, that bodies may be beautifully said to be the images of the perfectly dead. That, besides this, each of us may be truly denominated an immortal soul, which will depart to other Gods to give an account of its conduct, as the law of our country asserts. This, however, is a circumstance which produces confidence in the good, but is terrible in the extreme to the evil; for no great assistance can be rendered them after death. Hence, it is necessary to give them all proper assistance while living, that they may live in the most just and holy manner, and that after the present life they may escape the punishments which await the commission of crimes. Since this, then, is the case, we ought by no means to ruin our families, in consequence of thinking that this mass of flesh which is buried is truly our relative; but we should be persuaded that the son or brother, or any person for whom we have an affection, and whom we consider as buried, has departed hence in consequence of having finished and filled up his fate. We shall, therefore, act well on these occasions by employing a moderate
3 B 2
expense,

expense, as upon an inanimate altar of terrestrial natures. But the legislator will not, in the most disgraceful manner, divine what this moderate expense should be. Let this, then, be the law :—That he who possesses the greatest estate shall not spend more than five minæ on any funeral ; that he who possesses the second estate shall spend three minæ ; the third, two ; and the fourth, one mina. For thus the funeral expenses of every individual will be moderate. But, as the guardians of the laws ought necessarily to take care of many things, so especially of this, that their life may be employed in attending to boys and men, and to males and females of every age. And besides this, on the death of every citizen, one of the guardians of the laws, whom the relations of the deceased shall think fit to choose, should take care that every thing pertaining to the funeral is conducted in a becoming and moderate, and not in an unbecoming and disgraceful manner. And let them be honoured when the former, but considered as infamous when the latter, is the case. Let, therefore, every thing pertaining to funerals take place according to this law. But things of the following kind ought to be committed to the care of the legislator who establishes political law :—It would be unbecoming either to order, or not, the dead to be lamented with tears ; but loud lamentations on this occasion, out of the house, are to be forbidden. The dead body, likewise, should not be suffered to be carried openly in the more frequented roads, accompanied with lamentations, nor yet out of the city before day. Let such, therefore, be the established laws respecting these particulars. And let him who is obedient to them be exempt from punishment ; but let him who disobeys one of the guardians of the laws be punished by all of them in such a manner as shall appear fit to all. With respect to other particulars, which either pertain to sepulchres, or to those who through patricide and sacrilege are deprived of sepulchres, these we have spoken of before, and legally established. So that legislation has now nearly obtained its completion. But the end of all things must be considered as taking place, not from their being performed, or possessed, or inhabited, but from their being properly accomplished, and firmly established. For, in a preservation of this kind, it is proper to think, that what ought to be done is done, but that prior to this, the whole is imperfect.

CLIN. You speak well, O guest. But inform me in a yet clearer manner what was your design in what you just now said ?

GUEST. Many things, O Clinias, are beautifully said by the antients, and this is true, in no small degree, with respect to the names of the Fates.

CLIN. How so?

GUEST. That the first of these is Lachesis, the second Clotho, and the third Atropos¹, who is the preserver of what has been asserted by us. These are assimilated to things conglomerated by fire, and which possess an inconvertible power. And in a city and polity these ought not only to procure health and safety to bodies, but a good establishment of laws in souls, or rather the preservation of laws. But it appears to me that this is yet wanting to laws,—I mean, an inquiry how they may obtain an inconvertible power according to nature.

CLIN. You speak of no small affair, if it is possible to find how a thing of this kind may take place in every possession.

GUEST. But this is possible, as it appears in every respect to me at present.

CLIN. Let us not, therefore, depart hence, by any means, till we have added this to the laws we have now delivered. For it is ridiculous to labour in any thing in vain, and not to lay down something stable.

MEGIL. You exhort in a proper manner: and you will also find me to be such a one.

CLIN. You speak well. What then is this preservation, and after what manner may it be obtained in our polity and laws?

GUEST. Have we not said that an assembly ought to be held in our city of the following kind:—That always ten of the oldest guardians of the law, together with all such as are honoured with gifts, should make a part of this assembly? That, further still, those who have travelled over many regions in order that they might find something adapted to the preservation of the laws, should go to this assembly, if on their return their manners were found to be uncorrupted, and themselves worthy to be members of this assembly? That, besides this, each of these ought to bring with him young men, who are not less than thirty years of age, and who are judged to deserve this honour both by nature and education, and by the approbation of the whole assembly? And that if any unworthy young man should be brought to the assembly, the sentence which is passed should be of no moment? Lastly, that this

¹ For an account of the Fates, see the Notes to the Tenth Book of the Republic.

assembly should be convened before day, when there is a perfect leisure from all other business, both public and private? Was not something of this kind asserted by us in the preceding discourse?

CLIN. It was.

GUEST. Again, therefore, resuming the discourse about this assembly, we say, that if any one hurls forth this, as an anchor of the whole city, and which contains in itself every thing that can be desired, every thing will be preserved which we wish to be so.

CLIN. How so?

GUEST. We shall after this take occasion to speak with rectitude, and, to the utmost of our power, leave nothing unfinished.

CLIN. You speak exceedingly well: act, therefore, agreeably to your conceptions.

GUEST. It is proper therefore, O Clinias, to understand, with respect to every thing, a fit favour in every work; as in an animal, the soul and the head are naturally the greatest favours of the whole.

CLIN. How again do you say?

GUEST. The virtue of these, doubtless, affords safety to the whole animal.

CLIN. But how?

GUEST. In soul, indeed, besides other things, intellect is inserted; and in the head, besides other things, sight and hearing. And, in short, intellect being mingled with the most beautiful senses, so as to produce one thing, the preservation of the several parts may most justly be said to be thus effected.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. Undoubtedly. But does not intellect, mingled with the senses, become the safety of ships, both in tempests and fair weather? Or, in a ship, do not the pilot and the sailors, in consequence of mingling their senses with the piloting intellect, preserve both themselves and every thing pertaining to the ship?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But there is no need of many examples about things of this kind: let us consider, therefore, in an army, and in medicine, to what mark both commanders and physicians directing their attention, become the means of preservation.

CLIN.

CLIN. It will be proper to do so.

GUEST. Do not the former of these, then, direct their attention to victory, and the strength of the enemies, but the latter to the health of the body?

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, if the physician is ignorant of that respecting the body which we now denominate health, or the commander of victory, or of other things which we might mention, would they appear to be endued with intellect about any of these particulars?

CLIN. How could they?

GUEST. But what with respect to a city? If any one is ignorant of the mark at which a politician ought to look, could he, in the first place, be justly denominated a governor? And, in the next place, would he be able to preserve that, the scope of which he is perfectly unacquainted with?

CLIN. How could he?

GUEST. It is necessary therefore now, as it appears, if the establishment of this our city is to obtain its completion, that there should be some one in it who knows, in the first place, this which we call the political scope; in the next place, after what manner it is requisite to partake of this; and, in the third place, which of the laws, and who among men, will properly or improperly consult with a view to this. For, if any city is destitute of a thing of this kind, it will not be wonderful, since it must be void of intellect and sense, if all its actions are the result of chance.

CLIN. You speak the truth.

GUEST. Now, therefore, are we able to say in what part of our city, or by what studies, any guard of this kind will be sufficiently obtained?

CLIN. I cannot clearly inform you, O guest. But, if I may be allowed to jest, it appears to me that this discourse tends to that nocturnal assembly which you said ought to be instituted.

GUEST. You have rightly conjectured, O Clinias; and, as the present reasoning announces, this assembly ought to possess every virtue; the chief of which is not to wander, by regarding a multitude of particulars, but, looking to one thing, always to emit all things like darts to this.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Now, therefore, we learn that it is not wonderful that the legal
institutions

institutions of cities wander. For different establishments of the laws in each city look to different things. And to some, the end of what is just consists in certain persons governing in the city, whether they are better or worse than others. But, with others, the end consists in becoming rich, whether they are slaves or not. The attention of others again is directed to a life of liberty. Others establish laws for two purposes, that they may be free themselves, and that they may become the despots of other cities. And those that are most wise direct their attention to these, and to all such particulars, at once; but they are unable to assign any one principal thing to which the rest ought to look.

CLIN. Hence, O guest, that which was formerly established by us is right; for we said that the whole of our laws should always look to one thing. And we granted that this might, with the greatest rectitude, be called virtue.

GUEST. We did so.

CLIN. And it was likewise established by us that virtue was, in a certain respect, fourfold.

GUEST. Entirely so.

CLIN. And that intellect, likewise, was the leader of all these, to which all other things, and three of the virtues, ought to look.

GUEST. You have followed me in a beautiful manner, O Clinias; continue, therefore, to follow me in what remains. For we have said, that the intellect of the pilot, the physician, and the commander, looks to one thing; but, accusing the politic intellect, we have arrived thus far, and we shall now thus interrogate it as if it were a man:—O wonderful man! to what do you tend? What is that one thing which the medicinal intellect can speak of in a perspicuous manner; but you, who, as you say, excel all prudent persons, are not able to do this in your art? Or can you, O Megillus and Clinias, answer for him what this is, as I have often done to you for others?

CLIN. By no means, O guest.

GUEST. But should we not desire to perceive what this is, and in what things it subsists?

CLIN. In what particular things do you mean?

GUEST. As we have said that there are four species of virtue, it is evident that each of them must necessarily be one, since they are altogether four.

CLIN.

CLIN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We likewise denominate all these one. For we say that fortitude is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue; and, in a similar manner, the two others, as if this thing virtue was not in reality many things, but one thing only.

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. So far, therefore, as these two differ from each other, and receive two names, and, in a similar manner, the other two, there is no difficulty in speaking of them; but so far as we call both of them, together with the other two, one thing, viz. virtue, it is not easy to speak of them.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. There is no difficulty in explaining what I say. For let us only divide among ourselves the business of interrogating and answering.

CLIN. How again do you mean?

GUEST. Do you ask me why, denominating virtue one thing, we again give this appellation to two things, one of which is fortitude, and the other prudence? For I will tell you the cause, which is this:—One of these is conversant with fear, whence savage beasts also participate of fortitude, and the manners of very young children. For the fowl may be brave from nature without reason, but without reason it never was prudent and endued with intellect, nor is, nor ever will be. So that this latter differs from the former.

CLIN. You speak truly.

GUEST. You, therefore, understand from my discourse in what manner these are two, and how they differ from each other; but how they are one and the same do you again inform me. But think as if you were telling me how being four they are one, and as if I afterwards should show you how being one they are again four. And after this, let us consider, whether he who wishes sufficiently to understand any thing which has both a name and a definition, ought only to know the name, but should be ignorant of the definition; or whether it is base for him who has any knowledge respecting things which transcend in magnitude and beauty, to be ignorant of all such particulars as these.

CLIN. It appears so.

GUEST. But is there any thing greater which a legislator, a guardian of

the laws, and he who is thought to surpass all others in virtue, and for this receives rewards, can possess, than fortitude, temperance, justice, and prudence?

CLIN. How is it possible there can?

GUEST. Ought not, therefore, interpreters, teachers, legislators, and guardians of others, to teach those who desire to know and to perceive things of this kind, or who require punishment and reproof, what power virtue and vice possess; and must they not, through information of this kind, in every respect excel others? Or will any poet coming into the city, or any instructor of youth, be considered as better than him who excels in all virtue? And, in the next place, will it appear wonderful if a city, in which the guardians have not a sufficient knowledge of virtue, in consequence of being without a guard, should suffer the same things which many cities at present suffer?

CLIN. It will not appear wonderful.

GUEST. What then? Shall we do what we just now spoke of? Or shall we consider how we may enable the guardians to excel others in virtue, both in words and in reality? Or after what manner our city may become similar to the head and senses of the prudent, through possessing in itself a guard of this kind?

CLIN. How, therefore, O guest, and after what manner, shall we speak, assimilating it to a thing of this kind?

GUEST. It is evident that the city itself will resemble the cavity of the head; and that the junior guardians, who are ingenuous and sagacious, will be placed, as it were, on the highest summit, whence they can survey, in a circle, the whole city, and, while they defend it, deliver the senses to the memory, and announce to the elders every thing that takes place in the city. But these being assimilated to intellect, through understanding in the highest perfection a multitude of things which are worthy of regard, they will consult for the city, and employ the junior guardians as agents in their consultations. For thus both will truly preserve the city in common. Whether, therefore, shall we say they are to be established in this manner, or not? Or shall we say that they are all to be considered as equal, and not accurately determine the difference between them, in education and discipline?

CLIN. But this, O wonderful man, is impossible.

GUEST.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, proceed to a more accurate discipline than the former.

CLIN. By all means.

GUEST. But is not that which we just now touched upon the very thing which we are in want of?

CLIN. Entirely so.

GUEST. We said, then, that in every thing a consummate artificer and guardian ought not only to be capable of looking to many things, but should eagerly tend to one thing, and, when he has obtained a knowledge of it, orderly dispose according to this whatever he beholds.

CLIN. Right.

GUEST. Can, therefore, any speculation be assigned more accurate than that which is able to look to one idea from things many and dissimilar?

CLIN. Perhaps not.

GUEST. Not perhaps, but in reality, O dæmoniacal man! there is not any human method more clear than this.

CLIN. Believing what you say, O guest, I will admit it. Let us, therefore, proceed, speaking agreeably to this assertion.

GUEST. As it appears, therefore, the guardians of a divine polity must be compelled by us to see accurately, in the first place, what that is which is the same in all the four virtues; and which, being one thing in fortitude and temperance, justice and prudence, we very properly call by one name, virtue. Strenuously laying hold of this at present, O friends, if you are willing, we will not leave it till we have sufficiently said what that is which is to be looked to, whether as one thing, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way it may subsist. Or can we think that, if this escapes, us we can ever sufficiently possess the things pertaining to virtue, respecting which we are neither able to say whether it is many things, nor whether it is four things, nor whether it is one thing? If, therefore, you are persuaded by our advice, we shall devise some method by which this may take place in our city. Or, if it appears in every respect agreeable to you, we will dismiss it.

CLIN. A thing of this kind, O guest, is by the hospitable God by no means to be dismissed, since you appear to us to speak with the utmost rectitude. But how can any one devise this method?

GUEST. We shall not yet say how this is to be devised: but, in the first place,

place, is it requisite or not that we should firmly consent among ourselves?

CLIN. It is doubtless requisite, if possible.

GUEST. But what with respect to the beautiful and the good? Are our guardians to know that each of these is alone many? Or should they, likewise, know that it is one, and how it is so?

CLIN. It nearly seems necessary, that they should know scientifically how each of these is one.

GUEST. But what? ought they to understand this, and at the same time be incapable of evincing by arguments that they do understand it?

CLIN. But how can this be? For you speak of a certain habit belonging to a slave.

GUEST. But what with respect to all serious pursuits? Shall we in a similar manner say, that those who are to be truly guardians ought truly to know the particulars respecting the truth of laws, be able sufficiently to unfold them in discourse, and act agreeably to them, judging what things subsist beautifully according to nature, and what have a contrary subsistence?

CLIN. How is it possible we should not?

GUEST. Is not that one of the most beautiful things which we seriously discussed concerning the Gods? As that they are, that they appear to possess a mighty power, and that this ought to be known by man, as far as he is capable of knowing it? Likewise, that we should pardon the greater part of those in the city, if they only follow the mandates of the laws, but that we should not commit the guardianship of them to any one who has not laboured to acquire all possible faith in things pertaining to the Gods? And that we should never choose any one for a guardian of the laws, who is not a divine man, who has not laboured in the study of the laws, and who does not excel in virtue?

CLIN. It is just, therefore, as you say, that he who is sluggish, or incapable of judging respecting things of this kind, should be far removed from beautiful concerns.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, know that there are two things which lead to a belief of the particulars concerning the Gods, which we discussed above?

CLIN. What are they?

GUEST. One is that which we asserted respecting the soul, that it is the most antient and divine of all things, of which the motion receiving generation

tion imparts an ever-flowing essence: but the other is concerning the orderly motion of the stars, and such other things as through the dominion of intellect adorn the universe. For he who contemplates these things neither in a negligent nor in a stupid manner, can never become so impious as not to be affected in a manner perfectly contrary to the conjectures of the multitude. For these conceive that those who apply themselves to things of this kind, I mean to astronomy and other necessary arts in conjunction with it, become atheists, in consequence of beholding things subsisting from necessity, and not from the dianoëtic energies of a will by which all things are rendered good.

CLIN. How then do these subsist?

GUEST. They now subsist, as I have said, perfectly contrary to what they would if they were conceived to be deprived of soul. For though such as more accurately investigate these things than others, in a wonderful manner touch upon the truth, and by employing accurate reasoning evince that they are not destitute of soul and intellect; and though some of these¹ dared to assert that it was intellect which adorned every thing in the heavens; yet again erring with respect to the nature of the soul, as not knowing that it is more antient than body, but conceiving it to be junior, they again, as I may say, subverted all things, and, much more, themselves. For, believing that all such things as are obvious to the sight subsist in the heavens², they considered the celestial regions as full of stones and earth, and many other inanimate bodies, and attributed to these the causes of the whole world. It was owing to this, that many who touched upon such like particulars were accused of impiety, and of engaging in difficult undertakings. And, besides this, those who philosophised were reviled by poets, and compared by them to dogs barking in vain; and other things were said of them which it would be foolish to repeat. But now, as I have said, the very contrary to this takes place.

CLIN. How so?

GUEST. No mortal man can ever become firmly pious who does not admit these two things: viz. that soul is the most antient of all things which

¹ Viz. Anaxagoras and his followers. See the Phædo.

² This is the doctrine of modern astronomers.

participate of generation, and is immortal ; and that it rules ¹ over all bodies. But, besides this, our guardian of the laws should not be ignorant of that which has been often asserted by us, that there is a true intellect in the stars ; and he should likewise possess the necessary disciplines which are previous to these things ; and employ a proper Muse, in order to harmonize the pursuits of manners and legal institutions. And, lastly, he should be able to render a reason for such things as admit one, and to show why this is not possible with other things. He who has not these requisites for public virtues will nearly never be a sufficient governor of the whole city, but will be subservient to other governors. But it is now proper to consider, O Clinias and Megillus, whether we ought to establish the character we have been describing, as the future legal guardian of all the preceding laws, for the sake of the preservation of the whole city ; at the same time, that nocturnal assembly of governors, endued with all such discipline as we have mentioned above, being adopted : or how shall we act ?

CLIN. But, O best of men, why should we not to the utmost of our power establish him ?

GUEST. We certainly ought all of us to strive to accomplish this. I, indeed, will cheerfully be your helper. For perhaps through skill in, and the consideration of, things of this kind, I may find many other assistants besides myself.

CLIN. Let us, O guest, proceed in this path rather than any other, in which Divinity himself nearly leads us. But let us now speak of and devise the method by which this may be properly accomplished.

GUEST. Laws about things of this kind, O Megillus and Clinias, cannot be established till the city is orderly disposed ; for then their authority may be legally determined. But they cannot in any other way be adopted with rectitude than by erudition and frequent examination in conjunction with others.

CLIN. How so ? Why do we again say this ?

¹ As Plato, therefore, has demonstrated in the preceding Tenth Book, that the apparent orb of every star is the vehicle of a ruling soul, it follows, according to him, that no one is firmly pious who does not believe this. And hence, the gross ignorance or impudence of those sophistical priests who have dared to assert that Plato ridiculed the religion of his country is sufficiently obvious.

GUEST.

GUEST. In the first place, without doubt, a catalogue should be made of those men who are adapted to be guardians, by their age, by the power of disciplines, and by their manners and habits. In the next place, it is neither easy to find what ought to be learnt, nor to become the disciple of him who discovers this. Besides this, the times will be in vain prescribed in writing, in which the several particulars ought to take place. For neither will the learners be able to know when any thing may be opportunely learnt, before science of the discipline is generated in their souls. Hence, all these particulars being spoken of occultly, will not be spoken of properly: but they are occult, because they cannot be rendered clearer by narration.

CLIN. Since this then is the case, O guest, what shall we do?

GUEST. We must act, O friends, according to the proverb. For we must discuss the affair in common and publicly. And if we wish to make the dangerous trial, respecting the whole polity, we must do all things, either, as they say, throwing thrice six, or three dice. I will, however, undergo the danger with you, in speaking and explaining what appears to me respecting the discipline and education which we have now discussed. The hazardous enterprise is, indeed, neither small, nor similar to any other. But I exhort you, O Clinias, to make this the object of your care. For you, in the city of the Magnesians, or in that to which Divinity shall give a name, will obtain the greatest glory if you establish it properly. Or certainly, in this case, you cannot avoid appearing to be the bravest of all that shall succeed you. If then this divine assembly shall be established for us, O friends and companions, the city must be delivered to its care. Nor will there be any altercation, as I may say, with any of the legislators at present respecting these institutions. But, in reality, we shall nearly effect that in a vigilant state, which we touched upon in our discourse a little before, as in a dream, when we mingled together a certain image of the agreement of the head with intellect, if these men are accurately mingled together for us, are properly disciplined, and when disciplined reside in the acropolis of the region, so as to become such guardians, and possess the virtue of preservation in such a degree as we have not known any to possess it in the former part of our lives.

MEGIL. O friend Clinias, from all that has been now said by us, it follows,
 4 that

that we must either omit the establishment of this city, or not dismiss this our guest, but by entreaties and all manner of devices make him a partaker with us in establishing the city.

CLIN. You speak with the greatest truth, Megillus. And I indeed shall act in this manner ; but do you also cooperate with me.

MEGIL. I will.

THE END OF THE TWELFTH AND LAST BOOK OF THE LAWS.

THE

EPINOMIS;

OR,

THE PHILOSOPHER.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EPINOMIS.

THE *Epinomis*, or Nocturnal Convention, was not written by Plato, but, as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius, by Philip Opuntius, one of Plato's disciples. This dialogue, which, as its name implies, is a supplement to the *Laws*, is highly valuable, both for its great antiquity, its author being contemporary with Plato, and the recondite wisdom which it contains. However, notwithstanding its great intrinsic excellence, it appears to me that any one much conversant with the writings of Plato might easily discover that it was not written by that philosopher, though antiquity had been totally silent in this particular; for, where shall we find in it either his heretical strength and magnificence of diction, or his profundity, accuracy, and sublimity of conception?

This dialogue is also very properly inscribed *The Philosopher*, since the design of it, as the author informs us in the very beginning, is to show what wisdom is, and how it may be obtained. Before, however, he teaches us what wisdom is, he inquires what it is not; and having premised certain things necessary to its definition, he shows that the august name of wisdom can by no means accord with those arts which are subservient to the necessities and conveniences of life, such as politics, agriculture, architecture, rhetoric, and the like. After this, he enumerates the speculative disciplines, and, in the first place, not only praises but admires arithmetic, which, according to Plato, most of all things sharpens the wit, strengthens the memory, and renders the mind prompt and adapted to every speculation and action. The arithmetic, however, which is here so deservedly praised, is not that which is commonly taught, and which is subservient to merchandize and traffic;

but it is entirely speculative, and considers the properties of pure numbers unconnected with any thing sensible. Of this arithmetic Euclid and Nicomachus have transmitted to us the elements; but the study of it is at present neglected, because it is not calculated to promote gain, facilitate calculation, or expedite business. The author also adds, that number was delivered by divinity to men, as a necessary instrument of reason and discursive energy; and that, this being taken away, the soul would appear to be destitute of intellect, and arts and sciences entirely vanish. He also praises geometry, astronomy, music, and physics; and places dialectic, i. e. metaphysics, or *wisdom*, before all the other sciences, because it employs these as steps in the discovery and adoration of Divinity. He likewise shows that there are three employments of this queen of the sciences about other disciplines. The first consists in beholding the multitude of all these; the second, in surveying the communion and connection in all of them; and the third considers in what manner this multitude and its union contribute to *the one itself* and divine good. Lastly, the reader may learn from this dialogue, that as religion consists in the worship, so wisdom in the contemplation of Divinity; and that human felicity and the end of laws are only to be obtained in the union of both.

THE EPINOMIS;

O R,

THE PHILOSOPHER.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN GUEST,
CLINIAS the Cretan, and
MEGILLUS the Lacedæmonian.

ACCORDING to our agreement, O guest, we are all of us rightly assembled, being three, I, and you, and Megillus here, for the purpose of considering after what manner we should investigate prudence; which when understood, we say that it causes the human habit to subsist in the most beautiful manner possible to man, with respect to itself. For we have discussed every thing else respecting the establishment of laws. But we have not yet related and discovered, that which it is the greatest thing to discover and relate, I mean, what that is by the learning of which mortal man will become wise. We should now endeavour not to leave this uninvestigated: for, if we do, we shall nearly leave that imperfect, for the sake of rendering which apparent from the beginning to the end we have all of us proceeded thus far.

ATHENIAN GUEST. You speak well, friend Clinias. But I think you will now hear a wonderful discourse, though again in a certain respect it is not wonderful. For many that we meet with in life assert, that the human race can neither be blessed nor happy. Attend, therefore, and see, whether it
appears

appears to you as well as to me, that by speaking as follows about this affair we shall speak well. For I say it is not possible for men in this life, except a few, to become blessed and happy. But the hope is beautiful that after death we shall obtain every thing, for the sake of which we cheerfully live and die in the best manner we are able. Nor is my assertion novel, but that which we all after a certain manner know, as well Barbarians as Greeks. For the production of every animal is in the beginning difficult. In the first place, the participation of the foetal habit is difficult; and, in the next place, to be nourished and educated. And, as we all say, these things are accomplished through ten thousand labours. The time, too, is short, not only with respect to the endurance of calamities, but every thing else which causes human life to take breath, as it were, about a medium. For old age swiftly arriving makes every one who is not full of puerile opinion unwilling to return to life again, when he considers the life he has lived. And is not the subject of our present investigation an argument of the truth of these assertions? For we investigate how we may become wise, taking it for granted that there is in each of us a power by which this may be accomplished. But wisdom then flies from us, when we apply ourselves to any of those things which are called by the name of art or prudence, or to any other such particulars as we rank among the sciences; because no one of these, as being conversant with human affairs, deserves to be called by the appellation of wisdom. The soul, however, vehemently confides and prophesies, that she naturally possesses this power: but what it is, and when, and how it subsists, she is not altogether able to discover. But do not our doubting and investigation respecting wisdom refer to this exceedingly, viz. that there is abundance of hope for such as are able to examine both themselves and others prudently, and in an according manner, through every kind of reasoning and disputation? Shall we say that these things are so, or not?

CLIN. We admit that they are, O guest, hoping that we shall in time, together with you, entertain the most true opinions respecting them.

GUEST. In the first place, then, let us discuss those other pursuits which are, indeed, called sciences, but do not render him wise who receives and possesses them; that, removing these out of the way, we may endeavour to assign the particulars of which we are in want, and, when assigned, to learn them.

them. Let us, therefore, first consider the things which the mortal genus first requires : for these are nearly most necessary, and truly such as are first¹. But he who is knowing in these, though at first he may appear to be wise, yet now he is not considered as such, but is rather disgraced by science of this kind. We shall mention, therefore, what they are, and shall show that every one who proposes to appear to others to be a most excellent man, will avoid these through the possession of prudence and accurate study. Let the first art then be that which orders us to abstain from the eating of human flesh ; this, according to the fable, being the practice of mankind formerly, after the manner of savage animals, and which recalls us to legal nutriment. The antients, indeed, were and are benevolent to us. Let us, however, bid farewell to those whom we call the first men. The preparation, indeed, and nutriment of Cerealian food is beautiful and good, but will never render a man completely wise : for it is attended with molestation. Nor yet will the whole of agriculture be able to accomplish this. For we all of us appear to undertake the cultivation of the earth, not from art but nature, through the favour of Divinity. But neither can the construction of houses, the whole of architecture, the making of every kind of furniture, the art of the copper-smith, and the apparatus of ætæonic, plastic, plectric, and, in short, of all instruments which are accommodated to the vulgar, but are not subservient to virtue, accomplish this. Nor, again, can the whole of hunting, though it is various and artificial, confer magnificence on the wise man. Nor yet divination, or the interpreting art ; for these alone know that which is asserted, but they do not understand whether it is true or not. Since then we see that none of those arts by which necessities are procured can make any one wise, after this that discipline remains which is for the most part imitative, but by no means serious. For imitation is here effected by means of many instruments, and through many gestures of bodies not altogether graceful. In discourse, too, there is imitation in every Muse ; and in things of which the graphic art is the mother, where things, many and all-various, are expressed in moist and dry bodies ; none of which, though fabricated with the greatest diligence, can in any respect render a man wise. After imitation, those arts remain which afford

¹ That is, they are first to man, who is naturally adapted to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect ; but the perfect is first to nature.

innumerable helps to men on innumerable occasions. The greatest of these and the most useful is the warlike art; but it is in want of abundance of felicity, and naturally rather requires fortitude than wisdom. But that which they call the medicinal art affords us assistance in unseasonable cold and heat, and in all those circumstances by which the nature of animals is injured; at the same time that no one of these contributes to the most true wisdom, for they proceed by uncertain conjectures and opinions. We likewise acknowledge that pilots and sailors afford us assistance; but at the same time we do not permit any one of these to be called a wise man. For none of them knows the rage, or the friendship, of the winds, which is the most acceptable thing in the whole of the pilot's art. Nor yet do we call those wise who by the power of eloquence afford assistance in courts of justice; for these pay attention to the manners of opinion, through memory and experience, but wander from the truth of things just in reality. There still remains a certain absurd power with respect to the opinion of wisdom, which many denominate nature rather than wisdom. This takes place when any one easily understands a thing which he is learning, and firmly remembers a multitude of things; and can rapidly attribute to any thing that which is accommodated to it, when it is proper so to do. For all these some denominate nature, others wisdom, and others sagacity of nature. But no prudent person will ever be willing to call any one of these a truly wise man. It is however necessary, that a certain science should be rendered apparent, which he who possesses will be truly wise, and not only so in opinion. But let us consider; for we are attempting a thing in every respect difficult, as we are endeavouring to find something different from the above-mentioned particulars, which may be truly and with propriety called wisdom, and which he who receives will neither be vile, nor stupid, but be rendered through it wise and good, and become an elegant man in a city, whether he governs or is governed.

Let us, therefore, consider this in the first place, investigating that one science belonging to human nature, which not existing, man would become most stupid and unwise. But this is not very difficult to perceive. For, as I may say, referring one to one, that which nature imparts to the mortal race will accomplish this. I think, however, that a God himself, rather than a certain fortune, gave us this for our preservation. It is proper,
however,

however, to inform you what God I think it was, though my opinion will appear wonderful, and yet in a certain respect not wonderful. For, how is it possible that he who is the cause to us of every thing good should not also be the cause of by far the greatest good, prudence? But what God am I celebrating, O Megillus and Clinias? Nearly *Heaven*, whom it is most just we should, in the highest degree, honour, and fervently pray to, since this is done by all other Dæmons and Gods. That *Heaven*, indeed, is the cause to us of all other good, we all acknowledge. But we must also assert that, at the same time, he has given us number, and still imparts it to us, if any one is willing to follow us in what we say. For *he* will ascend to the right contemplation of this divinity (whether we may be allowed to call him the World, or Olympus, or Heaven,) who attends to the variety it contains, and how, by the courses of the stars which revolve in it, it imparts the seasons and nutriment to all things; and besides these, prudence, as we have said, together with all number, and every other good. But this is the greatest thing, when any one, receiving from him the gift of number, proceeds through every circulation. Again, recurring back a little, let us call to mind that we very rightly conceived that, by taking away number from human nature, we should be deprived of prudence. For the soul of this animal would scarcely any longer be able to receive every virtue, if deprived of reason. But the animal which does not know two and three, the even and the odd, and is entirely ignorant of number, will never be able to give a reason respecting those things of which it alone possesses sensation and memory; but nothing hinders it from possessing the other virtues, I mean fortitude and temperance, without this knowledge. However, he who is void of true reason can never become wise. And he to whom wisdom is not present, which is the greatest part of the whole of virtue, as in this case he will not be perfectly good, so he will never be happy. So that there is the greatest necessity that number should be established as a principle: but to show that this is necessary, a discourse longer than the preceding is requisite. It was, however, just now rightly asserted by us, that all the other arts which we a little before enumerated, must be entirely subverted if the arithmetical science is taken away. But some one who looks to the arts may be of opinion, that there are but few things in which mankind are indigent of number; yet, even here its utility is great. But if any one looks to that

which is divine and mortal in generation, in which the cultivation of divinity and true piety are known, he will find that no prophet can comprehend the mighty power which the whole of number possesses. For it is evident that every thing pertaining to music requires numbered motion and sound. And, which is the greatest thing, it may be easily known that number is the cause of every thing good, but of nothing evil, because every irrational, disordered, inelegant, and unharmonious lation, and all such things as participate of a certain evil, are deprived of all number. And this ought to be thus understood by him who is to be finally happy. To which we may add, that he who is ignorant of the just, the good, the beautiful, and all such things, and who has not received a true opinion respecting them, cannot employ the power of number in order to persuade himself and others.

But let us now proceed to consider how we learnt to number:—Whence, then, came we to perceive one and two; so that we might understand that in order to the knowledge of which we received this power from the universe? Nature, indeed, has not imparted to many animals the power of numbering, derived from their parents; but Divinity first implanted in us the ability of understanding number in that which is pointed out to us. Afterwards he rendered it more apparent to us; in which unfolding of things nothing can be seen more beautiful, if one thing is compared with another, than the genus of day. In the next place behold the night, which possesses the greatest diversity. For, by continually revolving these things, you will see many days, and many nights, in which the heavens, without ceasing, teach men one and two, so that even the most indocile may hence learn to number. For thus each of us, on perceiving these things, may understand three and four, and the many. And from these, Divinity fabricating, made one thing the moon, which at one time appearing greater, and at another less, continually varies as far as to fifteen days and nights. And this is a period, if any one is willing to establish the whole circle as one. So that, as I may say, the most indocile animal may learn to number, if he is one to whom Divinity has imparted the ability of learning. And, as far as to these, and in these particulars, every animal has the ability of becoming skilled in arithmetic, by considering one thing itself, by itself. But always to reason about all numbers, when compared with each other, appears to be a more arduous undertaking. And for the sake of this, Divinity having made, as
we

we have said, the moon, increasing and decreasing, fabricated months for the purpose of constituting the year, and caused us to compare every number with number, with prosperous fortune. Hence, earth bears fruit for us, and becomes prolific, so that she is the nurse of all animals; and winds and showers are produced, neither immoderate nor immense. But if any thing evil happens in these, it is proper to accuse not a divine, but human, nature, as unjustly distributing its own life. To us, therefore, investigating laws, it has appeared, that other things which are best for men, are easy to be known, and that every one can sufficiently understand and perform what we asserted respecting them, if he understands what is advantageous and what is not so. It has been shown by us, indeed, and at present it appears, that all other pursuits are not difficult in the extreme; but to assign the manner in which men may be rendered good, is perfectly difficult. And again, to possess other goods in a proper manner is, as has been said, possible, and not difficult,—I mean riches, and the body. Likewise, every one acknowledges it is requisite that the soul should be good; and every one will say that it becomes good through temperance, fortitude, and the like. Every one, too, will say that the soul ought to be wise; but what the wisdom is which it ought to acquire, is not, as we just now observed, determined by any of the multitude. Now, therefore, besides the above-mentioned kinds of wisdom, we have discovered a wisdom by no means vile; so that he who learns what we have discussed will appear to be wise. But whether he who learns these things will be in reality wise and good, must become the subject of our discourse.

CLIN. How justly, O guest, you said that you should endeavour to speak greatly about great things!

GUEST. They are not trifling things, Clinias; and what is of still greater consequence, they are in every respect true.

CLIN. Exceedingly so, O guest; but, at the same time, do not yield to labour, but continue your discourse.

GUEST. I will. Neither do you, therefore, be weary of hearing.

CLIN. We shall not: for I will be answerable to you for both of us.

GUEST. It is well. But it is necessary, as it appears, to speak first of all from the beginning; and especially, if we are able, we should comprehend in one name that which we consider as wisdom. But if we are very incapable of accomplishing this, we should consider that which ranks in the

second place, the quality and number of those arts, which he who receives will, according to our doctrine, be a wise man.

CLIN. Proceed, then, in this manner.

GUEST. In the next place, then, the legislator will be without envy who speaks better respecting the Gods than the antients, and who employing, as it were, beautiful discipline, honours the Gods with hymns, extols their felicity, and thus passes through life.

CLIN. You speak well, O guest; since the proposed end of your laws consists in acquiring the best and most beautiful end of life, through reverencing the Gods, and purity of conduct.

GUEST. How, therefore, shall we speak, Clinias? Does it appear to you that we should vehemently honour by hymning the Gods, and that we should beseech them that we may proceed to speak things the most beautiful and the best respecting their divinities? Or how do you say?

CLIN. Thus, in a wonderful manner. But, O dæmoniacal man, confiding in the Gods, pray, and begin your discourse on the beautiful things respecting the Gods and Goddeffes.

GUEST. Be it so, if Divinity himself is pleased to be our leader. Do you only pray with me.

CLIN. Now, therefore, proceed with your discourse.

GUEST. As the antients, then, as it seems, have badly delivered in images the generation of Gods and animals, it is proper, in the first place, according to our former assertion, to accomplish this in a better manner, by resuming our discourse to the impious. For, if you remember, Clinias, we have shown that there are Gods, that their providence extends to all things both small and great, and that they are not to be appeased by any unjust supplications or gifts. These things, indeed, you should call to mind, because they are highly true. But the greatest among those assertions is this, that every soul is more antient than every body. Do you remember? or, rather, do you not perfectly remember this? For that which is better, more antient, and more divine, is prior to that which is worse, junior, and less honourable. And, universally, that which governs is more antient than that which is governed, and that which leads than that which is led. We must admit this, therefore, that soul is more antient than body. But, if this be the case, it is probable that what is first in the generation of the first must take the lead,

lead. We lay down this position, then, that the principle of a principle subsists in a more becoming manner, and that thus we shall most rightly ascend to the wisdom respecting the generation of the Gods.

CLIN. Let these things be so, which are asserted in the best manner we are able.

GUEST. Come, then, do we not say that an animal then subsists most truly according to nature, when one composition of soul and body produces by its junction one form?

CLIN. We do.

GUEST. A thing of this kind, then, is most justly called an animal.

CLIN. It is.

GUEST. But it is requisite, according to assimilative reasoning, to say, that there are five solid bodies, from which the most beautiful and best things may be fashioned. But the whole of the other genus possesses one form. For there is not any thing else which can be generated immortal, and in no respect at any time possess colour, except the truly most divine genus of soul. But this is nearly that alone to which it pertains to fashion and fabricate; but it belongs to body to be fashioned, generated, and become the object of sight. And we again assert (for it must not be said once only) that it is the property of soul to be invisible, endued with knowledge, intelligible, and to partake of memory and the reasoning power in even and odd mutations. As there are, therefore, five bodies, it is requisite to say that two of them are fire and water, that the third is air, the fourth earth, and the fifth æther. But in the several principalities of these many and all-various animals are produced. The truth of this we may thus learn in one of these bodies. For let us, in the first place, consider the terrene genus of animals, viz. all the human kind, all such animals as have many feet, and are without feet, such as have a progressive motion, and such as are stable and connected by roots. But this one thing ought to be attended to, that though all animals are constituted from all these genera, yet the terrene genus abounds with earth and solidity. It is, however, requisite to place another genus of animals, which is generated, and, at the same time, capable of being seen. For it consists for the most part of fire; but likewise contains small parts of earth and air, and of all other things. Hence, it is requisite to assert that all-various and visible animals are generated from this genus. It is likewise
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necessary to think that these genera of animals constitute all that the heavens contain; or, in other words, that they are the divine genus of the stars, consisting of a most beautiful body, and of a soul the most happy and the best. It is also requisite to consider this respecting these two genera of animals. For each of them is, from the greatest necessity, either indestructible, immortal and divine, or the life of each is so extended as not to require any longer period of duration. In the first place, therefore, as we have said, we must consider that there are these two genera of animals. And we again say that both of them are visible; the one, as it appears, consisting wholly of fire, and the other of earth. We must likewise assert, that the earthly genus is moved in a disorderly manner, but that which consists from fire, in perfect order. It is proper, therefore, to consider that which is moved without order, as stupid. But it is requisite to establish this as a great argument, that the natures which revolve in the heavens are endued with intellect,—I mean, that they always proceed according to the same and in a similar manner, and both do and suffer the same. But the necessity of a soul possessing intellect is by far the greatest of all necessities¹. For it promulgates laws governing and not governed. But when soul, which is a thing of the most excellent nature, deliberates according to the most excellent intellect, then that which is perfect according to intellect takes place in reality, nor can an adamant be more firm and inconvertible than such a soul. Indeed, the three fates preserve perfect that which is deliberated by each of the Gods with the best counsel. It is requisite, therefore, men should be convinced that the stars, and the whole of this progression, are endued with intellect, from this circumstance, that they always perform the same things. For in the past time they have deliberated for a wonderfully extended period respecting their actions. But they are not, in deliberating, agitated upwards and downwards, nor do they wander and revolve in a disorderly manner, acting differently at different times. The contrary of this, however, appears to many of us,—I mean, that because they perform the same things, and in a similar manner, they are without a soul. The vulgar, too, embracing this INSANE OPINION, conceive that the human genus is intellectual and vital, because it is moved, but that the divine genus is destitute of intellect, because

¹ For *persuasion* belongs to soul, but *necessity* to intellect.

it abides in the same motions. But it becomes the man who attributes to the Gods things more beautiful, more excellent, and more friendly to their natures, to conceive that it is necessary to consider them as possessing intellect, because they always accomplish the same things, according to the same, and in a similar manner. And that this is the nature of the stars, most beautiful to the sight, and which by a progression and musical dance, the most beautiful and magnificent of all choirs, produces in all animals every thing that is proper and becoming. But that we justly consider them as animated, may, in the first place, be evinced by their magnitude. For they are not in reality so small as they appear to be; but it deserves to be believed, that each of them is of an immense magnitude, as this may be shown by sufficient demonstrations. For we may rightly think that the whole sun is larger than the whole earth; and that all the stars possess a wonderful magnitude. We should consider, therefore, after what manner so great a bulk can be made to revolve by a certain nature perpetually in the same time. I say, therefore, that Divinity is the cause of this, and that it cannot in any other manner be accomplished. For it can no otherwise become animated than through a God, as we have evinced. As Divinity, therefore, is the cause of its animation, and all things are easy to a God, in the first place, he generated every body and every bulk in the heavens an animal; and, in the next place, he caused it to move in that manner which he conceived, by a dianoëtic energy, to be the best. And now, respecting all these particulars, we shall make one true assertion, viz. It is impossible that earth, heaven, all the stars, and all the bulks composed from these, could subsist, unless a soul is either present with each, or resident in each, enabling them to revolve with such accuracy according to years, and months, and days, and thus procuring for all of us every good. But it is requisite that, by how much more vile man is than celestial animals, by so much the less should he trifle, but assert something conspicuous concerning them. He, therefore, who assigns certain fluxions of bodies, or natures, or any thing of this kind, as the causes of the celestial convolutions, will not assert any thing conspicuous.

It is, however, requisite to reconsider what we have said with the utmost attention, that it may appear whether our assertions were reasonable, or altogether futile. In the first place, then, we said, that there were two things,
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the one soul, and the other body; and that there were many things pertaining to each. We likewise asserted, that all these mutually differed from each other; and that there was no other third thing common to any one of them: but that soul differed from body in this, that the former possessed, and the latter was destitute of, intellect; that the one governed, and the other was in a state of subjection; and that the one was the cause of all the passions of bodies, but that the other was not the cause of any one of these. So that he who asserts that celestial natures were generated by any thing else, and that they do not consist, in the manner we have said, from soul and body, must be very stupid and irrational. If, therefore, it is requisite that the arguments respecting all such particulars as these should be victorious, and that every nature of this kind should be believed to be divine, one of these two things must follow, viz. we must either celebrate the celestial orbs as Gods, and in so doing we shall act most rightly; or we must consider them as images of the Gods, fabricated as statues by the Gods themselves. For these two consequences are neither absurd nor of small importance, but, as we have said, one of these must ensue; and these statues are to be honoured beyond all other statues. For no statues will ever be found more beautiful and more common to all men than these, nor any that are established in more excellent places, or which so transcend in purity, venerableness, and all life, as these, which are throughout generated the same. Now, therefore, we should also endeavour to assert this respecting the Gods, viz. Since we perceive two species of visible animals, one of which we say is immortal, and the whole of the other which is terrene, mortal, we should endeavour to unfold, according to probable opinion, three species of animals which subsist between these five. After fire, then, we place æther; and we assert, that from it soul fashions animals which possess, like other genera, an abundant power from their own nature, but the smallest degree of power for the sake of a mutual bond, from other genera. But, after æther, soul fashions from air another genus of animals; and a third genus from water. Soul, therefore, having fabricated all these, filled the whole of heaven with animals, employing, to the utmost of its power, all the genera, as all these participate of life. But the second, third, fourth, and fifth, beginning from the generation of the visible Gods, at length end in us men. Respecting the Gods,

Gods, Jupiter, Juno, and all the rest, let any one assign them such places as he pleases, if he only distributes them according to the same law, and considers this reasoning as stable.

We must call, therefore, the nature of the stars, and such things as we perceive together with the stars, the visible Gods, the greatest and the most honourable, perceiving every way most acutely, and ranking among such things as are first. But after, and under these, in a following order, dæmons subsist, an ærial genus, possessing a third and middle seat, who unfold the will of the Gods to men, and whom it is highly fit we should honour by prayers, for the sake of obtaining their propitious intercession. We cannot, however, wholly perceive either of these two kinds of animals, one of which subsists in ether, and the other in a following order in air. For, though these dæmons are by their situations near us, yet they never become manifest to us; but they participate of an admirable prudence, as being docile and of a good memory; and they know all our thoughts. They likewise love in a wonderful manner worthy and good men, and vehemently hate such as are vicious, as being themselves participants of pain. For the Gods, indeed, who possess the end of a divine allotment, are situated beyond the reach of all pleasure and pain, and participate, in the utmost perfection, of prudence and knowledge. And, as the heavens are full of animals, these dæmons, and the highest Gods, mutually¹ interpret all things to each other. For the middle animals are borne to earth and the whole heaven with a light and rapid impetus. But he who assimilates the fifth genus of animals, which is from water to a demigod, will assimilate rightly. And this genus is sometimes visible, and sometimes concealed from our sight; and, when it is visible, is seen in a wonderful and obscure manner. As, therefore, there are these five kinds of animals, whatever occurs to us in dreams, oracles, and divinations, and such things as we hear through the voice of the healthy or diseased, or which happen to us at the close of life, whence many sacred rites are instituted, both privately and publicly, and will be instituted hereafter,—*with respect to all these, the legislator who possesses the smallest degree of intellect, will never make innovations in any of them, lest he should turn his city to a religion which possesses nothing conspicuous.* Nor will he forbid any thing

¹ By dæmons interpreting all things to the Gods, nothing more is implied than an energy in dæmons, by which they become fitted to receive the influence of divinity more abundantly.

respecting sacrifices which the law of his country has established, as being convinced that it is not possible for a mortal nature to know any thing about such like particulars. And for the same reason MUST NOT THOSE BE THE WORST OF MEN WHO DO NOT CELEBRATE THE TRULY APPARENT GODS, AND WHO SUFFER THE OTHER GODS TO REMAIN DEPRIVED OF THEIR SACRED RITES, AND THE HONOURS WHICH ARE THEIR DUE? For this is just as if some one should perceive the sun and moon inspecting without receiving any honours from the whole of the human race, and at the same time should not be anxious for the celebration of their divinities by mankind, that festivals and sacrifices may be instituted, and that certain parts of greater and lesser years may be often distributed in honour of them. Would not such a one, if he should be said to be evil both to himself and to any other by whom he is known, be justly said to be so?

CLIN. Undoubtedly, O guest: for such a one must be the worst of men.

GUEST. Know assuredly then, friend Clinias, that this very thing has now happened respecting myself.

CLIN. How do you say?

GUEST. Know that there are eight powers revolving round the whole heaven, which are sisters to each other, and which I have beheld without paying them any great attention: for this is easy for another to accomplish. Of these, the following are three; one of the sun, another of the moon, and another of all the stars, which I mentioned a little before: and besides these there are five^{*} others. With respect to all these, and such natures as are contained in these, whether they have a progressive motion themselves, or are borne along in vehicles, no one of us should at any time think that some of them are Gods, and others not; nor yet, that some of them are legitimate, but others such as it is not lawful for any of us to mention; but we should say that they are all of them brothers, and that they live in fraternal allotments. We should likewise honour them, not ordaining for some a year, for others a month, and for others no allotted portion of time, in which they accomplish their revolutions, and at the same time give perfection to a world, which reason determines to be the most divine of all visible things. This world a happy man will in the first place admire; and, in the next

^{*} Viz. the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury.

place, he will ardently desire to learn as much respecting it as is possible to a mortal nature; thinking that he shall thus pass through life in the best and most fortunate manner, and after death arrive at places adapted to virtue; and thus being truly initiated, and participating in reality of prudence, and becoming one, will pass the rest of his time in the contemplation of things the most beautiful of all such as pertain to the sight.

It now remains that we should relate, in the next place, what and how many these are. For we may without falsehood strenuously assert as follows. I again say, then, that there are eight of these, three of which we have already discussed, and consequently five remain. But the fourth and fifth lation and transition are nearly equal in swiftness with the sun, and are neither slower nor swifter. And of these three, intellect is always a sufficient leader, I mean of the sun, Lucifer, and that third which cannot be denominated because it is not known. But the reason of this is, because a Barbarian was the first spectator of these. For an antient region is the nurse of those who first understood these particulars through the beauty of the summer season. And such was Egypt, and Syria, where, as I may say, all the stars are perpetually apparent, because clouds and rain are always far remote from that part of the world. Hence, both here, and in every other place, these things are found by the experience of an infinite length of time to be true; and on this account they ought boldly to be established by the laws. For to think that divine natures are not honourable, or that these things are not divine, is clearly the province of one not endued with intellect. But it is requisite to assign this as the reason why they have no names, though indeed they are denominated by certain persons. For Lucifer is called Vesper, or the star of Venus, by which it is probable that the author of this appellation was a Syrian. But the star which revolves with an equal velocity with the sun and Lucifer, is called Stilbon, or Mercury. And, besides these, there are three lations of those stars, whose course is to the right hand, in conjunction with the sun and moon. But it is requisite to call the eighth orb ¹ one, which may with the greatest propriety be denominated the upper world. This orb moves contrary to the rest, and draws

¹ That is, the sphere of the fixed stars.

the others along with it, according to the opinion of those who have some skill in these affairs. But it is necessary to speak of such things as we sufficiently know. For true wisdom will thus in a certain respect appear to him who participates, though in a small degree, of right and divine intelligence. Three stars then remain, one of which differs from the rest by the slowness of its motion. This star is called by some Phænon, or Saturn. That which is next to this in slowness is called Phaethon, or Jupiter: and, after this follows Puroeis, or Mars, who has the most red colour of them all. These things, when explained by any one, are not difficult to be understood; but, when understood, we should frame such conceptions respecting them as we have mentioned above. This, also, ought to be known by every Grecian, that we inhabit a region which is nearly the best of all others for the acquisition of virtue. But it is proper to assert that its praise consists in being situated between the nature of summer and winter. However, as we have said, because we are more distant from the nature of summer than the Barbarians we understood posterior to them the orderly arrangement of these Gods; yet we must assert, that whatever the Greeks receive from the Barbarians, is by them carried to greater perfection. This, too, we should conceive to be the case with respect to the subject of the present discourse. For, though it is difficult to discover without ambiguity all such particulars as the present, yet the hope is both beautiful and great, that the Greeks will reverence all these divinities with a more excellent mode of worship than that which they received from the Barbarians, and that they will employ both discipline and the Delphic oracles, and every legitimate observance, for this purpose. Nor should any Greek be at any time fearful, that mortals ought not busily to employ themselves about divine concerns; but, on the contrary, he should think that neither is a divine nature destitute of intellect, nor ignorant of human nature. For he knows that, in consequence of Divinity acting as a teacher, those that are taught follow and learn: and he likewise certainly knows that he teaches us number and to numerate. For he would be the most stupid of all beings if he were ignorant of this. For, as it is said, he would truly be ignorant of himself, if he were indignant, and not delighted with those that are able to learn, and who are rendered good through Divinity. But it is highly reasonable to suppose that the first conceptions

ceptions of men, respecting the nature and actions of the Gods, were neither such as wise men would frame, nor those that succeeded them. For they asserted, that fire and water, and the other bodies, were the most antient of all things; but that the particulars belonging to that wonderful thing soul were of posterior origin. Hence, they considered the lation of body as better and more honourable, and as moving itself through heat and cold, and every thing else of this kind: but they asserted that soul neither moved body nor itself. But, now since we say, if soul subsists in body, that it is not at all wonderful it should move and carry about both the body and itself, there can be no reason to disbelieve its ability to carry about a certain weight. Hence, as we now think proper to assert, that soul is the cause of the universe; and as of things, some are good and others evil, it is not at all wonderful, that soul should be the cause of every lation and motion, but that a lation and motion which tends to good should proceed from the best soul, and a lation and motion to the contrary, from a contrary soul. But it is necessary that things good should have vanquished, and should continue to vanquish, things which are not so. All these particulars have been asserted by us according to Justice, the avenger of the impious. With respect, however, to that which we have just now examined, we ought not to hesitate in asserting, that a good man is a wise man.

Let us however see, whether this wisdom, of which we were some time since in search, can be acquired by discipline or art. For, if we are destitute of the knowledge of this, we shall be ignorant of things just. Thus it appears to me, and therefore I assert this to be the case. For, having explored upwards and downwards, I will endeavour to evince to you that which has become apparent to me. For, when the greatest part of virtue is negligently attended to, it becomes the cause of ignorance, as what we have just now said appears to me most perspicuously to signify. But no one shall persuade us, that there is any part of virtue belonging to the mortal race, greater than piety. We must likewise assert that this is not produced in the most excellent natures through the greatest ignorance. But those are the most excellent natures which are most rarely found, and which when found benefit others in the highest degree. For the soul which moderately and mildly receives a flow, or the contrary nature, is simple and ingenuous :

ingenuous: it likewise admires fortitude, and is obedient to temperance: and, what is the greatest of all in these natures, it is able to learn, is of a good memory, is a lover of literature, and is very much delighted with things of this kind. For these things are not easily implanted by nature; and when they are innate, and obtain proper education and discipline, their possessors obtain such authority over most part of their inferiors as to cause them to think, speak, and act, in such a manner as is requisite, and when it is requisite, towards the Gods; prevent them from employing artifice in the sacrifices and purifications which are performed both to Gods and men; and dispose them to honour virtue in reality, which is the most important of all things to every city. This part, therefore, we say is naturally the most principal, and, when instructed, is capable of learning in the greatest degree, and in the best manner. But no one can teach, unless Divinity leads the way. It is better, therefore, not to learn from one who teaches, but at the same time does not act after this manner. However, from what we have now said, it is necessary to learn these things; and I have asserted that a nature of this kind is the most excellent. Let us then endeavour to explain what these particulars are, and how it is requisite to learn them; and this both according to my ability, who am the speaker, and the ability of those who are able to hear, that we may know after what manner certain things pertaining to the culture of divinity may be learnt. Perhaps, therefore, what you will hear is unusual: we shall, however, mention the name of the thing which, to him who is ignorant of it, would never appear to be the name. Are you then ignorant of astronomy, and that a true astronomer is necessarily the wisest of men? Not, indeed, that he is so who astronomizes according to Hesiod¹, and all such as consider the rising and setting of the stars; but this must be affirmed of him who contemplates the eight periods, and how seven of these are contained under the first, and in what order each revolves. But no one will easily contemplate these things, unless he participates of a wonderful nature, as we have just now said, and as we shall again say, unfolding what is to be learnt, and the manner of learning it. In the first place, therefore, let this be said

¹ Alluding to *The Works and Days* of Hesiod. He is not a true astronomer who studies the heavenly bodies with a view to the necessities, conveniences, or elegancies of a mortal life, but he who speculates them as images of true beings.

by us, that the moon accomplishes its period most swiftly, and thus, first of all, leads forth month and full moon. In the second place, it is requisite to consider the sun who produces the solstices through the whole of his period, and, together with the sun, those that revolve in conjunction with him. But that we may not often assert the same things about the same, the revolutions of all those natures which we mentioned before, and which it is not easy to understand, must be made the subject of contemplation; preparing human nature for this purpose by disciplines pertaining to these speculations, and this by long exercise and labour, while it is in a juvenile state. On this account, the mathematical disciplines will be necessary; of which the first and the greatest is that which respects numbers, but not those that possess a body, but which contain the whole of the generation and power of the even and the odd, as these two contribute to the knowledge and nature of things. That which is very ridiculously called geometry ¹ follows these in an orderly succession. But the similitude of numbers naturally dissimilar to planes, becomes conspicuous by comparison. This circumstance, however, to him who is capable of understanding it, will evidently appear to be not a human, but a divine miracle. After this, those numbers which receive a triple increase, and are similar to the nature of a solid, are to be considered, and likewise those that are dissimilar to this nature, which is called by those that are conversant with it, geometry. But this, to those that are capable of understanding it, is a divine and wonderful thing, that as the power of things always revolves about that which is double, and in its own opposite, according to each proportion, every nature is fashioned according to genera and species. The first power, therefore, of the double proceeds according to number, in the ratio of one to two, being double ² according to power.

¹ Alluding to its name, which signifies the measuring of the earth, which is a mechanical operation; but geometry is a speculative science.

² Of numbers, some are linear, others superficial, and others cubic and solid. The first are such as the number 2; the second such as the number 4, which is the square or second power of 2; and the third such as eight, which is the cube or third power of 2. Duple proportion also was considered by the ancients as perfect. In the first place, because it is the first proportion, being produced between one and two; and, in the second place, because it contains all proportions within

power. But in that which is solid and tangible, the double again proceeds from one to eight. Another power of the double proceeds to the middle; but perhaps into that which is more than the less, and less than the greater; while again, another power by the same part surpasses, and is surpassed by the extremities. But in the middle, of the proportion of six to twelve, the sesquialter and sesquitercian proportion subsists. And in the middle of these, a power revolving to both distributes to men an according and apt utility, which is imparted by the blessed choir of the Muses for the sake of sports, rhythm, and harmony. All these things, therefore, are produced and subsist after this manner. But their end is this, that we may betake ourselves to divine generation, and the most beautiful and divine nature of things visible, as far as divinity has conferred on men the ability of beholding them. These, however, we shall never behold without the above-mentioned discipline. Besides this, in our several conversations we must refer every individual thing to its species, by interrogating and confuting when any thing is improperly asserted. For this may be rightly said to be the most beautiful and the first touch-stone which men can employ. But where only a pretended examination takes place, it is of all labours the most vain.

Further still, the accuracy of time must be considered by us, and the exactness with which it causes all the revolutions of the heavenly bodies to be accomplished; that he who believes the assertion to be true, that soul is more antient and more divine than body, may also think it was beautifully and sufficiently said, *that all things are full of Gods*, and that no one of the natures more excellent than mankind, at any time forget, or pay but little

within itself; for the sesquialter, sesquitercian, and the like proportions are, as it were, parts below duple proportion. The numbers which the author of the *Epinomis* here adduces are 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12. The ratio of 4 to 2 is duple, and that of 8 to 4 is also duple. These two excesses are equal in ratio, for that of each is duple, but they are not equal in number; for 8 exceeds 4 by 4, but 4 exceeds 2 by 2. Again, if we compare 6 to 4, and afterwards to 8, in the first case we shall have a sesquialter, and in the second a sesquitercian ratio; but these excesses are unequal in ratio, but equal in number. For the ratio of 6 to 4 = $1\frac{1}{2}$, and the ratio of 8 to 6 = $1\frac{1}{3}$; but 6 exceeds 4 by 2, and is exceeded by 8 by 2. Again, compare 12 to 6, which is a duple ratio, and between these compare 8 to each. Then, 12 to 8 will be a sesquialter ratio, and 8 to 6 will be a sesquitercian ratio; but a duple ratio arises from 12 to 6; and the excesses between 12 and 8, and 8 and 6, are unequal both in ratio and number.

attention

attention to our concerns. But in all such things as these we should thus consider, that he who rightly apprehends each of these particulars will be benefited by them; but that it will be better for him who does not, to invoke Divinity. The manner, however, in which these particulars may be rightly apprehended is as follows: (for it is necessary to relate this also)—Every diagram, system of number, and composition of harmony, together with the one concord of all the stars in their revolutions, ought to be beheld by him who learns in a proper manner. But that of which we are speaking will become apparent to him who rightly learns looking to one thing. *For, to those who reason scientifically, there will appear to be naturally one bond of all these.* But he who attempts to apprehend these in any other way ought, as we have said, to invoke Fortune. For, without these, it is not possible that any nature in cities can be happy. But this is the mode, this is the education, these are the disciplines; and through these we must proceed, whether they are difficult or easy. But it is not lawful to neglect the Gods; since the prosperous conception of all the above-mentioned particulars becomes apparent by an orderly progression. And I call him who rightly apprehends all these, most truly the wisest of men. I likewise strenuously affirm, both in jest and seriously, that such a one, when he has by death filled up his allotted time, will no longer participate of many senses, as at present, but will be a partaker of one destiny alone; and becoming one, instead of a multitude of things, will be happy, and, at the same time, most wise and blessed. And again, whether any one lives blessed on the continent, or in islands, I affirm that he will always participate a fortune of this kind; and that, whether any one living a public or a private life studies these things, he will, in like manner, obtain the same destiny from the Gods. But, as we have said in the beginning, and now the assertion appears to be most true, *it is only possible for a few of mankind to be perfectly blessed and happy.* And this is rightly asserted by us. For those that are divine and at the same time prudent men, who naturally participate of the other virtues, and who besides this have acquired all such portions of *blessed discipline* as we have mentioned, these alone can sufficiently receive and possess

¹ Meaning *Dialectic*; for an account of which see my Introduction to the Parmenides.

all that pertains to a divine destiny. We legally, therefore, ordain, that those who thus labour in these things, both privately and publicly, when they have arrived at old age, ought to possess the greatest authority in cities; and that others should follow these, and should celebrate all the Gods and Goddesses; and lastly, that all of us, in consequence of having examined these things, may, with the greatest propriety, exhort the nocturnal assembly to the pursuit of this wisdom.

THE END OF THE EPINOMIS.

THE

THE TIMÆUS,

A DIALOGUE

ON NATURE.

INTRODUCTION.

TO

THE TIMÆUS.

THE design, says Proclus, of Plato's Timæus evidently vindicates to itself the whole of physiology, and is conversant from beginning to end with the speculation of the universe. For the book of Timæus the Locrian concerning nature is composed after the Pythagoric manner; and Plato, thence deriving his materials, undertook to compose the present dialogue, according to the relation of the scurrilous Timon. This dialogue, therefore, respects physiology in all its parts; speculating the same things in images and in exemplars, in wholes and in parts. For it is filled with all the most beautiful modes of physiology, delivering things simple for the sake of such as are composite, parts on account of wholes, and images for the sake of exemplars; and it leaves none of the primary causes of nature unexplored.

But Plato alone, of all the physiologists, has preserved the Pythagoric mode in speculations about nature. For physiology receives a threefold division, one part of which is conversant with matter and material causes; but a second adds an inquiry into form, and evinces that this is the more principal cause; and lastly, a third part manifests that these do not rank in the order of causes, but concauses; and, in consequence of this, establishes other proper causes of things subsisting in nature, which it denominates *producing*, *paradigmatical*, and *final* causes. But this being the case, all the physiologists prior to Plato, confining themselves to speculations about matter, called this general receptacle of things by different names. For, with respect to Anaxagoras himself, as it appears, though while others were dreaming he perceived that intellect was the first cause of generated natures, yet he made no use of intellect in his demonstrations, but rather considered certain airs and
ethers

ethers as the causes of the phænomena, as we are informed by Socrates in the Phædo. But the most accurate of those posterior to Plato, (such as the more early peripatetics,) contemplating matter in conjunction with form, considered these as the principles of bodies; and if at any time they mention a producing cause, as when they call nature a principle of motion, they rather take away than establish his efficacious and producing prerogative, while they do not allow that he contains the reasons¹ of his productions, but admit that many things are the progeny of chance. But Plato, following the Pythagoreans, delivers as the concauses of natural things, an all-receiving matter, and a material form, as subservient to proper causes in generation; but, prior to these, he investigates primary causes, i. e. the producing, the paradigmatical, and the final.

Hence, he places over the universe a demiurgic intellect and an intelligible cause; in which last the universe and goodness have a primary subsistence, and which is established above the artificer of things in the order of the desirable, or, in other words, is a superior object of desire. For, since that which is moved by another, or a corporeal nature, is suspended from a motive power, and is naturally incapable either of producing, perfecting, or preserving itself, it evidently requires a fabricative cause for the commencement and continuance of its being. The concauses, therefore, of natural productions must necessarily be suspended from true causes, as the sources of their existence, and for the sake of which they were fabricated by the father of all things. With great propriety, therefore, are all these accurately explored by Plato, and likewise the two depending from these, viz. form, and the subject matter. For this world is not the same with the intelligible and intellectual worlds, which are self-subsistent, and consequently by no means indigent of a subject, but it is a composite of matter and form. However, as it perpetually depends on these, like the shadow from the forming substance, Plato assimilates it to intelligible animal itself; evinces that it is a God through its participation of good, and perfectly defines the whole world to be a blessed God, participating of intellect and soul.

Such, then, being Plato's design in the Timæus, he very properly in the beginning exhibits, through images, the order of the universe; for it is

¹ That Aristotle himself, however, was not of this opinion, I have shown in the Introduction to my Translation of his *Metaphysics*.

usual with the Pythagoreans ¹, previous to the tradition of a scientific doctrine, to present the reader with a manifestation of the proposed inquiry, through similitudes and images: but in the middle part the whole of Cosmogony is delivered; and towards the end, partial natures, and such as are the extremities of fabrication, are wove together with wholes themselves. For the repetition of the Republic, which had been so largely treated of before, and the Atlantic history, unfold through images the theory of the world. For, if we consider the union and multitude of mundane natures, we must say, that the summary account of the Republic by Socrates, which establishes as its end a communion pervading through the whole, is an image of its union; but that the battle of the Atlantics against the Athenians, which Critias relates, is an image of the distribution of the world, and especially so according to the two coordinate oppositions of things. For, if we make a division of the universe into *celestial* and *sublunary*, we must say that the Republic is assimilated to the celestial distribution; since Socrates himself asserts that its paradigm is established in the heavens; but that the Atlantic war corresponds to generation, which subsists through contrariety and mutation. And such are the particulars which precede the whole doctrine of physiology.

But after this the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are delivered; from the prior subsistence of which the universe is fabricated, both according to a whole and according to parts. For the corporeal nature of it is fabricated with forms and demiurgic sections, and is distributed with divine numbers; and soul is produced from the demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic reasons and divine and fabricative symbols. The whole mundane animal too is connected together, according to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world; and the parts which it contains are distributed so as to harmonize with the whole, both such as are corporeal and such as are vital. For partial souls are introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane Gods, and become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected, imitating their presiding and leading Gods. Mortal animals too are fabricated and vivified by the celestial Gods; and prior to these, the formation of man is delivered as a

¹ Είναι γὰρ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἔθος, πρὸ τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς διδασκαλίας προτιθεῖναι τὴν διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ τῶν σικόντων τῶν ζήτουμένων σχημάτων δῆλωσιν. Procl. in Tim. p. 10.

microcosm, comprehending in himself partially every thing which the world contains divinely and totally. For we are endued with an intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same father and vivifying goddesses as were the causes of the intellect and soul of the universe. We have likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body composed from the four elements, and with which it is also coordinate. If, therefore, it be proper to contemplate the universe multifariously both in an intelligible and sensible nature, paradigmatically, and as a resemblance, totally and partially, a discourse concerning the nature of man is very properly introduced in the speculation of the universe.

With respect to the form and character of the dialogue, it is acknowledged by all that it is composed according to the Pythagoric mode of writing. And this also must be granted by those who are the least acquainted with the works of Plato, that the manner of his composition is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. If, therefore, Plato any where mingles the Socratic and Pythagoric property together, this must be apparent in the present dialogue. For it contains, agreeably to the Pythagoric custom, elevation of intellect, together with intellectual and divine conceptions: it likewise suspends every thing from intelligibles, bounds wholes in numbers, exhibits things mystically and symbolically, is full of an elevating property, of that which transcends partial conceptions, and of the enunciative mode of composition. But from the Socratic philanthropy it contains an easy accommodation to familiar discourse, gentleness of manners, proceeding by demonstration, contemplating things through images, the ethical peculiarity, and every thing of this kind. Hence, it is a venerable dialogue, and deduces its conceptions from on high, from the first principles of things; but it mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative, and prepares us to understand physics, not only physically but theologically. For, indeed, Nature herself rules over the universe suspended from the Gods, and directs the forms of bodies through the influence of their inspiring power; for she is neither herself a divinity, nor yet without a divine characteristic, but is full of illuminations from all the various orders of the Gods.

But if it be proper, as Timæus says, that discourses should be assimilated to the things of which they are the interpreters, it will be necessary that the dialogue should contain both that which is physical and that which is theological;

theological; imitating by this mean Nature which it contemplates. Further still, since according to the Pythagoric doctrine things receive a triple division, into such as are intelligible, such as are physical, and such as rank in the middle of these, which the Pythagoreans usually call mathematical, all these may very conveniently be viewed in all. For in intelligibles things middle and last subsist in a causal manner; and in mathematical natures both are contained, such as are first according to similitude, and such as are third after the manner of an exemplar. And lastly, in natural things the resemblances of such as are prior subsist. With great propriety, therefore, does Timæus, when describing the composition of the soul, exhibit her powers, and reasons, and the elements of her nature, through mathematical names: but Plato defines the characteristics of these from geometrical figures, and at the same time leaves the causes of all these pre-subsisting in a primary manner in the intelligible intellect, and the intellect of the artificer of the universe.

And thus much for the manner of the dialogue; but its argument or hypothesis is as follows. Socrates coming into the Piræus for the sake of the Bendidian festival, which was sacred to Diana, and was celebrated prior to the Panathenaia ¹, on the twentieth of the month Thargelion or June, discoursed there concerning a republic with Polemarchus, Cephalus, Glauco, Adimantus, and Thrasymachus the sophist. But on the following day he related this discourse in the city to Timæus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth nameless person. On the third day they end the narration; and Timæus commences from hence his discourse on the universe, before Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates; the same nameless person who was present at the second narration being now absent from the third.

With respect to the term *nature*, which is differently defined by different philosophers, it is necessary to inform the reader, that Plato does not consider either matter or material form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called nature; though nature has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper to call it soul; but establishing its essence between soul and corporeal powers, he considers it as inferior to the former through its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of conversion to itself, but as surpassing the latter through its containing the reasons of all

¹ Sacred to Minerva.

things, and generating and vivifying every part of the visible world. For nature verges towards bodies, and is inseparable from their fluctuating empire. But soul is separate from body, is established in herself, and subsists both from herself and another; from another, that is, from intellect through participation, and from herself on account of her not verging to body, but abiding in her own essence, and at the same time illuminating the obscure nature of matter with a secondary life. Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, bounds the progressions of incorporeal essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she governs mundane affairs. And she is a goddess indeed, considered as deified; but not according to the primary signification of the word. For the word God is attributed by Plato, as well as by the ancient theologians, to beings which participate of the Gods. Hence every pure intellect is, according to the Platonic philosophy, a God according to union; every divine soul according to participation; every divine dæmon according to contact; divine bodies are Gods as statues of the Gods; and even the souls of the most exalted men are Gods according to similitude; while in the mean time superessential natures only are primarily and properly Gods. But nature governs the whole world by her powers, by her summit comprehending the heavens, but through these ruling over the fluctuating empire of generation, and every where weaving together partial natures in amicable conjunction with wholes.

But as the whole of Plato's philosophy is distributed into the contemplation of intelligibles and sensibles, and this very properly, since there is both an intelligible and sensible world, as Plato himself asserts in the course of the dialogue; hence in the *Parmenides* he comprehends the doctrine of intelligibles, but in the *Timæus* of mundane natures. And in the former of these dialogues he scientifically exhibits all the divine orders, but in the latter all the progressions of such as are mundane. Nor does the former entirely neglect the speculation of what the universe contains, nor the latter of intelligibles themselves. And this because sensibles are contained in intelligibles paradigmatically, and intelligibles in sensibles according to similitude. But the latter abounds more with physical speculations, and the former with such as are theological; and this in a manner adapted to the persons after whom the dialogues are called: to *Timæus* on the one hand,

who had composed a book on the universe, and to Parmenides on the other, who had written on true beings. The divine Jamblichus, therefore, asserts very properly, that the whole theory of Plato is comprehended in these two dialogues, the Parmenides and Timæus. For the whole doctrine of mundane and supermundane natures is accurately delivered in these, and in the most consummate perfection; nor is any order of beings left without investigation.

We may behold too the similitude of proceeding in the Timæus to that in the Parmenides. For, as Timæus refers the cause of every thing in the world to the first artificer, so Parmenides suspends the progression of all things from *the one*. And as the former represents all things as participating of demiurgic providence, so the other exhibits beings participating of a uniform essence. And again, as Timæus prior to his physiology presents us through images with the theory of mundane natures, so Parmenides prior to his theology excites us to an investigation of immaterial forms. For it is proper, after being exercised in discourses about the best polity, to proceed to a contemplation of the universe; and, after an athletic contention through strenuous doubts about ideas, to betake ourselves to the mystic speculation of the unities of beings. And thus much for the hypothesis or argument of the dialogue.

But as a more copious and accurate investigation of some of its principal parts will be necessary, even to a general knowledge of the important truths which it contains, previous to this I shall present the reader with an abstract of that inimitable theory respecting the connection of things, which is the basis of the present work, and of the whole philosophy of Plato. For by a comprehensive view of this kind we shall be better prepared for a minute survey of the intricate parts of the dialogue, and be convinced how infinitely superior the long lost *philosophy of Pythagoras* and *Plato* is to the *experimental farrago* of the *moderns*.

Since the first cause is *the good*¹, and this is the same with *the one*, as is evident from the Parmenides, it is necessary that the whole of things should be the most excellent, that is, the most united that can possibly be conceived. But perfect union in the whole of things can no otherwise take place than

¹ See the sixth Book of the Republic.

by the extremity of a superior order coalescing, *κατὰ σχεσιν*, through habitude or alliance, with the summit of an order which is proximately inferior. Again, with respect to all beings, it is necessary that some should move or be motive only, and that others should be moved only; and that between these there should be two mediums, the self-motive natures, and those which move and at the same time are moved. Now that which is motive only, and consequently essentially immovable, is intellect, which possesses both its essence and energy in eternity; the whole intelligence of which is firmly established in indivisible union, and which though a cause prior to itself participates of deific illumination. For it possesses, says Plotinus, twofold energies; one kind indeed as intellect, but the other in consequence of becoming as it were intoxicated, and deifying itself with nectar. But that which is self-motive is soul, which, on account of possessing its energy in transition and a mutation of life, requires the circulations of time to the perfection of its nature, and depends on intellect as a more ancient and consequently superior cause. But that which moves and is at the same time moved is nature, or that corporeal life which is distributed about body, and confers generation, nutrition and increase to its fluctuating essence. And lastly, that which is moved only is body, which is naturally passive, imbecil and inert.

Now, in consequence of the profound union subsisting in things, it is necessary that the highest beings or intelligibles should be wholly super-essential, *κατὰ σχεσιν*, according to proximity or alliance; that the highest intellects should be beings, the first of souls intellects, and the highest bodies lives, on account of their being wholly absorbed as it were in a vital nature. Hence, in order that the most perfect union possible may take place between the last of incorporeals and the first of bodies, it is necessary that the body of the world should be consummately vital; or indeed, according to habitude and alliance, life itself. But it is necessary that a body of this kind should be perpetually generated, or have a subsistence in perpetually *becoming to be*. For after intellect, which eternally abides the same both in essence and energy, and soul, which is eternally the same in essence but mutable in energy, that nature must succeed which is perpetually mutable both in essence and energy, and which consequently subsists in a perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. Such a body, therefore,

fore, is very properly said to be generated, at the same time that this generation is perpetual; because, on account of its divisibility and extension, it alone derives its existence from an external cause: likewise, because it is a composite, and because it is not at once wholly that which it is, but possesses its being in continual generation. This body, too, on account of the perpetuity of its duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity, may be very properly called a whole with a total subsistence: for every thing endued with a total subsistence is eternal; and this may be truly asserted of the body of the world, when we consider that its being is co-extended with the infinite progressions of time. Hence, this divine or celestial body may be properly called *ὅλος ὅλικως*, or *a whole totally*, just as the limb of an animal is *μέρος μερικώς*, or *a part partially*. But between *whole totally* and *part partially* two mediums are necessarily required, viz. *part totally* and *whole partially* (*μέρος ὅλικως* and *ὅλος μερικώς*). The *parts*, therefore, with a *total subsistence* which the world contains, are no other than the celestial orbs, which are consequently eternal and divine, after the same manner as the whole body of the world, together with the spheres of the elements; and the *wholes partially* are no other than the individuals of the various species of animals, such as a man, a horse, and the like.

Now this divine body, on account of its superiority to sublunary natures, was called by Aristotle *a fifth body*, and was said by Plato to be composed for the most part from fire. But in order to a more perfect comprehension of its nature, it is necessary to observe, that the two elements which, according to Plato, are situated in the extremes, are fire and earth, and that the characteristic of the former is *visibility*, and of the latter *tangibility*; so that every thing becomes visible through fire, and tangible through earth. Now the whole of this celestial body, which is called by the ancients heaven, consists of an unburning vivific fire, like the natural heat which our bodies contain, and the illuminations of which give life to our mortal part. But the stars are for the most part composed from this fire, containing at the same time the summits of the other elements. Hence, heaven is wholly of a fiery characteristic, but contains in a causal manner the powers of the other elements; as, for instance, the solidity and stability of earth, the conglutinating and unifying nature of water, and the tenuity and transparency of air.

For,

For, as earth comprehends all things in a terrestrial manner, so the heavens contain all things according to a fiery characteristic.

But the following extraordinary passage from Proclus admirably unfolds the nature of this divine body, and the various gradations of fire and the other elements. "It is necessary to understand (says he ¹) that the fire of the heavens is not the same with sublunary fire, but that this is a divine fire consubstantial with life, and an imitation of intellectual fire; while that which subsists in the sublunary region is entirely material, generated and corruptible. Pure fire, therefore, subsists in the heavens, and there the whole of fire is contained; but earth according to cause, subsisting there as another species of earth, naturally associating with fire, as it is proper it should, and possessing nothing but solidity alone. For, as fire there is illuminative, and not burning, so earth there is not gross and sluggish, but each subsists according to that which is the summit of each. And as pure and true fire is there, so true earth subsists here, and the *wholeness*, *ὁλότης*, of earth ²; and fire is here according to participation, and materially, as earth is according to a primary subsistence. So that in heaven the summit of earth is contained, and in earth the dregs and sediment of fire. But it is evident that the moon has something solid and dark, by her obstructing the light; for obstruction of light is alone the province of earth. The stars too obstruct our sight, by casting a shadow of themselves from on high. But since fire and earth subsist in heaven, it is evident that the middle elements must be there also; air first of all, as being most diaphanous and agile, but water, as being most vaporous: each at the same time subsisting far purer than in the sublunary region, that all things may be in all, and yet in an accommodated manner in each.

"However, that the whole progression and gradations of the elements may become apparent, it is necessary to deduce the speculation of them from on high. These four elements, then, fire, air, water, and earth, subsist first of all in the demiurgus of wholes, uniformly according to cause. For all

¹ In Tim. p. 152.

² For it is necessary that the first subsistence of each of the elements should be, as we have before observed, according to *part total*, in order to the perfect union of the world; and this *part total* is called by the Platonists *ὁλότης*, or a *wholeness*.

causes are previously assumed in him, according to one comprehension; as well the intellectual, divine, pure, and vigorous power of fire, as the containing and vivific cause of air; and as well the prolific and regenerating essence of water, as the firm, immutable, and undeviating form of earth. And this the theologist Orpheus knowing, he thus speaks concerning the demiurgus:

His body's boundless, stable, full of light.

And

Th' extended region of surrounding air
Forms his broad shoulders, back and bosom fair.

Again,

His middle zone's the spreading sea profound.

And

The distant realms of Tartarus obscure
Within earth's roots his holy feet secure;
For these earth's utmost bounds to Jove belong,
And form his basis, permanent and strong.

“But from these demiurgic causes a progression of the elements into the universe takes place, but not immediately into the sublunary world. For how can the most immaterial things give subsistence to the most material without a medium; or things immovable be immediately hypostatic of such as are moved in all directions? Since the progression of things is nowhere without a medium, but subsists according to a well-ordered subjection; and generations into these material, dissipated, and dark abodes, take place through things of a proximate order. Since, therefore, the elements in the demiurgus are intellects and imparticipable intellectual powers, what will be their first progression? Is it not manifest that they will yet remain intellectual powers, but will be participated by mundane natures? For from imparticipable intellect the proximate progression is to that which is participated. And, universally, progression takes place from imparticipables to things participated, and from supernundane to mundane forms. But what are these things which yet remain intellectual, but are participated, and what subjection do they possess? Is it not evident that they are no longer intellectual (i. e. essentially intellectual)? But I call those natures intellectual which are the forms of intellect, and of a truly intellectual essence. But
becoming

becoming participated, and being no longer intellectual, it is evident that they are no longer immovable natures. But, not being immovable, they must be self-motive. For these are proximately suspended from immovable natures; and from things essentially intellectual a progression takes place to such as are so according to participation, and from things immovable to such as are self-motive. These elements, therefore, subsist in life, and are self-motive and intellectual according to participation. But the progression from this must be manifest. For the immediate descent from life is to animal; since this is proximate to life. And from that which is essentially self-motive, to that which is self-motive according to a participation of life. For, so far as it proceeds from life to animal, it suffers a mutation. But so far as it proceeds from that which is immaterial to things immaterial¹, (that is, such as may be called immaterial when contrasted with mutable matter,) and from divine life to a divine essence, it becomes assimilated to them. If, therefore, you take away from hence that which is immaterial and immutable, you will produce that which is mutable and material. And through this, indeed, they are diminished from such as are before them; but on account of the symmetry and order of their motions, and their immutability in their mutations, they become assimilated to them. If, therefore, you take away this order, you will behold the great confusion and inconstancy of the elements; and this will be the last progression, and the very dregs and sediment of all the prior gradations of the elements.

“Of the elements, therefore, some are immovable, imparticipable, intellectual and demiurgic; but others are intellectual and immovable according to essence, but participated by mundane natures. Others again are self-motive, and essentially lives; but others are self-motive and vital, but are not lives. Some again are alter-motive, or moved by another, but are moved in an orderly manner; and, lastly, others have a disordered, tumultuous, and confused subsistence.”

Such then is the progression of the elements, and such the nature of a celestial body. But, if the body of the world be spherical, and this must necessarily be the case, as a sphere is the most perfect of figures, and the world the best of effects, there must be some part in it corresponding to a

¹ He means the divine bodies of the stars, and the body of the heavens; which, compared with sublunary bodies, may be justly called *immaterial bodies*.

centre, and this can be no other than earth. For, in an orderly progression of things, that which is most distant, and the last, is the worst; and this we have already shown is the earth. But in a sphere, that which is most distant from the superficies is the centre; and, therefore, earth is the centre of the world. This conclusion, indeed, will doubtless be ridiculed by every *sagacious* modern, as too absurd in such an *enlightened* age as the present to deserve the labour of a confutation. However, as it follows by an inevitable consequence from the preceding theory, and this theory is founded on the harmonious union of things, we may safely assert that it is consistent with the universe itself. At such a period, indeed, as the present, when there is such a dire perversion of religion, and men of every description are involved in extreme impiety, we cannot wonder that the spirit of profane innovation should cause a similar confusion in the system of the world. For men of the present day being destitute of true science, and not having the least knowledge of the true nature and progressions of things, in the first place make the universe an unconnected production, generated in time, and of course naturally subject to dissolution; and, in the next place, allow of no essential distinction in its principal parts. Hence, the earth is by them hurled into the heavens, and rolled about their central sun in conjunction with the celestial orbs. The planets are supposed to be heavy bodies similar to our sluggish earth; the fixed stars are all so many suns; and the sun himself is a dense, heavy body, occasionally suffering dimness in his light, and covered with dark and fuliginous spots. With respect to this last particular, indeed, they boast of ocular conviction through the assistance of the telescope; and what reasoning can invalidate the testimony of the eyes? I answer, that the eyes in this particular are more deceived when assisted by glasses, than when trusting to their own naked power of perceiving. For, in reality, we do not perceive the heavenly bodies themselves, but their inflammations in the air: or, in other words, certain portions of air enkindled by the swiftness of their course. This at least cannot be denied to be possible; and, if so, it is not at all wonderful that a gross ærial inflammation should, when viewed through a telescope, appear dim and clouded with spots. But this is not an hypothesis of my own invention, but is derived from Ammonius Hermeas, who, as we are informed by Olympiodorus in the *Phædo*, was of this opinion, as also was Heraclitus long before him; who, speaking (says Olym-

piodorus) in his obscure way concerning the sun, says of that luminary "*enkindling measures and extinguishing measures*,"—that is, enkindling an image of himself in the air when he rises, the same becoming extinguished when he sets.

Nor let the moderns fondly imagine that their system of astronomy was adopted by Pythagoras and his followers, for this opinion is confuted by Spanheim and Dickinson; and this, says Fabricius¹, with no contemptible arguments: and we are informed by Simplicius², long before them, that the Pythagoreans by the fire in the middle did not mean the sun, but a demiurgic vivific fire, seated in the centre of the earth. The prophecy of Swift, therefore, in his *Gulliver's Travels*, that the boasted theory of gravitation would at one time or other be exploded, may certainly be considered as a most true prediction, at least so far as relates to the celestial orbs.

But to return from this digression. The inerratic sphere, according to the Platonic philosophy, has the relation of a monad to the multitude of stars which it contains; or, in other words, it is the proximate cause of this multitude which it contains, and with which it has a coordinate subsistence. But, according to the same philosophy, all the planets are fixed in solid spheres, in conformity to the motions of which they perpetually revolve; but, at the same time, have peculiar motions of their own besides those of the spheres³. These spheres too are all concentric, or have the same centre with the earth and the universe, and do not consist of hard impenetrable matter, as the moderns have ignorantly supposed; for being divine or immaterial bodies, such as we have already described, they have nothing of the density and gravity of this our earth, but are able to permeate each other without division, and to occupy the same place together; just like the illuminations emitted from several lamps, which pass through the whole of the same room at once, and pervade each other without confusion, divulsion, or any apparent distinction. So that these spheres are similar to mathematical bodies, so far as they are immaterial, free from contrariety, and exempt from every passive quality; but are different from them, so far as they are full of motion and life. But they are concealed from our sight through the

¹ Vid. Biblioth. Græc. vol. 1. de Orpheo.

² In Aristot. de Cælo, lib. 2.

³ For Plato makes no mention of epicycles and eccentric circles.

tenuity and subtilty of their nature, while, on the contrary, the fire of the planets which are carried in them is visible through the solidity which it possesses. So that earth is more predominant in the planets than in the spheres; though each subsists, for the most part, according to the characteristic of fire. But let it be carefully remembered, that the peculiarity of all fire is the *being visible*, but that neither heat nor fluidity belongs to every species of fire: and that the property of all earth is the *being tangible*, but that gravity and subsiding downwards do not belong to all.

But, in consequence of each of these spheres being a *όλοτης*, or *part with a total subsistence*, as we have already explained, it follows that every planet has a number of satellites surrounding it, analogous to the choir of the fixed stars? and that every sphere is full of Gods, angels, and dæmons, subsisting according to the properties of the spheres in which they reside. This theory indeed is the grand key to the theology of the antients, as it shows us at one view why the same God is so often celebrated with the names of other Gods; which led Macrobius formerly to think that all the Gods were nothing more than the different powers of the sun; and has induced certain superficial moderns, to frame hypotheses concerning the antient theology so ridiculous, that they deserve to be considered in no other light than the ravings of a madman, or the undisciplined conceptions of a child. But that the reader may be fully convinced of this, let him attend to the following extraordinary passages from the divine commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus. And, in the first place, that every planet is attended with a great number of satellites, is evident from the following citation;—"There are other divine animals attending upon the circulations of the planets, the leaders of which are the seven planets; and these revolve and return in their circulations in conjunction with their leaders, just as the fixed stars are governed by the circulation of the innerratic sphere."—Εἶδεναι καὶ ἀλλὰ ζῶα θεῖα εἰς οὐρανία συνεπομένα ταῖς τῶν πλανημένων περιφοραῖς, ὧν ἡγέμονες εἰσιν οἱ ἑπτὰ.—Καὶ συμπεριπολεῖ, καὶ συναποκαθίσταται ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀρχαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀπλανῆ κρατεῖται ὑπὸ τῆς ὅλης περιφοράς¹. And in the same place he informs us, that the revolution of these satellites is similar to that of the planets which they attend; and this, he acquaints us a little before, is according to Plato a spiral revolution. Καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρεπομένα ἐστὶ, καὶ πλανῆν ἔχοντα τοιαύτην, ὅταν εἰρηκέν περὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ μικρῶ προτερον.

¹ Vid. Procl. in Tim. p. 279.

Again, with respect to their number—"about every planet there is a number (of satellites) analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, all of them subsisting with proper circulations of their own".—Ἔστι γὰρ καθ' ἑκάστην ἀριθμὸς ἀναλογὸν τῶν τῶν ἀστέρων χορῶν, συνυφέστιος ταῖς οἰκείαις περιφοραῖς.—And if it should be inquired why, with respect to the fixed stars, there is one monad, the *wholeness* (ὁλότης) of them; but among the planets there is both a *ὁλότης*, *wholeness* or *totality*, that is the sphere of each, and a leader besides in each, that is the apparent orb; he answers in the same place, that as the motion of the planets is more various than that of the fixed stars, so their possession of government is more abundant, for they proceed into a greater multitude. He adds—But in the sublunary regions there is still a greater number of governors; for the *monads* (that is, *totalities*) in the heavens generate a number analogous to themselves. So that the planets being secondary to the fixed stars, require a twofold government; one of which is more total and the other more partial.

But with respect to the satellites, the first in order about every planet are Gods; after these, dæmons revolve in lucid orbicular bodies; and these are followed by partial souls such as ours, as the following beautiful passage abundantly evinces. "But that in each of these (the planetary spheres) there is a multitude coordinate to each, you may infer from the extremes. For if the innerratic sphere has a multitude coordinate to itself, and earth is, with respect to terrestrial animals, what the innerratic sphere is to such as are celestial, it is necessary that every *wholeness* should possess certain partial animals coordinate to itself, through which also the spheres derive the appellation of *wholenesses*. But the natures situated in the middle are concealed from our sense, while, in the mean time, those contained in the extremes are apparent; one sort through their transcendently lucid essence, and the other through their alliance to ourselves. But if partial souls are disseminated about these spheres, some about the sun, some about the moon, and others about each of the remaining spheres²; and if prior to souls there are dæmons filling up the herds of which they are the leaders; it is evidently beautifully said that each of the spheres is a world. And this is agreeable to the doctrines of theologists, when they teach us that there are Gods in every sphere

¹ Page 275.

² This Plato himself asserts in the following dialogue.

prior to dæmons, the government of some receiving its perfection under that of others. As for instance with respect to our queen the Moon, that she contains the goddesses Hecate and Diana ; and with respect to our sovereign the Sun, and the Gods which he contains, theologists celebrate Bacchus as subsisting there,

The Sun's assessor, who with watchful eye
Inspects the sacred pole :

They also celebrate Jupiter as seated there, Osiris, and a solar Pan, as likewise other divinities, of which the books of theologists and theurgists are full; from all which it is evident how true it is that each of the planets is the leader of many Gods, which fill up its proper circulation ¹.”—Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τούτων πλῆθος ἐστὶν ἑκάστη συστοιχόν, κατασκευασείας ἀν' ἀπο τῶν ἀκρῶν. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀπλῆς ἔχει συστοιχόν ἑαυτῇ πλῆθος, καὶ ἡ γῆ τῶν χθονίων ζῶων ἐστὶ, ὡς ἐκείνη τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀναγκὴ καὶ ἑκάστην ὁλοτῆτα παντὶ ἔχειν μέρηκα αὐτῆς συστοιχὰ πρὸς αὐτὴ ζῶα, διὰ καὶ ὁλοτῆτες λεγόνται. Λαμβάνει δὲ ἡμῶν τὰ μέσα τὴν αἰσθησίν, τῶν ἀκρῶν δὴλων ὄντων, τῶν μὲν, διὰ τὴν ὑπερλαμπρὸν οὐσίαν, τῶν δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς συγγενείαν. Εἰ δὲ καὶ μερικαὶ ψυχὰι περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐσπαρήσαν, ἀλλὰ μὲν περὶ ἥλιον, ἀλλὰ δὲ περὶ σελήνην, ἀλλὰ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστον τῶν λοιπῶν, καὶ πρὸ τῶν ψυχῶν δαίμονες συμπληροῦσι τὰς ἀγέλας ὧν εἰσὶν ἡγεμόνες, δὴλον ὅτι καλῶς εἰρητὰ κόσμον ἑκάστην εἶναι τῶν σφαιρῶν, καὶ τῶν θεολογῶν ἡμᾶς ταῦτα διδάσκοντων, ὅποταν περὶ ἑκάστους θεοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, πρὸ τῶν δαίμονων, ἀλλοὺς ὑπο τῶν ἄλλων τελούντας ἡγεμονίαν, οἷον, καὶ περὶ τῆς δεσποίνης ἡμῶν Σελήνης, ὅτι καὶ ἡ Ἑκάτη θεὰ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ ἡ Ἀρτεμις, καὶ περὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἥλιου καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ θεῶν, τὸν ἐκεῖ Διόνυσον ὑμνούντες, Ἡέλιος παρὲδρος ἐπισκοπεῖν πολλοὺς ἀγῶν, τὸν Δία τὸν ἐκεῖ, τὸν Ὀσίριν, τὸν Πανά τὸν ἡλιακόν, τοὺς ἄλλους, ὧν οἱ βίβλοι πληρεῖς εἰσὶ τῶν θεολογῶν καὶ τῶν θεωργῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντων δὴλον, ὅπως ἀληθές, καὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἑκάστον ἀγέλαρχὴν εἶναι πολλῶν θεῶν, συμπληρουμένων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδίαν περιφορὰν.

Now, from this extraordinary passage, we may perceive at one view why the Sun in the Orphic hymns is called Jupiter, why Apollo is called Pan, and Bacchus the sun ; why the Moon seems to be the same with Rhea, Ceres, Proserpine, Juno, Venus, &c. and, in short, why any one divinity is celebrated with the names and epithets of so many of the rest. For from this sublime theory it follows that every sphere contains a Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, and in short every deity, each sphere at the same time conferring on these Gods the peculiar characteristic of its nature ; so that, for instance,

¹ Procl. in Tim. p. 279.

in the sun they all possess a solar property, in the moon a lunar one, and so of the rest. From this theory too we may perceive the truth of that divine saying of the ancients, that all things are full of Gods; for more particular orders proceed from such as are more general, the mundane from the supermundane, and the sublunary from the celestial; while earth becomes the general receptacle of the illuminations of all the Gods. "Hence (says Proclus ¹) there is a terrestrial Ceres, Vesta, and Isis, as likewise a terrestrial Jupiter and a terrestrial Hermes, established about the one divinity of the earth; just as a multitude of celestial Gods proceeds about the one divinity of the heavens. For there are progressions of all the celestial Gods into the earth; and earth contains all things, in an earthly manner, which heaven comprehends celestially. Hence we speak of a terrestrial Bacchus, and a terrestrial Apollo, who bestows the all-various streams of water with which the earth abounds, and openings 'prophetic of futurity.'" And if to all this we only add that all the other mundane Gods subsist in the twelve above mentioned, and that the first triad of these is *демиургic* or *fabricative*, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; the second, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, *defensive*; the third, Ceres, Juno, Diana, *vivific*; and the fourth, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, *elevating* and *harmonic*:—I say, if we unite this with the preceding theory, there is nothing in the ancient theology that will not appear admirably sublime and beautifully connected, accurate in all its parts, scientific and divine. Such then being the true account of the Grecian theology, what opinion must we form of the wretched systems of modern mythologists; and which most deserves our admiration, the impudence or ignorance of the authors of such systems? The systems indeed of these men are so monstrously absurd, that we may consider them as instances of the greatest distortion of the rational faculty which can possibly befall human nature, while connected with such a body as the present. For one of these considers the Gods as merely symbols of agriculture, another as men who once lived on the earth ², and a third as the patriarchs and prophets of the Jews. Surely should these systems be transmitted to posterity, the historian by whom they are related must either be considered by future generations as an impostor, or his narration must be viewed in the light of an extravagant romance.

I only add, as a conclusion to this sublime theory, that though the whole

¹ In Tim. p. 282.

² See my notes on the Cratylus.

of the celestial region is composed from the four elements, yet in some places fire in conjunction with earth (*i. e.* earth without gravity and density) predominates; in others fire, with the summit of water; and in others again fire with the summit of air: and according to each of these an all-various mutation subsists. Hence some bodies in the heavens are visible, and these are such as have fire united with the solid; but others are still more visible¹, and these are such as have fire mingled with the splendid and diaphanous nature of air. And hence the spheres of the planets, and the inerratic sphere itself, possess a more attenuated and diaphanous essence; but the stars are of a more solid composition. But fire every where prevails, and all heaven is characterized through the power of this exalted element. And neither is the fire there caustic (for this is not even the property of the first of the sublunary elements, which Aristotle calls *fiery*, πυροειδές) nor corruptive of any thing, nor of a nature contrary to earth; but it perpetually shines with a pure and transparent light, with vivific heat, and illuminating power.

And such are the outlines of the system of the world, according to Pythagoras and Plato; which, strange as the assertion may seem, appears to have been but little known from the æra of the emperor Justinian to the present time. That beautiful mode in which as we have shown the elements subsist both in the heavens and the earth, has not been even suspected by modern natural philosophers to have any existence; and astronomers have been very far from the truth in their assertions concerning the celestial spheres. In consequence of indolence, or ignorance, or prejudice, or from all three in conjunction, the moderns have invented systems no less discordant with the nature of things than different from each other. They have just been able to gain a glimpse of the beautiful union of things in the vegetable and animal tribes belonging to the earth, and have discovered that the lowest of the animal species and the highest of the vegetable approximate so near to each other, that the difference between the two can scarcely be perceived; but this is the very summit of their researches; they are unable to trace the connection of things any further, and rest satisfied in admitting that

The chain continues, but with links unknown.

¹ That is, in themselves: but they are invisible to us, on account of their possessing but little of the resisting nature of earth; and this is the reason why we cannot see the celestial spheres.

The divine nature of the celestial bodies cannot be seen through the telescope, and incorporeals are not to be viewed with a microscopic eye: but these instruments are at present the great standards of truth; and whatever opposes or cannot be ascertained by the testimony of these, is considered as mere conjecture, idle speculation, and a perversion of the reasoning power.

But let us now proceed to a summary view of some of the principle parts of this most interesting dialogue. And, in the first place, with respect to the history which is related in the beginning, concerning a war between the inhabitants of the Atlantic island and the Athenians:—Crantor, the most early of Plato's commentators, considered this relation (says Proclus) as a mere history unconnected with allegory; while other Platonists, on the contrary, have considered it as an allegory alone. But both these opinions are confuted by Proclus and the best of the Platonists; because Plato calls it a very wonderful, but at the same time true, narration. So that it is to be considered as a true history, exhibiting at the same time an image of the opposition of the natures which the universe contains. But according to Amelius ¹ it represents the opposition between the inerratic sphere and the fixed stars; according to Origen ², the contest between dæmons of a superior and those of an inferior order; according to Numenius, the disagreement between more excellent souls who are the attendants of Pallas, and such as are conversant with generation under Neptune. Again, according to Porphyry, it insinuates the contest between dæmons deducing souls into generation, and souls ascending to the Gods. For Porphyry gives a three-fold distinction to dæmons; asserting that some are divine, that others subsist according to habitude, *κατα σχῆσιν*, among which partial souls rank when they are allotted a dæmoniacal condition, and that others are evil and noxious to souls. He asserts, therefore, that this lowest order of dæmons always contends with souls in their ascent and descent, especially western dæmons; for, according to the Egyptians, the west is accommodated to dæmons of this description. But the exposition of Jamblichus, Syrianus and Proclus is doubtless to be preferred, as more consistent with the nature of the dialogue; which refers it to the opposition perpetually flourishing in the universe between unity and

¹ A disciple of Plotinus contemporary with Porphyry.

² Not the father, of that name, but a disciple of Ammonius Saccas, and contemporary with Plotinus.

multitude,

multitude, bound and infinity, sameness and difference, motion and permanency, from which all things, the first cause being excepted, are composed. Likewise, being has either an essential or accidental subsistence, and is either incorporeal or corporeal: and if incorporeal, it either verges or does not verge to body. But bodies are either simple and immaterial, as the celestial bodies, or simple and material, as those of an ærial nature, or composite and material, as those of earth. So that the opposition of all these is occultly signified by that antient war; the higher and more excellent natures being every where implied by the Athenians, and those of a contrary order by the inhabitants of the Atlantic island.

That the reader, however, may be convinced that Plato's account of the Atlantic island is not a fiction of his own devising, let him attend to the following relation of one Marcellus, who wrote an history of Æthiopian affairs, according to Proclus¹:—"That such, and so great, an island once existed, is evinced by those who have composed histories of things relative to the external sea. For they relate that in their times there were seven islands in the Atlantic sea, sacred to Proserpine: and besides these, three others of an immense magnitude; one of which was sacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and another, which is the middle of these, and is of a thousand stadia, to Neptune. And besides this, that the inhabitants of this last island preserved the memory of the prodigious magnitude of the Atlantic island, as related by their ancestors; and of its governing for many periods all the islands in the Atlantic sea. And such is the relation of Marcellus in his Æthiopic history."

Ὅτι μὲν ἐγένετο τοιαυτὴ τις νῆσος καὶ τετρακάυτη, δὴλοῦσι τινες τῶν ἱστορούντων τὰ περὶ τῆς ἑξω θαλάττης. εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖν χρόνοις ἑπτὰ μὲν νήσους ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ πελάγει Περσεφόνης ἱέρως, τρεῖς δὲ ἄλλας ἀπλῆτους, τὴν μὲν Πλουτωνος, τὴν δὲ Ἀμμωνος, μιστὴν δὲ τουτοῦ ἀλλήν Προσείδωνος, χιλίων σταδίων τὸ μέγεθος. Καὶ τοὺς οἰκούντας ἐν αὐτῇ μνημὴν ἀπὸ τῶν προγεγονότων διασωζέειν περὶ τῆς Ἀτλαντίδος οὕτως γενομένης ἐκείνῃ νήσου παμμεγίστου τῆς, ἣν ἐπὶ πολλὰς περιόδους δουλαστέεται πατρῶν τῶν ἐν Ἀτλαντικῇ πελάγει νήσων. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Μαρκελλὸς ἐν τοῖς Αἰθιοπικοῖς γέγραφε.

Indeed it is not at all wonderful that so large an island should once have existed, nor improbable that many more such exist at present, though to us unknown, if we only consider the Platonic theory concerning the earth, of which the reader will find an account in the Introduction to the Phædo, and

¹ In Tim. p. 55.

which the following extraordinary passage from Proclus¹ abundantly confirms. "It is here (says he) requisite to remember the Platonic hypotheses concerning the earth. For Plato does not measure its magnitude after the same manner as mathematicians; but thinks that its interval is much greater, as Socrates asserts in the *Phædo*. In which dialogue also he says, that there are many habitable parts similar to our abode². And hence he relates that an island and continent of this kind exist in the external or Atlantic sea. For, indeed, if the earth be naturally spherical, it is necessary that it should be such according to its greatest part. But the parts which we inhabit, both internally and externally, exhibit great inequality. In some parts of the earth, therefore, there must be an expanded plain, and an interval extended on high. For, according to the saying of Heraclitus, he who passes through a very profound region will arrive at the Atlantic mountain, whose magnitude is such, according to the relation of the *Æthiopian* historians, that it touches the æther, and casts a shadow of five thousand stadia in extent; for from the ninth hour of the day the sun is concealed by it, even to his perfect demerision under the earth. Nor is this wonderful: for Athos, a Macedonian mountain, casts a shadow as far as to Lemnos, which is distant from it seven hundred stadia. Nor are such particulars as these, which Marcellus the *Æthiopic* historian mentions, related only concerning the Atlantic mountain; but Ptolemy also says that the lunar mountains are of an immense height; and Aristotle, that Caucasus is enlightened by the rays of the sun a third part of the night after sun-set, and a third part before the rising of the sun. And if any one considers the whole magnitude of the earth,

¹ In *Tim.* p. 56.

² The latter Platonists appear to have been perfectly convinced that the earth contains two quarters in an opposite direction to Europe and Asia; and Olympiodorus even considers Plato as of the same opinion, as the following passage from his commentary on this part of the *Phædo* clearly evinces.—"Plato (says he) directs his attention to four parts of the globe, as there are two parts which we inhabit, i. e. Europe and Asia; so that there must be two others, in consequence of the antipodes." *Καταστοχαζεται δε των τεσσαρων (τοπων) επειδη δυο καθ' ημας εισιν, η Ευρωπη και η Ασια, ωστε δυο αλλοι κατα τους αντιποδας.* Now in consequence of this, as they were acquainted with Africa, the remaining fourth quarter must be that which we call America. At the same time let it be carefully remembered, that these four quarters are nothing more than four holes with respect to the whole earth, which contains many such parts; and that consequently they are not quarters of the earth itself, but only of a small part of the earth in which they are contained, like a small globe in one of a prodigious extent.

bounded by its elevated parts, he will conclude that it is truly of a prodigious magnitude, according to the assertion of Plato."

In the next place, by the fable of Phaëton we must understand the destruction of a considerable part of the earth through fire, by means of a comet being dissolved of a solar nature. Likewise, when he mentions a deluge, it is necessary to remember, that through the devastations of these two elements, fire and water, a more prolific regeneration of things takes place at certain periods of time; and that when Divinity intends a reformation, the heavenly bodies concur with this design in such a manner, that when a conflagration is about to take place, then, according to Berosus ¹ the Chaldæan, all the planets are collected together in Cancer; but when a deluge, then the planets meet in Capricorn. With respect to Pallas and Neptune, who are mentioned in this part of the dialogue, as the reader will find an account of these Divinities in the Notes to the Cratylus, I shall only add at present, that, according to Proclus, Minerva most eminently presides in the celestial constellation called the Ram, and in the equinoctial circle, where a power motive of the universe principally prevails.

Again, it is necessary to understand, that when the world is said by Plato to be *generated*, this term expresses its flowing and composite nature, and does not imply any temporal commencement of its existence. For, as the world was necessarily produced according to essential power, this being the most perfect of all modes of operation, it is also necessary that it should be coexistent with its artificer; just as the sun produces light coexistent with itself, fire heat, and snow coldness. The reader must, however, carefully observe, that when we say it is necessary that the cause of the universe should operate according to power, we do not understand a necessity which implies violence or constraint; but that necessity which Aristotle ² defines as the perfectly simple, and which cannot have a multifarious subsistence. And hence this term, when applied to the most exalted natures, to whom alone in this sense it belongs, signifies nothing more than an impossibility of subsisting otherwise than they do, without falling from the perfection of their nature. Agreeably to this definition, Necessity was called by ancient theologists Adrastia and Themis, or the perfectly right and just:

¹ Vid. Senec. Natural. Quæst. III. 29.

² Metaphys. lib. 5.

and if men of the present day had but attended to this signification of the word, i. e. if any edition of Aristotle's works, with a *copious index* mentioning this sense of necessity, had fortunately existed, they would not have ignorantly supposed that this word, when applied to divine natures, signified constraint, violence, and over-ruling power. As intellect, therefore, is eternal, both according to essence and energy, and as soul is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy, so the world is temporal both in essence and energy. Hence, every thing prior to soul always *is*, and is never generated; but soul both *is*, and is perpetually generated; and the world never *is*, but is always generated: and whatever the world contains in like manner never is; but instead of being always generated, like the whole world, is so at some particular time. Because the world therefore is conversant with perpetual motion and time, it may be said to be always generated, or advancing towards being; and therefore never truly is. So that it resembles the image of a mountain beheld in a torrent, which has the appearance of a mountain without the reality, and which is continually renewed by the continual renovation of the stream. But soul, which is eternal in essence, and temporal in energy, may be compared to the image of the same rock beheld in a pool, and which, of course, when compared with the image in the torrent, may be said to be permanently the same. In fine, as Proclus well observes, Plato means nothing more by *generation* than the formation of bodies, i. e. a motion or procession towards the integrity and perfection of the universe.

Again, by the *демиургος* and *father* of the world we must understand Jupiter, who subsists at the extremity of the *intellectual triad*¹; and *αὐτοζών*, or *animal itself*, which is the exemplar of the world, and from the contemplation of which it was fabricated by Jupiter, is the last of the *intelligible triad*, and is same with the Phanes of Orpheus: for the theologist represents Phanes as an animal with the heads of various beasts, as may be seen in our Notes to the Parmenides. Nor let the reader be disturbed on finding that, according to Plato, the first cause is not the immediate cause of the universe; for this is not through any defect or imbecility of nature, but, on the contrary, is the consequence of transcendency of power. For, as the first cause

¹ See the Notes on the Cratylus and Parmenides.

is the same with *the one*, a unifying energy must be the prerogative of his nature; and as he is likewise perfectly superessential, if the world were his immediate progeny, it must be as much as possible superessential and profoundly one: but as this is not the case, it is necessary that it should be formed by intellect and moved by soul. So that it derives the unity and goodness of its nature from the first cause, the orderly disposition and distinction of its parts from Jupiter its artificer, and its perpetual motion from soul; the whole at the same time proceeding from the first cause through proper mediums. Nor is it more difficult to conceive matter after this manner invested with form and distributed into order, than to conceive a potter making clay with his own hands, giving it a shape when made, through the assistance of a wheel, and, when fashioned, adorning it through another instrument with figures; at the same time being careful to remember, that in this latter instance different instruments are required through the imbecility of the artificer, but that in the former various mediums are necessary from the transcendency of power which subsists in the original cause. And from all this it is easy to infer, that matter was not prior to the world by any interval of time, but only in the order of composition; priority here implying nothing more than that which must be considered as first in the construction of the world. Nor was it hurled about in a disordered state prior to order; but this only signifies its confused and tumultuous nature, when considered in itself, divested of the supervening irradiations of form.

With respect to the four elements, I add, in addition to what has been said before, that their powers are beautifully disposed by Proclus as follows, viz:

FIRE.	AIR.
Subtle, acute, movable.	Subtle, blunt, movable.
WATER.	EARTH.
Dense, blunt, movable.	Dense, blunt, immovable.

In which disposition you may perceive how admirably the two extremes fire and earth are connected, though indeed it is the peculiar excellence of the Platonic philosophy to find out in every thing becoming mediums through that part of the dialectic art called division; and it is owing to this that the
philosophy

philosophy itself forms so regular and consistent a whole. But I have invented the following numbers for the purpose of representing this distribution of the elements arithmetically.

Let the number 60 represent fire, and 480 earth; and the mediums between these, viz. 120 and 240, will correspond to air and water. For as $60 : 120 :: 240 : 480$. But $60 = 3 \times 5 \times 4$. $120 = 3 \times 10 \times 4$. $240 = 6 \times 10 \times 4$. and $480 = 6 \times 10 \times 8$. So that these numbers will correspond to the properties of the elements as follows :

FIRE :			AIR ::		
3 ×	5 ×	4 :	3 ×	10 ×	4 ::
Subtle, acute, movable :			Subtle, blunt, movable.		
WATER :			EARTH.		
6 ×	10 ×	4 ::	6 ×	10 ×	8
Dense, blunt, movable ::			Dense, blunt, immovable.		

With respect to fire it must be observed, that the Platonists consider *light*, *flame*, and *a burning coal*, $\phi\omega\varsigma$, $\phi\lambda\omicron\xi$, $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\alpha\xi$, as differing from each other; and that a subjection or remission of fire takes place from on high to the earth, proceeding, as we have before observed, from that which is more immaterial, pure, and incorporeal, as far as to the most material and dense bodies : the last profection of fire being subterranean; for, according to Empedocles, there are many rivers of fire under the earth. So that one kind of fire is material and another immaterial, i. e. when compared with sublunary matter; and one kind is corruptible, but another incorruptible; and one is mixed with air, but another is perfectly pure. The characteristic too of fire is neither heat nor a motion upwards, for this is the property only of our terrestrial fire; and this in consequence of not subsisting in its proper place : but the essential peculiarity of fire is visibility; for this belongs to all fire, i. e. to the *divine*, the *mortal*, the *burning*, and the *impetuous*. It must, however, be carefully observed, that our eyes are by no means the standards of this visibility : for we cannot perceive the celestial spheres, on account of fire and air in their composition so much predominating over earth; and many terrestrial bodies emit no light when considerably heated, owing

owing to the fire which they contain being wholly absorbed, as it were, in gross and ponderous earth.

In like manner, with respect to earth, the characteristic of its nature is solidity and tangibility, but not ponderosity and a tendency downwards; for these properties do not subsist in every species of earth. Hence, when we consider these two elements according to their opposite subsistence, we shall find that fire is always in motion, but earth always immovable; that fire is eminently visible, and earth eminently tangible; and that fire is of a most attenuated nature through light, but that earth is most dense through darkness. So that as fire is essentially the cause of light, in like manner, earth is essentially the cause of darkness; while air and water subsisting as mediums between these two, are, on account of their diaphanous nature, the causes of visibility to other things, but not to themselves. In the mean time moisture is common both to air and water, connecting and conglutinating earth, but becoming the seat of fire, and affording nourishment and stability to its flowing nature.

With respect to the composition of the mundane soul, it is necessary to observe that there are five genera of being, from which all things after the first being are composed, viz. *essence, permanency, motion, sameness, difference*. For every thing must possess *essence*; must *abide* in its cause, from which also it must *proceed*, and to which it must be *converted*; must be the *same* with itself and certain other natures, and at the same time *different* from others and distinguished in itself. But Plato, for the sake of brevity, assumes only three of these in the composition of the soul, viz. *essence, sameness, and difference*; for the other two must necessarily subsist in conjunction with these. But by a nature impartible, or without parts, we must understand intellect, and by that nature which is divisible about body, corporeal life. The mundane soul, therefore, is a medium between the mundane intellect and the whole of that corporeal life which the world participates. We must not, however, suppose that when the soul is said to be mingled from these two, the impartible and partible natures are consumed in the mixture, as is the case when corporeal substances are mingled together; but we must understand that the soul is of a middle nature between these, so as to be different from each, and yet a participant of each.

The first numbers of the soul are these: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27; but the other numbers are,

6	
8	9
9	12
12	18
16	27
18	36
24	54
32	81
36	108
48	162

But in order to understand these numbers mathematically, it is necessary to know, in the first place, what is meant by arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic proportion. Arithmetical proportion, then, is when an equal excess is preserved in three or more given numbers; geometrical, when numbers preserve the same ratio; and harmonic, when the middle term is exceeded by the greater, by the same part of the greater as the excess of the middle term above the lesser exceeds the lesser. Hence, the numbers 1, 2, 3, are in arithmetical proportion; 2, 4, 8, in geometrical, since as 2 is to 4, so is 4 to 8; and 6, 4, 3, are in harmonic proportion, for 4 is exceeded by 6 by 2, which is a third part of 6, and 4 exceeds 3 by 1, which is the third part of 3. Again, sesquialter proportion is when one number contains another and the half of it besides, such as the proportion of three to 2; but sesquitercian proportion takes place when a greater number contains a lesser, and besides this, a third part of the lesser, as 4 to 3; and a sesquioctave ratio is when a greater number contains a lesser one, and an eighth part of it besides, as 9 to 8; and this proportion produces in music an entire tone, which is the principle of all symphony. But a tone contains five symphonies, viz. the *diateffaron*, or sesquitercian proportion, which is composed from two tones, and a semitone, which is a sound less than a tone; the *diaphente*, or sesquialter proportion, which is composed from three tones and a semitone; the *diapafon*, or duple proportion, i. e. four to two, which is composed from six tones; the *diapafon diaphente*, which consists of nine tones
and

and a semitone; and the *disfiliaphson*, or quadruple proportion, i. e. four to one, which contains twelve tones.

But it is necessary to observe further concerning a tone, that it cannot be divided into two equal parts; because it is composed from a sesquioctave proportion, and 9 cannot be divided into two equal parts. Hence, it can only be divided into two unequal parts, which are usually called semitones; but by Plato *λειμματα*, or *remainders*. But the lesser part of a tone was called by the Pythagoreans *diesis*, or *divisjon*; and this is surpassed by a sesquitercian proportion by two tones; and the remaining greater part, by which the tone surpasses the less semitone, is called *apotome*, or a *cutting off*.

But as it is requisite to explain the different kinds of harmony, in order to a knowledge of the composition of symphonies, let the reader take notice that harmony receives a triple division, into the Diatonic, Enharmonic, and Chromatic. And the Diatonic genus takes place when its division continually proceeds through a less semitone and two tones. But the Enharmonic proceeds through two dieses. And the Chromatic is that which ascends through two unequal semitones and three semitones; or *τρίημιτονιον*, according to the appellation of the antient musicians. And to these three genera all musical instruments are reduced, because they are all composed from these harmonies. But though there were many different kinds of instruments among the antients, yet the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophers used only three—the Monochord, the Tetrachord, and the Polychord; to which three they refer the composition of all the other instruments. From among all these, therefore, Plato assumes the *diatonic* harmony, as more agreeable to nature; in which the tetrachord proceeds through a less semitone and two tones; tending by this means from a less to a greater semitone, as from a more slender to a more powerful matter, which possesses a simple form, and is at the same time both gentle and robust. And hence, as all instruments are conversant with these three kinds of harmony, Plato, says Proclus, in consequence of preferring the diatonic harmony, alone uses two tones when he orders us to fill up the sesquitercian, sesquioctave and semitone intervals.

With respect to the first numbers, which are evidently those described by Plato, the first three of these, 1, 2, 3, as Syrianus beautifully observes, may

be considered as representing the soul of the world, abiding in, proceeding from, and returning to, herself, viz. abiding according to that first part, proceeding through the second, and this without any passivity or imbecility, but returning according to the third: for that which is perfective accedes to beings through conversion. But as the whole of the mundane soul is perfect, united with intelligibles, and eternally abiding in intellect, hence she providentially presides over secondary natures; in one respect indeed over those which are as it were proximately connected with herself, and in another over solid and compacted bulks. But her providence over each of these is twofold. For those which are connected with her essence in a following order, proceed from her according to the power of the fourth term (4), which possesses generative powers; but return to her according to the fifth (9), which reduces them to one. Again, solid natures, and all the species which are discerned in corporeal masses, proceed according to the octuple of the first part (i. e. according to 8), which number is produced by two, is solid, and possesses generative powers proceeding to all things; but they return according to the number 27, which is the regression of solids, proceeding as it were from the ternary, and existing of the same order according to nature: for such are all odd numbers.

And thus much for the first series of numbers, in which duple and triple ratios are comprehended; but after this follows another series, in which the duple are filled with sesquitertian and sesquialter ratios, and the sesquitertian spaces receive a tone. And here, in the first place, in the duple progression between 6 and 12, we may perceive two mediums, 8 and 9. And 8 indeed subsists between 6 and 12 in an harmonic ratio; for it exceeds 6 by a third part of 6, and it is in like manner exceeded by 12 by a third part of 12. Likewise 8 is in a sesquitertian ratio to 6, but 12 is sesquialter to 8. Besides, the difference between 12 and 8 is 4, but the difference between 8 and 6 is 2. And hence, 4 to 2, as well as 12 to 6, contains a duple ratio: and these are the ratios in which the artifice of harmony is continually employed. We may likewise compare 9 to 6 which is sesquialter, 12 to 9 which is sesquitertian, and 9 to 8 which is sesquioctave, and forms a tone; and from this comparison we shall perceive that two sesquitertian ratios are bound together by this sesquioctave, viz. 8 to 6 and 9 to 12. Nor is an arithmetical medium wanting in these numbers; for 9 exceeds 6 by 3, and is by the same number exceeded

exceeded by 12. And in the same manner we may proceed in all the following duple ratios, binding the duple by the sesquitertian and sesquialter, and connecting the two sesquitertians by a sesqui octave ratio. We may run through the triple proportions too in a similar manner, excepting in the tone. But because sesquitertian ratios are not alone produced from two tones, but from a semitone, and this a lesser, which is deficient from a full tone by certain small parts, hence Plato says, that in the sesquitertian ratios a certain small portion remains ¹. And thus much may suffice for an epitome of the mode in which the duple and triple intervals are filled.

But the words of Plato respecting these intervals plainly show, as Proclus well observes, that he follows in this instance the doctrine of the ancient theologists. For they assert, that in the artificer of the universe there are separating and connecting powers, and that through the former he separates his government from that of his father Saturn, but through the latter applies the whole of his fabrication to his paternal unity; and they call these operations incisions and bonds. Hence the demiurgus, dividing the essence of the soul, according to these powers in demiurgic bounds, is said to cut the parts from their totality, and again to bind the same with certain bonds, which are μέσσητες, *middles* or *mediums*, and through which he connects that which is divided, in the same manner as he divides, through sections, that which is united. And as the first numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, represented those powers of the soul by which she abides in, proceeds from, and returns to, herself, and causes the progression and conversion of the parts of the universe—so, in these second numbers, the sesquitertian, sesquialter, and other ratios constitute the more particular ornament of the world; and, while they subsist as wholes themselves, adorn the parts of its parts.

I only add, that we must not suppose these numbers of the soul to be a multitude of unities; but we must conceive them to be vital self-motive natures, which are indeed the images of intellectual numbers, but the exemplars of such as are apparent to the eye of sense. In like manner, with respect to harmony, soul is neither harmony itself, nor that which subsists in harmonized natures. For harmony itself is uniform, separate, and exempt from the whole of things harmonized; but that which subsists in things har-

¹ The proportion of 256 to 243 produces what is called in music *λεμμα*, *limma*, or that which remains.

monized is dependent on others, by which also it is naturally moved. But the harmony of the soul subsists in the middle of these two, imparting harmony to others, and being the first participant of it herself.

In order to understand the figure of the soul, in the first place, mathematically, conceive all the above-mentioned numbers to be described in a certain straight rule, according to the whole of its breadth; and conceive this rule to be afterwards divided according to its length. Then all these ratios will subsist in each part of the section. For, if the division were made according to breadth, it would be necessary that some of the numbers should be separated on this side, and others on that. Afterwards let the two lengths of the rule be mutually applied to each other, viz. in the points which divide these lengths in half: but let them not be so applied as to form right angles, for the intended circles are not of this kind. Again, let the two lengths be so incurved, that the extremes may touch each other; then two circles will be produced, one interior and the other exterior, and they will be mutually oblique to each other. But one of these will be the circle of *sameness*, and the other of *difference*; and the one will subsist according to the equinoctial circle, but the other according to the zodiac: for every circle of difference is rolled about this, as of identity about the equinoctial. Hence, these rectilinear sections ought not to be applied at right angles, but according to the similitude of the letter X, agreeably to the mind of Plato, so that the angles in the summit only may be equal; for neither does the zodiac cut the equinoctial at right angles. And thus much for the mathematical explanation of the figure of the soul.

But again, says Proclus, referring the whole of our discourse to the essence of the soul, we shall say that, according to the mathematical disciplines, continuous and discrete quantity seem in a certain respect to be contrary to each other; but in soul both concur together, i. e. union and division. For soul is both unity and multitude, and one reason and many; and so far as she is a whole she is continuous, but so far as number she is divided, according to the reasons which she contains. Hence, according to her continuity, she is assimilated to the union of intelligibles; but, according to her multitude, to their distinction. And if you are willing to ascend still higher in speculations, soul, according to her union, possesses a vestige and resemblance of *the one*, but according to her division she exhibits the multitude

of

of divine numbers. Hence we must not say that she alone possesses an arithmetical essence, for she would not be continuous; nor alone a geometrical essence, for she would not be divided: she is therefore both at once, and must be called both arithmetical and geometrical. But so far as she is arithmetical, she has at the same time harmony conjoined with her essence; for the multitude which she contains is elegant and composite, and receives in the same and at once both that which is essential quantity and that which is related. But so far as she is geometrical, she has that which is spherical connected with her essence. For the circles which she contains are both immovable and moved; immovable indeed according to essence, but moved according to a vital energy; or, to speak more properly, they may be said to possess both of these at once, for they are self-motive: and that which is self-motive is both moved and is at the same time immovable, since a motive power seems to belong to an immovable nature. Soul, therefore, essentially pre-assumes all disciplines; the geometrical, according to her totality, her forms, and her lines; the arithmetical, according to her multitude and essential unities; the harmonical, according to the ratios of numbers; and the spherical, according to her double circulations. And, in short, she is the essential, self-motive, intellectual, and united bond of all disciplines, purely comprehending all things; figures in an unfigured manner; unitedly such things as are divided; and without distance such as are distant from each other.

We are likewise informed by Proclus, that, according to Porphyry, a character like the letter X comprehended in a circle was a symbol with the Egyptians of the mundane soul; by the right lines, perhaps (says he), signifying its biformed progression, but by the circle its uniform life and intellectual progress, which is of a circular nature. But of these circles the exterior, or the circle of sameness, represents the dianoëtic power of the soul; but the interior, or the circle of difference, the power which energizes according to opinion: and the motion which is perpetually revolved in sameness, and which comprehends the soul, is intellect.

Again, we have before observed that, according to the Platonic philosophy, the planets revolve with a kind of spiral motion; while variously wandering under the oblique zodiac, they at one time verge to the south, and at another to the north, sometimes advance, and sometimes retreat, and being at one
time

time more distant from and at another nearer to the earth. And this motion, indeed, very properly belongs to them, from their middle position, as it is a medium between the right-lined motion of the elements and the circular motion of the innerratic sphere: for a spiral is mixed from the right line and circle. Add too, that there are seven motions in the heavens; the circular, before, behind, upwards, downwards, to the right hand, and to the left. But the spheres alone possess a circular motion. And the stars in the innerratic sphere revolve about their centres; but at the same time have an advancing motion, because they are drawn along towards the west by the sphere in which they are fixed. But they are entirely destitute of the other five motions. On the contrary, the planets have all the seven. For they revolve about their own centres, but are carried by the motions of their spheres towards the east. And besides this, they are carried upwards and downwards, behind and before, to the right hand and to the left. Every star, too, by its revolution about its own centre, imitates the energy of the soul which it contains about its own intellect; but by following the motion of its sphere, it imitates the energy of the sphere about a superior intellect. We may likewise add, that the uniformity in the motions of the fixed stars confers union and perseverance on inferior concerns; but that the manifold and opposite motions of the planets contribute to the production, mingling and governing of things various and opposite.

And here, as the reader will doubtless be desirous of knowing why earth is called by Plato the first and most antient of the Gods within the heavens, I doubt not but he will gratefully receive the following epitome of the beautiful account given by Proclus of the earth in his inestimable commentaries on this venerable dialogue.—“Earth (says he) first proceeds from the intelligible earth which comprehends all the intelligible orders of the Gods, and from the intellectual earth which is co-ordinated with heaven. For our earth, being analogous to these, eternally abides, as in the centre of heaven; by which being every way comprehended, it becomes full of generative power and demiurgic perfection. The true earth, therefore, is not this corporeal and gross bulk, but an animal endued with a divine soul and a divine body. For it contains an immaterial and separate intellect, and a divine soul energizing about this intellect, and an ethereal body proximately depending on this soul; and, lastly, this visible bulk, which is on all sides animated and filled

filled with life from its inspiring soul, and through which it generates and nourishes lives of all-various kinds. For one species of life is rooted in the earth, and another moves about its surface. For how is it possible that plants should live while abiding in the earth, but when separated from it die, unless its visible bulk was full of life? Indeed it must universally follow that wholes must be animated prior to parts: for it would be ridiculous that man should participate of a rational soul and of intellect, but that earth and air should be deprived of a soul, sublimely carried in these elements as in a chariot, governing them from on high, and preserving them in the limits accommodated to their nature. For, as Theophrastus well observes, wholes would possess less authority than parts, and things eternal than such as are corruptible, if deprived of the possession of soul. Hence there must necessarily be a soul and intellect in the earth, the former causing her to be prolific, and the latter connectedly containing her in the middle of the universe. So that earth is a divine animal, full of intellectual and animastic essences, and of immaterial powers. For if a partial soul, such as ours, in conjunction with its proper ethereal vehicle, is able to exercise an exuberant energy in a material body, what ought we to think of a soul so divine as that of the earth? Ought we not to assert, that by a much greater priority she uses these apparent bodies through other middle vehicles, and through these enables them to receive her divine illuminations?

“Earth then subsisting in this manner, she is said, in the first place, to be our nurse, as possessing, in a certain respect, a power equivalent to heaven; and because, as heaven comprehends divine animals, so earth appears to contain such as are earthly. And, in the second place, as inspiring our life from her own proper life. For she not only yields us fruits, and nourishes our bodies through these, but she fills our souls with illuminations from her own divine soul, and through her intellect awakens ours from its oblivious sleep. And thus, through the whole of herself, she becomes the nurse of our whole composition.

“But we may consider the poles as powers which give stability to the universe, and excite the whole of its bulk to intelligible love; which connect a divisible nature indivisibly, and that which possesses interval in an united and indistant manner. But the axis is one divinity congregating the centres of the universe, connecting the whole world, and moving its
divine

divine circulations; about which the revolutions of the stars subsist, and which sustains the whole of the heavens by its power. And hence it is called Atlas, from the immutable and unwearied energy with which it is endued. Add too that the word *τεταμεινός*, *extended*, signifies that this one power is Titanic, guarding the circulations of the wholes which the universe contains.

“Earth is likewise called the guardian and fabricator of night and day. And that she causes the night indeed is evident; for her magnitude and figure give that great extent to the conical shadow which she produces. But she is the fabricator of the day, considered as giving perfection to the day which is conjoined with night; so that earth is the artificer of both these in conjunction with the sun.

“But she is the most antient and first of the Gods in the heavens, considered with respect to her stability and generative power, her symphony with heaven, and her position in the centre of the universe. For the centre possesses a mighty power in the universe, as connecting all its circulations; and hence it was called by the Pythagoreans the tower of Jupiter, from its containing a demiurgic guard. And if we recollect the Platonic hypothesis concerning the earth (which we have mentioned before), that our habitable part is nothing but a dark hollow, and very different from the true earth, which is adorned with a beauty similar to that of the heavens, we shall have no occasion to wonder at her being called the first and most antient of the celestial Gods.”

Again, according to the Platonic philosophy, some of the fixed stars are sometimes so affected, that for a considerable space of time they become invisible to us; and in this case, both when they withdraw themselves from our view, and when they again make their appearance, they are said by such as are skilled in these affairs, according to the information of Proclus¹, both to produce and signify mighty events. But though it is evident from the very words of Plato, in this part of the dialogue, that this opinion concerning certain stars disappearing and becoming again visible was entertained by all the astronomers of his time, and by the Pythagoreans prior to him,

¹ In Tim. p. 285. And in p. 333 he informs us, that the fixed stars have periods of revolution, though to us unknown, and that different stars have different periods. See also Chalcidius in Plat. Tim. p. 218.

yet this most interesting circumstance seems to have been utterly unknown to the moderns. Hence, not in the least suspecting this to be the case, they have immediately concluded from stars appearing of which we have no account, and others disappearing which have been observed in the heavens for many ages, that the stars are bodies, like earthly natures, subject to generation and decay. But this is not wonderful, if we consider that such men as these have not the smallest conception that the universe is a perfect whole; that every thing perfect must have a first, middle, and last; and that, in consequence of this, the heavens alone can rank in the first place, and earth in the last.

As the universe, indeed, as well as each of its principal parts or *wholes*, is *perpetual*, and as this perpetuity being temporal can only subsist by periodical circulation, hence all the celestial bodies, in order that all the possible variety of things may be unfolded, form different periods at different times; and their appearings and disappearings are nothing more than the restitutions of their circulations to their pristine state, and the beginnings of new periods. For according to these especially, says Proclus, they turn and transmute mundane natures, and bring on abundant corruptions and mighty mutations, as Plato asserts in the Republic.

In the next place, from the sublime speech of the demiurgus to the junior or mundane Gods, the reader may obtain full conviction that the Gods of the antients were not dead men deified; for they are here represented as commanded by the mundane artificer to fabricate the whole of the mortal race. And with respect to the properties of the sublunary Gods, which Plato comprehends in nine divinities, Proclus beautifully observes that *Heaven* bounds, *Earth* corroborates, and *Ocean* moves, the whole of generation. That *Tethys* establishes every thing in its proper motion, intellectual natures in intellectual, middle natures in animal, and corporeal natures in physical motion; *Ocean* at the same time moving all things collected together in one. But *Saturn* distributes intellectually only, *Rhea* vivifies, *Phorcys* scatters spermatic reasons, *Jupiter* gives perfection to things apparent from unapparent causes, and *Juno* evolves according to the all-various mutations of apparent natures. And thus through this ennead the sublunary world is in a becoming manner distributed and filled; divinely indeed from the Gods, angelically from angels, and dæmoniacally from

dæmons. And again, the Gods subsisting about bodies, souls, and intellects; angels exhibiting their providence about souls and bodies; and dæmons being divided about the fabrication of nature, and the care of bodies. But it may be asked, Why does Plato comprehend the whole extent of the Gods producing generation, in these nine divinities? Because, says Proclus, this ennead accomplishes the fabrication of generation. For in the sublunary regions there are bodies and natures, souls and intellects, and these both totally and partially. And all these subsist in both respects, that is both totally and partially, in each of the elements, because wholes and parts subsist together. Hence, as each element ranks as a monad, and contains bodies and natures, souls and intellects, both totally and partially, an ennead will evidently be produced in each. But *Heaven* and *Earth* generate the unapparent essences of these, the former according to union, and the latter according to multiplication: but *Ocean* and *Tethys* give perfection to their common and distributed motion; at the same time that the motion of each is different. In like manner, with respect to the wholes which are adorned, *Saturn* distributes things partial from such as are total, but in an intellectual manner. But *Rhea* calls forth this distribution from intellectual natures into all-various progressions, and as far as to the ultimate forms of life, in consequence of her being a vivific Goddess. But *Phorcys* produces the Titanic distinction, as far as to natural reasons. And after these three, the fathers of composite natures succeed. And Jupiter indeed orderly disposes sensible natures totally, in imitation of *Heaven*. For in the intellectual order, and in the royal series, he proceeds analogous to *Heaven*¹. But Juno moves the wholes, fills them with powers, and unfolds them according to every progression. And the Gods posterior to these fabricate the partial works of sensible natures, according to the characteristics by which they are distinguished; viz. the demiurgic, the vivific, the perfective, and the connective, unfolding and distributing themselves as far as to the last of things. For these last are all of them analogous to the Saturnian order, from whose government the distributive characteristic originally proceeds.

Again, by the *Crater* in which the mundane soul was mingled, we must

¹ For there are six kings, according to Orpheus, who preside over the universe—Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus; and of these Saturn proceeds analogous to Phanes, and Jupiter to Heaven.

understand

understand the vivific Goddeſs Juno; by the term *mingling*, a communion of eſſence; and by a ſecond mixture in a certain reſpect the ſame, but yet deficient from the firſt in a ſecond and third degree, the ſimilitude and at the ſame time inferiority of partial to total ſouls, and the order ſubſiſting among partial ſouls. For ſome of theſe are pure and undefiled, aſſociating with generation but for a ſhort time, and this for the God-like purpoſe of benefiting more ingenious ſouls; but others wander from their true country for very extended periods of time. For between ſouls which abide on high without deſilement, and ſuch as deſcend and are deſiled with vice, the medium muſt be ſuch ſouls as deſcend, indeed, but without deſilement.

But when the artiſicer of the univerſe is ſaid to have diſtributed ſouls equal in number to the ſtars, this muſt not be underſtood as if one partial ſoul was diſtributed under one of the ſtars, and that the quantity of ſouls is equal to that of the ſtarry Gods; for this would be perfectly inconſiſtent with what Plato aſſerts a little before, that the artiſicer diſſeminated ſome of theſe into the earth, ſome into the ſun and ſome into the moon, thus ſcattering a multitude into each of the inſtruments of time. But, as Proclus well obſerves, equality of number here muſt not be underſtood monadically, but according to analogy. For in numbers, ſays he, ten is analogous to unity, thirty to three, fifty to five, and entirely all the numbers poſterior to the decad, to all within the decad. And hence five is not equal to fifty in quantity, nor three to thirty, but they are only equal according to analogy. After this manner, therefore, the equal in number muſt be aſſumed in partial ſouls; ſince there is a number of theſe accommodated to every divine ſoul, and which each divine ſoul uniformly pre-aſſumes in itſelf. And hence, when it unfolds this number, it bounds the multitude of partial ſouls diſtributed under its eſſence. Likewise, with reſpect to theſe depending ſouls, ſuch as are firſt ſuſpended from a divine ſoul are leſs in number, but greater in power; but ſuch as are ſecond in progreſſion are leſs in power, but more extended in number; while at the ſame time each is analogous to the divine cauſe from which it proceeds.

Obſerve, too, that when Plato uſes the term *the moſt pious of animals*, man alone is not implied, but the inhabitants likewise or partial ſouls of the ſeveral ſpheres and ſtars: for, ſays Proclus, between eternal animals¹, and

¹ i. e. ſtars and ſpheres.

such as live but for a short period ¹, (viz. whose periods of circulation are short) it is necessary there should be a species of rational animals more divine than man, and whose existence is of a very extended duration. It is likewise worthy of observation, that the soul is conjoined with this gross body through two vehicles as mediums, one of which is ethereal and the other aerial: and of these the ethereal vehicle is *simple and immaterial*, but the aerial *simple and material*; and this dense earthly body is *composite and material*.

Again, when our souls are represented after falling into the present body as suffering a transmutation into brutes, this, as Proclus beautifully observes, must not be understood as if our souls ever became the animating principles of brutal bodies, but that by a certain sympathy they are bound to the souls of brutes, and are as it were carried in them, just as evil dæmons insinuate themselves into our phantasy, through their own depraved imaginations. And by the circulations of the soul being merged in a profound river and impetuously borne along, we must understand by the river, not the human body alone, but the whole of generation (with which we are externally surrounded) through its swift and unstable flowing. For thus, says Proclus, Plato in the Republic calls the whole of generated nature the river of Lethe, which contains both Lethe and the meadow of Ate, according to Empedocles ²; the devouring jaws of matter and the light-hating world, as it is called by the Gods; and the winding rivers under which many are drawn down, as the oracles ³ assert. But by the circulations of the soul the diænoëtic and doxastic powers are signified; the former of which, through the soul's conjunction with the body, is impeded in its energies, and the latter is Titanically torn in pieces under the irrational life.

Again, if we consider man with reference to a contemplative life, which is the true end of his formation, we shall find that the head, which is the instrument of contemplation, is the principal member, and that the other members were only added as ministrant to the head. With respect to sight,

¹ i. e. men.

² Εν ἧ καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνη, καὶ ὁ τῆς Ἀττικῆς λειμῶν, ὡς φησὶν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τὸ λαβρὸν τῆς ἰλῆς, καὶ ὁ μισοφαιῆς κόσμος, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ λεγουσὶ, καὶ τὰ σκοτία ρεῖθρα, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κατασυρονται, ὡς τὰ λόγια φησιν. Procl. in Tim. p. 339. See more concerning this in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.

³ Viz. the oracles of Zoroaster.

it must be observed that Democritus, Heraclitus, the Stoics, many of the Peripatetics and ancient geometricians, together with the Platonists, were of opinion that vision subsists through a lucid spirit emitted from the eyes ; and this spirit, according to Plato and his followers, is an unburning vivific fire similar to celestial fire, from which it originally proceeds. But this fire, the illuminations of which, as we have already observed, give life to our mortal part, is abundantly collected in the eye as in a fat diaphanous substance, whose moisture is most shining and whose membranes are tender and transparent, but yet sufficiently firm for the purpose of preserving the inherent light. But a most serene ray shines through the more solid pupil ; and this ray originates internally from one nerve, but is afterwards derived through two small nerves to the two eyes. And these nerves, through the fat humours of the eyes, winding under the tunics, arrive at length at the pupils. But a light of this kind, thus preserved in the small nerves, and bursting through the narrow pupils as soon as it shines forth into dispersed rays, as it commenced from one ray, so it immediately returns into one, from the rays naturally uniting in one common ray : for the eyes also, on account of their lubricity, roundness, and smooth substance, are easily moved hither and thither, with an equal and similar revolution. This visual ray, however, cannot proceed externally and perceive objects at a distance, unless it is conjoined with external light proceeding conically to the eyes ; and hence our ray insinuating itself into this light, and becoming strengthened by the association, continues its progression till it meets with some opposing object. But when this is the case, it either diffuses itself through the superficies of the object, or runs through it with wonderful celerity, and becomes immediately affected with the quality of the object. And a resistance, motion, and affection of this kind produces vision, viz. from the vibration of the ray thus affected gradually arriving at the instrument of sight, and by this means exciting that image of the object which is naturally inherent in the instrument, and through which when excited perception ensues. For there are three particulars which belong in general to all the senses ; first, an image or mark of the sensible thing impressed in the sensitive instrument ; and this constituted both in passion and energy in a certain similitude to the sensible object : but afterwards we must consider an impression of this kind as now perfect, and ending in species, viz. in the common composite life :
and

and, in the third place, that inherent reason of the soul ensues, which germinates from the sensitive soul, is accommodated to species of this kind, and is that through which sensitive judgment and cogitation subsist.

But further, the Platonists admit, with Democritus and Empedocles, that certain material images of things flow through the pores of bodies, and preserve, to a certain distance, not only the qualities but likewise the shape of the bodies from which they flow. And these radial images are intimated by Plato in this dialogue, in the Sophista, and in the seventh book of his Republic; in commenting on the last of which, Proclus observes as follows: "According to Plato, (says he) representations of things are hypostases of certain images fabricated by a dæmoniacal art, as he teaches us in the Sophista; for shadows, of which they say images are the companions, possess a nature of this kind. For these are the effigies of bodies and figures, and have an abundant sympathy with the things from which they fall; as is evident from what the arts of magicians are able to effect, and from what they tell us concerning images and shadows. But why should I speak of the powers of magicians, when irrational animals are able to operate through images and shadows, prior to all reason? for they say that the hyæna, by trampling on the shadow of a dog seated on an eminence, will hurl him down and devour him; and Aristotle says, that if a woman, during her menstrua, looks into a mirror, she will defile both the mirror and the apparent image."—*Ὅτι κατὰ Πλάτωνα αἱ εἰκαστεῖς ὑποστάσεις εἰναι εἰδῶν τινῶν δαιμονίᾳ μηχανῇ δημιουργοῦνται, καθάπερ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ διδάσκει. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ σκῆαι αἷς τὰ εἰδῶλα συζυγεῖν φησὶ τοιαύτην ἔχουσι φύσιν. Καὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ σωματῶν εἰσὶ καὶ σχημάτων εἰκόνες, καὶ παντοῦν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιπίπτουσι συμπάθειαν, ὡς δηλοῦσι καὶ ὅσα μαχῶν (lege μαγῶν) τέχναι πρὸς τὰ εἰδῶλα δράν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλονται καὶ τὰς σκῆας. Καὶ τι λέγου τὰς ἐκεῖνων δυνάμεις ἃ καὶ τοῖς ἀλογοῖς ἤδη ζωὴς ὑπάρχει πρὸ λόγου πάντως ἐνεργεῖν. Ἦ γὰρ ὕψιν φασὶν τὴν τοῦ κυνὸς ἐν ὕψει καθήμενου πατήσασα σκῆαν καταβάλλει, καὶ θοῖνῃ ποιεῖται τὸν κύνα. Καὶ γυναῖκος καθάρουμένης φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, εἰς ἐνοπλῆρον ἰδούσης, αἰματῶνται, τὸ τὲ ἐνοπλῆρον, καὶ τὸ ἐμφαινόμενον εἰδῶλον.*—And he likewise informs us in the same place, that these images, on account of their slender existence, cannot otherwise become visible to our eyes, than when, in consequence of being established, restored, and illuminated in mirrors, they again receive their pristine power and the shape of their originals. Hence, says he, density

* Vid. Procl. in Plat. Polit. p. 430.

is required in the body which receives them, that the image may not be dissipated from the rarity of the receptacle, and that from many defluxions it may pass into one form. But smoothness likewise is required, lest the asperity of the receptacle, on account of the prominency of some of its parts and the depth of others, should be the cause of inequality to the image. And, lastly, splendour is required; that the image, which naturally possesses a slender form, may become apparent to the sight.

In the next place, with respect to matter, and the various epithets by which Plato calls it in this dialogue, it is necessary to observe, that as in an ascending series of subjects we must arrive at length at something which is better than all things, so in a descending series our progression must be stopped by something which is worse than all things, and which is the general receptacle of the last procession of forms. And this is what the ancients called matter, and which they considered as nothing more than a certain indefiniteness of an incorporeal, indivisible, and intellectual nature, and as something which is not formally impressed and bounded by three dimensions, but is entirely remitted and resolved, and is on all sides rapidly flowing from being into non-entity. But this opinion concerning matter, says Simplicius¹, seems to have been adopted by the first Pythagoreans among the Greeks; and after these by Plato, according to the relation of Moderatus. For he shows us—"that, according to the Pythagoreans, there is a *first one* subsisting prior to the essence of things and every substance; that after this, true being and intelligible or forms subsist: and, in the third place, that which pertains to soul, and which participates of *the one* and of intellectual forms. But after this (says he) the last nature, which is that of sensible, subsists; which does not participate of the preceding natures, but is thus affected and formed according to the representation of these; since the matter of sensible natures is the shadow of that non-being which primarily subsists in quantity, or rather may be said to depend upon, and be produced by, this." Hence Porphyry, in his second book on Matter, says Simplicius, observes that Plato calls matter, quantity, which is formless, indivisible, and without figure; but capacious, and the receptacle of form, figure, division, quality, and other things of a similar kind. And this quantity and form, considered according

¹ In Aristot. Phys. p. 50, b.

to the privation of a uniform reason, which comprehends all the reasons of beings in itself, is the paradigm of the matter of bodies; which, says Porphyry, both Plato and the Pythagoreans call a quantum, not after the same manner as form is a quantum, but according to privation and analysis, extension and divulsion, and its mutation from being. Matter, therefore, according to this doctrine, as Simplicius well observes, is nothing else than the permutation and vicissitude of sensible forms, with respect to intelligibles; since from thence they verge downwards, and extend to perfect non-entity, or the last of things—that is, to matter itself. Hence, says he, because dregs and matter are always the last of things, the Egyptians assert that matter, which they enigmatically denominate water, is the dregs of the first life; subsisting as a certain mire or mud, the receptacle of generable and sensible natures; and which is not any definite form, but a certain constitution of subsistence, in the same manner as that which is indivisible, immaterial and true being, is a constitution of an intelligible nature. And though all forms subsist both in intelligibles and in matter, yet in the former they subsist without matter, indivisibly and truly; but in the latter divisibly, and after the manner of shadows. And on this account every sensible form is diffused through its union with material interval, and falls from the stability and reality of being.

But the following profound and admirable description of matter by Plotinus (Ennead. 3, lib. 6) will, I doubt not, be gratefully received by the Platonic reader.—“ Since matter (says he) is neither soul, nor intellect, nor life, nor form, nor reason, nor bound, but a certain indefiniteness; nor yet capacity, for what can it produce? since it is foreign from all these, it cannot merit the appellation of being; but is deservedly called non-entity. Nor yet is it non-entity in the same manner as *motion* and *permanency* are non-beings, considered as different from being: but it is true non-entity; the mere shadow and imagination of bulk, and the desire of subsistence; remaining fixed without abiding, of itself invisible, and avoiding the desire of him who is anxious to perceive its nature. Hence, when no one perceives it, it is then in a manner present; but cannot be viewed by him who strives intently to behold it. Again, in itself contraries always appear; the small and the great, the less and the more, deficiency and excess. So that it is a phantom, neither abiding nor yet able to fly away; capable of no one denomination,
and

and possessing no power from intellect; but is constituted in the defect and shade, as it were, of all real being. Hence, too, in each of its vanishing appellations, it eludes our search: for, if we think of it as something great, it is in the mean time small; if as something more, it becomes less; and the apparent being which we meet with in its image is non-being, and, as it were, a flying mockery. So that the forms which appear in matter are merely ludicrous; shadows falling upon shadow, as in a mirror, where the position of the apparent is different from that of the real object; and which, though apparently full of forms, possesses nothing real and true. But the things which enter into, and depart from, matter, are nothing but imitations of being, and semblances flowing about a formless semblance. They seem, indeed, to effect something in the subject matter, but in reality produce nothing; from their debile and flowing nature being endued with no solidity and no rebounding power. And since matter likewise has no solidity, they penetrate it without division, like images in water, or as if any one should fill a vacuum with forms."

Such, then, being the true condition of matter and her inherent shadowy forms, we may safely conclude that whatever becomes corporeal in an eminent degree has but little power of recalling itself into one; and that a nature of this kind is ready by every trifling impulse to remain as it is impelled; to rush from the embraces of bound, and hasten into multitude and non-entity. Hence, as Plotinus beautifully observes, (Ennead. 3, lib. 6,)—"those who only place *being* in the genus of body, in consequence of impulses and concussions, and the phantasms perceived through the senses, which persuade them that sense is alone the standard of truth, are affected like those in a dream, who imagine that the perceptions of sleep are true. For sense is alone the employment of the dormant soul; since as much of the soul as is merged in body, so much of it sleeps. But true elevation and true vigilance are a resurrection from, and not with, the dull mass of body. For, indeed, a resurrection with body is only a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like a man passing in the dark from bed to bed. But that elevation is perfectly true which entirely rises from the dead weight of bodies; for these, possessing a nature repugnant to soul, possess something opposite to essence. And this is further evident from their gene-

ration, their continual flowing and decay ; properties entirely foreign from the nature of being, substantial and real."

Lastly, when Plato composes the elements from mathematical planes, it is necessary to observe that, as these are physical planes, they must not only have length and breadth, but likewise depth, that they may be able to subsist as principles in natural effects.—“ For the Pythagoreans (says Simplicius ¹) considered every physical body as a figured quantity, and as in itself matter, but fashioned with different figures. That, besides this, it differs from a mathematical body in being material and tangible, receiving its tangibility from its bulk, and not either from heat or cold. Hence, from the subject matter being impressed with different figures, they assert that the four elements of the elements subsist. For these elements rank more in the nature of principles, as for instance, the cubic of earth ; not that earth has wholly a cubic figure, but that each of the parts of earth is composed from many cubes, which through their smallness are invisible to our sight ; and in the same manner the other elements from other primary figures. They add too, that from this difference of figures all the other properties of the elements ensue, and their mutations into each other. For, if it is inquired why much air is produced from a little water, they can very readily assign the cause by saying, that the elements of water are many, and that, the icosædrons of water being divided, many octædrons, and consequently a great quantity of air, will be produced.”

Simplicius likewise informs us, that the more ancient of Plato's interpreters, among which the divine Jamblichus ranks, considered Plato as speaking symbolically in this part concerning the figures of the elements ; but the latter Platonic philosophers, among whom Proclus, in my opinion, ranks as the most eminent, explained this part according to its literal meaning. And Simplicius, in the same book, has fortunately preserved the arguments of Proclus in defence of Plato's doctrine respecting these planes, against the objections of Aristotle.

Should it be asked in what this doctrine concerning planes differs from the dogma of Democritus, who asserted that natural bodies were fashioned

¹ De Cælo, lib. iv. p. 139.

according to figures, we may answer with Simplicius ¹, that Plato and the Pythagoreans by a plane denoted something more simple than a body ², atoms being evidently bodies; that they assigned commensuration and a demiurgic analogy ³ to their figures, which Democritus did not to his atoms; and that they differed from him in their arrangement of earth.

And thus much may suffice at present for an epitome of some of the principal parts of this most interesting dialogue. For, as it is my design at some future period to publish as complete a commentary as I am able from the inestimable commentaries of Proclus on this dialogue, with additional observations of my own, a more copious introduction might at present be considered as superfluous. The difficulty, indeed, of proceeding any further, might alone very well apologise for the want of completion in this compendium. For the commentary of Proclus, though consisting of five books, is imperfect ⁴, and does not even extend so far as to the doctrine of vision, which in the present introduction I have endeavoured to explain. I trust, therefore, that the candid and liberal reader will gratefully accept these fruits of my application to the Platonic philosophy; and as this introduction and the following translation were the result of no moderate labour and perseverance, I earnestly hope they may be the means of awakening some few at least from the sleep of oblivion, of recalling their attention from fluctuating and delusive objects to permanent and real being; and thus may at length lead them back to their paternal port, as the only retreat which can confer perfect security and rest.

¹ De Cælo, p. 142.

² Viz. than any visible sublunary body.

³ i. e. active and fabricative powers.

⁴ It is a circumstance remarkably unfortunate, as I have before observed, that not one of the invaluable commentaries of this philosopher has been preserved entire. For that he wrote a complete commentary on this dialogue, is evident from a citation of Olympiodorus on Aristotle's *Meteors* from it, which is not to be found in any of the books now extant. In like manner, his treatise on Plato's theology is imperfect, wanting a seventh book; his commentaries on the *Parmenides* want many books; his *scholia* on the *Cratylus* are far from being complete; and this is likewise the case with his commentary on the *First Alcibiades*.

THE TIMÆUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES,		CRITIAS,
TIMÆUS,		HERMOCRATES.

Soc.

I SEE one, two, three, but where, friend Timæus, is that fourth person, who being received by me yesterday at a banquet of disputation, ought now in his turn to repay me with a similar repast?

TIM. He labours, Socrates, under a certain infirmity; for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present.

Soc. It remains therefore for you, O Timæus, and the company present, to fill up the part of this absent guest.

TIM. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour, to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished. For it would be by no means just that we, who were yesterday entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received, should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight.

Soc. Do you recollect the magnitude and nature of the things which I proposed to you to explain?

TIM. Some things, indeed, I recollect; but such as I have forgotten do you recall into my memory. Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly established in our memory.

Soc. Let it be so. And to begin: The sum of yesterday's dispute was,
what

what kind of republic appeared to me to be the best, and from what sort of men such a republic ought to be composed.

TIM. And by us, indeed, Socrates, all that you said was approved in the highest degree.

Soc. Did we not, in the first place, separate husbandmen and other artificers from those whom we considered as the defenders of the city?

TIM. Certainly.

Soc. And when we had assigned to every one that which was accommodated to his nature, and had prescribed only one particular employment to every particular art, we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only, I mean that of protecting the city; and this as well from the hostile incursions of internal as of external enemies; but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with warlike fierceness against their enemies in battle.

TIM. Entirely so.

Soc. For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philosophic in a remarkable degree; so that they might be gentle to their friends, and bold and ferocious to their enemies.

TIM. You did so.

Soc. But what did we assert concerning their education? Was it not that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and other becoming disciplines?

TIM. Entirely so.

Soc. We likewise established, that those who were so educated should neither consider gold, or silver, or any goods of a similar kind, as their own private property; but that rather, after the manner of adjutants, they should receive the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve; and that their recompense should be no more than is sufficient to a moderate subsistence. That, besides this, they should use their public stipend in common, and for the purpose of procuring a common subsistence with each other; so that, neglecting every other concern, they may employ their attention solely on virtue, and the discharge of their peculiar employment.

TIM. These things also were related by you.

Soc.

Soc. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in such a manner, as to be aptly conformed similar to the natures of men ; with whom they should perform in common both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business of life.

TIM. This too was asserted by you.

Soc. But what did we establish concerning the procreation of children ? Though perhaps you easily remember this, on account of its novelty. For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common ; as we were particularly careful that no one might be able to distinguish his own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred ; that hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sisters ; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children and grandsons.

TIM. These things, indeed, as you say, are easily remembered.

Soc. But that they might from their birth acquire a disposition as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league the worthy were mingled with the worthy ; that no discord may arise in this connection when it does not prove prosperous in the end ; but that all the blame may be referred to fortune, and not to the guardians of such a conjunction.

TIM. We remember this likewise.

Soc. We also ordered that the children of the good should be properly educated, but that those of the bad should be secretly sent to some other city ; yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition should be recalled from exile ; while, on the contrary, those who were retained from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished.

TIM. Just so.

Soc. Have we, therefore, sufficiently epitomized yesterday's disputation ; or do you require any thing further, friend Timæus, which I have omitted ?

TIM. Nothing, indeed, Socrates ; for all this was the subject of your disputation.

Soc. Hear now how I am affected towards this republic which we have described ; for I will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose then that
some

some one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a picture, or really alive, but in a state of perfect rest, should desire to behold them in motion, and struggling as it were to imitate those gestures which seem particularly adapted to the nature of bodies; in such a manner am I affected towards the form of that republic which we have described. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests of our city with other nations, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during such an engagement in a manner worthy of its institution, both with respect to practical achievements and verbal negotiations. For indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise such men and such a city according to their desert. Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets both of the past and present age. Not that I despise the poetic tribe; but it appears from hence evident, that, as these kind of men are studious of imitation, they easily and in the best manner express things in which they have been educated; while, on the contrary, whatever is foreign from their education they imitate with difficulty in actions, and with still more difficulty in words. But with respect to the tribe of Sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking and in many other illustrious arts; yet, as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, I am afraid lest, with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals, in warlike undertakings, both in actions and discourse. It remains, therefore, that I should apply to you, who excel in the study of wisdom and civil administration, as well naturally as through the assistance of proper discipline and institution. For Timæus here of Locris, an Italian city governed by the best of laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has arrived in his own city at the highest posts of government and honours. Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of the particulars of which we are now speaking. Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of circumstances evince that he is both by nature and education adapted to all such concerns. Hence, when you yesterday requested me to dispute about the institution of a republic, I readily complied with your request;

being persuaded that the remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained by any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion. For, unless you properly adapt the city for warlike purposes, there is no one in the present age from whom it can acquire every thing becoming its constitution. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-mentioned particulars. Nor have you indeed refused this employment, but have with common consent determined to repay my hospitality with the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared to receive the promised feast.

HERM. But we, O Socrates, as Timæus just now signified, shall cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire; for we cannot offer any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when we departed from hence and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and prior to this in the way thither we discoursed on this very particular. He therefore related to us a certain antient history, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his request.

CRIT. It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timæus, the third associate of our undertaking.

TIM. I assent to your compliance.

CRIT. Hear then, O Socrates, a discourse surprising indeed in the extreme, yet in every respect true, as it was once related by Solon, the most wise of the seven wise men. Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grandfather Dropis, as he himself often relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias, (as the old man himself informed us,) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheless were buried in oblivion, through length of time and the destruction of mankind. In particular he informed me of one undertaking more illustrious than the rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation I may offer my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by celebrating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly and in a manner agreeable to truth.

SOC. You speak well. But what is this antient achievement which was
not

not only actually related by Solon, but was once really accomplished by this city?

CRIT. I will acquaint you with that antient history, which I did not indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in years; for at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I myself was about ten. When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us which is known by the name of *Cureotis Apaturiorum*¹, nothing was omitted which boys in that festivity are accustomed to perform. For, when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time entirely new. But then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry the most ingenious of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted; and said, laughing—If Solon, O Arynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair, but had made it, as others do, a serious employment; and if through seditions and other fluctuations of the state, in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown. In consequence of this, Arynander inquired of Critias what that history was. To which he answered, that it was concerning an affair the greatest and most celebrated

¹ The *Apaturia*, according to Proclus and Suidas, were festivals in honour of Bacchus, which were publicly celebrated for the space of three days. And they were assigned this name, δι' απατην, that is, on account of the deception through which Neptune is reported to have vanquished Xanthus. The first day of these festivals was called *δρπεια*, in which, as the name indicates, those of the same tribe feasted together; and hence (says Proclus) on this day *ενοχιαί και δειπνα πολλά*, splendid banquets and much feasting took place. The second day was called *αναρρυσίς*, a sacrifice, because many victims were sacrificed in it; and hence the victims were called *αναρρυσματα*, because *ερωμενα ανω εθετο*, they were drawn upwards, and sacrificed. The third day, of which Plato speaks in this place, was called *κουρευτης*, because on this day *κυροι*, that is, boys or girls, were collected together in tribes, with their hair shorn. And to these some add a fourth day, which they call *επειδα*, or the day after. Proclus further informs us, that the boys who were collected on the third day were about three or four years old.

which this city ever performed ; though through length of time, and the destruction of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the present age. But I beseech you, O Critias, (say Amy-nander,) relate this affair from the beginning ; and inform me what that event was which Solon asserted as a fact, and on what occasion, and from whom he received it.

There is then (says he) a certain region of Egypt called Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided. In this place a government is established called Saitical ; and the chief city of this region of Delta is Sais, from which also king Amasis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. These men were friends of the Athenians, with whom they declared they were very familiar, through a certain bond of alliance. In this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himself relates, very honourably received. And upon his inquiring about antient affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge in such particulars superior to others, he perceived, that neither himself, nor any one of the Greeks, (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of very remote antiquity. Hence, when he once desired to excite them to the relation of antient transactions, he for this purpose began to discourse about those most antient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the traditions concerning the first Phoroneus and Niobe, and after the deluge, of Deucalion and Pyrrha, (as described by the mythologists,) together with their posterity ; at the same time paying a proper attention to the different ages in which these events are said to have subsisted. But upon this one of those more antient priests exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there any such thing as an aged Grecian among you ! But Solon, when he heard this—What (says he) is the motive of your exclamation ? To whom the priest :—Because all your souls are juvenile ; neither containing any antient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any discipline hoary from its existence in former periods of time. But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be : the greatest of these, indeed, arising from fire and water ; but the lesser from ten thousand other contingencies. For the relation subsisting among you, that Phaeton, the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time
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attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and perished himself, blasted by thunder—is indeed considered as fabulous, yet is in reality true. For it expresses the mutation of the bodies revolving in the heavens about the earth; and indicates that, through long periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the devastations of fire. Hence, those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers, or on the borders of the sea. To us indeed the Nile is both salutary in other respects, and liberates us from the fear of such-like depredations. But when the Gods, purifying the earth by waters, deluge its surface, then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the mountains are preserved, while the inhabitants of your cities are hurried away to the sea by the impetuous inundation of the rivers. On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the waters descending from on high pour with desolation on the plains; but they are naturally impelled upwards from the bosom of the earth. And from these causes the most antient traditions are preserved in our country. For, indeed, it may be truly asserted, that in those places where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of mankind is always preserved, though sometimes the number of individuals is increased, and sometimes suffers a considerable diminution. But whatever has been transacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of which we have heard the report, every thing of this kind is to be found described in our temples, and preserved to the present day. While, on the contrary, you and other nations commit only recent transactions to writing, and to other inventions which society has employed for transmitting information to posterity; and so again, at stated periods of time, a certain celestial defluxion rushes on them like a disease; from whence those among you who survive are both destitute of literary acquisitions and the inspiration of the Muses. Hence it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the events which happened in antient times, as well among us as in the regions which you inhabit.

The transactions, therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, differ very little from puerile fables. For, in the first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, when at the same time many have hap-

pened. And, in the next place, you are ignorant of a most illustrious and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country; from whence you and your whole city descended, though a small seed only of this admirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this affair is owing to the posterity of this people, who were for many ages deprived of the use of letters, and became as it were dumb. For prior, O Solon, to that mighty deluge which we have just mentioned, a city of Athenians existed, informed according to the best laws both in military concerns and every other duty of life; and whose illustrious actions and civil institutions are celebrated by us as the most excellent of all that have existed under the ample circumference of the heavens. Solon, therefore, upon hearing this, said that he was astonished; and, burning with a most ardent desire, entreated the priests to relate accurately all the actions of his antient fellow-citizens. That afterwards one of the priests replied:—Nothing of envy, O Solon, prohibits us from complying with your request. But for your sake, and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and especially on account of that Goddess who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been educated and founded: yours, indeed, by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth. But the description of the transactions of this our city during the space of eight thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings. I will, therefore, cursorily run over the laws and more illustrious actions of those cities which existed nine thousand years ago. For when we are more at leisure we shall prosecute an exact history of every particular, receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves.

In the first place, then, consider the laws of these people, and compare them with ours: for you will find many things which then subsisted in your city, similar to such as exist at present. For the priests passed their life separated from all others. The artificers also exercised their arts in such a manner, that each was engaged in his own employment without being mingled with other artificers. The same method was likewise adopted with shepherds, hunters and husbandmen. The soldiers too, you will find, were separated from other kind of men; and were commanded by the laws to engage in nothing but warlike affairs. A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts, was employed by each. These we first used in Asia;
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the Goddesses in those places, as likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use. You may perceive too from the beginning what great attention was paid by the laws to prudence and modesty; and besides this, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of health. And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated. From such a distribution, therefore, and in such order, the Goddesses first established and adorned your city, choosing for this purpose the place in which you were born; as she foresaw that, from the excellent temperature of the region, men would arise distinguished by the most consummate sagacity and wit.* For, as the Goddess is a lover both of wisdom and war, she fixed on a soil capable of producing men the most similar to herself; and rendered it in every respect adapted for^pthe habitation of such a race. The antient Athenians, therefore, using these laws, and being formed by good institutions, in a still higher degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes those to do who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods.

But*though many and mighty deeds of your city are contained in our sacred writings, and are admired as they deserve, yet there is one transaction which surpasses all of them in magnitude and virtue. For these writings relate what prodigious strength your city formerly tamed, when a mighty warlike power, rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury over all Europe and Asia. For at that time the Atlantic sea was navigable, and had an island before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this island was greater than both Libya and all Asia together, and afforded an easy passage to other neighbouring islands; as it was likewise easy to pass from those islands to all the continent which borders on this Atlantic sea. For the waters which are beheld within the mouth which we just now mentioned, have the form of a bay with a narrow entrance; but the mouth itself is a true sea. And lastly, the earth which surrounds it is in every respect truly denominated the continent. In this Atlantic island a combination of kings was formed, who with mighty and wonderful power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent; and, besides this, subjected to their dominion all Libya, as far as to Egypt; and Europe, as far as to the Tyrrhene sea. And when

when they were collected in a powerful league, they endeavoured to enslave all our regions and yours, and besides this all those places situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sea. Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength. For, as its armies surpassed all others both in magnanimity and military skill, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it presided in warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, and became situated in extreme danger, yet still it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those who were not yet enslaved it liberated from danger; and procured the most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Hercules. But in succeeding time prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking place, and bringing with them desolation in the space of one day and night, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present innavigable, arising from the gradually impeding mud which the subsiding island produced. And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon.

But when yesterday you was discoursing about a republic and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history: for I perceived how divinely, from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon. Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as, from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remembrance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. I considered it, therefore, necessary that I should first of all diligently revolve the whole in my mind. And on this account I yesterday immediately complied with your demands: for I perceived that we should not want the ability of presenting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Hermocrates has informed you, immediately as we departed from hence, by communicating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair. And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood abides in the memory with a wonderful stability.

For, with respect to myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of yesterday's discourse, yet I should be very much astonished if any thing should escape my remembrance which I had heard in some past period of time very distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight; who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently gratified me with a repetition. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly established in my memory. In consequence of this, as soon as it was day I repeated the narration to my friends, that together with myself they might be better prepared for the purposes of the present association. But now, with respect to that for which this narration was undertaken, I am prepared, O Socrates, to speak not only summarily, but so as to descend to the particulars of every thing which I heard. But the citizens and city which you fabricated yesterday as in a fable, we shall transfer to reality; considering that city which you established as no other than this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived as no other than those ancestors of ours described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the affair will harmonize in every respect; nor will it be foreign from the purpose to assert that your citizens are those very people who existed at that time. Hence, distributing the affair in common among us, we will endeavour, according to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming manner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite, therefore, to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whether we should lay it aside, and seek after another.

Soc. But what other, O Critias, should we receive in preference to this? For your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the present sacred rites of the Goddesses. And besides this, we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, that your relation is not a mere fable, but a true history. It is impossible, therefore, to say how, and from whence, neglecting your narration, we should find another more convenient. Hence it is necessary to confess that you have spoken with good fortune; and it is equally necessary that I, on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest from speaking, and be wholly attentive to yours.

Crit. But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet

banquet of disputation. For it seems proper to us that Timæus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and is particularly knowing in the nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the law of Solon, as to proper judges, should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us in the report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse concerning them as about citizens and Athenians.

Soc. I seem to behold a copious and splendid banquet of disputation set before me. It is, therefore, now your business, O Timæus, to begin the discourse; having first of all, as is highly becoming, invoked the Gods according to law.

TIM. Indeed, Socrates, since those who participate but the least degree of wisdom, in the beginning of every undertaking, whether small or great, call upon Divinity, it is necessary that we (unless we are in every respect unwise) who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it is generated or without generation, invoking the Gods and Goddessees, should pray that what we assert may be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves. And such is my prayer to the Gods, with reference to myself; but as to what respects the present company, it is necessary to pray that you may easily understand, and that I may be able to explain my meaning about the proposed subjects of disputation. In the first place, therefore, as it appears to me, it is necessary to define what that is which is always *real being*¹, but is without generation; and

¹ It is well observed here by Proclus, that Plato, after the manner of geometricians, assumes, prior to demonstrations, definitions and hypotheses, through which he frames his demonstrations, and previously delivers the principles of the whole of physiology. For, as the principles of music are different from those of medicine, and those of arithmetic from those of mechanics, in like manner there are certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers: and these are as follow. *True being is that which is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason: that which is generated, is the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense: every thing generated is generated from a cause: that which does not subsist from a cause is not generated: that of which the paradigm is eternal being, is necessarily beautiful: that of which the paradigm is*

and what that is *which is generated indeed, or consists in a state of becoming to be*, but which never *really is*. The former of these indeed is apprehended by *intelligence* in conjunction with *reason*, since it always subsists according to *same*. But the latter is perceived by *opinion* in conjunction with *irrational sense*; since it subsists in a state of generation and corruption, and never truly is. But whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a certain cause. For it is every way impossible that any thing should be generated without a cause. When, therefore, an artificer, in the fabrication of any work, looks to that which always subsists according to *same*, and, employing a paradigm of this kind, expresses the idea and power in his work, it is then necessary that the whole of his production should be beautiful. But when he beholds that which is in generation, and uses a generated paradigm, it is alike necessary that his work should be far from beautiful.

I denominate, therefore, this universe *heaven, or the world*, or by any other appellation in which it may particularly rejoice. Concerning which, let us in the first place consider that which, in the proposed inquiry about the universe, ought in the very beginning to be investigated; whether it always was, having no principle of generation¹, or whether it was generated,

is generated, is not beautiful: the universe is denominated heaven, or the world. For from these principles he produces all that follows. Hence, says Proclus, he appears to me to say *what* eternal is, and *what* that which is generated is, but not to say *that* each of them is. For the geometrician also informs us *what* a point is and *what* a line is, prior to his demonstrations, but he by no means teaches us *that* each of these has a subsistence. For how will he act the part of a geometrician, if he discourses about the existence of his proper principles? After the same manner the physiologist says *what* eternal being is, for the sake of the future demonstrations, but by no means shows *that* it is; since in so doing he would pass beyond the limits of physiology. As, however, Timæus being a Pythagorean differs from other physiologists, and Plato in this dialogue exhibits the highest science, hence he afterwards, in a manner perfectly divine, proves *that* true being has a subsistence; but at present he employs the definition of *what* it is, preserving the limits of physiology. He appears, indeed, to investigate the definition of eternal being, and of that which is generated, that he may discover the causes which give completion to the universe, viz. form and matter: for that which is generated requires these. But he assumes the third hypothesis, that he may discover the fabricative cause of the universe; the fourth, because the universe was generated according to a paradigmatic cause; and the fifth concerning the name of the universe, that he may investigate the participation of *the good* and *the ineffable* by the world.

¹ That is denominated generated, says Proclus (in Tim. p. 85.) which has not the whole of its essence or energy established in one, so as to be perfectly immutable. And of this kind are, this

rated, commencing its generation from a certain cause. It was generated. For this universe is visible, and has a body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with sense. And such things appear to have their subsistence in becoming to be, and in being generated. But we have before asserted, that whatever is generated is necessarily generated from some cause. To discover, therefore, the *artificer* and *father* of the universe is indeed difficult; and when found it is impossible to reveal him through the ministry of discourse to all men.

Again: this is to be considered concerning him, I mean, according to what paradigm extending himself, he fabricated the world—whether towards an exemplar, subsisting according to that which is always the same, and similarly affected, or towards that which is generated. But, indeed, if this world is beautiful, and its artificer good, it is evident that he looked towards an eternal exemplar in its fabrication. But if the world be far from beautiful, which it is not lawful to assert, he necessarily beheld a generated instead of an eternal exemplar. But it is perfectly evident that he regarded an

sensible world, time in things moved, and the transitive intellection of souls. But that every motion subsists according to a part, and that the whole of it is not present at once, is evident. And if the essence of the world possesses generation, and the perpetuity of it is according to a temporal infinity, it may be inferred, that between things eternally perpetual, and such as are generated in a part of time, it is necessary that nature should subsist which is generated infinitely. It is also requisite that a nature of this kind should be generated infinitely in a twofold respect, viz. either that the whole of it should be perpetual through the whole of time, but that the parts should subsist in the parts of time, as is the case with the sublunary elements, or that both the whole and the parts of it should be co-extended with the perpetuity of all time, as is the case with the heavenly bodies. For the perpetuity according to eternity is not the same with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as neither is the infinity of eternity and time the same; because eternity is not the same with time, the former being infinite life at once total and full, or, the whole of which is ever present to itself, and the latter being a flowing image of such a life.

Further still, says Proclus, the term generated has a multifarious meaning. For it signifies that which has a temporal beginning, every thing which proceeds from a cause, that which is essentially a composite, and that which is naturally capable of being generated, though it should not be generated. The term generated, therefore, being multifariously predicated, that which is generated according to time possesses all the modes of generation. For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and is naturally capable of being generated. Hence, as that which is generated in a part of time begins at one time, and arrives at perfection in another, so the world, which is generated according to the whole of time, is always beginning, and always perfect. And it has indeed a certain beginning of generation, so far as it is perfected by its cause, but has not a certain beginning so far as it has not a beginning of a certain partial time.

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eternal paradigm. For the world is the most beautiful of generated natures, and its artificer the best of causes. But, being thus generated, it is fabricated according to that which is comprehensible by reason and intelligence, and which subsists in an abiding sameness of being. And from hence it is perfectly necessary that this world should be the resemblance of something. But to describe its origin according to nature is the greatest of all undertakings. In this manner, then, we must distinguish concerning the image and its exemplar. As words are allied to the things of which they are the interpreters, hence it is necessary, when we speak of that which is stable¹ and firm, and intellectually apparent, that our reasons should be in like manner stable and immutable, and as much as possible irreprehensible, with every perfection of a similar kind. But that, when we speak concerning the image of

¹ That which Plato now calls *stable* and *firm*, he before called eternal being, subsisting after the same manner, and apprehended by intelligence; denominating it *stable* instead of *eternal being*, and *intellectually apparent*, instead of *that which is apprehended by intelligence*. He also says, that the reasonings about it should be *stable* indeed, that through the sameness of the appellation he may indicate the similitude of them to things themselves; but *immutable*, that they may shadow forth the firmness of the thing; and *irreprehensible*, that they may imitate that which is apprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. For it is necessary that reasonings, if they are to be adapted to intelligibles, should possess the accurate and the stable, as being conversant with things of this kind. For, as the knowledge of things eternal is immutable, so also is the *reasoning*; since it is evolved knowledge. However, as it proceeds into multitude, is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of the union and impartibility of the thing, he calls the former in the singular number *stable* and *firm*, and *intellectually apparent*, but the latter in the plural number *stable*, immutable and irreprehensible *reasons*. And since in *reason* there is a certain similitude to its paradigm, and there is also a certain dissimilitude, and the latter is more abundant than the former, he employs one appellation in common, *the stable*; but the other epithets are different. And as, with respect to our knowledge, scientific reasoning cannot be confuted by it, (for there is nothing in us better than science,) but is confuted by the thing itself, as not being able to comprehend its nature such as it is, and as it comes into contact with its impartibility, hence he adds, *as much as possible*. For science itself considered as subsisting in souls is irreprehensible, but is reprehended by intellect, because it evolves the impartible, and apprehends the simple in a composite manner. Since the phantasy also reprehends sense, because its knowledge is attended with passion according to mixture, from which the phantasy is pure; opinion the phantasy, because it knows in conjunction with type and form, to which opinion is superior; science opinion, because the latter knows without being able to assign the cause, the ability of effecting which especially characterizes the former; and intellect as we have said science, because the latter divides the object of knowledge transitively, but the former apprehends every thing at once in conjunction with essence. Intellect, therefore, is alone unconquerable; but science and scientific reasoning are vanquished by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.

that which is immutable, we should employ only probable arguments, which have the same analogy to the former as a resemblance to its exemplar. And, indeed, as essence¹ is to generation, so is truth to faith. You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, since many things are asserted by many concerning

¹ Plato, says Proclus, had prior to this made two things the leaders, the intelligible and that which is generated, or paradigm and image, and had assumed two things analogous to these, science and probability, or truth and faith, truth being to an intelligible paradigm as faith to a generated image; and now he geometrically adds the alternate proportion. For, if as truth is to the intelligible, so is faith to that which is generated, it will be alternately as truth is to faith, so the intelligible to that which is generated. Plato, therefore, clearly divides reasonings and knowledges with the things known; and Parmenides also, though obscure through his poetry, yet at the same time says, that there are twofold knowledges, truth and faith, of twofold things, viz. of beings and non-beings; and the former of these knowledges he calls splendour, as shining with intellectual light, but he deprives the latter of stable knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now assumes appears to be different from that of which he speaks in the sixth book of his Republic, in the section of a line; for that is irrational knowledge, whence also it is divided from conjecture, but is arranged according to sense. But the present faith is rational, though it is mingled with irrational knowledges, employing sense and conjecture; and hence it is filled with much of the unstable. For, receiving *that* a thing is from sense or conjecture, it thus assigns the causes: but these knowledges possess much of the confused and unstable. Hence Socrates in the Phædo very much blames the senses, because we neither see nor hear any thing accurately. How then can knowledge, originating from sense, possess the accurate and irreprehensible? For those powers that employ science alone collect with accuracy every thing which is the object of their knowledge; but those powers that concur with sense err and fall off from the accurate, through sense, and through the unstable nature of the thing known. For what can any one assert of that which is material, since it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide for a moment? And with respect to a celestial nature, in consequence of being very remote from us, it is not easily known, nor scientifically apprehended; but we must be satisfied with an approximation to the truth, and with probability in the speculation of it. For every thing which is in place requires a residence there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. But the intelligible is not a thing of this kind, since it is not to be apprehended by our knowledge in place. For where any one stops his dianoëtic power, there, in consequence of the intelligible being every where present, he comes into contact with truth. And if it is possible to assert any thing stable concerning a celestial nature, this also is possible, so far as it partakes of being, and so far as it is to be apprehended by intelligence. For it is through geometrical demonstrations, which are universal, that we are alone able to collect any thing necessary concerning it; but, so far as it is sensible, it is with difficulty apprehended, and with difficulty surveyed.

With respect to truth, however, Plato, following the theologists, establishes it as manifold. For one kind of truth is characterized by the nature of *the one*, being the light proceeding from *the good*, which, in the Phæbus, he says, imparts purity, and, in the Republic, union, to intelligibles. Another kind is that which proceeds from intelligibles, which illuminates the intellectual orders, which

cerning the Gods and the generation of the universe, if I should not be able to produce the most approved and accurate reasons on so difficult a subject. But you ought to rejoice if it shall appear that I do not employ reasons less probable than others : at the same time remembering, that I who discourse, and that you who are my judges, possess the human nature in common ; so that you should be satisfied if my assertions are but assimilative of the truth.

Soc. You speak excellently well, Timæus ; and we shall certainly act in every respect as you advise. This introduction, indeed, of your discourse we wonderfully approve : proceed, therefore, with the subsequent disputation.

TIM. Let us declare then on what account the composing artificer constituted generation and the universe. The artificer, indeed, was good ; but in that which is good envy never subsists about any thing which has being. Hence, as he was entirely void of envy, he was willing to produce all things as much as possible similar to himself. If, therefore, any one receives this most principal cause of generation and the world from wise and prudent men, he will receive him in a manner the most perfect and true. For, as the Divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be evil ; hence, receiving every thing visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moving with confusion¹ and disorder, he

which an essence unfigured, uncoloured, and untouched first receives, and where also the plain of truth is situated, as it is written in the Phædrus. A third kind of truth is that which is con-nate with souls, which comes into contact with being through intelligence, and science subsisting in conjunction with the objects of science : for the light pertaining to the soul is the third from the intelligible ; since the intellectual is filled from the intelligible, and that pertaining to the soul from the intellectual order. This truth, therefore, subsisting in souls, must be now assumed, since we have admitted a corresponding faith, and not that which is irrational, and destitute of all logical consideration ; and the one must be conjoined with intelligibles, but the other with sensibles.

¹ Plato being willing to indicate the providence of the demiurgus pervading the universe, together with the gifts of intellect and the presence of soul, and to show the magnitude of the good which these impart to the world, surveys prior to this the whole corporeal constitution by itself, and how, thus considered, it is confused and disordered ; that also, beholding by itself the order proceeding from soul and demiurgic ornament, we may be able to define what a corporeal nature is in itself, and what orderly distribution it is allotted from fabrication. The world, indeed, always had a subsistence, but discourse divides the thing generated from the maker, and produces according to time things which subsist at once together, because every thing generated is a composite.

he reduced it from this wild inordination into order, considering that such a conduct was by far the best. For it neither ever was lawful, nor is, for the best of causes to produce any other than the most beautiful of effects. In consequence of a reasoning¹ process, therefore, he found that among the things naturally visible² there was nothing, the whole of which, if void of intelligence, could ever become more beautiful than the whole of that which is endued with intellect: and at the same time he discovered, that it was impossible for intellect to accede to any being, without the intervention of soul. Hence, as the result of this reasoning, placing intellect in soul and soul in body, he fabricated the universe; that thus it might be a work naturally the most beautiful and the best. In this manner, therefore, according

posited. To which we may add, that demiurgic fabrication being twofold, one being corporeal, and the other ornamental, Plato, beginning from the ornamental, very properly represents every thing corporeal moved in a confused and disordered manner, because such is its motion from itself when considered as not yet animated by an intellectual soul.

It also deserves to be noticed that Plato, in giving subsistence to the confused and disordered, prior to the fabrication of the world, imitates the antient theologists. For, as they introduce the battles and seditions of the Titans against the Olympian Gods, so Plato pre-supposes these two, the unadorned, and the fabricator of the world, that the former may be adorned and participate of order. They, however, introduce these theologically; for they oppose the powers that preside over bodies to the Olympian deities: but Plato philosophically; for he transfers order from the Gods to the subjects of their government.

¹ The demiurgus of the universe, through the plenitude of his power, fabricates different things by different powers; for, since he comprehends in himself the cause of all fabrications, he after one manner gives subsistence to the whole world, and after another to its parts. Hence, by one intelligence he adorns the whole world, and generates it collectively, according to which energy the world also is one animal; but by reasoning he produces its parts, and these as wholes, because he is the demiurgus of total natures, viz. of total intellect, total soul, and all the bulk of body. In consequence of this, when composing parts, he is said to fabricate by reasoning. For reasoning here signifies a distributive cause of things; since it is not the reasoning of one doubting. For neither does art doubt, nor science; but artists and the scientific then doubt when they are indigent of their proper habits. If these, therefore, do not doubt when they are perfect, can it be supposed that intellect doubts, or the fabricator and father of the universe?

² That is, intelligibles: for that these are visible is evident from the words of Plato further on, where he says—"Whatever ideas intellect perceived in animal itself," &c. But that these are *naturally* visible will be evident, as Proclus beautifully observes, if we consider that some things are visible to us, and others according to nature. And the things, indeed, which are visible to us, are in their own nature dark and obscure; but things naturally visible are truly known, and are resplendent with divine light. And such are intelligibles.

to

to an assimilative reason, it is necessary to call the world an animal, endued with intellect, and generated through the providence of Divinity.

This being determined, let us consider what follows; and, in the next place, after the similitude of what animals the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed, we must by no means think that he fashioned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part, or have a partial subsistence: for, if it had been assimilated to an imperfect animal, it certainly would not have been beautiful. But we should rather establish it as the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered separately and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts. For this, indeed, contains all intelligible animals comprehended in itself; just as this world contains us and the other animals which are the objects of sight. For, the Divinity being willing to assimilate this universe in the most exquisite degree to that which is the most beautiful and every way perfect of intelligible objects, he composed it one visible animal, containing within itself all such animals as are allied to its nature. Do we therefore rightly conclude that there is but one universe; or is it more right to assert that there are many and infinite? But indeed there can be but one, if it be only admitted that it is fabricated according to an exemplar. For that which comprehends all intelligible animals whatever can never be the second to any other. For another animal again would be required about these two, of which they would be parts; and it would be more proper to assert that the universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the other two. That the world, therefore, from its being singular or alone, might be similar to all-perfect animal—on this account the artificer neither produced two nor infinite worlds; but heaven, or the universe, was generated and will be one and only begotten.

But since it is necessary that a corporeal nature should be visible and tangible, and since nothing can be visible without fire, and nothing tangible without something solid, and nothing solid without earth—hence the Divinity, beginning to fabricate, composed the body of the universe from fire and earth. But it is impossible for two things alone to cohere together without the intervention of a third; for a certain collective bond is necessary in the middle of the two. And that is the most beautiful of bonds which renders both itself and the natures which are bound remarkably one. But the

most beautiful analogy naturally produces this effect. For when either in three numbers, or masses, or powers, as is the middle to the last, so is the first to the middle; and again, as is the last to the middle, so is the middle to the first: then the middle becoming both first and last, and the last and the first passing each of them into a middle position, they become all of them necessarily the same, as to relation to each other. But, being made the same with each other, all are one. If, then, it were necessary that the universe should be a superficies only, and have no depth, one medium would indeed be sufficient, both for the purpose of binding itself and the natures which it contains. But now it is requisite that the world should be a solid; and solids are never harmonized together by one, but always with two mediums. Hence, the Divinity placed water and air in the middle of fire and earth, and fabricated them as much as possible in the same ratio to each other; so that fire might be to air as air to water; and that as air is to water so water might be to earth. And from this conjunction and composition he rendered the world visible and tangible. Hence, from things of this kind, which are four in number, it must be confessed that the body of the universe was generated through analogy, conspiring into friendship with itself from their conjunction, and so aptly cohering in all its parts, as to be indissoluble except by its artificer, who bound it in this union and consent.

The composition of the world, therefore, received one *whole* of each of these four natures. For its composing artificer constituted it from *all* fire, water, air, and earth; leaving no part of any one of these, nor any power external to the world. For by a reasoning process he concluded that it would thus be a whole animal, in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts: that, besides this, it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced; and lastly, that it would be neither obnoxious to old age nor disease. For he perceived that the heat and cold from which bodies are composed, and all such things as possess vigorous powers, when surrounding bodies externally, and acceding to them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and, introducing diseases and old age, cause them to perish by decay. Hence, through this cause and this reasoning process, he fabricated the universe one whole, composed from all wholes, perfect, undecaying, and without disease. He likewise gave to it a figure becoming and allied to its nature. For to the animal which was destined to comprehend

comprehend all animals in itself, that figure must be the most becoming which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence, he fashioned it of a spherical shape, in which all the radii from the middle are equally distant from the bounding extremities; as this is the most perfect of all figures, and the most similar to himself. For he considered that the similar was infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar.

Besides this, he accurately polished the external circumference of the spherical world, and rendered it perfectly smooth¹. Nor was the addition of eyes² requisite to the universe; for nothing visible remained external to itself.

¹ It is well observed here by Proclus, that, the whole universe being luminous, it is most lucid according to its external superficies, and full of divine splendour. For through this the poets also place Olympus at the extremity of the world, this being entirely luminous and self-splendid.

There a white splendour spreads its radiance round,

says Homer. But of this luminous subsistence smoothness is a symbol. Why, therefore, are the extremities of the universe smooth? We reply, That it may be spontaneously conjoined with soul and intellect, and that it may be harmoniously adapted to supermundane lights, through its similitude to them. Smoothness, therefore, is significant of extreme aptitude, through which the universe is able to receive the illuminations proceeding from intellect and soul; just as mirrors, by their smoothness, receive the representations of things. Proclus further observes, that a mirror was assumed by antient theologists as a symbol of the aptitude of the universe to be filled with intellectual illumination. Hence, says he, they say that Vulcan made a mirror for Bacchus, into which the God looking, and beholding the image of himself, proceeded into the whole of a divisible fabrication. And you may say that the smoothness of the external surface of the universe, which is now mentioned by Plato, reminds us of the above-mentioned catoptric apparatus. The whole body of the universe, therefore, being externally smooth, becomes connate with its own intellect, and with that of the demiurgus. Hence, poets establish the demiurgus on the lofty summit of the world, which is allotted from him such an aptitude, in order to its participation of intelligible causes.

² By these words, says Proclus, Plato appears to do nothing else than to take away from the universe a divisible life, and divisible organs, which being suspended from us descend into generation, or the whole of a visible nature. For, while we remain on high, we are in no want of any one of these multiform lives and divisible instruments; but our lucid vehicle is sufficient, which contains in itself unitedly all the senses. As, therefore, when we are liberated from generation we are purified from every life of this kind, what ought we to think respecting the universe? Is it not this, that it has one simple life, to which the whole of it is excited, and that it is equally on all sides prepared to be filled with one life? Or ought we not much more to admit these things of the universe? For wholes are more divine than parts, and things which comprehend than those which are comprehended.

Plato, however, must not be supposed in what he now says to deprive the world of sense; for, according

itself. Nor were ears necessary; as there was nothing externally audible. Nor was the universe invested with surrounding air, that it might be indigent of respiration. Nor, again, was it in want of any organ through which it might receive nutriment into itself, and discharge it when concocted: for there was no possibility that any thing could either accede to or depart from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could be produced. For, indeed, the universe affords nutriment to itself through its own consumption; and, being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its composing artificer considered that it would be much more excellent if sufficient to itself, than if indigent of foreign supplies. But he neither thought that hands¹ were necessary to the world, as there was nothing for it either to receive

according to him, the world is an animal, and an animal is characterized by sense. In order, therefore, to understand what the nature of that sense is which the world possesses, it will be necessary to make the following division. Of sense, therefore, the first and most principal is that which imitates intellect. For every where things which rank as first possess an imitation of things prior to them. Hence, that is conjoined with first natures which has a sensible perception of itself, comprehended in itself, not passing from one thing to another, for this would be divided sense, nor proceeding to externals, for this is imperfect, but possessing the whole of that which is sensible in itself, and which may be rather called consciousness than sense. The next to this is that which proceeds indeed, and does not abide like the former, but yet proceeds according to a perfect energy, and always, on all sides, similarly apprehends that which is known; which is likewise purified from all passion, and from all that imbecility which is peculiar to divisible and material organs. The third is that which is passive to things external, and is mingled from passion and knowledge; originating, indeed, from passion, but ending in knowledge. The last sense is that with which a most obscure knowledge is present, which is full of passion, and is proximate to physical sympathy, as not knowing the forms of sensibles; as, for instance, that what operates is hot or cold, but that what falls upon it is alone pleasant or painful; for such is the sense of plants, as Timæus informs us in the course of this dialogue, being the apprehension of that which is alone pleasant and painful from things sensible. Sense, therefore, thus supernally proceeding, the world is sensitive according to the first sense. For it is visible, and an eye, according to the whole of itself, since the sun also is called an eye, and each of the stars. The world, therefore, is wholly sight and the thing seen, and is *truly* to be comprehended by sense and opinion. Hence, it contains all-perfect knowledge, indivisible sense, and is itself sensible, the instrument of sense, and sense; just as also its artificer is intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. And as it comprehends partial bodies in its whole body, so likewise it contains many senses in its total sense.

¹ These things, says Proclus, are by no means in the universe, though after another manner it contains both sense and motion. For, since every thing sensible is comprehended in it, and it is

receive or reject; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are subservient to progression and rest. For from among the seven species of local motion he selected one, which principally subsists about intellect and intelligence, and assigned it to the world as properly allied to its surrounding body. Hence, when he had led it round according to *same*, in *same*, and in itself, he caused it to move with a circular revolution. But he separated the other six motions from the world, and framed it void of their wandering progressions. Hence, as such a conversion was by no means indigent of feet, he generated the universe without legs and feet. When, therefore, that God who is a perpetually reasoning divinity cogitated about the God who was destined to subsist at some certain period of time, he produced his body smooth and equable; and every way from the middle even and whole, and perfect from the composition of perfect bodies. But, placing soul in the middle of the world, he extended it through the whole; and besides this, he externally invested the body of the universe with soul; and, causing circle to revolve in a circle, established the world one single, solitary nature, able through virtue to converse with itself, indigent of nothing external, and sufficiently known and friendly to itself. And on all these accounts he ren-

is itself the first sensible, it has also one sense conjoined with sensible of this kind; just as the intelligence of the demiurgus is conjoined with the whole of the intelligible, in consequence of which he is said by Orpheus to absorb the universe in himself. After this manner, therefore, the world absorbs itself by the sensible perception of itself, and comprehends the thing known by a connate knowledge. It also possesses powers which rule over, and are the guardians of, all things; and these are its hands. It likewise possesses perfective orders, which are analogous to nutritive parts; and receives vivific causes which correspond to the members of respiration. Further still, it also contains other powers, some of which fill it with unapparent causes, and others connect it with intelligible light. And of these powers, some are analogous to sight, and others to hearing. With this sense it likewise possesses an analogous motion; for, as it possesses a sensible perception of itself, so also it contains motion in itself, and a revolving about itself; and both these according to the similitude of its paradigm. For in Phanes, or animal itself, there is intelligence verging to itself, a life converted to itself, and a knowledge not subsisting according to transition and division, but self-perfect, and united with intelligibles themselves. For such is the intellect which is there, which in consequence of its being absorbed in superessential light may be said to energize prior to energy; because, according to the Chaldaic oracle, it has not proceeded, but abides in the paternal profundity, and in the adytum, according to a silence which is nourished by Deity.

dered the universe a happy¹ God. But indeed the artificer did not produce soul, as we just now began to say, junior to body: for he who conjoined these would never permit that the more antient nature should be subservient to the younger. But we, as being much conversant with that which casually occurs, assert things of this kind in an assimilative way; while, on the contrary, the artificer of the world constituted soul both in generation and virtue prior to, and more antient than, body, as being the proper lord and ruler of its servile nature; and that in the following manner:

From an essence impartible², and always subsisting according to sameness of

¹ The happiness of any being is the proper perfection of that being; and hence, as the perfections of beings differ, so also do their felicities. A felicity, therefore, in the present case must be assumed, adapted to the universe. For, since the world is suspended from a paternal intellect and a total fabricative energy, and lives according to those causes, it is happy in a degree consequent to these. The world, therefore, living according to the will of the father, and preserving immutably the intellectual good which is thence imparted, is very justly said to be happy. But the first form of felicity, says Proclus, and which is all-perfect, is that of the world. The second is that of the mundane Gods, whom Plato in the *Phædrus* calls happy divinities, following the mighty Jupiter. The third is that which subsists in the genera superior to our nature, viz. angels, daemons, and heroes; for the felicity of each of these is different. The fourth is that which subsists in undefiled souls, who make blameless descents into mortality, and exhibit an inflexible and untamed life; such as were the souls of Hercules, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, &c. The fifth is the felicity of partial souls; and this is multifarious: for a soul the attendant of the moon is not happy after the same manner as the soul that is suspended from the solar order; but as the form of life is different, so also the perfection is limited by different measures. And the last form of felicity is that which is seen in irrational animals.

² The Orphic writers, says Proclus, (in *Tim.* p. 184.) do not predicate the impartible of every intelligible or intellectual order, but, according to them, there is something better than this appellation; just as, with respect to other names, they do not adapt king and father to all orders. Where, then, shall we first perceive the indivisible according to Orpheus, that we may thus understand the divinely intellectual conception of Plato? Orpheus, therefore, establishing one demiurgus of all divided fabrication, who is analogous to the one father that generates total fabrication, produces from him the whole mundane intellectual multitude, the number of souls, and corporeal compositions. This demiurgus, (viz. Bacchus) therefore, generates all these unitedly; but the Gods who are placed about him divide and separate his fabrications. Orpheus says, that all the other fabrications of this divinity were separated into parts by the distributive Gods, but that his heart alone was preserved indivisible by the providence of Minerva. For, as he gave subsistence to intellects, souls and bodies, and souls and bodies receive in themselves much division and separation into parts, but intellect remains united and undivided, being all things in one, and comprehending

of being, and from a nature divisible about bodies, he mingled from both a third form of essence, having a middle subsistence between the two. And again, between that which is impartible and that which is divisible about bodies, he placed the nature of *same* and *different*. And taking these, now they are three, he mingled them all into one idea. But as the nature of *different* could not without difficulty be mingled in *same*, he harmonized them together by employing force in their conjunction. But after he had mingled these two with essence, and had produced one from the three, he again divided this whole into becoming parts; at the same time mingling each part from *same*, *different*, and *essence*. But he began to divide as follows:—In the first place, he received one part from the whole. Then he separated a second part, double of the first; afterwards a third, sesquialter of the second, but triple of the first: then a fourth, double of the second; in the next place a fifth, triple of the third; a sixth, octuple of the first; and lastly a seventh, twenty-seven times more than the first. After this, he filled up the double and triple intervals, again cutting off parts from the whole; and placed them so between the intervals, that there might be two mediums in every interval;

prehending in one intelligence total intelligibles,—hence he says, that intellectual essence alone, and an intellectual number, were saved by Minerva. For, says he,

The intellectual heart alone was saved :

openly denominating it intellectual. If, therefore, the indivisible heart is intellectual, it will evidently be intellect and an intellectual number; not that it will, indeed, be every intellect, but that which is mundane; for this is the indivisible heart, since the divided God was the fabricator of this. But Orpheus calls intellect the indivisible essence of Bacchus; and denominates his prolific power that life which is distributed about body, which is physical and productive of seeds, and which he says Diana, who presides over all the generation in nature, and leads into light physical reasons, supernally extends as far as to subterranean natures. All the remaining body of the God is, according to Orpheus, mythologically considered as the composition pertaining to the soul, and is divided into seven parts. “All the parts into which they divided the boy were seven*,” says the theologist, speaking concerning the Titans; just in the same manner as Timæus divides the soul into seven parts. And, perhaps, when Timæus says that soul is extended through the whole world, he reminds us of the Orphic Titanic division, through which not only the soul is spread round the universe like a veil, but is also extended through every part of it. With great propriety, therefore, does Plato call that essence impartible which is proximately placed above soul, following the Orphic fables, and wishing, as it were, to be an interpreter of what is said in the mysteries.

* Έπτα δὲ πάντα μέρη κεύρου διμοίρουντο φησὶν ὁ θεολόγος περὶ τῶν Τιτανῶν.

and

and that one of these might by the same part exceed one of the extremes, and be exceeded by the other; and that the other part might by an equal number surpass one of the extremes, and by an equal number be surpassed by the other. But as from hence sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquioctave intervals were produced, from those bonds in the first spaces, he filled with a sesquioctave interval all the sesquitercian parts, at the same time leaving a part¹ of each of these. And then again the interval of this part being

¹ It is well observed here by Proclus, (in Tim. p. 211.) that from each of the spheres from which the universe consists there are certain defluxions which extend as far as to the subterranean regions, and also certain dregs mingled together, of the elements themselves, possessing much of the tumultuous, dark and material, but at the same time contributing to the whole composition and harmony of the world. Plato (says he) placing the cause of this in the soul of the universe calls it a remainder (*λειμμα*), a term significant of ultimate subjection.

Proclus further observes, "that theologists also establish about subterranean places the powers of the highest Gods; and that Jupiter himself is represented by them as adorning those places in order to adapt them to the participation of such mighty Gods. That, if this be the case, we ought much more to think, concerning the soul of the universe, that it adorns every thing which appears to have a disordered subsistence, possesses the cause of its existence, and arranges it in a becoming manner according to this cause. For, how can it govern the universe, or conduct all things according to intellect, unless it orderly disposes that which is disordered, and co-harmonizes things last with the one life of the world? If also the causes of these presubsist in the demiurgus, as Orpheus says, what wonder is it that the whole soul which possesses all such things in a manner adapted to itself, as a divine intellect possesses demiurgically, should also comprehend the cause of things last in the world, and of that which is as it were the sediment of wholes? For soul prior to the apparent and sensible comprehends an unapparent world."

Proclus concludes with observing, that the whole number of the essential monads in the soul is 105,947^{*}; the soul thus proceeding according to all the orders of numbers. For it proceeds decadically indeed, that it may become the mundane soul; since the decad is the number of the world: but pentadically, that it may be converted to itself; for the pentad is self-convertive. It also proceeds enneadically (or according to the number 9), that it may not only connect the universe monadically, but may proceed to the last of things after departing from the monad: tetradically, as collecting the quadripartite division of things into one, and hebdomadically (or according to the number 7), as converting all things to the monad, to which the hebdomad is alone referred, this number being motherless and masculine. And the whole of this number is indeed in the soul of the world totally, viz. has a total subsistence; but in divine souls, as energizing towards the mundane soul, it is contained totally and partially. In dæmoniacal souls, as energizing yet more partially, it subsists on the contrary partially and totally; and in human souls partially and gnostically alone.

^{*} In the original *μυριαδες δεκα, χιλιαδες πεντε, εκατονταδες τεσσαρες*; but from what Proclus immediately after observes, it is evident that instead of *εκατονταδες τεσσαρες* we should read *εννεακονταδες τεσσαρακοντες*.

affumed, a comparifon is from thence obtained in terms of number to number, fubfifting between 256 and 243. But now the whole of that mixture from which thefe were feparated was confumed by fuch a fection of parts. Hence he then cut the whole of this compofition according to length, and produced two from one; and adapted middle to middle, like the form of the letter X. Afterwards he bent them into a circle, connecting them, both with themfelves and with each other, in fuch a manner that their extremities might be combined in one directly oppofite to the point of their mutual interfection; and externally comprehended them in a motion revolving according to *fameneſs*, and in that which is perpetually the ſame. And beſides this, he made one of the circles external, but the other internal; and denominated the local motion of the exterior circle, the motion of that nature which fubſiſts according to *fameneſs*; but that of the interior one, the motion of the nature fubſiſting according to *difference*. He likewiſe cauſed the circle partaking of *fameneſs* to revolve laterally towards the right hand; but that which partakes of *difference* diametrically towards the left. But he conferred dominion on the circulation of that which is *ſame* and *ſimilar*: for he ſuffered this alone to remain undivided. But as to the interior circle, when he had divided it ſix times, and had produced ſeven unequal circles, each according to the interval of the double and triple; as each of them are three, he ordered the circles to proceed in a courſe contrary to each other:—and three of the ſeven interior circles he commanded to revolve with a ſimilar ſwiftness; but the remaining four with a motion diſſimilar to each other, and to the former three; yet ſo as not to deſert order and proportion in their circulations.

After, therefore, the whole compoſition of the ſoul was completed according to the intention of its artiſicer, in the next place he fabricated within ſoul the whole of a corporeal nature; and, conciliating middle with middle, he aptly harmonized them together. But ſoul¹ being every way extended

¹ Soul proceeding ſupernally as far as to the laſt receſſes of the earth, and illuminating all things with the light of life, the world being converted to it, becomes animated from its extremities, and alſo according to its middle, and the whole of its interval. It alſo externally enjoys the intellectual illumination of ſoul. Hence ſoul is ſaid to obtain the middle of the univerſe, as depoſiting in it its powers, and a ſymbol of its proper preſence. It is alſo ſaid to extend itſelf to the extremities of heaven, as vivifying it on all ſides; and to inveſt the univerſe as with a veil, as poſſeſſing powers exempt from diviſible bulks.

from the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and investing it externally in a circle, at the same time herself revolving ¹ within herself, gave rise to the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life, through the whole of time. And, indeed, the body of the universe was generated visible; but soul is invisible, participating of a rational energy and harmony ², and subsisting as the best of generated natures, through its artificer, who is the best of intelligible and perpetual beings. Since, therefore, soul was composed from the mixture of the three parts *same*, *different*, and *essence*, and was distributed and bound according to analogy, herself at the same time returning by a circular energy towards herself; hence, when she touches ³ upon any thing endued with a dissipated essence, and when upon that which is indivisible, being moved through the whole of herself, she pronounces concerning the nature of each—asserts what that is with which any thing is the same ⁴, from what it is different, to what it is related, where it is situated, how

¹ Plato here evidently evinces, that the conversion of the soul to herself is a knowledge of herself, of every thing which she contains, and of every thing prior to and proceeding from her. For all knowledge may be said to be a conversion and adaptation to that which is known; and hence truth is an harmonious conjunction of that which knows with the object of knowledge. Conversion, however, being twofold, one as to *the good*, and the other as to *being*, the vital conversion of all things is directed to *the good*, and the gnostic to *being*.

² Harmony has a threefold subsistence; for it is either *harmony itself*, i. e. ideal harmony in a divine intellect; or *that which is first harmonized*, and is such according to the whole of itself; or *that which is secondarily harmonized*, and partly participates of harmony. The first of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and the third to body.

³ Plato calls the gnostic motions of the soul *touchings*, indicating by this their immediate apprehension of the objects of knowledge, and their impartible communion with them. Since, however, one of the circles, viz. the dianoëtic power, knows intelligibles, and the other, i. e. the doxastic power, sensibles, what is it which says that these objects are different from each other, and that the one is a paradigm, but the other an image? We reply, that in the same manner as the common sense knows visibles and audibles, the former through sight, and the latter through hearing, and, in consequence of asserting that these are different from each other, must necessarily have a knowledge of both,—so this reason of which Plato now speaks, being different from the two circles, asserts through the whole soul some things concerning intelligibles, and others concerning sensibles. For, in as much as the soul is one essence, she possesses this one gnostic energy, which he calls reason: and hence we simply say that the whole soul is rational. This reason then is the one knowledge of the soul, which through the circle of sameness understands an impartible essence, and through the circle of difference that which is dissipated.

⁴ The soul of the world, says Proclus (in Tim. p. 234.) comprehends all sensibles, together with

how it subsists; and when any thing of this kind happens either *to be* or *to suffer* both in things which are generated and in such as possess an eternal sameness of being. Reason indeed, which is *becoming*¹ *to be* true according to sameness, when it is conversant as well with *different* as *same*, evolving itself without voice or sound in that which is moved by itself; when in this case it subsists about a sensible nature, and the circle characterized by *difference* properly revolving, enunciates any circumstance to every part of the soul with which it is connected; then stable and true opinions and belief are produced. But when again it evolves itself about that which is *logistic*², and the circle of *sameness* aptly revolving announces any particular thing, intellect

every thing which they either do or suffer. For, since the universe is one animal, it sympathizes with itself, so that all generated natures are parts of the life of the world, as of one drama. Just as if a tragic poet should compose a drama in which Gods make their appearance, and heroes and other persons speak, and should permit such players as were willing, to utter the heroic speeches, or the speeches of other characters, he at the same time comprehending the one cause of all that is said. Thus ought we to conceive respecting the whole soul: that giving subsistence to all the life of the world, this life being one and various, and speaking like a many-headed animal with all its heads, partly in Grecian and partly in Barbaric language, it comprehends the causes of all generated natures; knowing particulars by universals, accidents by essences, and parts by wholes, but all things simply by the divinity which it contains. For a God so far as a God knows things partial, contrary to nature, and in short all things, even though you should say matter itself. For every thing, whatever it may be, is one, so far as it proceeds from *the one*. The knowledge, therefore, of all things simply and directly, is divine.

¹ This reason is the one power of the essence of the soul, according to which the soul is one, just as it is twofold according to *the same* and *different*. This reason, therefore, being one, knows according to *sameness*. For it does not at one time know the intelligible, and at another time a sensible nature, like our reason, which is unable to energize about both according to the same. Plato very properly says of this reason, that it is *becoming to be true* (αλλοθες γιγνομενος) about intelligibles and sensibles, but is not *absolutely* true like intellect, in consequence of its transitive knowledge according to both these. Hence, by asserting that it knows according to *sameness*, he signifies the difference between the knowledge of a divine and partial soul; but when he says that it is *becoming to be true*, he indicates the difference between the knowledge of soul and intellect. You may also say, that it is *becoming to be true*, as being transitive in its twofold knowledges; but that it is true *according to the same*, as always comprehending the whole form of every thing which it knows, and not like our reason evolving every form, but with respect to every thing which it sees beholding the whole at once. For we see every thing according to a part, and not according to sameness.

² It appears from the comment of Proclus on this part, that we should read λογιστικον, and not λογικον as in all the printed editions of the Timæus. Proclus also well observes, that by *logistic*, here, we must understand *the intelligible*; for Plato opposes this to *the sensible*. He adds, that

intellect and science are necessarily produced in perfection by such an operation. Whoever, therefore, asserts that this¹ is ingenerated in any other nature than soul, asserts every thing rather than the truth.

But when the generating father understood that this generated resemblance of the eternal Gods² moved and lived, he was delighted with his work, and in consequence of this delight considered how he might fabricate it still more similar to its exemplar. Hence, as that is an eternal animal, he endeavoured to render this universe such, to the utmost of his ability. The nature indeed of the animal its paradigm is eternal, and this it is impossible to adapt perfectly to a generated effect. Hence he determined by a dianoëtic energy to produce a certain movable image of eternity: and thus, while he was adorning and distributing the universe, he at the same time formed an

Plato appears to call *the intelligible the logistic*, after the same manner as he afterwards calls *the sensible, sensitive*, (το αισθητόν, αισθητικόν). For *the sensible* is motive of sense, and *the intelligible* of the reasoning of the soul. After this he observes as follows: "By aptly revolving we must understand the intellectual, the unimpeded in transition, the circular, and the consummation of vigour, perfection in intellections, the energizing about a divine nature, the beneficent, and moving about the intelligible as a centre;"—"hastening to conjoin yourself with the centre of resounding light," says some one of the Gods. By *intellect* Plato here signifies intellect according to habit. For intellect is threefold: the first, that which is divine, such as the demiurgic; the second, that which is participated by the soul, but is at the same time essential and self-perfect; and the third, that which subsists according to habit, and through which the soul is intellectual. *Science* here signifies the first knowledge filled from intelligibles, and which has an undeviating and immutable subsistence. But it differs from intellect, so far as intellect is beheld in simple projections alone of the soul; for through this the soul understands at once the whole of every thing which is the object of intellection. For an energy at once collective is the peculiarity of intellect; but that of science consists in a knowledge from cause; since the composition and division of forms constitute the idiom of science.

¹ By *this*, says Proclus, we must understand *intellect* and *science*. Every thing, therefore, which is the recipient of intellect and science, of opinion and faith, is soul. For all the knowledges of the soul are rational and transitive. And because they are rational, indeed, they are exempt from irrational powers; but, because they are transitive, they are subordinate to intellectual knowledge. For, if science and intellect are in intelligibles, they are not *ingenerated* in them, as Plato here says they are in the soul.

² By *the eternal Gods* here we must not understand, as Proclus well observes, the *mundane Gods*; for Plato does not alone speak of the corporeal nature of the universe, but also discourses about it as animated, and an intellectual animal, which comprehends in itself the mundane Gods. We must understand, therefore, that the world is the resemblance of the intelligible Gods: for it is filled from them with deity, and the progressions into it of the mundane are as it were certain rivers and illuminations of the intelligible Gods.

eternal image flowing according to number, of eternity abiding in one; and which receives from us the appellation of time. But besides this he fabricated the generation of days¹ and nights, and months and years, which had

no

¹ What day and night, month and year, are, says Proclus, and how these are said to be parts of time, but *was* and *will be* species, and not parts, requires much discussion and profound consideration. If then we should say that day is air illuminated by the sun, in the first place, we should speak of something which takes place in day, and not that which day is; for, when we say that the day is long or short, we certainly do not predicate an increase or decrease of the air; and, in the next place, it is difficult to devise how this will be a part of time. But if we say that day is the temporal interval according to which the sun proceeds from the east to the west, we shall perhaps avoid the former objections, but we shall fall into more impervious difficulties. For whether, surveying this interval itself without relation to the sun, we say that it is day, how does it happen, since the same interval is every where according to the same, that day is not every where? And if we consider this interval in connection with the solar motion, if it is simply so considered, day will always be in the heavens, and there will be no night; and how is it possible that a part of time should not be every where? for night, day, and month, are here clearly said to be parts of time. But if we connect this interval with the circulation of the sun, not simply, but assert that day is the portion of the sun's course from east to west, but night that portion which is produced by his course from west to east, the heavens will not possess those nights and days which are said to be parts of time; and it is also evident that neither will they possess months and years. But we assert of time, both considered according to the whole of itself, and every part of its progression, that it is present to the whole world: for one and the same *now* is every where the same. It is necessary, therefore, that day and the other parts of time should be every where the same, though they are participated partly, and with divulsion by sensible fabrications. Assigning, therefore, to these a more principal subsistence, conformably to the custom of our father*, we must say, that night and day are demiurgic measures of time, exciting and convolving all the apparent and unapparent life and motion, and orderly distribution of the inerratic sphere: for these are the true parts of time, are present after the same manner to all things, and comprehend the primary cause of apparent day and night, each of these having a different subsistence in apparent time; to which also Timæus looking reminds us how time was generated together with the world. Hence he says in the plural number *nights* and *days*, as also *months* and *years*. But these are obvious to all men: for the unapparent causes of these have a uniform subsistence prior to things multiplied, and which circulate infinitely. Things immovable also subsist prior to such as are moved, and intellectual natures are prior to sensibles. Such, therefore, must be our conceptions of night and day according to their first subsistence.

By *month* we must understand that truly divine temporal measure which convolves the lunar sphere, and every termination of the other † circulation. But *year* is that which perfects and connects the whole of middle fabrication, according to which the sun is seen possessing the

* Meaning his preceptor Syriacus, as being his true father, the father of his soul.

† Viz. of the circulation about the zodiac.

no subsistence prior to the universe, but which together with it rose into existence. And all these, indeed, are the proper parts of time. But the terms *it was* and *it will be*, which express the species of generated time, are transferred by us to an eternal essence, through oblivion of the truth. For we assert of such an essence that it *was*, *is*, and *will be*; while according to truth the term *it is* is alone accommodated to its nature. But we should affirm, that *to have been* and *to be hereafter* are expressions alone accommodated to generation, proceeding according to the flux of time: for these

greatest strength, and measuring all things in conjunction with time. For neither day nor night, nor month, is without the sun, nor much more year, nor any other mundane nature. I do not here speak according to the apparent fabrication of things alone, for the apparent sun is the cause of these measures, but also according to that fabrication which is unapparent. For, ascending higher, we shall find that the more true* sun measures all things in conjunction with time, being itself in reality time of time, according to the oracle† of the Gods concerning it. For that Plato not only knew these apparent parts of time, but also those divine parts to which these are homonymous, is evident from the tenth book of his Laws. For he there asserts that we call hours and months divine, as having the same divine lives, and divine intellects presiding over them, as the universe. But, if he now speaks about the apparent parts of time, it is by no means wonderful; because now his design is to physiologize. Let these, therefore, be the parts of time, of which some are accommodated to the inerratic Gods, others to the Gods that revolve about the poles of the oblique circle, and others to other Gods, or attendants of the Gods, or to mortal animals, or the more sublime or more abject parts of the universe.

But Plato says that *was* and *will be* are species and not parts of time, in the same manner as days and nights, and months and years: for by these he represents to us those divine orders which give completion to the whole series of time; and on this account he calls them parts of time. But *was* and *will be* are entirely beheld according to each of these; and hence they are certain species, not having as it were a peculiar matter; I mean a diurnal or nocturnal matter, or any other of this kind. If then these are the species of time which was generated together with the world, there was no generation prior to the world. Neither, therefore, was there any motion: for in every motion there are these species of time, because there are prior and posterior. But, if there was not motion, neither was there inordinate motion. In vain, therefore, do the followers of Atticus say, that there was time prior to the generation of the world, but not subsisting in order: for where time is there also there is past and future; and where these are, *was* and *will be* must likewise be found. But *was* and *will be* are species of time generated by the demiurgus: and hence time was not prior to the fabrication of the world. Proclus after this observes, that *was* indicates the perfective order of time, but *will be* the unfolding, in the same manner as *is*, the connective order of time. For time unfolds things which yet are not, connects things present, and perfects things past, and introduces a boundary to them adapted to their periods.

* Viz. the sun considered according to its subsistence in the supermundane order of Gods.

† Viz. one of the Chaldean Oracles.

parts of time are certain motions. But that which perpetually subsists the same and immovable, neither becomes at any time older or younger; neither has been generated in some period of the past, nor will be in some future circulation of time; nor receives any circumstance of being, which generation adapts to natures hurried away by its impetuous whirl. For all these are nothing more than species of time imitating eternity, and circularly rolling itself according to number. Besides this, we likewise frequently assert that a thing which was *generated*, is *generated*: that what subsists in BECOMING TO BE, IS *in generation*; that what WILL BE, IS TO BE; and that NON-BEING IS NOT: no one of which assertions is accurately true. But perhaps a perfect discussion of these matters is not adapted to the present disputation.

But time ¹ was generated together with the universe, that being produced together they might together be dissolved, if any dissolution should ever
happen

¹ Plato, says Proclus, asserts that time was generated together with the universe, animated and endued with intellect, because the world first participates of time according to soul and according to a corporeal nature. But when he says, “that, being produced together, they may together be dissolved, if any dissolution should ever happen to these,” he clearly shows that the universe is unbegotten and incorruptible. For, if it was generated, it was generated in time; but, if it was generated together with time, it was not generated in time: for neither is time generated in time, lest there should be time prior to time. If, therefore, the universe was generated together with time, it was not generated*: for it is necessary that every thing which is generated should be posterior to time; but the universe is by no means posterior to time. Again, if every thing which is dissolved, is dissolved on a certain time, but time cannot be dissolved in a part of itself, time can never be dissolved; so that neither will the universe be dissolved, since it is indissoluble, as long as time is indissoluble. Time also is indissoluble through the simplicity of its nature, unless some one should denominate the contrariety which arises through its procession from, and regression to, the demiurgus, generation and dissolution: for thus also the universe possesses dissolution and generation according to cause. Just, therefore, as if some one, wishing to indicate that the circulations of the other nature† are odd in number, should say that the heptad is *consubstantial* with them, that if at any time the heptad should become an even number, those circulations also may become even, signifying that the circulations will never be changed into an even number,—after the same manner must we conceive respecting the all-various indissolubility of the world and of time, in consequence of time possessing an indissoluble nature. One cause, therefore, of time being generated together with the universe is, that the universe may be indissoluble

* Viz. it was not generated according to the usual acceptation of the word generated.

† Viz. the circulations about the zodiac.

happen to these. And time was generated according to the exemplar of an eternal nature, that this world might be the most similar possible to such a nature. For its exemplar is permanent being, through the whole of eternity; but the universe alone *was* generated, *is*, and *will be*, through the whole of time. After this manner, therefore, and from such a dianoëtic energy of Divinity about the generation of time ¹, that he might give birth to its flowing subsistence, he generated the sun and moon, and the five other stars, which are denominated planets, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time. But the Divinity, as soon as he had produced the bodies of these stars, placed them, being seven in number, in the seven circulations formed by the revolution of the nature distinguished by *difference*. The moon, indeed, he fixed in the first circulation about the earth; the sun in the second above the earth; the star called Lucifer ², and that which is sacred to Mercury, in circulations revolving with a swiftness equal to the sun, to whom at the same time they are allotted a contrary power; in consequence

and perpetual; but a second cause is, that it may become most similar to its paradigm. How, therefore, does the universe become more similar to its paradigm animal itself (*αὐτὸ ζῷον*) through time? Because, says Plato, as the intelligibles from which animal itself consists receive all the power of eternity, which is unific, and connective, and subsists at once, collectively and unitedly, so the world receives partly and divisibly all the measured motion of time; through which it was, and is, and will be, not possessing these three in the whole of time, but each in a part of time.

¹ The one monad itself of time (says Proclus) is an all-perfect number; but from this monad there is also in each of the celestial revolutions a proper measure, Saturnian, or Jovian, or Lunar, receiving its peculiarity from the soul and motive deity contained in each of the spheres. For one number is adapted to the sun, another to a horse, and another to a plant; but the mundane number is common to all that the world contains. Hence also we say that the same time is every where. For the world has one life, in the same manner as it has one nature, and one intellect. But if it has one life, it has also one temporal measure. And as, with respect to the parts which it contains, each lives according to the nature which subsists in the world as a whole, so also it is measured according to *total* time; and this is the common measure of all things. But after this monad there is a triad, of which the summit is the measure of the first circulation, viz. of the motion of the inerratic sphere; but the middle is the measure of the revolutions of the planets, (for there is one life, one period, and one time, restoring things to their pristine condition, of all the planets as of one animal), and the third is the measure of the circular motion in generation. For through this the mutations of the elements, and the opposition and regeneration of the things moved, again receive their subsistence. But, after this triad, time proceeds according to different numbers, measuring wholes, and bounding all things by appropriate measures.

² Venus.

of which, these stars, the Sun, Lucifer, and Mercury, mutually comprehend and are mutually comprehended by each other in a similar manner. But with respect to the other ¹ stars, if any one should think proper to investigate their circulations, and through what causes they are established, the labour would be greater than that of the discourse itself, for the sake of which they were introduced. An accurate discussion, therefore, of these particulars may, perhaps, be undertaken by us hereafter, if convenient leisure should fall to our lot.

When, therefore, each of the natures necessary to a joint fabrication of time had obtained a local motion adapted to its condition, and their bodies became animals through the connecting power of vital bonds, they then learned their prescribed order; that according to the oblique revolution of the circle of *difference*, which moves in subjection to the circle of *sameness*, these orbs should, by their revolution, partly form a more ample and partly a more contracted circle; and that the orb which formed a lesser circle should revolve swifter; but that which produced a greater, more slow:—but that in consequence of the motion of the circle of *sameness*, the orbs which circu-

¹ By the *other stars*, says Proclus, Plato means Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; and by the word *established*, he signifies the perpetual and incorruptible fabrication of them. After this Proclus observes, that it is here requisite to call to mind the order of all the mundane spheres, which is as follows:—The inerratic sphere ranks as a monad, being the cause to all mundane natures of an invariable subsistence. But of the triad under this monad, viz. Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the first is the cause of connected comprehension, the second of symmetry, and the third of separation. And again, the moon is a monad, being the cause of all generation and corruption; but the triad consists from the elements* in generation under the moon; and the planets whose course is equal† subsist between these. And the Sun, indeed, unfolds truth into light, Venus beauty, and Mercury the symmetry of reasons, or the productive principles of nature. Or, you may say that the Moon is the cause of nature to mortals, she being the self-conspicuous image of mortal‡ nature. But the Sun is the demiurgus of every thing sensible, since he is also the cause of seeing and being seen. Mercury is the cause of the *motions* of the phantasy; for the sun gives subsistence to the phantastic *essence*. Venus is the cause of the appetites of desire; and Mars of all natural irascible motions. Jupiter is the common cause of all vital, and Saturn of all gnostic powers. For all the irrational forms are divided into these, and the causes of these are comprehended in the celestial spheres.

* Viz. from fire, air, and water.

† Viz. Mercury and Venus subsist between the triad Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, and the Moon.

‡ Viz. of Nature, considered as subsisting in its divine cause Rhea.

late most swiftly, comprehending other orbs as they revolve, should themselves appear to be comprehended by the revolution of the more slow. But all these circles revolve with a spiral motion, because they are agitated at one and the same time in two contrary directions: and in consequence of this, the sphere endued with the slowest revolution is nearest to that to which its course is retrograde, and which is the swiftest of all. And that these circles might possess a certain conspicuous measure of slowness and swiftness with reference to each other, and that the motion of the eight circulations might be manifest, the Divinity enkindled a light which we now denominate the Sun ¹, in the second revolution from the earth; that the heavens might

¹ Plato, says Proclus, here delivers the one and the leading cause of apparent time. For, as the demiurgus gives subsistence to unapparent, so the sun to apparent time, which measures the motion of bodies: for the sun, through light, leads into the apparent every temporal interval, bounds all periods, and exhibits the measures of restorations to a pristine state. Very properly, therefore, does Plato call the sun a *conspicuous measure*, as especially unfolding the progression * of time into the universe, according to number. For it has a more accurate period than the five planets, being freed from advancing and receding motions, and also revolves more accurately than the moon, in consequence of always bounding its progressions to the north and south, according to the same sign. But, if it has a more accurate period, it is deservedly said to be the measure of measures, and to know from itself the periodic measures of the other planets, the ratios which they contain, and the swiftness of some of them compared with others. It also imitates in a greater degree than the other planets the permanency of eternity, through perpetually revolving after the same invariable manner. Such then is its difference with respect to the planets.

But the sun is after another manner a more conspicuous measure of the innertic sphere; since this sphere also has a certain appropriate measure, and an appropriate interval, and one invariable number of its proper motion. The solar light, however, makes this measure, and all the evolution of apparent time, conspicuous and known. Hence Plato says "that these circles might possess a certain conspicuous measure:" for though there is a certain measure in the other stars, yet it is not *conspicuous*. But the sun unfolds into light both other intelligibles and time itself. You must not, however, say, that the solar light was therefore generated for the sake of measuring; for how is it possible that wholes can have a subsistence for the sake of parts, governing natures for the sake of the governed, and things eternal for the sake of such as are corruptible? But we should rather say that light manifests total time, possessing an unfolding power, and calls forth its supermundane monad, and one measure, to a mensuration of the periods of bodies. It is the light of the sun, therefore, which makes every thing that is moved to have a conspicuous measure. And this, indeed, is its total good. But after wholes it also secondarily benefits parts; for it gives the generation of number and a measure to such things as are fit participants of these.

* In the original *περιόδον*, but the sense requires we should read *πρόσδοον*.

might become eminently apparent to all things, and that such animals might participate of number as are adapted to its participation, receiving
numerical

For irrational natures are destitute of these; but the genera of demons follow the periods of the Gods, and men become partakers of number and measure. The communications, therefore, of the sun, supernally beginning from wholes, descend as far as to parts, conferring good through light. And if, commencing from things apparent, you are willing to speak of things unapparent, the sun illuminates the whole world, makes the corporeal nature of it divine, and the whole of it to be totally filled with life. It also leads souls through undefiled light, and imparts to them an undefiled and elevating power, and by its rays governs the world. It likewise fills souls with empyrean fruits. For the order of the sun proceeds supernally from supermundane natures; and hence Plato does not here give subsistence to its light from a certain place, but says that the demiurgus *enkindled* it, as forming this sphere from his own essence, and emitting from the solar fountain a divulsed and nascent life; which also theologists assert concerning the supermundane firmaments. On this account, also, Plato appears to me to deliver a twofold generation of the sun; one together with the seven governors of the world, when he fashions their bodies and places them in their revolving spheres; but the other the *enkindling* of its light, according to which he imparts to it supermundane power. For it is one thing to generate itself by itself, the whole bulk of the sun, and another to generate it together with a governing idiom, through which it is called the king of every thing visible, and is established as analogous to the one fountain of good. For, as *the good itself*, being better than *the intelligible*, illuminates both intellect and the intelligible, so the sun, being better than the visible essence, illuminates sight, and whatever is visible. But if the sun is above the visible essence, it will have a supermundane nature: for the world is visible and tangible, and possesses a body. We must, therefore, survey the sun in a twofold respect; as one of the seven mundane governors, and as the leader of wholes, as mundane and as supermundane, according to which also he illuminates with divine light. For, as *the good* generates truth, which defies both the intelligible and intellectual orders; as Phanes, according to Orpheus, emits intelligible light, which fills all the intellectual Gods with intelligence; and as Jupiter enkindles an intellectual and demiurgic light in all supermundane natures, so the sun illuminates every thing visible through this undefiled light. But that which illuminates is always in an order more elevated than the things which are illuminated. For neither is *the good* intelligible, nor is Phanes intellectual, nor Jupiter supermundane. From this reasoning, therefore, the sun being supermundane emits the fountains of light. And the most mystic of discourses place the *subtleness* of the sun in the supermundane order; for there a solar world and total light subsist, as the oracles of the Chaldeans say, and as I am persuaded. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Proclus afterwards, near the end of his commentary on this part, observes, that if by the heavens here we understand that which is moved in a circle, the sun does not illuminate the whole of this: for there are shadows there, through the obscurations of the stars and the moon. But nothing in the world is pure from shadow, (as neither is there any thing mundane pure from matter, supermundane natures alone being without shadow and immaterial,) except

numerical information from the revolution of a nature similar and the same. From hence, therefore, night and day arose; and through these revolving bodies the period of one most wise circulation was produced.

And *month* indeed was generated, when the moon having run through her circle passed into conjunction with the sun. But *year*, when the sun had completely wandered round his orb. As to the periods of the other stars, they are not understood except by a very few of mankind; nor do the multitude distinguish them by any peculiar appellation; nor do they measure them with relation to each other, regarding the numbers adapted to this purpose. Hence, it may be said, they are ignorant that the wanderings of these bodies are in reality time; as these wanderings are endued with an infinite multitude, and an admirable variety of motions. But it is easy to conceive, that a perfect number of time will then accomplish a perfect year, when the eight circulations concurring in their courses with each other become bounded by the same extremity; being at the same time measured by the circle subsisting according to sameness. But the stars, whose revolutions are attended with a procession through the heavens, were generated, that the whole of this visible animal the universe might become most similar to the most perfect intelligible animal from an imitation of a perpetual nature.

the sun. Hence, the sun is truly shadowless and without generation, every thing else receiving at different times different illuminative additions. Why, then, some one may say, was not the light of the sun enkindled in the first of the periods from the earth? Because, I reply, the effulgence of the sun is of itself incommensurate with generation; but the moon, existing as a medium, and first receiving his light, renders it more commensurate with generation. For, as Aristotle says, the moon is, as it were, a lesser sun. And it is requisite that what is proximately above generation should not be the most splendid and luminous. For it is not lawful that a thing of this kind should approach to that which is dark; but what is proximate to the darkness of generation must necessarily be luminous in a secondary degree, always possessing, indeed, its proper light, but evincing a mutation in its participation of a more excellent light. It is likewise requisite that it should exhibit this mutation in an orderly manner, that through this mutation it may be the paradigm of that very mutable nature which matter introduces to generated things.

But that the stars, and all heaven, receive light from the sun, may be easily perceived. For that which is common in many things derives its subsistence from one cause, which is either exempt or coordinate; and the coordinate cause is that which first participates of that form. But that first participates in which this form especially subsists the first. If, therefore, light especially subsists in the sun, the sun will be the first light, and from this the light in other things will be derived.

And

And indeed the artificer fabricated other forms, as far as to the generation of time, according to the similitude of the world's exemplar.

But as the universe did not yet contain all animals in its capacious receptacle, in this respect it was dissimilar to its exemplar. Its artificer, therefore, supplied this defect by impressing it with forms, according to the nature of its paradigm. Whatever ideas, therefore, intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for the universe to contain. But these ideas are four: One, the celestial genus of Gods; another, winged and air-wandering; a third, the aquatic form; and a fourth, that which is pedestrial and terrene. The idea, therefore, of that which is divine, or the inerratic sphere, he for the most part fabricated from fire, that it might be most splendid and beautiful to behold. And as he meant to assimilate it to the universe, he rendered it circular; placed it in the wisdom of the best nature; ordered it to become the attendant of that which is best; and gave it a circular distribution about the heavens, that it might be a *true world*, adorned with a fair variety in its every part. But he adapted to each of the divine bodies two motions; one by which they might revolve in *same* according to *same*, by always cogitating the same things in themselves about *same*; the other through which they might be led with an advancing motion from the dominion of the *same* and *similar* circulation. He likewise rendered them immovable and stable as to the other five motions, that each of them might become in an eminent degree the best. And on this account such of the stars as are inerratic were generated, which are divine animals; and, in consequence of this, always abide revolving in that which is *same*. But, the stars, which both revolve and at the same time wander in the manner we have described above, were produced next to these. But he fabricated the earth the common nourisher of our existence; which being conglobed about the pole extended through the universe, is the guardian and artificer of night and day, and is the first and most antient of the Gods which are generated within the heavens. But the harmonious progressions of these divinities, their concursions with each other, the revolutions and advancing motions of their circles, how they are situated with relation to each other in their conjunctions and oppositions, whether direct among themselves or retrograde, at what times and in what manner they become concealed, and, again emerging to our view,

cause terror, and exhibit tokens of future events to such as are able to discover their signification—of all this to attempt an explanation, without inspecting the resemblances of these divinities, would be a fruitless employment. But of this enough; and let this be the end of our discourse concerning the nature of the visible and generated Gods.

But to speak concerning the other dæmons¹, and to know their generation, is a task beyond our ability to perform. It is, therefore, necessary in this case

¹ Plato here calls the sublunary Gods who proximately preside over, and orderly distribute, the realms of generation, dæmons; for a God who proximately presides over any thing is a dæmon according to analogy.

Proclus, in speaking concerning dæmons who fill up all the middle space between Gods and men, observes as follows:—"There is a triad which conjoins our souls with the Gods, proceeding analogous to the three * primary causes of things, though Plato is accustomed to call the whole of it dæmoniacal. For the angelic preserves an analogy to the intelligible, which first unfolds itself into light from the arcane and occult fountain of things; on which account it also unfolds the Gods, and announces their occult nature. The dæmoniacal is analogous to infinite life; and hence it proceeds every where according to many orders, and possesses various species and a multitude of forms. But the heroic subsists according to intellect and a convertive energy; and hence it is the inspective guardian of purification, and a magnificently operating life. Again, the angelic proceeds according to the intellectual life of the demiurgus; and hence it also is essentially intellectual, and interprets and transmits a divine intellect to secondary natures. The dæmoniacal governs according to the demiurgic providence and nature of wholes, and rightly gives completion to the order of all the world. But the heroic subsists according to a providence convertive of all these. Hence this genus is sublime, elevates souls on high, and is the cause of the grand and robust. And such are the triple genera which are suspended from the Gods, viz. from the celestial Divinities, and from the inspective guardians of generation. For about each of these Gods there is an appropriate number of angels, dæmons, and heroes: for each is the leader of a multitude which receives the form of its ruling Deity. And on this account the angels, dæmons, and heroes of the celestial Gods are celestial; of the Gods that preside over generation, they are generative; of those that elevate souls on high, they are anagogic; of those that are immutable, they are immutable; and so on. And again, in those Gods of an anagogic characteristic, the angels, dæmons, and heroes of the Saturnian Gods are saturnine, but those of the Solar Gods are solar. And in those that are vivific, the attendants of the Lunar Deities are lunar, and of the Mercurial Gods, mercurial: for they derive their appellations from the Deities from which they are suspended, as being continuous with them, and receiving one idea with remission. And why is this wonderful, since partial souls also, knowing their presiding and leading Gods, call themselves by their names? Or, whence did the Æsculapiuses, the Bacchuses, and the Dioscouri

* Viz. *Being, life, and intellect*, which considered according to their first subsistence form the intelligible triad, or the first procession from the ineffable principle of things. See the *Parmenides*.

safe to believe in antient men; who being the progeny of the Gods, as they themselves assert, must have a clear knowledge of their parents. It is impossible, therefore, not to believe in the children of the Gods, though they should speak without probable and necessary arguments: but as they declare that their narrations are about affairs to which they are naturally allied, it is proper that, complying with the law, we should assent to their tradition. In this manner, then, according to them, the generation of these Gods is to be described:

That Ocean and Tethys were the progeny of heaven and earth. That from hence Phorcys, Saturn, and Rhea, and such as subsist together with these, were produced. That from Saturn and Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and all such as we know are called the brethren of these descended. And lastly, others which are reported to be the progeny of these. When, therefore, all such Gods as visibly revolve, and all such as become apparent when they please, were generated, the Artificer of the universe thus addressed them: "Gods of Gods¹, of whom I am the demiurgus and father, whatever is generated
by

receive their appellations? As, therefore, in the celestial Gods, so also in those that preside over generation, it is requisite to survey about each of them a coordinate, angelic, dæmoniacal, and heroic multitude; the number suspended from each bearing the name of its monad, so that there is a celestial God, dæmon, and hero. With respect to Earth, also, Ocean, and Tethys, it is requisite to consider that these proceed into all orders, and in a similar manner other Gods. For there is a Jovian, Junonian, and Saturnian multitude, which is denominated through the same name of life. Nor is there any thing absurd in this, since we call man both intelligible and sensible, though the restoration to their pristine condition is in these more abundant. And thus much in common concerning the generation-producing Gods and dæmons, that, conjoined with the Gods, we may also survey the discourse about dæmons: for Plato comprehends each of the genera in the same names. And he seems to call the same powers both dæmons and Gods on this account, that we may understand that the dæmoniacal genus is suspended at the same time together with these Gods, and that we may also adapt the names as to Gods. This he also does in other places, indicating the every way extended nature of the theory, and the eye of science surveying all things together and in connection."

¹ The scope of this speech, says Proclus, is, as we have said, to insert demiurgic power and providence in the mundane genera of Gods, to lead them forth to the generation of the remaining kinds of animals, and to place them over mortals, analogously to the father of wholes over the one orderly distribution of the universe. For it is necessary that some things should be primarily generated by the demiurgic monad, and others through other media; the demiurgus, indeed, producing all things from himself, at once and eternally, but the things produced in order, and first proceeding

by me is indissoluble, such being my will in its fabrication. Indeed every thing which is bound is dissoluble; but to be willing to dissolve that which
is

proceeding from him, producing, together with him, the natures posterior to themselves. Thus, for instance, the celestial produce sublunary Gods, and these generate mortal animals; the demiurgus at the same time fabricating these in conjunction with the celestial and sublunary Divinities. For in speaking he understands all things, and by understanding all things he also makes the mortal genera of animals; these requiring another proximate generating cause, so far as they are mortal, and through this receiving a progression into being. But the character of the words is enthusiastic, shining with intellectual intuitions, pure and venerable as being perfected by the father of the Gods, differing from and transcending human conceptions, delicate, and at the same time terrific, full of grace and beauty—at once concise and perfectly accurate. Plato, therefore, particularly studies these things in the imitations of divine speeches; as he also evinces in the Republic, when he represents the Muses speaking sublimely, and the prophet ascending to a lofty feat. He also adorns both these speeches with conciseness and venerableness, employing the accurate powers of colons, directly shadowing forth divine intellections through such a form of words. But in the words before us he omits no transcendency either of the grand and robust in the sentences and the names adapted to these devices, or of magnitude in the conceptions and the figures which give completion to this idea. Besides this, also, much distinction and purity, the unfolding of truth, and the illustrious prerogatives of beauty, are mingled with the idea of magnitude, this being especially adapted to the subject things, to the speaker, and to the hearers. For the objects of this speech are, the perfection of the universe, an assimilation to all-perfect animal, and the generation of all mortal animals; the maker of all things at the same time pre-fabricating and adorning all things, through exempt transcendency, but the secondary fabricators adding what was wanting to the formation of the universe. All, therefore, being great and divine, as well the persons as the things, and shining with beauty and a distinction from each other, Plato has employed words adapted to the form of the speech.

Homer also, when energizing enthusiastically, represents Jupiter speaking, converting to himself the twofold coordinations of Gods, becoming himself, as it were, the centre of all the divine genera in the world, and making all things obedient to his intellect. But at one time he conjoins the multitude of Gods with himself without a medium, and at another through Themis as the medium.

But Jove to Themis gives command to call
The Gods to council.

This Goddess pervading every where collects the divine number, and converts it to the demiurgic monad. For the Gods are both separate from mundane affairs, and eternally provide for all things, being at the same time exempt from them through the highest transcendency, and extending their providence every where. For their unmingled nature is not without providential energy, nor is their providence mingled with matter. Through transcendency of power they are not filled with the subjects of their government, and, through beneficent will, they make all things similar to themselves; in permanently abiding, proceeding, and in being separated from all things,
being

is beautifully harmonized, and well composed, is the property of an evil nature. Hence, so far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor in every

being similarly present to all things. Since, therefore, the Gods that govern the world, and the dæmons the attendants of these, receive after this manner unmingled purity and providential administration from their father; at one time he converts them to himself without a medium, and illuminates them with a separate, unmingled, and pure form of life. Whence also I think he orders them to be separated from all things, to remain exempt in Olympus, and neither convert themselves to Greeks nor Barbarians; which is just the same as to say, that they must transcend the twofold orders of mundane natures, and abide immutably in undefiled intellection. But at another time he converts them to a providential attention to secondary natures, through Themis, and calls upon them to direct the mundane battle, and excites different Gods to different works. These Divinities, therefore, especially require the assistance of Themis, who contains in herself the divine laws according to which providence is intimately connected with wholes. Homer, therefore, divinely delivers twofold speeches, accompanying the twofold energies of Jupiter; but Plato through this one speech comprehends those twofold modes of discourse. For the demiurgus renders the Gods unmingled with secondary natures, and causes them to provide for, and give existence to, mortals. But he orders them to fabricate in imitation of himself: and in an injunction of this kind both these are comprehended, viz. the unmingled through the imitation of the father, for he is separate, being exempt from mundane wholes; but providential energy, through the command to fabricate, nourish and increase mortal natures. Or rather, we may survey both in each; for in imitating the demiurgus they provide for secondary natures, as he does for the immortals; and in fabricating they are separate from the things fabricated. For every demiurgic cause is exempt from the things generated by it; but that which is mingled with and filled from them is imbecil and inefficacious, and is unable to adorn and fabricate them. And thus much in common respecting the whole of the speech.

Let us then, in the first place, consider what we are to understand by "Gods of Gods," and what power it possesses: for that this invocation is collective and convertive of multitude to its monad, that it calls upwards the natures which have proceeded to the one fabricator of them, and inserts a boundary and divine measure in them, is clear to those who are not entirely unacquainted with such-like discourses. But how those that are allotted the world by their father are called Gods of Gods, and according to what conception, cannot easily be indicated to the many; for there is an unfolding of one divine intelligence in these names. Proclus then proceeds to relate the explanations given by others of these words; which having rejected as erroneous, he very properly, in my opinion, adopts the following, which is that of his preceptor, the great Syrianus. All the mundane Gods are not simply Gods, but they are wholly Gods which participate: for there is in them that which is separate, unapparent, and supermundane, and also that which is the apparent image of them, and has an orderly establishment in the world. And that, indeed, which is unapparent in them is primarily a God, this being undistributed and one; but this vehicle which is suspended from their unapparent essence is secondarily a God. For if, with respect to us, man is twofold, one inward, according to the soul, the other apparent, which we see, much more must both these be ascribed of the Gods; since Divinity also is twofold, one

every respect indissoluble: yet you shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; my will being a much greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which you were bound at the commencement of your generation. Learn, therefore, what I now say to you indicating my desire. Three genera of mortals yet remain to be produced. Without the generation of these, therefore, the universe will be imperfect; for it will not contain every kind of animal in its spacious extent. But it ought to contain them, that it may become sufficiently perfect. Yet if these are generated, and participate of life through me, they will become equal to the Gods. That mortal natures, therefore, may subsist, and that the universe may be truly all, convert yourselves, according to your nature, to the fabrication of animals, imitating the power which I employed in your generation. And whatever among these is of such a nature as to deserve the same appellation with immortals, which obtains sovereignty in these, and willingly pursues justice, and reverences you—of this I myself will deliver the seed and beginning: it is your business to accomplish the rest; to weave¹ together

unapparent and the other apparent. This being the case, we must say that “Gods of Gods” is addressed to all the mundane Divinities, in whom there is a connection of unapparent with apparent Gods; for they are Gods that participate. In short, since twofold orders are produced by the demiurgus, some being supermundane and others mundane, and some being without and others with participation,—if the demiurgus now addressed the supermundane orders, he would have alone said to them, “Gods:” for they are without participation, are separate and unapparent:—but since the speech is to the mundane Gods, he calls them Gods of Gods, as being participated by other apparent Divinities. In these also dæmons are comprehended; for they also are Gods, as to their order with respect to the Gods, whose idiom they indivisibly participate. Thus also Plato, in the Phædrus, when he calls the twelve Gods the leaders of dæmons, at the same time denominates all the attendants of the Divinities Gods, adding, ‘and this is the life of the Gods.’ All these, therefore, are Gods of Gods, as possessing the apparent connected with the unapparent, and the mundane with the supermundane.

¹ It is well observed here by Proclus, that the animal spirit (*το πνεῦμα*) comprehends the summits of the irrational life, which summits subsist eternally with the vehicle of the soul, as being produced by the demiurgus; but that these, being extended and distributed, make this life which the junior Gods weave together, being indeed mortal, because the soul must necessarily lay aside this distribution, when, being restored to her pristine state, she obtains purification, but subsisting for a much longer time than the life of this body; and that, on this account, the soul also in Hades chooses a life of this kind. For, in consequence of verging to a corporeal nature, she receives this mortal life from the junior Gods. If these things then be admitted, the demiurgus gives

together the mortal and immortal nature; by this means fabricating and generating animals, causing them to increase by supplying them with aliment, and receiving them back again when dissolved by corruption."

Thus spoke the demiurgus; and again into the same crater ¹, in which mingling he had tempered the soul of the universe, he poured mingling the remainder ² of the former mixture: in a certain respect indeed after the same

gives subsistence to the *summit* of the irrational life, but does not produce this life; since, giving subsistence to dæmons, he certainly also produces the irrational life which they contain, but not this life which the junior Gods weave together in us; for this is alone adapted to souls falling into generation. The mundane Gods, therefore, illuminate their depending vehicles with rational lives; for they possess intellectual souls. But those dæmons who are properly defined according to reason use irrational powers, which they keep in subjection; but our souls much more possess a life in the vehicle, which is irrational with relation to them. It superabounds however by receiving another irrational life, which is an apostacy from that life in the vehicle which was woven by the junior Gods. All *that* is immortal, therefore, which souls possess according to an imitation of wholes, but the addition of the secondary life is mortal. If, therefore, in the summit of the irrational life, there is one impassive sense, this in the pneumatic vehicle will generate one passive sense; and this latter will produce in the shelly body many and passive senses. The orectic or appetitive power, also, in this summit, will produce many orectic powers in the spirit, possessing something separate from the shelly body, and capable of being disciplined; and these will produce in the body ultimate and material appetitive powers.

¹ Viz. the vivific Goddeſs Juno.

² It is well obſerved here by Proclus, that ſouls poſſeſs eſſential differences, and not differences according to energies only. For, ſays he, ſome ſouls look to total and others to partial intellects; and ſome employ undeſiled intellections, but others at times depart from the contemplation of true beings. Some perpetually fabricate and adorn wholes, but others only ſometimes revolve with the Gods. And ſome always move and govern fate, but others ſometimes ſubſiſt under the dominion of fate, and are ſubject to its laws. Some are the leaders to intelligible eſſence, and others are ſometimes allotted the order of thoſe that follow. Some are divine only, and others are transferred into a different order, dæmoniacal, heroic, human. Some employ horſes that are good, but others ſuch as are mingled from good and evil. And ſome poſſeſs that life alone which they received from the one fabrication of things, but others the mortal form of life, which was woven to their nature by the junior Gods. Some energize according to all their powers, but others at different times draw forth different lives. By no means, therefore, do our ſouls poſſeſs the ſame eſſence with divinity: for the rational nature is different in the two, being in the Gods intellectual, but in our ſouls mingled with the irrational; and in the middle genera it is defined according to their middle ſubſiſtence. In like manner, with reſpect to every thing elſe, ſuch as reaſons, the form of life, intelligence and time, theſe ſubſiſt divinely in divine ſouls, but in a human manner in ours.

Proclus alſo further obſerves, that the common definition of all ſouls is as follows: Soul is an eſſence ſubſiſting between true eſſence and generation, being mingled from middle genera, divided

same manner¹, yet not similarly incorruptible according to the same, but deficient from the first in a second and third degree. And having thus composed

into essential number, bound with all media, diatonically harmonized, living one and a twofold life, and being gnostic in one and a twofold manner.

¹ Timæus, says Proclus, by these words indicates the similitude, subjection and different progression of partial to total souls. For he not only describes their difference together with their alliance, according to first and second demiurgic energy, nor alone according to their union with and separation from the crater of life, nor yet alone according to excess or defect of genera, but also according to the mode of mixture, which is the same, and yet not the same. For neither is the temperament of the genera similar, nor the unmingling of difference; since this is more abundant in partial souls. Hence, of the horses in these, one is good, but the other contrary, and consisting from contraries, as it is said in the Phædrus, in consequence of difference having dominion. For the whole mixture is no longer incorruptible, according to the same, and after the same manner, but in a second and third degree; since in these there are subjection and order. But by *incorruptible*, here, we must understand the immutable, the undeviating, the inflexible, the immaculate form of essence, that which is not converted to secondary natures, and which does not receive mutation, or subjection of life, that which is established beyond the reach of mortality, and that which is exempt from the laws of fate: for these things are common to every genus of souls which perpetually transcend generation. But the contraries of these are adapted to powers which descend into generation, viz. a mutation of life from intelligence to action, the becoming sometimes subject to fate, and the being mingled with mortal affairs. Neither is the immovable present with these according to the same, since they sometimes proceed into generation, nor, when it is present, is it present after the same manner: for that which always understands is better than that which sometimes departs from its proper intellection. Since, however, in these souls also there is an order, and some are undefiled, rarely associating with generation and deserting their own order, but others are rolled in all-various flows, and wander myriads of periods,—hence Timæus indicates the difference of these, when he says “in a second and third degree.” For souls which descend, and become defiled with evil, are very much separated from those that perpetually abide on high, and are free from evil: but souls of a middle order are such as descend indeed, but are not defiled. For, vice versa, it is not lawful to be defiled, and yet abide on high; since evil is not in the Gods, but in the mortal place, and in material things.

Again, therefore, from these things it appears that the first genus of souls is divine; for everywhere that which is the recipient of deity has a leading order, in essences, in intellects, in souls and in bodies. But the second genus is that which is perpetually conjoined with the Gods, that, through this, souls which sometimes depart from may again be recalled to the Gods. The third genus is that which falls into generation, but descends with purity, and changes a subordinate for a more divine life, but is exempt from vice and passions; for this genus is continuous with souls that perpetually abide on high, and are perpetually undefiled. But the fourth and last genus is that which abundantly wanders, which descends as far as to Tartarus, and is again excited from its dark profundities, evolving all-various forms of life, employing various manners, and at different times different passions. It also obtains various forms of animals, daemoniacal, human, irrational, but

posed the universe, he distributed souls equal in number to the stars, inserting each in each : and causing them to ascend as into a vehicle ¹, he pointed out to

but is at the same time corrected by Justice, returns from earth to heaven, and is circularly led from matter to intellect, according to certain orderly periods of wholes. By the words, therefore, "in a certain respect indeed after the same manner, yet not similarly incorruptible according to the same," he signifies that partial souls are in a certain respect incorruptible, as for instance, according to their essence alone, but that in a certain respect they are not incorruptible, viz. being mingled in their energies with all-various destinies, and conversant with mortal things, and not possessing these energies with invariable sameness, and entire, but sometimes more, and at others less, an all-various inequality subsisting in souls, according to their habitude to mortal natures, from which they derive the privation of incorruptibility according to life.

¹ Vulcan, who is the artificer of the whole of a corporeal essence, gives subsistence to the vehicles of the soul ; for he receives souls sent into the world from the intelligible region, and gives different habitations to different souls. The demiurgus of all things also gives subsistence to these vehicles ; for he is the fabricator of animals, and the completions of the universe, so that he not only produces souls, but also produces them with their proper vehicles. As Proclus likewise well observes, the conception of Plato here is truly wonderful : for he does not represent the demiurgus as fashioning these vehicles from the *sublunesses* which are now produced, but he says that he makes these, the junior Gods lending parts, and from them composing bodies. But this is an evident argument, that each of these vehicles is in a certain respect self-composed, and not fabricated by an ablation from other things, lest it should require to be again poured back into something else. For every thing which subsists by an abscission from other things, being cut off with a diminution of the whole to which it belonged, must necessarily be returned to the whole from which it was cut off. For it is necessary that every whole in the universe should perpetually remain a whole : and hence every such vehicle is perpetual, and the same vehicle is always suspended from the soul. Besides, how can the soul be any longer said to be mundane, if its vehicle is corrupted ? for that of which there is nothing in the universe cannot be mundane. For, if partial souls are superior to a life in conjunction with vehicles, they will also be superior to divine souls : but if they are inferior to such a life, how does the demiurgus immediately after their generation introduce them into these vehicles ? And how can they use them in Hades, and in the Heavens, unless they had them perpetually suspended from their essence ? For, that they use them in Hades, is evident from what Socrates says in the *Phædo*, viz. that souls ascending into their vehicles proceed to Acheron : and that they also use them in the Heavens, is evident from the *Phædrus*, in which Socrates says that the vehicles of the Gods proceed equally balanced, but those of the attendants of the Gods, with great difficulty.

From this, also, we may perceive the difference between partial and divine souls : for with respect to the latter the demiurgus is said to place their bodies in their souls, as being every way comprehended by them, these souls not being converted to the objects of their government, but employing one immutable intellection : but, with respect to partial souls, he is said to cause these to ascend into their vehicles ; for these are naturally adapted to be frequently in subjection to bodies, and to convert themselves to the subjects of their government ; when they also become

to them the nature of the universe, and announced to them the laws of fate; showing them that the first generation orderly distributed to all was one, lest any particular soul should be allotted a less portion of generation than another. But when he had disseminated them through the several instruments of time adapted to each, he declared to them it was necessary that an animal the most religious of all others should make its appearance. But as the human nature is twofold, he showed them that the more excellent kind was that which would afterwards be called man. And as souls are from necessity engrafted in bodies, and as something accedes to and something departs from such bodies, he declared to them that, in the first place, one connate sense¹ produced by violent

parts of the universe as well as their vehicles, act in subserviency to the laws of fate, and no longer live with purity under the divine light of Providence. It must likewise be observed, that the demiurgus among other causes contains that of Nature in himself, to which also he converts souls. For, by showing Nature to souls, he also beholds it himself. But he alone beholds things prior to and in himself. Now, therefore, he beholds Nature in himself, which he comprehends supernaturally, or according to cause.

¹ The demiurgus, says Proclus, comprehends the whole of a material and mortal life in three boundaries, and establishes the causes of it in souls, that they may obtain dominion over it: for dominion is not derived from any thing else than essential precedency. The irrational life, therefore, subsists *intellectually* in the demiurgus, but *rationally* in souls. Nor is this wonderful, since body also subsists incorporeally in the intelligible causes of all things. But this connate sense produced by violent passions, of which Plato now speaks, is that corporeal life which is gnostic of things falling upon it externally, which produces this knowledge through instruments, does not subsist from itself, but from the natures by which it is used, is mingled with material masses, and knows what it knows with passion. For it is necessary to sensation, that a certain agitation should be produced about the instruments of sense; since neither do the motions in the soul pervade every where, and as far as to the body, but there is a motion of the soul belonging to itself by itself, such as is that which is intellectual; nor does every thing about the body extend as far as to the soul, but there is also a certain corporeal passion, which through its obscurity is not able to move the soul. Sense, therefore, is produced not from all passions, but from such as are violent, and which are attended with much agitation. And this is corporeal sense, which is divisible and material, and forms its judgment mingled with passions. But there is another sense prior to this, in the vehicle of the soul, which with respect to this is immaterial, and is a pure impassive knowledge, itself subsisting by itself, but which is not liberated from form, because it also is corporeal, as being allotted its subsistence in body. And this sense, indeed, has the same nature with the phantasy; for the being of both is common; but externally proceeding it is called sense, and abiding internally, and surveying in the spirit (*ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*) forms and figures, it is called phantasy. So far also as it is divided about the spirit, it is sense. For, again, the basis of the rational life is opinion; but the phantasy is the summit of the second, or the irrational life.

Opinion

violent passions was necessary to all; and, in the second place, love mingled with pleasure and grief. That after these, fear and anger were necessary, with whatever else is either consequent to these, or naturally discordant from a contrary nature. That such souls as subdue these would live

Opinion also and phantasy are conjoined with each other, and the second is filled from the more excellent with powers. But the middle of the irrational life does not receive the impression of the natures superior to it, but is alone the recipient of things external. It is common, however, to this also to know that which is sensible with passivity: but external sense alone pertains to things externally falling upon and moving it, not being able to possess spectacles in itself, since it is partible and not one; for it is distributed about the organs of sense. There is one sense, therefore, which is impassive and common, another which is common and passive, and a third which is distributed and passive. The first of these belongs to the first vehicle of the soul, the second, to the irrational life, and the third, to the animated body.

After sense, Plato arranges desire. And this indeed is life, and is also corporeal; but it is a life which perpetually unweaves the body, and affords a solace to its wants, and about which pleasure and pain are beheld. For these passions are also present to other parts of the soul; since you may perceive pleasures and pains, both in reason and anger. But corporeal pleasure and pain are produced according to desire. For, with respect to the body, a way contrary to nature, and a privation of life, produce pain in it; but a regression according to nature, and an adaptation to life, are the sources of its pleasure. And that which is afflicted or delighted in these is the desiderative part of the soul. But since these two passions are primary, and the fountains of the other passions, as Plato says in the *Philebus* and the *Laws*, through the mixture of these giving a generation to the other passions, he also denominates love a mixture of pleasure and pain. For, so far as it is conversant with the lovely, it is present with pleasure, but, so far as it is not yet present with it in energy, it is mingled with pain. But he characterizes all the life of desire through love, because this passion is most vehement about it.

In the third place, therefore, he enumerates anger. Anger then is also life, but a life which removes every thing painful, and which disturbs the body. Excess and defect also are surveyed about it, such as rashness and timidity, and the things consequent to these, ambition and contention, and all such particulars as take place about mortal concerns. And such is the order of these three generated powers. For as soon as the body is formed it participates of sense: since it would not be an animal, nor would possess appetite, if it were not sensitive. For appetites subsist in conjunction with sense, but the senses are not entirely in conjunction with appetites; and hence the animal is more characterized by the sensitive than by the appetitive nature. But after the possession of sense the animal appears to be pleased and pained, afflicted by the cold, but cherished by the bandages, and led to a condition according to nature. After desire, as age advances, the animal is angered: for anger is the power of a more robust nature. Hence also, among irrational animals, such as are more material alone live according to desire, and partake of pleasure and pain; but such as are more perfect are allotted a more irascible life. But prior to these appetites, as we also said of sense, there is a certain summit of them in the spirit of the soul, which summit is a power impulsive and motive of the spirit, guarding and connecting its essence, at one time extending and distributing itself, and at another being led to bound and order, and measured by reason.

justly,

justly, but such as are vanquished by them unjustly. And again, that he who lived well during the proper time of his life, should, again returning to the habitation of his kindred star ¹, enjoy a blessed life. But that he whose conduct was depraved, should in his second generation be changed into the nature of a woman. * That both these, at the expiration of a thousand years, should return to the allotment and choice of a second life; each soul receiving a life agreeable to its choice. That in this election the human soul should pass into the life of a brute: * and that in case the inclination to evil should not even then cease, but the defilement of vice remain according to a similitude of the mode of generation, then the soul should be changed into the nature of a brute correspondent to its disposition. And that it should not be freed from the allotment of labours ², till, following the

¹ Since Plato now discourses concerning souls that are restored to their pristine state in their legitimate star, after their first generation, and says that on leaving the body they possess a happy life, it may be asked how this accords with what is said in the *Phædrus*? For, there, he who chooses a philosophic life is restored to his pristine state through three lives. We reply, with Proclus, that Plato does not here assert that the soul passes into that very state whence it came, for this is accomplished through three chiliads of periods, but that the soul returns to the star under which it was essentially arranged, and leads a life in common with it. For it is possible for those that are not philosophers to be elevated by Justice to a certain place in the heavens, and there to live in a manner adapted to their life while in a human form: for this is asserted in the *Phædo* respecting the souls of such as are not philosophers; since the restoration to the same condition again is one thing, and the ascent to the kindred star another. And the former of these requires three periods, but the latter may be effected by one period. The former also leads back the soul to the intelligible, from which it descended, but the latter to a subordinate form of life. For there are measures of felicity, and the ascent is twofold; one, of those that have yet to ascend still higher, and the other, of those that have no further flight to take. So that it is possible for the soul having arrived at its kindred star, either to be conjoined with the mundane powers of its God, or to proceed still higher; but to be led back to the intelligible requires a period of three thousand years. For through this the highest flight is accomplished.

* The translation of the part between the two stars is omitted by Ficinus.

¹ The one safety of the soul herself, says Proclus, which is extended by the demiurgus, and which liberates her from the circle of generation, from abundant wandering, and an inefficacious life, is her return to the intellectual form, and a flight from every thing which naturally adheres to us from generation. For it is necessary that the soul which is hurled like seed into the realms of generation, should lay aside the stubble and bark, as it were, which she obtained from being disseminated into these fluctuating realms; and that, purifying herself from every thing circumjacent, she should become an intellectual flower and fruit, delighting in an intellectual life instead of doxastic nutriment, and pursuing the uniform and simple energy of the period of sameness, in-

the revolution of that *same* and *similar* nature contained in its essence, it vanquishes those abundantly turbulent affections, tumultuous and irrational, adhering to it afterwards from fire, water, air, and earth, and returns to the first and best disposition of its nature.

When he had instructed souls in all these particulars, that he might be in no respect the cause of the future evil of each, he disseminated some of them into the earth, others into the moon, and others into the remaining different instruments of time. But after this semination he delivered to the junior Gods the province of fabricating mortal bodies, and generating whatever else remained necessary to the human soul; and gave them dominion over

stead of the abundantly wandering motion of the period which is characterized by difference. For she contains each of these circles and twofold powers. And of her horses, one is good, and the other the contrary: and one of these leads her to generation, but the other from generation to true being; the one also leads her round the circle of sense, but the other round an intellectual essence. For the period of the same and the similar elevates to intellect, and an intelligible nature, and to the first and most excellent habit. But this habit is that according to which the soul being winged governs the whole world, becoming assimilated to the Gods themselves. And this is the universal form of life in the soul, just as that is the partial form when she falls into the last body, and becomes something belonging to an individual instead of belonging to the universe. The middle of these also is the partial universal, when she lives in conjunction with her middle vehicle, as a citizen of generation. Dismissing, therefore, her first habit, which subsists according to an alliance to the whole of generation, and laying aside the irrational nature which connects her with generation, likewise governing her irrational part by reason, and extending intellect to opinion, she will be circularly led to a happy life, from the wandering about the regions of sense; which life those that are initiated by Orpheus in the mysteries of Bacchus and Proserpine pray that they may obtain, together with the allotments of the sphere, and a cessation of evil. But if our soul necessarily lives well, when living according to the circle of sameness, much more must this be the case with divine souls. It is, however, possible for our soul to live according to the circle of sameness, when purified, as Plato says. Cathartic virtue, therefore, alone must be called the salvation of souls; since this cuts off and vehemently obliterates material natures, and the passions which adhere to us from generation, separates the soul, and leads it to intellect, and causes it to leave on earth the vehicles with which it is invested. For souls descending receive from the elements different vehicles, ærial, aquatic, and terrestrial; and thus at last enter into this gross bulk. For how, without a medium, could they proceed into this body from immaterial spirits? Hence, before they come into this body, they possess the irrational life, and its vehicle, which is prepared from the simple elements, and from these they enter into the tumultuous, which is so called as being foreign to the connate vehicle of souls, composed from all-various vestments, and causing souls to become heavy. In short, the connate vehicle makes the soul mundane, the second vehicle, a citizen of generation, and the shelly body, (το σφικτερές), terrestrial.

every

every thing consequent to their fabrications. He likewise commanded them to govern as much as possible in the best and most beautiful manner the mortal animal, that it might not become the cause of evil to itself. At the same time he who orderly disposed all these particulars remained in his own accustomed abiding habit. But in consequence of his abiding, as soon as his children understood the order of their father, they immediately became obedient to this order; and receiving the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their artificer, they borrowed from the world the parts of fire and earth, water and air, as things which they should restore back again; and conglutinated the received parts together, not with the same indissoluble bonds which they themselves participated, but gave them a tenacious adherence from thick fet nails, invisible through their smallness; fabricating the body of each, one from the composition of all; and binding the circulations of the immortal soul in the influxive and effluxive nature of body.

But these circulations [†], being merged in a profound river, neither govern nor are governed, but hurry and are hurried along with violence: in consequence

[†] Plato, says Proclus, immediately conjoining the soul to the body, omits all the problems pertaining to the descent of the soul, such as the prophet, the allotments, the lives, the elections, the dæmon, the residence in the plain of oblivion, the sleeping, the oblivious potion, the thunders, and all such particulars as the fable in the Republic discusses. But neither does he here deliver such things as pertain to the soul after its departure from the body, such as the terrors, the rivers, Tartarus, those savage and fiery dæmons, the thorns, the bellowing mouth, the triple road, and the judges, concerning which the fable in the Republic, in the Gorgias, and in the Phædo, instructs us. What, then, you will say, is the cause of this omission? We reply, Because Plato preserves that which is adapted to the design of the dialogue. For here he admits whatever is physical in the theory respecting the soul, and its association with the body.

It is requisite, however, to inquire why souls fall into bodies. And we may reply, with Proclus, Because they wish to imitate the providential energies of the Gods, and on this account proceed into generation, and leave the contemplation of true being: for, as Divine perfection is twofold, one kind being intellectual, and the other providential, and one kind consisting in an abiding energy, and the other in motion, hence souls imitate the prolific, intellectual, and immutable energy of the Gods by contemplation, but their providential and motive characteristic through a life conversant with generation. As the intelligence, too, of the human soul is partial, so likewise is her providence; but, being partial, it associates with a partial body. But still further, the descent of the soul contributes to the perfection of the universe; for it is necessary that there should not only be immortal and intellectual animals, such as are the perpetual attendants of the Gods,

quence of which, the whole animal is indeed moved, yet in a disorderly manner; since from every kind of motion its progression is fortuitous and irrational. For it proceeds backwards and forwards, to the right and left, upwards and downwards, and wanders every way according to the fix differences of place. For though the inundating¹ and effluxive waves pour
along

Gods, nor yet mortal and irrational animals only, such as are the last progeny of the demiurgus of the universe, but likewise such as subsist between these, and which are by no means immortal*, but are capable of participating reason and intellect. And in many parts of the universe there are many animals of this kind; for man is not the only rational and mortal animal, but there are other such-like species, some of which are more dæmoniacal, and others approximate nearer to our essence. But the descents of a partial soul contribute to the perfect composition of all animals, which are at the same time mortal and rational.

Should it be again asked, Why, therefore, are partial souls descending into generation filled with such material perturbation, and such numerous evils? we reply, that this takes place through the inclination arising from their free will; through their vehement familiarity with body; through their sympathy with the image of soul, or that divisible life which is distributed about body; through their abundant mutation from an intelligible to a sensible nature, and from a quiet energy to one entirely conversant with motion; and through a disordered condition of being, naturally arising from the composition of dissimilar natures, viz. of the immortal and mortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect, of the indivisible and that which is endued with interval. For all these become the cause to the soul of this mighty tumult and labour in the realms of generation; since we pursue a flying mockery which is ever in motion. And the soul, indeed, by verging to a material life, kindles a light in her dark tenement the body, but she herself becomes situated in obscurity; and by giving life to the body, she destroys herself and her own intellect, in as great a degree as these are capable of receiving destruction. For thus the mortal nature participates of intellect, but the intellectual part of death, and the whole becomes a prodigy, as Plato beautifully observes in his *Laws*, composed of the mortal and immortal, of the intellectual, and that which is deprived of intellect. For this physical law, which binds the soul to the body, is the death of the immortal life, but is the cause of vivification to the mortal body.

¹ The philosopher here, says Proclus, refers the whole of this tumult to two causes, viz. the nutritive and sensitive life; and these are the appetitive and gnostic powers of all the irrational part, into which we are accustomed to divide all the powers of the soul, asserting that some of them are vital, and others gnostic. For the nutritive life, verging to bodies, produces in them an abundant flux; through their material moisture sending forth a great efflux, and through vital heat receiving an influx of other things. But the sensitive life suffers from the external bodies of fire and air, earth and water, falling upon it; and, considering all the passions as mighty, through the vileness of its life, causes tumult to the soul. And to all these things, indeed, those that are arrived at maturity are accustomed; but to those that are recently born, the smallest things,

* For the whole composite which we call man is not immortal, but only the rational soul.

along with impetuous abundance, which afford nutrition to the animal, yet a still greater tumult and agitation is produced through the passions arising from external impulsions: and this either when the body is disturbed by the sudden incursion of external fire, or by the solidity of earth, or receives an injury from the whirling blasts of the air. For from all these, through the medium of the body, various motions are hurried along, and fall with molestation on the soul. But on this account all these were afterwards, and are even now, denominated senses. And these, indeed, both at first and at present¹, are the sources of an abundant and mighty motion, in conjunction with

through their being unusual, become the causes of astonishment. For, what a great fire is to the former, that the flame of a lamp is to the latter; and what the magnitude of the highest mountains is to men, that the smallest stone in the fields is to infants. And what whirlwinds and cataclysms of rain are to others, that a weak motion of the air, or the falling of a little moisture, is to those that are recently born. For sense, being agitated by all these particulars, astonishes the soul of infants, and leads them to desperation and tumult. These, then, in short, are the causes of the disturbance of souls, viz. the motions of the nutritive part, and the impulses of sense. We must not, however, suppose that the soul suffers any thing through these particulars. For, as if some one standing on the margin of a river should behold the image and form of himself in the floating stream, he indeed will preserve his face unchanged, but the stream being all-variously moved will change the image, so that at different times it will appear to him different, oblique and upright, and perhaps divided and continuous. Let us suppose, too, that such a one, through being unaccustomed to the spectacle, should think that it was himself that suffered this distortion, in consequence of surveying his shadow in the water, and, thus thinking, should be afflicted and disturbed, astonished and impeded. After the same manner the soul, beholding the image of herself in body, borne along in the river of generation, and variously disposed at different times, through inward passions and external impulses, is indeed herself impassive, but thinks that she suffers, and, being ignorant of, and mistaking her image for, herself, is disturbed, astonished, and perplexed. This passion particularly takes place in infants: but it is also seen in the dreams of those that have arrived at maturity; as when some one, in consequence of nature being wearied in the concoction of food, thinks in a dream that he is wearied through long journeys, or carrying heavy burdens, or suffers something else of this kind. But to return to the words of Plato, the *waves* do not signify, says Proclus, the externally blowing wind, as some say, but the collected agitation, and abundant influx and efflux which take place in youth. But the *inundation* first strikes upon and makes the pneumatic vehicle heavier, for it is this which expresses stains and vapours; and in the second place it strikes upon the soul, for she also is disturbed by the collected and the sudden.

¹ Sense, says Proclus, is of the present, in the same manner as memory is of the past, but hope of the future. Sense, therefore, excites souls in the present time, and this in conjunction with the nutritive power, which by influxions applies a remedy to the perpetual effluxions of the

with that perpetually flowing river, moving and vehemently agitating the circulations of the soul, every way fettering the revolution of the nature characterized by *sameness*, through flowing in a contrary direction, and restraining its energies by their conquering and impetuous progressions. But they agitate and tear in pieces the circulation of the nature distinguished by *difference*. Hence, they whirl about with every kind of revolution each of the three intervals of the double and triple, together with the mediums and conjoining bonds of the sesquitercian, sesquialter, and sesquioctave ratios, which cannot be dissolved by any one except the artificer by whom they were bound: and besides this, they induce all the fractures and diversities of circles which it is possible to effect; so that, scarcely being connected with each other, they are borne along indeed, yet in an irrational manner, at one time in a contrary, at another time in an oblique, and then again in a resupine situation. Just as if any one, in an inverted position, should fix his head on the earth and raise his feet on high; for in such a situation both the inverted person and the spectators would mutually imagine the right hand parts to be on the left, and the left to be on the right. So with respect to the circulations of the soul, the very same affections, and others of a similar kind, vehemently

the body, and again composes what was analysed, after the manner of Penelope's web. For this is the perpetually flowing river, which is properly so called, as being a part of the whole river of generation. Hence, in conjunction with this, it agitates and disturbs the periods of the immortal soul, and *fetters*, indeed, the circle of *sameness*, but *agitates* the circle of *difference*. For, as there are twofold circles in the soul in imitation of divine souls, the dianoëtic circle, which contemplates intelligibles, is only restrained in its energy, but sustains no distortion: but the doxastic circle is distorted; and this very properly, since it is possible to opine not rightly, but it is not possible to know scientifically falsely. If it should be said that the dianoëtic part may be ignorant in a twofold respect, and that a thing which suffers this is distorted; we reply, that twofold ignorance does not simply belong to the dianoëtic part, but, originating indeed from thence, is implanted in the doxastic part. For, so far as it is ignorance, and a privation of science, so far, being an immobility of the scientific power, it originates from the dianoëtic part. For science and ignorance subsist about the same thing. But, so far as it also adds a false opinion of knowledge, it subsists in the doxastic part. And ignorance is the insanity of the dianoëtic part, possessing, indeed, but concealing, the productive principles of knowledge; but false conception is the insanity of opinion, of which it is also the distortion. For, being false, it also depraves its possessor; since what vice is in action, that falsehood is in knowledge. The period of *sameness*, therefore, is alone fettered, and is similar to those that are bound, and on this account are impeded in their energies; but the period of *difference* is agitated, being filled with false opinions. For its proximity to the irrational nature causes it to receive a certain passion from externals.

take place ; and hence, when this is the case, if any thing external occurs, characterized by the nature of *same* or *different*, they denominate things the same with, or different from, others in a manner contrary to the truth. Hence they become false, and destitute of intelligence ; nor is any revolution to be found among them in such a situation which energizes with the authority of a ruler and chief.

But when certain senses, borne along externally, strike against the soul and attract the whole of its receptacle, then the circulations which are in reality in subjection appear to have dominion : and hence, in consequence of all these passions, the soul becomes insane at present, and was so from the first period of her being bound in a mortal body. However, when the river of increase and nutrition flows along with a more gentle and less abundant course, the circulations, being again restored to tranquillity, proceed in their proper path ; in process of time become more regular and steady, and pass into a figure accommodated to their nature. Hence, in this case, the revolutions of each of the circles becoming direct, and calling both *same* and *different* by their proper appellations, they render the being by whom they are possessed prudent and wise. If any one, therefore, receives a proper education in conjunction with convenient nutriment, such a one will possess perfect health, and will every way avoid the most grievous disease. But when this is neglected by any individual, such a one, proceeding along the path of life in a lame condition, will again pass into Hades imperfect and destitute of intelligence. These are particulars, however, which happen posterior to the production of mankind. But it is our business at present to discourse more accurately concerning the first composition of our nature, and to show, in the first place, from assimilative reasons, through what cause and providence of the Gods the several members of the body were accommodated to the several employments of the soul.

In the first place, then, the Gods bound the two divine circulations of the soul in a spherical body, in imitation of the circular figure of the universe : and this part of the body is what we now denominate the head ; a most divine member, and the sovereign ruler of our whole corporeal composition, through the decree of the Gods, who considered that it would participate of all possible motions. Left, therefore, the head, by rolling like a cylinder on the earth, which is distinguished by all-various heights and depths, should
be

be unable to pass over its inequalities and asperities, the Gods subjected this upright figure of the body, as a pliable vehicle to the head. Hence, in consequence of the body being endued with length, they extended four naturally flexible members; Divinity fabricating a progression through which the body might apprehend any object, might receive a stable support, and might be able to pass through every place, bearing on high the head, our most divine and sacred habitation. For this purpose, therefore, they furnished us with legs and hands. And as the Gods considered that the anterior parts are more honourable and adapted to rule than the posterior, they gave us a motion for the most part consisting of a forward progression. Beside this, it was requisite that the anterior parts of our body should be divided from each other, and be dissimilar: and on this account they first placed about the cavity of the head the face; fixed in it organs subservient to all the providential energies of the soul, and determined that the natural government of man should consist in this anterior part of the body. But they fabricated the luciferous eyes the first of all the corporeal organs, binding them in the face on the following account. Of that fire which does not burn, indeed, but which comprehends our proper diurnal light, the Gods fabricated the orbs of the eyes. For the fire contained within our body, and which is the genuine brother of this diurnal fire, they caused to flow through the eyes with smoothness, and collected abundance, condensed indeed in the whole, but especially in the middle of these lucid orbs; so as that the more dense fire might remain concealed within the recesses of the eyes, and the pure might find a passage and fly away. When, therefore, the diurnal light subsists about the effluxive river of the sight, then, similar concurring and being mingled with similar, one domestic body is constituted according to the direct procession of the eyes; and this too in that part where the internally emitted light resists that which is externally adduced. But the whole becoming similarly passive through similitude, when it either touches any thing else or is itself touched by another, then the motion produced by this contact diffusing itself through the whole body of the eye, as far as to the soul, causes that sensation which we denominate sight. But when this kindred fire departs into night, the conjunct on being dissolved, sight loses its power. For in this case, proceeding into a dissimilar nature, it is changed, and becomes extinct: since it is by no means connate with the proximate surrounding air, which is naturally destitute

destitute of fire. Hence it ceases from seeing; and, besides this, becomes the introducer of sleep. For the Gods fabricated the nature of the eye-lids as a salutary guardian of the sight; that, these being compressed, the inward fiery power of the eye might be restrained from any further emission; that, besides this, they might sprinkle over and equalize the eye's internal motions; and that, when equalized, rest might be produced.

But when much rest takes place, sleep attended with few dreams is produced. On the contrary, if certain more vehement motions remain, then such as is the nature of these relics, and the places in which they were produced, such and so many will be the similar phantasms within, and of which we shall possess the remembrance when we are externally roused. But with respect to the images produced in mirrors, and all such things as are visible in that which is apparent and smooth, there is nothing in these difficult of solution. For, from the communication of the external and internal fire with each other, and from that fire which subsists about the smooth body, and becomes abundantly multiplied, all such appearances are necessarily produced as take place when the fire of the eyes mingles itself with the fire diffused about the smooth and splendid object of vision. But the right hand parts appear to be the left, because a contact takes place between the contrary parts of the sight and the contrary parts of the object, different from the accustomed mode of perception. On the contrary, the right hand parts appear on the right, and the left hand on the left, when the mingled light leaps forth, together with that with which it is mingled. When the smoothness of the mirrors receives this here and there in an elevated manner, it repels the right hand part of the sight to the left of the mirror, and the left to the right. But if the mirror is turned according to the length of the countenance, it causes the whole face to appear resupine, by repelling the downward part of the splendour towards the upward part, and again the upper towards the downward part. All such particulars as these, therefore, are but causal assistants, which the Divinity employed as subservient to rendering the idea of that which is best as far as possible complete. *But the multitude are of opinion that these are not causal assistants, but the real causes of all things; I mean such things as are capable of giving cold and heat, rarity and density, with whatever produces such-like affections, but is incapable of possessing reason and intellect.* For soul must be considered as the only thing among beings by which intellect

can be possessed. And this is invisible. But fire and water, air and earth, are all of them visible bodies. *It is, however, necessary that the lover of intellect and science should explore the first causes of prudent nature; and that he should consider such things as are moved by others, and at the same time necessarily give motion to other things, as nothing more than secondary causes.* Hence it is proper that we should speak concerning both kinds of causes; separately of such as fabricate things beautiful and good in conjunction with intellect, and of such as, being left destitute of wisdom, produce each particular in a casual and disorderly manner. Concerning the second causes of the eyes, therefore, which contribute to the possession of the power they are now allotted, what has been already said is sufficient.

But the greatest employment of the eyes, with respect to the use for which they were bestowed on us by the Divinity, we shall now endeavour to explain. For, in my opinion, the sight is the cause of the greatest emolument to us on the present occasion; since what we are now discoursing concerning the universe could never have been discovered without surveying the stars, the sun, and the heavens. But now, from beholding day and night, we are able to determine by arithmetical calculation the periods of months and years; to acquire a conception of time, and to scrutinize the nature of the universe. But from all this we obtain the possession of philosophy; a greater good than which never was nor ever will be bestowed by the Gods on the mortal race. And this is what I call the greatest benefit of the eyes. But why should I celebrate other particulars of less consequence, which he who is not a philosopher, since destitute of sight, may attempt to explore, but will explore in vain? By us, indeed, it is asserted that Divinity bestowed sight on us for this purpose, that on surveying the circulations of intellect in the heavens we may properly employ the revolutions of our dianoëtic part, which are allied to their circulations; and may recall the tumultuous motions of our discursive energies to the orderly processions of their intellectual periods. That besides this, by learning these and participating right reason according to nature, and imitating the revolutions of Divinity which are entirely inerratic, we may give stability to the wanderings of our dianoëtic energy.

But concerning voice and hearing, we again assert that they were bestowed on us by the Gods on the same account. For the acquisition of speech pertains to these, and is of the greatest advantage to their possession.

And

And whatever utility musical voice brings to the sense of hearing, was bestowed for the sake of harmony. But harmony, possessing motions allied to the revolutions of our soul, is useful to the man who employs the Muses in conjunction with intellect; but is of no advantage to irrational pleasure, though it appears to be so at present. Indeed, it was given us by the Muses for the purpose of reducing the dissonant circulation of the soul to an order and symphony accommodated to its nature. Rhythm too was bestowed on us for this purpose; that we might properly harmonize that habit in our nature, which for the most part is void of measure, and indigent of the Graces. And thus far, a few particulars excepted, have we shown the fabrications of intellect. But it is likewise requisite to give a place in our discourse to the productions of necessity. For, the generation of the world being mingled, it was produced from the composition of intellect and necessity. But intellect ruling over necessity persuaded it to lead the most part of generated natures to that which is best; and hence necessity being vanquished by wise persuasion, from these two as principles the world arose. If, then, any one truly asserts that the universe was generated according to these, he should also mingle with it the form of an erratic cause, which it is naturally adapted to receive. In this manner then let us return; and, assuming a convenient principle of these, again discourse concerning them as about the former particulars, commencing our discussion from their origin. Let us, therefore, speculate the nature and passions of fire and water, air and earth, prior to the generation of the heavens. No one, indeed, as yet has unfolded the generation of these: but we speak of fire, and the other elements, as if the nature of each was known; and place them as the principles of the universe, when at the same time they ought not to be assimilated to elements, not even as in the rank of syllables, by men who in the smallest degree merit the appellation of wise. But now we shall not speak of the principle or principles, or whatever other denomination they may receive, of all things; and this for no other reason than the difficulty of delivering what appears to be the truth about these in the present mode of disputation. Neither, therefore, is it proper that you should expect me to speak, nor that I should persuade myself into a belief of being able to speak with perfect rectitude on so difficult a subject. But it is proper, as I told you in the beginning of this discourse, that, preserving all the force of assimilative reasons, we should endeavour to
deliver

deliver that which is not less assimilative of the truth than the doctrine of others; and that in this manner we should discourse from the beginning concerning particulars and the whole. In the first place, therefore, invoking the Divinity who is the favour of discourse, and beseeching him to lead us from an absurd and unusual exposition to an assimilative doctrine, we shall again begin to speak.

But it is necessary that the beginning of our present disputation should receive a more ample division than the former one. For then we made a distribution into two species: but now a third sort must be added. In the former disputation two species were sufficient; one of which was established as the form of an exemplar, intelligible and always subsisting according to *same*; but the other was nothing more than the imitation of the paradigm, generated and visible. But we did not then distribute a third, because we considered these two as sufficient. However, now reason seems to urge as a thing necessary, that we should endeavour to render apparent by our discourse the species which subsists as difficult and obscure. What apprehension then can we form of its power and nature? Shall we say that it is in an eminent degree the receptacle, and as it were nurse, of all generation? Such an assertion will, indeed, be true; but it is requisite to speak more clearly concerning it. And this will certainly be an arduous undertaking on many accounts, but principally because it will be necessary to doubt previous to its discussion concerning fire and the rest of the elements, why any one of these should be called water rather than fire, or air rather than earth; or why any one should be denominated some definite particular rather than all. For it is indeed difficult to frame any certain opinion, or to employ any stable discourse about such intricate forms. After what manner, then, and in what respect, and what of an assimilative nature shall we assert in this dubious inquiry?

In the first place, then, that which we now denominate water, when it loses its fluidity by concretion, appears to become stones and earth; but, when liquefied and dispersed, it forms vapour and air. Likewise, air when burnt up becomes fire. And, on the contrary, fire becoming concrete and extinct passes again into the form of air. And again, air becoming collected and condensed produces mists and clouds. But from these still more compressed rain descends. And from water, again, earth and stones derive

their subsistence. And thus, as it appears, they mutually confer on each other generation in a certain circular progression. But since these never appear to be the same, who without being covered with confusion can confidently assert that any one of these is this rather than that? Certainly, no one. Hence it will be far the most safe method of proceeding to speak about them as follows: That the nature which we always perceive becoming something different at different times, such, for instance, as fire, is not fire absolutely, but something fiery. And again, that the nature which we denominate water is not absolutely so, but such-like, or watery; and that it is not at any time any thing else, as if it possessed any stability of essence. And lastly, that they cannot be distinguished by any word, such as we are accustomed to employ when endeavouring to show that any particular is either this thing or that. For they fly away, incapable of sustaining the affirmation which asserts them to be *this thing, of such a nature, belonging to this*; and all such appellations as would evince them to be something permanent and real. Hence, we ought not to denominate any one of these either this, or that; but something such-like, and a perpetually-revolving similitude. Thus, we should assert that fire is every where *such-like*, and should speak in the same manner of every thing endued with generation. But we should alone distinguish by the appellations of this, or that, the subject in which each of these appears to be generated, and again to suffer a dissolution. But this subject is by no means to be denominated *such-like*, as for instance hot or white, or any quality belonging to contraries, or any thing which contraries compose. However, let us endeavour to explain more clearly what we mean to express. For if any one, fashioning all possible figures from gold, should without ceasing transform each figure into all; and if, during this operation, some one who is present should, pointing to one of these figures, inquire what it is; it might most safely, with respect to truth, be replied, that it was gold: but he who should assert that it is a triangle, or any other of the figures which are continually generated, and which ought by no means to be denominated beings, would fall from the truth in the midst of his assertion. But we ought to be content with that answer as most safe, which denominates it *such-like*, or of such a determinate nature.

In the same manner we should speak concerning that nature which is the general receptacle of all bodies. For it never departs from its own proper
power,

power, but perpetually receives all things ; and never contracts any form in any respect similar to any one of the intromitted forms. It lies indeed in subjection to the forming power of every nature, becoming agitated and figured through the supernally intromitted forms : and through these it exhibits a different appearance at different times. But the forms which enter and depart from this receptacle are the imitations of perpetually true beings ; and are figured by them in a manner wonderful and difficult to describe, as we shall afterwards relate. At present, however, it is necessary to consider three sorts of things : one, that which is generated ; another, that in which it is generated ; and the third, that from which the generated nature derives its similitude. But it is proper to assimilate that which receives to a mother ; that from whence it receives to a father ; and the nature situated between these to an offspring. It is likewise necessary to understand that the figured nature can never become distinguished with an all-possible variety of forms, unless its receptacle is well prepared for the purpose, and is destitute of all those forms which it is about to receive. For, if it were similar to any one of the supernally intromitted forms, when it received a nature contrary to that to which it is similar, or any form whatever, it would very imperfectly express its similitude, while at the same time it exhibited the very same appearance with the supernally acceding form. And hence it is necessary, that the receptacle which is destined to receive all possible forms should itself be destitute of every form. Just as those who are about to prepare sweet-smelling unguents, so dispose a certain humid matter as the subject of the ensuing odour, that it may possess no peculiar smell of its own ; and as those who wish to impress certain figures in a soft and yielding matter, are careful that it may not appear impressed with any previous figure, but render it as much as possible exquisitely smooth. In the same manner, it is necessary that the subject which is so often destined to receive in a beautiful manner, through the whole of itself, resemblances of eternal beings, should be naturally destitute of all that it receives. Hence, we should not denominate this mother and receptacle of that which is generated, visible and every way sensible, either earth, or air, or fire, or water ; nor, again, any one of the composites from these, or any thing from which these are generated : but we should call it a certain invisible species, and a formless universal recipient, which in the most dubious and scarcely explicable manner partici-

pates of an intelligible nature. Of itself, indeed, we cannot speak without deception; but so far as it is possible to apprehend its nature from what has been previously said, we may with the greatest rectitude assert as follows: that fire appears to be its inflamed part; water its moist part; and that earth and air are its parts in a similar manner, so far as it receives the imitations of these. But we ought rather thus to inquire about these, distinguishing and separating them by a reasoning process; whether there is a certain fire, itself subsisting in itself; and whether this is the case with all such particulars which we perpetually assert to subsist from themselves; or whether such things alone as are the objects of sight, and which are perceived through the ministry of the body, possess being and truth; so that nothing besides these has in any respect any subsistence; that we in vain assert there is a certain intelligible form of each of these; and that all such forms are nothing but words. Indeed, whether such a doctrine is true or not, must not be asserted rashly and without examination: nor is it proper to add to the present disputation, which is naturally prolix, any thing tedious and foreign from the purpose. But if any definition can be employed in this affair, comprehending things of great moment in a short compass, such a one will be very opportune to our present design. In this manner then I shall relate my opinion on the subject.

If intellect and true opinion are two kinds of things, it is every way necessary that there should be forms, subsisting by themselves, which are not the objects of sense, but which are apprehended by intelligence alone. But if, as appears to some, true opinion differs in no respect from intellect, every thing which is perceived through body is to be considered as possessing the most certain and stable nature. But in reality these ought to be denominated two distinct things, because they are generated separate from each other, and are dissimilar. For the one of these subsists in us through learning, but the other through persuasion. And the one is indeed always attended with true reason, but the other is irrational. The one is not to be moved by persuasion; the other, on the contrary, is subject to this mutation. And lastly, of true opinion every man participates; but of intellect all the Gods, and but a few of mankind. Such then being the case, we must confess that the form which subsists according to *fame*, is unbegotten and without decay; neither receiving any thing into itself externally, nor itself proceeding

ceeding into any other nature. That it is invifible, and imperceptible by fenfe; and that this is the proper object of intellectual fpeculation. But the form which is fynonymous and fimilar to this, muft be confidered as fenfible, generated, always in agitation, and generated in a certain place, from which it again recedes, haftening to diffolution; and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with fenfe. But the third nature is that of place; which never receives corruption, but affords a feat to all generated forms. This indeed is tangible without tangent perception; and is fcarcely by a certain fpurious reasoning the object of belief. Befides, when we attempt to behold this nature, we perceive nothing but the delufions of dreams, and affert that every being muft neceffarily be fomewhere, and be fituated in a certain place: and we by no means think that any thing can exift, which is neither in the earth nor comprehended by the heavens. All thefe, and all fuch opinions as are the fifters of thefe, we are not able to feparate from our cogitation of that which fubfifts about a vigilant and true nature: and this becaufe we cannot rouse ourfelves from this fallacious and dreaming energy, and perceive that in reality it is proper for an image to fubfift in fomething different from itfelf; fince that in which it is generated has no proper refemblance of its own, but perpetually exhibits the phantafm of fomething elfe; and can only participate of effence in a certain imperfect degree, or it would become in every refpect a perfect non-entity. But to true being, true reafon bears an affifting testimony, through the accuracy of its decifions; affirming, that as long as two things are different from each other, each can never become fo fituated in either, as to produce at the fame time one thing, and two things effentially the fame.

This, then, is fummarily my opinion:—that, prior to the generation of the univerfe, thefe three things fubfifted in a triple refpect, viz. being, place, and generation. And that the nurfe of generation, fiery and moift, receiving the forms of earth and air, and fuffering fuch other paffions as are the attendants of thefe, appeared of an all-various nature to the view. But becaufe it was neither filled with fimilar powers, nor with fuch as are equally balanced, it poffeffed no part in equilibrium; but through the perfect inequality of its libration it became agitated by thefe paffions, and again through its motion gave agitation to thefe. But the parts in motion, being feparated from each other, were impetuously hurried along in different

directions,

directions, similar to the agitations and ventilations which take place in the operations of textorial instruments, and such as are employed in the purgation of corn. For in this case the dense and the heavy parts are borne along one way, and the rare and the light are impelled into a different seat. In the same manner, these four natures being agitated by their receptacle tumultuously moving like the instrument of corn, such as were dissimilar became far separated from each other, and such as were similar became again amicably united. And hence they passed into different seats before the universe was from the mixture of these distributed into beautiful order; but at the same time they all subsisted irrationally, and without the limitation of measure.

But when the artificer began to adorn the universe, he first of all figured with forms and numbers fire and earth, water and air, which possessed indeed certain traces of the true elements, but were in every respect so constituted, as it becomes any thing to be from which Deity is absent. But we should always persevere in asserting that Divinity rendered them as much as possible the most beautiful and the best, when they were in a state of existence opposite to such a condition. I shall now, therefore, endeavour to unfold to you the distribution and generation of these by a discourse unusual indeed, but, to you who have trod in all the paths of erudition, through which demonstration is necessarily obtained, perspicuous and plain. In the first place, then, that fire and earth, water and air, are bodies, is perspicuous to every one. But every species of body possesses profundity; and it is necessary that every depth should comprehend the nature of a plane. Again, the rectitude of the base of a plane is composed from triangles. But all triangles originate from two species; one of which possesses one right angle, and the other two acute angles. And one of these contains one right angle distributed with equal sides; but in the other unequal angles are distributed with unequal sides. Hence, proceeding according to assimilative reasons, conjoined with necessity, we shall establish a principle of this kind, as the origin of fire and all other bodies. The supernal principles of these indeed are known to Divinity, and to the man who is in friendship with Divinity.

But it is necessary to relate by what means four most beautiful bodies were produced; dissimilar indeed to each other, but which are able from certain dissolutions into each other to become the sources of each other's generation.

generation. For, if we are able to accomplish this, we shall obtain the truth concerning the generation of earth and fire, and of those elements which are situated according to analogy between these. And then we shall not assent to any one who should assert that there are visible bodies more beautiful than these, each of which subsists according to one kind. We must endeavour, therefore, to harmonize the four sorts of bodies excelling in beauty; and to evince by this means that we sufficiently comprehend the nature of these. Of the two triangles indeed the isosceles is allotted one nature, but the oblong or scalene is characterized by infinity. We ought therefore to choose the most beautiful among infinities, if we wish to commence our investigation in a becoming manner. And if any one shall assert that he has chosen something more beautiful for the composition of these, we shall suffer his opinion to prevail; considering him not as an enemy, but as a friend. Of many triangles, therefore, we shall establish one as most beautiful (neglecting the rest); I mean the equilateral, which is composed from three parts of a scalene triangle. To assign the reason of this would indeed require a prolix dissertation; but a pleasant reward will remain for him who by a diligent investigation finds this to be the case. We have, therefore, selected two triangles out of many, from which the body of fire and of the other elements is fabricated; one of which is isosceles, but the other is that which always has its longer side triply greater in power than the shorter.

But that which we formerly asserted without sufficient security, it is now necessary more accurately to define. For it appeared to us, though improperly, that all these four natures were mutually generated from each other: but they are in reality generated from the triangles which we have just described:—three of them, indeed, from one triangle containing unequal sides; but the fourth alone is aptly composed from the isosceles triangle. All of them, therefore, are not able, by a dissolution into each other, to produce from many small things a mighty few, or the contrary. This indeed can be effected by three of them. For, as all the three are naturally generated from one triangle, when the greater parts are dissolved, many small parts are composed from them, receiving figures accommodated to their natures. And again, when the many small parts being scattered according to triangles produce a number of one bulk, they complete one mighty species
of

of a different kind. And thus much may suffice concerning their mutual generation.

It now remains that we should speak concerning the quality of each of their kinds, and relate from what concurring numbers they were collected together. The first species indeed is that which was composed from the fewest triangles, and is the element of that which has its longer side twice the length of the shorter side, which it subtends. But two of these being mutually placed according to the diameter, and this happening thrice, the diameters and the shorter sides passing into the same, as into a centre, hence one equilateral triangle is produced from six triangles. But four equilateral triangles being composed, according to three plane angles, form one solid angle; and this the most obtuse of all the plane angles from which it is composed. Hence, from four triangles of this kind receiving their completion, the first solid species was constituted, distributive of the whole circumference into equal and similar parts. But the second was formed from the same triangles, but at the same time constituted according to eight equilateral triangles, which produced one solid angle from four planes: so that the second body received its completion from the composition of six triangles of this kind. And the third arose from the conjunction of twice sixty elements, and twelve solid angles, each of which having twenty equilateral bases is contained by five plane equilateral triangles. In this manner, then, the other elements generated these. But the isosceles triangle, being constituted according to four triangles, and collecting the right angles at the centre, and forming one equilateral quadrangle, generated the nature of the fourth element. But six such as these being conjoined produced eight solid angles, each of which is harmonized together, according to three plane right angles. Hence the figure of the body thus composed is cubical, obtaining six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There is also a certain fifth composition, which Divinity employed in the fabrication of the universe, and when he delineated those forms the contemplation of which may justly lead some one to doubt whether it is proper to assert that the number of worlds is infinite or finite;—though indeed to affirm that there are infinite worlds, can only be the dogma of one who is ignorant about things in which it is highly proper to be skilful. But it may with much less absurdity be doubted whether there is in reality but one world, or whether there are five. According to our
opinion,

opinion, indeed, which is founded on assimilative reasons, there is but one world: though some one, regarding in a certain respect other particulars, may be of a different opinion. But it is proper to dismiss any further speculations of this kind.

Let us now, therefore, distribute the four sorts of things which we have generated, into fire, earth, water, and air. And to earth indeed let us assign a cubical form: for earth is the most immovable of all these four kinds, and the most plastic, or adapted to formation, of all corporeal natures. But it is in the most eminent degree necessary that this should be the case with that which possesses the most secure and stable bases. Among the triangles, indeed, established at the beginning, such as are equilateral possess firmer bases than such as contain unequal sides. And hence, among the plane figures composed from each, it will be found that the isosceles is necessarily more stable than the equilateral, and the square than the triangle, both when considered according to parts and to the whole. On this account, by distributing this figure to the earth, we shall preserve an assimilative reason. This will be the case too by assigning to water that figure which is more difficultly movable than the other three; to fire, the most easily movable form; and to air, that figure which possesses a middle nature. Besides this, we should assign the smallest body to fire, the greatest to water, and one of a middle kind to air. And again, the most acute body to fire, the second from this to air, and the third to water. But, among all these, it is necessary that the body which possesses the fewest bases, should be the most easily movable: for, being every way the most acute, it becomes the most penetrating and incisive of all. It is likewise the most light, because composed from the fewest parts. But that which is second to this, possesses these properties in a secondary respect; and that which ranks as the third, in a third gradation. Hence, according to right and assimilative reason, the solid form of the pyramid is the element and seed of fire. But we must assign that form which is second according to generation to air; and that which is the third to water. And it is necessary to consider all these such, with respect to their smallness, that no one of the several sorts can be discerned by us, on account of its parvitude; but that, when many of them are collected together, their bulks become the objects of our perception. And besides this, all these were accurately absolved and harmonized by the Divinity, both

as to their multitude, motions, and powers, in such a proportion as the willing and persuaded nature of necessity was able to receive.

But, among all those natures whose kinds we have above related, the following circumstances appear to take place. And first with respect to earth: when it meets with fire, becoming dissolved by its acuteness, it is borne along; and remains in this dissolved state either in fire, or in the bulk of air, or in that of water—till its parts, associating themselves together, and again becoming mutually harmonized, produce again a body of earth; for it can never pass into another form. But water, when it is distributed into parts by fire or air, when its parts become again collected, produces one body of fire, but two bodies of air. And the sections of air form from one dissolved part two bodies of fire. Again, when fire receives into itself either air or water, or a certain earth, and, being itself small, is moved in many natures; and besides this, when, through opposing, being vanquished by the agitated forms, it becomes broken in pieces, then two bodies of fire coalesce into one form of air. And when air becomes vanquished and separated into parts, then, from two wholes and a half, one whole form of water is produced. But, again, let us consider this matter as follows: When any one of the other forms, becoming invested by fire, is cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides, then, passing into the nature of fire, it suffers no further dissection. For no species is ever able to produce mutation or passivity, or any kind of alteration, in that which is similar and the same with itself: but as long as it passes into something else, and the more imbecil contends with the more powerful, it will not cease to be dissolved.

Again, when the lesser are comprehended in the greater many, and the few being lacerated are extinguished,—if they are willing to pass into the idea of the conquering nature, they cease to be extinguished, and air becomes generated from fire, and water from air. But if, when this transition is accomplished, the composite opposes any of the other species, the agitated parts will not cease to be dissolved, till, on account of their dissoluble subsistence being every way impelled, they fly to their kindred nature; or being vanquished, and becoming one from many, similar to their vanquisher, they abide with the victor in amicable conjunction. But, in consequence of these passions, they all of them mutually change the receptacles which they once possessed. For the multitude of each kind is distinguished, according to its
proper

proper place, through the motion of its recipient seat. But such as become dissimilar to each other are borne along through the agitation to the place of the natures to which they are similar. Such bodies, therefore, as are unmixed, and the first, are generated from such causes as these. But that other genera are naturally inherent in these forms, is owing to the composition of each element; which not only from the first produces a triangle, together with magnitude, but also such things as are greater and less: and this so many in number as there are different kinds in the forms themselves. And hence, these being mingled in themselves, and with each other, produce an infinite variety; which it is proper he should contemplate who is about to employ assimilative reasons in the investigation of nature. He, therefore, who does not apprehend in what manner, and in conjunction with what particulars, the motion and composition of these take place, will find many impediments in the remaining part of this disputation. And these indeed we have already partly discussed; but a part still remains for our investigation.

And, in the first place, motion is by no means willing to reside in smoothness: for it is difficult, or rather impossible, that a thing in motion should subsist without a mover, or a mover without that which is in motion. Hence, it is impossible that these should be at any time equable and smooth. And, in consequence of this, we should always place an abiding nature in smoothness, and motion in that which is unequal and rough. Inequality, indeed, is the cause of roughness: and we have already treated concerning the generation of inequality. But we have by no means explained how the several sorts, being undistributed according to their kinds, cease to be moved and borne along through each other. This, therefore, must be the subject of our present discussion. The circulation then of the universe, since it comprehends the different sorts of things in its circumference, being of a circular form, and naturally desiring to pass into union with itself, compresses all things within its spacious receptacle, and does not suffer a void place anywhere to subsist. On this account, fire in the most eminent degree penetrates through all things; and air next to this, ranking as the second to fire, on account of the subtilty and tenuity of its parts. And the same reasoning must be extended to the other elements, which are posterior to these. For such as are composed from the greatest parts leave also the greatest vacuity in their composition; but, on the contrary, such as are the smallest leave the

least vacuity. But the coalition of compression thrusts the small parts into the void spaces of the large; and on this account, the small parts being placed with the large, and the former separating the latter, but the larger being mingled with the smaller, all of them are borne upwards and downwards to their respective places of abode. For each, upon changing its magnitude, changes also its situation. Hence, through these causes the generation of a nature contrary to smoothness being always preserved, affords a perpetual motion of these, both at present and in all future periods of time.

But, in the next place, it is necessary to understand that there are many kinds of fire: as for instance, flame, and that which is enkindled from flame; which burns, indeed, but exhibits no light to the eyes—and which, when the flame is extinguished, abides in the ignited nature. In like manner, with respect to air, one kind is most pure, which is denominated ether; but another most turbulent, and at the same time obscure and dark; and after this another nameless kind is produced, through the inequality of the triangles. But, with respect to water, it is in the first place twofold; one kind of which is humid, but the other fusile. The humid, therefore, through its participating such parts as are small and unequal, becomes movable, both from itself and another, through inequality and the idea of its figure. But that which is composed from large and smooth parts is more stable than this kind of water, and coalesces into a heavy body through smoothness and equality of parts. But through fire entering into and dissolving its composition, in consequence of losing its equability and smoothness, it participates more of a movable nature. Hence, becoming easily agile, driven about by the proximate air, and extended over the earth, it liquefies, which is denominated a purification of bulk, and falls upon the earth, which is called a defluxion. Again, fire flying upwards from hence, since it does not depart into a vacuum, the proximate air being agitated, impels the moist bulk as yet movable into the seats of fire, with which at the same time it mingles itself. But when the bulk becomes collectively thrust downwards, and again receives equability and smoothness of parts, then fire, the artificer of inequality, departing, the whole mass passes into a sameness with itself. And this departure of fire we denominate refrigeration; but the coalition which takes place when fire is

¹ Instead of *ὄρεα*, in this part read *ἀρα*.

absent we call a concretion, and cold rigidity. But among all those which we denominate fusile waters, that which, becoming most dense from the most attenuated and equable parts, is of a uniform kind, and participates a splendid and yellow colour, is that most honoured and valuable possession gold, which is usually impelled through a rock. And a branch of gold, on account of its density most hard and black, is called a diamond. But that which contains parts proximate to gold, which possesses more than one species, surpasses gold in density, and participates but a small and attenuated part of earth, so that it becomes of a harder nature, but from its internally possessing great intervals is lighter;—this is one kind of splendid and concrete waters, and is denominated brass. But when an earthly nature, being mingled with this, is through antiquity separated from other parts of the brass, and becomes of itself conspicuous, it is then denominated rust. In a similar manner other particulars of this nature may be investigated without much labour by the assistance of assimilative reasons. And if any one, for the sake of relaxation, omitting for a while the speculation of eternal beings, should pursue the assimilative arguments concerning generation, and should by this means possess a pleasure unattended with repentance, such a one will establish for himself in life a moderate and prudent diversion.

This being admitted, let us run over the assimilative reasons concerning the particulars which yet remain for discussion. When such water then as is attenuated and moist is mingled with fire, (being denominated moist through its motion and rolling progression on the earth, and likewise soft, because its bases being less stable than those of earth easily yield to impulsion,) this, when separated from fire and deserted by air, becomes more equable, and through the departure of these is compelled into itself: and being thus collected, if it suffers this alteration above the earth, it becomes hail; but if upon the earth, ice; which then takes place in consequence of extreme congelation. But when it is less congealed, if this happens above the earth, it becomes snow; but when upon the earth, and this from collected dew, it then becomes frost. But when many species of water are mingled with each other, the whole kind, which is strained from the earth through plants, is called moisture or liquor. These liquors, being dissimilar on account of their mixtures, exhibit many other nameless kinds: but four, which are of a fiery species, and which become in an eminent degree diaphanous, are allotted appellations.

appellations. And that which heats the soul in conjunction with the body is called wine. But that which is smooth, and segregative of the sight, and on this account splendid, refulgent, and unctuous to the view, is an oleaginous species, and is pitch, gum, oil, and other things endued with a similar power. Again, that which possesses a power of diffusing the things collected about the mouth, and this as far as nature will permit, at the same time bringing sweetness with its power, is generally denominated honey. And lastly, that which dissolves the flesh by burning, is of a frothy nature, and is secreted from all liquors, is called juice. But the species of earth strained through water produces a stony body in the following manner:—When collected water fails in mingling, it passes into the form of air; but, becoming air, it returns to its proper place. Hence, as there is no vacuum, it impels the proximate air; and this, if the impulsion is weighty, being poured round the bulk of earth, becomes vehemently compressed, and betakes itself to those seats from whence the new air ascended. But earth, when indissolubly associated with water, through the ministry of air composes stones: the more beautiful sort indeed being such as are resplendent from equal and plane parts, but the deformed being of a contrary composition. But when all the moisture is hurried away by the violence of fire, and the body by this means becomes more dry, then a species of earth which is denominated stérile is produced. Sometimes, likewise, when the moisture is left behind, and the earth becomes fusile through fire, then through refrigeration a stone with a black colour is generated. But when this species of strained earth in a similar manner through mixture is deprived of much moisture, but is composed from more attenuated parts of earth, is salt and semiconcrete, and again emerges through water; then it is partly called nitre, a cathartic kind of oil, and earth, and partly salt, a substance most elegantly and legitimately adapted to the common wants of the body, and most grateful to divinity. But the parts common to both these are not soluble by water, but through some such thing are thus collected together by fire. Again, fire and air do not liquefy the bulk of earth. For since these naturally consist of parts smaller than the void spaces of earth, they permeate through its most capacious pores without any violence, and neither subject it to dissolution nor liquefaction. But the parts of water, because they are greater and pass along with violence, dissolve and liquefy the mass of earth. Hence,

water

water alone dissolves earth when violently composed, but fire alone when it is properly composed; for an entrance in this case is afforded to nothing but fire.

Again, fire alone permeates the most violent association of the parts of water; but both fire and air diffuse themselves through its more debile collection; air through its void, and fire through its triangular spaces. But nothing is capable of dissolving air when collected together by violence, except it operates according to an element: but when it coheres together without force, it is resolved by fire alone. Again, bodies which are so composed from water and earth that the water compressed by force obstructs the void spaces of earth, cannot in this case afford an ingress to the water externally approaching; and in consequence of this, the water flowing round such a body suffers the whole mass to remain without liquefaction. But the parts of fire entering into the void spaces of water, as water into those of earth, and influencing water in the same manner as fire influences air, become in this case the causes of liquefaction to a common body. But these partly possess less water than earth; such as the whole genus of glass, and such stones as are denominated fusile: and partly, on the contrary, they possess more of water; such as all those bodies which coalesce into waxen and vaporific substances. And thus we have nearly exhibited all those species, which are varied by figures, communications and mutations into each other; but it is now necessary that we should endeavour to render apparent the causes through which the passions of these are produced.

In the first place, then, sense ought always to be present with discourses of this kind. But we have not yet run through the generation of flesh, and such things as pertain to flesh, together with that part of the soul which is mortal. For all these are inseparable from the passions subsisting with sense, and cannot without these passions be sufficiently explained; though, indeed, even in conjunction with these, it is scarcely possible to unfold their production. We should, therefore, first of all establish other things; and then consider such things as are consequent to these. That in our disputation, therefore, the passions themselves may follow the genera in succession, let our first investigations be concerning such things as pertain to body and soul. Let us then first of all inquire why fire is called hot. And the reason of this we shall be able to perceive by considering the separation and division of fire about our bodies:

bodies: for that this *passion* is a certain sharpness is nearly evident to all. But we ought to consider the tenuity of its angles, the sharpness of its sides, the smallness of its parts, and the velocity of its motion, through all which it becomes vehement and penetrating, and swiftly divides that with which it meets; calling to mind for this purpose the generation of its figure. For fire, indeed, and no other nature, separating our bodies and distributing them into small parts, produces in us that *passion* which is very properly denominated heat. But the *passion* contrary to this, though sufficiently manifest, ought not to pass without an explanation. For the moist parts of bodies larger than our humid parts, entering into our bodies, expel the smaller parts; but, not being able to penetrate into their receptacles, coagulate our moisture, and cause it through equability to pass from an unequable and agitated state into one immovable and collected. But that which is collected together contrary to nature, naturally opposes such a condition, and endeavours by repulsion to recall itself into a contrary situation. In this contest and agitation a trembling and numbness takes place; and all this *passion*, together with that which produces it, is denominated cold. But we call that hard to which our flesh gives way; and soft, which yields to the pressure of our flesh. And we thus denominate them with reference to each other. But every thing yields to pressure which is established on a small base. But that which rests on triangular bases, on account of its being vehemently firm, is of a most resisting nature; and, because it is dense in the highest degree, strongly repels all opposing pressure.

Again, the nature of heavy and light will become eminently apparent, when investigated together with upwards and downwards. But indeed it is by no means rightly asserted that there are naturally two certain places distant by a long interval from each other: one denominated downwards, to which all bodies tend endued with bulk, but the other upwards, to which every thing is involuntarily impelled. For, the whole universe being spherical, all such things as by an equal departure from the middle become extremes, ought to become naturally extremes in a similar manner. But the middle, being separated from the extremes according to the same measures, ought to be considered as in a situation just opposite to all things. Such, then, being the natural disposition of the world, he who places any one of the above-mentioned particulars either upwards or downwards, will justly appear

by such appellations to wander from the truth. For the middle place in the universe cannot be properly called either naturally downwards or upwards, but can only be denominated that which is the middle. But that which environs is neither the middle, nor contains any parts in itself differing from each other with reference to the middle, nor does it possess any thing corresponding to an opposite direction. But to that which is every way naturally similar how can any one with propriety attribute contrary names? For, if there be any thing solid, and endued with equal powers, in the middle of the universe, it will never tend to any part of the extremities, through the perfect similitude which they every where possess. But if any one moves about this solid in a circle, he will often stand with his feet in opposite directions, and will denominate the same part of himself both upwards and downwards. Since the universe, therefore, as we have just observed, is of a spherical figure, it is not the part of a prudent man to assert that it has any place which is either upwards or downwards. But from whence these names originate, and, in what things existing, we transfer them from thence to the universe, it is our business at present to investigate. If any one then should be seated in that region of the world which for the most part belongs to the nature of fire, and to which it on all sides tends, and if such a one should acquire a power of taking away the parts of fire, and of causing them to balance; or, placing the parts in a scale, should violently seize on the beam, and, drawing out the fire, hurl it downwards into dissimilar air—it is evident that in this case a less portion of fire would be more easily compelled than a greater. For, when two things are at the same time suspended from one power, it is necessary that the less quantity should more easily, and the greater with less readiness, yield to the oppressive force. Hence, the one is called heavy, and tending downwards; but the other light, and tending upwards. The same thing happens to us who inhabit this terrestrial region. For, walking on the earth, and separating the terrene genera from each other, we sometimes violently hurl a fragment of earth into its dissimilar the air, and this with a motion contrary to its nature; each region at the same time retaining that to which it is allied. But the less portion, being more easily impelled into a dissimilar place than the larger, first of all yields to the violence: and this we denominate light, and call the place into which it is violently hurled, upwards. But the passion contrary to this we denominate

heavy and downwards. Hence it is necessary that these should mutually differ from each other; and this through the multitude of genera obtaining contrary situations. For that which is light in one place is contrary to that which is light in a contrary situation: likewise the heavy to the heavy, the downward to the downward, and the upward to the upward. For all these will be found to be contrary, transverse, and every way different from each other. One thing however is to be understood concerning all these, that the progression of each, tending to its kindred nature, renders the proceeding body heavy, and the place to which it tends, downwards. But this progression influences in a different manner such as are differently affected. And thus have I unfolded the causes of these passions.

But again, any one who beholds the cause of the *passion* of smoothness and roughness may be able to disclose it to others. For hardness mingled with inequality produces the one, and equality with density the other. But among the common *passions* which subsist about the whole body, that is the greatest which is the cause of pleasure and pain: to which may be added, such as through the parts of the body detain the senses, and have in these pleasures and pains as their attendants. In this manner, then, we should receive the causes of every passion, both sensible and insensible, calling to mind the distinctions which we formerly established concerning the easily and difficultly movable nature. For in this manner we ought to pursue all such things as we design to apprehend. Thus, with respect to that which is naturally easily movable, when any slender passion falls upon it, the several parts give themselves up to each other in a circular progression, producing the same effect; till, having arrived at the seat of prudence, they announce the power of that by which the passion was induced. But that which is affected in a contrary manner, being stable and without a circular progression, alone suffers; but does not move any of the parts to which it is proximate. Hence, the parts not mutually giving themselves up to each other, and the first passion in them becoming immovable with respect to the whole animal, that which suffers is rendered void of sensation. This last case indeed happens about the bones and hairs, and such other parts of our composition as are mostly terrene. But the circumstances belonging to the easily movable nature take place about the instruments of sight and hearing, through their containing the most abundant power of fire and air. But it is necessary to consider the peculiarities
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of pleasure and pain as follows :—When a *passion* is produced in us contrary to nature, and with violence and abundance, then it becomes the occasion of pain. And again, when a *passion* conformable to our nature is excited, and this with abundance, it causes pleasure and delight. But that which is contrary to these produces contrary effects. But a *passion*, the whole of which is induced with great facility, is eminently indeed the object of sensation, but does not participate of pleasure and pain. And of this kind are the *passions* subsisting about the sight; to which, as we have above asserted, our body is allied. For such objects as exhibit sections and burnings, and other *passions* of a similar kind, do not cause pain to the sight; nor, again, does the sight receive pleasure when it is restored to the same form as before. But the most vehement and clear sensations influence it with pain, so far as it suffers any thing, strikes against, or comes into contact with, any object. For no violence subsists in the separation or concretion of the sight. But such bodies as are composed from larger parts, and which scarcely yield to impulsion, when they transfer the induced motions to the whole body, contain in themselves pleasures and pains; when varied, indeed, pains, but, when restored to their pristine situation, pleasures. Again, whatever bodies in a small degree receive departures and evacuations of themselves, accompanied at the same time with abundant repletions,—since such bodies have no sense of evacuation, but are sensible of repletion, they do not affect the mortal part of the soul with any pain, but, on the contrary, influence it with the greatest delight. And the truth of this is manifest from the sensation of sweet odours. But such bodies as suffer an abundant variation, and are scarce able to be restored in a small degree to their pristine situation, are totally affected in a manner contrary to those we have just described. And the truth of this is manifest in the burnings and sections of the body. And thus have we nearly discussed the common passions of the whole body, and the appellations assigned to the causes by which they are produced.

Let us now endeavour to explain those passions which take place in particular parts of our bodies, and relate from whence they arise, and by what causes they are induced. In the first place, let us if possible complete what we formerly left unfinished concerning humours; since these are passions subsisting about the tongue. But these, as well as many other things, appear to be produced by certain separations and concretions; and, besides this, to

employ smoothness and roughness more than the rest. For certain small veins extend themselves from the tongue to the heart, and are the messengers of tastes. And when any thing falls upon these so as to penetrate the moist and delicate texture of the flesh, which through its terrestrial nature is moderately liquefied, it then contracts and dries the veins. Hence, if these penetrating substances are of a more rough nature, they produce a sharp taste; but, if less rough, a sour taste. But such things as are purgative of these veins, and which wash away whatever is found adhering to the tongue, if they accomplish this in an immoderate degree, so as to liquefy something of the nature of the tongue, such as is the power of nitre;—all such as these are denominated bitter. But whatever is subordinate to this property of nitre, and purges in a more moderate degree, appears to us to be salt, without the roughness of bitterness, and to be more friendly to our nature. Again, such things as, communicating with the heat of the mouth, and being rendered smooth by it, heat also in their turn the mouth—and which through their lightness are elevated towards the senses of the head, at the same time dividing whatever they meet with in their ascent;—all these, through powers of this kind, are denominated sharp. But sometimes these several particulars, becoming attenuated through rottenness, enter into the narrow veins, and compel the interior parts, as well the terrene as those containing the symmetry of air, to be mingled together by moving about each other; and when mingled cause some of the parts to glide round, some to enter into others, and when entered to render them hollow and extended; and this in the place where a hollow moisture is extended about the air. This moisture too being at one time terrene and at another pure, a moist orbicular receptacle of air is produced from the hollow water. But that which is produced from pure water is on all sides diaphanous, and is called a bubble. On the contrary, that which owes its subsistence to a more earthly moisture, and which is at the same time agitated and elevated, is denominated fervid, and a fermentation. But the cause of all these passions receives the appellation of acute. And a passion contrary to all that has been asserted concerning these proceeds from a contrary cause. But when the composition of the things entering into moist substances is naturally accommodated to the quality of the tongue, it polishes and anoints its asperities, and collects together or relaxes such parts as were either assembled or dissipated contrary to nature, and restores

restores them to their proper and natural habit. Hence, all such substances are pleasant and friendly to every one, become the remedies of violent passions, and are denominated sweet. And thus much may suffice concerning particulars of this kind.

There are, however, no species about the power of the nostrils: for all odours are but half begotten. But it happens to no species to be commensurate with any odour. And our veins, with respect to particulars of this kind, are too narrow to admit the genera of earth and water, and too broad to receive those of fire and air; and hence no one ever perceives an odour of any one of these. But odours are always produced from the madefaction, corruption, liquefaction or evaporation of the elements. For, water becoming changed into air, and air into water, odours are generated in the middle of these. And all odours are either smoke or mists. But, of these, that which passes from air into water is a mist; but that which is changed from water into air, smoke. And hence it comes to pass that all odours are more attenuated than water, and more dense than air. But the truth of this is sufficiently evident when any one, in consequence of a disagreeable smell, violently draws his breath inwards; for then no odour is washed off, but breath alone follows unattended by smell. On this account, the varieties of these subsist without a name; as they are neither composed from many nor from simple species. But two of these alone receive an appellation, the pleasant and the disagreeable: the latter of which disturbs and violently assaults all that cavity which lies between the top of the head and the navel; but the former allures this part of the body, and by its amicable ingreſs preserves it in a condition accommodated to its nature. But we ought to consider the third sensitive part of our composition, hearing, in such a manner that we may explain through what causes the passions with which it is conversant subsist. We ought, therefore, entirely to define voice a certain pulsation of the air, penetrating through the ears, brain, and blood, as far as to the soul: and we should call the motion arising from hence, which commences from the head and ends in the seat of the liver, hearing. When this motion is swift, a sharp sound is produced; but, when slow, a flat sound. And the former of these is equal and smooth, but the latter rough. Many voices too produce a great sound, but a small sound is the result of a few. But it is necessary that we should speak about the symphonies of these in the subsequent part

of this discourse. The fourth sensitive genus now remains for our discussion; which contains in itself an abundant variety, all which are denominated colours. But colour is a flame flowing from bodies, and possessing parts commensurate to the sight with respect to perception. But we have already considered the causes from which sight is produced. It appears then that we may now speak of colours according to assimilative reasons as follows:

Of things which, proceeding from other parts, fall on the sight, some are greater, others less, and others equal to the parts of the sight. Such as are equal, therefore, cannot be perceived; and these we denominate diaphanous. But, among such as are larger or smaller, some of these separate, but others mingle the sight, similar to the operations of heat and cold about the flesh, or to things four, acute and hot about the tongue. But things which affect the sight in this manner are called black and white; which are indeed the passions of those particulars we have just related, being their sisters, as it were, and the same with them in a different genus; but which, nevertheless, through these causes appear to be different. We should, therefore, speak of them as follows:—That the colour which is segregative of the sight is white; but that which produces an effect contrary to this, black. But when a more acute motion, and of a different kind of fire, falls upon and separates the sight, as far as to the eyes, at the same time violently propelling and liquefying the transitions of the eyes, then a collected substance of fire and water flows from thence, which we denominate a tear; but the motion itself is a fire meeting with the sight in an opposite direction. And, indeed, when a fire, leaping as it were from a certain corruption, becomes mingled with another fire, penetrating and extinguished by moisture, from this mixture colours of all-various kinds are produced. In this case we call the passion a vibrating splendour, and that which produces it fulgid and rutilating. But a kind of fire which subsists in the middle of these, arriving at the moisture of the eyes, and becoming mingled with it, is by no means splendid: but in consequence of the rays of fire being mingled through moisture, and producing a bloody colour, we denominate the mixture red. And when splendour is mingled with red and white, it generates a yellow colour. But to relate in what measure each of these is mingled with each, is not the business of one endued with intellect, even though he were well informed in this affair; since he would not be able to produce concerning these either a
necessary

necessary or an assimilative reason. But red, when mingled with black and white, produces a purple colour. And when to these, mingled and burnt together, more of black is added, a more obscure colour is produced. A ruddy colour is generated from the mixture of yellow and brown; but brown from the mixture of black and white. A pallid colour arises from the mingling of white and yellow. But that which is splendid conjoined with white, and falling upon abundance of black, gives completion to an azure colour. And azure mingled with white generates a gray colour. But from the temperament of a ruddy colour with black, green is produced. All the rest will be nearly evident from these, to any one who, imitating the former mixtures, preserves assimilative reasons in his discourse. But if any one undertakes the investigation of these, for the sake of the things themselves, such a one must be ignorant of the difference between a divine and human nature: since a God is indeed sufficient for the purpose of mingling many things into one, and of again dissolving the one into many, as being at the same time both knowing and able: but there is no man at present who is able to accomplish either of these undertakings, nor will there ever be one in any future circulation of time. But all these which thus naturally subsist from necessity, were assumed in the things which are generated by the artificer of that which is most beautiful and best, when he produced a self-sufficient and most perfect God; employing, indeed, causes which are subservient to these, but operating himself in the best manner in all generated natures. On this account it is requisite to distinguish two species of causes; the one necessary, but the other divine. And we should inquire after the divine cause in all things, for the sake of obtaining a blessed life in as great a degree as our nature is capable of receiving it; but we should investigate the necessary cause for the sake of that which is divine. For we should consider, that without these two species of causes, the objects of our pursuit can neither be understood nor apprehended, nor in any other way become participated. But since to us at present, as to artificers, matter lies in subjection, the genera of causes serving as prepared materials from which the remaining discourse is to be woven, let us again return with brevity to our first discussions, and swiftly pass from thence to the place at which we are now arrived; by this means endeavouring to establish an end and summit to our disputation, which may harmonize with its beginning.

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Indeed, as we asserted towards the commencement of our discourse, when all sensible natures were in a disordered state of subsistence, Divinity rendered each commensurate with itself, and all with one another, and connected them as much as possible with the bands of analogy and symmetry. For then nothing participated of order except by accident; nor could any thing with propriety be distinguished by the appellation which it receives at present, such for instance as fire, water, and the rest of this kind. But the demiurgus in the first place adorned all these, afterwards established the world from their conjunction, and rendered it one animal, containing in itself all mortal and immortal animals. And of divine natures, indeed, he himself became the author; but he delivered to his offspring the junior Gods the fabrication of mortal natures. Hence, these imitating their father's power, and receiving the immortal principle of the soul, fashioned posterior to this the mortal body, assigned the whole body as a vehicle to the soul, and fabricated in it another mortal species of soul, possessing dire and necessary passions through its union with the body. The first indeed of these passions is pleasure, which is the greatest allurements to evil; but the next is pain, which is the exile of good. After these follow boldness and fear, those mad advisers; anger, hard to be appeased; hope, which is easily deceived; together with irrational sense, and love, the general invader of all things. In consequence, therefore, of mingling these together, the junior Gods necessarily composed the mortal race. And religiously fearing lest the divine nature should be defiled through this rout of molestations more than extreme necessity required, they lodged the mortal part, separate from the divine, in a different receptacle of the body; fabricating the head and breast, and placing the neck between as an isthmus and boundary, that the two extremes might be separate from each other.

In the breast, therefore, and that which is called the thorax, they seated the mortal genus of the soul. And as one part of it is naturally better, but another naturally worse, they fabricated the cavity of the thorax; distributing this receptacle in the woman different from that of the man, and placing in the middle of these the midriff or diaphragm. That part of the soul, therefore, which participates of fortitude and anger, and is fond of contention, they seated nearer the head, between the midriff and the neck; that becoming obedient to reason, and uniting with it in amicable conjunction,

junction, it might together with reason forcibly repress the race of desires, whenever they should be found unwilling to obey the mandates of reason, issuing her orders from her lofty place of abode. But they established the heart, *which is both the fountain of the veins, and of the blood, which is vehemently impelled through all the members of the body in a CIRCULAR PROGRESSION*, in an habitation corresponding to that of a satellite; that when the irascible part becomes inflamed, reason at the same time announcing that some unjust action has taken place externally, or has been performed by some one of the inward desires, then every thing sensitive in the body may swiftly through all the narrow pores perceive the threatenings and exhortations, may be in every respect obedient, and may thus permit that which is the best in all these to maintain the sovereign command.

But as the Gods previously knew that the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of dreadful events, and the effervescence of anger, and every kind of wrathful inflation, would be produced by fire, they implanted in the body the idea of the lungs, artificially producing them as a guardian to the heart. And, in the first place, they rendered them soft and bloodless, and afterwards internally perforated with hollow pipes like a sponge; that through their receiving spirit and imbibing moisture, they might become themselves refrigerated, and might afford respiration and remission to the heart in its excessive heat. Hence they deduced the arteries as so many canals through the substance of the lungs; and placed the lungs like a soft thicket round the heart, that when anger rages in it with too much vehemence it may leap into submission, and becoming refrigerated may be subject to less endurance, and may be able together with anger to yield with greater facility to the authority of reason. But they seated that part of the soul which is desiderative of meats and drinks, and such other things as it requires through the nature of body, between the præcordia and the boundary about the navel; fabricating all this place as a manger subservient to the nutriment of the body, and binding in it this part of the soul as a rustic and savage animal. But it is necessary that this part should nourish its conjoined body, if the mortal race has a necessary existence in the nature of things. That this part, therefore, might be always fed at the manger, and might dwell remote from the deliberative part, molesting it in the smallest degree with its tumults and clamours, and permitting it, as that which is most excellent in our composition, to consult in quiet for the

common utility of the whole animal; on this account the Gods assigned it such a subordinate situation.

However, as the Divinity perceived that this part would not be obedient to reason, but that it would naturally reject its authority in consequence of every sensible impression, and would be animafically hurried away by images and phantafms both by day and night—confidering this, he conftituted the form of the liver, and placed it in the habitation of this defiderative part; compofing it dense and fmooth, fplendid and fweet, and at the fame time mingled with bitternefs; that the power of cogitations, defcending from intellect into the liver as into a mirror receiving various refemblances and exhibiting images to the view, might at one time terrify this irrational nature by employing a kindred part of bitternefs and introducing dreadful threats, fo that the whole liver being gradually mingled might reprefent bilious colours, and becoming contracted might be rendered throughout wrinkled and rough; and that, befides this, it might influence its lobe, ventricle, and gates, in fuch a manner, that by diftorting and twifting fome of thefe from their proper difpofition, and obftructing and fhutting in others, it might be the caufe of damages and pains. And again, that at another time a certain infpiration of gentlenefs from the dianoëtic power, by defcribing contrary phantafms and affording refit to bitternefs, through its being unwilling either to excite or apply itfelf to a nature contrary to its own; and befides this, by employing the innate fweetnefs of the liver, and rendering all its parts properly difpofed, fmooth, and free, might caufe that part of the foul which refides about the liver to become peaceful and happy, fo that it might even refrain from excefs in the night, and employ prophetic energies in fleep: fince it does not participate of reafon and prudence. For thofe who compofed us, calling to mind the mandate of their father, that they fhould render the mortal race as far as poffible the beft, fo conftituted the depraved part of our nature that it might become connected with truth; eftablifhing in this part a prophetic knowledge of future events. But that Divinity assigned divination to human madnefs may be fufficiently inferred from hence; that no one while endued with intellect becomes connected with a divine and true prophecy; but this alone takes place either when the power of prudence is fettered by fleep, or fuffers fome mutation through difeafe, or a certain enthuftaftic energy: it being in this cafe the employment of prudence to
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understand what was asserted either sleeping or waking by a prophetic and enthusiastic nature; and so to distinguish all the phantastic appearances as to be able to explain what and to whom any thing of future, past, or present good is portended. But it is by no means the office of that which abides and is still about to abide in this enthusiastic energy, to judge of itself either concerning the appearances or vociferations. Hence it was well said by the ancients, that to transact and know his own concerns and himself, is alone the province of a prudent man. And on this account the law orders that the race of prophets should preside as judges over divine predictions; who are indeed called by some diviners—but this in consequence of being ignorant that such men are interpreters of ænigmatical visions and predictions, and on this account should not be called diviners, but rather prophets of divinations. The nature, therefore, of the liver was produced on this account, and seated in the place we have mentioned, viz. for the sake of prediction. And besides this, while each of such like parts is living, it possesses clearer indications; but when deprived of life it then becomes blind, and the divination is rendered too obscure to signify any thing sufficiently clear. But an intestine which subsists for the sake of the liver, is placed near it on the left hand, that it may always render the liver splendid and pure, and prepared like a mirror for the apt reception of resembling forms. On this account, when certain impurities are produced about the liver through bodily disease, then the spleen, purifying these by its rarity, receives them into itself from its being of a hollow and bloodless contexture. Hence, being filled with purgations, it increases in bulk, and becomes inflated with corruption. And again, when the body is purified, then becoming depressed it subsides into the same condition as before. And thus we have spoken concerning both the mortal and divine part of the soul, and have related where they are situated, in conjunction with what natures, and why they are separated from each other. That all this indeed is unfolded according to indisputable truth, can only be asserted when confirmed by the vocal attestation of a God: but that it is spoken according to assimilative reasons, we should not hesitate to evince both now and hereafter by a more diligent discussion of what remains.

It is proper to investigate in a similar manner the subsequent part of our disputation; and this is no other than to relate how the other members

of the body were produced. It is becoming, therefore, in the most eminent degree that they should be composed as follows: Those artificers then of our race well knew that we should be intemperate in the assumption of meats and drinks, and that we should often through gluttony use more than was moderate and necessary. Hence, lest sudden destruction should take place through disease, and the mortal race thus becoming imperfect should presently cease to exist; the Gods previously perceiving this consequence, fabricated in the lower parts a hollow receptacle for the purpose of receiving a superabundance of solid and liquid aliment; and, besides this, invested it with the spiral folds of the intestines, lest, the assumed nutriment swiftly passing away, the body should as swiftly require an accession of new aliment; and, by producing an insatiable appetite through gluttony, should render our whole race void of philosophy and the muses, and disobedient to the most divine part of our composition. But the nature of the bones and flesh, and other things of this kind, was constituted as follows: In the first place, the generation of the marrow serves as a principle to all these. For the bonds of that life which the soul leads through its conjunction with the body, being woven together in the marrow, become the stable roots of the mortal race. But the marrow itself is generated from other particulars. For, among the triangles, such as are first, being unbent and smooth, were particularly accommodated to the generation of fire and water, air and earth; and the Divinity separating each of these apart from their genera, and mingling them commensurate with each other, composing by this means an all-various mixture of feeds for the mortal race, produced from these the nature of the marrow. But afterwards disseminating in the marrow, he bound in it the genera of souls. Besides, in this first distribution, he immediately separated as many figures and of such kinds as it was requisite the marrow should possess. And he fashioned indeed that part of the marrow in which as in a cultivated field the divine seed was to be sown, every way globular, and called it *εγκεφαλον*, or the brain; because in every animal, when it has acquired the perfection of its form, the receptacle of this substance is denominated the head. But he distinguished with round and at the same time oblong figures, that receptacle of the body which was destined to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul; and was willing that the whole should receive the appellation of marrow. And besides this, hurling from these as anchors the bonds of all
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the soul, he fabricated the whole of our body about the substance of the marrow, and invested it on all sides with a covering of bones.

But he thus composed the nature of the bones. In the first place, bruising together pure and smooth earth, he mingled and moistened it with marrow; after this he placed it in fire, then merged it in water, then again seated it in fire, and after this dipped it in water. And thus, by often transferring it into each, he rendered it incapable of being liquefied by both. Employing therefore this nature of bone, he fashioned like one working with a wheel a bony sphere, and placed it round the brain; leaving a narrow passage in the sphere itself. And besides this, forming certain vertebræ from bone about the marrow of the neck and back, he extended them like hinges, commencing from the head and proceeding through the whole cavity of the body. And thus he preserved all the seed, by fortifying it round about with a stony vestment. He likewise added joints, for the purpose of motion and inflection, employing the nature of that which is distinguished by *difference* in their fabrication, as this is endued with a certain middle capacity. But, as he thought that the habit of the bony nature would become more dry and inflexible than it ought to be, and that, when it became heated and again cooled, it would in consequence of ulceration swiftly corrupt the seed which it contained, on this account he fashioned the genus of nerves and flesh; that the nerves, by binding all the other members, and becoming stretched and remitted about those hinges the vertebræ, might render the body apt to become inflected and extended as occasion required: but that the flesh might serve as a covering from the heat and a protection from the cold; and, besides this, might defend it from falls, in the same manner as external supports, gently and easily yielding to the motions of the body. He likewise placed a hot moisture in the nature of the flesh, that, becoming in summer externally dewy and moist, it might afford a kindred refrigeration to the whole body; and that again in winter, through its own proper fire, it might moderately repel the externally introduced and surrounding cold. When, therefore, the plastic artificer of our bodies had perceived all this through a dianoëtic energy, having mingled and harmonized together water, fire, and earth, and added to the mixture a sharp and salt ferment, he gradually composed soft and succulent flesh.

But he mingled the nature of the nerves from bone and unfermented flesh,

composing one middle substance from the power of both, and tingeing it with a yellow colour. And on this account it comes to pass that the power of the nerves is more intense and viscous than that of the flesh, but more soft and moist than that of the bones. Hence, the Divinity bound the bones and marrow to each other with the nerves, and afterwards invested them all supernally with the flesh, as with a dark concealing shade. Such of the bones, therefore, as were the most animated he covered with the least flesh; but such as were the least animated he invested with flesh the most abundant and dense. And, besides this, he added but a small quantity of flesh to the joints of the bones, except where reason evinces the necessity of the contrary: and this lest they should be a hindrance to the inflections, and retard the motions of the body; and again, lest in consequence of their being many and dense, and vehemently compressed in one another, they should cause through their solidity a privation of sense, a difficulty of recollection, and a remission of the dianoëtic energy. On this account he invested with abundance of flesh the bones of the groin, legs, loins, the upper part of the arms, and that part which extends from the elbow to the wrist, and such other parts of our bodies as are without articulation, together with such inward bones as through the paucity of soul in the marrow are destitute of a prudential energy. But he covered with a less quantity of flesh such bones as are endowed with prudence: unless, perhaps, the fleshy substance of the tongue, which was produced for the sake of sensation, is to be excepted. In other parts, the case is such as we have described. For a nature which is generated and nourished from necessity can by no means at one and the same time receive a dense bone and abundant flesh, united with acuteness of sensation. But this would be most eminently the case with the composition of the head, if all these were willing to coalesce in amicable conjunction: and the human race, possessing a fleshy, nervous, and robust head, would enjoy a life twice as long, or still more abundantly extended, healthy and unmolested, than that which we at present possess.

Again, in consequence of those artificers of our generation considering whether they should fabricate our race possessing a life more lasting indeed but of a worse condition, or of a shorter extent but of a more excellent condition, it appeared to them that a shorter but more excellent life was by all means to be preferred to one more lasting but of a subordinate condition.

Hence

Hence they covered the head with a thin bone, but did not invest it with flesh and nerves, because it was destitute of inflections. On all these accounts, therefore, the head was added to the body as the most sensitive and prudent, but at the same time by far the most imbecil part of all the man. But through these causes, and in this manner, the Divinity placing the nerves about the extreme part of the head, conglutinated them in a circle about the neck, (after a certain similitude), and bound with them those lofty cheek-bones situated under the countenance; but he disseminated the rest about all the members, connecting joint with joint. Besides, those adorners of our race ornamented us with the power of the mouth, teeth, tongue, and lips, and this for the sake of things which are at the same time both necessary and the best; producing ingression for the sake of necessaries, but egression for the sake of such as are best. Every thing, indeed, which being introduced affords nutriment to the body, is necessary; but the stream of words flowing forth externally, and becoming subservient to prudence, is the most beautiful and best of all effluxions. Besides, it was not possible that the head could remain without any other covering than that of a naked bone, through the extremities of heat and cold in the different seasons; nor, again, could it become the instrument of knowledge when invested with darknefs, dulled, and without sensation, through the perturbation of flesh. Hence, a part of a fleshy nature, not entirely dried, and surpassing the residue, was separated from the rest; and which is now denominated a membrane. This membrane passing into union with itself, and blossoming about the moisture of the brain, circularly invests the head. But the moisture flowing under the futures of the head irrigates this membrane, and, causing it to close together at the crown, connects it, as it were, in a knot. But an all-various species of futures is generated through the power of the circulations and the nutriment; the variety becoming greater when these oppose each other with greater violence, but less when they are in a state of less opposition. All this membrane the divine artificer of our bodies circularly pierced with fire. And hence, becoming as it were wounded, and the moisture externally flowing through it, whatever is moist, hot, and pure, passes away; but whatever is mingled from the same natures as the membrane itself, this, in consequence of receiving an external production, becomes extended into length, and possesses a tenuity equal to the punctuation of the membrane. But this substance,

substance, from the slowness of its motion, being continually thrust back by the externally surrounding spirit, again revolves itself under the membrane, and there fixes the roots of its progression. Hence, from these passions the race of hairs springs up in the membrane of the head, being naturally allied to, and becoming, as it were, the reins of this membrane, at the same time that they are more hard and dense through the compression of cold. For every hair, when it proceeds beyond the membrane, becomes hardened through cold. After this manner, then, the artificer planted our head with hairs, employing for this purpose the causes which we have mentioned.

But at the same time he understood by a dianoëtic energy, that instead of flesh a light covering was necessary for the security of the brain; which might sufficiently shade and protect it like a garment from the extremities of heat and cold, but by no means hinder the acuteness of sensation. But that comprehension of nerve, skin, and bone about the fingers, being a mixture of three substances, and becoming of a drier nature, produced one common hard membrane from the whole. These indeed were the ministrant causes of its fabrication; but the most principal cause consists in that cogitation which produced this membrane for the sake of future advantage. For those artificers of our nature well knew that at some time or other women and other animals would be generated from men; and that nails would be of the greatest advantage in many respects to the bestial tribes. Hence they impressed in men the generation of nails, at the very period of their production. But from this reason, and through these causes, they planted the skin, hairs, and nails in the members situated at the extremities of the body. However, as all the parts and members of a mortal animal were generated in alliance with each other, and necessarily possessed their life in the union of fire and spirit, lest the animal becoming resolved and exhausted by these should swiftly decay, the Gods devised the following remedy:—For mingling a nature allied to the human with other forms and senses, they planted, as it were, another animal; such as those mild trees, plants, and seeds, which, being now brought to perfection through the exercise of agriculture, are friendly to our nature; though prior to this they were of a rustic kind, being more antient than such as are mild. For whatever participates of life we may justly and with the greatest rectitude denominate an animal. But this which we are now speaking of participates the third species of soul, which

we place between the præcordia and the navel : and in which there is neither any thing of opinion, reason, or intellect ; but to which a pleasant and painful sense, together with desires, belongs. For it continually suffers all things. But when it is converted in itself, about itself, and, rejecting external, employs its own proper motion, it is not allotted by its generation a nature capable of considering its own concerns by any thing like a reasoning energy. On this account it lives, and is not different from an animal ; but, becoming stably rooted, abides in a fixed position, through its being deprived of a motion originating from itself.

But when those superior artificers of our composition had implanted all these genera for the purpose of supplying nutriment to our nature, they deduced various channels in our body as in a garden, that it might be irrigated as it were by the accession of flowing moisture. And, in the first place, they cut two occult channels under the concretion of the skin and flesh, viz. two veins in the back, according to the double figure of the body on the right hand and the left. These they placed with the spine of the back, so as to receive the prolific marrow in the middle, that it might thus flourish in the most eminent degree ; and, by copiously flowing from hence to other parts, might afford an equable irrigation. But after this, cutting the veins about the head, and weaving them with each other in an opposite direction, they separated them ; inclining some from the right hand to the left hand parts of the body, and some from the left to the right, that the head, together with the skin, might be bound to the body, as it is not circularly divided with nerves about its summit ; and besides this, that the passion of the senses might from each of these parts be deduced on all sides through the whole of the body. In this manner, then, they deduced an aqueduct from hence ; the truth of which we shall easily perceive by assenting to the following position. That all such things as are composed from lesser parts are able to contain such as are greater ; but such as consist from greater cannot invest those composed from lesser parts. But fire, among all the genera of things, is constituted from the smallest parts. Hence, it penetrates through water, earth, and air, and the composites from these ; and this in such a manner, that nothing can restrain its pervading power. The same must be understood of that ventricle our belly ; that it is able to retain the intromitted meat and drink, but cannot stay spirit and fire, because these consist of smaller parts than those from

which the belly is composed. These, therefore, the Divinity employed for the purpose of producing an irrigation from the belly into the veins; weaving from fire and air a certain flexible substance like a bow-net, and which possesses a twofold gibbosity at the entrance. One of these he again wove together, divided into two parts; and circularly extended these parts from the curvatures like ropes through the whole body, as far as to the extremities of the net. All the interior parts therefore of the net-work he composed from fire; but the gibbosities and the receptacle itself from air. And lastly, receiving these, he disposed them in the animal new formed as follows:—In the first place, one of the gibbous parts he assigned to the mouth; but, as the gibbosity of this part is twofold, he caused one part to pass through the arteries into the lungs, but the other along with the arteries into the belly. But having divided the other gibbous part according to each of its parts, he caused it to pass in common to the channels of the nose, so that, when the one part does not reach the mouth, all its streams may be filled from this. But he placed the other cavity of this gibbous substance about the hollow parts of the body; and caused the whole of this at one time to flow together gently into the gibbous parts, as they were of an aerial texture, and at another time to flow back again through the convex receptacles. But he so disposed the net, as being composed from a thin body, that it might inwardly penetrate and again emerge through this substance. Besides this, he ordered that the interior rays of fire should follow in continued succession, the air at the same time passing into each of the parts; and that this should never cease to take place as long as the mortal animal continued to subsist. But, in assigning an appellation to a motion of this kind, we denominate it expiration and respiration. But all this operation and the whole of this passion in our nature take place in the body by a certain irrigation and refrigeration conducive to our nutriment and life. For, when the breath passes inwardly and outwardly, an interior fire attends it in its course; and being diffused through the belly, when it meets with solid and liquid aliments, it reduces them to a state of fluidity; and, distributing them into the smallest parts, educes them as from a fountain through the avenues of its progression: pouring these small particles into the channels of the veins, and deducing rivers through the body as through a valley of veins.

But let us again consider the passion of respiration, and investigate through
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what causes it was generated, such as we perceive it at present. We should consider it, therefore, as follows:—As there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any thing in motion can enter, and as breath passes from us externally, it is evident to every one that it cannot proceed into a void space, but must thrust that which is nearest to it from its proper seat; that again the repulsed nature must always expel its neighbour; and that from a necessity of this kind every thing which is impelled into that seat from which the emitted breath is excluded, must, when it has entered into and filled up this space, attend on the breath in its progression. And all this must take place like the revolution of a wheel, through the impossibility of a vacuum. Hence, when the breast and the lungs externally dismiss the breath, they are again replenished through the air which surrounds the body entering into and riding round the avenues of the flesh. But the air being again externally dismissed, and flowing round the body, impels the respiration inward, through the passages of the mouth and nostrils.

But we should establish the following as the cause from which the origin of these was derived. Every animal belonging to the universe possesses a heat in the veins and the blood, like a certain fountain of fire; and this heat we compared to a bow-net, extended through the middle of the body, and wholly woven from fire; all such things as are external being composed from air. But it must be confessed that heat naturally proceeds externally into a region to which it is allied. But as there are two progressions, one according to the body externally, but the other again according to the mouth and nostrils, hence, when the breath is impelled inward, it again thrusts back that by which it was impelled. And that which is drawn back, meeting with fire, becomes heated; while that which is exhaled becomes refrigerated. In consequence, therefore, of the heat being changed, and such things as subsist according to the other transition becoming more hot, and that again which is more fervid verging to its own nature,—hence, one thing strikes against and repels another in its course; and as they always suffer and mutually influence each other in the same manner, leaping this way and that in a circular progression, they give birth to the expiration and respiration of the breath. But in this manner also we should investigate the causes of those passions which arise from medical cupping-glasses, from drinking, from things

things violently hurled, whether upwards or on the ground; together with such sounds as appear swift and flow, sharp and flat, and which are at one time borne along unharmoniously, through the dissimilitude of the motion which they cause within us, and at another time attended with harmony, through the similitude of motion which they produce. For, the motions of such sounds as are prior and swifter ceasing, and proceeding to a nature similar to their own, are comprehended by such as are slower, which now succeed to the swifter, and set them again in motion. But during their comprehension of these they do not disturb them by introducing another motion, but lead on the beginning of the slower lation in conformity to that of the swifter. And these, adapting to themselves a similitude of the ceasing motion, mingle together one passion from the union of sharp and flat. From whence they afford pleasure to the unwise, but joy to the wise, through the imitation of divine harmony subsisting in mortal motions. And, indeed, with respect to all effluxions of water, the falling of thunder, and the wonderful circumstances observed in the attraction of amber, and of the Herculean stone;—in all these, nothing in reality of attraction takes place: but, as a vacuum cannot any where be found, and these particulars mutually impel each other,—hence, from the individuals when separated and mingled together tending to their proper seats, and from these passions being interwoven with each other, such admirable effects present themselves to the view of the accurate investigator. And indeed respiration (from whence our discourse originated) is generated from these causes, and after this manner, as we asserted above. For fire, dividing the aliment and becoming elevated internally, attending at the same time the breath in its ascent, fills the veins from the belly by this joint elevation; and this in consequence of drawing upwards from thence the dissected parts: so that by this means, through the whole body of every animal, the streams of nutriment are abundantly diffused. But the parts which are recently dissected and separated from their kindred natures, some of which are fruits and others grafts, and which were produced by Divinity for the nourishment of our bodies, possess all-various colours through their mixture with each other: but for the most part a red colour predominates in them, whose nature is fabricated from a section of fire, and an absterfion in a moist substance. And hence, the colour of that which flows about the

body is such as appears to the sight, and which we denominate blood ; being the pasture of the flesh and of the whole body ; from whence an irrigation becoming every where diffused, it copiously replenishes all the exhausted parts.

But the manner of impletion and evacuation is produced in the same way as in the universe the lation of every thing takes place, viz. from that cause through which every kindred nature tends to itself. For the natures by which we are externally invested perpetually liquefy and distribute our bodies, dismissing every species to its kindred form. But the sanguineous parts, being distributed and comprehended within us, as is the case with every animal constituted under the heavens, are compelled to imitate the local motion of the universe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being borne along to its kindred nature, replenishes again that which is void. But when the effluxions surpass the accessions, a corruption of the whole animal ensues ; and when the contrary takes place, it receives an increase. The recent composition, therefore, of every animal possessing new triangles, like ships formed from timbers unimpaired by age, causes a strong enclosure of them within each other : but the whole of its delicate bulk unites in amicable conjunction, as being generated from most recent marrow, and nourished in milk. Those triangles, therefore, from which the liquid and solid aliments are composed, approaching externally, and being received into the animal, as they are more antient and imbecil than its own proper triangles, are vanquished and cut in pieces by the new triangles : and the animal is rendered of a large size, through its being nourished from a multitude of similar parts. But when it relaxes the root of its triangles, in consequence of becoming wearied and tamed, through many contests with many particulars in a long course of time ; then it is no longer able to reduce by section the received aliment into a similitude of itself, but its own parts become easily dissipated by the natures which are externally introduced. Hence the whole animal, becoming by this means vanquished, decays ; and the passion itself is denominated old age. But the end of its existence then arrives, when the jointly harmonized bonds of the triangles about the marrow no longer possess a detaining power, but becoming separated through the weariness of labour, desert the bonds of the soul. The soul, however, in this case being concealed in a state according to nature, flies away with pleasure and delight. For every thing contrary to nature is painful ; but that which happens naturally

rally is pleasant. Hence, the death which is produced through wounds and disease is painful and violent ; but that which is caused from old age, proceeding to an end according to nature, is of all deaths the most free from labour, and is rather accompanied with pleasure than pain.

But it must be obvious to every one from whence diseases are produced. For, since there are four genera from which the body is composed, viz. earth, fire, water, and air, the unnatural abundance and defect of these, and a translation from their own proper to a foreign seat, in consequence of which each of these does not receive that which is accommodated to its nature, together with all such circumstances as these, produce contentions and disease. For, each of these subsisting and being transferred in a manner contrary to nature, such things as were formerly heated become cold, such as were once dry become moist, such as were light heavy, and every thing receives all possible mutations. For we assert that when the same thing approaches to, and departs from, the same, in the same manner, and according to analogy, then alone it permits that which is the same to abide healthy and safe. But that which inordinately wanders, either in acceding or departing, produces all-various mutations, diseases, and infinite corruptions. Likewise a second apprehension of diseases may be obtained by any one who is so disposed, from the second compositions of things constituted according to nature. For, since the concretion of marrow, bone, flesh, and nerve, is derived from these, as likewise the blood, though from a different mode of coalition, hence many events happen in the same manner as those we have mentioned above ; but the greatest and most severe diseases subsist as follows: When the generation of these second compositions takes place inversely, then they become subject to corruption. For the flesh and nerves are naturally generated from blood : the nerves indeed from fibres, through the alliance subsisting between these ; but the flesh from the coalition of that which when separated from the fibres passes into a state of concretion. But that substance again which arises from nerves and flesh, being glutinous and fat, increases at the same time by nutrition the flesh, which for the most part subsists about the nature of the bones ; and likewise the bone itself, with which the marrow is surrounded. And again, that which trickles through the density of the bones, being the most pure kind of the triangles, and the most smooth and unctuous, while it drops and distils from the bones, irrigates
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the marrow. And hence, when each particular subsists in this manner, a healthy condition of body is produced; but a diseased condition when the contrary is the case. For, when the flesh becoming liquefied again transmits the consumption into the veins, then the blood, together with spirit, becoming abundant and all-various in the veins, diversified with colours and density, and infected with acid and salt qualities, generates all-various bile, corruption, and phlegm. And all these, being again thus generated and corrupted, in the first place destroy the blood itself; and this, no longer affording nutriment to the body, is every where borne along through the veins, without observing a natural order in its circulations. But these indeed are unfriendly to each other, because they derive no mutual advantages from the properties with which each is endued. They likewise war upon the natural habit of the body, and its perseverance in its proper state, by introducing dissolutions and liquefactions.

A most ancient portion of flesh, therefore, when it is liquefied and rendered difficult of digestion, grows black through ancient burning; but through its being entirely macerated it becomes bitter, and adverse to all the other parts of the body which are not yet infected with corruption. And then indeed the black colour possesses sharpness instead of bitterness; that which was bitter becoming more attenuated: and the bitterness, being again tinged with blood, possesses a redder colour; but, from the black which is mingled with this, becomes of a bilious nature. But, besides this, a yellow colour is mingled with bitterness, when the new flesh liquefies through the fire subsisting about flame. And, indeed, either some physician will assign to all these the common appellation of bile, or some one who is able to consider things many and dissimilar, and to behold one genus in many particulars deserving one denomination. But such other things as are called species of bile receive an appellation peculiar to each, according to colour. But corruption (*ρῥωσις*), which is the defluxion or whey of the blood, is gentle and mild: but that which is the sediment of black and sharp bile is of a ferocious and rustic nature, when it is mingled through heat with a saline power. And a substance of this kind is denominated acid phlegm. But a portion of recent and delicate flesh is often liquefied together with the air, and is afterwards inflated and comprehended by moisture: and from this passion bubbles are produced, which taken separately are invisible on account of their smallness.

ness, but which, when collected into a large bulk, become conspicuous, and possess a white colour on account of the generation of froth. And we denominate all this liquefaction of delicate flesh, and which is woven together with spirit, white phlegm. But we call the sediment of recent phlegm tears and sweat; together with every thing of that kind into which the body is every day resolved. And all these, indeed, become the instruments of disease, when the blood does not naturally abound from liquid and solid aliment, but increases from contraries in such a manner as to violate the laws of nature. When, therefore, any part of the flesh is cut off, but at the same time the foundation of it remains, the calamity possesses but half its power; for it is capable of being easily recovered. But when that which binds the flesh to the bones becomes diseased, and the blood flowing from it and the nerves no longer nourishes the bones and binds the flesh, but, instead of being fat, smooth, and glutinous, becomes rough and salt through bad diet; then, in consequence of suffering all this, and being separated from the bones, it is refrigerated under the flesh and nerves. For the flesh, falling from its roots, leaves the nerves bare, and drenched in a salt humour; and hence, gliding again into the circulation of the blood, it increases the number of the diseases we have already described. And these passions, indeed, which subsist about the body, are of a grievous nature: but those which precede these are still more afflictive and troublesome. But this takes place when the bone through the density of the flesh does not admit sufficient respiration, but, being heated through filthiness, becomes rotten, receives no nutriment, but falls upon the flesh, which is on the contrary refrigerated; and the flesh again falls on the blood, so that by this means diseases more severe than the former are produced. But the extremity of all maladies then happens, when the nature of the marrow becomes diseased through some defect or excess: for then it produces the most vehement and fatal diseases; as the whole nature of the body is in this case necessarily dissipated and dissolved.

But it is requisite after this to understand that the third species of diseases receives a tripartite division. For one of the divisions is produced by spirit, the other by phlegm, and the other by bile. For when the lungs, those distributive guardians of the breath, being obstructed by defluxions, cannot afford a free passage to the breath; then, as there is no emission of the breath in one part, and more is received into another part than is requisite, the parts without

without refrigeration become rotten ; but that which is received in too great abundance passing through the veins, distorts them and liquefies the diaphragm situated in the middle of the body : and thus ten thousand grievous diseases arise from hence, together with an abundance of sweat. But often, when the flesh becomes separated within the body, breath is produced ; and this being incapable of departing externally, causes the same torments as the breath when entering from without. It produces, however, the greatest pains, when surrounding the nerves and neighbouring veins it inflates them, and stretches and distorts the ligaments and nerves continued from the back. And these diseases, from the stretching and inflating passion, are denominated tensions and contortions from behind ; and of which it is difficult to find a cure. For, fevers taking place dissolve these diseases in a most eminent degree. But the white phlegm possessing a difficulty of respiring externally, through the spirit of the bubbles, variegates the body indeed in a milder nature, yet sprinkles it with white spots, and generates other diseases of a similar kind. But when this white phlegm is mingled with black bile, and becomes dissipated about the circulations of the head, which are of a most divine nature, then it disturbs these circulations ; and if this happens in sleep, the perturbation is less violent ; but if to those who are awake, it cannot without difficulty be expelled. And as this is a disease of a sacred nature, it is most justly denominated a sacred disease.

A sharp and salt phlegm is the fountain of all such diseases as are produced by a defluxion of humours : and because the places into which this phlegm flows possess an omniform variety, it generates all-various diseases. But whatever parts of the body are said to be inflated are thus affected from the inflammation of bile : which, when it expires, produces externally various tumours from its fervid nature ; but, when inwardly restrained, generates many inflammatory diseases. It is, however, then greatest, when, being mingled with pure blood, it removes the fibres from their natural order, which are scattered into the blood for this purpose, that it may possess tenuity and density in a commensurate degree ; and that it may neither through heat (as it is of a moist nature) flow from the thin body, nor, when becoming more dense, and of consequence more unadapted to motion, may scarcely be able to flow back again through the veins. The fibres, therefore, are very serviceable on this occasion, which if any one should collect together in the

blood when dead, and in a state of frigidity, all the remaining blood would become diffused; and when poured forth they would be swiftly coagulated, together with the cold by which they are surrounded. But as the fibres possess this power in the blood, and the bile naturally becomes antient blood, and is again liquefied from flesh into this, such things as are hot and moist falling gradually the first of all, hence it becomes collected together through the power of the fibres. When the bile is coagulated and violently extinguished, it causes a tempest and tremour within. But when it flows more abundantly, vanquishing the fibres by its own proper heat, and becoming fervid in an inordinate degree, it then preserves the body: and if it retains its conquering power to the end, it penetrates into the marrow; and burning the bonds of the soul, as if they were the cables of a ship, dissolves her union, and dismisses her from thence entirely free. But when it flows with less abundance, and the body becoming liquefied opposes its passage, then finding itself vanquished, it either falls through the whole body, or, being compelled through the veins into the upper or lower belly, like one flying from a seditious city, it escapes from the body and introduces defluxions, dysenteries, or gripings of the intestines, and all diseases of a similar kind. When the body, therefore, is eminently diseased through excess of fire, it then labours under continued burnings and fever; but when through excess of air, under quotidian fevers: under tertian through water, because water is more sluggish than fire and air; under quartan, through excess of earth. For earth, being the most sluggish of all these, is purified in quadruple periods of time; and on this account introduces quartan fevers, which it is scarcely possible to disperse. And in this manner are the diseases of the body produced.

But the diseases of the soul, which subsist through the habit of the body, are as follow:—We must admit that the disease of the soul is folly, or a privation of intellect. But there are two kinds of folly; the one madness, the other ignorance. Whatever passion, therefore, introduces either of these must be called a disease. And we should establish excessive pleasures and pains as the greatest diseases of the soul. For, when a man is too much elevated with joy or depressed with grief, while he hastens immoderately either to retain the one or to fly from the other, he is not able either to perceive or hear any thing properly, but is agitated with fury, and is very little capable.

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of exercising the reasoning power. But he who possesses a great quantity of fluid feed about the marrow, and who, like a tree laden with a superabundance of fruit, riots in the excess,—such a one being influenced by many pains and pleasures in desires, and their attendant offspring, will be agitated with fury for the greatest part of his life through mighty pleasures and pains: and though the soul of such a one will be diseased and unwise, from the body with which it is connected, yet it will be falsely considered not as diseased, but as voluntarily bad. But in reality venereal intemperance for the most part becomes a disease of the soul, through a habit of one kind, from the tenuity of the bones, in a body fluid and moist. And, indeed, it may be nearly asserted, that all intemperance of pleasures of whatever kind, and all disgraceful conduct, is not properly blamed as the consequence of voluntary guilt. For no one is voluntarily bad: but he who is depraved becomes so through a certain ill habit of body, and an unskilful education. But these two circumstances are inimical to all, and productive of a certain ill. And again, the soul, when influenced by pain, suffers much depravity from this through the body. For, when sharp and salt phlegm, and likewise bitter and bilious humours, wandering through the body, are prevented from passing forth externally, but, revolving inwardly, mingle their exhalations with the circulation of the soul; in this case they produce all-various diseases of the soul, in a greater and less degree, and less and more numerous. They are introduced, indeed, to three seats of the soul; and according to the diversity of the place, each generates all-various species of difficulty and sorrow, of boldness and timidity, and, still further, of oblivion and indocility. But, besides this, the vicious manners of cities, and discourses both private and public, often contribute to increase this malady: nor are any disciplines taught in the early part of life, which might serve as remedies for such mighty ills. And thus all such as are vicious are so through two involuntary causes; the existence of which we should always rather ascribe to the planters than to the things planted, and to the educators rather than to the educated. We should, therefore, endeavour to the utmost of our ability, by education, studies, and disciplines, to fly from vice, and acquire its contrary, virtue. But these particulars, indeed, belong to another mode of discourse.

Again, therefore, with respect to the contrary of these, it is now proper

to explain in a becoming manner by what culture, and from what causes, we may preserve both the body and dianoëtic energies of the soul. For it is more just to discourse concerning good things than of such as are evil. But every thing good is beautiful; and that which is beautiful is not destitute of measure. An animal, therefore, which is about to be beautiful and good, must possess commensuration. But, perceiving certain small particulars of things commensurate, we syllogize concerning them; while at the same time we are ignorant of such as are greatest and the chief. For, indeed, no symmetry and immoderation is of greater consequence with respect to health and disease, virtue and vice, than that of the soul towards the body. But we consider no circumstance of these; nor do we perceive that when a more imbecil and inferior form is the vehicle of a robust and every way mighty soul, and when, on the contrary, these two pass into a state of concretion, then the whole animal cannot subsist in a beautiful manner: for it is incommensurate through the want of the greatest symmetry. But the animal whose composition is contrary to this, affords a spectacle to him who is able to behold it, of all spectacles the most beautiful and lovely. When the body, therefore, possesses legs immoderately large, or any other member surpassing its just proportion, and becomes through this incommensurate with itself, it is rendered at the same time base, in the endurance of labour suffers many molestations and many convulsions, and through an aggregation of accidents becomes the cause of innumerable maladies to itself. The same too must be understood concerning that composition of body and soul which we denominate an animal. As, for instance, that when the soul in this composite is more robust than the body, and possesses it raging and transported, then the soul, agitating the whole of it, inwardly fills it with diseases; and, when she vehemently applies herself to certain disciplines, causes it to liquefy and waste away. Lastly, when the soul employs herself in teaching and literary contests, both in public and private, through a certain ambitious strife, then inflaming the body, she dissolves its constitution; and besides this, introducing distillations of humours, she deceives the most part of those who are called physicians, and induces them to consider these effects as proceeding from contrary causes.

But again, when a mighty body and above measure frigid is conjoined with
a small

a small and imbecil dianoëtic part, since there are naturally twofold desires in man, one of aliment through the body, but the other of prudence through the most divine part of our nature ;—in this case, the motions of that which is more powerful prevail, and increase that which is their own : but render the dianoëtic part of the soul dull, indocile, and oblivious, and thus produce ignorance, which is the greatest of all diseases. But this one thing alone is the health and safety of both—neither to move the soul without the body, nor the body without the soul ; that, being equally balanced in their mutual contentions, the health of the whole composite may be preserved. Hence, he who vehemently applies himself to the mathematics, or to any other dianoëtic exercise, should also employ the motion of the body, and be familiar with gymnastic. And again, he who is careful in forming his body aright should at the same time unite with this the motions of the soul, employing music and all philosophy ; if he is to be rendered such a one as can be justly called beautiful, and at the same time truly good. In the same manner, too, we ought to take care of the parts of the body, imitating the form of the whole. For when the body, through such things as are introduced from without, is inflamed and refrigerated, and is again rendered dry and moist by externals, and suffers every thing consequent to these affections ; then, if any one in a quiet state gives up his body to motions, he will be vanquished by them and dissolved. But if any one imitates that nature which we called the nourisher of the universe, so as never to suffer the body to be in a state of rest, but perpetually moves and agitates it throughout, he will then assist the internal and external motions according to nature ; and, in consequence of a moderate agitation, will reduce into order and adorn the wandering passions and parts of the body, according to their alliance with each other. Such a one, indeed, as we said in our former discourse about the universe, will not, by placing foe against foe, suffer war and disease to be produced in the body ; but, combining friend with friend, will thus render the body healthy and sound. But, of all motions, that is the best in any nature which takes place in itself from itself : for this is particularly allied to the dianoëtic motion of the universe. But that motion is of the worst kind which is produced by another. And that is the worst of all motions, when the body, being in a recumbent and quiet state, is moved by others according to parts. And hence,

hence, of all the purgations and concretions of the body, that is the best which subsists through gymnastic. The next to this is that which takes place through easy carriage, whether in a ship or any other convenient vehicle. But the third species of motion is only to be used when vehemently necessary, and at no other time by any one endued with intellect: and this is that medical motion which is performed by pharmaceutical purgations. For diseases, unless they are extremely dangerous, are not to be irritated by medicines. For every composition of diseases is in a certain respect similar to the nature of animals. And indeed the association of the animal nature is allotted stated periods of life; both the whole genus, and every individual, containing in itself a fatal term of living, separate from the passions which necessity produces. For the triangles, which from the very beginning possessed the power of each animal, are sufficiently able to cohere together for a certain time: but life beyond this period cannot be extended to any one. The same mode of composition likewise subsists about diseases; which if any one destroys by medicine before the fated time, he will only produce great diseases from small ones, and many from a few. On this account it is necessary to discipline all such maladies by proper diet, according as every one's leisure will permit; and to avoid irritating by medicines a most difficult disease. And thus much may suffice concerning the common animal and its corporeal part; and how these may be disciplined and governed in such a manner as to produce a life according to reason in the most eminent degree.

But that which is destined to govern, ought much more and by far the first to be furnished as much as possible with such materials as may render it capable, of disciplinative sway, in a manner the most beautiful and the best. To discuss accurately indeed particulars of this kind would require a treatise solely confined to such a discussion: but if any one slightly considers this affair in a manner consequent to what has been above delivered, such a one by thus proceeding will not unreasonably arrive at the end of his pursuit. We have often then previously asserted that there are three species of soul within us, triply distributed; and that each has its own proper motions. And we shall now, therefore, briefly affirm, that when any one of them is in a torpid state, and rests from its own proper motions, it necessarily becomes

THE CRITIAS,

OR

ATLANTICUS.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CRITIAS,

OR

ATLANTICUS.

IT is a singular circumstance, that though there is not, perhaps, any thing among the writings of the antients which has more generally attracted the attention of the learned in every age than the Atlantic history of Plato, yet no more than one single passage of about twenty or thirty lines has, prior to my translation of the *Timæus*, appeared in any modern language. Much has been said and written by the moderns respecting the Atlantic island; but the extent of the original source has not even been suspected.

That the authenticity of the following history should have been questioned by many of the moderns, is by no means surprising, if we consider that it is the history of an island and people that are asserted to have existed NINE THOUSAND years prior to Solon; as this contradicts the generally-received opinion respecting the antiquity of the world. However, as Plato expressly affirms, that it is a relation in *every respect true* ¹, and, as Crantor ², the first interpreter of Plato, asserts, “that the following history was said, by the Egyptian priests of his time, to be still preserved inscribed on pillars,” it appears to me to be at least as well attested as any other narration in any antient historian. Indeed, he who proclaims that “truth is the source of every good both to Gods and men,” and the whole of whose works consists in detecting error and exploring certainty, can never be supposed to have

¹ Πανταπασί γε μιν ἀληθές.

² Ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητῆς Κραντῶρ. Procl. in Tim. p. 24. et mox—Μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ πρεφῆται φησὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἐν στήλαις ταῖς ἐπὶ σφαιρομέναις ταῦτα γεγραφέναι λεγόντες.

wilfully deceived mankind by publishing an extravagant romance as matter of fact, with all the precision of historical detail.

Some learned men have endeavoured to prove that America is the Atlantic island of Plato; and others have thought that the extreme parts of Africa towards the south and west were regarded by Plato in this narration. These opinions, however, are so obviously erroneous, that the authors of them can hardly be supposed to have read this dialogue, and the first part of the *Timæus*; for in these it is asserted that this island, in the space of one day and night, was absorbed in the sea.

I only add, that this dialogue is an appendix, as it were, to the *Timæus*, and that it is not complete, Plato being prevented by death from finishing it, as we are informed by Plutarch in his life of Solon.

THE CRITIAS,

OR

ATLANTICUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

TIMÆUS,		SOCRATES,
CRITIAS,		HERMOCRATES.

TIMÆUS.

AS pleasant, Socrates, as is rest after a long journey, so pleasing to me is the present liberation from an extended discourse. But I beseech THE WORLD, that God, which was in reality generated formerly, though but recently in our discussion, to preserve those things which we have asserted with rectitude, but to inflict on us a becoming punishment if we have involuntarily said any thing discordant. But the proper punishment of him who acts disorderly and inelegantly, is to make him act with order and elegance. That we may, therefore, after this speak rightly respecting the generation of the Gods, let us beseech THAT DIVINITY, THE WORLD, to impart to us *the medicine science, which is the most perfect and best of all medicines*. But having prayed, let us deliver, according to our agreement, the following discourse to Critias.

CRIT. I receive it, O Timæus: and as you, at the beginning of your discussion, entreated pardon, as being about to speak of great things; in like manner, I at present entreat the same. Indeed I think that I ought to solicit pardon in a still greater degree for the ensuing discourse, though I nearly know that this my request is very ambitious, and more rustic than is proper; but, at the same time, let us begin the discourse. For who ended with a
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found mind will attempt to say that the things which have been asserted by you have not been well said? But that the particulars which remain to be discussed require greater indulgence, as being more difficult, this I will endeavour to show. For he, O Timæus, who discourses concerning the Gods to men, may more easily appear to speak all that is sufficient than he who discourses concerning mortals to you. For the unskilfulness and vehement ignorance of the auditors about things of this kind afford a great copia verborum to him who enters on the discussion of them: but we know how we are circumstanced with respect to the Gods. However, that I may more plainly evince what I say, thus attend to me in what follows:—It is requisite that all we shall say should become in a certain respect an imitation and a resemblance. But we see the facility and subtilty which take place in the representation exhibited by pictures of divine and human bodies, in order that they may appear to the spectators to be apt imitations. We likewise see, with respect to the earth, mountains, rivers, woods, all heaven, and the revolving bodies which it contains, that at first we are delighted if any one is able to exhibit but a slender representation to our view; but that afterwards, as not knowing any thing *accurately* about such-like particulars, we neither examine nor blame the pictures, but use an immanifest and fallacious adumbration respecting them. But when any one attempts to represent our bodies, we acutely perceive what is omitted, through our continual and familiar animadversion of them, and we become severe judges of him who does not perfectly exhibit all the requisite similitudes. It is likewise necessary to consider the same thing as taking place in discourse. For, with respect to things celestial and divine, we are delighted with assertions concerning them that are but in a small degree adapted to their nature; but we accurately examine things mortal and human. And hence it is requisite to pardon whatever in the ensuing discourse may be delivered in an unbecoming manner. For it is proper to think, that to assimilate mortal concerns to opinion, is not an easy but a difficult task. I have said all this, Socrates, being willing to remind you, and to solicit not less but greater pardon for the following discourse. But if my request shall appear to you to be just, do you willingly impart this gift.

Soc. Why should we not, O Critias, impart it? And besides this, the same pardon must be granted by us to a third. For it is evident that Her-
mocrates,

mocrates¹, who is to speak shortly after, will make the same request. That he, therefore, may make a different exordium, and may not be obliged to repeat what you have said, let him know that pardon is granted him, and let him, therefore, prepare to speak. But I previously announce to you, friend Critias, the conceptions of the theatre². For the poet has approved in a wonderful manner the person who spoke in it before; so that you will require abundant pardon in attempting to discharge the office of his successor.

HER. You announce the same thing to me, Socrates, as to him. But desponding men, Critias, never erect a trophy. It is, therefore, requisite to proceed in a virile manner to the discourse, and, invoking Pæan and the Muses, to exhibit and celebrate antient citizens who were excellent men.

CRIT. O friend Hermocrates, as you are to speak on the following day, having another to speak before you, on this account you are courageous. But he will, perhaps, manifest to you how this is to be accomplished. You, therefore, thus exhorting and encouraging me, I shall obey; and besides those Gods which you have mentioned, I shall invoke others, and especially Mnemosyne. For nearly the greatest reasons and discussions are contained for us in this Divinity. If, then, we can sufficiently remember and relate the narration which was once given by the Egyptian priests, and brought hither by Solon, you know that we shall appear to this theatre to have sufficiently accomplished our part. This, therefore, must now be done, and without any further delay.

But first of all we must recollect, that the period of time from which a war is said to have subsisted between all those that dwelt beyond and within the pillars of Hercules, amounts to nine thousand years: and this war it is now requisite for us to discuss. Of those, therefore, that dwelt within the pillars of Hercules, this city was the leader, and is said to have fought in every battle; but of those beyond the pillars, the kings of the Atlantic island were the leaders. But this island we said was once larger than Libya and Asia, *but is now a mass of impervious mud, through concussions of the earth; so that those who are sailing in the vast sea can no longer find a passage from hence thither.* The courté of our narration, indeed, will unfold the many barbarous nations and Grecian tribes which then existed, as they may happen

¹ This speech of Hermocrates is not extant.

² Viz. the persons of the dialogue.

to present themselves to our view : but it is necessary to relate, in the first place, the wars of the Athenians and their adversaries, together with the power and the politics of each. And in discoursing of these we shall give the preference to our own people.

The Gods, then, once were locally allotted ¹ the whole earth, but not with contention : for it would be absurd that the Gods should be ignorant of what is adapted to every one, or that, knowing that which rather belongs to others, they should endeavour, through strife, to possess what is not their own. Likewise, receiving places agreeable to them, from the allotments of justice, they inhabited the various regions of the earth. In consequence of this, too, like shepherds, they nourished us as their possessions, flocks, and herds ; with this exception, however, that they did not force bodies to bodies in the same manner as shepherds, who, when feeding their cattle, compel them to come together with blows : but they considered us as a docile and obedient animal ; and, as if piloting a pliant ship, employed persuasion for the rudder ; and with this conception as the leader, they governed the whole mortal race. Different Gods, therefore, being allotted, adorned different places. But Vulcan and Minerva ², who possess a common nature, both because they
are

¹ As, according to the theology of Plato, there is not one father of the universe only, one providence, and one divine law, but many fathers subordinate to the one first father, many administrators of providence posterior to, and comprehended in, the one universal providence of the demiurgus of all things, and many laws proceeding from one first law, it is necessary that there should be different allotments, and a diversity of divine distribution. The allotment, however, of a divine nature is a government exempt from all passivity, and a providential energy about the subjects of its government.

² Vulcan is that divine power which presides over the spermatic and physical reasons, or productive principles, which the universe contains : for whatever Nature accomplishes by verging towards bodies, Vulcan performs in a divine and exempt manner, by moving Nature, and using her as an instrument in his own proper fabrication ; since natural heat has a Vulcanian characteristic, and was produced by Vulcan for the purpose of fabricating a corporeal nature. Vulcan, therefore, is that power which perpetually presides over the fluctuating nature of bodies ; and hence, says Olympiodorus, he operates with bellows (*ἐν φυσαίς*) ; which occultly signifies his operating in natures (*ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς φυσαίς*). But by *earth* we must understand *matter*, which was thus symbolically denominated by the antients, as we learn from Porphyry de Antr. Nymph. By Minerva we must understand the summit (*κορυφή*) of all those intellectual natures that reside in Jupiter, the artificer of the world : or, in other words, she is that deity which illuminates all mundane natures with intelligence. The Athenians, therefore, who are souls of a Minerval characteristic, may be
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are the offspring of the same father, and because, through philosophy and the study of arts, they tend to the same things;—these, I say, in consequence of this, received one allotment, viz. this region, as being naturally allied and adapted to virtue and prudence. But these Divinities having produced worthy, earth-born men, arranged in their intellectual part the order of a polity. Of these men the names are preserved; but their works, through the extinction of those that received them, and length of time, have disappeared. For the surviving race of men, as has been observed before, are always mountaineers, and void of discipline, who have only heard the names of men that were powerful in the region, and who, besides this, have been acquainted but with few of the transactions of the country. In consequence, therefore, of loving these antient men, they gave the names of them to their children: but they were ignorant of the virtues and laws of those before them; for of these they knew nothing, but what they gathered from certain obscure rumours; and as for many generations they were in want of necessaries, both they and their children directed their attention to the particulars of which they were destitute, discoursed about these, and neglected past and antient transactions. For mythology, and an investigation of antient affairs, commence in cities in conjunction with leisure, when the necessaries of life are procured; but not before. On this account the names of antient transactions were preserved, without any account of the transactions themselves. But I infer that this was the case, said Solon, because those priests, in their narration of the war at that period, inserted many names similar to those that were adopted afterwards, such as Cecrops, Erechtheus, Erichthonius, Erichthon, and many other of those names which are commemorated prior to Theseus. This was likewise the case with the names of the women. The figure too and statue of Minerva evinced, that at that period the studies of women and men with respect to war were common, as an armed image was then dedicated to the Goddess; this serving as a document, that among animals of the same species both male and female are naturally able to pursue in common every virtue, which is

very properly said to be the progeny of Vulcan and the Earth, because Vulcan, who perpetually imitates the intellectual energy of Minerva in his fabrication of the sensible universe, imparts to them through this imitation those *vehicles*, and those *spermatic reasons*, through which in conjunction with *matter* they become inhabitants of this terrestrial abode.

adapted to their species. But at that time many other tribes of citizens dwelt in this region, who were skilled in the fabricative arts, and in agriculture. The warlike tribe, however, lived from the first separate from divine men, and possessed every thing requisite to aliment and education. None of them, however, had any private property; for all of them considered all things as common. They likewise did not think it worth while to receive from other citizens beyond a sufficiency of nutriment; and they engaged in all those pursuits which we related yesterday as pertaining to the guardians of our republic. It was likewise plausibly and truly said of our region, that, in the first place, at that time its boundaries extended, on one side to the Isthmus, and on the other to Epirus, as far as to Cithæron and Parnethe. These boundaries are on the descent, having Oropia on the right hand, and limiting Afopus toward the sea on the left. It is likewise said that the whole earth was vanquished by the valour of this region; and that on this account it was at that time able to support the numerous army formed from the surrounding inhabitants. But this it is said was a mighty proof of virtue. For what is now left of this country may contend with any other in fertility of soil, in the goodness of its fruits, and in pastures accommodated to every species of animals. But then it produced all these, not only thus beautiful, but likewise in the greatest abundance. But how is this credible? And by what arguments can it be shown that these are the remains of the land that then existed? The whole of this region is situated like a long promontory, extending into the sea, from the other continent. This the profound receptacle of the sea every way surrounds. *As, therefore, many and mighty deluges happened in that period of nine thousand years (for so many years have elapsed from that to the present time),* the defluxions of the earth at these times, and during these calamities, from elevated places, did not, as they are elsewhere wont to do, accumulate any hillock which deserves to be mentioned, but, always flowing in a circle, at length vanished in a profundity. The parts, therefore, that are left at present are but as small islands, if compared with those that existed at that time; and may be said to resemble the bones of a diseased body; such of the earth as was soft and fat being washed away, and a thin body of the country alone remaining. But at that time the land, being unmingled, contained mountains and lofty hills; and the plains, which are now denominated Phellei, were then full of
fat

fat earth; and the mountains abounded with woods, of which there are evident tokens even at present. For there are mountains which now only afford nutriment for bees, but formerly, and at no very distant period, the largest trees were cut down from those mountains, as being adapted for buildings; and of these edifices, the coverings still remain. There were likewise many other lofty domestic trees; and most fertile pastures for cattle. This region, too, every year enjoyed prolific rain, which did not then, as now, run from naked earth into the sea, but, being collected in great abundance from lofty places, and preserved for use in certain cavities of the earth, diffused copious streams of fountains and rivers to every part of the country; the truth of which is confirmed by certain sacred remains which are still to be seen in the antient fountains. And such was the natural condition of this region formerly; besides which, it was cultivated, as it is reasonable to suppose it would be, by real husbandmen, who were men of elegant manners, and of a disposition naturally good; who possessed a most excellent soil, most abundant streams of water, and a most salubrious temperament of air.

But the city at that time was built in the following manner: In the first place, the Acropolis was not then, as it is at present. For now one rainy night having softened the bare land round about, in a remarkable degree, at the same time produced an earthquake; *and thus there happened a THIRD fatal inundation of water, PRIOR to the deluge of Deucalion*¹. But prior to this, the magnitude of the Acropolis extended as far as to Eridanus and Ilissus, comprehended within itself Pnyx, and Lycabetus, and was bounded in a direction opposite to Pnyx. All the land too was glebous, except a few places in a more elevated situation which were plain. Its exterior parts on the left hand were inhabited by artists and husbandmen, who cultivated the neighbouring land. But the warlike tribe alone inhabited the elevated parts, about the temple of Minerva and Vulcan, being distributed in one enclosure round the garden as it were of one edifice. For those who raised public buildings, and common banquets for the winter season, together with whatever is adapted to a common polity, and who furnished both these, and temples themselves, without gold and silver, all of this de-

¹ The deluge of Deucalion appears to be the same with that which is mentioned by Moses; but the Jews had no knowledge of any other.

scription dwelt in the northern parts of this region. For gold and silver were not employed by any one at any time ; but, pursuing a middle course between arrogance and illiberality, they built moderate houses, in which both they, and the offspring of their offspring growing old, they always left them to others like themselves. But in summer they used gardens, gymnasia, and public banquets, in places situated towards the south. There was likewise one fountain in the place where the Acropolis is now situated, which having been exhausted by earthquakes, small circulating streams alone remain at present. But at that time every part was abundantly supplied with springs of water, which were of a salutary temperament both in summer and winter. In this manner, then, these places were formerly inhabited ; and the men of whom we have been speaking were guardians of their own citizens, but leaders of the other willing Greeks. They likewise were especially careful that there might always be the same number of men and women who by their age are able to fight, and that this number might not be less than twenty thousand. These men, therefore, being such as we have described, and always justly administering in this manner both their own affairs and those of all Greece, they were esteemed and renowned beyond every other nation by all Europe and Asia, both for the beauty of their bodies and the all-various virtue of their souls.

In the next place, I shall communicate to you from the beginning the particulars respecting the adversaries of these men, if I am able to recollect what I heard when I was a boy. But, somewhat prior to this narration, it is proper to observe, that you must not be surprised at often hearing me mention Grecian names of barbarous men. For the cause of this is as follows :—Solon intending to insert this narration into his verses, investigated for this purpose the power of names, and found that those first Egyptians who committed these particulars to writing transferred these names into their own tongue. He, therefore, again receiving the meaning of every name, introduced that meaning into our language. And these writings were in the possession of my grandfather, and are now in mine : they were likewise the subject of my meditation while I was a boy. If, therefore, in the course of this narration you hear such names as subsist among us at present, you must not be surprised ; for you know the cause. But it will require a long discourse to speak from the beginning, as I did before, concerning the allotment

ment of the Gods, and to show how they distributed the whole earth, here into larger, and there into lesser allotments, and procured temples and sacrifices for themselves. Neptune, indeed, being allotted the Atlantic island, settled his offspring by a mortal woman in a certain part of the island, of the following description. Towards the sea, but in the middle of the island, there was a plain, which is said to have been the most beautiful of all plains, and distinguished by the fertility of the soil. Near this plain, and again in the middle of it, at the distance of fifty stadia, there was a very low mountain. This was inhabited by one of those men who in the beginning sprung from the earth, and whose name was Evenor. This man living with a woman called Leucippe had by her Clites, who was his only daughter. But when the virgin arrived at maturity, and her father and mother were dead, Neptune¹ being captivated with her beauty had connection with her, and enclosed the hill on which she dwelt with spiral streams of water; the sea and the land at the same time alternately forming about each other lesser and larger zones. Of these, two were formed by the land, and three by the sea; and these zones, as if made by a turner's wheel, were in all parts equidistant from the middle of the island, so that the hill was inaccessible to men. For at that time there were no ships, and the art of sailing was then unknown. But Neptune, as being a divinity, easily adorned the island in the middle; caused two fountains of water to spring up from under the earth, one cold and the other hot; and likewise bestowed all-various and sufficient aliment from the earth. He also begat and educated five male-twins; and having distributed all the Atlantic island into ten parts, he bestowed upon his first-born son his maternal habitation and the surrounding land; this being the largest and the best division. He likewise established this son king of the whole island, and made the rest of his sons governors. But he gave to each of them dominion over many people, and an extended tract of land. Besides this, too, he gave all of them names. And his first-born son, indeed, who was the king of all the rest, he called Atlas, whence the whole island was at that time denominated Atlantic. But the twin son that was born

¹ A dæmoniacal Neptune, or a dæmon belonging to the order of Neptune, by contributing to the procreation of the offspring of Clites, is, in mythological language, said to have been captivated with her beauty, and to have had connection with her. See the first note to the Life of Plato by Olympiodorus.

immediately after Atlas, and who was allotted the extreme parts of the island, towards the pillars of Hercules, as far as to the region which at present from that place is called Gadiric, he denominated according to his native tongue Gadirus, but which we call in Greek Eumelus. Of his second twin offspring, he called one Ampheres, and the other Eudæmon. The first-born of his third offspring he denominated Mnefeus, and the second Autochthon. The elder of his fourth issue he called Elafippus, and the younger Mestor. And, lastly, he denominated the first-born of his fifth issue Azaes, and the second Diaprepes. All these and their progeny dwelt in this place, for a prodigious number of generations, ruling over many other islands, and extending their empire, as we have said before, as far as to Egypt and Tyrrhenia. But the race of Atlas was by far the most honourable; and of these, the oldest king always left the kingdom, for many generations, to the eldest of his offspring. These, too, possessed wealth in such abundance as to surpass in this respect all the kings that were prior to them; nor will any that may succeed them easily obtain the like. They had likewise every thing provided for them which both in a city and every other place is sought after as useful for the purposes of life. And they were supplied, indeed, with many things from foreign countries, on account of their extensive empire; but the island afforded them the greater part of every thing of which they stood in need. In the first place, the island supplied them with such things as are dug out of mines in a solid state, and with such as are melted: and orichalcum¹, which is now but seldom mentioned, but then was much celebrated, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, and was considered as the most honourable of all metals except gold. Whatever, too, the woods afford for builders the island produced in abundance. There were likewise sufficient pastures there for tame and savage animals; together with a prodigious number of elephants. For, there were pastures for all such animals as are fed in lakes and rivers, on mountains, and in plains. And, in like manner, there was sufficient aliment for the largest and most voracious kind of animals. Besides this, whatever of odoriferous the earth nourishes at present, whether roots, or grass, or wood, or juices, or gums, flowers, or fruits,—these the island produced, and produced them well. Again, the

¹ It is uncertain what this orichalcum was: perhaps it was the same with *platina*.

island bore mild and dry fruits, such as we use for food, and of which we make bread, (aliment of this kind being denominated by us leguminous,) together with such meats, drinks, and ointments, as trees afford. Here, likewise, there were trees, whose fruits are used for the sake of sport and pleasure, and which it is difficult to conceal; together with such dainties as are used as the remedies of satiety, and are grateful to the weary. All these an island which once existed, bore sacred, beautiful, and wonderful, and in infinite abundance. The inhabitants, too, receiving all these from the earth, constructed temples, royal habitations, ports, docks, and all the rest of the region, disposing them in the following manner:—In the first place, those who resided about the antient metropolis united by bridges those zones of the sea which we before mentioned, and made a road both to the external parts and to the royal abode. But the palace of the king was from the first immediately raised in this very habitation of the God and their ancestors. This being adorned by one person after another in continued succession, the latter of each always surpassing the former in the ornaments he bestowed, the palace became at length astonishingly large and beautiful. For they dug a trench as far as to the outermost zone, which commencing from the sea extended three acres in breadth, and fifty stadia in length. And that ships might sail from this sea to that zone as a port, they enlarged its mouth, so that it might be sufficient to receive the largest vessels. They likewise divided by bridges those zones of the earth which separated the zones of the sea, so that with one three-banked galley they might sail from one zone to the other; and covered the upper part of the zones in such a manner that they might sail under them. For the lips of the zones of earth were higher than the sea. But the greatest of these zones, towards which the sea directed its course, was in breadth three stadia: the next in order was of the same dimension. But, of the other two, the watery circle was in breadth two stadia; and that of earth was again equal to the preceding circle of water: but the zone which ran round the island in the middle was one stadium in breadth. The island which contained the palace of the king was five stadia in diameter. This, together with the zones, and the bridge which was every way an acre in breadth, they inclosed with a wall of stone, and raised towers and gates on the bridges according to the course of the sea. Stones, too, were dug out from under the island, on all sides of it, and from within

and without the zones : some of which were white, others black, and others red : and these stone quarries, on account of the cavity of the rock, afforded two convenient docks. With respect to the edifices, some were of a simple structure, and others were raised from stones of different colours ; thus by variety pursuing pleasure, which was allied to their nature. They likewise covered the superficies of the wall which inclosed the most outward zone with brass, using it for this purpose as an ointment ; but they covered the superficies of that wall which inclosed the interior zone with tin : and lastly, they covered that which inclosed the acropolis with orichalcum, which shines with a fiery splendour.

The royal palace within the acropolis was constructed as follows :—In the middle of it there was a temple, difficult of access, sacred to Clites and Neptune, and which was surrounded with an inclosure of gold. In this place assembling in the beginning, they produced the race of ten kings ; and from the ten divisions of the whole region here collected every year, they performed seasonable sacrifices to each. But the temple of Neptune was one stadium in length, and three acres in breadth ; and its altitude was commensurate to its length and breadth. There was something, however, barbaric in its form. All the external parts of the temple, except the summit, were covered with silver ; for that was covered with gold. With respect to the internal parts, the roof was entirely formed from ivory, variegated with gold, silver, and orichalcum ; but as to all the other parts, such as the walls, pillars, and pavement, these were adorned with orichalcum. Golden statues, too, were placed in the temple ; and the God himself was represented standing on a chariot, and governing six-winged horses ; while, at the same time, through his magnitude, he touched the roof with his head. An hundred Nereids upon dolphins were circularly disposed about him ; for at that time this was supposed to be the number of the Nereids. There were likewise many other statues of private persons dedicated within the temple. Round the temple, on the outside, stood golden images of all the women and men that had descended from the ten kings : together with many other statues of kings and private persons, which had been dedicated from the city, and from foreign parts that were in subjection to the Atlantic island. There was an altar, too, which accorded in magnitude and construction with the other ornaments of the temple ; and in like manner, the palace was adapted to the magnitude
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of the empire, and the decorations of the sacred concerns. The inhabitants, likewise, used fountains both of hot and cold water, whose streams were copious, and naturally salubrious and pleasant in a wonderful degree. About the fountains, too, edifices were constructed, and trees planted, adapted to these fontal waters. Receptacles of water, likewise, were placed round the fountains, some of which were exposed to the open air, but others were covered, as containing hot baths for the winter season. Of these receptacles, some were appropriated to the royal family, and others, apart from these, to private individuals; and again, some were set apart for women, and others for horses and other animals of the yoke; a proper ornament at the same time being distributed to each. They likewise brought defluent streams to the grove of Neptune, together with all-various trees of an admirable beauty and height, through the fecundity of the soil: and thence they derived these streams to the exterior circles, by conducting them through channels over the bridges. But in each island of these exterior circles there were many temples of many Gods, together with many gardens, and gymnasia apart from each other, some for men, and others for horses. But about the middle of the largest of the islands there was a principal hippodrome, which was a stadium in breadth, and the length of which extended round the whole circle, for the purpose of exercising the horses. On all sides of the hippodrome stood the dwellings of the officers of the guards. But the defence of the place was committed to the more faithful soldiers, who dwelt in the smaller circle, and before the acropolis; and the most faithful of all the soldiers were assigned habitations within the acropolis, and round the royal abodes. The docks, likewise, were full of three-banked galleys, and of such apparatus as is adapted to vessels of this kind. And in this manner the parts about the royal palaces were disposed. But having passed beyond the external ports, which were three in number, a circular wall presented itself to the view, beginning from the sea, and every way distant from the greatest of the circles and the port by an interval of fifty stadia. This wall terminated in the mouth of the trench which was towards the sea. The whole space, too, inclosed by the wall was crowded with houses; and the bay and the greatest harbour were full of ships and merchants that came from all parts. Hence, through the great multitude that were here assembled, there was an all-various clamour and tumult both by day and night. And thus we have

nearly related the particulars respecting the city and the antient habitation, as they were then unfolded by the Egyptian priests. In the next place, we shall endeavour to relate what was the nature, and what the arrangement, of the rest of the region.

First, then, every place is said to have been very elevated and abrupt which was situated near the sea; but all the land round the city was a plain, which circularly invested the city, but was itself circularly inclosed by mountains which extended as far as to the sea. This plain too was smooth and equable; and its whole length, from one side to the other, was three thousand stadia; but, according to its middle from the sea upwards, it was two thousand stadia. The whole island, likewise, was situated towards the south, but from its extremities was exposed to the north. Its mountains were then celebrated as surpassing all that exist at present in multitude, magnitude, and beauty; and contained many villages, whose inhabitants were wealthy. Here, too, there were rivers, lakes, and meadows, which afforded sufficient nutriment for all tame and savage animals; together with woods, various both in multitude and kind, and in abundance adequate to the several purposes to which they are subservient. This plain, therefore, both by nature and the labours of many kings in a long period of time, was replete with fertility. Its figure, too, was that of a square, for the most part straight and long; but on account of the trench which was dug round it, it was deficient in straightness. The depth, breadth, and length of this trench are incredible, when compared with other labours accomplished by the hands of men: but, at the same time, we must relate what we have heard. Its depth was one acre; and its breadth every where a stadium. And as it was dug round the whole plain, its length was consequently ten thousand stadia¹. This trench received the streams falling from the mountains, and which, circularly flowing round the plain towards the city, and being collected from different parts, at length poured themselves from the trench into the sea. Ditches one hundred feet in breadth, being cut in a right line from this part, were again sent through the plain into the trench near the sea: but these were separated from each other by an interval of one hundred stadia. The inhabitants brought wood to the city from the mountains, and other seasonable

¹ That is, 1250 miles. This trench, however, was not a more surprising effort of human industry than is the present wall of China.

articles, in twofold vessels, through the trenches; for the trenches intersected each other obliquely, and towards the city. Every year, too, they twice collected the fruits of the earth; in winter using the waters from Jupiter, and in summer bringing the productions of the earth through the streams deduced from the trenches. With respect to the multitude of men in the plain useful for the purposes of war, it was ordered that a commander in chief should be taken out of each allotment. But the magnitude of each allotted portion of land was ten times ten stadia; and the number of all the allotments was sixty thousand. There is said to have been an infinite number of men from the mountains and the rest of the region; and all of them were distributed according to places and villages into these allotments, under their respective leaders. The commander in chief, therefore, of each division was ordered to bring into the field of battle a sixth part of the war-chariots, the whole amount of which was ten thousand, together with two horses and two charioteers: and again, it was decreed that he should bring two horses yoked by the side of each other, but without a seat, together with a man who might descend armed with a small shield, and who after the charioteer might govern the two horses: likewise, that he should bring two heavy-armed soldiers, two slingers, three light-armed soldiers, three hurlers of stones, and three jaculators, together with four sailors, in order to fill up the number of men sufficient for one thousand two hundred ships. And in this manner were the warlike affairs of the royal city disposed. But those of the other nine cities were disposed in a different manner, which it would require a long time to relate. The particulars respecting the governors were instituted from the beginning as follows:—Each of the ten kings possessed absolute authority both over the men and the greater part of the laws in his own division, and in his own city, punishing and putting to death whomsoever he pleased. But the government and communion of these kings with each other were conformable to the mandates given by Neptune; and this was likewise the case with their laws. These mandates were delivered to them by their ancestors inscribed on a pillar of orichalcum, which was erected about the middle of the island, in the temple of Neptune. These kings, therefore, assembled together every fifth, and alternately every sixth year, for the purpose of distributing an equal part both to the even and the odd; and,

when assembled, they deliberated on the public affairs, inquired if any one had acted improperly, and, if he had, called him to account for his conduct. But when they were about to sit in judgment on any one, they bound each other by the following compact. As, prior to this judicial process, there were bulls in the temple of Neptune, free from all restraint, they selected ten of these, and vowed to the God, they would offer a sacrifice which should be acceptable to him, viz. a victim taken without iron, and hunted with clubs and snares. Hence, whatever bull was caught by them they led to the pillar, and cut its throat on the summit of the column, agreeably to the written mandates. But on the pillar, besides the laws, there was an oath, supplicating mighty imprecations against those that were disobedient. When, therefore, sacrificing according to their laws, they began to burn all the members of the bull, they poured out of a full bowl a quantity of clotted blood for each of them, and gave the rest to the fire; at the same time lustrating the pillar. After this, drawing out of the bowl in golden cups, and making a libation in the fire, they took an oath that they would judge according to the laws inscribed on the pillar, and would punish any one who prior to this should be found guilty; and likewise that they would never willingly transgress any one of the written mandates. They added, that they would neither govern, nor be obedient to any one who governed, contrary to the prescribed laws of their country. When every one had thus supplicated both for himself and those of his race, after he had drunk, and had dedicated the golden cup to the temple of the God, he withdrew to the supper, and his necessary concerns. But when it was dark, and the fire about the sacrifice was abated, all of them, invested with a most beautiful azure garment, and sitting on the ground near the burnt victims, spent the whole night in extinguishing the fire of the sacrifice, and in judging and being judged, if any person had accused some one of them of having transgressed the laws.

When the judicial process was finished, and day appeared, they wrote the decisions in a golden table, which together with their garments they dedicated as monuments, in the temple of the God. There were also many other laws respecting sacred concerns, and such as were peculiar to the several kings; but the greatest were the following:—That they should
never

never wage war against each other, and that all of them should give assistance if any person in some one of their cities should endeavour to extirpate the royal race. And as they consulted in common respecting war and other actions, in the same manner as their ancestors, they assigned the empire to the Atlantic family. But they did not permit the king to put to death any of his kindred, unless it seemed fit to more than five out of the ten kings. Such then being the power, and of such magnitude, at that time, in those places, Divinity transferred it from thence to these parts, as it is reported, on the following occasion. For many generations, the Atlantics, as long as the nature of the God was sufficient for them, were obedient to the laws, and benignantly affected toward a divine nature, to which they were allied. For they possessed true, and in every respect magnificent conceptions; and employed mildness in conjunction with prudence, both in those casual circumstances which are always taking place, and towards each other. Hence, despising every thing except virtue, they considered the concerns of the present life as trifling, and therefore easily endured them; and were of opinion that abundance of riches and other possessions was nothing more than a burthen. Nor were they intoxicated by luxury, nor did they fall into error, in consequence of being blinded by incontinence; but, being sober and vigilant, they acutely perceived that all these things were increased through common friendship, in conjunction with virtue; but that, by eagerly pursuing and honouring them, these external goods themselves were corrupted, and, together with them, virtue and common friendship were destroyed. From reasoning of this kind, and from the continuance of a divine nature, all the particulars which we have previously discussed, were increased among them. But when that portion of divinity, or divine destiny, which they enjoyed, vanished from among them, in consequence of being frequently mingled with much of a mortal nature, and human manners prevailed,—then, being no longer able to bear the events of the present life, they acted in a disgraceful manner. Hence, to those who were capable of seeing, they appeared to be base characters, men who separated things most beautiful from such as are most honourable: but by those who were unable to perceive the true life, which conducts to felicity, they were considered as then in the highest degree worthy and blessed, in consequence of being filled with an unjust
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desire of possessing, and transcending in power. But Jupiter, the God of Gods, who governs by law, and who is able to perceive every thing of this kind, when he saw that an equitable race was in a miserable condition, and was desirous of punishing them, in order that by acquiring temperance they might possess more elegant manners, excited all the Gods to assemble in their most honourable habitation, whence, being seated as in the middle of the universe, he beholds all such things as participate of generation: and having assembled the Gods, he thus addressed them: * * * * *

THE END OF THE CRITIAS, OR ATLANTICUS,

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE TIMÆUS,

**EXTRACTED FROM THE COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS ON
THAT DIALOGUE.**

ADDITIONAL NOTES

O N

THE TIMÆUS.

Page 473. *The former of these is, indeed, apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason.*

LET us, in the first place, consider how manifold intelligence is, and collect by reasoning its various progressions. The first intelligence, therefore, is intelligible, which passes into the same with the intelligible, and is in no respect different from it. This is essential intelligence and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly. The second is that which conjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing an idiom connective and collective of the extremes, and being life and power; filling, indeed, intellect from the intelligible, in which also it establishes intellect. The third is the conjoined intelligence in a Divine intellect itself, being the energy of intellect, through which it embraces the intelligible which it contains, and according to which it understands and is what it is: for, it is energy and intelligence itself, not indeed intelligible, but intellectual intelligence. The intelligence of partial intellects possesses the fourth order; for each of these contains all things partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, the intelligible, through which it is conjoined with wholes, and understands the whole intelligible world. The fifth intelligence is that of the rational soul; for as the rational soul is called intellect, so its knowledge is intelligence, viz. a transitive intelligence, with which time is connate. In the sixth place, you may rank, if you please, phantastic knowledge, which is by some denominated intelligence, and the phantasy itself is called a passive intellect, because it knows whatever it knows inwardly, and accompanied with types and figures. For it is common to all intelligence to possess the objects of its knowledge

inwardly, and in this it differs from sense. But the highest kind of intelligence is the thing known itself. The second is that which sees the first totally, and is the thing known secondarily. The third is the thing known partially, but perceives wholes through that which is partial. The fourth sees wholes indeed, but partially, and not collectively. And the fifth is a vision accompanied with passivity. Such, therefore, are the diversities of intelligence.

At present, however, neither phantastic intelligence must be assumed; for this is not naturally adapted to know true being, because it is indefinite, and knows the imaginable accompanied with figures. Eternal being, however, is unfigured; and, in short, no irrational knowledge is capable of beholding being itself, since neither is it naturally adapted to perceive universal. Nor does Plato here signify the intelligence in the rational soul; for this does not possess collective vision, and that which is coordinated with eternal natures, but proceeds according to time. Nor yet are total intelligences to be here understood; for these are exempt from our knowledge; but *Timæus* coordinates intelligence with reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect must now be assumed; for it is this in conjunction with which we once saw true being. For as sense is below the rational soul, so intelligence is above it. For a partial intellect is proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects; and to which we convert ourselves when we are purified through philosophy and conjoin our intellectual power with its intelligence. This partial intellect is participated by all other proximate dæmoniacal souls, and illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render our reason intellectual. It is this intellect which Plato in the *Phædrus* calls the governor of the soul, and says that it alone understands true being, which is also perceived in conjunction with this intellect, by the soul which is nourished with intellect and science. In short, as every partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain dæmon, and every dæmon has a dæmoniacal intellect above itself, hence, every partial soul will have this intellect ranked prior to itself as an impartible essence. Of this intellect, therefore, the first participant will be a dæmoniacal soul, but the second, the partial souls under this, which likewise makes them to be partial. It also appears that the intellect immediately above every dæmon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the dæmon which proximately participates it, but that it also comprehends the number of the souls which are under it, and the intellectual
paradigms

paradigms of them. Every partial soul, therefore, will have as an indivisible essence its proper paradigm, which this intellect contains, and not simply the whole intellect, in the same manner as the dæmon which is essentially its leader. Hence, the impartible belonging to every partial soul, may be accurately defined to be the idea of that soul, comprehended in the one intellect which is destined to be the leader of the dæmoniacal series, under which every such soul is arranged. And thus it will be true that the intellect of every partial soul is alone supernally established among eternal entities, and that every such soul is a medium between the impartible above it and the partible nature below it. This, then, is the intelligence prior to the soul, and which the soul participates when its intellectual part energizes intellectually. Hence, in the latter part of this dialogue, Plato says, that this intelligence is in the Gods, but that it is participated by a few only of the human race.

It likewise appears that Plato, unfolding the knowledge of eternal being, calls it at first intelligence, but he also conjoins with intelligence reason. For, when reason understands perpetual being, as reason it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually it energizes with simplicity, understands each particular so far as simple at once, but not all things at once, but passing from one to another, at the same time intellectually perceiving every thing which it transitively sees, as one and simple.

In the next place, let us consider what reason is, and how it is connate with intelligence. Reason, therefore, is threefold, doxastic, scientific, and intellectual. For since there are in us opinion, the dianoëtic part, and intellect, which last is the summit of the dianoëtic part, and since the whole of our essence is reason, in each of these parts reason must be differently considered. But neither is opinion naturally adapted to be conjoined with the intelligence of intellect in energy; for, on the contrary, it is conjoined with irrational knowledge, since it only knows *that* a thing is, but is ignorant of *the why*. Nor is the dianoëtic part, so far as it proceeds into multitude and division, capable of recurring to an intellect above the human soul, but on the contrary, it is separated through the variety of its reasons from intellectual impartibility. It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that which is most characterized by unity in the dianoëtic part, must be established in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being conjoined with it through alliance. This, then, is the reason which understands in us intelligibles, and an energy which Socrates in the Republic calls intelligence,

intelligence, in the same manner as he calls the dianoëtic power a knowledge subsisting between intelligibles and objects of opinion. In a subsequent part of this dialogue, Plato says, that this reason, together with science, is ingenerated in the soul when revolving about the intelligible. Science, however, has a more various energy, exploring some things by others; but the energy of intellect is more simple, surveying beings by an immediate projection of its vivifying power. This highest, therefore, and most indivisible part of our nature, Plato now denominates reason, as unfolding to us intellect and an intelligible essence. For, when the soul abandons phantasy and opinion, together with various and indefinite knowledge, and recurs to its own impartibility, according to which it is rooted in a partial intellect, and when recurring it conjoins its own energy with the intelligence of this intellect, then, together with it, it understands eternal being, its energy being both one and twofold, and sameness and separation subsisting in its intellections. For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal natures, that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that our reason, like a lesser, may energize in conjunction with a greater, light.

But how is true being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reason? For true being is superior to all comprehensor, and contains in itself all things with an exempt transcendency. In answer to this it may be replied, that intellect possessing its own intelligible, is on this account said to comprehend the whole of an intelligible essence; but reason, through an intellect coordinate to itself receiving conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said to comprehend being. Perhaps, also, it may be said that reason running round the intelligible, and energizing, and being moved as about a centre, thus beholds it; intelligence, indeed, knowing it without transition and impartibly, but reason circularly energizing about its essence, and evolving the united subsistence of all things which it contains.

Let us, in the next place, consider what opinion is. According to Plato, then, the doxastic power comprehends the reasons of sensibles, knows the essence of these, and *that* they are, but is ignorant of the cause of their existence: the dianoëtic power, at the same time, knowing both the essences and the causes of sensibles, but sense having no knowledge of either. For it is clearly shown in the Theætetus that sense is ignorant of essence, being perfectly unacquainted with the cause of what it knows. Hence it

is necessary that opinion should be ranked in the middle, and that it should know the essences of sensibles through the reasons or productive principles which it contains, but be ignorant of their causes. For in this right opinion differs from science, that it alone knows *that* a thing is, science being able to speculate the cause of its subsistence. Sense follows opinion, and is a medium between the organ of sense and opinion. For the organ of sense apprehends sensibles with passivity; and on this account it is destroyed when they are excessive. But opinion possesses a knowledge unattended with passion. Sense participates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic nature, is illuminated by it, and becomes invested with reason, being of itself irrational. In this the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which intelligence is the leader, being above reason and without transition. But reason has the second order, which is the intelligence of our soul, and transitively passes into contact with intelligibles. Opinion is in the third rank, being a knowledge of sensibles. And the fourth in gradation is sense, which is an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For the dianoëtic power subsisting between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle forms, which require an apprehension more obscure than that of intelligence, and more clear than that of opinion. Hence opinion must be placed next to reason, because it possesses gnostic reasons of essences, but is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. But sense must be considered as entirely irrational. For, in short, each of the senses knows the passion subsisting about the animal from a sensible nature. Thus, for instance, with respect to an apple, the sight knows that it is red from the passion about the eye; the smell, that it is fragrant from the passion about the nostrils; the taste, that it is sweet; and the touch, that it is smooth. What then is it which says that this thing which thus affects the different senses, is an apple? It is not any one of the partial senses; for each of these knows one particular thing pertaining to the apple, but does not know the whole. Nor yet is this effected by the common sense; for this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but does not know that the thing which possesses such an essence is the whole. It is evident, therefore, that there is a certain power better than the senses, which knowing the whole prior to those things which are as it were parts, and beholding the form of this whole, is impartibly connective of these many powers. Plato calls this power opinion; and on this account he denominates that which is sensible, the object of opinion.

Further

Further still, as the senses frequently announce to us things different from what they are in reality, what is it which judges in us, and says, that the sight, when it asserts that the diameter of the sun is no more than a foot in length, is deceived, and that this also is the case with the taste of the diseased, when honey appears to it to be bitter? For it is perfectly evident that in these, and all such like cases, the senses announce their passion, and are not entirely deceived. For they assert the passion which is produced about the instruments of sense, and which is such as they announce it to be; but that which declares the cause, and forms a judgment of the passion, is different. There is therefore a certain power of the soul which is better than sense, and which no longer knows sensibles through an organ, but through itself, and corrects the gross and inaccurate information of sense. This power which subsists as reason with respect to sense, is irrational with respect to the knowledge of true beings; but sense is simply and not relatively irrational. Hence Socrates in the Republic shows, that opinion is a medium between knowledge and ignorance. For it is a rational knowledge, but is mingled with irrationality, in consequence of knowing sensibles in conjunction with sense. Sense, however, is irrational alone; in the first place, because it subsists in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every irrational life; and in the second place, because contrary to all the parts of the irrational soul, it is incapable of being persuaded by reason. For the irascible and desirative parts, submit to reason, are obedient to its commands, and receive from it instruction. But sense, though it should ten thousand times hear reason asserting, that the sun is greater than the earth, would at the same time see it of the dimension of a foot, and would not announce it to us in any other way. In the third place, sense is irrational alone, because it does not know that which it perceives: for it is not naturally adapted to perceive the essence of it. Thus, for instance, it does not know what a white thing is, but it knows that it is white through passion. It is also distributed about the instrument of sense, and on this account therefore is irrational. In the fourth place, this is true of sense, because it is the boundary of all the series of knowledge, possesses an essence most remote from reason and intellect, belongs to things external, and makes its apprehension through body: for all these particulars indicate its irrational nature. Every thing generated, therefore, is apprehended by opinion, in conjunction with sense; the latter announcing the passions, and the former producing from itself the reasons of generated natures, and knowing their essences. And as reason, when in con-

tact

tact with intelligence, sees the intelligible, so opinion, coordinated with sense, knows that which is generated. For the soul being of a middle essence, fills up the medium between intellect and an irrational nature: for by her summit, or the vertex of the dianoëtic part, she is present with intellect, and by her extremity she verges to sense. Hence Timæus, in the former conjunction, ranked intelligence before reason, as being more excellent; but in the second conjunction he places opinion before sense. For there reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a lesser intellect; but here opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion, however, and reason bound the whole extent of the rational essence; but as the great Plotinus says, intellect is our king, and sense our messenger. And reason indeed, together with intellect, sees the intelligible; but by itself it speculates the middle reasons of things. Opinion, together with sense, sees that which is generated; but by itself it considers all the forms which its own essence contains.

P. 474. *It was generated. For this universe is visible, and has a body, &c.*

As the demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding after his accustomed manner, produces the whole world totally, collectively, or at once, and with an eternal sameness of energy, so Timæus being converted to himself, lays down the whole theory, recurring to intellect from the dianoëtic power, and proceeding into reasoning from intellect. Doubting therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self-moved nature of the soul; but answering, he imitates the projection of intellect. In the first place, therefore, he comprehends the dogma in one word *γενεσις*, *it was generated*, and enunciates the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the manner of those that energize enthusiastically, who perceive the whole collectively, and contract in intellect the end previous to the digression, in consequence of seeing all things at once. But in the second place syllogizing, he descends from intellect to logical evolutions, and an investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. In a perfectly divine manner, therefore, he indicates from hypotheses the whole form of the universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is visible, tangible, and has a body, is sensible, and that which is sensible, and the object of opinion in conjunction with sense, is generated: the world therefore is generated. And

this he shows demonstratively from the definition: since geometricians also use demonstrations of this kind. And thus much concerning the form of these words.

It is however evident that Timæus, in giving a certain generation to the world, establishes it at the same time remote from temporal generation. For if the world has a *certain*, and not *every* principle of generation, but that which is generated from time has the principle of *all* generation the world is not generated from time. Further still, let us attend to the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus, who says, that what according to Plato was moved in a confused and disordered manner is unbegotten; but that the world was generated from time. Since then Plato admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what he asserts it to be. For the world is sensible and tangible. Whether therefore was every thing sensible generated from time, or not every thing? For if every thing, that which was moved in a confused and disordered manner was also generated from time: for he says, that this likewise was visible. But if not every thing, the reasoning is unsyllogistic, according to Atticus, and concludes nothing. Unless indeed Atticus should say that the world is visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disordered manner is not *now* visible, but *was* so prior to the fabrication of the world, since Plato thus speaks, "Every thing which *was* visible, being moved in a confused and disordered manner;" but here he says, "The world *is* visible and tangible, and has a body." Plato therefore shows that every thing which *is* visible and tangible is generated, but not every thing which *was* so. Should Atticus then thus speak, (for the man is skilful in taking up one word in the place of another,) we must say, that in the definition of what is generated, there is nothing of this kind, but it is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense; so that if any thing is perfectly sensible, it will also be generated. But every thing visible is sensible, so that what was moved with confusion and disorder was generated. Nor is it proper to say that it was unbegotten according to time, but that the universe was generated in time; since either both were generated, or both are unbegotten. For both are similarly called visible and generated by Plato. But if both were generated, prior to this the world was changed into disorder: for generation to a contrary is entirely from a contrary. And if the maker of the world is good, how is it possible that he should not harmonize it beautifully; or that having beautifully harmonized it, he should destroy it?

But

But if he was not good, how not being good, did he make it to be orderly and elegantly arranged? For to effect this is the work of a beneficent artificer. But if being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not necessary immediately to assign to the universe a temporal generation, because it is said to be visible and generated. And thus much in reply to Atticus.

Let us however return to our principles, and inquire whether the world always was, as being eternal, or is not eternal, but consubstant with time, and whether it is self-subsistent, or produced by another. Such then is the inquiry. The answer to which is, that it was produced by another, and is consubstant with time. But a thing of this kind is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has generation in consequence of its composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not producing itself. And if it is eternal, it has its whole subsistence coextended with time. For it was fabricated with reference to something else, and it was generated as a flowing image of real being. As therefore that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence. If then a simple and uniform essence is eternal, an essence composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation. Hence Plato divinely inquires, whether the world originated from a *certain* principle. For that which was *once* generated, originated from a temporal, fabricative, final, material, and formal principle. For principle being predicated multifariously, that which is produced in time originates according to all these modes. But the world originated from a *certain*, and not from *every* principle. What then was this principle? It was not temporal: for that which originates from this, is also allotted the principle of its generation from all the others. It originated indeed from that most leading and proper principle, the final, as Plato himself teaches us in the course of this Dialogue. For it was generated through *the good*, and this is the principle of generation from which it originated. In the first place, therefore, he shows that the world is generated, from its composition: for it is tangible and visible. These then are the extremities of the universe: for heaven is visible, but earth is tangible; and the visible is in earth, so far as it participates of light, and the tangible in heaven, so far as a terrene nature is comprehended in it according to cause. In short he says that the world has a body, that we may also take into account the middle perfections of the universe. And in this Plato speaks agreeably to the oracle, which says, "The world is an imitation of intellect, but that which is

fabricated possesses something of body." So far therefore as the universe has something corporeal, it is generated, for according to this it is both visible and tangible. But every thing visible and tangible is sensible: for *sense is touching and seeing*. But that which is sensible is the object of opinion, as being mingled with dissimilars, and as incapable of preserving the purity of intelligible forms. And every thing of this kind is generated, as having a composite essence. Plato therefore does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some have thought he does, following Aristotelic hypotheses: and that this is true, we may easily learn as follows.

Time, says Plato, was generated together with heaven, or the universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual. But if time has a temporal beginning, the universe also has a temporal beginning; though it is of all things most absurd that time should have a beginning. But the advocates for the temporal origin of the world say, that time is twofold, one kind being disordered, and the other proceeding according to number; since motion is twofold, one disordered and confused, and the other orderly and elegant; and time is coordinate with each of these motions. But it is possible indeed for body to be moved equably or unequably, but impossible to conceive time equable and unequable: for thus the essence of time would be a composite. Though, indeed, why do I thus speak? for when motion is unequable, time is equable. Now, therefore, there are also many motions, some more swift, and others more slow, and one of which is more equable than another, but of all of them there is one continued time, proceeding according to number. Hence it is not right to make this twofold time. But if time is one and continued, if it is unbegotten, the universe also is unbegotten, which is consubstant with time. But if time is generated, an absurdity will ensue; for time will require time in order to its being generated, and this when it has not yet a being; since when time was generated, time was not yet.

Further still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe, immediately on its generation with the body of the universe, and does not give to it a life prior to that of the corporeal nature. Soul however ranks, according to him, among perpetual beings. If therefore soul is consubstant with body, but soul has a perpetual subsistence, body also is perpetual according to Plato: for that which is consubstant with a perpetual nature is unbegotten.

Again, Timæus here says, that the soul is generated, but Socrates in the Phæ-

drus says, that it is unbegotten. Hence he calls that which is clearly unbegotten according to time, after another manner begotten. Again, Plato calls the world incorruptible, in the same manner as those who contend that it was generated in time. But in the Republic he clearly asserts, or rather the Muses and not Plato, that every thing which is generated according to time is corruptible. But from these things you may understand what I say : for the world is shown by them to be unbegotten. For if the world is incorruptible, but nothing generated according to time is incorruptible, the world is not generated according to time. But why is a syllogism of this kind necessary, since Plato clearly says in the Laws, that time is infinite according to the past, and that in this infinity myriads on myriads of fertile and barren periods of mankind have taken place? Or rather, that we may reason from what we have at hand, Plato a little before, in this very dialogue, says, “that in those places where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of mankind is *always* preserved, though sometimes the number of individuals is increased, and sometimes suffers a considerable diminution. But if the race of mankind *always* is, the universe also must necessarily be perpetual.

Again, therefore, if the demiurgus of the universe ranks among eternal beings, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not ; for he would not possess a sameness of subsistence, nor an immutable nature. But if he always fabricates, that which he produces always is. For what could be his intention, after having been indolent for an infinite time, in converting himself to fabrication? Shall we say that he apprehended it was better so to do? Was he then ignorant before that this was better or not? For if he was ignorant, he will, though a pure and divine intellect, be deprived of knowledge, which is absurd to suppose. But if he knew that it was better, why did he not before begin to generate and make the world? In another respect also, those appear to me to sin against the demiurgus of the universe, who say that the world once was not. For if the world once had no existence, the demiurgus once did not make it : since that which is made and the maker subsist together. But if he once did not make, he was then a maker in capacity ; and if in capacity, he was then imperfect, and afterwards perfect, when he made the world. If, however, prior and posterior subsist about him, it is evident that he does not rank among beings who eternally energize, but among those that energize according to time, passing from not making to making. However, he produces time. How therefore, possessing an energy indigent of time, did he through this energy produce time?

time? For he once made time, of which notwithstanding he is in want, in order that he may make time.

How therefore may the world be said to be generated? We reply, as that which always is to be generated, and always will be generated. For a partial body not only *is* to be generated, but there was a time when it *was* generated. But all heaven, or the universe, alone subsists in the being to be generated, or in becoming to be, and is not at the same time that which was generated. For as the solar light proceeds from its proper fountain, so the world is always generated, and always produced, and is as it were always advancing into being.

P. 474. *To discover therefore the Artificer and Father of this Universe, &c.*

Father and artificer differ with respect to each other, so far as the former is the cause of being, and the supplier of union, but the latter of powers, and a multiform essence; and so far as the former stably comprehends all things in himself, but the latter is the cause of progression and generation; and so far as the former signifies ineffable and divine Providence, but the latter a copious communication of reasons or productive principles. But *this universe* signifies corporeal masses, the whole spheres, and those things which give completion to each. It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers which are carried in the corporeal masses. It likewise comprehends all mundane causes, and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of mundane gods proceeds. The one intellect, divine soul, and whole bulk of the universe, and its conjoined, divine, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal number, since every monad has a multitude coordinate with itself, are also to be assumed in the place of the world. For the universe signifies all these. Perhaps too the addition of *this* is significant of the world being in a certain respect sensible and partial. For the whole of an intelligible nature cannot be denominated *this*, because it comprehends all intellectual forms. But to the visible universe the particle *τὸδε*, or *this*, is adapted, in consequence of its being allotted a sensible and material nature. It is difficult therefore, as he says, to find the artificer of this universe. For since, with respect to invention, one kind proceeds from things first according to science, but another from things secondary according to reminiscence, invention from things first may be said to be difficult, because the discovery of the powers which are
situated

situated between, is the province of the highest theory, but that from things secondary is still more difficult. For, in order to behold from these the essence of the demiurgus, and the powers which he contains, it is necessary to survey the whole nature of his productions. We must therefore behold all the apparent parts of the world, and its unapparent powers, according to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the universe subsist; and prior to these stable physical reasons and natures themselves, both the more partial and the more total, material and immaterial, divine and daemonical, and those of mortal animals. And further still, we must survey the genera of life, the eternal and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, the total and the partial, the rational and the irrational, and all the completions pertaining to essences more excellent than ours, through which every thing between the gods and a mortal nature is bound together. We must also be able to perceive all various souls, and different numbers of gods, according to different parts of the universe, together with the ineffable and effable impressions of the world, through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who, without surveying these, attempts the vision of the demiurgus, will, through imperfection, be deprived of the intellectual perception of the father of the universe. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be united with that which is all perfect. It is necessary, indeed, that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and assimilated in her power to the whole and intelligible world, should approach near to the maker of the universe, and through this approximation become familiar with him, through continuity of intellectual projection. For an uninterrupted energy about any thing calls forth and re-fuscitates our essential reasons. But through this familiarity the soul, being stationed at the gate of the father, will become united with him. For the discovery of him is this, to meet with him, to be united with him, to associate alone with the alone, and to see him with immediate vision, the soul for this purpose withdrawing herself from every other energy. The discovery therefore of the father of the universe is such as this, and not that which is effected by opinion; for such a discovery is dubious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Nor yet is it scientific; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intellectual essence of the intellectual demiurgus. But the discovery of which Plato now speaks subsists according to immediate vivise-projection (κατὰ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τὴν αὐτοπτικὴν), a contact with the intelligible, and an union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may be properly denominated difficult, whether

as laborious, and appearing to souls after all the journey of life*, or as the true labour of souls. For after the wandering of generation and purification from its stains, and after the light of science, intellectual energy, and the intellect which is in us, will shine forth, establishing as in a port the soul in the father of the universe, purely seating her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, intellectual, and uniform than this. For this is the paternal port, and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

But when Plato says, "it is impossible to reveal him through the ministry of discourse to all men," it perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who preserved in secrecy assertions respecting divine natures, and did not speak concerning them to the multitude. For, as the Elean guest in the Sophista says, "The eyes of the multitude are not sufficiently strong to look to truth." This also, which is a much more venerable assertion, may perhaps be said, that it is impossible for him who has discovered the father of the universe, to speak of him, such as he has seen him. For this discovery was not effected by the soul speaking, but by her being initiated in divine mysteries, and converting herself to the divine light; nor was it in consequence of her being moved according to her proper motion, but from her becoming silent, according to that silence which leads the way. For since the essence of other things is not naturally adapted to be enunciated through names, or through definition, or even through science, but by intelligence alone, as Plato says in his seventh Epistle, after what other manner is it possible to discover the essence of the demiurgus than intellectually? Or how, having thus discovered him, can that which is seen be told through nouns and verbs, and communicated to others? For a discursive energy, since it is attended with composition, is incapable of representing a uniform and simple nature. But here some one may say, Do we not assert many things concerning the demiurgus, and other gods, and concerning *the one* itself, the principle of all things? We reply that we speak *concerning* them, but we do not speak the *auto*, or *the very thing itself*, which each of them is. And we are able indeed to speak of them *scientifically*, but not *intellectually*: for this, as we have said before, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silent energy of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth be sufficient to lead into light that which is discovered, such as it truly is?

* And this is what Homer divinely insinuates in the Fable of Ulysses.

After this, Proclus, following, as he says, the light of science, investigates who the demiurgus of the universe is, and in what order of things he ranks. For Numenius the Pythagorean (says he), celebrating three gods, calls the first *father*, the second *maker*, and the third *work* or *effect* (ποίημα), for the world, according to him, is the third god; so that with Numenius there is a two-fold demiurgus, viz. the first and second god, but that which is fabricated is the third divinity. Numenius, however, in thus speaking, in the first place, does not act rightly in connumerating *the good* with these causes. For *the good*, or the supreme principle of things, is not naturally adapted to be conjoined with certain things, nor to possess an order secondary to any thing. But with Plato *father* is here ranked after *artificer*. Further still, he coaranges that which is exempt from all habitude, viz. the ineffable cause of all, with the natures under, and posterior to, him. But these things ought to be referred to subordinate natures, and all habitude should be taken away from that which is first. That which is paternal therefore in the universe cannot be adapted to the first principle of things. And, in the third place, it is not right to divide father and artificer, since Plato celebrates one and the same divinity by both these names. For one divine fabrication, and one fabricator and father, are everywhere delivered by Plato.

With respect to Harpocraton, it would be wonderful if he were consistent with himself in what he says concerning the demiurgus. For this man makes the demiurgus two-fold, and calls the first god Heaven and Saturn, the second Jupiter and Zena, and the third Heaven and the World. Again, therefore, transferring the first god into another order, he calls him Jupiter, and the king of the intelligible world; but he calls the second, the Ruler; and the same divinity according to him is Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first god therefore is all these, though Plato in the Parmenides takes away from *the one*, or the first god, every name, all discourse, and every habitude. We indeed do not think it proper to call the first even father; but with Harpocraton the first is father, son, and grandson.

Again Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocraton, directly makes the demiurgus to be the same with *the good*, though the demiurgus is called by Plato *good* (αγαθός), but not *the good* (το αγαθόν). The demiurgus is also denominated by Plato *intellect*; but *the good* is the cause of all essence, and is beyond being, as we learn from the 6th book of the Republic. But what will he say respecting the paradigm, to which the demiurgus looks in fa-

bricating the world? For it is either prior to the demiurgus, and so according to Atticus there will be something more antient than *the good*; or it will be in the demiurgus, and so that which is first will be *many*, and not *the one*; or it will be after the demiurgus, and so *the good*, which it is not lawful to assert, will be converted to things posterior to itself, and will intellectually apprehend them.

After these men, Plotinus the philosopher places a two-fold demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, and the other the governor of the universe. And he says rightly: for in a certain respect the mundane intellect is the demiurgus of the universe. But the father and artificer, whom he places in the intelligible, is transcendently the demiurgus; Plotinus calling every thing between *the one* and the world intelligible: for there, according to him, the true heaven, the kingdom of Saturn, and the intellect of Jupiter, subsist. Just as if any one should say that the sphere of Saturn, that of Jupiter, and that of Mars, are contained in the heavens: for the whole of an intelligible essence is one many, and is one intellect comprehending many intelligibles. And such is the doctrine of Plotinus.

In the next place, Amelius (the disciple of Plotinus) makes a triple demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one that *is*, the second that *both*, and the third that *sees*. But these differ, because the first intellect is truly that which is; but the second is indeed the intelligible which it contains, yet has that which is prior to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second. And the third is indeed likewise the intelligible which it contains; for every intellect is the same with its conjoined intelligible; but it contains that which is in the second, and sees the first: for that which it possesses is obscure in proportion to its distance from the first. According to Amelius, therefore, these three intellects and artificers are the same as the three kings with Plato, and as Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn, with Orpheus; and that which is especially the demiurgus according to him is Phanes. To Amelius, however, it is proper to say, that Plato is every where accustomed to recur from multitude to the unities from which the order in the many proceeds; or rather prior to Plato, from the very order of things themselves, *the one* is always prior to *multitude*, and every divine order begins from a monad. For it is indeed requisite that a divine number should proceed from a triad*, but prior to the triad

* As all things abide in their causes, proceed from them and return to them, as is demonstrated by Proclus

triad is the monad. Where therefore is the demiurgic monad, that there may be a triad from it? And how is the world one, not being fabricated by one cause? For it is requisite by a much greater priority that the cause of the world should be united and be monadic, that the world may become only-begotten. Let there then be three artificers; but who is the one prior to the three; looking indeed to one paradigm, but making the word only-begotten? It is not proper, therefore, that the demiurgic number should begin from a triad but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry, thinking to accord with Plato, calls the supermundane soul the demiurgus, and the intellect of this soul to which he is converted, animal itself, as being according to him the paradigm of the demiurgus. It is requisite, therefore, to inquire of Porphyry, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the demiurgus, and how this accords with Plato, who continually denominates the demiurgus a god and intellect, but never calls him soul? How likewise does Plato call the world a god? And how does the demiurgus pervade through all mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul; but all things partake of demiurgic providence. And divine fabrication indeed is able to generate intellect and gods; but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing above the order pertaining to soul. I omit to observe that it is by no means certain that Plato knew any imparticipable soul.

To Porphyry succeeds the divine Jamblichus, who having written largely against the opinion of Porphyry, and subverting it as being Plotinian, delivers to us his own theology, and calls all the intelligible world the demiurgus. If therefore he means that all things subsist demiurgically in the demiurgus, both being itself, and the intelligible world, he accords with himself, and also with Orpheus, who says,

All that exists in confluent order lies
Within the belly of the mighty Jove.

Proclus in his *Elements of Theology*, this must also be true of the immediate and first procession from the highest god. The first offspring, therefore, from the ineffable principle of things will be an all-perfect triad, the leader of a divine number; and in like manner every divine number will proceed from a triad, and this from a monad: for there is no number prior to three, unity being the principle of number, and the duad partaking of the nature both of unity and number. This will be evident from considering that it is the property of number to receive a greater increase from multiplication than addition, viz. when multiplied into itself; but unity is increased by being added to, but not by being multiplied by itself, and two in consequence of its middle nature produces the same when added to, as when multiplied by itself. See the Introduction to *The Parmenides*.

Nor is it in any respect wonderful that each of the gods should be the universe, but at the same time each differently from the rest; one demiurgically, another according to connecting comprehension (*συνεχίζων*), another immutably, and another in a still different manner according to a divine idiom. But if Jamblichus means that the whole extent between the world and *the one* is the demiurgus, this indeed is worthy of doubt, and we may reply to the assertion from what he himself has taught us. For where are the kings prior to Jupiter, who are the fathers of Jupiter? Where are the kings mentioned by Plato, whom Jamblichus arranges above the world, and about *the one*? And how can we say that eternal being itself is the first being, but that the demiurgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself also eternal being as well as animal itself? For shall we not thus be compelled to say that the demiurgus is not eternal being; unless so far as he also is comprehended together with other eternal beings? But that Jamblichus himself, though most prolific in these things, has in some of his other writings more accurately celebrated the demiurgic order, may be inferred from this, that in speaking concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the *Timæus*, after the intelligible triads, and the three triads of gods in the intellectual hebdomad, he assigns the third order in these processions to the demiurgus. For he says that these three gods are also celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who denominate the first of these intellects, and which comprehends in itself total monads, simple, indivisible, boniform, abiding in and united with itself, and consider it as possessing such like signs of transcendency. But they say that the most beautiful signs of the middle intellect, and which collects together the completion of such like natures, are that which is prolific in the gods, that which congregates the three intellects, replenishes energy, is generative of divine life, and is the source of progression and beneficence to every thing. And they inform us that the most illustrious tokens of the third intellect, which fabricates wholes, are prolific progressions, fabrications and connected comprehensions of total causes, whole causes bounded in forms, and which emit from themselves all fabrications, and other prerogatives similar to these. It is proper, therefore, to judge from these assertions, what the Jamblichean theology is concerning the demiurgus of wholes.

After him Theodorus*, following Amelius, says, that there are three artificers; but he does not arrange them immediately after *the one*, but at the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual gods. He likewise calls one of these essential intellect, another intel-

* Theodorus, as well as Jamblichus, was the disciple of Porphyry.

tual effluence, and another the fountain of souls; and says that the first is indivisible, the second is distributed into wholes, and that the third has made a distribution into particulars. Again, therefore, we may say the same things to him as we said to the noble Amelius, that we acknowledge these to be three gods, or analogous to these, but not also three artificers; but we say that one of these is the intelligible of the demiurgus, the second his generative power, and the third that which is truly demiurgic intellect. But it is requisite to consider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third: for power belongs to the middle, as he also says, and hence the fountain of souls should be partially, and not universally, denominated the fountain of life. For the fountain of souls is only one of the fountains in this middle; since life is not in souls only, nor in animated natures alone, but there is also divine and intellectual life prior to that of the soul, which they say, proceeding from this middle, emits a diversity of life from distributed channels. Such then, in short, are the dogmas of antient interpreters respecting the demiurgus.

Let us now, therefore, briefly relate the conceptions of our preceptor on this subject, and which we think accord in a very eminent degree with those of Plato. The demiurgus, therefore, according to him, possesses the extremity* of the intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life, emitting from himself total fabrication, and imparting dominion to the more partial fathers of wholes. He is likewise immovable, being eternally established on the summit of Olympus, and ruling over two-fold worlds, the supercelestial and celestial, and comprehending the beginning, middle, and end of all things. For of every demiurgic distribution, one kind is of wholes with a total subsistence, another of wholes with a partial subsistence, another of parts with a total†, and another of parts with a partial subsistence. But fabrication being fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds in itself the total providence of wholes, but a demiurgic triad is suspended from it which governs parts totally, and distributes the power of the

* There are three divine orders, which according to antient theologians are said to comprehend the total orders of the gods, viz. the intelligible, (the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of things,) the intelligible and at the same time intellectual; and the intellectual order. The demiurgus of the universe subsists at the extremity of this last.

† There is wanting here in the original το δε των μεγων ολικως.

monad*; just as in the other, or partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad which orderly distributes wholes partially, and parts partially. But all the multitude of the triad revolves round the monad, is distributed about it, divides its fabrications, and is filled from it. If these things then are rightly asserted, the demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of the intellectual gods, being established indeed in the intelligible, but full of power, according to which he produces wholes, and converts all things to himself. Hence Timæus call him *intellect*, and *the best of causes*, and says *that he looks to an intelligible paradigm*, that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible gods; but by calling him *intellect*, he places him in an order different from that of the gods, who are both intelligible and intellectual: and by the appellation of *the best of causes*, he establishes him above all other supermundane fabricators. He is, therefore, an intellectual god exempt from all other fabricators. But if he was the first† deity in the intellectual order, he would possess a permanent characteristic, abiding after his accustomed mode: for this is the illustrious prerogative of the first intellectual god. If he was the second‡ deity of this order he would be particularly the cause of life; but now in generating soul, he energizes indeed together with the crater, but is essentially intellect. He is therefore no other than the third|| of the intellectual fathers: for his peculiar work is the production of intellect, and not the fabrication of body. For he makes body, yet not alone, but in conjunction with necessity; but he makes intellect through himself. Nor is it his peculiar work to produce soul: for he generates soul together with the crater; but he alone both gives subsistence to and causes intellect to preside over the universe. As he is therefore the maker of intellect, he very properly has also an intellectual order. Hence he is called by Plato, *fabricator and father*; and is neither father alone, nor fabricator alone, nor again, father and fabricator. For the extremes are father§ and fabricator; the former possessing the summit of intelligibles, and subsisting prior to the royal series, and the latter subsisting at the extremity of the order; and the

* *Τριαδος* is erroneously printed in the original instead of *μοναδος*.

† Viz. Saturn.

‡ Viz. Rhea.

|| Viz. Jupiter.

§ Being itself, or the summit of the intelligible order, is called *father* alone; Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order, is called *father and artificer*; Jupiter, or the extremity of the intellectual order, is called *artificer and father*; and Vulcan, who is the fabricator of a corporeal nature, is called *artificer* alone.

one being the monad of paternal deity, and the other being allotted a fabricative power in the universe. But between both these are, father and at the same time artificer, and artificer and at the same time father. For each of these is not the same; but in the one the paternal, and in the other the fabricative has dominion; and the paternal is better than the fabricative. Hence the first of the two media is more characterized by *father*; for, according to the Oracle, "he is the boundary of the paternal profundity, and the fountain of intellectual natures." But the second of the media is more characterized by *creator*: for he is the monad of total fabrication. Whence also I think that the former is called *Metis* (*μητις*) but the latter *Metietes* (*μητιετης*); and the former is seen, but the latter fees. The former also is swallowed up, but the latter is satiated with the power of the former; and what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectals; for the one is the boundary of the intelligible, and the other of the intellectual gods. Likewise concerning the former Orpheus says, "The father made these things in a dark cavern;" but concerning the latter, Plato says, "Of whom I am the demiurgus and father." And in his Politicus he reminds us of the doctrine of the demiurgus and father, because the former of these divinities is more characterized by the paternal, and the latter by the demiurgic peculiarity. But every god is denominated from his idiom, though at the same time he comprehends all things. And the divinity indeed, who is *alone the maker* or artificer, is the cause of mundane natures; but he who is both *artificer* and *father* is the cause of supermundane and mundane natures. He who is *father* and *artificer* is the cause of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures; and he who is *father* alone is the cause of things intelligible, intellectual, supermundane and mundane. Plato, therefore, thus representing the demiurgus, leaves him ineffable and without a name, as subsisting prior to wholes, in the allotment of *the good*. For in every order of gods there is that which is analogous to *the one*; and of this kind is the monad in every world. But Orpheus also gives him a name as being thence moved; and in this he is followed by Plato in other parts of his writings: for the Jupiter with him, who is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the demiurgus of universe.

After the absorption, therefore, of Phanes, the ideas of all things appeared in Jupiter, as the theologist (Orpheus) says:

Hence with the universe great Jove contains
Heav'n's splendid height, and æther's ample plains;

The

ADDITIONAL NOTES

The barren sea, wide-bosom'd earth renown'd,
 Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound ;
 Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main,
 With all that nature's ample realms contain ;
 And gods and goddesses of each degree,
 All that is past, and all that e'er shall be ;
 Occultly, and in confluent order lie
 In Jove's vast womb, the ruler of the sky.

But being full of ideas, through these he comprehends wholes in himself, which also the theologist indicating, adds,

Jove is the first and last, high thund'ring king ;
 Middle and head, and all things spring from Jove.
 King Jove the root of earth and heav'n contains :
 One power, one dæmon is the source of all.
 For in Jove's royal body all things lie,
 Fire, earth, and water, æther, night, and day.

Jupiter, therefore, comprehending wholes, at the same time gives subsistence to all things in conjunction with Night. Hence to Jupiter thus inquiring,

Tell me how all things will as one subsist,
 Yet each its nature separate preserve ?

Night replies,

All things receive enclos'd on ev'ry side,
 In æther's wide ineffable embrace :
 Then in the midst of æther place the heav'n,
 In which let earth of infinite extent,
 The sea, and stars, the crown of heav'n, be fixt.

And Jupiter is instructed by Night in all the subsequent mundane fabrication : but after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds,

But when around the whole your pow'r has spread
 A strong coercive bond, a golden chain
 Suspend from æther.

viz. a chain perfectly strong and indissoluble, proceeding from nature, soul and intellect.
 For being bound, says Plato, with animated bonds, they became animals,

——— the golden chain suspend from æther.

The divine orders above the world * being denominated Homerically a golden chain. And Plato, emulating Homer, says in this dialogue, “ that the demiurgus *binding* intellect in soul, and soul in body, fabricated the universe, and that he gave subsistence to the junior gods, through whom also he adorns the parts of the world.” If therefore it is Jupiter who possesses one power, who swallows Phanes in whom the intelligible causes of wholes primarily subsist, who produces all things according to the admonitions of Night, and who confers dominion both on other gods and the three sons of Saturn, he it is who is the one and whole demiurgus of the universe, possessing the fifth order among those gods that rank as kings, as is divinely shown by our preceptor in his Orphic conferences, and who is coordinate with Heaven and Phanes; and on this account he is artificer and father, and each of these totally.

But that Plato also has these conceptions concerning the mighty Jupiter is evident from the appellations which he gives him in the Cratylus, evincing that he is the cause and the supplier of life to all things: for, says he, that through which life is imparted to all things is denominated by us *δια* and *ζηνα*. But in the Gorgias, he coordinates him with the sons of Saturn, and at the same time gives him a subsistence exempt from them, that he may be prior to the three, and may be participated by them, and establishes Law together with him, in the same manner as Orpheus. For, from the admonitions of Night, according to Orpheus, Law is made the assessor of Jupiter, and is established together with him. Further still, Plato in his Laws, conformably to the theologist, represents total Justice as the associate of Jupiter: and in the Philebus he evinces that a royal soul and a royal intellect presubsist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause; agreeably to which he now also describes him as giving subsistence to intellect and soul, as unfolding the laws of fate, and producing all the orders of mundane gods and animals, as far as to the last of things; generating some of these by himself alone, and others through the celestial gods as media. In the Politicus also he calls Jupiter the demiurgus and father of the universe, in the same manner as in this dialogue, and says that the present order of the world is under Jupiter, and that the world is governed

* Instead of *των θεων παραγων υπο των εγκοσμιων*, as in the original, it is necessary to read as in our translation *των θεων ταξων υπερ των εγκοσμιων*.

according to fate. The world, therefore, living a life under the dominion of Jupiter, has Jupiter for the demiurgus and father of its life. The divine poet Homer likewise represents him fabricating on the summit of Olympus, ("Hear me, all ye gods and goddesses!") and converting the two-fold coordinations of divinities to himself. Through the whole of his poetry, too, he calls him the supreme of rulers, and the father of men and gods, and celebrates him with all demurgic conceptions. Since, therefore, according to all the Grecian theology, the fabrication of the universe is ascribed to Jupiter, what ought we to think respecting these words of Plato? Is it not that the deity which is celebrated by him as artificer and father is the sovereign Jupiter, and that he is neither father alone, nor father and artificer? For the father was the monad, as the Pythagoreans say: but he is this very order of gods, the decad, at which number proceeding from the retreats of the monad arrives, this being a universal recipient, venerable, circularly investing all things with bound, immutable, unwearied, and which they call the sacred decad. After the paternal monad, therefore, and the paternal and at the same time fabricative tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds; being *immutable* indeed, because *immutable deity* is consubstantial with it, but *investing all things with bound*, as being the supplier of order to things disordered, and of ornament to things unadorned, and illuminating souls with intellect, as being itself intellect totally; body with soul, as possessing and comprehending the cause of soul; and producing things which are truly generated as middle and last, in consequence of containing in itself demiurgic being.

P. 485. *In the first place, he received one part from the whole, &c.*

After Proclus has discussed every thing pertaining to the mathematical speculation of the psychogonic * diagram, an epitome of which we have given in the Introduction to this dialogue, he proceeds to a more principal and profound explanation of this part of the *Timæus*, as follows: In the first place, says he, we think it proper to speak about the division of the soul, according to which it is divided in these ratios, and likewise to remove whatever may be an impediment to us in apprehending the truth concerning it. Let no one therefore think that this division is corporeal, for we have before shown that the medium of the soul is exempt from body, and from the whole of that essence which is

* Viz. the diagram pertaining to the generation of the soul.

divided about it. Nor let any one who admits that it is better than body suppose that it ought to be divided after the same manner as the extremes and intervals by which body is measured. For things which possess interval, are not totally through the whole of themselves present to themselves, and when divided are not able to preserve an unconfused union. But soul, participating of an impartible destiny, is united to itself, and exhibits all the same elements subsisting in all the same. Nor again, let any one suppose that this is a section of number. For soul is indeed number, but not that which subsists according to quantity, but that which is essential, self-begotten, uniform, and converted to itself. Nor let any one compare the presence of these ratios in all things to spermatric reasons: for those are imperfect, corporeal and material, and are in every respect surpassed by the immaterial and pure essence of the reasons of the soul. Nor yet let any one assimilate the above-mentioned parts to the theorems of science, in consequence of each possessing the whole: for we do not now consider the knowledge, but the essence of the soul. Nor is it proper to think that diversities of essences are similar to the distinctions of habits: for the latter are all-variously diversified in those that possess them, but the former are established with a sameness of subsistence in demiurgic boundaries. It is requisite, therefore, to suspend the primary principle of the psychogonic division from a demiurgic cause, and from those perfect measures which eternally presubsist in beings, and to which the demiurgus also looking divides the soul. For as he divides this universe by intelligible paradigms, so also he separates the essence of the soul by the most beautiful boundaries, assimilating it to more ancient and principal causes. The mode, therefore, of division is immaterial, intellectual, undefiled, perfective of the essence of the soul, generative of the multitude it contains, collective through harmony into one order, and connective of things divided; at the same time being the cause of the unmingled purity in the soul, and producing a confluent communion of reasons. And the demiurgus indeed to consume the whole by dividing it into parts: and thus, after a manner, Timæus also asserts; for he says, that the demiurgus consumed the whole from which he separated these parts. But as he had previously said that soul is not only partible, but also impartible, it is requisite to preserve both, and to consider that while the wholeness remains impartible, a division into multitude is produced: for if we take one of these only, I mean the section, we shall make it only indivisible. The whole, therefore, is divided together with the whole remaining impartible; so that it

equally participates of both. Hence it is well observed by the dæmoniacal Aristotle, that there is something impartible in partible natures, by which they are connected *; so that it is much more necessary that something impartible should remain in things whose nature is not only partible, but also impartible. For if it should not remain, that which consists from both will be alone partible. But that it is necessary that the whole should remain in the generation of the parts is evident; since the demiurgus is an eternal fabricator. But he constituted the soul one whole prior to its division: for he does not produce at one time and destroy at another; but he always produces every thing, and this eternally; and makes that which is produced to remain such as it is. The wholeness, therefore, is not destroyed in giving subsistence to the parts, but remains and precedes† the parts. For he did not produce the parts prior to the whole, and afterwards generate the whole from these; but, on the contrary, produced the whole first, and from this gave subsistence to the parts. Hence the essence of the soul is at the same time a whole and possesses parts, and is one and multitude. And such is the division which Timæus assumes in the soul.

But let the mode of its explanation accord with the essence of the soul, being remote from apparent harmony, but recurring to essential and immaterial harmony, and sending us from images to paradigms. For the symphony which flows into the ears, and consists in sounds and pulsations, is entirely different from that which is vital and intellectual. Let no one therefore stop at the mathematical speculation of the present passage, but let him excite in himself a theory adapted to the essence of the soul. Not let him think that we should look to intervals, or differences of motions; for these things are very remote, and are by no means adapted to the proposed object of inquiry; but let him

* That which ultimately connects bodies must necessarily be impartible; for if it also consisted of parts, those parts would require something else as the cause of their connection, and this something else, if also partible, another connecting principle, and so on *ad infinitum*. Body, therefore, derives its connection from the presence of something incorporeal.

† Whole, as Proclus soon after this informs us, has a triple subsistence, prior to parts, in a part, and posterior to parts. We have a beautiful image of the first of these of which Proclus is now speaking, in the centre of a circle considered as subsisting with the extremities of the radii terminating in it. For these extremities, considered as giving completion to the centre, so far as centre, may be said to be as it were parts of it; but when they are considered as they may be, as proceeding from the centre, they are posterior to it.

consider

consider the assertions essentially, and examine how they indicate the medium pertaining to the soul, and how they exhibit demiurgic providence. In the first place, therefore, since wholeness is triple, one being prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and another in each of the parts, that wholeness of the soul which is now delivered is that which subsists prior to parts; for the demiurgus made it one whole prior to all division, which, as we have said, remains such as it is, without being consumed in the production of the parts: for to be willing to dissolve that which is well harmonized is the province of an evil artificer. He would however dissolve it, if he consumed the whole in the parts. But Plato insinuates that wholeness which consists from parts, when he represents the demiurgus consuming the whole mixture in the section of the essence of the soul, and renovating the whole of it through the harmony of its parts; this whole receiving its completion from all according parts. And a little further on he will teach us that wholeness which subsists in each of its parts, when he divides the whole soul into certain circles, and attributes all the above-mentioned ratios to them, which he has already rendered apparent; for he says that the three are in each of the parts, in the same manner as in the whole. Every part, therefore, is in a certain respect a triadic whole, after the same manner as the whole. Hence it is necessary that the soul should have three wholenesses, because it animates the universe, which is a whole of wholes, each of which is a whole as in a part. As it therefore animates in a two-fold respect, viz. both that which is a whole, and those wholes which are as parts, it requires two wholenesses; and it transcends the natures which are animated, possessing something external to them, so as, in the language of Timæus, to surround the universe as with a veil. Hence by the wholeness prior to parts it entirely runs above the universe, and by the other two connects it, and the natures which it contains; these also subsisting as wholes.

In the next place, we must observe that Plato, proceeding from the beginning to the end, preserves that which is monadic and also that which is dyadic in the soul: for he reduces its hyparxis into essence, sameness, and difference, and bisects number, beginning from one part, into the double and triple; and contemplating the media, he comprehends two in one, and according to each of these unfolds two-fold ratios, the sesquialter and sesquitertian, and again cuts these into sesquioctaves and remainders (λειψήματα). In what follows also, he divides one length into two, and one figure of the soul into two periods; and, in short, he very properly never separates the dyadic from the monadic;

for

for to intellect the monadic alone is adapted, on which account it is also impartible, but to body the dyadic; and hence, in the generation of a corporeal nature, he begins from the duad of fire and earth, and arranges two other genera of elements between these. But soul subsisting between body and intellect is at the same time a monad and a duad; and this because in a certain respect it equally participates of bound and infinity; just as intellect is allied to bound, but body more accords with infinity, through its subject matter, and its division *ad infinitum*. And if after this manner some have referred the impartible and partible to the monad and indefinite duad, they have spoken agreeably to things themselves; but if they have considered the soul to be number in no respect differing from monadic numbers, their assertions have been utterly discordant with the essence of the soul. It is therefore at the same time both a monad and duad, resembling by the monadic, intellectual bound, and by the dyadic, infinity; or by the former being the image of the impartible, and by the latter the paradigm of partible natures. This also should be considered, that Timæus here speaks of a two-fold work of the demiurgus: for he divides the soul into parts, and harmonizes the divided portions, and renders them accordant with each other. But in so doing he at the same time energizes both Dionysiacally and Apolloniacally. For to divide and produce wholes into parts, and to preside over the distribution of species, is Dionysiacal; but to perfect all things harmoniously is Apolloniacal. As the demiurgus, therefore, comprehends in himself the cause of both these gods, he divides and harmonizes the soul: for the hebdomad is a number common to both these divinities; since theologists say that Bacchus was divided into seven parts, and they ascribe the heptad to Apollo, as the power that connects all symphonies; for in the monad, duad, and tetrad, from which the hebdomad is composed, the disdiapason first consists. Hence they call the god, the leader of the hebdomad, and assert that the seventh day is sacred to him: for they say that on that day Apollo was born from Latona, in the same manner as Diana on the sixth day. This number, therefore, in the same manner as the triad, accedes to the soul from superior causes; the triad indeed from intelligible, but the hebdomad from intellectual* causes. But the heb-

* The number 7, according to the Pythagoreans, is the image of intellectual light; and hence the intellectual order is hebdomadic, consisting of two triads, viz. Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, and the three Curetes, and a separating monad which is called by ancient theologists Ocean. See the fifth book of Proclus on Plato's Theology, and the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.

domad is derived from these gods, that the division into seven parts may be a sign of the Dionysiacal series, and of that dilaceration which is celebrated in fables. For it is requisite that the soul participating a Dionysiacal intellect, and, as Orpheus says, carrying the god on her head, should be divided after the same manner as he is divided; and that the harmony which she possesses in these parts should be a symbol of the Apolloniad order. For in the fables* respecting this god, it is Apollo who collects and unites the lacerated members of Bacchus, according to the will of his father.

In the next place, three middles are assumed, which not only in the soul, but also every where shadow forth the daughters of Themis, who are three, as well as these middles: for the geometrical middle is the image of Eunomia; and hence in the Laws Plato says, that she governs politics, and is the judgment of Jupiter, adorning the universe, and comprehending in herself the truly political science. But the harmonic middle is the image of Justice, which distributes a greater ratio † to greater, and a lesser to lesser terms, this being the employment of Justice. And the arithmetical middle is the image of Peace: for it is she, as he also says in the Laws, who attributes to all things the equal according to quantity, and makes people preserve peace with people, for the solid proportion prior to these is sacred to their mother Themis, who comprehends all the powers of these. And thus much generally respecting these three middles.

That we may, however, speak of them more particularly, it is requisite to observe that they are unific and connective of the essence of the soul, viz. they are unions, analogies, and bonds. Hence Timæus also calls them bonds. For above, he says, that the geometric middle is the most beautiful of bonds, and that the others are contained in this; but every bond is a certain union. If, therefore, these middles are bonds, and bonds are unions of the things bound, the consequence is evident. These therefore pervade through the whole essence of the soul, and cause it to be one from many wholes, as they are allotted a power which can bind various forms. But these being three, the geometric binds every thing which is essential in souls: for essence is one reason ‡ which pervades through all things, and connects things first, middle, and last, in the same manner

* See my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.

† Thus in 6, 4, 3, which are in harmonic proportion, the ratio of 6 to 4 is greater than that of 4 to 3.

‡ Reason must here be considered as signifying a productive and connective principle of things, to which ratio in quantity is analogous.

as in the geometric middle there is one and the same ratio which perfectly pervades through three terms. The harmonic middle connects all the divided samenesses of souls, imparting a communion of reasons to the extremes, and a kindred conjunction; this sameness which it connects being more apparent in more total, but less apparent in more partial souls. And the arithmetic middle binds the all-various difference of the progression of the soul, and is less inherent in things greater according to order, but more in such as are lesser. For difference has dominion in more partial natures, just as sameness has in such as are more total and more excellent. Those middles also may be compared with each other, in the same manner as sameness and difference: and as essence is the monad of these, so the geometric middle of those. The geometric middle therefore is the union of all the essences which are comprehended in the thirty-four terms. The harmonic is the union of equally numerous identities, and the arithmetic of differences; all these middles at the same time being extended through all the terms. For how could a certain whole be produced from them, unless they were as much as possible united with each other, essentially indeed by one of these, but variously by the other two? Hence these two become the supplement of the geometric middle, just as sameness and difference contribute to the consummation of essence; for in consequence of their possessing contrariety to each other, the geometric middle conciliates their dissension, and unites their interval. For the harmonic middle, as we have said, distributes greater ratios to greater, and lesser to lesser terms: since it evinces that things greater and more total according to essence are more comprehensive, and transcend in power subject natures. But the arithmetic middle, on the contrary, distributes lesser ratios to greater terms, and greater ratios to lesser terms*. For difference prevails more in subordinate natures, as, on the contrary, the dominion of sameness is more apparent in superior than in inferior natures. And the geometric middle extends the same ratio to all the terms, illuminating union to things first, middle, and last, through the presence of essence to all things. The demiurgus, therefore, imparts to the soul three connective unions, which Plato calls middles, because they appear to bind the middle order of the universe. For the geometric collects the multitude of essences, and unites essential progressions; since one

* Thus, in the numbers 6, 4, 2, which are in arithmetic proportion, the ratio of 6 to 4, i. e. the ratio of the greater terms is less than the ratio of 4 to 2, the ratio of the lesser terms: for the ratio of 6 to 4 is $1\frac{1}{2}$, but that of 4 to 2 is 2.

ratio is an image of union. But the harmonic binds total identities and their hyparxes into one communion; and the arithmetic conjoins first, middle, and last differences. For, in short, difference is the mother of numbers, as we learn in the *Parmenides*. But in every part there were these three, viz. essence, sameness, and difference; and it is requisite that all these should be conjoined with each other through a medium, and binding reasons.

In the next place, we say that the soul is a plenitude of reasons, being more simple indeed than sensibles, but more composite than intelligibles. Hence *Timæus* assumes seven ratios in it, viz. the ratio of equality, multiple, submultiple, superparticular, and superpartient, and the opposites of these, the subsuperparticular and subsuperpartient ratios*: but he does not assume the ratios which are composed from these; since they are adapted to corporeal natures, which are composite and divisible; while on the contrary the ratios in the soul proceed indeed into multitude and division, but at the same time, together with multitude, exhibit simplicity, and the uniform together with division. Neither therefore like intellect is it allotted an essence in the monad and the impartible (for intellect is alone monadic and impartible); nor is it multitude and division alone.

Again, it is requisite to understand that numbers which are more simple and nearer to the monad have a more principal subsistence than such as are more composite; since Plato also establishes one part prior to all those that follow, refers all of them to this, and ends in those which are especially composite and solid. This then being admitted, I say that equality, and the ratio of equality, have the ratio of a monad to all ratios; and what the monad is in essential quantity, that the equal is † in relative quantity. Hence, according to this reasoning, the soul introduces a common measure to all things which subsist according to the same ratios, and one idea bearing an image of sameness; but according to the multiple

* For an account of these ratios, see the Note to the 8th Book of the *Republic* on the Geometric Number, vol. i.

† That all the species of inequality of ratio proceed from equality of ratio may be shown as follows:—Let there be any three equal terms, as, for instance, three unities, 1, 1, 1. Let the first therefore be placed equal to the first, viz. 1; the second to the first and second added together, viz. to 2; and let the third be equal to the first, twice the second, and the third added together, viz. to 1, 2, 1, or 4. This

ple and submultiple ratio, it governs all series, connects wholes themselves, and exhibits every whole form of mundane natures often produced by it in all things. Thus, for instance, it exhibits the solar and lunar form in divine, dæmonical, and human souls, in irrational animals, in plants, and in stones themselves. It possesses therefore the series as one according to multiple ratio, the whole of which repeatedly appears in the same series, and adorns the most universal genera by more partial series. But by superparticular and subsuperparticular ratios it governs things which subsist as wholes in their participants, and are participated according to one of the things which they contain. And, according to superpartient and subsuperpartient ratios, it governs such things as are participated wholly indeed by secondary natures, but in conjunction with a division, into multitude. Thus, for instance, man participates of animal, and the whole form is in him, yet, not alone, but at the same time, the whole is according to one thing, viz. the human form; so that, together with the whole, and one certain thing* which is a part of it, it is present to its participant. But things which are called common genera, participate indeed of one genus, yet do not participate of this alone, but together with this of many other genera† which are parts, and not a part of that one genus. Thus, for instance, a mule participates of the species, from which it has a mixt generation. Each species therefore either participates of one genus according to one thing, and imitates the superparticular

will produce duple proportion, viz. 1, 2, 4. By the same process with 1, 2, 4, triple proportion will arise, viz. 1, 3, 9; and by a like process with this again, quadruple proportion, and so on. Multiple proportion being thus produced from equal terms, by inverting the order of these terms, and adopting the same process, sesquialter will be produced from duple proportion, sesquitercian from triple, &c. Thus, for instance, let the three terms 4, 2, 1, be given, which form a duple proportion: let the first be placed equal to the first, viz. to 4; the second to the first and second, viz. to 6; and the third to the first, twice the second, and the third, viz. to 4, 4, 1, or 9, and we shall have 4, 6, 9, which form a sesquialter proportion; for $\frac{6}{4} = 1\frac{1}{2} = \frac{9}{4}$. By a like process with 9, 3, 1, which form a triple proportion, a sesquitercian proportion will arise, viz. 9, 12, 16; and so of other species of superparticular proportion. In like manner, by inverting the terms which compose superparticular proportion, all the species of superpartient proportions will arise. And hence it appears that equality is the principle of all inequalities, in the same manner as the monad of all numbers.

* Thus in the superparticular ratio of 3 to 2, 2 is contained in 3, and together with it one part of 2, viz. the $\frac{1}{2}$ of it.

† Thus in the superpartient ratio of 10 to 6, 6 is contained in 10, and together with it two parts of 6, viz. 4, which is two-thirds of 6.

ratio,

ratio, which contains the whole, and one part of the whole ; or it participates of one common genus, and which is extended to many species, and thus imitates the superpartient ratio, which, together with the whole, contains more parts of it than one : and there is not any participation of forms besides these. Looking therefore to these things, we can easily assign the cause of those things which subsist according to one species, as for instance of the sun, the moon, and man ; and also of those which subsist according to many species in conjunction with that which is common. For there are many such like natures both in the earth and sea, as, for instance, satyrs and marine nymphs, the upper parts of which resemble the human form, and the lower the extremities of goats and fishes. There is also said to be a species of dragons with the faces of lions, such as these possessing an essence mingled from many things. All these ratios therefore are very properly preassumed in the soul, because they bound all the participations of forms in the universe ; nor can there be any other ratios of communion besides these, since all things are deduced into species according to these.

Again, therefore, a hebdomad of ratios corresponds to a hebdomad of parts ; and the whole soul through the whole of it is hebdomadic in its parts, in its ratios, and in its circles, being characterized by the number seven. For if the demiurgic intellect is a monad, but soul primarily proceeds from intellect, it will subsist as the hebdomad with respect to it : for the hebdomad is paternal and motherless *. And perhaps equality imparts a communion equally to all the ratios of the soul, that all may communicate with all. But multiple ratio indicates the manner in which natures that have more of the nature of unity measure such as are multiplied, wholly pervading through the whole of them ; and also the manner in which impartible natures measure such as are more distributed. Superparticular and subsuperparticular ratio appears to signify the differences according to which total reasons do not wholly communicate with each other, but possess indeed a partial habitude, yet are conjoined according to one particular thing belonging to them which is most principal. And the superpartient and subsuperpartient ratio indicates the last nature, according to which the communion of the reasons of the soul is divisible, and multiplied through subjection. For the more sublime reasons are wholly united to the whole of themselves ; but those of a middle subsistence are not

* The hebdomad is said to be motherless, because in monadic numbers 7 is not produced by the multiplication of any two numbers between 1 and 10.

united to the whole of themselves, but are conjoined according to their highest part; and those that rank in the third degree are divisibly connascent according to multitude. Thus, for instance, *essence* communicates with all reasons, measuring all their progressions; for there is nothing in them unessential: but *fameness* being itself a genus, especially collects into one communion the summits of these; and *difference* in a particular manner measures their progressions and divisions. The communion therefore of the ratios of the soul is every where exhibited: for it is either all-perfect, or it alone subsists according to summits, or according to extensions into multitude.

Again, therefore, let us in the next place attend to the manner in which the seven parts subsist*. The first part, indeed, is most intellectual and the summit of the soul, being conjoined with *the one*, and the hyparxis of its whole essence. Hence it is called one, as being *uniform*; its number is comprehended in union, and it is analogous to the cause and the center of the soul. For the soul abides according to this, and subsists in unproceeding union with wholes. And the tetrad indeed is in the first monads, on account of its stability, and its rejoicing in equality and fameness. But the number 8 is in the monads of the second order, through its subjection, and that providence of the soul which extends itself from its supreme part, as far as to the last of things. The triad is in the monads of the third order, through the circular progression of the multitude in it, to the all-perfect. And at the same time it is manifest from these things as images, that the summit of the soul, though it is uniform, is not purely one, but that this also is united multitude, just as the monad † is not without multitude, but is at the same time monad; but the one of the gods is alone *one*. And *the one* of intellect is indeed more one than multitude, though this also is multiplied; but *the one* of the soul is similarly one and multitude, just as *the one* of the natures posterior to soul, and which are divided about bodies, is more multitude than one. And *the one* of bodies is not simply one, but a phantasm and image of *the one*. Hence the Elean guest in the Sophista says, that every thing corporeal is broken in pieces, as having an adventitious one, and never ceasing to be divided. The second part multiplies the part prior to it by generative progressions, which

* Let it be remembered that the first numbers of the soul are, as we have observed in the Introduction to this Dialogue, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27.

† In the dissertation on nullities, at the end of my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, I have demonstratively shown that infinite multitude is contained causally in the monad.

the duad indicates, and unfolds all the progressions of essence. Hence also it is said to be double of the first, as imitating the indefinite duad and intelligible infinity. But the third part converts the whole soul again to its principle : and it is the third part of it which is convolved to the principles, and which indeed is measured by the first part, as being filled with union from it, but is more partially conjoined to the second part. Hence it is said to be triple of that, but sesquialter of this : for it is indeed contained from the half by the second part, as not possessing an equal power, but is perfectly contained by the first. Again the fourth, and also the fifth part, peculiarly evince that the soul presides over secondary natures : for these parts are intellectual causes of those incorporeals which are divided about bodies, since they are superficies and tetragonic ; this being derived from the second, but that from the third part ; for the fourth part is the source of progression and generation, and the fifth of conversion and perfection. For both are superficies ; but the one subsists twice from the second, and the other proceeds thrice from the third. And it appears that the one *, imitating the procession about body, is productive of generative powers, but that the other † is productive of intellectual regressions : for all knowledge converts that which knows to the thing known ; just as every nature wishes to generate, and to make a progression downwards. The sixth and seventh parts insert in the soul the primary causes of bodies, and of solid bulks : for these numbers are solid ; and the one ‡ is derived from the second part, and the other § from the third. But Timæus, in what he here says, converting things last to such as are first, and the terminations of the soul to its summit, establishes this to be octuple, and that twenty-seven times, the first. And thus the essence of the soul consists of seven parts, as abiding, proceeding, and returning, and as the cause of the progression and conversion, both of essences divisible about bodies, and of bodies themselves.

If you please you may also say, because the soul is allotted an hypostasis between impartible and partible essences, that it imitates the former through the triad, and pre-assumes the latter from the tetrad. But every soul is from all these terms, because every rational soul is the centre of wholes. The harmonic and arithmetic middles, therefore, fill these intervals, which have an essential subsistence, and are considered

* Viz. 4. † Viz. 9. ‡ Viz. 8 is derived from 2. § Viz. 27 is derived from 3.

according

according to essence, these as we have said collecting their samenesses, and those their differences.

We may likewise, approaching nearer to things themselves, say, that the soul, according to one part, viz. its summit, is united to natures prior to itself; but that, according to the double and triple parts, it proceeds from intellect and returns to it; and that, according to the double of the double, and the triple of the triple, it proceeds from itself, and is again converted to itself; and through its own middle to the principles of its essence; for abiding according to them, it is filled from them with every thing of a secondary nature. And as the progression from itself is suspended from the progression prior to itself, so the conversion to itself depends on that which is prior to itself. But the last parts, according to which the soul gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, are referred to the first part, that a circle may be exhibited without a beginning, the end being conjoined with the beginning, and that the universe may be generated animated and intellectual, solid numbers being coordinated with the first part. From these middles, also, Timæus says that sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquioctave ratios result. What else then does he wish to indicate by these things, than the more partial differences of the ratios of the soul? For the sesquialter ratios present us with an image of divisible communion indeed, but according to the first of the parts; but the sesquitercian of communion according to the parts in the middle; and the sesquioctave of that which subsists according to the extremes. Hence the middles are conjoined with each other according to the sesquioctave ratio. For when they are beheld according to opposite genera, they possess the least communion: but each is appropriately conjoined with the extremes. Timæus also adds, that all the sesquitercian ratios are filled with the interval of the sesquioctave together with the lemma, or remainder; indicating by this that the terminations of all these ratios end in more partial hypostases, until the soul has comprehended the causes of things last in the world, and which are every way divisible. For soul has previously established in herself, according to the demiurgic will, the principles of the order and harmony of these. Soul, therefore, contains the principles of harmonious progression and conversion, and of division into things first, middle, and last; and she is one intellectual reason, which is at the same time filled with all reasons.

With

With these things also accord what we have before asserted, that all its harmony consists from a quadruple diapason, with the diapente and tone. For harmony subsists in the world, in intellect, and in soul; on which account also Timæus says that soul participates of and is harmony. But the world participates of harmony decadically, soul tetradically, and intellect monadically. And as the monad is the cause of the tetrad, and the tetrad of the decad, so also intellectual harmony is the supplier of that which pertains to the soul, and that of the soul is the source of sensible harmony: for soul is the proximate paradigm of the harmony in the sensible world. Since, however, there are five figures* and centers† in the universe which give completion to the whole; hence the harmony diapente is the source of symphony according to parts to the world. Again, because the universe is divided into nine‡ parts, the sesquioctave ratio makes its communion commensurate with soul. And here you may see that soul comprehends the world according to cause, and renders it a whole, harmonizing it considered as one, as consisting of four, and of five parts, and as divided into nine parts. For the monad, tetrad, pentad, and ennead, comprehend the whole number according to which all the parts of the world are divided. Hence the ancients considered the Muses, and Apollo the leader of the Muses, as presiding over the universe, the latter supplying the one union of the whole harmony, and the former connecting its divided progression: and the eight Syrens mentioned in the Republic appear to give completion to the same numbers. Thus then, in the middle of the monad and ennead, the world is adorned tetradically and pentadically; tetradically indeed, according to the four ideas of animals which its paradigm comprehends, but pentadically according to the five figures through which the demiurgus adorned all things, introducing as Timæus says a fifth idea, and arranging this harmonically in the universe.

* Proclus here means the five regular bodies, viz. the dodecahedron, the pyramid, the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the cube. It is a remarkable property of these figures, that the sum of their sides is the same as that of their angles, and that this sum is pentadic; for it is equal to 50. Thus the dodecahedron contains 12 sides, the pyramid 4, the octahedron 8, the icosahedron 20, and the cube 6; and $12 + 4 + 8 + 20 + 6 = 50$. In like manner, with respect to their angles, the dodecahedron has 20, the pyramid 4, the octahedron 6, the icosahedron 12, and the cube 8; and $20 + 4 + 6 + 12 + 8 = 50$.

† Viz. the northern, southern, eastern and western centers, and that which subsists between these.

‡ Viz. into the five centers and the four elements considered as subsisting every where.

Again,

Again, therefore, let us say from the beginning, that the demiurgus possessing two-fold powers, the one being productive of sameness, and the other of difference, as we learn in the *Parmenides*, he both divides and binds the soul. And he is indeed the final cause of these, that the soul may become the middle of wholes, being similarly united and divided; since two things are prior to it, the gods as unities, and beings as united natures; and two things are posterior to it, viz. those natures which are divided in conjunction with others* and those which are perfectly divisible†. You may also say that *the one* is prior to the former, viz. to the gods and beings, and that *matter* is posterior to the latter; that sameness and difference which are the idioms of the demiurgic order are effective; and that the sections and bonds of the father are paradigmatic. For he first among the gods cuts and binds with infrangible bonds; theologists obscurely signifying these things when they speak of Saturnian excisions, and those bonds which the fabricator of the universe is said to hurl round himself, and of which Socrates reminds us in the *Cratylus*. We may also consider numbers as having a formal power with respect to divisions; for the parts of the soul are separated according to these. But the middles and the ratios which give completion to these are analogous to bonds: for it is impossible to consider concauses, which have the relation of matter, in souls which have an incorporeal essence. These things being premised, it is evident how the demiurgus of all division, energizing with two-fold powers, the dividing and the binding, divides from primary causes the triform nature and triple mixture of the soul, the whole soul at the same time remaining undiminished. For since he constituted the soul as a medium between an impartible essence, and that nature which is divided about bodies, and since an impartible essence is triple, abiding, proceeding and returning, hence he established a similitude of this in three parts; adumbrating its permanency by the first part, its progression by the second, and its conversion by the third. And perhaps on this account the second is said to be double of the first: for every thing which proceeds has also that which abides subsisting prior to its progression. But the third part is said to be triple of the first: for every thing which is converted proceeds also and abides. Since also soul produces the essence posterior to itself, it likewise contains in itself the whole of this essence. Hence it contains every incorporeal essence, but which is at

* Viz. corporeal forms and qualities.

† Viz. bodies.

the same time inseparable from bodies, according to the fourth and fifth parts; but every corporeal essence according to solid numbers, viz. the sixth and seventh parts. Or, it produces and converts itself to itself, according to square numbers, since it is self-subsistent* and self-energetic, but every divisible essence posterior to itself according to cube numbers. The one ratio of geometric analogy essentially binds these parts, divided as we have said into three and seven. But the harmonic middle binds them according to sameness, and the arithmetic according to difference. These two likewise lie between the geometric middle, and are said to fill the double and triple intervals, because all sameness and all difference are uniformly comprehended under essence and the harmony pertaining to it. But from these middles the multitude of sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquioctave ratios becomes apparent; which multitude is indeed binding and connective, as well as the middles, but is of a more partial nature, because each of these is a certain ratio; but each of the middles consists from many ratios, either the same or different. And as analogy or proportion is more comprehensive than ratio, so the above-mentioned middles afford a greater cause to the soul of connecting the multitude which it contains, this cause pervading intellectually through the whole of it. The sesquialter, sesquitercian, and sesquioctave ratios are, therefore, certain bonds of a more partial nature, and are comprehended in the middles, not according to different habitudes of them with respect to the extremes, for this is mathematical, but according to causal comprehension and a more total hypostasis.

Again, these bonds contain the second and third progressions of the ratios; the sesquialter comprehending through five centers the harmony of the ratios; the sesquitercian, through the four elements which subsist every where, evincing their power, and rendering all things known and allied to each other; and the sesquioctave harmonizing the division into nine and eight. Hence the ancients at one time, considering the parts of the world as eight, and at another as nine, placed over the universe eight Syrens, and

* Even square numbers are beautiful images of self-subsistence. For that which produces itself effects this by its hyparxis or summit, since the being of every thing depends on its principal part, and this is its summit. But the root of a number is evidently analogous to hyparxis; and consequently an even square number will be an image of a nature which produces itself. And hence self-production is nothing more than an involution of hyparxis.

nine Muses, from whom harmony is derived to wholes. The sesquitercian and sesquialter ratios, therefore, are more total than the sesquioctaves; and hence they are the suppliers of a more perfect symphony, and comprehend the harmonious section of the world in less numbers. Here therefore the divisions in the participants are distant from each other, but in the incorporeal ratios of the soul the more total comprehend the more partial. But since the sesquioctaves are the causes of a more partial symphony, hence that which is posterior to these is justly said to be thrust down into the extremity of the universe. Nor is it discordant to the whole of things, that divisible defluxions from each of the elements should be driven into the subterranean region. For since the elements subsist in many places, in the heavens, and in the regions under the moon, the ratio posterior to the sesquioctave collecting the last sediment of them in the subterranean region, conjoins them with wholes, that from the union of both the whole harmony of the universe may be complete. Hence we have said that the harmony of the soul is perfectly intellectual and essential, preceding according to cause sensible harmony, and that Timæus, wishing to exhibit this through images, employed harmonic ratios, presupposing that there are certain causes in the soul more comprehensive than others, and which subsist prior to every form and to all the knowledge of the soul. On this account I think it is not fit to discuss things of this kind, by explaining the parts, or the ratios, or the analogies, but we should contemplate all things essentially, according to the first division and harmony of the soul, and refer all things to a demiurgic and intellectual cause. Hence we should comprehend the sesquioctaves and remainders (*λειμματα*) in the sesquitercian and sesquialter ratios, these in the middles, and the middles in that one middle which is the most principal of all of them; and should refer more partial to more total causes, and consider the former as derived from the latter. And thus much concerning harmonic ratios.

P. 490. *He at the same time formed an eternal image flowing according to number of eternity abiding in one.*

That eternity then, says Proclus, is more venerable, has a more principal subsistence, and is as it were more stable than animal itself, though this is the most beautiful and perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato has informed us in the first part of this dialogue,

is entirely evident. For if the eternal is said to be and is eternal, as that which participates, but eternity is neither said to participate of animal itself, nor to receive its appellation from it, it is evident that the one is secondary, but the other more simple and primary. For neither does eternity participate of animal itself, because it is not an animal, nor is time a visible animal, nor any other animal. For it has been shown that animal itself is only-begotten and eternal; and hence eternity is more excellent than animal itself; since the eternal is neither that which eternity is, nor is better than eternity. But as we all acknowledge that what is endued with intellect, and that what is animated, are posterior to intellect and soul, in like manner the eternal is secondary to eternity. But here some one may say, what can be more venerable than animal itself, since it is said by Plato to be the most beautiful of intelligibles, and according to all things perfect? We reply, that it is most beautiful from receiving the summit of beauty, through vehement participation of it, but not from its transcendent participation of *the good*. For it is not said to be the *best* of intelligibles. To which we may add, that it is not simply the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but of all intelligible animals. Eternity, therefore, is not any animal, but infinite life. In the next place, it is not necessary, that what is every way perfect should be the first. For the perfect possesses all things; so that it will contain things first, middle, and last. But that which is above this division will be super-perfect. Nothing therefore hinders, but that eternity may be superior to the most beautiful and in every respect perfect animal, since intelligible animals are many, if it is the best, and super-perfect.

If these things then are rightly asserted, eternity will neither be one certain genus of being, as some have thought it to be, such as essence, or permanency, or sameness: for all these are parts of animal itself, and each of these possesses as it were an opposition, viz. essence, non-being; permanency, motion; sameness, difference; but nothing is opposed to eternity. All these therefore are similarly eternal, viz. the same, the different, permanency, motion; but this would not be the case if eternity were one of these. Eternity, therefore, is not opposed to any thing either of these, or to any of the things posterior to itself: for time, which may seem to subsist dissimilarly to eternity, in the first place, does not revolve about the same things with it, but about things which do not receive their continuous coherence from eternity; and in the next place it is an image of, and is not opposed to eternity, as Plato now says, and as we

shall shortly demonstrate. Eternity, therefore, will not be any one genus, nor the whole collection of the genera of being: for again, there would be multitude in it, and it would require the union of that which abides in one. But it is itself that which abides in one; so that it would abide, and yet not abide in one. It would abide indeed as eternity, and as the cause of union to beings, but it would not abide as being composed from multitude. To all which we may add, that it is intellect which comprehends the genera of being, and that the conception of intellect is different from that of eternity, in the same manner as the conception of soul from that of time: for the energy of intellect is intransitive intelligence, but of eternity, impartible perpetuity.

What then will eternity be, if it is neither any one of the genera of being, nor that which is composed from the five, since all these are eternal, and eternity has a prior subsistence? What else than the monad* of the intelligible unities? But I mean by unities, the ideas of intelligible animals, and the genera of all these intelligible ideas. Eternity is the one comprehension, therefore, of the summit of the multitude of these, and the cause of the invariable permanency of all things, not subsisting in the multitude of intelligibles themselves, nor being a collection of them, but in an exempt manner being present to them, by itself disposing and as it were forming them, and making them to be wholes. For perfect multitude is not unfolded into light, nor is the all-various idea of intelligibles produced immediately after *the good*; but there are certain natures between, which are more united than all-perfect multitude, but indicate a parturiency and representation of the generation of wholes, and of connected comprehension in themselves. How many, and of what kind these are, the gods know divinely, but the mystic doctrine of Parmenides will inform us in a human and philosophic manner, to which dialogue we shall refer the reader for accurate instruction in these particulars. For we shall now show that eternity is above all-perfect animal, and that it is proximately above it, from the very words of the philosopher.

Because animal itself, therefore, is said to be eternal, it will be secondary to eternity; but because there is nothing eternal prior to it, it will be proximately posterior to eternity. Whence then is this evident? Because, I say, neither is there any thing temporal prior to the world, the image of animal itself, but the world is the first participant of time, and animal itself of eternity. For if as eternity is to time, so is animal

* *Μονάς* is omitted in the original; but the sense requires that either this word, or the word *αἰτία*, cause, should be inserted.

itself to the world, then, as geometricians would say, it will be alternately as eternity is to animal itself, so is time to the world. But time is first participated by the world; for it was not prior to the orderly distribution of the universe: and hence eternity is first participated by animal itself. And if time is not the whole sensible animal (i. e. the world), for it was generated together with it, and that which is generated with a thing is not that thing with which it is generated, if this be the case, neither will eternity be intelligible animal, so that neither will it be an animal, lest there should be two intelligible animals: for Plato has before shown that animal itself is only begotten (*μονογενής*). Hence we must not say that eternity is an animal, but different from animal itself. Neither, therefore, in short, is it an animal: for it is either an animal the same with or different from animal itself, neither of which, as we have shown, can be asserted. It is not the latter, because animal itself is only begotten, nor the former, because neither is time the same with that which is temporal. But if it is participated by and does not participate of intelligible animal, it will be a god prior to it, intelligible indeed, but not yet an animal. The order of eternity, therefore, with respect to animal itself, is apparent: for it is evident that it is higher, and proximately higher, and that it is the cause to intelligibles of a subsistence according to the same things, and after the same manner. It has indeed been said to be permanency, but this is a coordinate cause, and rather affords sameness of subsistence about energy; but eternity is an exempt cause. It is also evident that it is the comprehension and union of many intelligible unities; and hence it is called by the oracles *father-begotten light**, because it illuminates all things with unific light. "For," says the Oracle, "this alone, by plucking abundantly from the strength of the father, the flower of intellect, is enabled by intellection to impart a paternal intellect to all the fountains and principles; together with intellectual energy and a perpetual permanency according to an unsluggish revolution." For, being full

* This is one of the Chaldaean Oracles, which, as I have shown in my collection of them in the Supplement to vol. iii. of the Monthly Magazine, were delivered by Chaldaean Theurgists under the reign of Marcus Antoninus. The original is as follows:

Πατρογενες φως· πολυ γαρ μονος
 Εκ πατρος αληθης δρεψαμενος νοου ανθος,
 Εχει τω νοειν πατρικον νουν ενδιδοναι
 Πασαις πηγαις τε και αρχαις
 Και το νοειν, αι τε μενε,ν ακνη στροφαλιγγη.

of paternal deity, which the Oracle calls the flower of intellect, it illuminates all things with intellect, together with an eternal sameness of intellection, and an amatory conversion and energy about the principle of all things. These things, however, I revolve in the inaccessible adyta of the dianoëtic part.

Again, investigating on all sides the intellectual conception of the philosopher about eternity, let us consider what is the meaning of its abiding in *one*. For we inquire, in what *one*? Shall we say, in *the good*, as it has appeared to the most theological of the interpreters? But neither does *the good* abide in itself, through its simplicity, as we learn in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, and therefore much less does any thing else abide in it. For, in short, nothing is in it, nor with it, in consequence of its being exempt from coordination with any thing. Hence it is not usually called good, or one, but *the good* and *the one*, that we may understand its monadic transcendency, and which is beyond every nature that is known. But now eternity is not said to abide in *the one*, but in one; so that neither does it abide in *the good*. Shall we say then, that by eternity abiding in one, its united nature as it were, its permanency in its own one, and its subsisting as one multitude, are implied? Or, in short, the number of that which does not proceed, that it may be the cause of union to the multitude of intelligibles? Shall we say that this also is true, that it may impart to itself the stable and the whole prior to things eternal? For to abide in one, is to have the whole and the same hyparxis invariably present at once. Every divine nature, therefore, begins its energy from itself, so that eternity also establishes itself in one prior to things eternal; and in a similar manner connects itself. Hence being is not the cause of permanency, as Strato* the natural philosopher says it is, but eternity†; and it is the cause of a permanency, not such as is always in generation, or becoming to be, but which, as Timæus says, invariably subsists in one. But if eternity unfolds a duad, though we are often studious to conceal it; for the ever is conjoined with being, according to the same, and *eternity is that which always is* (ἐστί τι αἰών, ο ἀείων); if this be the case, it appears to have the monad of being prior to it, and the one being, viz. the highest being, and to abide in this one,

* Strato was a philosopher of Lampsacus. He was the disciple and successor of Theophrastus; and flourished 289 years before Christ.

† For eternity is stability of being; and in like manner immortality is stability of life, and memory of knowledge.

agreeably to the doctrine of our preceptor, that the first being may be one prior to the duad, as not departing from *the one*. And the duad indeed in eternity, which causally unfolds multitude, is united to the first being in which eternity* abides; but the multitude of intelligibles is united to eternity itself, which in a transcendent and united manner comprehends and connects all their summits. For that the conception of the first being is different from that of eternity is evident; since to be for ever is perfectly different from simply to be. If therefore any thing is *eternal*, this also *is*; but the contrary does not follow, that if any thing *is*, this also is *eternal*. Hence, *to be* is more total and generative than *to be for ever*, and on this account is nearer to the cause of all beings, of the unities in beings, of generation itself, of matter, and, in short, of all things. These three, therefore, orderly succeed each other; *the one being*†, as the monad of beings; *eternity* as the duad, together with being possessing *the ever*; and *the eternal*, which participates both of being and the ever, and is not primarily eternal being, like eternity. And *the one being* is alone the cause of being to all things, whether they are truly or not truly beings; but eternity is the cause of permanency in being. And this is what Strato ought rather to have said, and not to have defined being to be the permanency of things, as he writes in his book Concerning Being, transferring the idiom of eternity to being.

Let us now attend to the following admirable account of time, by Proclus.

How then is time said by Plato to be an image of eternity? Is it because eternity abides in *one*, but time proceeds according to *number*? These things however rather indicate their dissimilitude than similitude to each other. For Plato nearly opposes all things to all, *proceeding*, to *abiding*, according to *number*, to *one*, the image to the thing itself. It is better, therefore, to say, that divinity produced these two as the measures of things, I mean eternity and time, the one of intelligible and the other of mundane beings. As the world, therefore, is said to be the image of the intelligible, so also the mundane measure is denominated the image of the intelligible measure. Eternity, however, is a measure as the one, but time as number: for each measures the former things

* As the intelligible triad, or the first procession from the ineffable cause of all, consists, as will be shown in the Introduction to the Parmenides, of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, eternity forms the middle of this triad, being, as Plotinus divinely says, infinite life, at once total and full, and abides in the summit of this triad, i. e. in being itself or the first and intelligible being.

† *To ev ev*, viz. being characterized by and wholly absorbed in *the one*; for such is the first being.

united, and the latter things numbered: and the former measures the permanency of beings, but the latter the extension of generated natures. But the apparent oppositions of these two, do not evince the dissimilitude of the measures, but that secondary are produced from more antient natures. For progression is from *abiding*, and number from *the one*. May we not therefore say, that time is on this account an image of eternity, because it is productive of the perfection of mundane natures, just as eternity connectedly contains, and is the guardian of beings. For as those natures which are unable to live according to intellect, are led under the order of Fate, left by flying from a divine nature they should become perfectly disordered; in like manner things which have proceeded from eternity, and are unable to participate of a perfection, the whole of which is established at once, and is always the same, end indeed in the government of time, but are excited by it to appropriate energies, through which they are enabled to receive the end adapted to their nature, from certain periods which restore them to their antient condition.

But how is time said to be a moveable image of eternity? Shall we say because the whole of it is in motion? Or is this indeed impossible? For nothing is moved according to the whole of itself, not even such things as are essentially changed: for the subject of these remains. Much more therefore must that which is moved, according to other motions, abide according to essence, and this if it be increased, and changed, and locally moved. For if it did not abide according to something, it would at the same time cause the motion to be evanescent; since all motion is in something. Nothing, therefore, is as we have said moved according to the whole of itself, and especially such perpetual natures as it is fit should be established in their proper principles, and abide in themselves, if they are to be continually preserved. But in a particular manner the image of eternity ought in a certain respect to possess perpetuity according to sameness, and stability; so that it is impossible that time should be moved according to the whole of itself, since neither is this possible to any thing else. Something of it, therefore, must necessarily remain, since every thing which is moved is moved in consequence of possessing something belonging to it which abides. The monad of time, therefore, abides suspended from the demiurgus; but being full of measuring power, and wishing to measure the essential motions of the soul, together with physical and corporeal motion, and also being, energies and passions, it proceeds according to number. Hence time,
abiding

abiding by its impartible and inward energy, and being participated by its external energy, and by the natures which are measured proceeds according to number; i. e. it proceeds according to a certain intellectual number, or rather according to the first number, which as Parmenides would say being analogous to *the one being*, or the first of beings, presides over intellectuals, in the same manner as the first being presides over intelligibles. Time, therefore, proceeds according to that number; and hence it distributes an accommodated measure to every mundane form.

You may also say still more appropriately, that time which is truly so called proceeds according to number, numbering the participants of itself, and being itself that intellectual number, which Socrates obscurely indicates when he says that swiftness itself and slowness itself are in true number, by which the things numbered by time differ, being moved swifter or slower. Hence Timæus does not speak with prolixity about this true number, because Socrates had previously in the Republic perfectly unfolded it, but he speaks about that which proceeds from it. For that being true number, time, says he, proceeds according to number. Let then true time proceed according to intelligible number, but it proceeds so far as it measures its participants, just as the time of which Timæus now speaks proceeds as that which is numerable, possessing yet an image of essential time, through which it numbers all things with greater or lesser numbers of their life, so that an ox lives for this and man for that period of time, and the sun and moon and the other stars accomplish their revolutions according to different measures. Time, therefore, is the measure of motion, not as that by which we measure, but as that which produces and bounds the being of life, and of every other motion of things in time, and as measuring them according to and assimilating them to paradigms. For as it refers itself to the similitude of eternity which comprehends paradigmatic causes, in like manner it sends back to a more venerable imitation of eternal principles things perfected by it, which are circularly convolved. Hence theurgists say that time is a god, and deliver to us a method by which we may excite this deity to render himself apparent. They also celebrate him as older and younger, and as a circulating and eternal God; not only as the image of eternity, but as eternally comprehending it prior to sensibles. They add further, that he intellectually perceives the whole number of all the natures that are moved in the world, according to which he leads round and

restores to their antient condition in swifter and slower periods every thing that is moved. Besides all this, they celebrate him as interminable through power, in consequence of infinite circulation. And lastly, they add that *h₂* is of a spiral form, as measuring according to one power things which are moved in a right line, and those which are moved in a circle, just as the spiral uniformly comprehends the right line and the circle.

We must not, therefore, follow those who consider time as consisting in mere naked conceptions, or who make it to be a certain accident; nor yet must we assent to those who are more venerable than these, and who approach nearer to reality, and assert with them that the idiom of time is derived from the soul of the world energizing transitively. For Plato, with whom we all desire to accord respecting divine concerns, says that the demiurgus gave subsistence to time, the world being now arranged both according to soul and according to body, and that it was inserted in the soul by him, in the same manner as harmonic reasons. Nor again, does he represent the god fashioning and generating time in the soul, in the same manner as he says the Divinity fabricated the whole of a corporeal nature within the soul, that the soul might be the despot and governor of it; but having discoursed concerning the essence, harmony, power, motions, and all various knowledges of the soul, he produces the essence of time, as the guardian and measurer of all these, and as that which assimilates them to paradigmatic principles. For what benefit would arise from all mundane natures being well-conditioned, without a perpetual permanency of subsistence; and in imitating after a manner the idea of their paradigm, but not evolving to the utmost of their power the whole of it, and in receiving partly impartible intelligence? Hence the philosopher places a demiurgic cause and not soul over the progression of time.

In the next place, looking to things themselves, you may say that if soul generated time, it would not thus participate as being perfected by it; for that soul is perfected by time, and also measured by it according to its energies, is not inmanifest, since every thing which has not the whole of its energy collectively and at once, requires time to its perfection and restoration, through which it collects its proper good, which it was incapable of acquiring impartibly, and without the circulations of time. Hence, as we have before observed, eternity and time are the measures of the permanency and perfection of things; the former being the one simple comprehension of the intelligible unities,

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and the other the boundary and demiurgic measure of the more or less extended permanency of the natures which proceed from thence. If, therefore, soul, after the same manner with intellect and the gods, apprehended every object of its knowledge by one projecting energy, and always the same, understanding immutably, it might perhaps have generated time, but would not require time to its perfection. But since it understands transitively, and according to periods by which it becomes restored to its pristine state, it is evidently dependant on time for the perfection of its energy.

After this, it is requisite to understand that inanimate natures also participate of time, and that they do not then only participate of it when they are born, in the same manner as they participate of form and habit, but also when it appears that they are deprived of all life; and this not in the same manner, as they are even then said to live, because they are coordinated with wholes, and sympathize with the universe, but they also peculiarly and essentially participate of a certain time, so far as they are inanimate, continually dissolving as far as to perfect corruption. To which we may add, that since the mutations, motions and rests pertaining to souls and bodies, and, in short, all such things as rank among opposites in mundane affairs, are measured by time, it is requisite that time should be exempt from all these; for that which is participated by many things, and these dissimilar, being one and the same, and always subsisting by itself, is participated by them conformably to this mode of subsistence; and still further, being in all things, it is every where impartible, so that it is every where one thing, impartible according to number, and the peculiarity of no one of the things which are said to subsist according to it. And this Aristotle also perceiving, demonstrates that there is something incorporeal and impartible in divisible natures, and which is every where the same, meaning by this the *now* in time. Further still, time not being essence, but an accident, it would not thus indicate a demiurgic power, so as to produce some things perpetually in generation, or becoming to be, but others with a more temporal generated subsistence; and some things more slowly proceeding to being than these, but swifter than more imbecil natures; at the same time distributing to all things an accommodated and proper measure of permanency in beings. But if time is a demiurgic essence, it will not be the whole soul, nor a part of soul; for the conception of soul is different from that of time, and each is the cause of different and not of the same things. For soul imparts life, and moves all things, and hence the work, so far as it approaches to soul, is filled with life,

and participates of motion ; but time excites fabrications to their perfection, and is the supplier of measure and a certain perpetuity to wholes. It will not, therefore, be subordinate to soul, since soul participates of it, if not essentially, yet according to its transitive energies. For the soul of the universe is said to energize incessantly, and to live intellectually through the whole of time. It remains, therefore, that time is an essence, and not secondary to that of soul. In short, if eternity were the progeny of intellect, or were a certain intellectual power, it would be necessary to say that time also is something of this kind pertaining to soul : but if eternity is the exempt measure of the multitude of intelligibles, and the comprehension of the perpetuity and perfection of all things, must not time also have the same relation to soul and the animastic order? So that time will differ from eternity, in the same manner as all proceeding natures from their abiding causes. For eternity exhibits more transcendence with respect to the things measured by it than time, since the former comprehends in an exempt manner the essences and the unities of intelligibles ; but the latter does not measure the essences of the first souls, as being rather coordinated and generated together with them. Intelligibles also are more united with eternity than mundane natures with time. The union indeed of the former is so vehement, that some of the more contemplative philosophers have considered eternity to be nothing else than one total intellect ; but no wise man would be willing to consider time as the same with the things existing in time, through the abundant separation and difference between the two.

If then time is neither any thing belonging to motion, nor an attendant on the energy of soul, nor, in short, the offspring of soul, what will it be ? For perhaps it is not sufficient to say that it is the measure of mundane natures, nor to enumerate the goods of which it is the cause, but to the utmost of our power we should endeavour to apprehend its idiom. May we not therefore say, since its essence is most excellent, perfective of soul, and present to all things, that it is an intellect, not only abiding but also subsisting in motion ? Abiding indeed according to its inward energy, and by which it is truly eternal, but being moved according to its externally proceeding energy, by which it becomes the boundary of all transition. For eternity possessing the abiding, both according to its inward energy, and that which it exerts to things eternal, time being assimilated to it according to the former of these energies, becomes separated from it according to the latter, abiding and being moved. And as with respect to the essence of

the soul, we say that it is intelligible, and at the same time generated, partible, and at the same time impartible, and are no otherwise able perfectly to apprehend its middle nature than by employing after a manner opposites, what wonder is there if, perceiving the nature of time to be partly immovable and partly subsisting in motion, we, or rather not we, but prior to us, the philosopher, through *the eternal*, should indicate its intellectual monad abiding in sameness, and through *the moveable* its externally proceeding energy, which is participated by soul and the whole world? For we must not think that the expression *the eternal* simply indicates that time is the image of eternity, for if this were the case, what would have hindered Plato from directly saying that it is the *image*, and not the *eternal image* of eternity? But he was willing to indicate this very thing, that time has an eternal nature, but not in such a manner as animal itself is said to be eternal: for that is eternal both in essence and energy; but time is partly eternal, and partly, by its external gift, moveable. Hence theurgists call it eternal, and Plato very properly denominates it not *only* so; for one thing is *alone* moveable, both essentially and according to the participants of it, being *alone* the cause of motion, as soul, and hence it *alone* moves itself and other things: but another thing is *alone* immovable, preserving itself without transition, and being the cause to other things of a perpetual subsistence after the same manner, and to moveable natures through soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the medium between these two extremes should be that which, both according to its own nature, and the gifts which it imparts to others, is immovable and at the same time moveable, essentially immovable indeed, but moved in its participants. But a thing of this kind is time; hence time is truly, so far as it is considered in itself, immovable, but so far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and subsists together with them, unfolding itself into them. It is therefore eternal, and a monad, and center essentially, and according to its own abiding energy; but it is, at the same time, continuous and number, and a circle, according to its proceeding and being participated. Hence it is a certain proceeding intellect, established indeed in eternity, and on this account is said to be eternal. For it would not otherwise contribute to the assimilation of mundane natures to more perfect paradigms, unless it were itself previously suspended from them. But it proceeds and abundantly flows into the things which are guarded by it. Whence I think the chief of theurgists celebrate time as a god, as Julian in the seventh of the Zones, and venerate it by these names, through which it is unfolded in
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its participants; causing some things to be older, and others to be younger, and leading all things in a circle. Time, therefore, possessing a certain intellectual nature, circularly leads according to number, both its other participants and souls. For time is eternal, not in essence only, but also in its inward energy; but so far as it is participated by externals, it is alone moveable, coextending and harmonizing with them the gift which it imparts. But every soul is transitively moved, both according to its inward and external energies, by the latter of which it moves bodies. And it appears to me that those who thus denominated time *χρονος*, had this conception of its nature, and were therefore willing to call it as it were *χρονευοντος νους*, an intellect moving in measure; but dividing the words perhaps for the sake of concealment, they called it *χρονος*. Perhaps too, they gave it this appellation because it abides, and is at the same time moved in measure; by one part of itself abiding, and by the other proceeding with measured motion. By the conjunction, therefore, of both these, they signify the wonderful and demiurgic nature of this god. And it appears, that as the demiurgus being intellectual began from intellect to adorn the universe, so time being itself supermundane, began from soul to impart perfection. For that time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is evident; since as eternity is to animal itself, so is time to this world, which is animated and illuminated by intellect, and wholly an image of animal itself, in the same manner as time of eternity.

Time, therefore, while it abides, moves in measure; and through its abiding, its measured motions are infinite, and are restored to their pristine state. For moving in measure, the first of intellects about the whole fabrication of things, so far as it perpetually subsists after the same manner, and is intellect according to essence, it is said to be eternal; but so far as it moves in measure, it circularly leads souls, and natures, and bodies, and, in short, periodically restores them to their pristine condition. For the world is moved indeed, as participating of soul; but it is moved in an orderly manner, because it participates of intellect; and it is moved periodically with a motion from the same to the same, imitating the permanency of the intellect which it contains, through the resemblance of time to eternity. And this it is to make the world more similar to its paradigm; viz. by restoring it to one and the same condition, to assimilate it to that which abides in one, through the circulation according to time. From these things also, you have all the causes of time according to Plato; the demiurgus indeed,

as the fabricative cause; eternity as the paradigm; and the end the circulation of the things moved to that which is one, according to periods. For in consequence of not abiding in one, it aspires after that which is one, that it may partake of *the one*, which is the same with *the good*. For it is evident that the progression of things is not one, and in a right line, infinitely extended as it were both ways, but is bounded and circumscribed, moving in measure about the father of wholes, and the monad of time infinitely evolving all the strength of fabrication, and again returning to its pristine state. For whence are the participants of time enabled to return to their pristine condition, unless that which is participated possessed this power and peculiarity of motion? Time, therefore, the first of things which are moved, circulating according to an energy proceeding to externals, and returning to its pristine state, after all the evolution of its power, thus also restores the periods of other things to their former condition. By the whole progression of itself indeed, it circularly leads the soul which first participates of it; but by certain parts of itself, it leads round other souls and natures, the celestial revolutions, and among things last, the whole of generation: for in consequence of time circulating all things circulate; but the circles of different natures are shorter and longer. For again, if the demiurgus himself made time to be a moveable image of eternity, and gave it subsistence according to his intellection about eternity, it is necessary that what is moveable in time, should be circular and moved in measure, that it may not apostatize from, and may evolve the intelligence of the father about eternity. For, in short, since that which is moveable in time is comprehensive of all motions, it is requisite that it should be bounded much prior to the things which are measured by it: for not that which is deprived of measure, but the first measure, measures things; as neither does infinity bound, but the first bound. But time is moved, neither according to soul, nor according to nature, nor according to that which is corporeal and apparent; since its motions would thus be divisible, and not comprehensive of wholes. It would likewise thus participate of irregularity, either more or less, and its motions would be indigent of time. For all of them are beheld in time, and not in progression, as those which are the measures of wholes, but in a certain quality of life, or lation, or passion. But the motion of time is a pure and invariable progression, equal and similar, and the same. For it is exempt both from regular and irregular motions, and is similarly present to both, not receiving any alteration through the motions themselves being changed, but remain-

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ing the same separate from all inequality, being energetic and restorative of whole motions according to nature, of which also it is the measure. It also subsists unmingled with the natures which it measures, according to the idiom of its intellectual energy, but proceeds transitively, and according to the peculiarity of self-motion. And in this respect, indeed, it accords with the order of soul, but is inherent in the things which are bounded and perfected by it according to a primary cause of nature. It is not however similar in all respects to any one thing. For in a certain respect it is necessary that the measure of wholes should be similar to all things, and be allied to all things, but yet not be the same with any one of the things measured.

The motion, therefore, of time proceeds evolving and dividing impartible and abiding power, and causing it to appear partible; being as it were a certain number, divisibly receiving all the forms of the monad, and reverting and circulating to itself. For thus the motion of time proceeding according to the measures in the temporal monad conjoins the end with the beginning, and this infinitely; possessing indeed itself a divine order, not *arranged* as the philosopher Jamblichus also says, but that which *arranges*; nor an order which is attendant on things precedent, but which is the primary leader of effects. This motion is also at the same time measured, not indeed from any thing endowed with interval, for it would be ridiculous to say that things which have a more ancient nature and dignity, are measured by things subordinate, but it is measured from the temporal monad alone, which its progression is said to evolve, and by a much greater priority from the demiurgy, and from eternity itself. With relation to eternity, therefore, which is perfectly immovable, time is said to be moveable; just as if some one should say that soul is divisible about bodies, when considered with relation to intellect, not that it is this alone, but that when compared with intellect, it may appear to be such, though when compared with a divisible essence, it is indivisible. Time, therefore, is moveable not in-itself, but according to the participation from it which appears in motions, and by which they are measured and bounded; just as if it should be said that soul is divisible about bodies, so far as there is a certain divisible participation of it about these of which it comprehends the cause. For thus also time is moveable, as possessing the cause of the energy externally proceeding from it, and which is divisibly apparent in motions, and is separated together with them. As motions, therefore, become temporal through participation, so time is moveable, through being participated by motions.

P. 499. *Whatever ideas, therefore, intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itself, &c.*

The demiurgic wholeness, says Proclus * (p. 266), weaves parts in conjunction with wholes, numbers with monads, and makes every part of the universe to be a world, and causes a whole and a universe to subsist in a part. For the world is allotted this from its similitude to animal itself, because animal itself is an entire monad and number, an all-perfect intelligible intellect, and a plenitude of intelligible causes, which it generated so as to abide eternally in itself. For there is one multitude which abides in causes, and another which proceeds and is distributed; since the demiurgus himself also gives subsistence to some genera of gods in himself, and produces others from himself, into secondary and third orders. His father Saturn likewise generates some divinities as paradigmatic causes of fabrication abiding in himself, and others as demiurgic causes coordinated with wholes. And the grandfather of Jupiter, Heaven, contains some divinities in, and separates others from himself. Theologists also manifest these things by mystic names, such as *concealment*, *absorption*, and *the being educated by Fate*. But by a great priority to these, intelligible intellect, the father of wholes, generates some causes, and unfolds them into light, in himself, but produces others from himself; containing within his own comprehensions, such as are uniform, whole, and all-perfect, but producing through difference into other orders such as are multiplied and divided. Since therefore every paternal order gives subsistence to things after this manner, this world, which is an imitation of the intelligible orders, and is elevated to them, very properly contains one *allness* prior to partial animals, and another, that which receives its completion from them, and together with the former receives the latter, that it may be most similar both to the demiurgic and paradigmatic cause.

With respect to animal itself, we have before said what it is according to our opinion, and we shall also now say, that of the intelligible extent, one thing is the highest, united

* The beginning of the Commentary on this part of the Timæus is unfortunately wanting in the original; and by a strange confusion, the words *καὶ ἡ τελευτή*, which there form the beginning, are connected with the comment on the preceding text, which comment is also imperfect; and what is still more strange, the part which is wanting to the completion of this preceding comment is to be found in p. 270, beginning at the words *τοὺς οὐρανούς*, line 11.

and occult; another is the power of this, proceeding, and at the same time abiding; and another, that which unfolds itself through energy, and exhibits the intelligible multitude which it contains. Of these also, the first is intelligible being, the second intelligible life, and the third intelligible intellect. *Animal itself*, however, cannot be the first being: for multitude is not there, nor the tetrad of ideas, but through its singleness and ineffable union it is called *one* by Plato. And, in short, animal itself is said to participate of eternity, but the first being participates of nothing, unless some one should say it participates of *the one*, which is itself a thing in every respect deserving consideration. For may we not say that what is above being itself, is even more excellent than this appellation *the one*? But that is primarily *one*, which is not such according to participation. Animal itself, therefore, cannot be being itself, through the above-mentioned causes. Neither can it be intelligible life: for animal is secondary to life, and is said to be animal by a participation of life. In short, if animal itself were the second, eternity would be being; but this is impossible: for being itself is one thing, and eternal being another; the former being the monad of being, and the latter the duad, having the ever connected with being. Besides the former is the cause of being to all things, but the latter, of their permanency according to being. If therefore animal itself is neither the one being, nor being itself, nor that which is immediately posterior to this, for eternity is this, being intelligible power, infinite life, and wholeness itself, according to which every divine nature is at once a whole; since this is the case, animal itself must be the remaining third. For animal itself must necessarily in a certain respect be intellect, since the image of it entirely subsists with sense, but sense is the image of intellect; so that in that which is primarily animal, intellect will be primarily inherent. If therefore it is secondary to life, it must necessarily subsist according to intelligible intellect: for being intelligible, and an animal, as Plato says, the most beautiful of intelligibles, and only begotten, it will possess this order. Hence animal itself is intelligible intellect, comprehending the intellectual orders of the gods in itself, of which also it is collective, unific, and perfective, being the most beautiful boundary of intelligibles, unfolding their united and unknown cause to intellectual natures, exciting itself to all-various ideas and powers, and producing all the secondary orders of the gods. Hence also Orpheus calls it the god Phanes, as unfolding into light the intelligible unities, and ascribes to him *the forms of animals*, because the first cause of intelligible animals shines forth in him; and *multiform ideas*,

ideas, because he primarily comprehends intelligible ideas. He also calls him *the key of intellect*, because he bounds the whole of an intelligible essence, and connectedly contains intellectual life. To this mighty divinity the demiurgus of the universe is elevated, being himself, indeed, as we have before said, intellect, but an *intellectual* intellect, and particularly the cause of intellect. Hence he is said to behold animal itself: for to behold is the peculiarity of the intellectual gods; since the *theologist* * also denominates intelligible intellect *eyeless*. Concerning this intellect therefore he says,

Love, eyeless, rapid, feeding in his breast.

For the object of his energy is intelligible. But the demiurgus being intellect, is not a participated intellect †, that he may be the demiurgus of wholes, and that he may be able to look to animal itself. But being imparticipable, he is truly intellectual intellect. And, indeed, through simple intelligence, he is conjoined with the intelligible, but through various intelligence, he hastens to the generation of secondary natures. Plato, therefore, calls his intelligence *vision*, as being without multitude, and as shining with intelligible light; but he denominates his second energy *dianoëtic*, as proceeding through simple intelligence to the generation of demiurgic works. And Plato indeed says, that he *looks* to animal itself; but Orpheus, that he *leaps to and absorbs it*, Night ‡ pointing it out to him: for through this goddess, who is both intelligible and intellectual, intellectual intellect is conjoined with the intelligible. You must not however on this account say, that the demiurgus looks to that which is external to himself: for this is not lawful to him; but that being converted to himself, and to the fountain of ideas which he contains, he is also conjoined with the monad of the all-various orders of forms. For since we say that our soul by looking to itself knows all things, and that things prior are not external to it, how is it possible that the demiurgic intellect, by understanding itself, should not in a far greater degree survey the intelligible world? For animal itself is also contained in him, though not monadically, but according to a certain divine number. Hence he is said by theologists, as we have observed, to absorb the intelligible

* Viz. Orpheus.

† Viz. he is not an intellect consubstantial with soul.

‡ Night subsists at the summit of that divine order which is denominates intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.

god, being himself intellectual, in consequence of containing the whole of an intelligible essence, formal divisions, and the intelligible number, which Plato indicating denominates the ideas of the demiurgus, *such* and *so many*, by the former of these appellations manifesting the idioms of causes, and by the latter, *separation according to number*.

If these things then subsist after this manner, it is not proper to place an infinity of forms in intelligibles: for that which is definite is more allied to principles than the indefinite; and first natures are always more contracted in quantity, but transcend in power natures posterior to and proceeding from them. Nor must we say with some, that animal itself is separate from the demiurgus, thus making the intelligible to be external to intellect: for we do not make that which is seen subordinate to that which sees, that it may be external, but we assert that it is prior to it: and more divine intelligibles are understood by such as are more various, as being contained in them; since our soul also entering into itself, is said to discover all things, divinity and wisdom, as Socrates asserts. Animal itself therefore is prior and not external to the demiurgus. And there indeed all things subsist totally and intelligibly, but in the demiurgus intellectually and separately: for in him the definite causes of the sun and moon presubsist, and not one idea alone of the celestial gods, which gives subsistence to all the celestial genera. Hence the Oracles assert *, that his demiurgic energies burst about the bodies of the world like swarms of bees: for a divine intellect evolves into every demiurgic multitude the total separation of these energies in intellect.

P. 499.—*But these ideas are four, &c.*

As with respect to demiurgic intelligence, a monad is the leader of intellectual multitude, and as with respect to paradigm, unical form subsists prior to number, in like manner discourse, the interpreter of divine concerns, shadowing forth the nature of the things of which it is the messenger, first receives the whole of the thing known collectively, and according to enthusiastic projection, but afterwards expands that which is convolved, unfolds the one intelligence through arguments, and divides that which is united; conformably to the nature of things, at one time interpreting their union, and at another their separation, since it is neither naturally adapted, nor is able to comprehend both

* Viz. The Chaldean Oracles. See the Parmenides.

these at once. Agreeably to this, the discourse of Plato first divinely unfolds the whole number of intelligible ideas, and afterwards distributes into parts the progressions which this number contains : for there intelligible multitude is apparent, where the first monads of ideas subsist. And that this is usual with Plato we have before abundantly shown. Descending therefore from words to things, let us in the first place see what this tetrad itself of ideas is, and whence this number originates, and in the next place what the four ideas are, and how they subsist in animal itself, whether so as that its all perfect nature receives its completion from these, or after some other manner, for by thus proceeding we shall discover the divinely intellectual conception of Plato. It is necessary, however, again to recur to the above-mentioned demonstrations, in which we said that the first, united, and most simple intelligible essence of the gods, proceeding supernally from the unity of unities, but according to a certain mode which is ineffable and incomprehensible by all things, one part of this essence ranks as the first, is occult and paternal ; but another part ranks as the second, and is the one power, and incomprehensible measure of wholes ; and the third part is that which has proceeded into energy and all various powers, and is at the same time both paternal and fabricative. The first of these also is a monad, because it is the summit of the whole intelligible extent, and the fountain and cause of divine numbers ; but the second is a duad, for it both abides and proceeds as in intelligible genera, and has *the ever* connected with being ; and the third is the tetrad which is now investigated, which receives all the occult cause of the monad, and unfolds in itself its unproceeding power. For such things as subsist in the monad primarily, and with unproceeding union, the tetrad exhibits in a divided manner, now separated according to number, and a production into secondary natures. But since the third possesses an order adapted to it, yet also entirely participates of the causes prior to itself, it is not only the tetrad, but besides this which is still greater, as a monad it is allotted a paternal, and as a duad a fabricative and prolific transcendence. So far therefore as it is called animal itself, it is the monad of the nature of all animals, intellectual, vital, and corporeal ; but so far as it comprehends at the same time the male and female nature, it is a duad ; for these subsist in an appropriate manner in all the orders of animals, in one way in the gods, in another in dæmons, and in another in mortals ; but so far as from this duad, it gives subsistence to the four ideas of animals in itself, it is a tetrad ; for the fourfold fabrication of things proceeds according to these ideas, and the first productive
cause

cause of wholes is the tetrad. Plato therefore teaching this tetradic power of the paradigm, and the most unical ideas of mundane natures, says, that they are four, comprehended in one animal itself. For there is one idea there, animal itself; and there is also a duad, viz. the female and the male, or, according to Plato, possessing genera and species: for he calls two of the ideas genera, viz. the intellectual and the air-wandering, but the other two species, as being subordinate to these. There is also a tetrad; and as far as to this, intelligible forms proceed into other productive principles according to a different number. For according to every order there is an appropriate number, the lesser comprehending more total ideas, but the more multiplied number such as are more partial; since more divine natures being contracted in quantity, possess a transcendency of power; and the forms of second natures are more multiplied than those prior to them; such as are intellectual more than intelligibles, supermundane than intellectual, and mundane than supermundane forms. These then are the forms which proceed to an ultimate distribution, just as intelligibles receive the highest union: for all progression diminishes power and increases multitude. If therefore Timæus discoursed about a certain intellectual order, he would have mentioned another number, as for instance the hebdomadic or decadic; but since he speaks about the intelligible cause of ideas, and which comprehends all such animals as are intelligible, he says that the first ideas are four. For there the tetrad subsists proceeding from the intelligible monad, and filling the demiurgic decad. For "divine number, according to the Pythagorean hymn upon it, proceeds from the retreats of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad, which produces the mother of all things, the universal recipient, venerable, placing a boundary about all things, undeviating and unwearied, which both immortal gods and earth-born men call the sacred decad *." Here the uniform and occult cause of being† is called the undecaying monad, and the retreats of the monad: but the manifestation of intelligible multitude, which the duad subsisting between the monad and tetrad unfolds, is denominated the divine tetrad; and the world itself receiving images of all the divine numbers, supernally imparted to it, is the decad: for thus we may understand these verses looking to the fabrication of the world. And thus much concerning this tetrad.

* The last line of these verses, viz. *ἀθάνατοι τε θεοί, καὶ γένεσις ἀνθρώπων*, is not in Proclus, but is added from the Commentaries of Syrianus on Aristotle's Metaphysics, where alone it is to be found.

† Viz. The summit of the intelligible triad, or superessential being.

In the next place, let us consider what the four ideas are, and what are the things to which they give subsistence: for there are different opinions concerning this, some especially regarding the words of Plato, asserting that the progression is into gods, and the mortal genera, but others looking to things, that it is into gods, and the genera superior to man, because these subsist prior to mortals, and it is necessary that the demiurgus should not immediately produce mortals from divine natures. Others again conjoin both these, and follow what is written in the *Epinomis*, that gods subsist in the heavens, dæmons in the air, demigods in water, and men and other mortal animals in the earth. Such then being the diversity of opinion among the interpreters, we admire indeed the lovers of things, but we shall endeavour to follow our leader *. Hence we say that the celestial genus of gods comprehends all the *celestial* genera, whether they are divine, angelic, or dæmoniacal; but the *air-wandering*, all such as are arranged in the air, whether gods, or their attendant dæmons, or mortal animals that live in the air. Again, that the *aquatic* comprehends all the genera that are allotted water, and those natures that are nourished in water; and the *pedestrial*, the animals that are distributed about the earth, and that subsist and grow in the earth. For the demiurgus is at once the cause of all mundane natures, and the common father of all things, generating the divine and dæmoniacal genera by and through himself alone, but delivering mortals to the junior gods, as they are able proximately to generate them. The paradigm also is not the cause of some, but by no means of other animals, but it possesses the most total causes of all things.

It is also requisite to consider the proposed words in an appropriate manner, according to every order; as, for instance, the genus of gods arranged in the heavens, in one way, in those that are properly called gods, and in another, in the genera more excellent than man. For we say that there are celestial angels, dæmons, and heroes, and that all these are called gods, because the divine idiom has dominion over their essential peculiarity. Again, we must consider the winged and air-wandering in one way in the aerial gods, in another in dæmons, and in another in mortals. For that which is *intellectual* in the gods, is denominated *winged*; that which is *providential*, *air-wandering*, as pervading through all the sphere of the air, and connectedly containing the whole of it. But in dæmons, *the winged* signifies rapidity of *energy*; and *the air-wandering* indicates their being every where present, and proceeding through all things without impediment.

* Viz. Syrianus, the preceptor of Proclus.

And in mortals, *the winged* manifests the motion through one organ of those natures that alone employ the circular motion ; but *the air-wandering*, the all-various motion through bodies : for nothing hinders partial souls that live in the air from pervading through it. Again, *the aquatic* in divine natures, indicates a government inseparable from water : and hence the oracle calls these gods *water-walkers* * ; but in the genera attendant on the gods, it signifies that which is connective of a moist nature. And indeed *the pedestrial*, in one place, signifies that which connectedly contains the last seat of things, and proceeds through it, in the same manner as *the terrestriat*, that which stably rules over this seat, and is perfective of it through all-various powers and lives ; but in another place it signifies the government at different times of different parts of the earth, through an appropriate motion. And thus much concerning the names.

But from these things it may be inferred that intelligible animal itself is entirely different from animal itself in the demiurgus ; since the former has not definite ideas of mortal animals. For the demiurgus wishing to assimilate what the world contains to every thing in himself, produced mortal animals, that he might make the world all-perfect ; but he comprehends the definite ideas of these, producing them from the immortal genera. He knows therefore mortal animals, and it is evident that he knows them *formally* ; and he thinks fit that the junior gods, looking to him, and not to animal itself, should fabricate them, in consequence of containing in himself separately the ideas of mortals and immortals. In animal itself, therefore, with respect to the ærial, or aquatic, or terrestriat, there was one idea of each of these, the cause of all ærial, aquatic, or pedestrial animals, but they are divided in the demiurgus ; and some are formal comprehensions of immortal ærial, and others of mortal ærial animals ; and after the same manner with respect to the aquatic and terrestriat genera. The formal multitude therefore in animal itself, is not the same with that in the demiurgus, as may be inferred from these arguments.

We may also see that Plato makes a division of these genera into monad and triad, (opposing the summit of the celestial genus to the total genera,) and into two duads. For he denominates the celestial and winged, genus, but the aquatic and pedestrial, species ; the

* Here, also by an unaccountable mistake, all that follows after the word *ὕδροπατος*, *water-walkers*, which is in p. 270, and which ought immediately to follow this word, begins near the bottom of p. 272, at the words *ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ποταμῶν*, &c.

latter possessing an order subordinate to the former, in the same manner as species to genus. It is likewise requisite to observe that he omits the region of fire in these, because the divine genus comprehends the summit of fire. For of sublunary bodies, fire has not any proper region, but subsists according to mutation alone, always requiring the nourishment of air and water. For its proper place, as fire, is on high : but neither is it there, since it would be seen, being naturally visible ; nor can it arrive thither, being extinguished by the surrounding air, which is dissimilar to it. If, therefore, it is requisite that there should be a wholeness of fire, and that possessing a form it should be somewhere, and not alone consist in being generated, and if there is no such fire under the moon, fire will alone subsist in the heavens, abiding such as it is, and always possessing its proper place. For a motion upwards* is not the property of fire when subsisting according to nature, but is alone peculiar to fire when subsisting contrary to nature. Thus also the SACRED DISCOURSE of the Chaldeans conjoins things aerial with the lunar ratlings, attributing to fire the celestial region, according to a division of the elements in the world. For the fire in generation is a certain defluxion of the celestial fire, and is in the cavities of the other elements. There is not however a sphere of fire by itself, but the summit of air imitates the purity of supernal fire. And we denominate this sublunary fire, and call the region under the heavens the place of fire : for this is most similar to the celestial profundity, as the termination of air is to water, which is gross and dark. But you should not wonder if the most attenuated and pure fire will be in the summits of air, as the most gross and turbid is in the bosom of the earth ; not making this pure fire to be a wholeness different from the whole air, but considering it, being most attenuated, as carried in the pores of the air, which are most narrow. Hence it is not seen through two causes ; from not being distinct from the air, and from consisting of the smallest parts : so that it does not resist our sight in the same manner as the light of visible objects. True fire, therefore, subsists in the heavens ; but of sublunary fire, that which is most pure, is in the air proximate to the celestial regions, which Plato in the course of this Dialogue calls æther ; and that which is most gross, is contained in the recesses of the earth.

* Agreeably to this, Plotinus observes, that every body, when in its proper place, is either at rest, or moves circularly.

INDEX TO *THE LAWS.*

BOOK	PAGE
I. - - - -	- 5
II. - - - -	- 36
III. - - - -	- 65
IV. - - - -	- 96
V. - - - -	- 120
VI. - - - -	- 143
VII. - - - -	- 180
VIII. - - - -	- 221
IX. - - - -	- 245
X. - - - -	- 293
XI. - - - -	- 226
XII. - - - -	- 353

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AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

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THE PARMENIDES:

A DIALOGUE

ON THE GODS.

E R R A T A.

Vol. III. p. 35, in the last line, for *infinite, multitude*, read *infinite multitude*.

———— p. 581, lines, 26, 27, 28, 29, for the word *mere*, in each of these lines, read *more*.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PARMENIDES.

IT was the custom of Pythagoras and his followers, amongst whom Plato holds the most distinguished rank, to conceal divine mysteries under the veil of symbols and figures; to dissemble their wisdom against the arrogant boastings of the Sophists; to jest seriously, and sport in earnest. Hence, in the following most important dialogue, under the appearance of a certain dialectic sport, and, as it were, logical discussion, Plato has delivered a complete system of the profound and beautiful theology of the Greeks. For it is not to be supposed that he, who in all his other dialogues introduces discussions adapted to the character of the principal speaker, should in this dialogue deviate from his general plan, and exhibit Parmenides, a venerable and aged philosopher, engaged in the puerile exercise of a merely logical disputation. Besides, it was usual with the Pythagoreans and Plato to form an harmonious conjunction of many materials in one subject, partly in imitation of nature, and partly for the sake of elegance and grace. Thus, in the *Phædrus*, Plato mingles oratory with theology; in the *Timæus*, mathematics with physics; and in the present dialogue, dialectic with divine speculations.

But the reader must not suppose that the dialectic of Plato is the same with vulgar dialectic, which is conversant with opinion, and is accurately investigated in Aristotle's *Topics*: for the business of this first of sciences, which at present is utterly unknown, is to employ definitions, divisions, analyses, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the progressions of beings from the first principle of things, and their continual conversion to it, as the ultimate object of desire. "But there are three energies," says Proclus¹, "of this most scientific method:

¹ In MSS. Comment. in *Parmenidem*, lib. i.

the first of which is adapted to youth, and is useful for the purpose of rousing their intellect, which is, as it were, in a dormant state; for it is a true exercise of the eye of the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth through opposite positions the essential impression of reasons which it contains, and considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing worthy of belief; and, lastly, stimulating the all-various conceptions of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the speculation of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established upon a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates, by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analysing, defining, demonstrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till, having entirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now arrived at the end of her search: and you may say that what is delivered in the *Phædrus* and *Sophista* is the employment of this energy, giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations of the dialectic art; and on this account it is assigned to such as philosophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy, which is exhibitivè according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance when its reasons are employed upon men full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the *Sophista*." So that the dialectic energy is triple, either subsisting through opposite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood.

Parmenides by means of this dialectic perfects the conceptions of Socrates about ideas. For, as Proclus well observes, the mode of discourse is every where obfetric, but does not confute; and is explorative, but not defensive. But it differs, considered as sometimes proceeding from on high to such things as are last, and sometimes ascending from sensible particulars to such reasons as are accommodated to divine causes; but, according to each of these, it elevates Socrates, calls forth his native conceptions concerning ideas, and causes them to possess an expanded distinction. And in this respect,

spe&ct, says Proclus, Parmenides truly imitates the paternal cause of the universality of things, who from the supreme hypostasis of all beings, preserves and perfects all things, and draws them upwards by his unknown and ineffable powers.

With respect to the dramatic apparatus of this dialogue, it is necessary to observe, that the Athenians had two festivals in honour of Minerva; the former of which, on account of the greater preparation required in its celebration, was called *the greater Panathenaia*; and the latter, on account of its requiring a less apparatus, was denominated *the lesser Panathenaia*. The celebration of them, likewise, was distinguished by longer and shorter periods of time. In consequence, therefore, of the greater festival taking place, sacred to Minerva, Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens, Parmenides being the master, and Zeno his disciple; but both of them Eleat&ans—and not only this, says Proclus, but partakers of the Pythagoric doctrine, according to the relation of Callimachus the historian. Parmenides and Zeno, therefore, in a place called the Ceramicus, beyond the walls of the city, and which was sacred to the statues of the Gods, met with one Pythodorus, together with Socrates and many other Athenians, who came thither for the purpose of hearing the writings of Zeno. The ensuing dialogue, which was the consequence of Zeno's discourse, was afterwards related by Pythodorus to one Antiphon, the brother on the mother's side of Adimantus and Glaucus, who were the brothers of Plato, both from the same father and mother; and the dialogue is supposed to be again related by Antiphon to Cephalus and his companions, in consequence of their soliciting Adimantus and Glaucus to request Antiphon for the narration.

Zeno, therefore, having read to the audience a book, in which he endeavoured to exhibit the difficulties attending the doctrine which asserts the existence of *the many*, and this in order to defend the favourite dogma of Parmenides, who called *being, the one*; Socrates by no means opposes his arguments, but readily admits the errors which must ensue from supposing multitude to exist, without participating *the one*. However, Socrates does not rest here, but urges Zeno to a speculation of *the one* and the *unities* which subsist in intelligible natures, not enduring to dwell on the contemplation of *the one* which sensibles contain: and this leads him to the investigation of ideas in which the unities of things reside. After this Parmenides,

not in the least contradicting Socrates, but completing the contemplation which he had begun, unfolds the entire doctrine of ideas, introducing for this purpose four questions concerning them: whether they have a subsistence; of what things there are ideas, and of what not; what kind of beings they are, and what power they possess: and how they are participated by subordinate natures. And this being discussed, Parmenides ascends from hence to *the one* which subsists above intelligibles and ideas, and adduces nine hypotheses concerning it; five, supposing *the one* to have a subsistence, and four, supposing it not to subsist; accurately investigating, at the same time, the consequences resulting from these hypotheses. But of this more hereafter.

With respect to ideas, though many invincible arguments may be adduced for their existence, the following appear to me remarkable for their perspicuity and strength. Diversity of powers always indicates diversity of objects. But it is obvious to every one, that the power of intellect is different from the power of sense; that which is sensible, therefore, is one thing, and that which is intelligible another. And as intellect is superior to sense, so is intelligible more excellent than that which is sensible. But that which is sensible has an existence; and by a much greater reason, therefore, that which is intelligible must have a real subsistence. But intelligible is a certain universal species; for universal reason is always the object of intelligence. And hence there are such things as intelligible and common species of things which we call ideas.

Again, all corporeal natures subsist in time; but whatever subsists in time is measured by time; and whatever is thus conditioned depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is composed of the past, present, and future. And if we conceive that any one of these periods is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time, therefore, is so essentially and intimately united with the natures which it measures, that their being, such as it is, depends on the existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident, therefore, that the natures to which it is so essential must subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing. As we cannot, therefore, affirm with propriety, of any part of time that it *is*, since even before we can form the assertion
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the present time is no more, so with respect to all corporeal natures (from their subsistence in time), before we can say that they exist, they lose all identity of being. And hence no one of them is truly that which it is said to be. On the contrary, truth is eternal and immutable: for, if any one should assert that truth is not, he asserts this either truly or falsely; but if falsely, there is such a thing as truth; and if truly, then it is true that there is no such thing as truth. But if it is truly asserted, it can only be true through truth; and, consequently, there is such a thing as truth, which must also be eternal and immutable. Hence, truth cannot subsist in any thing mutable; for that which is situated in a mutable nature is also changed in conjunction with it. But all corporeal natures are continually changed, and hence they are neither true, nor have a true existence. If, therefore, the forms of bodies are imperfect, they are not the first forms; for whatever ranks as first is perfect and entire, since the whole reason of every nature is established in that which is first. There are, therefore, certain forms above these, perfect, primary, and entire, and which are not indigent of a subject.

But if the forms of bodies are not true, where do the true forms subsist? Shall we say nowhere? But in this case falsehood would be more powerful than truth, if the former possessed, and the latter had no, subsistence. But this is impossible. For that which is more powerful derives its power from truth; since, unless it was truly more powerful, it would not be that which it is said to be. But, indeed, without the presence of truth, the forms which are said to be false could not subsist; for they would no longer be what they are, unless it was true that they are false. True species, therefore, have a subsistence somewhere. But does not our soul possess truer species than those which are the objects of sensible inspection, by which it judges, condemns, and corrects them, and understands how far they depart from, and in what respect they agree with, such forms as are true? But he who does not behold true forms, can by no means make a comparison between them and others, and rectify the inaccuracy of the one by the accurate truth of the other. For the soul, indeed, corrects the visible circle, when it does not touch a plane in one point only; approves or condemns every artificial structure and musical modulation; and judges concerning the goodness or depravity, utility or detriment, beauty or deformity, of every object in nature.

ture. The soul, therefore, possesses truer forms, by which she judges of corporeal natures. But neither are these forms in the soul first forms, for they are movable; and though not subsisting in place, yet they have a discursive procession through the intervals of time. Nor do they always exist in energy; for the soul does not always energize through them. Nor do they subsist in a total but in a partial intellect. For as the soul is not total intellect, on account of its self-motive nature, so the intellect which is in soul is not a total and first intellect, but suffers a remission of intellectual union, from its connection with the discursive energies of soul. There is, therefore, above soul, and that intellect which is a part of soul, a certain first intellect, in itself entire and perfectly complete, in which the first and most true species of all things are contained, and which have a subsistence independent of time, place, and motion. And this first intellect is no other than that vital nature *αυτοζωον*, or *animal itself*, in which Plato in the *Timæus* represents the artificer of the universe contemplating the ideas of things, and fabricating the machine of the world according to this all-beautiful exemplar.

Again, the artificer of the universe must be a God. Every God operates essentially, or produces from his essence that which he produces, because this is the most perfect mode of production. Every thing which operates essentially produces an image of itself. He, therefore, who fabricated the universe, fabricated it an image of itself. But if this be the case, he contains in himself paradigmatically the causes of the universe: and these causes are ideas. To which we may add, that the perfect must necessarily antecede the imperfect; unity, multitude; the indivisible, the divisible; and that which abides perpetually the same, that which subsists in unceasing mutation. From all which it follows, that things do not originate from baser natures, but that they end in these; and that they commence from natures the most perfect, the most beautiful, and the best. For it is not possible that our intellect should be able to apprehend things properly equal, similar, and the like, and that the intellect of the artificer of the universe should not contain in itself the essentially equal, just, beautiful, and good, and, in short, every thing which has a universal and perfect subsistence, and which, from its residence in deity, forms a link of that luminous chain of substances to which we very properly give the appellation of ideas.

The

The following additional arguments in defence of the Platonic doctrine of ideas are given for the sake of the liberal and Platonic reader. The whole is nearly extracted from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides.

This visible world is either self-subsistent, or it derives its subsistence from a superior cause. But if it is admitted to be self-subsistent, many absurd consequences will ensue: for it is necessary that every thing self-subsistent should be impartible; because every thing which makes and every thing which generates is entirely incorporeal. For bodies make through incorporeal powers; fire by heat, and snow by coldness. But if it is necessary that the maker should be incorporeal, and in things self-subsistent the same thing is the maker and the thing made, the generator and the thing generated, that which is self-subsistent will be perfectly impartible. But the world is not a thing of this kind: for every body is every way divisible, and consequently is not self-subsistent. Again: every thing self-subsistent is also self-energetic. For, as it generates itself, it is by a much greater priority naturally adapted to energize in itself, since to make and to generate are no other than to energize. But the world is not self-motive, because it is corporeal. No body, therefore, is naturally adapted to be moved, and at the same time to move according to the whole of itself. For neither can the whole at the same time heat itself, and be heated by itself: for, because it is heated, it will not yet be hot, in consequence of the heat being gradually propagated through all its parts; but, because it heats, it will possess heat, and thus the same thing will be, and yet not be, hot. As, therefore, it is impossible that any body can move itself according to internal change, neither can this be effected by any other motion. And, in short, every corporeal motion is more similar to passion than to energy; but a self-motive energy is immaterial and impartible: so that, if the world is corporeal, it will not be self-motive. But, if not self-motive, neither will it be self-subsistent. And if it is not self-subsistent, it is evident that it is produced by another cause.

For, again, that which is not self-subsistent is twofold, viz. it is either better than, or inferior to, cause. And that which is more excellent than cause¹, as is the ineffable principle of things, has something posterior to

¹ This is demonstrated by Proclus in his *Elements of Theology*.

itself, such as is a self-subsistent nature. But that which is subordinate to cause is entirely suspended from a self-subsistent cause. It is necessary, therefore, that the world should subsist from another more excellent cause. But, with respect to this cause, whether does it make according to free will and the reasoning energy, or produce the universe by its very essence? for, if according to free will, its energy in making will be unstable and ambiguous, and will subsist differently at different times. The world, therefore, will be corruptible: for that which is generated from a cause moving differently at different times is mutable and corruptible. But, if the cause of the universe operated from reasoning and inquiry in producing the world, his energy could not be spontaneous and truly his own; but his essence would be similar to that of the artificer, who does not derive his productions from himself, but procures them as something adventitious by learning and inquiry. Hence we infer that the world is eternal, and that its maker produced it by his very essence; for, in short, every thing which makes according to free will has also the essential energy. Thus, our soul, which energizes in many things according to free will, imparts at the same time life to the body by its very essence, which life does not depend on our free will: for, otherwise, the animal from every adverse circumstance would be dissolved, the soul on such occasions condemning its association with the body. But not every thing which operates from its very essence has also another energy according to free will. Thus, fire heats by its very essence alone, but produces nothing from the energy of will; nor is this effected by snow, nor, in short, by any body, so far as body. If, therefore, the essential energy is more extended than that of free will, it is evident that it proceeds from a more venerable and elevated cause: and this very properly; for the creative energy of natures that operate from their very essence is unattended with anxiety. But it is especially necessary to conceive an energy of this kind in divine natures; since we also then live more free from anxiety, and with greater ease, when our life is divine, or according to virtue. If, therefore, there is a cause of the universe operating from his very essence, he is that primarily which his production is secondarily; and that which he is primarily he imparts in a secondary degree to his production. Thus, fire both imparts heat to something else, and is itself hot; and soul imparts life, and possesses life: and this reasoning will be found to be

be true in every thing which operates essentially. The cause of the universe, therefore, fabricating from his very essence, is that primarily which the world is secondarily. But, if the world is full of all-various forms, these will subsist primarily in the cause of the world: for it is the same cause which gave subsistence to the sun and moon, to man and horse. These, therefore, are primarily in the cause of the world; another sun besides the apparent, another man, and, in a similar manner, every other form. There are, therefore, forms prior to sensibles, and demiurgic causes of the phenomena pre-subsisting in the one cause of the universe.

But if any one should say that the world has indeed a cause, yet not producing, but final, and that thus all things are orderly disposed with relation to this cause, it is so far well indeed, that they admit the good to preside over the universe. But, it may be asked, whether does the world receive any thing from this cause, or nothing according to desire? for, if nothing, the desire by which it extends itself towards this cause is vain. But if it receives something from this cause, and this cause not only imparts good to the world, but imparts it essentially, by a much greater priority, it will be the cause of existence to the universe, that it may impart good to it essentially; and thus he will not only be the final, but the producing cause of the universe.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to the phenomena, to things equal and unequal, similar and dissimilar, and all such sensible particulars as are by no means truly denominated: for where is there equality in sensibles which are mingled with inequality? where similitude in things filled with dissimilitude? where the beautiful among things of which the subject is base? where the good in things in which there is capacity and the imperfect? Each of these sensible particulars, therefore, is not that truly which it is said to be: for, how can things, the nature of which consists in the impartible and in privation of interval, subsist perfectly in things partible, and endued with interval? But our soul is able, both to conceive and generate things far more accurate and pure than the phenomena. Hence, it corrects the apparent circle, and points out how far it falls short of the perfectly accurate. And it is evident that in so doing it beholds another form more beautiful and more perfect than this: for, unless it beheld something more pure, it could not say that this is not truly beautiful, and that is not in every respect equal. If, therefore, a partial soul such as ours is able to generate and contemplate

in itself things more perfect than the phænomena, such as the accurate sphere and circle, the accurately beautiful and equal, and, in a similar manner, every other form, but the cause of the universe is neither able to generate, nor contemplate, things more beautiful than the phænomena, how is the one the fabricator of the universe, but the other of a part of the universe? For a greater power is effective of things more perfect, and a more immaterial intellect contemplates more excellent spectacles. The maker of the world, therefore, is able both to generate and understand forms much more accurate and perfect than the phænomena. Where, then, does he generate, and where does he behold them? Evidently, in himself: for he contemplates himself. So that, by beholding and generating himself, he at the same time generates in himself, and gives subsistence to forms more immaterial and more accurate than the phænomena.

In the third place, if there is no cause of the universe, but all things are from chance, how are all things coordinated to each other, and how do things perpetually subsist? And whence is it that all things are thus generated according to nature with a frequency of subsistence? for whatever originates from chance does not subsist frequently, but seldom. But if there is one cause, the source of coordination to all things, and this cause is ignorant of itself, must there not be some nature prior to this, which, by knowing itself, imparts being to this cause? for it is impossible that a nature which is ignorant should be more excellent than that which has a knowledge of itself. If, therefore, this cause knows itself, it is evident that, knowing itself to be a cause, it must also know the things of which it is the cause; so that it will also comprehend the things which it knows. If, therefore, intellect is the cause of the universe, it also coordinated all things to each other: for there is one artificer of all things. But the universe is various, and all its parts do not participate either of the same dignity or order. Who is it then that measures the dignity of these, except the power that gave them subsistence? Who distributed every thing in a convenient order, and fixed it in its proper seat—the sun here, and there the moon, the earth here, and there the mighty heaven—except the being by whom these were produced? Who gave coordination to all things, and produced one harmony from all, except the power who imparted to every thing its essence and nature? If, therefore, he orderly disposed all things, he cannot be ignorant
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of the order and rank which every thing maintains in the universe ; for to operate in this manner would be the province of irrational nature, and not of a divine cause, and would be the characteristic of necessity, and not of intellectual providence. Since, if, intellectually perceiving himself, he knows himself, but knowing himself and the essence which he is allotted, he knows that he is an immovable cause, and the object of desire to all things, he will also know the natures to which he is desirable : for he is not desirable from accident, but essentially. He will therefore either be ignorant of what he is essentially, or, knowing this, he will also know that he is the object of desire ; and, together with this, he will know that all things desire him, and what the natures are by which he is desired : for, of two relatives, to know one definitely, and the other indefinitely, is not the characteristic of science, and much less of intellectual perception. But, knowing definitely the things by which he is desired, he knows the causes of them, in consequence of beholding himself, and not things of a posterior nature. If, therefore, he does not in vain possess the causes of all things, he must necessarily, according to them, bound the order of all things, and thus be of all things the immovable cause, as bounding their order by his very essence.

But whether shall we say that, because he designed to make all things, he knew them, or, because he understands all things, on this account he gave subsistence to all things ? But if, in consequence of designing to make all things, he knows all things, he will possess inward energy, and a conversion to himself subordinate to that which proceeds outwardly, and his knowledge of beings will subsist for the sake of things different from himself. But if this is absurd, by knowing himself he will be the maker of all things. And, if this be the case, he will make things external similar to those which he contains in himself ; for such is the natural order of things, that externally proceeding should be suspended from inward energy, the whole world from the all-perfect monad of ideas, and the parts of the visible universe from monads which are separated from each other.

In the fourth place, we say that man is generated from man, and from every thing its like. After what manner, therefore, are they generated ? for you will not say that the generation of these is from chance : for neither nature nor divinity makes any thing in vain. But, if the generation of men is not from chance, whence is it ? You will say, It is evidently from seed.

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Let it then be admitted, that man is from seed ; but seed possesses productive powers in capacity, and not in energy. For, since it is a body, it is not naturally adapted to possess productive powers impartibly and in energy : for every where a subsistence in energy precedes a subsistence in capacity : since, being imperfect, it requires the assistance of something else endued with a perfective power. This something else you will say is the nature of the mother ; for this perfects and fashions the offspring by its productive powers. For the apparent form of the mother does not make the infant, but nature, which is an incorporeal power and the principle of motion. If, therefore, nature changes the productive powers of seed from capacity to a subsistence in energy, nature must herself possess these productive powers in energy. Hence, being irrational and without imagination, she is at the same time the cause of physical reasons. As the nature of man, therefore, contains human productive powers, does not also nature in a lion contain those of the lion ; as, for instance, the reasons or productive powers of the head, the hair, the feet, and the other parts of the lion ? Or, whence, on shedding a tooth, does another grow in its place, unless from an inherent power which is able to make the teeth ? How, likewise, does it at the same time make bone and flesh, and each of the other parts ? for the same thing energizing according to the same would not be able to fashion such a variety of organization. But does not nature in plants also possess productive powers as well as in animals ? or shall we not say that, in these likewise, the order of generation and the lives of the plants evince that they are perfected from orderly causes ? It is evident, therefore, from the same reasoning, that the natures of these also comprehend the apparent productive powers. Let us then ascend from these to the one nature of the earth, which generates whatever breathes and creeps on its surface, and which by a much greater priority contains the productive powers of plants and animals. Or whence the generation of things from putrefaction ? (for the hypothesis of the experimentalists is weak and futile.) Whence is it that different kinds of plants grow in the same place, without human care and attention ? Is it not evident that it is from the *whole nature* of the earth, containing the productive powers of all these in herself ? And thus proceeding, we shall find that the nature in each of the elements and celestial spheres comprehends the productive powers of the animals which it contains. And if from the celestial spheres

we ascend to the nature of the universe itself, we may also inquire respecting this, whether it contains forms or not, and we shall be compelled to confess, that in this also the productive and motive powers of all things are contained : for whatever is perfected from inferior subsists in a more excellent and perfect manner from more universal natures. The nature of the universe, therefore, being the mother of all things, comprehends the productive powers of all things ; for, otherwise, it would be absurd that art, imitating natural reasons, should operate according to productive principles, but that nature herself should energize without reasons, and without inward measures. But, if nature contains productive principles, it is necessary that there should be another cause prior to nature, which is comprehensive of forms ; for nature verging to bodies energizes in them, just as if we should conceive an artist verging to pieces of timber, and inwardly, by various operations, reducing them to a certain form : for thus nature, merged together with and dwelling in corporeal masses, inspires them with her productive powers and with motion ; since things which are moved by others require a cause of this kind, a cause which is properly irrational indeed, that it may not depart from bodies, which cannot subsist without a cause continually residing with them, but containing the productive powers of bodies, that it may be able to preserve all things in their proper boundaries, and move every thing in a convenient manner. Nature, therefore, belongs to other things, being merged in, or coordinated with, bodies. But it is requisite that the most principal and proper cause should be exempt from its productions : for, by how much more the maker is exempt from the thing made, by so much the more perfectly and purely will he make. And, in short, if nature is irrational, it requires a leader. There is, therefore, something prior to nature, which contains productive powers, and from which it is requisite that every thing in the world should be suspended. Hence, a knowledge of generated natures will subsist in the cause of the world more excellent than the knowledge which we possess ; so far as this cause not only knows, but gives subsistence to, all things ; but we possess knowledge alone. But if the demiurgic cause of the universe knows all things, if he beholds them externally, he will again be ignorant of himself, and will be subordinate to a partial soul ; but, if he beholds them in himself, he will contain in himself all forms, intellectual and gnostic.

In the fifth place, things produced from an immovable cause are immovable and without mutation; but things produced from a movable cause are again movable and mutable, and subsist differently at different times. If this be the case, all such things as are essentially eternal and immutable must be the progeny of an immovable cause; for, if from a movable cause, they will be mutable; which is impossible. Are not, therefore, the form of man and the form of horse from a cause, if the whole world subsists from a cause? From what cause, therefore? Is it from an immovable or from a movable cause? But if from a movable cause, the human species will some time or other fail; since every thing which subsists from a movable cause ranks among things which are naturally adapted to perish. We may also make the same inquiry respecting the sun and moon, and each of the stars: for, if these are produced from a movable cause, in these also there will be a mutation of essence. But if these, and all such forms as eternally subsist in the universe, are from an immovable cause, where does the immovable cause of these subsist? For it is evidently not in bodies, since every natural body is naturally adapted to be moved. It therefore subsists proximately in nature. But nature is irrational; and it is requisite that causes properly so called should be intellectual and divine. Hence, the immovable causes of these forms subsist primarily in intellect, secondarily in soul, in the third gradation in nature, and lastly in bodies. For all things either subsist apparently or unapparently, either separate or inseparable from bodies; and if separate, either immovably according to essence and energy, or immovably according to essence, but movably according to energy. Those things, therefore, are properly immovable, which are immutable both according to essence and energy, such as are intelligibles; but those possess the second rank which are immovable indeed according to essence, but movable according to energy, and such are souls: in the third place, things unapparent indeed, but inseparable from the phenomena, are such as belong to the empire of nature; and those rank in the last place which are apparent, subsist in sensibles, and are divisible: for the gradual subjection of forms proceeding as far as to sensibles ends in these.

In the sixth place, let us speculate after another manner concerning the subsistence of forms or ideas, beginning from demonstrations themselves. For Aristotle has proved in his *Last Analytics*, and all scientific men must

confess, that demonstrations are entirely from things which have a priority of subsistence, and which are naturally more honourable. But if the things from which demonstrations consist are universals, (for every demonstration is from these),—hence, these must be causes to the things which are unfolded from them. When, therefore, the astronomer says, that the circles in the heavens bisect each other, since every greatest circle bisects its like, whether does he demonstrate or not? For he makes his conclusion from that which is universal. But where shall we find the causes of this section of circles in the heavens which are more universal than the circles? For they will not be in bodies, since every thing which is in body is divisible. They must, therefore, reside in an incorporeal essence; and hence there must be forms which have a subsistence prior to apparent forms, and which are the causes of subsistence to these, in consequence of being more universal and more powerful. Science, therefore, compels us to admit that there are universal forms, which have a subsistence prior to particulars, are more essential and more causal, and from which the very being of particulars is derived.

By ascending from motion we may also after the same manner prove the existence of ideas. Every body from its own proper nature is alter-motive, or moved by another, and is indigent of motion externally derived. But the first, most proper and principal motion is in the power which moves the mundane wholes: for he possesses the motion of a mover, and body the motion of that which is moved, and corporeal motion is the image of that which pre-subsists in this power. For that is perfect motion because it is energy; but the motion in body is imperfect energy: and the imperfect derives its subsistence from the perfect.

From knowledge also we may perceive the necessity of the same conclusion. For last knowledge is that of bodies, whether it be denominated sensible or imaginable: for all such knowledge is destitute of truth, and does not contemplate any thing universal and common, but beholds all things invested with figure, and all things partial. But more perfect knowledge is that which is without figure, which is immaterial, and which subsists by itself, and from itself; the image of which is sense, since this is imperfect knowledge, subsisting in another, and not originating from itself. If, therefore, as in motion, so also in knowledge and in life, that which participates, that which is participated, and that which is imparticipable, are different

from each other, there is also the same reasoning with respect to other forms. For matter is one thing, the form which it contains another, and still different from either is the separate form. For God and Nature do not make things imperfect which subsist in something different from themselves, and which have an obscure and debile existence, but have not produced things perfect, and which subsist from themselves; but by a much greater priority they have given subsistence to these, and from these have produced things which are participated by, and merged in, the darkness of matter.

But if it be requisite summarily to relate the cause that induced the Pythagoreans and Plato to adopt the hypothesis of ideas, we must say, that all these visible natures, celestial and sublunary, are either from chance, or subsist from a cause. But that they should be from chance is impossible: for things more excellent will subsist in things subordinate, viz. intellect, reason, and cause, and that which proceeds from cause. To which we may add, as Aristotle observes, that prior to causes according to accident, it is requisite that there should be things which have an essential subsistence; for the accidental is that in which the progressions of these are terminated. So that a subsistence from cause will be more antient than a subsistence from chance, if the most divine of things apparent are the progeny of chance. But if there is a cause of all things, there will either be many unconjoined causes, or one cause; but if many, we shall not be able to assign to what it is owing that the world is one, since there will not be one cause according to which all things are coordinated. It will also be absurd to suppose that this cause is irrational. For, again, there will be something among things posterior better than the cause of all things, viz. that which, being within the universe, and a part of the whole, operates according to reason and knowledge, and yet derives this prerogative from an irrational cause. But if this cause is rational and knows itself, it will certainly know itself to be the cause of all; or, being ignorant of this, it will be ignorant of its own nature. But if it knows that it is essentially the cause of the universe, it will also definitely know that of which it is the cause; for, that which definitely knows the one will also definitely know the other. Hence, he will know every thing which the universe contains, and of which he is the cause: and if this be the case, beholding himself, and knowing himself, he knows things posterior to himself. By immaterial reasons, therefore, and forms, he knows the

the mundane reasons and forms from which the universe consists, and the universe is contained in him as in a cause separate from matter. This, Proclus adds, was the doctrine of the Eleatic Zeno, and the advocates for ideas: nor did these men alone, says he, form conceptions of this kind respecting ideas, but their doctrine was also conformable to that of the theologists. For Orpheus says, that after the absorption of Phanes in Jupiter all things were generated: since prior to this the causes of all mundane natures subsisted unitedly in Phanes, but secondarily and with separation in the demiurgus of the universe. For there the sun and the moon, heaven itself, and the elements, Love the source of union, and in short all things, were produced: for there was a natural conflux, says Orpheus, of all things in the belly of Jupiter. Nor did Orpheus stop here; but he also delivered the order of demiurgic forms through which sensible natures were allotted their present distribution. Proclus further adds: The Gods also have thought fit to unfold to mankind the truth respecting ideas; and have declared what the one fountain is whence they proceed; where ideas first subsist in full perfection; and how in their progression they assimilate all things, both wholes and parts, to the Father of the universe. What Proclus here alludes to is the following Chaldaic Oracle:

Νους πατρος ἐρρόιζ' ἡς νοησας ἀκμαδι βουλή
 Παμμορφους ιδεας· πηγης δὲ μιας αποπτασαι
 Εξέθορον· πατροθεν γὰρ ἐν βουλητε τέλος τε.
 Ἀλλ' ἐμερισθησαν νοερῷ πυρὶ μοιρηθῆσαι
 Εἰς ἀλλας νοερας· κοσμῷ γὰρ ἀναξ πολυμορφῷ
 Προυθηκεν νοερὸν τυποῦ ἀφθίτου, οὐ κατὰ κοσμον
 Ἰχνος ἐπειγομενος μορφῆς μετὰ κοσμος ἐφάνθη,
 Παντοιαῖς ἰδέαις κεχαρισμενος, ὧν μία πηγή,
 Ἐξ ἧς ῥοιζονται μεμερισμεναι ἀλλαι ἀπληται,
 Ῥηγνυμεναι κοσμοῦ περὶ σωμασίν, αἱ περὶ κολποῦς
 Σμερδαλεοὺς σμηνεσσὶν εὐκυνῖαι φορεονται,
 Τραπουσι περὶ τ' ἀμφὶ παρὰ σῆμαδ' ἀλλυδὶς ἀλλῇ
 Ἐννοιαὶ νοεραὶ πηγῆς πατρικῆς ἀπο, πολυ
 Δραϊτομεναι πυρὸς ἀνθος ἀκοιμητοῦ χρόνου, ἀκμῇ
 Ἀρχεγονοὺς ιδεας πρώτῃ πατρος ἐβλυσε τας δὲ
 Αυτοτέλης πηγῇ.

i. e. "The intellect of the Father made a crashing noise, understanding with unwearied counsel omniform ideas. But with winged speed they leaped forth from one fountain: for both the counsel and the end were from the Father. In consequence, too, of being allotted an intellectual fire, they are divided into other intellectual forms: for the king previously placed in the multiform world an intellectual incorruptible impression, the vestige of which hastening through the world, causes it to appear invested with form, and replete with all-various ideas of which there is one fountain. From this fountain other immense distributed ideas rush with a crashing noise, bursting forth about the bodies of the world, and are borne along its terrible bosoms like swarms of bees. They turn themselves, too, on all sides, and nearly in all directions. They are intellectual conceptions from the paternal fountain, plucking abundantly the flower of the fire of sleepless time. But a self-perfect fountain pours forth primogenial ideas from the primary vigour of the Father."

Through these things, says Proclus, the Gods have clearly shown where ideas subsist, who the divinity is that comprehends the one fountain of these, and that from this fountain a multitude proceeds. Likewise, how the world is fabricated according to ideas; that they are motive of all mundane systems; that they are essentially intellectual; and that they are all-various according to their characteristics.

If, therefore, he adds, arguments persuade us to admit the hypothesis respecting ideas, and the wise unite in the same design, viz. Plato, Pythagoras, and Orpheus, and the Gods clearly bear witness to these, we should but little regard sophistical arguments, which are confuted by themselves, and assert nothing scientific, nothing sane. For the Gods have manifestly declared that they are conceptions of the Father: for they abide in his intelligence. They have likewise asserted that they proceed to the fabrication of the world; for the crashing noise signifies their progression;—that they are omniform, as comprehending the causes of all divisible natures; that from fontal ideas others proceed, which are allotted the fabrication of the world, according to its parts, and which are said to be similar to swarms of bees; and lastly, that they are generative of secondary natures.

Timæus, therefore, places in intelligibles the one primary cause of all ideas; for there animal itself subsists, as is evident from that dialogue. But the

the oracles say, that the fountain of ideas pre-subsists in the demiurgus ; nor are these assertions discordant with each other, as they may appear to be to some. For it is not the same thing to investigate the one and total cause of mundane forms, and simply to contemplate the first unfolding into light of every series of ideas ; but the comprehension of the former must be referred to the demiurgus, and of the latter to the intelligible order itself, of divine natures, from which the demiurgus is filled, and all the orders of an ideal essence. And, on this account, I think the oracles assert, that ideas proceed with a crashing noise from their intellectual fountain, and, being distributed in different places, burst about the bodies of the world, in consequence of the cause of mundane natures being comprehended in this fountain, according to which, all generated composite natures in the world are invested with form, conformably to the demiurgic will. But the forms subsisting in animal itself, according to an intelligible bound, are neither said by Plato to be moved, nor to leap into bodies, but to impart essence to all things by their very essence alone. If, therefore, to subsist through energy and motion is secondary to a making prior to energizing and being moved, it is evident that the ideas intelligibly and immovably established in animal itself are allotted an order more elevated than demiurgic ideas. And the demiurgus is fabricative of forms in a twofold respect ; both according to the fountain in himself, and according to intelligible ideas : for there are the total causes of all things, and the four monads ; but, thence originating, they proceed through the whole divine orders as far as to the last of things, so that the last and sensible images of these possess a certain similitude, more clearly of some, and more obscurely of others. He, likewise, who is capable of following the divine progressions will perceive that every sensible form expresses the idioms of all of them. For the immovable and the eternal in sensible forms are no otherwise present than from the first forms : for they are primarily eternal ; and hence they communicate eternity to the consequent progressions in a secondary and third gradation. Again, that every form is a multitude, subsists according to a peculiar number, and is filled with its proper numbers, and that on this account a different form is referred to a different divine order to us unknown and ineffable,—this it receives from the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order, and from the forms which there subsist occultly, and ineffably : just as the power of

uniting.

uniting a dissipated essence, and bounding the infinity of generated natures in common limits, is derived from the connecting order, and from connective forms. But to be entirely perfective of an imperfect nature, and to produce into energy the aptitude of subjects, comprehending the unfigured in figures, and the imperfect in perfection, is solely derived from perfective deity, and the forms which there appear. Again, so far as every form hastens to verge to itself, and comprehends parts uniformly in itself, so far it bears an image of the summit of intellects, and the impartible subsistence of forms established according to that order. But so far as it proceeds with life, subsists through motion, and appears immovably in things moved, so far it participates of the vivific series, and expresses the powers of vivific forms. Again, so far as it possesses the power of giving form to matter, is filled with artificial fabrication pervading through nature herself, and evinces a wonder subtilty, and a production of forms according to reason, so far it receives the representations of demiurgic ideas. If, likewise, it assimilates sensibles to intelligibles, and separates the essences of them by mutations according to reasons, it is evident that it resembles the assimilative orders of forms, from which the divisible progressions of mundane natures appear, which invest sensibles with the representations from intelligibles. Further still, if every form pervades to many things, though it be material, and bounds the multitude of them according to its proper form, must it not, according to this power, be referred to that order of Gods which governs with a liberated characteristic the allotments in the world, and draws to itself many portions of divine allotments in the universe? We may behold, therefore, an uninterrupted continuity of the whole series supernally proceeding from intelligible ideas as far as to the last of things, and likewise perceive what peculiarities sensibles derive from each order. For it is requisite that all secondary things should participate of the natures prior to them, and thus enjoy each, according to the order which they are severally allotted.

With respect to *what things there are ideas of, and what not*, I shall summarily observe, that there are ideas only of universal and perfect substances, and of whatever contributes to the perfection of these, as for instance of man, and whatever is perfective of man, such as wisdom and virtue; and consequently matter, particulars, parts, things artificial, evil and fardid natures, are excluded from the region of ideas.

To the question *what kind of beings ideas are*, we may answer with Zeno-
crates, according to the relation of Proclus, that they are *the exemplary causes*
of things, which perpetually subsist according to nature. They are *exemplars*,
indeed, because the final cause, or *the good*, is superior to these, and that
which is properly the efficient cause, or the demiurgic intellect, is of an in-
ferior ordination. But they are the exemplars of things *according to nature*,
because there are no ideas of things unnatural or artificial: and of such
natural things as are *perpetual*, because there are no ideas of mutable par-
ticulars.

Lastly, *ideas are participated by material natures*, similar to the impressions
in wax of a seal, to images appearing in water or a mirror, and to pictures.
For material species, on account of their union with matter, are analogous
to the impressions of a seal; but on account of their apparently real, but at
the same time delusive subsistence in its dark receptacle, they are similar to
images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream; and they resemble pictures on
account of their similitude, though very remote and obscure, to first ideas
themselves. We may add too, as Proclus beautifully observes, that they
derive their subsistence as *impressions* from the *mundane* Gods; their *apparent*
existence from the *liberated* Gods; and their *similitude* to supernal forms
from the *supermundane* or *assimilative* Gods. And thus much for the first
part of the dialogue, or the doctrine of ideas ¹.

But in order to a summary view of the inimitably profound and sublime
discussion which the second part contains concerning *the one*, it is necessary to
observe, that by *the one itself* the Pythagoreans and Plato signified the first
cause, which they very properly considered as perfectly *superessential*, inef-
fable and unknown. For it is necessary that multitude should be posterior
to unity: but it is impossible to conceive *being* ² without multitude, and con-
sequently the cause of all beings must be void of multitude and *superessential*.
And that this was really the opinion of the most ancient Pythagoreans, from

¹ See more concerning ideas in the first dissertation prefixed to my translation of Proclus on
Euclid, in the notes to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and in the notes to this dialogue.

² If *being* were the same with *the one*, multitude would be the same with non-being: for the
opposite to *the one* is *multitude*, and the opposite to *being* is *non-being*. As *being*, therefore, is not
the same with, it must be posterior to, *the one*; for there is not any thing in things more excellent
than unity.

whom

whom Plato derived his philosophy, the following citations will abundantly evince.

And, in the first place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a most antient Pythagorean, on the principles of things, preserved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82, and in which the following extraordinary passage occurs: 'Ὅστ' ἀνάγκη τρεῖς εἶμεν τὰς ἀρχάς, τὰν τε ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κινητικὸν καὶ ἀοράτον δυνάμει· τὸ δὲ τοῖσιν ὃν οὐ μόνον¹ εἶμεν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦν τι κρείσσον· νοῦν δὲ κρείσσον ἐστὶ ὅπερ ὀνομαζόμεν θεὸν φανερόν.—i. e. "So that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; *that which is the subject of things (or matter), form, and that which is of itself motive, and invisible in power.* With respect to the last of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a subsistence, *but that it should be something better than intellect.* But that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with that which we denominate God." It must here however be observed, that by the word *God* we are not only to understand the first cause, but every God: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every Deity, considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior to intellectual essence. Agreeably to the above passage is that also of Broctinus, as cited by Syrianus in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who expressly asserts that the first cause *ὡς παντός καὶ ὅσας δυνάμει καὶ πρεσβείᾳ ὑπερέχει*—"surpasses every intellect and essence both in power and antiquity." Again, according to the same Syrianus, p. 103, b. we are informed, "that the Pythagoreans called God *the one*, as the cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things, through illumination, essence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound." Τῶν θεῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν μὲν λεγόντων τὸν θεὸν ὡς ἐνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἰτίον, καὶ παντός τε ὄντος, καὶ πάσης ζωῆς, καὶ ὡς τὰ πάντεσσι ἐπεκτείνει. Μέτρον δὲ τῶν πάντων ὡς πᾶσι τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐπιλαμβάνοντα, καὶ ὡς πάντα περιέχοντα, καὶ ὀρίζοντα ταῖς ἀφραστοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ πάντος ὑπερῆπλωμέναις περατός ὑπερέχει. And again, this is confirmed by Cliniius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place *præclari* is erroneously substituted for *Clinii*. "That which is *the one*, and *the measure of*

¹ Instead of *ὃν οὐ μόνον*, which is evidently the true reading, *ὁνομαζόμενον* is erroneously printed in Stobæus.

all things (says he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves ; since he is the venerable principle of beings, the measure of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (*μονον*), possessing absolute dominion (*καριωνδες*), and himself manifesting himself (*αυτο το εαυτο δηλεν*).” This fine passage I have translated agreeably to the manuscript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaus ; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is superior to the two first elements of things, *bound* and *infinite*. For (says he) “ Philolaus asserts that the Deity established *bound* and *infinite* : by bound, indeed, exhibiting every coordination, which is more allied to *the one* ; but by infinity a nature subjected (*υφειμενην*) to *bound*. And prior to these two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated from the universality of things, which Archaietus (*Αρχαιετος*) denominates a cause prior to cause ; but which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all things.” To all these respectable authorities for the supersessential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony of Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us, “ that the Pythagoreans placed *the one* as transcending the genus of things which are essentially understood.” *Και δη των μεν καθ’ αυτα νομμενων γενοσ υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικων παιδες, ως επαναβεβηκος το εν*. In which passage, by things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy.

But in consequence of this doctrine of the antients concerning *the one*, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others : such as *αλαμπια*, *σκοτωδια*, *αμιξια*, *βαραθρον υποχθονιον*, *Απολλων*, &c. viz. *obscurity*, or *without illumination*, *darkness*, *without mixture*, *a subterranean profundity*, *Apollo*, &c. For, considered as ineffable, incomprehensible, and supersessential, he may be very properly called *obscurity*, *darkness*, and a *subterranean profundity* : but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less propriety be denominated *without mixture*, and *Apollo* ; since Apollo signifies a privation of multitude. “ For (says Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the first God *Apollo*, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of many.” *Ennead. 5. lib. 5.* To which we

may add, that the epithets *darkness* and *obscurity* wonderfully agree with the appellation of *a thrice unknown darkness*, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damascius ¹, in their most mystical invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most antient philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.

This silence is, indeed, remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his Theogony he says :

Ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστ' Ἥαος γένετ',—

That is, “*Chaos was the first thing which was generated*”—and consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Hesiod *γενετο* is translated *fruit*, as if the poet had said that *Chaos was the first of all things*; and he is even accused by Cudworth on this account as leaning to the atheistical system. But the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, *γενετο* was considered as meaning *was generated*, and not *was simply*. And, in the first place, this is clearly asserted by Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cælo. “There are certain persons (says he) who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are *generated*. And this is especially the case with Hesiod.”—Εἰσι γὰρ τινες οἱ φασιν οὐθὲν ἀγεννητον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα γιγνέσθαι—Μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον. And again, by Sextus Empiricus in his Treatise Adversus Mathematic. p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying himself to philosophy. “For (says he) when Epicurus was as yet but a young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Hesiod,

Chaos of all things was the first produced,

from what Chaos was *generated*, if it was the first thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his business to teach things of this kind, but was the province of those who are called philosophers—To those then, says Epicurus, must I betake myself, since they know the truth

¹ Περὶ ἀρχῶν.

of things." Κομὴν γὰρ μερακισκὸς ὢν, ἤρετο τὸν ἐπαναγινώσκοντα αὐτὸν Γραμματικὴν (ἢ τοι μὲν πρῶτιστα Χάος γινέτ') ἐκ τίνος τὸ χάος ἐγένετο, εἰπερ πρῶτον ἐγένετο. Τούτου δὲ εἰπόντος μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καλουμένων Φιλοσόφων· τῶν αὖ ἐφ' ἧται ὁ Ἐπικύρεος, ἐπ' ἐκείνους μοι βαδιστεῖον ἐστίν, εἰπερ αὐτοὶ τῇ τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείαν ἴσασιν.

Simplicius, too, in commenting on the passage above cited from Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows—"Aristotle (says he) ranks Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings Chaos was first *generated*. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is by him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert that *all things are generated, except the first*. It is, however, evident that those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by *generation* than the procession of things from their causes; on which account *all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten*. For Hesiod also, when he says that *Chaos was first generated*, insinuates that there was something prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all knowledge and every appellation." (De Cælo, p. 147.)

But these divine men not only called the first cause *the one*, on account of his transcendent simplicity, but likewise *the good*, on account of the superlative excellency of his nature; by the former of these appellations considering him as that principle from which all things flow, and by the latter as that supreme object of desire to which all things ultimately tend. And hence Plato, in his Republic, asserts that *the good* is superessential; and Aristotle, in lib. 14, Metaphyf. cap. 4, alluding to Plato and the Pythagoreans, says, "that according to some, *the one* is the same with the good." Οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

With great beauty, therefore, does Proclus¹, with his usual magnificence of expression, assert of this incomprehensible cause, "that he is the God of all Gods, the unity of unities, and above the first adyta²; that he is more

¹ In Plat. Theol. p. 110.

² Ἀδύταται is erroneously printed for ἀδύτων.

ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence; that he is holy among the holies, and is concealed among the intelligible Gods."

Plato, too, in the *Republic*, that we may be enabled to gain a glimpse from analogy of this transcendent nature, compares him to the sun. For as the sun by his light not only confers the power of being seen on visible objects, but is likewise the cause of their generation, nutriment, and increase; so *the good*, through superessential light, imparts being and the power of being known to every thing which is the object of knowledge. Hence, says Damascius¹, "this highest God is seen afar off as it were obscurely; and if you approach nearer, he is beheld still more obscurely; and lastly, he takes away the ability of perceiving other objects. He is, therefore, truly an incomprehensible and inaccessible light, and is profoundly compared to the sun: upon which the more attentively you look, the more you will be darkened and blinded; and will only bring back with you eyes stupefied with excess of light."

And such is the doctrine of Plato and the Pythagoreans concerning the highest principle of things. But, according to the same divine men, the immediate progeny of this ineffable cause must be Gods; and as such must have a superessential subsistence. For what else prior to unities is it lawful to conjoin with *the one*, or what is more conjoined with a God subsisting according to unity, than the multitude of Gods? Besides, progressions are every where perfected through similitude to their principles. For both nature herself, intellect, and every generative cause, leads and conjoins to itself similar natures, prior to such as are dissimilar. For as there can be no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that every thing which has a natural progression should proceed through similitude. Hence, every cause must deliver its own form and characteristic to its progeny, and, before it generates that which is hypostatic of progressions far distant and separate from its nature, must constitute things proximate to itself according to essence, and conjoined with it through similitude. As nature, therefore, generates a natural number, soul one that is animal, and intellect an intellectual number, it is necessary that the first unity should produce from itself,

¹ Περὶ ἀρχῶν.

prior to every thing else, a multitude of natures characterised by unity, and a number the most of all things allied to its cause. And hence the fountain of universal good must produce and establish in beings *goodnesses* naturally conjoined with himself; and these exalted natures can be no other than Gods.

But if these divine natures are alone supereffential, they will in no respect differ from the highest God. They must, therefore, be participated by beings; that is, each must have some particular being consubstantial with its nature, but yet so as not to lose its supereffential characteristic. And hence every unity may be considered as the lucid blossom or centre of the being by which it is participated; absorbing, as it were, in supereffential light, and thus deifying the essence with which it is connected.

Nor let the reader imagine that this sublime theory is nothing more than the fanatic jargon of the latter Platonists, as is rashly and ignorantly asserted by Cudworth; for it is a doctrine as old at least as Timæus the Locrian. For, in his book *On the Soul of the World*, after asserting that there are two causes of all things, intellect of such as are produced according to reason, but necessity of such as are produced by force, according to the powers of bodies, he adds—"that the former of these, that is intellect, is a cause of the nature of *the good*, and is called God, and is the principle of such things as are best."

ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΔΕ, ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΤΑΣ ΤΑΧΕΩΣ ΦΥΣΙΟΣ ΕΙΜΕΝ, ΘΕΟΝ ΤΕ ΟΝΥΜΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ, ΑΡΧΑΝ ΤΕ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΙΣΤΩΝ. But according to the Pythagoreans, as we have abundantly proved, *the good* or *the one* is above essence and intellect; and consequently by intellect here we must not understand the first cause, but a deity subordinate to the first. Intellect, however, is (says he) of the nature of *the good*; but *the good* is supereffential, and consequently intellect participates of a supereffential nature. And when he adds that intellect is called God, he plainly intimates that every God (the first being excepted) partakes of a supereffential nature.

But to return to our inimitable dialogue: This second part consists of nine hypotheses; five of which consider the consequences which result from admitting the subsistence of *the one*, and the other four what must be the consequences if it were taken away from the nature of things. But as Plato in these hypotheses delivers the Eleatic method of reasoning, it is necessary to inform the reader that, according to Proclus¹, it was as follows:—Two

¹ In lib. 5. MS. Comment. in Parmenidem.

hypotheses being laid down, viz. *if a thing is*, and *if it is not*, each of these may be tripled by considering in each *what happens*, *what does not happen*, *what happens and at the same time does not happen*: so that six cases will be the result. But since, *if a thing is*, we may consider itself either with respect to itself, or itself with respect to others; or we may consider others themselves with respect to themselves, or others with respect to that thing itself, and so likewise if a thing is not: hence, the whole of this process will consist of eight triads, which are as follows:—1. *If a thing is*, what happens to itself with respect to itself, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 2. *If a thing is*, what happens to itself with respect to others, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 3. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with respect to themselves, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 4. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with respect to that thing, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypothesis *that a thing is not*, are to be distributed in exactly the same manner as those we have just enumerated. Such (says Proclus) is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and scientific; and under which those four powers, the *definitive* and *divisive*, the *demonstrative* and *analytic*, receive their consummate perfection.

In the first hypothesis, therefore, Plato considers *what does not follow to the one*, considered with respect to itself and to others. *In the second*, *what does follow*. *In the third*, *what follows and at the same time does not follow*. And this forms the first hexad. But *in the fourth hypothesis* he considers *what follows to others with respect to themselves*, and *what does not follow*, *what follows and at the same time does not follow*. *In the fifth*, *what follows to others with respect to the subject of the hypothesis*, *what does not follow*, *what follows and at the same time does not follow*. And so two hexads, or four triads, are by this means produced from the five hypotheses, if *the one* is. And the reader will easily perceive how each of the other four, which suppose *the one* is not, may form a triad: so that these four triads, in conjunction with the preceding four, will give the whole Eleatic or dialectic method complete.

It

It is likewise necessary to observe, that these hypotheses are derived from the triple division of *the one*, and the twofold division of *non-being*. For *the one* is either *above being*, or *in being*, or *posterior to being*. But *non-being* is either *that which in no respect is*, or *that which is considered as partly having a subsistence, and partly not*. This being premised, let the reader attend to the following beautiful account of these hypotheses from Proclus on Plato's Theology, and from his admirable commentary on this dialogue.

The first hypothesis demonstrates by negations the ineffable supereminence of the first principle of things; and evinces that he is exempt from all essence and knowledge. But the second unfolds the whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essential idiom of the Gods, but likewise the divine characteristic of their hyparxis, through the whole of this hypothesis. For what other *one* can that be which is participated by *being*, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the *imparticipable one*? For, as bodies through their *life* are conjoined with *soul*, and as *souls* through their *intellective part* tend to *universal intellect* and *the first intelligence*, in like manner *true beings*, through *the one* which they contain, are reduced to a *separate union*, and are conjoined with *the first cause of all*.

But because this hypothesis commences from that which is *one being*, and establishes the summit of intelligibles as the first after *the one*, but ends in an essence which participates of time, and deduces divine souls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is necessary that the third hypothesis should demonstrate by various conclusions the whole multitude of particular souls, and the diversities which they contain. And thus far the separate and incorporeal hypostasis extends.

But after this follows *that nature which is divisible about bodies and inseparable from matter*, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supernally depending from the Gods. And the last hypostasis is the procession of matter, whether considered as *one* or as *various*, which the fifth hypothesis demonstrates by negations, according to its dissimilar similitude to *the first*. But sometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and sometimes the separate causes of all productions. And that which is most wonderful of all, the highest

highest negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner, and others according to subjection. But each of the negations consequent to these is affirmative; the one paradigmatically, but the other iconically, or according to similitude. But the middle corresponds to the order of soul: for it is composed from affirmative and negative conclusions. But it possesses negations similar to affirmations. And since it is alone multiplied, as consisting from wholes, it possesses an adventitious *one*. And this *one* which it contains, though truly one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its progressions is, as it were, absorbed by essence. And such are the hypotheses which unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable, together with the causes of the universe, as well exempt as subsisting in things themselves, according to the hyparxis of *the one*.

But there are four hypotheses besides these, which by taking away *the one* entirely subvert all things, both such as truly are, and such as subsist in generation, and show that no being can any longer exist. *The one*, therefore, being admitted, all things subsist even to the last hypothesis; and this being taken away, essence itself is immediately destroyed.

The preceding mode of exposition (except in the second hypothesis) agrees with that of the great Plutarch, preserved by Proclus in his commentary on this dialogue, and which is as follows:

The first hypothesis discourses concerning the first God. The second, concerning the first intellect, and an order entirely intellectual. The third, of the soul. The fourth, of material species. And the fifth, of formless matter. For these are the five principles of things. Parmenides in the mean time, after the manner of his own Pythagoreans, calls every separate substance, on account of its simplicity, by the common appellation of *one*. But he denominates matter and corporeal form *different*, on account of their flowing nature and far distant diversity from divine essences: especially since these two do not so much subsist by themselves as through others, and are not so much causes as concauses, as it is asserted in the *Timæus* and *Phædo*. With great propriety, therefore, the three first hypotheses, which inquire how *the one* is related to itself and to others, are considered as treating of principal causes. But the other two, which investigate how other things are related to each other and to *the one*, are considered as representing form

and matter. In these five hypotheses, therefore, these principles, together with what they contain or subsist about them, are confirmed from the position of *one*: of *one*, I say, *above* being, *in* being, and *posterior* to being. The remaining four hypotheses demonstrate how many absurdities follow from taking away *that one* which beings contain, that we may understand how much greater absurdities must ensue from denying the subsistence of that which is *simply one*. The sixth hypothesis, therefore, proves that, if there is not *that which is one* in beings, i. e. if intelligible has no real subsistence, but partly possesses and is partly destitute of being, that which is sensible would alone exist in the order of things. For, if intelligible is taken away, that which is sensible must alone remain; and there can be no knowledge beyond sense. And this the sixth hypothesis demonstrates to be absurd. But the seventh hypothesis proves that, if *the one which beings contain* has no kind of subsistence, there can be no knowledge, nor any thing which is the object of knowledge, which this seventh hypothesis shows is foolish to assert. And again, if *this one partly subsists and is partly without subsistence*, as the sixth hypothesis feigns, other things will be similar to shadows and dreams, which the eighth hypothesis confutes as absurd. But if *this one has no kind of subsistence*, other things will be less than shadows or a dream, that is, nothing; which the ninth hypothesis represents as a monstrous assertion. Hence the first hypothesis has the same relation to those which remain, as the principle of the universe to the universality of things. But the other four which immediately follow the first, treat concerning the principles posterior to *the one*. And the four consequent to these prove that, *one* being taken away, all that was exhibited in the four prior hypotheses must entirely perish. For since the second demonstrates that, if *that one subsists which is conjoined with being*, every order of soul must subsist; the seventh declares that, if *this one is not*, all knowledge, reason, imagination, and sense, must be destroyed. Again, since the fourth hypothesis declares that, if *this one being* subsists, material species also must subsist, which in a certain respect participate of *one being*,—the eighth hypothesis shows that, if *this one being* has no subsistence, what we now call sensible natures would be only shadows and dreams, without any formal distinction or substance whatever. And lastly, since the fifth hypothesis admonishes us that, if *this one being* subsists, matter will

subsist, not indeed participating of *one being* so far as *being*, but considered as *one*; the ninth hypothesis at length shows that, *if this one being* is taken away, not even the shadow of any thing could possibly subsist.

Thus far Plutarch; who likewise observes that this dialogue was considered as divine by the antients; and declares that the preceding exposition is partly taken from the writings of the antients, and partly from his own private opinion.

Now from all this we may safely conclude, with Proclus, that all the axioms of theological science are perfectly exhibited in this part of the dialogue; that all the distributions of the divine natures are unfolded in connected continuity; and that this is nothing else *than the celebrated generation of the Gods, and every kind of existence, from the ineffable and unknown cause of the universe*. For the antients by *generation* meant nothing more than the *proceßion* of things from their cause; and hence the first cause was symbolically called by Orpheus *time*,—because, says Proclus, where there is generation, there time has a subsistence.

That first and imparticipable one, then, who is declared to be the cause of all things after an ineffable manner, but who is without circumscription, and does not possess any power or characteristic of a kindred kind with the other Gods, is celebrated by the first hypothesis. And from this supereminent cause, as from an exalted place of survey, we may contemplate the divine unities, that is, the Gods, flowing in admirable and ineffable order, and at the same time abiding in profound union with each other, and with their cause. And here, says Proclus, an apt resemblance of their progression presents itself to our view. Because a line is the first continuous and divisible nature amongst magnitudes, hence it participates of an indivisible, that is, of a point. And this point, though it is allotted a superlinear condition and is indivisible, yet it subsists in the line, is something belonging to it, and is the summit of the line. To which we may add, that many lines in a circle touch by their several points the centre of the circle. In like manner an intelligible and intellectual essence, because it is the first multiplied nature, on this account partakes of an excellent unity. And this unity, though it is neither essence nor obnoxious to essential multitude, yet abides in essence, or rather subsists as its vertex, through which every intellectual essence is a God, enjoying
divine

divine unity as the very flower of its nature, and as that which conjoins it with the ineffable one. And as every thing is established in its own species through form, and as we derive the characteristic of our nature from soul, so every God becomes that which he is, or a Deity, through the unity of his nature.

Lastly, says he, the intention of the first hypothesis is to absolve that which is simply one from all the properties and conditions of the unities of the Gods; and by this absolving to signify the procession of all things from thence. But our intention in pursuing these mysteries is no other than by the logical energies of our reason to arrive at the simple intellection of beings, and by these to excite the divine one resident in the depths of our essence, or rather which presides over our essence, that we may perceive the simple and incomprehensible one. For after, through discursive energies and intellections, we have properly denied of the first principle all conditions peculiar to beings, there will be some danger, lest, deceived by imagination after numerous negations, we should think that we have arrived either at nothing, or at something slender and vain, indeterminate, formless, and confused; unless we are careful in proportion as we advance in negations to excite by a certain amatorial affection the divine vigour of our unity; trusting that by this means we may enjoy divine unity, when we have dismissed the motion of reason and the multiplicity of intelligence, and tend through unity alone to *the one itself*, and through love to *the supreme and ineffable good*.

It may likewise be clearly shown, and will be immediately obvious to those who understand the following dialogue, that the most antient poets, priests, and philosophers, have delivered one and the same theology, though in different modes. The first of these, through fabulous names and a more vehement diction; the second, through names adapted to sacred concerns, and a mode of interpretation grand and elevated; and the third, either through mathematical names, as the Pythagoreans, or through dialectic epithets, as Plato. Hence we shall find that the *Æther, Chaos, Phanes*, and *Jupiter*, of Orpheus; the *father, power, intellect*, and *twice beyond* of the Chaldeans; the *monad, duad, tetrad*, and *decad*, of Pythagoras; and *the one being, the whole, infinite multitude*, and *sameness and difference* of Plato, respectively,

spectively, signify the same divine processions from the ineffable principle of things.

I only add, that I have followed the opinion of Proclus in inscribing this Dialogue **ON THE GODS** : for as ideas, considered according to their summits or unities, are Gods, and the whole dialogue is entirely conversant with ideas and these unities, the propriety of such an inscription must, I think, be apparent to the most superficial observer.

THE PARMENIDES:

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CEPHALUS,	PYTHODORUS,
ADIMANTUS,	SOCRATES,
ANTIPHON,	ZENO,
GLAUCO,	PARMENIDES.

SCENE, *the CERAMICUS*†.

WHEN we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand, I am glad to see you (says he), Cephalus; and if you are in want of any thing here, in which we are able to assist you, I beg you would inform me. Upon which I replied, I came for this very purpose, as being indigent of your assistance. Tell me, then (says he), what you are in want of. And I replied, What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almost a child when I first came here from Clazomenia; and, since that circumstance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes. Entirely so (says he), and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally inquire after? I replied, These my fellow-citizens are very philosophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently present with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory the discourses which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus. You speak the truth

† See the Introduction.

(says

(says he). These discourses, therefore (says I), we are desirous to hear. But this (says he) is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made them the subject of vehement meditation; and now with his grandfather, who bears the same name as himself, very much applies himself to equestrian affairs. But if it is necessary, we will go to him: for he just now went from hence home; and dwells very near, in Melita. After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a copper-smith, to be furnished in a proper manner. But as soon as the smith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cause of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly saluted me: and upon our begging him to relate the discourses, at first he seemed unwilling to comply (for he said it was a very operose undertaking); but afterwards, however, he gratified our request. Antiphon, therefore, said that Pythodorus related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenæa: that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aspect, and about sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the bosom friend of Parmenides. He likewise said that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls; where also Socrates came, and many others with him, desiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the first time they became acquainted with his writings: but that Socrates at that time was very young. That, in consequence of this, Zeno himself read to them. And Pythodorus further related that it happened Parmenides was gone out; and that but a small part of the discourse remained unfinished, when he himself entered, together with Parmenides and Aristotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in consequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole discourse from Zeno.

He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's discourse, entreated him to repeat the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when he had repeated it, Socrates said—How is it you assert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this
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what you assert? Zeno answered, It is. If, therefore, it is impossible that dissimilars should be similar, and similars dissimilar, is it not impossible that many things should have a subsistence? For, if there were many, they would suffer impossibilities. Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince, by contesting through all things, that *the many* has no subsistence? And do you not consider each of your discourses as an argument in support of this opinion; and so think that you have produced as many arguments as you have composed discourses, to show that *the many* is not? Is not this what you say, or do I not rightly understand you? Upon which Zeno replied, You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book. That Socrates then said, I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wish to connect himself in the bands of friendship with you, but to agree with you likewise in sentiments concerning the doctrines of the present discourse. For Zeno, in a certain respect, has written the same as yourself; though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his assertions are different from yours. For you in your poems assert that the universe is *one*; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion: but Zeno says that *the many* is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defence of this assertion. As, therefore, you assert that *the one* is, and he, that *the many* has no subsistence; and each speaks in such a manner as to disagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly assert the same; on this account it is that your discourses seem to be above our comprehension. That Zeno said—Indeed, Socrates, so it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently pursue and trace the meaning of the assertions. But this in the first place is concealed from you, that this discourse is not in every respect so venerable, that it was composed, as you say, for the purpose of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have spoken something of that which happens to be the case. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: These writings were composed for the purpose of affording a certain assistance to the doctrine of Parmenides, against those who endeavour to defame it by attempting to show that if *the one* is *many*, ridiculous consequences must attend such an opinion; and that things contrary to the assertion must ensue. This writing, therefore, contradicts

tradicts those who say that *the many* is, and opposes this and many other opinions; as it is desirous to evince that the hypothesis which defends the subsistence of *the many* is attended with more ridiculous consequences than that which vindicates the subsistence of *the one*, if both are sufficiently examined. You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when a youth, through the love of contention, and which was privately taken from me, so that I was not able to consult whether or not it should be issued into the light—you are ignorant, I say, that it was not written through that desire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile desire of contention: though, as I have said, you do not conjecture amiss. I admit it (says Socrates); and I think the case is just as you have stated it. But satisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, itself subsisting from itself? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is dissimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of these two? And that such things as participate of similitude become similar, so far as they participate? But those which participate of dissimilitude become dissimilar? And that those which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other, and become similar and dissimilar to each other through participating of both, is there any thing wonderful in the case? For, if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that such things as participate both these suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if any one should evince that *all things are one*, through their participating of *the one*, and at the same time *many*, through their participating multitude. But I should very much wonder if any one should show that that which is *one* is *many*, and that *the many* is *one*; and in a similar manner concerning all the rest: for, doubtless, he would produce a proper subject of admiration, who should evince that both genera and species suffer these contrary affections. But what occasion of wonder would there be, should any one show that I myself am both *one* and *many*? and should prove his assertion by saying, when he wishes to assert that I am *many*, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the ante-

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rior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude): but when he desires to show that I am *one*, should say, that as we are seven in number, I am *one* man, and participate of *the one*? so that he would by this means evince the truth of both these assertions. If any one, therefore, should endeavour to show that stones, wood, and all such particulars, are both *many* and *one*, we should say that he exhibits to our view such things as are *many* and *one*, but that he does not assert that *the one* is *many*, nor *the many one*; nor speak of any thing wonderful, but asserts that which is confessed by all men. But if any one should, in the first place, distribute the forms of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them essentially apart from each other, such as *similitude* and *diffimilitude*, *multitude* and *the one*, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show himself able to mingle and separate them in themselves, I should be astonished (says he), O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we should strenuously labour in the investigation of these particulars: yet I should be much astonished if any one could solve this doubt, which is so profoundly involved in species; so as to be able no less clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reasoning power, than in those belonging to visible objects, and which you have already discussed.

Pythodorus said, that when Socrates had thus spoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno seemed to be indignant at the several particulars of Socrates's discourse; but that they bestowed the greatest attention on what he said, and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates: and that, in consequence of his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardour in the pursuit of liberal disciplines! Tell me, therefore, have you separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise the participants of these species apart? And does there appear to you to be a certain *similitude* separate from that *similitude* which we possess, and a certain *one* and *many*, and all such other particulars, which you have just now heard mentioned by Zeno? That Socrates said, So it appears to me. And (that Parmenides said) does it also appear to you, that there is a certain species or form of *justice*, itself subsisting by itself; likewise of *beauty* and *the good*, and every thing of this kind? That Socrates said, It does. And likewise of all such things as we

are composed from : so that there is a certain form of *man* ¹, or of *fire*, or *water* ? That Socrates answered—I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning these ; whether it is necessary to speak of them in the same manner as of the former particulars, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that there is a certain form of every such particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair ², clay, and mud, or any thing else which is vile and abject ; and that these forms are different from the particulars with which we are conversant ? That Socrates said, I do not by any means think that the forms of these can be

¹ It is necessary, says Proclus, that immovable causes of all things which have a perpetual subsistence in the universe should preexist in the intellect of the fabricator of the world : for the immutable is present with these, through the eternal power of causes. Hence, of man so far as man, and of every individual form in animals and in plants, there are intellectual causes ; and the progression of all things from thence is not immediately into these material genera. For it was not lawful for intellectual, eternal, and immaterial causes to generate material particulars, which have a various subsistence ; since every progression is effected through similitude ; and prior to things which are separated from their cause as much as possible, such things as are conjoined with, and are more clearly assimilated to, it, must have a subsistence. From *man itself*, therefore, or the ideal man in the demiurgic intellect, there will be, in the first place, a certain celestial man ; afterwards an empyrean, an aerial, and an aquatic man ; and, in the last place, this terrestrial man. All this series of form is perpetual, (the subjection proceeding into that which is more partial,) being suspended from an intellectual unity, which is called *man itself*. There is also another series from *horse itself*, from *lion itself*, and in a similar manner of all animals and plants. Thus, too, there is a fountain and unity of all fire, and a fountain of all mundane water. And that these monads are more partial than those before mentioned, viz. than beauty, similitude, justice, &c. is evident ; and it is also clear that the fountain, or idea, of all the series of man is the most partial of all the forms that are participated by mundane natures.

² We have already observed in the Introduction to this dialogue, and shall largely prove in the Additional Notes, that there are ideas alone of *universal* essences, and of such things as contribute to the perfection of these : for *the good*, *the essential*, and *the perpetual*, eminently pertain to forms ; the first of these being derived from the first cause, the second from the highest being, and the third from eternity. From these three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a paradigmatic intellectual cause, and what things subsist indeed from other principles, but not according to an intellectual paradigm. Of hair, therefore, because it is a part, there can be no idea ; nor of clay, because it is an indefinite mixture of two elements, earth and water, and is not generated according to a physical reason, or productive principle ; since there are ten thousand other things which we combine for the various purposes of life, and which are the works of art, and not of nature. Nor is there any idea of mud, because there are no ideas of degenerations, detriments, and evils, which either arise from a confluence of divided causes, or from our actions and passions.

different from those which are the objects of our inspection: but is it not vehemently absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? For this has formerly disturbed me, whether or not something of this kind does not take place about every thing: but, after having been fixed for some time in this opinion, I have hastily withdrawn myself and fled away; fearing lest, falling into a certain abyss of trifles, I should utterly perish and be lost; but, returning from thence, I have seriously applied myself to consider those particulars, to which, as we have just now asserted, forms belong. That Parmenides then said, You are as yet but a young man ¹, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for, in my opinion, when you are received by her, you will not despise any of these particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men.

Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you say, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating ² retain the appellations; as, for instance,

¹ Parmenides, as Proclus justly observes, in correcting this conception of Socrates, reproves in what he now says those who consider these little and vile particulars as without a cause. For every thing which is generated, as Timæus says, is necessarily generated from some cause, since it is perfectly impossible that it should be generated without a cause. There is nothing, therefore, so dishonourable and vile which does not participate of *the good*, and thence derive its generation. Since, even though you should speak of matter, you will find that this is good; though of evil itself, you will find that this also participates of a certain good, and is no otherwise able to subsist than as coloured with, and receiving a portion of, a certain good. But the opinions of men are ashamed to suspend from a divine cause things small and vile, looking to the nature of the latter, and not to the power of the former; and not considering that, being generative of greater things, it is much more so of such as are less, as the Athenian guest says in the Laws. True philosophers, however, suspending every thing in the world both great and small from providence, see nothing dishonourable, nothing despicable in the dwelling of Jupiter; but they perceive all things good, so far as they subsist from providence, and beautiful, so far as generated according to a divine cause.

² The discourse of Parmenides, says Proclus is perfective of, evolves and elevates, the conceptions of Socrates; praising, indeed, his unperverted conceptions, but perfecting such as are imperfect, and distinctly unfolding such as are confused. But as there are four problems concerning ideas, as we have observed in the Introduction, with respect to their subsistence Parmenides excites Socrates, in order to learn whether he suspends all things from a formal principle, or whether he knew another cause more antient than this; and his reproof of Socrates was in consequence of looking to this first cause. He proceeds, therefore, supernally from the most total

instance, that such things as participate of *similitude* are *similar*; of *magnitude*¹, *great*; and that the participants of *beauty* and *justice* are *beautiful* and

forms, through the more partial, and such as are most individual, to such things as do not subsist according to an intellectual form, but originate from the monad of all beings, or, in other words, being itself. Hence truly proceeding as far as to the last of things, and suspending all things from a paternal cause, and perfecting the conceptions of Socrates concerning these, he proceeds to the third problem, or the manner in which ideas are participated, again extending obstetric aid. For the mode of the discourse is every where maieutic or obstetric, and does not confute, and is pirastic, or explorative, but not vindictive. It differs, however, so far as at one time it proceeds from on high as far as to the last of things, and at another recurs downwards to assertions adapted to divine causes; according to each of these forms perfecting and elevating Socrates, and distinctly unfolding his conceptions respecting these particulars. Such, then, is the mode of the discourse, calling forth spontaneous conceptions, accurately expanding such as are imperfect, and elevating those that are able to follow them; truly imitating the paternal cause, which from the summit of all beings preserves, perfects, and draws upwards all things by the unknown powers which he contains. Let us now proceed to consider the mode in which forms or ideas are participated, following the divine Proclus as our leader in this arduous investigation.

The participations of intellectual forms are assimilated to the representations in a mirror; for as, in these, *habitude* and *position* cause the image of the person to be seen in the mirror; so, the *aptitude* of matter extending itself as it were to the Artificer of the universe, and to the inexhaustible abundance which he contains, is filled from him with forms. The participations are also assimilated to the impressions in wax. For ideas impart a certain vestige and impression of themselves; and neither is this impression the same with the seal by which it was produced, as neither is the form merged in matter the same with the immaterial and divine form from which it originated. But this latter mode differs from the former so far as it indicates a certain passive property in the recipient; for the mirror does not exhibit passivity sensibly, as the wax does in the latter instance. Hence some of the Platonic philosophers, considering matter as impassive in the participation of forms, assimilate it to a mirror, but call forms images and representations. Others again, considering matter as passive, say, that it is impressed like the wax by the seal, and call forms the *passions* of matter.

Forms also are said to be like the similitudes of icons, whether effected by the painter's, or the plastic, or any other art. For these forms, being fashioned by a divine artificer, are said to be *similar* to divine forms; and hence the whole sensible order is called the icon of the intelligible. But this assertion differs from the former, so far as this separates the maker from the exemplar; but

¹ *Magnitude* here, as Proclus well observes, is not such as that of which geometricians speak; for they denominate whatever possesses interval magnitude, whether it be line, superficies, or solid. But Plato does not denominate the form which is the cause of every interval, magnitude, but that which according to every genus imparts *transcendency* to things.

and *just*? That Socrates replied, Entirely so. Does not every thing which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there

but those produce the analogy from considering both as one. And such are the modes according to which material forms have been said to subsist with relation to such as are divine.

It must, however, be observed, that each of these is imperfect considered by itself, and incapable of representing to our intellectual conceptions the whole truth respecting this participation. For, in the first place, consider, as to the mirror, that the countenance beheld in it turns itself towards the mirror, while, on the contrary, an intellectual cause beholds itself, and does not direct its vision to outward objects. If, too, the mirror appears to possess a communication of something, but in reality does not, (for the rays are reflected back to the countenance,) it is evident that this also is foreign from the participation of divine forms; for, as they are perfectly incorporeal, nothing can be separated from them and distributed into matter.

In the second place, if we consider the impressions in wax, we shall find, that both that which impresses externally impresses, and that which is passive to the impression is externally passive; but form pervades through the whole of the subject matter, and operates internally. For nature fashions body inwardly, and not externally like art. And above all, in this instance, that which is participated approximates to that which participates. But it is requisite that divine forms should be exempt from all things, and not be mingled with any thing of a different nature.

In the third place, let us consider the analogy from icons, and we shall find this also deficient. For, in the first place, forms fashion the whole of the subject matter by which they are received, and this by an internal energy: and, in the next place, the exemplar and the maker are here separated from each other. Thus, the figure which is painted does not produce its likeness on the canvass, even though the painter should paint a resemblance of himself; for it is the soul which operates, and not the external figure, which is the exemplar; nor does that which makes, *affimilate* that which is produced to itself; for it is soul which makes, and that which is produced is the resemblance of external form. But divine forms are at the same time paradigmatic and demiurgic of their resemblances: for they have no similitude to the impressions in wax, but possess an efficacious essence, and a power assimilative of things secondary to themselves.

No one of these modes, therefore, is of itself sufficient to represent the true manner in which divine forms are participated. But, perhaps, if we can discover the most proper mode of participation, we shall see how each of these touches on the truth, at the same time that it falls short of the whole characteristic.

It is requisite, therefore, in order to this participation, to consider as the causes by which it is effected, the efficacious power of primary and divine forms, and the desire and aptitude of the natures which thence derive their formation. For neither is the fabricative and efficacious power of forms alone sufficient to produce participation; for they are every where similarly present, but are not similarly participated by all things. Nor is the desire and aptitude of the participants sufficient without the productive energy of forms; for desire and aptitude are of themselves imperfect. The prolific essence, therefore, of the demiurgic intellect exerts an
efficacious

there be any other mode of participation besides these? That Socrates said, How can there be? Does it then appear to you that the whole form¹ is

one

efficacious energy, which the subject nature of sensibles receives. But, in effecting this participation, it neither makes use of impulsions, for it is incorporeal; nor of any indefinite impetus, as we do, for it is impassive; nor of any projectile force, for it is perfect; but it operates by its very essence. Hence, that which is generated is an image of its maker, intellection there concurring with essence: so that, according as he intellectually perceives, he fabricates; and, according as he fabricates, intellectually perceives. Hence, too, that which is generated is *always* generated by him; for, in essential productions, that which is generated is every where consubstantial with its maker. In consequence of this, in things subsisting according to time, form, in *the sudden*, supervenes its subject matter, whatever has been effected previous to its presence alone removing the impediments to its reception. For, *the sudden* imitates according to *the now*, the at-once-collected and eternal generation of all things through the aptitude of the recipient.

If, again, we desire to see what it is which connects demiurgic power with the aptitude of recipients, we shall find it is goodness itself, this being the cause of all possible union. For, participations proceed to mundane causes through a desire of good; and demiurgic forms, through goodness, make their progressions into secondary natures, imitating the inexhaustible and exuberant fountain of all good, which, through its own transcendent goodness, gives subsistence to all the divine orders, if it be lawful so to speak. We have therefore these three causes of the participation of forms, the one goodness of the Father of all things; the demiurgic power of forms, and the aptitude of the natures which receive the illuminations of forms. But, participation subsisting according to these causes, we may perceive how it is possible to assimilate it to representations in a mirror, and to *reflection*. For aptitude and desire, which are imparted to sensible natures from on high, become the causes of their being again *converted* to the sources whence they were derived. This participation too may, after another manner, be assimilated to a *seal*. For the efficacious power of divine causes imparts a *vestige* of ideas to sensibles, and apparent impressions from unapparent forms. For we have said that the demiurgic cause unites both these together. But he who produces an icon effects something of this kind. For in a certain respect he congregates the subject and the paradigm; since, when this is accomplished, he produces an impression similar to the exemplar. So that these modes, in a certain respect, touch upon the truth. But it is by no means wonderful if each is found to be deficient. For the recipients of ideas are partible and sensible; and the characteristic peculiarity of these unapparent and divine causes cannot be circumscribed by the nothingness of corporeal natures.

¹ He who investigates whole and part, not corporeally, but in such a manner as is adapted to intelligible and immaterial forms, will perceive that every sensible nature participates both of the whole and the part of its paradigm. For, as that has the relation of a cause, but sensibles are from a cause, and effects can by no means receive the whole power of their causes, hence, sensibles do not participate of the whole form. For, where can that which is sensible receive the intellectual lives and powers of form? Where can the uniform and impartible nature of idea subsist in matter? Because however, sensibles preserve the idiom according to which *the just*
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one in each individual of *many things*? Or what other opinion have you on this subject? That then Socrates said, What hinders, O Parmenides, but

in the intelligible world is called *the just*, or *the beautiful the beautiful*; through this again they may be said to participate of wholes, and not of parts. Thus, for instance, the idiom of *the beautiful* is every where and in all things; but in one place it is intellectually, and in another materially present. And it is evident that the participations of more perfect natures are more abundant than of those more remote from perfection; and that some things participate according to many, and others according to a few, powers. For, let *the beautiful itself* be an intellectual vital form the cause of symmetry. Form, therefore, and that which is effective of symmetry, are present to every thing beautiful: for this was the idiom of *the beautiful itself*; so that every thing participates of its whole idiom. But the intellectual nature of *the beautiful* is not present to all beauty, but to that which belongs to soul: for the beauty in this is uniform. Nor, again, is its vital nature present to all beauty, but to that which is celestial; but the splendour of beauty is seen in gold, and in certain stones. Some things, therefore, participate of the intellectual and vital nature of *the beautiful*; others of its vital separate from its intellectual nature; and others participate of its idiom alone. More immaterial natures, likewise, receive more of its powers than material natures. Things secondary, therefore, participate both the wholes and parts of their proper paradigms. And in this manner it is proper to speak to those who are able to look to the incorporeal essence of forms. But to those who are of opinion that the participation is corporeal, we must say, that sensibles are incapable of participating either the wholes or parts of ideas; which Parmenides evinces, leading Socrates to the discovery of the most proper mode of the participation of forms, and, in the first place, that they are not participated according to the whole; for this was the first thing to be shown. And Socrates says, that nothing hinders the participation of the whole form. But Parmenides reprobates the position inferring that one and the same thing will be in many things separate from each other, and so the thing itself will be separate from itself, which is of all things the most absurd. For if a finger, or any thing else which subsists in other things, whether it be a corporeal part or power, should be in many things separate from each other, it would also be separate from itself. For a corporeal power being in a subject will thus belong to subjects, and be separate from itself, since it will be both in one and many. And, with respect to a body, it is impossible that the whole of it should be in this place, and at the same time in another. For it cannot be denied, that many bodies may be in one place when the bodies consist of pure immaterial light, such as those of the spheres in which the planets are carried, but it is impossible for the same body to be at the same time in many places. And hence it is impossible for a whole to be in many subjects corporeally.

But, says Proclus, if you wish to perceive the accuracy of Plato's diction in a manner adapted to theological speculation, divide the words, and say as follows:—Since forms first subsist in the paradigm of intelligibles, as we learn in the *Timæus*, each of the first forms will be *one*, and *being*, and *a whole*. And being such, it is impossible for the same thing to be in many things separate from each other, and at once, except in an exempt manner; so as to be both every where and no where, and, being present with all things without time, to be unmingled with them. For every

but that it should be one? As it is, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, the whole will be at the same time one, and so itself will be separate from itself. That Socrates said, It would not be so: but just as if this form was *day*¹, this being *one* and *the same*, is collectively present in many places, and yet is not any thing the more separate from itself; in the same manner, every form may be at once *one* and *the same* in all. That Parmenides then said, You have made, O Socrates, one and the same thing to be collectively present in many places, in a very pleasant manner; just as if, covering many men with a veil, you should say that there is *one whole*, together with *the many*. Do you not think that you would make an assertion of this kind? That Socrates said, Perhaps so. Will, therefore, the whole veil subsist together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual? A different part only. That Parmenides said, These forms then, O Socrates, are divisible², and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form. So indeed it

every divine form, being in itself, is also present with others. And those natures which are incapable of being at the same time in many things, derive this inability from not being in themselves: for that which is something belonging to one thing is not capable of belonging to another.

¹ That Socrates, says Proclus, derived his example of day from the discourse of Zeno, is evident. For Zeno, wishing to evince how the many participate of a certain one, and are not destitute of the one, though they should be most remotely separated from each other, says in this very discourse, that whiteness, being one, is present both to us and the antipodes, in the same manner as day and night. Ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ζήνωνος λόγου το παραδειγμα εἰληφε, δὴλον· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ δηλωσαι βουλομενος ὅπως τὰ πολλὰ μετεχει τινος ἐνός, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐρημα ἐνός, καὶ διεστηκεὶ πορρωτάτω ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, εἶπεν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ μίαν οὐσαν τὴν λευκότητα παρῆναι καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἀντιποσίν, οὕτως ὡς εὐφροῖνῃ καὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ. Parmenides, however, corrects Socrates, as no longer preserving, by the example of day, form one and the same; but as introducing the partible instead of the impartible, and that which is one, and at the same time not one, instead of one; such as is whiteness with us and the antipodes. For the intention of Zeno's discourse was not to ascend to separate form, but to lead his auditors to that form which subsists with, and is inseparable from, the many.

² Every thing sensible is a multitude which has an adventitious one, but form is a certain one comprehending multitude uniformly. For in divine natures progression begins from the one, and from hyparxis; since, if multitude subsists prior to the one, the one will be adventitious. From these things also, says Proclus, you may understand how fables assert that there are certain divisions and lacerations of the Gods, when they are divisibly participated by secondary natures, which distribute the impartible causes of things partible presubsisting in the Gods. For the division is not in reality of the divinities, but of these secondary natures, about them.

seems.

seems. Are you then willing to assert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheless it is still one? That Socrates said, By no means. For see (said Parmenides), whether upon dividing magnitude ¹ itself, it would not be absurd that each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude less than magnitude itself? Entirely so, said Socrates.

¹ Parmenides, says Proclus, wishing to show the absurdity of admitting that a formal essence is partible, discourses concerning magnitude, equality, and parvitude, because each of these is beheld about quantity. But quantity has not by any means a part the same with the whole, in the same manner as a part of quality appears to preserve the same power with the whole; whence also a part of fire is indeed diminished according to quantity, but according to quality preserves the nature of fire. In magnitude, therefore, equality, and parvitude, he very properly confutes those who say that forms are partible. For, if those forms which especially appear to be partible, because they introduce with themselves the conception of quantity, cannot be divisible, by a much greater reason other forms must be impartible, which do not introduce together with themselves such a conception; such as are the just itself, the beautiful itself, the similar itself, and the dissimilar itself, which Parmenides co-ordinating with magnitude itself inquires how they are participated by sensible. About these, therefore, which appear to be quantities, he very properly forms the demonstration, and, in the first place, about magnitude. For, let magnitude be corporeally divisible. The part, therefore, will be less than the whole; and, if this be the case, the whole will be greater than the part. So that, if sensible magnitude receiving a part of magnitude in the intelligible world, i. e. of magnitude itself, becomes great, this very thing is called great from receiving that which is smaller: for a part of magnitude itself is less and smaller. But it is supposed that things which participate of *the great* are great, and that things which participate of *the small* are small.

Let us however consider magnitude itself by itself, apart from corporeal division. Do we not, therefore, say that it has multitude, and is not one alone? But, if it has multitude, shall we say that each of its parts is magnitude itself, or that each is less than the whole, but is by no means small? For, if a part is magnitude itself, in no respect less than the whole, there will be a progression to infinity; since this will not only be the case with this part, but also with its parts, and the parts of its parts, the parts always being the same with the wholes. But if magnitude has not magnitudes as its parts, the whole will consist from parts unadapted to it. It is necessary, therefore, that the parts as it were of magnitude itself should be magnitudes, according with the whole, but yet not that which the whole is. For the part of fire is fire, but the power of the whole is greater than that of the part; and neither does the whole consist from cold parts, nor is each part of equal strength with the whole. Hence we must conceive that magnitude itself has twofold powers, one of which infers transcendency in incorporeals with respect to incorporeals; for in these there is a certain magnitude, and the other in bodies with respect to bodies. So that, though form possesses abundance of power, yet it does not depart from its proper idiom in the multitude of the powers which it contains. By speculating intellectually in this manner parts and wholes in ideas, we shall avoid the absurdities with which Parmenides shows the speculation of them in a corporeal manner is attended.

But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal ¹ itself, be equal to any thing by this its part of equality, which is less than equal itself?

¹ *Magnitude itself* is the source of transcendency and exempt perfection to all things, whether such transcendency and perfection be intellectual, or vital, or subsisting with interval. But *the equal* is the cause of harmony and analogy to all things: for from equality, as we shall show in the Additional Notes to the *Timæus*, all the mediums are derived, as well those belonging to the soul and such as are physical, as those that are mathematical; and the end of it is friendship and union. Since therefore the demiurgus, in adorning the universe, employed all the mediums, and the arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic bonds proceeding from these, it may be safely inferred that the one intellectual cause of these, which generates and adorns them, is this demiurgic equality. For, as the monad which subsists in the demiurgus gives subsistence to every natural number, so the equality which is there, generates all the mediums or middles which are here; since also the equality which is contained in our dianoëtic part generates the mathematical mediums. But, if this be the case in images, much more in intellectual forms is equality the prolific source of all the variety of mediums which proceed about the world. Equality, therefore, is the cause of these to all mundane natures. It is likewise the supplier of co-ordination to beings; just as *magnitude* is the cause of exempt perfection, and *parvitude* of essential subjection. It appears, indeed, that all beings are adorned from this triad of forms, as they impart transcendency to superior natures, subjection to such as are inferior, and a communion of the same series to such as are co-ordinate. And it is evident that the perpetually indissoluble series of wholes are generated according to this triad. For every series requires these three, viz. *transcendency*, *co-ordination* and *subjection*. So that, if there are certain progressions of every form from on high, as far as to the last of things, and which, together with communion, preserve the distinction between things second and first, they are perfected through this triad.

Let us now see how Parmenides confutes those who think that sensible equals participate parts of equality itself corporeally. For, if any sensible particular thus participates a part of equality, it is evident that it participates of something less than the whole. But, if this be the case, that which participates of the lesser is no longer lesser, but equal. It ought not however to be so; since it is agreed that forms give the appellations of themselves to sensibles. Hence that which participates of the lesser must not be called equal, but lesser; nor must that which participates of the equal be called lesser, but equal; nor that which participates of the greater be denominated equal or lesser, but greater. If, therefore, we direct our view to equality itself as an incorporeal essence, we must say that being one it contains in itself the causes of all equalities, viz. of the equality in weights, in corporeal masses, in multitudes, in dignities and in generations; so that each of such-like particulars, which are all-various, is a certain *equal*, possessing a power and dignity subordinate to the whole. Since every form, therefore, generates all the idioms of the powers which it contains, it follows that there are many equalities comprehended under one equality. Nor ought we to wonder if all equalities, being subordinate to their comprehending unity, suffer this through the participation of parvitude itself. For all forms communicate with all; and magnitude itself, so far as it possesses a lesser power than other forms, participates of parvitude. Parvitude itself also, so far as it surpasses other forms, participates of magnitude itself; while in the mean time every form is participated by sensibles so far as it is that which it is, and not so far as it communicates with others.

It is impossible. But some one of us must possess a part of this small quantity ; and that which is *small itself*¹ will be greater than this, this small quantity

¹ Parvitude itself may be considered as that which is the source of subjection in all forms, or it may be said to be that which supplies impartibility, connected continuity, and a power which converges to the same in every form. For through this souls are able to proceed from a life extended with body and sense to a more impartible form of life. Through this also bodies are compressed and connectedly contained in their indivisible causes ; the whole world is one, and possesses the whole of its life converging in one thing, the middle ; and from this the poles and centres, and all impartible sections, and contacts of circles, are derived. But the present discourse evinces that it is impossible for sensibles to participate a part of parvitude corporeally. For, if parvitude itself had a certain part, it would be greater than its part ; since a part of the small, so far as it is a part, must be smaller than the whole : so that the small will evidently be greater than its proper part, which is smaller than it. But it is impossible that the small simply considered should be greater. For we now consider parvitude itself by itself, without any connection with magnitude. And such is the absurdity attending those that divide parvitude when such division is considered in the form itself. But we may also investigate another absurdity which takes place in the participants of parvitude, and which is as follows : If we divide the small itself, since the part of it is, as has been shown, smaller than the whole, it is evident that the thing, to which the part taken away from the whole of *the small* is added, will become greater by this addition, and not smaller. Hence parvitude must not be divided.

We may also, says Proclus, interpret the present passage in the same manner as our associate Pericles. For, to whatever the part taken away from the small is added, this must necessarily become greater ; but, by adding to that same thing the remaining part of the small thus divided, the whole thing will become small, and not greater than it was before : for the form was small from the beginning. It is absurd, therefore, to think that the small can be divided. Proclus adds, that the present passage to some appeared so difficult, that they considered it as spurious. The words of Parmenides however, by introducing certain ablations and additions, evince that the participation which he reprobates is corporeal.

But we may assert in common, says Proclus, respecting these three forms, magnitude, parvitude, and equality, or rather concerning all forms at once, that they are impartible, and are allotted an incorporeal essence. For every thing corporeal, being bounded according to interval, cannot after the same manner be present to things greater and lesser ; but the equal, the greater, the lesser, and, in a similar manner, every other form are present to their participants, whatever interval they may possess. All forms, therefore, are without interval. For the same reason they are also established above all place ; since without impediment they are every where present to their participants. But things which subsist in place are naturally destitute of this unimpeded presence : for it is impossible that they can be participated by all things which are arranged in different places. In like manner, forms are entirely expanded above all time : for they are present untemporally and collectively to all things ; since generations themselves are certain preparations which precede the participations of forms. And generations indeed subsist in time, but

quantity being a part of *small itself*; and thus *small itself* will be that which is *greater*: but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become smaller, and not greater than it was before. That Socrates said—This cannot take place. But after what manner¹ then, O Socrates, can individuals

forms give the participations of themselves to generated natures, in an instant, impartibly, without being in any respect indigent of temporal extension. Let not, therefore, any one transfer from participants to the things participated, either time, or local comprehension, or corporeal division; nor let him, in short, understand in forms either corporeal compositions or separations. For these things are very remote from the immaterial simplicity of forms, and from the purity of an impartible essence which is contained in eternity.

¹ The whole form of these words, says Proclus, is excitative and maieutic of the conceptions of Socrates. Hence Parmenides does not add, like one who contends for victory in disputation, "sensibles, therefore, do not participate of forms," but he excites Socrates, and calls forth his intellect to the discovery of the most proper mode of participation. But we have already observed that whole and part are not to be considered corporeally, but in a manner accommodated to immaterial and intellectual essences. Sensibles, therefore, participate both the whole and the parts of form. For, so far as the idiom of every form proceeds in its participants as far as to the last of them, the participation is that of a whole; but, so far as things secondary do not receive all the power of their causes, the participation is of parts. Hence the more elevated of participants receive more powers of the paradigm; but the more subordinate, fewer. So that, if there are men in other parts of the universe better than us, these, being nearer the idea of man, will have a greater communion with it, and according to a greater number of powers. Hence the celestial lion is intellectual, but the sublunary irrational: for the former is nearer to the idea of lion than the latter. The idiom indeed of idea pervades as far as to mortal natures; and hence things sublunary sympathize with things celestial. For one form, and communion according to this, produce the sympathy. The moon also, says Proclus, as beheld in the heavens is a divinity; but the lunar form, which is beheld here in stones, preserves also a power appropriate to the lunar order, since it increases and decreases in conformity to the changes of the moon. Thus, one idiom proceeds from on high as far as to the last of things; and it is evident that it proceeds through mediums. For, if there is this one form both in Gods and stones, much prior to its being present with the latter must it subsist in the middle genera, such as dæmons, or other animals. For certain series pervade from the intellectual Gods to the heavens, and again from the heavens into generation or the sublunary realms, being changed according to each of the elements, and subsiding as far as to earth. But of these series the higher parts participate in a greater, but the lower in a lesser degree; one idiom being extended to all the parts, which makes the whole series one.

Again, after another manner, we may say that sensibles participate both of the whole and of the parts of form. They participate of the whole, so far as the fabrication of form is impartible: whence also the same whole is every where present to all things, subsisting from itself in the first place, and afterwards filling the essence of its participants with its proper power. But they par-

participate

individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes? That Socrates said, It does not appear to me, by Jupiter, to be in any respect an easy matter to define a circumstance of this kind. But what will you say to this? To what? I think that you consider every form as one¹, on this account; because, since a certain multitude of particulars seems to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who surveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think

ticipate of the parts of form, so far as they do not participate of form itself, but of its images; and images are parts of their proper paradigms. For image is to its paradigm, as a part to the whole. And if any one, admitting this exposition, examines what has been already delivered concerning ideas, none of those impossibilities will follow, which some of the antients have considered as the inevitable consequences of the doctrine of ideas. For, will it any longer be impossible that the same thing should be in all things, if we admit that an immaterial and intellectual form subsisting in itself, and requiring no seat nor place, is equally present to all things which are able to participate it? Will it be impossible that essentially impartible form, and which pre-subsists as one, should be divided in its participants and sustain a Titanic division? And how is it not most true that what participates of magnitude itself participates of the lesser? For magnitude in the participant, being divisible, is the image of magnitude itself; but the image is less than the paradigm by a certain part. In like manner, that which we call equal in sensibles is less than the power of the equal itself, and is nothing more than the image of perfection; but the equal itself is greater than this, so far as it is more perfect in power. In short, with respect to each of these three forms, since they are exempt from their participants, measure their essence, and impart the cause of subjection to them; according to exempt transcendency, each employs magnitude itself; according to a measuring power, the equal itself; and according to the gift of subjection, parvitude itself. All, therefore, co-operate with each other in the gifts which they impart to secondary natures. For, if magnitude itself imparts a power which extends to all things, but parvitude impartibility, they are consubstant with each other; since then pervading more impartibly to a great number of particulars, they are impartible in a greater degree: and both are in a greater degree equal, by being especially the measures both of themselves and others. There is nothing, therefore, absurd, nothing impossible, if whole and part are considered in a manner adapted to the nature of forms; but all things follow appropriately to the hypothesis. Whence also Parmenides appears continually to ask Socrates, how sensibles participate of, and how whole and part are to be surveyed in, forms, elevating him to the most true conceptions concerning ideas.

¹ From what has been already delivered (says Proclus) it is sufficiently evident that forms are not participated in a corporeal manner; whence we may infer that neither do they fabricate corporeally, nor operate by impulsion, like the motions of bodies. But if this be the case, it is evident that the order of forms is incorporeal. In the Sophists, therefore, it is shown that *the one* is incorporeal; for, if it were body, it would require something else to unite its parts. But it is here shown that *true being* and *intellectual forms* have an impartible subsistence: and in the Laws,

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think them to be one great thing. That then Socrates said, You speak the truth. But what if you consider the *great*¹ *itself*, and other things which
are

that *souls* are incorporeal through their self-motive hypostasis. These, however, are the three orders prior to sensibles, viz. the order of *souls*, the order of *intellectual essences*, and the order of *unities*, the immediate progeny of *the one*.

But here Parmenides ascends to a more perfect hypothesis concerning ideas, viz. whether sensibles participate of ideas as of physical reasons or productive principles, which are coordinate and connascent with their participants, but are at the same time incorporeal: for the doubt prior to this considered the participation of ideas as corporeal. Parmenides, therefore, ascends to a certain incorporeal reason, which, looking to things, we must define to be physical, and must assert, that the mode of participation is indeed incorporeal, but possesses something common with its participants. For if, together with incorporeal participation, we also consider the things participated as perfectly exempt from their participants, there will no longer any doubt remain concerning the participation; since these two things produce the doubt, the corporeal mode of being present, and the possession of something common between ideas and their participants, to which Socrates looking in the *Phædo* says, that it is dubious whether participation is the *presence* of forms, as in the preceding inquiry, whether sensibles participate of the whole of form, or only of a part; or whether it is not a being present. This second inquiry, therefore, considers form as in its participants, and as coordinate with them. For physical reasons and natures are arranged above bodies and the apparent order of forms; but at the same time they verge to bodies, and do
not

¹ Ideas must be considered as exempt and separate from, and as generative of, the many; and the transitions from things which are separated must be made, not through privations, but through forms, and in forms, till we arrive at self-subsistent and first natures. For how, through things indefinite and formless, can we arrive at form and bound? Ascending, indeed, from things material to spermatik reasons, we shall find something common in them, but which is imperfect; and proceeding from these to causes subsisting in soul, we shall perceive that the effective power of these is temporal. But if we run back to forms which are truly so called, we shall find that there is nothing common between these and sensibles. For these true forms are perfect, and their energy is incorporeal and eternal, and is above all generation. For the characteristics of all generation are the imperfect from itself, the partible, the temporal, from which forms being purified, they are liberated from all sensibles, and possess nothing in common with them; so that it is no longer possible to make a transition to any other something common. As, therefore, says Proclus, we observed in commenting on the former doubt, that forms are present with their participants through that which they impart, and are not present through their separate hypostasis; so, with respect to this second doubt, we say, that forms communicate with their participants, and do not communicate. They communicate by illuminating them from themselves, but do not communicate, in consequence of being unmingled with the illuminated natures. So that a certain similitude to them is divulged, not from forms themselves, but from the illuminations proceeding from them. Hence, through these they are said to communicate after a certain manner with sensibles; not as in things synonymous, but as in things second and first.

are *great*, in the same manner, with the eye of the soul, will not again a certain something which is *great* appear to you, through which all these necessarily

not connect them exemptly. Hence, also, physical reasons are entirely coordinated with sensible forms. But Parmenides himself clearly teaches how we ascend to physical reasons; since we recur from things common in particulars to the proximate cause of them, which is entirely physical form. For, perceiving many things that are great, and one idea extending to all these, we conceive that there is a certain something *great* which is common to the magnitude in particulars. But that the discourse is about physical form, and a transition from sensibles to this form, is evident, as Proclus justly observes, from Parmenides employing such expressions as *το αἰσθαι*, *το δοῦναι*, *το δῶναι*, *το νῦν*, and the like, which could not be employed about things which are objects of science, but are only adapted to physical concerns. In like manner we must say, with respect to men, that we see many men, and one idea extending to all of them, the man in particulars. Whence we think that one man pre-exists in the reasons or productive principles of nature, generative of the apparent man, and that thus the many participate of the one, as of physical reason proceeding into matter; such reason or form not being separate from matter, but resembling a seal verging to the wax, impressing in it the form which it contains, and causing it to be adapted to the whole of the inserted form. As the proximate transition, therefore, is from bodies to natures, Parmenides evinces that physical reasons fall short of the perfection of ideas, which is primary and unmingled with its participants.

From hence it may be inferred, that, as form is that primarily which the multitude under it is secondarily, it neither communicates with this multitude according to name alone, nor is synonymous with it; and that it is not necessary again to investigate that which is common to form and its depending multitude. When, therefore, we consider the one in every form, we ought not to investigate it either doxastically or dianoetically: for these knowledges are not connate with intellectual monads, which neither belong to the objects of opinion, nor to those of the dianoetic part, as we learn from the sixth book of the Republic. But it is fit that we should survey the simple and uniform essence of forms through intellectual intuition. Nor must we conceive that the one in these subsists according to composition from the many, or by an abstraction from particulars: for the intellectual number of forms proceeds from *the good* and *the one*, and does not depart from a union and alliance adapted to the cause which gave it subsistence. Hence, Socrates in the Philebus, at one time calls ideas *unities*, and at another time *monads*. For, considered with relation to *the one*, they are *monads*, because each is a multitude, since it is a certain being, life, and intellectual form; but considered with relation to their productions, and the series to which they give subsistence, they are *unities*; for things posterior to them are multiplied, and from their impartible essence become partible. If, therefore, that which is characterized by unity in forms is exempt from the many, it is evident that the knowledge of intellect, which is profoundly one, is sufficient to the apprehension of the one of forms. Whether, therefore, there is a multitude of participants, it does not multiply the unity of that which is participated; or, whether there are differences of parts in the participants, the impartible nature of forms is preserved immutable; or, whether there is composition in that which participates, the simplicity of intellectual

necessarily seem to be great? It seems so. Hence, another form of *magnitude* will become apparent, besides *magnitude itself* and its participants: and besides

lectual forms remains eternally the same. For they are neither connumerated with their effects, nor do they give completion to their essence; since, if they subsisted in their productions, they could not be beheld as the principle of them, and as their prolific cause. For, in short, every thing which is something belonging to another cannot be a cause, simply considered; since every true cause is exempt from its effects, and is established in itself and from itself, separate from its participants. He, therefore, who is willing to pass from these sensibles, and every way divided natures, to forms themselves, must permit intellect instead of opinion to be the leader of the way, and must contemplate every form uncoordinated and unmingled with objects of sense; neither conceiving that they possess any habitude with sensibles, nor surveying any common definition of essence between them and the many, nor, in short, any coordination of participants and the things which are participated. But he who uses opinion in this transition, and apprehends forms mingled with sensibles, and connumerated with material reasons, will scarcely ascend as far as to nature, and the physical order of forms: whence, again, he must after these contemplate other more total monads, and this to infinity, till, arriving at intellectual boundaries themselves, he beholds in these self-subsisting, most simple, and eternal natures, the definite derivation of forms. Parmenides, therefore, gradually evinces that primary are expanded above divisible forms, and all that is mingled and connumerated with these, and this according to a wonderful transcendence of nature.

And here, what Socrates observes in the *Phædo* respecting the participation of forms, is worthy of admiration: for he there says, that he cannot yet strenuously affirm whether it is requisite to call this participation *presence*, or *communion*, or any thing else besides these. For, from the first doubt, it may be evinced that it is impossible for the participation to be *presence*, since neither the whole, nor certain parts of them, are able to be present with their participants. But, from this second doubt, we may confute those who contend that the participation is *communion*. If, therefore, there is any thing common to ideas and their participants, there will be a transition ad infinitum from the participants of that which is common to that which is common; and hence this latter doubt is different from the former. For the former was, that form is present with its participants, and is something belonging to them; but the latter, that form is different from its participant, but possesses an abundant communion with it. Hence, in the former, the argument proceeds from the inability of form being present, either according to the whole or a part of itself; but, in the latter, it no longer proceeds in a similar manner, but, from that which is common in form and its participant, again ascends to something else which is more common than the one form, and the many by which it is participated. He alone, therefore, can assign a scientific reason concerning the participation of forms, who takes away that which is corporeal in their being present, and removes that which is common from an incorporeal essence. For thus ideas will be incorporeally present with their participants, but will not be subdued by one relation towards them; that they may be every where, through their incorporeal nature, and no where, in consequence of being exempt from their participants. For a communion with participants takes
away

besides all these another *magnitude*, through which all these become great; so that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.

away exempt transcendency. For it is requisite, indeed, that there should be communion, yet not as of things coordinate, but only so far as participants are suspended from ideas; but ideas are perfectly exempt from their participants. Corporeal presence, however, obscures a presence every way impartible. Bodies therefore, are things incapable of being wholly in many things; but essentially incorporeal natures are wholly present to things which are able to participate them; or, rather, they are not present to their participants, but their participants are present to them. And this is what Socrates obscurely signifies in the *Phædo*, when he says, "whether presence, or communion, or any thing else may be the cause of the participation of forms." Forms, therefore, must not be admitted to be the progeny and blossoms of matter, as they were said to be by the Stoics; nor must it be granted that they consist from a comixture of simple elements; nor that they have the same essence with spermatic reasons. For all these things evince their subsistence to be corporeal, imperfect, and divisible. Whence, then, on such an hypothesis, is perfection derived to things imperfect? Whence union to things every way dissipated? Whence is a never-failing essence present with things perpetually generated, unless the incorporeal and all-perfect order of forms has a subsistence prior to these? Others again, of the ancients, says Proclus, alleged that which is common in particulars as the cause of the permanency in forms: for man generates man, and the similar is produced from the similar. They ought, however, at the same time, to have directed their attention to that which gives subsistence to what is common in particulars. For, as we have before observed, true causes are exempt from their effects. That which is common, therefore, in particulars, may be assimilated to one and the same seal which is impressed in many pieces of wax, and which remains the same, without failing, while the pieces of wax are changed. What, then, is it which proximately impresses this seal in the wax? For matter is analogous to the wax, the sensible man to the type, and that which is common in particulars, and verges to things, to the ring itself. What else, then, can we assign as the cause of this, than nature proceeding through matter, and thus giving form to that which is sensible, by her own inherent reasons? Soul, therefore, will thus be analogous to the hand which uses the ring, since soul is the leader of nature; that which ranks as a whole of the whole of nature, and that which is partial of a partial nature. But intellect will be analogous to the soul which impresses the wax through the hand and the ring; which intellect fills that which is sensible through soul and the nature of forms, and is itself the true Porus*, generative of the reasons which flow, as far as to matter. It is not necessary, therefore, to stop at the things common in particulars, but we should investigate the causes of them. For why do men participate of this peculiar something which is common, but another animal of a different something common, except through unapparent reasons? For nature is the one mother of all things; but what are the causes of definite similitudes? And why do we say the generation is according to nature when man is from man, unless there is a reason of men in nature, according to which all sensible men subsist? For it is not because that which is produced is an animal, since if it were a lion that was pro-

* See the speech of Diotima in the *Banquet*.

titude. But that upon this Socrates replied, Perhaps, O Parmenides, each of these forms is nothing more than an intellectual *conception*¹, which ought

duced from a man, it would be a natural animal indeed, but would no longer be *according to nature*, because it would not be generated according to a proper reason. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be another cause of similars prior to similars; and hence it is necessary to recur from the things common in particulars to the one cause which proximately gives subsistence to sensibles, and to which Parmenides himself leads us. That he does not, however, think it proper that we should stop at this cause, he manifests from what follows. For if, looking to these things which are common, we wish, beginning from these, to fashion ideas, in consequence of recurring in a similar manner to them from all things, we shall be in want not only of things of which there are ideas, but also of those of which there are not, such as of things contrary to nature, of things artificial, of things unessential, and of such as have no subsistence, such as an animal mingled from a goat and stag, (*τραγελαφος*), or an animal mingled from a horse and centaur, (*ιππομενταυρος*); for there are also things common in these, and thus we shall establish ideas of non-entities. To which we may add, that we must likewise admit that there are ideas of infinities, as of irrational lines, and the ratios in numbers: for both these are infinite, and of both there are things common. If, therefore, we fashion certain ideas from these, we shall often make infinities, though it is requisite that ideas should be less numerous than their participants, the participants of each, at the same time, being many. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides direct the mode of transition to ideas, as not being scientific, if it proceeds from the things common in sensibles; for it will always be possible to conceive different things common, and thus to proceed ad infinitum. But this is evident from the words that immediately follow.

¹ The fourth problem concerning ideas is here considered, viz. what kind of beings they are, or in other words, where they subsist, whether in souls, or prior to souls. Socrates, therefore, being separated by Parmenides from physical forms, calls idea a conception belonging to the soul, (*νοημα ψυχικον*), and defines the place of it to be soul. For the form in soul is one and incorporeal; and this dogma is not attended with the former difficulties. For this form is exempt from the many, and is not co-ordinate with them like the forms in matter, in consequence of being allotted a subsistence in soul. There is likewise nothing common between this form and the many; nor is it either according to the whole, or a part of itself, in its participants, so that it may be shown to be separate from itself, or to have a partible subsistence. Socrates, therefore, by adopting this dogma, avoids the above-mentioned doubts. But, says Proclus, when Socrates calls idea a *conception* (*νοημα*), we must not think that he asserts it to be that which is the object of intellectual vision, (*το νοουμενον*) in the same manner as we call that which is apprehended by sense *sensible* (*ως αισθημα φαιμεν το τη αισθησει λεπτου*); but that intelligence itself understanding form, is here called a *conception*; being so denominated as a certain theorem and dogma ingenerated in souls, about dogmatized and deiform concerns. (*Ουτω νοημα λεγομενον ως θεωρημα τι και δογμα ενταις ψυχαις εγγινωμενον περι των δογματιζομενων και θεωριδων πραγματα*). This conception, therefore, he says is *ingenerated* in souls, through the word *ingenerated*, (*εγγινεσθαι*), manifesting that it does not subsist in them *essentially*. And this is that form of posterior origin (*το υστερογενες ειδος*), which some of the followers

ought not to subsist any where but in the soul; and if this be the case, each will be one: and the consequences just now mentioned will not ensue. That
Parmenides

of Aristotle, and most of the moderns, so much celebrate, but which is entirely different from that reason or form which abides essentially in souls, and does not derive its subsistence from an abstraction from sensibles. Looking to this essential reason we say, that the soul is all forms, and is the place of forms, not in capacity only, but in that kind of energy, through which we call one skilled in geometry a geometician in energy, even when he does not geometrize, and which Aristotle accurately calls the prior form of being in energy. This, therefore, which is denominated a conception, as of posterior origin, is very properly said to be different from the essential reason of the soul: for it is more obscure than the many in sensibles, as being posterior and not prior to them. But the essential reason or form of the soul is more perfect, because the conception of posterior origin, or in modern language, abstract idea, has a less essence than the many, but the essential form more.

That it is not, however, proper to stop at conceptions of posterior origin, i. e. notions gained by an abstraction from sensible particulars, but that we should proceed to those essential reasons which are allotted a perpetual subsistence within the soul, is evident to those who are able to survey the nature of things. For, whence is man able to collect into one by reasoning the perceptions of many senses, and to consider one and the same unapparent form prior to things apparent, and separated from each other; but no other animal that we are acquainted with, surveys this something common, for neither does it possess a rational essence, but alone employs sense, and appetite, and imagination? Whence, then, do rational souls generate these universals, and recur from the senses to that which is the object of opinion? It is because they essentially possess the gnostically productive principles of things: for, as nature possesses a power productive of sensibles, by containing reasons, or productive principles, and fashions, and connects sensibles, so as by the inward eye to form the external, and in a similar manner the finger, and every other particular; so he who has a common conception of these, by previously possessing the reasons of things, beholds that which each possesses in common. For he does not receive this common something from sensibles; since that which is received from sensibles is a phantasm, and not the object of opinion. It likewise remains within such as it was received from the beginning, that it may not be false, and a non-entity, but does not become more perfect and venerable, nor does it originate from any thing else than the soul. Indeed, it must not be admitted that nature in generating generates by natural reasons and measures, but that soul in generating does not generate by animastic reasons and causes. But if matter possesses that which is common in the many, and this something common is essential, and more essence than individuals; for this is perpetual, but each of those is corruptible, and they derive their very being from this, since it is through form that every thing partakes of essence,—if this be the case, and soul alone possesses things common which are of posterior origin (*ὕστερον γεννητοῖς*), do we not make the soul more ignoble than matter? For the form which is merged in matter will be more perfect and more essence than that which resides in the soul; since the latter is of posterior origin, but the former is perpetual; and the one is after, but the other generative and connective of the many. To which we may add, that a common phantasm in the soul derives its subsistence from a survey of that which is

said, What then? is each of these *conceptions*¹ one, but at the same time a *conception* of nothing? That Socrates said, This is impossible. It is a *conception*, therefore, of something? Certainly. Of *being* or of *non-being*? Of *being*. Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception understands as one certain idea in all things? Undoubtedly. But now will not that which is understood to be one, be a form always the same in all

common in particulars. Hence it tends to this; for every thing adheres to its principle, and is said to be nothing else than a predicate; so that its very essence is to be predicated of the many.

Further still: the universal in the many is less than each of the many; for by certain additions and accidents it is surpassed by every individual. But that which is of posterior origin (i. e. universal abstracted from particulars) comprehends each of the many. Hence it is predicated of each of these; and that which is particular is contained in the whole of this universal. For this something common, or abstract idea, is not only predicated of that something common in an individual, but likewise of the whole subject. How then can it thence derive its subsistence, and be completed from that which is common in the many? For, if from the many themselves, where do we see infinite men, of all which we predicate the same thing? And if from that which is common in the many, whence is it that this abstract idea is more comprehensive than its cause? Hence it has a different origin, and receives from another form this power which is comprehensive of every individual; and of this form the abstract idea which subsists in opinion is an image, the inward cause being excited from things apparent. To which we may add, that all demonstration, as Aristotle has shown in his Last Analytics, is from things prior, more honourable, and more universal. How, therefore, is universal more honourable, if it is of posterior origin? For, in things of posterior origin, that which is more universal is more essential; whence species is more essence than genus. The rules, therefore, concerning the most true demonstration must be subverted, if we alone place in the soul universals of posterior origin: for these are not more excellent than, nor are the causes of, nor are naturally prior to, particulars. If, therefore, these things are absurd, it is necessary that essential reasons should subsist in the soul prior to universals, which are produced by an abstraction from sensibles. And these reasons or productive powers are indeed always exerted, and are always efficacious in divine souls, and in the more excellent orders of beings; but in us they are sometimes dormant, and sometimes in energy.

¹ From the things common in particulars, it is necessary to recur to physical form, which is proximate to these; and after this to the reason or form in the soul which is of posterior origin, or which derives its subsistence from an abstraction from sensibles, and is a conception ingenerated in the soul. But when we have arrived thus far, it is requisite to pass on to the conception of the essential reason of the soul, and from this to make a transition to being itself, to which also Socrates is now led through the obsetric arguments of Parmenides. As in intellect, therefore, that which understands, intelligence, and the intelligible, are united to each other, and intellectual conception every where pertains to the intelligible, it is evident that the intelligible is prior to intellectual conception, in which intelligible, the reason in the soul being firmly fixed, is a *noëma*, or intellectual conception. Hence, we must not stop in ascending from one form to another,

all things? This seems to be necessary. That Parmenides then said, But what, is it not necessary, since other things participate of forms, that each should be composed from intellectual conceptions¹; and thus all of them be

another, till we arrive at true beings, or, in other words, intelligibles. For though we shall find that intellect and intelligibles are connately united to each other, yet intellect is a plenitude of forms according to the intelligible which it contains. And as we unite intellect and the intelligible to each other, so we should consider intelligibles to be the same with beings. For intellect being in itself, and intellectually perceiving itself, is at the same time full of intelligibles. And, as among sensibles, whatever is apparently one, is in reality a multitude; so in intelligibles, intellectual conception and being, which are two things, are profoundly absorbed in unity.

¹ If all things participate of forms, but all things do not participate of intellectual conceptions, forms or ideas will not primarily be intellectual conceptions. For one of these three things must happen, either that things which participate of intellectual conceptions do not participate of intellection, or that forms are not intellectual conceptions, or that things which are destitute of intelligence do not participate of forms, of which three the first and last are perfectly absurd. For every thing which participates of intellectual conception, understands intellectually, since the word *noëma* manifests intelligence; and things deprived of intelligence participate of forms; for inanimate natures participate of the equal, the lesser, and the greater, which are forms. Ideas, therefore, are not intellectual conceptions, nor are they essentialized in intellections, but in intelligibles. We must ascend, therefore, from things partible to the impartible reasons of nature, which do not intellectually perceive the things prior to themselves: for nature is not only deprived of intelligence, but is also irrational and destitute of phantasy. In the next place, we must rise from these to the intelligibles which are proximately placed above physical forms, and are the energies of the intellectual soul, according to the position of Socrates concerning them: for he says, that they are ingenerated in the soul, and are *noëmata*, as being intellections of the soul. But from these we must ascend to true intelligibles: for these are able to be the causes of all things which have a formal subsistence, but this cannot be asserted of such things as are intellectual conceptions only.

Here, however, as Proclus well observes, it is worth while to enquire, why, since all things subsist intellectually in intellect, all sensible natures in consequence of participating forms do not intellectually energize? and why, since all things there possess life, all things that are assimilated to them do not live? The answer is, that the progression of beings gradually subsiding from the first to the last of things, obscures the participations of wholes and all-perfect essences. Demiurgic energy also pervading through all things, gives subsistence to all things, according to different measures of essence; and besides this, all things do not similarly participate of the same form. For some things participate of it in a greater, and others in a lesser degree; and some things are assimilated to form according to one power, others according to two, and others according to many powers. Whence also there are certain series which beginning supernally extend as far as to things beneath. Thus, for instance, says Proclus, the form of the moon is beheld first of all in the Gods according to that which is characterized by *the one* and *the good* in form: for all things are

be endued with intellect? Or will you assert that though they are intellectual conceptions, yet they understand nothing? But that Socrates said, This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair appears to me to take place, in the most eminent degree, as follows: *that these forms are established paradigms¹, as it were, in nature; but that other things are assimilated*

are deified from *the good*, as Socrates says in the sixth book of the Republic, through the light of truth. This form is also beheld in angels, according to that which is intellectual in form; and in dæmons, according to the dianoëtic energy. It is likewise beheld in animals which are no longer able to imitate it intellectually, but vitally. Hence, the Egyptian Apis, and the lunar fish, and many other animals, differently imitate the celestial form of the moon. And this form is beheld in the last place in stones; so that there is a certain stone suspended from this form, and which sustains augmentations and diminutions, together with the moon in the heavens, though it is deprived of life. It must not, therefore, be supposed that all things receive all the powers of forms, but, together with proper subjection, some things receive a greater, and others a lesser, number of these; while that alone which is the idiom of the participated form, and according to which it differs from other forms, is necessarily seen in all its participants. To which we may add, that the participation being different, the subordinate idioms of forms first desert the participants, and afterwards those that are more total than these; but those idioms which are primary, and are particularly allied to *the one*, are similarly apparent in all the productions of form. For every form is *one* and a *multitude*, the multitude not giving subsistence to *the one* according to composition, but *the one* producing the many idioms of the form. Form, therefore, uniformly *is*, and *lives*, and *intellectually energizes*; but with respect to its progeny, some participate of all these, others of more or less of them, and others of one idiom alone. Since also in forms themselves, their intellectual nature is derived from the first intellect, their life from imparticipable, or the first life, their being from the first being, and *the one* which they contain from the unity which is beyond beings.

¹ Socrates, says Proclus, being led by the obstetrication of Parmenides to the intelligible essence of forms, thinks that here especially, the order and the mode of the participation of forms should be investigated; asserting, indeed, that forms themselves are established in nature, but that other things are generated as their resemblances. Having, therefore, thus explored the order of forms, he at the same time introduces the mode of participation, and dissolves the former doubts, that he may not be compelled to say that sensibles participate either of the whole or a part of form, or that forms are coordinate with sensibles. For a paradigm is not present with its image, nor coordinate with it. The participation, therefore, is through similitude; which Socrates introduces, calling forms paradigms, but their participants resemblances. And so confident is he in these assertions, that he who before swore that it was not easy to define what the participation of forms is, now says that the mode of participation is eminently apparent to him. But he is thus affected through his acuteness, and the power of Parmenides perfecting his spontaneous conceptions concerning divine natures; by which it is also evident that the manner of what is said is maieutic, or obstetric, and not contending for victory (*καταγωνιστικός*). For it would not otherwise

lated to these, and are their resemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms. If any thing,

wife advance Socrates, and perpetually perfect his conceptions. For the end of obstetrication is the evocation of inward knowledge, but of contention, victory. If, therefore, Socrates by every doubt advances, and is perfected, and distinctly evolves his conceptions concerning primary forms, we must say that he is rather obstetricated than vanquished by Parmenides.

This being premised, let us see how the hypothesis of Socrates approximates to the truth, but does not yet possess the perfect. For he is right in apprehending that forms are intellectual and truly paradigms, and in defining their idiom, by asserting that they are *established*; and further still, in admitting that other things are assimilated to them. For the stable and a perpetual sameness of subsistence are the idioms of eternally energizing forms. For, in the Politicus, it is said that a subsistence according to the same, and after the same manner, belongs only to the most divine of all things; and the Eleatean guest, in the Sophista, defines *the being established* (*το ισταναι*) to be nothing else than a subsistence according to the same, and after the same manner. If, therefore, Socrates also says, that forms are *established*, but things established subsist according to the same and after the same manner, and things which thus subsist are the most divine of all things, it is evident that forms will be most divine. Hence, they will no longer be the conceptions of souls, but will be exempt from every thing of this kind. These things, therefore, are rightly asserted; and Socrates also very properly admits union in forms prior to multitude. For the words *in nature* (*ἐν τῇ φύσει*) manifest the one enad or unity of forms. It is usual indeed with Plato to give the appellation of *nature* to intelligibles. For Socrates, in the Philebus, says, that a royal intellect, and a royal soul, subsist in the *nature* of Jupiter; and Timæus says, "the *nature* of animal itself being eternal," signifying by *nature* the monad of intelligible ideas. Such, therefore, is that which is now called nature, viz. the one unity and comprehension of intelligible forms. And thus far, as we have said, Socrates is right.

However, as he only attributes a paradigmatic idiom to ideas, and does not assert that they also perfect, guard, and unite, in this respect he will appear to have yet imperfectly apprehended the theory concerning them. For every form is not only the paradigm of sensibles, but also gives subsistence to them; since if it were alone paradigmatic, another nature would be requisite, in order to produce and assimilate sensibles to forms, which would thus remain sluggish and unmoved, without any efficacious power, and resembling impressions in wax. Forms, therefore, produce and generate their images: for it would be absurd that the reasons in nature should possess a certain effective power, but that intelligible forms should be deprived of it. Hence, every divine form is not only paradigmatic, but also *paternal*, and is by its very essence a cause generative of the many. It is also *perfective*: for it leads sensibles from the imperfect to the perfect, fills up their indigence, and brings matter, which is all things in capacity, to become that in energy which it was in capacity, prior to its becoming specific. Forms, therefore, contain in themselves this perfective power. But do they not also possess a *guardian* power? For whence is the order of the universe indissoluble, except from forms? Whence those stable reasons, and which preserve the one sympathy of wholes infrangible, through which the world abides for ever perfect,

thing, therefore, becomes similar ¹ to a form, can it be possible that the form should not be similar to the assimilated, so far as the assimilated nature is rendered

perfect, without the desertion of any form, except from stable causes? Again, the divisible and dissipated nature of bodies is no otherwise compressed and connected than by impartible power. For body is of itself divisible, and requires the connective power of forms. But, if union precedes this connection, for every thing connective must previously be one and undivided, form will not only be *generative*, and possess a *guarding* and *perfective* power, but it will also be *connective* and *unific* of all secondary natures. Socrates, therefore, should not only have said that form is a *paradigm*, but should also have added, that it *connects*, *guards*, and *perfects* the things assimilated; which Timæus also teaching us, says, that the world was generated *perfect* and *indissoluble* through the *assimilation* to all-perfect animal itself.

¹ Socrates, as we have before observed, was not accurate in asserting that ideas are paradigms alone, since they also generate, perfect, and guard sensibles; and that sensibles are resemblances alone of ideas, since they are generated and guarded by them, and thence derive all their perfection and duration. This being the case, Parmenides, in a truly divine manner, grants that forms are established as paradigms in nature; but Socrates having introduced similitude, and a participation according to similitude, in order to solve the first doubts concerning the participation of forms, Parmenides being desirous to indicate the primary and total cause of paradigm and its exemption from all habitude to its resemblances, shows, that if sensible is similar to intelligible form, it is not requisite that the habitude should reciprocate, and that the intelligible should be similar to the sensible form, lest, prior to two things similar to each other, we should again investigate some other form, the cause of similitude to both: for things similar to each other entirely participate a certain something which is the same, and through this something same which is in them they are said to be similar. Hence, if it be granted that the participant and that which is participated are similar, or, in other words, the paradigm and its resemblance, there will be prior to these something else which assimilates them, and this will be the case ad infinitum. To avoid this inconvenience, Socrates should have said that the similar is twofold, the one being similar conjoined with the similar, the other being as a subject similar to its archetype; and the one being beheld in the sameness of a certain one ratio, but the other not only possessing sameness, but at the same time difference, when it is similar in such a manner as to possess the same form from, but not together with, it. And thus much may be said logically and doubtfully.

But if we direct our attention to the many orders of forms, we shall find the profundity which they contain. For there are physical forms prior to sensibles, the forms in soul prior to these, and intellectual forms preceding those in soul; but there are no longer others prior to these. Intellectual forms, therefore, are paradigms alone, and are by no means similar to the things posterior to these; but the forms in soul are both paradigms and images. And so far as they are images, both these forms themselves, and the things posterior to them, are similar to each other, as deriving their subsistence from the same intellectual forms. This is also the case with physical forms, which are similar to sensibles, so far as both are images of the forms which are above them. But those forms which are alone paradigms, are no longer similar to their images: for things

rendered similar to the form? Or can any reason be assigned why similar should not be similar to similar? There cannot. Is there not, therefore, a mighty necessity that the similar to similar should participate of one and the same form? It is necessary. But will not that through the participation of which similars become similars be *form itself*? Entirely so. Nothing, therefore, can be similar to *a form*, nor *a form* to any other. For in this case another *form* will always appear besides some particular *form*: and if this again should become similar to another, another would be required; and a new *form* would never cease to take place, as long as any *form* becomes similar to its participant. You speak most truly. Hence, then, other things do not participate of *forms* through similitude¹; but it is necessary to seek after something else through which they participate. So it seems.

That

things are similar through a participation of a certain *fameness*; but paradigmatic forms participate of nothing, since they rank as the first of things.

We may also say, speaking theologically, that there is one order of forms in the mundane intellect, another in the demiurgic intellect, and another subsisting between these, viz. in participated but supermundane intellect, or, in other words, in an intellect consubstantial indeed with soul, but unconnected with body, and binding the forms in the mundane intellect with that intellect which is not consubstantial with soul, and is therefore called imparticipable. To those, therefore, who begin downwards, we may say that the intellectual forms in the world and in soul are similar to each other, so far as all these are secondary to the assimilative or supermundane intellects, and are as it were sisters to each other. But to those who recur to imparticipable intellect, this can no longer be said. For the assimilative order has a middle subsistence; and hence it assimilates sensibles which are subordinate to it to intellectual forms, but not, vice versa, intellectuals to sensibles. For it is not lawful that what is secondary should impart any thing to that which is primary, nor that what is primary should receive any thing from what is secondary. That Parmenides, therefore, might indicate to Socrates these paradigms, which are indeed intellectual, but established in imparticipable intellect prior to assimilative intellects, he shows him that it is not proper that the habitude of forms to sensibles should reciprocate: for this pertains to things secondary to an assimilative cause.

¹ Parmenides justly infers that sensibles do not participate of all forms through the similar; for this is effected through another more principal cause, viz. the uniting cause of wholes. The efficacious power of forms also, in conjunction with the aptitude of sensibles, must be considered as together giving completion to the fabrication of the universe. The assimilative genus of forms, therefore, which are denominated by theologists supermundane, are able to connect and conjoin mundane causes with their participants. This genus also connects according to a medium first intellectual forms and their participants, imparting to secondary natures a habitude to these forms; but the uniting cause of wholes, or in other words *the one*, connects supernally, and with

That Parmenides then said, Do you see, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises, if any one defines forms as having an essential subsistence by themselves? I do very much so. Know, then, that you do not apprehend what dubious¹ consequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings separate from its participants. But that Socrates said, How do you mean? That Parmenides answered, There are many other doubts², indeed, but this is the

exempt transcendency, intelligible forms with sensibles. It may also be truly asserted that the third cause of similitude is the aptitude of the recipient. For, in consequence of this being in capacity what form is in energy, that which is generated becomes similar to form. So that the three causes of assimilation are the subject matter, that which collects together the things perfecting and perfected, and that which subsists between these, and binds the extremes in union. What is asserted, therefore, is in a certain respect true. For if we investigate the one most principal cause of participation, we must not say that it is similitude, but a cause superior to both intellectual and intelligible forms.

¹ Parmenides here indicates the essence of divine forms, which is uncircumscribed, and incapable of being narrated by our conceptions. For the discourse is, indeed, dubious to those who undertake to define accurately their essence, order, and power, to behold where they first subsist, and how they proceed; what the divine idioms are which they receive; how they are participated by the last of things, and what the series are to which they give subsistence; with such other particulars of a more theological nature as the speculation of them may afford. And these things, indeed, Parmenides indicates, but Socrates has not yet touched upon the doubts concerning them. For Parmenides was willing, not only beginning downwards to define the order of divine forms, but also beginning from on high to behold their idiom. For he has already spoken concerning physical forms, and such as are simply intellectual, and concerning those that are properly intellectual. Something also will be said concerning those that are called intelligible and at the same time intellectual; and, in the last place, concerning those that are alone intelligible. But how he speaks concerning these, says Proclus, and that his discourse is under the pretext of doubting, is already evident to the more sagacious, and follows from what has been said.

² That the discourse concerning ideas, says Proclus, is full of very numerous and most difficult doubts, is evident from the infinite assertions of those posterior to Plato, some of which regard the subversion, and others the admission, of ideas. And those that admit their subsistence think differently respecting their essence; concerning the particulars of which there are ideas, the mode of participation, and other all-various problems with which the speculation of them is attended. Parmenides, however, does not attend to the multitude of doubts, nor does he descend to their infinite length, but, in two of the greatest, comprehends all the subsequent investigation concerning them; through which doubts it appears that forms are neither apprehended and known by us, nor have any knowledge of, nor providentially energize about, sensibles; though, through this we especially embrace a formal essence, that, as being ourselves intellectual, we may energize about it, and may contemplate in it the providential causes of wholes. But, if ideas are

not

the greatest: if any one should assert that it is not proper *forms* should be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, it is impossible to demonstrate

not known by us, it is also vain to say that they have any subsistence; for we do not even know that they are, if we are ignorant of their nature, and are, in short, incapable of apprehending them, and do not possess from our own essence that which is preparatory to the speculation of them. Such, then, are the doubts, both of which happen through the exempt essence of forms, which exemption we consider so transcendent as to have no communication with secondary natures. For that which thus subsists is foreign from us, and is neither known by, nor is gnostic of, us. But, if the exempt nature of forms, together with transcendence, is also present to all things, our knowledge of them will be preserved, and they will possess a formal knowledge of secondary natures. For if they are every where present to all things, we may then be able to meet with them, by only making ourselves adapted to the reception of them. And if they adorn all things, they comprehend intellectually the cause of the things adorned. It is necessary, therefore, that those who wish to guard these dogmas, should consider forms as unshaken and exempt, and pervading through all things. And here also we may see how this accords with the unrestrained nature of forms: for neither does that which is demiurgic in them possess any habitude to things secondary, nor is their unrestrained and exempt nature such as to be incommunicable with, and foreign from, sensibles.

But here the divine conception of Plato is truly admirable, which previously subverts through these doubts all the confused and atheistical suspicion concerning divine forms; imitating in this respect intellect itself, which, prior to the shadowy subsistence of evils, gave subsistence to subvertive powers. That it is not proper, therefore, to make that which is generative in forms possessing any habitude to that which is generated, or that which is paradigmatic to consist in verging to that which is governed, Parmenides has sufficiently shown in what has been already delivered. For all habitude requires another collective and connecting cause, so that, prior to forms, there will be another form conjoining both through similitude; since habitude is of the similar, with relation to the similar. But that the exempt nature of forms is not sluggish and without providential energy, and is not foreign from things secondary, Parmenides indicates through these doubts. For, perhaps, some one, alone looking to the unrestrained nature of forms, may say that they neither know their participants, nor are known by us. Hence, he leads Socrates to an admiration of the mode of the exempt power of divine forms. And how, indeed, he collects that sensibles are not known by them, will be afterwards manifest to us; but he wishes, first of all, to evince that we are not able to know them, assuming, for this purpose, in a manner perfectly divine, that the science which we possess pertains to human objects of scientific knowledge, but that divine science belongs to such as are divine. And this, indeed, appears to deprive us of the knowledge of divine natures. It is, however, true in a certain respect, and not according to one mode, but after one manner when philosophically, and after another when theologically, considered. For let the science which is with us pertain to our objects of scientific knowledge; but what prevents such objects from being images of divine natures? And why may we not know divine natures through them, in the same manner as the Pythagoreans, perceiving the images of the

demonstrate that he who asserts this is deceived, unless he who doubts is skilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally of a good disposition.

But

the divine orders in numbers and figures, and being conversant with these, endeavoured to obtain from them as from certain types, a knowledge of things divine. Why, also, is it wonderful that the science which is with us should be so called with relation to that which is with us the object of scientific knowledge, and should be conjoined with this? For it is coordinate to that with respect to which it is denominated. It may also, not as coordinate knowledge, but as that which is of an inferior order, be admitted to intelligibles themselves. For coordinate knowledges of all things are of one kind, and those which are arranged according to a different order of things known, of another, and which either apprehend the nature of things subordinate in a more excellent manner, as opinion the nature of sensibles, or which apprehend things more excellent secondarily and subordnately, as opinion that which is the object of science. He, therefore, who possesses scientific knowledge, and he who opines rightly, know the same thing, but the one in a more excellent, and the other in a subordinate manner. Hence there is no absurdity that science should be denominated not with relation to the object of science among intelligibles, but with relation to that with which it is conjoined, and that it should apprehend the former not as coordinate, but in a secondary degree. Agreeably to this, Plato in his seventh Epistle says that the intelligible form is not known through science but through intelligence, or the direct and immediate vision of intellect. For scientific knowledge is of a more composite nature with respect to intellectual intuition; but intellect is properly the spectator of ideas: for these are naturally intellectual, and we every where know the similar by the similar; intelligibles indeed by intellect, the objects of opinion by opinion, and things scientific by science. It is by no means wonderful, therefore, that there should be no science of forms, and yet that another knowledge of them should remain, such as that which we denominate intelligence.

But if you are willing, says Proclus, to speak after another more theological mode, you may say that ascending as far as to intellectual forms, Parmenides shows that the forms which are beyond these, and which possess an exempt transcendence, such as are the intelligible, and the intelligible and at the same time intellectual forms, are better than our knowledge. Hence by asserting that souls when perfectly purified, and conjoined with the attendants on the twelve supercelestial Gods, then merge themselves in the contemplation of these forms, you will perhaps not wander from the divinely-inspired conception of Plato. For as there are three orders of forms prior to the assimilative order as is evident from the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, viz. the intellectual, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual, and the intelligible; intellectual forms indeed are proximate to secondary natures, and through the separation which they contain are more known to us, but intelligible and at the same time intellectual forms are not to be apprehended by that partial knowledge by which we perceive things coordinate with our nature; and hence these forms are characterized by *the unknown*, through their exempt transcendence.

Let us now consider, says Proclus, the words of Plato, because through these he indicates who is a fit hearer of these things, and who is adapted to be a teacher of them. For it is requisite that

But he should be willing to pursue *him* closely who endeavours to support his opinion by a multitude of far-fetched arguments: though, after all, he
 who

that the hearer should possess a *naturally good disposition*, and this in a remarkable degree, that he may be by nature a philosopher, may be astonished about an incorporeal essence, and prior to things visible may always pursue something else and reason concerning it, and may not be satisfied with things present; and in short he must be such a one as Socrates in the Republic describes him to be, who *naturally* loves the speculation of wholes. In the next place, he must be skilled in a multitude of particulars, not indeed in a multitude of human affairs, for these are trifling, and contribute nothing to a divine life, but in logical, physical, and mathematical theorems. For such things as our dianoëtic power is unable to survey in the Gods, we may behold in these as in images; and beholding we are induced to believe the assertions of theologists concerning divine natures. Thus if he wonders how multitude is contained in *the one*, and all things in the impartible, he will perceive that the even and the odd, the circle and the sphere and other forms of numbers are contained in the monad. If he wonders how a divine nature makes by its very essence, he will perceive in natural objects that fire essentially imparts heat, and snow coldness. And if he wonders how causes are every where present with their effects, he will behold the images of this in logic. For genera are every where predicated of the things of which species are predicated, and the latter indeed with the former, but the former without the latter. And thus in every thing, he who is unable to look directly to a divine nature, may survey it through these as images. It is requisite, therefore, in the first place, that he should possess a naturally good disposition, which is allied to true beings, and is capable of becoming winged, and which as it were from other persuasions vindicates to itself the conceptions concerning permanent being. For as in every study we require a certain preparation, in like manner in order to obtain that knowledge which genuinely leads to being, we require a preceding purified aptitude. In the next place, skill, as we have said, in many and all-various theorems is requisite, through which he will be led back to the apprehension of these things; and, in the third place, *alacrity*, and an extension of the powers of the soul about the contemplation of true beings; so that from his leader alone indicating, he may be able to follow his indications.

Three things, therefore, are requisite to the contemplation of an incorporeal nature, a naturally good disposition, skill, and alacrity. And through a naturally good disposition indeed, faith in a divine nature will be spontaneously produced; but through skill the truth of paradoxical theorems will be firmly possessed; and through alacrity the amatory tendency of the soul to the contemplation of true being will be excited.

But the leader, says Proclus, of these speculations, will not be willing through a long discourse to unfold divine truth, but to indicate it with brevity, framing his language similar to his intellections; nor will he accomplish this from things known and at hand, but supernally, from principles most profoundly one. Nor again, will he so discourse as that he may appear to speak clearly, but he will be satisfied with indications. For it is requisite that mystical concerns should be mystically delivered, and that occult conceptions respecting divine natures, should not be rendered popular. Such then is the hearer and such the leader of these discourses. And in

Parmenides.

who contends that *forms* cannot be known will remain unpersuaded. That Socrates said, In what respect¹, O Parmenides? Because, O Socrates, I think

Parmenides you have a perfect leader of this kind; and hence if we attend to the mode of his discourse we shall find that he teaches many things through a few words, that he derives what he says supernally, and that he alone indicates concerning divine natures. But in Socrates you have a hearer of a naturally good disposition indeed, and amatory, but not yet perfectly skilled; whence also Parmenides exhorts him to exercise himself in dialectic, that he may obtain skill in the theorems, receiving indeed his naturally good disposition and his impulse, but supplying what is deficient. He also informs us that the end of this triple power is the being freed from deception in reasonings concerning divine natures: for he who is deficient in any one of these three, must be compelled to assent to many things that are false. I only add that instead of *και μη αφους*, as in Thompson's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the commentary of Proclus that we should here read *και μεν ευφους*, as in our translation.

¹ The discourse here proceeds to other doubts, one of which takes away from our soul the knowledge of true beings, but the other deprives divine natures of the knowledge of sensibles; through both which our progressions from and conversion to divine natures, are destroyed. Things second and first also appear to be divided from each other, second being deprived of first, and first being unprolific of second natures. The truth however is, that every thing is in all things in an appropriate manner; the middle and last genera of wholes subsisting causally in things first, whence also they are truly known by them, as they also subsist in them; but things first subsisting according to participation in such as are middle; and both these in such things as are last. Hence souls also know all things in a manner accommodated to each; through images indeed things prior to them; but according to cause things posterior to them; and in a connate and co-ordinate manner, the reasons or productive principles which they themselves contain. These doubts, therefore, are extended after the two prior to these concerning the order of ideas, because Socrates and every one who admits that there are ideas must be led to this hypothesis, through a causal and scientific knowledge of every thing in the world. Hence those who deny that there are ideas, deny also the providential animadversion of intelligibles. Parmenides, therefore, proposes at present to show that by admitting ideas to be alone exempt from things it must also be necessarily admitted that they are unknown, as there will no longer be any communion between us and them, nor any knowledge, whether they subsist or not, whether they are participated, and how, and what order they are allotted, if they are alone exempt, and are not together with unrestrained energy, the causes of secondary natures. But to the speculation of this the discourse pre-assumes certain axioms and common conceptions; and, in the first place, that ideas are not entirely exempt, and do not subsist by themselves without any communion with things subordinate. For how can this be possible, since both we and all other things are suspended from them? For the place in which they subsist is intellect, not that it is the place as if they required a seat, in the same manner as accidents require essence for their support, or as material forms require matter. Intellect indeed, does not comprehend them, as if they were its parts heaped together by composition, but in the same manner as the centre comprehends in itself the many terminations

I think that both you and any other, who establishes the essence of each *form* as subsisting by itself, must allow, in the first place, that no one of these subsists

tions of the lines which proceed from it, and as science, the many theorems of which it is the source; not being composed from the many, but subsisting prior to the many, and all being contained in each. For thus intellect is many, containing multitude impartibly in the unity of its nature; because it is not *the one* which subsists prior to all multitude, but is collectively one multitude, its multitude being profoundly united through the dominion of unity in its nature. In this manner, therefore, is intellect the place of ideas. Hence, if soul is not the same with intellect, those ideas will not be in us of which intellect is the place. Hence, also, it is evident that the discourse in this dialogue about ideas becomes perpetually more perfect, ascending to certain more-united hypostases of these luminous beings. For the discourse no longer supposes them to be corporeal or physical, or conceptions of the soul, but prior to all these. For they are not in us, says Parmenides; nor are they coordinate with our conceptions.

You may say, then, philosophically with Proclus, that they are exempt from, and are not in us; and that they are present every where, and are participated by us, without being ingenerated in their participants. For they being in themselves, are proximate to all things for participation that are capable of receiving them. Hence, we participate them through the things which we possess, and this is not only the case with us, but also with more excellent natures, who possess in themselves essential images of ideas, and introducing these as vestiges of paradigms to ideas, they know the latter through the former. For he who understands the essence of these, knows also that they are images of other things, but knowing this, it is also necessary that by intellects he should come into contact with the paradigms. But you may say, theologically, that the forms which are exempt from those that are intellectual, are perfectly established above our order. Hence, of intellectual forms, we perceive both in ourselves, and in sensibles, images; but the essence of intelligibles, through its profound union, is perfectly exempt both from us and all other things, being of itself unknown. For it fills Gods and intellects with itself; but we must be satisfied with participating intellectual forms in a manner adapted to the soul. Plato also manifests these things when he makes our life to be twofold, political and theoretical, and assigns us a twofold felicity; elevating the former life to the patronymic government of Jupiter, and the latter to the Saturnian order and a pure intellect. For from hence it is evident that he re-elevates the whole of our life, as far as to the intellectual kings: for Saturn subsists at the summit, and Jupiter at the extremity, of the intellectual order. But such things as are beyond these, he says in the Phædrus, are the spectacles of souls divinely inspired and initiated in them as in the most blessed of all mysteries. So that thus the proposed axiom will be true, when considered as pertaining to a certain formal order. And thus much for the things.

With respect to the dictum, says Proclus, the words *πῶς δὲ ἑ Παρμενίδης*; "*In what respect, O Parmenides?*" are the interrogation of Socrates, vehemently wondering if intellectual form is unknown, and not yet perceiving the transition, and that Parmenides proceeds through the whole extent of forms till he ends in the first ideas. But the words *πῶς γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐστιν*; "*For how could it any longer subsist itself by itself?*" are asserted according to common conceptions.

subsists in us. For (that Socrates said) how if it did, could it any longer subsist itself by itself? That Parmenides replied, You speak well. But will you not admit that such ideas as are, with relation [†] to each other, such as they

For every thing exempt is of itself, and is itself by itself, neither subsisting in any other, nor in us. Hence, through these three terms, *itself*, *by itself*, and *essence*, Parmenides unfolds the whole truth concerning these forms. For the first of these indicates their *simplicity*, the second, their *separate transcendency*, and the third their *perfection established in essence alone*. In the next place, the words *καλώς λεγεις*, "*You speak well*," are not delivered ironically, and as if Parmenides was from them beginning a confutation, but as receiving the spontaneous intuition of Socrates, and his conception about divine natures. For the assumed axiom is true, Timæus also asserting that true being neither receives any thing into itself, as matter does form, nor proceeds into any other place, as form does into matter. It remains, therefore, separately in itself, and being participated, does not become any thing belonging to its participants, but, subsisting prior to them, imparts to these as much as they are able to receive; neither being in us, for we participate, not receiving idea itself, but something else proceeding from it; nor being generated in us, for it is entirely void of generation.

[†] This is the second axiom, says Proclus, contributing to the speculation of the proposed object of inquiry. For the former axiom was, that forms are by no means in us, but in themselves; but this second axiom is, that sensibles when denominated as relatives, are so denominated with relation to each other; and that intelligibles are denominated with relation to each other, and not with relation to sensibles; and that sensibles are not denominated with relation to intelligibles. For, by those who are accustomed to consider these things more logically, it is well said, that universals ought to be referred as relatives to universals, but particulars to particulars; science simply considered to that which is simply the object of science, but a particular science to a particular object of science; things indefinite to the indefinite; such as are definite to the definite; such as are in capacity to things in capacity; and such as are in energy to things in energy. And of these things the logical and physical treatises of the ancients are full. If, therefore, in things universal, and things particular, alternations cannot be admitted in comparing the one with the other, by a much greater reason it cannot take place in ideas and the images of ideas; but we must refer sensibles to sensibles, and intelligibles to intelligibles. These things, then, are perfectly true, if we consider each so far as it is that which it is, and not so far as it makes something, or is generated something. For in this case, sensibles have the relation of things generated to intelligibles, but intelligibles, that of producing causes to sensibles; and as images, sensibles are related to intelligibles, but ideas, as paradigms, are related to sensibles.

If, therefore, we assume dominion itself, it must be referred to servitude itself; but if we consider it as a paradigm, it must be referred to that which is similar to dominion itself; though we are accustomed, indeed, to call the Gods our lords, so that dominion there will be denominated with reference to servitude with us. This, however, is true, because we participate of servitude itself, to which dominion itself has a precedaneous reference. And here you may see how dominion among ideas, or in the intelligible world, evinces that more excellent natures are our lords, because

they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves, and not with reference to things subsisting among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner you may establish such things; each of which, while we participate, we distinguish by some peculiar appellation? But that the things subsisting among us, and which are synonymous to these, subsist also with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive with them a common appellation. That then Socrates said, How do you mean? As if, Parmenides answered,

because we participate of servitude itself. But that which is called dominion with us, with reference to servitude among us, is no longer also denominated with reference to servitude among ideas, because the being of servitude which is there does not subsist from that which is with us, but the very contrary takes place. For things which govern more excellent natures must also necessarily govern such as are subordinate, but not vice versa.

But from all these doubts we learn what idea truly so called is. From the first doubt we assume that it is incorporeal; for if it were a body, neither the whole, nor a part of it could be participated. But from the second doubt we assume that it is not coordinate with its participants; for if it were coordinate, it would possess something common, and on this account we must conceive another idea prior to it. From the third doubt we learn, that it is not a conception of essence, but essence and being; for otherwise all its participants would participate of knowledge. From the fourth, we collect that it is a paradigm alone, and not an image also, as the reason or productive principle in soul, left being similar to that which proceeds from it, it should introduce another idea prior to itself. From the fifth, we learn that intelligible idea is not directly known to us, but from the images of it. For science in us is not coordinate with it. And from the sixth we infer that it understands things which are secondary to it, and that it knows them by being itself their cause. Idea, therefore, truly so called, is an incorporeal cause, exempt from its participants, is an immovable essence, is a paradigm only and truly, and is intelligible to souls from images, but has a causal knowledge of things which subsist according to it. So that from all the doubts we derive one definition of idea truly so called. Hence, those that oppose the doctrine of ideas, should oppose this definition, and not assuming corporeal imaginations of them, or considering them as co-arranged with sensibles, or as unessential, or as coordinate with our knowledge, sophistically discourse concerning them. Let it also be observed that Parmenides says that ideas are Gods, and that they have their subsistence in deity; in the same manner as the Chaldean oracle also calls them the conceptions of the father: for whatever subsists in deity is a God. Lastly, we must be careful to remember that when we speak of relation as subsisting among ideas, we must remove from them mere, unessential habitudes: for nothing of this kind is adapted to the Gods. But we must assume sameness for habitude; and even prior to this sameness, the *hyparxis* of each in itself: for each is of itself first, and is both united to itself and to other things. Communion, therefore, according to participations characterizes the power of things which are said to be relatives in the intelligible world.

some one of us should be the master¹ or servant of any one; he who is master is not the *master* of servant, nor is he who is servant, *servant* of master;

¹ How relatives are to be understood, says Proclus, among forms, is I think evident from what has been already said. You will, however, find dominion and servitude peculiarly subsisting there. For what else pertains to despots, than to have absolute dominion over slaves, and to arrange every thing pertaining to them with a view to their own good? And what else is the province of slaves, than to be governed by others, and to minister to the will of their masters? Must not these, therefore, by a much greater priority, be found among forms which are arranged one under the other, and among which some are more powerful, and use those of a subordinate nature, but others are subservient, and cooperate with the powers of the higher orders of forms? *Dominion*, therefore, is an *employing* power (*χρηστικὴ δύναμις*), and *servitude* a *ministering* power. And both these subsist essentially among forms, and not casually, as in their images: for dominion and servitude among sensibles, are the last echoes, as it were, of dominion and servitude in the intelligible world.

But if you are willing not only to survey these two in forms philosophically, but also theologically, in the divine orders themselves, direct your intellectual eye to those intellectual and at the same time intelligible Gods, and to the forms which are suspended from them; and you will see how both these are adapted to that order of forms. For having primarily a middle subsistence, they rule over all secondary natures, but are suspended from the forms which are prior to them, and which are alone intelligible, energize with reference to their good, and are from them that which they are. For being first unfolded into light from them, they are governed by, and abide in, them; but they supernally rule over the essences and powers posterior to themselves. Hence, also, in the secondary orders, the more total govern the more partial, the more monadic, the more multiplied, and the exempt, the coordinated. Thus, for instance, in the demiurgic genera, Jupiter in Homer at one time issues his mandates to Minerva, at another time to Apollo, at another to Hermes, and at another to Iris; all of whom act in subservience to the will of their father, imparting their providential energies according to the demiurgic boundary. The angelic tribe, also, and all the better genera, are said to act as servants to the Gods, and to minister to their powers.

But, that dominion and servitude have an essential, and not a casual subsistence only, we may learn from the *Phædo*: for it is there said, that nature commanded the body to act the part of a slave, but the soul that of a master. If, therefore, these have a natural subsistence in the soul and body, it is nothing wonderful that we should refer dominion itself, and servitude itself, to divine forms, theologists employing these names as indications of the ruling and ministering powers in the Gods; just as the paternal and maternal there subsist in one respect according to a divine idiom, and in another according to a formal cause, mere habitude having no subsistence in these, but prolific power, and an essence adapted to the Gods.

It must, however, here be carefully observed, that when the Gods are said to rule over us also with absolute dominion, as when in the *Phædo* Socrates calls the Gods our masters, and us the possessions of the Gods, the mode of dominion is transcendently exempt. For in the divine orders

master; but he sustains both these relations, as being a man; while, in the mean time, *dominion itself* is that which it is from its relation to *servitude*; and *servitude*, in a similar manner, is servitude with reference to *dominion*. But the ideas with which we are conversant possess no power over the ideas which subsist by themselves, nor have *they* any authority over us: but I assert that they subsist from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and ours, in a similar manner, with relation to themselves. Do you understand what I say? That Socrates replied, Entirely so. That Parmenides then said, Is not science ¹ itself, so far as it is such, the science of truth ² itself? Perfectly

the more total rule over the more partial coordinately, and we approach to the Gods, as our masters, through the servitude which is there as a medium. Hence, as all the series of servitude itself is under that of dominion itself, the Gods also govern according to their absolute power. And not only do the more total rule over the more partial Gods, but also over men, participating according to comprehension of servitude itself, which makes subordinate subservient or more excellent natures.

¹ Socrates, in the Phædrus, celebrates divine science, elevating souls of a total characteristic, or which subsist as wholes to the intellectual and intelligible orders, and asserting that they there survey justice itself, temperance itself, and science itself, in consequence of being conjoined with the middle order of these Gods. He also asserts that truth is there, proceeding from intelligibles, and illuminating all the middle genera of Gods with intelligible light; and he conjoins that science with that truth. If, therefore, in discoursing concerning the formal orders, he says that science itself is of truth itself, it is not wonderful. For there science and truth, and all the forms in the middle genera of Gods, participate of science itself, and truth itself, which cause every thing there to be intellectual: for science itself is the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal natures. For the light of truth being intelligible, imparts to these forms intelligible power. But since there are many orders of these middle forms; for some of them are, as theologists say, the highest, uniform, and intelligible; others connect and bind together wholes; and others are perfective and convertive; hence, after the one and the first science, Parmenides mentions many sciences. For they proceed supernally through all the genera in conjunction with the light of truth. For truth is *the one* in every order, and the intelligible, with which also intelligence is conjoined. As, therefore, total intelligence is of the total intelligible, so the many intelligences are united to the many intelligibles. These middle forms, therefore, which possess intelligences united with their intelligibles, are perfectly exempt from our knowledge; or, in other words, they cannot be directly and without a medium apprehended even by the highest of our powers. Intellectual forms, indeed, are exempt from us; but since we proximately subsist from them, they are

² Instead of *της ὁ ἐστὶν ἀληθεια, αὐτης ἀν ἐκείνης εἰς ἐπιστημην*, as in Thompson's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the MS. commentary of Proclus that we should read *της ἀληθείας αὐτης ἀν ἐκείνης* κ. τ. λ. Indeed the sense of the text requires this emendation.

feetly so. But will each of the sciences which is, be the science of each of the things which are? Certainly it will. But will not our science¹ be converfant

are in a certain respect in us, and we possess a knowledge of them, and through these, of the unknown transcendency of more divine forms.

We ought not however, says Proclus, to say, with some of the friends of Plato, that divine science does not know itself, but from itself imparts self-knowledge to other things. For every divine nature primarily directs its energy to itself, and begins its idiom from itself. Thus the cause of life fills itself with life, and the source of perfection produces itself perfect. Hence, that which imparts knowledge to other things, possesses itself prior to other things the knowledge of beings; since also the science which is with us being an image of science itself, knows other things, and prior to other things, itself. Or what is that which informs us what this very thing science is? And must not relatives belong to the same power? Knowing, therefore, the objects of science, it also knows itself, being the science of those objects. As the knowledge, however, of divine science is simple and uniform, so the object of its knowledge is single and comprehensive of all other objects of scientific knowledge. Science itself, therefore, is the cause of scientific knowledge to other things, and by a much greater priority, to itself. For it is an essence essentialized in the knowledge of itself and of being. For science there is not a habit, nor a quality, but a self-perfect hyparxis subsisting from, and established in, itself; and by knowing itself, knowing that which is primarily the object of scientific knowledge, or that which is simply being. For it is conjoined with this, in the same manner as that which is intellect simply, to that which is simply intelligible, and as that which is simply sense, to that which is simply sensible. But the many sciences after science itself are certain progressions of the one science conjoined with the multitude of beings, which the being of that one science comprehends. For being is many, and in like manner science. And that which is most characterized by unity in science itself, is united to the one of being, which also it knows; but the multitude in science itself knows the multitude of beings which being itself comprehends.

¹ We also participate in a certain respect of truth, but not of that of which those divine forms alluded to in the preceding text participate, but of that which was imparted to our order by the artificer of the universe; and the science which is with us is the science of this truth. There are, however, knowledges more partial than this, some evolving one, and others a different object of knowledge. Some of these, also, are converfant with generation, and the variety it contains; others investigate the whole of nature; and others contemplate supernatural beings. Some, again, employ the senses, and together with these, give completion to their work; others require the figured intellection of the phantasy; others acquiesce in doxastic reasons; others convert pure reason itself to itself; and others extend our reason to intellect. As there is then such a difference in the sciences, it is evident that some form a judgment of these, and others of different, objects of science, and things which contribute to our reminiscence of being. Thus, for instance, geometry speculates the reason of figure in us, but arithmetic unfolds, by its demonstrations, the one form of numbers; and each of the other sciences which have a partial subsistence speculates some other particular of the things with which we are converfant. We must not, therefore, pervert

versant with the truth which subsists among us? And will not each of our sciences be the science of that being which happens to reside with us? It is necessary that it should be so. But you have granted that we do not possess forms¹, and that they are not things with which we are conversant? Certainly not. Is each genus² of beings known to be what it is, through

pervert the name of science by introducing arts into the midst, and the ideas of these, to which the uses of a mortal life gave a being; for they are nothing more than adumbrations of true science. As, therefore, we say that there are ideas of things which contribute to the perfection of essence, but not of things proceeding from these, and alone subsisting accidentally in others, in like manner the arts being the images of the sciences have here their generation. But the sciences themselves are derived from the sciences which pre-exist among ideas; and through the former we are enabled to ascend to the latter, and become assimilated to intellect. However, as there it is necessary that there should be one science prior to the many, being the science of that which is truth itself, just as the many sciences have many truths for their objects (for the peculiar scientific object of every science is a certain truth) in like manner with respect to the sciences with us which are many, it is necessary to understand the one and whole form of science, which neither receives its completion from the many, nor is coordinated with them, but pre-exists itself by itself. But the many sciences distribute the one power of science, a different science being arranged under a different object of knowledge, and all of them being referred to and receiving their principles from the one and entire form of science. The science, therefore, which is with us is very different from that which is divine; but through the former we ascend to the latter.

¹ Here Parmenides, says Proclus, beginning from the preceding axioms collects the thing proposed as follows: Exempt forms subsist by themselves; things which subsist by themselves and of themselves are not in us; things which are not in us, are not coordinate with our science, and are unknown by it. Exempt forms, therefore, are unknown by our science. All forms indeed, are only to be seen by a divine intellect, but this is especially the case with such as are beyond the intellectual Gods. For neither sense nor doxastic knowledge, nor pure reason, nor our intellectual knowledge, is able to conjoin the soul with those forms; but this can alone be effected through an illumination from the intellectual Gods, as some one speaking divinely says. The nature, therefore, of those forms is unknown to us, as being better than our intellection, and the divisible intuitive perceptions of our soul. Hence Socrates in the *Phædrus*, as we have before observed, assimilates the survey of them to the mysteries, and calls the spectacles of them entire, tranquil, simple and happy visions. Of intellectual forms, therefore, the demiurgus and father of souls has implanted in us the knowledge; but of the forms above intellect, such as those belonging to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders, the knowledge is exempt from our immediate vision, is spontaneous, and alone known to souls energizing from a divine afflatus. So that what Parmenides now infers, and also that we do not participate of science itself, follow from the conceptions concerning this order of divine forms.

² The genera of being are not to be considered in this place, either as things appearing in the many, and which are the subject of logical predication, or as universals collected from the many, and which are called by the moderns abstract ideas; for these are posterior to beings. But the genera

through the *form itself* of science? Undoubtedly. But this *form* we do not possess? By no means. No form, therefore, is known by us, as we do not participate of science itself? It does not appear it can. The *beautiful itself*, therefore, and the *good itself*, and all such things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us? So it seems. But survey this, which is yet still more dire¹. What? You will say, perhaps, that if there is

of being here signify such things as possess a generative power, more total than, and preceding according to cause, the progeny in more partial forms. For as the genera of forms in sensibles, either appear in the many, or are predicated of the many; in like manner genera in intelligibles are more principal, perfect and comprehensive than other forms; surpassing the things comprehended in simplicity and prolific power. These genera we must say are known by the form of science itself, as beginning supernally, and comprehending according to one uniform knowledge, things multiplied, unitedly, and things partial, totally. This also the science which is with us wishes to effect: for it always contemplates the progressions of things from their causes.

¹ *The beautiful*, and also *the good* considered as a form and not as supersensitival proceed supernally from the summit of intelligibles to all the second genera of Gods. The middle orders of forms, therefore, receive the progressions of these in a becoming manner; according to *the good* becoming full of their own perfection, and of the sufficient, and the undigent; but according to *the beautiful* becoming lovely to secondary natures, leading back things which have proceeded, and binding together divided causes. For a conversion to *the beautiful* collects together and unites all things, and fixes them as in one center. These two forms, therefore, *the good* and *the beautiful* subsist occultly and uniformly in first natures, but are changed in the different orders of things in a manner coordinate to each. So that it is not wonderful if there is certain beauty known only to sense, another known to opinion, another beheld through the dianoëtic power, another by intelligence in conjunction with reason, another by pure intelligence, and lastly another which is unknown, subsisting by itself perfectly exempt, and capable of being seen by its own light alone.

² The preceding arguments have led us as far as to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order of forms: for being false and of a doubting idiom, they alone unfold the truth in intellectual forms. But what is now said, says Proclus, leads us to those forms which pre-subsist in the intelligible, proceeding indeed in the form of doubt as about intellectual forms, but in reality signifying the idiom of the first forms. The discourse, therefore, shows that forms neither know nor govern sensibles; falsely, indeed, in demiurgic ideas, for sensibles subsist from these, and these rule over their all-various distribution into individual forms; so that they previously comprehend the providence and government of sensibles: but the discourse is most true in the first ideas, which are in the highest degree characterized by unity, and are truly intelligible. For these first shine forth from being in intelligible intellect, uniformly, unitedly, and totally. For they contain the paternal causes of the most common and comprehensive genera, and are superior to a distributed knowledge of and a proximate government of sensibles. Hence these intelligible Gods have dominion over the Gods which are unfolded from them, and their knowledge is beyond all other divine knowledge; to which also Plato looking collects, that the Gods neither rule over us, nor have any knowledge of human concerns.

is any certain *genus of science*, it is much more accurate than the science which resides with us; and that this is likewise true of beauty, and every thing

concerns. For the divided causes of these, and the powers which rule over them, are in the intellectual Gods. But the ideas which are properly called intelligible, are established above all such divisions; produce all things according to united and the most simple causes; and both their effective energy and knowledge are one, collected and uniform. Hence there the intelligible cause of the celestial genus produces every thing celestial, Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, souls, not so far as they are dæmons or angels, for this is the peculiarity of divisible causes, and of divided ideas, of which the intellectual forms make a distribution into multitude, but so far as all these genera are in a certain respect divine and celestial, and so far as they are allotted an *hyperaxis* united to the Gods; and in a similar manner with respect to each of the rest. Thus for instance, the intelligible idea of every thing pedestrian and terrestrial cannot be said to rule over things, each of which is separated according to one form, for this is the province of things distributed from it into multitude, but it governs all things so far as they are of one genus. For things nearer to the one, give subsistence to all things in a more total and uniform manner.

As, however, we shall hereafter speak of this, let us rather consider the opinion of Plato concerning providence. The Athenian guest, therefore, in the *Laws* clearly evinces that there is a providence, where his discourse shows that the Gods know and possess a power which governs all things. But Parmenides at the very beginning of the discussion concerning providence evinces the absurdity of doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to assert that the conclusion of this doubt is still *more dire* than the former, sufficiently shows that he rejects the arguments which subvert providence. For it is dire to say that divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual natures, and who essentially possess something divine; but it is still more dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; since the former pertains to those who do not convert themselves to divinity, but the latter to those who impede the all-pervading goodness of the Gods. And the former pertains to those who err respecting our essence, but the latter to those who convert themselves erroneously about a divine cause. But the expression still *more dire*, (*δινωτερον*) says Proclus, is not used as signifying a more strenuous doubt, in the same manner as we are accustomed to call those *dire* (*δινω*) who vanquish by the power of language, but as a thing worthy of greater dread and caution to the intelligent. For it divulses the union of things, and dissociates divinity apart from the world. It also defines divine power as not pervading to all things, and circumscribes intellectual knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewise subverts all the fabrication of the universe, the order imparted to the world from separate causes, and the goodness which fills all things from one will, in a manner accommodated to the nature of unity. Nor less dire than any one of these is the confusion of piety. For what communion is there between Gods and men, if the former are deprived of the knowledge of our concerns. All supplications, therefore, of divinity, all sacred institutions, all oaths adducing the Gods as a witness, and the untaught conceptions implanted in our souls concerning divinity, will perish. What gift also will be left of the Gods to men, if they do not previously comprehend in themselves the defect of the recipients, if they do not possess a knowledge of all that we do, of all we suffer, and of all that we think though we do not carry it into effect? With great propriety, therefore,

thing else? Certainly. If, therefore, any one possesses *science itself*, will you not assert that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a God?

fore are such assertions called dire. For if it is unholy to change any legitimately divine institution, how can such an innovation as this be unattended with dread? But that Plato rejects this hypothesis which makes Divinity to be ignorant of our concerns, is evident from these things, since it is one of his dogmas, that Divinity knows and produces all things. Since, however, some of those posterior to him have vehemently endeavoured to subvert such-like assertions, let us speak concerning them as much as may be sufficient for our present purpose.

Some of those, then, posterior to Plato, on seeing the unstable condition of sublunary things were fearful that they were not under the direction of providence and a divine nature; for such events as are said to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality respecting lives, and the disordered motion of material natures, induced them greatly to suspect that they were not under the government of providence. Besides, the persuasion that Divinity is not busily employed in the evolution of all-various reasons, and that he does not depart from his own blessedness, induced them to frame an hypothesis so lawless and dire. For they were of opinion that the passion of our soul, and the perturbation which it sustains by descending to the government of bodies, must happen to Divinity, if he converted himself to the providential inspection of things. Further still, from considering that different objects of knowledge are known by different gnostic powers; as, for instance, sensibles by sense, objects of opinion by opinion, things scientific by science, and intelligibles by intellect, and, at the same time, neither placing sense, nor opinion, nor science in Divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and pure;—hence, they asserted that Divinity had no knowledge of any other things than the objects of intellect *. For, say they, if matter is external to him, it is necessary that he should be pure from apprehensions which are converted to matter; but being purified from these, it follows that he must have no knowledge of material natures; and hence, the patrons of this doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions about, sensibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a transcendency of gnostic energy; just as those whose eyes are filled with light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at the same time that this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency of vision. They likewise add, that there are many things which it is beautiful not to know. Thus, to the entheastic, (or those who are divinely inspired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would destroy the dælic energy; and to the scientific, not to know that which would defile the indubitable perception of science.

But others ascribe, indeed, to Divinity a knowledge of sensibles, in order that they may not take away his providence, but at the same time convert his apprehension to that which is external, represent him as pervading through the whole of a sensible nature, as passing into contact with the objects of his government, impelling every thing, and being locally present with all things; for, say they, he would not otherwise be able to exert a providential energy in a becoming manner, and impart good to every thing according to its desert†.

* This opinion was embraced by the more early Peripatetics.

† This was the opinion of the Stoics.

God¹? It is necessary so to assert. But can a God, being such as he is, know our affairs through possessing science itself? Why should he not? That

Others again affirm that Divinity has a knowledge of himself, but that he has no occasion to understand sensibles in order to provide for them, since by his very essence he produced all things, and adorns whatever he has produced, without having any knowledge of his productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, since nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantasy; but that Divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of himself, though not of the things which are fabricated by him. And such are the assertions of those who were persuaded that Divinity is not separated from mundane natures, and of those who deprived him of the knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union with providence.

With respect to these philosophers, we say, that they speak truly, and yet not truly, on this subject.

¹ Every divine intellect, says Proclus, and every order of the Gods, comprehends in itself the knowledge and the cause of all things. For neither is their knowledge inefficacious, possessing the indefinite in intellection; but they both know all things, and communicate good. For that which is primarily good, is also willing to illuminate secondary natures with a supply from himself. Nor are their productions irrational and void of knowledge: for this is the work of nature and of ultimate life, and not of a divine cause, which also produces rational essences. Hence, they at the same time both know and make all things; and prior to these, according to their will, they preassume both a knowledge and a power effective of all things. Hence, they preside over all things *willingly*, *gnostically*, and *powerfully*; and every thing through this triad enjoys their providential care. And if you are willing to unite things which subsist divisibly in secondary natures, and refer them to a divine cause, you will perhaps apprehend the truth concerning it more accurately. Nature, therefore, appears to possess reasons or productive principles effective, but not gnostic; the dianoëtic power possesses as its end, knowledge in itself; and *proæresis*, or a deliberative tendency to things capable of being accomplished, has for its end good, and the will of things good. Collect these, therefore, in one, *the willing*, *the gnostic*, *the efficacious*, and prior to these, conceiving a divine unity, refer all these to a divine nature, because all these presubsist there uniformly together. However, though all the Gods possess all these, yet in intelligibles, the first intelligence, the first power generative of wholes, and a beneficent will, are especially apparent. For the intelligible order subsisting immediately after the fountain of good, becomes that to natures posterior to itself, which *the good* is to the universality of things; expressing his super-causal nature through paternal power; *the good*, through beneficent will; and that which is above all knowledge, through occult and united intellection. Proclus adds, but it appears to me that through this Parmenides now first calls ideas Gods, as recurring to the first fountain of them, and as being uniform, and most near to *the good*, and as thus possessing a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things, so far as each participates of a divine power, and so far as all of them are suspended from the Gods.

That Parmenides said, Because it has been confessed by us, O Socrates, that neither do those forms possess the power which is peculiar to them, through relation

subject. For if providence has a subsistence, neither can there be any thing disordered, nor can Divinity be busily employed, nor can he know sensibles through passive sense: but these philosophers, in consequence of not knowing the exempt power and uniform knowledge of Divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature? as, for instance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its essence, energize physically, intellect intellectually, and soul psychically, or according to the nature of soul? And when the same thing is generated by many and different causes, does not each of these produce according to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing produced? Or shall we say, that each produces after the same manner, and that, for example, the sun and man generate man, according to the same mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a busy energy, but the other without anxious attention, by its very essence, and totally? But to assert this would be absurd; for a divine operates in a manner very different from a mortal nature.

If, therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its own nature and order, some things divinely and supernaturally, others naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every gnostic being knows according to its own nature, and that it does not follow that because the thing known is one and the same, on this account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the essence of the things known. Thus sense, opinion, and our intellect, know that which is white, but not in the same manner: for sense cannot know what the essence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge of its proper objects in the same manner as intellect; since opinion knows only *that* a thing is, but intellect knows the cause of its existence. Knowledge, therefore, subsists according to the nature of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is known. What wonder is it then that Divinity should know all things in such a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. divisible things indivisibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated, according to an eternal intelligence, totally, such things as are partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he should possess a power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all things with simple and united intellections, he should impart to every thing being, and a progression into being? For the auditory sense knows audibles in a manner different from the common sense; and prior to, and different from, these, reason knows audibles, together with other particulars which sense is not able to apprehend. And again, of desire, which tends to one thing, of anger, which aspires after another thing, and of *proairesis*, (*προαιρεσις*), or that faculty of the soul which is a deliberative tendency to things in our power, there is one particular life moving the soul towards all these, which are mutually motive of each other. It is through this life that we say, I desire, I am angry, and I have a deliberative tendency to this thing or that; for this life verges to all these powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a power which is impelled to every object of desire. But prior both to reason and this one life, is *the one* of the soul, which often says, I perceive, I reason,

relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each division are referred to themselves. It was admitted by us. If,

reason, I desire, and I deliberate, which follows all these energies, and energizes together with them. For we should not be able to know all these, and to apprehend in what they differ from each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which has a subsistence above the common sense, and which, prior to opinion, desire, and will, knows all that these know and desire, according to an indivisible mode of apprehension.

If this be the case, it is by no means proper to disbelieve in the indivisible knowledge of Divinity, which knows sensibles without possessing sense, and divisible natures without possessing a divisible energy, and which, without being present to things in place, knows them prior to all local presence, and imparts to every thing that which every thing is capable of receiving. The unstable essence, therefore, of apparent natures is not known by him in an unstable, but in a definite manner; nor does he know that which is subject to all-various mutations dubiously, but in a manner perpetually the same; for by knowing himself, he knows every thing of which he is the cause, possessing a knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is coordinate to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of every thing is superior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity, therefore, knows without busily attending to the objects of his intellect, because he abides in himself, and by alone knowing himself, knows all things. Nor is he indigent of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know sensible natures; for it is himself that produces all these, and that, in the unfathomable depths of the intellect of himself, comprehends an united knowledge of them, according to cause, and in one simplicity of perception. Just as if some one having built a ship, should place in it men of his own formation, and, in consequence of possessing a various art, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and afterwards launch the ship into the new created main. Let us suppose, too, that he causes these to have an existence by merely conceiving them to exist, so that by imagining all this to take place, he gives an external subsistence to his inward phantasms, it is evident that in this case he will contain the cause of every thing which happens to the ship through the winds on the sea, and that by contemplating his own conceptions, without being indigent of outward conversion, he will at the same time both fabricate and know these external particulars. Thus, and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of the universe, possessing the causes of all things, both gives subsistence to, and contemplates, whatever the universe contains, without departing from the speculation of himself. But if, with respect to intellect, one kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident that there is not the same intellectual perfection of all things, but that where intelligibles have a more total and undistributed subsistence, there the knowledge is more total and indivisible, and where the number of forms proceeds into multitude and extension, there the knowledge is both one and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing the Orphic verses, in which the theologist says:

Αὐτὴ δὲ Ζηνὸς καὶ ἐν ὁμασί πατρός ἀνακτος
Ναίουσ' ἀθάνατοι τε θεοί, θνητοὶ τ' ἀνθρώποι,
Ὅσσα τε νῦν γέγρασσα, καὶ ὑστερον ὅσσα ἐμείλλον.

If, therefore, there is the most accurate dominion with Divinity, and the most accurate science, the dominion of the Gods will not rule over us, nor will

i. e. There in the sight of Jove, the parent king,
Th' immortal Gods and mortal men reside,
With all that ever was, and shall hereafter be.

For the artificer of the universe is full of intelligibles, and possesses the causes of all things separated from each other; so that he generates men, and all other things, according to their characteristic peculiarities, and not so far as each is divine, in the same manner as the divinity prior to him, the intelligible father Phanes. Hence, Jupiter is called the father of things divided according to species, but Phanes of things divided according to genera. And Jupiter, indeed, is the father of wholes, though, by a much greater priority, Phanes is the father of all things, but of all things so far as each participates of a divine power. With respect to knowledge, also, Jupiter knows human affairs particularly, and in common with other things: for the cause of men is contained in him, divided from other things and united with all of them; but Phanes knows all things at once, as it were centrally, and without distribution. Thus, for instance, he knows man, so far as he is an animal and pedestrian, and not so far as he is man. For as the pedestrian which subsists in Phanes, is collectively, and at once, the cause of all terrestrial Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, souls, animals, plants, and of every thing contained in the earth, so also the knowledge which is there is one of all these things collectively, as of one genus, and is not a distributed knowledge of human affairs. And as in us the more universal sciences give subsistence to those which are subordinate to them, as Aristotle says, and are more sciences, and more allied to intellect, for they use more comprehensive conclusions,—so also in the Gods, the more excellent and more simple intellects comprehend according to causal priority the variety of such as are secondary. In the Gods, therefore, the first knowledge of man is as of being, and is one intellect which knows every being as one, according to one union. But the second knowledge is as of eternal being: for this knowledge uniformly comprehends according to one cause every eternal being. The knowledge which is consequent to this is as of animal: for this also has an intellect of animal according to union. But the knowledge which succeeds this is of that which is perfected under this particular genus, as of pedestrian: for it is an intellect of all that genus, as of one thing; and division first takes place in this, and variety together with simplicity. At the same time, however, neither in this is the intellect of man alone: for it is not the same thing to understand every thing terrestrial as one thing, and to understand man. Hence, in demiurgic, and in short in intellectual forms, there is a certain intellect of man as of man, because this form is separated from others in these orders. And thus we have shown how the highest forms do not possess a knowledge of human affairs, and how they have dominion over all things, so far as all things are divine, and so far as they participate of a certain divine idiom. But that in the first order of forms dominion itself, and science itself, subsist, is evident. For there is a divine intellect there of all things characterized by unity, and a power which rules over wholes; the former being the fountain of all knowledge, and the latter the primary cause

will their science take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a similar manner, we shall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know any thing divine through the assistance of our science. And again, in consequence of the same reasoning, they will neither, though Gods¹, be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns. But would not the discourse be wonderful in the extreme, which should deprive Divinity of knowledge? That Parmenides said, These, O Socrates, and many other consequences besides these, must necessarily² happen to forms, if they are the

of all dominion, whether they subsist in the Gods, or in the genera more excellent than our species, or in souls. And, perhaps, Parmenides here calls the genus of science the intellect of those forms, wishing to show its comprehensive and uniform nature; but prior to this, when he was speaking of middle ideas, he alone denominated it species. For, from intelligible knowledge the middle orders are filled with the intelligence which they possess; and intelligence in the latter, has the same relation to that in the former, which species has to genus. If, also, the term *much more accurate*, is employed in speaking of this science, it is evident that such an addition represents to us its more united nature. For this is the accurate, to comprehend all things, and leave nothing external to itself.

¹ It is well observed here by Proclus, that the words "*though Gods*" contain an abundant indication of the present doubt. For every thing divine is good, and is willing to fill all things with good. How, therefore, can it either be ignorant of things pertaining to us, or not have dominion over secondary natures? How is it possible that it should not govern according to its own power, and provide according to its own knowledge for things of which it is the cause? And it appears that Parmenides by these words evinces, that for the Divinities to be ignorant of our concerns over which they have dominion, is the most absurd of all things, profoundly indicating that it especially pertains to the Gods, so far as Gods, to know and provide for all things, according to *the one* by which they are characterized. For intellect, so far as intellect, has not a knowledge of all things, but of *wholes*, nor are ideas the causes of all things, but of such as perpetually subsist according to nature; so that the assertion is not entirely false which deprives these of the knowledge and government of our concerns, so far as we rank among particulars, and not so far as we are men, and possess one form. But it is necessary that the Divinity and the Gods should know all things, particulars, things eternal, and things temporal; and that they should rule over all things, not only such as are universal, but such also as are partial: for there is one providence of them pervading to all things. Forms, therefore, so far as Gods, and intellect so far as a God, possess a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things. But intellect is a God according to *the one*, which is as it were the luminous flower of its essence; and forms are Gods, so far as they contain the light proceeding from *the good*.

² Parmenides here indicates that what has been said under the pretext of doubts, is after another manner true. For he says that these and many other consequences must *necessarily* happen to forms, viz. the being unknown, and having no knowledge of our affairs. And, in short,

the ideas of things, and if any one separates each form apart from other things; so that any one who hears these assertions, may doubt and hesitate whether such forms have any subsistence; or if they do subsist in a most eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly necessary that they should be unknown¹ by the human nature. Hence he who thus speaks may seem to say something to the purpose; and as we just now said, it may be considered as a wonderful² thing, on account of the difficulty of being persuaded, and as the province of a man³ of a very naturally good disposition, to be able to perceive *that there is a certain genus of every thing, and an essence itself subsisting by itself*: but he will deserve still greater admiration, who, after having made this discovery, shall be able to teach another how to discern and distinguish all these in a becoming manner. That then Socrates said, I assent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely speak agreeably to my opinion.

That Parmenides further added, But indeed, O Socrates, if any one on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been

short, he indicates that all the above-mentioned idioms are adapted to different orders of forms. For it is by no means wonderful that what is true of one order should be false when extended to another.

¹ These things also, says Proclus, are divinely asserted, and with a view to the condition of our nature. For neither does he who has arrived at the summit of human attainments, and who is the wisest among men, possess science perfectly indubitable concerning divine natures; for it is intellect alone which knows intelligibles free from doubt; nor is the most imperfect and earth-born character entirely deprived of the knowledge of a formal cause. For to what does he look when he sometimes blames that which is apparent to sense, as very mutable, if he does not contain in himself an unperverted preconception of an essence permanent and real?

² The similar is every where naturally adapted to proceed to the similar. Hence that which is obscure to the eyes, and is only to be obtained by philosophy, will not be apprehended by imperfect souls, but by those alone who through physical virtue, transcendent diligence, and ardent desire apply themselves in a becoming manner to so sublime an object of contemplation. For the speculation of intelligibles cannot subsist in foreign habits; nor can things which have their essence and seat in a pure intellect become apparent to those who are not purified in intellect; since the similar is every where known by the similar.

³ By these words, says Proclus, Plato again teaches us who is a most fit hearer of this discourse about ideas. Such a one he denominates a *man* (i. e. *ανθρωπος*, not *ανθρωπος*), not indeed in vain, but in order to indicate that such a one according to the form of his life possesses much of the *grand, robust and elevated*: (*ανδρα μὲν ονομασας ου ματην, ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἶδός τῆς ζωῆς τοιούτους ἢ, πολὺ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ ὑψηλοῦ ἐπιδεικνυμένους*.)

been said, and other things of the same kind, he will not find where to turn his dianoëtic ¹ part, while he does not permit the idea of every thing which exists

ἐπιδεικνύμενος.) For it is fit that he who is about to apprehend the Gods should direct his attention to nothing small and grovelling. But he calls him a man of a very naturally good disposition, as being adorned with all the prerogatives of a philosophic nature, and as receiving many viatica from nature, in order to the intellectual perception of divine natures. In addition to this, he also again reminds us who is the leader of the science concerning these divine forms, and that he is prolific and inventive, and this with respect to teaching. For some have made such a proficiency as is sufficient for themselves, but others are also able to awaken others to a recollection of the truth of things. Hence he says, that such a one deserves still greater admiration. In the third place, he shows us what is the end of this teaching, viz. that the learner who possesses science may be sufficiently able to distinguish the genera of beings, and to survey in perfection the definite causes of things; whence they originate; how many are their orders; how they subsist in every order of things; how they are participated; how they causally comprehend all things in themselves; and, in short, all such particulars as have been discussed in the preceding notes.

Proclus adds, that by a certain genus of every thing, Plato signifies the primary cause presubsisting in divine natures of every series. For idea compared with any other individual form in sensibles is a genus, as being more total than sensible forms, and as comprehending things which are not entirely of a similar form with each other. For how can the terrestrial man be said to be entirely of a similar form with the celestial, or with the man that is allotted a subsistence in any other element?

¹ Very scientifically, says Proclus, does Plato in these words remind us that there are ideas or forms of things. For if dianoëtic and intellectual are better than sensible knowledge, it is necessary that the things known by the dianoëtic power and by intellect should be more divine than those which are known by sense: for as the gnostic powers which are coordinated to beings are to each other, such also is the mutual relation of the things which are known. If, therefore, the dianoëtic power and intellect speculate separate and immaterial forms, and likewise things universal, and which subsist in themselves, but sense contemplates things partible, and which are inseparable from subjects, it is necessary that the spectacles of the dianoëtic power and of intellect, should be more divine and more eternal. Universals, therefore, are prior to particulars, and things immaterial to things material. Whence then does the dianoëtic power receive these? for they do not always subsist in us according to energy. It is however necessary, that things in energy should precede those in capacity, both in things intellectual and in essences. Forms, therefore, subsist elsewhere, and prior to us, in divine and separate natures, through whom the forms which we contain derive their perfection. But these not subsisting, neither would the forms in us subsist: for they could not be derived from things imperfect: since it is not lawful that more excellent natures should be either generated or perfected from such as are subordinate. Whence, too, is this multitude of forms in the multitude of souls derived? For it is every where necessary, prior to multitude, to conceive a monad from which the multitude proceeds. For as the multitude of sensibles was not generated, except from an unity, which is better than sensibles,

exists to be always the same, and by this means entirely destroys the dialectic power of the soul: but you also seem in this respect to perceive perfectly

and which gave subsistence to that which is common in particulars; so neither would the multitude of forms subsist in souls, such as the just itself, the beautiful itself, &c. which subsist in all souls in a manner accommodated to the nature of soul, without a certain generating unity, which is more excellent than this animastic multitude: just as the monad from which the multitude of sensibles originates, is superior to a sensible essence, comprehending unitedly all the variety of sensibles. Is it not also necessary, that prior to self-motive natures, there should be an immovable form? For as self-motive reasons transcend those which are alter-motive, or moved by others, after the same manner immovable forms, and which energize in eternity, are placed above self-motive forms, which are conversant with the circulations of time: for it is every where requisite that a stable should precede a movable cause. If, therefore, there are forms in souls which are many, and of a self-motive nature, there are prior to these intellectual forms. In other words, there are immovable prior to self-motive natures, such as are monadic, prior to such as are multiplied, and the perfect prior to the imperfect. It is also requisite that they should subsist in energy; so that if there are not intellectual, neither are there animastic forms: for nature by no means begins from the imperfect and the many; since it is necessary that multitude should proceed about monads, things imperfect about the perfect, and things movable about the immovable. But if there are not forms essentially inherent in soul, there is no place left to which any one can turn his dianoëtic power as Parmenides justly observes: for phantasy and sense necessarily look to things consaccnt with themselves. And of what shall we possess a dianoëtic or scientific knowledge, if the soul is deprived of forms of this kind? For we shall not make our speculation about things of posterior origin, since these are more ignoble than sensibles themselves, and the universals which they contain. How then will the objects of knowledge, which are coordinate to the dianoëtic power, be subordinate to those which are known by sense? It remains, therefore, that we shall not know any thing else than sensibles. But if this be the case, whence do demonstrations originate? Demonstrations indeed, are from those things which are the causes of the things demonstrated, which are prior to them according to nature, and not with relation to us, and which are more honourable than the conclusions which are unfolded from them. But the things from which demonstrations are formed are universals, and not particulars. Universals, therefore, are prior to, and are more causal and more honourable than, particulars. Whence likewise are definitions? For definition proceeds through the essential reason of the soul: for we first define that which is common in particulars, possessing within, that form, of which the something common in these is the image. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonstration, it is necessary that there should be another definition prior to this, of the many forms and essential reasons which the soul contains. For since, as we have before said, the just itself is in every soul, it is evident that there is something common in this multitude of the just, whence every soul knowing the reason of the just contained in its essence, knows in a similar manner that which is in all other souls. But if it possesses something common, it is this something common which we define, and this is the principle of demonstration, and not that universal in the many, which is material, and in a certain

fectly the same with myself. That Socrates answered, You speak the truth. What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself,

certain respect mortal, being coordinated with the many: for in demonstrations and definitions, it is requisite that the whole of what is partial should be comprehended in universal and definition. The definitions however of things common in particulars do not comprehend the whole of particulars: for, can it be said that Socrates is the whole of rational mortal animal, which is the definition of man? since he contains many other particulars, which cause him to possess characteristic peculiarities. But the reason of man in the soul comprehends the whole of every individual: for it comprehends uniformly all the powers which are beheld about the particulars of the human species. And, in a similar manner with respect to animal: for, indeed, the universal in particulars is less than the particulars themselves, and is less than species; since it does not possess all differences in energy, but in capacity alone; whence also, it becomes as it were the matter of the succeeding formal differences. But the reason of man in our soul is better and more comprehensive; for it comprehends all the differences of man unitedly, and not in capacity, like the universal in particulars, but in energy. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonstration, it is requisite that it should be the definition of a thing of that kind which is entirely comprehensive of that which is more partial. But of this kind are the forms in our soul, and not the forms which subsist in particulars. These, therefore, being subverted, neither will it be possible to define. Hence the definitive together with the demonstrative art will perish, abandoning the conceptions of the human mind. The divisive art also, together with these, will be nothing but a name: for the whole employment of division is, to separate the many from the one, and to distribute things preexisting unitedly in the whole, into their proper differences, not adding the differences externally, but contemplating them as inherent in the genera themselves, and as dividing the species from each other. Where, therefore, will the work of this art be found, if we do not admit that there are essential forms in our soul? For he who supposes that this art is employed in things of posterior origin, i. e. forms abstracted from sensibles, perceives nothing of the power which it possesses: for to divide things of posterior origin, is the business of the divisive art, energizing according to opinion; but to contemplate the essential differences of the reasons in the soul, is the employment of dianoëtic and scientific division, which also unfolds united powers, and perceives things more partial branching forth from such as are more total. By a much greater priority, therefore, to the definitive and demonstrative arts will the divisive be entirely vain, if the soul does not contain essential reasons: for definition is more venerable, and ranks more as a principle than demonstration, and again, division than definition: for the divisive gives to the definitive art its principles, but not vice versa. The analytic art also, must perish together with these, if we do not admit the essential reasons of the soul. For the analytic is opposed to the demonstrative method, as resolving from things caused to causes, but to the definitive as proceeding from composites to things more simple, and to the divisive, as ascending from things more partial to such as are more universal. So that those methods being destroyed, this also will perish. If, therefore, there are not forms or ideas, neither shall we contain the reasons of things. And if we do not contain the reasons of things, neither will there

yourself, being ignorant of these? Indeed I do not seem to myself to know at present. That Parmenides said, Before you exercise¹ yourself in this affair,

be the dialectic methods according to which we obtain a knowledge of things, nor shall we know where to turn the dianoëtic power of the soul.

¹ Socrates was alone deficient in skill, whence Parmenides exhorts him to apply himself to dialectic, through which he would become much more skilful, being exercised in many things, and perceiving the consequences of hypotheses; and when he has accomplished this, Parmenides advises him to turn to the speculation of forms. For such particulars as are now dubious are very easy of solution to those that are exercised in dialectic. And this is the whole end of the words. This exercise, however, must not be thought to be such as that which is called by logicians the epichirematic or argumentative method. For that looks to opinion, but this despises the opinion of the multitude. Hence, to the many it appears to be nothing but words, and is on this account denominated by them garrulity. The epichirematic method, indeed, delivers many arguments about one problem; but this exercise delivers the same method to us about many and different problems; so that the one is very different from the other. The latter, however, is more beautiful than the former, as it uses more excellent methods, beginning from on high, in order to accomplish its proper work. For, as we have already observed in the Introduction to this dialogue, it employs as its instruments division and definition, analysis and demonstration. If, therefore, we exercise ourselves in this method, there is much hope that we shall genuinely apprehend the theory of ideas; distinctly evolving our confused conceptions; dissolving apparent doubts; and demonstrating things of which we are now ignorant. But till we can effect this, we shall not be able to give a scientific definition of every form.

Should it, however, be inquired whether it is possible to define forms or not, such as the beautiful itself, or the just itself; for forms, as Plato says in his Epistles, are only to be apprehended by the simple vision of intelligence; to this we reply, that the beautiful itself, the just itself, and the good itself, considered as ideas, are not only in intellect, but also in souls, and in sensible natures. And of these, some are definable, and others not. This being the case, intellectual forms, though they may be in many and partial natures, cannot be defined on account of their simplicity, and because they are apprehended by intelligence, and not through composition; and likewise, because whatever is defined ought to participate of something common, which is, as it were, a subject, and is different from itself. But in divine forms there is nothing of this kind: for being, as Timæus says, does not proceed into any thing else, but though it makes a certain progression from itself, yet after a manner it is the same with its immediate progeny, being only unfolded into a second order. Forms, however, belonging to soul, and subsisting in sensibles, can be defined; and, in short, such things as are produced according to a paradigmatic cause, and such as are said to participate of forms. Hence, dialectic speculates the first forms by simple intuitions; but when it defines, or divides, it looks to the images of these. If, therefore, such a science is the purest part of intellect and prudence, it is evident that it employs pure intellections, through which it apprehends intelligibles, and multifarious methods by which it binds the spectacles derived from

affair, O Socrates, you should endeavour to define what *the beautiful, the just, and the good* are, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the necessity of your accomplishing this, when I heard you discoursing with Aristotle. Indeed that ardour of yours, by which you are impelled to disputation, is both beautiful¹ and divine; but collect yourself together, and while

from intelligibles, and which subsist in secondary orders: and thus it appears that the assertions of Plato are true.

But it is by no means wonderful if we also define certain other particulars of which there are no ideas, such as things artificial, parts, and things evil. For there are in us reasons of wholes which are according to nature, and also of things good; and in consequence of this, we know such things as give completion to wholes, such as imitate nature, and such as have merely a shadowy subsistence. For such as is each of these, such also is it known and defined by us; and we discourse about them from the definitely stable reasons which we contain.

¹ Some, says Proclus, are neither impelled to, nor are astonished about, the speculation of beings: others again have obtained perfection according to knowledge: and others are impelled, indeed, but require perfection, logical skill, and exercise, in order to the attainment of the end. Among the last of these is Socrates; whence Parmenides, indeed, receives his impulse, and calls it divine, as being philosophic. For, to despise things apparent, and to contemplate an incorporeal essence, is philosophic and divine; since every thing divine is of this kind, separate from sensibles, and subsisting in immaterial intellects. But Parmenides also calls the impulse of Socrates beautiful, as leading to that which is truly beautiful, (which does not consist in practical affairs, as the Stoics afterwards conceived it did, but in intellectual energies,) and as adapted to true love. For the amatory form of life especially adheres to beauty. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides admit the impulse of Socrates as *divine and beautiful*, as leading to *intellect and the one*. As *divine*, indeed, it vindicates to itself *the one*, but as *beautiful, intellect*, in which the beautiful first subsists; and as purifying the eye of the soul, and exciting its most divine part. But he extends the road through dialectic as irreprehensible and most expedient; being connate, indeed, with things, but employing many powers for the apprehension of truth; imitating intellect, from which also it receives its principles, but beautifully extending through well-ordered gradations to true being, and giving respite to the wandering about sensibles; and lastly, exploring every thing by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the occult residence of *the one and the good*.

But when Parmenides says, "if you do not truth will elude your pursuit," he manifests the danger which threatens us from rash and disordered impulse to things inaccessible to the unexercised, and this is no other than falling from the whole of truth. For an orderly progression is that which makes our ascent secure and irreprehensible. Hence, Proclus adds, the Chaldean oracle says, "that Divinity is never so much turned from man, and never so much sends us novel paths, as when we make our ascent to the most divine of speculations or works in a confused and disordered manner, and, as it adds, with unbathed feet, and with unhallowed lips. For, of those

while you are young more and more exercise yourself in that science, which appears useless to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your pursuit.

That Socrates then said, What method of exercise [†] is this, O Parmenides? And that Parmenides replied, It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but besides this, while you was speaking with Zeno, I admired your asserting that you not only suffered yourself to contemplate the *wandering* [‡] which subsists about the objects of sight, but likewise that which takes place

that are thus negligent, the progressions are imperfect, the impulses are vain, and the paths are blind." Being persuaded, therefore, both by Plato and the oracles, we should always ascend through things more proximate to us to such as are more excellent, and from things more subordinate, through mediums, to such as are more elevated.

[†] If again, says Proclus, Parmenides calls this dialectic an exercise (*γυμνασία*), not being argumentative, we ought not to wonder. For every logical discursus, and the evolution itself of theorems, considered with reference to an intellectual life, is an exercise. For as we call endurance an exercise, with reference to fortitude, and continence, with respect to temperance, so every logical theory may be called an exercise with reference to intellectual knowledge. The scientific discursus, therefore, of the dianoëtic power, which is the business of dialectic, is a dianoëtic exercise preparatory to the most simple intellection of the soul.

[‡] Again, in these words Parmenides evinces his admiration of the astonishment of Socrates about intelligibles and immaterial forms: for he says that he admires his transferring the dialectic power from sensibles to intelligibles; and he also adds the cause of this. For things which are especially apprehended by reason, or the summit of the dianoëtic part (for such is the meaning of reason in this place), are intelligibles; since Timæus also says that the reason about sensibles is not firm and stable, but conjectural, but that the reason which is employed about intelligibles is immovable and cannot be confuted. For sensibles are not accurately that which they are said to be; but intelligibles having a proper subsistence, are more able to be known. But, after another manner, it may be said that intelligible forms are especially known by reason, and this by beginning from the gnostic powers. For sense has no knowledge whatever of these forms; the phantasy receives figured images of them; opinion logically apprehends them, and without figure, but at the same time possesses the various, and is, in short, naturally adapted alone to know *that*, and not *why*, they are. Hence, the summit of our dianoëtic part is the only sufficient speculator of forms: and hence Timæus says that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. So that forms, properly so called, are justly said to be especially apprehended by reason. For all sensible things are partial; since every body is partial: for no body is capable of being all things, nor of subsisting impartibly, in a multitude of particulars. Physical forms verge to bodies, and are divided about them; and the forms belonging to the soul participate of variety, and fall short of the simplicity of intellectual forms. Hence, such forms as are called intellectual and intelligible, and are most remote from matter are especially to be apprehended by reason.

place in such things as are especially apprehended by reason, and which some one may consider as having a real subsistence. For it appears to me (said Socrates), that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved, that there are both similars and dissimilars, or any thing else which it is the province of beings to suffer. That Parmenides replied, You speak well: but it is necessary that, besides this, you should not only consider *if each of the things supposed is*¹, what will be the consequences from the hypothesis, but likewise

reason. The dialectic wandering, therefore, is necessary to the survey of these forms, exercising and fitting us, like the preparatory part of the mysteries, for the vision of these splendid beings. Nor must we by this wandering understand, as we have before observed, a merely logical discursus about matters of opinion, but the whole of dialectic, which Plato in the Republic calls the defensive inclosure of disciplines, and which, in the evolutions of arguments, exercises us to the more accurate intellection of immaterial and separate natures.

Nor must we wonder, says Proclus, that Plato calls scientific theory wandering: for it is so denominated with reference to pure intelligence, and the simple apprehension of intelligibles. And what wonder is it, says he, if Plato calls a progression of this kind wandering, since some of those posterior to him have not refused to denominate the variety of intellects in intellect a wandering; for though the intelligence in intellect is immutable, yet it is at the same time one and multiplied, through the multitude of intelligibles. And why is it requisite to speak concerning intellect, since those who energize in the highest perfection from a divine afflatus, are accustomed to speak of the wanderings of the Gods themselves, not only of those in the heavens, but also of those that are denominated intellectual; obscurely signifying by this their progression, their being present to all secondary natures, and their prolific providence as far as to the last of things. For they say that every thing which proceeds into multitude wanders; but that the innerratic alone subsists in the stable and uniform. Wandering, indeed, appears to signify four things, either a multitude of energies, though they may all subsist together, or a transitive multitude, like the intellects of the soul, or a multitude proceeding from opposites to opposites, or a multitude of disordered motions. The dialectic exercise is called a wandering according to the third of these, in consequence of proceeding through opposite hypotheses. So that if there is any thing which energizes according to one immutable energy, this is truly innerratic.

¹ It appears to me, says Proclus, to be well said by the ancients that Plato has given perfection in this dialogue to the writings both of Zeno and Parmenides, producing the dialectic exercise of the former to both opposites, and elevating the theory of the latter to true being. We shall find, therefore, the perfection of the writings of Parmenides in the following part of this dialogue, which contains nine hypotheses concerning *the one*; but we may perceive the perfection of Zeno's writings in what is now said. In addition, therefore, to what we have already delivered respecting the dialectic of Zeno in the preceding Introduction, we shall subjoin from Proclus the following observations. The discourse of Zeno having supposed the multitude of forms separate from *the one*, collects the absurdities which follow from this hypothesis, and this by considering what

likewise what will result from supposing that *it is not*, if you wish to be more exercised in this affair. How do you mean¹ (said Socrates)? As if (said Parmenides)

what follows, and what follows and does not follow: for he collects that they are similar and not similar; and proceeds in a similar manner respecting *the one* and the many, motion and permanency. Parmenides, however, thinks it fit that in dialectic investigations it should not only be supposed if *the one* is, but also if it is not, and to speculate what will happen from this hypothesis; as, for instance, not only if similitude is, but also if it is not, what will happen, either as consequent, or as not consequent, or as consequent and at the same time not consequent. But his reason for making such an addition is this: if we only suppose that a thing is, and discover what will be the consequence of the hypothesis, we shall not entirely discover that of which the thing supposed is essentially the cause; but if we can demonstrate in addition to this, that if it is not, this very same thing will no longer follow which was the consequence of its being supposed to have a subsistence, then it becomes evident to us that if the one is, the other is also.

Some

¹ Socrates not being able to apprehend the whole method synoptically delivered, through what has been previously said, requests Parmenides to unfold it more clearly. Parmenides accordingly again gives a specimen of this method logically and synoptically: comprehending in eight the four and twenty modes which we have already mentioned in the Introduction to this dialogue. For, he assumes, if it happens, and if it follows and does not follow, and both these conjoined; so that again we may thus be able to triple the eight modes. But let us concisely consider, with Proclus, these eight modes in the hypothesis of Zeno:—If, then, the many have a subsistence, there will simply happen to the many with respect to themselves to be separated, not to be principles, to subsist dissimilarly. But to the many with respect to *the one* there will happen, to be comprehended by *the one*, to be generated by it, and to participate of similitude and union from it. To *the one* there will happen, to have dominion over the many, to be participated by them, to subsist prior to them; and this with respect to the many. But to *the one* with respect to itself there will happen the impartible, the unmultiplied, that which is better than being, and life, and knowledge; and every thing of this kind.

Again, if the many is not, there will happen to the many with respect to themselves the unseparated and the undivided from each other: but to the many with respect to *the one*, a subsistence unproceeding from *the one*, a privation of difference with respect to *the one*. To *the one* with respect to itself there will happen the possession of nothing efficacious and perfect in its own nature; for if it possessed any thing of this kind it would generate the many. To *the one* with respect to the many, not to be the leader of multitude, and not to operate any thing in the many.

Hence, we may conclude, that *the one* is every where that which makes multitude to be one thing, is the cause of, and has dominion over, multitude. And here you may see that the transition is from the object of investigation to its cause; for such is *the one*. It is requisite, therefore, that always after many discussions and hypotheses there should be a certain summary deduction, (συναγωγὴν.) For thus Plato, through all the intellectual conceptions, shows that *the one* gives subsistence to all things, and to the unities in beings, which we say is the end of the dialogue.

Parmenides) you should wish to exercise yourself in this hypothesis of Zeno, *if there are many things*, what ought to happen both to *the many* with reference to themselves, and to *the one*; and to *the one* with respect to itself, and to *the many*: and again, *if many are not*, to consider what will happen both to *the one* and to *the many*, as well to themselves as to each other. And again, if he should suppose *if similitude*¹ *is*, or *if it is not*, what will happen from

Some one, however, may probably inquire how it is possible for any thing to happen to that which is not. And how can that be the recipient of any thing which has no subsistence whatever? To this we reply, that *non being*, as we learn in the Sophista, is either that which in no respect has a subsistence (το μηδεν μηδενως εν), or it is privation, for by itself it is not, but has an accidental being; or it is matter, for this is not, as being formless, and naturally indefinite; or it is every thing material, as that which has an apparent being, but properly is not; or, further still, it is every thing sensible, for this is continually conversant with generation and corruption, but never truly is. Prior to these, also, there is non-being in souls, according to which they are likewise said to be the first of generated natures, and not to belong to those true beings which rank in intelligibles. And prior to souls, there is the non-being in intelligibles themselves, and this is the first *difference* of beings, as we are taught by the Sophista, and which as we there learn is not less than being itself. Lastly, beyond all these is the non-being of that which is prior to being, which is the cause of all beings, and is exempt from the multitude which they contain. If, therefore, non-being may be predicated in so many ways, it is evident that what has not in any respect being, can never become the subject of hypothesis: for it is not possible to speak of this, nor to have any knowledge of it, as the Eleatean guest in the Sophista shows, confirming the assertion of Parmenides concerning it. But when we say that the many is not, or that *the one* is not, or that soul is not, we so make the negation, as that each of these is something else, but is not that particular thing, the being of which we deny. And thus the hypothesis does not lead to that which in no respect has a subsistence, but to that which partly is, and partly is not: for, in short, negations are the progeny of intellectual difference. Hence, a thing is not a horse, because it is another thing; and, through this, it is not man, because it is something else. And Plato in the Sophista on this account says, that when we say non-being, we only assert an ablation of being, but not the contrary to being, meaning by contrary, that which is most distant from being, and which perfectly falls from it. So that when we say a thing is not, we do not introduce that which in no respect has a being, nor when we make non-being the subject of hypothesis do we suppose that which is in no respect is, but we signify as much of non-being as is capable of being known and expressed by words.—For an account of the Eleatic method of reasoning which Plato here delivers, see the Introduction to this dialogue.

¹ If similitude is, says Proclus, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, the monadic, the perpetual, the prolific, and the primary. But, with respect to sensibles, the assimilation of them to intelligibles, the not suffering them to fall into the place of dissimilitude, and the conjunction of parts with their wholenesses. To sensibles with respect to themselves there will hap-

from each hypothesis, both to the things supposed and to others, and to themselves and to each other; and the same method of proceeding must take place concerning the *diffimilar*, *motion*¹ and *permanency*, *generation*

pen, a communion with each other, a participation of, and a rejoicing in, each other. For similars rejoice in, are copassive, and are mingled with similars. But with respect to similitude there will happen a participation of it, an assimilation with, and union according to, it.

But if similitude is not, there will happen to itself according to itself the unessential, the neither possessing prolific power, nor a primary essence. But with respect to others not to have dominion over them, not to make them similar to themselves according to form, but rather in conjunction with itself to take away the similar which is in them; for the principle of similars not having a subsistence, neither will these be similar. But to sensibles with respect to themselves there will happen the immovable, the unmingled, the unsympathetic. But with respect to it, neither to be fashioned by form according to it, nor to be connected by it.

In like manner we say with respect to the dissimilar. For if dissimilitude is, there will happen to itself with respect to itself to be a form pure, immaterial and uniform, possessing multitude together with unity; but with respect to other things, I mean sensibles, a cause of the definite circumscription and division in each. To other things with respect to themselves there will happen, that each will preserve its proper idiom and form without confusion; but with respect to it, to be suspended from it, and to be adorned both according to wholes and parts by it. But if dissimilitude is not, it will neither be a pure and immaterial form, nor, in short, one and not one, nor will it possess, with respect to other things, a cause of the separate essence of each; and other things will possess an all-various confusion in themselves, and will not be the participants of one power which gives separation to wholes.

From these things, therefore, we collect that similitude is the cause of communion, sympathy, and commixture to sensibles; but dissimilitude of separation, production according to form, and unconfused purity of powers in themselves. For these things follow the positions of similitude and dissimilitude, but the contraries of these from their being taken away.

¹ If motion is, there will happen to itself with respect to itself the eternal, and the possession of infinite power; but to itself, with respect to things which are here, to be motive of them, the vivific, the cause of progression, and of various energies. But to these things with respect to themselves there will happen, the energetic, the vivific, the mutable; for every thing material passes from a subsistence in capacity, to a subsistence in energy. To other things with respect to motion there will happen, to be perfected by it, to partake of its power, to be assimilated through it to things eternally stable. For things which are incapable of obtaining good stably, participate of it through motion.

But if motion is not, it will be inefficacious, sluggish, and without power; it will not be a cause of things which are here; will be void of motive powers, and a producing essence. And things which are here will be uncoordinated, indefinite and imperfect, first motion not having a subsistence.

In like manner with respect to permanency, if it is, there will happen to itself with reference

*tion*¹ and *corruption*, *being* and *non-being*: and, in one word, concerning every

to itself, the stable, the eternal, and the uniform. But to other things with respect to themselves, that each will abide in its proper boundaries, and will be firmly established in the same places or measures. To other things with respect to it there will happen, to be every way bounded and subdued by it, and to partake of stability in being. But if it is not, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, the inefficacious, and the unstable. To itself with reference to other things, not to afford them the stable, the secure, and the firm; but to other things with respect to themselves the much wandering, the unestablished, the imperfect, and the being deprived of habitation; and to other things with respect to it, neither to be subservient to its measures, nor to partake of being according to it, but to be borne along in a perfectly disordered manner, that which connects and establishes them, not having a subsistence. Motion itself, therefore, is the supplier of efficacious power, and multiform life and energy; but permanency, of firmness and stability, and an establishment in proper boundaries.

¹ Let us now consider, says Proclus, prior to these, whence generation and corruption originate, and if the causes of these are to be placed in ideas. Or is not this indeed necessary, not only because these rank among things perpetual (for neither is it possible for generation not to be, nor for corruption to be entirely dissolved, but it is necessary that these should consubstist with each other in the universe, so far as it is perpetual) but this is also requisite, because generation participates of essence and being, but corruption of non-being. For every thing so far as it is generated is referred to essence, and partakes of being, but so far as it is corrupted, it is referred to non-being, and a mutation of the *is* to another form. For through this it is corrupted from one thing into another, because non-being presubsists which gives division to forms. And as in intelligibles, non-being is not less than being, as is asserted by the Eleatean guest, so here corruption is not less than generation, nor does it less contribute to the perfection of the universe. And as there, that which participates of being enjoys also non-being, and non-being partakes of being, so here that which is in generation, or in passing into being, is also the recipient of corruption, and that which is corrupting, of generation. Being, therefore, and non-being, are the causes of generation and corruption.

But it is requisite to exercise ourselves after the same manner with respect to these. In the first place, then, if generation is, it is in itself imperfect, and is the cause to others of an assimilation to essence. But there will happen to other things with respect to themselves, a mutation from each other: and to other things with respect to generation, there will happen a perpetual participation of it, in consequence of its subsisting in them. But if generation is not, it will be itself, not the object of opinion; and with respect to other things it will not be the form of any thing, nor the cause of order and perfection to any thing; but other things will be unbegotten and impassive, and will have no communion with it, nor participate through it of being.

In like manner with respect to corruption: If corruption is, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, the never failing, infinite power, and a fullness of non-being; but to itself with respect to other things, the giving measure to being, and the cause of perpetual generation. But to other things with respect to themselves, there will happen a flowing into each other, and an inability of connecting themselves. And to other things with respect to corruption there will

every thing which is supposed either to be ¹ or not to be, or influenced in any manner by any other passion, it is necessary to consider the consequences

happen, to be perpetually changed by it, to have non-being conjoined with being, and to participate of corruption totally. But if corruption is not, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, that it will not be subvertive of itself; for not having a subsistence, it will subvert itself with respect to other things. To itself, with reference to other things there will happen, that it will not dissipate them, nor change them into each other, nor dilacerate being and essence. To other things with respect to themselves there will happen, the not being changed into each other, the not being passive to each other, and that each will preserve the same order. But to other things with respect to it there will happen, the not being passive to it. The peculiarity, therefore, of generation is to move to being, but of corruption to lead from being. For this we infer from the preceding hypotheses, since it has appeared to us that admitting their existence, they are the causes of being and non-being to other things; and that being subverted they introduce a privation of motion and mutation.

¹ We engage, says Proclus, in the investigation of things in a twofold respect, contemplating at one time if a thing is or is not, and at another time, if this particular thing is present with it, or is not present, as in the inquiry if the soul is immortal. For here we must not only consider all that happens to the thing supposed, with respect to itself and other things, and to other things with respect to the thing supposed, but also what happens with reference to subsistence and non-subsistence. Thus, for instance, if the soul is immortal, its virtue will have a connate life, sufficient to felicity; and this will happen to itself with respect to itself. But to itself with respect to other things there will happen, to use them as instruments, to provide for them separately, to impart life to them. In the second place, to other things with respect to themselves there will happen, that things living and dead will be generated from each other, the possession of an adventitious immortality, the circle of generation; but to other things with respect to it, to be adorned by it, to participate of a certain self-motion, and to be suspended from it, in living.

But if the soul is not immortal, it will not be self-motive, it will not be intellectual essentially, it will not be self-vital; nor will its disciplines be reminiscences. It will be corrupted by its own proper evil, and will not have a knowledge of true beings. And these things will happen to itself with respect to itself. But to itself with respect to others there will happen, to be mingled with bodies and material natures, to have no dominion over itself, to be incapable of leading others as it pleases, to be subservient to the temperament of bodies; and all its life will be corporeal, and conversant with generation. To other things with respect to themselves there will happen, such a habit as that which consists from entelecheia and body. For there will alone be animals composed from an indefinite life and bodies. But to other things with respect to it there will happen, to be the leaders of it, to change it together with their own motions, and to possess it in themselves, and not externally governing them, and to live in conjunction with and not from it. You see, therefore, that after this manner we discover by the dialectic art the mode, not only how we may be able to suppose if a thing is and is not, but any other passion which it may suffer, such as the being immortal or not immortal.

quences both to itself and to each individual of other things, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner; and again, how other things are related to themselves, and to another which you establish, whether you consider that which is the subject

Since, however we may consider the relation of one thing to another variously; for we may either consider it with reference to one thing only, as for instance, how similitude, if it is supposed to be, subsists with respect to dissimilitude; or, we may consider it with respect to more than one thing, as for instance, how essence, if supposed to be, is with reference to permanency and motion; or with respect to all things, as, if *the one* is, how it subsists with reference to all things,—this being the case, Plato does not omit this, but adds, That it is requisite to consider the consequences with respect to one thing only, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner.

It is necessary indeed that this one, or those many should be allied to the thing proposed, for instance, as the similar to the dissimilar: for these are coordinate to each other. And motion and rest to essence: for these are contained in and subsist about it. But if the difference with respect to another thing, is with respect to one thing, to many things, and to all things, and we say there are twenty four modes, assuming in one way only a subsistence with reference to another, this is not wonderful. For difference with respect to another thing pertains to matter; but we propose to deliver the form of the dialectic method, and the formal but not the material differences which it contains.

Observe, too, that Plato adds, that the end of this exercise is the perception of truth. We must not, therefore, consider him as simply speaking of scientific truth, but of that which is intelligible, or which in other words, subsists according to a supereffential characteristic: for the whole of our life is an exercise to the vision of this, and the wandering through dialectic hastens to that as its port. Hence Plato in a wonderful manner uses the word *διόψομαι* to look through: for souls obtain the vision of intelligibles through many mediums.

But again, that the method may become perspicuous to us from another example, let us investigate the four-and-twenty modes in providence. If then providence is, there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the beneficent, the infinitely powerful, the efficacious; but there will not follow, the subversion of itself, the privation of counsel, the unwilling. That which follows and does not follow is, that it is one and not one. There will follow to itself with respect to other things, to govern them, to preserve every thing, to possess the beginning and the end of all things, and to bound the whole of sensibles. That which does not follow is, to injure the objects of its providential care, to supply that which is contrary to expectation, to be the cause of disorder. There will follow and not follow, the being present to all things, and an exemption from them; the knowing and not knowing them: for it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers coordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with respect to themselves, to suffer nothing casually from each other, and that nothing will be injured by any thing. There will not follow, that any thing pertaining to them will be from fortune,

subject of your hypothesis as having a subsistence or as not subsisting; if, being perfectly exercised, you design through proper media to perceive the truth.

That Socrates then said, You speak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impossible to accomplish, nor do I very much understand what you mean; but why do you not establish a certain hypothesis yourself, and enter on its discussion, that I may be the better instructed in this affair?

fortune, and the being uncoordinated with each other. There will follow and not follow, that all things are good; for this will partly pertain to them and partly not. To other things with respect to it there will follow, to be suspended from it, on all sides to be guarded and benefited by it. There will not follow, an opposition to it, and the possibility of escaping it. For there is nothing so small that it can be concealed from it, nor so elevated that it cannot be vanquished by it. There will follow and not follow, that every thing will participate of providence: for in one respect they partake of it, and in another not of it, but of the goods which are imparted to every thing from it.

But let providence not have a subsistence, again there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the imperfect, the unprolific, the inefficacious, a subsistence for itself alone. There will not follow, the unenvying, the transcendently full, the sufficient, the assiduous. There will follow and not follow, the unfelicitous, and the undisturbed: for in one respect these will be present with that which does not providentially energize, and in another respect will not, in consequence of secondary natures not being governed by it. But it is evident that there will follow to itself with respect to other things, the unmingled, the privation of communion with all things, the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the assimilating other things to itself, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being desirable to other things: for this in a certain respect is possible and not possible. For, if it should be said, that through a transcendency exempt from all things, it does not providentially energize, nothing hinders but that it may be an object of desire to all secondary natures; but yet, considered as deprived of this power, it will not be desirable. To other things with respect to themselves there will follow, the unadorned, the casual, the indefinite in passivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their natures, the being carried in a confused and disordered manner. There will not follow, an allotment with respect to one thing, a distribution according to merit, and a subsistence according to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good: for, so far as they are beings, they must necessarily be good: and yet, providence not having a subsistence, it cannot be said whence they possess good. But to other things with respect to providence there will follow, the not being passive to it, and the being uncoordinated with respect to it. There will not follow, the being measured and bounded by it. There will follow and not follow, the being ignorant of it: for it is necessary they should know that it is not, if it is not. And it is also necessary that they should not know it; for there is nothing common to them with respect to providence.

That

That Parmenides replied, You assign, O Socrates, a mighty labour ¹ to a man so old as myself! Will you, then, O Zeno (said Socrates), discuss something

¹ By this Plato indicates that the ensuing discourse contains much truth, as Proclus well observes: and if you consider it with relation to the soul, you may say that it is not proper for one who is able to perceive intellectually divine natures, to energize through the garrulous phantasy and body, but such a one should abide in his elevated place of survey, and in his peculiar manners. It is laborious, therefore, for him who lives intellectually to energize logically and imaginatively, and for him who is converted to himself, to direct his attention to another; and to simplicity of knowledge the variety of reasons is arduous. It is also laborious to an old man to swim through such a sea of arguments. The assertion also has much truth, if the subjects themselves are considered. For frequently universal canons are easily apprehended, but no small difficulty presents itself to those that endeavour to use them; as is evident in the lemmas of geometry, which are founded on universal assertions. Proclus adds, that the difficulty of this dialectic method in the use of it is evident, from no one after Plato having professedly written upon it; and on this account, says he, we have endeavoured to illustrate it by so many examples.

For the sake of the truly philosophic reader, therefore, I shall subjoin the following specimen of the dialectic method in addition to what has been already delivered on the subject. The importance of such illustrations, and the difficulty with which the composition of them is attended, will, I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for its appearing in this place. It is extracted, as well as the preceding, from the admirable MS. commentary of Proclus on this dialogue.

Let it then be proposed to consider the consequences of admitting or denying the perpetual existence of soul.

If then soul always is, the consequences *to itself, with respect to itself*, are, the self-motive, the self-vital, and the self-subsistent: but *the things which do not follow to itself with respect to itself*, are, the destruction of itself, the being perfectly ignorant, and knowing nothing of itself. The consequences which *follow* and *do not follow* are the indivisible and the divisible*, (for in a certain respect it is divisible, and in a certain respect *indivisible*), perpetuity and non-perpetuity of being; for so far as it communicates with intellect, it is eternal, but so far as it verges to a corporeal nature, it is mutable.

Again, *if soul is*, the consequences *to itself with respect to other things*, i. e. bodies, are communication of motion, the connecting of bodies, as long as it is present with them, together with dominion over bodies, according to nature. *That which does not follow*, is to move externally; for it is the property of animated natures to be moved inwardly; and to be the cause of rest and immutability to bodies. *The consequences which follow and do not follow*, are, to be present to bodies, and yet to be present separate from them; for soul is present to them, by its *providential energies*, but is exempt from them by its *essence*, because this is *incorporeal*. And this is the first hexad.

The second hexad is as follows: *if soul is*, the consequence *to other things*, i. e. *bodies with respect to themselves*, is sympathy; for, according to a vivific cause, bodies sympathize with each other.

* For soul, according to Plato, subsists between *intellect* and a corporeal nature; the former of which is perfectly *indivisible*, and the latter perfectly *divisible*.

something for us? And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, said — We must request Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking; for,

But that which does not follow, is the non-sensitive; for, in consequence of there being such a thing as soul, all things must necessarily be sensitive: some things peculiarly so, and others as parts of the whole. *The consequences which follow and do not follow to bodies with respect to themselves* are, that in a certain respect they move themselves, through being animated, and in a certain respect do not move themselves: for there are many modes of self-motion.

Again, *if soul is*, the consequences to bodies with respect to soul are, to be moved internally and vivified by soul, to be preserved and connected through it, and to be entirely suspended from it. *The consequences which do not follow* are, to be dissipated by soul, and to be filled from it with a privation of life; for bodies receive from soul life and connection. *The consequences which follow and do not follow* are, that bodies participate, and do not participate of soul; for so far as soul is present with bodies, so far they may be said to participate of soul; but so far as it is separate from them, so far they do not participate of soul. And this forms the second hexad.

The third hexad is as follows: *if soul is not*, the consequences to itself with respect to itself are, the non-vital, the unessential, and the non-intellectual; for, not having any subsistence, it has neither essence, nor life, nor intellect. *The consequences which do not follow* are, the ability to preserve itself, to give subsistence to, and be motive of, itself, with every thing else of this kind. *The consequences which follow and do not follow* are, the unknown and the irrational. For not having a subsistence, it is in a certain respect unknown and irrational with respect to itself, as neither reasoning nor having any knowledge of itself; but in another respect, it is neither irrational nor unknown, if it is considered as a certain nature, which is not rational, nor endued with knowledge.

Again, *if soul is not*, the consequences which follow to itself with respect to bodies are, to be unprolific of them, to be unmingled with, and to employ no providential energies about, them. *The consequences which do not follow* are, to move, vivify, and connect bodies. *The consequences which follow and do not follow* are, that it is different from bodies, and that it does not communicate with them. For this in a certain respect is true, and not true; if that which is not soul is considered as having indeed a being, but unconnected with soul: for thus it is different from bodies, since these are perpetually connected with soul. And again, it is not different from bodies, so far as it has no subsistence, and is not. And this forms the third hexad.

In the fourth place, then, *if soul is not*, the consequences to bodies with respect to themselves are, the immovable, privation of difference according to life, and the privation of sympathy to each other. *The consequences which do not follow* are, a sensible knowledge of each other, and to be moved from themselves. *That which follows and does not follow* is, to be passive to each other; for in one respect they would be passive, and in another not; since they would be alone corporally and not vitally passive.

Again, *if soul is not*, the consequences to other things with respect to it are, not to be taken care of, nor to be moved by soul. *The consequences which do not follow* are, to be vivified and connected by soul. *The consequences which follow and do not follow* are, to be assimilated and not assimilated

to

for, as he says, it is no trifling matter; or do you not see the prodigious labour of such a discussion? If, therefore, many¹ were present, it would not

to soul: for, so far as soul having no subsistence, neither will bodies subsist, so far they will be assimilated to soul; for they will suffer the same with it; but so far as it is impossible for that which is not to be similar to any thing, so far bodies will have no similitude to soul. And this forms the fourth and last hexad.

Hence we conclude, that *soul* is the cause of life, sympathy, and motion to bodies; and, in short, of their being and preservation: for soul subsisting, these are at the same time introduced; but not subsisting, they are at the same time taken away.

¹ It is unnecessary to observe, that the most divine of dogmas are unadapted to the ears of the many, since Plato himself says that all these things are ridiculous to the multitude, but thought worthy of admiration by the wise. Thus also, says Proclus, the Pythagoreans assert, that of discourses, some are mystical, and others to be exposed in open day; and the Peripatetics, that some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself wrote some things according to truth, and others according to opinion; and Zeno calls some discourses true, and others useful. *Ὅτῳ δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν λόγων, τοὺς μὲν ἐφασκόν εἶναι μυστικούς, τοὺς δὲ ὑπαιθρίους, καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπατοῦ, τοὺς μὲν ἐσωτερικούς, τοὺς δὲ ἐξωτερικούς, καὶ αὐτὸς Παρμενίδης, τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἀληθείαν ἐγράφε, τὰ δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὁ Ζήνων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἐκαλεῖ τῶν λόγων, τοὺς δὲ χρεώδεις.*

The multitude therefore, says Proclus, are ignorant how great the power is of dialectic, and that the end of this wandering is truth and intellect. For it is not possible for us to recur from things last to such as are first, except by a progression through the middle forms of life. For, as our descent into the realms of mortality was effected through many media, the soul always proceeding into that which is more composite, in like manner our ascent must be accomplished through various media, the soul resolving her composite order of life. In the first place, therefore, it is requisite to despise the senses, as able to know nothing accurate, nothing sane, but possessing much of the confused, the material, and the passive, in consequence of employing certain instruments of this kind. After this it follows, that we should dismiss imaginations, those winged stymphalidæ of the soul, as alone possessing a *figured* intellection of things, but by no means able to apprehend unfigured and impartible form, and as impeding the pure and immaterial intellection of the soul, by intervening and disturbing it in its investigations. In the third place, we must entirely extirpate multifarious opinions, and the wandering of the soul about these; for they are not conversant with the causes of things, nor do they procure for us science, nor the participation of a separate intellect. In the fourth place, therefore, we must hastily return to the great sea of the sciences, and there, by the assistance of dialectic, survey the divisions and compositions of these, and, in short, the variety of forms in the soul, and through this survey, unweaving our vital order, behold our dianoëtic part. After this, in the fifth place, it is requisite to separate ourselves from composition, and contemplate by intellectual energy true beings: for intellect is more excellent than science; and a life according to intellect is preferable to that which is according to science. Many, therefore, are the wanderings of the soul: for one of these is in imaginations, another in opinions, and a third in the dianoëtic power. But a life according to intellect

not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for an old man, to discourse about things of this kind before many witnesses. For the many are ignorant that, without this discursive progression and wandering through all things, it is impossible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the possession of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a discussion, which I have not heard for a long time. But Zeno having made this request, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that he also, and Aristotle, and the rest who were present, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he spoke of, and not to deny their request. That then Parmenides said, It is necessary to comply with your entreaties, though I should seem to myself to meet with the fate of the Ibycean ¹ horse, to whom as a courser, and advanced in years, when about to contend in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himself, said—*Thus also I that am so*

is alone inerratic. And this is the mystic port of the soul, into which Homer conducts Ulysses, after an abundant wandering of life.

¹ Parmenides, as Proclus beautifully observes, well knew what the wandering of the soul is, not only in the senses, imaginations, and opinions, but also in the dianoëtic evolutions of arguments. Knowing this, therefore, and remembering the labours he had endured, he is afraid of again descending to such an abundant wandering; like another Ulysses, after passing through various regions, and being now in possession of his proper good, when called to certain similar barbaric battles, he is averse, through long experience, to depart from his own country, as remembering the difficulties which he sustained in war, and his long extended wandering. Having, therefore, ascended to reasoning from phantasies and the senses, and to intellect from reasoning, he is very properly afraid of a descent to reasoning, and of the wandering in the dianoëtic part, lest he should in a certain respect become oblivious, and should be drawn down to phantasy and sense. For the descent from intellect is not safe, nor is it proper to depart from things first, lest we should unconsciously abide in those of a subordinate nature. Parmenides, therefore, being now established in the port of intellect, is averse again to descend to a multitude of reasonings from an intellectual and simple form of energy. At the same time, however, he does descend for the sake of benefitting secondary natures; for the very grace (*χάρις*) itself is an imitation of the providence of the Gods. Such, therefore, ought the descents of divine souls from the intelligible to be, coming from divine natures, knowing the evils arising from wandering, and descending for the benefit alone of fallen souls, and not to fill up a life enamoured with generation, nor falling profoundly, nor agglutinating themselves to the indefinite forms of life. I only add, that Ibycus, from whom Parmenides borrows his simile of a horse, was a Rheginensian poet, and is mentioned by Cicero in *Tuſcul. Quæſtion. lib. 4.* Pausan. *Corinth. lib. 2.* Suidas and Erasmus in *Adagiis.* There are also two epigrams upon him in the *Anthologia.*

old,

old, am compelled to return to the subjects of my love; in like manner, I appear to myself to dread vehemently the present undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requisite to swim over such, and so great a sea of discourse: but yet it is necessary to comply, especially as it is the request of Zeno, for we are one and the same. Whence then shall we begin¹; and what shall we first of all suppose? Are you willing, since it seems we must play a very serious game, that I should begin from myself, and my own² hypothesis, supposing concerning the one itself, whether the

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¹ Parmenides, says Proclus, descending to the evolution of arguments, and to scientifically-discursive energies from his intellectual place of survey, and from a form of life without, to one with habitude, asks his participants whence he shall begin, and from what hypothesis he shall frame, his discourse; not suspending his intellect from their judgment; for it is not lawful that the energy of more excellent natures should be measured from that of such as are subordinate; but converting them to himself, and exciting them to a perception of his meaning, that he may not insert arguments in the stupid, as nature implants productive principles in bodies, but that he may lead them to themselves, and that they may be impelled to *being* in conjunction with him. For thus intellect leads souls, not only elevating them together with itself, but preparing them to assist themselves. He exhorts, therefore, his participants to attend to themselves, and to behold whence he begins, and through what media he proceeds, but does not seek to learn from them what is proper on the occasion. That this is the case is evident from hence, that he does not wait for their answer, but discourses from that which appears to him to be best.

² The one method of Parmenides assumes one hypothesis, and according to it frames the whole discourse, this hypothesis not being one of many, as it may appear to some, but that which is comprehensive of all hypotheses, and is one prior to the many. For it unfolds all beings, and the whole order of things, both intelligible and sensible, together with the unities of them, and the one ineffable unity, the fountain of all these. For *the one* is the cause of all things, and from this all things are generated in a consequent order from the hypothesis of Parmenides. But perhaps, says Proclus, some one may ask us how Parmenides, who in his poems sings concerning true or the one being, (*το ἓν ὄν*), calls *the one* his hypothesis, and says that he shall begin from this his proper principle. Some then have said that, Parmenides making *being* the whole subject of his discussion, Plato, finding that *the one* is beyond being and all essence, corrects Parmenides, and represents him beginning from *the one*. For, say they, as Gorgias and Protagoras, and each of the other persons in his dialogues, speak better in those dialogues than in their own writings, so, likewise, Parmenides is more philosophic in Plato, and more profound, than in his own compositions; since in the former he says, if *the one* is, it is not *one being*, as alone discoursing concerning *the one*, and not concerning *one being*, or *being* characterized by *the one*; and in the following hypotheses he says, if *the one* is not; and lastly, infers that if *the one* is, or is not, all things are, and are not. Parmenides, therefore, being Platonic, calls that his hypothesis which supposes

one is, or whether it is not, what ought to be the consequence? That Zeno said, By all means. Who then (said Parmenides) will answer to me? Will the

the one. In answer to this it may be said that it is by no means wonderful if Parmenides in his poems appears to assert nothing concerning *the one*: for it is ineffable, and he in his poems generates all beings from the first being; but he might indicate something concerning it, so far as this can be effected by discourse, in his unwritten conversations with Zeno. Very properly, therefore, does he call this business concerning *the one* his own hypothesis. Proclus adds—if, however, it be requisite to speak more truly, we may say, with our preceptor Syrianus, that Parmenides begins indeed from *one being*; (for the hypothesis, if *the one is*, having the *is* together with *the one*, belongs to this order of things); but that he recurs from *one being* to *the one*, clearly showing that *the one*, properly so called, wills this alone, to be *the one*, and hastily withdraws itself from being. He also shows that *one being* is the second from this, proceeding to being through subjection, but that *the one* itself is better than the *is*, and that if it *is*, together with the *is*, it no longer remains that which is properly *the one*. Hence, it is true that Parmenides makes *true being*, or *the one being*, the subject of his hypothesis, and also, that through this hypothesis he ascends to *the one* itself, which Plato in the Republic denominates unhypothetic: for it is necessary, says he, always to proceed through hypotheses, that ascending, we may at length end in the unhypothetic one; since every hypothesis is from a certain other principle. But if any one should make the hypothesis the principle, we may say to such a one, with Plato, that where the principle is unknown, and the end and middle also consist from things that are unknown, it is not possible that a thing of this kind can be science. *The one* alone, therefore, is the principle, and is unhypothetic; so that what is made the subject of hypothesis is something else, and not *the one*. But Plato ascends from this to *the one*, as from hypothesis to that which is unhypothetic. Whence also it appears that the manner in which Parmenides manages the discourse is admirable. For, if he had assumed the unhypothetic as an hypothesis, and that which is without a principle as from a principle, he would not have followed the method which says it is entirely necessary to consider what is consequent to the hypothesis. Or, if he had not assumed *the one* as an hypothesis, but some one of the things more remote from *the one*, he could not easily have made a transition to it, nor would he have unfolded to us spontaneously and without violence the cause prior to being. That *the one*, therefore, might remain unhypothetic, and that at the same time he might recur from a certain proper hypothesis to *the one*, he makes *the one being* the subject of his hypothesis, which proximately subsists after *the one*, and in which, perhaps, that which is properly *the one* primarily subsists, as we shall show at the end of the first hypothesis of this dialogue. And thus he says that he begins from his own hypothesis, which is *the one being*, and this is, “if *the one is*,” and transferring himself to the unhypothetic, which is near to this, he unfolds the subsistence of all beings from the unity which is exempt from all things. Whence, saying that he shall make his own one the subject of hypothesis, in evincing what things follow, and what do not follow, at one time as using *the one* alone, he demonstrates the *is*, employing affirmations; but at another time he assumes, together with *the one*, the conception of the *is*. But he every
where

the youngest among you do this? For the labour will be very little for him to answer what he thinks; and his answer will at the same time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous investigation. That then Aristotle said, I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngest. Ask me, therefore, as one who will answer you.

That Parmenides said, Let us then begin. If *one*¹ is, is it not true that
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where reasons as looking to *the one*, either unparticipated, or participated, that he may show that all things are through *the one*, and that separate from *the one*, they and their very being are obliterated.

¹ In the Introduction to this Dialogue we have spoken concerning the number, and unfolded the meaning of the hypothesis about *the one*; let us, therefore, with Proclus, discuss a few particulars respecting principle, that we may more accurately understand the nature of *the one*. The principle, therefore, of all beings and non-beings is called *the one*, since to be united is good to all things, and is the greatest of goods; but that which is entirely separated from *the one* is evil, and the greatest of evils. For division becomes the cause of dissimilitude, and a privation of sympathy, and of a departure from a subsistence according to nature. Hence the principle of wholes, as supplying all things with the greatest of goods, is the source of union to all things, and is on this account called *the one*. Hence, too, we say that every principle, so far as it is allotted this dignity in beings, is a certain *enad* or unity, and that what is most united in every order ranks as first, placing this principle not in parts, but in wholes, and not in some one of the many, but in the monads connective of multitude; and, in the next place, especially surveying it in the summits, and that which is most united in monads, and according to which they are conjoined with *the one*, are deified, and subsist without proceeding, in the one principle of all things.

Thus, for instance, (that we may illustrate this doctrine by an example,) we perceive many causes of light, some of which are celestial, and others sublunary; for light proceeds to our terrestrial abode from material fire, from the moon, and from the other stars, and this, so as to be different according to the difference of its cause. But if we explore the one monad of all mundane light, from which other lucid natures and sources of light derive their subsistence, we shall find that it is no other than the apparent orb of the sun; for this orbicular body proceeds, as it is said, from an occult and supermundane order, and disseminates in all mundane natures a light commensurate with each.

Shall we say then that this apparent body is the principle of light? But this is endued with interval, and is divisible, and light proceeds from the different parts which it contains; but we are at present investigating the one principle of light. Shall we say, therefore, that the ruling soul of this body generates mundane light? This indeed, produces light, but not primarily, for it is itself multitude: and light contains a representation of a simple and uniform subsistence. May not intellect, therefore, which is the cause of soul, be the fountain of this light? Intellect, indeed, is more united than soul, but is not that which is properly and primarily the principle of light. It remains, therefore, that *the one* of this intellect, its summit, and as it were flower, must be the principle of mundane light: for this is properly the sun which reigns over the visible place,

the one will not be many? For how can it be? It is necessary, therefore, that

and, according to Plato in the Republic, is the offspring of *the good*; since every unity proceeds from thence, and every deity is the progeny of the unity of unities, and the fountain of the Gods. And as *the good* is the principle of light to intelligibles, in like manner the unity of the solar order is the principle of light to all visible natures, and is analogous to *the good*, in which it is occultly established, and from which it never departs.

But this unity having an order prior to the solar intellect, there is also in intellect, so far as intellect, an unity participated from this unity, which is emitted into it like a seed, and through which intellect is united with the unity or deity of the sun. This, too, is the case with the soul of the sun; for this through *the one* which she contains, is elevated through *the one* of intellect as a medium, to the deity of the sun. In like manner, with respect to the body of the sun, we must understand that there is in this a certain echo as it were, of the primary solar *one*. For it is necessary that the solar body should participate of things superior to itself; of soul according to the life which is disseminated in it; of intellect according to its form; and of unity according to its one, since soul participates both of intellect and this one, and participations are different from the things which are participated. You may say, therefore, that the proximate cause of the solar light is this *unity* of the solar orb.

Again, if we should investigate the root as it were of all bodies, from which celestial and sublunary bodies, wholes and parts, blossom into existence, we may not improperly say that this is *Nature*, which is the principle of motion and rest to all bodies, and which is established in them, whether they are in motion or at rest. But I mean by *Nature*, the one life of the world, which being subordinate to intellect and soul, participates through these of generation. And this indeed is more a principle than many and partial natures, but is not that which is properly the principle of bodies; for this contains a multitude of powers, and through such as are different, governs different parts of the universe: but we are now investigating the one and common principle of all bodies, and not many and distributed principles. If, therefore, we wish to discover this one principle, we must raise ourselves to that which is most united in Nature, to its flower, and that through which it is a deity, by which it is suspended from its proper fountain, connects, unites, and causes the universe to have a sympathetic consent with itself. This *one*, therefore, is the principle of all generation, and is that which reigns over the many powers of Nature, over partial natures, and universally over every thing subject to the dominion of Nature.

In the third place, if we investigate the principle of knowledge, we shall find that it is neither phantasy nor sense; for nothing impartible, immaterial, and unfigured is known by these. But neither must we say that doxastic or dianoëtic knowledge is the principle of knowledge; for opinion does not know the causes of things, and the dianoëtic power, though it knows causes, yet apprehends the objects of its perception partially, and does not view the whole at once, nor possess an energy collective and simple, and which eternally subsists according to the same. Nor yet is intellect the principle of knowledge: for all the knowledge which it contains subsists indeed, at once, and is intransitive and impartible. But if the knowledge of intellect was entirely without multiplication, and profoundly one, perhaps we might admit that it is the principle of knowledge.

that there should neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it should be a whole.

knowledge. Since however, it is not only one but various, and contains a multitude of intellects; for as the objects of intellect are separated from each other, so also intellectual conceptions,—this being the case, intellect is not the principle of knowledge, but this must be ascribed to *the one* of intellect, which is generative of all the knowledge it contains, and of all that is beheld in the secondary orders of beings. For this being exempt from the many, is the principle of knowledge to them, not being of such a nature as the sameness of intellect; since this is coordinate to *difference*, and is subordinate to essence. But *the one* transcends and is connective of an intellectual essence. Through this *one* intellect is a God, but not through sameness, nor through essence: for in short intellect so far as intellect is not a God; since otherwise a partial intellect would be a God. And the peculiarity of intellect is to understand and contemplate beings, and to judge; but of a God to confer unity, to generate, to energize providentially, and every thing of this kind. Intellect, therefore, by that part of itself which is not intellect is a God, and by that part of itself which is not a God, it is a divine intellect. And this unity of intellect knows itself indeed, so far as it is intellectual, but becomes intoxicated as it is said with nectar, and generates the whole of knowledge, so far as it is the flower of intellect, and a superessential one. Again, therefore, investigating the principle of knowledge, we have ascended to *the one*; and not in these only, but in every thing else in a similar manner, we shall find monads the leaders of their proper numbers, but the unities of monads subsisting as the most proper principles of things. For every where *the one* is a principle, and you may say concerning this principle, what Socrates says in the Phædrus, viz. “a principle is unbegotten.” For if no one of total forms can ever fail, by a much greater necessity the one principle of each must be preserved, and perpetually remain, that about this every multitude may subsist, which originates in an appropriate manner from each. It is the same thing, therefore, to say unity and principle, if principle is every where that which is most characterized by unity. Hence he who discourses about every *one*, will discourse about principles. The Pythagoreans, therefore, thought proper to call every incorporeal essence *one*; but a corporeal and in short partible essence, they denominated *other*. So that by considering *the one*, you will not deviate from the theory of incorporeal essences, and unities which rank as principles. For all the unities subsist in, and are profoundly united with each other; and their union is far greater than the communion and sameness which subsist in beings. For in these there is indeed a mutual mixture of forms, similitude and friendship, and a participation of each other; but the union of the Gods, as being a union of unities, is much more uniform, ineffable and transcendent: for here *all are in all*, which does not take place in forms or ideas*; and their unmingled purity and the characteristic of each, in a manner far surpassing the diversity in ideas, preserve their natures unconfused, and distinguish their peculiar powers. Hence some of them are more universal, and others more partial; some of them are characterized according to permanency, others according to progression, and others according to conversion. Some again, are generative, others anagogic, or ended with a power of leading things back to their causes, and others demiurgic; and, in short, there are different

* For in these all are in each, but not all in all.

whole'. Why? Is not a part a part of a whole? Certainly. But what is

characteristics of different Gods, viz. the connective, perfective, demiurgic, assimilative, and such others as are celebrated posterior to these, so that all are in all, and yet each is at the same time separate and distinct.

Indeed, Proclus adds, we obtain a knowledge of their union and characteristics from the natures by which they are participated: for, with respect to the apparent Gods, we say that there is one soul of the sun, and another of the earth, directing our attention to the apparent bodies of these divinities, which possess much variety in their essence, powers, and dignity among wholes. As, therefore, we apprehend the difference of incorporeal essences from sensible inspection, in like manner, from the variety of incorporeal essences, we are enabled to know something of the unmingled separation of the first and superessential unities, and of the characteristics of each; for each unity has a multitude suspended from its nature, which is either intelligible alone, or at the same time intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual alone; and this last is either participated or not participated, and this again is either supermundane or mundane: and thus far does the progression of the unities extend. Surveying, therefore, the extent of every incorporeal hypostasis which is distributed under them, and the mutation proceeding according to measure from the occult to that which is separated, we believe that there is also in the unities themselves idiom and order, together with union: for, from the difference of the participants, we know the separation which subsists in the things participated; since they would not possess such a difference with respect to each other if they participated the same thing without any variation. And thus much concerning the subsistence of the first unities, and their communion with, and separation from, each other, the latter of which was called by the ancient philosophers, idiom, and the former, union, contradicting them by names derived from the sameness and difference which subsist in essences. For these unities are superessential, and, as some one says, are flowers and summits. However, as they contain, as we have observed, both union and separation, Parmenides, discussing this, that he may supernally unfold all their progression from the exempt unity, the cause of all things, assumes as an hypothesis his own one. But this is *the one* which is beheld in beings, and this is beheld in one respect as *the one*, and in another as participated by being. He also preserves that which has a leading dignity, surveying it multifariously, but varies that which is consequent, that through the sameness of that which leads, he may indicate the union of the divine unities: for whichever of these you receive, you will receive the same with the rest; because all are in each other, and are rooted in *the one*. For as trees by their summits are rooted in the earth, and are earthly according to these, after the same manner, divine natures are by their summits rooted in *the one*, and each of them is an enad and one, through unconfused union with *the one*. But through the mutation of that which is consequent, Parmenides at one time assumes *whole*, at another time *figure*, and at another something else, and these either affirmatively or negatively, according to the separation and idiom of each of the divine orders. And, through that which is conjoined from *enad* and what is consequent, he indicates the communion, and at the same time unmingled purity of each of the divine natures. Hence, one thing is the leader, but many the things consequent, and many are the things conjoined, and many the hypotheses.

Parmenides,

is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole? Entirely so.
From

Parmenides, also, through the hypothesis of the one being, at one time recurs to *the one* which is prior to the participated unities, at another time discusses the extent of the unities which are in beings, and at another time discovers that subsistence of them which is subordinate to being.

Nor must we wonder that there should be this union, and at the same time separation, in the divine unities. For thus also we are accustomed to call the whole of an intellectual essence impartible and one, and all intellects one, and one all, through sameness which is collective and connective of every intellectual hypostasis. But if we thus speak concerning these, what ought we to think of the unities in beings? Must it not be that they are transcendently united? that their commixture cannot be surpassed? that they do not proceed from the ineffable adytum of *the one*? and that they all possess the form of *the one*? Every where, therefore, things first possess the form of their cause. Thus, the first of bodies is most vital, and is similar to soul; the first of souls has the form of intellect; and the first intellect is a God. So that the first of numbers is uniform and enadic, or characterized by unity, and is superessential as *the one*. Hence, if they are unities and number, there is there both multitude and union.

Again, the scope of this first hypothesis, as we have observed in the Introduction, is concerning the first God alone, so far as he is generative of the multitude of Gods, being himself exempt from this multitude, and uncoordinated with his offspring. Hence, all things are denied of this one, as being established above, and exempt from, all things, and as scattering all the idioms of the Gods, at the same time that he is uncircumscribed by all things. For he is not a certain one, but simply one, and is neither intelligible nor intellectual, but the source of the subsistence of both the intelligible and intellectual unities. For it is requisite in every order which ranks as a principle that imparticipable and primary form should be the leader of participated multitude. Thus, immaterial are prior to material forms. Thus, too, a separate life, unmingled, and subsisting from itself, is prior to the life which subsists in another; for every where things subsisting in themselves precede those which give themselves up to something else. Hence, imparticipable soul, which revolves in the supercelestial place, is the leader, according to essence, of the multitude of souls, and of those which are distributed in bodies. And one, imparticipable intellect, separate, eternally established in itself, and supernally connecting every intellectual essence, precedes the multitude of intellects. The first intelligible also, unmingled, and uniformly established in itself, is expanded above the multitude of intelligibles. For the intelligible which is in every intellect is different from that which is established in itself; and the latter is intelligible alone, but the former is intelligible as in intellects. The imparticipable one, therefore, is beyond the many and participated unities, and is exempt, as we have before said, from all the divine orders. Such, then, is the scope of the first hypothesis, viz. to recur from the one being, or in other words, the first and highest being, to that which is truly the one, and to survey how he is exempt from wholes, and how he is connumerated with none of the divine orders.

In the next place, let us consider what mode of discourse is adapted to such a theory, and how the interpretation of what is before us may be properly undertaken. It appears, then, that this
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From both these consequences, therefore, *the one* would be composed of parts,

can only be effected by energizing logically, intellectually, and at the same time divinely, that we may be able to apprehend the demonstrative power of Parmenides, may follow his intuitive perceptions which adhere to true beings, and may in a divinely inspired manner recur to the ineffable and uncircumscribed coextension of *the one*. For we contain the images of first causes, and participate of total soul, the intellectual extent, and of divine unity. It is requisite, therefore, that we should excite the powers of these which we contain, to the apprehension of the things proposed. Or how can we become near to *the one*, unless by exciting *the one* of our soul, which is as it were an image of the ineffable one? And how can we cause this one and flower of the soul to diffuse its light, unless we first energize according to intellect? For intellectual energy leads the soul to the tranquil energy according to *the one* which we contain. And how can we perfectly obtain intellectual energy, unless we proceed through logical conceptions, and prior to more simple intellections, employ such as are more composite? Demonstrative power, therefore, is requisite in the assumptions; but intellectual energy in the investigations of beings; (for the orders of being are denied of *the one*) and a divinely-inspired impulse in the coextension of that which is exempt from all beings, that we may not unconsciously, through an indefinite phantasy, be led from negations to non-being, and its dark immensity. Let us, therefore, by exciting *the one* which we contain, and through this, causing the soul to revive, conjoin ourselves with *the one itself*, and establish ourselves in it as in a port, standing above every thing intelligible in our nature, and dismissing every other energy, that we may associate with it alone, and may, as it were, dance round it, abandoning those intellections of the soul which are employed about secondary concerns. The mode of discourse, then, must be of this kind, viz. logical, intellectual, and entheastic: for thus only can the proposed hypothesis be apprehended in a becoming manner.

In the third place, let us consider what the negations are, and whether they are better or worse than affirmations: for affirmation appears to all men to be more venerable than negation; negation, say they, being a privation, but affirmation the presence and a certain habit of form. To forms, indeed, and to things invested with form, affirmation is better than negation; for it is necessary that their own habit should be present with forms, and that privation should be absent, and, in short, to be is more accommodated to beings than not to be, and affirmation than negation: for being is the paradigm of affirmation, but non-being of negation. But it is not immanifest how Plato in the *Sophista* says that *non-being*, by which he means *difference*, is related to being, and that it is not less than being. Since, however, *non-being* is multifarious, one kind subsisting as more excellent than, another as coordinated with, and a third as a privation of, *being*, it is evident that we may also speculate three species of negations; one above affirmation, another inferior to affirmation, and a third in a certain respect equal to it. Affirmation, therefore, is not always uniformly more excellent than negation, since, when negation speaks of that non-being which is above being, affirmation is allotted the second order. But since this non-being is also twofold, one kind being participated by being, viz. the divine unities, the immediate progeny of *the one*, and the other, viz. the ineffable principle of things, not being connumerated with

parts, being a whole and possessing parts? It is necessary it should be so.

And

with any being, it is evident that to this latter affirmation is not by any means adapted, and that to the former negation more properly belongs than affirmation; though in a certain respect affirmation is adapted to this so far as it communicates with being. However, though nothing can be truly said of that non-being which is uncoordinated with being, yet negation may be more properly asserted of it than affirmation; for, as affirmations belong to beings, so negations to non-being. In short, affirmation wishes to be conversant with a certain form; and when the soul says that one thing is present to another, and makes an affirmation, it adduces some of the kindred natures which it contains. But the first cause of all is above form, and it is not proper to introduce to it any thing belonging to secondary natures, nor transfer to it things adapted to us: for we shall thus deceive ourselves, and not assert what the first is. We cannot, therefore, in a becoming manner employ affirmations in speaking of this cause, but rather negations of secondary natures; for affirmations hasten to know something of one thing as present with another. But that which is first is unknown by the knowledge which is connate with beings, and nothing can be admitted as belonging to, or present with, it, but rather as not present: for it is exempt from all composition and participation. To which we may add, that affirmations manifest something definite; for non-man is more infinite than man. The incomprehensible and uncircumscribed nature of *the one* is therefore more adapted to be manifested through negations: for affirmations may be said to vanquish beings, but negations possess a power of expanding from things circumscribed to the uncircumscribed, and from things distributed in proper boundaries to the indefinite. Can it, therefore, be said that negations are not more adapted to the contemplation of *the one*? For its ineffable, incomprehensible, and unknown nature can alone through these be declared, if it be lawful so to speak, to partial intellectual conceptions such as ours. Negations, therefore, are better than affirmations, and are adapted to such as are ascending from the partial to the total, from the coordinated to the uncoordinated, and from the circumscribed and vanquished form of knowledge to the uncircumscribed, single, and simple form of energy.

In the fourth place, let us consider how, and after what manner, negations are adapted to the first cause. They must not then be adapted as in things capable of receiving negation, but yet which do not receive it, as if we should say that Socrates is not white: for, in short, *the one* does not receive any thing, but is exempt from every being, and all participation. Nor, again, must negation be adapted to *the one*, as in that which in no respect receives negation, which possesses a privation of it, and is unmingled with form; as if any one should say that a line is not white, because it is without any participation of whiteness. For that which is first is not simply divulged from its negations; nor are these entirely void of communion with *the one*, but they are thence produced: nor can it be said that, as whiteness neither generates a line, nor is generated by it, so things posterior to *the one* neither generate *the one*, nor are generated by it; for they thence derive their subsistence. Nor yet must negation be applied according to that middle mode, in which we say, that things do not receive indeed, but are the causes to others in which they are inherent, of receiving affirmation; as, for instance, motion is not moved, but that which is in motion. Negation, therefore, is predicated of it, viz. the not being moved, though other things

And so both ways *the one* will be many, and not one. True. But it is necessary

are moved through it. And, in short, every passion is itself impassive; since, being simple, it either is or is not. But that which suffers, or the passive subject, is through passion a composite. Negations, therefore, are not after this manner denied of *the one*; for neither is *the one* ingenerated in any thing, but is the cause of all the affirmations, the negations of which we introduce to it; but it is by no means ingenerated in those things of which it is the cause. It may be concluded, therefore, that as *the one* is the cause of wholes, so negations are the causes of affirmations; whence such things as the second hypothesis affirms, the first denies. For all those affirmations proceed from these negations; and *the one* is the cause of all things, as being prior to all things: for, as soul, being incorporeal, produces body, and as intellect, by not being soul, gives subsistence to soul, so *the one*, being void of multitude, gives subsistence to all multitude, and, being without number and figure, produces number and figure; and in a similar manner with respect to other things: for it is no one of the natures which it produces; since neither is any other cause the same with its progeny. But if it is no one of the natures to which it gives subsistence, and at the same time gives subsistence to all things, it is no one of all things. If, therefore, we know all things affirmatively, we manifest *the one* negatively, by denying every thing of it; and so this form of negation is generative of the multitude of affirmations. Thus, the unfigured, when applied to *the one*, is not like that of matter, which is beheld according to a privation of figure, but it is that which generates and produces the order which subsists according to figure.

With respect to matter, therefore, negations are worse than affirmations, because they are privations, but affirmations are participations of which matter is essentially deprived. But, with respect to beings, negations are conjoined with affirmations: and when applied to *the one*, they signify transcendency of cause, and are better than affirmations. Hence, negations of things subordinate are verified in causes posterior to *the one*. Thus, when we say that the soul neither speaks nor is silent, we do not assert these things respecting it as of stones and pieces of wood, or any other insensible thing, but as of that which is generative in an animal of both voice and silence. And again, we say that nature is neither white nor black, but uncoloured, and without interval. But is she without these in the same manner as matter? By no means: for she is better than the things denied. But she is uncoloured, and without interval, as generative of all various colours and intervals. In the same manner, therefore, we say that the monad is without number, not as being subordinate to numbers and indefinite, but as generating and bounding numbers. I mean the first monad, and that which we say contains all the forms of numbers. All, therefore, that is denied of *the one*, proceeds from it: for it is necessary that it should be none of all things, that all things may be its offspring. Hence, it appears that Plato often denies of *the one* things which are opposite to each other, such as that it is neither *whole* nor *part*, neither *same* nor *different*, neither *permanent* nor in *motion*: for it is expanded above all habitude, and is pure from every duad, being the cause of all the multitude of these, of twofold coordinations, of the first duad, and of all habitude and opposition. For nature is the cause of all corporeal oppositions, the soul of all vital causes, and intellect of the genera pertaining to soul. But *the one* is simply the cause of all divisions: for it cannot be said that it is the cause of some, and not the cause

cessary that it should not be many, but one. It is necessary³. Hence, it will

cause of others. The cause, however, of all opposition is not itself opposed to any thing: for, if it were, it would be requisite that there should be some other cause of this opposition, and *the one* would no longer be the cause of all things. Hence, negations are generative of affirmations: those which are assumed in the first hypothesis of those which are investigated in the second: for whatever the first cause generates in the first hypothesis is generated and proceeds in its proper order in the second. And thus the order of the Gods subsisting from exempt unity is demonstrated.

But here, perhaps, some one may ask us whether we use negations through the imbecility of human nature, which is not able firmly to apprehend the simplicity of *the one*, through a certain projection of intellect, and adhesive vision and knowledge? or whether natures better than our soul know *the one* negatively in an analogous manner? We reply, therefore, that intellect by its perceptions which are conjoined with forms, knows forms, and comprehends intelligibles, and this is a certain affirmative knowledge: for *that which is*, approaches to *that which is*, and intellect is that which it understands through the intellectual perception of itself. But, by an unity above intellect, it is conjoined with *the one*, and through this union knows *the one*, by not being that which is *being*. Hence, it knows *the one* negatively: for it possesses a twofold knowledge, one kind as intellect, the other as not intellect; one as knowing itself, the other becoming inebriated, as some one says, and agitated with divine fury from nectar; and one so far as it is, but the other so far as it is not. Much-celebrated intellect itself, therefore, possesses both a negative and affirmative knowledge of *the one*. But if intellect, divine souls also, according to their summits and unities, energize enthusiastically about *the one*, and are especially *divine* souls on account of this energy; but, according to their *intellectual* powers, they are suspended from intellect, round which they harmonically dance. According to their *rational* powers they know themselves, preserve their own essence with purity, and evolve the productive principles which they contain; but, according to those powers which are characterized by *opinion*, they comprehend and govern in a becoming manner all sensible natures. And all the other kinds of knowledge which they possess are indeed affirmative: for they know beings as they are; and this is the peculiarity of affirmation. But the enthusiastic energy about *the one* is in these a negative knowledge: for they do not know that *the one* is, but that he is not, according to that which is better than the is. The intellection, however, of that which is not, is negation. If, therefore, both divine souls and much celebrated intellect itself knew *the one* through negation, what occasion is there to despise the imbecility of our soul, earnestly endeavouring to manifest negatively its uncircumscribed nature? For nothing pertaining to *the first* is such as we are accustomed to know, i. e. a certain quality of a thing, as Plato says in his second Epistle. This, however, is the cause of every thing beautiful in the soul, viz. to investigate the characteristic of the first, to commit in a becoming manner the knowledge of him to the reasoning power, and to excite *the one* which we contain, that, if it be lawful so to speak, we may know the similar by the similar, so far as it is possible to be known by our order: for, as by opinion we know the objects of opinion, and by the dianoëtic

will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if *the one* is one. It will not.
If,

power dianoëtic objects, and as by our intellectual part we know that which is intelligible, so by our *one* we know *the one*.

Again, in the fifth place, let us consider whether Plato denies all things of *the one*, or, if not all, what those are which he denies, and why he proceeds as far as to these. But in the first place, it will, perhaps, be proper to enumerate all the particulars which in the first hypothesis are denied of *the one*. These then are in order as follow: that it is not many; that it is neither whole nor part; that it has neither a beginning, nor middle, nor end; that it has no boundary; that it is without figure; is neither in another nor in itself; is neither in motion nor at rest; is neither same nor different; is neither similar nor dissimilar; is neither equal, nor greater nor lesser; is neither older nor younger; that it participates in no respect of generation or time; that neither does it participate of being; that it cannot be named, and is not effable; and that it is neither the object of opinion nor science. These, then, are briefly what the first hypothesis denies of *the one*; but why these alone, we now propose to investigate: for Proclus informs us, that to some philosophers prior to him this was a subject of much doubt. Some, says he, were of opinion, that whatever the ten categories of Aristotle contain is enumerated in these negations. However, as he justly observes, not these alone, but many other things are contained under the ten categories, which are not mentioned by Parmenides. Others asserted, that these negations were comprehended in the five genera of being, viz. essence, sameness, and difference, motion and permanency. However, not these only are denied of *the one*, but likewise *figure, the whole, time, number*, and the similar, and the dissimilar, which are not genera of being. But those, says he, speak the most probably who wish to show that all these negations subsist in the monad. For the monad contains occultly many things, such as whole, and parts, and figures, and is both in itself and in another, so far as it is present to whatever proceeds from itself. It also is permanent and is moved, abiding and at the same time proceeding, and, in being multiplied, never departing from itself: and in a similar manner other things may be shown to belong to the monad. That these things indeed subsist in the monad may be readily granted, and also, that the monad is an imitation of intellect, so that by a much greater priority all these are causally comprehended in intellect. Hence, these things are denied of *the one*, because it is above intellect and every intellectual essence. For these things, says Proclus, Parmenides also surveying in his verses concerning true being, says, that it contains the sphere, and the whole, the same, and the different. For he celebrates true being as similar to a perfect sphere, every where equal from the middle, and rejoicing in revolving mansion. He also denominates it perfectly entire and unmoved. So that all these subsist primarily in intellect, but secondarily, and after the manner of an image, in the monad, and every thing sensible, physically in this, and mathematically in that. For intellect is an intelligible sphere, the monad a dianoëtic sphere, and this world a sensible sphere, bearing in itself the images of the perpetual Gods.

However, the patrons of this opinion cannot assign the cause why the particulars which Parmenides denies are alone assumed, but by no means neither more nor less. For neither are these things

If, therefore, it has no part, it neither possesses beginning, middle, nor end;

things alone in the monad, but many others also may be found, such as the even and the odd, and each of the forms subsisting under these. Why, therefore, these alone from among all are assumed, they assign no clear reason. Our preceptor, therefore, Syrianus, says Proclus, is the only one we are acquainted with who perfectly accords with Plato in the knowledge of divine concerns. He therefore perceived, that all such things * as are affirmed in the second are denied of *the one* in the first hypothesis; and that each of these is a symbol of a certain divine order; such as the many, the whole, figure, the being in itself and in another, and each of the consequent negations. For all things are not similarly apparent in every order of being; but in one multitude, and in another a different idiom of divine natures is conspicuous. For, as we learn in the Sophista, *the one being*, or, in other words, the highest being, has the first rank, *whole* the second, and *all* the third. And in the Phædrus, after the intelligible Gods, an essence without colour, without figure, and without touch, is the first in order, colour is the second, and figure the third; and in other things, in a similar manner, an unfolding of different things takes place in a different order of being. If, therefore, all these things manifest the extent of the first being, but, according to Plato, *the one* is beyond all beings, with great propriety are these things alone denied of *the one*. How each of these is distributed in the divine orders, we shall know more accurately in the second hypothesis. It is apparent, therefore, what are the particulars which are denied of *the one*, and that so many alone are necessarily denied: for so many are the enumerated orders of true beings. Thus much, however, is now evident, that all the negations are assumed from the idiom of being, and not from the idiom of knowledge. For to will, and to desire, and every thing of this kind, are the peculiarities of vital beings; but to perceive intellectually, or dianoetically, or sensibly, is the idiom of gnostic beings. But these negations are common to all beings whatever. For the hypothesis was, If *the one* is, so many things will follow as negations of *the one*, that at last it may be inferred if *the one* is, this *one* is not, as being better than the *is*: for it is the recipient of nothing, which is consequent to the *is*. And it appears that those alone are the things which belong to beings, so far as they are beings; which the second hypothesis affirms, and the first denies; and we shall not find things common to all beings, except these. But, of these, the higher are more total, but the others more partial. Hence, by taking away the higher, Plato also takes away those in a following order, according to the hypothesis. He has, therefore, in a wonderful manner discovered what are the things consequent to being, so far as being, as he was willing to show that *the one* is beyond all beings.

But if any one should think that this hypothesis collects things impossible, he should call to mind what is written in the Sophista, in which the Eleatean guest examines the assertion of Parmenides concerning being, and clearly says that *the one* truly so called must necessarily be impartible, or without parts (*ἀμερές γὰρ δεῖ το ὅς ἀληθὺς ἐν*). So that, this being granted, all the conclusions of the first hypothesis must unavoidably follow, as in every respect true, and as alone according with that which is truly *the one*. For it is absurd to admit that true being has a subsistence, and

* Viz. Such things as are respectively characteristic of the divine orders.

end⁴; for such as these would be its parts? Right. But end and beginning

not only true being, but also the truly equal, the truly beautiful, and every other form, but that the true one should nowhere subsist, but should be a name alone, though by this all beings are preserved and have a subsistence. But if it is, it is evident that it is not many: for it would not be the true one, if it were replete with any thing; since the many are not one. If, therefore, it is not many, again the whole of the first hypothesis will follow, this being assumed; and it is by no means proper to accuse it as asserting impossibilities.

Again, in the sixth place, let us consider concerning the order of the negations: for, if they originate supernally and from things first, how does he first of all take away the many, and, in the last place, being, and even *the one* itself? *The one*, therefore, appears to us to be more venerable than multitude, and *being* itself as among beings is most venerable. But if they originate from things last, how, after the genera of being, does he assume the similar and dissimilar, the equal and unequal, the greater and the lesser? For these are subordinate to the genera of being. It is better, therefore, to say, that he begins supernally, and proceeds through negations as far as to the last of things. For thus also in the Phædrus, denying of the summit of the intellectual orders, things consequent to, and proceeding from it, he makes the ablation, beginning supernally; in the first place, asserting that it is without colour, in the next place, without figure, and, in the third place, without contact. For here *colour* symbolically signifies that middle order of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, which is called by theologists *synochike* (συνοχή) or *connective*; but *figure* indicates the extremity of that order, which is denominated *teleiurgic*, (τελειουργικόν) or *the source of perfection*; and *contact* signifies the intellectual order. In like manner here also the negations begin supernally, and proceed together with the series of the divine orders, of all which *the one* is the generative source. But that at the end he should take away *the one* itself, and being, is by no means wonderful. For, if we follow the whole order of the discourse, this will become most apparent. For it is immediately evident, that in affirmative conclusions it is requisite to begin from things most allied, and through these to evince things less allied, which are consequent; but in negative conclusions it is necessary to begin from things most foreign, and through these to show things less foreign, which are not consequent to the hypothesis. For it is requisite, says Plato, that those who use this method should begin from things most known. Hence he first denies *many* of the one, and last of all *the one* that *is*, which is by position most allied to *the one*, but is participated by essence, and on this account is a certain one, and not simply one. Hence it is necessary, since the conclusions are negative, that the beginning of all the hypothesis should be *not many*, and the end *not one*.

In the seventh place, let us consider what we are to understand by the *many*, which Plato first denies of *the one*. Some of the ancients then, says Proclus, assert that multitude of every kind is here taken away from *the one*, because *the one* transcends all multitude, both intelligible and sensible. But these should recollect, that in the second hypothesis *the many* is affirmed. What sensible multitude then can we behold there? For all things are asserted of true beings, because *the one* is there equal to *being*. Others more venerable than these assert that *intellectual multitude* is denied of *the one*. For the first cause, say they, is one without multitude; intellect, *one many*;
foul,

ning are the bounds of every thing? How should they not? *The one*, therefore,

foul, *one* and *many*, through its divisible nature, being indigent of copula; body, *many* and *one*, as being a divisible nature characterized by multitude; and matter, *many* alone. This *many*, therefore, viz. intellectual multitude, Parmenides takes away from the first cause, that he may be one alone, and above intellect. It is proper, therefore, to ask these, what intellect they mean? For, if that which is properly intellect, and which is secondary to the intelligible, not only *the one* is beyond intellectual multitude, but the intelligible also, as being better than intellect. But if they call the whole of an intelligible essence intellect, as was the case with the followers of Plotinus, they are ignorant of the difference which subsists in the Gods, and of the generation of things proceeding according to measure. Other philosophers, therefore, more entheastic than these, dismissing sensible, and not even admitting intellectual multitude, say that prior to the intellectual numbers are the intelligible monads, from which every intellectual multitude and the many divided orders are unfolded into light. Plato, therefore, takes away from *the one*, the multitude which is intelligible, as subsisting proximately after *the one*, but he does not take away intellectual multitude. For it is by no means wonderful that *the one* should be exempt from intellectual multitude, above which the intelligible monads also are expanded. And hence the discourse, being divine, recurs to certain more simple causes. It is necessary however to understand that there are many orders in intelligibles, and that three triads are celebrated in them by theologists, as we shall show when we come to the second hypothesis. But, if this be admitted, it is evident that these *many* must be the first and intelligible multitude: for these so far as many alone subsist from *the one*; and from these the triadic supernally proceeds as far as to the last of things in the intellectual, supermundane, and sensible orders; and whatever is allotted a being participates of this triad. Hence, some of the ancients, ascending as far as to this order, considered its summit as the same with *the one*. We must either, therefore, admit that *the many* which are now denied of *the one* subsist according to the intelligible multitude, or that they are the first multitude in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders. Indeed, the many unities are not in the intelligible Gods, but in those immediately posterior to them. For there is one unity in each intelligible triad; but the multitude of unities is first apparent in the first order of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. Thus much, therefore, must now be admitted, that Plato exempts *the one* from all the multitude of these unities, as being generative of and giving subsistence to it; and this he does, by assuming from our common conceptions that *the one* is not many. But at the end of the hypothesis, he takes away intelligible multitude itself from *the one*, conjoining the end with the beginning: for he there shows that *the one* is not *being*, according to which the intelligible order is characterized.

It is likewise necessary to observe, that Plato does not think that the assertion, '*the one* is not many,' requires demonstration, or any confirmation of its truth; but he assumes it according to common and unperverted conception. For, in speculations concerning the first cause of all things, it is especially necessary to excite common conceptions; since all things are spontaneously arranged after it, and without labour, both such as energize according to intellect, and those that energize according to nature only. And, in short, it is necessary that the indemonstrable should

therefore, is infinite^s, if it has neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And
without

should be the principle of all demonstration, and that common conceptions should be the leaders of demonstrations, as also geometricians assert. But there is nothing more known and clear to us than that *the one* is not *many*.

^a It is necessary, says Proclus, that the first negation of *the one* should be that it is not *many*; for *the one* is first generative of *the many*; since, as we have before observed, the first and the highest multitude proceeds from *the one*. But the second negation after this is, that *the one* is neither a whole, nor has any part: for it gives subsistence to this order, in the second place, after the first multitude. This will be evident from considering in the first place logically, that in negative conclusions, when through the ablation of that which precedes we collect a negative conclusion, that which precedes is more powerful; but that when through the ablation of that which is consequent we subvert that which precedes, that which is consequent; and, in short, that which by the subversion of itself takes away that which remains, whether it precedes or follows, is more powerful. Thus, if we say, If there is not *being*, there is not *man*; but also, If there is not animal, there is not man: animal, therefore, is more universal than man. Let this then be one of the things to be granted; but another which must be admitted is as follows:—Every thing which is more comprehensive than another according to power, is nearer to *the one*. For, since *the one itself* is, if it be lawful so to speak, the most comprehensive of all things, and there is nothing which it does not ineffably contain, not even though you should adduce privation itself, and the most evanescent of things, since, if it has any subsistence, it must necessarily be in a certain respect one;—this being the case, things also which are nearer to *the one* are more comprehensive than those which are more remote from it; imitating the uncircumscribed cause, and the infinite transcendence of *the one*. Thus *being*, as it is more comprehensive than life and intellect, is nearer to *the one*; and life is nearer to it than intellect. These two axioms being admitted, let us see how Parmenides syllogizes. If *the one*, says he, is a whole, or has parts, it is many; but it is not many, as was before said: neither, therefore, will it be a whole, nor will it have parts. And again, If *the one* is not many, it is neither a whole, nor has parts. In both these instances, by the subversion of the many, *parts* also and *whole* are subverted. But our position is, that whatever together with itself subverted that which remains in things conjoined, is more powerful and more comprehensive; but that which is more comprehensive is nearer to *the one*. Hence, *many* is nearer to *the one* than *parts* and *whole*. For *parts* are *many*, but *many* are not entirely *parts*. So that *the many* are more comprehensive than *parts*, and are therefore beyond them. *The many*, therefore, first subsist in beings; and in the second place, whole and parts. Hence, *the one* produces the first by itself alone, but the second through the many. For first natures, in proceeding from their causes, always produce, together with their causes, things consequent. Since, therefore, the negations generate the affirmations, it is evident that the first generates such of these as are first, but the second such as are second. We may also see the geometrical order which Plato here observes: for that *the one* is not many, is assumed as an axiom, and as a common conception; but that it is neither a whole, nor has parts, is collected through this common conception. And again, that *the one* has neither beginning nor end, is demonstrated through the prior conclusion;

without figure ⁶, therefore, for it neither participates of the round ⁷ figure
nor

clusion; and thus always in succession according to the truly golden chain of beings, in which all things are indeed from *the one*, but some immediately, others through one medium, others through two, and others through many. After this manner, therefore, it may be logically demonstrated that these *many* are prior to *whole* and parts.

If we wish, however, to see this in a manner more adapted to things themselves, we may say that the many, so far as many, have one cause, *the one*: for all multitude is not derived from any thing else than *the one*; since also, with respect to the multitude of beings, so far as they are intelligible, they are from being, but, so far as they are multitude, they subsist from *the one*. For, if multitude was derived from any other cause than *the one*, that cause again must necessarily either be one, or nothing, or not one. But if nothing, it could not be a cause. And if it was not one, not being one, it would in no respect differ from the many, and therefore would not be the cause of the many, since cause every where differs from its progeny. It remains, therefore, either that the many are without cause, and are uncoordinated with each other, and are infinitely infinite, having no one in them, or that *the one* is the cause of being to the many. For either each of *the many* is not one, nor that which subsists from all of them, and thus all things will be infinitely infinite; or each is indeed one, but that which consists from all is not one: and thus they will be uncoordinated with each other; for, being coordinated, they must necessarily participate of *the one*: or, on the contrary, that which consists from all is one, but each is not one, and thus each will be infinitely infinite, in consequence of participating no one: or, lastly, both that which consists from all and each must participate of *the one*, and in this case, prior to them, there must necessarily be that which is the source of union both to the whole and parts, and which is itself neither a whole, nor has parts; for, if it had, this again would be indigent of *the one*; and if we proceed to infinity, we shall always have *the one* prior to whole and parts. To this we may also add, that if there was another cause of the many besides *the one*, there would be no multitude of unities. If, therefore, there are many unities, the cause of this multitude so far as multitude is *the one*: for the primary cause of unities is *the one*, and on this account they are called unities. But the multitude of beings is from the multitude of unities; so that all multitude is from *the one*. But whole and parts belong to beings: for, though *whole* should be *the one being*, it is evident that, together with being, it is a *whole*, though it should be *the participated one*. This also entirely confubfists with being; and though it should be *being alone*, this is immediately essence. If, therefore, whole and part are beings, either essentially or according to participation, these also will indeed be produced from *the one*, but from essence also, if whole and part belong to beings. Hence, *whole* is a certain being. For all such things as participate of essential wholeness, these also participate of essence, but not all such things as participate of essence participate also of wholeness. Thus, for instance, parts, so far as they are parts, partake of essence, but so far as they are parts they do not participate of wholeness. But if this be the case, essence is beyond essential wholeness. And hence, the essential whole participates of essence, and is not the same with it. Thus, also, if there is any wholeness which is characterized by unity, it participates of *the one*: a part however characterized by unity must indeed

nor the straight. Why not? For the round figure is that, the extremities of

necessarily participate of *the one*, but is not necessarily a whole; since indeed it is impossible it should be, so far as it is a part. Whole and part, therefore, are either essential or characterized by unity: for whole and part subsist both in essences and in unities. *The one*, therefore, is beyond whole and parts, both the essential, and those characterized by *the one*: and not this only, but the many also subsist prior to whole and parts. For each, as we have shown, is in a certain respect many; but the first *many* alone participate of *the one*. *The many*, therefore, are beyond *whole* and *parts*.

And here it is necessary to observe, that in the first part of this first hypothesis Plato assumes such things as do not follow to *the one* considered with respect to itself. For we assert, that *the one* itself by itself is without multitude, and is not a whole, though there should be nothing else. But in the middle of the hypothesis such things are assumed as do not follow, neither to itself with respect to itself, nor to other things; such, for instance, as that it is neither the same with itself, nor different from itself, nor is the same with others, nor different from others: and after the same manner that it is neither similar nor dissimilar, &c. And at the end such things are assumed as do not follow to *the one* with respect to others alone; where it is also shown that it is neither effable, nor the object of opinion or science, nor is, in short, known by any other gnostic power, but is itself exempt from all other things, both knowledges and objects of knowledge. When, therefore, he says *the one* is not *many*, he does not say that things different from *the one* are not *the one*, as denying them of *the one*, but that it has not multitude in itself; and that *the one* is not also multitude together with *the one*, but that it is alone *one*, and one itself exempt from all multitude.

¹ The caution of Plato here, says Proclus, deserves to be remarked: for he does not say that *the one* is *impartible*, (*ἀμερής*), but that it has no parts (*μὴν μὴ ἐξόν*). For the *impartible* is not the same with the *non-possession of parts*; since the latter may be asserted of *the one*, but the *impartible* not entirely. Thus the *impartible* sometimes signifies a certain nature, and, as it were, a certain form. Or rather, it is nothing else than a form characterized by unity; and in this sense it is used by Timæus when he is describing the generation of the soul. But in the Sophista he calls that which is truly one *impartible*: "for it is necessary (says he) that *the truly one* should be *impartible*." So that he there calls the same thing *impartible* which he says here *has no parts*. Hence, if any thing has no parts, it is *impartible*, according to Plato; but it no longer follows, that what is *impartible* has no parts, if each of the genera of being is either *impartible*, or *partible*, or a *medium* between both. Thus, a point is *impartible*, not having parts, such as that which is endowed with interval possesses: but it is not simply *impartible*, as having no part; for the definition of a point receives its completion from certain things. But all such things as complete, have the order of parts, with respect to that which is completed by them. Thus, also, the monad is *impartible*, because it is not composed from certain divided parts, as is every number which proceeds from it. Because, however, it consists of certain things which make it to be the monad, and to be different from a point, these may be said to be the parts of the definition of the monad. For such things as contribute to the definition of every form are entirely parts of it, and such form

of which are equally distant from the middle. Certainly. And the straight figure

is a certain whole passive to *the one*, but is not *the one itself*. But *the simply one* alone neither subsists from parts as connecting, nor as dividing, nor as giving completion to it; being alone *the one*, and simply one, but not that which is united.

Plato also indicates concerning these negations, that they are not privative, but that they are exempt from affirmations according to transcendency: "for it is *necessary* (says he) that it should not be many, but one." By this word *necessary*, therefore, he indicates transcendency according to the good. As a proof of this, we do not add the word *necessary* to things deprived of any thing. For who would say it is necessary that the soul should be ignorant of itself? for ignorance is a privation to gnostic natures. Thus also, in the Theætetus, Plato speaking of evils says, "it is *necessary* that they should have a subsistence." At the same time, also, by this word Plato indicates that he is discoursing about something which has a subsistence, and not about a non-subsisting thing. For who would say, about that which has no subsistence, that it is *necessary* it should be?

Here again we may observe how Plato collects that *the one* neither possesses beginning, nor middle, nor end, from the conclusion prior to this, following demonstrative canons. For, if *the one* has no parts, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end; but that which precedes is true, and consequently that also which follows. By taking away, therefore, that which precedes, he takes away that which is consequent. Hence, beginning, middle, and end, are symbols of a more partial order: for that which is more universal is more causal; but that which is more partial is more remote from the principle. Thus, with respect to that which has parts, it is not yet evident whether it has a beginning, middle, and end. For, what if it should be a whole consisting only of two parts? For the duad is a whole after a certain manner, and so as the principle of all partible natures; but that which has a beginning, middle, and end, is first in the triad. But if it should be said that every whole is triadic, in this case nothing hinders but that a thing which possesses parts may not yet be perfect, in consequence of subsisting prior to the perfect and the whole. Hence, Plato does not form his demonstration from *whole*, but from *having parts*.

And here it is necessary to observe, with Proclus, that *part* is multifariously predicated. For we call that a part which is in a certain respect the same with the whole, and which possesses all such things partially as the whole possesses totally. Thus, each of the multitude of intellects is a part of total intellect, though all things are in every intellect. And the inerratic sphere is a part of the universe, though this also comprehends all things, but in a manner different from the world, viz. more partially. In the second place, that is said to be a part which is completive of any thing. Thus the total spheres of the planets and elements are said to be parts of the universe; and the dianoëtic and doxastic powers are said to be parts of the soul: for the former give completion to the universe, and the latter to the soul. In the third place, according to a common signification, we call a part every thing which is in any way coordinated with certain things to the consummation of one thing: for thus each of us may be said to be a part of the world: not that the universe receives its completion, as the universe, through us; for it would not become imperfect from the corruption of any one of us; but because we also are coarranged with the total parts of the universe, are governed in conjunction with all other things, are in the world as in

figure is that, the middle part of which is situated before, or in the view of
both

one animal, and give completion to it, not so far as it is, but so far as it is prolific. Part, therefore, being triply predicated, Plato, having before said that *the one* has no part, evidently takes away from it all the conceptions of part. For whatever has parts has multitude; but *the one* has no multitude, and consequently has no parts whatever. But, if this be the case, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end: for these may be said to be the parts of the things that possess them, according to the third signification of part, in which every thing coordinated with certain things is said to be a part of that which receives its completion through the coordination of those things.

§ Plato might here have shown, as Proclus well observes, that *the one* is without beginning and end, from its not possessing extremes, and its not possessing extremes from its not possessing parts; but his reasoning proceeds through things more known. For, from its non-possession of parts, he immediately demonstrates that it is without beginning and end, transferring beginning and end to bound, which is the same with extreme. Infinite, therefore, in this place does not simply signify that which is negative of bound, but that which is subversive of extremes. As in the second hypothesis, therefore, he affirms the possession of extremes, he very properly in this hypothesis, where he denies it, demonstrates *the one* to be infinite, as not having extremes, which are accustomed to be called terms or limits.

But in order to understand how *the one* is infinite, it will be necessary to consider, with Proclus, how many orders there are in beings of *the infinite*, and afterwards, how many progressions there are opposite to these of *bound*. *Infinite*, therefore, that we may begin downwards, is beheld in matter, because it is of itself indefinite and formless; but forms are the bounds of matter. It is also beheld in body devoid of quality, according to division ad infinitum: for this body is infinitely divisible, as being the first thing endued with interval. It is also beheld in the qualities which first subsist about this body, which is itself devoid of quality, in which qualities the more and the less are first inherent: for by these Socrates in the *Philebus* characterizes the infinite. It is also beheld in the whole of a generated nature, i. e. in every thing which is an object of sense: for this possesses the infinite according to perpetual generation, and its unceasing circle, and according to the indefinite mutations of generated natures, which are always rising into being and perishing, in which also infinity according to multitude exists, alone possessing its subsistence in becoming to be. But prior to these, the infinite is beheld in the circulation of the heavens: for this also has the infinite, through the infinite power of the mover; since body so far as body does not possess infinite power; but through the participation of intellect body is perpetual, and motion infinite. Prior also to these, the infinite must be assumed in soul: for in its transitive intellections it possesses the power of unceasing motion, and is always moved, conjoining the periods of its motions with each other, and causing its energy to be one and never-failing. Again, prior to soul, the infinite is seen in time, which measures every period of the soul. For time is wholly infinite, because its energy, through which it evolves the motions of souls, and through which it measures their periods, proceeding according to number, is infinite in power: for it never ceases abiding and proceeding, adhering to *the one*, and unfolding the number which
measures

both the extremes? It is so. Will not, therefore, *the one* consist of parts ²,
and

measures the motions of wholes. Prior to time, also, we may survey the infinite in intellect, and intellectual life: for this is intransitive, and the whole of it is present eternally and collectively. That which is immovable, too, and never failing in intellect, is derived from an essence and power which never desert it, but which eternally possesses a sleepless life; through which also every thing that is always moved, is able to be always moved, participating in motion of stable infinity. Nor does the infinite alone extend as far as to these: but prior to every intellect is much-celebrated eternity, which comprehends every intellectual infinity. For, whence does intellect derive its eternal life, except from eternity? This, therefore, is infinite according to power prior to intellect; or rather, other things are indeed infinite according to power, but eternity is primarily power itself. From this first fountain then of the infinite, it remains that we ascend to the occult cause of all infinities whatever, and, having ascended, that we behold all infinities subsisting according to the power which is there. For such is the infinite itself; and such is the chaos of Orpheus, which he says has no bound. For eternity, though it is infinite through the ever, yet, so far as it is the measure of things eternal, it is also a bound. But chaos is the first infinite, is alone infinite, and is the fountain of all infinity, intelligible, intellectual, that which belongs to soul, that which is corporeal, and that which is material. And such are the orders of the infinite, in which such as are second are always suspended from those prior to them. For material infinity is connected through the perpetuity of generation. The perpetuity of generation is never-failing, through the perpetual motion of æther; and the perpetual motion of æther is effected through the unceasing period of a divine soul; for of this it is an imitation. The period also of a divine soul is unfolded through the continued and never-failing power of time, which makes the same beginning and end, through the temporal *instant* or *now*. And time energizes infinitely, through intellectual infinity, which is perpetually permanent. For that which proceeds according to time, when it is infinite, is so through a cause perpetually abiding, about which it evolves itself, and round which it harmonically moves in a manner eternally the same. Intellect also lives to infinity through eternity. For the eternal is imparted to all things from eternity and being; whence all things derive life and being, some more clearly, and others more obscurely. And eternity is infinite, through the fountain of infinity, which supernally supplies the never-failing to all essences, powers, energies, periods, and generations. As far as to this, therefore, the order of infinities ascends, and from this descends. For the order of things beautiful is from the beautiful itself, that of equals from the first equality, and that of infinities from the infinite itself. And thus much concerning the orders of *the infinite*.

Let us now consider supernally the series of bound which proceeds together with the infinite: for divinity produced these two causes, bound and infinity, together, or in other words, speaking Orphically, æther and chaos. For *the infinite* is *chaos*, as distributing all power, and all infinity, as comprehending other things, and as being as it were the most infinite of infinities. But bound is æther, because æther itself bounds and measures all things. The first bound, therefore, is bound itself, and is the fountain and basis of all bounds, intelligible, intellectual, supermundane, and mundane, presubsisting as the measure and limit of all things. The second is
that

and be many, whether it participates of a straight or round figure? Entirely

that which subsists according to eternity. For eternity, as we have before observed, is characterized both by infinity and bound; since, so far as it is the cause of never-failing life, and so far as it is the supplier of *the ever*, it is *infinite*; but so far as it is the measure of all intellectual energy, and the boundary of the life of intellect, terminating it supernally, it is *bound*. And, in short, it is itself, the first of the things mingled from bound and infinity. The third procession of bound is beheld in intellect. For, so far as it abides in sameness according to intellection, and possesses one life, eternal and the same, it is bounded and limited. For the immutable and the stable belong to a bounded nature; and, in short, as it is number, it is evident that in this respect it participates of bound. In the fourth place, therefore, time is bound, both as proceeding according to number, and as measuring the periods of souls. For every where that which measures, so far as it measures and limits other things, effects this through participating of the cause of bound. In the fifth place, the period of the soul, and its circulation, which is accomplished with invariable sameness, is the unapparent measure or evolution of all alter-motive natures. In the sixth place, the motion of æther, subsisting according to the same, and in the same, and about the same, *bounds* on all sides that which is disordered in material natures, and convolves them into one circle; and is itself bounded in itself. For the infinity of it consists in *the again*, (ἐν τῷ πάλιν), but not in not reverting, (οὐ τῷ μὴ ἀνακαμπτεῖν): nor is the infinity of it such as that which subsists according to a right line, nor as deprived of bound. For the one period of æther is infinite by frequency (τῷ πολλάκις εἶναι ἀσείρος). In the seventh place, the never-failing subsistence of material forms, the indestructibility of wholes, and all things being bounded, particulars by things common, and parts by wholes, evince the opposition in these of bound to the infinite. For, generated natures being infinitely changed, forms at the same time are bounded, and abide the same, neither becoming more nor less. In the eighth place, all quantity in things material may be called bound, in the same manner as, we before observed, quality is infinite. In the ninth place, the body without quality, which is the last of all things except matter, as a whole is *bound*: for it is not infinite in magnitude, but is as much extended in quantity as the universe. For it is necessary to call this body the whole subject of the universe. In the tenth place, the material form which detains matter, and circumscribes its infinity, and formless nature, is the progeny of *bound*, to which some alone looking, refer bound and the infinite to matter alone and form. And such and so many are the orders of bound.

The *infinite*, therefore, which is here denied of *the one*, is the same as *the not having a bound*, in the same manner as *the not having parts* is the same with the *impartible*, when the impartible is asserted of *the one*. But if *the one* is neither from any other cause, and there is no *final* cause of it, it is very properly said to be *infinite*. For every thing is bounded by its cause, and from it obtains its proper end. Whether, therefore, there is any intelligible or intellectual bound, *the one* is beyond all the series of bound. But if the first God, in the Laws, is said to be the measure of all things, it is not wonderful: for there he is so denominated, as the object of desire to all things, and as limiting the being, power, and perfection of all things; but here he is shown to be infinite, as being indigent of no bound or part. For all things are denied of him in this place, as

tirely so. It is, therefore, neither straight nor circular, since it is without parts.

of himself with respect to himself. *The one*, therefore, is infinite, as above all bound. Hence this infinite must be considered as the same with the non-possession of extremes; and the possession of extremes is, therefore, denied of *the one*, through the infinite. For neither power must be ascribed to it, nor indefinite multitude, nor any thing else which is signified by the infinite.

⁶ Parmenides first takes away *many* from *the one*; and this as from common conception: in the second place, he takes away *whole*, and *the having parts*; and this through *the one* not being *many*: in the third place, *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*; and this through not having parts. He also assumes as a consequent corollary, that *the one* is beyond bound, which is coordinated with parts, and which makes the possession of extremes. But bound is twofold: for it is either beginning or end. In the fourth place, therefore, he now takes away *the straight* and *the round*, which in the second hypothesis he arranges after the possession of extremes, and after the possession of beginning, middle, and end. But before he syllogistically demonstrates the fourth, he enunciates the conclusion; for he says, "without figure therefore." For it is requisite that intellectual projections, or, in other words, the immediate and direct vision of intellect, should be the leader of scientific syllogisms; since intellect also comprehends the principles of science. The pre-assumption, therefore, of the conclusion imitates the collected vision of intellect; but the procession through syllogisms imitates the evolution of science from intellect. And here we may perceive also, that the conclusion is more common than the syllogisms: for the latter receive the straight and the round separately, and thus make the negation; but the former simply asserts that *the one* is without figure. But these are the forms common to all intervals. For lines are divided into the straight, the round, and the mixed; and, in a similar manner, superficies and solids; except that in lines the straight and the round are without figure; but in superficies or solids they are receptive of figure. Hence some of these are called right-lined, others curve-lined, and others mixed from these. As it has been shown, therefore, that *the one* is without bounds or extremities, it was necessary that Parmenides should deny of it the straight, and the possession of extremes. But that which is figured is a thing of this kind: for he assumes boundaries comprehensive of the things bounded, which alone belong to things figured. There is also another accuracy in the words, says Proclus, which is worthy of admiration. For he does not say that *the one* is neither straight nor round; since he has not yet collected that it is without figure. For what would hinder it from having some one of the middle figures, such as that of the cylinder or cone, or some other of those that are mixed? For, if we should give to *the one* some figure from those that are mixed, it would participate both of the straight and the round. Thus, for instance, if we should inquire whether nature is white or black, and should find that it is neither white nor black, it would not follow from this, that it is entirely void of colour: for, by the participation of both these, it would possess some one of the middle colours; since the media are from the extremes. Plato therefore says, that *the one* neither participates of the round nor the straight, that it may not have either of these, nor any one of the media. This also is evident, that this conclusion is more partial than that which is prior to it. For, if any thing participates of figure, it has also extremes and a middle; but not every thing which has extremes
and

parts. Right. And indeed, being such, it will be no where⁹; for it will
neither

and a middle participates of figure. For a line, number, time and motion, may possess extremes, all which are without figure. A transition likewise is very properly made from figure to the straight and the round. For it is possible universally to deny figure of *the one*, by showing that figure has bound and limitation. But *the one* does not receive any bound. Plato however was willing to deduce his discourse supernally, according to two coordinations; and hence from the beginning he assumes after *many, whole and parts*, and again *extremes and middle, straight and round, in itself and in another, abiding and being moved*, &c. through this assumption indicating that *the one* is none of these. For it is not possible that it can be both opposites, since it would no longer remain one according to the hypothesis; nor can it be either of these, for thus it would have something hostile and opposed to itself. It is however necessary that *the one* should be prior to all opposition, or it will not be the cause of all things; since it will not be the cause of those things which its opposite produces. Proceeding, therefore, according to the two series of things, he very properly now passes from figure to *the straight and the round*.

But since in the Phædrus Plato denominates the intelligible summit of intellectuals, which he there calls the supercelestial place, uncoloured, unfigured, and untouched, must we say that that order and *the one* are similarly unfigured? By no means: for neither is there the same mode of negation in both. For of that order Plato denies some things, and affirms others. For he says that it is essence and true essence, and that it can alone be seen by intellect, the governor of the soul; and likewise that the genus of true science subsists about it; because there is another, viz. the intelligible order prior to it, and it is exempt from some things, but participates of others. But he denies all things, and affirms nothing of *the one*: for there is nothing prior to *the one*, but it is similarly exempt from all beings. The mode, therefore, of ablation is different; and this, as Proclus well observes, Plato indicates by the very words themselves. For he calls the intelligible summit of intellectuals *unfigured*; but he says that *the one* participates of *no figure*. But the former of these is not the same with the latter, as neither is the *impartible* the same with that which has no part. After the same manner, therefore, he calls that essence *unfigured*, but asserts that the one participates of no figure. Hence it appears that the former, as producing, and as being more excellent than intellectual figure, is called *unfigured*. This, therefore, was subordinate to another figure, viz. the intelligible: for intelligible intellect comprehends the intelligible causes of figure and multitude, and all things; and there are figures perfectly unknown and ineffable, which are first unfolded into light from intelligibles, and which are only known to intelligible intellect. But the supercelestial place, being the summit in intelligibles, is the principle of all intellectual figures; and hence it is *unfigured*, but is not simply exempt from all figure. *The one*, however, is exempt from every order of these figures, both the occult and intellectual, and is established above all unknown and known figures.

⁹ The *straight* and the *round* here are to be considered as signifying progression and conversion: for progression is beheld according to the straight, which also it makes the end of itself. Every intellectual nature, therefore, *proceeds* to all things according to the straight, and is *converted* to its own good, which is the middle in each; and this is no other than the intelligible which it contains. But things are separated from each other according to progression, the *proceeding* from
the

neither be in another, nor in itself. How so? For, being in another, it would

the *abiding*, and the *multiplied* from the *united*. For *progression* is that which makes some things first, others middle, and others last; but *conversion* again conjoins all things, and leads them to one thing, the common object of desire to all beings. In these two, therefore, each of these definitions is to be found, of which the intellectual Gods first participate: for these are especially characterized by conversion. In the second place from these, souls participate of the straight and the round; proceeding, indeed, after the manner of a line, but being again inflected into circles, and converting themselves to their principles. But sensibles participate of these in the last place: for right-lined figures subsist in these with interval, and partly, and the spheric form, which is comprehensive of all mundane figures. Hence, Timæus makes the whole world to be a sphere; but through the five figures, which are the only figures that have equal sides and angles, he adorns the five parts of the world, inscribing all these in the sphere, and in each other, by which he manifests that these figures are supernally derived from a certain elevated order.

These two also may be perceived in generation: the *round* according to the circulation in things visible; for generation circularly returns to itself, as it is said in the Phædrus. But the *straight* is seen according to the progression of every thing, from its birth to its acme; and acme is here the middle darkening the extremes; for through this there is a transition to the other of the extremes, just as, in a right line, the passage from one extreme to the other is through the middle. These two, therefore, supernally pervade from intellectual as far as to generated natures; the *straight* being the cause of progression, but the *round* of conversion. If, therefore, *the one* neither proceeds from itself, nor is converted to itself—for that which proceeds is second to that which produces, and that which is converted is indigent of the desirable—it is evident that it neither participates of the *straight*, nor of the *round* figure. For how can it proceed, having no producing cause of itself, neither in nor prior to itself, lest it should be deprived of *the one*, being second, or having the form of the duad? How, also, can it be converted, having no end, and no object of desire? Here, likewise, it is again evident that Plato collects these conclusions from what precedes, viz. from *the one* neither possessing beginning, nor middle, nor end; always geometrically demonstrating things second through such as are prior to them, imitating the orderly progression of things, which ever makes its descent from primary to secondary natures.

⁸ As the whole middle order of the Gods called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, is symbolically signified in these words, Plato very properly in the conclusion converts the whole of it. For, if *the one* has figure, it will be *many*. He therefore conjoins figure to *many* through parts; but demonstrates that all these genera are secondary to *the one*. So great, however, says Proclus, is the separation of the divine orders, that Plato does not attempt to connect the negations that follow in a regular succession till he has first converted this order to itself; conjoining figure to *many*, and indicating the alliance of all the afore said genera. In what order of things, however, the *straight* and the *round* subsist, will be more clearly known in the second hypothesis.

⁹ The discourse passes on to another order, viz. to the summit of those Gods that are properly called intellectual: and this he denies of *the one*, demonstrating that *the one* is no where; neither as comprehended in another cause, nor as itself comprehended in itself. Before he syllogizes,

would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is,
and

however, he again previously announces the conclusion, employing intellectual projections prior to scientific methods ; and this he constantly does in all that follows.

It is here, however, necessary to observe, that *no where* is predicated most properly and simply of the first cause. For the soul is frequently said to be *no where*, and particularly, the soul which has no habitude or alliance with body : for it is not detained by any secondary nature, nor is its energy circumscribed through a certain habitude, as if it were bound by such habitude to things posterior to itself. Intellect also is said to be *no where* : for it is in a similar manner every where, and is equally present to all things. Or rather, through a presence of this kind it is detained by no one of its participants. Divinity also is said to be *no where*, because he is exempt from all things, because he is imparticipable, or, in other words, is not consubstantial with any thing else ; and because he is better than all communion, all habitude, and all coordination with other things. There is not, however, the same mode of the *no where* in all things. For soul indeed is *no where* with respect to the things posterior to itself, but is not simply *no where* ; since it is in itself, as being self-motive, and likewise in the cause whence it originates. For every where the cause preassumes and uniformly comprehends the power of its effect. Intellect is also *no where* with respect to the things posterior to itself, but it is in itself, as being self-subsistent, and, further still, is comprehended in its proper cause. Hence, it is false to say that intellect is absolutely *no where* ; for *the one* alone is simply *no where*. For it is neither in things posterior to itself, as being exempt from all things ; (since neither intellect nor soul, principles posterior to *the one*, are in things posterior to themselves,) nor is it in itself, as being simple and void of all multitude ; nor is it in any thing prior to itself, because there is nothing better than *the one*. This, therefore, is simply *no where* ; but all other things have the *no where* secondarily, and are in one respect *no where*, and in another not. For, if we survey all the order of beings, we shall find material forms subsisting in others only, and established in certain subjects : for they verge to bodies, and are in a certain respect in a subject, bearing an echo, as it were, and image of a thing subsisting in itself, so far as they are certain lives and essences, and in consequence of one part suffering they are copassive with themselves. With respect to souls that subsist in habitude or alliance to body, these, so far as they have habitude, are in another : for habitude to secondary natures entirely introduces, together with itself, subsistence in another ; but so far as they are able to be converted to themselves, they are purified from this, subsisting in themselves. For natures indeed extend all their energies about bodies, and whatever they make they make in something else. Souls employ, indeed, some energies about bodies ; but others are directed to themselves, and through these they are converted to themselves. But souls that are without habitude to body are not in other things that are secondary or subordinate to them, but are in others that are prior to them. For a subsistence in another is twofold, one kind being subordinate to the subsistence of a thing in itself, and arising from a habitude to things secondary, but the other being better than such a subsistence ; and the former extends as far as to souls that subsist in habitude to body ; but the latter only originates from divine natures, and, in short, from such as subsist without habitude. Divine souls, therefore, are alone in the natures prior to them, as, for instance, in the intellects
from

and would be touched ^{1°} by it in many places : but it is impossible that *the one*

from which they are suspended ; but intellect is both in itself, and in that which is prior to itself, viz. in the unity which it derives from *the one*, and which is the vertex and flower of its essence. This *no where*, therefore, is by no means subordinate to the subsistence of a thing in itself. For how can the *no where* which opposes a subsistence in some particular thing be adapted to things which have their being in another ? But to those that have a subsistence in themselves better than a subsistence in another, *the no where* is present indeed, but not simply : for each of these is in its proper cause. But to *the one* alone *the no where* primarily and simply belongs. For *the one* is not in things posterior to itself, because it is without habitude or alliance ; nor in itself, because it is *the one* ; nor in any thing prior to itself, because it is the first.

In the next place, let us consider *the every where*, and whether it is better and more perfect than *the no where*, or subordinate to it. For, if better, why do we not ascribe that which is better to the first, instead of saying that *the one* is alone *no where* ? But, if it is subordinate, how is it not better not to energize providentially, than so to energize ? May we not say, therefore, that the *every where* is twofold ? one kind taking place, when it is considered with reference to things posterior to it, as when we say that providence is every where, that it is not absent from any secondary natures, but that it preserves, connects and adorns all things, pervading through them by its communications. But the other kind of *every where* subsists as with relation to all things prior and posterior to it. Hence that is properly *every where* which is in things subordinate, in itself, and in things prior to itself. And of this *every where* the *no where* which is now assumed is the negation, as being neither in itself, nor in any thing prior to itself. This *no where* also is better than *the every where*, and is alone the prerogative of *the one*. But there is another *no where* coordinate with *the every where*, and which is alone predicated with reference to things secondary, so that each is true in consequence of that which remains. For *being* is *no where* because it is *every where*. For that which is detained in some particular place, is in a certain thing ; but that which is similarly present to all things is definitely *no where* : and again, because *no where*, on this account it is *every where*. For, in consequence of being similarly exempt from all things, it is similarly present to all things, being as it were equally distant from all things. Hence, this *no where* and this *every where* are coordinate with each other. But the other *no where* is better than every *every where*, and can alone be adapted to *the one*, as being a negation of every subsistence in any thing. For, whether the subsistence is as in *place*, or as in *whole*, or as the *whole* in its *parts*, or as in the *end*, or as *things governed* in the *governing principle*, or as *genus* in *species*, or as *species* in *genera*, or as in *time*, *the one* is similarly exempt from all these. For neither is it comprehended in *place*, lest it should appear to be multitude. Nor is it any comprehending *whole*, lest it should consist of parts. Nor is it a part of any thing, lest, being in the whole of which it is a part, it should be a passive one. For every whole which is passive to the *one*, is indigent of that which is truly one. Nor is it in parts : for it has no parts. Nor is there any end of it : for it has been shown that it has no end. Nor does it subsist as in the *governing principle* : for it has been shown that it has not any *beginning*. Nor is it as *genus* in *species*, lest again multitude should happen about it, through the comprehension of species ;

one which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle,
should

nor as species in genera; for, of what will it be the species, since nothing is more excellent than itself? Nor is it as in time: for thus it would be multitude; since every thing which is in time flows; and every thing that flows consists of parts. *The one*, therefore, is better than all the modes of a subsistence in any thing. Hence the negation of *no where* is true: for a subsistence in *some particular thing* is opposed to *no where*; just as *some one* is opposed to *no one*: so that *the one* will be *no where*.

Again, too, Plato gives a twofold division to a subsistence in something; viz. into a subsistence in another, and into a subsistence in itself; comprehending in these two all the abovementioned celebrated modes which are enumerated by Aristotle in his *Physics*; that if he can show that *the one* is neither in itself, nor in another, he may be able to demonstrate that it is *no where*. But this being shown, it will appear that *the one* is exempt from that order to which the symbol of being in *itself* and in *another* pertains. It will also appear from hence that intellect is not the first cause: for the peculiarity of intellect is a subsistence in itself, in consequence of being converted to itself, at the same time that its energy is directed to such things as are first, viz. to intelligibles and *the one*.

¹⁰ Let us here consider how according to Plato every thing which is in another, is after a manner circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and is touched by it in many places. Of those prior to us then, says Proclus, some have considered the subsistence of *the one* in something else, more partially, alone assuming a subsistence in place, and in a vessel, and to these adapting the words. For that which is in place in a certain respect touches place, and also that which is in a vessel touches the vessel, and is on all sides comprehended by it. This, therefore, say they, is what Plato demonstrates to us, that *the one* is not in place, since that which is in place must necessarily be many, and must be touched by it in many places; but it is impossible that *the one* should be many. There is however nothing venerable in the assertion that *the one* is not in place, since this is even true of partial souls like ours; but it is necessary that what is here shown should be the prerogative of *the one*, and of that cause which is established above all beings. But others looking to things say, that every thing which being in a certain thing is comprehended by it, is denied of *the one*: and their assertion is right. For *the one* is in no respect in any thing, as has been before shown. But how does this adapt the words to the various modes of a subsistence in something? For a point is evidently said to be in a line as in another; since a point is different from a line; and it does not follow, because it is in another, that on this account it is on all sides comprehended by the line, and is touched by many of its parts. It may indeed be said, in answer to this, that though the line does not circularly contain the point according to interval, yet it comprehends it after another manner: for it embraces its idioms. For a point is a boundary only; but a line is both a boundary and something else, being a length without a breadth. A point also is without interval; but a line possesses interval according to length, though not according to breadth and depth. For, in short, since a point is not the same with *the one*, it is necessary that the point should be many, not as containing parts after the manner of interval, for in this respect it is impartible, but as containing many idioms which

should be touched by a circle in many places. Impossible. But if it were in itself it would also contain itself, since it is no other than itself which subsists in itself: for it is impossible that any thing should not be comprehended¹¹
by

which have the relation of parts, and which the line comprehending, may be said to touch the point in many places. But that the point is not the same with *the one* is evident; for the latter is the principle of all things, but the former of magnitudes alone. Nor is the point prior to *the one*: for the monad is one, and the impartible in time, or the now. It remains, therefore, that the point is posterior to *the one*, and participates of it. But, if this be the case, it may possess many incorporeal idioms, which are in the line, and are comprehended by it.

Those however who thus interpret the present passage do not perceive how Plato assumes a subsistence in a certain thing, and what he looks to among beings, when he denies this of *the one*. It is better, therefore, says Proclus, to say with our preceptor Syrianus, conformably to that most prudent and safe mode of interpretation, that Plato denies these things of *the one*, which in the second hypothesis he affirms of *the one being*, and that he so denies as he there affirms. In the second hypothesis, therefore, Plato indicating the summit of the intellectual order, says that *the one* is in itself and in another; which evidently applies to that order, because it is converted to itself intellectually, and abides eternally with a monadic subsistence in its causes. For it is the monad of the intellectual Gods; abiding indeed, according to its transcendency, in the intellectual Gods, prior to, but unfolding into light the intellectual idiom, according to an energy in and about, itself. The subsistence, therefore, in another is of such a kind as an abiding in cause, and being comprehended in its proper cause. This, therefore, is the circular comprehension, and the being touched in many places, of which Plato now speaks. For, as this order is contained in its cause, it is more partial than it. But every thing more partial is more multiplied than its more comprehensive cause; and, being more multiplied, it is conjoined with it by the various powers of itself, and differently with different powers. For this is what is implied by the words "*in many places*," since according to different powers it is differently united to the intelligible prior to itself. To this order of beings, also, a subsistence in itself accords together with a subsistence in another. The multitude likewise of this order is numerous: for it participates of intelligible multitude, and has parts; since it participates of the middle genera in the causes prior to itself. It is also in a certain respect circular; for it participates of the extremity of the middle orders, viz. of the figure which is there. Hence, it is neither one simply, but many, nor impartible, but having parts, viz. incorporeal idioms; nor is it beyond all figure, but is circular. And so far as it is many, it is able to be touched in many things by the natures prior to itself; but so far as it has parts, it is able to communicate with them in many places, and in a remarkable degree; and so far as it is figured, it is circularly comprehended by them. For every thing figured is comprehended by figure. But *the one* neither has parts, nor participates of the circle; so that there cannot be a cause prior to it, which circularly touches it and in many places; but it is beyond all things, as having no cause better than itself.

¹¹ Let us here consider with Proclus how that which is in itself possesses both that which
comprehends,

by that in which it is. It is impossible. Would not, therefore, that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the same whole ¹² cannot at the same time suffer and do both these: and thus
the

comprehends, and that which is comprehended; and what both these are. Every thing, therefore, which is the cause of itself, and is self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. For, as self-motive rank prior to alter-motive natures, so things self-subsistent are arranged prior to such as are produced by another. For, if there is that which perfects itself, there is also that which generates itself. But if there is that which is self-subsistent, it is evident that it is of such a kind as both to produce and be produced by itself. As, therefore, producing power always comprehends according to cause that which it produces, it is necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is caused; but that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, that which comprehends and that which is comprehended. If, therefore, a subsistence in another signifies the being produced by another more excellent cause, a subsistence in self must signify that which is self-begotten, and produced by itself.

¹² Let us consider how it is impossible for the same whole, at the same time, both to do and suffer: for this Plato assumes as a thing common and universally acknowledged. Will it not follow, therefore, if this be granted, that the self-motive nature of the soul will no longer remain? For, in things self-moved, that which moves is not one thing, and that which is moved another; but the whole is at the same time moving and moved. To this it may be replied as follows: Of the powers of the soul some are generative, and others converfive of the soul to herself. The generative powers, therefore, beginning from the soul produce its life; but the converfive convolve the soul to itself, according to a certain vital circle, and to the intellect which is established prior to soul. For, as the generative powers produce a twofold life, one kind abiding, but the other proceeding into body and subsisting in a subject, so the converfive powers make a twofold conversion, one of the soul to herself, the other to the intellect which is beyond her. Of these powers, therefore, the whole soul participates, because they proceed through each other, and energize together with each other; whence every rational soul is said to generate herself. For the whole participates through the whole of generative powers, and she converts as it were herself to herself; and neither is that which generates without conversion, nor is that which converts unprolific, but a participation through each other is effected. Hence both assertions are true, viz. that the soul generates herself, and that it is not possible for the whole of a thing at the same time both to do and suffer. For though that which produces and that which is produced are one thing, yet together with union there is also difference, through which a thing of this kind does not remain unmultiplied. For the whole soul is indeed produced, but not so far as it produces is it also according to this produced; since that which primarily produces is the generative power of the soul. Since however it is possible in some things for a certain part to generate, and a part to be generated, as in the world that which is celestial is said to generate and fabricate, and that which is sublunary to be generated; and again, not for a part, but the whole to be generated and generate in different times; and lastly, for the whole

the one would no longer be one, but two. It certainly would not. *The one*, therefore, is not any where ¹³, since it is neither in itself nor in another.

It

both to do and suffer in the same time, but to do one thing, and suffer another, and not the same: for what if a thing should impart heat, and at the same time receive cold, or should whiten and be at the same time blackened?—on this account, Plato taking away all such objections accurately adds the words, *the whole; at the same time, the same thing*, that it may not act in one part and suffer in another, nor at different times, nor do one thing and suffer another.

Hence, since that which is self-subsistent is necessarily divisible into that which is more excellent, and that which is subordinate, for so far as it produces it is more excellent, but so far as it is produced subordinate, it follows that *the one* is beyond a self-subsistent nature: for *the one* does not admit of division, with which a self-subsistent nature is necessarily connected. Indeed *the one* is better than every paternal and generative cause, as being exempt from all power. For though according to Plato it is the cause of all beautiful things, yet it is not the cause in such a manner as if it employed power, through which it is productive of all things: for power subsists together with *hyparxis* or the summit of essence, to which it is at the same time subordinate. But of the natures posterior to *the one*, some being most near to, and ineffably and occultly unfolded into light from it, have a paternal and generative dignity with relation to all beings, and produce other things from themselves by their own powers. In this, therefore, they abound more than, and consequently fall short of the simplicity of, *the one*, that they generate self-subsistent natures: for additions in things divine are attended with diminution of power. Other natures, therefore, posterior to *the one*, being now separated and multiplied in themselves, are allotted the power of things self-subsistent; subsisting indeed from primary causes, but produced also from themselves. These, therefore, are suspended from the paternal and generative causes of forms, but paternal causes from *the one*, which is more excellent than every cause of this kind, and which in a manner unknown to all things unfolds beings from itself, according to the principles of things. Hence, if this be the case, it is evident that every thing which gives subsistence to itself is also productive of other things. For self-subsistent natures are neither the first nor the last of things. But that which produces other things without producing itself is twofold; one of these being better, and the other worse, than things self-subsistent. Such, therefore, are producing natures. But of things produced from a generating cause, self-subsistent natures first proceed, being produced indeed, but subsisting self-begotten from their proper causes. For they proceed from their cause in a way superior to a self-begetting energy. The next in order to these are the natures which are suspended from another producing cause, but which are incapable of generating and being generated from themselves. And this order of things has its progression supernally as far as to the last of things. For if, among generating natures, that which generates itself also generates other things, but that which generates other things does not necessarily generate itself, it follows that things generative of others are prior to such as generate themselves: for things more comprehensive rank more as principles.

¹³ Plato very geometrically, in each of the theorems, first enunciates the proposition, afterwards gives the demonstration, and, in the last place, the conclusion; through the proposition imitating

It is not. But consider whether thus circumstanced it can either stand or be moved ¹⁴. Why can it not? Because whatever is moved is either locally moved, or suffers alteration ¹⁵; for these alone are the genera of motion.

imitating the collected and stable energy of intellect; through the demonstration, the progression of intellects evolving itself into multitude; and through the conclusion, the circular motion of intellect to its principle, and the one perfection of all intellectual energy. This, therefore, which he does in the preceding theorems, he particularly does in this. For it pertains to this order, both to subsist from itself, and to abide in the natures prior to itself. The logical discursus, therefore, imitates the subsistence of this order in itself, but the conclusion, and a returning to the principle, a subsistence in another.

¹⁴ Parmenides here proceeds to another order, viz. the vivific, from the intellectual monad, and evinces that *the one* is exempt from this. The idioms, therefore, of this vivific order are *motion* and *permanency*; the former unfolding into light the fountains of life, and the latter firmly establishing this life exempt from its proper rivers. That it is not requisite, however, alone to take away physical motions from *the one*, Plato himself manifests, by saying, "*the one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion." But all energy, according to him, is motion. *The one* therefore is prior to energy. Hence also it is prior to power, lest it should possess power imperfect and unenergetic. Should it be asked why Plato places *motion* before *sameness* and *difference*? we reply, that motion and permanency are beheld in the essences and energies of things: for procession is essential motion, and permanency an essential establishment in causes; since every thing at the same time that it abides in, also proceeds from, its cause. Essential *motion* and *permanency*, therefore, are prior to *sameness* and *difference*: for things in proceeding from their causes become *same* and *different*; *different* by proceeding, but *same* by converting themselves to that which abides. Hence *motion* and *permanency* rank prior to *sameness* and *difference*, as originating prior to them. On this account, in the *Sophista*, Plato arranges *motion* and *permanency* after *being*, and next to these *same* and *different*.

¹⁵ Plato, in the tenth book of his *Laws*, makes a perfect division of all motions into ten, eight of which are passive. The ninth of these is indeed energetic, but is both motive and moved, moving other things, and being moved by a cause prior to itself; and the tenth is energetic from itself, in that which is moved possessing also that which moves, being no other than a self-motive nature. It is however now requisite to make a more synoptical division, that we may not physiologize in discourses about divine natures. Hence Plato concisely distributes all motions into two. For that it is requisite not only to consider the proposed motions as corporeal, but likewise as comprehensive of all incorporeal motions, is evident from his saying, "for these are the only motions." Both the motions of soul, therefore, and such as are intellectual, are comprehended in these two, viz. *lation* and *alteration*, or *internal motion*. It is also evident that every vivific genus of the Gods belongs to these motions, since all life is motion according to Plato, and every motion is comprehended in the two which are here mentioned. Let us therefore consider every thing which is moved; and first of all let us direct our attention to bodies, either as suffering some internal or some external change: for that which changes one place for another sustains

motion. Certainly. But if *the one* should be altered from itself, it is impossible that it should remain in any respect the one. Impossible. It will not therefore be moved according to alteration? It appears that it will not.

tains a mutation of something belonging to things external; but that which is generating or corrupting, or increasing, or diminishing, or mingling, suffers a mutation of something inward. Hence that which is changed according to the external is said to be moved according to lation: for a motion of this kind is local, place being external to bodies. But that which is moved according to some one of the things within it is said to suffer internal change, whether it sustains generation, or corruption, or increase, or diminution, or mixture. Local motion, therefore, is present with divine bodies, such as those of the stars, but they have no mutation according to essence. For it is necessary, indeed, that these should be locally moved, because, as Plato says in the *Politicus*, always to subsist according to the same, and after the same manner, belongs to the most divine of things alone; but the nature of body is not of this order. The celestial bodies, however, being the first of things visible, possess a perpetual subsistence: for such things as are first in every order possess the form of natures prior to themselves. Hence these bodies are moved according to this motion alone, which preserves the essence of the things moved unchanged. But, ascending from bodies to souls, we may see that which is analogous in these to local motion, and that which corresponds to internal change. For, so far as at different times they apply themselves to different forms, and through contact with these become assimilated to their proper intelligibles, or the objects of their intellectual vision, they also appear in a certain respect to be multiform, participating by their energies of these intelligibles, which are always different, and being disposed together with them. So far, therefore, as this is effected, they may be said to be internally changed. But again, so far as they energize about the intelligible place, and pervade the whole extent of forms, being as it were external to them, and comprehending them on all sides, so far they may be said to be locally moved; Plato also in the *Phædrus* calling the energy of the soul about the intelligible place, a period and circulation. Souls, therefore, are both internally changed and locally moved; being internally changed according to that which is vital, for it is this which is disposed together with, and is assimilated to, the visions of the soul; but, according to that which is gnostic, passing on locally from one intelligible to another, revolving round these by its intellections, and being reflected from the same to the same. Or we should rather say, that souls comprehend in themselves the causes of internal change, and of mutation according to place. In much celebrated intellect, also, we shall find the paradigms subsisting intellectually of these two species of motion. For by participating the nature of the intelligible in intellection, and becoming through intelligence a certain intelligible itself, it is internally changed about the intellectual idiom. For participations are said to impart something of their own nature to their participant. But by intellectually perceiving in the same, according to the same things, and after the same manner, and by energizing about its own intelligible as about a centre, it previously comprehends the paradigm of local circulation. Every where, therefore, we shall find that motions are internal changes and lations, subsisting intellectually in intellect, psychically in soul, and corporeally and divisibly in sensibles; so that we ought not to wonder if these are the only motions; for all others are comprehended in these.

But will it be moved locally ¹⁶? Perhaps so. But indeed if *the one* is moved locally,

¹⁶ Parmenides passes on to the other form of motion, viz. lation, and shows that neither is *the one* moved according to this. He also divides lation into motion about the same place, and into a mutation from one place to another. For every thing which is moved according to place, either preserves the same place, so that the whole remains intransitive, and the thing itself is only moved in its parts; or it is moved both in the whole and the parts, and passes from one place to another. For there are these four cases: a thing is neither moved in the whole, nor in the parts; or it is moved in the whole, and not in the parts; or it is moved in the parts, and not in the whole; or it is moved both in the whole and in the parts. But, of these four, it is impossible for the whole to be moved, the parts remaining immovable; since the parts from which the whole consists are moved together with the whole. To be moved neither in the whole nor in the parts belongs to things which stand still. It remains, therefore, either that the whole is not moved, the parts being moved, or that both the whole and the parts are moved. The former of these motions is produced by a sphere or cylinder, when these are moved about their axes; but the latter is effected by a transition from one place to another, when the whole changes its place. It is evident, therefore, from this division, that such are the necessary differences of motion.

These two motions are not only apparent in sensibles, viz. the circular in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and a motion both according to whole and parts in the sublunary region, but they also subsist in the natures beyond those. For a partial soul, through its ascents and descents, and its transitive energy according to length, contains the paradigm of motions both according to the whole and parts; and intellect, through its intransitive revolution about the intelligible, causally contains the circular motion. And not only intellect, but also every divine soul, through its measured motion about intellect, receives an incorporeal circulation. Parmenides also, says Proclus, when he calls being a sphere, in his poems, and says that it perceives intellectually, evidently calls its intellection spheric motion. But Timæus, bending the progression of the soul according to length, into circles, and making one of these circles external and the other internal, confers both these eternally on the soul according to a demiurgic cause, and an intellectual period prior to that of bodies. Theologists also, Proclus adds, were well acquainted with incorporeal circulation. For the theologist of the Greeks (Orpheus) speaking concerning that first and occult God * who subsists prior to Phænos, says, "that he moves in an infinite circle with unwearied energy."

* Ο δ' ἀπείροτον κατὰ κύκλον αἰετῶς φοροῖτο.

And the Chaldaean Oracles assert that all fountains and principles abide in an *unfluxing* revolution. For, since every thing which is moved in a circle has permanency mingled with motion, they are very properly said always to abide in circulation, the *unfluxing* here signifying immateriality. The motions, therefore, of incorporeal natures are comprehended in this division; and so *the one*

* Viz. the το ὄν or the first being of Plato, the summit of the intelligible order.

locally, it will either be carried round in the same circle, or it will change one place for another. Necessarily so. But ought not that which is carried round in a circle to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself rolled about the middle? And can any method be devised by which it is possible that a nature which has neither middle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle? There cannot be any. But if it changes its place¹⁷, would it not become situated elsewhere, and thus be moved? In this case it would. Has it not appeared to be impossible that *the one* should be in any thing? It has. Is it not much more impossible that it should *become situated* in

is shown to be immovable, as being established above all motion, and not as being partly immovable and partly movable.

¹⁷ That it is impossible for *the one* to pass from one place to another is evident. For either the whole must be within both places; or the whole must be without both; or this part of it must be here, and that in the other place. But if the whole being without is in neither, it cannot be moved from one place to another. If again the whole is within both, neither again will it be moved from the former to the following place. And if one part of it is in this, and another in the remaining place, it will be partible, or consist of parts. But *the one* is not partible; and consequently it cannot be in any thing. And here observe, that though there may be something which is neither without nor within a certain thing, but is both without and within (for thus soul and intellect are said to be in the world and out of it), yet it is impossible for the whole of a thing to be in something, and yet be neither without nor within it. Regarding, therefore, the partible nature of soul, not only ours, but also that which is divine, we may say that it possesses the cause of a motion of this kind, since it is neither wholly within nor yet perfectly without that which is the object of its energy. For the whole of it does not at once apply itself to the conceptions of intellect, since it is not naturally adapted to see these collectively; nor is it wholly separated from intellect, but according to its own different intellections it becomes in a certain respect situated in the different forms of intellect, and introduces itself as it were into its intellections, as into its proper place. Hence Timæus does not refuse to call the soul generated, as he had previously denominated it partible. For soul does not possess a collective intelligence, but all its energies are generated; and in consequence of this its intellections are essentialized in transitions. Hence also time is so intimately connected with soul, that it measures its first energies. Intellect, therefore, appears genuinely to contain the paradigm of a circular motion, possessing as a centre that part of itself which abides, and which is the intelligible of intellect, but the many progressions of forms from this Vesta as it were of itself, as right lines from the centre. But all its energies, which are intellective of intelligibles, have the relation of the one superficies running round the lines from the centre, and the centre itself. A divine soul, however, contains the paradigm both of a right-lined and circular progression; of the former, as proceeding about the intelligible place, abiding indeed as a whole, but evolving the intelligible by its transitions; but of the latter, as always fixing the whole of itself in the object of intellection: for, as

in any thing? I do not understand how you mean. If any thing is *becoming to be* in any thing, is it not necessary that it should not yet *be* in it, since it is *becoming to be*; nor yet entirely out of it, since it has already *become*? It is necessary. If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it must certainly happen to that which possesses parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more impossible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be *becoming to be* in any thing; since it can neither subsist in *becoming to be* according to parts, nor according to a whole? So it appears. Hence it will neither change its place by going any where¹⁸, nor that it may *become situated* in any thing; nor, through being carried round in that which is the same, will it suffer any alteration. It does not appear that it can. *The one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Immovable. But we have likewise asserted¹⁹ that it is impossible for

a whole, it both abides and is moved. And in the last place, a partial soul, by its motions according to length, clearly produces the incorporeal cause of a right-lined motion.

¹⁸ Plato here collects all the aforefaid conclusions about motion; and having before enumerated them in a divided manner, he makes one universal conclusion, teaching us through this ascent how it is always requisite in the vision of *the one* to contract multitude into that which is common, and to comprehend parts through the whole. For the things which he had before divided into parts receiving three motions, viz. internal mutation, the right-lined and circular progression, these he now separately enumerates, by saying, that *the one* neither proceeds, nor is circularly borne along, nor is altered; and making an orderly enumeration, he recurs from things proximately demonstrated to such as are prior to them, that he may conjoin the beginning to the end, and may imitate the intellectual circle. And here we may again see that the proposition and the conclusion are universal, but that the demonstrations proceed together with divisions. For stable intellectsions and conversions contract multitude; but those which subsist according to progression divide the whole into parts, and *the one* into its proper number.

¹⁹ The thing proposed to be shown from the first was to demonstrate that *the one* is undigent of permanency and motion, and that it is beyond and the cause of both. For the negation of permanency and motion cannot be applied to *the one* in the same manner as to matter. For matter participates of these merely in appearance. It is therefore applied to *the one*, as being better than both these. For, as some one prior to us, says Proclus, observes, because *the one* does not abide, *being* is moved, and because it is not moved, *being* is permanent. For *being* by its stability imitates the immobility of *the one*, and, by its efficacious energy, that which in *the one* is above tension and an establishment in itself. And through both these it is assimilated to *the one*, which is neither.

It

for *the one* to be in any thing. We have said so. It can never therefore be in *same*. Why? Because it would now be in that in which *same* is. Entirely so. But the one can neither be in itself nor in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in *same*. It does not appear that it is. But as it is never in *same*, it can neither be at rest nor stand still. In this case it cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is moved. It does not appear that it can. Nor will it be the same either with another²⁰, or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from another.

It is also beautifully observed here by Proclus, that a thing appears to stand still, which is established in *another*, but to be at rest, which is able to abide in *itself*. But Parmenides denies both these of *the one*, as not being in another nor in itself. Whether, therefore, there is a certain intellectual tranquillity which is celebrated by the wise, or mystic port, or paternal silence, it is evident that *the one* is exempt from all such things, being beyond energy, silence and quiet, and all the stable signatures which belong to beings.

But here, perhaps, some one may say, it has been sufficiently shown that *the one* is neither moved nor stands still, yet nothing hinders but that he may be called *stability* or motion. To this we reply, that *the one*, as we have before observed, is neither both of two opposites, lest he should become not one, and there should be prior to it that which mingles the opposites; nor is it the better of the two, lest it should have something which is opposed, and thus, in consequence of containing a property opposite to something else, should again be not one, and not being one should consist of infinite infinities; nor is it the worse of the two, lest it should have something better than itself, and this something better should again in like manner consist of infinite infinities. Hence Plato at length even denies *the one* of it, because that which is first is beyond all opposition, and *the one* is opposed to *the many*.

Let it also be observed that the first permanency and the first motion originate from themselves, the one deriving from itself stable power, and the other efficacious energy; in the same manner as every thing else which is first begins its own energy from itself. So that, when it is said *the one* does not stand, and is not moved, this also implies that it is not permanency, and that it is not motion. Hence, neither must it be said that *the one* is the most firm of all stable things, and the most energetic of every thing that is in motion: for transcendencies of participations do not take away, but strengthen the participations. If, therefore, *the one* does not in short stand, it is not *most firm*. For either *most firm* is only a name, and asserts nothing concerning *the one*, or it manifests that it is most stable. And if it is not in any respect moved, it is not *most energetic*. For, if these words signify nothing, they assert nothing concerning *the one*; but, if they signify that which in the most eminent degree participates of motion, *the one* will not be most energetic. For energy is a certain motion.

²⁰ Plato here appears to characterise for us the whole demiurgic order, in the same manner as the words prior to these characterise the vivific order, and those again prior to these, that which ranks as the summit in intellects. These things, indeed, as Proclus well observes, appear in a most eminent degree to pertain to the demiurgic series, according to the Platonic narrations concerning

another. How so? For, if different from itself²¹, it would be different from

cerning it, and those of other theologists; though, says he, this is dubious to some, who alone consider *permanency* and *motion*, *simeness* and *difference*, philosophically, and do not perceive that these things are first beheld about *the one*, and not about *being*; and that, as there is a twofold number, viz. *supereffential* and *essential*, in like manner each of these genera of being first subsist in the divine unities, and afterwards in beings. They likewise do not see that these are signs of the divine and self-perfect orders, and not of the genera or species only of being.

Let it also be observed that the genera of being subsist both in the intelligible and intellectual orders, intelligibly in the former, and intellectually in the latter; and this is just the same as to assert that in intelligibles they subsist absorbed in unity, and without separation, but in intellectual things with separation according to their proper number. So that it is by no means wonderful if the intelligible monad comprehends the whole intellectual pentad, viz. *essence*, *motion*, *permanency*, *sameness* and *difference*, without division, and in the most profound union, since through this union all these are after a manner one: for all things, says Proclus, are there without separation according to a dark mist, as the theologist²² asserts. *Ἀδιακρίτων πάντων ὄντων κατὰ σκοτεινότητα ὁμίχλην φησὶν ὁ θεολόγος*. For if in arithmetic the monad, which is the cause of monadic numbers, contains all those forms or productive principles which the decad comprehends decadically, and the tetrad tetradically, is it at all wonderful that among beings the intelligible monad should comprehend all the genera of being monadically, and without separation; but that another order should contain these dyadically, another tetradically, and another decadically? For ideas also subsist in intelligibles, but not after the same manner as in intellectual things; since in the former they subsist *totally*, *unitedly*, and *paternally*; but in the latter *with separation*, *partially*, and *demiurgically*. But it is every where necessary that the number of ideas should be suspended from the genera of being. If, therefore, intellectual ideas participate of the intellectual genera, intelligible ideas also must participate of the intelligible genera. But if ideas first subsist tetradically at the extremity of intelligibles, it is necessary that there should be a monadic subsistence of these genera prior to the formal tetrad.

Let us now consider why Plato first takes away from *the one*, *motion* and *permanency*, and afterwards *same* and *different*. We have already indeed said what was the cause of this, viz. that *motion* and *permanency* are twofold, one kind being prior to *same* and *different*, according to which every thing proceeds and is converted to its cause, but the other being posterior to *same* and *different*, and appearing in the energies of beings. But we shall now, with Proclus, assign the reason of this, after another manner, from the problems themselves. In this first hypothesis then, concerning *the one*, some things are denied of it with respect to itself alone: for *multitude* and *the whole*, *figure*, and *the being in a certain thing*, *motion* and *permanency*, are taken away from *the one* considered with respect to itself. But *same* and *different*, *similar* and *dissimilar*, *equal* and *unequal*, *older* and *younger*, are denied of *the one* both with respect to itself and other things: for *the one* is neither the *same* with itself, nor with others, and in a similar manner with respect to

²¹ Viz. Orpheus. Agreeably to this, in the Orphic hymn to Protogenus, who subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order, that deity is said "to wipe away from the eyes a dark mist."

Ὅσων ἐς σκοτεινότητα ἀπημαρυσας ὁμίχλην.

different,

from *the one*, and so would not be *the one*. True. And if it should be the same

different, and each of the rest. But *that which is the object of opinion or science, or which can be named, or is effable*, are denied of *the one* with respect to other things: for it is unknown to all secondary natures, by these gnostic energies. Negations, therefore, being assumed in a triple respect, viz. of a thing with respect to itself, of itself with respect to others, and of itself both with respect to itself and others, and some of these ranking as first, others as middle, and others as last, hence *motion* and *permanency* are denied of *the one*, as of itself with reference to itself, but *the same* and *different* are denied in a twofold respect, viz. of *the one* with reference to itself, and of itself with reference to other things. Hence the former are co-arranged with first negations, but the latter with such as are middle. Nor is it without reason that he first discourses about the former, and afterwards about the latter. Thus also he denies *the similar* and *the dissimilar*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, *the older* and *the younger*, of *the one* with reference to itself and other things. He likewise through these takes away from *the one*, *essence*, *quantity*, *quality*, and *the when*: for *the same* and *different* pertain to *essences*, *the similar* and *the dissimilar*, to *qualities*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, to *quantities*, and *the older* and *the younger*, to things which exist at a certain time. Plato also, says Proclus, denies *the same* and *the different* of *the one*, knowing that Parmenides in his poems places these in *the one being*: for thus Parmenides speaks—

Ταυτὸν τ' ἐν ταυτῷ μένει, καὶ αὐτὸ τε κείται.

i. e. *Same in the same abides, yet by itself subsists.*

It is necessary, therefore, to show that *the one* which is established above *the one being*, is by no means *same*, and much more that it is not *different*: for *sameness* is more allied to *the one* than *difference*. Hence, he takes away both *same* and *different* from *the one*, that he may show that it transcends *the one being*, in which both these subsist according to the verses of Parmenides, not confuting these verses, but taking occasion from them to make this additional assertion. For, if that which participates of sameness and difference is not yet *the true one*, it necessarily follows that *the true one* must subsist prior to these: for whatever is added to *the one* obscures by the addition the unity of the recipient.

²¹ There being four problems concerning *same* and *different*, as denied of *the one*, Plato beginning from the former of these, and which are more easily apprehended by us, proceeds through those that remain. But the four problems are as follow: *The one* is not different from itself: *the one* is not different from other things: *the one* is not the same with itself: and *the one* is not the same with other things. Of these four the extremes are the clearest: for that *the one* is not the same with other things is evident, and also that it is not different from itself. But the other two are attended with some difficulty. For how can any one admit that that which is one is not the same with itself? Or how is it possible not to be persuaded, that it is not different from other things, since it is exempt from them?

Let us then consider how the first of these problems is demonstrated, viz. that *the one* is not different from itself. It is, therefore, demonstrated as follows: If *the one* is different from itself, it will be entirely different from *the one*. But that which is different from *the one*, is not *one*:

same with another ²², it would be that thing and would not be itself; so that neither could it thus be *the one*, but it would be something different from *the*

for that which is different from man is not man, and that which is different from horse is not horse; and, in short, that which is different from any thing is not that thing. If, therefore, *the one* is different from itself, *the one* is not *one*. And this absurdity leads us to contradiction, that *the one* is not *one*. *The one*, therefore, is not different from itself. Some one, however, may doubt against this demonstration, whether it may not thus be shown that *difference* is not *different* from itself; though indeed it is necessary that it should. For every true being begins its energy from itself, as we have before observed: and the Eleatean guest, in the Sophista, says that the nature of *difference* is different from the other genera. But if *difference* is different from itself, it will not be *difference*; and hence *difference* is not different from itself. May we not say, therefore, that *difference* begins indeed its energy from itself, and makes itself different, yet not different from itself, but from other things? For it is able to separate them from each other, and, by a much greater priority, itself from them: and thus its energy is directed to itself, in preserving itself unconfused with other things. It may also be said, and that more truly, that *difference* so far as it is different from itself is not *difference*: for it is different from itself through the participation of the other genera of being. So far, therefore, as it participates of other things, so far it is not *difference*. Nor is it absurd that this should be the case with *difference*: for it is *multitude*. But it is absurd that this should be the case with *the one*: for it is *one* alone, and nothing else.

²² This is the second of the four problems, which is indeed more easily to be apprehended than those that follow, but is more difficult than the one that precedes it. Plato, therefore, confides in the assertion that *the one* receives nothing from other things. For this is an axiom of all others the most true, both when applied to *the one*, and to all other causes; since no cause receives any thing from that which is subordinate to itself. For neither do the heavens receive into themselves any thing of mortal molestation; nor does the demiurgus receive any thing from the generation which is about the whole world; nor do intelligibles participate of multitude from the intellectual order, and the separation which it contains. So that neither can *the one* be filled from the idiom of beings, and consequently it is by no means the same with other things. For it would either participate of the things themselves, or of things proceeding from them, or both they and *the one* would participate of some other one. But both cannot participate of another one: for nothing is better than *the one*, nor is there any thing which is more one; since in this case there would be something prior to *the one*. For the ascent is to *the one*, and not to multitude; since things more elevated always possess more of the nature of unity, as for instance, soul than body. Nor does *the one* participate of things themselves, since these are worse than it, nor of things proceeding from them: for it is at once exempt from all things, and is the object of desire to all beings, subsisting as an imparticipable prior to wholes, that it may be *one* without multitude; since the participated one is not in every respect one. In no respect, therefore, is *the one* the same with others. And thus it appears from common conceptions that the assertion is true.

the one. It could not indeed. But, if it is the same with another, must it not be different from itself? It must. But it will not be different ²³ from another

Let us now consider the demonstration of Parmenides, which is as follows: If *the one* is the same with any thing else, it will be the same with that which is not one: for it is itself *the one*. Hence also it is at the same time evident, that it is impossible for the true one to be two: for the two will differ from each other. Each, therefore, being one and differing from the other, each in consequence of possessing difference together with unity, will no longer be one. Hence *the one* is alone one. That, therefore, which is different from it is not one. Hence, if *the one* is the same with another, it is clearly the same with non-one: for that which is the same with *the one* is one, and that which is the same with non-man is non-man. If, therefore, *the one* is the same with any other thing besides itself, *the one* is not one. But if not one it is different from *the one*; which was before shown to be absurd. Parmenides also adds, and it would be different from *the one*, that through the absurdity proximately shown the absurdity of this hypothesis also may become apparent. Thus likewise it may be demonstrated that sameness itself is not sameness, if there is any instance in which it is in a certain respect the same with difference, or any thing else besides itself. Thus, it may be said that sameness is the same with difference, so far as it participates of difference. If, therefore, it is the same with difference, it is different, and not the same. Nor is there any absurdity in this: for in its own essence it is sameness, but by participation of difference it becomes different. It becomes however the same with difference, through the participation of difference; which is most paradoxical, that *sameness* should become *same* through difference.

²³ Of the two remaining problems Plato again demonstrates the more easy prior to the other. But it is easier to deny that which is more remote from *the one*; and such is difference. But sameness is more allied to *the one*; and hence it has a nature more difficult to be separated from it, and requires more abundant discussion. *The one* then, so far as *one*, does not participate of difference: for, if it did, it would be non-one. But every thing which is different from another is said to be so through difference. *The one*, therefore, so far as *one* is not different, because it does not participate of difference. For to be different alone pertains to that which is different from another, and not to *the one*; and such is that which participates of difference. But if *the one* is different through difference, it participates of difference. For *the one* is one thing, and different another; the former being denominated by itself, and the other with relation to something else: so that different is not different by *the one*, but by that which makes different.

But here a doubt may arise, how *the one* is said to be exempt from all things if it is not different from them? For that which is exempt is separated from those things from which it is exempt. But every thing which is separated is separated through difference: for difference is the source of division, but *sameness* of connexion. In answer to this it may be said, that *the one* is exempt and separate from all things, but that it does not possess this separation through difference, but from another ineffable transcendancy, and not such as that which difference imparts to beings. For, as both the world and intellect subsist for ever, but the *ever* is not the same in both, being *temporal* in the former, and *eternal* in the latter, and exempt from all time; so intellect is exempt from the

another while it is *the one*. For it does not belong to *the one* to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and to no other. Right. In consequence, therefore, of its being *the one*, it will not be another; or do you think that it can? Certainly not. But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itself. But if not different from itself, it will not be that which is *different*; and being in no respect that which is different, it will be different from nothing. Right. Nor yet will it be the same ¹ with itself. Why not? Is the nature of *the one* the same with that of *same*? Why? Because, when any thing becomes the same with any thing, it does not on this account become one. But what then? That which becomes the same with many things must necessarily become many, and not one. True. But if *the one* and *same* differ in no respect, whenever any thing becomes *same* it will always become *the one*, and whenever it becomes *the one* it will be *same*. Entirely so. If, therefore, *the one* should be the *same* with itself, it would be to itself that which is *not one*; and so that which is one will not be one. But this indeed is impossible. It is impossible, therefore, for *the one* to be either different from another, or the same with itself. Impossible. And thus *the one* will neither be *different* ² nor *the same*, either with respect to itself or another.

It

world, and *the one* from beings; but the exempt subsistence of intellect is derived from *difference* which separates beings, but that of *the one* is prior to *difference*. For *difference* imitates that which is exempt and unmingled in *the one*, just as *sameness* imitates its ineffable *oneness*.

¹ This is the fourth of the problems, that *the one* is not the *same* with itself, neither as *sameness*, nor as participating of *sameness*: and, in the first place, he shows that it is not as *sameness*. For, if *the one* is *sameness*, it is necessary that every thing which participates of *sameness* should according to that participation become one. It is however possible that a thing so far as it participates of *sameness* may become many, as is evident in that which becomes the same with many qualities. *Sameness*, therefore, is not *the one*. For, as that which becomes the same with man is man, and that which becomes the same with the white is white, and with the black, black, and, in short, in every thing, that which is the same with any form entirely receives that with which it is said to become the same,—so that which becomes the same with many things, so far as it is many, is the same with them. But, so far as it is many, it is impossible that it can be one. And hence *sameness* is not *the one*.

² This is the common conclusion of the four problems, and which reverts to the first proposition. We may also see that Plato begins from *the different* and ends in *the different*, imitating, both by the conciseness of the conclusion and in making the end the same with the beginning,

the

It will not. But neither will it be similar ¹ to any thing, or dissimilar either to itself or to another. Why not? Because the similar is that which in a certain

the circle of intellectual energy. It is also beautifully observed here by Proclus, that as *difference* in beings is twofold, or rather triple, viz. that of things more excellent, that of things subordinate, and that of things coordinate,—hence in superessential natures *transcendence* must be assumed instead of the *difference* which subsists in forms between the more excellent and the inferior; *subjection* instead of the *difference* of the *inferior* with respect to the superior; and *idiom* instead of the *separation* of things coordinate from each other. *The one*, therefore, transcends all things; and neither is *the one* different from other things, nor are other things different from *the one*. But if we employ such like appellations, and assert that other things are different from *the one*, we should look to the imbecility of human nature, and pardon such assertions. For that we cannot properly predicate any thing of *the one*, Plato himself indicates at the end of this hypothesis: at the same time, however, we assert something *concerning it*, through the spontaneous parturition of the soul about *the one*.

¹ Parmenides, says Proclus, passes from the *demiurgic* to the *assimilative* order, the idiom of which is to be alone supermundane, and through which all the *mundane* and *liberated* genera are assimilated to the intellectual Gods, and are conjoined with the demiurgic monad, which rules over wholes with exempt transcendence. From this demiurgic monad, too, all the assimilative order proceeds. But it imitates the *fameness* which is there through similitude, exhibiting in a more partial manner that power of *fameness* which is collective and connective of wholes. It likewise imitates *demiurgic difference*, through dissimilitude, expressing its separating and divisive power through unconfused purity with respect to the extremes. Nor must we here admit, as Proclus well observes, that which was asserted by some of the antients, viz. that *similitude* is *remitted fameness*, and *dissimilitude* *remitted difference*. For neither are there any intentions and remissions in the Gods, nor things indefinite, and the more and the less, but all things are there established in their proper boundaries and proper measures. Hence, it more accords with divine natures to assert such things of them as can be manifested by analogy. For Plato also admits analogy in these, in the Republic establishing *the good* to be that in intelligibles which *the sun* is in sensibles. Similitude, therefore, and dissimilitude are that in secondary which *fameness* and *difference* are in the natures prior to them: and the similar and the dissimilar are the first progeny of *fameness* and *difference*. The equal, also, and the unequal proceed from thence, but prior to these are similitude and dissimilitude: for the similar is more in forms than the equal, and the dissimilar more than the unequal. Hence, they are proximately suspended from the demiurgic monad; and on this account Timæus not only represents the demiurgus making the world, but also *assimilating* it to animal itself more than it was before; indicating by this that the *assimilative* cause preexists in the fabricator of the universe. With great propriety, therefore, Plato proceeds to the assimilative order after the demiurgic monad, taking away this also from *the one*.

But the method of the problems is the same as before: for here also there are four problems, viz. if *the one* is similar to itself; if *the one* is dissimilar to itself; if *the one* is similar to other things;

certain respect suffers ' *same*. Certainly. But it has appeared that *same* is naturally separate from *the one*. It has appeared so. But if *the one* should suffer any thing except being *the one* which *is*, it would become more than *the one*: but this is impossible. Certainly. In no respect, therefore, can *the one*

if *the one* is dissimilar to other things. But all the demonstrations, that none of these is adapted to *the one*, originate from sameness and difference, the media, according to demonstrative rules, being the proper causes of the thing. Hence, he often frames the demonstration from things remote, and not from things which have been proximately demonstrated. For things in a higher order, and which have a prior subsistence, are not always generative of secondary natures, but they perfect, or defend, or employ a providential care about, but are not entirely generative of them. Thus, for instance, Plato demonstrates that *the one* is not a *whole*, and has not *parts*, from *the many*: for thence the intellectual wholeness proceeds. He demonstrates that it has not *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, from *whole* and *parts*: for the order characterized by *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, is proximately produced from these. Again, he demonstrates that *the one* is neither *straight* nor *round*, from *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*: for the *straight* and *round* thence receive their generation. But he shows that *the one* is neither in *itself*, nor in *another*, from that order, and not from figure, though according to progression this is arranged before it. And he demonstrates that *the one* neither stands nor is moved, from *not being in any thing*, and from *not having a middle*, and from *not having parts*. Thus, also, in the demonstrations concerning *similitude* and *dissimilitude*, he derives the negations which are negative of *the one* from *sameness* and *difference*: for the latter are the sources of progression to the former.

¹ The syllogism which furnishes us with a proof that *the one* is not similar, neither to itself nor to another, proceeds geometrically as follows, Plato having first defined what the similar is. That, then, which suffers a certain something which is the same, is said to be similar to that with which it suffers something the same. For, we say that two white things are similar, and also two black, in consequence of the former being the passive recipients of the white, and the latter of the black. And again, if you say that a white thing and a black thing are similar to each other, you will say that they are similar from the participation of colour, which is their common genus. The syllogism, therefore, is as follows: *The one* suffers nothing the same, neither with itself nor with another: *the similar* suffers something the same, either with itself or with another: *the one*, therefore, is not similar, neither to itself nor to another. Such being the syllogism, Plato thinks that one of the propositions alone requires assistance, viz. that which asserts that *the one* does not suffer any thing the same, neither with itself nor with another.

And here, as Proclus well observes, we may see what caution Plato uses: for he does not say if *the one* should suffer *the one*, but if *the one* should suffer any thing, except being *the one* which *is*, χωρίς του ἑν εἶναι, for it is *the one*, and does not suffer it; since every thing which suffers, or is passive, is many. For he calls the participation of any thing a passion. Does he not, therefore, in saying that *the one* suffers nothing else, but *the one* which *is*, indicate in a very wonderful manner that even *the one* is subordinate to the principle of all things? which indeed he says it is at the

one suffer to be the same, either with another or with itself. It does not appear that it can. It cannot, therefore, be similar either to another or to itself. So it seems. Nor yet can *the one* suffer to be another; for thus it would suffer to be more than *the one*. More, indeed. But that which suffers to be different, either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers *same* is similar. Right. But *the one*, as it appears, since it in no respect suffers *different*, can in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another. It certainly cannot. *The one*, therefore, will neither be similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself. It does not appear that it can.

end of this hypothesis. He also indicates that the addition of this assertion to the principle of things is foreign to it, though more allied to it than other things, because it is not possible to conceive any thing more venerable than *the one*.

Should it be asked whence it is that what suffers the same is similar, we reply that similitude is the progeny of sameness, in the same manner as sameness of *the one*. Sameness, therefore, participates of *the one*, and similitude of sameness. For, this it is to suffer, to participate of another, and to proceed according to another more ancient cause.

Let it also be observed, that when it is said that all things are similar to *the one*, in consequence of ineffably proceeding from thence, they must not be understood to be similar according to this similitude, but alone according to that union which pervades to all beings from *the one*, and the spontaneous desire of all things about *the one*. For all things are what they are from a desire of *the one*, through *the one*; and in consequence of this parturition every thing being filled with a union adapted to its nature, is assimilated to the one cause of all things. Hence, it is not assimilated to similars; lest the ineffable principle itself should also appear to be similar to other things; but, if it be lawful so to speak, it is assimilated to the paradigm of things similar to this highest cause. Beings, therefore, are assimilated to *the one*; but they are assimilated through an ineffable desire of *the one*, and not through this assimilative order, or the form of similitude. For the assimilative which immediately subsists after the intellectual order, is not able to conjoin and draw upwards all beings to *the one*; but its province is to elevate things posterior to itself to the intellectual demiurgic monad. When, therefore, it is said that every progression is effected through similitude, it is requisite to pardon the names which we are accustomed to use in speaking of beings, when they are applied to the unfolding into light of all things from the ineffable principle of all. For, as we call him *the one*, in consequence of perceiving nothing more venerable, nothing more holy, in beings than unity, so we characterize the progression of all things from him by *similitude*, not being able to give any name to such progression more perfect than this. Thus also Socrates, in the Republic, calls this ineffable principle, according to analogy, the *idea* of the good; because *the good*, or *the one*, is that to all beings which every intelligible idea is to the proper series subsisting from and with relation to it.

But

But since it is such, it will neither be equal ¹ nor unequal, either to itself or to another. How so? If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same

¹ After the assimilative order of Gods, which is supermundane alone, antient theologists arrange that which is denominated liberated, the peculiarity of which, according to them, is to be exempt from mundane affairs, and at the same time to communicate with them. They are also proximately carried in the mundane Gods; and hence they say that they are allotted the medium of the supermundane and mundane Gods. This liberated order, therefore, Plato delivers to us in the second hypothesis, and also there says what the idiom of it is, and that it is *touching*: for it is in a certain respect mundane and supermundane, being collective of those that are properly called mundane Gods, and producing into multitude the union of all the assimilative and supermundane series. Here, however, Plato omits this order, and passes on to those Gods that are alone mundane; the reason of which we shall endeavour to assign in commenting on the second hypothesis.

The peculiarity, therefore, of the mundane Gods is *the equal* and *the unequal*, the former of these indicating their fulness, and their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for such is that which is equal to itself, always preserving the same boundary;) but the latter, the multitude of their powers, and the excess and defect which they contain. For, in these, divisions, variety of powers, differences of progressions, analogies, and bonds through these, are, according to antient theologists, especially allotted a place. Hence, Timæus also constitutes souls through analogy, the causes of which must necessarily subsist in the Gods that proximately preside over souls: and as all analogies subsist from equality, Plato very properly indicates the idiom of these divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he now very properly frames the demonstrations of the negations of the equal and the unequal from *sameness* and *the many*, and not from *the similar* and *the dissimilar*, though he proximately spoke of these. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and the first multitude which he first denies of the one.

Of this then we must be entirely persuaded, that the things from which demonstrations consist are the preceding causes of the particulars about which Parmenides discourses; so that *the equal* and *the unequal*, so far as they proceed from *the one*, and subsist through *sameness* and *the many*, so far through these they are denied of *the one*. Hence, Plato thus begins his discourse concerning them:—"But since it is such," viz. not as we have just now demonstrated, but as was formerly shown, that it neither receives *same* nor *different*, and is *without multitude*,—being such, it is neither equal nor unequal, neither to itself nor to others: for, again, there are here twofold conclusions, in the same manner as concerning the similar and the dissimilar, and the same and the different. But that *the equal* and *the unequal* are suspended from the twofold coordinations of divine natures is not immanifest. For *the equal* is arranged under *the similar*, and *the same*, *subsistence in another*, *the round*, and *the whole*; but *the unequal*, under *the dissimilar*, *the different*, *subsistence in itself*, *the straight*, and *the possession of parts*. And again, of these the former are suspended from *bound*, and the latter from *infinity*. Plato also appears to produce the discourse through certain oppositions, as it were, that he may show that *the one* is above all opposition. For *the one* cannot be the worse of the two opposites, since this would be absurd; nor can it be the better of the two, since

same[†] measures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or lesser than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the lesser quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser; and with respect to the other, of greater measures. How should it not? Is it not, therefore, impossible that that which does not participate of *same* should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same? It is im-

in this case it would not be the cause of all things. For the better opposite is not the cause of the worse, but in a certain respect communicates with it, without being properly its cause. For neither does sameness give subsistence to difference, nor permanency to motion; but comprehension and union pervade from the better to the worse.

[†] It is by no means wonderful that the demonstrations of *the equal* and *the unequal*, which are here assumed as symbols of mundane deity, should be adapted to physical and mathematical equals, to the equals in the reasons of soul, and to those in intellectual forms. For it is necessary that demonstrations in all these negations should begin supernally, and should extend through all secondary natures, that they may show that *the one* of the Gods is exempt from intellectual, psychical, mathematical, and physical forms. All such axioms, therefore, as are now assumed concerning things equal and unequal, must be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, says Proclus, as it contains many powers, some of which are coordinate with each other, and extend themselves to the self-perfect and the good, but others differ according to transcendency and subject in—the former must be said to be characterised by *equality*, but the latter by *inequality*. For *the good* is the measure of every thing; and hence such things as are united by the same good are measured by the same measure, and are equal to each other. But things which are uncoordinated with each other make their progression according to the unequal.

Since, however, of things unequal, some are commensurate and others incommensurate, it is evident that these also must be adapted to divine natures. Hence commensuration must be referred to those Gods, through whom secondary natures are mingled with those prior to them, and participate of the whole of more excellent beings: for thus, in things commensurate, the lesser is willing to have a common measure with the greater, the same thing measuring the whole of each. But incommensuration must be ascribed to those divinities from whom things subordinate, through the exempt transcendency of more excellent natures, participate of them in a certain respect, but are incapable through their subjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. For the communion from first to partial and multifarious natures is incommensurate to the latter. If, indeed, *the equal* and *the unequal* are symbols of the mundane Gods, *the commensurate* and *the incommensurate* are here very properly introduced. For in things incorporeal and immaterial this opposition has no place, all things being there effable; but where there is a material subject, and a mixture of form and something formless, there an opposition of commensuration very properly subsists. Hence, as the mundane Gods are proximately connective of souls and bodies, form and matter, a division appears in them, according to *the equal* and *the unequal*.
possible.

possible. It will, therefore, neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and so again it will no longer be *the one*, but as many as there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure: but it has appeared that *the one* cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. *The one*, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of *same*) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or lesser either than itself or another. It is in every respect so.

But what? Does it appear that *the one* can be either older¹ or younger,
or

¹ Plato having proceeded in negations as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a consequent order from *the one*, through the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to *the one*, from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from *the one* the divine essence itself, which first participates of the Gods, and receives their progression into the world; or, to speak more accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its subsistence from the monad of beings, both *true being*, and that which is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being; in like manner, from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful so to speak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendency, every divine number subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said, is to show that *the one* is exempt from this essence. And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind, and this by showing that *the one* does not participate of time: for it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which are measured by time. *The one* also is better than and is beyond intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent; but it is demonstrated that *the one* neither stands nor is moved: so that, as Proclus well observes, through these things the three hypostases which rank as principles, viz. *the one*, *intellect*, and *soul*, become known to us (ὡς τε δια τούτων τὰς τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ἐχρίμεν ἀν' ἡνωμένους γεννημένους.) But that *the one* is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides demonstrates by showing in the first place that it is neither older, nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of these; so that by showing that *the one* is exempt from these which happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that *the one* has no connexion with time. This, however, says Proclus, is incredible to the many, and appeared so to the physiologists

or be of the same age? What should hinder? If it had in any respect the same

gifts prior to Plato, who thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any thing which time does not measure. For, as they were of opinion that all things are in place, in consequence of thinking that all things are bodies; and that nothing is incorporeal, so they thought that all things subsist in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is immovable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itself place, but motion time. As therefore it was demonstrated that *the one* is not in place, because it is not in another, and on this account is incorporeal,—in like manner through these arguments it is also shown that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not soul, nor any thing else which requires and participates of time, either according to essence or according to energy.

And here it is well worthy our observation, that Parmenides no longer stops at the dyad as in the former conclusions, but triadically enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. *the older, the younger, and the possession of the same age*, though, as Proclus justly observes, he might have said dyadically, *of an equal age, and of an unequal age*, as there *the equal and the unequal*. But there indeed, having previously introduced the dyad, he passes from the division of the unequal to the triadic distribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of things multitude is most apparent, and a division into parts, as Timæus says, whom Parmenides, in what is now said, imitating begins indeed from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For *the older and the younger, and the possession of the same age*, are doubled, being divided into *itself* and *relation to another*. That the triad, indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order, is not immanifest: for the triple nature of soul, consisting of *essence, same, and different*, and its triple power, which receives its completion from the charioteer and the two horses, as we learn from the Phædrus, evince its alliance with the triad; and its essence being combined from both these shows its natural alliance with the hexad.

And here it is necessary to observe, that as the discourse is about divine souls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, time according to its first subsistence pertains to these souls,—not that which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and without habitude; and this is the time which is now denied of *the one*. All the periods of souls, their harmonious motions about the intelligible, and their circulations, are measured by this time. For it has a supernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to soul, or in whatever other manner it may be said to subsist. This time also is indeed essentially an intellect; but it is the cause to divine souls of their harmonic and infinite motion about the intelligible, through which these likewise are led to *the older* and to *the same age*: and this in a twofold respect. For *the older* in these *with respect to themselves* takes place, so far as with their more excellent powers they more enjoy the infinity of time, and participate it more abundantly: for they are not filled with similar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their powers, but with some more, and with others less. But that is said to be older which participates more of time. That which is older in these divine souls *with respect to other things* is effected so far as some of these receive the whole measure of time,

same ¹ age, either with itself or with another, it would participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted *the one* does not participate.

and the whole of its extension proceeding to souls, but others are measured by more partial periods. Those, therefore, are older, whose period is more total, and is extended to a longer time. They may also be said to be older and at the same time younger with respect to themselves, by becoming *hoary* as it were above, through extending themselves to the whole power of time, but *juvenile* beneath, by enjoying time more partially. But, as with respect to others, they may be said to be older and at the same time younger, according to a subjection of energy: for that which has its circulation measured by a lesser period is younger than that whose circulation is measured by a more extended period. Again, among things coordinate, that which has the same participation and the same measure of perfection with others may be said to be of the same age with itself and others. But every divine soul, though its own period is measured according to one time, and that of the body which is suspended from it according to another, yet it has an equal restitution to the same condition; itself always according to its own time, and its body also according to its time. Hence, again, it is of the same age with itself and its body, according to the *analogous*.

By thus interpreting what is now said of *the one*, we shall accord with Plato, in the *Timæus*, who there evinces that *time* is the measure of every transitive life, and who says that soul is the origin of a divine and wise life through the whole of time. And we shall also accord with his assertion in the *Phædrus*, that souls see true being through time, because they perceive *temporally*, and not *eternally*.

² Plato here demonstrates that *the one* is neither older nor younger than itself, or another. For, it was necessary to show that *the one* is beyond every divine soul, prior to other souls, in the same manner as it is demonstrated to be prior to true beings, and to be the cause of all things. Nor must it be on this account admitted that *the one* comprehends in itself the causes of all things, and through this is multitude. For every cause is the cause of one particular property; as, for instance, *animal itself* is the cause alone to animals of a subsistence as animals; and, in the same manner, every intelligible produces other things, according to its idiom alone. *The one*, therefore, is the cause of *unities*, and of *union* to all things; and all things are thence derived, either as being unities, or as composed from certain unities: for being itself, and, in short, every thing, is either as *one*, or as consisting from certain unities. For, if it is *united*, it is evident that it consists from certain things; and if these are unities the consequence is manifest: but if they are things united, we must again pass on to the things from which they are composed, and thus proceeding ad infinitum, we must end in certain unities, from which, as elements, that which is united consists. Hence it follows that all things are either unities or numbers. For that which is not a *unity*, but *united*, if it consists from certain definite unities, is number, and this will be the first number, subsisting from things indivisible: for every unity is indivisible. But the number of beings is from beings, and not from things indivisible. So that, if there is a certain cause of beings, it is the cause of all beings; but if there is a certain cause of the unities from which all things consist, it is indeed the cause of all things: for there is no longer any thing which is not either a *unity*, or composed from unities. Hence, it is not proper to say that the causes of all things are

participate. We have asserted so. And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How, therefore, being such, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any thing? It can in no respect. The one, therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not, therefore, be impossible that *the one* should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not that which is older ¹, always older than the younger? What then? That, therefore, which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. How do you say? Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in *becoming* to be different from another, when it *is* already different, but that it should

in *the one*, nor, without saying this, to think that *the one* is the cause of certain things, as of unities, and is not at the same time the cause of all things. Since, therefore, it is the cause of every divine soul, so far as these derive their subsistence as well as all beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it necessary to show that the one is beyond the order of deified souls: for these souls so far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cause; so far as they are essences, they originate from intellect; and so far as they have the form of unity, they are derived from the one; receiving their hypostasis from this, so far as each is a multitude consisting of certain unities, and of these as elements.

¹ That which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion from the same to the same, to which both the beginning and the end are the same, and the motion is unceasing, every thing in it being both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, participates of time periodically: and so far as it departs from the beginning it becomes older, but so far as it approaches to the end it becomes younger. For, becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to its proper beginning; but that which becomes nearer to its beginning becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end becomes younger, the same also according to the same becoming older; for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is older. That to which the beginning, therefore, is one thing, and the end another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to which the beginning and the end are the same, is in no respect older than younger, but, as Plato says, at the same time becomes younger and older than itself. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, if it becomes both older and younger than itself, is circularly moved. But divine souls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and the time of their proper motion is periodical.

be now different from that which *is* different, *have been* from that which *was*, and *will be* from that which *is to be hereafter*: but from that which *is becoming to be* different, it ought neither to *have been*, nor to *be hereafter*, nor to *be*, but to subsist in *becoming to be* different, and no otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which *is becoming to be* older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in *becoming to be* younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to subsist in *becoming to be* in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in *becoming to be*, should *be*, *have been*, and *be hereafter*. For these are necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of these passions belongs to *the one*. None. Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist¹ in any time. It does not, indeed, according to the decisions of reason. What then? Do not the terms *it was*², *it has been*, *it did become*, seem

to

¹ As *the one* is not in time, because it is not in motion, so neither is it in eternity, because it is not in permanency: for eternity abides, as Timæus says.

² This division of time, says Proclus, accords with the multitude of the divine genera which are suspended from divine souls, viz. with angels, dæmons and heroes. And, in the first place, this division proceeds to them supernally, according to a triadic distribution into the *present*, *past*, and *future*; and, in the next place, according to a distribution into nine, each of these three being again subdivided into three. For the monad of souls is united to the one whole of time, but this is participated secondarily by the multitude of souls. And of this multitude those participate of this whole *totally*, that subsist according to *the past*, or *the present*, or *the future*; but those participate it *partially*, that are essentialized according to the differences of these: for to each of the wholes a multitude is coordinated, divided into things first, middle, and last. For a certain multitude subsists in conjunction with that which is established according to the past, the *summit* of which is according to *the was*, but the *middle* according to it *has been*, and the *end* according to it *did become*. With that also which is established according to the *present*, there is another multitude, the *principal* part of which is characterized by *the is*, the *middle* by it *is generated*, and the *end* by it *is becoming to be*. And there is another triad with that which subsists according to the future, the *most elevated* part of which is characterized by the *will be*, that which ranks in the *middle*, by it *may become*, and the *end*, by it *will be generated*. And thus there will be three triads proximately suspended from these three wholenesses, but all these are suspended from their monad.

AU

to signify the participation of the time past? Certainly. And do not the terms *it will be*, *it may become*, and *it will be generated*, signify that which

All these orders which are distributed according to the parts of time, energize according to the whole of time, this whole containing in itself triple powers, one of which is *perfective* of all motion, the second *connects* and *guards* things which are governed by it, and the third *unfolds* divine natures into light. For as all such things as are not eternal are led round in a circle, the *wholeness* or the *monad* of time perfects and connects their essence, and discloses to them the united infinity of eternity, evolving the contracted multitude which subsists in eternal natures; whence also this apparent time, as Timæus says, unfolds to us the measures of divine periods, perfects sensibles, and guards things which are generated in their proper numbers. Time, therefore, possesses triple powers prior to souls, viz. *the perfective*, *the connective*, and *the unfolding*, according to a similitude to eternity. For eternity, possessing a middle order in intelligibles, *perfects* the order posterior to itself, supplying it with union, but *unfolds into light* that which is prior to itself, producing into multitude its ineffable union, and *connects* the middle bond of intelligibles, and guards all things intransitively through its power. Time, therefore, receiving supernally the triple powers of eternity, imparts them to souls. Eternity, however, possesses this triad unitedly; but time unitedly, and at the same time distributively; and souls distributively alone. Hence, of souls, some are characterized according to one, and others according to another power of time; some imitating its *unfolding*, others its *perfective*, and others its *connective* power. Thus also with respect to the Fates, some of these being adapted to give completion and perfection to things, are said to sing the past, always indeed energizing, and always singing, their songs being intellections and fabricative energies about the world: for the *past* is the source of *completion*. Others again of these are adapted to *connect* things present: for they guard the essence and the generation of these. And others are adapted to *unfold* the future: for they lead into essence and to an end that which as yet is not.

We may also say, since there is an order of souls more excellent than ours: divided into such as are first, such as are middle, and such as are last, the most total of these are adapted to *the past*. For, as this comprehends in itself the present and the future, so these souls comprehend in themselves the rest. But souls of a middle rank are adapted to *the present*: for this was once *future*, but is not yet *the past*. As, therefore, *the present* contains in itself *the future*, so these middle souls comprehend those posterior, but are comprehended in those prior to themselves. And souls of the third order correspond to *the future*: for this does not proceed through *the present*, nor has become *the past*, but is *the future* alone; just as these third souls are of themselves alone, but, through falling into a most partial subsistence, are by no means comprehensive of others; for they involve the boundary according to a triadic division of the genera posterior to the Gods.

The whole of the first triad, therefore, has in common the *once*, for this is the peculiarity of the past, and of completion; but it is divided into *the was*, *it was generated*, and *it did become*. Again, therefore, of these three, *the was* signifies the summit of the triad, bounded according to hyparxis itself; but *it was generated*, signifies an at-once-collected perfection; and *it did become*, an extension in being perfected; these things being imitations of intelligibles. For *the was* is an imitation of *being*, *it was generated*, of *eternity*, and *it did become*, of that which is *primarily eternal*: for *being* is derived to all things from the first of these; a subsistence at once as *all* and a *whole* from the second, and an *extension into multitude* from the third.

is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not the terms *it is*, and *it is becoming to be*, marks of the present time? Entirely so. If then *the one* participates¹ in no respect of any time, it neither ever *was*, nor *has been*, nor *did become*: nor is it *now generated*, nor is *becoming to be*, nor *is*, nor *may become* hereafter, nor *will be generated*, nor *will be*. It is most true. Is it possible, therefore, that any thing can participate of essence², except

¹ It is not immanifest how the syllogism proceeds in what is now said: *The one* participates of no time; but every thing which once subsisted *was*, or *has been*, or *did become*; every thing which subsists according to the present *is*, or *is generated*, or *is becoming to be*; and every thing which subsists according to the future *will be*, or *may become*, or *will be generated*. But all these distribute the *wholeness* of time. *The one*, therefore, is exempt from, and is expanded above, this temporal triad and the unity from which it is suspended. From all, therefore, that has been said, it is requisite, as Proclus justly observes, to collect this one thing, that *the one* is established above every divine essence characterized by the nature of soul, and which always energizes after the same manner, such as are the souls of the more excellent genera, whether the division of them is made into three, or into nine, or into any other number.

Should it be said, however, that *the one*, though it does not participate of time, may be time itself, for the first cause is denominated time by Orpheus; to this it may be replied, that *the one* cannot be time; since in this case the perfection proceeding from it would extend no further than souls, and things which are moved. For eternal natures are more excellent than such as energize according to time. *The one*, therefore, would be the cause of subordinate only, and not of superior natures; and thus would not be the cause of all things. But the first cause, says Proclus, was denominated time by Orpheus, according to a certain wonderful analogy: for the theologist symbolically calls the mystical processions of unbegotten natures, generations; and the cause of the unfolding into light of divine natures, Time; for, where there is generation, there also there is time. Thus, the generation of sensibles is according to mundane time, that of souls according to supercelestial time, and that of things eternal according to *the one*. Proclus beautifully adds: As therefore we endure to hear the sleepless energy of divine natures separate from the objects of their providential care, denominated sleep, their union, a bond, and their progression, a solution from bonds, so also we must endure those that introduce time and generation to things without time, and which are unbegotten.

² Having proceeded as far as to a deified essence, and which always energizes after the same manner, and having denied all the orders of *the one*, viz. the divine, the intellectual, and such as are psychical, we must again recur through a nature common to all the aforesaid orders, or, in other words, through *being* to the intelligible monad of all beings, and from this also we must exempt *the one*. For, as we before observed, Plato does not make the beginning of his negations from the summit of intelligibles, but from the summit of the intellectual order: for there *the many* are generated, as we shall show in commenting on the second hypothesis. But essence which subsists according to *the one being*, is prior to these *many*, and to all the above-mentioned orders. Hence, from all these, as participating of *essence* in common, we recur to *essence itself*, and

according to some one of these? It is not. In no respect, therefore, does *the one* participate of essence. It does not appear that it can. *The one*, therefore,

and make a negation even of this. For every thing which participates of essence participates of it according to some one of these, not indeed of those that are proximately enumerated, but of all together that the first hypothesis contains, such as *whole*, or having *parts*, or having *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, or *being in itself*, or in *another*, and every thing else which is there denied of *the one*; so that it follows, as was before observed, that such things only are assumed as are consequent to beings so far as they are beings, and not so far as they are certain vital or intellectual natures. For every thing, says he, which in any respect participates of essence, participates of it according to some one of these negations. *The one*, therefore, does not participate of essence. Thus also Socrates, in the Republic, says, that *the good* is beyond essence, and is not essence, but is the cause of it, and is beyond every thing intellectual and intelligible, in the same manner as the sun is the cause of all visible natures, by *essence* meaning the same as *being* (*to on*). For Plato here clearly says, that it is not possible for any thing to *be*, unless it participates of *essence*: and in the Timæus he makes a similar assertion. If, therefore, the first cause is superessential and above all being, it is false to assert that he *is*: for, since he is beyond *essence*, he is also exempt from *being*. And in this, as Proclus well observes, Parmenides in Plato differs from Parmenides in his verses, because the latter looks to *the one being*, and says that this is the cause of all things; but the former ascending from *the one being* to that which is *one alone* and prior to being, he denies of *the one* the participation of essence.

And here observe, that Plato does not adopt the conclusion that *the one is not* through demonstration, because it was not possible to demonstrate this directly through the alliance of *being* with *the one*. For, as we have before observed, in negations, things more allied are more difficult to be demonstrated. But if this be true, it is evident that *the one is not*. For every thing about *the one* which is added to it diminishes its exempt transcendence.

Should it be asked why Parmenides does not begin his negations from *the is*, but from *the many*, and neither separates the order which immediately subsists after *the one*, and thus proceeds as far as to the last of things, nor, separating *the one* from these, ascends as far as to the summit of beings, we reply, that the negation of essence would be contrary to the hypothesis: for the hypothesis says that *the one is*, but the negation that it *is not*. It would, therefore, be of all things the most ridiculous to say immediately from the beginning, if *the one is*, *the one is not*: for the assertion would appear to subvert itself. Hence, employing the *is*, and saying, as if it made no difference, if *the one is*, Parmenides finds that *the many* appear to be especially opposed to *the one*.

That *the one*, indeed, according to Plato, is above all essence, is evident from the testimony of Speusippus, according to Proclus, who also adds, that Speusippus confirms this from the opinion of the ancients, when he says they thought that *the one* is better than *being*, and is the principle of *being*, free from all habitude to subsequent natures, just as *the good itself* is separated from the condition of every other good. But Speusippus there calls the first being the proper principle of beings, and boundless divinity depending on *the one*.

Parmenides,

fore, *is* in no respect. So it seems. Hence, it is not in such a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be being, and participate of essence: but, as it appears, the one neither *is one* nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not? How can it? Neither, therefore, does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not appear that there can. Hence, it can neither be named, nor

Parmenides, therefore, beginning supernally from the intelligible summit of the first intellectual Gods, and producing in an orderly series the genera of the Gods, and of the natures united and subsequent to them, and always evincing that *the one* is ineffably exempt from all things, again returns from hence to the beginning, and, imitating the conversion of wholes, separates *the one* from the intelligible or highest Gods. For thus especially may we behold its immense transcendency, if we not only show that it is established above the second or third orders in the golden chain of deity, but that it also ranks before the intelligible unities themselves, and evince this in a manner coordinate to the simplicity of those occult natures, and not by various words, but by intellectual projection alone: for intelligibles are naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This, therefore, Parmenides in reality evinces, leaving logical methods, but energizing according to intellect, and asserting that *the one* is beyond essence, and *the one being*. For this is not collected, as we have before observed, from the preceding conclusions; since in this case the belief concerning the highest Gods, who are implied by *essence*, being derived from things inferior to them, would be void of demonstration: for all demonstration, as Aristotle justly observes, is from things naturally prior to, and more honourable than, the conclusions. Hence, Parmenides at the same time infers, that every kind of knowledge, and all the instruments of knowledge, fall short of the transcendency of *the one*, and beautifully end in the ineffable of the God who is beyond all things. For, after scientific energies and intellectual projections, union with the unknown succeeds; to which also Parmenides referring the whole discourse, concludes the first hypothesis, suspending all the divine genera from *the one*, which, as he also shows, is singularly exempt from all things. Hence it is said to be beyond *the one which is conjoined with essence*, and at the same time all the participated multitude of unities.

It is also beautifully observed by Proclus, that by the appellation of *the one* in this dialogue we are not to understand that which is in itself *the one*; but that the inward one resident in our essence, and derived from the first one, as an occult symbol of his nature, is expressed by this appellation. For in every being there is an innate desire of the first cause; and hence, prior to appetite there is a certain occult perception of that which is first.

Lastly, when Parmenides says that *the one* can neither be named nor spoken of, it follows that we are not only incapable of affirming any thing of it, but that even negations of it, though more safe than affirmations, are not to be admitted. For he who openly denies, in the mean time secretly affirms; since to deny any thing of the first, is to separate something from it; and this cannot be effected without forming in ourselves both the first, and that which we separate from it.

spoken

spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it seems. Is it possible, therefore, that these things can thus take place about *the one*? It does not appear to me that they can.

Are you therefore willing that we should return again to the hypothesis from the beginning, and see whether or not by this means any thing shall appear to us different from what it did before? I am entirely willing. Have we not therefore declared if *the one is*, what circumstances ought to happen to it? Is it not so? Certainly. But consider from the beginning, if *the one is*¹, can it be possible that it should *be*, and yet not participate of *essence*?

¹ This is the beginning of the second hypothesis, which, as we have observed in the Introduction to this dialogue, unfolds the whole order of the Gods, and establishes the summit of intelligibles as the first after *the one*, but ends in an essence which participates of time, and in deified souls. In the first place, therefore, let us endeavour to unfold what Plato here occultly delivers concerning the first procession or order of Gods, called the intelligible triad.

As the first cause then is *the one*, and this is the same with *the good*, the universality of things must form a whole, the best and the most profoundly united in all its parts which can possibly be conceived: for *the first good* must be the cause of the greatest good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodness is union, the best production must be that which is most united. But as there is a difference in things, and some are more excellent than others, and this in proportion to their proximity to the first cause, a profound union can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of a superior order coalescing through intimate alliance with the summit of one proximately inferior. Hence the first of bodies, though they are essentially corporeal, yet *κατα σῆμα*, through *habitude* or *alliance*, are most vital, or lives. The highest of souls are after this manner intellects, and the first of beings are Gods. For, as *being* is the highest of things after *the first cause*, its first subsistence must be according to a superessential characteristic.

Now that which is superessential, considered as participated by the highest or *true being*, constitutes that which is called *intelligible*. So that every true being depending on the Gods is a *divine intelligible*. It is *divine*, indeed, as that which is deified; but it is *intelligible*, as the object of desire to intellect, as perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of *being* itself. But in the first being life and intellect subsist according to cause: for every thing subsists either according to *cause*, or according to *hyperxis*, or according to *participation*. That is, every thing may be considered either as subsisting occultly in its cause, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is), or as participated by something else. The first of these is analogous to light when viewed subsisting in its fountain the sun; the second to the light immediately proceeding from the sun; and the third to the splendour communicated to other natures by this light.

The first procession therefore from the first cause will be the intelligible triad, consisting of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, which are the three highest things after the first God, and of which *being*

essence? It cannot. Will not essence therefore be the *essence* of *the one*, but not the same with *the one*? for, if it were the same, it would not be the essence

is prior to *life*, and *life* to *intellect*. For whatever partakes of life partakes also of being: but the contrary is not true, and therefore being is above life; since it is the characteristic of higher natures to extend their communications beyond such as are subordinate. But *life* is prior to *intellect*, because all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of its superessential characteristic, all things may be considered as subsisting according to cause: and consequently number here has not a proper subsistence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and absorbed in super-essential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we must not suppose that any *essential distinction* takes place, but must consider this appellation as expressive of its ineffable perfection. For, as it is the nearest of all things to *the one*, its union must be transcendently profound and ineffably occult.

All the Gods indeed considered according to their unities are all in all, and are at the same time united with the first God like rays to light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all established in the first cause (as Proclus beautifully observes) like the roots of trees in the earth; so that they are all as much as possible superessential, just as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the same time being earth itself: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, or subsisting according to the eternal, is different from the partial natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its being wholly of a superessential idiom, must possess an inconceivable profundity of union, both with itself and its cause, so as to subsist wholly according to *the united*, το *ἑνωμένον*; and hence it appears to the eye of pure intellect, as one simple indivisible splendour beaming from an unknown and inaccessible fire.

He then who is able, by opening the greatest eye of the soul, to see that perfectly which subsists without separation, will behold the simplicity of the intelligible triad subsisting in a manner so transcendent as to be apprehended only by a superintellectual energy, and a deific union of the perceiver with this most arcane object of perception. But since in our present state it is impossible to behold an object so astonishingly lucid with a perfect and steady vision, we must be content, as Damascius well observes*, with a far distant, scarcely attainable, and most obscure glimpse; or with difficulty apprehending a trace of this light like a sudden coruscation bursting on our sight. Such then is the preeminence of the intelligible order, to which, on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we assign a triple division, beholding as in a mirror a luminous triad, beaming from a uniform light; just, says Damascius, as the uniform colour of the sun appears in a cloud which possesses three catoptric intervals, through the various-coloured nature of the rainbow.

But when we view this order in a distributed way, or as possessing separation in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of subsistence to our imperfect conceptions, it is necessary to give the triad itself a triple division. For we have said that it consists of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*. But in *being* we may view life and intellect, according to cause; in *life* being according to participation,

* Vid. Excerpta ex Damascio, a Wolfio, p. 232.

essence of *the one*, nor would *the one* participate of essence; but it would be all one to say *the one is*, and *one one*. But now our hypothesis is not *if one*, what

and intellect according to cause; and in *intellect* both being and life according to participation; while at the same time in reality the whole is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to cause. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is said in the Chaldaic theology to consist of *father*, *power*, and *intellect*; *father* being the same with *hyperis*, *unity*, *summit*, or *that which is super-essential*; *power* being a certain pouring forth, or infinity of *the one** (or the summit); and on this account, says Damascius, it is present with *father*, as a diffused with an abiding one, and as pouring itself forth into a true chaos: but *intellect*, that is *paternal intellect*, subsisting according to a conversion to the paternal *one*; a conversion transcending all other conversions, as being neither gnostic, nor vital, nor essential, but an unseparated surpassing energy, which is union rather than conversion.

Let not the reader, however, imagine that these names are the inventions of the latter Platonists; for they were well known to Plato himself, as is evident from his *Timæus*. For in that dialogue he calls the artificer of the universe *intellect*, and *father*; and represents him commanding the junior Gods to imitate the *power* which he employed in their generation.

This intelligible triad is occultly signified by Plato, in the *Philebus*, under the dialectic epithets of *bound*, *infinite*, and *that which is mixed*. For all beings (says he) consist or are mingled from *bound* and *infinity*; and consequently *being itself*, which we have already shown has the highest subsistence after the first cause, must be before all things mixed from these two; the former of these, viz. *bound*, being evidently analogous to *the one*, or *father*, and *infinity* to *power*. We may likewise consider him as unfolding the intelligible order in the same dialogue, by the epithets of *symmetry*, *truth*, and *beauty*; which, says he, are requisite to every thing that is mixed. And he adds that this triad subsists in the vestibule of *the good*; evidently alluding by this expression to the profound union of this triad with the incomprehensible cause of all things.

But, in the present dialogue, the intelligible order is delivered by Plato according to an all-perfect distribution into three triads; for the sake of affording us some demonstration, though very obscure and imperfect, of truth so transcendent and immense. In this second hypothesis, therefore, which, as we have already observed, unfolds the various orders of the Gods, each conclusion signifying some particular order, he calls the first of these triads *in or, one being*; *power*, or the middle habitude of both, being here concealed through excess of union; so that here *the one* partakes of *being*, and *being of the one*; which, as Proclus well observes, is indeed a circumstance of a most wonderful nature. Parmenides therefore calls this triad *one being*, without mentioning *power*, because the whole triad abides in unproceeding union, subsisting uniformly and without separation. But after this the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterises by intelligible *wholeness*, but its parts are *being* and *the one*, and *power*, which is situated in the middle, is here distributive and not unific, as in the former triad. But his discourse concerning this triad commences from hence—"Again, therefore, let us consider if *the*

* Let the reader be careful to remember that *the one* of the Gods is their supersessential characteristic.

what ought to happen, but *if the one is*—Is it not so? Entirely so. Does it not signify that the term *is* is something different from *the one*? Necessarily.

one is, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a *one* as possesses parts." But he concludes his speculation thus—"That which is *one* therefore is a whole, and possesses a part."

But after these the third triad subsists, in which all intelligible multitude appears; and which Parmenides indeed (says Proclus) calls a wholeness, but such a *one* as is composed from a multitude of parts. For after that occult union (says he) of the first triad, and the dyadic distinction of the second, the progression of the third triad is produced, possessing its hypostasis indeed from parts, but then these parts compose a multitude which the triad prior to this generates. For *unity*, *power* and *being* are contained in this third triad; but then each of these is multiplied, and so the whole triad is a wholeness. But since each of its extremities, viz. *the one*, and *being*, is a multitude which is conjoined through a collective power, each of these is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining united multitude with the multitude of beings, some of these *one being* perfects through progression; but others, *being which is one*, through communion. Here therefore there are two parts of the wholeness, *one* and *being*. But *the one* participates of *being*: for *the one of being* is conjoined with *being*. *The one of being* therefore is again divided, so that both *the one* and *being* generate a second unity, connected with a part of *being*. But *being which participates of the one*, or *is*, is again divided into *being* and *the one*: for it generates a more particular *being*, depending on a more particular *unity*. And *being* here belongs to more particular deified beings, and is a more special monad. But *power* is the cause of this progression: for power possesses dual effect, and is fabricative of multitude.

Parmenides begins his discourse concerning this triad as follows:—"What then? Can each of these parts of *one being*, that is to say *the one* and *being*, desert each other, so that *the one* shall not be a part of *being*, or *being* shall not be a part of *the one*? By no means." But he finishes thus: "Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it appears." Proclus adds: "Hence this triad proceeds according to each of the preexistent triads, *flowing* (according to the Oracle) and *proceeding into all intelligible multitude*. For infinite multitude demonstrates this flux, and evinces the incomprehensible nature of power."

But he likewise evinces that this triad is *first begotten*: for this first imparts the power of generating. And hence he calls the multitude which it contains *generating* (*γενεον*). Proclus, therefore, very properly asks, whether the frequent use of the term generation in this part, does not plainly imply that the natures prior to this triad are more united with each other? But the infinity of multitude in this triad must not be considered as respecting the infinite of quantity; but nothing more is implied than that a multitude of this kind is the progeny of the first infinity, which it also unfolds: and this infinite is the same with that which is *all perfect*. For that (says Proclus) which has proceeded according to *the all*, and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, on account of a power generative of all things, is *infinite*; for it can be comprehended by no other. And thus much concerning the third intelligible triad, according to Parmenides.

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farly. If, therefore, any one should summarily assert that *the one is*, this would be no other one than that which participates of essence. Certainly. Again,

Let us now discourse in general (says Proclus *) concerning all the intelligible triads, and the three conclusions in the Parmenides, by which these three orders are characterized. The first triad, therefore, which is allotted an occult and intelligible summit among intelligibles, Plato, at one time proceeding from that union which it contains, and from its separate supremacy with respect to others, denominates *one*; as in the Timæus—For *eternity* (says he) *abides in one*. But reason demonstrates that the first triad of intelligibles is contained in this *one*. But at another time proceeding from the extremities which it contains, that is from that which is participated, and from that which participates, he calls it *one being*; not mentioning power here, because it is uniformly and occultly comprehended in this triad. And again, sometimes he calls the whole triad *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*, according to the monads which it contains. And here *bound* demonstrates divine *hyparxis*; but *infinite*, *generative power*; and *mixed*, *an essence proceeding from this power*. And thus (as I have said) by these appellations Plato instructs us concerning the first triad; evincing its nature, sometimes by one name, sometimes by two, and sometimes by three appellations. For a *triad* is contained in this, according to which the whole is characterized; likewise a *duad*, through which its extremities communicate with each other; and lastly a *monad*, which evinces through its monads the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the first God.

But he calls the second triad posterior to this; in the Timæus, indeed, *eternity*; but in the Parmenides *the first wholeness*. And if we attentively consider that every eternal is a whole, we shall perceive that these two are allotted the same peculiarity of nature. For, whatever is entirely eternal possesses both its whole essence and energy at once present with itself. For such is every intellect which perfectly establishes in itself both being and intellect, as a whole at once present, and a comprehensive all. Hence it does not possess one part of being while it is destitute of another; nor does it participate partially of energy, but it *wholly* comprehends *total* being and *total* intelligence. But if intellect proceeded in its energies according to time, but possessed an eternal essence, it would possess the one as a *whole* ever abiding the same, but the other subsisting in generation, differently at different periods of time. *Eternity*, therefore, wherever it is present, is the cause of *wholeness*. To which we may add, that *the whole* every where contains eternity: for no *whole* ever deserts either its own essence or perfection; but that which is first corrupted and vitiated is partial. Hence this visible universe is eternal, because it is a whole; and this is likewise true of every thing contained in the heavens, and of each of the elements: for *wholeness* is every where comprehensive of its subject natures. Hence *wholeness* and *eternity* subsist together, are the same with each other, and are each of them a measure; the one indeed of all eternal and perpetual natures, but the other of parts and every multitude. But since there are three *wholenesses*, one *prior to parts*, another *composed from parts*, and a third *contained in a part*—hence, through that *wholeness* which is prior to parts, eternity measures the divine unities exempt from beings; but through that which is composed from parts, the unities distributed together with beings; and through that which subsists in a part, all beings

* In Plat. Theol. lib. 3. p. 168.

Again, therefore, let us say, if *the one is*, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a

one

and total essences. For these partially contain the parts of the divine unities, which preexist unically in the unities themselves. Besides, *eternity is nothing else than an illumination proceeding from the unity connected with being*. But *whole itself* consists of two parts, viz. from *one* and *being*, power being the conciliator of these parts. Hence the duad, according with the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform and occult hypostasis of the first triad. Besides, Plato in the *Timæus* calls the third intelligible triad *animal-itself*, *perfect*, and *only-begotten*. But in the *Parmenides* he denominates it *infinite multitude*, and *a wholeness comprehending many parts*. And in the *Sophista* he calls it *that which is always intelligible, and distributed into many beings*. All these, therefore, are the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when *Timæus* calls this triad *intelligible animal*, he likewise asserts that it is *perfect*, and that it comprehends intelligible animals as its parts, both according to *the one* and according to *parts*. And *Parmenides* himself, declaring that *one being* is perfect multitude, demonstrates that it subsists in this order. For the infinite is omnipotent and perfect, as we have previously observed, containing in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which it likewise produces. And of these parts, some are more universal, but others more partial; and (as *Timæus* observes) are parts both according to the one and according to genera. Besides, as *Timæus* calls that which is *animal-itself eternal*, and *only-begotten*, so *Parmenides* first attributes to infinite multitude *the ever*, and *to be generated*, in the following words: "And on the same account, whatever part is generated will always possess these two parts: for *the one* will always contain *being*, and *being the one*; so that two things will always be generated, and no part will ever be one."

Who then so perspicuously admonishes us of *eternal animal* and of the *first-begotten* triad as *Parmenides*, who first assumes in this order *generation* and *the ever*, and so frequently employs each of these appellations? *Perfect animal*, therefore, is the same with omnipotent intelligible multitude. For since the first infinity is power, and the whole of that which is intelligible subsists according to this, receiving from hence its division into parts, I rather choose to call this triad *omnipotent*; deviating in this respect from that appellation of *the infinite*, by which vulgar minds are generally disturbed.

Such then is the intelligible triad, considered according to an all-perfect distribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our mental eye. But if we are desirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal vision, and the fascinating but delusive forms of the phantasy, which, Calypso-like, detain us in exile from our fathers' land; after having through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal port, and purified ourselves from the baneful rout of the passions, those domestic foes of the soul; if after all this we are desirous of gaining a glimpse of the surpassing simplicity and ineffable union of this occult and astonishing light, we must crowd all our conceptions together into the most profound indivisibility, and, opening the greatest eye of the soul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, silently walking on the extremities of her shining feet, he will suddenly from his awful sanctuary rise to our view.

one as possesses parts? How? Thus. If the term *it is* is spoken of *one being*, and *the one*, of *being which is one*, and *essence* is not the same with *the one*, but each belongs to that same *one being* which we have supposed, is it

But after such a vision, what can language announce concerning this transcendent object? That it is perfectly indistinct and void of number. "And," as Damascius * beautifully observes, "since this is the case, we should consider whether it is proper to call *this* which belongs to it *simplicity*, *απλοτης*; *something else*, *multiplicity* *πολλοτης*; and *something besides this*, *universality* *παντοτης*. For that which is intelligible is *one*, *many*, *all*, that we may triply explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be *one* and *many*? Because *many* is the infinite power of *the one*. But how can it be *one* and *all*? Because *all* is the every-way extended energy of *the one*. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it was an extension of power to that which is external; nor power, as an extension of *hyparxis* abiding within; but again, it is necessary to call them three instead of one: for one appellation, as we have often testified, is by no means sufficient for an explanation of this order. And are all things then here indistinct? But how can this be easy to understand? For we have said that there are three principles consequent to each other; viz. *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*. But these in reality are neither *one*, nor *three*, nor *one and at the same time three* †. But it is necessary that we should explain these by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is adapted to their nature, or rather through our desire of expressing something proper on the occasion. For as we denominate this triad *one*, and *many*, and *all*, and *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*, and again *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*—so likewise we call it a *monad*, and the *indefinite duad*, and a *triad*, and a paternal nature composed from both these. And as in consequence of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations as unable to harmonize with the things themselves, we should likewise reject the latter on the same account."

Now from this remarkable passage in particular, and from all that has been said respecting the intelligible triad, it follows that the Platonic is totally different from the Christian trinity, since the former is a triad posterior to the first cause, who according to Plato is a principle transcendently exempt from all multitude, and is not coordinated or consubstantial with any being or beings whatever.

A superficial reader indeed, who knows no more of Platonism than what he has gleaned from Cudworth's Intellectual System, will be induced to think that the genuine Platonic trinity consists of the *first cause*, or the *good*, *intellect*, and *soul*, and that these three were considered by Plato as in a certain respect one. To such men as these it is necessary to observe, that a triad of principles distinct from each other, is a very different thing from a triad which may be considered as a whole, and of which each of the three is a part. But the *good* or the *one* is according to Plato supersubstantial, as is evident from the first hypothesis of this Dialogue, and from the sixth Book of his Republic. It is impossible, therefore, that the *good* can be consubstantial with *intellect*, which is even posterior to *being*, and much less with *soul*, which is subordinate to *intellect*. And hence the *good*, *intellect*, and *soul*, do not form a consubstantial triad.

* Vid. Excerpta, p. 228.

† Ἀλλ' αὐταὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσι κατὰ ἀληθειαν, οὔτε μίαν, οὔτε τρεῖς, οὔτε μίαν ἅμα καὶ τρεῖς.

not necessary that the whole of it should be *one being*, but that its parts should be *the one* and *to be*? It is necessary. Whether, therefore, should we call each of these parts a part alone, or a part of the whole? Each should be called a part of the whole. That which is *one*, therefore, is a whole, and possesses a part. Entirely so. What then? Can each of these parts of one being, viz. *the one* and *being*, desert each other, so that *the one* shall not be a part of *being*, or *being* shall not be a part of *the one*? It cannot be. Again, therefore, each of the parts will contain both *one* and *being*, and each part will at least be composed from two parts; and, on the same account, whatever part takes place will always possess these two parts: for *the one* will always contain *being*, and *being the one*; so that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be *one*. Entirely so. Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it seems.

But proceed, and still further consider this. What? We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account *one being* appears to be *many*. It does so. But what then? If we receive dianoetically that one which we said participates of essence, and apprehend it alone by itself without that which we have said it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this also be many? I think it will be one. But let us consider another certain circumstance. It is necessary that its essence should be one thing, and itself another thing, if *the one* does not participate of essence; but as essence it participates of *the one*. It is necessary. If, therefore, *essence* is one thing, and *the one* another thing, neither is *the one*, so far as *the one*, different from *essence*, nor *essence*, so far as *essence*, different from *the one*; but they are different from each other through that which is *different* and *another*. Entirely so. So that *different* is neither the same with *the one* nor with *essence*. How can it? What, then, if we should select from them, whether if you will *essence* and *different*, or *essence* and *the one*, or *the one* and *different*, should we not, in each assumption, select certain things which might very properly be denominated both these? How do you mean? After this manner: Is there not that which we call *essence*? There is. And again, that which we denominate *the one*? And this also. Is not, therefore, each of them denominated? Each. But what, when I say *essence* and *the one*, do I not pronounce both these? Entirely so. And if I should say *essence* and *different*, or *different* and

and *the one*, should I not perfectly, in each of these, pronounce both? Certainly. But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two? They cannot. And can any reason be assigned, why of two things each of them should not be one? There cannot. As, therefore, these two subsist together, each of them will be one. It appears so. But if each of them is one, and *the one* is placed together with them, by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three? Certainly. But are not three *odd*, and two *even*? How should they not? But what then? Being two, is it not necessary that twice should be present? And being three, thrice; since twice one subsists in two, and thrice one in three? It is necessary. But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there should be thrice three? How should it not? But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be thrice two and twice three? Entirely so. Hence, there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd. It will be so. If, therefore, this be the case, do you think that any number will be left which is not necessarily there? By no means. If, therefore, *the one* is, it is also necessary that there should be number¹. It is necessary.

But

¹ Parmenides after the intelligible triads generates the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders, and demonstrates, by subsequent conclusions, a continuous progression of the Gods. For the series and connection of the words with each other imitate the indissoluble order of things, which always conjoins the media with the extremes, and through middle genera advances to the ultimate progressions of beings. As there are then three intelligible triads, consisting of *one being*, *whole itself*, and *infinite multitude*, so three intelligible and at the same time intellectual triads present themselves to our view, viz. *number itself*, *whole itself*, and *the perfect itself*. Hence, *number* here proceeds from *one being*; but *that which is a whole* from *whole itself* in intelligibles; and *the perfect itself* from *infinite multitude*. For in the intelligible triad the *infinite* was omnipotent and perfect, comprehending all things, and subsisting as incomprehensible in itself. *The perfect*, therefore, is analogous to that which is omnipotent and all-perfect, possessing an intellectual perfection, and such as is posterior to primary and intelligible perfection. But *the whole*, which is both intelligible and intellectual, is allied to that which is intelligible, yet it differs from it so far as the latter possesses wholeness according to *the one union of the one being*; but *the one* of the former appears to be essentially a whole of parts characterized by unity, and its being a composite of many beings.

But again, *number* must be considered as analogous to *one being*. For *one being* subsists among intelligibles occultly, intelligibly, and paternally; but here, in conjunction with difference, it ge-

But if number is, it is necessary that the many should subsist, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you think that number, infinite in multitude, will also participate of essence? By all means I think so. If, therefore, every number participates of essence, will not each part also of number participate of essence? Certainly. Essence, therefore, will be distributed through all things which are many, and will not desert any being, whether the least or the greatest: for how can essence be absent from any being? In no respect. Essence, therefore, is distributed as much as possible into the least and the greatest, and into all things every way, and is divided the most of all things, and possesses infinite parts. It is so. Very many, therefore, are its parts. Very many, indeed. But what, is there any one of these which is a part of essence, and yet is not *one* part? But how can this be? But if it is, I think it must always be necessary, as long as it is, that it should be a certain one; but that it cannot possibly be nothing. It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, is present with every part of essence, deserting no part, whether small or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected. It is so. Can *one being*, therefore, be a whole, subsisting in many places at once? Consider this diligently. I do consider it, and I see that it is impossible. It is divided, therefore, since it is not a whole; for it can no otherwise be present with all the parts of essence, than in a divided state. Certainly. But that which is divisible ought necessarily to be so many as its

nerates number, which establishes the separation of forms and reasons. For *difference* first exhibits itself in this order; but subsists among intelligibles as *power* and the *duad*. And in this order it is a maternal and prolific fountain. With great propriety, therefore, does Plato from the summit of this order begin his negations of *the one*: for *the many* subsist here, through that difference which divides *being* and *the one*; because *the whole*, which is denied of *the one*, is intellectual and not intelligible. The negation, therefore, asserts that *the one* is not a whole, on which account the affirmation must be, *the one* is a whole. For *intelligible whole* is *one being*, but not *the one*. And he thus denies *the many*, "*The one is not many*," the opposite to which is, *the one is many*. But the multitude of intelligibles, and not *the one*, is the proximate cause of *the many*. And, in short, the whole of that which is intelligible is characterized by *one being*. For both *being* and *the one* are contained in this, and are naturally conjoined with each other; and *being* is here the most of all things characterized by *the one*. But when each of these, viz. *being*, and *the one*, proceeds into multitude, the one becomes distant from the other, and evinces a greater diversity of nature; but each is distributed into multitude through the prolific nature of difference itself. And thus it is from hence evident, that the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders proceed with subjection analogous to the intelligible triads. In the notes to the *Phædrus* it will be shown how Socrates leads us to this order of Gods.

parts.

parts. It ought. We did not, therefore, just now speak truly, when we said that essence was distributed into very many parts; since it is not divided into more parts than *the one*, but into parts equal to those of *the one*: for neither does *being* desert *the one*, nor *the one, being*: but these two always subsist, equalized through all things. It appears to be entirely so. *The one*, therefore, which is distributed by essence, is many and an infinite multitude. So it appears. *One being*, therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that *the one* which is distributed by essence should be many. Entirely so.

And, indeed, in consequence of the parts being parts of a whole, *the one* will be defined according to a whole: or are not the parts comprehended by the whole? Necessarily so. But that which contains will be a bound. How should it not? *One being*, therefore, is in a certain respect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears so. As it is bounded, therefore, must it not also have extremes? It is necessary. But what, if it be a whole, must it not also have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole? It cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, will possess a beginning, end, and middle. It will. But the middle is equally distant from the extremes; for it could not otherwise be the middle. It could not. And, as it appears, *the one* being such, will participate of a certain figure, whether straight or round, or a certain mixture from both. It will so.

Will it, therefore, being such, subsist in itself¹ and in another? How? For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is any one external to the whole.

It

¹ By these words Plato indicates the summit of the intellectual order, or in other words, according to the Grecian theology, Saturn. For, so far as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himself, he establishes the all-perfect intelligence of himself in another. For subsistence in another here signifies that which is better than the subsistence of a thing in itself. Saturn, therefore, being intelligible as among intellectuals, establishes himself in the intelligible triads of the orders prior to him, from which he is also filled with united and occult good; and on this account he is said to be in another. But because he is a pure and immaterial deity, he is converted to himself, and shuts up all his powers in himself. For the parts of this deity, when he is considered as an intellectual wholeness, are more partial

It is so. But all the parts are comprehended by the whole. Certainly. But *the one* is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all. Certainly. Is not *the one*, therefore, a whole? How should it not? If, therefore, all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and *the one* is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence, *the one* will be comprehended by *the one*, and so *the one* will be in itself. It appears so. But again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For, if it were in all, it would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts? In no respect. Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole should be in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible. Impossible. But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary that it should either be in some other, or that it should be nowhere? It is necessary. But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary that it should be in another? Entirely so. So far, therefore, as *the one* is a whole, it is in another: but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself: and so *the one* will necessarily be in itself and in another. Necessarily.

But as *the one* is naturally such, is it not necessary that it should both be moved¹ and stand still? How? It must stand still, indeed, if it be in itself.

For,

powers, which hasten indeed to a progression from him as their father, but are established in, and on all sides comprehended by, him. And this wholeness is a deity which connectedly contains the intelligible parts in itself, being parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, and stably generating all things. It also receives into its bosom, and again gathers into itself its progeny, and, as the more tragical of fables say, devours and deposits its offspring in itself. For its progeny are twofold; some being, as it were, resolved into itself, and others separated from it.

¹ The middle of the intellectual order, viz. Rhea, is here indicated by Plato: for all life, according to Plato, is motion; since soul is self-motive because it is self-vital; and intellect is through this moved, because it possesses the most excellent life. The first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods is primarily allotted *motion*. If this cause, however, was the first and highest life, it would be requisite to call it *motion*, and not *that which is moved*; but since it is life as in intellects, and is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time *motion* and *that which is moved*. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides evince that *the one* in this order is moved, be-

cause

For, being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in *same*, through being in itself. It will. But that which is always in the same must necessarily without doubt always stand still. Entirely so. But what, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily never be in *same*? But if it be never in *same*, can it stand still? And if it does not stand still, must it not be moved? Certainly. It is necessary, therefore, that *the one*, since it is always in itself and in another, must always be moved and stand still. It appears so.

But, likewise, it ought to be the same¹ with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with, and different from, others, if it suffers

cause it proceeds from the causes of all life which rank above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order; which triad Socrates in the *Phædrus* calls *heaven*, because the whole of it is *life* and *motion*.

When Parmenides, therefore, says that *the one* is both *moved* and *stands still*, by *motion* he indicates the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, and the generative fountain of wholes; but by *permanency* coordinated with motion, that pure monad which contains the middle centres of the triad of *guardian* deities, or, in other words, one of the *Curetes* consubstant with Rhea. So that the *motion* in this order is the fountain of the life which proceeds to all things; and the *permanency* establishes the whole vivific fountain in itself, but is thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Hence Parmenides, delivering to us the progression of these two, shows that *that which is moved* is generated from *that which is in another*, but *that which is permanent* from *that which is in itself*. For *motion* in this order is better than *permanency*. For as *that which is in another* is causally more ancient than *that which is in itself*, so here that which is *moved* than that which is *permanent*. Hence, according to the Grecian theology, the *Curetes* are powers subordinate to Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, the parents of the intellectual order, and are contained in them.

¹ Parmenides here delivers the symbols of that deity who subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, viz. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe. We shall find, therefore, that the number of the conclusions is here doubled. For *the one* is no longer shown to be alone *same* or *different*, as it was shown to be *in itself* and *in another*, and to be *moved* and be *permanent*; but it is now demonstrated to be *the same with itself*, and *different from itself*, and *different from others*, and *the same with others*. But this *twice* perfectly accords with the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates in the *Cratylus*, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from two words.

In the next place the multitude of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods appear according to the demiurgic progression. For the paternal order of the demiurgus, the prolific power which is coordinate with him, the undefiled monad which is the cause of exempt providence, the fountain distributive of wholes, and all the orders in conjunction with these
which

suffers what we have related above. How? Every thing, in a certain respect, thus takes place with relation to every thing: for it is either the same with it or different: or if it is neither same nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is so related, or with respect to a part it will be a whole. It appears so. Is therefore *the one* a part of itself? By no means. It will not therefore be a whole, with respect to itself, as if itself were a part. For it cannot. But is *the one*, therefore, different from *the one*? By no means. It will not therefore be different from itself. Certainly not. If, therefore, it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with respect to itself, is it not necessary that it should be the same with itself? It is necessary. But what, that which is elsewhere than itself, subsisting in *same* in

which subsist about the demiurgus, according to which he produces and preserves all things, and, being exempt from his productions, is firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom from the united government of his father—all these are here unfolded into light.

Hence that which Parmenides first demonstrates concerning the nature of *the one*, viz. that it is *the same* with itself, represents to us the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which Jupiter is the demiurgus. For the term *same* is a manifest sign of his proper or paternal hyparxis: for being one, and the exempt demiurgus and father of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. This term also remarkably shows the uniform nature, and the alliance of this deity with *bound*. But his being *the same with others*, is the illustrious good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to all things, and pervading through all things without impediment. For he is present to all things which he produces, and is in all things which he adorns, pre-establishing in himself an essence generative of wholes. Hence *bound* and *the infinite* subsist in him fabricatively; the former consisting in a *same* separate from *others*, and the latter in a power which generates *others*. The assertion also that *he is different from others*, manifests his undefiled purity, and his transcendency exempt from all secondary natures. Hence by his never ceasing to impart good, by his providence, and by his generating things subordinate, *he is the same with them*: for he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But by his purity, his undefiled power, and his undeviating energies, he is separate from wholes, and is not confusible with others. And as Saturn, the first king of the intellectual Gods, is allotted a nature which does not verge to matter, through that pure monad or guard which is united to him, viz. the first of the Curetes; and as the vivific goddess Rhea possesses her stable and undeviating power from the second of the guardian deities; so also the demiurgic intellect guards a transcendency separate from others, and a union withdrawing itself from multitude, through the third monad of the Curetes, who are the leaders of purity.

That deity therefore remains who is the seventh of these intellectual monads, who is conjoined with all of them, and energizes in conjunction with all, but particularly unfolds himself into light in the demiurgic order. This deity, which is celebrated by ancient theologists as Ocean, Parmenides

in itself, must it not necessarily be different from itself, since it has a subsistence elsewhere? It appears so to me. And in this manner *the one* appears to subsist, being at the same time both in itself and in another. So it seems. Through this, therefore, it appears that *the one* is different from itself. It does so.

But what if any thing is different from any thing, is it not different from that which is different? Necessarily so. But are not all such things as are not one different from *the one*? And is not *the one* different from such things as are not one? How should it not? *The one* therefore will be different from other things. Different. But see whether *different* and *same* are not contrary to each other. How should they not? Do you think, therefore, that *same* can ever be in *different*, or *different* in *same*? I do not.

menides indicates when he asserts that *the one* is *different from itself*. As, therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself through paternal union, so he is separated from himself and his father, according to this difference. Whence, therefore, does Parmenides say that the demiurgus derives this power? We reply, From being *in himself*, and *in another*. For these things were unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Hence separation there subsists according to cause, but in the demiurgus it shines forth, and unfolds his power into light. For that the cause of division subsists in a certain respect in the first father, Parmenides himself evinces in the first hypothesis, when he says, that every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect *two*, and is *separated* from itself. But the duad is there indeed occultly, but here it subsists more clearly, where all intellectual multitude is apparent. For difference is the progeny of the duad, which is there firmly established. This *difference*, therefore, separates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and also separates from each other the monads which it contains. Hence Parmenides, when he divides the signs of fabrication, shows that the idioms of the undefiled and divisive monads are in the middle of them, so far as they also in a certain respect are comprehended in the one fabrication of things. For the first of the conclusions demonstrates that *the one* is *the same with itself*; the second, that it is *different from itself*; the third, that it is *different from others*; and the fourth, that it is *the same with others*; conjoining the divisive power with the paternal union, and connecting the providential cause of secondary natures—with a transcendency separate from them. For in the Gods it is necessary that union should subsist prior to separation, and a purity unmingled with things secondary prior to a providential care of them, through which the divinities being every where are also no where, being present to all things are exempt from all things, and being all things are no one of their progeny.

I only add, that the reader will find the theology concerning Saturn, delivered by Plato in perfect conformity to what has been above asserted of this deity, in the Cratylus, Politicus, and Gorgias; that concerning Rhea, in the Cratylus; concerning Jupiter in the Timæus, Critias, Philebus, Protagoras, and Politicus; and concerning the Curetes in the Laws.

If therefore *different* is never in *same*, there is no being in which for any time *different* subsists; for, if it subsisted in it during any time whatever, in that time *different* would be in *same*. Would it not be so? It would. But since it is never in *same*, *different* will never subsist in any being. True. Neither therefore will *different* be in things which are not one, nor in *the one*. It will not. *The one*, therefore, will not through *different* be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from *the one*. Not, indeed. Nor likewise will they be different from each other, since they do not participate of *different*. For how can they? But if they are neither different from themselves, nor from *different*, must they not entirely escape from being different from each other? They must escape. But neither will things which are not one participate of *the one*: for if they did they would no longer be *not one*, but in a certain respect one. True. Hence things which are *not one* will not be number; for they would not be entirely *not one* in consequence of possessing number. Certainly not. But what, can things which are *not one* be parts of one? Or would not things which are *not one* by this means participate of *the one*? They would participate. If, therefore, this is entirely *the one*, but those *not one*, neither will *the one* be a part of things which are *not one*, nor a whole with respect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are *not one* be parts of *the one*, nor yet wholes, as if *the one* were a part. They will not. But we have said that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, must be the same with each other. We have said so. Must we not therefore assert that *the one*, since it subsists in this manner with respect to things which are *not one*, is the same with them? We must. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself. It appears from this reasoning to be so.

But is it also similar^{*} and dissimilar to itself and others? Perhaps so.
Since,

^{*} After the intellectual the supermundane order of Gods follows, who are also called by the Grecian theologists *assimilative leaders*. *Sameness* and *difference*, therefore, as we have before observed, define the idiom of the demiurgic order, and of the Gods coordinated with it. But since the whole order of the assimilative Gods is suspended from the demiurgic monad, subsists about, and is converted to it, and is perfected from it, it is necessary to refer the signs of this

Since, therefore, it appears to be different from others, others also will be different from it. But what then? Will it not be different from others, in the same manner as others from it? And this neither more nor less? How should it not? If, therefore, neither more nor less, it must be different in a similar manner. Certainly. Will not that through which *the one* becomes different from others, and others in a similar manner from it, be also that through which both *the one* becomes the same with others, and others with *the one*? How do you say? Thus: Do not you call every name the name of something? I do: but what then? Do you pronounce the same name often or once? I pronounce it once. When, therefore, you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs: but if often, not the same? Or, whether you pronounce the same name once or often, do you not necessarily always signify the same thing? But what then? Does not a different name belong to some certain thing? Entirely so. When, therefore, you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not assign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs. It is necessary it should be so. But when we say that other things are different from *the one*, and that *the one* is different from others, twice pronouncing the name *different*, we yet signify nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name. Entirely so,

this order to the demiurgic series, and thence to impart to them a generation proceeding according to order and measure.

As this order of Gods, therefore, according to the Grecian theologists, assimilates sensibles to intellects, and produces all things posterior to itself according to an imitation of causes, it is the primary cause of similitude to things subordinate to itself. Hence it is also the cause of dissimilitude coordinate with similitude: for all things which participate of the similar necessarily also participate of the dissimilar.

Similitude also in this order has a subsistence analogous to paternal causes, and to those which convert things to their principles; but dissimilitude is analogous to prolific causes, and which preside over multitude and division. Hence *similitude* is *collective*, but *dissimilitude* *separative* of things which proceed.

But that the idioms of these Gods proceed from the demiurgic monad, and the signs which there pre-exist, Parmenides sufficiently demonstrates: for demiurgic sameness and difference are the causes, as he says, of the similitude and dissimilitude of this order.

The reader will find the theology relative to this order delivered by Plato, conformably to what is here said, in the *Politicus* and the *Laws*, the *Gorgias* and the *Cratylus*.

If therefore *the one* be different from others, and others from *the one*, in consequence of suffering the same *different*, *the one* will not suffer that which is different from others, but the same with others : but is not that which in a certain respect suffers the same similar? Certainly. But, in the same manner, as *the one* becomes different from others, every thing becomes similar to every thing : for every thing is different from all things. It appears so. But is the similar contrary to the dissimilar? It is. And is not *different* contrary to *same*? And this also. But this likewise is apparent, that *the one* is both the same with and different from others. It is apparent. But to be the same with others is a contrary passion to the being different from others. Entirely so. But *the one* appears to be similar, so far as different. Certainly. So far therefore as it is *same*, it will be dissimilar on account of its suffering a passion contrary to that which produces the similar : or was it not the similar which produced the different? Certainly. It will therefore render that which is dissimilar the same ; or it would not be contrary to different. So it appears. *The one* therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to others : and so far as *different* it will be similar ; but so far as *the same* dissimilar. The case appears to be so. And it is likewise thus affected. How? So far as it suffers *same* it does not suffer that which is various ; but not suffering that which is various, it cannot be dissimilar ; and not being dissimilar, it will be similar : but so far as it suffers *different* it will be various ; and being various it will be dissimilar. You speak the truth. Since, therefore, *the one* is both the same with and different from others, according to both and according to each of these, it will be similar and dissimilar to others. Entirely so. And will not this in a similar manner be the case with relation to itself, since it has appeared to be both different from and the same with itself ; so that, according to both these, and according to each, it will appear to be similar and dissimilar? Necessarily so.

But consider now how *the one* subsists with respect to touching¹ itself and others,

¹ That order of Gods called by the Greek theologists *απολυτοι* or *liberated*, succeeds the *supermundane* order, and is here indicated by Plato by *the one touching itself and others*. For all the divine genera after the demiurgic monad double their energies, since their energy is naturally directed both to themselves and to other things posterior to themselves, rejoicing in progressions, being subservient to the providence of secondary natures, and calling forth the supernatural, impartible,

others, and not touching. I consider. For *the one* appears in a certain respect to be in the whole of itself. Right. But is *the one* also in others? Certainly. So far therefore as *the one* is in others it will touch others; but so far as it is in itself it will be hindered from touching others, but it will touch itself because it subsists in itself. So it appears. And thus, indeed, *the one* will both touch itself and others. It will so. But what will you say to this? Must not every thing which is about to touch any thing be situated in a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when situated it touches? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to be situated immediately after itself, occupying the place proximate to that in which it is. It ought so. Would not this be the case with *the one* if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once? But can this be the case while it is *the one*? It cannot. The same necessity therefore belongs to *the one*, neither to be two nor to touch itself. The same. But neither will it touch others. Why? Because we have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing which is separate from it, it ought to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them. True. Two things, therefore, at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take

partible, and all-perfect producing power of their father, and deducing it to subordinate beings. This *contact*, therefore, with and separation from inferior natures clearly represents to us a liberated idiom. For *touching* indicates a providence allied to and coordinate with us; and *not to touch*, a transcendency exempt and separate from others. Hence these epithets admirably accord with the *liberated* genus of Gods, who are said to be at the same time conjoined with the celestial divinities, and expanded above them, and to proceed to all things with unrestrained energy. Hence the Fates, as we have shown in a note on the 10th book of the Republic, belong to this order; for they are said by Socrates to *touch* the celestial circulations. In the Cratylus also, the mundane *Core* or Proserpine, who governs the whole of generation, is said to *touch* flowing essence, and through this contact to have been called *Phersephatta*. To which we may add, that in the Phædo, where we are taught what the mode is of the cathartic life of souls, Socrates says, that the soul, when it is not conversant with the body, *passes into contact with being*; through all which Plato indicates that *contact* is the business of an inseparable providence, and coordinate inspection; and that the negation of this is the employment of a dominion separate, unrestrained, and exempt from the natures that are governed.

These *liberated* Gods are the same with those which the Chaldeans call *axonic*, and which according to them are *Serapis*, *Bacchus*, the series of *Osiris*, and of *Apollo*, as we are informed by Pfellus in his exposition of Chaldaic dogmas. He adds, "they are called *axonic*, because they rule without restraint over the zones, and are established above the apparent Gods."

place. Certainly. But if a third thing succeeds to the two terms, these will now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to pass that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two first numbers surpassed the contacts, so as to be more in number than the contacts, by so much will all the following number surpass the multitude of the contacts. For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts. Right. The contacts, therefore, less by one will always be as many in number as the things themselves. True. If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact. How can there? Have we not said that such things as are different from *the one* are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different? We have. *The one* therefore is not number in others, as *the one* is not contained in them. How can it? *The one*, therefore, is neither others, nor two, nor any thing possessing the name of another number. It is not. *The one*, therefore, is one alone, and will not be two. It will not, as it appears. There is no contact, therefore, two not subsisting. There is not. *The one* therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch *the one*, as there is no contact. Certainly not. On all these accounts, therefore, *the one* will both touch and not touch others and itself. So it appears.

Is it therefore equal ¹ and unequal to itself and others? How? If *the one* were greater or lesser than others, or others greater or lesser than *the one*, would it not follow that neither *the one*, because one, nor others, because different from *the one*, would be greater or lesser than each other from their own essences? But if each, besides being such as they are, should possess equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one should possess magnitude, and the other parvitude, or *the one* magnitude but *others* parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever species magnitude was present, that species would be greater; but that the species would be lesser with which parvitude was present? Necessarily so. Are there not, therefore, two certain species of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no subsistence they could never be contrary to each other, and be present with beings.

¹ The *equal* and *unequal* are characteristic of the mundane Gods, as we have shown in the notes on the first hypothesis, to which we refer the reader.

How

How should they? If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in *the one*, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it. It is necessary. But if it should be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of *the one* or comprehend *the one*? Plainly so. If parvitude, therefore, is equally inherent in *the one*, will it not be equal to *the one*; but if it comprehends *the one* will it not be greater? How should it not? Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than any thing, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own? It is impossible. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of *the one*, but if at all, in a part. Certainly. Nor yet again in the whole part; as the same consequences would ensue in the *whole* part of *the one*, as in the whole of *the one*: for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent. It is necessary. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in any being, since it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness itself. It does not appear that there will. Neither will magnitude therefore be in *the one*: for there will be some other thing great besides magnitude itself. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be surpassed by that which is great; but which in this case is impossible, since parvitude is not inherent in any being. True. But, indeed, magnitude itself will not surpass any thing else but parvitude itself, nor will parvitude be less than any other than magnitude itself. It will not. Neither therefore will other things be greater than *the one*; nor lesser, since they neither possess magnitude nor parvitude: nor will these two possess any power with respect to *the one*, either of surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will be the case only with respect to each other: nor, on the contrary, will *the one* be either greater or lesser than these two, or others, as it neither possesses magnitude nor parvitude. So indeed it appears. If *the one* therefore is neither greater nor lesser than others, is it not necessary that it should neither surpass nor be surpassed by them? It is necessary. Is it not also abundantly necessary, that that which neither surpasses nor is surpassed should be equally affected? And must it not, if equally affected, be equal? How should it not? *The one* therefore will be thus circumstanced with respect to itself: *viz.* from neither possessing magnitude nor parvitude in itself, it will neither surpass nor be surpassed by itself; but being equally affected it will

be equal to itself. Entirely so. *The one* therefore will be equal both to itself and others. So it appears.

But if *the one* should be in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and so, through comprehending itself, it would be greater than itself; but from being comprehended less than itself: and thus *the one* would be both greater and lesser than itself. It would so. Is not this also necessary, that nothing has any subsistence besides *the one* and others? How should it be otherwise? But ought not whatever has a being to be always somewhere? Certainly. And does not that which subsists in another, subsist as the lesser in the greater? For one thing cannot in any other way subsist in another. It cannot. But since there is nothing else except *the one* and others, and it is necessary that these should be in something, is it not necessary that they should be in one another, viz. others in *the one*, and *the one* in others; or that they should be no where? It appears so. Because, therefore, *the one* is in others, others will be greater than *the one*, through comprehending it; but *the one* will be less than others, because comprehended: but if others are inherent in *the one*, *the one* on the same account will be greater than others; but others will be less than *the one*. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, is equal to, greater and lesser, both than itself and others. It seems so. But if it is greater, equal, and lesser, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and others; and if of measures, also of parts. How should it not? Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also be more and less in number, both with respect to itself and others; and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and others. How? That which is greater possesses more measures than that which is smaller, and contains as many parts as measures; and that which is lesser in the same manner, as also that which is equal. It is so. Since *the one*, therefore, is both greater, lesser, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts? How should it not? If, therefore, it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself. It appears so. But will *the one* be similarly affected towards others? For, since it appears to be greater than others, is it not necessary that it should be more in number than others? but, because it is lesser, must it not also be fewer in number?

number? and because equal in magnitude, must it not also be equal in multitude to others? It is necessary. And thus again, as it appears, *the one* will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and others. It will so.

Will *the one*, therefore, participate of time? And is it, and does it subsist in becoming to be younger¹ and older, both than itself and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, though participating of time? How? *To be* in a certain respect is present with it, since it *is the one*. Certainly. But what else is *to be* than a participation of essence with the present time? In the same manner as *it was* is a communication of essence with the past, and *it will be* with the future? It is no other. It must participate, therefore, of time, if it participates of being. Entirely so. Must it not, therefore, participate of time in progression? Certainly. It will always, therefore, subsist *in becoming to be* older than itself, if it proceeds according to time. It is necessary. Do we, therefore, call to mind that the older is always becoming older, because it is always becoming younger? We do call it to mind. Does not *the one*, therefore, while it is becoming older than itself, subsist in becoming older than itself, while it is becoming younger than itself? Necessarily so. It will, therefore, become both younger and older than itself. Certainly. But is it not then older when it subsists in *becoming to be* according to the present time, which is between *it was* and *it will be*: for, through proceeding from the past to the future, it will not pass beyond the present *now*? It will not. Will it not, therefore, cease becoming to be older, when it arrives at *the now*, and is no longer *becoming to be*, but *is* now older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by *the now*. For that which proceeds subsists in such a manner as to touch upon both *the now* and the future time; departing, indeed, from *the now*, but apprehending the future, because it subsists in the middle of the future and *the now*. True. But if it be necessary that whatever is becoming to be should not pass by *the now* or the present time, hence, as soon as it arrives at *the now*, it will always cease becoming to be, and *is* then that which it was in pursuit of becoming. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*, will cease *becoming*

¹ Younger and older are characteristic of divine souls. See the notes on that part of the first hypothesis which corresponds to this part of the second.

to be, and then *is* older. Entirely so. Is it not, therefore, older than that in respect of which it becomes older? And does it not become older than itself? Certainly. And is not the older older than the younger? It is. *The one*, therefore, is younger than itself, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*. It is necessary. But *the now* is always present with *the one*, through the whole of its being: for it is always *now* as long as it is. How should it not? *The one*, therefore, always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itself. So it appears. But *is the one*, or does it subsist in *becoming to be*, in a time more extended than or equal to itself? In an equal time. But that which either *is*, or subsists in *becoming to be*, in an equal time possesses the same age. How should it not? But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger. By no means. *The one*, therefore, since it both subsists in *becoming to be* and *is*, in a time equal to itself, neither *is* nor *becoming to be* younger nor older than itself. It does not appear to me that it can.

But how is it affected with respect to others? I know not what to say. But this you may say, that things different from *the one* because they are *others*, and not *another*, are more than *the one*. For that which is another is one; but being *others* they are more than one, and possess multitude. They do. But multitude participates of a greater number than *the one*? How should it not? What then? Do we say that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few? We assert this of the few before the many. That which is the fewest, therefore, is first: but is not this *the one*? Certainly. *The one*, therefore, becomes the first of all things possessing number: but all other things have number, if they are *others* and not *another*. They have indeed. But that which is first generated has I think a priority of subsistence: but others are posterior to this. But such as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation; and thus others will be younger than *the one*, but *the one* will be older than others. It will indeed. But what shall we say to this? Can *the one* be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impossible? Impossible. But *the one* appears to consist of parts; and if of parts, it possesses a beginning, end, and middle. Certainly. Is not, therefore, the beginning generated first of all, both of *the one* and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end? What then? And, indeed,

indeed, we should say that all these are parts of a whole and of one; but that *the one*, together with the end, is generated *one* and a *whole*. We should say so. But the end I think must be generated last of all, and *the one* must be naturally generated together with this; so that *the one*, since it is necessary that it should not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the last of others. *The one*, therefore, is younger than others, but others are older than *the one*. So again it appears to me. But what, must not the beginning, or any other part whatever, of *the one*, or of any thing else, if it is a part, and not parts—must it not necessarily be one, since it is a part? Necessarily. *The one*, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the first part, will be generated, and together with the second; and it will never desert any one of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other whatever in its generation. True. *The one*, therefore, will possess the same age with others, as (if it be not *the one* contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor posterior to others, but together with them; and on this account *the one* will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than *the one*: but, according to the former reasoning, *the one* was both older and younger than others, and others in a similar manner than it. Entirely so.

After this manner, therefore, *the one* subsists and is generated. But what shall we say respecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than *the one*; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we say that it subsists in the same manner with respect to the term *becoming to be* as with respect to the term *to be*? or otherwise? I am not able to say. But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwise subsist in *becoming to be* older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was born: nor, on the contrary, can that which is younger subsist in *becoming to be* younger, otherwise than by the same difference. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing else, always cause them to differ by the same interval by which they were distant at first. How should it be otherwise? *That which is*, therefore, cannot subsist in *becoming to be*

older or younger than *one being*, since it *is* always equally different from it in age: but this *is* and *was* older, but that younger; but by no means subsists in *becoming* so. True. That which *is* one, therefore, will never subsist in *becoming to be* either older or younger than other beings. Never. But see whether by this means other things will *become* younger and older. After what manner? The same as that through which *the one* appeared to be older than others, and others than *the one*. What then? Since *the one* is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others. Certainly.

But again consider, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part? By a smaller. *The one*, therefore, will not differ from others by so great an age afterwards as before; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a less age than before. Will it not be so? Certainly. But does not that which differs less in age, with respect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those than which it was before older? Younger. But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with respect to *the one* be older than before? Entirely so. That, therefore, which was generated younger, will subsist in *becoming to be* older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never *is* older, but always is *becoming* older than it; the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile state, but the other to one more aged: but that which is older is *becoming to be* younger than the younger, after the same manner. For both tending to that which is contrary they subsist in becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger: but they are not able to *become* so. For if they should *become* they would no longer subsist in *becoming*, but would now *be*. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and *the one* indeed becomes younger than others, because it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation: but others are older than *the one*, because they have a posterior generation; and, from the same reason, other things will be similarly related with respect to *the one*, since they appear to be more antient and to have a prior generation. So indeed it appears. Does it not follow, that so far as *the one* does not become younger or older than
the

the other, because they differ by an equal number from each other, that, so far as this, *the one* will not become older or younger than others, nor others than *the one*? But that, so far as it is necessary that the prior should always differ from such as are becoming to be posterior, and the posterior from the prior; so far it is necessary that they should become older and younger than each other, both others than *the one* and *the one* than others? Entirely so. On all these accounts, therefore, *the one is*, and is *becoming to be*, older and younger both than itself and others; and again, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* older nor younger than itself and others. It is perfectly so. But since *the one* participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not necessary that it should participate of the past, present, and future, since it participates of time? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated. What then? And there will also be something belonging to it, and which may be asserted of it, and which was, and is, and will be. Entirely so. There will, therefore, be science, opinion, and sense of *the one*, since we have now treated of all these things about it. You speak rightly. A name, therefore, and discourse may subsist about *the one*, and it may be denominated and spoken of: and whatever particulars of the same kind take place in other things, will also take place about *the one*. The case is perfectly so.

In the third place, let us consider, if *the one* subsists in the manner we have already asserted, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that because *it is* one it should participate of essence; but that because *it is not*, it should not at any time participate of essence? It is necessary. Is it, therefore, possible, that when it participates and becomes such as it is, that then it should not participate; or that it should participate when it does not participate? It cannot be possible. It participates, therefore, at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the same. Right. Is not that also time, when it receives *being* and again loses it? Or how can it be possible that, being such as it is, it should at one time possess the same thing, and at another time not, unless it both receives and loses it? No otherwise. Do you not denominate the receiving of essence *to become*? I do. And is

not to lose essence the same as to perish? Entirely so. *The one*, therefore, as it seems, by receiving and losing essence, is generated and perishes. Necessarily so. But since it is both one and many, and subsists in becoming to be and perishing, when it becomes one does it cease to be many, and when it becomes many does it cease to be one? Entirely so. But, in consequence of becoming one and many, must it not be separated and collected? It must. And when it becomes dissimilar and similar, must it not be assimilated and dissimilated? Certainly. And when it becomes greater, lesser, and equal, must it not be increased, corrupted, and equalized? It must so. But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it is changed into being moved, it is requisite that it should not subsist in one time. How should it? But that which before stood still and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards stands still, cannot suffer these affections without mutation. For how can it? But there is no time in which any thing can neither be moved nor stand still. There is not. But it cannot be changed without mutation. It is not probable that it can. When, therefore, will it be changed? For neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time. It will not. Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes? What thing? *The sudden*, or that which unapparently starts forth to the view. For *the sudden* seems to signify some such thing, as that from which it passes into each of these conditions. For while it stands still it will not be changed from standing, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature *the sudden* is situated between motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved passes into standing still, and that which stands still into motion. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both these affections. But, becoming changed, it will be changed suddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: for it will then neither stand still nor be moved. It will not. Will *the one* also be thus affected with respect to other mutations? And when it is changed from *being* into the *loss of being*, or from *non-being* into *becoming to be*, does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? and then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor perishes? It appears so. And in the same manner,
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when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor collected. And in passing from similar to dissimilar, and from dissimilar to similar, it is neither similar nor dissimilar, nor is assimilated nor dissimilated. And while it passes from small into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor perishing, nor equalized. It does not appear that it can. But all these passions *the one* will suffer, if it is. How should it not?

But should we not consider what other things ought to suffer if *the one* is? We should. Let us relate, therefore, *if the one is*, what other things ought to suffer from *the one*. By all means. Does it not follow that because other things are different from *the one* they are not *the one*: for otherwise they would not be different from *the one*? Right. Nor yet are others entirely deprived of *the one*, but participate it in a certain respect. In what respect? Because things different from *the one* are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one. Right. But parts we have asserted belong to that which is a whole. We have so. But it is necessary that a whole should be one composed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole. How so? If any thing should be a part of many, among which it subsists itself, it would doubtless be a part of itself (which is impossible), and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these it will be a part of the others, this being excepted; and so it will not be a part of each one: and not being a part of each, it will be a part of no one of the many: and being a part of no one of the many, it is impossible that it should be any thing belonging to all those, of no one of which it is either a part or any thing else. So it appears. A part, therefore, is neither a part of many nor of all; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all: for a part indeed is a part of this. Entirely so. If, therefore, other things have parts, they will also participate of a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect whole, therefore, possessing parts, must necessarily be different from *the one*. It is necessary. But the same reasoning is true concerning each of the parts: for it is
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necessary that each of these should participate of *the one*. For, if each of these is a part, the very being each, in a certain respect, signifies one; since it is distinguished from others, and has a subsistence by itself, if it is that which is called each. Right. But it participates of *the one* as it is evidently something different from *the one*; for otherwise it would not participate, but would be *the one itself*. But now it is impossible that any thing can be *the one* except *the one itself*. Impossible. But it is necessary both to a whole and to a part to participate of *the one*: for a whole is one certain thing and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part. It is so. Must not, therefore, those which participate of *the one* participate it, as being different from *the one*? How should they not? But things different from *the one* will in a certain respect be many; for if things different from *the one* were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. They would. But since the things which participate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not necessary that these very things which participate of *the one* should be infinite in multitude? How? Thus: they are different from *the one*, nor are they participants of *the one*, then when they have already participated of it. Certainly. Are not those multitudes in which *the one* is not? Multitudes, certainly. What then? If we should be willing by cogitation to take away the least quantity from these, would it not be necessary that this quantity which is taken away should be multitude, and not one, since it does not participate of *the one*? It is necessary. By always surveying, therefore, another nature of form, itself subsisting by itself, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude? Entirely so. And since every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts. Perfectly so. It will happen, therefore, to things different from *the one*, as it appears both from *the one* and from their communicating with each other, that a certain something different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the mean time the nature of these causes them to become essentially connected with infinity. It appears so. And thus things different from *the one*, both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound.

Entirely

Entirely so. Are they not, therefore, similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves? Why? Because, so far as all of them are in a certain respect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in consequence of this, suffer that which is *the same*. How should they not? But so far as they suffer to be bounded and infinite, which are passions contrary to each other, they suffer these passions. Certainly. But things contrary, as such, are most dissimilar. What then? According to each of these passions, therefore, they are similar to themselves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both sides most contrary and dissimilar. It appears so. And thus others will be the same with themselves and with each other, and similar and dissimilar. They will so. And again, they will be the same and different from each other, will both be moved and stand still; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary passions suffered by things different from *the one*, while they appear to be passive, in the manner we have related. You speak rightly.

Shall we not, therefore, pass by these things as evident, and again consider if *the one* is, whether things different from *the one* will subsist not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone? Entirely so. Let us, therefore, assert again from the beginning, *if the one is*, what things different from *the one* ought to suffer. Let us. Is, therefore, *the one* separate from others, and are others separate from *the one*? Why? Because there is no other *different* besides these, viz. that which is *different* from *the one*, and that which is *different* from others; for all that can be spoken is asserted, when we say *the one* and *others*. All, indeed. There is nothing else, therefore, besides these in which *the one* and *others* can subsist after the same manner. Nothing. *The one* and *others*, therefore, are never in the same. It does not appear that they are. Are they separate, therefore? They are. We have likewise asserted that *the truly one* has not any parts. For how can it? Neither, therefore, will the whole of *the one* be in *others*, nor the parts of it, if it is separate from *others*, and has no parts. How should it not be so? In no way, therefore, will *others* participate of *the one*, since they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole. It does not appear that they can. By no means, therefore, are *others the one*, nor have they any *one* in themselves. They have not.

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Neither, then, are other things many ; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one : but now things different from *the one* are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, since they in no respect participate of *the one*. Right. *Others*, therefore, are neither two nor three, nor is *one* contained in them, because they are entirely deprived of *the one*. So it is. *Others*, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same with *the one*, nor are similitude and dissimilitude inherent in them. For, if they were similar and dissimilar, so far as they contained in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, so far things different from *the one* would comprehend in themselves two contrary species. So it appears. But it is impossible for those to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one. Impossible. *Others*, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor both. For, if they were things similar or dissimilar, they would participate of one other form ; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms : but these things appear to be impossible. True. *Others*, therefore, are neither *same* nor *different*, nor are moved nor stand still, nor are generated nor destroyed, nor are greater, or lesser, or equal, nor do they suffer any thing else of this kind. For, if *others* could sustain to suffer any such affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd ; all which it appears impossible for them to participate, since they are entirely deprived of *the one*. All this is most true. Hence, then, if *the one is*, *the one* is all things and nothing ; and is similarly affected towards itself and towards others. Entirely so.

Let this then be admitted. But should we not after this consider what ought to happen if *the one* is not ? We should. What then will be the hypothesis if *the one is not* ? Will it differ from the hypothesis if *that which is not one is not* ? It will indeed differ. Will it only differ, or is the hypothesis if *that which is not one is not*, entirely contrary to the hypothesis if *the one is not* ? Entirely contrary. But what, if any one should say, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not evince in each of these that he speaks of *that which is not* as something different ? Entirely so. Would he not, therefore, now evince that he calls *that which is not* different from others, when he says if *the one is not* ; and should we understand that which he says ? We should understand. In
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the first place, therefore, he speaks of something which may be known; and afterwards of something different from others when he says *the one*, whether he adds to it *to be* or *not to be*: for that which is said not to be will be not the less known, nor that it is something different from others: is it not so? It is necessary it should. Let us, therefore, relate from the beginning, *if the one is not*, what ought to be the consequence. In the first place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there should be a science of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when any one says *if the one is not*. True. Must not this also happen, that either other things must be different from it, or that it must be said to be different from others? Entirely so. Diversity, therefore, besides science, is present with it; for, when any one says that *the one* is different from others, he will not speak of the diversity of others, but of the diversity of *the one*. It appears so. And besides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of *that*, and of *some certain thing*, and of *this*, and of *these*, and every thing of this kind. For neither could *the one* be spoken of, nor things different from *the one*, nor would any thing be present with it, nor could it be denominated any thing, if it neither participated of some certain thing or things of this kind. Right. But *to be* cannot be present with *the one* if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of *the many*: but, indeed, it is necessary that it should, if *the one* is *that*, and is not something different from *that*. If, therefore, it is neither *the one* nor *that*, neither will it be; but discourse must take place about something else, and it will be necessary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if *the one* is established as *that* and not as *another*, it is necessary that it should participate of *that* and of many other things. Entirely so. Dissimilitude, therefore, is present with it as to other things: for other things being different from *the one* will also be foreign from it. Certainly. But are not things foreign various? How should they not? And are not things various dissimilars? Dissimilars. If, therefore, they are dissimilars to *the one*, it is evident they will be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar. It is evident. Dissimilitude, therefore, will be present with *the one*, according to which others will be dissimilars to it. It appears so. But if a dissimilitude with respect to other things belongs to it, must not dissimilitude to itself be present with it? How? If there be a dissimilitude of *the one* with respect to *the one*, discourse would not take place about a thing

thing of this kind as of *the one*; nor would the hypothesis be about *the one*, but about something different from *the one*. Entirely so. But it ought not. Certainly not. There ought, therefore, to be a similitude of *the one* with respect to itself. There ought. But neither is *the one* equal to others. For, if it were equal, it would according to equality be similar to them; but both these are impossible, since *the one* is not. Impossible. But since it is not equal to others, is it not necessary that others also should not be equal to it? It is necessary. But are not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal? How should they not? *The one*, therefore, will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it. It will participate. But magnitude and parvitute belong to inequality. They do. Do magnitude and parvitute, therefore, belong to a one of this kind? It appears they do. But magnitude and parvitute are always separated from each other. Entirely so. Something, therefore, always subsists between them. Certainly. Can you assign any thing else between these, except equality? Nothing else. With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitute, with this equality also is present, subsisting as a medium between these. It appears so. But to *the one which is not*, equality, magnitude, and parvitute, as it appears, belong. So it seems. But it ought likewise, in a certain respect, to participate of essence. How so? Ought it to possess the properties which we have already described? for, unless this is the case, we shall not speak the truth when we say *the one is not*; but if this is true, it is evident that we have asserted things which have a subsistence: is it not so? It is. But since we assert that we speak truly, it is likewise necessary to assert that we speak of things which exist. It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, as it appears, *is*; for *if it is not*, while *not being*¹, but remits something of *being* in order to *not being*, it will immediately become *being*. Entirely so. It ought, therefore, to have, as the bond of *not to be*, *to be that which is not*², if it is about *not to be*: just as *being* ought to have as a bond *not to be that which is*

¹ The original is *μη εστι μη ον*, and this is literally *is not non-being*. But the meaning of this difficult passage is as follows: Any remission of *being* is attended with *non-being*, which is the same with *is not*; and if any thing of *is* be taken away, *is not* is immediately introduced, and so it will immediately become *is not non-being*, that is, *it is being*.

² For between *μη εστι* and *εστι ον*, *εστι μη ον* must subsist as a medium.

*not*¹, that it may be perfectly *that which is*. For thus, in a most eminent degree, *being* will *be* and *non-being* will *not be*: *being* participating of essence, in order that it may *be being*; but of *non-essence* in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is about perfectly *to be*: but *non-being* participating of *non-essence*, in order that it may *not be that which is not being*; but participating of essence, in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is to be perfectly *that which is not*. Most truly so. Since, therefore, *non-being* is present with *being*, and *being* with *non-being*, is it not necessary that *the one* also, since it is not, should participate of *being*, in order that it may *not be*? It is necessary. Essence, therefore, will appear with *the one*, if it is not. So it seems. And *non-essence*, since it is not. How should it not? Can any thing, therefore, which is affected in a certain manner, be not so affected when not changed from this habit? It cannot. Every thing, therefore, signifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in some particular manner. How should it not? Is mutation a motion, or what else do we call it? It is a motion. But has not *the one* appeared to be both *being* and *non-being*? Certainly. It has appeared, therefore, to be *thus* and *not thus* affected. It has. *The one*, therefore, which is *non-being* appears to be moved, since it possesses a mutation from *being* into *non-being*. It appears so. But if it be no where among beings, as *it is not* in consequence of *not being*, it cannot pass elsewhere. For how can it? It will not, therefore, be moved by transition. It will not. Neither will it revolve in *same*: for it will never touch *same*, since *same* is *being*. But it is impossible that *non-being* can reside in *any being*. Impossible. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, cannot revolve in that in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will *the one* be altered from itself, either into *being* or *non-being*: for our discourse would no longer be concerning *the one*, if it was altered from itself, but concerning something different from this one. Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in *same*, nor suffers transition, is there any way in which it can be moved? How should there? But that which is immovable must necessarily

¹ So $\tau\omicron \mu\eta \omicron\upsilon \mu\eta \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$ is the medium between $\tau\omicron \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \omicron\upsilon$ and $\tau\omicron \mu\eta \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \omicron\upsilon$: for $\tau\omicron \mu\eta \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \mu\eta$ is the same as $\tau\omicron \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$, and connects with $\tau\omicron \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \omicron\upsilon$; and $\tau\omicron \mu\eta \omicron\upsilon$ with $\tau\omicron \mu\eta \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \omicron\upsilon$. Thompson had not the least glimpse of this meaning, as may be seen from his version.

be at rest ; and that which is at rest must abide or stand still. It is necessary. *The one which is not*, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved. It appears so. But if it be moved, there is a great necessity that it should be altered ; for, so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer affected in the same manner as before, but differently. There is so. *The one*, therefore, since it is moved, is also altered. Certainly. But as again it is in no respect moved, it will be in no respect altered. It will not. So far, therefore, as *the one which is not* is moved, it is altered ; but so far as it is not moved it is not altered. Certainly not. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, is both altered and not altered. It appears so. But is it not necessary that when any thing is altered it should become different from what it was before, and should suffer a dissolution of its former habit ; but that a nature which is not altered should neither be generated nor dissolved ? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, through being altered, will be generated and dissolved ; but at the same time, from its not suffering alteration, will not be subject to either generation or corruption. And thus *the one which is not* will be generated and dissolved, and will neither be generated nor dissolved. It will not.

But let us again return to the beginning, and see whether these things will appear to us in our subsequent discussion as they do now, or otherwise. It is necessary, indeed, so to do. Have we not already related, *if the one is not*, what ought to happen concerning it ? Certainly. But when we say *it is not*, do we signify any thing else than the absence of essence from that which we say is not ? Nothing else. Whether, therefore, when we say that any thing *is not*, do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is ? Or does the term *is not* simply signify that it is in no respect any where, and that it does not any how participate of essence, since it *is not* ? It signifies, indeed, most simply. Neither therefore can that which is not *be*, nor in any other respect participate of essence. It cannot. But is to be generated and corrupted any thing else than for this to receive essence and for that to lose essence ? It is nothing else. That therefore with which nothing of essence is present, can neither receive nor lose it. How can it ? *The one*, therefore, since it in no respect *is*, can neither possess, nor lose, nor receive essence, in any manner whatever. It is proper
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it should be so. *The one which is not*, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, since it in no respect participates of essence. It does not appear that it will. Neither, therefore, will it be in any respect altered; for if it suffered this passion it would be generated and corrupted. True. But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary that it should not be moved? It is necessary. But that which in no respect *is*, we have likewise asserted, cannot stand still; for that which stands ought always to be in a certain *same*? How should it not? And thus we must assert that *non-being* neither at any time stands nor is moved. For indeed it does not. But likewise nothing of beings is present with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of essence. It is evident. Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it. Certainly not. Neither will similitude or diversity, either with respect to itself or others, be present with it. It does not appear that they will. But what, can other things be in any respect present with it, if nothing ought to be present with it? They cannot. Neither, therefore, are similars nor dissimilars, nor *same* nor *different*, different from it. They are not. But what, can any thing be asserted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with some other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now—or can science, or opinion, or sense, or discourse, or a name, or any thing else belonging to beings, subsist about that which is not? There cannot. *The one* therefore *which is not*, will not in any respect subsist any where. So indeed it appears.

But let us again declare *if the one is not*, what other things ought to suffer. Let us. But in a certain respect *others* ought to subsist; for, unless *others* have a being, we cannot discourse concerning them. True. But if discourse is about *others*, *others* will be different: or do you not call *others* and *different* the same? I do. But do we not say that *different* is different from different, and *other* is other than *another*? Certainly. With respect to *others*, therefore, if they are about to be *others*, there is something than which they will be others. It is necessary. But what will this be? For they will not be different from *the one*, since it is not. They will not. They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing. Right. According to multitudes, therefore,

each is different from each; for they cannot be different according to *the one*, since *the one is not*. But each mass of these, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though any one should assume that which appears to be the least, like a dream in sleep, on a sudden, instead of that which seemed to be *one*, *many* would rise to the view; and instead of that which is smallest, a quantity perfectly great with respect to the multitude distributed from it. Most right. But among these masses or heaps, *others* will be mutually different from one another, if they are *others* and *the one* is not. Eminently so. Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not so since *the one* is not? There will so. There will likewise appear to be a number of these, if each of these which are many is one. Entirely so. But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, since *the one* will not have a being. They will not. But likewise that which is smallest, as we have said, will appear to be with them; but this minimum will seem to be many things and great, with respect to each of the things which are many and small. How should it not? And every small heap will seem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many small heaps: for it will not appear to pass from a greater into a lesser quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between; and this will be a phantasm of equality. It is likely to be so. Will it not also appear to be bounded with respect to another heap, itself with respect to itself, at the same time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end? How so? Because, when any one apprehends by the dianoëtic power some one of these prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind: but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle; and smaller, because each of them cannot receive *one one*, since *the one is not*. This is most true. But every thing which any one may apprehend by the dianoëtic power, must I think be broken to pieces and distributed; for the bulk will in a certain respect be apprehended without *the one*. Entirely so. But will not such a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, necessarily appear to be one: but to him who with an intellectual eye surveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, since it is deprived of *the one*, because it has no subsistence? It is necessary it should be so in the highest degree.

Each, therefore, of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, *if the one is not*, and other things besides *the one* have a subsistence. It ought to be so. Will they, therefore, appear to be similars and dissimilars? But how? Since to him who beholds *others* at a distance, involved as it were in shadow, they all appear to be one, they will seem to suffer *same* and to be similar. Entirely so. But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the phantasm of *diversity*. It is so. The heaps, therefore, will necessarily appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves, and to each other. Entirely so. Will they not also be the same and different from each other, and in contact with, and separate from, themselves, and moved with all possible motions, and every way abiding: likewise generated and corrupted, and neither of these, and all of this kind, which may be easily enumerated, if, though *the one is not*, *the many* have a subsistence? All this is most true.

Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from *the one*, *if the one is not*. Let us relate. Does it not, therefore, follow that *others* are not *the one*? How should it not be so? Nor yet are they many; for, in *the many*, *the one* also would be inherent. For, if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that neither can there be many. True. *The one*, therefore, not being inherent in *others*, *others* are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor will they appear either to be one or many. Why not? Because *others* cannot in any respect have any communication with things which are not, nor can any thing of non-beings be present with *others*; for no part subsists with non-beings. True. Neither, therefore, is there any opinion of that which is not, inherent in *others*, nor any phantasm; nor can that which is not become in any respect the subject of opinion to *others*. It cannot. *The one*, therefore, *if it is not*, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of *others*, nor yet many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without *the one*. It is impossible. If *the one*, therefore, *is not*, neither have *others* any subsistence; nor can *the one* or *the many* be conceived by opinion. It does not appear that they can. Neither, therefore, do similars nor dissimilars subsist. They do not. Nor *same* nor *different*, nor things in contact, nor such

such as are separate from each other, nor other things, such as we have already discussed, as appearing to subsist; for no particular of these will have any existence, nor will others appear to be, *if the one is not*. True. If we should, therefore, summarily say, that *if the one is not, nothing is*, will not our assertion be right? Entirely so. Let this then be asserted by us, and this also: that whether *the one is* or *is not*, both itself, as it appears, and others, both with respect to themselves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the same time are not all, and appear to be, and at the same time do not appear. It is most true.

THE END OF THE PARMENIDES.

THE

THE SOPHISTA;

A

DIALOGUE

ON BEING..

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE SOPHISTA.

THE following is the preface of Proclus ¹ to this dialogue, as preserved in the Greek Scholia on Plato, published by Ruhnkenius. "Plato not only calls a certain man a Sophist, but also Love ², Pluto, and Jupiter, and says that the sophistical art is all-beautiful; whence we may conjecture that the dialogue has a more noble scope than it appears to possess. For, according to the great Jamblichus, its scope is concerning the sublunary demiurgus ³; since this Divinity is the fabricator of images, and the purifier of souls, always separating them from contrary reasons, being a transmuter, and a mercenary hunter of rich young men. While he receives souls coming from on high replete with productive principles, he takes from them a reward, viz. the fabrication of animals, in such a way as is accommodated to the nature of mortals. This Deity gives himself to non-being, because he fabricates material beings, and embraces matter,—a thing which is truly false. At the same time, however, he looks to true being. He is also many-headed, hurling forth many essences and lives, through which he furnishes the variety of generation. The same power is likewise a magician, in consequence of alluring souls by natural reasons, so that they are with difficulty divulsed from generation. For Love, also, and Nature, are called by some magicians,

¹ Ficinus, who has given a version of this preface, ascribes it to Proclus, and doubtless from good authority.

² This word is wanting in Ruhnkenius, and is supplied from the version of Ficinus.

³ Viz. Pluto.

on account of the sympathy and antipathy in things which have a natural subsistence. Now, therefore, Plato wishes to instruct us in an all-various sophist. For a philosopher is a sophist, as imitating the celestial and also the sublunary demiurgus: for the divisive art imitates the progression of things from *the one*, and the sublunary the celestial demiurgus; and on this account he is a sophist. A sophist also among men is so called, because he imitates great things: and hence Plato denominates the sophist many-headed. The Elean guest is analogous to the supercelestial and exempt father of the artificers of things, but his hearers to demiurgic intellects, one of these being analogous to the intellect of Jupiter, and the other to angelic intelligence, as being Mercurial and geometrical. And because fabrication proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, on this account the Elean guest first converses with Theodorus, and afterwards converts himself to Socrates in particular¹. Thus far Proclus.

Plato in this dialogue presents us with six definitions of a sophist; but as definition cannot be obtained without division, for the latter is the principle of the former, hence he divides the genus of the sophist by its proper differences, from which, in conjunction with genus, species is composed and de-

¹ I give the original of this fragment of Proclus for the sake of the learned Platonic reader, who may not have these Greek Scholia in his possession: for, to a genuine Platonist, every thing written by Proclus must be invaluable. 'Ὅτι σοφιστὴν καλεῖ ὁ Πλάτων καὶ τὸν . . . (supple Ἐρώτα) καὶ τὸν Αἰδῶν, καὶ τὸν Δία, καὶ παγκάλῃ λέγει εἶναι τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην' ὅθεν ὑπονοομεν, ὅτι γλαφυρωτέρου σκοποῦ ἔχεται ὁ διαλογος. Ἐστὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Ἰαμβλίχον σκοπὸς νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὑπο σελήνην δημιουργοῦ. 'Οὗτος γὰρ εἰδωλοποιός, καὶ καθάρτης ψυχῶν, ἐναντίων λόγων αἰεὶ χωρίζων, μεταβλητικός, καὶ νέων πλουτίων ἐμπίστος δημιουργὸς, ψυχὰς ὑποδεχόμενος πληρεῖς λόγων ἀνωδὲν ἰσθῶς, καὶ μίσθον λαμβάνων παρ' αὐτῶν, τὴν ζωopoιοῦν τὴν κατὰ λόγον τῶν θνητῶν. 'Οὗτος ἐνδεδεται τῷ μὴ οὐτὶ, τὰ ἐνυλὰ δημιουργῶν, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὺς ψεύδος ἀσπαζόμενος, τὴν ὕλην. Βλέπει δὲ εἰς τὸ οὐτως οὐ. 'Οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ πολυκεφαλὸς, πολλὰς εὐσείας καὶ ζωᾶς προέβλημενος, δι' ὃν κατασκευάζει τὴν ποικίλιαν τῆς γενέσεως. 'Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ γὰρ, ὡς θελῶν τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις, ὡς δυσάποσπαστως ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐρως γὰρ, καὶ ἡ φύσις ὑπὸ τινῶν μαγῶν κεκλήται διὰ τὰς συμπαθείας καὶ ἀντιπαθείας τῶν φύσει. Νῦν οὖν τὸν παντοδαπὸν σοφιστὴν βούλεται διδασκεῖν. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος σοφιστὴς, ὡς μίμουμένος τὸν τε οὐρανίον δημιουργὸν καὶ τὸν γενεοποιόν. Καὶ ἡ διαιρετικὴ μίμειται τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς τῶν οὐτῶν προοδὸν, καὶ ὁ γενεοποιὸς τὸν οὐρανίον δημιουργόν. διὸ καὶ σοφιστὴς, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ σοφιστὴς ἀνθρώπος ὡν διὰ τὸ τὰ μεγάλα μίμεισθαι, σοφιστὴς καλεῖται' ὅθεν καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν πολυκεφαλὸν εἰρκεν. 'Ὁ δὲ ξένος εἰς τυπὸν τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν δημιουργούντων νοεῖσθαι ὑπερορανοῦς καὶ ἐξηγούμενος' οἱ δὲ ἀκροαταὶ εἰς τὰς δημιουργικὰς νοήσεις, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν τοῦ Διὸς, ὁ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀγγελικὴν, ὡς Ἑρμαῖος καὶ γεωμετρικός. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ δημιουργία ἐκ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς εἰς τὸ τέλειον, διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον ὁ ξένος τῷ Θεόδωρῳ συγγίνεται· εἴτα δ' ἐπιστροφῆς τῇ διῷ (lege ἰδίῳ) Σωκράτει.

fined. He also shows, conformably to what is delivered in the Parmenides, that *being* is subordinate to *the one*; and enumerates five genera of *being*, viz. *essence*, *same*, and *different*, *permanency* and *motion*. He likewise teaches us that true essence belongs to incorporeal, and imaginable to corporeal natures; and is indignant with those who deny that there are forms superior to sensibles, and also with those who contend that all things are either alone permanent, or alone in motion. Besides all this, he disputes concerning science and opinion, true and false discourse, verb and noun, so far as they appear to pertain to the discussion of *being*. He likewise observes, that the sophist is concealed from our view, because he is involved in the darkness of non-entity, and that a philosopher also is not easily discerned on account of the splendor of being with which he is surrounded: "for the eyes of vulgar souls (says he) are unable to support the view of that which is divine."

In order, however, to understand the most abstruse part of this dialogue, it is necessary to refer the reader to our copious Notes and Introduction to the Parmenides: for he whose mental eye has gained a glimpse of the ineffable light of *superessential unity*, will more easily perceive the splendors of *being*.

I only add, that Plato in this dialogue has given a most beautiful specimen of that part of his dialectic ¹ called division; a branch of the master science in which he and the most illustrious of his disciples were eminently skilled, and by which they were enabled to discover all the connecting media in the vast series of being, and to ascend from that which is last in the universe to the ineffable principle of all things.

¹ For an ample account of this master science see the Introduction to the Parmenides.

THE SOPHISTA.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS,		An ELEAN GUEST, or STRANGER,
SOCRATES,		And THEÆTETUS.

WE are come, Socrates, according to our agreement yesterday, as good manners require, and have brought with us this guest, who is an Elean by birth, but very different from the associates of Parmenides and Zeno: he is however a great philosopher.

Soc. Perhaps, therefore, Theodorus, according to the assertion of Homer¹, you are conducting a certain God, and not a stranger. For he says, that both other Gods, and especially the hospitable deity, are conversant with men who participate of just shame, and that they inspect the insolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he who now follows you, is one of the natures superior to man, who attends you in order to behold and confute us who dispute badly, as being himself a certain reprehending God.

THEO. This is not the manner of this guest, Socrates, but he is more modest than those that are studious of contention. And he appears to me, as being a man, not to be a God, but to be divine: for so I denominate all philosophers.

¹ Odyss. lib. vii. ver. 485, &c. See the Apology for the Fables of Homer, vol. i. p. 163 of this work. It is well observed by the Greek Scholiast on this place, that Socrates now, consistently with what he asserts in the Republic, reprobates these verses of Homer, but in a milder manner, in consequence of becoming an associate with the Elean guest.

Soc. And you do well in calling them so, my friend. But indeed the genus of philosophers is not much more easily distinguished, as I may say, than that of divinity. For those who are not fictitiously but truly philosophers, appear through the ignorance of others to be of an all-various nature, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of inferior natures. And to some they appear to deserve no honour, but by others they are considered as worthy of all honour. And sometimes they appear to be politicians, but at other times Sophists; and sometimes, in the opinion of certain persons, they are considered to be perfectly insane. I would gladly, therefore, inquire of this our guest, if agreeable to him, what his familiars the Eleans think of these things, and how they denominate them.

THEO. What things do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. The sophist, politician, and philosopher.

THEO. What, and of what kind, is the doubt about these, which you would wish to have dissolved?

Soc. This: Whether they denominate all these, one or two. Or as there are three names, whether they also make a distribution into three genera, and ascribe the respective names to the respective genera.

THEO. But I think that he will not enviously refuse to discuss these things. Or how shall we say, guest?

GUEST. In this manner, Theodorus. For I shall not enviously refuse, nor is it difficult to inform you, that they think these are three genera: but to define clearly what each of them is, is not a small nor an easy work.

THEO. You have perhaps, Socrates, fallen upon questions similar to those which we were asking this our guest before we came hither. But he then gave us the same answers as he just now gave you: for he said, that he had sufficiently heard, and did not forget them.

Soc. You ought, therefore, to gratify us, O guest, with respect to our first question: But tell us thus much, whether you are accustomed to discuss by yourself in a long discourse, that which you wish to evince, or by interrogations, which I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the same time delivering all-beautiful arguments, I being then a young and he a very elderly man.

GUEST. If any one answers, Socrates, without difficulty, and in a placid manner

manner, it is more easy to discourse with such a one by interrogating; but if not, it is better to discourse by oneself.

SOC. You are at liberty, therefore, to choose whichever of these you please: for we shall all of us obey you without reluctance. But I would advise you to choose some young man for this purpose, either Theætetus here, or any other that you may think proper.

GUEST. I am ashamed, Socrates, that, conversing with you now for the first time, I have not given word for word, but, making a long discourse either by myself or to another, I have acted as if I had been framing a demonstration. For in reality no one should expect that the present question can be solved with the greatest facility: for it requires a very long discussion. On the contrary, not to gratify you, and those that are now assembled, especially since you have asked in so modest a manner; would, as it appears to me, be inhospitable and rustic; since, from what I have before said, and from what you have now urged me to do, I shall have Theætetus here as my associate in the discussion.

THEÆ. By thus acting indeed, O guest, as Socrates says, you will gratify all of us.

GUEST. It appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further must be said against these things. And as it seems, after this, I must address myself to you. But if being weary through the length of the discourse you should become indignant, do not blame me, but these your companions, as the cause of this.

THEÆ. I am far from thinking that this will be the case: but if a thing of this kind should take place, then we can call upon the namefake of Socrates here, who is of the same age with me, and is my associate in gymnastic exercises, and who is not unaccustomed to accomplish many laborious things in conjunction with me.

GUEST. You speak well. Deliberate, therefore, about these things by yourself, in the course of the disputation: but now consider in common with me, beginning in the first place (as it appears to me) from the sophist; and let us evince by our discourse what he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common respecting this thing: but perhaps each of us thinks differently as to the thing denominated. But it is always requisite respecting every thing, rather to consent through reasons to the thing itself, than to the name alone without reason. However, with respect to the tribe
which

which we now take upon us to investigate, it is by no means easy to apprehend what a sophist is. It appears however to all men, and is an ancient opinion, that whoever wishes to labour through great things well, should exercise himself in such as are small and more easy, before he attempts such as are the greatest. Now, therefore, as we are of opinion that the genus of a sophist is difficult to investigate, I would advise, Theætetus, that we should first of all consider the method of this investigation, in something more easy: unless you are able to show a more expeditious way.

THEÆ. But I am not able.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that, adducing a vile thing, we should establish it as a paradigm of a greater thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what if we propose a thing well known, and of a trifling nature, but which will contribute as well as any thing to the apprehension of greater things? as for instance a fisherman. Is he not known to every one? and is it not likewise certain, that he does not deserve much serious consideration?

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST. Yet I suspect he will furnish us with a method, and reasoning process, not unadapted to our design.

THEÆ. In this case, therefore, it will be well.

GUEST. Come then, let us begin from this: and inform me, whether we should consider a fisherman, as one endued with art, or as without art, but possessing another power.

THEÆ. We must by no means consider him as without art.

GUEST. But there are nearly two species of all arts.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Agriculture, and the care respecting every mortal body, together with that pertaining to every thing composite and plastic, which we denominate an utensil, and in conjunction with these the imitative power, all which may be justly called by one name.

THEÆ. How so? and by what name?

GUEST. When any one afterwards leads into existence that which was not before, then we say that he who leads makes, and that the thing led is made.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But all the particulars which we just now mentioned possess a power adapted to this.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. In a summary way, therefore, we shall denominate them effective.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. But after this, the whole species of discipline and knowledge, together with the species of gain, contest and hunting, may be called a certain art of acquiring, since no one of these fabricates any thing, but procures things which are and have been, partly subjecting them to its power by words and actions, and partly conceding them to those by whom they are received.

THEÆ. They may be so called : for it is proper.

GUEST. Since all arts, therefore, consist either in acquiring or in effecting, in which of these, Theætetus, shall we place the art of fishing ?

THEÆ. Doubtless in the art of acquiring.

GUEST. But are there not two species of the art of acquiring ? the one being a commutation between those that are willing, through gifts, buying, and wages ? But the other will be a mancipation, effected either by deeds or words.

THEÆ. It appears this must be the case, from what has been said.

GUEST. But what ? Must not mancipation also receive a twofold division ?

THEÆ. After what manner ?

GUEST. The one being apparent, and wholly agonistic ; but the other being occult, and wholly consisting in hunting.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. It is likewise absurd, not to give hunting a twofold division.

THEÆ. Inform me how.

GUEST. One member of the division consists of the inanimate, and the other of the animated kind.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly : for there are both these.

GUEST. How, indeed, is it possible there should not ? And it is requisite that we should leave the hunting of inanimate things without a name, and that we should likewise dismiss the consideration of certain parts of the art of swimming, and other trifling things of this kind ; and denominate
the

the other part, which is the hunting of animated natures, the hunting of animals.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. But is it not justly said, that there is a twofold species of the hunting of animals? one being the hunting of the pedestrian kind, which is distinguished by many species and names, but the other of every swimming animal, and which is denominated hunting in water?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But of the swimming division, we see that one kind cuts the air with wings, and that the other is aquatic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called fowling.

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST. But nearly that of all the aquatic tribe, fishing.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what? Must we not divide this hunting into two greatest parts?

THEÆ. What are these parts?

GUEST. According to which we either fish with nets, or by percussion.

THEÆ. How do you say? And how do you divide each?

GUEST. That every thing which on all sides enclosing restrains any thing for the sake of impediment, is fitly denominated a net.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But do you call a bow-net, *diſtuon*¹, a snare, and a casting-net, any thing else than nets?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. We must say, therefore, that this hunting with nets is a part of fishing, or something of this kind.

THEÆ. We must.

GUEST. But that which is accomplished with hooks and darts, by percussion, and which is different from the other kind of fishing, it will be proper that we should now call by one word, percutient-hunting, unless you, Theætetus, have any thing better to say.

¹ The *diſtuon* was a larger and wider kind of net.

THEÆ. Let us pay no attention to the name : for this is sufficient.

GUEST. Of percutient-hunting, therefore, one kind is I think nocturnal, being effected by the light of fire ; and on this account it happens to be called igniferous.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But the other kind is diurnal, and is effected with tridents hooked on the extremities of rods ; the whole of this being aduncous fishing.

THEÆ. It is indeed so called.

GUEST. Of aduncous-percutient-fishing, therefore, that kind which is effected by darting the tridents into the water from on high, is I think called by some tridental fishing.

THEÆ. So certain persons say.

GUEST. Only one species then, as I may say, remains.

THEÆ. What is that ?

GUEST. A percussive contrary to this, effected indeed with a hook, but not casually striking any part of the body, as in fishing with tridents, but piercing only the head and mouth of the fish, and drawing it upwards with rods and reeds. By what name, Theætetus, shall we say this ought to be called ?

THEÆ. By that of aduncous fishing with rods : and we now appear to have accomplished that which we proposed to discuss.

GUEST. Now, therefore, you and I have not only accorded in giving a name to fishing, but we have likewise sufficiently explained the manner in which it is conducted. For, of the whole art, one half we said consisted in acquiring ; and the half of this in manual subjugation ; and again the half of this in hunting. Likewise that the half of hunting consisted in the capture of animals ; and that the half of the capture of animals was hunting in water. That again, of hunting in water, the downward division of the whole was fishing ; that the half of fishing was percutient ; that the half of percutient fishing was performed with a hook : and lastly, that the half of this consisted in drawing that which is downwards upwards ; and that, thence deriving its name, it is called aduncous fishing with rods.

THEÆ. This, therefore, has been in every respect sufficiently shown.

GUEST. Come then, let us endeavour according to this paradigm to discover what a sophist is.

THEÆ. By all means.

GUEST. And this indeed was the first object of inquiry in the example just adduced, whether a fisherman is to be considered as a rude character, or as one endued with a certain art.

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. And now, Theætetus, shall we call a sophist a rude character, or one in every respect skilful?

THEÆ. We must by no means call him a rude character. For I understand what you say, that he who is so called ought not to be unskilful, but endued with a certain art.

GUEST. But with what art ought we to consider him endued?

THEÆ. I ask you the same question.

GUEST. By the Gods, then, are we ignorant that one of these men is allied to the other?

THEÆ. Which men?

GUEST. The fisherman and the sophist.

THEÆ. In what respect are they allied?

GUEST. Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

THEÆ. Of what is this latter character a hunter? for we have spoken of the other.

GUEST. We divided the whole of hunting into the swimming and the pedestrian.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we discussed, indeed, the particulars respecting the swimming part of aquatic natures; but we omitted the pedestrian division, and said that it was multiform.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Thus far, therefore, the sophist and the fisherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

THEÆ. They appear so indeed.

GUEST. Some however, abandoning the hunting of land animals, betake themselves to the sea, to rivers and lakes, and hunt animals in these.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But some subjugate animals on the earth, and in rivers, as in meadows abounding with riches and youthfulness.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. Of pedestrian hunting there are two greatest parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is each of these parts?

GUEST. One is the hunting of tame, and the other of savage animals.

THEÆ. Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

GUEST. Either man is a tame animal, (adopt what I say as you please,) or no animal is tame; or some other animal is tame, but man is a savage animal: or you may say that man indeed is a tame animal, but you may think that there is no hunting of men. Adopt whichever of these divisions is most agreeable to you.

THEÆ. But I think, O guest, that we are a tame animal, and I say that there is a hunting of men.

GUEST. We must say then that there is also a twofold hunting of tame animals.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. By defining prædatory hunting, that which reduces into bondage, and tyrannic hunting, to be all of them violent hunting.

THEÆ. Well defined.

GUEST. But that which pertains to judicial cases, popular harangues, and discourse, may summarily be called a certain art of persuasion.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But of this art of persuasion we say there are two kinds.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. One of them is private, and the other public.

THEÆ. There are these two species.

GUEST. Again, with respect to the hunting of private persuasion, one kind is effected by wages, and another by gifts.

THEÆ. I do not understand you.

GUEST. It seems you have never attended to the hunting of lovers.

THEÆ. In what respect?

GUEST. In this, that besides other things they bestow gifts on those they have caught.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

GUEST. Let this then be a species of the amatory art.

THEÆ. By all means.

GUEST. But with respect to that species of the hunting of persuasion which is effected by wages, that part of it which converses with others through favour, and entirely procures enchantments through pleasure, that it may thence alone receive aliment as its reward, this I think we all of us call adulation, or a certain art administering to pleasure.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But another part of it professes to converse for the sake of virtue, and requires money for its reward. Ought not this part, therefore, to be called by another name?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Endeavour to tell me this name.

THEÆ. It is evident. For we appear to me to have found a sophist; and I think this name is adapted to this other part of the object of our investigation.

GUEST. According to the present reasoning, as it seems, Theætetus, the profession of a sophist must be called an art, servile, subjugating, and venatic; hunting pedestrian, terrestrial, and tame animals; or, in other words, privately bringing men into captivity for pecuniary rewards, and ensnaring rich and noble young men, through an opinion of erudition.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Further still, let us consider as follows:—For the object of our present investigation does not participate of a certain vile art, but of one various in the extreme. For, from what has been before said, we may conjecture that it does not belong to that kind of art which we just now mentioned, but to another kind.

THEÆ. What is that kind?

GUEST. There were in a certain respect two species of the art of acquiring, the one consisting in hunting, and the other flowing from contracts.

THEÆ. There were.

GUEST. We say, therefore, that there are two species of contracts, the one consisting in bestowing, and the other in buying and selling.

THEÆ. There are so.

GUEST. And again, we say that the species of contracts which consists in buying and selling, must receive a twofold division.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST.

GUEST. He who exposes his own works to sale may be called a seller of his own property ; but he who sells the works of others, an exchanger.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what ? Is not that exchange which takes place in the same city, and which is nearly the half of the whole of exchange, denominated cauponary ?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And is not the other half that which takes place by buying and selling in different cities, and which we call emporic ?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do we not perceive, that of emporic exchange, one part pertains to the nutriment of the body, and the other to the discipline of the soul, exchanging erudition for money ?

THEÆ. How do you say ?

GUEST. That part which pertains to the soul we are, perhaps, unacquainted with : for the other part we understand.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But we say that he who buys music in one city by learning, and sells it in another by teaching, and who acts in a similar manner with respect to painting, enchantment, and many other things pertaining to the soul, as well serious as jocose,—we say that such a one traffics no less than he who sells meats and drinks.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

GUEST. Will you not, therefore, similarly denominate him who wanders about different cities in order to exchange disciplines for money ?

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But of this merchandize pertaining to the soul, may not one part be most justly called demonstrative ; and may not the other part, though ridiculous, yet, since it is no less the selling of disciplines than the former, be called by a name which is the brother to that of selling ?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But in this traffic of disciplines, he who sells the disciplines of other arts must be called by a name different from him who sells the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. For he who sells the disciplines of other arts may be aptly called a feller of arts; but consider by what name he should be called who sells the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. By what other name can he be called without error, except that which is the object of our investigation at present, a sophist?

GUEST. By no other. We may, therefore, now collect as follows: that, by a second investigation, a sophist has appeared to us to be an exchanger, a buyer and seller, a merchant respecting discourses, and one who sells the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. In the third place, I think that you in like manner will call him a sophist, who being settled in a city, partly buys and partly himself fabricates disciplines, which he sells in order to procure the necessaries of life.

THEÆ. Why, indeed, should I not?

GUEST. You will, therefore, call him a sophist who is conversant in acquiring, who traffics, and sells either his own inventions, or those of others, about the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Necessarily so. For it is requisite to assent to reason.

GUEST. Let us still further consider, whether the genus which we are at present investigating is similar to a certain thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind?

GUEST. Of the art of acquiring, a certain part appeared to us to be agonistic.

THEÆ. It did.

GUEST. It will not, therefore, be improper to give it a twofold division.

THEÆ. Inform me how you divide it.

GUEST. One part is defensive, and the other offensive.

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST. Of the offensive part, therefore, that which takes place when bodies fight against bodies may be fitly called violence.

THEÆ. It may.

GUEST. But what else, Theætetus, can that which takes place when arguments oppose arguments be called, except contention?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. But as to contentions, there must be a twofold division.

THEÆ. In what respect?

GUEST. For, so far as contention takes place through employing prolix arguments against prolix arguments in public concerning things just and unjust, it is judicial.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But when it takes place in private, by a distribution into minute parts, through question and answer, are we accustomed to call it any thing else than contradiction?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. But of contradiction, that part which is employed about contracts, and which subsists casually, and without art, is to be placed as a separate species, since reason distinguishes it from other kinds of contradiction; but it has neither been assigned a name by any of the antients, nor does it deserve to be denominated by us at present.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. For it is divided into parts extremely small and all-various. But that which proceeds according to art, and disputes about things just and unjust, and universally about other particulars, we are accustomed to call contentious.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But of the contentious division, one part dissipates possessions, and the other accumulates wealth.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. We should, therefore, endeavour to discover by what name each of these ought to be called.

THEÆ. It is proper to do so.

GUEST. It appears then to me, that he who, through delighting in the study of contention, neglects his affairs, and is always hunting after trifling questions, cannot be called any thing else than a man of words.

THEÆ. He may, indeed, be called so.

GUEST. But do you now, in your turn, endeavour to inform me how he is to be denominated who endeavours to acquire wealth from private contention.

THEÆ. Can any one with rectitude call him any thing else than that wonderful character the sophist, which we investigate, and who now again for the fourth time presents himself to our view?

GUEST. As reason, therefore, again shows us, a sophist is nothing else than that pecuniary genus which is conversant with the art of contention, with contradiction, controversy, hostile opposition, and with the agonistic art, and that of acquiring.

THEÆ. He is altogether so.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, therefore, that it is truly said, this wild beast is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the other hand?

THEÆ. It will, therefore, be proper to use both hands.

GUEST. It will be proper, and we must do so to the utmost of our power. But inform me, whether we have any servile names?

THEÆ. We have many. But respecting which of the many do you ask me?

GUEST. Such as when we say to wash, to distribute, to boil, and to separate.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And besides these, to card wool, to draw down, to comb, and ten thousand other such-like words which we meet with in the arts. Or do we not?

THEÆ. Which among these do you wish to serve throughout, as an instance of what you mean to evince?

GUEST. All the names that have been mentioned are in a certain respect divisive.

THEÆ. They are.

GUEST. According to my reasoning, therefore, since there is one art in all these, we should call them by one name.

THEÆ. By what name?

GUEST. Segregative.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. Consider, again, whether we are able to perceive two species of this?

THEÆ. You seem to urge me to a rapid consideration.

GUEST. And, indeed, in all these segregations, the worse was separated from the better, and the similar from the similar.

THEÆ. It appears that it was nearly so said.

GUEST. Of the latter of these segregations, therefore, I cannot tell the name ; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worse.

THEÆ. Inform me what it is.

GUEST. The whole of this separation (as I conjecture) is called by all men a certain purification.

THEÆ. It is so called.

GUEST. Does not, therefore, every one see that the cathartic species is twofold ?

THEÆ. Yes. If any one, perhaps, thinks about it at leisure ; for I do not see it at present.

GUEST. And, indeed, it is proper to comprehend in one name the many species of purgations pertaining to the body.

THEÆ. What kind of purgations do you mean ? and by what name ought they to be called ?

GUEST. The inward purgations of the bodies of animals, by gymnastic and medicine, which purify by rightly separating ; and those which operate externally, and which it is vile to mention, viz. such as baths afford ; and likewise the purgations of inanimate bodies, by means of the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, which occasions attention to things of a trifling nature,—all these appear to be allotted many and ridiculous names.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. Entirely so, indeed, Theætetus. But the order of reasoning cares neither more nor less, whether wiping with a sponge purifies in a small degree, but the drinking a medicine is more advantageous to us, by the purification it affords. For, that it may understand all arts, by endeavouring to apprehend what is allied, and what not, it equally honours the several arts, and is of opinion that some are not more ridiculous than others according to similitude. It likewise considers hunting, effected through military discipline, as in no respect more venerable than searching after vermin, but for the most part more futile. And now, indeed, which was what you asked, we have comprehended in one name all the powers which are allotted the purification either of an animated or inanimate body ; but it is of no consequence to the present disputation what name may appear to be more becoming, if it be only placed separate from the purgations of the soul, and include

in itself all such things as purify the body. For the order of reasoning now endeavours to separate the purification of the dianoëtic part from other purgations, if we understand what it wishes to accomplish.

THEÆ. But I do understand, and I grant that there are two species of purification; one species respecting the soul, and the other, which is separate from this, respecting the body.

GUEST. You speak in the most beautiful manner. Attend to me, therefore, in what follows, and endeavour to give a twofold division to what has been said.

THEÆ. Wherever you may lead, I will endeavour to distribute in conjunction with you.

GUEST. Do we not say, then, that depravity in the soul is something different from virtue?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And we likewise said, that purification consists in rejecting what is depraved, and preserving what remains.

THEÆ. We did say so.

GUEST. So far, therefore, as we shall discover an ablation of depravity in the soul, we ought to call it purgation.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. Two species of depravity in the soul must be established.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is like disease in the body, but the other resembles inherent baseness.

THEÆ. I do not understand you.

GUEST. Perhaps you do not think that disease is the same with sedition.

THEÆ. Again, I am not able to answer this question.

GUEST. Whether do you think sedition is any thing else than the corruption of natural alliance through a certain discord?

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

GUEST. And is baseness any thing else than entire deformity, arising from the immoderation of things of one kind?

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

GUEST. What then, do we not see in the soul of the depraved that opinions

nions differ from desires, anger from pleasures, reason from pain, and all these from each other?

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But all these are necessarily allied to each other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We shall speak rightly, therefore, in calling depravity the sedition and disease of the soul.

THEÆ. We shall speak most rightly.

GUEST. But what, when we see such things as participate of motion, and propose to themselves a certain end, wander from and miss the mark according to every impulse, do we say that they are affected in this manner through symmetry to each other, or, on the contrary, through a privation of symmetry?

THEÆ. It is evident that this happens through a privation of symmetry.

GUEST. But we know that every soul is involuntarily ignorant of any thing.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But ignorance is nothing else than a delirium of the soul, which, while it is impelled to truth, wanders in its apprehension of things.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. We must consider, therefore, a soul involved in ignorance as base and deformed.

THEÆ. So it appears.

GUEST. It seems, therefore, that there are these two genera of evils in the soul; one of which is called by the multitude depravity, and is most evidently a disease.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But the other the multitude call ignorance, but they are unwilling to acknowledge that this is a vice in the soul.

THEÆ. It must by all means be granted, though when you just now spoke I was doubtful of it, that there are two genera of vice or depravity in the soul; and that we ought to consider timidity, intemperance, injustice, and every thing else of this kind, as a disease in us; but the passion of abundant and all-various ignorance as baseness.

GUEST.

GUEST. In the body, therefore, are there not two certain arts about these two passions?

THEÆ. What are these arts?

GUEST. About baseness, gymnastic; but about disease, medicine.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. About insolence, therefore, injustice, and timidity, is not chastizing justice naturally the most adapted of all arts?

THEÆ. It is likely, as I may say, according to human opinion.

GUEST. But, can any one say that there is a more proper remedy for all ignorance than erudition?

THEÆ. No one can.

GUEST. Must we say, therefore, that there is only one kind of erudition, or that there are more kinds than one? But take notice, that there are two greatest genera of it.

THEÆ. I do take notice.

GUEST. And it appears to me that we shall very rapidly discover this.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. By perceiving that ignorance has a certain twofold division. For, being twofold, it is evident that it necessarily requires a twofold mode of instruction, corresponding to the members of its division.

THEÆ. What then? Is that apparent which is the object of your present investigation?

GUEST. I perceive, indeed, a great and ponderous species of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is it?

GUEST. When he who is ignorant of a thing appears to himself to know it. For it appears that through this all the deceptions in our dianoëtic part take place.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And I think that to this species of ignorance alone the name of rusticity should be given.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. How, therefore, do you think that part of erudition should be called which liberates from this species of ignorance?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I think, indeed, O guest, that the other part is denominated demiurgic erudition, but that this is called by us discipline.

GUEST. It is nearly so denominated, Theætetus, by all the Greeks. But this also must be considered by us, whether the whole of this is indivisible, or possesses a certain division which deserves to be named.

THEÆ. It is requisite to consider this.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, to me, that this may be still further divided.

THEÆ. According to what?

GUEST. Of the erudition which is effected by discourse, one way appears to be more rough, and another part of it more smooth.

THEÆ. Of what kind do we call each of these?

GUEST. The one antient and paternal, which men formerly adopted towards their children, and many use at present, viz. as often as children do wrong, partly severely reproofs, and partly mildly admonishing them. But the whole of this may be called with the utmost propriety admonition.

THEÆ. It may so.

GUEST. But some are of opinion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn those things in which he considers himself as skilled; but that the admonitory species of discipline makes very small advances with great labour.

THEÆ. And they think right.

GUEST. They likewise adopt another mode in order to disclose this opinion.

THEÆ. What mode?

GUEST. By inquiring into those particulars about which a man thinks he says something to the purpose, when at the same time this is far from being the case. In the next place, they easily explore the opinions of those that err, and, collecting them together by a reasoning process, render them the same with each other: and after this they evince that these opinions are contrary to themselves, respecting the same things, with reference to the same, and according to the same. But those whose opinions are thus explored, on seeing this, are indignant with themselves, and become milder to others; and after this manner are liberated from mighty and rigid opinions; which liberation is of all others the most pleasant to hear, and the most firm to him who is the subject of it. For, O beloved youth, those that purify
these

these think in the same manner as physicians with respect to bodies. For physicians are of opinion, that the body cannot enjoy salubrious food till some one removes the impediments it contains. In like manner, these mental purifiers think that the soul can derive no advantage from disciplines accommodated to its nature, till he who is confuted is ashamed of his error, and, the impediments of disciplines being expelled, viz. false opinions, he becomes pure, and alone thinks that he knows the things which he does know, and not more than he knows.

THEÆ. This is the best and the most modest of habits.

GUEST. Hence, Theætetus, we must say, that confutation¹ is the greatest and the chief of all purifications; and that he who is not confuted, even though he should be the great king himself, since he would be unpurified in things of the greatest consequence, will be rude and base with respect to those things in which it is fit he should be most pure and beautiful, who wishes to become truly happy.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But by whom shall we say this art is employed? For I am afraid to say it is used by the sophists.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Lest we should honour them more than is fit.

THEÆ. But yet what has been just now said appears to be adapted to a certain character of this kind.

GUEST. So likewise a wolf resembles a dog, a most savage a most mild animal. But he who wishes to be free from deception ought to guard against similitude above all things: for it is a genus of the greatest lubricity. But, at the same time, let these things be admitted; for I think it is not proper to dispute about small terms, at a time when these ought to be carefully avoided.

THEÆ. It is not proper.

GUEST. Let, therefore, a species of the separating art be cathartic: and let a part of the cathartic species be limited to the soul. But of this let a part be doctrinal; and of the doctrinal let discipline be a part. But of discipline,

¹ Plato here alludes to the third energy of the dialectic method, the end of which is a purification from twofold ignorance. See the Introduction to the *Parmenides*.

that confutation which takes place about a vain opinion of wisdom should be called, as it appears from our present discourse, nothing else than that sophistic art which is of a noble race.

THEÆ. It should be so called. But I am dubious, what, out of many things which present themselves, it is fit truly and strenuously to call a sophist.

GUEST. You are very properly dubious. But indeed it is proper to think, that even a sophist himself will now very much doubt, by what means he may escape our arguments. For the proverb rightly says, It is not easy to avoid all things. Now, therefore, let us attack him with all our might.

THEÆ. You speak well.

GUEST. But, in the first place, let us stop as it were to take breath, and reason among ourselves, at the same time mutually resting when we are weary. Let us consider, then, how many forms the sophist assumes. For we appear from our first investigation to have discovered, that he is a mercenary hunter of the youthful and rich.

THEÆ. We do so.

GUEST. But from our second investigation it appears, that he is a certain merchant in the disciplines of the soul.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. And did he not, in the third place, appear to be a huckster about these same things?

THEÆ. He did. And did we not, in the fourth place, find him to be one who sells us his own inventions?

GUEST. You properly remind me. But I will endeavour to remember the fifth particular. For, in the next place, we found him to be one who strives in the agonistic exercise about discourses, and who is defined from the art of contention.

THEÆ. We did so.

GUEST. The sixth form is indeed ambiguous; but at the same time we must admit it, and grant that a sophist is a purifier of such opinions as are an impediment to disciplines respecting the soul.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do you therefore perceive, that, when any one appears to possess
a scientific

a scientific knowledge of many things, and is called by the name of one art, this is not a sound phantasm? It is indeed evident, that he who is thus affected with respect to any art cannot behold that particular thing to which all these disciplines look. Hence he who possesses a multitude of disciplines should be called by many names, instead of one name.

THEÆ. This appears to be in the highest degree natural.

GUEST. Left, therefore, the same thing should happen to us through indolence in this investigation, let us repeat, in the first place, one of the things which we said respecting the sophist: for one of these appears to me especially to indicate him.

THEÆ. Which of them?

GUEST. We said that he was in a certain respect a contradictor.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And does he not also become a teacher of this to others?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, consider, about what it is that sophists say they make others contradictors. But let our consideration from the beginning be as follows. With respect to divine things which are unapparent to the many, do sophists sufficiently impart the power of contradiction?

THEÆ. This is indeed asserted of them.

GUEST. But what with respect to things apparent, such as earth and heaven, and the particulars pertaining to these?

THEÆ. What of them?

GUEST. For, in private conversations, when any thing is asserted in general respecting generation and essence, we say that the sophists are skilled in contradicting, and that they are able to render others like themselves.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what, with respect to laws, and all political concerns, do they not also promise to make men contentious in these?

THEÆ. No one, as I may say, would discourse with them unless they promised this.

GUEST. But writings containing such contradictions as ought to be urged
2 G 2
against

against the professors of the several arts, may every where be procured by him who wishes to learn the art of contradiction.

THEÆ. You appear to me to allude to the writings of Protagoras respecting wrestling and the other arts.

GUEST. And to the writings of many others, O blessed man. But is not the art of contradicting, summarily a certain power, sufficient to bring all things into controversy?

THEÆ. It appears, therefore, that nearly nothing is omitted.

GUEST. But by the Gods, O boy, do you think this is possible? For perhaps you young men behold this more acutely, but we more dully.

THEÆ. In what respect? and why do you particularly assert this? For I do not understand your present question.

GUEST. I asked, if it were possible for any one man to know all things.

THEÆ. If it were possible, our race, O guest, would be blessed.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one destitute of science be able, by contradicting, to urge any thing found against him who is endued with science?

THEÆ. He cannot in any respect.

GUEST. What then is it which will be wonderful in the sophistic power?

THEÆ. About what?

GUEST. The manner by which sophists are able to produce an opinion in young men, that they are the wisest of all men in all things? For it is evident that, unless they contradicted rightly, or at least appeared to do so to young men, and, when appearing to do so, unless they were considered to be more wise through their contentions, they would be without employment, and, as you said, no one would give them money to become their disciple.

THEÆ. Doubtless no one would.

GUEST. But now men are willing to do this.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. For I think the sophists appear to have a scientific knowledge of those particulars about which they employ contradiction.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But do they employ contradiction in all things? Shall we say so?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. They appear, therefore, to their disciples to be wise in all things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But yet they are not: for this seems to be impossible.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. A sophist, therefore, appears to us to possess doxastic, and not true science, about all things.

THEÆ. Entirely so. And what has been now said, respecting sophists, seems to be most rightly said.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, assume a clearer paradigm respecting them.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. This. But endeavour to attend to what I say, and answer me in the best manner you are able.

THEÆ. Of what kind is the paradigm?

GUEST. Just as if any one should assert that he neither says any thing, nor contradicts, but that he makes and causes all things to be known by one art.

THEÆ. What is your meaning in all this?

GUEST. You are obviously ignorant of the beginning of what is said: for, as it seems, you do not understand the word *all*.

THEÆ. I do not.

GUEST. I say then that you and I are in the number of all things, and besides us, other animals and trees.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. If any one should assert that he would make you and me, and all other living things.

THEÆ. Of what making do you speak? For you do not mean a husbandman, because the artificer you mention is a maker of animals.

GUEST. I do say so. And besides this, he is the maker of the sea, the earth, the heavens, the Gods, and all other things. And as he rapidly makes each of these, so he sells each for a small price.

THEÆ. You speak in jest.

GUEST. What then? May not he also be said to jest, who asserts that he knows all things, and professes himself able to teach another all things, for a small sum of money, and in a short time?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But have you any species of jesting more artificial and agreeable than the imitative?

THEÆ,

THEÆ. I have not. For you have mentioned a very ample species, which comprehends all things in one, and is nearly most various.

GUEST. Do we not, therefore, know that he who professes himself able to make all things by one art, in consequence of fabricating imitations and homonyms of things, by the art of painting, is able to deceive stupid young men and boys, by showing them his pictures at a distance, and induce them to believe that he is sufficient to effect whatever he pleases?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what as to discourses, will it not appear to us that there is another certain art respecting these, by which seducers, as if employing certain incantations, are able to draw young men far away from the truth, by bewitching their ears with their discourses, and exhibiting to them images of every thing, instead of realities; so as to cause themselves to appear to speak the truth, and to be the wisest of all men in all things?

THEÆ. Why should there not be another certain art of this kind?

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, necessary, Theætetus, that many of those who then hear these things, after through the course of time they have arrived at the perfection of manhood, and consider the things themselves nigh at hand, and are compelled through passions clearly to handle realities, will then abandon their former opinions, and be induced to consider those things as small, which once appeared to them to be great, those things difficult which they once considered easy, and thus at length entirely subvert all the phantasms produced by discourse, through the works which take place in actions?

THEÆ. It appears so to me, as far as my age is capable of judging. For I am of opinion, that as yet I rank among those who are far distant from the truth.

GUEST. All we, therefore, who are present will endeavour to assist you. And now we shall endeavour, free from passion, to approach as near as possible to the truth. With respect to a sophist, then, inform me whether this is clear, that he ranks among enchanterers, being an imitator of things? or must we yet doubt whether he possesses in reality the sciences of those things respecting which he appears able to contradict?

THEÆ. But how can we doubt this, O guest? For it is nearly evident from what has been said that he is one of those who participate parts of erudition.

GUEST,

GUEST. He must be considered, therefore, as a certain enchanter and mimic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Come then : for we must now no longer drop our prey ; as we have now nearly enclosed the sophist in a certain net of reasoning ; so that he cannot hereafter escape from this.

THEÆ. From what ?

GUEST. That he is one of those who work miracles.

THEÆ. This also is my opinion respecting him.

GUEST. It seems, therefore, that we should divide with the utmost celerity the image producing art ; and that, entering into it, if the sophist evidently waits for us, we should apprehend him conformably to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to the king : but that, if he enters into the parts of the imitative art, we should follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, till we apprehend him. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever be able to fly from him who can pursue every particular through all things according to method.

THEÆ. You speak well. And in this manner, therefore, we must act.

GUEST. According to the superior mode of division, I now appear to myself to see two species of the imitative art ; but in which of these we should place the idea which is the object of our investigation, it does not yet appear to me possible to know.

THEÆ. But first of all inform me by division what these two species are.

GUEST. I see that one indeed is the assimilative[†] art. But this especially takes place, when any one according to the commensurations of a paradigm, in length, depth, and breadth, and besides this by the addition of convenient colours, gives birth to a resemblance.

THEÆ. What then, do not all those that imitate any thing endeavour to do this ?

GUEST. Not such as fashion or paint any great work. For, if they should impart the true symmetry of things beautiful, you know that the upper parts would appear smaller than is fit, and the lower parts greater, in consequence of the former being seen by us at a distance, and the latter nigh at hand.

[†] See the Notes to the tenth book of the Republic.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do not therefore artists, bidding farewell to truth, neglect real symmetry, and accommodate to images such commensurations as are only apparently beautiful?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, just to call the one species, since it is a likeness, an image?

THEÆ. Perfectly so.

GUEST. And is it not just to call the other species assimilative?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We must, therefore, call the other part of the imitative art, as we said above, assimilative.

THEÆ. We must so call it.

GUEST. But what shall we call that which appears indeed similar to the beautiful, but, when inspected by him who is endued with a power sufficient for the purpose, is found not to resemble that to which it appears to be similar? Must we not call it a phantasm, since it appears to be but is not similar?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Is not this part abundantly to be found in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

THEÆ. It is impossible it should not.

GUEST. But may we not with the greatest rectitude call that art which produces a phantasm, and not an image, phantastic?

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. I have already, therefore, said that these were two species of the image-producing art, viz. the assimilative and phantastic.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But neither am I able now to see clearly, that of which I was then dubious, viz. in which of these species the sophist is to be placed. For this is truly a wonderful man; and it is extremely difficult to discern him; since even now, in a very excellent and elegant manner, he has fled into a species which it is almost impossible to investigate.

THEÆ. It seems so.

GUEST. Do you then assent to this in consequence of understanding it?
or

or does a certain usual impetus arising from discourse induce you to a rapid coincidence of sentiment ?

THEÆ. How, and with a view to what, do you say this ?

GUEST. O blessed man, we are truly engaged in a speculation perfectly difficult. For that this thing should appear and seem to be, and yet is not ; and that a man should assert certain things, and yet not such as are true,—all these things have always been subjects of the greatest doubt in former times, and are so at present. For it follows, that he who speaks in this manner must either speak falsely, or be of opinion that such things truly are ; and thus speaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to contradict himself.

THEÆ. Why so ?

GUEST. Because such a mode of speaking dares to admit that non-being is : for otherwise it would not be false, which it is. But the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, both from the first and to the end, rejected this mode of speaking. For, both in prose and verse, he every where speaks as follows : “ Non-beings can never, nor by any means, be. But do thou, when inquiring, restrain thy conceptions from this path.” The truth of this, therefore, is testified by him, and this assertion will the most of all things become evident, if moderately discussed. Let us, therefore, if it is not disagreeable to you, consider this in the first place.

THEÆ. You may do as you please with respect to me. But do you consider what it is best to investigate, and in this path lead me.

GUEST. It will be proper so to do. Tell me, then : Dare we to pronounce that which in no respect is ?

THEÆ. How is it possible we should not ?

GUEST. Not for the sake of contention, therefore, nor jesting, but seriously, every one who hears us ought to join with us in considering the import of this word *non-being*. But can we think that he who is asked this question would know where to turn himself, or how to show what non-being is ?

THEÆ. You ask a difficult question, and to me, as I may say, entirely impervious.

GUEST. This, however, is evident, that non-being cannot be attributed to any thing which ranks among beings.

THEÆ. For how could it?

GUEST. Since, therefore, it cannot be attributed to being, neither can any one rightly attribute it to any thing.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

GUEST. This also is evident to us, that this word *something* is every where predicated of a certain being. For it is impossible to speak of it alone, as if it were naked and solitary with respect to all beings.

THEÆ. It is impossible.

GUEST. Thus considering, therefore, must you not agree with me, that he who speaks of something must necessarily speak of one certain thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. For you would say, that the word *something* is a sign of one thing, and that *certain-things* is a sign of many things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But it is most necessary, as it appears, that he who speaks of that which is not something must entirely speak of nothing.

THEÆ. This is most necessary.

GUEST. Must it not therefore follow, that neither this is to be granted, that he who speaks of something speaks of that which is not even one thing, or nothing? But neither must we say that he speaks who endeavours to enunciate non-being.

THEÆ. The doubts, therefore, in which our discourse is involved should come to an end.

GUEST. You do not as yet speak of something great. For, O blessed man, the greatest and first of doubts still remains about these things: for it is a doubt which takes place about the principle of non-being.

THEÆ. Tell me how, and do not be remiss.

GUEST. To that which is, something else belonging to beings may happen.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But shall we say, that any thing belonging to beings can ever be present to that which is not?

THEÆ. How can we?

GUEST. But do we not rank the whole of number among beings?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, if we rank any thing else among beings.

GUEST. We should, therefore, neither attempt to attribute the multitude of number, nor *the one*, to non-being.

THEÆ. Reason shows that we cannot with propriety.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one enunciate by the mouth, or altogether comprehend by the dianoëtic power, non-beings, or non-being separate from number?

THEÆ. Tell me why not.

GUEST. When we say non-beings, do we not endeavour to adjoin the multitude of number?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And when we say non-being, do we not endeavour to adjoin *the one*?

THEÆ. Most clearly so.

GUEST. And besides this we say, that it is neither just nor right to endeavour to adapt being to non-being.

THEÆ. You speak most truly.

GUEST. Do you not, therefore, perceive, that non-being can neither be rightly enunciated, nor spoken, nor yet be cogitated, itself by itself, but that it is incomprehensible by thought, ineffable, non-vocal, and irrational?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Did I, therefore, just now speak falsely when I said, that I could produce the greatest doubt respecting it?

THEÆ. What then, can we mention any doubt greater than this?

GUEST. Do you not see, O wonderful youth, from what has been said, that non-being leads him who confutes it into such perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it he is compelled to contradict himself?

THEÆ. How do you say? Speak yet clearer.

GUEST. There is no occasion to consider any thing clearer in me. For, when I adopted the position, that non-being ought to participate neither of *the one*, nor of *many*, both a little before, and now, I employed the term *the one*. For I enunciated non-being. Do you perceive this?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And again, a little before, I said that non-being was non-vocal, ineffable, and irrational. Do you apprehend me?

THEÆ. I do. For how is it possible I should not?

GUEST. When, therefore, I endeavoured to adapt being to non-being, did I not assert things contrary to what I had before advanced?

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. And in consequence of attributing this to it, did I not speak of it as one thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And besides this, while I called it irrational, ineffable, and non-vocal, did we not make these assertions as pertaining to one thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For we have said, that he who speaks of non-being in a proper manner, ought neither to define it as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever: for it is impossible to denominate it, without at the same time calling it one thing.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. What then will some one say of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me vanquished in this contention respecting non-being. So that, as I have already said, you must not expect me to speak properly on this subject. But come, let us now consider this affair in you.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. Endeavour in a becoming and generous manner, as being a young man, and with all your might, to assert something about non-being, conformable to right reason, without adding to it either essence, or *the one*, or the multitude of number.

THEÆ. It certainly would be great rashness in me to engage in a contest in which you have been vanquished.

GUEST. But, if it is agreeable to you, we will dismiss you and me; and till we meet with some one who is able to accomplish this, we will say that a sophist more than any other person conceals himself in an impervious place.

THEÆ. Very much so, indeed.

GUEST. If, therefore, we should say that he possessed a certain phantastic art from this use of words, he would easily attack us, and turn the discourse to the very contrary of what is asserted. For, while we call him a maker of images,

images, he will immediately ask us what we assert an image to be. Consider therefore, Theætetus, what answer we should give to this question of the sophist.

THEÆ. It is evident we should say that images are such things as are seen in water and mirrors, and besides this, such things as are painted and carved, and every thing else of this kind.

GUEST. It seems, Theætetus, that you have never seen a sophist.

THEÆ. Why so?

GUEST. He would appear to you to wink, or to be entirely deprived of eyes.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. He would laugh at you for answering him by appearances in mirrors, and by pictures and carvings, when you speak to him as being yourself endued with sight; and he will pretend that he knows nothing about mirrors, or water, or even sight itself, but that he alone interrogates you about this one thing.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That which in all the particulars you have mentioned you think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image in all of them, as being one thing. Speak, therefore, and give assistance, and do not yield to the man.

THEÆ. But what, O guest, can we say an image is, except that which, being itself something different, approaches to a true similitude to another thing?

GUEST. When you say an image is something different, do you mean that it is truly different, or do you assert this of something else?

THEÆ. It is by no means truly different, but only appears to be so, or is similar.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, call real being that which is true?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. But is not that which is not true contrary to the true?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. When, therefore, you say that which is similar is at the same time not true, you assert that it is not. It has however a being.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. You say that it truly is not.

THEÆ. It certainly *is* not; but it is truly an image.

GUEST. That, therefore, which we called an image of being, is not truly being, and that which is not truly being, truly is.

THEÆ. Non-being appears to possess a certain connection of this kind with being, and that in a very wonderful manner.

GUEST. How is it possible it should not appear wonderful? You now, therefore, perceive that the many-headed sophist, through this alternation, compels us unwillingly to confess that *non-being* in a certain respect *is*.

THEÆ. I see it, and very much so.

GUEST. How, then, shall we define this art, so that we may be consistent with ourselves?

THEÆ. What is it you are afraid of, that you speak in this manner?

GUEST. When we said that he was a deceiver about a phantasm, and that his art was a certain deception, whether shall we say that our soul then opined falsely, through his art; or what shall we say?

THEÆ. This very thing. For what else can we say?

GUEST. But is false opinion that which opines things contrary to things which are?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. You say, therefore, that false opinion opines things which are not.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. Whether does it opine that non-beings are not, or that things which have no subsistence whatever, in a certain respect are?

THEÆ. If any one is ever deceived, and in the smallest degree, it is necessary he should opine that non-beings in a certain respect are.

GUEST. And will he not also opine, that things which entirely are, in no respect are?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And this also falsely?

THEÆ. And this too.

GUEST. And false speech, in my opinion, will think after the same manner, asserting that beings are not, and that non-beings are.

THEÆ. For how can it otherwise become false?

GUEST. Nearly, no otherwise. But the sophist will not say so. For by what possible device can any one of a sound mind admit the things which have

have been previously granted, since they are non-vocal, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehensible by the dianoëtic power? Do we understand what the sophist says, Theætetus?

THEÆ. How is it possible we should not? For he says that our former assertions are contrary to the present, since we have falsely dared to assert that non-being subsists in opinion and discourse. He likewise adds, that we have often been compelled to adapt being to non-being, though we have just now acknowledged, that this is in a certain respect the most impossible of all things.

GUEST. You rightly recollect. But we should now consult what we ought to do respecting the sophist. For, if we should attempt to investigate him, by placing him in the art of deceivers and enchanters, you see that many doubts will arise.

THEÆ. Many, indeed.

GUEST. We have, therefore, only discussed a small part of them, since they are, as I may say, innumerable.

THEÆ. But if this is the case, it appears to be impossible to apprehend a sophist.

GUEST. What then, shall we thus effeminately desist from our undertaking?

THEÆ. I say we ought not, if there is the least possibility of apprehending this man.

GUEST. You will, therefore, pardon, and, as you just now said, be satisfied, if we make but a small proficiency in so arduous an affair.

THEÆ. How is it possible I should not?

GUEST. I, therefore, in a still greater degree request this of you.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That you do not think I am become, as it were, a certain parricide.

THEÆ. Why do you request this?

GUEST. Because it will be necessary for us to examine with our opponents the discourse of our father Parmenides, and to compel non-being in a certain respect to be, and again being, in a certain respect not to be.

THEÆ. It appears that a thing of this kind must be contended for in our discourse.

GUEST. For how is it possible this should not appear, and, as it is said,
even

even to a blind man? For, while these things are neither confuted, nor assented to, no one can speak either about false assertions, or about opinion, whether respecting resemblances, or images, or imitations, or phantasms, or of the arts conversant with these, without being ridiculous in consequence of being compelled to contradict himself.

THEÆ. Most true.

GUEST. Hence, we must dare to oppose the paternal discourse; or we must entirely dismiss it, if a certain sluggishness restrains us from opposing it.

THEÆ. But nothing will in any respect hinder us from opposing it.

GUEST. I still, therefore, request a third, and a trifling thing of you.

THEÆ. Only say what it is.

GUEST. I just now said that I was always wearied in the confutation of things of this kind, and that I am so at present.

THEÆ. You did say so.

GUEST. I am afraid lest I should appear to you to be insane, in consequence of what I have said, and from immediately transferring myself upwards and downwards. For we shall enter on the confutation of the paternal discourse, for your sake, if we happen to confute it.

THEÆ. As you will not, therefore, by any means be considered by me as acting in a disorderly manner by entering on this confutation, and demonstration, on this account engage boldly in this affair.

GUEST. Come then, whence shall we begin this very dangerous discourse? For it appears, O boy, to be most necessary for us to proceed in the following path.

THEÆ. What is that path?

GUEST. That we should first of all consider those things which now appear to be clear, lest we immediately desist from our undertaking, deterred by its difficulty; and that we should proceed in an easy manner, by mutually assenting to each other, as if we were engaged in a subject which may be easily discussed.

THEÆ. Speak more clearly.

GUEST. Parmenides appears to me to have spoken with ease, and whoever else has attempted to determine the number and quality of beings.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. It seems to me that each of them has related a fable to us, as being
boys.

boys. One of them, by asserting that the things which have a subsistence are three¹; but that some of them sometimes oppose each other in a hostile manner; and at other times becoming friends, unite in marriage, bring forth, and administer aliment to their offspring. But another of these says that beings are only two, viz. the moist and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and these he associates with each other. But the Eleatic sect among us, which derives its origin from Zenophanes, and from others still prior to him, by denominating all things one, discusses its doctrines in fables. But the Iades², and certain Sicilian muses posterior to these, have thought it more safe to connect these with each other, and to say that being is both many and one, but is held together by strife and friendship³. For that which is discordant always unites with something else, as the more vehement muses assert. But the more effeminate muses always loosen *the many* from *the one*; and assert that the universe is alternately one, and in friendship with itself, through Venus; and many, and hostile to itself, through a certain strife. But with respect to all these assertions, whether they are true or false, to oppose such illustrious and ancient men is difficult and rash. This, however, may be asserted without envy.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That they very much despised us who rank among the multitude. For each of them finishes his own work, without being at all concerned whether we can follow them in what they assert.

THEÆ. How do you say?

¹ Of the ancient philosophers that physiologized, some said that the first beings were three in number, *the hot* and *the cold* as extremes, but *the moist* as the medium, which sometimes conciliates the extremes, and sometimes not; but they did not place *the dry* in the rank of a principle, because they thought it subsisted either from a privation or a concretion of moisture. On the other hand, the followers of Anaxagoras asserted that there were four elements, two of which, viz. *heat* and *cold*, ranked as agents, but the other two, *dryness* and *moisture*, as patients. Heraclitus and Empedocles asserted that there is one matter of the universe, but different qualities, with which this matter sometimes accords, and at others is dissonant. Heraclitus, however, was of opinion that the world, together with a certain discordant concord, was nearly always similar, though not entirely the same: for all things are in a continual flux. But Empedocles asserted that the substance of the world remained the same, but that in one age all things were dissolved into chaos through discord, and in another were adorned through concord.

² Viz. the Ionians.

³ This was the doctrine of Empedocles.

GUEST. When any one of them asserts that *the many* is, or was, or is generated, or that this is the case with two or one, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, externally adducing for this purpose separations and concretions,—by the Gods, Theætetus, do you understand what they mean by each of these assertions? Indeed, when I was younger, I was confident that I accurately understood that of which we are now dubious, when any one spoke of non-being; but now you see in what difficulties we are involved through doubting about it.

THEÆ. I do see.

GUEST. Perhaps, therefore, receiving in no less a degree the same passion in our soul respecting being, we say that it is easy to understand it when it is enunciated by any one, but that this cannot be asserted of non-being, though we are similarly affected with respect to both.

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. And this very same thing has been said by us respecting the other particulars which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. We will consider, therefore, after this respecting many things, if it is agreeable to you; but let us now first speculate about that which is the greatest and principal thing.

THEÆ. Of what are you speaking? Or do you say that we ought in the first place to investigate being, and consider what they assert who are thought to evince something about it?

GUEST. You clearly apprehend me, Theætetus. For I say that we ought to proceed in the same manner as if those I just now mentioned were present, and to interrogate them as follows: Ye who assert that the hot and the cold, or any two such things, are all things, what is it you affirm to subsist in both these, when you say that both are, and that each is? What are we to understand by this term of yours *to be*? Is it a third thing different from those two, and are we to establish three things as constituting the all, and no longer two things, according to your hypothesis? For, while you call either of the two *being*, you cannot say that both similarly *are*. For each would nearly be one thing, and not two.

THEÆ. You speak the truth.

GUEST. Are you, therefore, willing to call both of them being?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But, O friends, we shall say, thus also you will most clearly call two things one.

THEÆ. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we are thus involved in doubt, will you sufficiently unfold to us what you wish to signify when you pronounce *being*? For it is evident that you have had a knowledge of these things for some time past: but we, indeed, at first thought we knew them, but now we are dubious. Instruct us, therefore, first of all in this, that we may not think we learn the things asserted by you, when the very contrary to this takes place. By speaking in this manner, and making this request, both to these, and to such others as assert that *the all* is more than one thing, shall we, O boy, err?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But what with respect to those who assert that *the all* is one, ought we not to inquire of them, to the utmost of our power, what they call *being*?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. To this question, therefore, they may answer: Do you say there is one thing alone? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. What then, do you call *being* any thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do you call it *the one*¹, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say?

THEÆ.

¹ Plato here dividing *the one* and *being* from each other, and showing that the conception of *the one* is different from that of *being*, evinces that what is most properly and primarily one is exempt from *the one being*. For *the one being* does not abide purely in an unmultiplied and uniform hyparxis. But *the one* withdraws itself from all addition; since by adding any thing to it you diminish its supreme and ineffable union. It is necessary, therefore, to arrange *the one* prior to *the one being*, and to suspend the latter from the former. For, if *the one* in no respect differs from *the one being*, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to name things, lest there should be two things, the thing itself, and the name. For all multitude being taken away, and all division, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear to be the same with the thing. Nor yet will a name be the name of a thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the same with a name, and a name the same

THEÆ. What answer will they give to these things, O guest?

GUEST. It is evident, Theætetus, that he who lays down this hypothesis will not be able with perfect ease to answer the present question, or any other whatever.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. To acknowledge that there are two names, while establishing nothing but one thing, is ridiculous.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And this also is ridiculous, to assent in every respect to him who asserts that there is a name to a thing of which no account can be given.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. He who establishes a name different from a thing, speaks of two certain things.

THEÆ. He does.

GUEST. And besides this, if he asserts that a name is the same with a thing, he is either compelled to say that it is the name of nothing; or, if he says it is the name of something, it must happen that a name is alone the name of a name, but of nothing else.

THEÆ. It must so.

GUEST. And *the one* must be *the one being* alone of *one*, and this must be *the one being* of a name.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. But what, do they say that which is a whole is different from one being, or the same with it?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, they will and do say so.

GUEST. If, therefore, a whole is, as Parmenides¹ says, "that which is every

same with a thing; and a thing also will be a thing of a thing. For all the same things will take place about a thing as about a name, through the union of thing and name. If these things, therefore, are absurd, both *the one* and *being* have a subsistence, and *being* participates of *the one*. And hence *the one* is not the same as *the one being*. See the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.

¹ The following extract from the Commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics, p. 31, contains an admirable account of the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the first being:

"That Parmenides did not consider *the one being*, *το ἓν ὄν*, to be any thing among things generated and corrupted, is evident from his asserting that *the one* is unbegotten and incorruptible. And, in short, he was far from thinking that it is corporeal, since he says it is indivisible; for thus
he

every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:”—if this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and an extremity.

he speaks: ‘nor is it divisible, since the whole is similar.’ Hence, neither can what he says be adapted to the heavens, according to the assertions of some, as we are informed by Eudemus, who were led to this opinion from that verse of Parmenides,

ΠΑΝΤΟθεν ΕΥΚΥΚΛΟΥ ΣΦΑΙΡΗΣ ΕΝΔΙΣΤΗΚΙΟΝ ΟΥΚΩ,

i. e. ‘on all sides similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere:’ for the heavens are not indivisible, nor a sphere similar to that which Parmenides mentions, though they form a sphere the most accurate of all such as are physical. It is also evident that neither does Parmenides call *the one being* psychical, because he says that it is immovable; for the psychical essence, according to the Eleatics, possesses motion. He likewise says, that the whole of this *one being* is present at once, *επει νυν εστιν ὅμου παν,* and that it subsists according to the same, and after the same manner.

ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΝ ΤΑΥΤῳ ΤΕ ΜΕΝΟΝ, ΚΑΘ’ ἑΑΥΤΟ ΤΕ ΝΕΙΤΑΙ.

‘Same in the same abides, and by itself subsists.’ And it is evident that it possesses the whole at once, and according to the same, in essence, power, and energy, since it is beyond a psychical hypostasis. Neither does he say that it is intellectual: for that which is intellectual subsists according to a separation from the intelligible, and a conversion to it. But, according to him, in *the one being* intellection, intelligible, and intellect, are the same: for thus he writes—

ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΔΕ ΕΣΤΙ ΝΟΕΙΝ ΤΕ, ΚΑΙ ΟΥ ΕΝΕΚΕΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΝΟΗΜΑ.

i. e. ‘Intellection, and that for the sake of which intellectual conception subsists, are the same.’ He adds, *ου γαρ ανευ του εοντος*, ‘for it is not without being,’ i. e. the intelligible, in which, says he, you will find intellection has not a subsistence separate from being. Further still, the intellectual is separated into forms, as the intelligible pre-assumes unitedly, or, in other words, causally comprehends the separation of forms. But where there is separation, there difference subsists, and where this is, there non-being also is at the same time apparent. Parmenides however entirely exterminates non-being from being: for he says, ‘non-beings never are, nor do they subsist in any respect; but do thou, investigating in this path, restrain thy intellectual conception.’ Neither likewise, according to him, is *the one being* a thing of posterior origin, subsisting in our conceptions, from an ablation of sensibles; for this is neither unbegotten nor indestructible. Nor is it that which is common in things: for this is sensible, and belongs to things doxastic and deceitful, about which he afterwards speaks. Besides, how could it be true to assert of this, that it is at once all things, or that it contracts in itself intellect and the intelligible? Shall we say, therefore, that he calls *the one being* an individual substance? But this indeed is more dissonant. For an individual substance is generated, is distinguished by difference, is material and sensible, and is different from accident. It is also divisible and in motion. It remains, therefore, that the Parmenidean *one being*

extremity. And having these, it must unavoidably have parts. Or how shall we say?

THEÆ. Just so.

GUEST. But, indeed, nothing hinders but that, when it is divided, it should have the passion of *the one*, in all its parts, and that thus *the one* should be every being, and a whole.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be *the one*?

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Because, according to right reason, that which is *truly one* should be said to be entirely without parts.

THEÆ. It must indeed necessarily be so.

GUEST. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts, would not harmonize with *the one*.

THEÆ. I understand you.

GUEST. But whether will the whole having the passion of *the one*, be thus one, and a whole, or must we by no means say that *the one* is a whole?

THEÆ. You propose a difficult choice.

GUEST. You speak most true. *For, since in a certain respect being is*
passive

being must be the intelligible, the cause of all things: and hence it is intellect and intellection, in which all things are unitedly and contractedly comprehended according to one union, in which also there is one nature of *the one* and *being*. Hence Zeno says, that he who demonstrates *the one* will likewise assign being, not as rejecting *the one*, but as subsisting together with being. But all the above-mentioned conclusions accord with *the one being*: for it is without generation and indestructible, entire and only-begotten. For that which is prior to all separation will not be secondary to any other being. To this likewise it pertains to be all things at once, and to have no connection with non-being. The undivided also, and the immovable according to every form of division and motion, a subsistence perfectly uniform, and *termination*, for it is the *end* of all things, accord with this *one being*. If besides it is that for the sake of which intellection subsists, it is evidently intelligible: for intellection and intellect are for the sake of the intelligible. And if intellection and the intelligible are the same in it, the transcendency of its union will be ineffable."

After this, Simplicius, in order to give credibility to what he has said of Parmenides, and on account of the books of that philosopher being very rare in his time, the sixth century, has preserved a considerable number of his verses, which are well worthy the attention of the learned and philosophical reader. He then adds as follows: "We must not wonder if Parmenides says
that

passive to the one, it does not appear to be the same with the one, and all things will be more than one. Is it not so?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But likewise if *being* is a non-whole on account of its becoming passive to whole, but yet is whole itself, *being* in this case will happen to be indigent of itself.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. And *being*, according to this reasoning, since it is deprived of itself, will be *non-being*.

THEÆ. It will so.

GUEST. And thus again all things will be more than one, since being and the whole are allotted their proper nature, each separate from the other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if the whole has in no respect a subsistence, these same things will take place with respect to *being*; and besides, *being* not having a subsistence, neither will it at any time have been generated.

THEÆ. Why not?

GUEST. Whatever is generated is always generated a whole. So that he who does not place in the rank of beings, *the one* or the *whole*, ought neither to denominate essence, nor generation, as that which has a being.

that *the one being* is similar to the bulk of a perfectly round sphere: for, on account of his poetry, he touches on a certain mythological fiction. In what, therefore, does this differ from that assertion of Orpheus, It is of a white texture? And it is evident that some of the assertions of Parmenides accord with other things posterior to being. Thus, for instance, the unbegotten and the indestructible are adapted to both soul and intellect; and the immovable and abiding in sameness to intellect. But all the assertions at once, and genuinely understood, accord with *the one being*. For though according to a certain signification the soul is unbegotten, and also intellect, yet they are produced by the intelligible. Likewise this one or first being is properly immovable, in which motion is not separated according to energy. An abiding in sameness also properly pertains to being. But soul and much-honoured intellect proceed from that which abides, and are converted to it. It is likewise evident that such things as are said to pertain to being pre-subst in it unitedly, but are unfolded from it with separation. And it seems indeed that *the one being* is delivered by Parmenides as the first cause, since it is at once, one and all, and the last boundary. But if he does not simply call it *one*, but *the one being*, and only-begotten, and a boundary but finite, perhaps he indicates that the ineffable cause of all things is established above it." Simplicius concludes with observing, that the objections both of Plato and Aristotle to the assertions of Parmenides are philanthropic, and were made by those philosophers to prevent his doctrine from being perverted.

THEÆ,

THEÆ. It appears that this is entirely the case.

GUEST. Likewise, that which is not a whole ought not to be any quantum whatever. For, being a certain quantum, so far as it is so, it must necessarily be a whole.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, that every one will be involved in ten thousand other insoluble doubts, who says that *being* is alone either two or one.

THEÆ. This is nearly evident by the things which have just now been shown. For greater and more difficult doubts will always follow each other in a connected series, respecting what has been above asserted.

GUEST. But we have not yet discussed the assertions of those who accurately discourse about *being* and *non-being*. At the same time, what we have already said is sufficient. But let us again consider those who speak inaccurately about these, that we may perceive from all things, that it is in no respect more easy to say what *being* is, than what *non-being* is.

THEÆ. It will be, therefore, requisite to consider those.

GUEST. Indeed, there appears to be among these a certain gigantic war as it were, through the doubts in which they are mutually involved respecting essence.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Some of these draw down all things from heaven and the invisible region to earth, seizing in *reality*, for this purpose, rocks and oaks. For, in consequence of touching all such things as these, they strenuously contend that that alone has a being which can be seen and handled¹, and this they define to be body and essence. But if any one says that there are other things which are without a body, they perfectly despise the assertion, and are unwilling to hear of any thing that is not corporeal.

THEÆ. You speak of *dire* men: but I also have frequently met with such.

GUEST. On the contrary, the opponents of these men *very religiously* contend supernally from the invisible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal species to be true essence: but by their arguments they

¹ Is not this the doctrine of those who are called experimental philosophers? If so, the fable of the Giants is unfolded in those men.

break into small pieces the bodies of the others, and that which is denominated by them truth, at the same time calling it flowing generation instead of essence. But *between these, Theætetus, an immense contest always subsisted.*

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, receive from each a particular account of the essence established by each.

THEÆ. But how can we receive it?

GUEST. From those that place essence in forms we may easily receive it: for they are more mild. But from those who violently draw all things to body we shall receive it more difficultly. And perhaps it will be nearly impossible to do so. It appears to me, however, that we should act in the following manner with respect to them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. It will be best, if possible, to make them in reality better: but if this is impossible, we must be content with making them so in our discourse, and suppose them to answer more equitably than at present they would be willing to do. For that which is assented to by better men possesses more authority than that which is assented to by worse men. However, we pay no attention to these things, but explore the truth.

THEÆ. Most right.

GUEST. Order them, therefore, as being made better to answer you, and to unfold the meaning of that which they assert.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. Do they, therefore, say, that what they call a mortal animal is any thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly they do.

GUEST. And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. And, admitting this, do they also acknowledge that soul is something?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do they likewise assert that one soul is just, and another unjust; and that one is wise, and another unwise?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But does not every soul become such through the habit and
VOL. III. 2 K presence

presence of justice, and the contrary, through the habit and presence of the contraries to these ?

THEÆ. These things also they will assent to.

GUEST. But will they say that that is altogether any thing, which is able to be present to and absent from any thing ?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. Since, therefore, justice is something, and likewise prudence, and every other virtue, and the contraries to the virtues, together with soul in which these subsist, whether will they say that each of these is visible and tangible, or that all of them are invisible ?

THEÆ. They will nearly assent that no one of these is visible.

GUEST. But what ? Will they say that any one of things of this kind has a body ?

THEÆ. They will not give the same answer to the whole of this question : but soul itself will appear to them to possess a certain body ; but with respect to prudence, and the other things about which you just now inquired, they will be restrained by shame from daring strenuously to assent, that they are either nothing, or that all of them are bodies.

GUEST. The men, Theætetus, are clearly become better. For such of them as are Spartans or natives would not be ashamed to assent this, but would contend that whatever cannot be grasped by the hands is altogether nothing.

THEÆ. You nearly speak their conceptions.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again ask them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is sufficient. For we ask them respecting that which is connate with incorporeal, and at the same time with corporeal natures, what it is they look to, when they say that both of them have a being.

THEÆ. Perhaps they would not be able to give an answer, if they should suffer any thing of this kind.

GUEST. Consider whether, in consequence of our proposing this question, they will be willing to admit and acknowledge that being is a thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind ? Speak, and perhaps we shall understand.

GUEST. I say then that whatever possesses any power, whether of doing
any

any thing naturally, or of suffering though in the least degree from the vilest thing, and though this takes place but once,—every thing of this kind truly is. For I define being to be nothing else than power.

THEÆ. But since they cannot at present say any thing better than this, they must admit it.

GUEST. It is well said: for perhaps afterwards both we and they may think differently. Let this then now remain acknowledged by them.

THEÆ. Let it remain.

GUEST. Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you unfold to us their sentiments.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. Do you then say that generation is one thing, and essence another, separating them from each other?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. And do you admit that by our body we communicate with generation, through sense, but that by our soul we communicate with true essence, through the reasoning power? Do you likewise say, that true essence always subsists similarly according to the same, but that generation subsists differently at different times?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But, O best of men, what do you call the communion which subsists between these two? Is it that which we just now mentioned?

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. Passion or action arising from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps you, Theætetus, do not know what answer they would give to this question; but perhaps I do, through my familiarity with them.

THEÆ. What answer then would they give?

GUEST. They would not grant us that which was just now said to the earth-born men respecting essence.

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. We established this to be a sufficient definition of beings, viz. when a power though the smallest is present to any thing, either of acting or suffering.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. To this they will say, that a power of acting and suffering is present with generation, but that no power of this kind is adapted to essence.

THEÆ. They will, therefore, speak to the purpose.

GUEST. To this, however, we must say, that we require to hear from them still more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the soul knows, and that essence is known.

THEÆ. They certainly say so.

GUEST. But what? Do you say that to know, or to be known, is action, or passion, or both? Or do you say that action is one thing, and passion another? Or that neither of these participates in no respect of the other? It is evident, indeed, that neither participates of the other. For, if they admitted this, they would contradict what they asserted above.

THEÆ. I understand you.

GUEST. For if to know was to do something, it would necessarily happen that what is known would suffer, or become passive. And thus, according to this reasoning, essence being known by knowledge, would, so far as it is known, be moved, through becoming passive; which we say cannot take place about a thing at rest.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. What then, by Jupiter, shall we be easily persuaded that true motion, life, soul¹, and prudence, are not present to that which is *perfectly being*, and that it neither lives, nor is wise, but abides immovable, not possessing a venerable and holy intellect?

THEÆ. But it would be a dire thing, O guest, to admit this.

GUEST. Shall we say then that it possesses intellect, but not life?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. Or shall we say that both these reside in it, but that it does not possess these in soul?

THEÆ. But after what other manner can it possess these?

GUEST. Shall we then say that it possesses intellect, life, and soul, but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

¹ All these are *causally* contained in the first being, because it is better than all these.

THEÆ. All these things appear to me to be irrational.

GUEST. We must therefore grant, that both that which is moved, and motion, are beings.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. It follows therefore, Theætetus, that intellect will never in any respect be present to any thing immovable.

THEÆ. It does follow.

GUEST. But, indeed, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we shall by such an assertion take away sameness from beings.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Does it appear to you that that which subsists according to the same, and in a similar manner, and about the same, can ever subsist without *permanency*?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you perceive that intellect ever was, or is, without these?

THEÆ. In the smallest degree.

GUEST. But besides this, we should oppose, by every possible argument, him who entirely taking away science, or prudence, or intellect, strenuously endeavours to introduce any thing else.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But it is perfectly necessary, as it appears, that the philosopher, and he who honours these things in the highest degree, should not assent to those who, asserting that there is either one, or many species of things, consider the universe as standing still: nor yet should he by any means hear those who affirm that being is every where moved; but, according to the opinion even of boys, he should call things immovable, and things moved, considered as subsisting together, being, and the all.

THEÆ. Most true.

GUEST. Do we not, then, now appear to have equitably comprehended being in our discourse?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Now therefore, Theætetus, as it appears to me, we are strangely involved in doubt.

THEÆ. How so? and why do you assert this?

GUEST.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, O blessed man, that we are at present in the greatest ignorance respecting being, and yet we have appeared to ourselves to say something about it?

THEÆ. I do perceive it; but I do not altogether understand in what respect we have deceived ourselves.

GUEST. Consider more clearly, whether, in consequence of assenting to these things, any one may justly interrogate us, in the same manner as we interrogated those who said that the whole of things consisted of the hot and the cold.

THEÆ. Remind me what these interrogations were.

GUEST. By all means: and I will endeavour to do this by asking you the same question as I then asked them, that we may at the same time make some advance in our inquiry.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Do you not then say, that motion and permanency are contrary to each other?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do you not likewise say, that both and each of them similarly are?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, say, that both and each are moved, when you admit that they are?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you signify that they stand still, when you say that both are?

THEÆ. But how can I?

GUEST. You may, therefore, place in your soul being, as a third thing different from these, considering it as comprehending under itself permanency and motion; and looking to the communion of these with essence, you may thus assert that both of them are.

THEÆ. We seem to prophesy that being is a certain third thing, when we say that there are motion and permanency.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not both motion and permanency, but something different from these.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. Hence being, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved.

THEÆ. It is nearly so.

GUEST. Where then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wishes to establish in himself any clear conceptions respecting being?

THEÆ. Where?

GUEST. I do not think it is yet easy for him to turn his thoughts any where. For, if being is not moved, why does it not stand still? Or how is it possible, if it in no respect stands still, that it should not be moved? But being has now appeared to us without both these. Is this, however, possible?

THEÆ. It is the most impossible of all things.

GUEST. In the next place, therefore, it will be just to call to mind this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That being asked respecting the name of non-being, we were involved in the greatest doubt respecting what it ought to be. Do you remember?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Are we, therefore, now involved in less doubt respecting being?

THEÆ. If it be possible to say so, O guest, we appear to be involved in greater doubt.

GUEST. Let this ambiguity then rest here. But since both being and non-being equally participate of doubt, we may now hope, that if one of them shall appear to be more obscure, or more clear, the other likewise will appear to be the same: and again, that if we should not be able to perceive one of them, the other will also be invisible to us. And thus we shall pursue the discourse respecting both of them in the most becoming manner we are able.

THEÆ. It is well said.

GUEST. Let us relate, then, after what manner we denominate this same thing by many names.

THEÆ. Adduce for this purpose a certain paradigm.

GUEST. In speaking of man, we give him various appellations, and attribute to him colour, figure, magnitude, virtue, and vice; in all which, and

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ten thousand other particulars, we not only say that man is, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and we act in a similar manner with respect to other particulars; for, considering each as one thing, we again call it many things, and by many names.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Whence, I think, we have given a feast to young men, and to those who study in old age. For it is easy for every one immediately to object, that it is impossible for *the many* to be *one*, and *the one many*. Hence, they will exult, not suffering us to say that a man is good, but that good is good, and man man. For I think, Theætetus, that you have often met with young men who seriously apply themselves to things of this kind, and sometimes with men advanced in years, who, through the poverty of their possessions with respect to wisdom, admire such things as these, and who think themselves all-wise for having discovered this.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. That our discourse, therefore, may extend to all who have ever asserted any thing respecting essence, let what we shall now say in the way of interrogation be understood as addressed as well to these as to those others whom we have above mentioned.

THEÆ. What is it you are now going to say?

GUEST. Whether we should neither conjoin essence with motion and permanency, nor any thing else with any thing else, but, as if things were unmingled, and it were impossible for them to communicate with each other, we should consider them as separate in our discourse? Or whether we should collect all things into the same, as if they were able to communicate with each other? Or consider this as the case with some things, but not with others? Which of these, Theætetus, shall we say is to be preferred?

THEÆ. I indeed have nothing to answer to these things. Why, therefore, do you not, by answering to each particular, consider what follows from each?

GUEST. You speak well. We will suppose them, therefore, if you please, to say, in the first place, that nothing has any power of communicating with any thing, in any respect. Will it not, therefore, follow, that motion and permanency in no respect participate of essence?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. They certainly will not.

GUEST. But what? Will any one of them be, and at the same time have no communication with essence?

THEÆ. It will not.

GUEST. From consenting to this, all things, as it seems, will become rapidly subverted, as well the doctrine of those who contend that all things are moved, as of those who contend that all things stand still, together with the dogmas of those who assert that such things as subsist according to forms or species subsist similarly according to the same. For all these conjoin being with their doctrines, some asserting that things are truly moved, and others that they truly stand still.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Such, likewise, as at one time unite all things, and at another time separate them, whether dividing from one thing into things infinite, or into things which have finite elements, and composing from these, and whether they consider this as partially, or as always taking place,—in all these cases they will say nothing to the purpose, if there is in no respect a mixture of things.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Further still, we ourselves shall have discoursed the most ridiculously of all men, who permitting nothing pertaining to the communion of the passion of *different*, have yet used the appellation *the other*.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. They are in a certain respect compelled to employ the term *to be*, about all things, likewise the terms *separate*, *others*, and *by itself*, and ten thousand others, from which being unable to abstain, and finding it necessary to insert these expressions in their discourses, they do not require any other confutation, but, as it is said, they have an enemy and an adversary at home, vociferating within, and always walk as if carrying about with them the absurd Eurycles¹.

THEÆ. You very much speak of that which is like and true.

¹ "This is a proverb, says the Greek Scholiast on this dialogue, applied to those who prophesy evil to themselves. For Eurycles appeared to have a certain dæmon in his belly, exhorting him to speak concerning future events; whence he was called a ventriloquist."

GUEST. But what if we should permit all things to have the power of communicating with each other? This, indeed, I myself am able to dissolve.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Because motion itself would entirely stand still, and again, permanency itself would be moved, if they were mingled with each other. But this indeed is impossible from the greatest necessity, that *motion* should stand still, and *permanency* be moved.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The third thing, therefore, alone remains.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. For one of these things is necessary, either that all things should be mingled together, or nothing; or that some things should be willing to be mingled with each other, and that other things should be unwilling.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And two of the members of this division cannot be found.

THEÆ. They cannot.

GUEST. Every one, therefore, who wishes to answer rightly should adopt that which remains of the three.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But since some things are willing to be mingled, and others not, they will nearly be affected in the same manner as letters. For some of these are incongruous with respect to each other, but others mutually harmonize.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For vowels being in a particular manner the bond, as it were, of the other letters, pervade through all of them, so that without some one of these it is impossible for any two of the others to accord with each other.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. Does every one, therefore, know what letters will communicate with each other? or is art requisite in order to accomplish this sufficiently?

THEÆ. Art is requisite.

GUEST. What kind of art?

THEÆ. The grammatic.

GUEST. And is not this the case with respect to sharp and flat sounds? I mean,

mean, Is not he who knows by art what sounds are consonant or dissonant; a musician, but he who is ignorant of this not so?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And in other arts, and the privation of arts, we shall find other such circumstances take place.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Since then we have acknowledged, that the genera ¹ of being are mixed

¹ Of the sciences, some look to one scientific object, as medicine to health, but others extend to more than one, as arithmetic to philosophy, to a polity, to the ætæonic art, and to many others; and others contribute to all arts, not the fabricative only, but also such as are theoretic, such as is the *divisive* art, of which Socrates speaks in the *Phædrus*. As, therefore, in the sciences some are most total, and others partial, so in intelligible causes some are altogether partial, alone being the leaders of a peculiar number of one species, but others extend themselves to many, as *equal*, *similar*, and *whole*; for *whole* so far as *whole* is not common to all things, since a *part* so far as a *part* is not a *whole*: and others extend themselves to all things, because all things participate of them so far as they are beings, and not so far as they are vital, or animated, or possess any other idiom, but according to the appellation itself of being. Because, therefore, *being* is the first among intelligible causes, it has the most total order among the genera; and these are five in number, viz. *essence*, *same*, *different*, *motion*, *permanency*. For every being is *essentialized*, is united itself to itself, is *separated* from itself and other things, *proceeds* from itself, and its proper principle, and participates of a certain *permanency*, so far as it preserves its proper form. Whether, therefore, it be intelligible, or sensible, or a thing subsisting between these two, it is composed from these genera. For all things are not vital, or wholes, or parts, or animated; but of these genera all things participate. Likewise *essence* not subsisting about a thing, neither will any thing else be there; for *essence* is the receptacle of other things. Without the subsistence of *sameness*, that which is a whole will be dissipated; and *difference* being destroyed there will be one thing alone without multitude. In like manner, *motion* and *permanency* not subsisting, all things will be unenergetic and dead, without stability, and tending to non-entity. It is necessary, therefore, that each of these should be in all things, and that *essence* should rank as the first, being as it were the *Vesta* and monad of the genera, and arranged analogous to *the one*. After *essence*, *sameness* and *difference* must succeed, the former being analogous to *bound*, and the latter to *infinity*; and next to these *motion* and *permanency*. Of these genera too, some are particularly beheld about the *powers*, and others about the *energies* of beings. For every being so far as it is a being participates of a certain *essence*, as it is said in this dialogue, and in the *Parmenides*. But every essential power is either under *same*, or under *different*, or under both. Thus for instance heat, and every *separative* power, subsists under *different*, but coldness, and every *collective* power, is under *same*. And if there is any thing which subsists between these, it is under both *same* and *different*. For every energy is either *motion* or *permanency*, or in a certain respect both; since the energy of intellect may be rather said to be *permanency* than *motion*, and in like manner every energy which preserves the energizing nature in the same condition, or that about which it energizes. But the motion of
bodies

mixed with each other, after the same manner, ought not he necessarily to proceed in his discourse scientifically, who is about to show what genera mutually accord, and what do not admit each other? Likewise, whether these genera so hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again in their divisions, if there is another cause of division through wholes?

THEÆ. How is it possible science should not be requisite for this purpose, and nearly, perhaps, the greatest of all sciences?

GUEST. What then, again, Theætetus, shall we call this science? Or, by Jupiter, have we ignorantly fallen upon the science of the liberal? And do we appear, while investigating a sophist, to have first found a philosopher?

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. Do we not say, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the same species different, nor a different species the same, is the business of the dialectic science?

THEÆ. We do say so.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is able to do this, sufficiently perceives one idea¹ every way extended through many things, the individuals of which

bodies into each other does not abide in *same*, but departs from that in which it subsists; and that which changes the energizing nature in the *same* and about the *same*, is *stable motion*. Every thing, therefore, by its very being participates of this triad, *essence*, *power*, and *energy*, on account of these five genera.

¹ Here genus is signified by *one idea extended through many*: for genus is not an aggregate of species, as a whole of parts, but it is present to every species, to which it is at the same time prior. But every species subsisting separate from other species, and from genus itself, participates of genus. By *many ideas different from each other, but externally comprehended under one idea*, which is genus, species are signified: externally comprehended, indeed, genus being exempt from species, but comprehending the causes of species: for genera, truly so called, are both more antient and more essential than the species which are ranked under them. Of genera, also, some have a subsistence prior to species, but others subsist in them according to participation. To perceive these two, therefore, viz. one idea extended through many, the individuals of which subsist apart from each other, is the province of the *divisive* power of dialectic; but the other two pertain to the *definitive* power of this art: for definition perceives one idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and collects into one definitive conception many ideas, each subsisting as a whole. It also connects them with each other, and perfects one idea from the assumption of all wholes; conjoining the many in one. Besides this, it considers the many which it has collected in one, lying apart, and the whole which is produced from them.

are

are placed apart from each other, and many ideas different from each other externally comprehended under one, and one idea through many wholes conjoined in one; and lastly, many ideas, every way divided apart from each other. This is to know scientifically, how to distinguish according to genus, in what respect particulars communicate, and how far they do not communicate with each other.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But I think you do not give dialectic to any other than one who philosophizes purely and justly.

THEÆ. For how is it possible to give it to any other?

GUEST. If we seek; indeed, we shall find a philosopher in a place of this kind, both now and hereafter, though it is also difficult to see this character clearly; but the difficulty of perceiving a sophist is of a different kind from that with which the perceiving a philosopher is attended.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. The former flying into the darkness of non-being, and by use becoming adapted to it, is with difficulty perceived through the obscurity of the place. Is it not so?

THEÆ. So it seems.

GUEST. But the philosopher through reasoning, being always situated near the idea of being, is by no means easily discerned, on account of the splendor of the region. For the eyes of vulgar souls are unable to support the view of that which is divine.

THEÆ. It is likely that these things subsist in this manner, no less than those.

GUEST. About this particular, therefore, we shall perhaps at another time consider more clearly, if it be permitted us. But, with respect to the sophist, it is evident that we should not dismiss him till we have sufficiently surveyed him.

THEÆ. You speak well.

GUEST. Since then it is acknowledged by us, that some of the genera of being communicate with each other, and that some do not, and that some communicate with a few, and others with many things, and others again are not hindered from communicating through all things with all things;—this being the case, let us, in the next place, following the order of discourse,

course, speculate not about all species, lest we should be confounded by their multitude,—but, choosing certain of those which are called the greatest, let us, in the first place, consider the qualities of each, and, in the next place, what communion of power they possess with each other, that we may not in any respect be indigent of discourse about being and non-being (though we may not be able to comprehend them with perfect perspicuity), as far as the condition of the present speculation admits. If, therefore, while we are assimilating non-being, we should say that it is truly non-being, we should be exculated.

THEÆ. It would indeed be proper that we should.

GUEST. But the greatest of all the genera which we have now mentioned are, being itself, permanency, and motion.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. And we have said that the two latter are unmingled with each other.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But being is mingled with both: for both after a manner are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. These things then become three.

THEÆ. Certainly.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, each of these different from the other two, but the same with itself?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. What then shall we now say respecting sameness and difference? Shall we say that they are two certain genera, different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from necessity? And thus are we to consider about five, and not three genera only? Or are we ignorant that we have denominated this sameness and difference, as something belonging to the other three?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But, indeed, motion and permanency are neither different nor same.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. That which we in common call motion and permanency can be neither of these.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Because motion would be permanent, and permanency be moved. For, with respect to both, the one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating of the contrary.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But yet both participate of same and different.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. We must not, therefore, say that motion is either same or different, nor yet must we assert this of permanency.

THEÆ. We must not.

GUEST. Are, therefore, being and sameness to be considered by us as one certain thing?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But if being and sameness signify that which is in no respect different, when we again assert of motion and permanency, that both are, we thus denominate both of them the same, as things which have a being.

THEÆ. But, indeed, this is impossible.

GUEST. It is impossible, therefore, that sameness and being should be one thing.

THEÆ. Nearly so.

GUEST. We must place sameness, therefore, as a fourth species, in addition to the former three.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what? Must we not say that difference is a fifth species? Or is it proper to think that this, and being, are two names belonging to one genus?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But I think you will grant, that of beings, some always subsist themselves by themselves, but others in relation to other things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But different is always referred to different. Is it not?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But this would not be the case unless being and difference widely differed

differed from each other. But if difference participated of both species, as is the case with being, there would be some one among things different, which would be no longer different with reference to that which is different. But now it happens from necessity, that whatever is different is so from its relation to that which is different.

THEÆ. It is as you say.

GUEST. We must say, then, that the nature of different must be added as a fifth to the species of which we have already spoken.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And we must likewise say that it pervades through all these. For each one of the others is different, not through its own nature, but through participating the idea of difference.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But we may thus speak respecting each of the five genera.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. In the first place, that motion is entirely different from permanency. Or how shall we say?

THEÆ. That it is so.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, permanency.

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But it *is*, through participating of being.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Again, motion is different from sameness.

THEÆ. Nearly so.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, sameness.

THEÆ. It is not.

GUEST. And yet it is same, in consequence of all things participating of sameness.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. It must be confessed, therefore, that motion is both same, and not same, nor must we be indignant that it is so. For, when we say that it is both same, and not same, we do not speak of it in a similar manner; but when we say it is same, we call it so, through the participation of sameness with respect to itself; and when we say it is not same, we call it so through

its communion with different, through which, separating it from fame, it becomes not fame, but different. So that it is again rightly said to be not fame.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. If, therefore, motion itself should in any respect participate of permanency, there would be no absurdity in calling it stable.

THEÆ. Most right, since we have acknowledged that some of the genera are willing to be mingled with each other, and others not.

GUEST. And, indeed, we arrived at the demonstration of this prior to what we have evinced at present, by proving that the thing subsists after this manner.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we may again say that motion is different from different, just as it is different from sameness and permanency.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. It is, therefore, in a certain respect, not different and different, according to this reasoning.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. What then follows? Shall we say it is different from three of the genera, but not from the fourth? acknowledging that the genera are five, about which, and in which, we propose to speculate?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. For it is impossible to grant that they are fewer in number than they now appear to be. We may, therefore, safely contend, that motion is different from being.

THEÆ. We may, most safely.

GUEST. It clearly follows, therefore, that motion is truly non-being, and at the same time being, since it participates of being.

THEÆ. Most clearly.

GUEST. Non-being, therefore, is necessarily in motion, and in all the genera. For, in all of them, the nature of different rendering them different from being, makes each to be non-being. Hence, we rightly say that all of them are non-beings; and again, because they participate of being, that they are, and are beings.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. About each of the species, therefore, there is much of being, but there is also non-being infinite in multitude.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. Must not, therefore, being itself be said to be different from the others?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not so many in number as the others; for, not being them, it is itself one, but is not other things, which are infinite in number.

THEÆ. This is nearly the case.

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to be indignant at these things, since the genera have naturally a mutual communion. But if some one does not admit these things, yet, as we have been persuaded by the former assertions, in like manner we ought to be persuaded by these.

THEÆ. You speak most justly.

GUEST. We may also see this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. When we say non-being, we do not, as it appears, say any thing contrary to being, but only that which is different¹.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Just as when we say a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to evince by this word that which is small rather than that which is equal?

THEÆ. How is it possible we should?

GUEST. We must not, therefore, admit that the contrary to a thing is signified, when negation is spoken of; but thus much only must be asserted, that the terms not, and neither, signify something of other things, when placed before names, or rather before things, about which the names of the negations afterwards enunciated are distributed.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. This also we may consider by a dianoëtic energy, if it is agreeable to you.

¹ By *non-being*, therefore, in this place, Plato means *difference*, one of the five genera of being,

THEÆ.

THEÆ. What is that ?

GUEST. The nature of different appears to me to be cut into small parts, in the same manner as science.

THEÆ. How ?

GUEST. This nature itself is one ; but a part of it residing in any thing and being individually defined, possesses a private appellation of its own ; on which account there are said to be many arts and sciences.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do not, therefore, the parts of the nature of different, which is itself one thing, suffer this very same thing ?

THEÆ. Perhaps so. But we must show how this takes place.

GUEST. Is there any part of different opposite to the beautiful ?

THEÆ. There is.

GUEST. Must we say that this part is nameless, or that it has a certain name ?

THEÆ. That it has a name. For every thing which we say is not beautiful, is not different from any thing else than the nature of the beautiful.

GUEST. Come, then, answer me the following question.

THEÆ. What question ?

GUEST. When any thing is defined as belonging to one particular genus, and is again opposed to a certain essence, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful ?

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. But the opposition of being to being happens, as it seems, to be not beautiful.

THEÆ. Most right.

GUEST. What then ? Does it follow from this reasoning that the beautiful belongs more to beings, and the non-beautiful less ?

THEÆ. It does not.

GUEST. We must say, therefore, that the non-great and the great similarly are.

THEÆ. Similarly.

GUEST. Hence, too, we must assert of the just and the non-just, that the one in no respect is more than the other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And the same must be said of other things, since the nature of different appears to rank among beings. But difference having a subsistence, it is necessary to place the parts of it as no less having subsistence.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As it appears, therefore, the opposition of a part of the nature of different, and of the parts of being, are no less essence, if it be lawful so to speak, than being itself; nor do they signify that which is contrary to being, but only something different from it.

THEÆ. It is most clear.

GUEST. What then shall we call it?

THEÆ. It is evident that non-being, which we have sought after on account of a sophist, is this very thing.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, as you say, is it no more deficient of essence than the others? And ought we now boldly to say, that non-being possesses its own nature firmly, in the same manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful beautiful, and the non-great to be non-great, and the non-beautiful non-beautiful? Shall we in like manner say, that non-being was and is non-being, as one species which must be numbered among many beings? Or must we still, Theætetus, be diffident about this?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, how disobedient we have been to the prohibition of Parmenides?

THEÆ. In what respect?

GUEST. We have wandered beyond the limits he appointed us, by thus continuing still further to explore and evince.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Because he says, "Non-beings never, and by no means are; but do you, while investigating, restrain your conceptions from this path."

THEÆ. He does speak in this manner.

GUEST. But we have not only shown that non-beings are, but we have demonstrated what the form of non-being is. For, having evinced that the nature of different has a subsistence, and that it is divided into small parts, which are mutually distributed through all things, we then dared to say, that the part of it which is opposed to the being of every thing, is itself truly non-being.

THEÆ. And to me, O guest, we appear to have spoken with the greatest truth.

GUEST. Let no one, therefore, say, that we, having evinced that non-being is contrary to being, dare to assert that it *is*. For we some time since bade farewell to him who asks whether that which is contrary to any thing has a subsistence, and possesses a certain reason, or is entirely irrational. But, with respect to that which we now call non-being, either some one who is not persuaded by our arguments should confute us, as not having spoken well; or, if he cannot do this, he must also say as we say, that the genera are mingled with each other, and that being and different pervading through all things, and through each other, different participating of being, *is* through this participation, not being that of which it participates, but something else. But, being different from being, it clearly follows that it is necessarily non-being. And again, *being*, in consequence of participating of difference, will be different from the other genera: but being different from all of them, it is not any one of them, nor all the others, nor any thing besides itself. So that, without doubt, being is not ten thousand things in ten thousand things: and, in like manner, each and all of the other genera are multifariously distributed, but are not themselves multifarious.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if any one does not believe in these contrarieties, he should consider, and assert something better than has been now said. Or if some one, in consequence of finding this to be a difficult speculation, rejoices, drawing the arguments from one side to another, such a one, as our present reasoning asserts, is not engaged in a pursuit which deserves much serious attention. For *this* neither possesses any thing elegant, nor is difficult to discover; but *that* is difficult, and at the same time beautiful.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That of which we have spoken above; I mean that, omitting these particulars, we may be able to confute any one who asserts that different is same, or same different. For, to show that same is different, and different same, that the great is small, and the similar dissimilar, and to rejoice in thus introducing contraries in discourse, is not a true confutation, but is evidently the province of one who has but a slight apprehension of the thing, and is recently born.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. For, O excellent young man, to endeavour to separate every thing from every thing, is both inelegant, and the province of one rude and destitute of philosophy.

THEÆ. Why so?

GUEST. To dissolve each thing from all things, is the most perfect abolition of all discourse. For discourse subsists through the conjunction of species with each other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Consider, therefore, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mingled with another.

THEÆ. With a view to what?

GUEST. To this, that discourse may be one certain thing belonging to the genera of being. For, if we are deprived of this, we shall, for the most part, be deprived of philosophy. And further still, it is requisite at present that we should mutually consent to determine what discourse is. But, if it is entirely taken away from us, we can no longer speak about any thing. And it will be taken away, if we admit that things are not in any respect mingled with each other.

THEÆ. Right. But I do not understand why we should now mutually consent to determine what discourse is.

GUEST. But, perhaps, you will easily understand by attending to this.

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Non-being has appeared to us to be one of the other genera, and to be dispersed through all beings.

THEÆ. It has so.

GUEST. After this, therefore, we should consider whether it is mingled with opinion and discourse.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Because, if it is not mingled with these, it must necessarily follow that all things are true: but, if it is mingled with these, false opinion and false discourse must be produced. For to opine, or speak of non-beings, is itself falsehood subsisting in the dianoëtic part and discourse.

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST.

GUEST. But, being falsehood, it is deception.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And deception subsisting, all things must necessarily be full of resemblances, images, and phantasy.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we have said that the sophist flies into this place, while he denies that there is any such thing as falsehood. For he asserts that no one can either think or speak of non-being; because it in no respect participates of essence.

THEÆ. These things were said by us.

GUEST. But now it has appeared that non-being participates of being. So that in this respect perhaps he will no longer oppose us. Perhaps however he will say, that of species, some participate of non-being, and others not; and that discourse and opinion rank among those things which do not participate it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have said he is concealed, has no subsistence; since opinion and discourse have no communion with non-being. He will likewise assert that falsehood has not any kind of subsistence, since this communion of things is no where to be found. Hence we must investigate the nature of discourse, opinion, and phantasy, that, these becoming apparent, we may perceive their communion with non-being; and, perceiving this, may evince that there is such a thing as falsehood; and, having evinced this, may bind the sophist in it, if he is found to be guilty; or, liberating him, investigate in some other genus.

THEÆ. That, O guest, which we said at first about the sophist, appears to be very true—I mean, that he is a genus difficult to apprehend. For he appears to be full of problems; nor can any one arrive at his retreats, till he has first vanquished the obstacle which he throws in the way. For now we have scarcely overcome the obstacle which he hurled forth, I mean that non-being is not, and he immediately throws in our way another. Hence it is requisite to show that there is falsehood, both in discourse and opinion, and after this perhaps something else, and another thing after that, and so on, as it appears, without end.

GUEST. He, O Theætetus, who is able to make advances continually,
though

though in a small degree, ought to proceed boldly in this affair. For what will he be able to accomplish in other things, who is without ardor in these? For he who either effects nothing in these, or is repelled backwards, will scarcely (according to the proverb) ever take the city. But now, O good man, since as you say this is accomplished, we shall have captured the greatest wall, and the rest will be easy and trifling.

THEÆ. You speak well.

GUEST. Let us then now, in the first place, as we said, consider discourse and opinion, that we may more clearly show, whether non-being touches upon these, or whether both these are in every respect true, and neither of them at any time false.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Come then, let us again speculate about nouns, in the same manner as we did about species and letters. For that which is the object of our present investigation appears in a certain respect to have a similar subsistence.

THEÆ. What is it you wish to be conceived respecting nouns?

GUEST. Whether all of them harmonize with each other; or some accord, but others do not.

THEÆ. It is evident that some accord, and others do not.

GUEST. Perhaps your meaning is this, that such nouns as in an orderly succession assert and evince something, mutually accord; but that such as signify nothing by continuity, do not mutually accord.

THEÆ. How do you mean? and what is it you say?

GUEST. What I thought you would both understand and assent to. For there is a twofold genus of vocal declarations respecting essence.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One, which is called nouns, and the other verbs.

THEÆ. Speak of each.

GUEST. That which is a declaration in actions, we call a verb.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But a mark or sign of voice imposed on the agents themselves, we call a noun.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST.

GUEST. From nouns, therefore, alone, enunciated in continued succession, a sentence is never produced; nor yet again from verbs enunciated without nouns.

THEÆ. These things I have not learned.

GUEST. But it is evident that you just now acknowledged this, when looking to something else. For this is what I wished to say, that when these are enunciated in continued succession, a sentence is not produced.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. As, for instance, walks, runs, sleeps, and such other words as signify actions, all which when any one enunciates in continued succession, he will not by this means produce a sentence.

THEÆ. For how can he?

GUEST. Again, therefore, when any one says, a lion, a stag, a horse, and such other nouns as signify agents themselves, a sentence will not yet be produced by this continuity. For the things enunciated do not evince action, or a privation of action, or the essence of a thing which is, or which is not, till verbs are mingled with nouns. But when they are harmonized, a sentence is immediately produced, and the first connection of these is nearly the first sentence, though it should be the shortest possible.

THEÆ. How is this?

GUEST. When any one says, A man learns, would you not say that this is the shortest and first sentence?

THEÆ. I should.

GUEST. For he then evinces something respecting things which actually are, or are rising into being, or have been, or will be. Nor does he denominate only, but he finishes something connecting verbs and nouns. Hence we say that he speaks, and does not alone denominate, and to this connection we give the name of discourse.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. And thus as we said respecting things, that some harmonized with each other, and that others did not, so likewise with respect to the signs of voice, some do not harmonize, but others do, and produce discourse.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Further still, attend to this trifling thing,

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. That discourse when it takes place must necessarily be a discourse about something: for it is impossible that it can be about nothing.

THEÆ. It must.

GUEST. Ought it not, therefore, to be of some particular kind?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us then give diligent attention:

THEÆ. For it is requisite.

GUEST. I will, therefore, enunciate to you a sentence, in which a thing is conjoined with action, through a noun and a verb: but do you inform me of what it is a sentence.

THEÆ. I will, as far as I am able.

GUEST. Theætetus sits:—is this a long sentence?

THEÆ. It is not; but a moderate one.

GUEST. It is now your business to say what it is about, and of whom it is a sentence.

THEÆ. It is evident that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But what again with respect to this?

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Theætetus, with whom I now discourse, flies.

THEÆ. Respecting this also, no one can say but that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But we said it was necessary that every sentence should be of some particular kind.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. But of what kind must each of the sentences just now mentioned be?

THEÆ. One must be false, and the other true.

GUEST. But that which is true asserts things respecting you as they are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But that which is false asserts things respecting you different from what they are.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. It speaks, therefore, of things which are not, as if they were.

THEÆ. Nearly so.

GUEST. And it speaks of things which have a subsistence, but which do

not belong to you. For we say, that about every thing there are many things which have a subsistence, and many things which have no subsistence.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. In the first place, therefore, it is most necessary, that the latter sentence which I enunciated respecting you should be one of the shortest, according to the definition we have given of a sentence.

THEÆ. This must now be acknowledged by us.

GUEST. In the next place, it must be confessed that it is a sentence of something.

THEÆ. It must.

GUEST. But if it is not of you, it is not of any thing else.

THEÆ. For how should it?

GUEST. But if it is not of any thing, it cannot in any respect be a sentence. For we have shown that it belongs to things impossible, that discourse should exist, and yet be a discourse of nothing.

THEÆ. Most right.

GUEST. When, therefore, *other* things are asserted of you, as if they were the *same*, and things which *are not*, as things which *are*, such a composition of verbs and nouns becomes altogether, as it appears, a really and truly false discourse.

THEÆ. Most true.

GUEST. But what with respect to the dianoëtic energy, opinion, and phantasy, is it not now evident that all these genera, as well the false as the true, are produced in our souls?

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. You will easily understand, if you first of all apprehend what each of them is, and in what they differ from each other.

THEÆ. Only inform me.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, the dianoëtic energy and discourse the same, except that the former is an inward dialogue without voice, of soul with itself?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But the fluxion from the dianoëtic energy through the mouth, proceeding with sound, is called discourse.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. We perceive this also in discourse.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. Affirmation and negation.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. When, therefore, this takes place in the soul according to the dianoëtic energy, accompanied with silence, can you call it any thing else than opinion?

THEÆ. How can I?

GUEST. But, when again, a certain passion of this kind is present, not according to the dianoëtic energy, but through sense, can it be rightly denominated any thing else than phantasy?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. Since, then, discourse is both true and false, and it appears that the dianoëtic energy is a dialogue of the soul with itself, but opinion the conclusion of the dianoëtic energy, and phantasy the mixture of sense and opinion with each other, it is necessary, since these are allied to discourse, that some of them should be sometimes true, and sometimes false.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, that we have found more easily than we expected, that opinion and discourse are sometimes false? For just now we were afraid, lest by investigating this matter we should attempt a work which it is perfectly impossible to accomplish.

THEÆ. I do perceive.

GUEST. Let us not, therefore, despair as to what remains; but, since these things are rendered apparent, let us recall into our memory those divisions according to species which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Of what kind were they?

GUEST. We divided image-making into two species; the one assimilative, and the other phantastic.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we said we were dubious in which of these we should place the sophist.

THEÆ. These things were said by us.

GUEST. And while we were doubting about this, we were oppressed with a still darker vertigo, in consequence of that assertion which is dubious to all men,

men, that there can be no such thing as either a resemblance, or an image, because that which is false has never in any respect any subsistence whatever.

THEÆ. You speak the truth.

GUEST. But now since discourse has become apparent, and likewise false opinion, it is possible there may be imitations of things, and that from this disposition the art of deceiving may be produced.

THEÆ. It is possible.

GUEST. And was it not also acknowledged by us above, that the sophist is conversant with these?

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again endeavour, by always bisecting the proposed genus, to proceed to the right hand part of the section, attending to its communion with the sophist, till, having taken away all his common properties, and leaving the nature peculiar to him, we may be able especially to exhibit this to ourselves, and afterwards to those who are naturally most proximate to the genus of this method.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Did we not, therefore, begin dividing the effective art, and the art of acquiring?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And the art of acquiring presented itself to us in hunting, contests, merchandize, and such-like species.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But now, since the imitative art comprehends the sophist, it is evident that the effective art must first receive a twofold division. For imitation is a certain making. We said, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of things themselves. Did we not?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But, in the first place, let there be two parts of the effective art.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is divine, the other human.

THEÆ. I do not yet understand you.

GUEST. If we remember what was said at first we asserted that the whole of the effective art was a power causing things to exist afterwards which were not before.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. We do remember.

GUEST. But, with respect to all mortal animals, and plants which are produced in the earth from seeds and roots, together with such inanimate natures as subsist on the earth, whether they are bodies which can be liquefied, or not, can we say that they were afterwards generated, when before they were not, by any other than a certain fabricating God? Or shall we employ the dogma and assertion of many?

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That nature generates these from a certain fortuitous cause, and which operates without thought. Or shall we say that they are produced in conjunction with reason and divine science, originating from Deity itself?

THEÆ. I, perhaps, through my age, often change my opinion. However, at present looking to you, and apprehending that you think these things were produced by Divinity, I think so too.

GUEST. It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that in some future time you would be of a different opinion, we should now endeavour to make you acknowledge this by the force of reason, in conjunction with necessary persuasion; but since I know your nature to be such, that, without any arguments from us, you would of yourself arrive at that conclusion to which I have drawn you, I shall dismiss the attempt; for it would be superfluous. But I adopt this position, that things which are said to subsist from nature are produced by a divine art: but that the things which are composed from these by men, are produced by human art: and that, according to this position, there are two genera of the effective art, one of which is human, and the other divine.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But, since there are two genera, bisect each of them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Just as the whole of the effective art was then divided according to breadth, so now let it be divided according to length.

THEÆ. Let it be so divided.

GUEST. And thus all its parts will become four; two of which indeed, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the Gods, divine.

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST.

GUEST. But with respect to these, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each division is effective, but the remaining parts may be nearly called representative. And hence, again, the effective art receives a twofold division.

THEÆ. Inform me again how each is to be divided.

GUEST. With respect to ourselves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally consist, viz. fire and water, and the sisters of these, we know that each of these productions is the offspring of Divinity. Do we not?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. After these the images of each, and not the things themselves, follow; and these are produced by a dæmoniacal artifice.

THEÆ. What kind of images are these?

GUEST. Phantasms which occur in sleep, and such as appearing in the day are called spontaneous; as, for instance, shadow, when darkness is generated in fire: but this is twofold, when domestic and foreign light concurring in one about splendid¹ and smooth bodies, and producing a sensation of seeing contrary to accustomed vision, effect by these means a species.

THEÆ. These works, therefore, of divine making are two, viz. the things themselves, and the image which follows each.

GUEST. But what? Shall we not say that our art, by architecture, makes a house, but by painting, that other thing, the image of the house, which is, as it were, a human dream effected by men awake?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Hence, by giving a twofold division after this manner to other things, we shall again find twofold works of our effective action, and we must call the one *auturgic*, or the thing itself effected, but the image, representative.

THEÆ. I now understand you better, and I admit these two species of the effective art, with a twofold division, viz. the divine and human according to one section; and the thing itself effected, and the offspring of certain imitations, according to the other.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, recollect, that of the image-producing art we

¹ See the latter part of the Introduction to the *Timæus*.

said, one kind would be assimilative, and the other phantastic, if it should appear that the false is truly false, and one certain thing belonging to beings.

THEÆ. We did say so.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, apparent, that we have now indubitably enumerated two species?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We must, therefore, again give a twofold distribution to the phantastic species.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One kind being that which is effected through instruments, but the other being the phantasm of that which exhibits itself as the instrument of the efficient.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. I think, when any one employing your figure causes body to appear similar to body, or voice to voice, this is particularly called an imitation belonging to the phantastic species.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but we will dismiss the whole of the other member, as being now weary, and we will permit some other person to collect it into one, and give it a proper denomination.

THEÆ. Let the member then you speak of be divided, and let us dismiss the other.

GUEST. And indeed, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this also is twofold; but take notice on what account.

THEÆ. Say.

GUEST. Of those who imitate, some knowing that which they imitate do this, but others not knowing it. Though, can we place any division greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

THEÆ. We cannot.

GUEST. Will not, therefore, that which we just now spoke of be an imitation of those that are endued with knowledge? For this man, knowing you, imitates your figure.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. But what shall we say respecting the figure of justice, and, in short, of the whole of virtue? Do not many, though they are ignorant, think that they know this, and, while they imitate that which seems to them to be the figure of justice, endeavour, both in words and works, to make it appear that it is inherent in them?

THEÆ. Very many, indeed.

GUEST. Are they not, therefore, disappointed in their expectations of appearing to be just, as they are not so in any respect? Or does the very contrary to this take place?

THEÆ. The very contrary takes place.

GUEST. I think then we must say that this imitator is different from the other, he who is ignorant from him who knows.

THEÆ. We must.

GUEST. Whence, then, can any one derive a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult? Because a certain antient cause of the division of genera into species was unknown to our ancestors, so that none of them attempted to divide; and on this account they were necessarily very much in want of names. But at the same time, though it may be a bolder assertion, for the sake of distinction, we shall call the imitation which subsists with opinion *doxomimetic*; but that which subsists in conjunction with science, a certain historic imitation.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. The other of these appellations, therefore, must be used: for a sophist was not found to be among the scientific, but among imitators.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. Let us then consider this *doxastic imitator*, or one who imitates from opinion, as if he were iron, and see whether he is found, or whether he contains in himself something twofold.

THEÆ. Let us consider.

GUEST. He is, therefore, very copious. For, of sophists, one is foolish, thinking that he knows the things which he opines: but the figure of another, through his rolling like a cylinder in discourse, is replete with abundance of suspicion and fear, that he is ignorant of those things which he feigns himself to know before others.

THEÆ. There are both these kinds of sophists, as you have said.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, place one of these as a simple, and the other as an ironical imitator?

THEÆ. It is proper so to do.

GUEST. And again, shall we say that the genus of this is one or two?

THEÆ. Do you see whether it is or not.

GUEST. I consider; and two imitators appear to me: one employing irony among the multitude publicly, and in prolix discourses; and the other compelling the person who converses with him to contradict himself, and this privately, and by short discourses.

THEÆ. You speak most rightly.

GUEST. What then did we evince the imitator to be who employs prolix discourses? Did we evince him to be a politician, or a popular speaker?

THEÆ. A popular speaker.

GUEST. But what did we call the other,—a wise man, or sophist?

THEÆ. To call him a wise man is impossible, since we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wise man, he must evidently receive a similar appellation. And I now nearly understand that this character ought truly to be called one who is in every respect a real sophist.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, bind together his name, as we did before, connecting every thing from the end to the beginning?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. He, therefore, who compels those that converse with him to contradict themselves, who is a part of the ironic genus, and a doxastic imitator, who likewise belongs to the phantastic genus, which proceeds from the representative art, who is to be defined to be not a divine but a human production, and who by the artifice of his discourses belongs to the wonder-working division; he who says that a real sophist is of this stock and consanguinity will, as it appears, speak most truly.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

THE END OF THE SOPHISTA.

THE

THE PHÆDRUS,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE BEAUTIFUL.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHÆDRUS.

SOME, says Hermeas[†], have endeavoured to show that this dialogue is concerning rhetoric, looking only to its beginning and end; others, that it is about the soul, since here especially Socrates demonstrates its immortality; and others, that it is about love, since the beginning and occasion of the dialogue originate from this. For Lysias had written an oration in order to prove that it is not proper to gratify a lover, but one who is not a lover; he being vehemently in love with Phædrus, but pretending that he was not. Wishing, therefore, to withdraw him from other lovers, he viciously composed an oration, the design of which was to show that it is requisite rather to gratify one who is not a lover, than one who is; which gave occasion to Socrates to discourse concerning this intemperate love, together with temperate, divine, and enthusiastic love, because it is a love of this latter kind which should be embraced and followed. Others again assert that the dialogue is theological, on account of what is said in the middle of it. But, according to others, its subject is *the good*, because Socrates says that the supercelestial place has never been celebrated according to its desert, and that an uncoloured and unfigured essence there subsists. And, lastly, others assert that it is concerning the beautiful itself. All these, therefore, form their opinion of the whole scope of the dialogue from a certain part of it. For it is evident that the discourse concerning the soul is assumed for the sake of something else, and also that concerning the first beauty: for Socrates ascends from other beautiful things to this, and to the

[†] In Scholiis MSS. in Phædrum.

supercelestial place. It is also evident that the discourses about love are to be referred to the lover. It must not, therefore, be said that there are many scopes; for it is necessary that all of them should be extended to one thing, that the discourse may be as it were one animal. In short, Socrates speaks concerning all-various beauty. Hence he begins from the apparent beauty in the form of Phædrus, with which Lyfias was enamoured, in consequence of falling off from the character of a true lover. But afterwards he proceeds to the beauty in discourses, of which Phædrus is represented as a lover. From this he ascends to the beauty in soul, viz. to the virtues and sciences; and thence, in his recantation, to the mundane Gods. After which he ascends to the intelligible fountain itself of beauty, to the God of love, and to the beautiful itself; whence he again descends through the divisive art to the beauty in soul, and in the virtues and sciences; and afterwards again to the beauty in discourses, thus conjoining the end with the beginning. In short, the whole intention of the dialogue may be divided into three parts, corresponding to three lives:—into the intemperate love, which is seen in the oration of Lyfias; into the temperate, which is seen in the first discourse of Socrates; and, in the third place, into the divinely inspired, which is seen in the recantation, and in the last discourse of Socrates. It may also be said that the lovers, the loves, and the objects of love, are analogous to these lives. Hence they do not much deviate from the design of the dialogue who assert that it is concerning love, since love is seen in a relation to the object of love: and it is necessary indeed not to be ignorant of kindred differences, since Plato himself does not deliver casual distinctions of love, and the object of love. However, it is evident that the leading scope of the dialogue is not concerning love; for neither does it discuss its essence, nor its power, but discourses concerning its energies in the world, and in souls. But if Plato any where makes love the leading scope of a dialogue, he discourses concerning its essence, power, and energy. Hence in *The Banquet*, where love is the leading object, he delivers its middle nature, and its order, calling it a mighty daemon, as binding secondary to primary natures. But here, a discourse concerning the beautiful takes the lead, to which all things are elevated by love.

And here it is necessary to observe, that the first subsistence of *the beautiful*, the primary object of this dialogue, is in intelligible intellect, the extremity

of the intelligible triad, where it subsists as an intelligible idea. It is this beauty which, according to Orpheus, when it arose, astonished the intellectual Gods, and produced in them an admiration of their father Phanes : for thus the theologist sings concerning it ;

Θαυμάζον καθορῶντες ἐν αἰθέρι φέγγος ἀέλπτον,
Τῷ μὲν ἀπεστίλγε χροὸς ἀθάνατοιο Φαντός.

i. e. "they wondered on beholding in æther an unexpected light, with which the body of the immortal Phanes glittered." This beauty too, as we have observed in a note on the *Parmenides*, is a vital intellectual form, the source of symmetry ¹ to all things,

With respect to the persons of the dialogue, they are *Lyfias*, or rather the oration of *Lyfias*, *Phædrus*, and *Socrates* ; *Lyfias* and *Phædrus* being, as we have said, lovers of each other, but *Socrates* being the curator of youth, and the providential inspector of *Phædrus*, elevating him from the apparent and external beauty in words, to the beauty in soul and intellect. As some however have accused ² the dialogue as inflated in its diction, on account of what is said in the recantation, it is necessary to observe, that *Socrates* employs words adapted to the things themselves. For, as he discourses about objects unapparent, and unknown to the many, he accordingly uses an elevated diction, and such as accords with an intelligible and divine essence.

Indeed, if human nature in this its degraded condition is capable of receiving the inspirations of divinity, and if a part of the present dialogue was composed under such an influence, an accusation of this kind is certainly its greatest commendation.

Hence it is justly observed by *Proclus* ³, "that *Plato* in this dialogue being inspired by the *Nymphs*, and exchanging human intelligence for fury, which is a thing far more excellent, delivers many arcane dogmas concerning the

¹ Symmetry, according to the most accurate and philosophical definition of it, is the dominion of that which is naturally *more* over that which is naturally *less* excellent. Hence symmetry then subsists in body, when *form* vanquishes *matter*. Had Mr. *Burke* known and understood the above definition of beauty, he would not have given to the world such a crudity as his treatise *On the Sublime and Beautiful*.

² *Dicæarchus*, according to *Cicero* vi. 2. ad *Atticum*, is said to have reprehended this dialogue as too vehement, because it breathes of the dithyrambic character.

³ In *Plat. Theol.* lib. i. p. 8.

intellectual Gods, and many concerning the liberated rulers of the universe, who elevate the multitude of mundane Gods to the intelligible monads, separate from the wholes which this universe contains. And still more does he deliver about the mundane Gods themselves, celebrating their intellections and fabrications about the world, their unpolluted providence, their government about souls, and other particulars which Socrates discloses in this dialogue according to a deific energy."

I only add, that though there are frequent allusions in this dialogue to that unnatural vice which was so fashionable among the Greeks, yet the reader will find it severely censured in the course of the dialogue by our divine philosopher. There can be no reason to fear, therefore, that the ears of the modest will be shocked by such allusions, since they are inserted with no other view than that they may be exploded as they deserve. But if, notwithstanding this, any one shall persist in reprobating certain parts of the dialogue as indecent, it may be fairly concluded, that such a one possesses the affectation of modesty without the reality; and that he is probably a bigot to some despicable and whining sect of religion, in which cant and grimace are the substitutes for genuine piety and worth.

THE PHÆDRUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND PHÆDRUS.

SCENE.—THE BANKS OF THE ILISSUS.

SOCRATES.

WHITHER are you going, my dear Phædrus, and from whence came you?

PHÆDR. From Lyfias, the son of Cephalus, Socrates; but I am going, for the sake of walking, beyond the walls of the city. For I have been sitting with him a long time, indeed from very early in the morning till now. But being persuaded by Acumenus¹, who is your associate as well as mine, to take some exercise, I determined upon that of walking. For he said that this kind of exercise was not so laborious, and at the same time was more healthful, than that of the course.

Soc. He speaks well, my friend, on this subject: and so Lyfias then, as it seems, was in the city.

PHÆDR. He was. For he dwells with Epicrates in this house of Morychus, which is next to that of Olympius.

Soc. But what was his employment there? Or did not Lyfias treat you with a banquet of orations?

PHÆDR. You shall hear, if you have but leisure to walk along with me, and attend.

¹ This Acumenus the physician is also mentioned by Plato in the Protagoras, and by Xenophon in the third book of the Sayings and Deeds of Socrates.

Soc. But what, do you not think that I, according to Pindar, would consider as a thing superior to business, the relation of your conversation with Lysias?

PHÆDR. Go on then.

Soc. Begin the relation then.

PHÆDR. And indeed, Socrates, the hearing of this is proper for you¹. For I do not know how it happened so, but our discourse was amatory. For Lysias, through the persuasion of some beautiful person, though not one of his lovers, had composed an oration on love, and this in a very elegant manner: in the course of which he asserts that one who does not love ought to be gratified rather than a lover.

Soc. Generous man! I wish he had likewise asserted that this should be the case with the poor rather than the rich, the old than the young, and so in all the rest, that thus I myself, and many more of us, might be gratified²: for then his discourse would have been both polite and publicly useful. I am therefore so desirous³ of hearing his oration, that if you should even walk as far as to Megara, and, like Herodicus⁴, when you had reached the walls, immediately turn back again, I should not leave you.

PHÆDR. What do you say, most excellent Socrates? Do you think me so much of an idiot as to suppose myself capable of relating, in such a manner as it deserves, a discourse which Lysias, the most skilful writer of the present age, was a long time in composing at his leisure? I am certainly very far from entertaining such a supposition: though I would rather be able to do this than be the possessor of a great quantity of gold.

Soc. O Phædrus, if I do not know Phædrus, I am likewise forgetful of myself; but neither of these happens to be the case. For I well know that

¹ Socrates acknowledges that he knew the three following things, viz. *the amatory art*, as in the Banquet he says concerning Diotima, "she taught me amatory affairs;" *the maieutic art*, as in the Theætetus he says, "divinity has ordered me to exercise obstetrication;" and *the dialectic art*, as in the Cratylus, "for I know nothing, says he, except to give and take words."

² It is scarcely necessary to observe that Socrates says this ironically.

³ Socrates desires to hear, because he vehemently wishes, from his amatory disposition, to energize divinely, and to save the youth.

⁴ This Herodicus, as we are informed by Hermeas, was a physician, who made gymnastic exercises beyond the walls, beginning from a certain commensurate interval at no great distance, as far as to the wall, and turning back again; and doing this often, he performed his exercises.

he has not only heard the discourse of Lysias once.¹, but that he has desired him to repeat it often: and that Lysias willingly complied with his request. But neither was this sufficient for Phædrus; but having at length obtained the book, he considered that which he mostly desired to see. And sitting down to peruse it very early in the morning, he continued his employment, till being fatigued, he went out for a walk; and, by the dog, as it appears to me committed it to memory, unless perhaps it was too long for this purpose. But he directed his course beyond the walls, that he might meditate on this oration. Meeting, however, with one who was madly fond of discourse, he rejoiced on beholding him, because he should have a partner in his corybantic fury; and desired him to walk on. But when that lover of discourse requested him to repeat the oration, he feigned as if he was unwilling to comply; but though he was unwilling that any one should hear him voluntarily, he was at length compelled to the relation. I therefore entreat, Phædrus, that you will quickly accomplish all I desire.

PHÆDR. Well then, I will endeavour to satisfy you in the best manner I am able; for I see you will not dismiss me till I have exerted my utmost abilities to please you.

Soc. You perfectly apprehend the truth respecting me.

PHÆDR. I will therefore gratify you; but, in reality, Socrates, I have not learned by heart the words of this oration, though I nearly retain the sense of all the arguments by which he shows the difference between a lover and one who does not love; and these I will summarily relate to you in order, beginning from the first.

Soc. But show me first, my friend, what you have got there in your left ² hand,

¹ Not to hear once, but often, says Hermias, manifests the unwearied labour of men about apparent beauty. The book here signifies that sensible beauties are images of images, as the letters in it are primarily indicative of the soul, but secondarily of the reasons proceeding from the soul. A dog is dedicated to Hermes, and is the last vestige of the Mercurial series. As the present hypothesis, therefore, is about the oration of Lysias, and Hermes is the inspective guardian of discourse, Socrates very properly swears by the dog. It may also be said that he thus swears as reverencing the extremity of this order, and through it calling the inspective Hermes himself as a witness.

² The left hand here manifests that a rhetoric of this kind is extended to the worse, or in other words, the passive part of the soul; and that it does not pertain to the pure power and summit

hand, under your cloak: for I suspect that you have got the oration itself. And if this be the case, think thus with yourself respecting me, that I perfectly esteem you; but that, when Lysias is present, it is by no means my intention to listen to you. And therefore show it me.

PHÆDR. You ought to desist: for you have destroyed those hopes, Socrates, which I entertained respecting you; the hopes I mean of contesting with you. But where are you willing we should sit, while we read?

Soc. Let us, turning hither, direct our steps towards the river Ilissus: and afterwards, when you shall think proper to rest, we will sit down.

PHÆDR. And this will be very seasonable, as it appears, for I am at present without shoes¹; but this is always the case with you. It will be easy, therefore, for us to walk by the side of the brook, moistening our feet; nor will it be unpleasant, especially at this season of the year, and this time of the day.

Soc. Go on then, and at the same time look out for a place where we may sit down.

PHÆDR. Do you see that most lofty plane tree?

Soc. Why, what then?

PHÆDR. For there, there is a cool shade, moderate breezes of wind, and soft grass, upon which we may either sit, or, if you are so disposed, lie down.

Soc. Let us go then.

PHÆDR. But inform me, Socrates, whether this is not the place in which Boreas is reported to have ravished Orithya from Ilissus.

of the rational soul, viz. to intellect, but rather to the doxastic and phantastic part. But the book being concealed under the garment of Phædrus, signifies that such rhetoric is involved in darkness, and is fallen from the light of science: for it is conversant with doxastic and material concerns, and with human trifles.

¹ The being without shoes here signifies promptitude, the unsuperfluous, and an aptitude to the anagogic, which indeed were always present with Socrates, but with Phædrus at that time, because he was about to be perfected by Socrates. The summer also, and mid-day, are adapted to re-elevation, conformably to that saying of Heraclitus, that the soul that has a dry splendour is the wisest. The dipping the feet in the brook signifies the touching on generation with the last and most abject powers of the soul; for these are indicated by the feet: the rational soul at the same time supernally contemplating generation. The breezes of wind also manifest the providential inspiration of the Gods: but the shade signifies an intelligible, unapparent, and elevating power, remote from that which is sensible and which agitates; for this latter is indicated by the light.

Soc.

Soc. It is reported so indeed.

PHÆDR. Was it not just here then? for the brooks hereabouts appear to be grateful to the view, pure and transparent, and very well adapted to the sports of virgins.

Soc. It was not, but two or three stadia lower down, where we meet with the temple of Diana ¹, and in that very place there is a certain altar sacred to Boreas ².

PHÆDR.

¹ The Athenians, says Hermeas, established a temple of Rural Diana, because this Goddess is the inspective guardian of every thing rural, and represses every thing rustic and uncultivated. But the altars and temples of the Gods, signify their allotments; as you may also call the altar and temple of the sun, and of the soul of the sun, this mundane body, or apparent solar orb. So that in this place the allotments and illuminations of the Gods themselves in temples will be the intelligible theory, and which investigates universal through particulars, and *being* through that which *appears to subsist*. But the temple of this theory will be intellect.

² A twofold solution, says Hermeas, may be given of this fable; one from history, more ethical, but the other transferring us to wholes. And the former of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, and the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a presiding deity, which the theistic art, or the art pertaining to sacred mysteries, religiously cultivates. To this Orithya then, the God was so very propitious, that he sent the north wind for the safety of the country; and besides this, he is said to have assisted the Athenians in their naval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming enthusiastic, being possessed by her proper God Boreas, and no longer energizing as man (for animals cease to energize according to their own idioms when possessed by superior causes), died under the inspiring influence, and thus was said to have been ravished by Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation of the fable.

But the second which transfers the narration to wholes is as follows, and does not entirely subvert the former: for divine fables often employ transactions and histories in subserviency to the discipline of wholes. They say then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he is considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes as the presiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity Orithya is the daughter; and she is the prolific power of the earth, which is, indeed, coextended with the word *Erectheus*, as the unfolding of the name signifies: for it is *the prolific power of the earth flourishing and restored according to the seasons*. But Boreas is the providence of the Gods supernally illuminating secondary natures: for they signify the providence of the Gods in the world by Boreas; because this Divinity blows from lofty places. But the anagogic power of the Gods is signified by the south wind, because this wind blows from low to lofty places; and besides this, things situated towards the south are more divine. The providence of the Gods, therefore, causes the prolific power of the earth, or of the Attic land, to *ascend*, and proceed into the apparent.

Orithya also, says Hermeas, may be said to be a soul * aspiring after things above, from *ορουσιν*

* This is according to the physical mode of interpreting fables. See the General Introduction, vol. 1, of this work.

and

PHÆDR. I did not perfectly know this. But tell me, by Jupiter, Socrates, are you persuaded that this fabulous narration ¹ is true?

Soc. If I should not believe in it, as is the case with the wife, I should not be absurd: and afterwards, speaking sophistically, I should say that the wind Boreas hurled from the neighbouring rocks Orithya, sporting with Pharmacia; and that she dying in consequence of this, was said to have been ravished by Boreas, or from the hill of Mars. There is also another report that she was not ravished from this place, but from that. But for my own part, Phædrus, I consider interpretations of this kind as pleasant enough, but at the same time, as the province of a man vehemently curious and laborious, and not entirely happy; and this for no other reason, than because after such an explanation, it is necessary for him to correct the shape of the Centaurs and Chimæra. And, besides this, a crowd of Gorgons and Pegasus will pour upon him for an exposition of this kind, and of certain other prodigious

and *θew*, according to the Attic custom of adding a letter at the end of a word, which letter is here an *ω*. Such a soul, therefore, is ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya was hurled from a precipice, this also is appropriate: for such a soul dies a philosophic, not receiving a physical death, and abandons a *proairetic* *, at the same time that she lives a physical life. And philosophy, according to Socrates in the Phædo, is nothing else than a meditation of death. Let then Orithya be the soul of Phædrus, but Boreas Socrates ravishing and leading it to a *proairetic* death.

¹ According to some, Socrates in what he now says, does not admit the explanations of fables. It is evident, however, that he frequently does admit and employ fables. But he now blames those explanations which make fables to be nothing more than certain histories, and unfold them into material causes, airs, and earth, and winds, which do not revert to true beings, nor harmonize with divine concerns. Hence Socrates now says, If unfolding this fable I should recur to physical causes, and should assert that the wind Boreas, blowing vehemently, hurled Orithya as she was playing from the rock, and thus dying she was said to have been ravished by Boreas,—should I not speak absurdly? For this explanation which is adopted by the *wife*, viz. by those who are employed in physical speculations, is meagre and conjectural; since it does not recur to true beings, but to natures, and winds, and airs, and vortices, as he also says in the Phædo. He rejects, therefore, these naturalists, and those who thus explain the fable, as falling into the ineffinite and infinite, and not recurring to soul, intellect, and the Gods. But when Socrates says that he considers such interpretations as the province of a man *very curious* and *laborious*, and *not entirely happy*, these words indicate the being conversant with things sensible and material. And the Centaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, and Pegasus are powers which preside over a material nature, and the region about the earth. But for an account of divine fables, and specimens of the mode in which they ought to be explained, see the Introduction to the second book of the Republic.

* That is a life pertaining to her own will; for the soul in this case gives herself up to the will of divinity.
natures,

natures, immense both in multitude and novelty. All which, if any one, not believing in their literal meaning, should draw to a probable sense, employing for this purpose a certain rustic wisdom, he will stand in need of most abundant leisure. With respect to myself indeed, I have not leisure for such an undertaking; and this because I am not yet able, according to the Delphic precept, to know ¹ myself. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am yet ignorant of this, to speculate things foreign from the knowledge of myself. Hence, bidding farewell to these, and being persuaded in the opinion which I have just now mentioned respecting them, I do not contemplate these, but myself, considering whether I am not a wild beast ², possessing more folds than Typhon, and far more raging and fierce; or whether I am a more mild and simple animal, naturally participating of a certain divine and modest condition. But are we not, my friend, in the midst of our discourse arrived at our destined seat? and is not yonder the oak to which you was to lead us?

PHÆDR. That indeed is it.

Soc. By Juno ³, a beautiful retreat. For the plane-tree very widely spreads its shady branches, and is remarkably tall; and the height and opacity of

¹ If any man ever knew himself, this was certainly the case with Socrates. In what he now says, therefore, his meaning may be, either that he does not yet know himself as pure soul itself, but that as being in body he knows himself; or that he does not yet know himself, as he is known by divinity.

² For it is evident that he who knows himself knows all things: for, in consequence of the soul being *παιμορφοῦν ἀγάλμας* an omniform image, he beholds all things in himself. By Typhon here we must understand that power which presides over the confused and disordered in the universe, or in other words the last procession of things. The term *manifold*, therefore, in this place must not be applied to the God Typhon, but to that over which he presides, as being in its own nature moved in a confused, disordered, and manifold manner. For it is usual with fables to refer the properties of the objects of providential care to the providing powers themselves.

³ Socrates mentions Juno, says Hermeas, as generating and adorning the beauty of the mundane fabrication; and hence she is said to have received the Cestus from Venus. Employing, therefore, true praise, he first celebrates the place from the three elements air, water, and earth; and afterwards he triply divides the vegetable productions of the earth into first, middle, and last. For this is evident from what he says of the plane tree, the willow, and the grafts. He shows, too, that all the senses were delighted except the taste. But Achelous is the deity who presides over the much-honoured power of water: for, by this mighty river, the God who is the inspective

of the willow, are perfectly beautiful, being now in the vigour of its vegetation, and, on this account, filling all the place with the most agreeable odour. Add too, that a most pleasant fountain of extreme cool water flows under the plane-tree, as may be inferred from its effect on our feet, and which appears to be sacred to certain nymphs, and to Achelous, from the virgins and statues with which it is adorned. Then again, if you are so disposed, take notice how lovely and very agreeable the air of the place is, and what a summer-like and sonorous ringing resounds from the choir of grasshoppers. But the most elegant prospect of all is that of the grass, which in a manner so extremely beautiful, naturally adapts itself to receive on the gradual slope the reclining head. So that, my dear Phædrus, you have led me hither as a guest in the most excellent manner.

PHÆDR. But you, O wonderful man, appear to act most absurdly; for by your discourse one might judge you to be some stranger and not a native of the place. And, indeed, one might conclude that you had never passed beyond the bounds of the city, nor ever deserted its walls.

SOC. Pardon me, most excellent Phædrus, for I am a lover of learning; and, hence I consider that fields¹ and trees are not willing to teach me any thing; but that this can be effected by men residing in the city. You indeed appear to me to have discovered an enchantment capable of causing my departure from hence. For as they lead famished animals whither they please, by extending to them leaves or certain fruits; so you, by extending to me the discourses contained in books, may lead me about through all Attica, and indeed wherever you please. But now, for the present, since
we

inspective guardian of potable water is manifested. Nymphs are goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant to Bacchus the offspring of Semele. Hence they dwell near water, that is, they ascend into generation. But this Bacchus supplies the regeneration of the whole sensible world. *Ἀχελῷος δὲ ἐστὶ ὁ ἐφορος θεὸς τῆς πολυτιμοῦ δυνάμεως ὕδατος· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ μεγίστου τούτου ποταμοῦ τὸν ἐφορὸν θεὸν δίδουσι τοῦ ποτίμεν ὕδατος· νύμφαι δὲ εἰσὶν ἐφοροὶ θεαὶ τῆς παλιγγενεσίας ὑπουργοὶ τοῦ ἐκ Σεμέλης Διονυσίου. Διὸ καὶ παρὰ τῷ ὕδατι εἰσὶ, τοῦτεστι τῇ γενέσει ἐπιβέβηκασιν· οὗτος δὲ ὁ Διόνυσος τῆς παλιγγενεσίας ὑπάρχει πάντος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.*

¹ This manifests, as it is beautifully observed by Hermias, that Socrates always adhered to his proper principles and causes, and his own intelligible and proper divinities. For the true country of souls is the intelligible world. His discipline, therefore, was not derived from things sensible and refusing, but from rational and intellectual souls, and from intellect itself. The country is
indeed

we are arrived hither, I for my part am disposed to lie down ; but do you, assuming whatever position you think most convenient, begin to read.

PHÆDR. Hear then.—“ You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers : for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed ; but there is no time in which it is proper for those void of love to repent their beneficence ; since they do not consult from necessity, but voluntarily, and in the best manner about their own affairs, and do good as far as their circumstances will admit. Besides, lovers sometimes reflect how negligently they have attended, through love, to their own concerns, what benefits they have bestowed, to their own loss, and what labours they have undergone ; and therefore think they have conferred favours worthy the objects of their love. But those void of love, neither blame themselves for neglecting their affairs, nor complain of past labours, or disagreement with their familiars, as produced by some beloved object. So that such mighty evils being removed, nothing else remains for them than to perform with willingness and alacrity whatever they think will be acceptable to the objects of their beneficent exertions. Besides, if it is said that lovers make much of the party beloved, because they love in the most eminent degree, and are always prepared, both in words and actions, to comply with the desires of their beloved, though they should offend others by so doing ; it is easy to know that this is not the truth, because lovers far more esteem the posterior than the prior objects of their love ; and if the more re-

indeed so far pleasant only to an intellectual man, as it is favourable to solitude, and this because solitude is favourable to contemplation ; but to be delighted with trees, and meadows, and streams, merely for their own sakes, is the province of such as are capable of no other energies than those of sense and imagination. Socrates, in following Phædrus, likewise manifests his providential energy about youth, and his wish to save them. But his hearing in a reclined position, signifies his energizing about things of a more abject nature, such as were the opinions of Lyfias about beauty. For it is necessary, as Hermæas well observes, to accommodate the figures also to the hypotheses. Hence, in his recantation, Socrates very properly uncovers his head, because he there discourses on divine love. As, therefore, now intending to energize about more abject beauty, he hears reclining ; assimilating the apparent figure to the discourse. Thus also in the Phædo, he sat in an *upright* posture on the bed when he was about to speak concerning the philosopher.

cently beloved party thinks fit, they are even willing to treat injuriously the former subjects of their regard. But to what else is it proper to ascribe such a conduct, except that calamity, love; a conduct which he who had never experienced this passion would never suppose possible to exist. And besides this, lovers themselves confess that they are rather diseased than prudent, and that they know their ill condition with respect to prudence, but are unable to subdue it. But how can such as are properly prudent approve the desires of such as are thus diseased? Besides, if you should wish to choose among lovers the best associate, your choice must be confined to a few; but if you desire to find among others one most accommodated to yourself, you may choose out of many. And there are much more hopes of finding one worthy of your friendship among a many than a few. If, therefore, you reverence the established law, and are afraid lest the infamy of offenders should be your portion, it is proper to remember that lovers, who consider themselves as loved with a mutual regard, are accustomed to boast that they have not bestowed their labour in vain; but that such as are not infected with love, being better than these, content themselves with enjoying that which is best rather than the opinion of men. But still further, when the multitude perceive lovers following the objects of their affection, and bestowing all possible assiduity in this employment, they are necessarily persuaded that when they perceive them discoursing with each other, the desire of coition has either then taken place, or is about to do so: but they do not attempt to reproach the familiarity of such as are without love, as they know it is necessary that they must either discourse through friendship, or some other pleasure unconnected with coition. And, indeed, if in consequence of this doctrine you are afraid that it will be difficult for friendship to remain, and that disagreements, by some means or other arising, will become a common destruction to both; at the same time premising that you shall thus suffer a great injury in most of your transactions; if this is the case, you ought with much greater reason to be afraid of lovers. For there are many things afflictive to these, and they consider every thing as happening to their disadvantage. Hence, they prohibit the objects of their regard from associating with other lovers, dreading lest the wealthy should surpass them in wealth, and the learned in knowledge; and, as far as they are able, preserve them from the company of those who possess any thing good. And thus, by
persuading

persuading them to abstain from such as these, they cause them to abandon their friends. If, therefore, you consider your own advantage, you will be wiser than these, and will entirely disagree with them in opinion. But such as are not your lovers, but who act in a becoming manner through virtue, will not envy your association with others, but will rather hate those who are unwilling to be your familiars; thinking that you are despised by such as these, but that you are benefited by your associates. So that there is much more reason to hope that friendship will be produced by this means, than that enmity will arise from such a connection. Add to this, that the most part of lovers desire the possession of the body before they know the manners, or have made trial of any thing else belonging to the beloved object: so that it is uncertain whether they will still wish to be friends to them, when the desire produced by love is no more. But it is probable that such as are without love, since from the commencement of their friendship they acted without regarding venereal delight,—it is probable that they will act with less ardour, but that they will leave their actions as monuments of their conduct in futurity. Besides, it will be more advantageous to you to be persuaded by me than by a lover. For lovers will praise both your sayings and actions beyond all measure; some through fear, lest they should offend you; but others, in consequence of being depraved in their judgment, through desire. For love will point you out to be such. It likewise compels the unfortunate to consider as calamitous things which cause no molestation to others, and obliges the fortunate to celebrate as pleasant, things which are not deserving of delight: so that it is much more proper to commiserate than emulate lovers. But if you will be persuaded by me, in the first place I will associate with you, without caring for present pleasure, but for the sake of future advantage; not vanquished by love, but subduing myself; nor for mere trifles exciting severe enmity, but indulging a very little anger, and this but slowly even for great offences: pardoning, indeed, involuntary faults, and endeavouring to turn you from the commission of such as are voluntary. For these are the marks of a friendship likely to endure for a very extended period of time. However, if it should appear to you that friendship cannot be firm unless it is united with the lover, you should consider that, according to this, we ought not to be very fond of our children or parents, nor reckon those friends faithful, who became such, not from desire, but from studies of a

different kind. But further still, if it is requisite to gratify in the most eminent degree those who are in want, it is proper to benefit, not the best of men, but the most needy : for, being liberated from the greatest evils, they will render them the most abundant thanks. And besides this, in the exertions of your own private benevolence, it is not proper to call your friends, but mendicants and those who stand in need of alimentary supplies. For these will delight in you, and follow you ; will stand before your doors, and testify the most abundant satisfaction ; render you the greatest thanks, and pray for your prosperity. But, perhaps, it is proper not to be pleased with those who are vehemently needy, but rather with those who are able to repay you with thanks, nor with lovers only but with those deserving your attention. Nor again, with those who enjoy the beauty of your youth, but with such as may participate your kindness when you are old. Nor with those who, when their desire is accomplished, are ambitious of obtaining others, but with those who through modesty are silent towards all men. Nor with those who officiously attend upon you for a short time, but with those who are similarly your friends through the whole of life. Nor, lastly, with those who, when desire is extinguished, seek after occasions of enmity ; but with those who, when the flower of your beauty is decayed, will then exhibit their virtue and regard. Do you, therefore, remember what I have said, and consider that friends admonish lovers, that they are engaged in a base pursuit ; but that those void of love are never blamed by any of their familiars, as improperly consulting about themselves, through a privation of love. Perhaps you will ask me whether I persuade you to gratify all who are not lovers. But I think that even a lover would not exhort you to be equally affected towards all your lovers : for neither would this deserve equal thanks from the receiver ; nor would you, who are desirous to conceal yourself from others, be able to accomplish this with equal facility towards all. It is, however, necessary that you should receive no injury from your lover ; but that some advantage should accrue to both. To me it appears, therefore, that I have said sufficient ; but if you think any thing should be added, inform me what it is."

How does this discourse appear to you, Socrates ? Is not the oration composed in a transcendent manner, both as to the sentiments and the structure of the words ?

Soc.

Soc. Divinely indeed, my friend, so as that I am astonished. And in the same transcendent manner am I affected towards you, Phædrus, while I behold you, because you appeared to me in the course of reading the oration to be transported with delight. As I considered, therefore, that you was more skilful in such affairs than myself, I followed you ; and, in following, was agitated together with you, O divine head ! with bacchic fury.

PHÆDR. Are you disposed to jest in this manner ?

Soc. Do I appear then to you to jest, and not to speak seriously ?

PHÆDR. You by no means appear to be serious, Socrates. But, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship, tell me whether you think that any one of the Greeks could say any thing greater and more copiously on this subject ?

Soc. But what, do you think that a discourse ought to be praised by you and me, because its composer has said what is sufficient ? and not for this alone, that he has artificially fashioned every word clear, and round, and accurate ? For, if it is necessary, this must be granted for your sake : for it is concealed from me, through my nothingness. Hence, I only attended to the eloquence of the composer ; for, as to the other particular, I do not believe that even Lysias will think himself sufficient. And indeed to me, Phædrus, it appears (unless you say otherwise) that he has twice and thrice repeated the same things, as if he did not possess a great copiousness of discourse upon the same subject : or, perhaps, he took no great care about a thing of this kind. And besides this, he seems to me to act in a juvenile manner, by showing that he can express the same thing in different ways, and yet at the same time, according to each mode, in the best manner possible.

PHÆDR. You speak nothing to the purpose, Socrates : for this oration possesses a copiousness of sentiment in the most eminent degree. For he has omitted nothing belonging to his subject, which he could with propriety introduce : so that, besides what has been said by him, no one could ever be able to discourse, either more abundantly or more to the purpose, on the same subject, than he has done.

Soc. I cannot grant you this : for the wife of old, both men and women, who have discoursed and written on this subject, would confute me, if I should admit this for the sake of gratifying you.

PHÆDR. Who are those antients? and where have you heard better things than these?

Soc. I do not sufficiently remember at present; but it is manifest that I have somewhere heard of some of these, such as the beautiful Sappho, or the wise Anacreon, or certain other writers. But from whence do I derive this conjecture? Because, O divine man! finding my breast full of conceptions, I perceive that I have something to say in addition to what has been already delivered, and this not of an inferior nature. I well know, indeed, that I understand nothing about such things from myself, as I am conscious of my own ignorance. It remains therefore, I think, that I myself, like a vessel, should be filled with knowledge, through hearing, from the fountains of others; but that, through my dulness of apprehension, I should again forget how, and from whom, I received the information.

PHÆDR. You speak, most generous man, in the most excellent manner. For you cannot inform me, though I should command you to do so, how, and from whom, you derived your knowledge; but this which you speak of you are able to accomplish, since you possess more abundant and more excellent conceptions than those contained in the oration of Lysias. And if you are but able to accomplish this, I promise you, after the manner of the nine Archons, to place a golden statue of an equal measure at Delphi, not of myself only, but likewise of you.

Soc. You are of a most friendly disposition, Phædrus, and truly golden, if you suppose me to have asserted that Lysias was perfectly faulty, and that something better might have been said than the whole of this: for I do not think that this can ever happen, even to the worst of writers. But to the point in hand, about this oration: Do you think that any one who asserts that it is more proper to gratify one who does not love than a lover can have any thing to say besides his assertion, if he omits to prove that he who is void of love is prudent, but the lover is not so; and praises the one, but blames the other? But I think that omissions of this kind are to be suffered, and even pardoned, in a writer; and that it is not the invention of these discourses, but the elegance of the composition, which ought to be praised. But in things which are not necessary, and which are difficult to discover, I think that not only the composition, but likewise the invention, should be praised.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. I assent to what you say : for you appear to me to speak modestly. I will therefore allow you to suppose that a lover is more diseased than one who is void of love ; but, if in what remains you speak more copiously and more to the purpose than Lyfias, you shall stand in Olympia, artificially fabricated, near the Cypselidæ¹.

Soc. You are serious, Phædrus, because I have found fault with a man who is exceedingly beloved by you ; and you think that I have in reality attempted to speak something more copious than what his wisdom has produced.

PHÆDR. In this affair, my friend, you have afforded me a similar handle to that which I some time since afforded you, and it is necessary for you to speak upon this subject in the best manner you are able. And that we may not be compelled to adopt that troublesome method of comedians, by answering one another, take care of yourself ; and do not oblige me to retort upon you “ If I, O Socrates ! am ignorant of Socrates, I am also forgetful of myself.” And, “ that he desires to speak, indeed, but feigns to be unwilling.” In short, assure yourself that we shall not depart from hence before you have disclosed to me that which you keep concealed in your breast. For there is none but us two ; we are in a solitary place ; and I am both stronger and younger than you. From all this, then, understand what I say ; and by no means dispose yourself to be forced to speak, rather than to discourse of your own accord.

Soc. But, O blessed Phædrus ! it would certainly be ridiculous in me, who am but an idiot, to contend with that excellent writer, and this too extemporary.

PHÆDR. Do you know how the case stands ? Cease your boasting before me : for I have nearly got a secret in my possession, which, when told, will force you to speak.

Soc. Do not tell it, therefore, I beseech you.

PHÆDR. Not tell it ? But indeed I shall. For my secret is an oath. And therefore I swear to you, by some one of the Gods, or, if you will, be

¹ The Cypselidæ were three princes who descended from Cypselus, a king of Corinth. This Cypselus reigned 73 years, and was succeeded by his son Periander, who left his kingdom, after a reign of 40 years, to Cypselus II.

this plane-tree, that unless you deliver to me a discourse the very contrary to that of Lyfias, I will never at any time either show or read to you another oration.

SOC. O you wicked man ! how well have you found out a method of compelling a lover of literature to act as you please !

PHÆDR. Why then, since it is so, do you hesitate about complying ?

SOC. I shall not indeed any longer, since you have sworn in this manner. For how is it possible for any one to abstain from such feasts as you are capable of supplying ?

PHÆDR. Begin then.

SOC. Do you know what I mean to do ?

PHÆDR. About what ?

SOC. Why, I mean to speak covered with my garment ¹, that I may rapidly run through my discourse, and that, by not looking at you, I may not be hindered through shame.

PHÆDR. Do but speak ; and as to the rest, you may act as you please.

SOC. Inspire me then, O ye Muses ² ? whether you are so called from the melody of singing, or from the musical tribe of shrill sounds ; and so assist me in the discourse which this best of men compels me to deliver, that his associate, who formerly appeared to him to be wise, may now appear to him to be still more so.

There was a certain youth, or rather a delicate young man, extremely beautiful, and who possessed a multitude of lovers. Among these there was one of a fraudulent disposition ; who, though he did not love less than the rest, yet persuaded the youth that he was not one of his lovers. And asking him on a certain time to satisfy his desire, he endeavoured to convince him that one who was not a lover ought to be gratified before one who was. But he spoke to this effect : In every thing, young man, one prin-

¹ The modesty of Socrates in this place must sufficiently convince the most careless reader of Plato, that this divine philosopher was very far from being a friend to that unnatural connection of the male species, which is so frequently alluded to in this dialogue, and which was so common among the Greeks. He indeed who has in the least experienced that extreme purity of sentiment and conduct which is produced by a cultivation of the Platonic philosophy, will require no further conviction of the chastity of Socratic love ; but as this can never be the case with the vulgar, they can alone be convinced by external and popular proofs.

² For an account of the Muses, see the notes on the Cratylus.

ciple, to those who are about to consult in a becoming manner, is, to know that about which they consult, or else it is necessary that they should perfectly wander from the truth. But the multitude are ignorant that they do not know the essence of every particular. Hence in the beginning of their disquisitions, they do not trouble themselves to declare what the essence of a thing is, as if they were very knowing in matters of this kind; but in the course of their inquiry they exhibit nothing more than probable reasons; and thus they are neither consistent with themselves, nor with others. With respect to you and me, therefore, lest we should suffer that which we condemn in others, in our inquiry, whether the engagement of friendship ought to be entered upon with one who does not love, rather than with one who does, we ought to know what love is, and what power it possesses, mutually agreeing in our definition respecting it; and looking towards, and referring our discourse to this, we should consider whether it is the cause of advantage or detriment. That love, therefore, is a certain desire, is manifest to every one; and we are not ignorant that those who are void of love, are desirous of beautiful things. That we may be able, therefore, to distinguish a lover from one who is not so, it is requisite to know that there are two certain ideas in each of us, endued with a ruling and leading power, and which we follow wherever they conduct us. One of these is the innate desire of pleasures; but the other an acquired opinion, desirous of that which is best. But these sometimes subsist in us in a state of amity, and sometimes in a state of opposition and discord. And sometimes the one conquers, and sometimes the other. When opinion, therefore, is led by reason to that which is best, and vanquishes, it is denominated, from its vanquishing, temperance. But when desire irrationally allures to pleasure, and rules within us, it is called from its dominion, injury. But injury possesses a multitude of appellations: for it is multiform, and consists of many species. And of these ideas that which subsists in the most remarkable degree, causes that in which it resides to receive its appellation, and does not suffer it to be denominated any thing graceful or worthy. For when, with respect to food, desire of eating vanquishes the reason of that which is best, and rules over the other desires, then this desire is called gluttony; which likewise subjects its possessor to the same appellation. But that which tyrannizes about intoxication, and which through this leads

its possessor wherever it pleases, evidently confers on him its own appellation. And it is sufficiently manifest how the sisters of these, and the names of the sister-desires when they rule with absolute sway, ought to be called. But that for the sake of which all this has been said is now nearly evident: though it will certainly be in every respect more clear if enunciated, than if not. For the desire which without reason rules over opinion tending to that which is right, which draws it down towards the pleasure of beauty, and being vehemently invigorated by its kindred desires about the beauty of body, leads and subdues it: this desire, receiving an appellation from its strength, is called love. But, my dear Phædrus, do I appear to you, as I do to myself, to suffer a certain divine passion?

PHÆDR. Indeed, Socrates, you possess a certain fluency of expression, beyond what is usual to you.

Soc. Hear me then in silence. For in reality the place appears to be divine. If, therefore, during my discourse, I should be often hurried away by the inspiring influence of the Nymphs, you must not be surprised. For the words which burst from me at present are not very remote from dithyrambic verse.

PHÆDR. You speak most truly.

Soc. But of this you are the cause. However, hear the rest; for perhaps that which now possesses me may depart. But this will be taken care of by divinity. Let us, therefore, again direct our discourse to the young man. What that is then, which was the object of consultation, has been declared and defined. But looking towards this, let us consider with respect to what remains, what assistance or detriment will very properly happen to him who is gratified by a lover, and to him who is gratified by one who is not so.

It is necessary then that a man who is enslaved by desire, or who is in subjection to pleasure, should render the object of his love as agreeable to himself as possible. But to one diseased every thing is pleasant which does not oppose his disease; but that which is better and equal is troublesome. Hence the lover is never willing that the object of his love should possess any thing more excellent than himself, or any thing approaching to an equality with himself; but that, as much as possible, he should be inferior to, and more indigent than himself. Thus, he is desirous that through

ignorance he may become inferior to the wife, through timidity inferior to the bold, through inability to speak, to rhetoricians, and through dullness, to the acute; And when these, and far more numerous ills than these, according to the conceptions of the lover, are naturally inherent, or are produced in the beloved object, the lover rejoices, and even endeavours to introduce others, that he may not be deprived of his desired pleasure. Hence it is necessary that the lover should be envious of his beloved, and should endeavour by all possible means to exclude him from an association with others, through whom he may become a most excellent man; and thus in reality he is the cause of a mighty injury to his beloved. But the greatest injury, which he is the cause of, is that of depriving his beloved of the means of becoming eminently prudent. But he becomes most prudent through divine philosophy, from which the lover is necessarily compelled to withdraw his beloved, through the fear of being despised. And besides this, he is obliged to a variety of other artifices, that his beloved, by becoming ignorant of every thing, may place all his admiration upon him; and may thus become most acceptable to his lover, but most pernicious to himself. And thus with respect to things relating to the rational part, an association with a lover is by no means advantageous, but prejudicial to the party beloved.

But after this it is necessary to consider how he, who is compelled to prefer the pleasant to the good, would take care of the body of his beloved, if it was committed to his charge. Indeed he would endeavour that it should not become firm and vigorous, but effeminate and soft; and that it should not be nourished in the pure light of the sun, but under the mingled shade; and that he should be educated without having any experience of manly labours and dry sweats; but on the contrary should be continually accustomed to a delicate and effeminate mode of living, and be adorned with foreign colours and ornaments, through the want of his own proper decorations: and that he should be studious of every thing else, which is consequent to cares of this kind. All which, as they are unworthy of a longer narration, having summarily defined, we shall proceed to what remains of our discourse. Enemies, therefore, in battle, and other mighty necessities, will confidently assault such a body, but friends and lovers will be in fear for its safety. But this, as sufficiently evident, we shall dismiss. Let us then, in the next place, declare what advantage or detriment, with

respect to possessions, arises to us from the familiarity and guardianship of a lover. But this indeed is manifest to every one, but especially to a lover, that he desires above all things that his beloved may be deprived of the most friendly, most dear, and divine possessions: for he wishes to receive him destitute of parents, kindred and friends, thinking that these will impede and reprehend his most pleasant association with his beloved. Besides, he considers that the object of his love, if rich in gold, or any other possession, cannot be easily taken, and, if taken, will not be tractable to his desires. From all which it is necessary that a lover should envy his beloved the possession of abundance, and should rejoice in his adversity. Further yet, he will wish the youth to live for a long time without a wife, without children, and without a proper home, desiring for a very extended period to enjoy those pleasures which he is capable of affording. There are, indeed, other evils besides these, but a certain dæmon¹ immediately mingles pleasure with

¹ We have already in the notes on the first Alcibiades, given an ample account of dæmons from Proclus. I shall, therefore, only observe at present, that, according to the Platonic theology, there are three species of dæmons; the first of which is *rational* only, and the last *irrational* only; but the middle species is partly *rational* and partly *irrational*. And again, of these the first is perfectly beneficent, but many among the other two species are malevolent and noxious to mankind; not indeed essentially malevolent (for there is nothing in the universe, the ample abode of all-bountiful Jove, essentially evil), but only so from the office which they are destined to perform: for nothing which operates naturally, operates as to itself evilly. But the Platonic Hermeas, in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, admirably observes on this passage as follows: "The distribution of good and evil originates from the dæmoniacal genus: for every genus, transcending that of dæmons, uniformly possesses good. There are, therefore, certain genera of dæmons, some of which adorn and administer certain parts of the world; but others certain species of animals. The dæmon, therefore, who is the inspective guardian of life, hastens souls into that condition, which he himself is allotted; as for instance, into injustice or intemperance, and continually mingles pleasure in them as a snare. But there are other dæmons transcending these, who are the punishers of souls, converting them to a more perfect and elevated life. And the first of these it is necessary to avoid; but the second sort we should render propitious. But there are other dæmons more excellent than these, who distribute good, in an uniform manner."—Ἐπο τοῦ δαιμονίου γένους πρώτως ἀρχεται ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν διαιρέσις· παν γὰρ τὸ ὑπερδαιμόνιον γένος, μονοειδὺς ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθόν. Ἐστίν οὖν τίνα γένη δαιμονίων, τὰ μὲν μερίδας τινὰς τοῦ κόσμου κατακοσμεῖντα καὶ ἐπιτροπεύοντα· τὰ δὲ εἶδε τίνα ζῶων· κατεχεῖν οὖν σπουδαζειν τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κληρὸν, ὡς εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ ἀκολασίαν· δέλεαρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ παρανομικῷ ἀναμειγνυσὶν ἐν αὐταῖς, ὃ εὖρος τῆς δὲ τῆς ζωῆς δαιμον· ἄλλοι δὲ τινες εἰσὶ τούτων ἐπανασταῖοντες δαίμονες, οἱ κολάσεις ἐπιτεμπουσὶ τὰς ψυχὰς, ἐπιστρέφοντες αὐτὰς εἰς τελειωτέραν καὶ ὑπερτέραν ζῶην· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρώτους ἀποτρεπεῖσθαι δεῖ· τοὺς δὲ δευτέρους εὐχόμενους· τρίτοι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι κρείττονες δαίμονες, τὰ ἀγαθὰ μονοειδῶς ἐπιτεμπόντες.

most of them : as in that dreadful beast, and mighty detriment, a flatterer, nature at the same time mingles a pleasure by no means inelegant and rude. And, indeed, some one may revile a harlot, and other cattle, and studies of this kind, which we are daily accustomed to delight in, as noxious ; but he who is a lover of young men, besides his being detrimental, is in his familiar converse the most unpleasant of all men. For equal, according to the proverb, rejoices in equal. For, as it appears to me, since equality of time leads to equal pleasures, it produces also friendship, through similitude. But at the same time, the association of these is connected with satiety ; and necessity is said to be grievous to every one in every concern. But this is most eminently the case in the dissimilitude of a lover towards his beloved. For an old man adhering to a young one, does not willingly leave him, either by night or by day, but is agitated by necessity and fury, which always affording him pleasure, lead him about, through seeing, hearing, touching, and in any manner apprehending his beloved ; so that he assiduously follows him with unceasing delight. But what solace or pleasures can he afford his beloved, so as to prevent him, during the period of mutual converse, from suffering the most extreme molestation ? And this when he beholds his countenance aged and deformed, together with other particulars consequent to this, which are not only unpleasant to be engaged with, but even to hear ; necessity always proposing to him such a survey. For in order to oblige him to this, he is always watched by suspicious guards in all his actions ; and is under a necessity of hearing the unreasonable and immoderate praises and reproaches of his lover ; which when he is sober, are indeed intolerable, but when he is intoxicated, are not only intolerable, but base, through his employing confidence, satiety, and repetition in his discourse. Besides, while he loves, he is pernicious and importunate. But when he ceases to love, he is afterwards unfaithful to the former object of his love, whom he had persuaded to comply with his request, by employing many oaths, prayers, and promises ; and whom, after all, he had scarcely been able to induce, by the hope of advantage, to bear with his troublesome familiarity. And, lastly, when he ought to repay him for his kindness, then receiving another ruler and patron in himself, viz. intellect and temperance, instead of love and fury, and thus becoming entirely changed, he deceives his once beloved object. And then the beloved calling to mind the former actions

and discourses of his lover, desires to be thanked for his kindness, as if he was discoursing with the same person as before. But the other, through shame, dares not say that he is changed, nor does he know how to free himself from the oaths and promises which his former stupid dominion over him produced, now he has acquired the possession of intellect and temperance; fearing lest, if he should act as formerly, he should again become such as he was before. Hence it necessarily comes to pass that he flies from the former object of his love, the shell being turned; but the other is compelled to pursue him, grievously enduring his change, and loading him with imprecations, as being ignorant from the beginning that a lover, and one who is necessarily insane, ought not to be gratified, but much rather one who does not love, and who is endued with intellect. For otherwise it would be necessary that he should give himself up to a man unfaithful, morose, envious, and unpleasant; detrimental with respect to the possession of things, and the habit of the body, but much more pernicious with respect to the discipline of the soul, than which nothing really is, or ever will be more venerable, both among Gods and men. It is necessary, therefore, my young friend, to consider all this, and to know that the friendship of a lover does not subsist with benevolence, but, like one who is hungry, is exerted only for the sake of being full. For,

The eager lover to the boy aspires,
Just as the wolf the tender lamb desires.

This is that which I predicted to you, O Phædrus, nor will you hear me speak any further; for my discourse to you has now arrived at its conclusion.

PHÆDR. But to me it appears that you have accomplished no more than the half, and that you should speak equally as much concerning one who is not a lover; that he of the two ought rather to be gratified; and that, for this purpose, the advantages which he possesses should be enumerated. Why, therefore, Socrates, do you now desist from speaking?

SOC. Have you not taken notice, blessed man, that I now speak in verse, but that it is no longer dithyrambic; and that I have done this, though my discourse has been full of reproach? But what do you think I should be able to accomplish, if I should begin to praise the other? Do you not perceive that,

that, being then urged by you, and assisted by Providence, I should be most evidently agitated by the fury of the Nymphs? I say then, in one word, that as many goods are inherent in the one as we have numbered evils in the other. But what occasion is there of a long discourse? for enough has been said concerning both. And every thing proper to the oration has been introduced. I will, therefore, cross over the river and depart, before I am compelled by you to accomplish something greater than this.

PHÆDR. Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is over. Do you not see that mid-day, as it is called, stably remains almost, even now? Let us, therefore, stay here, and discourse together about what has been said, and immediately as it begins to grow cool, we will depart.

Soc. You are divine, Phædrus, with respect to discourse, and sincerely admirable. For I think that no one has been the occasion of more of the orations which exist at present, than yourself; whether by speaking of your own accord, or in some way or other by compelling others. I except only Simmias the Theban. For you far surpass all the rest. And now you appear to be the cause of my commencing another discourse, though you did not announce war, as the consequence of my refusal.

PHÆDR. But how have I been the cause? and what new discourse is this?

Soc. When I was about to pass over the river, excellent man, a dæmoniacal¹ and usual signal was given me; and whenever this takes place, it always prohibits me from accomplishing what I was about to do. And in the present instance I seemed to hear a certain voice, which would not suffer me to depart till I had made an expiation, as if I had offended in some particular a divine nature. I am therefore a prophet, indeed, but not such a one as is perfectly worthy; but just as those who know their letters in a very indifferent manner, alone sufficient for what concerns myself. I clearly, therefore, now understand my offence: for even yet, my friend, there is something prophetic in my soul, which disturbed me during my former discourse. And this caused me to fear lest, perhaps, according to Ibycus, I should offend the Gods, but acquire glory among men. But now I perceive in what I have offended.

PHÆDR. Will you not inform me what it is?

¹ For a full and every way satisfactory account of the dæmon of Socrates, see the note at the beginning of the First Alcibiades on dæmons, from Proclus.

SOC. You, O Phædrus, have repeated a dire, dire discourse, and have compelled me to utter the same.

PHÆDR. But how?

SOC. The discourse has been foolish, and in a certain respect impious. And can any thing be more dire ¹ than this?

PHÆDR. Nothing, if you speak the truth.

SOC. What then? Do you not think that Love ² is the son of Venus and a certain God?

PHÆDR. So it is said.

SOC. Yet this was neither acknowledged by Lyfias, nor in your discourse, which was deduced by you, as by a certain charm, through my mouth. But if Love, as is really the case, is a God, or a certain something divine, he cannot be in any respect evil: and yet in our discourse about him he has been spoken of as evil. In this, therefore, we have offended against Love. But, besides this, our disputations, though polite, appear to have been very foolish: for though they asserted nothing sound or true, yet they boasted as if they did, and as if they should accomplish something considerable, by gaining the approbation of some trifling deluded men. It is necessary, therefore, my friend, that I should purify myself. But there is an antient purification for those who offend in matters respecting mythology, which Homer did not perceive, but which was known to Stesichorus. For, being deprived of his eyes through his accusation of Helen, he was not like Homer, ignorant of the cause of his blindness, but knew it, as being a musician. So that he immediately composed the following lines:

False was my tale; thou ne'er across the main
In beauteous ships didst fly, Troy's lofty tow'rs to gain.

And thus having composed a poem directly contrary to what he had before published, and which is called a recantation, he immediately recovered his lost sight ³. I am, therefore, in the present instance wiser than both these:
for

¹ This is the language of true philosophy and *true religion*, that nothing can be more dire than impiety.

² For an account of Love considered as a Deity, see the notes on The Banquet.

³ From hence it is evident that the narration of the rape of Helen, and of the Trojan war, is entirely

for before I suffer any damage through my accusation of love, I will endeavour to present him with my recantation, and this with my head uncovered, and not as before veiled through shame.

PHÆDR. You cannot, Socrates, say any thing which will be more pleasing to me than this.

Soc. For, my good friend, you must be sensible how imprudent the oration was which you repeated, and how shamefully I myself also spoke concerning a lover. For, if any one of a generous disposition and elegant manners, who either loves, or had formerly loved, such a one as himself, had heard us, when we said that lovers often excited the greatest enmities for the most trifling occasions, and that they were envious of, and injurious to, their beloved, would he not have thought that he was hearing men educated in ships, and who were perfectly unacquainted with liberal love? or do you think that he would by any means have assented to our accusation of love?

PHÆDR. By Jupiter, Socrates, perhaps he would not.

Soc. Reverencing, therefore, such a man as this, and fearing Love himself, I desire, as it were with a potable oration, to wash away that salt and

entirely mythological, concealing certain divine truths under the symbols of fable. But as this account of Stesichorus, and the fable of the Iliad, is beautifully explained by Proclus on Plato's Republic, p. 393, I shall present the reader with the following epitomized translation of his comment. "Stesichorus, who considered the whole fable of Helen as a true narration, who approved the consequent transactions, and established his poetry accordingly, with great propriety suffered the punishment of his folly, that is, ignorance: but at length, through the assistance of music, he is said to have acknowledged his error; and thus, through understanding the mysteries concerning Helen and the Trojan war, to have recovered his sight. But Homer is said to have been blind, not on account of his ignorance of these mysteries, as Stesichorus, but through a more perfect habit of the soul, i. e. by separating himself from sensible beauty, establishing his intelligence above all apparent harmony, and extending the intellect of his soul to unapparent and true harmony. Hence, he is said to have been blind, because divine beauty cannot be usurped by corporeal eyes. On this account, fables bordering upon tragedy represent Homer as deprived of sight, on account of his accusation of Helen. But fables, in my opinion, intend to signify by Helen all the beauty subsisting about generation, for which there is a perpetual battle of souls, till the more intellectual having vanquished the more irrational forms of life, return to that place from which they originally came. But, according to some, the period of their circulation about sensible forms consists of ten thousand years, since a thousand years produce one ambit as of one year. For nine years therefore, i. e. for nine thousand years, souls revolve about generation; but in the tenth having vanquished all the barbaric tumult, they are said to return to their paternal habitations."

bitter discourse which we have lately heard. And I would advise Lysias himself, for similar reasons, to write as soon as possible that a lover ought rather to be gratified than one who is without love.

PHÆDR. You may be well assured that he will do so; for, after you have spoken in praise of a lover, it will be necessary that Lysias should be compelled by me to do the same.

Soc. This indeed I believe, while you remain affected as you are at present.

PHÆDR. Speak then confidently.

Soc. But will you not permit me to suppose that the same young man is present, to whom I addressed my former discourse, lest, in consequence of not hearing my recantation, he should rashly gratify one who is not a lover?

PHÆDR. He will always be very nearly present with you, when you are willing he should be so.

Soc. In this manner then, O beautiful young man, understand that the former discourse was that of Phædrus the Myrrhinusian, the offspring of Pythocles; but that this which I am now about to deliver is the discourse of Stesichorus the Imeræan, and the son of Euphemus. But he began his oration as follows:

“ The discourse is not true which asserts that, though a lover should be present, one who is not a lover ought to be gratified before him, because the one is agitated with fury, but the other is prudent in his conduct. For if it was simply true that mania is evil, this would be beautifully asserted. But now the greatest goods ¹ are produced for us through mania, and are assigned to

¹ This is a most weighty testimony indeed in favour of the antient oracles, and prediction in general. I shall therefore observe, in answer to the followers of Van Dale, Fontenelle, and others who have endeavoured to prove that the oracles of the antients were nothing more than the tricks of fraudulent priests, that to suppose mankind should have been the dupes of such impositions for the space of three thousand years, would exceed the most extravagant fiction in romance. For how is it possible, even if these priests had been a thousand times more cunning and deceitful than they are supposed to have been, that they could have kept such a secret so impenetrable in every city and province where there were any oracles, as never to have given themselves the lie in any particular? Is it possible that there should never have been one man among them of so much worth as to abhor such impostures? that there should never have been any so inconsiderate as unluckily to discover all the mystery for want of some precautions? that no man should ever

to us by a divine gift. For the predicting prophets at Delphi, and the priestesses

have explored the sanctuaries, subterraneous passages, and caverns, where it is pretended they kept their machines? that they should never have had occasion for workmen to repair them? that only they should have had the secret of composing drugs proper to create extraordinary dreams? and, lastly, that they should have perpetually succeeded one another, and conveyed their machines and their juggling tricks to all those that were to follow them in the same employments from age to age, and from generation to generation, and yet no man have been ever able to detect the imposition?

Besides, who were these priests, that, as it is pretended, were monsters of cruelty, fraud, and malice? They were the most honourable men among the heathens*, and such as were most esteemed for their piety and probity. They were sometimes magistrates and philosophers. Thus Plutarch† informs us in one of his treatises, that he was himself, to a very old age, the priest of Apollo of Delphi, and that he presided in this character over the oracle, the sacrifices, and all the other ceremonies of this deity for many years. Depraved as the age is, will any one be hardy enough to assert that a man of such probity, of such gravity of manners, of so much penetration, learning, and judgment as Plutarch, was a cheat and an impostor by profession? That he was capable of speaking through a hollow image to counterfeit the voice of Apollo? Or of suborning a female to act the part of one possessed, when she was seated on the Tripod? There is not surely any one so lost to shame, so devoid of common sense as to make such an assertion.

Again, how could those clear and precise oracles have been produced by fraud, in which what was done in one place was foretold in another, as in that famous oracle which was delivered to the ambassadors of Croesus. This most stupid of kings, and most unfortunate of cooks, as he is justly called by Maximus Tyrius, in order to try the veracity of the oracles, had determined, it seems, in a secret part of his palace to do something to which no one should be privy but himself, and sent to the oracle of Apollo to tell him what he was doing. His messengers returned with the following answer:

Οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ ψαμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης,
καὶ κωφὸν σὺνημι, καὶ οὐ χάλκοντος ἀκούω.

* The pontiffs and other priests among the Greeks, as well as among the Romans, held the first rank of honour. They were usually taken from noble or patrician families. Plutarch asserts that in some parts of Greece their dignity was equal to that of kings. In the first ages, indeed, kings themselves were often priests, diviners, and augurs. This we may learn from Aristotle in the third book of his Politics, c. 10; from Cicero, de Divin. lib. i. and de leg. l. 2. where he speaks of Romulus and Numa; from Homer, Iliad vi. l. 76. and Virgil, Æn. l. 3. when they speak of Helenus, and from the latter also when he speaks of king Anius, Æn. iii. l. 80.

Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phœbique sacerdos.

Who can believe that kings, princes, and persons of the first quality were capable of carrying on the trade of jugglers, and amusing the people by delusions and tricks of legerdemain?

† Plutarch. lib. de senectute et de republica.

priestesses in Dodona ¹, have, when insane procured many advantages, both privately

Ὀδῶν δ' εἰς φρένας ἤλθε κραταιαῖρ' ὀϊστοῖς
 Εὐφομένης ἐν χαλκῷ αἰμ' ἀρνεῖοισι κρέσσιν
 Ἦ χαλκὸς μὲν ὑπεστρωταί, χαλκοῖ δ' ἐπιστάται.

- i. e. The sand's amount, the measures of the sea,
 Tho' vast the number, are well known to me :
 I know the thoughts within the dumb concealed,
 And words I hear by language unrevealed.
 Even now, the odours to my sense that rise
 A tortoise boiling, with a lamb, supplies,
 Where brafs below, and brafs above it lies. }

Cræsus it seems was, at the very time when this oracle was delivered, boiling a lamb and tortoise together in a brazen vessel. This story is first related by Herodotus, Hist. lib. i. c. 8. and after him by various other writers, both heathen and christian, and among the rest by Basil, who, with the rest of the fathers, says that the devil was the author of it. Now the fact is as certain as any in antiquity. Besides, it is not the only one of this nature: Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Dionysius Halicarnassæus, Strabo, Florus, &c. relate several instances of predictions having been verified in one place of what was doing in another. Plutarch, in the life of Paulus Æmilius, and in that of Sylla, adds others also; but one especially that happened in the reign of Domitian, and of the truth of which he says no man doubted in his time. The circumstance, as related also by Augustine, lib. ii. de Civit. Dei, cap. 24. was, that a servant of one Lucius Pontius prophetically exclaimed, I come a messenger from Bellona, the victory Sylla is thine. He afterwards added, that the capitol would be in flames. Having said this, he immediately left the camp, and the next day returned more rapidly, and exclaimed that the capitol had been burnt. And the capitol it seems had in reality been on fire. Augustine adds that it was easy for the devil to foresee this, and most rapidly to tell it. Indeed, such predictions must have been the effect of inspiration, either from divinity, or from some of the genera between divinity and man; and hence Augustine, very consistently with his religion, ascribed them to an evil dæmon. The Platonic reader, however, will easily account for most of them more rationally, as he *scientifically* knows that divination has *deity* for its origin; and that, when the persons inspired are worthy characters, and the predictions beneficial, such inspiration cannot be the offspring of fraudulent spirits.

It is very justly indeed observed by Plutarch, in his treatise concerning the Pythian oracles, that with respect to cursory predictions, some one might foretel that a certain person should be victorious in battle, and he accordingly conquered; that such a city should be subverted, and it was accordingly destroyed; but, says he, *when not only the event is foretold, but how, and when, after what, and by whom, it shall be effected, this is no conjecture of things which may perhaps take place, but a premanifestation of things which will absolutely happen.* Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Εὐθου διελθόντος ὁ Σεραπίων, δίκαιον (εἶπεν) τὸ αξίωμα περὶ τῶν οὕτως λέγει Βοηθὸς ἀριστῶς καὶ ἀνυπόθετως λεγόμενων· εἰ νικῇ στρατηγῶν προ-
 11 ρηταί, νενικήκει· ἢ πολέως ἀναιρεῖς, ἀπολλών. Οὗπου δὲ οὐ μόνον λέγεται τὸ γνησιώμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πῶς, καὶ
 ποτε,

privately and publicly, to the Greeks; but when they have been in a prudent state, they have been the cause of very trifling benefits, or indeed of none

ΠΟΤΕ, ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΙ, ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΙΝΟΣ, ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙ ΕΙΚΑΣΜΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΤΑΧΥ ΓΕΝΗΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ, ΑΛΛΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΕΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΡΟΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ.

Should it be asked why such inspiration, if it once existed, no longer exists at present, I reply by repeating what I have said in my Notes on Pausanias (Vol. 3. p. 251), that when those circulations take place, mentioned in a note on the eighth book of the Republic, during which the parts of the earth subsist according to nature, and this is accompanied with a concurrence of proper *instruments, times, and places*, then divine illumination is abundantly and properly received. But when parts of the earth subsist contrary to nature as at present, and which has been the case ever since the oracles ceased, then as there is no longer an aptitude of *places, instruments, and times*, divine influence can no longer be received, though the illuminations of divine natures continue *immutably* the same; just, says Proclus, as if a face standing in the same position, a mirror should at one time receive a clear image of it, and at another, one obscure and debile, or indeed, no image at all. For, as the same incomparable man further observes, it is no more proper to refer the defect of divine inspiration to the Gods, than to accuse the sun as the cause of the moon being eclipsed, instead of the conical shadow of the earth into which the moon falls. The reader will find in the above-mentioned place, the theory of oracles scientifically unfolded.

¹ Hermias the philosopher, in his MS. Scholia on this dialogue, gives us the following very satisfactory information respecting the oracle in Dodona: Περὶ δὲ τοῦ Δωδωναίου μαντείου διάφορα εἰσι τὰ ἰστορούμενα· ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ παλαιότατον τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μαντείων· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὄρυς ἦν ἐκεῖ ἡ μαντεύουσα διὰ ὅτι περιστέραι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ὅτι γυναῖκες ἦσαν ἱερεῖαι αἱ μαντεύουσαι, δρῦν τὴν κεφαλὴν στεφομένηαι, αἱ τινες ἐκαλούντο πελειαῖδες, ἰσως ὅν ἀπο τοῦ οἰοματός τινες πλανήντες, ὑποπτεύουσιν εἶναι περιστέρας τὰς μαντεύουσας· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν δρῦν κατεστρέφοντο, ἰσως διὰ τοῦτο εἰρηκασίαι καὶ τὴν δρῦν μαντεύειν. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦ Διὸς τὸ μαντεῖον· τὸ δὲ ἐν Δελφοῖς, Ἀπολλωνίως· εἰκότως οὖν παρελάβον ὡς συγγενὴ τὰ μαντεῖα· καὶ γὰρ ὁ Ἀπολλων ὑπουργὸς λέγεται τῆς τοῦ Διὸς δημιουργίας, καὶ πολλαῖς, εἰ ἐδόξεν αὐτοῖς ἀσαφὲς εἶναι ὁ τοῦ Δωδωναίου χρησμός, ἀπῆλθαν εἰς τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, χρησόμενοι τι βούλεται ὁ τοῦ Διὸς χρησμός· καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἐξηγήσατο πολλαῖς ὁ Ἀπολλων. ἐνθουσιῶται μὲν οὖν καὶ μαντεύονται αἱ ἱερεῖαι, πολλὰ εὐηργετοὺν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους προλεγουσάαι τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ προδιορροῦμαι· σφρονουσί δὲ ὕμναι ἦσαν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς γυναῖξιν. i. e. "Different accounts are given of the Dodonæan oracle: for it is the most antient of the Grecian oracles. According to some an oak prophesied in Dodona; but according to others, doves. The truth however is, that priestesses whose heads were crowned with oak prophesied; and these women were called by some *peleïades*, or doves. Perhaps, therefore, certain persons being deceived by the name, suspected that doves prophesied in Dodona; and as the heads of these women were crowned with oak, perhaps from this circumstance they said that an oak prophesied. But this oracle belongs to Jupiter, and that at Delphi, to Apollo. Very properly, therefore, are these oracles considered as allied to each other. For Apollo is said to be ministrant to Jupiter in the administration of things: and often when the Dodonæan oracle appeared to be obscure, the oracle at Delphi has been consulted, in order to know the meaning of that of Jupiter. Often too, Apollo has interpreted many of the Dodonæan oracles. These priestesses, therefore, when in an enthusiastic

none at all. And if we should speak of the Sibyl¹, and others who have employed deific prophecy, rightly predicting many things to many respecting futurity, we should be too prolix, and at the same time only speak of that which is manifest to every one. This indeed is worthy of being testified, that such of the antients as gave names to things, did not consider mania as either base or disgraceful. For they did not connect the appellation of mania with that most beautiful art, by which we are enabled to judge of the future, as if it was something noxious; but they gave it a name of this kind, as something beneficial, when it subsists through a divine allotment. But men of the present day, being ignorant of what is becoming, by the insertion of the letter τ, call it *μαντική*, or the art of divining. Indeed the investigations of futurity, by prudent men, which take place through birds, and a variety of other tokens, as proceeding from the dianoëtic part through human intelligence, they denominated intellect and *intellective opinion*; which the moderns, through a reverence of the ω, denominate *augurial*, or pertaining to augury. By how much more perfect and honourable, therefore, prophecy is than augury, and the name and operation of the one than the name and operation of the other, by so much did the antients testify

enthusiastic and prophetic condition, have greatly benefited mankind by predicting and previously correcting future events; but, when in a prudent state, they were similar to other women."

² Hermeas, in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, has the following remarkable passage on the Sibyl here mentioned: Περὶ δὲ τῆς Σιβύλλης, οὗτος ἐστὶ θαυμαστάτα τα λεγόμενα, ὥστε δοῦναι μὲν οὐκ ὅλβιαι πολλὰ μαντοὶ Σιβύλλαι γεγονασί, πασαι τούτων ἐλόμεναι βίον· πασαι μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἰσως λογικῆν αἰτίαν ἐλόντο Σιβύλλαι προσαγορευέσθαι· ὥσπερ δὴ ὁ Τρισμαγίστος Ἑρμῆς λέγεται πολλακίς ἐπιδήμησας τῇ Αἰγυπτῷ, ἑαυτὸν σπαμινέσθαι, καὶ τρίτον πεκλησθαι Ἑρμῆν· καὶ τρεῖς δὲ Ὀρφεὺς παρὰ Θραξί γενέσθαι· ἡμῶς οὐ καὶ αὐταὶ κατὰ τινὰ νομῶναι, καὶ ἀναμνήσιν εἰλοντο ταύτας τὰς προσηγορίας· ἐπεὶ αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ Σιβύλλα ἡ Ερυθραία περὶ ἧς οὐ λέγει Εὐριφύλη ἐκαλεῖτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς· λέγουσι δὲ αὐτὴν εὐθύς προελθούσαν προσεπεῖν ἐξ ὀνοματός ἑκάστου, καὶ ἀμμετρα φθεγγέσθαι, καὶ εἰς βραχὺν χρόνον τέλειον εἰδὲς ἀνθρώπου λαβεῖν. i. e. "The particulars which are reported about this Sibyl, are so wonderful, that they have the appearance of fables. But, indeed, there were many Sibyls, all of whom adopted the same life, and all of them, perhaps through a certain rational cause, were called Sibyls: just as Hermes Trismegistus, who often resided in Egypt, is said to have made mention of himself, and to have called himself the third Hermes. Three Orpheuses also are said to have existed among the Thracians. Perhaps, therefore, these Sibyls chose these appellations from a certain communication and recollection; since this very Erythraean Sibyl, of whom Plato now speaks, was from the first called Erophile. But they report that she called every one by his proper name, as soon as she was born, that she likewise spoke in verse, and that in a short time she arrived at the perfection of the human species."

that

that mania proceeding from divinity is more beautiful than prudence which proceeds from men. But indeed, in the greatest diseases and labours to which certain persons are sometimes subject through the indignation of the Gods in consequence of guilt, mania when it takes place, predicting what they stand in need of, discovers a liberation from such evils, by flying to prayer and the worship of the Gods. Hence, obtaining by this means purifications and the advantages of initiation, it renders him who possesses it free from disasters, both for the present and future time, by discovering to him who is properly insane and possessed by divinity a solution of his present evils. But the third species is a possession and mania descending from the Muses, which receiving a soul tender and solitary, rouses and agitates it with Bacchic fury, according to odes and other species of poetry; in consequence of which, by adorning the infinite actions of antiquity, it becomes the means of instructing posterity. But he who approaches to the poetic gates without the mania of the Muses¹, persuading himself that he can become a poet, in a manner perfectly sufficient from art alone, will, both as to himself and his poetry, be imperfect; since the poetry which is produced by prudence vanishes before that which is the progeny of mania. So many then are the beautiful works arising from divine mania, and still more than these, which, if it was requisite, I should relate. So that we ought not to be afraid of mania; nor should any reason disturb us, which endeavours to evince that we ought to prefer a prudent friend to one who is divinely agitated: for he who asserts this, ought likewise to show, in order to gain the victory, that love was not sent from the Gods for the utility of the lover and his beloved. But, on the contrary, it must now be shown by us that a mania of this kind was sent by the Gods, for the purpose of producing the greatest felicity. The demonstration, indeed, will be to the unworthy incredible, but to the wise, an object of belief. It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, that, beholding the passions and operations of the divine and human soul, we should understand the truth concerning the nature of each. Let this then be the beginning of the demonstration:

Every soul is immortal²: for that which is perpetually moved is eternal.

But

¹ See the Note on the tenth book of the Republic, concerning the different kinds of poetry.

² The discourse of Plato here, is as it were, analytical. Thus, for instance, the end of man is

But that which moves another and is moved by another, when it has a cessation of motion, has also a cessation of life. Hence that alone which moves itself, because it does not desert itself, never ceases to be moved; but this also is the fountain and principle of motion to other things which are moved. But a principle is unbegotten: for every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated from a principle, while the principle itself is incapable of being generated. For neither could it any longer be a principle, if it was generated from an external cause. Since then it is unbegotten, it is also necessary that it should be incorruptible: for, should the principle become extinct, it could neither renew its being from another, nor generate another from itself, since it is necessary that all things should be generated from that which is the principle. And thus the beginning of motion is derived from that which moves itself: and this can neither be destroyed nor generated. For, if this were admitted, all heaven and earth falling together must stop; nor could any force be found, whence being moved, they would be again generated. Since then it appears that a self-motive nature is immortal, he who asserts that this is the very essence and definition of soul, will have no occasion to blush. For every body to which motion externally accedes, is inanimate. But that to which motion is inherent from itself, is animated; as if this was the very nature of soul. And if there is nothing else which moves itself except soul, soul is necessarily without generation, and immortal. And thus much may suffice, concerning the immortality of the soul¹.

But

is nothing else than felicity, and this is a union with the Gods; for Plato does not place felicity in externals. But the soul is conjoined with the Gods even in the present life, when, surveying the whole of sensible and celestial beauty, she acquires a reminiscence of intelligible beauty. But her reminiscence must be of that which she once beheld: for reminiscence is of things which some one has either heard of or seen. But the soul formerly beheld this beauty, when she revolved in conjunction with her proper God. She must, therefore, be immortal: for if not, she would neither have revolved nor have recovered her memory. Hence he first speaks concerning the immortality of the soul, her idea, and what follows; and afterwards he discourses concerning that to which Love conducs us, viz. an intelligible essence, and divine beauty, simple, and unmoved.

¹ This part contains one of the strongest demonstrations possible of the immortality of the soul, as will be evident to every one whose intellectual eye is not blinded by modern pursuits. But when Plato says every soul, the reader must not suppose that the souls of brutes are meant to be included,

But respecting its idea ¹ we must speak after the following manner: To give a perfect description of its nature, would indeed be the employment of

included, for these, as is evident from the *Timæus*, are mortal; but every rational soul, as well human as divine. But this reasoning consists of two syllogisms, the parts of which Socrates, as being agitated with divine fury, does not altogether dispose into order; and these are as follows: Soul is self-motive. That which is self-motive is always moved, because it never forsakes itself, nor is ever deserted by motive power. But if it is always moved with an inward motion, it always lives. Soul, therefore, is immortal. This is the first syllogism. But the second: soul is self-motive, and is therefore the principle of motion. But the principle of motion is unbegotten. That which is unbegotten is immortal. Soul therefore is immortal.

¹ By the idea of the soul we are not to understand its supernal exemplar, but its intimate form, and the disposition, and as it were figure of its power. But by the chariots of the Gods, that is, of the mundane Gods and beneficent *dæmons*, are to be understood all the inward discursive powers of their souls, which pursue the intelligence of all things, and which can at the same time equally contemplate and provide for inferior concerns. And the horses signify the efficacy and motive vigour of these powers. But the horses and chariots of partial soul, such as ours when separated from the body, are mixed from good and evil. Our *principal part* is intellect. The better horse is anger, and the worse desire. The wings are anagogic or reduciory powers, and particularly belong to the charioteer or intellect. An immortal animal is composed from soul and a celestial body; but a mortal animal from soul and an elementary body. For partial souls, such as ours, have three vehicles; one ethereal, derived from the heavens; the second ærial; and the third this gross terrestrial body. Jupiter here signifies the head of that order of Gods which subsists immediately above the mundane Gods, and is called *ἀπολυτός*, liberated: for the term *mighty*, as is well observed by Proclus, is a symbol of exempt supremacy. The twelve Gods, therefore, which are divided into four triads, are Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The first triad of these is *fabricative*; the second *defensive*; the third *vivific*; and the fourth *reduciory*. And the chariots of these Gods are supermundane souls, in which they are proximately carried. By *the heavens*, to the contemplation of which the *liberated* and *mundane* Gods proceed, cannot be meant the sensible heavens: for what blessed spectacles do these contain, or how can Gods be converted to things posterior to themselves? It is evidently, therefore, the *heaven* which Plato in the *Cratylus* defines to be *ὁπῆς ἐς τὸ ἀνω*, or *sight directed to that which is above*; and forms that order of Gods which is called by the Chaldean oracles *νοῦτος καὶ νοερός*, *intelligible and intellectual*. There is a remarkable error here in the Greek text, for instead of *οὐρανια ἀψίδα*, *celestial arch*, it should be read *ὑπουρανια ἀψίδα*, *subcelestial arch*, as is evident from Proclus in *Plat. Theol.* p. 217, who lays a particular stress upon the word *ὑπουρανια*, as a reading universally acknowledged. Our course is said to be difficult and hard, because the motion of the better horse verges to intelligibles, but of the worse to sensibles and generation; and because our soul is unable in the present life equally to contemplate, and providentially energize. By ambrosia is signified that power which renders the Gods separate from generation; but by nectar the immutable nature of their providential energies, which extend even to the last of things.

a narration every way prolix and divine ; but to describe a certain similitude of this idea is the business of a human and shorter discourse. Let it then be similar to the kindred power of a winged chariot and charioteer. All the horses and chariots of the Gods are indeed good, and composed from things good ; but those of other natures are mixed. And, in the first place, our principal part governs the reins of its two-yoked car. In the next place, one of the horses is good and beautiful, and is composed from things of this kind ; but the other is of a contrary nature, and is composed of contrary qualities : and on this account our course is necessarily difficult and hard. But we must endeavour to explain why it is called in a certain respect a mortal and immortal animal. Every soul takes care of every thing which is inanimate, and revolves about the whole of heaven, becoming situated at different times in different forms. While it is perfect, indeed, and winged, its course is sublime, and it governs the universe. But the soul whose wings suffer a defluxion verges downward, till something solid terminates its descent ; whence it receives a terrene body, as its destined receptacle, which appears to move itself through the power of the soul : and the whole is called an animal composed from soul and body, and is surname'd a mortal animal. But that which is immortal is perceived by no rational deduction, except that which is hypothetical and feigned : since we neither see, nor sufficiently understand, that a God is a certain immortal animal endued with a soul, and possessing a body naturally conjoined with soul, through the whole of time. These things however are asserted, and may exist, as it pleases divinity. But let us now declare the cause through which the wings were cast aside, and fell from the soul. And this is of the following kind : There is a natural power in the wings of the soul, to raise that which is weighty on high, where the genus of the Gods resides. But of every thing subsisting about body, the soul most participates of that which is divine. But that which is divine is beautiful, wise, and good, and whatever can be asserted of a similar kind. And with these indeed the *winged nature* of the soul is especially nourished and increased : but it departs from its integrity, and perishes, through that which is evil and base, and from contraries of a similar kind. Likewise Jupiter, the mighty leader in the heavens, driving his winged chariot, begins the divine procession, adorning and disposing all things with providential care. The army of Gods and demons, distributed into eleven parts, follows
his

his course: but Vesta alone remains in the habitation of the Gods. But each of the other Gods belonging to the twelve, presides over the office committed to his charge. There are many, therefore, and blessed spectacles and processions within the heavens, to which the genus of the blessed Gods is converted as each accomplishes the proper employment of his nature. But *will* and *power* are the perpetual attendants of their processions: for envy is far distant from the divine choir of Gods. But when they proceed to the banquet, and the enjoyment of delicious food, they sublimely ascend in their progression to the sub-celestial arch. And, indeed, the vehicles of the Gods being properly adapted to the guiding reins, and equally balanced, proceed with an easy motion: but the vehicles of other natures are attended in their progressions with difficulty and labour. For the horse, participating of depravity, becomes heavy; and when he has not been properly disciplined by the charioteers, verges and gravitates to the earth. And in this case labour, and an extreme contest, are proposed to the soul. But those who are denominated immortals, when they arrive at the summit, proceeding beyond the extremity of heaven, stand on its back: and while they are established in this eminence, the circumference carries them round, and they behold what the region beyond the heavens contains. But the supercelestial place has not yet been celebrated by any of our poets, nor will it ever be praised according to its dignity and worth. It subsists, however, in the following manner; for we should dare to affirm the truth, especially when speaking concerning the truth: without colour, without figure, and without contact, subsisting as true essence, it alone uses contemplative¹ intellect, the governor of the soul; about which essence, the genus of true science, resides. As the dianoëtic power, therefore, of divinity revolves with intellect and immaculate science, so likewise the dianoëtic power of every soul, when it receives a condition accommodated to its nature, perceiving being through time, it becomes enamoured with it, and contemplating truth, is nourished and filled with joy, till the circumference by a circular revolution brings it back again to its pristine situation. But in this circuit it beholds justice herself, it beholds temperance, and science herself: not that with which generation is present, nor in which one thing has a particular local residence in another, and to which we give the appellation of beings; but

¹ See the Additional Notes to the *Timæus*.

that which is science in *true being*. And, besides this, contemplating and banqueting on other true beings in the same manner, again entering within the heavens, it returns to its proper home. But, when it returns, the charioteer, stopping his horses at the manger, presents them with ambrosia, and together with it, nectar for drink. And this is the life of the Gods.

But, with respect to other souls, such as follow divinity in the best manner, and become similar to its nature, raise the head of the charioteer ¹ into the supercelestial place; where he is borne along with the circumference; but is disturbed by the course of the horses, and scarcely obtains the vision of perfect realities. But other souls at one time raise, and at another time depress, the head of the charioteer: and, through the violence of the horses, they partly see indeed, and are partly destitute of vision. And again, other souls follow, all of them affecting the vision of this superior place: but from being unable to accomplish this design, they are carried round in a merged condition, spurning against and rushing on each other, through a contention of precedency in their course. Hence the tumult, contest, and perspiration, are extreme. And here, indeed, many become lame through the fault of the charioteers, many break many of their wings, and all of them, involved in mighty labour, depart destitute of the perception of reality; but after their departure they use an aliment composed from *opinion*; through which there is a great endeavour to behold where the *plain of truth* is situated. For, from a *meadow* of this kind, that which is best in the soul receives convenient nutriment; and from this the nature of the wing is nourished, by which the soul is enabled to ascend. And this is the law of Adraftia, that whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality shall be free from damage, till another period takes place: and that if she is always able to accomplish this, she shall be perpetually free from the incursions of evil. But if, through an impotency of accomplishing this end, she has not perceived reality, and from some misfortune, and being filled with oblivion and depravity, she becomes heavy and drowsy, breaks her wings, and falls again on the earth ², then this law prevents her in her first generation from

¹ The head of the charioteer is that unity of the soul, which she participates from a divine unity, and which is, as it were, the very summit and flower of her essence.

² The general cause of the soul's descent, is her neglecting, as it were, the universal form of the world, diligently contemplating a certain portion of it only, and ardently desiring a partial mode of subsistence; imagination and her vegetable power strongly alluring her to such a condition of being.

being implanted in some brutal nature, but commands the soul which has seen the most, to inform the body of a philosopher, or of one desirous of beauty; of a musician, or of one devoted to love¹. But it orders the soul, whose perceptions rank in the second class, to descend into a legitimate king, or a man studious of empire and war. But it distributes a soul of the third order into the governor of a republic, or the ruler of a family, or the master of a trade. And again, it distributes a soul of the fourth rank into one engaged in gymnastic exercise, or in procuring remedies, and taking care of the body: but souls of the fifth order it distributes into prophets and mystics. In the sixth, it makes a distribution into a poetic life. In the seventh, into a geometrician or artificer. In the eighth, into a sophist or popular character. And in the ninth, into a tyrant. But in all these, he who passes his life justly will afterwards obtain a better condition of being: but he who acts unjustly will pass into a worse state of existence. For no soul will return to its pristine condition till the expiration of ten thousand years²: since it will not recover the use of its wings before this period; except it is the soul of one who has philosophized sincerely, or together with philosophy has

¹ As there are principally nine celestial souls, viz. the soul of the world, and the souls of the eight celestial spheres, to which our souls are at different times accommodated; hence, souls in their descent receive nine differences of character. But the philosophic genius has the first rank, because it is naturally adapted to the investigation of every thing human and divine. And as such a genius is studious of wisdom and truth, and the first beauty subsists in these; hence, with great propriety, it brings with it the pursuit of beauty. But we receive the image of beauty through the sight and hearing; and hence Plato connects with this character a musician and a lover: the former on account of audible, and the latter of visible beauty. But the next character is that of a king, who indeed extends a universal providence towards mankind, but whose contemplations are not so ample as those of the philosopher. The providential energies of those which follow, are still more contracted. But when he distributes prophets and mystics into the fifth order, we must not suppose that he means such as are divine, but mercenary and vulgar prophets, who do not operate from science and art, but from custom and chance.

² The numbers three and ten are called perfect; because the former is the first complete number, and the latter in a certain respect the whole of number; the consequent series of numbers being only a repetition of the numbers which this contains. Hence, as 10 multiplied into itself produces 100, a plain number, and this again multiplied by 10 produces 1000, a solid number; and as 1000 multiplied by 3 forms 3000, and 1000 by 10, 10,000; on this account Plato employs these numbers as symbols of the purgation of the soul, and her restitution to her proper perfection and felicity. I say, as symbols; for we must not suppose that this is accomplished in just so many years, but that the soul's restitution takes place in a perfect manner.

loved beautiful forms. These, indeed, in the third period of a thousand years, if they have thrice chosen this mode of life in succession, and have thus restored their wings to their natural vigour, shall in the three thousandth year, fly away to their pristine abode. But other souls, having arrived at the end of their first life, shall be judged. And of those who are judged, some proceeding to a subterranean place of judgment, shall there sustain the punishments they have deserved. But others, in consequence of a favourable judgment, being elevated into a certain celestial place, shall pass their time in a manner becoming the life they have lived in a human shape. And in the thousandth year, both the kinds of those who have been judged, returning to the lot and election of a second life, shall each of them receive a life agreeable to his desire. Here also the human soul shall pass into the life of a beast ¹, and from that of a beast again into a man, if it has first been the soul of a man. For the soul which has never perceived the truth, cannot pass into the human form. Indeed it is necessary to understand man, denominated according to species, as a being proceeding from the information of many senses to a perception contracted into one by the reasoning power. But this is a recollection of what our soul formerly saw with divinity, when in a perfect condition of being; and when she despised what we now consider as realities, and was supernally elevated to the contemplation of that which is true. On this account, the dianoëtic power alone of the philosopher is justly winged. For the philosophic memory perpetually adheres as much as possible to those concerns, by an application to which even a God becomes divine. But he who properly uses meditations of this kind, being always initiated in perfect mysteries, alone acquires true perfection. And such a one being separated from human studies and pursuits, and adhering to that which is divine, is accused by the multitude as insane, while in the mean time, from being filled with divine enthusiasm, he is concealed from the multitude. This whole discourse, therefore, which respects the fourth kind of fury ², tends to the means by which any one, on perceiving a portion

¹ We not must understand by this, that the soul of a man becomes the soul of a brute; but that by way of punishment it is bound to the soul of a brute, or carried in it, just as daemons reside in our souls. Hence all the energies of the rational soul are perfectly impeded, and its intellectual eye beholds nothing but the dark and tumultuous phantasms of a brutal life.

² The four kinds of fury are the prophetic, mystic, poetic, and amatory.

of terrene beauty, from a reminiscence of that which is true, may recover his wings, and, when he has recovered them, may struggle to fly away. But since he cannot accomplish this according to his wish, like a bird looking on high and despising inferior concerns, he is accused as one insanely affected. This enthusiasm¹, therefore, is of all enthusiasms the best, and is composed from the best, both to the possessor and the participant: and he who is under the influence of this mania when he loves beautiful objects, is denominated a *lover*. For, as we have before observed, the soul of every man has from its nature perceived realities, or it could not have entered into the human form. But to recollect superior natures from objects of sense, is not easy to all men; neither to those who then were engaged but a short time in the contemplation of those divine objects; nor to those who descending hither have been unfortunate; nor to such as, turning to injustice from certain associations, have become oblivious of the sacred mysteries which they once beheld. And hence but a few remain whose memory is sufficient for this exalted purpose. But these, when they behold any similitude of supernal forms, they are astonished, and as it were rapt above themselves: and at the same time they are ignorant what this passion may be, because they are not endued with a sufficient perception. Indeed, we behold no splendour in similitudes which are here, of justice, temperance, and whatever else is precious in the soul; but very few are able, and even to these it is difficult, through certain dark instruments, to perceive from these images the genus of that which is represented. But we then saw splendid² beauty, when we obtained together with that happy choir, this blessed vision and contemplation. And we indeed beheld it together with Jupiter³, but others in conjunction

¹ He who is agitated with this enthusiasm possesses that purification which is called by the Platonic philosophers *telestic*, because it is obtained by the exercise of mystic rites, and gives perfection to the soul.

² Plato every where speaks of the sun as analogous to the highest God. For as here the sun is the lord of the whole sensible world, so the first cause of the intelligible world. And as light is deduced from the lord the sun, which conjoins, connects, and unites that which is visible with that which is visible, after the same manner the light proceeding from the highest God, which light is truth, conjoins intellect with the intelligible. We may see, therefore, that beauty imitates this light: for it is as it were a light emitted from the fountain of intelligibles, to this world, which it calls upwards to itself, and becomes the source of union to lovers and the beloved.

³ Plato, in the *Timæus*, says that the demiurgus, when he made the world, disseminated souls

conjunction with some other God; at the same time being initiated ¹ in those mysteries which it is lawful to call the most blessed of all mysteries ².

And

equal in number to the stars, viz. as we have observed in the Introduction to that dialogue, equal according to analogy, and not as monadically considered. Now, therefore, in conformity to what is there asserted, he says, "we together with Jupiter," as knowing his proper God. For this is the felicity of the human soul, to revolve in conjunction with its proper deities; since it is not possible to pass beyond the Gods.

¹ The word τελετη or initiation, says Hermias, was so denominated from rendering the soul perfect, παρα το τελειαν ψυχην αποτελειν. The soul, therefore, was once perfect. But here it is divided, and is not able to energize wholly by itself. But it is necessary to know, says Hermias, that telete, mystis, and epopteia, τελετη, μυστις and εποπτεια differ from each other. Telete, therefore, is analogous to that which is preparatory to purifications. But mystis, which is so called from closing the eyes, is more divine. For to close the eyes in initiation is no longer to receive by sense those divine mysteries, but with the pure soul itself. And epopteia is to be established in, and become a spectator of the mysteries. See more on this interesting subject in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.

² There is nothing belonging to antiquity more celebrated than the mysteries, and especially the Eleusinian, though the leading particulars of this august institution are perfectly unknown to the moderns, as I have shown in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries. One circumstance in particular of the last importance, has been grossly misrepresented by that most consummate sophist Dr. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of Moses. The circumstance I allude to belongs to that part of the mysteries which is called εποπτεια, or inspection. For here the Gods themselves became actually apparent in splendid images to the eyes of the epoptæ, or initiated inspectors. And this, in the first place, is evident from the following passage of Proclus, in MS. Comment. on the first Alcibiades: Εν ταις ἁγιωτάταις των τελετων, προ της θεου παρουσιας δαιμονων χθονιων τινων εκβολαι προφαινονται, και απο των αχραντων αγαθων εις την υλην προκαλυμμεναι. i. e. "In the most holy of the mysteries, before the God appears, the impulsions of certain terrestrial dæmons become visible, alluring (the initiated) from undefiled goods to matter." And that by the most holy of mysteries he means the Eleusinian, is evident from his sixth book de Plat. Theol. p. 371. where he expressly calls them by this name. And still more expressly in his Commentary on Plato's Republic, p. 3^o. Εν απασι ταις τελεταις και τοις μυστηριοις, οι θεοι πολλας μεν ταυτων προτεινουσι μορφας πολλα δε σχηματα εξαλλαττοντες φαινονται και τοτε μεν ατυπωτων αυτων προβεβληται φως, τοτε δε εις ανθρωπειον μορφην εσχηματισμενον, τοτε δε εις αλλοιον τυπον προεληλυθως. i. e. "In all initiations and mysteries, the Gods exhibit many forms of themselves, and appear in a variety of shapes. And sometimes indeed an unfigured light of themselves is held forth to the view; sometimes this light is figured according to a human form, and sometimes it proceeds into a different shape." And we are informed by Pselius in a MS. on Dæmons that this evocation of divine natures formed one part of the sacerdotal office; though, says he, those who now preside over the mysteries, are ignorant of the incantation necessary to evocation. Αλλ' οι γε νυν της τελετης πρεσβαρχον, την μεν της κλησεως ουκ ισασιν επωδην. This doctrine, too, of divine appearances in the mysteries is clearly confirmed by Plotinus, ennead. i. lib. 6. p. 55. and ennead.

And these divine orgies were celebrated by us while we were perfect, and free from those evils which awaited us in a succeeding period of time. We likewise were initiated in, and became spectators of, entire ¹, simple, quietly stable ², and blessed visions, resident in a pure ³ light; being ourselves pure, and liberated from this surrounding vestment, which we denominate body, and to which we are now bound, like an oyster to its shell.

With these speculations, therefore, we should gratify our memory; for the sake of which, and through a desire of those realities which we once beheld, I have given such an extent to my discourse. But beauty, as we have said, shone upon us during our progressions with the Gods; but on our arrival hither we possessed the power of perceiving it, shining most conspicuously, through the clearest of our senses. For sight ⁴ is the most acute of all our corporeal senses; though even through this wisdom cannot be perceived. If indeed it could, what vehement love would it excite, by presenting to the eye some conspicuous image of itself! And the same may be

lib. 9. p. 770. From all this we may collect how egregiously Dr. Warburton was mistaken when, in page 231 of his *Divine Legation*, he asserts that the light beheld in the mysteries was nothing more than an illuminated image which the priest had purified. "This," says he, "which was all over illuminated, and which the priest had thoroughly purified, was *αγαλμα*, an image." But, indeed, his whole account of this divine institution is absurd, false, and ridiculous in the extreme. I only add, that the preceding observations plainly show to what Plato alludes in this part of the dialogue, by his *simple and blessed visions resident in a pure light*, and that we can no longer wonder why the initiated are reported to have been called *happy*.

¹ Viz. perfect.

² By this Plato indicates the firm and permanent nature of intelligibles.

³ He says this because the light here is not pure, being mingled with the air.

⁴ Plato now wishes to speak concerning the amatory character, and to show how it is led back from sensible to intelligible beauty. What he says, therefore, is this,—that intelligible beauty shines forth in an intelligible essence, together with the spectacles which are there, and that from this beauty, sensible beauty is unfolded into light. For, as the light proceeding from the sun illuminates the whole sensible world, so beauty, originating from intelligibles, pervades through the regions of sense. But he calls the sight the clearest of all the senses, because it is more acute than the rest. Hence, it is considered as analogous to fire by those who compare the senses to the elements. But its superior acuteness is evident from this, that when sound, and that which is visible, are produced together, as in the instance of thunder and lightning, we first see the lightning, and some time after the sound reaches our hearing. The reason of this is evident: for sight sees without time, or in an instant; but the other senses require time. Sight also is analogous to intellect: for as intellect sees all things indivisibly, so likewise sight. For it directly sees the interval which reaches from hence as far as to the heavens.

said of every thing else which is the object of love. But now beauty alone is allotted the privilege of being the most apparent and lovely of all things. He, therefore, who has not recently descended hither, or whose manners are depraved, will not very swiftly be excited from hence thither to a survey of the beautiful itself, by beholding that among sensible objects which receives the same appellation. Hence, he will not reverence it while he beholds it; but, giving himself up to pleasure, he will endeavour to walk about and generate after the manner of a quadruped: and, injuriously conversing with others, he will neither be afraid nor ashamed of pursuing pleasure contrary to nature. But he who has been recently initiated, and who formerly was a spectator of many blessed visions, when he beholds some deiform countenance, elegantly imitative of beauty, or some incorporeal idea, at first indeed he is struck with horror ¹, and feels something of that terror which formerly invaded him; but, from an after survey, he venerates it as a God: and if it was not for the dread of being thought vehemently insane, he would sacrifice to his beloved ², as to a statue and a God. But, in consequence of surveying this beautiful object, he experiences a mutation in his feelings, a perspiration and unaccustomed heat ³, such as horror produces. For, receiving the influx of beauty through his eyes, he becomes hot, and this irrigates the nature of his wings; but when heated, whatever belongs to the germinating of his pinions liquefies, and which formerly being compressed through hardness restrained the vigour of their shoots. But an influx of nutriment

¹ It is well observed by Hermeas, that it is necessary to consider what is here said vitally and intellectually. For, as we are seized with astonishment on beholding certain sensible particulars, so likewise in the vision of the Gods; not that it is such a terror as that which arises from the view of enemies approaching, but a terror better than a fear of this kind, through the transcendent fullness of the Gods. It is necessary, therefore, that the human soul should submit itself to the Gods, and to incorporeal forms which surpass our power, and should be seized with a terror better than human fear at the view of them, not as if they were dire, and dreadful, and resisting; for these are the indications of matter and earth-born natures. Plato, therefore, signifies by *horror*, an excitation from sensibles to intelligibles.

² That is, he would sacrifice to intelligible beauty, of which sensible beauty is the representation, similitude and image. For here, says Hermeas, those who sacrifice to statues do not sacrifice to the matter itself, and the images, but to the Gods. *Και γὰρ ἐνταῦθα οἱ τοῖς ἀγαλμασιν θύοντες οὐκ αὐτὴν ἰδὲ θύουσι καὶ ταῖς εἰκόσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς θεοῖς.*

³ Heat here signifies the anagogic power of the soul, or that power which elevates her to intelligibles.

taking place, the quill of the wing swells, and endeavours to burst forth, through the whole form of the soul: for the whole was formerly winged. The whole, therefore, in this case, becomes fervid, and leaps upward. And as infants, during the growth of their teeth, are tormented with the friction and pain of their gums, in the same manner is the soul affected with respect to the shooting forth of its wings: for it becomes subject to an immoderate heat, titillation, and torment. When, therefore, it beholds the beauty of some human form, then imbibing the parts which flow from thence, and which is on this account called desire, it becomes irrigated and heated, ceases to be in pain, and rejoices. But when it is separated from this vision of beauty, and becomes dry through heat, then the orifices of the passages through which the feathers endeavoured to shoot forth, being closed, impede the offspring of the wing. But these being shut in together with desire, and leaping about like things subject to palpitation, strike against the avenues of their progression. Hence, the whole soul, becoming pierced on all sides in a circle, is agitated with fury, and tormented; but, through the memory of the beautiful, again exults with delight. But, from the mixture of both these, it is grievously tormented, through the novelty of the passion, and becomes dubious and raging; and, while it is thus furious, can neither sleep by night, nor abide any where by day; but runs about agitated by desire, wherever there is any probability of obtaining the vision of beauty. But beholding the beloved beautiful object, and deducing desire, as through a channel, it now frees from confinement what was before inclosed; and, by this means enjoying the benefit of respiration, is liberated from its incitements and parturitions. For the present, therefore, it reaps the advantage of this most delicious pleasure; by which it is so charmed, that it would never voluntarily depart from its allurements, nor does it esteem any thing so much as this beloved beauty, but delivers over to oblivion its parents, brethren, and friends; and, besides this, considers the dissipation of its possessions through negligence as a thing of no consequence, and perfectly despises those legal institutions and decencies in which it formerly gloried; and is always prepared for every kind of servitude and subjection, so that it may be near to the object of its desire. For, besides reverencing that which possesses beauty, it finds that this alone is the physician of its greatest diseases.

This passion therefore, O beautiful youth, which is the subject of my
 2 U 2 present

present discourse, is called by men Love ¹ : but if you should hear how it is denominated by the Gods, you would probably laugh, on account of your youth. But I think that certain Homeric assert, from some recondite verses, that there are two poems upon Love, one of which calls him perfectly injurious, and not very elegant ; but they celebrate him as follows :

By men Love's *flying* called ; but, forced to fly,
He's named *the winged*, by the powers on high.

In these it is partly lawful to believe, and partly not. This however is the cause, and the passion of lovers. When any one, therefore, of the attendants upon Jupiter ² is taken captive, such a one is able to bear with greater firmness the burthen of this winged God : but such as are subservient to Mars ³, and revolve in conjunction with that deity, when they are ensnared by love, and think that they are in any respect treated unjustly by their beloved, they are easily incited to slaughter, and are ready to destroy both themselves and the objects of their regard. And thus every one honours the God, round whom he harmoniously revolves, and imitates his life as much

¹ Plato, says Hermeas, wishes to etymologize the name of Love, viz. the passion which is ingenerated in us from the beautiful. This passion is called by men *Love*, from *flowing inward*, but by the Gods winged, from its giving wings to the soul. But Plato, says Hermeas, calls Homeric those that sing the verses of Homer. He also denominates the above verses *recondite*, wishing to indicate the concealed, divine, and arcane nature of the assertion.

² For all the gifts of Jupiter, says Hermeas, are firm, stable, and always subsist after the same manner.

³ For Mars is the source of division and motion. But it is necessary to know this universally, says Hermeas, that whatever is imparted by any divinity is received according to the peculiar aptitude of the recipient. Thus, for instance, says he, Venus bestows friendship and union ; but since the illumination imparted by the Goddess is mingled with matter, the recipient often perverts her gift, and friendship becomes adultery, from being viciously received. For things are imparted in one way by the Gods, and are received in another by their participants. Thus also, when different substances become the recipients of the solar heat, one of these is liquefied as wax, and another is hardened as clay : for each receives what is given according to its proper essence, though the solar light has a uniform subsistence.

Hermeas adds, it may also be said, speaking more theoretically, that the *slaughter* which is here ascribed to Mars, signifies a divulsion from matter, through rapidly turning from it, and no longer energizing physically, but intellectually. For slaughter, when applied to the Gods, may be said to be an apostacy from secondary natures, just as slaughter here signifies a privation of the present life.

as possible, and as long as he remains free from corruption : and after this manner he lives here his first generation, and associates with, and conducts himself towards, his beloved and others. Every one, therefore, chooses the love of beauty after his own fashion, and, as if he considered it with respect to himself a God, he fabricates and adorns it like a statue, and as that which is the object of his adoration and sacrifice. Such, therefore, as are the followers of Jupiter seek after a soul belonging to this God for the object of their affection. Hence, they consider whether he is naturally philosophic, and adapted to command ; and when they find their beloved with such dispositions, they endeavour by all possible means to render him completely such. If, therefore, they have not already endeavoured to obtain what they desire, then, through the incitements of love, they anxiously strive for its possession ; learning by what means it may be acquired ; and investigating by themselves how to discover the nature of their proper deity, they at length find it, through being compelled to look with vehemence towards their presiding God. But when they become connected with him through memory, and are agitated by a divine influence, they receive from him manners and pursuits, as far it is possible for man to participate of divinity. And as they consider the object of their love as the cause of all this, their love becomes still more vehement. If, too, they draw their afflatus from Jupiter, then, like the female priestesses of Bacchus, they pour their enthusiasm into the soul of their beloved, and by this means become as much as possible most similar to their ruling God. But such as follow Juno¹ seek after a royal soul ; which when they have discovered, they act in every respect towards it in a manner similar to the attendant on Jupiter. But the followers of Apollo, and of each of the other Gods, imitating their several deities, seek after a beloved object who is naturally affected like themselves. This when they have obtained, both by imitation, persuasion, and elegant manners, they endeavour by all means to lead their beloved to the pursuits and idea of their peculiar God ; not, indeed, by employing envy and illiberal malevolence towards the objects of their affection, but by endeavouring to conduct them to a perfect similitude to the God whom they particularly adore.

¹ Of the two divinities, Juno and Apollo, that are here mentioned, says Hermeas, the former converts all things through empire, and the latter leads all things to symphony and union.

The willing desire, therefore, and end of true lovers, if they obtain the object of their pursuit, is such as I have described: and thus they become illustrious and blessed, through the fury of love towards the beloved, when the beloved object is once obtained.

But every one who is allured is captivated in the following manner. In the beginning of this fable ¹, we assigned a triple division to every soul; and we established two certain species as belonging to the form of the horses, and considered the charioteer as the third species. Let this division, therefore, remain the same for us at present. But one of the horses, we said, was good, and the other not. But we have not yet declared what the virtue is of the good horse, or the vice of the bad one; it is therefore proper that we should now declare it. The good horse ², therefore, subsists in a more beautiful

¹ Socrates having spoken concerning that love which subsists according to rectitude, and also concerning that which subsists according to a deviation from rectitude, and having, therefore, discussed the extremes, he now wishes to speak about the media, viz. temperate and intemperate love. As, therefore, he speaks of the soul considered as associating with the body, he very properly gives to it other horses: for, in proportion as the soul descends into generation, and approaches to these tempestuous realms, she receives a greater number of vestments. Hence, he discourses concerning other horses, viz. such as possess a habitude to this body, and participate of its vital passions. For the soul while she lives in the intelligible world has other horses, which are characterized by *sameness* and *difference*. This indeed is evident, for antient theology gives horses even to the Gods themselves. Now, therefore, he considers other horses, viz. anger and desire, and calls his discourse concerning them a *fable*, which he did not before, when speaking of the horses of divine natures, and of the human soul herself when liberated from this terrene body. The reason of this, as Hermæas beautifully observes, is, because the soul is in this body as in a *scēim*. For the whole apparent body with which we are surrounded, and all the visible order of things, is similar to a *fable*. Very properly, therefore, does Socrates, wishing to speak concerning the habitude, proximity, or alliance of the soul to this body, call his discourse a fable. But he did not call what he said prior to this a fable, because the soul while living on high with the Gods had other horses. He also here calls the rational soul *ἡννοχικὸς*, of the nature of a charioteer, and not *ἡννοχός*, a charioteer, as in what he said prior to this; signifying that the rational soul in the present body only imitates a charioteer. In speaking of the horses, too, he uses the word *ἵππων μορφῶν*, or *having the form of horses*, and not *ἵπποι*, *horses*, as before. For the energies of the soul in conjunction with body are not such as when she is united with intelligibles.

² The divine Plato, says Hermæas, distributes the parts of the soul into different parts of the body. Hence, considering intellect and the reasoning power as analogous to the ruler of a city, he establishes them in the brain: for the brain is spherical, and man is a microcosm. He makes the brain, therefore, analogous to the heavens. In the next place, since *anger* is naturally more noble

beautiful condition, is erect, well-articulated, has its neck lofty, its nose somewhat aquiline, its colour white, and its eyes black. It is likewise a lover of honour¹, together with temperance and modesty; is the companion of true opinion, is not whipped, and is only to be governed by exhortation and reason. But the bad one is crooked², various, rash in its motions, stiff and

noble than *desire*, and is analogous to those in a city that fight for its defence, and repress whatever is disorderly and tumultuous in it, and whom he calls *auxiliaries*; since anger also reproves and opposes desire,—hence he fixes it in the heart, that it may be in the vestibules of reason, being only separated from the brain by that interval the neck. But the desiderative part, as being irrational and similar to the *mercenary* tribe and the multitude in a city, he places in the liver, as an ass at a manger. Anger, therefore, is more noble than desire, as being nearer to reason; and hence it has a better station, for it is arranged in a better region. He says, therefore, in the first place concerning anger, that it is more beautiful, and is impressed with forms, at one time from the body, and at another from the manners and the soul. He calls it *straight*, because it receives the measures of reason; *well-articulated*, i. e. of a distinct, and not of a mixed nature; and having its *neck lofty*, i. e. always extending itself, and despising things of a worse condition. He also says that it has an *aquiline nose*, indicating by this its royal nature: for the hooked or aquiline, says Hermias, is always given by Plato to that which is royal and noble; and the aquiline is of a more elegant form than the flat nose. He adds, that it is *white* to the view; indicating that it is most splendid and shining with beauty; also, that its *eyes are black*, viz. investigating things profound, and wishing to survey unapparent and intelligible natures: for he calls the unapparent black.

¹ Plato having related the prerogatives which the better of the two horses possesses from the body, now enumerates those which it possesses from the soul. Honour, then, is the greatest of goods, as he says in the *Laws*; but nothing evil is honourable. On which account also we honour Divinity. The good horse, therefore, is a lover of honour; that is, it aspires after form and the good. But it also loves honour in conjunction with temperance, i. e. it possesses these prerogatives of the soul, performs things pertaining to itself, and is not willing to be filled with the contrary. It is likewise only to be governed by reason and exhortation, as being near to reason, and directing by its measures all the measures of its own life.

² Plato here speaks concerning the worse of the two horses, and imitates its mingled nature. For he no longer speaks first concerning the prerogatives of the body, and afterwards concerning those of the soul, but he confuses the order. In opposition, therefore, to what he had asserted of the more noble horse, he says of this, that it is *crooked*, as being characteristic of desire; for desire is similar to a wild beast: *various*, for this epithet also is accommodated to desire, which is multiform, and the friend of multitude; and *rash in its motions*, as being hurried along by casual impulse. He also adds, that it is *stiff*; indicating by this its *resisting* nature: that it is *short-necked*, as being abject, living according to desire, and not aspiring after honour: *flat-nosed*, as being vile, grovelling, and not royal: *of a black colour*, as being dark, and not clear and shining like the other: *having its eyes gray*, as being only superficially splendid, and possessing intellects only

and short-necked, flat-nosed, of a black colour, having its eyes gray, and being full of blood; is the companion of injury and arrogance, has its ears hairy and deaf, and is scarcely obedient to the whip and the spur. When, therefore, the charioteer beholds the amatory eye inflaming all the soul, through sensible perception, and filling it with the incentives of titillation and desire, then, as always, the horse which is obedient to the charioteer, violently checking its motions, through shame restrains itself from leaping on the beloved object. But the other cannot be held back, either by the spur or whip of the charioteer; but hurries along violently, leaping and exulting, and, fully employing the charioteer and its associate, compels both of them to rush along with it to venereal delight. Both these, however, resist its violence from the beginning, and indignantly endure to be thus compelled to such dire and lawless conduct. But at length, when there is no end of the malady, in consequence of being borne along by compulsion, they now give way, consent to do what they are ordered, and deliver themselves up to the survey of the splendid aspect of the beloved. But the charioteer, from a vision of this kind, recovers the memory of the nature of beauty, and again perceives it firmly established, together with temperance, in a pure and holy¹ seat. In consequence, however, of such a perception he is terrified, and through reverence falls supine, and at the same time is compelled to draw back the reins with such vehemence, that both the horses fall upon their hips; the one indeed willingly, through his not making any resistance; but the other with arrogant opposition, through his extreme unwillingness to comply. But when they have departed to a greater distance in their course, the one, through shame and astonishment, moistens all the soul with sweat; but the other, being liberated from the pain which he had suffered through the bridle and the fall, is scarcely able to breathe, and, full of anger, reviles the charioteer and his partner in the course, as deserting order and

only as far as to the phantasy: *being full of blood*, i. e. being most allied to generation: *the companion of injury and arrogance*, as possessing properties directly contrary to the other horse; for that was the associate of temperance and modesty: *has its ears hairy and deaf*, as being unobedient, and often hearing a thing without attending to it: and, lastly, *is scarcely obedient to the whip and the spur*, as not capable of being benefited by exhortation.

¹ i. e. In the intelligible; for such is the intelligible region, since the beauties which are here are not *genuinely* beautiful.

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the compact through effeminacy and fear; and again compelling them to proceed, though perfectly unwilling, he scarcely complies with them, requesting some delay. But when the appointed time for which the delay was granted arrives, and which they feign themselves to have forgotten, then the vicious horse, violently urging, neighing, and hurrying them away, compels them to address the beloved again in the same language as before. When, therefore, they approach near, then bending and extending his tail, and champing the bridle, he draws them along with importunate impudence. But the charioteer, being still more affected in this manner, and falling down as it were from the goal, pulls back the reins with still greater violence from the teeth of the injurious horse, represses his reviling tongue and bloody jaws, fixes his legs and hips on the ground, and thus torments him for his behaviour. But when the vicious horse has often endured a punishment of this kind, he is at length rendered humble and submissive, and follows the providential directions of the charioteer; so that he is lost as it were on seeing a beautiful object. Hence it sometimes happens, that the soul of a lover follows its beloved with reverence and fear, and that the lover pays it every kind of observance and attention as if it was equal to a God; and this not with any dissimulation, but in consequence of being really thus affected: so that, when the beloved happens to be naturally a friend, then his friendship conspires into one with that of his obsequious lover.

If, therefore, in some former period of time, he has been deceived by his associates, or by some other persons, asserting that it was base to be familiar with a lover, and has on this account rejected his lover; yet advancing age, and the wants of nature, lead him to the converse of love. For it was never decreed by fate, either that the evil should be a friend to the evil, or that the good should not be a friend to the good. When, therefore, the youth admits his lover to an intimate familiarity with him, then the benevolence of the lover astonishes the beloved, in consequence of perceiving that all other friends and associates exhibit no portion of friendship which can be compared with that of a friend divinely inspired. But when the lover continues to act in this manner for a long space of time, living with his beloved in high familiarity, frequently touching him in gymnastics and other associations, then the fountain of that effluxion which Jupiter, when enamoured with Ganymedes, denominated *desire*, streaming abundantly

towards the lover, is partly infused into him, and partly through its exuberance flows forth externally. And as air, or a certain echo, when received by smooth and solid bodies, is again impelled to the place from whence it proceeded; so this effluxion of beauty, flowing back again to the beautiful through the eyes, as it is naturally adapted to penetrate into the soul, and stimulate the avenues of the wings, now irrigates, and excites them to shoot forth their feathers, and fills the soul of the beloved with love. Hence he loves, but is doubtful concerning what he loves; and neither knows what he suffers, nor is able to relate it: but just like an eye infected with the vision of another eye which is diseased, he is unable to assign the cause of his malady, and is ignorant that he beholds himself in his lover, as in a mirror. Hence, when his lover is present, he, like him, ceases to be in pain; but, when he is absent, he desires in the same manner as he is desired, possessing, instead of love, nothing more than an image of love; and he denominates it, and thinks that it is not love, but friendship. He desires, therefore, in a manner similar to his lover, though more feebly, to see, to touch, to love, to fit together; and, as it is reasonable to suppose, he performs all this afterwards with the greatest celerity. Hence, in their most intimate associations, the intemperate horse of the lover calls on the charioteer, and tells him that he ought to be gratified with a small degree of pleasure, as the reward of such mighty labours: but the same horse of the beloved has, indeed, nothing to say; but, distended and dubious, it embraces the lover, full of vehement benevolence towards him, and is prepared to comply in every respect with the desires of the beloved. But the conjoined horse, together with the charioteer, resists this familiarity through reason and shame. If, therefore, the better parts of the dianoëtic power obtaining the victory lead the lovers to an orderly and philosophic mode of conduct, then they pass through the present life with felicity and concord, subduing themselves, and adorned with modest manners; the vicious part of the soul being in subjection, and the virtuous, free. But, arriving at the end of the present life, they become winged and light, in consequence of being victors in one of the truly Olympic contests¹; a greater good than which, neither human

¹ These contests are denominated Olympic, not from the mountain Olympus, but from Olympus, heaven. But he who philosophizes truly becomes the victor in three contests. In the first place,

human temperance, nor divine fury, can extend to man. But if they lead a more arrogant and unphilosophic life, but at the same time united with ambition, their intemperate horse will perhaps lead their unguarded souls into intoxication, or some other indolent habits; cause them to embrace those delights which the multitude consider as the most blessed of all pleasures; and will fix them in continual endeavours to gain the object of their desire. They will, therefore, exercise themselves in these delights, but this, however, rarely; because the whole of the dianoëtic nature does not consent to such enjoyments. These too will live in friendship with each other, as well as the former, through the external effluxion of love, but in a less fervent degree; thinking that they ought both to give and receive from each other the greatest confidence, which it is unlawful to dissolve, and by this means become enemies instead of friends. But, in their exit from the present body, they will not be winged indeed, but will be excited to emit their pinions; so that they will carry with them no small reward of amatory fury. For the law forbids those who are now beginning the celestial progression, to enter into darkness, and the subterranean journey; but orders them, in consequence of leading a splendid life, to be happy with each other during their progressions; and that, when they are similarly winged, this shall take place for the sake of love. Such then, O young man, so numerous, and so divine are the benefits which the friendship of a lover will confer on you. But the familiarity of one who is void of love, being mingled with mortal temperance, and dispensing mortal and niggardly concerns, will generate in the soul of its friendly associate that illiberality which is considered as virtue by the vulgar, and will cause it to wander for nine thousand years with a rolling motion upon and under the earth.

place, he subjects all the inferior powers of his soul to intellect; in the second place, he obtains wisdom, in conjunction with divine fury; and, in the third place, recovering his wings, he flies away to his kindred star. But if any one, through the generosity of his nature, happens to be more propense to love, and yet has not been from the beginning philosophically and morally educated, and hence, after he has been ensnared by love, gives way perhaps to venereal delights; such a one, in consequence of a lapse of this kind, cannot recover his wings entire, yet, on account of the wonderful anagogic power of love, he will be prepared for their recovery. Hence, when in a course of time he has amputated his lust, and, retaining the sublimity of love, has formed a virtuous friendship, he will not after the present life be precipitated into the lowest region of punishment, but will be purified in the air, till he has philosophized in the highest degree.

And thus, O beloved Love, through the impulse of Phædrus, we have rendered and extended to thee a recantation, clothed in poetic figures and expressions, in the most beautiful and best manner we are able to accomplish. Wherefore, pardoning what we before asserted, and gratefully ¹ receiving our present discourse, continue benignantly and propitiously the amatory art ² which you have conferred on me, neither taking away nor diminishing its possession through avenging anger. But grant, that among such as are beautiful I may yet be more honoured than at present. And if Phædrus and I have formerly said any thing severe against thy divinity, grant that, accusing Lysias as the author of such a discourse, we may desist from all such assertions in future; and besides this, graciously convert him to the study of philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus, so that this lover of his may no longer tend hither and thither, without any stability, as is the case at present, but may ingenuously pass his life in future, in conjunction with love and philosophic discourses.

PHÆDR. I unite with you in prayer, Socrates, if it is better that all this should happen to us. But I have some time since wondered at your discourse; as it so far surpasses that which was formerly delivered, that I am afraid, lest Lysias himself should appear but mean, if he is desirous to enter the lists against another. And, indeed, but lately a very principal person in the commonwealth branded him with this very epithet; calling him, through the whole of his accusation, nothing more than a composer of orations. Perhaps, therefore, he will desist through ambition from writing any more.

Soc. You assert, O young man, a ridiculous opinion; and you very much wander from the intention of your associate, if you think him so extremely timid: but perhaps you think that his reviler has spoken the truth in what he has said against him.

¹ It is well observed here by Hermeas, that Socrates uses the word *gratefully*, not as if the Gods received any *favour* from us, but because we *gratify* ourselves through worshipping the divinities, in consequence of becoming allied to and familiar with them.

² Should it be asked why Socrates now calls that an *art* which he had before denominated *enthusiastic*, we reply with Hermeas, that he says this because it is necessary to excite the artificial theorems which we possess, and thus afterwards receive the illuminations from the Gods.

PHÆDR. To me it appears so indeed, Socrates: and you yourself know, that the most powerful and venerable in a city are ashamed to compose orations, and to leave their writings behind them, dreading the opinion of posterity, lest they should be called sophists.

Soc. You are ignorant, Phædrus, that the proverb, *A couch is pleasant*, is derived from that long curvature which is about the Nile¹: and, besides this, you are ignorant that the most prudent of politicians particularly love to compose orations, and to leave their writings behind them; and are so fond of those who extol their works, as to give the first place in their writings to such as celebrate their productions every where.

PHÆDR. How do you mean? For I do not understand you.

Soc. What, do not you know that, in the beginning of a politician's book, the very first thing that makes its appearance is the person by whom the book is praised?

PHÆDR. How?

Soc. Why, it says, that it is approved by the council, or the people, or by both. And he who says this, says it, at the same time extremely reverencing and celebrating himself as the author. But after this he speaks in such a manner as to show his wisdom to his admirers, and sometimes accomplishes this in a very long discourse. Does this, therefore, appear to you to be any thing else than a written oration?

PHÆDR. It does not.

Soc. If, therefore, this happens to be approved, he departs rejoicing from the theatre, like a poet. But if it should be rejected, and he should be excluded from composing orations, and should be considered as unworthy to be an author, both he and his friends are afflicted on the account.

PHÆDR. And, indeed, very much so.

Soc. In this, therefore, it is sufficiently evident, that they do not despise a study of this kind, but hold it in the highest estimation.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

Soc. But what, when a rhetorician, or a king, acquires an ability like

¹ This is said according to that figure in Rhetoric which is called *αντισπασις*, or *opposition*: for this long curvature about the Nile, according to Hermeas, was a place where there was much molestation.

that

that of Lycurgus, or Solon, or Darius, so as to be reckoned an immortal writer by the city, will he not think himself equal to a God, while he is yet alive? and will not posterity entertain the same opinion respecting him, upon surveying his writings?

PHÆDR. Very much so.

Soc. Do you think then that any such person, however malevolent he may be, would revile Lyfias, merely because he is a writer?

PHÆDR. It does not seem probable from what you have said: for he would revile, as it appears, his own pursuit.

Soc. From hence, therefore, it must be evident to every one, that no one is scandalous merely from composing orations.

PHÆDR. For how should he?

Soc. But this I think is in reality shameful, not to write and speak in a becoming manner, but shamefully and viciously.

PHÆDR. Evidently so. What then is the mode of writing well and ill?

Soc. Have we not occasion, Phædrus, to inquire this of Lyfias or of some other, who has either at any time written any thing, or is about to write; whether his composition is political, or on private subjects; whether it is in measure like the works of a poet, or without measure like those of a private person?

PHÆDR. Do you ask, if we have not occasion? For what purpose, as I may say, is our very life, but for the sake of pleasures of this kind? For, certainly, it is not for the sake of those pleasures which pain must necessarily antecede, or else no pleasure would subsist; which is nearly the case with all pleasures respecting the body. And, on this account, they are very justly denominated servile.

Soc. But we have leisure, as it appears: and the grasshoppers seem to me singing over our heads, as in the heat, and, discoursing with one another, to look also upon us. If, therefore, they should behold us, like the multitude, not discoursing in mid-day, but sleeping and allured by their singing, through the indolence of our dianoëtic power, they might very justly deride us; thinking that certain slaves had taken up their abode with them, in order to sleep like cattle by the side of the fountain during the fervour of the meridian sun. But if they perceive us engaged in discourse, and not captivated by

their allurements as if they were Syrens, but failing by them to our destined port, perhaps they will rejoice to bestow upon us that gift which, by the consent of the Gods, they are able to deliver to men.

PHÆDR. But what gift is this which they possess? For I do not recollect that I ever heard what it is ¹.

Soc. And yet it is not proper that a man studious of the Muses should be ignorant of things of this kind. But it is said that these insects were formerly men ², before the Muses had a being; that when the Muses made their appearance, and had given birth to the song, some of these were so ensnared by the pleasure which it produced, that through singing they neglected the proper sustenance of the body, and, thus wasting away, at length perished: but that from these the race of grasshoppers was produced, who received this

¹ According to Jamblichus and Hermias, dæmons are signified by the grasshoppers in this fable, and this is by no means wonderful, since in the preceding part of this dialogue, which is full of allegory, something more divine than dæmons is implied by the horses of the Gods. Besides, the office which is here assigned to grasshoppers perfectly corresponds with the employment which Plato in the Banquet attributes to benevolent dæmons: for they stand as it were over our heads, discourse with each other, and in the mean time speculate our affairs, disapprove our evil deeds, and commend such as are good; all which is likewise confirmed by Hesiod in his Works and Days. Besides, they receive divine gifts, and deliver them to us, approach to the Muses, and relate our actions to the Gods. In consequence of this correspondence, Jamblichus and Hermias conclude with great probability that aerial dæmons are signified in this place by grasshoppers. For, as these animals live perpetually singing, and imbibe the air through a sound of this kind; so beneficent aerial dæmons live in the air, through perpetually celebrating divine natures.

² According to Hermias, the interpretation of this place by the divine Jamblichus is as follows: Socrates calls men souls dwelling in the intelligible world: for souls before they live a mortal life abide on high in the intelligible, contemplating forms themselves together with the supermundane Gods. Thus then men were before the Muses had a being, that is, before the spheres and the sensible world; not that the term *before*, signifies here temporal precedency, but a subsistence * prior to this apparent progression of the spheres. For this is the generation of the Muses, an apparent subsistence, proceeding from the demiurgus into the sensible world. The Muses, therefore, and the spheres, the sensible world, and the whole soul of the universe, and the partial souls of men, had a consubstantial progression. These souls, too, as being recently born, and remembering what they had seen in the intelligible region, were averse to generation, and were unwilling to eat and drink, i. e. were not willing to partake of sensible opinion; for they possessed intelligible nutriment. Hence, wasting away, they at length perished, i. e. they reascended to the intelligible.

* Viz. an *unapparent* subsistence: for this is prior to an *apparent* subsistence; in the same way as every cause, so far as it is a cause, is prior to its effect, though it may be temporally consubstantial with it.

gift¹ from the Muses, that they should never want nutriment, but should continue singing without meat or drink till they died; and that after death they should depart to the Muses, and inform them what Muse was honoured by some particular person among us. Hence that, by acquainting Terpsichore with those who reverence her in the dance², they render her propitious to such. By informing Erato of her votaries, they render her favourable in amatory concerns; and the rest in a similar manner, according to the species of veneration belonging to each. But that they announce to the most antient Calliope, and after her to Urania, those who have lived in the exercise of philosophy, and have cultivated the music over which they preside; these Muses more than all the rest being conversant with the heavens, and with both divine and human discourse; and sending forth the

¹ He who lives according to intellect, says Hermias, who is a lover of the Muses, and a philosopher, in consequence of wishing to reascend to the Gods, does not require the care of the body and of a corporeal life; but considers these as nothing, being desirous to be separated from them. For he meditates death, i. e. a departure from the present life, as he knows that the body molests and impedes the energies of intellect. But the *gift* which is here mentioned signifies the soul becoming the attendant of its proper God. Hermias adds: It is however necessary to know that a divine nature is present to all things without a medium, but that we are incapable of being conjoined with divinity, without the medium of a dæmoniacal nature; just as we behold the light of the sun through the ministrant intervention of the air.

² Dancing here must not be understood literally, as if Terpsichore was propitious to those who engage in that kind of dancing which is the object of sense; for this would be ridiculous. We must say, therefore, as Hermias beautifully observes, that there are divine dances: in the first place, that of the Gods; in the second place, that of divine souls: in the third place, the revolution of the celestial divinities, viz. of the seven planets, and the inerratic sphere, is called a dance: in the fourth place, those who are initiated in the mysteries* perform a certain dance: and, in the last place, the whole life of a philosopher is a dance. Terpsichore, therefore, is the inspective guardian of all dancing. Who then are those that honour the goddesses in the dance? Not those who dance well, but those who live well through the whole of the present existence, elegantly arranging their life, and dancing in symphony with the universe. Erato, says Hermias, is denominated from Love, and from making the works of Love, lovely: for she cooperates with Love. Calliope is denominated from the eye (*παρα την οπα*); and Urania presides over astronomy. Through these two goddesses we preserve our rational part from being in subjection to the irrational nature. For, through sight surveying the order of the celestial Gods, we properly arrange our irrational part. And further still, through rhythms, philosophy, and hearing, we elegantly dispose that which we contain of the disorderly and void of rhythm.

* Επειτα και νιταυθα οι τελουμενοι τοις θεοις χορειαν τινα αποτελουσιν εν τοις μυστηριοις.

most beautiful voice. On many accounts, therefore, it is necessary to ~~say~~ something, and not to sleep in mid-day.

PHÆDR. It is necessary, indeed.

SOC. Let us, therefore, consider what we lately spoke of, viz. after what manner any one may both speak and write properly, or improperly.

PHÆDR. By all means.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, necessary, that he who is about to speak with propriety should possess a true [†] dianoëtic perception of that which is the subject of his discourse?

PHÆDR. I have heard, my dear Socrates, that it is not necessary that he who engages in the profession of an orator should learn what is truly just [‡],

[†] Plato here teaches how to write, and what the mode is of writing and speaking well or ill, making the problem more universal and scientific, after having referred the whole beginning of the discourse to the Muses and the Gods. But as that which is distorted is judged of by a rule, and that which is not straight by the straight, so that which is false can only be accurately known by truth. Hence, he says, in speaking or writing well, it is necessary that truth, and a knowledge of the subject, should precede as the leaders. For he who does not know the truth of a thing speaks conjecturally about it. Three things, therefore, are said to be present with those who speak or write. First, a knowledge of the truth. In the second place, an ability of making one thing many, which is the business of the divisive method: for by this we know the various significations of the thing proposed, if it should happen to be many, whether it is homonymous or synonymous, whether genus or species, and the like. There must necessarily, therefore, be the divisive method. In the third place, the many must be collected into one, which is the business of the analytic and definitive methods: for to be able to collect many things into one sentence, is to give the definition of a thing. Afterwards, the composition and ornament of the discourse must succeed. These, then, as the instruments of speaking and writing, ought to be known before every thing, viz. the nature and the essence, or, in other words, the truth of a thing. For thus we shall know how we ought to proceed, whether through such things as are true, or through such as are assimilated to the truth. For he who does not know the truth, but only has an opinion concerning it, like those who possess popular rhetoric, will often persuade his hearers to the contrary of what he wishes.

Afterwards, the philosopher relates how many goods are derived from true rhetoric, and how many evils happen from that which is falsely denominated.

[‡] There are three parts of rhetoric, *that which counsels*, (το συμβουλευτικόν), *the forensic*, (το δικανικόν), and *the panegyric*, (το πανηγυρικόν). And with respect to the ends of these three, the just is the end of the forensic; good, of that which counsels; and beauty, of the panegyric. According to opposition, likewise, the just and the unjust are the ends of the forensic; good and evil of that which counsels; and the beautiful and the base, of the panegyric. A certain duplicity also appears about each of these: about the forensic, accusation and defence; about that which counsels, exhortation and dehortation; and, about the panegyric, praise and blame.

but only that which appears so to the multitude, who undertake to judge ; nor, again, what is truly good or beautiful, but only what appears to be so : for that persuasion is derived from these, and not from truth.

Soc. The sayings of the wife, Phædrus, are by no means to be despised, but we should rather consider the meaning of their assertions ; and, consequently, we must not pass by what you have now said.

PHÆDR. You speak properly.

Soc. Let us then consider this matter as follows.

PHÆDR. How ?

Soc. Suppose I should persuade you to fight your enemies on horseback, but at the same time both of us should be ignorant what a horse is ; and that I only should know respecting you, that Phædrus thinks a horse is an animal which has the greatest ears of all domestic animals.

PHÆDR. This would be ridiculous indeed, Socrates.

Soc. Not yet ; but when I should earnestly persuade you to do this by a discourse composed in praise of an ass, calling him a horse, and asserting that he is a most excellent animal, useful for domestic and military purposes, able to carry burthens, and adapted for a variety of other employments.

PHÆDR. This, indeed, would be perfectly ridiculous.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, better that a friend should be ridiculous, than that he should be wicked, and an enemy ?

PHÆDR. It appears so.

Soc. When an orator, therefore, who is ignorant of good and evil, endeavours to persuade a city in a like condition, not indeed by praising the shadow of an ass, as if it was that of a horse, but by praising evil, as if it was good, being anxiously solicitous about the opinion of the multitude, and thus persuades them to do evil instead of good ; what crop do you think the orator can reap after such a sowing ?

PHÆDR. Not a very good one.

Soc. Have we not therefore, my friend, reviled the art of speaking in a more rustic manner than is becoming ? For the art itself will, perhaps, thus address us : " What delirium, O wonderful men, has invaded you ? For I compel no one who is ignorant of truth to learn how to speak : but if any one will take my advice, he will then only employ me, when he has acquired the possession of truth. This, then, I assert as a thing of great consequence,

consequence, that without me even he who knows realities will not, for all this, be able to procure persuasion." Will not the art, therefore, speak justly, by making such a declaration?

PHÆDR. I confess it, if our subsequent reasons evince that rhetoric is an art. For I think I have heard some arguments, which assert that it deceives, and that it is not an art, but an unartificial exercise. But the true art of speaking, says Laco, never was, nor ever will be unaccompanied by truth. This then is what they say¹, Socrates. But, bringing them hither, let us inquire of them what they assert, and in what manner.

Soc. Be present then, ye generous animals, and persuade the beautiful youth, Phædrus, that unless he philosophizes sufficiently, he will never sufficiently speak about any thing. But let Phædrus answer to the interrogations. Is not the whole rhetorical art that which leads the soul by discourses, not in judicial matters only, and other public concerns, but also in private affairs, and these whether trifling or important? And is there any thing more honourable than to act according to the true rules of this art, both in important and inconsiderable affairs? Or have you not heard that this is the case?

PHÆDR. I am not, by Jupiter, perfectly acquainted with all this. But it is spoken of, and written about, as an art for the most part conversant with judicial matters and speeches; but I have not heard that it extends any further.

Soc. What, have you heard of the rhetorical art which Nestor and Ulysses exercised at Troy, but have never heard about that of Palamedes?

PHÆDR. I have indeed, by Jupiter, heard about the orations of Nestor: unless you will prove that Gorgias is a certain Nestor, or Thrasymachus and Theodorus a certain Ulysses.

Soc. Perhaps they may be so; but let us drop any further discourse about these. And do you inform me what litigators do in judicial matters: do they not contradict? Or shall we say they do any thing else?

PHÆDR. Nothing else.

¹ Hermias here asks whether rhetoricians are philosophic; and he says in reply, that good rhetoricians cannot be formed without philosophy. For the more celebrated among the ancient rhetoricians were philosophic. Thus, Pericles was the associate of Anaxagoras, and Demosthenes of Plato.

SOC. But are not their contradictions about *just* and *unjust*?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. But does not he who accomplishes this by art, cause the same thing to appear to the same persons, whenever he pleases, at one time just, and at another time unjust?

PHÆDR. But what then?

SOC. And in his oration does he not cause the same things to appear to the city at one time good, and at another time just the contrary?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes is reported to have been able by his art to cause the same things to appear to his hearers, both similar and dissimilar, one and many, abiding and borne along?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. The contradictory art, therefore, takes place, not only in judicial matters and orations, but, as it appears, about every thing which is the subject of discourse; since it is one art, enabling us to assimilate every thing to every thing, both such things as are capable of assimilation, and those to which they are able to be assimilated; and, besides this, to lead them into light, notwithstanding their being assimilated and concealed by something else.

PHÆDR. How do you mean?

SOC. My meaning will appear in the following inquiries: Does deception subsist in things which differ much, or but a little, from each other?

PHÆDR. In things which differ but a little.

SOC. But, by making a transition according to small advances, you will effect a greater concealment, while passing on to that which is contrary, than you will by a transition according to great advances.

PHÆDR. How should it not be so?

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, that he who is about to deceive another should accurately know the similitude and dissimilitude of things.

PHÆDR. It is necessary.

SOC. Is it possible, therefore, that he who is ignorant of the truth of every thing can judge concerning the similitude, whether great or small, which subsists in other things?

PHÆDR. It is impossible.

Soc.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, that such as conceive opinions contrary to the truth of things, and who are deceived, are thus affected through certain similitudes.

PHÆDR. The case is so.

Soc. Can, therefore, he who is ignorant about the nature of each particular, artificially deliver any thing, by passing according to small advances into its contrary, through similitudes? Or can such a one avoid falling into error?

PHÆDR. He cannot.

Soc. Hence then, my friend, he who is ignorant of truth, and is led by opinion, will, as it appears, exhibit a ridiculous and inartificial rhetoric.

PHÆDR. It appears so.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, both in the oration of Lyfias, which you now carry about you, and in that which we delivered, to see what we have asserted without art, and what is agreeable to art?

PHÆDR. I am above all things willing. For we speak at present in a trifling manner, as we are without sufficient examples.

Soc. But, indeed, as it appears, some reasons have been given, through the assistance of a certain fortune, which have all the force of examples, evincing that he who knows the truth will, even while he jests in his discourse, attract his auditors. And I consider, O Phædrus, the local Gods as the cause of this. Perhaps, also, the interpreters of the Muses, singing over our heads, have inspired us with this ability: for I myself participate of no art¹ belonging to discourse.

PHÆDR. Let it be as you say; only render what you assert evident.

Soc. Come then, read over the beginning of Lyfias's oration.

PHÆDR. " You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs; and you

¹ It was usual with Socrates to deny that he possessed any invention of his own, and to refer all things to the Gods. But there is, says Hermias, a communion between us and the Gods, our soul being thence illuminated both without a medium, and through the middle genera of beings. Providence, therefore, says he, is twofold; for it is either that of the superior Gods themselves, or it takes place through the more excellent genera, such as angels, dæmons, and heroes, and the local Gods. Socrates, therefore, ascribes such an order and management of words to the local Gods. But he signifies by the singing over his head the more excellent genera, the attendants of the Gods. For it is always requisite to call that which transcends, a dæmon; as, for instance, the rational is the dæmon of the irrational part, and a God is the dæmon of intellect.

have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed."

SOC. Stop there: are we not then to show, in what he is faulty, and in what respect he has acted without art?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, manifest to every one, that when we speak upon certain subjects we are unanimous in our conceptions; but when upon others, that we are discordant in our opinions?

PHÆDR. I seem to understand what you say; but, notwithstanding this, speak more plainly.

SOC. When any one pronounces the name of iron or silver, do we not all understand the same thing?

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

SOC. But when we pronounce that of the just, or the good, are we not of different opinions? and do we not doubt both with others and ourselves?

PHÆDR. Very much so.

SOC. In some things, therefore, we agree in sentiments, and in others not.

PHÆDR. We do so.

SOC. Where, then, are we more easily deceived? And in which of these is rhetoric able to accomplish the most?

PHÆDR. Evidently in those about which we are dubious.

SOC. He, therefore, who is about to pursue the rhetorical art, ought first of all to distinguish these in order; to consider the character of each species; and to perceive in what the multitude must necessarily be dubious, and in what not.

PHÆDR. He who is able to accomplish this, Socrates, will understand a beautiful species.

SOC. Afterwards, I think, he ought not to be ignorant when he comes to particulars, but to perceive acutely to what genus the subject of his future discourse belongs.

PHÆDR. What then?

Soc.

Soc. With respect to Love, shall we say that it belongs to things dubious, or to such as are not so?

PHÆDR. To things dubious, certainly.

Soc. Do you think he would permit you to assert that respecting him which you have now asserted, that he is pernicious both to the beloved and the lover; and again, that he is the greatest of all goods?

PHÆDR. You speak in the best manner possible.

Soc. But inform me also of this (for, through the enthusiastic energy, I do not perfectly remember), whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

PHÆDR. By Jupiter you did, and that in a most wonderful manner.

Soc. O how much more sagacious do you declare the Nymphs of Acheilöus, and Pan the son of Mercury, to be, than Lysias the son of Cephalus, with respect to orations! Or do I say nothing to the purpose? But did not Lysias, in the beginning of his discourse, compel us to conceive of love, as a certain something such as he wished it to be, and, referring what followed to this, complete in this manner the whole of his oration? Are you willing that we should again read over the beginning of his oration?

PHÆDR. If you are so disposed; though you will not find what you seek for there.

Soc. Read, however, that I may again hear it.

PHÆDR. "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed."

Soc. He seems here to have been very far from accomplishing what we are now seeking after; since he endeavours to pass through his discourse, not commencing from the beginning, but from the end, after a certain contrary and supine mode of proceeding; and begins from what the lover, now ceasing to be such, says to his once beloved. Or perhaps, my dear Phædrus, I say nothing to the purpose.

PHÆDR. But it is the end, Socrates, which is the subject of his discourse.

Soc. But what, do not all the other parts of the discourse appear to be promiscuously

promiscuously scattered? Or does it appear to you, that what is asserted in the second place ought to rank as second from a certain necessity; or any thing else which he says? For to me, as a person ignorant of every thing, it appears, that nothing ought to be carelessly asserted by a writer. But do you not possess a certain necessary method of composing orations, according to which he thus disposed the parts of his oration in succession to each other?

PHÆDR. You are pleasant, Socrates, in supposing that I am sufficient to judge concerning compositions so accurate as his.

SOC. But I think this is evident to you, that every discourse ought in its structure to resemble an animal, and should have something which can be called its body; so that it may be neither without a head, nor be destitute of feet, but may possess a middle and extremes, adapted to each other, and to the whole.

PHÆDR. How should it not be so?

SOC. Consider, therefore, the discourse of your associate, whether it subsists with these conditions, or otherwise; and you will find, that it is in no respect different from that epigram which certain persons report was composed on the Phrygian Midas.

PHÆDR. What was the epigram, and what are its peculiarities?

SOC. It was as follows;

A brazen virgin traveller am I,
Whom fate decrees in Midas' tomb to lie:
And while streams flow, and trees luxuriant bloom,
I here shall stay within the mournful tomb;
And this to every passenger attest,
That here the ashes of king Midas rest.

But that it is of no consequence as to the connection, which part of it is read first or last, you yourself, I doubt not, perceive.

PHÆDR. You divide our oration, Socrates.

SOC. Left you should be angry, therefore, let us drop it; though it appears that many examples might be found in it, from an inspection of which we might derive the advantage of not attempting to imitate them. But let us proceed to the discussion of other orations: for they contain something, as it appears to me, which it is proper for those to perceive who are willing to speculate about orations.

PHÆDR. But what is this something?

SOC. That they are in a certain respect contrary to each other. For one kind asserts that the lover, and the other that he who is void of love, ought to be gratified.

PHÆDR. And it asserts this, indeed, most strenuously.

SOC. I should have thought that you would have answered more truly, "and indeed furiously so." But what I inquire after is this—Do we say that love is a certain mania, or not?

PHÆDR. A mania, certainly.

SOC. But there are two species of mania; the one arising from human diseases; but the other from a divine mutation, taking place in a manner different from established customs.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

SOC. But there are four parts of the divine mania, distributed according to the four divinities which preside over these parts. For we assign prophetic inspiration to Apollo, telestic or mystic to Bacchus, poetic to the Muses; and the fourth or amatory mania, which we assert to be the best of all, to Venus and Love. And I know not how, while we are representing by images the amatory passion, we perhaps touch upon a certain truth; and perhaps we are at the same time hurried away elsewhere. Hence, mingling together an oration not perfectly improbable, we have produced a certain fabulous hymn, and have with moderate abilities celebrated your lord and mine, Phædrus, viz. Love, who is the inspective guardian of beautiful youths.

PHÆDR. And this, indeed, so as to have rendered it far from unpleasant to me your auditor.

SOC. Let us, therefore, from this endeavour to understand how our discourse has passed from censure to praise.

PHÆDR. What do you mean by this?

SOC. To me we seem to have really been at play with respect to the other parts of our discourse: but I think that if any one is able to comprehend, according to art, these two species which we have spoken of, through a certain fortune, he will not be an ungraceful person.

PHÆDR. How do you mean?

SOC. By looking to one idea, to bring together things every way dispersed; that, by thus defining each, he may always render manifest that

which he is desirous to teach : just as we acted at present with respect to our definition of Love, whether good or bad. For certainly our discourse by this means became more clear, and more consistent with itself.

PHÆDR. But what do you say respecting the other species, Socrates ?

Soc. That this again should be cut into species according to members, naturally ; not by breaking any member, like an unskilful cook, but, as in the above discourse, receiving the foam of the dianoëtic energy, as one common species. But as, in one body, members which are double and synonymous are called right or left, so our discourse considered the species of delirium within us as naturally one. And dividing the one part into that which is on the left hand, and giving this another distribution, it did not cease till it there found a certain sinister Love, and, when found, reviled it, as it deserves. But the other part conducted us to the right hand of mania, where we found a certain divine Love synonymous to the former ; and, extending our praise, we celebrated him as the cause of the greatest good to us.

PHÆDR. You speak most true.

Soc. But I, O Phædrus, am a lover of such divisions and compositions as may enable me both to speak and understand. And if I think that any other is able to behold the one and the many, according to the nature of things, this man I follow, pursuing his footsteps as if he were a God. But whether or not I properly denominate those who are able to accomplish this, Divinity knows. But I have hitherto called them men conversant with dialectic. Tell me, therefore, by what name it is proper to call them, according to your opinion and that of Lysias. Or is this that art of speaking, which Thrasymachus and others employing, became themselves wise in oratory, and rendered others such, who were willing to bestow gifts on them, as if they had been kings ?

PHÆDR. Those were indeed royal men, but yet not skilled in the particulars about which you inquire. But you appear to me to have properly denominated this species in calling it dialectic ; but the rhetorical art appears as yet to have escaped us.

Soc. How do you say ? Can there be any thing beautiful which is destitute of these particulars, and yet be comprehended by art ? If this be the case, it is by no means to be despised by me and you ; but we must relate what remains of the rhetorical art.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. And there are many things, Socrates, which are delivered in books about the art of speaking.

Soc. You have very opportunely reminded me. For I think you would say that the proœmium ought to be called the first part of the oration; and that things of this kind are the ornaments of the art.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. And, in the second place, a certain narration; and this accompanied with testimonies. In the third place, the reasoning. In the fourth, probable arguments: and besides this, I think that a certain Byzantine, the best artificer of orations, introduces confirmation and approbation.

PHÆDR. Do you not mean the illustrious Theodorus?

Soc. I do. For he discovered how confutation, both in accusation and defence, might not only take place, but also be increased. But why should we not introduce the most excellent Evenus, the Parian? For he first discovered sub-declarations, and the art of praising: and, according to the reports of some persons, he delivered his reprehensions in verse for the sake of assisting the memory. For he is a wise man. But shall we suffer Tisias¹ and Gorgias to sleep, who placed probabilities before realities; and, through the strength of their discourse, caused small things to appear large, and the large small; likewise old things new, and the new old; and who besides this discovered a concise method of speaking, and, again, an infinite prolixity of words? All which when Prodicus once heard me relate, he laughed, and asserted that he alone had discovered what words this art required; and that it required neither few nor many, but a moderate quantity.

PHÆDR. You was, therefore, most wise, O Prodicus.

Soc. But shall we not speak of Hippias? for I think that he will be of the same opinion with the Elean guest.

PHÆDR. Why should we not?

Soc. But what shall we say of the musical composition of Polus², who employed the doubling of words, a collection of sentences, similitudes, and elegance of appellations, in order to give splendour to his orations, according to the instruction which he had received from Lycimnion?

¹ This Tisias is said by Cicero to have been the inventor of rhetoric.

² Polus was a disciple of Gorgias the Leontine. See the Gorgias.

PHÆDR. But were not the orations of Protagoras, Socrates, of this kind?

Soc. His diction was indeed proper, and contained besides this many other beautiful properties: but the Chalcedonian orator excelled in exciting commiseration from the distresses of poverty, and the infirmities of old age. He was besides most skilful in rousing the multitude to anger, and when enraged appeasing them, as he said, by enchantment; and highly excelled in framing and dissolving calumnies, from whence the greatest advantage might be derived. But all seem to agree in opinion with respect to the conclusion of the oration, which some call the repetition, but others give it a different denomination.

PHÆDR. Do you say that the conclusion summarily recalls into the memory of the auditors all that had been said before?

Soc. I do, and any thing else besides, which you may have to say about this art.

PHÆDR. What I have to say is but trifling, and not worth mentioning.

Soc. Let us, therefore, dismiss trifling observations, and rather behold in the clear light, in what particulars the power of this art prevails, and when it does so.

PHÆDR. Its power, Socrates, is most prevalent in the association of the multitude.

Soc. It is so. But, O dæmoniacal man, do you also see, whether their web appears to you, as it does to me, to have its parts separated from each other?

PHÆDR. Show me how you mean.

Soc. Tell me then: If any one addressing your associate Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, should say, I know how to introduce certain things to the body, by which I can heat and cool it when I please; and besides this, when I think proper I can produce vomiting, and downward ejection, and a variety of other things of this kind, through the knowledge of which I profess myself a physician, and able to make any one else so, to whom I deliver the knowledge of these particulars;—what do you think he who heard him ought to reply?

PHÆDR. What else, than inquiring whether he knows to whom, when, and how far, each of these ought to be applied?

Soc.

Soc. If, therefore, he should say that he by no means understands all this, but that he who is instructed by him ought to do so and so; what then would be his answer?

PHÆDR. He would answer, I think, that the man was mad; and that, having heard from some book about things of this kind, or met with some remedies, he thought he might become a physician without knowing any thing about the art.

Soc. But what if any one, addressing Sophocles and Euripides, should say that he knew how to compose a prolix discourse on a very trifling subject, and a very short one on a great occasion; and that when he pleased he could excite pity, and its contrary, horror and threats, and other things of this kind; and that by teaching these he thought that he delivered the art of tragic poetry?

PHÆDR. And these also, I think, Socrates, would deride him, who should fancy that a tragedy was any thing else than the composition of all these, so disposed as to be adapted to each other, and to the whole.

Soc. And I think they would not rustically accuse him; but, just as if a musician should meet with a man who believes himself skilled in harmony, because he knows how to make a chord sound sharp and flat, he would not fiercely say to him, O miserable creature, you are mad; but, as being a musician, he would thus address him more mildly: O excellent man! it is necessary that he who is to be a musician should indeed know such things as these; but at the same time nothing hinders us from concluding, that a man affected as you are may not understand the least of harmony: for you may know what is necessary to be learned prior to harmony, without understanding harmony itself.

PHÆDR. Most right.

Soc. In like manner, Sophocles would reply to the person who addressed him, that he possessed things previous to tragedy, rather than tragedy itself: and Acumenus, that the medical pretender understood things previous to medicine, and not medicine itself.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

Soc. But what if the mellifluous Adrastus, or Pericles, should hear those all-beautiful artificial inventions, concise discourses, similitudes, and other things which we said should be discussed in the light, do you think that they
would

would be angry, as we were through our rusticity, with those who wrote about and taught such things as if they were the same with rhetoric? Or rather, as being wiser than us, would they not thus reprove us? It is not proper, Phædrus and Socrates, to be angry with such characters; but you ought rather to pardon those who, being ignorant of oratory, are unable to define what rhetoric is, and who in consequence of this passion, from possessing a knowledge of things previous to the art, think that they have discovered rhetoric itself; and, by teaching these to others, imagine that they teach rhetoric in perfection: but who at the same time leave to the proper industry of their disciples the art of disposing each of these, so as to produce persuasion, and of composing the whole oration, as if nothing of this kind was necessary for them to accomplish.

PHÆDR. Such indeed, Socrates, does that art appear to be which these men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you seem to me to have spoken the truth: but how and from whence shall we be able to acquire the art of true rhetoric and persuasion?

Soc. It is probable, Phædrus, and perhaps also necessary, that the perfect may be obtained in this as in other contests. For, if you naturally possess rhetorical abilities, you will become a celebrated orator, by the assistance of science and exercise: but if you are destitute of any one of these, you will be imperfect through this deficiency. But the method employed by Lyfias and Thrasymachus does not appear to me to evince the magnitude of this art.

PHÆDR. But what method then does?

Soc. Pericles, most excellent man, appears with great propriety to have been the most perfect of all in the rhetorical art.

PHÆDR. Why?

Soc. All the great arts require continual meditation, and a discourse about the sublime parts of nature. For an elevation of intellect, and a perfectly efficacious power, appear in a certain respect to proceed from hence; which Pericles possessed in conjunction with his naturally good disposition. For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who had these requisites, he was filled with elevated discourse, and comprehended the nature of intellect and folly, which Anaxagoras diffusely discussed: and from hence he transferred to the art of discourse whatever could contribute to its advantage.

PHÆDR. How is this?

Soc. In a certain respect the method of the rhetorical and medicinal art is the same.

PHÆDR. But how?

Soc. In both it is requisite that a distribution should be made, in one of the nature of body, in the other of the soul, if you are desirous in the first instance of giving health and strength by introducing medicine and nutriment according to art, and not by exercise and experience alone; and in the second instance, if you wish to introduce persuasion and virtue into the soul, by reason and legitimate institutions.

PHÆDR. It is probable it should be so, Socrates.

Soc. But do you think that the nature of the soul can be sufficiently known without the nature of the universe?

PHÆDR. If it is proper to be persuaded by Hippocrates, the successor of Æsculapius, even the nature of body cannot be known without this method.

Soc. He speaks in a becoming manner, my friend. But it is necessary, besides the authority of Hippocrates, to examine our discourse, and consider whether it is consistent.

PHÆDR. I agree with you.

Soc. Consider, then, what Hippocrates and true reason assert concerning nature. Is it not, therefore, necessary to think respecting the nature of every thing, in the first place, whether that is simple or multiform about which we are desirous, both that we ourselves should be artists, and that we should be able to render others so? And, in the next place, if it is simple, ought we not to investigate its power, with respect to producing any thing naturally, or being naturally passive? And if it possesses many species, having numbered these, ought we not to speculate in each, as in one, its natural power of becoming active and passive?

PHÆDR. It appears we should, Socrates.

Soc. The method, therefore, which proceeds without these, is similar to the progression of one blind. But he who operates according to art, ought not to be assimilated either to the blind or the deaf; but it is evident that whoever accommodates his discourses to any art, ought accurately to exhibit the essence of that nature to which he introduces discourses; and this is doubtless the soul.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. Without doubt.

Soc. Will not, therefore, all the attention of such a one be directed to this end, that he may produce persuasion in the soul?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, that Thrasymachus, and any other person who applies himself to the study of the rhetorical art, ought first, with all possible accuracy, to describe, and cause the soul to perceive whether she is naturally one and similar, or multiform according to the form of body: for this is what we call evincing its nature.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

Soc. But, in the second place, he ought to show what it is naturally capable of either acting or suffering.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. In the third place, having orderly distinguished the genera of discourses and of the soul, and the passions of these, he should pass through all the causes, harmonizing each to each, and teaching what kind of soul will be necessarily persuaded by such particular discourses, and through what cause; and again, what kind of soul such discourses will be unable to persuade.

PHÆDR. Such a method of proceeding will, as it appears, be most beautiful.

Soc. He, therefore, who acts in a different manner will neither artificially write nor discourse upon this or any other subject. But writers on the art of rhetoric of the present day (whom you yourself have heard) are crafty, and conceal from us that their knowledge of the soul is most beautiful. However, till they both speak and write according to this method, we shall never be persuaded that they write according to art.

PHÆDR. What method do you mean?

Soc. It will not be easy to mention the very words themselves which ought to be employed on this occasion; but as far as I am able I am willing to tell you how it is proper to write, if we desire to write according to art.

PHÆDR. Tell me then.

Soc. Since the power of discourse is attractive of the soul, it is necessary that the future orator should know how many species soul contains: but these are various, and souls possess their variety from these. Souls, therefore,

of such a particular nature, in consequence of certain discourses, and through a certain cause, are easily persuaded to such and such particulars. But such as are differently affected are with difficulty persuaded through these means. It is necessary, therefore, that he who sufficiently understands all this, when he afterwards perceives these particulars taking place in actions, should be able to follow them with great celerity through sensible inspection; or otherwise he will retain nothing more than the words which he once heard from his preceptor. But when he is sufficiently able to say, who will be persuaded by such and such discourses, and sagaciously perceives that the person present is such by nature as was spoken of before, and that he may be incited by certain discourses to certain actions; then, at length, such a one will be a perfect master of this art, when to his former attainments he adds the knowledge of opportunely speaking, or being silent, the use or abuse of concise discourse, of language plaintive and vehement, and of the other parts of rhetoric delivered by his masters; but never till this is accomplished. But he who fails in any of these particulars, either in speaking, teaching, or writing, and yet asserts that he speaks according to art, is vanquished by the person he is unable to persuade. But what then (perhaps a writer of orations will say to us); does it appear to you, Phædrus and Socrates, that the art of speaking is to be obtained by this method, or otherwise?

PHÆDR. It is impossible, Socrates, that it should be obtained otherwise, though the acquisition seems to be attended with no small labour.

Soc. You speak the truth. And, for the sake of this, it is necessary, by tossing upwards and downwards all discourses, to consider whether any easier and shorter way will present itself to our view for this purpose; lest we should in vain wander through a long and rough road, when we might have walked through one short and smooth. If, therefore, you can afford any assistance, in consequence of what you have heard from Lyfias, or any other, endeavour to tell it me, by recalling it into your mind.

PHÆDR. I might indeed do this for the sake of experiment, but I cannot at present.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that I should relate to you the discourse which I once heard concerning things of this kind?

PHÆDR. How should I not?

SOC. It is said therefore, Phædrus, to be just, to tell what is reported of the wolf.

PHÆDR. Do you therefore act in the same manner.

SOC. They say, then, that there is no occasion to extol and magnify these particulars in such a manner, nor to deduce our discourse from on high, and afar off. For, as we said in the beginning of this discourse, he who intends to be sufficiently skilful in rhetoric ought not to participate the truth respecting *things* just and good, or *men* who are such, either from nature or education. For, in judicial matters, no attention whatever is paid to the truth of these, but to persuasion alone; and that this is the probable, which ought to be studied by him who is to speak according to art. For he ought never to speak of transactions, unless they are probable; but both in accusation and defence probabilities should always be introduced: and, in short, he who speaks should pursue the probable, and, if he speaks much, should bid farewell to truth. For, when this method is observed through the whole of a discourse, it causes all the perfection of the art.

PHÆDR. You have related those particulars, Socrates, which are asserted by the skilful in rhetoric; for I remember that we briefly touched upon this in the former part of our discourse. But to such as are conversant with these matters, this appears to be a thing of great consequence: but you have indeed severely reviled Tisias himself.

SOC. Let then Tisias himself tell us, whether he calls the probable any thing else than that which is apparent to the multitude.

PHÆDR. What else can he call it?

SOC. He also appears to have discovered and written about the following crafty and artificial method: that if some imbecil but bold man should knock down one who is robust but timid, taking from him at the same time a garment, or something else, and should be tried for the assault, then neither of these ought to speak the truth; but that the coward should say, the bold man was not alone when he gave the assault; and that the bold man should deny this, by asserting that he was alone when the pretended assault was given, and should at the same time artfully ask, How is it possible that a man so weak as I am could attack one so robust as he is? That then the other should not acknowledge his cowardice, but should endeavour, by devising some false allegation,

allegation, to accuse his opponent. And in other instances, things of this kind must be said according to art. Is not this the case, Phædrus?

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

SOC. O how craftily does Tisias appear to have discovered an abstruse art, or whoever else was the inventor, and in whatever other name he delights! But shall we, my friend, say this or not?

PHÆDR. What?

SOC. This: O Tisias, some time since, before your arrival, we affirmed that the probable, with which the multitude are conversant, subsisted through its similitude to truth: and we just now determined that similitudes might every where be found in the most beautiful manner, by him who was acquainted with truth. So that, if you assert any thing else about the art of discourse, we shall readily listen to you; but if not, we shall be persuaded by our present determinations, that unless a person enumerates the different dispositions of his auditors, and distributes things themselves into their species, and again is able to comprehend the several particulars in one idea, he will never be skilled in the art of speaking to that degree which it is possible for man to attain. But this degree of excellence can never be obtained without much labour and study; and a prudent man will not toil for its acquisition, that he may speak and act so as to be pleasing to men; but rather that, to the utmost of his ability, he may speak and act in such a manner as may be acceptable to the Gods. For men wiser than us, O Tisias, say that he who is endued with intellect ought not to make it the principal object of his study how he may gratify his fellow servants, but how he may please good masters, and this from good means. So that, if the circuit is long, you ought not to wonder: for it is not to be undertaken in the manner which seems proper to you, but for the sake of mighty concerns. And these, if any one is so disposed, will be most beautifully effected by this mean, as reason herself evinces.

PHÆDR. This appears to me, Socrates, to be most beautifully said, if there is but a possibility that any one can accomplish the arduous undertaking.

SOC. But to endeavour after beautiful attainments is beautiful, as likewise to endure whatever may happen to be the result of our endeavours.

PHÆDR. Very much so.

Soc. And thus much may suffice concerning a knowledge and ignorance of the art of rhetoric.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. Does it not therefore remain, that we should speak concerning the elegance and inelegance of writing?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. Do you know how you may in the highest degree please the divinity of discourse both in speaking and acting?

PHÆDR. Not at all. Do you?

Soc. I have heard certain particulars delivered by the antients, who were truly knowing. But if we ourselves should discover this, do you think we should afterwards be at all solicitous about human opinions?

PHÆDR. Your question is ridiculous; but relate what you say you have heard.

Soc. I have heard then, that about Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of their antient Gods, to whom a bird was sacred, which they call Ibis; but the name of the dæmon himself was Theuth^{*}. According to tradition, this God first discovered number and the art of reckoning, geometry and astronomy, the games of chess and hazard, and likewise letters. But Thamus was at that time king of all Egypt, and resided in that great city of the Upper Egypt

* The genus of disciplines belonging to Mercury contains gymnastics, music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the art of speaking and writing. This God, as he is the source of invention, is called the son of Maia; because *investigation*, which is implied by *Maia*, produces *invention*: and as unfolding the will of Jupiter, who is an intellectual God, he is the cause of matheſis, or discipline. He first subsists in Jupiter, the artificer of the world; next, among the supermundane Gods; in the third place, among the liberated Gods; fourthly, in the planet Mercury; fifthly, in the Mercurial order of dæmons; sixthly, in human souls who are the attendants of this God; and in the seventh degree his properties subsist in certain animals, such as the ibis, the ape, and sagacious dogs. The narration of Socrates in this place is both allegorical and anægic, or reductory. Naucratis is a region of Egypt eminently subject to the influence of Mercury, though the whole of Egypt is allotted to this divinity. Likewise in this city a certain man once flourished, full of the Mercurial power, because his soul formerly existed in the heavens of the Mercurial order. But he was first called Theuth, that is, Mercury, and a God, because his soul subsisted according to the perfect similitude of this divinity. But afterwards a dæmon, because from the God Mercury, through a Mercurial dæmon, gifts of this kind are transmitted to a Mercurial soul. This Mercurial

Egypt which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; but the God himself they denominate Ammon. Theuth, therefore, departing to Thamus, showed him his arts, and told him that he ought to distribute them amongst the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked him concerning the utility of each; and upon his informing him, he approved what appeared to him to be well said, but blamed that which had a contrary aspect. But Theuth is reported to have fully unfolded to Thamus many particulars respecting each art, which it would be too prolix to mention. But when they came to discourse upon letters, This discipline, O king, says Theuth, will render the Egyptians wiser, and increase their powers of memory. For this invention is the medicine of memory and wisdom. To this Thamus replied, O most artificial Theuth, one person is more adapted to artificial operations, but another to judging what detriment or advantage will arise from the use of these productions of art: and now you who are the father of letters, through the benevolence of your disposition, have affirmed just the contrary of what letters are able to effect. For these, through the negligence of recollection, will produce oblivion in the soul of the learner; because, through trusting to the external and foreign marks of writing, they will not exercise the internal powers of recollection. So that you have not discovered the medicine of memory, but of admonition. You will likewise deliver to your disciples an opinion of wisdom, and not truth. For, in consequence of having many readers without the instruction of a master, the multitude will appear to be knowing in many things of which they are at the same time ignorant; and

curial soul, and at the same time daemon, relate their inventions to king Thamus. And though a man named Thamus once reigned in Egypt, yet anagogically Thamus is a Mercurial divinity either celestial or supercelestial. But Ammon is that superior Jupiter who comprehends the Mercurial gifts. Lastly, invention belongs to natural instinct and conception, but judgment and discrimination to reason and perfect intelligence, which are far more excellent. But each at the same time belongs to Jupiter Ammon; though, when taken separately, invention, and as it were the material form of art, must be referred to a demoniacal or human Mercury; but judgment and use, and that which leads to the end, to Thamus, who is superior both to a human and demoniacal Mercury. Though the narration seems to comprehend Thamus and Ammon under the same person, yet accurate reasoning is able to distinguish them. They relate that the Egyptian ibis was similar to a stork, that it had the figure of a heart, that it walked in a very unequal manner, and that it brought forth its eggs through its throat, just as Mercury delivers his progeny into light. And these and the other Mercurial symbols signify wisdom, geometry, eloquence, and interpretation.

will

will become troublesome associates, in consequence of possessing an opinion of wisdom, instead of wisdom itself.

PHÆDR. You with great facility, Socrates, compose Egyptian discourses, and those of any other nation, when you are so disposed.

SOC. But, my friend, those who reside in the temple of Dodonean Jupiter assert that the first prophetic discourses issued from the oak. It was sufficient, therefore, for those antients, as they were not so wise as you moderns, to listen to oaks and rocks, through their simplicity, if these inanimate things did but utter the truth. But you perhaps think it makes a difference who speaks, and to what country he belongs. For you do not alone consider, whether what is asserted is true or false.

PHÆDR. You have very properly reproved me; and I think the case with respect to letters is just as the Theban Thamus has stated it.

SOC. Hence, he who thinks to commit an art to writing, or to receive it, when delivered by this mean, so that something clear and firm may result from the letters, is endued with great simplicity, and is truly ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon; since he is of opinion, that something more is contained in the writing than what the things themselves contained in the letters admonish the scientific reader.

PHÆDR. Most right.

SOC. For that which is committed to writing contains something very weighty, and truly similar to a picture. For the offspring of a picture project as if they were alive; but, if you ask them any question, they are silent in a perfectly venerable manner. Just so with respect to written discourses, you would think that they spoke as if they possessed some portion of wisdom. But if, desirous to be instructed, you interrogate them about any thing which they assert, they signify one thing only, and this always the same. And every discourse, when it is once written, is every where similarly rolled among its auditors, and even among those by whom it ought not to be heard; and is perfectly ignorant, to whom it is proper to address itself, and to whom not. But when it is faulty or unjustly reviled, it always requires the assistance of its father. For, as to itself, it can neither resist its adversary, nor defend itself.

PHÆDR. And this, also, you appear to have most rightly asserted.

SOC. But what, shall we not consider another discourse, which is the genuine

genuine brother of this, how legitimate it is, and how much better and more powerful it is born than this?

PHÆDR. What is this? and how do you say it is produced?

SOC. That which, in conjunction with science, is written in the soul of the learner, which is able to defend itself, and which knows to whom it ought to speak, and before whom it ought to be silent.

PHÆDR. You speak of the living and animated discourse of one endued with knowledge; of which written discourse may be justly called a certain image.

SOC. Entirely so. But answer me with respect to this also: Will the husbandman, who is endued with intellect, scatter such seeds as are most dear to him, and from which he wishes fruit should arise? Will he scatter them in summer in the gardens of Adonis, with the greatest diligence and attention, rejoicing to behold them in beautiful perfection within the space of eight days? Or rather, when he acts in this manner, will he not do so for the sake of some festive day, or sport? But, when seriously applying himself to the business of agriculture, will he not sow where it is proper, and be sufficiently pleased, if his sowing receives its consummation within the space of eight months?

PHÆDR. He would doubtless act in this manner, Socrates, at one time sowing seriously, and at another time for diversion.

SOC. But shall we say that the man who possesses the science of things just, beautiful and good, is endued with less intellect than a husbandman, with respect to the seeds which he sows?

PHÆDR. By no means.

SOC. He will not, therefore, with anxious and hasty diligence write them in black water, sowing them by this mean with his pen in conjunction with discourses; since it is thus impossible to assist them through speech, and impossible sufficiently to exhibit the truth.

PHÆDR. This, therefore, is not proper.

SOC. Certainly not. He will, therefore, sow and write in the gardens which letters contain for the sake of sport, as it appears; and when he has written, having raised monuments as treasures to himself, with a view to the oblivion of old age, if he should arrive to it, and for the like benefit of others who tread in the same steps, he is delighted on beholding his delicate progeny
of

of fruits; and while other men pursue other diversions, irrigating themselves with banquets, and other entertainments which are the sisters of these, he on the contrary passes his time in the delights which conversation produces.

PHÆDR. You speak, Socrates, of a most beautiful diversion, and not of a vile amusement, as the portion of him who is able to sport with discourse, and who can mythologize about justice, and other particulars which you speak of.

SOC. For it is indeed so, my dear Phædrus. But, in my opinion, a much more beautiful study will result from discourses, when some one employing the dialectic art, and receiving a soul properly adapted for his purpose, plants and sows in it discourses, in conjunction with science; discourses which are sufficiently able to assist both themselves and their planter, and which are not barren, but abound with seed; from whence others springing up in different manners, are always sufficient to extend this immortal benefit, and to render their possessor blessed in as high a degree as is possible to man.

PHÆDR. This which you speak of is still far more beautiful.

SOC. But now, Phædrus, this being granted, are we able to distinguish and judge about what follows?

PHÆDR. What is that?

SOC. Those particulars for the sake of knowing which we came hither; that we might inquire into the disgrace of Lyfias in the art of writing; and that we might investigate those discourses which are either written with or without art. To me, therefore, it appears that we have moderately evinced that which is artificial, and that which is not so.

PHÆDR. It appears so.

SOC. But again we ought to remember that no one can acquire perfection in the art of speaking, either with respect to teaching or persuading, till he is well acquainted with the truth of the particulars about which he either speaks or writes: till he is able to define the whole of a thing; and when defined, again knows how to divide it according to species, as far as to an indivisible: and, according to this method, contemplating the soul, and discovering a species adapted to the nature of each, he thus disposes and adorns his discourse; accommodating various and all-harmonious discourses to a soul characterized by variety; but such as are simple, to one of a simple disposition.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. It appears to be so in every respect.

Soc. But what shall we say to the question, whether it is beautiful or base to speak and write orations; and in what respect this employment may be blameable or not? unless what we have said a little before is sufficient for this purpose.

PHÆDR. What was that?

Soc. That whether Lyfias, or any other, has at any time written, or now writes, so as to establish laws, either privately or publicly, composing a political work, and thinking that it contains great stability and clearness; this is base in a writer, whether any one says so or not. For to be ignorant of the difference between true visions and the delusions of sleep, between just and unjust, evil and good, cannot fail of being really base, though the whole rout of the vulgar should unite in its praise.

PHÆDR. It cannot be otherwise.

Soc. But he who in a written oration thinks that there is a great necessity for amusement, and who considers no discourse, whether in prose or verse, deserving of much study in its composition or recital, like those rhapsodists who without judgment and learning recite verses for the sake of persuasion, while in reality the best of those discourses were written for the sake of admonishing the skilful; but who thinks, that the clear, the perfect, and the serious, ought only to take place in discourses which teach and are delivered for the sake of learning, and which are truly written in the soul, about the just, the beautiful and the good; and who judges that discourses of this kind ought to be called his legitimate offspring; that, in the first place, which is inherent in himself, if he should find it there, and afterwards whatever offspring, or brethren, spring in a becoming manner from this progeny of his own soul in the souls of others, bidding at the same time farewell to all others;—a man of this kind, Phædrus, appears to be such a one as you and I should pray that we may be.

PHÆDR. I perfectly desire and pray for the possession of what you speak of.

Soc. We have, therefore, moderately spoken thus much about discourses, as it were in play: it only remains that you tell Lyfias, that, descending with intellect to the stream of the Nymphs and Muses, we heard certain discourses, which they ordered us to acquaint Lyfias with, and every other

writer of orations, likewise Homer, and any other who may compose either naked poetry, or that which is adorned with the song; and in the third place Solon, and all who may commit political institutions to writing;—that if their compositions result from knowing the truth, and if they are able to defend their writings against the objections of adversaries who declare that they can evince the improbity of their discourses,—then, they ought not to be denominated from works of this kind, but from what they have seriously written.

PHÆDR. What appellations, then, will you assign them?

SOC. To call them wise, Phædrus, appears to me to be a mighty appellation, and adapted to a God alone; but to denominate them philosophers, or something of this kind, seems to be more convenient and proper.

PHÆDR. There is nothing indeed unbecoming in such an epithet.

SOC. He, therefore, who cannot exhibit any thing more honourable than what he has written, and who turns upwards and downwards his composition, for a considerable space of time, adding and taking away,—may not such a one be justly called a poet, or a writer of orations or laws?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. Relate these particulars, therefore, to your associate.

PHÆDR. But what will you do? For it is not proper that your companion should be neglected.

SOC. Who is he?

PHÆDR. The worthy Isocrates. What will you tell him, Socrates? and what character shall we assign him?

SOC. Isocrates as yet, Phædrus, is but a young man; but I am willing to tell you what I prophesy concerning him.

PHÆDR. What?

SOC. He appears to me to possess such excellent natural endowments, that his productions ought not to be compared with the orations of Lysias. Besides this, his manners are more generous; so that it will be by no means wonderful, if, when he is more advanced in age, he should far surpass, in those orations which are now the objects of his study, all the other boys who ever meddled with orations; or, if he should not be content with a pursuit of this kind, I think that a more divine impulse will lead him to greater attainments: for there is naturally, my friend, a certain philosophy in the diano-

etic part of this man. Tell, therefore, my beloved Isocrates this, as a piece of information which I have received from the Gods of this place; and do you likewise acquaint Lysias with the particulars which respect his character and pursuits, as a person who is the object of your warmest attachment.

PHÆDR. Be it so; but let us depart, since the heat has now abated its fervour.

Soc. But it is proper we should pray before we depart.

PHÆDR. Undoubtedly.

Soc. O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are residents of this place¹, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever I possess externally may be friendly to my inward attainments! Grant, also, that I may consider the wise man as one who abounds in wealth; and that I may enjoy that portion of gold, which no other than a prudent man is able either to bear, or properly manage! Do we require any thing else, Phædrus? for to me it appears that I have prayed tolerably well.

PHÆDR. Pray also in the same manner for me: for the possessions of friends are common.

Soc. Let us then depart.

¹ By Pan, and the other Gods, understand local deities under the moon. But Pan is denominated as it were *all*, because he possesses the most ample sway in the order of local Gods. For, as the supermundane Gods are referred to Jupiter, and the celestial to Bacchus, so all the sublunary local Gods and dæmons are referred to Pan.

THE END OF THE PHÆDRUS.

THE GREATER HIPPIAS,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE BEAUTIFUL

CONSIDERED AS SUBSISTING IN SOUL.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

THE design of this dialogue, which has the addition of *greater* to its name Hippias, in contradistinction to another of the same name which is shorter, is gradually to unfold the nature of *the beautiful* as subsisting in soul. That this is the real design of it will be at once evident by considering that logical methods are adapted to whatever pertains to soul, in consequence of its energies being naturally discursive, but do not accord with intellect, because its vision is simple, at once collected, and immediate. Hence this dialogue is replete with *trials*¹ and *confutations*, *definitions* and *demonstrations*, *divisions*, *compositions*, and *analyses*; but that part of the Phædrus in which *beauty* according to its first subsistence is discussed, has none of these, because its character is enthusiastic.

It is necessary however to remark, that in saying the design of the dialogue is concerning the beautiful as subsisting in soul, we do not merely mean the human soul, but soul in general:—in other words, it is concerning that beauty which first subsists in the soul of the universe, which in Platonic language is the monad of all souls, and is thence imparted to all the subsequent orders of souls.

It is well observed by Mr. Sydenham², that Plato conceals the importance of his meaning in this dialogue, by a vein of humour and drollery which runs throughout the whole. The introductory part of the dialogue

¹ Πείραι και ἐλεγχχοι, και ορισμοι, και αποδείξεις, και διαιρέσεις, συνθεσεις τε και αναλυσεις.

² I am sorry that I could not give the whole of his argument to this dialogue; but as he was not profoundly skilled in the philosophy of Plato, he is mistaken in many points, and particularly in the design of the dialogue, which according to him is concerning the highest or the sovereign beauty.

is purely ironical, and seems intended by deriding to purify the sophists from their twofold ignorance; exposing with this view their love of gain, their polymathy, or various knowledge, of itself useless to the prime purposes of life, and their total want of that true wisdom whose tendency is to make men virtuous and happy. Mr. Sydenham also observes, that the character of the composition of this dialogue is so perfectly dramatic, that, but for the want of fable, it might be presented on the stage by good comedians with great advantage. He adds: Nay, so highly picturesque is it in the manners which it imitates, as to be a worthy subject for the pencil of any moral painter. Some of the ancients, it seems, placed it among the dialogues which they called *anatreptic*, or *the subverting*; but it appears to me that it ought rather to be ranked among those of the *pirastic* and *maieutic* ¹ kind.

Should it be asked, since it is by no means positively asserted in this dialogue, what *the beautiful* in soul is, we reply, that it is a vital *rational* form, the cause of symmetry to every thing in and posterior to soul. The propriety of this definition will be obvious by considering that the highest beauty is a vital *intellectual* form, the source of symmetry to all things posterior to the ineffable principle of all, as we have shown in the Notes on the Parmenides; and that consequently soul, in participating this beauty, will preserve all its characteristic properties entire, except the *intellectual* peculiarity, which in the participation will become rational.

¹ i. e. Among those which explore and obfetricate the conceptions of the soul.

THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPIAS.

SCENE'.—THE LYCÆUM.

SOCRATES.

HIPPIAS, the fine ² and the wise! what a long time it is since last you touched ³ at Athens!

HIP.

¹ The scene of this dialogue is clearly the Lycæum, a structure of astonishing grandeur and beauty, at a small distance from the city, by the side of the Ilyssus; the largest and most magnificent of those three built at the public cost for the purpose of bathing and the gymnastic exercises. The other two were within the city, lying convenient for the use of the ordinary citizens and men of business. But this was the most frequented by men of larger fortune and more leisure; with many of whom Socrates was intimately acquainted. Hither, as we learn from Plato's Symposium, it was his usual custom to resort, accompanied by his friends, and to spend here the greatest part of the day. That the Sophists, whenever they came to Athens, frequented the same place, appears from Isocrates in Orat. Panathen.; as indeed it is natural to suppose; the nobler part of the youth being daily there assembled: for these were extremely inquisitive after knowledge, and great admirers of philosophy; and the Sophists professed the teaching it, and the making, for a certain stipulated sum of money, any man a philosopher. To carry on this business of their profession, they were continually travelling about, like the Rhapsodists, from city to city, (*ταχέως πανταχὺ γιγνομένους*, says Isocrates,) wherever philosophy and knowledge were in esteem; but visited Athens the oftener, where above all places those ornaments of the mind were highly valued.—S.

² Hippias was remarkable for the finery of his apparel, as we shall see further on. This striking the eyes of Socrates immediately on meeting him occasioned his addressing him first with this epithet.—S.

³ Socrates in this sentence humorously makes use of a sea term to represent the life led by the Sophists, as resembling that of mariners; who are roving incessantly from port to port, and never

HIP. It is because I have not had leisure ¹, Socrates. For the Eleans, you are to know, whenever they have any public affairs to negotiate with any of the neighbouring cities, constantly apply to me, and appoint me their ambassador for that purpose, in preference to all others: because they consider me as a person the ablest to form a right judgment of what is argued and alleged by every one of the cities, and to make a proper report of it to them. My embassies ², therefore, have been frequent to many of those powers; but ofteneft, and upon points the most in number, as well as of the highest importance, have I gone to Sparta to treat with the Lacedæmonians. This is the reason, then, in answer to your question, why so seldom I visit these parts.

Soc. This it is, Hippias, to be a man truly wise and perfectly accomplished. For, being thus qualified, you have, in your private ³ capacity, great

continue long in one place. But possibly there is a further meaning; it may be intended to prepare us for observing that instability of Hippias himself, his notions and opinions, which is afterwards to appear throughout the dialogue; an instability arising from his want of the fixed principles of science, the only sure foundation of settled opinions. At the same time; there is a propriety in this expression from the mouth of an Athenian, to whom it must have been habitual; Athens being seated near the sea, the Athenians the principal merchants, and their state the greatest maritime power then in the world.—S.

¹ Plato acquaints us always as soon as possible with the character of his speakers. In this first speech of Hippias, the vain and ostentatious sophist, the solemn and formal orator, both appear in a strong light, and prepare us at once for all which is to follow, agreeably to those characters.—S.

² See Philostrat. p. 495. ed. Olear.—S.

³ Hippias is here represented as being both a sophist and an orator. For the better apprehending this double character of his, and the more fully understanding those many passages of Plato where these professions are mentioned, it may be useful to give a summary account of their rise and nature. The Grecian wisdom then, or philosophy, in the most antient times of which any records are left us, included physics, ethics, and politics, until the time of Thales the Ionian; who giving himself up wholly to the study of Nature, of her principles and elements, with the causes of the several phænomena, became famous above all the antient sages for natural knowledge; and led the way to a succession of philosophers, from their founder and first master called Ionic. Addicted thus to the contemplation of things remote from the affairs of men, these all lived abstracted as much as possible from human society; revealing the secrets of nature only to a few select disciples, who sought them out in their retreat, and had a genius for the same abstruse inquiries, together with a taste for the same retired kind of life. As the fame of their wisdom spread, the curiosity of that whole inquisitive nation, the Grecians, was at length excited. This

great presents made you by the young men of the age ; and are able to make them ample amends by the greater advantages which they derive from you : then, in your public character, you are able to do service to your country, as a man ought who would raise himself above contempt, and acquire reputation among the multitude. But, Hippias, what sort of reason can be given, why those in former days, who are so highly famed for wisdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and Thales the Milesian, with his disciples, successors, and followers, down to Anaxagoras, if not all, yet most of them, are found to have lived the lives of private men, declining to engage in public affairs ?

HIP. What other reason, Socrates, can you imagine beside this, that they

gave occasion to the rise of a new profession, or sect, very different from that of those speculative sages. A set of men, smitten, not with the love of wisdom, but of fame and glory, men of great natural abilities, notable industry and boldness, appeared in Greece ; and assuming the name of Sophists, a name hitherto highly honourable, and given only to those by whom mankind in general were supposed to be made wiser, to their antient poets, legislators, and the Gods themselves, undertook to teach, by a few lessons, and in a short time, all the parts of philosophy to any person, of whatever kind was his disposition or turn of mind, and of whatever degree the capacity of it, so that he was but able to pay largely for his teaching. In the same age with Thales lived Solon the Athenian ; who took the other part of philosophy to cultivate, and, applying himself chiefly to moral and political science, became so great a proficient in those studies, that he gave a new system of excellent laws to his country. Hence arose in Athens a race of politicians, studious of the laws, and of the art of government. During this succession, through force of natural genius, good polity, commerce and riches among the Athenians, great improvements were made in all the liberal arts : but that of oratory flourished above the rest, for this reason ; because the Athenians lived under a popular government, where the art of ruling is only by persuasion. Eloquence then being one of the principal means of persuasion, and persuasion the only way to acquire and maintain power, all who were ambitious of any magistracy or office in the government studied to become eloquent orators : and the arts of rhetoric and polity were thus united in the same persons. Accordingly, we learn from the Attic writers of those days, that the most popular orators at Athens were appointed to embassies, to magistracies, to the command of armies, and the supreme administration of all civil affairs. See particularly Isocrates in *Orat. de Pace, & Panathen.* In this dialogue we find that the same spirit prevailed at Elis. Now in men of great abilities the predominant passion is ambition more frequently than avarice. Those of the Sophists, therefore, who excelled in quickness of understanding, compass of knowledge, and ingenuity, such as Hippias was, added to their other attainments the arts of popular oratory, and by those means got into the management of the state. Thus much for the present : the sequel and the supplement of this short history, so far as they are necessary to our purpose, will appear on fit occasions.—S.

had not a sufficient reach of prudence for the conduct of their own private affairs, and those of the public at the same time?

Soc. Tell me then, in the name of Jupiter, whether, as all other arts are improved, and the workmen of former times are contemptible and mean in comparison with ours, shall we say that your art, that of the Sophists, hath in like manner received improvement; and that such of the antients as applied themselves to the study of wisdom were nothing, compared to you of the present age?

HIP. Perfectly right: that is the very case.

Soc. So that, were Bias to be restored to life again in our days, he would be liable to ridicule, appearing in competition with you Sophists: your case being parallel to that of our modern statuaries, who tell us that Dædalus, were he alive, and to execute such works as those to which he owed his great name, would but expose himself, and become ridiculous.

HIP. The truth of the matter, Socrates, exactly is what you say. I myself, however, make it my custom to bestow my commendations rather upon the antients, and upon all such as flourished in times precedent to our own; giving them the preeminence and precedence¹ above ourselves; in order to escape the envy of the living, and for fear of incurring the repentment of the dead².

Soc.

¹ Adliterations, adnominations, and repetitions of the same word, were some of those prettinesses of style, or graces, where they are employed with judgment, which are said to have been invented by the rhetorical Sophists. Plato, therefore, frequently in his dialogues, with great propriety, puts them into the mouths of such speakers. On what occasions, and how differently from the use made of them by those sophistical orators, he introduces them into his own style at other times, will be observed elsewhere.—S.

² There was a law at Athens, the author of which was Solon, ordaining μη λεγειν κακως τον τεθνηκοτα, *not to revile the dead*: a law made, says Plutarch, partly from a political consideration, to hinder the perpetuating of enmities; partly from a motive of justice, which forbids the attacking those who are not in a capacity of defending themselves; and partly from a principle of religion, agreeably to which the departed are to be looked on as sacred: και οσιον τους μεθεστωτας ιερους νομιζειν. Plut. in Vit. Solon. p. 89. E. That this sentiment was of much earlier antiquity than the age of Solon, appears from the following passage of Archilochus, cited by Clemens Alex. Strom. l. vi. p. 619. ed. Sylburg.

Ου γαρ (inf. f. ταδ') εσθλα, κατθανουσι κερταμεν
Επ' α'ερασι.—

For

Soc. In my opinion, Hippias, you see the matter in a just light, and consider it thoroughly well. I myself can witness the truth of what you say. It is indeed certain, that your art is in this respect really improved, in that you are able to manage the concerns of the public, and at the same time give attention to your own private interests. For Gorgias¹, that great sophist of Leontium, came hither on a public embassy from his country, as the ablest man among the Leontines to negotiate their affairs of state: and here he acquired glory by his fine harangues in the assembly of the people; at the same time that by his exhibitions before private companies²,
and

For this is evil, with heart biting taunt
To persecute men dead.—

And from this of Homer still earlier,

Οὐκ ὅστιον φθιμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδραῖν εὐχεται ἄσθαι:

Odys. l. xxii. ver. 412.

With boastful speech to glory o'er the dead
Is impious.—

This piece of ancient religion arose partly from an opinion, that souls freed from their earthly bodies were in a state of being superior to that of mortals, and ought, therefore, to be honoured by them; and partly was owing to a belief that the shadowy ghosts, or spirits, (which they distinguished from the intellectual souls,) of dead persons had it in their power to hurt the living, by haunting and disturbing them at least, if no other way. It is on the foundation of this belief that Virgil represents Dido thus threatening Æneas,

Omnibus umbra locis adero: dabis, improbe, poenas.

Æneid. l. iv. ver. 386.

Be where thou wilt, my shade shall still be there:

Yes; thou shalt suffer for thy cruelty,

Base man!—

And hence likewise came to be instituted the religious rite of offering *θελκτήρια*, pacificatory sacrifices, to the ghosts of those whom they were afraid of having offended. See Eurip. Iphigen. in Taur. ver. 166.—S.

¹ The character of Gorgias is painted by Plato at full length in a dialogue inscribed with his name. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to observe, that Gorgias was by profession, like Hippias, an orator as well as sophist; and set up for teaching both philosophy and the art of rhetoric: and that the price of his teaching was 100 *μναι*, which is of our money 322l. 18s. 4d. from each of his scholars.—S.

² The profession or business of a sophist consisted of three branches: one of which was to perfect and accomplish the fine gentleman, according to the idea which the Grecians had of such a character in that age of sophism: not to form him from the first rudiments throughout, or in
any

and his teaching our young men, he collected and raised very considerable sums of money from this city. Or, if you would have another instance, there is my own friend, the famous Prodicus¹; who has frequently been sent hither on several public embassies: but the last time, not long since, when he came as ambassador from Ceos, his speeches before the council gained him great honour; and his private exhibitions in the mean time, together with the tuition of our young men, procured him an immense heap of money. But not one of those antient sages ever thought proper to exact money by way of fee or reward for his teaching; or ever took it into his head to display his wisdom before a mixed multitude. So simple were they, and so much a secret was it to them, how valuable a thing was

any part, (for this task they thought beneath them,) but, after a course of liberal education had been gone through, and the studies and exercises of youth were ended, to give him then the finishing touches; qualifying him to speak plausibly upon all subjects, to support with specious arguments either side of any question or debate, and by false oratory and fallacious reasoning, afterwards from them called sophistical, to corrupt the hearers, silence the opposers, and govern all in all things. To attain these admired accomplishments, the young gentleman was constantly to attend, and follow them every where, as long as he thought fit himself; observing in what manner they disputed *de quolibet ente*, on any point which offered; and learning by degrees to imitate them. Hence, that which we translate tuition, or teaching, is every where in Plato termed *οὐκ ἐναι τοῖς νεοῖς*, the being accompanied by the young men. Another part of the sophist's occupation, quite distinct from the former, though carried on at the same time, was to read lectures at a certain price to each auditor, before as many as they could procure beforehand to become subscribers to them. These lectures, the subjects of which were chosen indifferently, were in the way of declamations, dissertations, or what we commonly call essays, ready composed and written down. They were not contrived, however, for the purpose of teaching or instruction: nor could they indeed effectually serve that end; for long speeches and lectures are easily forgotten: but they were calculated merely for entertainment and ostentation; and properly enough, therefore, entitled by the Sophists themselves *παρρησιᾶς*, exhibitions. The third branch of their trade, the only one cultivated gratuitously, for the sake of fame, though probably with a view, besides, of gaining customers in those other the lucrative branches, was to answer all questions proposed to them; like the antient oracle at Delphi, or the authors of the Athenian oracle in the last age; allusions to which practice of theirs we shall meet with frequently in Plato. But in this passage he had occasion only to mention their other two employments, from which immediately accrued their gain.—S.

¹ In Prodicus also were united the two characters of orator and sophist: as Philostratus (in Vit. Sophist.) confirms. That Socrates condescended to attend his lectures, and contracted an intimacy with him, we learn from several of Plato's dialogues. The price paid by each of his auditors at those last exhibitions of his, here mentioned, was 50 δραχμαί, or 1l. 12s. 3½d. See Plat. in Cratyl. p. 384. and Aristot. Rhet. l. iii. c. 14.—S.

money.

money. Whereas each of the others, whom I mentioned, has made more money of his wisdom, than any other artificer¹ could ever earn from any art whatever : and prior to these Protagoras did the same.

HIP. You know nothing, Socrates, of what high advantages belong to our profession. If you knew but how great have been my own gains, you would be amazed. To give you only one instance : Going upon a certain time to Sicily, where Protagoras then resided, high in reputation and revered in years ; I, though at that time in age greatly his inferior, gained in a very short time more than a hundred and fifty minas² : nay, from one place only, and that a very little one, Inycum, I took above twenty³. This when I brought home with me, and presented to my father, it struck him and my other friends in the city with wonder and astonishment. To say the truth, I am inclined to think, that not any two of the sophists, name which you please, taken together, have acquired so much money as myself.

SOC. A fair and a notable evidence have you produced, Hippias, proving not only your own wisdom, but how wise the world, too, is become now-a-days ; and what difference there is between the modern wisdom and the ancient in point of excellence. For of these predecessors of yours there is reported great folly, according to your account of things⁴. To Anaxagoras, for instance, it is said, happened the contrary of that lucky fate which befel you. For, when great wealth had been left him, he through negligence,

¹ ἄλλος δημιουργός. The reason why Plato uses this word, rather than τεχνικός, his usual term for artist, will appear in his dialogue named The Sophist ; where he debases that profession below the rank of the meanest artificer in any useful or honest way.—S.

² Equal to 484l. 7s. 6d. English money.—S.

³ Equal to 63l. 11s. 8d. In all our calculations we have followed the usual way of computing ; in which an ounce of the silver coin of Athens is valued but at 5s. 2d. and the Attic δραχμή is supposed equal to the Roman denarius ; though, as Dr. Arbuthnot judiciously observes, there is reason to think it was of greater value.—S.

⁴ Τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου. In our translation we have omitted this last word ; apprehending it to have been at first one of those, so frequently of old written on the margin of books by way of explication or illustration, and so frequently, when those books came to be copied afterward, assumed into the text. For, if permitted to remain, it confounds or much disturbs the construction ; and so greatly puzzles the old translators, that they have severally given this passage four different meanings, all of them, compared with what follows, evidently spoiling the sense. We should choose, therefore, to read τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ, λέγεται κ. τ. λ.—S.

they

they say, lost it all : so silly was he with his wisdom. And of other antient fables they relate stories of the same kind. A clear proof, I think, therefore, this which you exhibit, in what a wise age we live ; and what disproportion the wisdom of it bears to that of former times. Many too, I know, are agreed in this opinion, that a wise man ought, in the first place, to be wise to himself. Now the standard of this kind of wisdom is, it seems, he who can get the most money. But so much for this. And now tell me, as to your own gains, from which of the cities whither you have travelled did you collect the largest sums ? Undoubtedly it must have been from Sparta, whither you have gone the oftenest.

HIP. Not from thence, Socrates, by Jupiter.

Soc. How say you ? What, the least sum from thence ?

HIP. Never any thing at all.

Soc. It is a prodigy what you relate : and I am amazed at it, Hippias. But tell me, as to that wisdom of yours, has it not the power to improve in virtuous excellence all your followers who are conversant with it, and will learn ?

HIP. In the highest degree, Socrates.

Soc. Were you able then to improve the sons of the Inycians, yet wanted such ability with regard to the sons of Sparta ?

HIP. Far from it.

Soc. The Sicilians then, I warrant, have a desire of virtuous improvement ; but the Spartans not so.

HIP. Strongly so, Socrates, have the Spartans.

Soc. Was their want of money then the reason why they followed you not ?

HIP. By no means ; for of money they have plenty.

Soc. What account then can be given in such a case as this, when they were desirous of improvement, and in no want of money to purchase it ; and you able to furnish them with the highest degrees of it ; why they did not send you away loaded with riches ? What ; certainly the reason of it cannot be this, that the Spartans can educate their sons in a better manner than you could educate them ? Or shall we say they can ? and do you admit this to be true ?

HIP. By no means in the world.

Soc. Were you not able then to persuade the young men at Sparta that,
by

by the help of your conversation, they might make greater advances in virtue than ever they could hope to do from the company and converse of their fathers? Or could you not persuade those fathers that they would do better to commit the instruction of their sons to your management, than to undertake that care themselves, if they had any affectionate regard for their offspring? For it could not be that they envied their children the attainment of the highest excellence in virtue.

HIP. I have no suspicion of their envying them such an attainment.

SOC. Well now; and Sparta is really governed by good laws.

HIP. Who makes a doubt of it?

SOC. Very well; and in cities governed by good laws the highest value is set on virtue.

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. And how to teach virtue to others you know best of all men.

HIP. By much, Socrates.

SOC. Now the man who knows best how to teach and impart to others the art of horsemanship, of all countries in Greece would not such a man meet with most honour, and acquire most wealth, in Thessaly¹, and wherever else this art was cultivated most?

HIP. It is probable he would.

SOC. And will not the man who is capable of delivering the most valuable instructions with regard to virtue, meet with most honour, and pick up most money too, if he be that way inclined, in Sparta, and every other Grecian city governed by good laws? But in Sicily², my friend, rather do you suppose, or at Inycum? Ought we, Hippias, to give credit to this? for, if you say it, we must believe.

HIP. The truth is, Socrates, that the Spartans hold it sacred³ to make

¹ See the beginning of Plato's *Meno*.—S.

² The Sicilians were as infamous for luxury as the Spartans were illustrious for virtue. Whence the Greek proverb, *Σικελικὴ τραπεζα*; and the Latin, *Siculæ dapes*.—S.

³ This sacred authority, which the Spartans attributed to the laws of their country, was owing partly to the sanction given to those laws by the Delphian oracle; as appears from Xenophon's short observations upon the Lacedæmonian polity; and partly to the sanction of an oath taken by their ancestors, through a stratagem of Lycurgus, to maintain his laws inviolable: for which see Plutarch's life of that legislator, towards the end.—S.

no innovation in their laws; and to educate their youth in no other way than what is agreeable to their antient usages¹.

Soc. How say you? Do the Spartans hold it sacred not to do what is right, but to do the contrary?

Hip. I would not say any such thing, not I, Socrates.

Soc. Would not they do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

Hip. It is true they would: but the laws do not permit them to have their youth educated by foreigners, or after a foreign mode². For, be assured, if any foreigner ever acquired wealth at Sparta by teaching or instructing their youth, much more so should I; since they take great pleasure in hearing my dissertations, and give me high encomiums: but in the affair of education, the law, as I said, does not permit them the benefit of my instructions.

Soc. The law, Hippias, do you suppose mischievous to the public, or beneficial?

Hip. It is instituted, I presume, for the benefit of the public: but sometimes, where the frame of the law is bad, it proves a public mischief.

Soc. Well; but do not legislators always frame the law with a view of procuring for the public the greatest good? and because without law it were impossible to live in a state of order and good government.

Hip. Without doubt, they do.

Soc. When those, therefore, who undertake the making laws fail of procuring good, they have missed their end, and erred from good government and law. Or how say you otherwise?

Hip. Accurately speaking, Socrates, I must own the thing is so; but men are not used to affix such a meaning to the word *law*.

¹ The manner of the Spartan education may be seen at large in Cragius de Repub. Lacedæm. lib. iii.—S.

² The Spartans, above all people being attached to the antient constitution of their government and laws, were extremely jealous of having a taste introduced among them for foreign manners and fashions; because they were well aware, that by these means an essential change in their constitution would gradually follow and take place. This jealousy of theirs they carried to such a height, that they suffered no foreigner, or person of foreign education, to take up his constant residence in Sparta; nor any of their own people to reside for any considerable length of time in foreign countries.—S.

Soc. Do you speak of men who know what law means, or of men who want that knowledge?

Hip. I speak of the bulk of mankind, the multitude.

Soc. Are these such as know the truth of things, this multitude?

Hip. Certainly not.

Soc. But those who have that knowledge, the wise, hold that which is more beneficial, to be in reality, and according to the truth of things, more a law to all men than what is less beneficial. Do not you agree with them in this?

Hip. I agree that in reality so it is.

Soc. Is not the nature and the condition of every thing such as those hold it to be who are really knowing in the thing?

Hip. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Now to the Spartans, you say, an education under you a foreigner, and after a foreign manner, would be more beneficial than to be educated after the manner of their own country.

Hip. And I say what is true.

Soc. And that which is more beneficial is more a law. This you say likewise, Hippias.

Hip. I have admitted it so to be.

Soc. According, therefore, to your account, to have the sons of the Spartans educated under Hippias, is more agreeable to law; and their education under their fathers is more repugnant to law; supposing that from you they would receive advantages really greater.

Hip. And so indeed would they, Socrates.

Soc. Now from hence it follows, that the Spartans violate the law in not making you presents of money, and committing their sons to your care.

Hip. Be it so: for you seem to argue thus in my favour; and it is not my business to controvert your argument.

Soc. Violators of the law then, my friend, we find these Spartans, and that in the most important article too; these, who are thought to be the greatest observers of it. But, in the name of the Gods, Hippias, of what kind are those dissertations for which they give you those high encomiums? and upon what topics do they take that great pleasure in hearing you harangue?

No doubt, they must be the same in which you have so much excellent knowledge; those which relate to the stars and the phænomena of the sky.

HIP. They by no means endure to hear a word upon these subjects ¹.

SOC. But they take pleasure in hearing a lecture upon the subject of geometry.

HIP. Not at all: for many of the Spartans know not even the common rules of arithmetic; nay, scarcely, I may say, how to reckon.

SOC. They are far from enduring then to hear you discourse on the nature of numbers and accounts.

HIP. Very far from that, by Jupiter.

SOC. The subjects, then, I warrant you, are those upon which you are able to dissent, divide, and distinguish, with the greatest accuracy of all men; concerning the power of letters and syllables, of harmonies and rhythms ².

HIP. What harmonies, or what letters, my good man, do they concern themselves about?

SOC. Well; what are the subjects, then, upon which they attend to you, with so much pleasure to themselves, and so much commendation of you? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find it out.

HIP. Concerning the genealogies, O Socrates, of the heroes and of men;

¹ The polity of the Spartans was contrived with a view of making them a military people. For this reason, the mechanical and necessary arts were left to servants and slaves; and such part only of the liberal kind was admitted amongst them as contributed to military skill, or fitted them for the toils and the stratagems of war. But philosophy and the sciences are said to have been wholly excluded. Many passages from the antients in proof of this are collected by the annotators on Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 50. and by Nic. Craig, in his treatise before cited, l. iii. Perhaps, however, it was only so in appearance. It may be worth while to examine and consider well what Plato says on this subject in his Protagoras.—S.

² The Spartans were not more remarkable for a contempt of grammar and mathematics, than was Hippias for his skill in those sciences, as appears from the shorter dialogue called by his name. This part of the Introduction, the third and last, receives much grace from both these circumstances. For the mention of the sciences here in this manner, with a mixture of compliment and humour, seems to arise naturally from the character of the person with whom Socrates is conversing, and from that of the people who are the present subject of this part of their conversation. Plato uses such exquisite art in the œconomy of his dialogues, that whatever is brought upon the carpet appears to fall in naturally: at the same time that all the circumstances of it harmonize together; and every particular contributes to carry on his designs, either the principal or subordinate; being indeed purposely introduced for the sake of these.—S.

concerning

concerning the migration of tribes, and settling of colonies; the antiquity and first foundation of cities; in a word, concerning every thing in ancient story, they hearken to me with the utmost pleasure. So that I have been obliged to study those things myself for their sakes, and to perfect myself in all that sort of knowledge.

Soc. By Jupiter, Hippias, it was fortunate for you that the Spartans take no pleasure in hearing a man reckon up our archons from the time of Solon¹. For, if they did, the perfecting yourself in such a catalogue would put you to no little trouble.

Hip. Why so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names repeated only once, I will undertake to remember them.

Soc. It is true; but I did not consider that you had an excellent memory. So now I conceive the reason why, in all probability, the Spartans are delighted with you: it is because you know such a multitude of things, and are of the same use to them that old women are to children, to entertain them with the recital of pretty fables and old stories.

Hip. And by Jupiter, Socrates, upon a manly subject too, that of beauty in manners. For, discoursing there lately of a complete rule of manners becoming a young man, I gained much applause. And I take this opportunity to inform you, that I have a dissertation upon this subject extremely beautiful, finely framed in every respect, but particularly admirable for the choice of words². The occasion, or way of introducing my discourse, is this:—

¹ This was the æra of the Athenian greatness. For the lenity of Solon's laws, the limitation which they gave to the formidable power of a perpetual senate, and the popular liberty which they established, produced in the people such a spirit—the consequence always of lenity in the government, legal liberty, and a share of power—that Athens soon grew able to rival Sparta, and to be her competitor for the chief sway and leading in the general affairs of Greece. Plato here, therefore, intends a fine compliment to his country. That he could have no contrary view is evident; because the archons, or chief magistrates of Athens, had been elected annually, nine in number, eighty years before the archonship of Solon, when his laws were instituted. Plato would not have bounded his list of archons with the time of Solon, had his intention been to *satirize* the Athenian constitution; as it may seem to some, who imagine him in all things to be in jest, and always satirical.—S.

² The Sophists were remarkably curious upon this head. The words which they affected to use were the smooth, the soft, and the delicate; the pompous, and the highly-compound; the splendid, the florid, the figurative and poetical; the quaint, and the uncommon; the antique, and

this:—After the taking of Troy, Neoptolemus is supposed to ask advice of Nestor, and to inquire of him, what course of life a young man ought to follow in order to acquire renown and glory. Upon this Nestor speaks, and lays down a great many excellent precepts concerning the beauty of manners and a well-regulated life. This ¹ dissertation I exhibited at Sparta; and three days hence am to exhibit the same here at Athens, in the school of Phidostatus, together with several other pieces of mine worth the hearing. I do it at the request of Eudicus, the son of Apemantes. You will not fail, I hope, being present at it yourself, and bringing others with you to be of the audience, such as are capable judges of performances of this kind.

Soc. We shall do so, Hippias; if so it please God. But at present answer me a short question relating to your dissertation. For you have happily reminded me. You must know, my friend, that a certain person puzzled me lately in a conversation we had together ²—after I had been inveighing against some things for their baseness and deformity, and praising some other things for their excellence and beauty—by attacking me with these questions in a very insolent manner.—“Whence came you, Socrates, said he, to know what things are beautiful, and what are otherwise? For can you tell me, now, what the beautiful is?” I, through the meanness of my knowledge, found myself at a loss, and had nothing to answer him with any propriety. So, quitting his company, I grew angry with myself, reproached myself, and threatened that, as soon as ever I could meet with any one of you wise men, I would hear what he had to say upon the subject, and learn and study it thoroughly; and, that done, would return to my questioner, and battle the point with him over again. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come hap-

and obsolete; with many new ones of their own invention; all, in short, which any way served to please the sense, or amuse the fancy, without informing the understanding. Instances of all which are recorded in the ancient critics, and may be seen collected, many of them by Crescollus in *Theat. Rhet.* l. iii. c. 23. As to the diction of Hippias in particular, it is represented by Maximus Tyrius, c. 23. to have been empty and unmeaning, and his eloquence void of solidity.

¹ This boasted dissertation of Hippias was intitled *Ἱππίας*, as we learn from Philostratus, in whose time it appears to have been extant. The plan of manners which it laid down, if we may conjecture from the title, was taken from the characters of the heroes in Homer's *Iliad*, chiefly from that of Achilles, Hippias's favourite. See the shorter dialogue called by his name.—S.

² This certain person was no other than the dianoëtic part or power of the soul of Socrates: for it is this part which investigates truth, deriving its principles from intellect.—T.

pily

pily for me. Give me ample information then accordingly concerning the nature of the beautiful itself: and endeavour to be as accurate as possible in your answers to what I shall ask you; that I may not be confuted a second time, and deservedly again laughed at. For you understand the question, no doubt, perfectly well. To you such a piece of knowledge can be but a little one, amongst the multitude of those which you are master of.

HIP. Little enough, by Jupiter, Socrates; and scarcely of any value at all.

SOC. The more easily then shall I learn it; and not be confuted or puzzled any more upon that point by any man.

HIP. Not by any man. For otherwise would my skill be mean, and nothing beyond vulgar attainment.

SOC. It will be a brave thing, by Juno, Hippias, to get the better of the man, as you promise me we shall. But shall I be any obstacle to the victory if I imitate his manner, and, after you have answered some question of mine, make objections to your answer; for the sake only of more thorough information from you? for I have a tolerable share of experience in the practice of making objections. If it be no difference therefore to you, I should be glad to have the part of an objector allowed me, in order to be made a better master of the subject.

HIP. Take the part of an objector, then: for, as I said just now, it is no very knotty point, that which you inquire about. I could teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, in such a manner that none should ever be able to refute you.

SOC. O rare! what good news you tell me! But come, since you bid me yourself, I will put myself in the place of my antagonist, try to be what he is, to the best of my power, and in his person begin to question you. Now, if he were of the audience, when you exhibited that dissertation which you talk of, concerning the beauty of manners, after he had heard it through, and you had done speaking, this point rather than any other would be uppermost in his mind to question you upon, this relating to the beautiful: for he has a certain habit of so doing; and thus would he introduce it.—“Elean stranger! I would ask you, whether it is not by having honesty that honest men are honest?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he proposed the question.

HIP. I shall answer—It is by their having honesty.

SOC. Is not this some certain thing then, this honesty?

HIP.

HIP. Clearly so.

SOC. And is it not likewise by their having wisdom that wise men are wise? and by having good in them that all good things are good?

HIP. Without dispute.

SOC. And are not these some certain real things¹? for they are not surely non-entities, by whose intimate presence with other things those things are what they are.

HIP. Undoubtedly, real things.

SOC. I ask you then, whether all things which are beautiful are not in like manner beautiful by their having beauty?

HIP. They are, by their having beauty.

SOC. Some certain real thing, this beauty.

HIP. A real thing. But what is to come of all this?

SOC. Tell me now, friend stranger, will he say, what this thing is, this beauty, or the beautiful.

HIP. Does not the proposer of this question desire to have it told him, what is beautiful?

SOC. I think not, Hippias: but to have it told him what the beautiful is.

HIP. How does this differ from that?

SOC. Do you think there is no difference between them?

HIP. There is not any.

SOC. You certainly know better. Observe², my good friend, what the question is. For he asks you, not what is beautiful, but what is the beautiful.

HIP. I apprehend you, honest friend. And to that question, What is the beautiful? I shall give an answer, such a one as can never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, a beautiful maiden is the thing beautiful.

¹ This is levelled against those who maintained that mind and the objects of mind have no real being; attributing reality to nothing but that which they are able *απριξ ταιν χειρων λαβεσθαι*, says Plato, (*Theætet.* p. 155.) "to take fast hold of with their hands;" or, at least, which is the object of one or other of their senses.—S.

² The Greek, as it is printed, is *ὁμως—αθρει*. But the sense, as we apprehend, not admitting an adversative adverb, the true reading probably is *ὁμοσε* or *ὁμου—αθρει*, that is, "Look close, or near:" for the Attic writers used the word *ὁμου* to signify the same with *εγγυς*. See Harpocrat. p. 130, 131. ed. Gronov.—S.

Soc.

Soc. An excellent answer, by the dog¹, Hippias; and such a one as cannot fail of being applauded. Shall I then, in answering thus, have answered the question asked me? and that so well as not to be refuted?

Hip. How should you be refuted, Socrates, in avowing that which is the opinion of all the world; and the truth of which all who hear you will attest?

Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But now, Hippias, let me alone to resume the question, with your answer to it, by myself. The man will interrogate me after this manner: "Answer me, Socrates, and tell me, if there be any such thing as the beautiful itself², to whose presence is owing the beauty of all those things which you call beautiful³?" Then shall I answer

¹ Plato has in his dialogues drawn the picture of his hero with an exactness so minute, that he seems not to have omitted the least peculiarity in the ordinary conversation of that great man. Of this we have here an instance very remarkable. Socrates, it seems, in common discourse used frequently to swear by brute animals. The different reasons which have been assigned for his so doing, and the various censures passed on him, may be seen collected by Menage in Not. ad Laërt. p. 92, 93; M. Massieu in the first tome of *Les Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript. & Belles Lett.* p. 205.; and by M. du Soul in Not. ad Lucian. vol. i. p. 556. ed. Hemsterhus. Thus much is evident, that the Cretans had a law or custom, introduced amongst them by Rhadamanthus, to use that very kind of oaths; on purpose to avoid naming on every trivial occasion the Gods in whom they believed. See the authors cited by Olearius in Not. ad Philostrat. p. 257. n. 22. That the great Athenian philosopher followed in this the example of the old Cretan judge and lawgiver, is the opinion of Porphyry, in l. iii. de Abstin. § 16. and indeed is in the highest degree probable; because we find Socrates swearing by the very same species of animals adjoined commonly by the Cretans. The dog is named the most frequently in the oaths of both; probably because domestic, and the most frequently in fight when they were talking. See the Scholiast on Aristoph. Av. ver. 521. and Suidas in voce *Ῥαδαμανθυος ὄρκος*.—S.

² The Greek is, *εἰ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ το καλόν*. Among the Attic writers *εἰ* has often the force of an adverb of interrogation, signifying "whether;" like the English particle "if." This is one of the many idioms of our language, corresponding with those of the ancient Attic Greek. But this idiom seems not to have been well known, or at least not here observed, by any of the translators: for they all interpret this part of the sentence in a conditional sense, making *εἰ* a conditional conjunction. Nor does it indeed appear to have been better known to those old transcribers of the original, from whose copies are printed the editions we have of Plato. For their ignorance in this point seems to have occasioned those corruptions of the text taken notice of in the two following notes.—S.

³ The whole sentence in the present editions stands thus: *Ἰθί μοι, ὦ Σωκράτης, ἀποκρίναι ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φης καλὰ εἶναι, εἰ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ το καλόν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ*; In the latter part of this sentence there is undoubtedly an omission; which we ought to supply thus; *Δι' ὅ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καλὰ, as we*

swer him thus: "A beautiful maiden is that beautiful, to whose presence those other things owe their beauty ¹."

HIP. Well. And do you imagine, after this, that he will ever think of refuting you? or attempt to prove your answer concerning the thing beautiful not a just answer? or, if he should attempt it, that he would not be ridiculous?

SOC. That he will attempt it, friend, I am well assured: but whether in so doing he will be ridiculous, will appear in the attempt itself. However, I'll tell you what he will say.

HIP. Tell me then.

SOC. "How pleasant you are, Socrates!" he will say. "Is not a beautiful mare then a thing beautiful? commended as such even by the divine oracle ²." What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we not acknowledge, that
a mare

read in the sentence following, where Socrates repeats the terms of the question: or rather, Ω κ. τ. λ. the dative case having been used by Socrates just before, when he stated the question first.—S.

¹ The Greek is printed thus: Εγω δε δη κρω, οτι ει παρθενος καλη, καλον εστι δι' ο ταυτ' αν ειη καλα. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word ει before παρθενος, and to read οτι παρθενος καλη καλον εστι, κ. τ. λ. The author of this interpolation, no doubt, intended to make this sentence answer to the former; and thus completed the series of blunders, which arose gradually from that ignorance of the Attic idiom, used in the former sentence, of which we accused the transcribers in note ², p. 393. This last blunder has been the source of another, a most ridiculous one, made by Augustinus Niphus in a Latin treatise De Pulchro. His intention, in the former part of that work, is to illustrate the Greater Hippias of Plato. In pursuance of which he thinks it incumbent on him, in the first place, to prove the excellence of some particular beauty; such as may best show, we presume he means, the perfection of the ideal pattern. For this purpose, he politely and gallantly urges the following argument, manifestly borrowed from the error complained of in this note: "If the princess Joan of Arragon be beautiful without a fault, then there must be something absolutely beautiful in the nature of things: But none can deny the faultless beauty of the princess Joan: Therefore, &c." And in proof of this last position, he gives us a long detail of the charms of that princess; such as, besides the beauties of her mind and sweetness of her manners, her golden locks, blue eyes, dimpled chin, &c. &c. &c. from head to foot.—S.

² The oracle here meant is recorded at large by Jo. Tzetzes, chil. ix. cap. 291. of which only the following verse relates to the present subject—

Ἰπποὶ Θρηϊκῆαι, Λακεδαιμονίαι τε γυναῖκες.

The dames of Sparta and the mares of Thrace
Excel amongst the females of their kind.

Out of this the Grecians, with a little alteration, made a proverb, current amongst them,

Ἰππῶν

a mare is beautiful likewise? meaning a beautiful mare. For, indeed, how should we dare deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

HIP. True, Socrates. And no doubt the God rightly gave that commendation: for with us, too, there are mares exceedingly beautiful¹.

SOC. "Very well now," will he say: "but what, is not a beautiful lyre too a thing beautiful?" Shall we allow it, Hippias?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. After this he will say, (for with tolerable certainty I can guess he will, from my knowledge of his character,) "But what think you of a beautiful soup-pan, you simpleton you? is not that a thing beautiful then?"

HIP. Who is this man, Socrates? I warrant, some unmannerly and ill-bred fellow, to dare to mention things so mean and contemptible, upon a subject so noble and so respectable.

SOC. Such is the man, Hippias; not nice and delicate; but a mean shabby fellow, without consideration or regard for aught except this, in every inquiry,—What is true?—The man, however, must have an answer: and in order to it, I thus premise—If the pan be made by a good workman,

Ἰππον Θεσσαλικὴν, Λαμειδαίμονιν τε γυναῖκα.

A Spartan dame, and a Thesfalian mare.

See Barthius on Claudian, de 4to Conf. Hon. ad ver. 543. pag. 697.

Hence it arose in time, that the words of the oracle itself suffered a change; and instead of *Θρηϊκίαι* was substituted *Θεσσαλικαί*: with which alteration we find the oracle cited again by the same Tzetzes, chil. x. c. 330. That the former word is the true reading, and the latter a corruption, rather than the reverse of this, is probable from the authority of a writer, the most antient of those who cite this oracle, Eusebius, in *Præp. Ev.* l. v. c. xxvii. pag. 132. ed. R. Steph.—S.

¹ We learn from Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 303. that the people of Elis carried their mares into other countries to be covered. It is probable, therefore, that they encouraged only the female breed of that animal at home: especially if it be true, what Pliny and Servius write, that mares are better for a long race. See the annotators on Virgil, *Georg.* i. ver. 59. The Eleans were undoubtedly thus curious about the breed, on account of the chariot-races in the Olympic games; which were celebrated in their country, and from which they derived the advantage of being suffered to enjoy a constant peace, with liberty and honour—

Et quas Elis opes ante pararat equis.

PROPERT. l. i. el. 8. ver. 36.

And by her mares, so fleet in race to run,

The wealth which Elis antiently had won.—S.

smooth and round, and well-baked; like some of our handsome soup-pans with two handles, those which hold six coas¹, exceedingly beautiful in truth; if he mean such a pan as these are, the pan must be confessed beautiful. For how, indeed, could we deny that to be beautiful which has real beauty?

HIP. By no means, Socrates.

Soc. "Is not a beautiful soup-pan, then," he will say, "a thing beautiful? Answer."

HIP. Well then, Socrates, my opinion of the case is this: Even this vessel, if well and handsomely made, is a beautiful thing likewise. But nothing of this kind deserves to be mentioned as beautiful, when we are speaking of a mare, and a maiden, or any other thing thus admirable for its beauty.

Soc. So; now I apprehend you, Hippias. When the man asks such a question as that, we are thus, it seems, to answer him:—"Honest man! are you ignorant how it was said well by Heraclitus, 'that the most beautiful ape, in comparison with the human² kind, is a creature far from beautiful?' Just so, the most beautiful soup-pan is a thing far from beautiful in comparison with the maiden kind; as it is said by Hippias the wife." Is it not thus, Hippias, that we must answer?

HIP. By all means, Socrates: your answer is perfectly right.

Soc. Mind me now: for upon this, I am well assured, he will say to me thus:—"But suppose, Socrates, the maiden kind were to be set in comparison with the Goddess's kind; would not the same accident befall the maidens in that case, which happened to the soup-pans compared with them? Would

¹ According to the accurate Dr. Arbuthnot's computation, the Attic *χοῦς*, or *χοα*, was a measure containing three quarts. So that the fine tureens here mentioned held 4½ gallons.—S.

² In the Greek we read *ἀλλὰ γένει*. But, that we ought to read *ἀνθρωπίνῃ γένει*, there is no occasion, we presume, for any arguments to prove. It will sufficiently appear from what is quoted presently after from the same Heraclitus. For, however *dark* or *mysterious* his writings might have been, as we are told they were, yet there is no reason to think he wrote *absurdly*. But the absurdity was easily committed by the transcribers of Plato; who probably sometimes did not well understand his meaning, certainly were not always very attentive to it. For we learn from those who are much conversant with ancient manuscripts, that *ἀνθρωπῶ* often, and *ἀνθρωπίνῃ* sometimes, is written in this concise manner, *ἀνῶ*. And no error is more common in the editions of Greek authors, than such as are occasioned by this very abbreviation.—S.

not the fairest maiden appear far from being beautiful? Does not Heraclitus further teach this very doctrine, which you yourself must needs infer to be true¹, that the wisest of men, compared with a God, will appear an ape in wisdom and beauty and every other excellence²? Shall we own, Hippias, the fairest maiden far from beautiful, in comparison with a Goddess?

HIP. Who, Socrates, would presume to call this in question?

SOC. No sooner then shall I have agreed with him in this, than he will laugh at me, and say, "Do you remember, Socrates, what question you was asked?"—"I do," I shall tell him; "it was this: What kind of thing was the beautiful itself?"—"When the question then," he will say, "concerned the beautiful itself, your answer was concerning that which happens to be far from beautiful, according to your own confession, as beautiful as it is."—"So it seems," shall I say? Or what other reply, my friend, do you advise me to make him?

HIP. I think, for my part, you must reply in those very words. For³,
when

¹ The Greek is thus printed, *ὁν σου επαγγ*; and by all the translators interpreted after this manner: "That Heraclitus, whose testimony you cite;" as if the word *μαρτυρα* was tacitly understood after *επαγγ*. Whether this interpretation be agreeable to the words of Plato, or not; we see it plainly repugnant to the matter of fact: for it was not Hippias, but Socrates himself, who had just before cited Heraclitus. Supposing, however, that the writings of this philosopher were cited frequently by Hippias; and that possibly, therefore, the meaning might be this: "He whose testimony you are used to cite;" yet the alteration of the word *ὁν* into *ὁ* AN will, we presume, to every attentive and judicious reader, appear to make better sense and reasoning. For the saying of Heraclitus, which follows, as this philosopher inferred the truth of it, by analogy, from his comparison between apes and men, is no less a proper inference, in the same way of reasoning, from what Hippias had just before admitted to be his own meaning, and the amount of what he had said concerning the soup-pan compared with a beautiful maiden. Our learned readers will also observe the construction to be much easier, and more natural, when the sentence is read thus: *ὁν καὶ Ἡρακλείτης ταυτοῦ τουτο λέγει, ὁ αν σου επαγγ*.—S.

² In this quotation from Heraclitus every one will discern the original of that thought in Mr. Pope's Essay on Man—

Superior beings, when of late they saw
A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,
And showed a Newton, as we show an ape.—S.

³ We entirely agree with Monf. Maucroy, in assigning the following sentence to Hippias; though all the other translations, with the printed editions of the Greek, attribute it to Socrates.

when he says that the human kind compared with the divine is far from beautiful, without doubt he will have the truth on his side.

Soc. "But were I to have asked you at first this question," will he say, 'What is beautiful, and at the same time far from beautiful?' and you were to have answered me in the manner you did; would not you in that case have answered rightly? And does the beautiful then itself, by which every other thing is ornamented, and looks beautiful, whenever this form of beauty supervenes and invests it, imparting thus the virtue of its presence,—does this still appear to you to be a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?"

Hip. Truly, Socrates, if this be the question which he asks, it is the easiest thing imaginable to answer it; and to tell him what that beautiful thing is, by which other things are ornamented; and which, by supervening and investing them, makes them look beautiful. So that he must be a very simple fellow, and entirely a stranger to things elegant and fine. For, if you only answer him thus, "that the beautiful, which he inquires after, is nothing else than gold," he will have no more to say, nor attempt ever to refute such an answer. Because none of us can be insensible that, wherever gold be applied or superinduced, let the thing have looked ever so vile and fordid before, yet then it will look beautiful, when it is invested or ornamented with gold.

Soc. You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how unyielding he is, and how hard in admitting any assertion.

Hip. What signifies that, Socrates? He must of necessity admit what is rightly asserted; or, in not admitting it, expose himself to ridicule.

Soc. And yet will he be so far from admitting this answer, my friend, that he will treat me with open derision, and say to me, "You that are so puffed up with the opinion of your own skill and knowledge, do you think Phidias was a bad workman?" And I believe I shall answer, that he was far from being so.

Hip. You will answer rightly, Socrates.

Soc. Rightly, without dispute. But he, when I have agreed with him that Phidias was a good workman, will say, "Do you imagine, then, that Phidias

The error seems to have arisen from want of observing, that the particle *και* in Plato has frequently the force of *γὰρ*; and that *και* *δη*, though oftener *και* *μὲν* *δη*, answers to the Latin *enimvero*.—S.

was ignorant of that which you call the beautiful?"—"To what purpose do you ask this?" I shall say.—"Because Minerva's eyes," will he reply, "Phidias made not of gold, nor yet the rest of her face; nor the feet, nor the hands neither: though she would have looked handsomest, it seems, had she been a golden Goddess: but he made these all of ivory¹. It is evident that he committed this error through ignorance; not knowing that gold it was which beautified all things, wherever it was applied." When he talks after this manner, what answer shall we make him, Hippias?

HIP. There is no difficulty at all in the matter. We shall answer, "Phidias was in the right; for things made of ivory are also, as I presume, beautiful."

SOC. "What was the reason, then," will he say, "why Phidias made not the pupil of the eyes out of ivory, but out of stone rather? choosing for that purpose such stone as (in colour) most resembled ivory. Is a beautiful stone then a thing beautiful too?" Shall we admit it so to be, Hippias?

HIP. We will; in a place where the stone is becoming.

SOC. But, where it is unbecoming, shall I allow it to be unhandsome, or not?

HIP. Allow it; where the stone becomes not the place.

SOC. "Well now; and is it not the same with ivory and gold, you wise man you?" will he say. "Do not these, where they are becoming, make things appear handsome; but far otherwise where they are unbecoming?" Shall we deny this, or acknowledge the man to be in the right?

HIP. We must acknowledge this, that whatever is becoming to any thing makes it appear handsome.

SOC. Upon this, he will say thus: "When that fine soup-pan, then, which we have been speaking of, is set upon the stove full of excellent soup², whether

¹ All the other parts, not here mentioned, were of massive gold: as we collect from Pliny's Natural History, l. xxxvi. c. 6. compared with this place. For the Athenian Minerva was always painted or carved with martial habiliments. It became a Goddess to have these made of gold. And with equal propriety, no doubt, did Phidias make of ivory the parts supposed to be left naked. The Olympian Jupiter, and this admirable statue, the size of which far exceeded the human, were esteemed the capital works of that great master. See Plin. Hist. Nat. l. xxxiv. c. 8. The Minerva stood in the *Παρθενον*, or temple of that Goddess, at Athens.—S.

² The fine compound soups of the Athenians, to prevent spoiling the contexture of some of the ingredients,

whether is a golden spoon the most becoming and proper for it, or a sycamore spoon?"

HIP. Hercules! what a strange sort of man, Socrates, is he whom you are talking of! Will you not tell me who he is?

SOC. Should I tell you his name, you would not know him.

HIP. But I know already that he is some ignorant silly fellow.

SOC. He is a very troublesome questioner indeed, Hippias. But, however, what shall we answer? Which of the two spoons shall we say is most becoming and proper for the soup and for the pan? Is it not clearly the sycamore¹ spoon? For this gives a better scent and flavour to the soup; and at the same time, my friend, it would not break the pan, and spill the soup, and put out the fire, and, when the guests were come prepared for feasting, rob them of an excellent dish. But all these mischiefs would be done by that golden spoon. We must, I think, therefore, answer, that the sycamore spoon is more becoming and proper in this case than the golden spoon: unless you say otherwise.

HIP. Well, Socrates; more becoming and proper be it then: but, for

ingredients, and confounding the order of others, were, many of them, served up to table in the very stewing-pans in which they were made. See Aristoph. Eq. act. iv. sec. 1.; Athenæus, l. ix. p. 406.; and Casaubon. in Athen. p. 693. For this reason, that elegant people was very curious about the beauty of these pans or dishes. The matter of them seems to have been a kind of porcelain, and the form not unlike our tureens. If the curiosity of any of our readers should lead them to inquire into the composition of these soups, they may satisfy it in some measure by looking into Athenæus and Apicius Cælius, l. v. c. 3.—S.

¹ In the Greek *συκίνη*. But that we ought to read *συκαμνή*, there is great reason to suspect. For the wood of the fig-tree was found so unfit a material in the making any domestic utensils, &c. that the Grecians in common speech metaphorically called whatever was useless, *συκινον*, a fig-tree thing, this or that. Upon which account Horace gives that wood the epithet of "*inutile*," l. i. sat. 8. Whereas the wood of the sycamore-tree, *συκαμινος*, is by Theophrastus said to be *ἐξυλον προς πολλὰ χρησιμον*, Hist. Plant. l. iv. c. 2. Not to insist on the extreme bitterness of fig-tree wood to the taste; and the offensiveness of its smoke, when burning, beyond that of any other tree: (see Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 684.) qualities which seem to indicate the scent and flavour of it not to be very agreeable. The alteration of this word is easily accounted for. The *συκαμινος*, or *συκαμορος*, being the same with the *συκη Αιγυπτια*, it is probable that the Alexandrian Platonists, to illustrate the word *συκαμνή*, wrote in the margin of their books *συκίνη*: which afterwards the more easily took place of the other, because the fig-tree was well known to be the most common of any tree in Attica.—S.

my

my part, I would not hold discourse with a fellow who asked such sort of questions.

Soc. Right, my dear friend. For it would not be becoming or proper for you to be bespattered with such vile dirty words, so finely dressed ¹ as you are from top to toe, and so illustrious for wisdom through all Greece. But for me—it is nothing to dirty ² myself against the man. Give me my lesson, therefore, what I am to say; and answer in my name. For the man now will say thus: “If the sycamore spoon then be more becoming and proper than the golden one, must it not be handfomer?”

HIP. Yes. Since the proper and becoming, Socrates, you have granted to be handfomer than the improper and unbecoming.

Soc. What, Hippias; and shall we grant him too, that the sycamore spoon has more beauty in it than the golden spoon?

HIP. Shall I tell you, Socrates, what you shall say the beautiful is, so as to prevent him from all further cavilling and disputing?

Soc. By all means: but not before you tell me whether of the two spoons we have been talking of is the most beautiful, as well as the most proper and becoming.

HIP. Well then; if it pleases you, answer him, “It is that made of the sycamore tree.”

Soc. Now say what you was just going to say. For this answer, in which I pronounce gold to be the beautiful, will be refuted; and gold will be demonstrated, I find, not to be at all more beautiful than sycamore wood. But what, say you, is the beautiful now?

HIP. I will tell you. For when you ask me, “What is the beautiful?” you would have me, I perceive, give you for answer something which shall never, in any place, or to any person, appear otherwise than beautiful.

Soc. By all means, Hippias. And now you apprehend me perfectly well. But observe what I say: Be assured, that if any man shall be able to

¹ The fine dress in which Hippias appeared at the Olympic games, is related by Plato in the lesser dialogue of his name; and more at large by Apuleius, *Florida*. l. ii. *Ælian* also tells us, that the ordinary attire of that sophist, whenever he appeared abroad, was of a scarlet colour, such as in those days peculiarly belonged to persons of high dignity. *Var. Hist.* l. xii, c. 32.—S.

² Meaning, that he was accustomed to submit his fancies and passions to the severe discipline and rough treatment of his higher principle.—S.

controvert our new answer, I shall vow never more to praise any thing for its beauty. Now in the name of the Gods proceed, and tell it me without delay.

HIP. I say then, that always, and to every person, and in every place it will appear the most beautiful, lovely, and desirable thing in the world, to be rich, healthy, honoured by his country, to arrive at a good old age, to give his parents an honourable burial, and at length to have the last offices performed for himself honourably and magnificently by his own issue.

SOC. O brave! O rare! How admirable, how great, and how worthy of yourself, Hippias, is the speech you have now spoken! By Juno, I receive with much pleasure that hearty willingness of yours to give me all the assistance in your power. But we reach not the point yet. For now will the man laugh at us more than ever, you may be assured.

HIP. An ill-timed laugh, Socrates. For in laughing, when he has nothing to object, he will in reality laugh only at himself; and be the ridicule of all who happen to be present.

SOC. Perhaps so. But perhaps, also, as soon as I have thus answered, I shall be in danger, if I prophesy aright, of something besides the being laughed at.

HIP. What besides?

SOC. That, if he happens to have a cane in his hand, unless I run away and escape him, he will aim some very serious strokes at me.

HIP. How say you? What, is the man some master of yours then? for, otherwise, would he not be punished for the injury done you? Or, is there no justice in your city? but the citizens are permitted to assault and beat one another injuriously.

SOC. By no means are they permitted to do any such thing.

HIP. Will he not, therefore, be condemned to punishment, as having beaten you injuriously?

SOC. I should think he would not, Hippias; not having beaten me injuriously if I had made him such an answer; but very deservedly, as it seems to me.

HIP. It seems so then to me, Socrates; if you are of that opinion yourself.

SOC. Shall I tell you, why, in my own opinion, I should have deserved a beating, if I had so answered?—Will you condemn me too without trying the cause? or will you hear what I have to say?

HIP. It would be a hard case indeed, Socrates, should I deny you a hearing. But what have you to say then?

SOC. I will tell you; but in the same way as I talked with you just now, assuming his character, whilst you personate me. I shall do this, to avoid treating you in your own person with such language as he will use in reprimanding me, with harsh and out-of-the-way terms. For I assure you that he will say thus:—"Tell me, Socrates; think you not that you deserve a beating, for having sung that pompous strain, so foreign to the design of the music; spoiling thus the harmony, and wandering wide of the point proposed to you?"—"How so?" I shall ask him.—"How?" he will reply: "can you not remember that I asked you concerning the beautiful itself, that which makes every thing beautiful, wherever it comes and imparts the virtue of its presence; whether it communicates it to stone or wood, to man or God, to actions and manners, or to any part of science. Beauty itself, man, I ask you what it is: and I can no more beat into your head what I say, than if you were a stone lying by my side, nay a mill-stone too, without ears or brains." Now, Hippias, would not you be angry with me, if I, frightened with this reprimand, should say to him thus:—"Why, Hippias said, this was the beautiful; and I asked him, just as you ask me, what was beautiful to all persons, and at all times."—What say you? will you not be angry if I tell him thus?

HIP. That which I described, Socrates, is beautiful, I am very positive, in the eyes of all men¹.

SOC. "And always will it be so?" he will say: "for the beautiful itself must be always beautiful."

HIP. To be sure.

SOC. "And always was it so in former times?" he will say.

HIP. It always was so.

SOC. "What? and to Achilles too," he will say, "did the Elean stranger affirm it was a beautiful and desirable thing to survive his progenitors? and that it was the same to his grandfather Æacus, and the rest

¹ At the end of this sentence, in the Greek, are added the words *καὶ δοξῇ*. These we have omitted to translate; on a presumption that they were at first but a marginal various reading of the words which follow, *καὶ ἰσται*, spoken by Socrates. For the difference between real and apparent beauty falls not under consideration in this part of the argument.—S.

of those who were the progeny of the Gods? nay, that it was so even to the Gods themselves?"

HIP. What a fellow is this! Away with him! Such questions as these are profane, and improper to be asked.

SOC. But is it not much more profane for any man, when these questions are asked him, to answer in the affirmative, and to maintain such propositions?

HIP. Perhaps it is.

SOC. "Perhaps then you are this man," will he say, "who affirm it to be a thing always, and to every person, beautiful and desirable, to be buried by his descendents, and to bury his parents. Was not Hercules one of these very persons? and those whom we just now mentioned, are not they also to be included in the number?"

HIP. But I did not affirm it was so to the Gods.

SOC. Nor to the heroes, I presume.

HIP. Not to such as were children of the Gods.

SOC. But to such only as were not so.

HIP. Right.

SOC. Amongst the number of heroes then, it seems, according to your account, to Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus, it would have been a bad thing, a horrible profanation of deity, to suppose it, and a fatal blow to their own honour; but to Pelops, and others born of men like him, it was a glorious thing, beautiful and desirable.

HIP. So I think it to be.

SOC. "You think this then to be true, the contrary of which you maintained just now," will he say, "that to survive their ancestors, and to be buried

¹ The Greek is, βαλλ' ες μακαριν. Various explications of this proverb are given us by Timæus, (in Lexic. Platonic.) Hesychius, Suidas, and others. But to us none of them are satisfactory. Erasmus, with his usual acuteness and sagacity, was the first, so far as we know, who discovered the most probable origin of it: though with his usual Socratic modesty he only says, It seems to be so; and after the accounts usually given of it, offers his own, which is this: that the particular spot of ground, where a great part of the Persian forces perished in the battle of Marathon, a deep marsh in which they sunk and were overwhelmed, being, as he observes from Pausanias, called Μακαρια, the Grecians used this proverbial speech by way of detestation, when they cursed any man, "Throw him into Macaria!" the place where our detested enemies lie perished. See Erasmus. Adag. chil. ii. cent. 1. n. 98. Schottus gives the same interpretation, in the very words of Erasmus; but, like many other learned commentators, without acknowledging his author, Schol. in Zenobium, p. 42.—S.

by their descendants, is, in some cases ¹, and to some persons ², a dishonourable and a horrible thing : nay more, it seems not possible that such a thing should be, or ever become, beautiful and desirable to all. So that this which you now hold to be the beautiful, happens to be in the same case with those your former favourites, the maiden and the gold ; sometimes it is beautiful, and sometimes otherwise : but a circumstance still more ridiculous attends this ; it is beautiful only to some persons, whilst to others it is quite the contrary. And not yet," will he say, " not all this day long, are you able, Socrates, to answer the question which you were asked,—What the beautiful is." In terms such as these will he reproach me justly, should I answer him as you directed me. Much after the manner, Hippias, which I have now represented to you, proceed the conversations usually held between the man and me. But now and then, as if in pity to my ignorance and want of learning, he proposes to me himself some particular matter of inquiry ; and asks me whether I think such or such a thing to be the beautiful ; or whatever else be the general subject of the question which he has been pleased to put to me, or upon which the conversation happens at that time to turn.

HIP. How mean you, Socrates ?

SOC. I will explain my meaning to you by an instance in the present subject.—" Friend Socrates," says he, " let us have done with disputing in this way : give me no more answers of this sort ; for they are very silly, and easily confuted. But consider now, whether the beautiful be something of this kind ; such as in our dispute just now we touched upon, when we said that gold, where it was proper and becoming, was beautiful ; but otherwise, where it was improper and unbecoming : and that the beauty of all other things depended on the same principle ; that is, they were beautiful only where they were becoming. Now this very thing, the proper and becoming, essential propriety and decorum itself, see whether this may not happen to be the beautiful." Now, for my part, I am used to give my assent, in such matters, to every thing proposed to me. For I find in myself nothing to object. But what think you of it ? are you of opinion that the becoming is the beautiful ?

HIP. Entirely am I, Socrates, of that opinion.

¹ Meaning the case of Achilles.—S.

² That is, to the heroes.—S.

Soc. Let us consider it, however; for fear we should be guilty of some mistake in this point.

Hip. I agree we ought so to do.

Soc. Observe then. That which we call the becoming, is it not either something whose presence, wherever it comes, gives all things a beautiful appearance; or something which gives them the reality of beauty; or something which bestows both¹, and causes them not only to appear beautiful, but really so to be?

Hip. I think it must be one or other of these.

Soc. Whether of these then is the becoming? Is it that which only gives a beautiful appearance? as a man whose body is of a deformed make, when he has put on clothes or shoes which fit him, looks handsomer than he really is. Now, if the becoming causes every thing to look handsomer than it really is, the becoming must then be a kind of fraud or imposition with regard to beauty, and cannot be that which we are in search of, Hippias. For we were inquiring what that was by which all beautiful things are beautiful. As², if we were asked what that was, by which all great things are great, we should answer, "it was by surpassing other things of the same kind³." For thus it is, that all things are great: and though they may not all appear great to us, yet, in as much as they surpass others, great of necessity they must be. So is it, we say, with the beautiful; it must be something by which things are beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now this cannot be the becoming: for the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, according to your account of it; concealing the truth

¹ A most egregious and gross blunder has corrupted the Greek text in this place; where we read *οὐδτετρα*: instead of which we ought to read *αμφοτετρα*: as will appear clearly in the course of the argument. Yet, gross as the blunder is, all the translators have given into it.—S.

² In the Greek we read *ὥσπερ ὃ πάντα τα μεγάλα ἐστὶ μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερῆχοντι*. Stephens in his Annotations says, he had rather the word *ὃ* was omitted. Parallel places might be found in Plato, to justify in some measure the expression as it stands. But were it necessary to make any alteration, we should make no doubt of supposing the error lay in the last words; nor scruple to read them thus, *τῷ ὑπερῆχοντι*. For, in the sentence presently after, where this similitude (as to the manner of defining) is applied, Plato uses the same way of expressing himself, thus: *ὅτω δὲ φαιμὲν καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς, ὃ καλὰ πάντα ἐστὶ, —Τὶ ἀνέη.*—S.

³ *Magnitude itself*, as we have shown in the Notes on the Parmenides, is, according to Plato, the cause of transcendency to all things.—T.

of things, and not suffering this ever to appear. But that which causes them to be really beautiful, as I just now said, whether they appear to be so or not, this it is our business to find out, and declare the nature of it : for this it is which is the subject of our search, if we are searching for the beautiful.

HIP. But the becoming, Socrates, causes things both to be, and to appear beautiful, by virtue of its presence.

SOC. If so, then it is impossible for things really beautiful to appear otherwise ; inasmuch as there is present with them the cause of beautiful appearance.

HIP. Admit it impossible.

SOC. Shall we admit this then, Hippias, that all laws, and rules of action, manners, or behaviour, truly beautiful, are beautiful in common estimation, and appear so always to all men ? Or shall we not rather say quite the reverse, that men are ignorant of their beauty, and that above all things these are the subjects of controversy and contention, not only private but public, not only between man and man, but between different communities and civil states ¹ ?

¹ For a full explication of this passage we refer our readers to Plato's First Alcibiades, Vol. I. But more particularly we recommend to their perusal, upon this occasion, a conversation between Socrates and Hippias, related by Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates : because it confirms the truth of many circumstances in this dialogue ; and, in particular, not only proves that Plato drew the character of Hippias such as it really was, but that he attributed to Socrates those sentiments which were truly his. Xenophon introduces it thus, with his usual simplicity : " I remember Socrates upon a certain time holding discourse with Hippias of Elis concerning the rule or standard of right. The occasion of it was this : Hippias, on his arrival at Athens, where he had not been for a long time before, happened to meet Socrates, at a time when he was in conference with some other persons," &c. The whole conversation is too long to be here inserted. But the following passage in it agrees with and illustrates this of Plato now before us. It follows a boast made by Hippias, that concerning the rule, by which to judge of right and wrong, he had some new things to deliver, which it was impossible for Socrates or any other person ever to controvert. *Νη την Ἑραν, εφη, μεγα λεγεις αγαθον ευρησκειαι, ει παυσονται μεν οι δικασται διχα ψηφίζουνοι. παντονται δ' οι πολιται περι των δικαιων αντιλεγοντες τε και αντιδίκουντες και στασιαζοντες, παυσονται δ' αι πολεις διαφερομεναι περι των δικαιων και πολεμουσαι.* " By Juno (said Socrates), the discovery which you talk of having made, will be of great service to the world, if it will put an end to all diversity of opinions amongst the judges concerning what is agreeable to justice : if there shall be no more controversies, nor suits at law, nor factions among the citizens concerning what is right and what is wrong ; nor any more differences or wars between the cities, occasioned by those very questions." *Ξενοφ. Απομνημ. βιβ. δ.—S.*

HIP. Thus indeed rather, Socrates, that in those points men are ignorant of the beautiful.

SOC. But this would not be the case if those beautiful things had the appearance of beauty, added to the reality : and this appearance would they have, if the becoming were the beautiful, and caused things, as you say it does, both to be and to appear beautiful, bestowing on them real and apparent beauty at the same time. Hence it follows, that if the becoming should be that by which things are made truly beautiful, then the becoming must be the beautiful which we are in search of, not that by which things are only made beautiful in appearance. But if the becoming should be that by which things are made beautiful only in appearance, it cannot be the beautiful which we are in search of; for this bestows the reality of beauty. Nor is it in the power of the same thing to cause the appearance and the reality, both, not only in the case of beauty, but neither in any other instance whatever. Let us choose now, whether of these two we shall take for the becoming, that which causes the appearance of beauty, or that which causes the reality.

HIP. The becoming, Socrates, I take it, must be that which causes the appearance.

SOC. Fie upon it, Hippias ! Our discovery of the beautiful is fled away, and hath escaped us. For the becoming has turned out to be a thing different from the beautiful.

HIP. So it seems ; and very unaccountably too.

SOC. But however, my friend, we must not give it up for lost. I have still some hope left, that the nature of the beautiful may come forth into light, and show itself.

HIP. With great clearness, Socrates, beyond doubt : for it is by no means difficult to find. I am positive that, if I were to go aside for a little while, and consider by myself, I should describe it to you with an accuracy beyond that of any thing ever so accurate.

SOC. Ah ! talk not, Hippias, in so high a tone. You see what trouble it has given us already ; and I fear lest it should grow angry with us, and run away still further than before. But I talk idly : for you, I presume, will easily find it out, when you come to be alone. Yet, in the name of the Gods, I conjure you, make the discovery while I am with you : and, if it be agree-
able

able to you, admit me, as you did before, your companion in the search. If we find it together, it will be best of all: and, if we miss it in this way of joint inquiry, I shall be contented, I hope, with my disappointment, and you will depart and find better success without any difficulty. Besides, if we now find it, I shall not, you know, be troublesome afterwards, teasing you to tell me what was the event of that inquiry by yourself, and what was the great discovery which you had made. Now therefore consider, if you think this to be the beautiful. I say then, that it is. But pray observe, and give me all your attention, for fear I should say any thing foolish, or foreign to the purpose. Let this then be in our account the beautiful, that which is useful. I was induced to think it might be so by these considerations. Beautiful, we say, are eyes; not those which look as if they had not the faculty of sight; but such as appear to have that faculty strong, and to be useful for the purpose of seeing. Do we not?

HIP. We do.

SOC. And the whole body also, do we not call it beautiful with a view to its utility; one for the race, another for wrestling? So further, through all the animal kind, as a beautiful horse, cock, and quail: in the same manner all sorts of domestic utensils, and all the conveniencies for carriage abroad, be they land vehicles, or ships and barges for the sea; instruments of music likewise, with the tools and instruments subservient to the other arts: to these you may please to add moral rules and laws. Every thing almost of any of these kinds we call beautiful upon the same account; respecting the end for which it was born, or framed, or instituted. In whatever way it be useful, to whatever purpose, and upon whatever occasion; agreeably to these circumstances we pronounce it beautiful. But that which is in every respect useless, we declare totally void of beauty. Are not you of this opinion, Hippias?

HIP. I am.

SOC. We are right, therefore, now in saying, that above all things the useful proves to be the beautiful.

HIP. Most certainly right, Socrates.

SOC. Now that which is able to operate or effect any thing, is it not useful so far as it has power, and is able? But that which is powerless and unable, is it not useless?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. Power then is beautiful, and want of power is the contrary.

HIP. Quite right. And many things there are, Socrates, which evince the truth of this conclusion : but particularly it holds good in politics. For the having ability in public affairs, and power in the state of which we are members, is of all things the most beautiful : and want of such power, with a total defect of any such ability, has of all things the meanest aspect.

SOC. You say well. In the name of the Gods then, Hippias, does it not follow from all this, that skill and knowledge are of all things the most beautiful, and want of them the contrary ?

HIP. Ay, what think you of this, Socrates ?

SOC. Softly, my dear friend : for I am under some fears about the rectitude of our present conclusions.

HIP. What are you afraid of, Socrates ? For the business of our inquiry is now in a fair way, and goes on as we could wish.

SOC. I would it were so. But let you and I consider together upon this point. Could any man execute a work, of which he has neither knowledge nor any other kind of abilities for the performance ?

HIP. By no means. For how should a man do that, for the doing of which he has no abilities ?

SOC. Those people then who do wrong, and who err in the execution of any thing, without erroneous or wrong intention, would they ever have done or executed things wrong, had they not been able to do or execute them in that manner ?

HIP. Clearly they would not.

SOC. But the able are able through their abilities : for it is not inability which any way enables them.

HIP. Certainly not.

SOC. And all who do any thing are able to do what they do.

HIP. True.

¹ Hippias is much flattered, and highly elevated, by this whole description of the beautiful now drawn ; presuming himself interested deeply in it, on account of his supposed political abilities, his various knowledge, and that skill in arts, as well the mechanic as the polite, for which he is celebrated in the Lesser Hippias.—S.

SOC.

Soc. And all men do many more wrong things than right ; and commit errors from their infancy, without intending to do wrong, or to err.

HIP. The fact is so.

Soc. Well then : those abilities, and those means or instruments, which help and are useful in the doing or executing any thing wrong, whether shall we say they are beautiful ? or are they not rather far from being so ?

HIP. Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. The able and useful, therefore, Hippias, in our opinion, it seems, no longer is the beautiful.

HIP. Still it is so, Socrates, if it has power to do what is right, or is useful to a good purpose.

Soc. That account is then rejected, that the able and useful simply and absolutely is the beautiful. But the thought, Hippias, which our mind laboured with, and wanted to express, was this, that the useful and able for the producing of any good, that is the beautiful.

HIP. This indeed seems to be the case.

Soc. But the thing thus described is the profitable. Is it not ?

HIP. It is.

Soc. From hence then is derived the beauty of bodies, the beauty of moral precepts, of knowledge and wisdom, and of all those things just now enumerated ; they are beautiful, because profitable.

HIP. Evidently so.

Soc. The profitable, therefore, Hippias, should seem to be our beautiful.

HIP. Beyond all doubt, Socrates.

Soc. But the profitable is that which effects or produces good.

HIP. True.

Soc. And the efficient is no other thing than the cause. Is it ?

HIP. Nothing else.

Soc. The cause of good, therefore, is the beautiful.

HIP. Right.

Soc. Now the cause, Hippias, is a thing different from that which it causes. For the cause can by no means be the cause of itself. Consider it thus : Did not the cause appear to be the efficient ?

HIP. Clearly.

SOC. And by the efficient no other thing is effected than that which is produced or generated ; but this is not the efficient itself.

HIP. You are in the right.

SOC. Is not that then which is produced or generated one thing, and the efficient a thing different ?

HIP. It is.

SOC. The cause, therefore, is not the cause of itself ; but of that which is generated or produced by it.

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. If the beautiful be then the cause of good, good itself must be produced or generated by the beautiful. And for this reason, it should seem, we cultivate and study prudence, and every other fair virtue, because their production and their issue are well worth our study and our care, as being good itself. Thus are we likely to find from our inquiries, that the beautiful, as it stands related to good, has the nature of a kind of father.

HIP. The very case, Socrates. You are perfectly right in what you say.

SOC. Am I not right also in this, that neither is the father the son, nor is the son the father ?

HIP. Right in that also.

SOC. Nor is the cause the production, nor the production, on the other hand, the cause.

HIP. Very right.

SOC. By Jupiter then, my friend, neither is the beautiful good, nor is the good beautiful. Do you think it is possible it should be so ? Is it consistent with what we have said, and are agreed in ?

HIP. By Jupiter, I think not.

SOC. Would this opinion please us then, and should we choose to abide by it, that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful ?

HIP. By Jupiter, no ; it would not please me at all.

SOC. Well said ¹, by Jupiter, Hippias : and me it pleases the least of any

¹ As the subject of this dialogue is, as we have observed in the Introduction to it, the beauty which subsists in soul, and as such beauty is consubstantial with the good which also subsists in the soul, hence it follows, that every thing which is beautiful in the soul is good, and every thing there

any of those descriptions or accounts which we have hitherto given of the beautiful.

HIP. So I perceive.

SOC. That definition of it, therefore, which we thought just now the most excellent of all, that the profitable, the useful and able to produce some good or other, was that beautiful, is in danger of losing all its credit with us; and of appearing, if possible, more ridiculous than our former accounts of it, where we reckoned the maiden to be the beautiful, or any other particular whose defect we have before discovered.

HIP. It seems so, indeed.

SOC. And for my own part, Hippias, I see no way where to turn myself any more, but am absolutely at a loss. Have you any thing to say?

HIP. Not at present. But, as I said just now, after a little considering I am certain I shall find it out.

SOC. But I fear, so extreme is my desire of knowing it, that I shall not be able to wait your time. Besides, I have just met with, as I imagine, a fair kind of opening to the discovery. For consider that which gives us delight and joy, (I speak not of all kinds of pleasure, but of that only which arises in us through the hearing and the sight,) whether we should not call this the beautiful. And how, indeed, could we dispute it? seeing that it is the beautiful of our own species, Hippias, with the sight of whom we are so delighted: that we take pleasure in viewing all beautiful works of the loom or needle; and whatever is well painted, carved, or moulded. It is the same with the hearing: for well-measured sounds and all musical harmony, the beauties of prosaic composition also, with pretty fables and well-framed stories, have the like effect upon us, to be agreeable, to be

there which is good is beautiful. This reciprocation, however, does not take place between *the good*, the ineffable principle of things, and the beautiful itself, the source of every kind of beauty: for the former is superessential, but the latter is an intelligible idea. See the sixth book of the Republic, and p. 516 of the Additional Notes on the First Alcibiades. The assertion of Mr. Sydenham, therefore, in his note on this part, is very erroneous, "that, according to Socrates and Plato, the sovereign beauty is the source of *all* good."—T.

¹ In the Greek we read thus, Πως τι ἀρ' αν αγωνιζοιμθα; But, since we know of no precedent in Plato for the use of two interrogatives in this manner, that is, without the conjunction η (or) between them; we suppose it ought to be read either Πως ΓΑΡ αν αγωνιζοιμθα; or ΠΠΟΣ τι ΓΑΡ.
 α. τ. λ. "To what purpose should we contend about it?"—S.

delightful, and to charm. Were we to give, therefore, that petulant and faucy fellow this answer—"Noble sir, the beautiful is that which gives us pleasure through the hearing, and through the sight," do you think we should not restrain his insolence?

HIP. For my part, Socrates, I think the nature of the beautiful now truly well explained.

SOC. But what shall we say of the beauty of manners, and of laws, Hippias? Shall we say it gives us pleasure through the hearing, or through the sight? or is it to be ranked under some other kind?

HIP. Perhaps the man may not think of this.

SOC. By the Dog, Hippias, but that man would, of whom I stand in awe the most of all men; and before whom I should be most ashamed if I trifled, and pretended to utter something of great importance, when in reality I talked idly, and spoke nothing to the purpose.

HIP. Who is he?

SOC. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer me to throw out such random speeches, or so readily decide on points which I had not thoroughly sifted, than he would allow me to talk of things which I am ignorant of, as if I knew them.

HIP. Why, really, I must own, that to me myself, since you have started the observation, the beauty of laws seems referable to another kind.

SOC. Softly, Hippias. For, though we have fallen into fresh difficulties, equal to our former ones, about the nature of the beautiful, we are in a fair way, I think, of extricating ourselves out of them.

HIP. How so, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you how the matter appears to me: whether or no there be any thing material in what I say, you will consider. The beauty then of laws and of manners, I imagine, may possibly be found not altogether abstracted from that kind of sensation which arises in the soul through the senses of hearing and of sight. But let us abide awhile by this definition, that "what gives us pleasure through these senses is the beautiful," without bringing the beauty of laws the least into question. Suppose then, that either the man of whom I am speaking, or any other, should interrogate us after this manner: "For what reason, Hippias and Socrates, have you separated from the pleasant in general that species of it in which you say consists

confists the beautiful; denying the character of beautiful to those species of pleasure which belong to the other senses, to the pleasures of taste, the joys of Venus, and all others of the same class? Do you refuse them the character of pleasant also, and maintain that no pleasure neither is to be found in these sensations, or in any thing beside seeing and hearing?" Now, Hippias, what shall we say to this?

HIP. By all means, Socrates, we must allow pleasure to be found also in these sensations; a pleasure very exquisite.

SOC. "Since these sensations then afford pleasure," will he say, "no less than those others, why do you deprive them of the name of beautiful, and rob them of their proper share of beauty?" "Because there is no one who would not laugh at us," we shall answer, "were we to call eating a beautiful thing, instead of a pleasant; or the smelling sweet odours, were we to say, not that it was pleasant, but that it was beautiful. Above all, in amorous enjoyments, all the world would contend, there was the highest degree of the sweet and pleasant; but that whoever was engaged in them should take care not to be seen, the act of love being far from agreeable to the sight, or beautiful." Now, Hippias, when we have thus answered, he may reply, perhaps, in this manner:—"I apprehend perfectly well the reason why you have always been ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful; it is because they seem not so to men. But the question which I asked you was not, What seemed beautiful to the multitude; but, What was so in reality." Then shall we answer, I presume, only by repeating our last hypothesis, that "we ourselves give the name of beautiful to that part only of the pleasant which ariseth in us by means of our sight and hearing." But have you any thing to say which may be of service to our argument? Shall we answer aught besides, Hippias?

HIP. To what he has said, Socrates, it is unnecessary to make any further answer.

SOC. "Very well now," will he say. "If the pleasant then, arising through the sight and hearing, be the beautiful, whatever portion of the pleasant hap-

¹ This sentence is ill pointed by H. Stephens in two places: in the first of which, at least, we think it was done with design; so as to give us this construction:—"What? Do you deprive," &c. That learned editor was fond of doing the same in many other sentences; and particularly in one, a little before this, he has in the margin proposed the like alteration.—S.

pens not to be this, it is clear it cannot be the beautiful." Shall we admit this?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. "Is that portion of the pleasant then," he will say, "which arises through the sight, the same with that which arises through the sight and hearing? Or is that which arises through the hearing, the same with that which arises through the hearing and the sight?" "That which ariseth in us through either of those senses alone, and not through the other," we shall answer, "is by no means the same with that which arises through them both. For this seems to be the import of your question. But our meaning was, that each of these species of the pleasant was, by itself separately, the beautiful; and that they were also, both of them together, the same beautiful." Should we not answer so?

HIP. By all means.

Soc. "Does any species of the pleasant then," he will say, "differ from any other, whatever it be, so far as it is pleasant? Observe; I ask you not if one pleasure is greater or less than another, or whether it is more or less a pleasure: but whether there is any difference between the pleasures in this respect, that one of them is pleasure, the other not pleasure." In our opinion there is no difference between them, of this kind. Is there any?

HIP. I agree with you, there is not any.

Soc. "For some other reason, therefore," he will say it is, "than because they are pleasures, that you have selected these species of pleasure from the rest, and given them the preference. You have discerned that there is something or other in them by which they differ from the rest; with a view to which difference you distinguish them by the epithet of beautiful. Now the pleasure which ariseth in us through the sense of seeing, deriveth not its beauty from any thing peculiarly belonging to that sense¹. For, if this were the cause of its being beautiful, that other pleasure which arises through the hearing never would be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing." "You are in the right," shall we say?

HIP. We will.

¹ That is, not from colour, or from figure; but from the due degree and proper disposition of the colours; or from the just size, fit arrangement and proportion of the parts; in a word, from measure, harmony, and order.—S.

Soc. "So neither, on the other hand, does the pleasure produced in us through the sense of hearing derive its beauty from any circumstance which peculiarly attends the hearing ¹. For, in that case, the pleasure produced through seeing would not be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing ²." Shall we allow, Hippias, that the man is in the right when he says this?

HIP. Allow it.

Soc. "But both these pleasures now are beautiful, you say." For so we say: do we not?

HIP. We do.

Soc. "There is something in them, therefore, the same in both, to which they owe their beauty, a beauty common to them both. There is something, I say, which they have belonging to them both in common, and also in particular to each. For otherwise they would not, both and each of them, be beautiful." Answer now, as if you were speaking to him.

HIP. I answer then, that, in my opinion ³, you give a true account of the matter.

Soc. Should there be any circumstance, therefore, attending on both these pleasures of the sight and hearing taken together; yet if the same circum-

¹ That is, not from sound, but from its just degree and proper tone; from the concord of sounds and their orderly succession; from those numbers and proportions by which sound is measured.—S.

² The Greek of this passage is thus printed, *οὐκ οὐσα ἐτι γε δι' ἀκοῆς ἡδονή*. So, in the speech of Socrates, immediately preceding, where the reasoning is the same, only the terms inverted, we read *οὐκ οὐσα ἐτι γε δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡδονή*. In both passages the sense is thus very lame. Stephens proposes this reading, *οὐκ οὐσα ἐστι γε κ. τ. λ.* which is found, he says, in some old manuscript. But the sense is very little amended by this alteration. Cornarius, whether from that manuscript in the Hassenstein library which he was favoured with the use of, or from his own sagacity, has recovered a part, at least, of the true reading; thus, *οὐκ οὐσα ἐτι γε κ. τ. λ.* For, that we ought to read *οὐκ οὐσα*, there can be no doubt; the argumentation shows it sufficiently: but this amendment may, we imagine, be improved by reading *οὐκ οὐσα ἢ γε δι' ἀκοῆς* (and in the former passage *δι' ὀφθαλμοῦ*).—S.

³ In the edition of Plato by Stephens we read the Greek of this passage thus, *ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ εἶπεν, ὡς λέγεις*; and by a marginal note we find, that it was so printed by design. But the editions of Aldus and of Walder give us the last word, *λέγεις*, which is certainly right: for, in reading *λέγεις*, Hippias is made to speak of the man, not to him, contrary to the intention of Plato expressed in the preceding sentence.—S.

stance attend not on each taken separately; or should any attend on each separately ¹, yet not on both together; they cannot derive their beauty from this circumstance.

HIP. How is it possible, Socrates, that any circumstance whatever, which attends on neither of them, should ever attend on both?

Soc. Do you think this impossible?

HIP. I must be quite ignorant, I own, in things of this sort; as I am quite unused to such kind of disputes.

Soc. You jest, Hippias. But I am in danger, perhaps, of fancying that I see something, so circumstanced, as you aver to be impossible.

HIP. You are in no danger of any such fancy, Socrates; but are pleased to look askint purpofely: that is all.

Soc. Many things, I assure you, of that kind appear to me very evident. But I give no credit to them; because they are not evident to you, who have raised a larger fortune than any man living, by the profession of philosophy; and because they appear only to me, who have never in that way earned a farthing. I have some suspicion, however, that possibly you are not in earnest with me, but design to impose upon me: so many things of that kind do I perceive so plainly.

HIP. No one will know better than yourself, Socrates, whether I am in earnest with you or not, if you will but begin and tell me, what those things are which you perceive so plainly. You will soon see that you talk idly. For you will never find a circumstance attending us both together, which attends separately neither you nor me.

Soc. How say you, Hippias? But perhaps you have reason on your side, and I may not apprehend it. Let me, therefore, explain to you my meaning more distinctly. To me then it appears, that some circumstance of being, which attends not my individual person, nor yours, something which belongs neither to me, nor to you, may yet possibly belong to both of us, and attend both our persons taken together: and, on the other hand ², that certain circumstances

¹ In the Greek text, after this first part of the sentence, *Εἰ ἄρα τι αὐταὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἀμφοτέραι πεπον-
θασιν, ἑκάτερα δὲ μὴ*, there is a manifest omission of the following words, *ἢ ἑκάτερα μὲν, ἀμφοτέραι δὲ
μὴ*, as will appear afterwards, where Socrates refers to this very sentence.—S.

² The Greek of this passage is thus printed: *ἑτέρα δ' αὖν, ἃ ἀμφοτέροι πεπονθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδε-*

cumstances of being, not attending us both taken together, may attend each of our separate and single persons.

HIP. You tell me of prodigies still greater, I think, now ¹, Socrates, than those which you told me of just before. For consider : if both of us are honest, man, must not each of us be honest ? or, supposing each of us dishonest, must we not both be so ? If both are sound and well, is not each also ? Or, should each of us now be tired of any thing ², or come off ill in some combat between us, or be amazed and confounded, or be affected any other way, would not both of us be in the same plight ? To go further : in case that we had, both of us, images of ourselves made of gold, or silver, or ivory ; or that both of us, if you will give me leave to say it, were generous, or wise, or honourable ; did both of us happen to be old or young ; or to be possessed of any other human quality ; or to be in any condition whatever incident to human life ; must not each of us be, of absolute necessity, that very same kind of man, and in those very same circumstances ?

Soc. Beyond all doubt.

HIP. But you, Socrates, with your companions and fellow disputants ; consider not things universally, or in the whole. Thus you take the beau-

-τερον ειναι ημων. By which the sense of this part of the sentence is made exactly the same with that of the former part. But the words *ιτερα δ' αυ* plainly indicate, that something different is intended. And what this precisely is, will appear in the beginning of page 421 ; where this sentence of Socrates is repeated in other words, and ridiculed by Hippias. In conformity with which undoubted meaning of this passage, we are obliged to make an alteration here in the Greek text, and to read it thus, *ιτερα δ' αυ, α ΜΗ αμφοτεροι πεπονθαμεν ειναι, ταυτα ΕΚΑΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ημων*.—S.

¹ Instead of *αυ*, we presume that we ought here to read *νυν*, as opposed to *ολην προτερον* at the end of the sentence.—S.

² Whoever has any taste for humour cannot fail of observing the drollery with which Hippias is here made to confess in what condition he finds himself ; tired of the conversation upon a subject, the tendency of which he is ignorant of, confused over and over, and at length quite puzzled with a seeming paradox. His sly insinuation also here, that Socrates was in the same condition with himself ; and his other, just before, that Socrates reasoned unfairly, like himself and his brother sophists ; these strokes of humour will be obvious to all who are acquainted with Plato's artful and humorous way of writing. But those who have a delicacy of taste to discern the several kinds of humour, will have an additional pleasure in distinguishing the coarse farcisms and buffoon manner of Hippias, both in this speech and before in page 402, from the genteel and fine raillery always used by Socrates.—S.

tiful and chop it into pieces: and every thing in nature, which happens to be the subject of your discourse, you serve in the same manner, splitting and dividing it¹. Hence you are unacquainted with the greatness of things²,
with

¹ It was the manner of Socrates in conversation, whatever was the subject of it, to ascend to the consideration of the thing in general; to divide it into its several species; and to distinguish each species from the rest by some peculiar character, in order to come at the definite and precise nature of the very thing in question.—S.

² All things in nature, distinguished into their several kinds, general and specific, are, according to the Platonic doctrine, the unfolding of universal form and beauty. That this principle, which every where bounds every part of nature, may appear in a brighter light; that opposite principle, infinitude or the infinite, is here exhibited to view: and amongst the various representations given of it by the antient physiologists, that of Anaxagoras is singled out from the rest; probably for this reason, because it affords the strongest contrast: the infinite, according to his doctrine, being, if the expression may be allowed us, infinite the most of all; or, as Simplicius styles it, *απειραχis απειρον*, infinitely infinite. A summary account of which may be necessary to a full comprehension of the passage before us.—Down to the time of Anaxagoras, all the philosophers agreed in the doctrine of one infinite, material, principle of things. This was held by Pythagoras and his followers to be nothing else than a common subject-matter of the four elements, or primary forms of nature: from the various combinations of which four, in various proportions, are made all other natural bodies. By the disciples of Anaximander it was supposed to have form, though indistinct and indeterminate; out of which all contraries arose through separation. Others imagined the infinite to have some determinate and distinct form: and these again were divided. For some, at the head of whom was Thales, thought it a watery fluid, or moisture, replete with the seeds of all things; every thing being produced from some seminal principle by evolution and dilatation, through the action of the moist fluid. In the opinion of others, of Anaximenes and his school, it was a kind of air; from the rarefaction and condensation of which were produced other great and uniform kinds of body throughout the universe, by mixture making the lesser the composite. Such were the most antient accounts of the material cause of things, and their origin out of the one infinite. But Anaxagoras struck out a new road to the knowledge of nature. For, denying the origin of things from any infinite one, whether determinate or indeterminate, formed or unformed; denying the existence of any primary or elementary bodies; denying all essential change in nature, even any alteration in any thing, except such as arose from local motion, or the shifting of parts from one body to another; he taught, that the corpuscula, or component parts of things, were always what they are at present: for that the forms of nature, innumerable in their kinds, were composed of similar and homogeneous parts. Further he taught that each of these minute bodies, though homogeneous with that whole of which it was a part, was itself composed of parts dissimilar and heterogeneous, infinite in number; there being no bounds in nature to minuteness: that these heterogeneous bodies, infinitely minute, were of all kinds; so that all things, in some measure, were together every where; and each of those corpuscula, apparently so uniform, contained all the various principles of things; that the predo-

with bodies of infinite magnitude, through the natural continuity of being. And now so much are you a stranger to the vastness of this view of the universe, as to imagine that any thing, whether being or circumstance of being, can possibly belong to both those pleasures which we are speaking of, taken together, yet not belong to each of them; or, on the other hand, may belong to each, without belonging to both. So void of thought and

minance of some one of these principles, that is, the quantity of it exceeding that of the rest, constituted the nature of each minute body; fitting it also for union with bodies homogeneous to it, that is, with other bodies, where the same principle was predominant: that, all things being in perpetual motion, which first began, and is continued on by active mind, disposing all things; the predominance of each principle was continually fluctuating and changing; the destruction of the present predominance was the dissolution of each temporary being; and a new predominance, that of some other principle, was the generation of what we call a new being. For instance; whereas every drop of water contains ærial particles within it; as soon as these begin to predominate in any watery drop, it rises in air; and, receiving there an increase of the ærial principle, by degrees becomes united to the air. So, air refines into fire, and thickens into water, through the overpowering of the one or the other of these neighbour principles, with which it ever had maintained a secret correspondence. So the earthy particles, accumulated in the water, produce mud, by degrees hardening into earth; thence into various mineral bodies, stones, and metals, according to the kind of earth predominant in each place through motion. These again crumble into common earth: from which all the various vegetable beings arise in like manner, nourished and increased by the accumulation of particles homogeneous; and into which they fall, and are dissolved again, through the decay and diminution of those particles, whose superior number and strength to resist others of a different kind had before constituted the being. In the same manner all the parts of animals, whether muscular, membranous, bony, or any other, receive nourishment, or admit decay, by addition or subtraction of homogeneous particles. It will be easy for a thinking mind to pursue nature acting in this method, according to Anaxagoras, through all things. The principles of things are thus made infinite, not only in number and minuteness; but there being also a continuity of *ὁμοιομερείαι*, or homogeneous particles, *ἀπὸ συνεχιζόμεναι*, through the universe, every *ὁμοιομερία*, that is, every kind of things, is a natural body, infinite in magnitude, and infinitely divisible into such parts as are wholly agreeing in their kind. Simplicius, in his commentary on the Physics of Aristotle, to which inestimable magazine of antient physiology we are indebted for the chief part of this note, draws the same conclusion: his words are these: *ἐκ τῆς εἰρημένων προχείρου συννοεῖν, ὅτι εἰ πᾶν ἐκ παντός ἐκκρίνεται, καὶ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐ μόνον τὸ πᾶν ἄλλα καὶ ἕκαστον, οὐ τῷ πληθεῖ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, ἀπειράν τις ἀπειρον ἐστὶν* "From the account now given it is easy to conceive, that if every thing is made out of every thing by separation, and all things are in all, not only the universe, but every kind of things therein, is infinitely infinite, not only in the number of its parts, but also in magnitude." See Aristot. Physic. l. i. c. 4. and l. iii. c. 4. Simplic. Com. fol. 6. and 105. b. 106. a.—S.

consideration,

consideration, so simple, and so narrow-minded are you and your companions.

Soc. Such is the lot of our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man will, says the common proverb, but what he can. However, you are always kind in assisting us with your instructions. For but just now, before you had taught me better, how simple my mind was, and how narrow my way of thinking, I shall give you still a plainer proof, by telling you what were my thoughts upon the present subject:—if you will give me leave.

Hip. You will tell them to one who knows them already, Socrates. For I am well acquainted with the different ways of thinking, and know the minds of all who philosophize. Notwithstanding, if it will give pleasure to yourself, you may tell me.

Soc. To me, I confess, it will. You must know then, my friend, that I was so foolish, till I had received from you better information, as to imagine of myself and you, that each of us was one person; and that this, which each of us was, both of us were not, as not being one, but two persons.—Such a simpleton was I!—But from you have I now learnt, that if both of us are two persons, each of us also by necessity is two; and that, if each of us be but one, it follows by the same necessity, that both of us are no more. For, by reason of the continuity of being, according to Hippias, it is impossible it should be otherwise; each of us being of necessity whatever both of us are, and both whatever each³. And now, persuaded by you to believe these things, here I sit me down and rest contented. But first inform me, Hippias, whether we are one person, you and I together; or whether you are two persons, and I two persons.

Hip. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. The very thing which I say. For I am afraid of entering with you into a further discussion of the subject, because you fall into a passion with me, whenever you say any thing which you take to be important.

³ The words of Anaxagoras, as cited by Simplicius, pag. 106. b. really favour such a conclusion. For he expressly says, that his system of the continuity of being included *τα πάντα καὶ τὰς ἰδέας*, every thing which any being had, or suffered: that is, in scholastic language, all the properties and accidents of being; or, in common speech, the condition and circumstances of things; which, as he tells us, inseparably follow and attend their several natures.—S.

To venture for once, however; tell me—Is not each of us one? and is not the being one a circumstance attendant upon our being?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. If each of us then be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

HIP. I think it is.

SOC. Are we odd both together then, notwithstanding that we are two?

HIP. That is absurd, Socrates.

SOC. But both together, we are even. Is it not so?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. Now, because both of us together we are even, does it follow from thence that each of us singly too is even?

HIP. Certainly not.

SOC. There is not, therefore, such an absolute necessity, as you said just now there was, that, whatever both of us were, each should be the same; and that, whatever each of us was, the same must we be both.

HIP. Not in such cases as these, I acknowledge; but still it holds true in such as I enumerated before.

SOC. That suffices, Hippias. I am contented with this acknowledgment, that it appears to be so in some cases, but in others otherwise. For, if you remember from whence the present dispute arose, I said, that the pleasures of sight and hearing could not derive their beauty from any circumstance which attended on each, yet not on both; neither from any which attended on both, yet not on each: but that the beauty of them was derived from something which they had belonging to both of them in common, and in particular to each. And this I said, because you had admitted the beauty of them both together, and of each separately. From which I drew this consequence, that they were indebted for their beauty to some being, whose presence still followed and attended on them both; and not to such as fell short of either. And I continue still in the same mind. But answer me, as if we were now beginning this last inquiry afresh. Pleasure through the sight and pleasure through the hearing, then, being supposed beautiful, both of them and each; tell me, does not the cause of their beauty follow and attend on both of them taken together, and upon each also considered separate?

HIP.

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. Is it then because they are pleasures, both and each of them, that they are beautiful? Or, if this were the cause, would not the pleasures of the other senses be beautiful, as well as these? For it appeared that they were pleasures as well as these:—if you remember.

HIP. I remember it well.

SOC. But because these pleasures arise in us through sight and hearing, this we assigned for the cause of their being beautiful.

HIP. It was so determined.

SOC. Observe now, whether I am right or not: for, as well as I can remember, we agreed that the pleasant was the beautiful; not the pleasant in general, but those species of it only which are produced through sight and hearing.

HIP. It is true.

SOC. Does not this circumstance then attend on both these pleasures taken together? and is it not wanting to each of them alone? For by no means is either of them alone, as was said before, produced through both those senses. Both of them are indeed through both, but not so is each. Is this true?

HIP. It is.

SOC. They are not beautiful, therefore, either of them, from any circumstance which attends on either by itself. For we cannot argue from either to both; nor, from what each is separately, infer what they both are jointly. So that we may assert the joint beauty of both these pleasures, according to our present hypothesis of the beautiful: but this hypothesis will not support us in asserting any beauty separate in either. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

HIP. So it appears.

SOC. Say we then that both are beautiful, but deny that each is so?

HIP. What reason is there to the contrary?

SOC. This reason, my friend, as it seems to me; because we had supposed certain circumstances attendant upon things with this condition, that, if they appertained to any two things, both together, they appertained at the same time to each; and, if they appertained to each, that they appertained also to both. Of this kind are all such circumstances and attendants of things as were enumerated by you. Are they not?

HIP.

HIP. They are.

SOC. But such circumstances or appendages of being, as those related by me, are otherwise: and of this kind are the being each, and the being both. Have not I stated the case rightly?

HIP. You have.

SOC. Under which kind then, Hippias, do you rank the beautiful? Do you rank it among those mentioned by yourself? as when you inferred that if I was well and hearty, and you well and hearty, then both of us were well and hearty: or, if I was honest and you honest, then both of us were honest: or, if we both were so, it followed that so was each of us. Does the same kind of inference hold true in this case? If I am beautiful, and you are beautiful, then both of us are beautiful; and if both of us, then each. Or is there no reason why it should not here be as it is in numbers¹? two of which, taken together, may be even; though each separately is perhaps odd, perhaps even: or, as it is in magnitudes²; where two of them, though each is incommensurable with some third, yet both together may perhaps be commensurable with it, perhaps incommensurable. A thousand such other things there are, which I perceived, as I said, with great clearness. Now, to whether of these two orders of being do you refer the beautiful? Does the proper rank of it appear as evident to you as it does to me? For to me it appears highly absurd, to suppose both of us beautiful, yet each of us not so; or each of us beautiful, yet not so both; no less absurd, than it is to suppose the same kind of difference between the natures of both and

¹ For instance; the two odd numbers, seven and three, together make the even number, ten: and the two even numbers, six and four, make the very same number.—S.

² For instance; let there be supposed a line ten inches in length, measured by whole inches: a line of three inches $\frac{3}{4}$, and another line of two inches $\frac{1}{4}$, are each of them incommensurable with the first given line; because neither of them can be measured completely by any line so long as a whole inch: yet both together making six inches, they are commensurable with the line of ten inches, by the inch-measure.—It is the same with the powers of two lines. The power of either may be incommensurable with that of the other, and also with some given magnitude: yet the power arising from both may be commensurable with that third magnitude. See Euclid. Elem. lib. x. prop. 35.—To the present purpose also is applicable the following theorem. The diameter of a square is demonstrated by Euclid (Elem. x. 97.) to be incommensurable with its side: and consequently so is a line twice as long as the diameter. Yet the rectangular space comprehended by that diameter and by a line of twice its length, is equal to a square, whose side is commensurable with the side of the given square.—S.

each in any of the cases put by you. Do you agree with me then in ranking the beautiful among these, or do you refer it to the opposite class of things?

HIP. I entirely agree with you, Socrates.

SOC. You do well, Hippias: because we shall thus be freed from any further inquiry upon this article. For, if the beautiful be in that class of things where we agree to place it, the pleasant then, which arises in us through sight and hearing, can no longer be supposed the beautiful. Because that which comes through both those senses jointly, may make the pleasures which arise from thence beautiful indeed both taken together; but cannot make either of them so, considered as separate from the other. But that the beautiful should have such an effect, or communicate itself in this manner, is absurd to suppose; as you and I have agreed, Hippias.

HIP. We agreed it was so, I own.

SOC. It is impossible, therefore, that the pleasant, arising in us through sight and hearing, should be the beautiful; because from this hypothesis an absurdity would follow.

HIP. You have reason on your side.

SOC. "Begin again then, and tell me," will he say, "for you have missed it now, what is that beautiful, the associate of both these pleasures, for the sake of which you give them the preference to all others, by honouring them with the name of beautiful?" It appears to me, Hippias, necessary for us to answer thus; that "these are of all pleasures the most innocent and good, as well both of them taken together, as each taken singly¹." Or can you tell me of any circumstance beside, in which they differ from other pleasures?

HIP. I know of none beside: for they are indeed the best of all.

SOC. "This then," he will say, "do you now maintain to be the beautiful, pleasure profitable?"—"It is so in my opinion," I shall answer.—What answer would you make?

HIP. The same.

SOC. "Well then," will he say: "the profitable, you know, is that which is the efficient of good. And the efficient, as we agreed lately, is a thing

¹ See the latter part of the *Philebus*.

different from the effect. Our reasoning, therefore, has brought us round to the same point again : for thus neither would the good be beautiful, nor would the beautiful be good ; each of these being, upon this hypothesis, different from the other." " Most evidently so ;" is the answer we must make, Hippias, if we are of sound mind. For the sacredness of truth will never suffer us to oppose the man who has truth with him on his side.

HIP. But now, Socrates, what think you all these matters are which we have been disputing about ? They are the shreds and tatters of an argument, cut and torn, as I said before, into a thousand pieces. But the thing which is beautiful, as well as highly valuable, is this : to be able to exhibit a fine speech, in a becoming and handsome manner, before the council, or court of justice, or any other assembly or person in authority, to whom the speech is addressed ; such a speech as hath the power of persuasion ; and having ended to depart, not with mean and insignificant trophies of victory, but with a prize the noblest, the preservation of ourselves, our fortunes, and our friends. This you ought to be ambitious of, and bid adieu to such petty and paltry disputes ; or you will appear as if you had quite lost your senses, playing with straws and trifles, as you have been now doing.

SOC. O friend Hippias ! you are happy that you know what course of life it is best for a man to follow, and have followed it, according to your own account, so successfully yourself. But I seem fated to be under the power of a dæmoniackal nature, who keeps me wandering continually in search of truth, and still at a loss where to find it. And whenever I lay my difficulties and perplexities before you wise men, I meet with no other answer from you than contumely and reproach. For you all tell me the same thing which you tell me now, " That I busy myself about silly, minute, and insignificant matters." On the other hand, when, upon giving credit to what you all tell me, I say, as you do, " That to be able to exhibit a fine speech in a court of justice, or any other assembly, and to go through it in a proper and handsome manner, is the finest thing in the world ; and that no employment is so beautiful, or so well becomes a man ; I then meet with censure and obloquy from some who are here present ¹, but especially from that man who is always reproving me. For he is my nearest of kin, and lives with me in

¹ Meaning his philosophic friends.

the same house. So, whenever I return home, and am entered in, as soon as he hears me talking in this strain, he asks me if I am not ashamed to pronounce, with so much confidence, what professions and employments are fine, or beautiful, or becoming; when I have plainly shown myself so ignorant with regard to things beautiful, as not to know wherein the nature of beauty consists.—“And how can you judge,” says he, “who has spoken a beautiful or fine speech, or done any thing else in a handsome manner, and who not, ignorant as you are what the beautiful and handsome is? Such then being the disposition of your mind, is it possible that you can think life more eligible to you than death?” Thus have I had the ill fortune, as I told you, to suffer obloquy and reproach from you, to suffer obloquy also and reproach from him. But, perhaps, it is necessary to endure all this. If I have received benefit or improvement from it, there is no harm done. And I seem to myself, Hippias, improved and benefited by the conversation of you both. For the meaning of the proverb, “Things of beauty are things of difficulty,” if I am not mistaken in myself, I know.

THE END OF THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

THE BANQUET,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

LOVE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE BANQUET.

THE composition, says Mr. Sydenham ¹, of this dialogue is of a singular cast, and different from that of any other. For the principal part of it consists of oratorical speeches, spoken at a certain banquet or entertainment, by some of the company in their turns, upon a subject proposed by one of their number.—The speakers are these six, Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agatho, and Socrates. Their several speeches are finely distinguished by different styles of oratory, and with great propriety display the peculiar character of each speaker.—The first of them, Phædrus, was a young gentleman of the most ingenuous disposition, modest, candid, and a lover of truth; refined, elevated, and heroic in his sentiments; the same person whose character Plato has thus drawn at large in a dialogue inscribed with his name. From thence also we learn that he was a great admirer of Lyfias the orator: accordingly, the speech made by him in this Banquet favours much of the style of Lyfias, such as it is characterized by Plato ² himself; the diction being pure and elegant; the periods round and well turned; but expressing the same sentiments over and over again in variety of language; and where the sentiments are various, void of all method or order in the ranging them.—The next speech, reported in the dialogue, is that of Pausanias; who appears to have been a statesman or politician, a great admirer

¹ Nearly the whole of this Introduction is extracted from Mr. Sydenham's argument to this dialogue. As he is mistaken in certain parts of his argument, from the want of a more profound knowledge of Plato's philosophy, I found it impossible to give it entire.—T.

² See the Phædrus.

of both the Spartan and the Athenian laws, and an enemy to all other systems of government and manners. The style of his oratory corresponds exactly with the character which Hermogenes gives us of the style used by Isocrates: for he is clear and distinct, and divides his subject properly; is profuse in ornaments, and rather too nice and accurate; diffuse and ample in his sentiments, though not in his expression; and taking a large compass of argument in the coming to his point. We find him however free from those faults for which that critic justly reprehends Isocrates: for in the speech of Pausanias there is no languor nor tediousness; nor is he guilty of preaching, or of being didactic; vices in oratory which are the usual concomitants of old age, and in Isocrates perhaps were principally owing to that cause: certain it is, that most of his orations now extant were composed in the decline of his life, and that in the latest of them those blemishes are the most conspicuous. But at the time when the speeches, reported in this dialogue, were supposed to have been spoken, Isocrates was in the flower both of his age and of his eloquence. Add to this, that Pausanias here immoderately affects some of those little graces of style for which Isocrates was remarkable in his younger years most¹; such as *αντιθesis*, or oppositions; *παρισωσεις*, or parities, where one member of a sentence answers either in sound or sentiment to another; and those merely verbal or literal similarities, of adnominations, adliterations, and the same beginnings or endings of two or more words near one another. One of these ornaments, improperly used, Plato ridicules in the way of mimicry, as soon as the speech of Pausanias is ended: which alone seems a sufficient evidence that Plato in framing that speech purposely imitated the style of Isocrates. His intention in so doing, as appears probable, we think, from the beginning of the speech itself, was to set in contrast those two celebrated orators, Lysias and Isocrates; and to exhibit the former as treating his subject in a general, indiscriminating, indeterminate way, copious in his language, but jejune in matter: the other, as distinguishing and methodical, full of matter, and ample in particulars, from having studied the nature of his subject more distinctly, philosophically, and minutely. It may be pertinent to observe, that Plato seems to have

¹ See Hermogenes *περι ιδων*, l. i. c. 12. The same critic *περι μεθόδου*, c. 15, and 16. Vit. Homer. inter Opusc. Mytholog. ex ed. 2da, pag. 300, 301. Quintilian. Institut. Orat. l. ix. c. 3. and Demetrius Phaler. *περι ῥημνειας*, § 29.

had the same view in introducing the mention of Isocrates near the conclusion of his dialogue named Phædrus.—The next speaker to Pausanias is Eryximachus; whose profession was that of medicine: and his speech is suitable to his profession; for he considers the subject in a more extensive view; and, beginning from the human body, both in its sound and morbid state, goes on like a thorough naturalist, and pursues his instances through every part of nature, through earth, air and sky, up to that which is divine. His oratory, to the best of our little judgment in these matters, agrees with what Hermogenes¹ reports of Pericles, that of all the antient orators, meaning before the time of Demosthenes, he had in appearance, as well as in reality, the most of the *δεινότης*, that is, weight with his hearers, and power over their passions. For, according to that critic, the real *δεινότης* of an orator consists in a ready and apt use of his general knowledge, or an opportune and proper application of it, in managing his subject; and the *δεινότης* is most apparent, he says, when the *εννοιαί*, the thoughts and sentiments, are profound, curious, and out of the common road, yet striking and forcible. Now the real and the apparent *δεινότης*, as thus described, are both of them remarkable in the only oration of Pericles we have left, inserted by Thucydides in his history: and both seem affectedly used in the speech of Eryximachus; which we presume, therefore, Plato composed in imitation of Pericles.—Next after him speaks Aristophanes, the celebrated comic poet; through whose comedies, such at least as are still remaining, runs the same rich vein of humour, the same lively and redundant wit, which characterize his speech in the Banquet.—The next speech is made by Agatho, the donor of the feast. Agatho was at this time a young man of a large fortune, generous, magnificent, and polished in his manners; much admired by all for the comeliness of his person; and celebrated by Plato in the Protagoras for his fine parts and excellent natural disposition. His genius inclined him to poetry, and particularly to that of the tragic kind; in which he was so successful, as to win the prize from all his antagonists, in one of those competitions for excellence in writing tragedies annually held at the feast of Bacchus. Upon this occasion it was that he gave his friends that entertainment which Plato has immortalized by this fine dialogue. We have no

¹ See his treatise *περί ιδίων*, l. ii. c. 9.

piece of his writing extant; but it is highly probable that the speech here attributed to him gives a just representation of his style: for the language of it is extremely poetical, florid, and abounding with metaphors; and the sentiments are wonderfully elegant, ingenious, and full of fancy, but have not so much as an appearance of truth for their foundation.—The last speaker on the subject is Socrates: and his speech is in every respect worthy of the man. For in his whole conduct he was modest, and careful to avoid the least degree of ostentation; in all his discourse he was solicitous above all things for the truth in every subject¹, and proposed to himself that as the principle end in all his disputes, inquiries, and researches; and whenever he took the lead in conversation, he began from things easy, common, and obvious, but gradually rose to speculations the most difficult, sublime, and excellent. Agreeably to this character, he delivers in his speech nothing as from himself; but introduces another person, assuming the magisterial airs of a teacher, yet condescending, gentle, and affable. This person is Diotima, a lady at that time in high reputation for her intercourse with the Gods, and her predictions of future events. The speech of Socrates contains the recital of a conversation between himself and this prophetic lady; into whose mouth he puts what he has a mind to teach, on purpose to insinuate that his speech was indisputably true, was worthy of being thought divinely inspired, and conveyed the knowledge of divine things. The eloquence of it exemplifies that doctrine taught by Plato in his *Phædrus* and his *Gorgias*, that the man who best knows the truth in every subject he treats of, and intends the good of those whom he endeavours to persuade, he who has the most knowledge of human nature, and of the various dispositions of men, and consequently can adapt his speech to the temper of his audience, he is likely to make the ablest and best speaker; the other qualifications requisite to form an orator being comparatively mean, and, so far as art is concerned in them, easily attainable. The truth of this doctrine was soon after abundantly confirmed in Demosthenes, who, forming himself upon the rules laid down by Plato, became at once the most perfect patriot, politician, and orator of his (I had almost said of any) age.—After these six speeches are ended, a new character is brought upon the

¹ See the *Greater Hippias*.

stage,—Alcibiades, a young nobleman of the first rank in Athens, of great natural and acquired abilities, chiefly those of the military kind, but of dissolute and thoroughly debauched manners. Being ambitious of power and government in the state too early, before he was qualified for them by knowledge and experience, he had for some time been a follower of Socrates, whose eloquence and reasoning he saw prevailing always over those of the Sophists: for he hoped to acquire, in his company and converse, the same superior power of persuasion; in order to employ that power with the people, and gratify the views of his ambition. He is introduced into the banquet-room, far from sober; and his behaviour and speech (for he is engaged by the company to make a speech) perfectly agree with the character of his manners. The subject on which he speaks is professedly, and in all appearance, foreign to the point spoken to by the rest, as the disorderly and unthinking condition which he is in requires it should be; but it is far from being so in reality. Plato has not only woven it into his design in this incomparable dialogue, but has made it one of the most essential parts, without which the work had been wholly defective in the end for which it was framed¹. These speeches, with the conversation and occurrences at the banquet, make the principal part of this dialogue; and are introduced, not in a dramatic, but a narrative way. The introduction is partly narrative, and partly dramatic; by which means it is somewhat intricate. For the dialogue opens with a conversation between two persons only, Apollodorus and some friend of his, though in the presence of others, such as dramatic writers call mute persons. At the very beginning Apollodorus relates a short conversation lately held between himself and Glauco; and tells his friend, that he then gave Glauco an account of what had passed at the banquet given by Agatho; which account, repeated by him here again, constitutes all the rest of the dialogue. He says, it was delivered to him by Aristodemus, one of the company; who had begun his narrative with the recital of a short conversation held between Socrates and himself, and of some other occurrences previous to the banquet. The same recital here made by Apollodorus to his friend, and to the company at that friend's house, immediately introduces the narrative or history of that truly noble entertainment. Such is the manner, and such the method, in which this dialogue is composed. It is

¹ See the Notes on the Speech of Alcibiades.

usually and very properly intitled, "Concerning Love," because the speculation of love is its leading object.

With respect to the speeches, that of Phædrus takes the word *love* in a general sense, so as to comprehend love toward persons of the same sex, commonly called friendship, as well as that toward persons of a different sex, peculiarly and eminently styled love.—Pausanias distinguishes between love of the mind, and love merely of the body, proving them to be affections of very different kinds, because productive of very different effects.—Eryximachus considers love as that universal principle in nature which attracts, unites, or associates one thing to another in a regular way; the effect of whose operation is harmony or concord: that which heals also the breaches made by the opposite, the disuniting and dividing principle, the cause of irregular motions and of discord.—Aristophanes treats of love as other writers of comedy do, taking it only in the grossest sense of the word, as it means the passion common to man with all brute animals.—And Agatho talks about it in a vague manner, without any determinate or fixed meaning at all; taking it in various senses; commonly, indeed, for the refinement of that passion between the sexes, but sometimes for great liking or attachment of the mind to any object; and then, all at once, using the word, like Eryximachus, to signify concord and harmony, not only between rational beings, but even the unintelligent parts of nature. But when Socrates comes to speak upon the subject, he goes much deeper into it by degrees: in the first place, he premises certain universal truths relating to love; that the object of it is beauty; the essence of it desire; its aim or end the possession of beauty, or, if already possessed of it, the perpetuity of that possession. Next, he considers love as the desire of good; whatever is beautiful being also good, so far as it is beautiful; and love, peculiarly so called, being part of that universal love or desire of good, common to all beings, intelligent and sentient. He considers this universal love, or desire of good, as the link between the eternal nature and the mortal, between the plenitude of good and the total want of it. He considers, that the aim of this desire, agreeably to a certain property of it before observed, is not only to enjoy good, but to immortalize that enjoyment. The desire of immortality, therefore, is of necessity, he says, annexed to the desire of good, or love of beauty. But personal immortality being impossible to be attained by any being whose nature is mortal,

tal, every such being, prompted by nature, seeks to continue itself, and its enjoyment of good, in the only way possible, the propagation of its species, and the production of some being resembling itself, another self, to succeed, and to continue as it were the enjoyment of the same good. Hence, the love of that beauty, with which every animal is most smitten in the beautiful of its own kind, is accompanied with an instinct, or natural desire, to mix and unite with it, and thus to generate another animal of the same kind. From corporeal beauty, and that lower species of love regarding it, man, as his mind opens more and is improved, naturally proceeds further; attaining the sight of that beauty which is seen only by the eye of intellect, in the temper and disposition of some fellow-mind; and fired with that love which attends the sight of mental beauty. To this love also is annexed, says Socrates, the desire of generating, of stamping upon that other mind its own thoughts, and of raising up and nurturing between them an intellectual progeny, of generous sentiments and fair ideas. By means of this mixture and this enjoyment, that is, by converse, such as improves the understanding, the mind, he observes, rises higher, and attains to view beauty in those things themselves, the subjects of their conversation; first, in virtuous pursuits, studies, and employments; next, in the sciences, and every branch of knowledge. In the embraces of these beauties the mind generates an offspring of the fairest kind and the most durable; the poet, his immortal writings; the hero, through the force of his example, continual copies of his virtue; the founder of civil polities, through his institutions, a long succession of patriot actions; and the legislator, wise and beneficial laws, to bless the latest posterity. But if the soul be endowed with a genius of the highest kind, she rests not here, nor fixes her attachment on any one of these mental excellencies or beauties in particular: the genuine lover of truth rises from hence to the survey of that universal, original, and exemplar beauty from which every thing beautiful, both in the intelligible and sensible world, proceeds. The love and the pursuit of this supreme beauty Plato calls philosophy; and to the embraces or enjoyment of it, and to no other cause, does he here ascribe the generation and the growth of true virtue.

With respect to the speech of Alcibiades, it has been already observed, that it is one of the most essential parts of the dialogue. This will be at once evident, when it is considered that the intention of Plato in it was to exemplify

in the character of Socrates, as one who had been initiated in the mysteries of love, that perfection of virtue which such an initiation is capable of effecting. Mr. Sydenham, therefore, was very unfortunately persuaded to abandon the design of publishing his translation of this speech; and much was he mistaken in thinking that some part of it is so grossly indecent that it may offend the virtuous and encourage the vicious. For it will appear in our notes, that this apparent indecency is introduced conformably to the machinery of the mysteries, with no other view than to purify the reader from every thing indecent, and to liberate him, in short, from vulgar love, by exciting the amatory eye of intellect to the vision of objects ineffably beautiful and truly divine.

The ancients, not without reason, generally rank this dialogue among those of the ethic class¹; but the character of it is of the mixed kind, that is, partly narrative and partly dramatic: and the genius of it takes its colour from the didactic part, the speech of Socrates; the reasoning of which is wholly analytical, resolving all love into its principles, and tracing all beauty upward to that source from whence it is derived to every order of being.

¹ Modern interpreters, with a view to the sublimer part of the speech of Socrates, but without regarding the drift of it, call this dialogue metaphysical or theological. And among the ancient Platonists, Albinus, as if he was attentive chiefly to the speech of Pausanias, and referred all the other speeches to that, calls it political.—S.

THE BANQUET.

PERSONS¹ OF THE DIALOGUE.

APOLLODORUS²,
FRIEND³ OF APOLLODORUS,
GLAUCO⁴,
ARISTODEMUS⁵,
SOCRATES⁶,
AGATHO,

PAUSANIAS,
ARISTOPHANES,
ERYXIMACHUS,
PHÆDRUS,
DIOTIMA,
ALCIBIADES.

SCENE⁷.—*Principally within the City of ATHENS.*

¹ The readers of Plato will observe, that before each of his dialogues the names of the speakers in it are recited, not in the order either of their real dignity, or of their importance to the dialogue, as the manner is of modern poets before their tragedies and comedies; but according to the order in which they severally make their first appearance; and, since in every scene of conversation two or more must appear at the same time together, these are named according to the order in which they first speak: after the manner we find the persons of the drama enumerated before all the dramatic writings of the antients.

² Apollodorus was a disciple of Socrates, but of no long standing at this time. His character, therefore, in the dialogue is properly marked by the vehemence of his attachment to philosophy, and admiration of his master.

³ This friend is not mentioned by name: a circumstance which alone seems to have induced some to imagine, that by the friend of Apollodorus Plato here meant himself.

⁴ If this be the same Glauco who was brother to Plato, and Plato be the friend here introduced, it seems strange that Apollodorus should speak of Plato's brother to Plato himself, as of one utterly unknown to Plato, mentioning his name, afterwards, only as it were by accident.

⁵ Aristodemus was a constant, humble follower of Socrates.

⁶ For the characters of all the following persons we refer to the first part of the preceding Introduction.

⁷ The scene of conversation between Apollodorus and his friend, the only dramatic part of the dialogue, and where all the rest of it is introduced in the way of narrative, appears to be the house of this friend; as proper a place as any for so long a recital as Apollodorus had to make him; and the most proper where to come to him with that intention. The way from Phalerus to Athens a long walk, is, with no less propriety, made the scene of the conversation related by Apollodorus between himself and Glauco; to whom, he says, he then made the same long recital. The scene of the short discourse next related between Aristodemus and Socrates is made the street; by which piece of conduct, the breaking it off so abruptly is suitable to the decorum of place. And Agatho's house is the grand scene of the principal part, the speeches at the entertainment.—S.

APOLLODORUS.

THE affair concerning which ye inquire I think myself now not quite unprepared to relate to you. For it happened ¹ a few days since, as I was walking up to the city from my house at Phalerus ², that an acquaintance of mine, who was going the same way, seeing me at a considerable distance before him, called out to me; and by way of joke ³ at the same time said, Apollodorus, you Phalerean, will not you stop a while till I come up to you? Upon which I stopped, and stayed for him. As soon as he had joined me, Apollodorus, said he, I was just now inquiring after you; from a desire I have to be thoroughly acquainted with what passed in the conversation between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest who were of the party, at an entertainment where the subject of their discourse was Love. I should be glad to be informed by you what was said on the occasion. For the person who gave me some account of it, such as he received from Phoenix the son of Philippus, told me that you knew every particular: but that, as to himself, he did not pretend to be at all perfect or exact in his relation. Do you then give me an account of it yourself; for you have the best right to relate a conversation in which an intimate friend of your own had the most distinguished share. But first, said he, tell me, were you yourself one of the company?—It appears plainly, said I, indeed, that your author by no means gave you an exact account of the circumstances of that conversation, if you suppose it passed so lately as to admit a possibility of my being of the company.—Really I imagined so, replied he.—How could it be, said I,

¹ The word *παύω*, which the older editions give us in this place, is, carelessly as it seems, omitted in that of Stephens: which error, as well as many others, we the rather take notice of, to prevent a repetition of the same in any future edition of Plato where the text of Stephens is likely to be made the standard.—S.

² Phalerus was a sea-port town, between four and five miles from the city of Athens; where frequently were furnished out, by way of spectacles of entertainment to the people, pompous cavalcades, issuing probably from thence, and marching to the city. See Xenophon in Hipparchic. p. 560. ed. 2da Steph.—S.

³ What the joke is, will easily be discerned by help of the preceding note. For it lies in a humorous opposition between the haste with which Apollodorus seems to have been walking, agreeably to his character, and the slowness usual in cavalcades of pomp, with the frequent stopping of those who are foremost, till the more dilatory train behind them is come up.—S.

Glauco?

Glauco? Do you not know that Agatho has not been at Athens for these many years? whereas it is not yet three since I first became a follower of Socrates, and began, as I have continued ever since, daily to observe and study all his sayings and actions. Before that time, running about here and there, wherever chance led me, and fancying myself all the while well employed, no mortal was in so wretched a condition as I: it was such as you are in at present, who give every study and every pursuit the preference to that of philosophy.—Leave off railing, said he, and tell me when that conversation happened.—Before we wrote ourselves men, replied I. It was at the time when Agatho brought his first tragedy upon the stage, and won the prize with it. It was the very next day after that himself and his chorus-fingers ¹ had offered the usual thanksgiving-sacrifice for his victory.—It is then, said he, a long time since, it seems. But who was it, continued he, that related the conversation to you? Was it Socrates himself?—Not Socrates, by Jupiter, replied I; but the same person who related it to Phoenix. It was one Aristodemus, a Cydathenian ², a man of remarkably low stature ³, who always

¹ Those who acted and sung the chorus parts in his play.—S.

² In all the editions of the Greek we here read *Κυδαθηνεύς*: but it ought certainly to be printed *Κυδαθηναίεύς*; as appears from Stephanus de Urb. and from an old inscription on a pillar at Athens published in Spon. de Pagis Attic. voce *Κυδαθηναίων*. See also Meursius de Pop. Attic. in eadem voce.—S.

³ Xenophon informs us, that Aristodemus was surnamed *the Little*. This circumstance, therefore, serves to ascertain the man. From the same author we learn, that this little man was also one of the minute philosophers of that age, till better taught by Socrates. For Xenophon represents him as *οὐτε θύοντα τοῖς θεοῖς μυχᾶναιμενον, οὐτε μαντικῇ χρωμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ποιοῦντων τὰ ταῦτα καταγελῶντα*. We quote the very words of this passage, for the sake of proposing to our learned readers an emendation of the word *μυχᾶναιμενον*. For we are not satisfied with *μῆτε ευχόμενον*, the conjecture of H. Stephens, nor with the *οὐτε ευχόμενον* of Leunclavius; because sacrifice to the Gods, we apprehend, always implied either petition or thanksgiving: nor can we acquiesce in retaining the word *μυχᾶναιμενον*, making it to signify, *when he undertook any thing*, and accordingly supposing, with Ernestus, the word *τι* to be tacitly understood; because the supposition seems not agreeable to any idiom of the Greek language. We approve rather the prudence of Bessarion, who, in his Latin translation of this passage, took no notice at all of the word *μυχᾶναιμενον*. But, as we must not make so bold with the original, we propose, instead of that word, to be read as in a parenthesis, *μη ἐκόντα μὲν οὐν*: by which alteration the sense will be this, that Aristodemus offered no sacrifices to the Gods, *no voluntary ones at least*, but in compliance only with custom, or in obedi-

ways went barefoot¹. He was of the party; being one of those who at that time were the most attached to the person and company of Socrates, Not but that I asked Socrates himself concerning some of the particulars reported by Aristodemus; and he allowed they were reported justly.—Why then, said Glauco, should not you favour me with that relation? The way to the city is perfectly convenient for people to converse together, as they go along.—Upon which we resumed our walk, and entered into the relation which my friend desired. So that I am now, as I said, not quite unprepared upon the subject. If then I am to relate that affair over again to you, so it must be. Besides, I must own, that when I am discoursing myself, or hearing the discourse of others, upon philosophical subjects, abstracted from the consideration of improvement, I am beyond measure delighted. But when I hear conversation of any other kind, especially the usual discourse between you rich people, who are still contriving to heap up money, I feel a tediousness in myself, and a concern for you my friends, who imagine you are employing your time to good purpose, while you are only trifling. On the other hand, it is possible you may think that I lead an unhappy life; and I believe those thoughts of yours are just: but as to you, I do not say that I believe, for I know, the state which you are in to be unhappy.

FRIEND. You are always the same man, Apollodorus, always railing at yourself and the whole world. You seem to me as if you absolutely thought all men wretched, and yourself in the first place; excepting none but Socrates. Whence you acquired the surname of the madman², for my part I know

ence to the laws. And this may appear to be the true meaning, when we consider that atheists in all ages are ready enough to join in public acts of divine worship; and, therefore, not the neglect of these, but of such as were *voluntary*, could be any indication to Socrates of the real sentiments of Aristodemus. See Xenophon in Memorabil. l. i. c. 4.—S.

¹ By this circumstance Aristodemus was distinguished, it seems, as much as by his littleness. It is probable that, like his fellow disciple Antisthenes the cynic, he imitated what appeared the most rigid and severe in his master's way of life, as being best suited to the natural roughness of his own temper, and the rudeness of his manners; which led him to entertain atheistical notions of the causes of things, and to ridicule those who paid real worship to what was divine in nature. This circumstance recalls to our mind those epithets of *rough, hard, and unyielding*, *τραχηλὸν καὶ ἀνένικον*, given to atheism by Plutarch at the end of his treatise *περὶ θεοειδαιμον*—S.

² Xenophon in his Apology, and Plato in his Phædo, near the beginning, and again toward the

know not: for, in your discourse, you are always the same as you are now, severe upon yourself and all other people,—Socrates alone excepted.

APOL. My dearest friend, it is evident enough now, that the entertaining such notions of myself, and of all you, proves me beyond question out of my senses and a madman.

FRIEND. It is not worth the while, Apollodorus, to dispute about this at present. Only do what I desired of you, and give me an account of the speeches made at that banquet.

APOL. The speeches then were as follows:—But I had better, I think, give you the whole history of that affair from the beginning, just as Aristodemus gave it me. For he told me, that he met Socrates fresh out of the bath, and perfectly clean, a condition which he was not in very often; wearing on his feet likewise a handsome pair of slippers¹, a part of dress which he used only on rare occasions: and that upon asking him, whither he was going, that he had made himself so spruce and fine, Socrates told him, he was going to Agatho's house to sup with him. For yesterday at the sacrifice, said he, I quitted his company, for fear of the crowd; but promised to be with him to-day. Now thus fine have I made myself, that I may visit so honourable and fine a person in a manner not unbecoming. But what

conclusion of it, represent Apollodorus as a man simple and sincere, but with such a kind of weakness in his mind, as made him remarkably hasty, negligent of decorum, and apt to speak inconsiderately and without discretion.—S.

¹ Socrates, in his ordinary way of life, accustomed himself to endure voluntary hardships: from which he drew this advantage, that he suffered less than other men when called to bear hardships that were necessary. In like manner the Cynics and Stoics, in imitation probably of Socrates, did many things *ἀσκητικῶς ἕνεκα*, that is, for the sake of habituating, through exercise, their minds and bodies to endurance. But Socrates, unlike the Cynics, made all this consistent with a regard to the decencies of civil and social life, a due compliance with custom, and conformity to fashion. For he always readily relaxed from his severity, whenever, as on the present occasion, he deemed the practice of it unseasonable. This civility distinguishes the manners of Socrates from the savage rusticity of Aristodemus before mentioned. And we cannot help thinking, that these seemingly slight circumstances, in the description of these two persons, were mentioned by Plato so near together, on purpose to make that distinction the more easy to be noted. We learn from *Ælian*, in *Var. Hist.* l. iv. c. 18. that Socrates was charged, probably by the Cynics, with being curious and nice about his house, and his bed, and his fine slippers. Which confirms the truth of our observation in this note.—S.

think you, said he, Aristodemus, of going to supper there yourself, without invitation? How do you find yourself disposed upon that point?—And I replied, said Aristodemus, that I was entirely at his disposal.—Follow me then, said Socrates; to corrupt the old proverb¹, by altering it,—and proving, that

When made by worthy men are feasts,
The worthy go, unbidden guests.

Homer, before us, seems not merely to have corrupted, but to have offered violence to the proverb, by reversing it. For, notwithstanding that he describes Agamemnon as a man excellent in all military virtues, and Menelaus as a man weak in arms, who

* ——— Failed of manly force
To fling the well-aimed javelin;

yet, on occasion of a sacrifice and feast made by Agamemnon, he has brought
Menelaus

¹ The proverb here alluded to, Athenæus, pag. 178. and Zenobius, c. 2. 19. have given us in this verse, which the latter quotes from Eupolis the comic poet,

Αὐτοματοὶ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλὸν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἰασιν.

When made by meaner men are feasts,
Their betters go, unbidden guests.

That is, when they are pleased to honour with their presence such as could not presume to invite them.—S.

² Μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν. Menelaus is so called in the 17th book of the Iliad, ver. 588. Athenæus is very angry with Plato for receiving this character of Menelaus as true; and for not considering that Homer puts it into the mouth of Apollo, a partial friend to the Trojans, and of consequence enemy to Menelaus. He, therefore, stands up very stoutly against Apollo and Plato, to prove, by many instances in Homer, that Menelaus was no coward. But in reality he only proves himself so inveterate an enemy to Plato, as, for the sake of abusing him, to misinterpret Homer; who, by the word *μαλθακὸν*, meant no more in that passage than, as the old scholiast rightly explains it, *ἀνέμνον τῇ ἰσχύϊ, ἀσθενῆ*; and just so much Athenæus himself confesses true of Menelaus, that he was *τῇ ῥώμῃ καταδεισέτερος*, somewhat deficient in strength. Thus much may serve to vindicate Plato in this place against Athenæus. But a better critic than Athenæus, unless he were well versed in Plato's peculiar manner of writing, would, with more show of justice, reprehend him here for the seemingly cold and insipid length of this digression about the proverb. And, indeed, were this part merely a digression, the criticism would in reality be just. But Plato intended it for a part
highly

Menelaus to the banquet uninvited ¹, a meaner man to the banquet of his betters.—Perhaps I too, replied Aristodemus, on hearing this, shall incur the imputation of a conduct, not, Socrates, such a one as you have supposed, but like that in Homer, if I go to the banquet of a man of great abilities, without being intitled to it either by merit or invitation. Will you, therefore, if you lead me thither, make an apology for so doing? for, as to myself, I shall not confess my coming without invitation, but shall plead that I was invited by you.—Well, says Socrates,

^a With social steps, companions of the way,

as we walk along, we will consult together what speech to make. But come, let us be going.—After this little talk together, he said, on they went. But in the way, Socrates musing, and attentive to something in his own mind, was outwalked by him; and, observing him to stop, bid him walk on. When he was come to Agatho's house, the door of which was open, an incident, he said, happened, which put him into some confusion. For a servant, who was coming out, meeting him there upon the spot, led him directly to the banquet-room, where he found the company just going to supper. Immediately Agatho, on seeing him enter the room, said,—Aristo-

highly important to his dialogue; to guard it against the misconstruction to which it might be liable from men of severe, sour, and malignant tempers; to signify, that not all people were worthy, or properly qualified, to partake as it were of the banquet he had provided; and to point out, for whom it was particularly improper to be present, *τους μαλθακούς*, *molles*, the voluptuous, or men of effeminate minds and manners: in which sense the word *μαλθακός* is often taken. See particularly Xenophon in Mem. I. iii. c. 11. § 10. where it is applied to libidinous love, and opposed to that which inspires the sentiments of friendship. Homer, it is true, had a different meaning, such as we have before explained; and Plato uses a kind of catachresis in adapting this passage to his purpose. But it was sufficient for him, if any way it was applicable. Some passage or other in Homer was here to be introduced, and the reader's mind to be detained on it for some time. For this observation will be found to hold true throughout all Plato's writings, that, whenever he cites a verse out of any poet, especially out of Homer, he does it not, like writers of a lower class, to embellish the plainness of prose with fine tags of poetry; but his view is always either to strike the mind of his reader more forcibly in the conveying some important meaning, and to make it sink the deeper in his memory; or else to prepare him for something of importance which is to follow, by ushering it in with the solemnity of verse, and, what in those days was of much weight, the authority of the poet.—S.

¹ See Homer's Iliad, b. ii. ver. 408.

^a Iliad, b. x. ver. 224.

demus,

demus, you are come very opportunely to sup with us. But if any other purpose brings you hither, defer it to another time. I was looking about for you in the temple yesterday, with intention to desire your company, and could not see you. But how came you not to bring us Socrates with you?—Upon which I looked back, said he, but could no where see Socrates following me, as I had imagined. However, I declared I came along with Socrates, upon his invitation hither to supper.—You did well, said Agatho; but where is he then himself?—He was following me in but just now, said I; and for my part, I wonder where he can be.—Boy, said Agatho to one of his servants, will you go and see if you can find Socrates, and conduct him in?—Then, turning to me, Do you, Aristodemus, said he, take your place next to Eryximachus. And immediately he ordered a servant to come and wash my feet clean¹, that I might take my place upon the couch². Just then the boy

¹ Thus in the original: *Και ἐγὼ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς τὸν παῖδα, ὅς τις ποῦ κατάνοιτο*. The remarkable enallage, or transition here, in speaking of himself, from the first person to the third, is no unusual thing in Plato; but is too bold, and would be a solecism in English. For, translated as literally as possible, the sentence runs in this manner: "Immediately he bid the [proper] servant to wash off [the dirt] from me, that [says he] he may lie down somewhere." The words included within hooks, we have added to complete the sense. The first part of the sentence, we see, is merely narrative, and the latter part represents Agatho speaking. But the word *ἐφ'*, having been used just before, though in a different sense, is here omitted, probably to avoid a repetition of it. Harry Stephens, not aware of this transition, has raised doubts about the right reading of this passage; and has endeavoured, without any necessity, to amend it, by altering *κατάνοιτο* into *κατανοομένη*. The same learned printer and editor has, in a passage of the Euthyphro, where there is a like transition, proposed altering the text in the same manner, from want of observing this peculiarity in Plato's style, as Dr. Forster has judiciously remarked in his notes on those five dialogues, published by him, pag. 328.—S.

² In that polite age, luxury and too great a delicacy and softness of manners had so far prevailed even amongst the brave Grecians, that when they made their evening meal, or supper, which was with them the principal meal of the day, as dinner is with us, they used not to sit on chairs, stools, or benches, at the table, like the modern Europeans; nor to sit or lie upon mats or carpets laid over the floor, like some of the Eastern nations; but their custom was to recline themselves on sofas, couches, or day-beds; the heads of which being placed at the sides of the table, an oblong square, were covered with cushions; and on these they leaned their elbows. It was necessary, therefore, that Aristodemus should have his dirty feet washed before he was fit to lie on one of those sofas. This little incident seems thrown in by Plato, to confirm the account before given of the manners of Aristodemus, and to exhibit them in a stronger light, as opposite in this particular to those of Socrates, about whom we see no such ceremony used, because unnecessary.

boy who had been sent out returned, and told us, that Socrates had withdrawn himself into the porch of some neighbouring house, and was there standing; and when I called to him, said the boy, he refused to come.—Absurd! said Agatho: go and call him again; and do not leave him in that manner.—But Aristodemus told me, that he himself opposed it, and desired that Socrates might be let alone, for that it was usual with him so to do. As he goes along he will sometimes stop, said he, without regarding where, and stand still a while. I make no doubt but he will be here presently. Let me entreat you, therefore, not to disturb him, but leave him at quiet.—Be it so then, if you think it best, said Agatho; but let the rest of us, however, proceed to supper.—Then, turning to his servants, Boys, said he, serve us up something or other; it is left to you what, for there is nobody to give you any particular directions: you know it is not my way on these occasions.—You are now to suppose me and these gentlemen, my friends here, invited by you to supper: entertain us handsomely, therefore, that you may have our commendations.—Immediately upon this, he said, they went to supper; but Socrates was still missing. Agatho¹, therefore, would every now and then

Different from either of these is the case of Alcibiades, further on in the dialogue. For, as he comes in drunk and dirty, in the midst of his rakehell rambles about the town, slippers are ordered to be brought him, and not his feet to be washed, as he wore shoes. So minute is Plato in his detail of every circumstance that may contribute to throw light on the characters of those persons he introduces. Whatever weight there is in this observation, be it great or little, so much of importance is there in the blunder committed by all the Latin translators, and by the Italian after them, in making Agatho order water to wash the hands of Aristodemus instead of his feet: and in the same degree is praise due to the judgment and accuracy of Mons. Racine, who, in his translation of this dialogue into French, corrects this error; and though he might justly be supposed prejudiced in favour of washing the hands before meals, after the modern French fashion, as well as the ancient Grecian, yet explains rightly the orders of Agatho; as being sensible, no doubt, that washing the feet of Aristodemus, not his hands, was a proper preparative for his laying up his legs on the sofa. But he omits this reason of Agatho's for giving those orders, though expressly mentioned by Plato; probably because he was at a loss how to translate the words, being puzzled by the doubts raised about them by Stephens, as mentioned in the preceding note.—S.

¹ There is none of Plato's dialogues in which Socrates is ushered in with so much ceremony as in this. In the first place, that recital of the conversation passed between Apollodorus and Glauco, with which the piece sets out, seems introduced only for the sake of giving the reader a high opinion of the character of Socrates. To this purpose tend the reflections made by Apollodorus upon the singular wisdom of his master. To the same end is directed his account of the alteration

then be giving orders to his people to call Socrates in; but I, said he, constantly opposed it. At length Socrates, having staid away, as usual, not very long, entered; about the time, at furthest, when supper was half over. Agatho then, who lay on the couch at the lower end of the table, alone, said, Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by me; that, by being close to you, I may have the benefit of that piece of wisdom¹, which you made a new acquisition of in the porch. For it is plain that you found it, and are in possession; otherwise you would never have desisted from the pursuit.—Socrates then, sitting down on the couch, said, It would be well, Agatho, if wisdom were a thing of such a nature, as to pass from those who abound with it into such as want it, when they sit close to one another, and are in contact; like water running through the wool² out of the fuller vessel into the

alteration produced in him by studying that wisdom. And for the same reason is mention made of the many admirers of that truly admirable man. But all these circumstances are made to appear simple and artless, the more irresistibly to operate their intended effect upon the reader's mind. The short conversation which follows, between Apollodorus and his friend, carries on the same intention; but goes greater lengths of praise in the character there given of Socrates. Then comes a narration of some little circumstances, immediately previous to the celebrated banquet, serving to prejudice the reader's mind with an idea of the excellence of the company assembled at Agatho's: of this kind is the extraordinary care which Socrates we see has taken of his person and dress, as a proper mark of respect to that assembly; and another of the same kind is the argument which he politely urges to Aristodemus, when he is persuading him to be of the party. The circumstances subsequent, the profound meditation of Socrates in his way to Agatho's, his stealing aside immediately on his coming there, plainly with design to finish his speculations, his staying away till supper was half over, and, during that stay, the conversation turning on Socrates, as the principal person wanting, together with the impatience of Agatho at his absence, are all contrived on purpose to raise the expectation of that great figure Socrates is soon to make, and of that high part he is to bear in a conversation where all the speakers shine in their several characters, upon the finest and most interesting subject in human life.—S.

¹ In the Greek *ὁ σοὶ προσέστι*. Perhaps it should be *προσέτι*. Whether Cornarius found it so written in the Hefsenstein manuscript, he has not told us; but he here translates, as if he had, *quæ tibi accessit*.—S.

² *Δια τοῦ εἴλου*. It is possible this may mean a woollen bag, made in the manner of our flannel jelly-bags, to strain and purify the liquor running through. Or perhaps it means a string of wool lightly twisted, fastened at one end about the mouth of the cock, in a ewer, or other vessel out of which the water is to run, and hanging down into some basin, or other receptacle; that the water, as it runs along, may leave behind it in the nappeiness of the wool any dirt or impure particles with which it may be loaded. This latter conjecture is made the more probable by the information

the emptier. If this quality attend wisdom, I shall set a high value upon partaking of your couch : for I shall expect to have wisdom flow into me from you in great quantity, and of a kind which appears the fairest. As for the little which I have, it must be mean and trivial¹, doubtful and questionable, seeming but a dream². But the wisdom³ you are master of is splendid, and promises a future great increase of brightness, having already in the morning of your age shone out with so much glory ; as more than thirty thousand Grecians, before whom it appeared⁴ the other day, can witness.—You are a joker, Socrates, said Agatho. But this controversy between us about our wisdoms shall be tried by and by, and Bacchus shall decide the cause. At present, turn your thoughts to the table.—Upon this, he told me, Socrates

information we have from a certain friend, a man of credit and veracity, that in some parts of Wiltshire the like method is practised of purifying water, by letting it run down in the manner we have described, along twisted wool, which they there call accordingly *the twist*. Cornarius says in his *Eclogæ*, that he cannot conceive what wool could have to do in the affair ; and therefore he supposes, that instead of the word *επιου* should be read *οργανου*, meaning, he says, a conduit-pipe to convey water out of one cistern, when full, into another. But by this alteration of the word a very humorous part of the similitude is lost ; that which represents wisdom streaming out of one man into another, as it were, by a strong transpiration, through their woollen or cloth garments being in contact together.—S.

¹ See the Greater Hippias.

² Socrates taught that outward things, the objects of sense, were the images only of those general ideas which are the objects of mind or intellect ; though, like images in dreams, they seemed the very things themselves. The sophists of his time, on the other hand, agreed with the multitude in maintaining that objects of sense were the only realities, and that those ideal things which Socrates cried up for real and true were at best but shadows, outlines, or faint images of the former. So that each seemed to the other to be as it were in a dream, taking the image for the substance. Accordingly, it was questioned between them, who was the dreamer, and who had the perception of a man whose mind was truly awake. See a passage to this purpose in the Theætetus. See also the fifth book of the Republic.—S.

³ Plato has in his writings used the word “ wisdom ” in two very different general senses : the one was the philosophical sense of it, as it signified the knowledge of nature, and of the principles of things, the science of mind, or science universal ; the other was the vulgar one ; the word being at that time commonly used, as it is in this place, to signify excellence in every particular science or art, any knowledge or skill beyond vulgar attainment. See the former part of Plato's Theages, and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, l. vi. c. 7. After this observation made, it will every where be easy to determine, which meaning is intended.—S.

⁴ Those who were spectators at the acting of his tragedy.

reclined himself, and made his supper. After he and the rest of them had done, performed their libations, sung the praises of the God, and gone through the other usual ceremonies, they were beginning to fit-in to drinking; when Pausanias, he said, opened the conversation thus:—Well, gentlemen, said he, what method shall we take to find most pleasure in our bottles to-night? For my own part, I confess to you that last night's debauch sits very heavy upon me, and I want a little respite. I imagine too that many more of us are in the same condition, such as were here at the entertainment yesterday. Consider, therefore, what way is the best to make drinking agreeable and easy to us.—Aristophanes then said, It is a good proposal of yours, Pausanias, in my opinion, this, that we should by all means procure ourselves an easy drinking-bout. For I am one of those who were well soaked yesterday.—Upon hearing this, Eryximachus the son of Acumenus said, Both of you say well. But I should be glad to be informed about one other person, and that is Agatho; in what condition of strength he finds himself with regard to drinking.—I am by no means very strong at present myself neither, said Agatho.—It is lucky for us, said Eryximachus, for me, and Aristodemus, and Phædrus, and the rest of us here, if you fail and are disabled, you stout men at the bottle. For we are at all times weak in that respect. Socrates, indeed, I except; for he is equally well qualified to drink, or to let it alone. So that he will be satisfied, and ready to comply, whichever course we take. Since none of the company, therefore, seem inclined to drink hard, I may be the less displeasing, perhaps, if I speak the truth about this matter in plain terms. For I have been convinced myself, from the experience acquired in our profession, that hard drinking is usually attended with ill consequences. For which reason, I should neither choose to venture far in drinking myself, nor advise it to any other person, especially when oppressed with the load of the last night's debauch.—As for me, said Phædrus, addressing himself to Eryximachus, I am accustomed to hearken to your advice in every thing, especially in what relates to your own profession: but now I find all the rest of the company are in the same complying disposition.—This they all assented to, and agreed not to make the present meeting a debauch; but to drink, every man, just as much as might be agreeable to him.—This point then being determined, said Eryximachus,

that

that we are to drink at our own pleasure, and that no compulsion is to be used; the next thing I have to offer is this, that the piper-girl¹, who has

¹ It was customary with the ancients, at or after their feasts and banquets, to entertain their minds, without the laborious exercise of thinking, through those nobler senses which have a near affinity with the mind; regaling their ears with vocal and instrumental music, and their eyes with spectacles either beautiful or wonderful. The performers, therefore, and exhibitors in these several ways used to attend on these occasions. Accordingly in the banquet of Xenophon one of each kind is introduced; and after they have all performed their parts the conversation begins.—Plato has been accused of want of elegance and politeness in not taking the same method in his banquet, but dismissing the female musician so roughly. Those who make this objection seem not to discern the difference between the banquets described by these two excellent writers; nor to be sensible that they framed these, as well as other of their works, on different plans, though on the same subjects. The guests at the entertainment given by Callias, and described by Xenophon, were a mixed company, composed partly of Autolycus and his friends, who either themselves excelled in bodily exercises, or admired most the excellencies of that kind in others; and partly of Socrates and his friends, whose abilities and excellencies lay rather another way, in the exercises of the mind. Such a promiscuous assembly it was proper to entertain in the usual manner. But the guests of Agatho were a select party, who had all a high relish for the rational pleasures of conversation, good sense, wit and humour; and every one of whom probably expected the enjoyment of those pleasures only that evening, and to be able afterward to say to each other, like our poet Cowley to his friend Harvey,

We spent it not in toys, in lust, or wine,
But search of deep philosophy,
Wit, eloquence, and poetry,
Arts which I loved, for they, my friend, were thine.

It seems also as if Agatho had assembled them for that very purpose; for he had the day before made his grand feast, (as it was the custom to do after a thanksgiving sacrifice,) to which not only his friends and intimates, but a crowd of acquaintance, all such as were known to him, had been invited; and where, as it appears, they had drunk hard, and consequently conversed little. Further; at Callias's entertainment, in order to furnish matter for some little task, a proposal was made, that each of the company should declare, on what he most valued himself, and why. This gave occasion to much pleasantry, to many ingenious and shrewd sayings and repartees, on various subjects, in few words: after which, Socrates alone made a discourse, of no considerable length, on the subject of Love; to give time for some short preparations, making without, for playing an interlude of Bacchus and Ariadne. The whole is short, and ends early enough for some of the company to take their accustomed evening walk. But the conversation at Agatho's had an air of solemnity and formality; as it consisted of oratorical speeches on one subject, but so ample and diversified in matter, so prolix, and protracted to so late an hour of the night, that a variety of other entertainments of a different kind would have been inconsistent, unnecessary, improper and absurd.—S.

just entered the room, may be dismissed, to pipe to herself, or, if she pleases, to the women in the inner rooms; and that we enjoy one another this evening in the way of conversation. The manner and the subject, I am ready, if you permit me, to propose.—To this they all unanimously gave consent, and desired him to propose accordingly.—Eryximachus then said, I shall begin my proposal after the manner of Euripides in his prologue to the *Melanippe*, for

The tale I have to tell is not my own¹;

I have it from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is continually saying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not astonishing, says he, Eryximachus, that

¹ The old Grecian tragedies were dramatic representations, each, of some single event, uncommon and important, chiefly such as had happened long before, and made a part of their fabulous or ancient story; the whole of which, not being then recorded in any writings, but handed down through oral tradition, was subject to much variety in the telling. This not only permitted the tragic poets great latitude in the choice of their fables, or fabulous stories, to represent; but allowed room also for much invention of their own; especially with regard to circumstances, both of things and persons, and what had happened previous to those signal events celebrated in their tragedies. Of these circumstances, and these prior accidents, which the poet made the foundation of his fable, it was necessary to inform the audience; because they might possibly have heard those stories related with different circumstances; and must certainly have been ignorant of such as were *ignota indistinctæ*, or of the poet's own invention. This was the rise of prologues; in which the audience had the necessary information given them. The prologue was spoken now and then in the person of some deity, the secret cause or leader of the great event going to be represented, but more frequently in the dramatic character of one of the actors in the drama; in either of which cases the prologue made a part of the play itself. Sometimes the player spoke it in his own proper character of player, according to the modern custom: and very rarely, the author spoke it himself, appearing openly and professedly as author; or the player, appearing for him, as his representative. An instance of this kind is the case here cited by Plato: and the reason why Euripides chose such a prologue to his *Melanippe* probably was this. He had given, it seems, great offence to the ladies in that age, by drawing so many of his female characters bad, and making their infamous actions so frequently the subject of his plays. But none of his characters, except that of *Phædra*, were likely to be thought more injurious to the sex than this of *Melanippe*. And in fact so it proved; for we learn from *Aristophanes* in *Θεσμοφορίαι*, that Euripides incurred the displeasure of the fair by no plays more than by these two. When his *Melanippe*, therefore, was to be brought upon the stage, his business was to ward off this blow, as well as he was able, by an apology beforehand. Accordingly, as in his prologue to the *Hippolytus*, he had artfully made *Venus* take upon herself the whole blame of

Phædra's

that the poets have made hymns and odes in honour of some other of the Deities; and yet not one poet, amongst so many in every age, has ever composed a panegyric upon Love; but the praises of a God so powerful, and of so excellent a nature, to this day remain unsung? The same complaint I have to make against the sophists: the best of whom, as you will find, have, in their prosaic compositions, made encomiums on Hercules, and other great and illustrious persons; as the celebrated Prodicus¹ has done, for instance. This, however, is not greatly to be wondered at. But I have lately met with a treatise, written by one of those wise men, containing a high panegyric upon salt on account of its utility². And many other

Phædra's unhappy conduct, so in his prologue to the *Melanippe*, as appears by the line here quoted, (for the prologue and the play are both lost.) he humorously excuses and exculpates himself, by declaring, with an air of simplicity, that the plot of the play was ready made to his hands, and that he had no finger in it; from whence it was to be concluded, that if *Melanippe* was a bad woman, he could not help it. The verse of Euripides seems to have been this,

Εμὸς γὰρ οὐκ ὁ μῦθος, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν...

Or, if the γὰρ be added by Plato, to weave it into his own style, the verse probably was this,

Ὁ μῦθος οὐκ ἐμὸς ἐστίν, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν...

The intended application of this passage out of the poet is as follows: Eryximachus, being of a grave profession, thought it incumbent on a man of his character to apologize in the same way for introducing such a proposal as this,—that Love should be the subject of discourse that evening; a proposal which would seem much more decent to be made by the youthful and handsome Phædrus; to whom, therefore, he is pleased to attribute it. That is, in fine, Plato himself with infinite address, as usual, apologizes in this manner for making Love the subject of his dialogue. For, as he always exhibits his subject in every light which it can possibly be viewed in, and thoroughly sifts the nature of it, he could not avoid introducing here, amongst the rest of the speeches, those which seemed the most exceptionable. At the same time, also, by beginning like one of the prologues of Euripides, and with a verse taken from thence, he signifies (to such as are acquainted with his manner) his intention, that this first speech of Eryximachus should be, or be taken for, the prologue to the following dramatic entertainment.—S.

¹ Plato here means the dissertation of Prodicus, intitled *Ὁραὶ*, so often exhibited, and so much admired; as we learn from Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists*, and from Xenophon in his *Memoirs of Socrates*. The allegorical story, or fable, of the judgment of Hercules, related in that dissertation, is recorded by the last-mentioned excellent writer, though, as he tells us himself, not in the pompous words of the original author, but in his own simplicity of style, much more elegant. Concerning Prodicus, see notes to the *Greater Hippias*.—S.

² The Greek of this passage runs thus,—βιβλίῳ—εἰ ᾧ ἐνίσταν ἅλεις, ἐπαινοῦν θαυμασίων ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφελίαν.

other things of as little worth you may see set off with great encomiums¹. That so much pains should be bestowed upon subjects so mean, and yet that no man should ever to this day have undertaken to give Love his due praises, but that so great a God has been neglected to such a degree, is it not astonishing? Now Phædrus, in all this, which I have repeated from his mouth, seems to me to plead well. I should be glad, therefore, to have him gratified, and to contribute my share to his gratification. Besides that I think it highly becoming this assembly to decorate with all possible honours the Deity of Love. If all of you then are of the same opinion with me, we may spend our time agreeably enough to-night in discoursing. For my proposal is, that every man of us should deliver an oration in praise of Love², as proper and handsome a one as he is able, the right hand way down; and that Phædrus should take the lead, as he is at the upper end, and is, besides, the father and founder of the argument.—You may be assured, Eryxima-

μειναιαν. In translating which words into English, we have thought it most advisable to follow all the translators before us into other languages, just as they seem to have followed one another, down from Ficinus; not because we approve their interpretation, for the Greek words will by no means bear such a one; but because we are at a loss for the true meaning, ourselves: the text in this place being apparently so much corrupted, as to require an abler critic than we deem ourselves to be, for the amendment of it.—S.

¹ Erasmus, in a long list, enumerates many such, some as antient as the time when Plato lived; which he cites as precedents, in the same manner, and for the same reason, that Plato speaks of some such here; that is, to introduce with the better grace, or perhaps to apologize for, a dissertation of his own of the like kind, A Panegyric on Folly: as may be seen in that incomparable piece of humour, near the beginning, and in his Epistle to Sir Thomas More prefixed to it.—S.

² *Ιστέον, ὅτι πάντα οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἃ δυνάμιν ἔχοντα ἰσῶν, οὐκ ἀνευ ἐπιστάσις θεῶν τὴν δυνάμιν αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐνομίζον· ἐν δὲ νοματί το τε τὴν δυνάμιν ἔχον καὶ τὸν ἐπιστάτουντα τούτῳ θεῶν ὀνομαζον*. "It is proper to know that the Greeks held an opinion, that every thing in nature, in which they saw any power (force, or virtue) inherent, exercised not its power without the superintendence of the Gods: and also, that they called by one and the same name that thing which had the power and that Deity who presided over it." This sentence, with which Moscopulus begins his commentary on Hesiod, will serve very properly instead of a preliminary note to all the following speeches concerning Love.—S.

It will be necessary to add in explanation of the above sentence from Moscopulus, that, as according to the Grecian theologists every Deity is the leader of a series which possesses his characteristic properties, in consequence of originating from him, and which extends to the last of things, every link of this series (the golden chain of Homer) was very properly denominated by them after the same manner as its monad, or leader. This observation, when properly understood, is, as I have observed in my Notes on Pausanias, the true key to antient mythology.—T.

thus,

chus, said Socrates, that none of us will put a negative on your proposal. For by no means ever should I, who pretend not to the knowledge of any other matters than those which belong to Love¹: neither would Agatho, nor Pausanias: no more will Aristophanes, without dispute; for his whole time is taken up about Bacchus and Venus: nor indeed will any other person whom I see present. We indeed, who sit lowest, and are to speak last, shall have the disadvantage. However, if the prior speakers speak well and fully to the point, we shall desire nothing more. Let Phædrus then, with our best wishes to attend him, begin, and make his panegyric upon Love.—To this all the rest of the company consented, and joined with Socrates in the encouraging Phædrus to begin. Now what was said by each of the several speakers Aristodemus did not perfectly remember; neither can I, indeed, all that he told me: but the speeches of those whom I looked on as the most considerable persons, and every thing which I thought most worth remembering, I will endeavour to relate to you distinctly.

He told me then, that Phædrus, in compliance with the request made him, spoke first; and began somewhat in this way, with saying—

THE SPEECH OF PHÆDRUS.

That Love was powerful², and wonderfully great, both on earth and amongst the Gods: that superior dignity belonged to him on many accounts, but especially with regard to his generation.—For to be one of the eldest of the Gods, said he, is a circumstance redounding highly to his honour. And that he enjoys this advantage, appears in that he had no parents³; and that never any writer, whether uninspired or poet, pretended that he had. But Hesiod

Chaos

¹ From the conclusion of the speech, hereafter spoken by Socrates, it will appear what his meaning is in this place.—S.

² The beginning of Phædrus's speech is not recited in the very words of it, but is related in the way of narration; by which means the transition from the narrative style to the oratorical, and from the preceding narration to the first formal speech, is made the more gentle, easy, and elegant.—S.

³ Love considered according to his highest subsistence, i. e. as subsisting at the extremity of the intelligible triad, has not indeed Venus for his mother, because this Goddess first subsists in the supermundane which is subordinate to the intelligible order, as will be shown in our Notes on

THE BANQUET.

Chaos was first produced ; Earth rose the next,
Wide-bosom'd, a fix'd seat secure to all
For ever yielding ; and with her rose Love.

Here the poet tells us, that next after Chaos were born these two, Earth and Love. Parmenides relates the generation thus,

First from th' eternal council forth came Love,
First of the Gods.—

Acufilaus says the same thing with Hesiod. On so many different hands^{*} is it agreed, that Love is among the most antient of the Gods. And as he is thus of highest antiquity in the nature of things, so is he the cause of the greatest good to human kind. For to young persons, at their first setting out in life, I know no greater good than love ; to the party beloved, if she has a worthy lover ; or to the lover himself, if his mistress be worthy : because that, which should be our leading principle in order to right conduct in every circumstance of life, consanguinity has not the power to excite in us, neither have honours, nor riches, nor aught else, so effectually as love. The principle I mean is the sense of shame attending a base conduct, together with a sense of honour in the doing what is honourable. For, without such a principle, no civil community nor private person can execute any thing great or noble. In confirmation of this, I take upon me to assert that if a man in love be found committing a base action, or suffering base usage from any, through cowardice, or without taking his revenge, he is not in so much pain at being seen by his father, by his intimates, or by any

the Cratylus ; but he derives his subsistence from the first and second monads of the intelligible triad, and prior to these from the ineffable principle of all things. For a full account of Love see the notes on the speech of Socrates.—T.

* This expression may seem strange, when only three writers have been cited. But each of them, on account of his excellence, stands as at the head of a numerous tribe ; and may, therefore, justly be supposed, and taken for, the representative of that tribe to which he belongs. Hesiod is singled out from amongst all the poets, to be cited, as being the best of those who composed poems *περι θεογονίας*, or concerning the generation of the Gods. His beautiful poem on that subject, from whence the quotation here is made, is still extant.—Parmenides, a philosopher of the Italic sect, wrote in verse, as did also most of the disciples of the same school ; but, on account of his superior reputation, is chosen to represent all his brother philosophers who taught the principles of things.—And Acufilaus, a writer unfortunately lost, treated of the first or most remote antiquities, and the genealogies of the Gods and Heroes.—S.

other person, as at being seen by his mistress. The same effect we see it has upon the party beloved, to be more ashamed of her lover's sight than of the eyes of the whole world, if she be discovered doing aught dishonourable. If, therefore, there could be any contrivance to have a city or an army composed of lovers and their beloved, the interest of the whole could not be promoted by any better way than this; in which every individual would have a care not to behave basely, and a zeal to behave nobly, excited by a desire to gain the good opinion of some other. Such a people fighting side by side in battle, a handful of them would conquer, I could almost say, the world. For a lover deserting his rank, or throwing down his arms, would less endure to be seen by his beloved than by all mankind. Rather than bear this, he would choose to die a thousand deaths: so would he, rather than forsake the defence of his beloved ¹, or rather than forbear flying to her aid, if she had fallen into danger. There is not any man such a dastard, whom Love himself would not inspire, and make an enthusiast in virtue: so that he should become equal to a man born with a disposition the most excellent. For what Homer says of certain of his heroes, that some God inspired them with a force resistless ², this in reality Love does to lovers; such an effect being produced in them by Love alone. And then to die for another, only lovers are ready; not only men, but women too. A signal instance of this appears in the daughter of Pelias, Alcestis; who, as the story goes among the Grecians, undertook to relieve her husband's life by her own death, when no other mortal could be found, willing to die for him ³, though he had

¹ In the Greek text of this passage, *και μιν εγκαταλειπειν*, there is a manifest omission of the very material word *η*, or some other equivalent to it, immediately before the word *εγκαταλειπειν*.—S.

² The passage particularly alluded to, *εμπνευστε μαινος*, is in the twentieth book of the Iliad, ver. 110. But expressions of the same import occur in many other places of Homer, such as *ημε μαινος*, *ωστε μαινος*, &c.—S.

³ The thought in this sentence is evidently taken from the Alcestis of Euripides; in the prologue to which are these lines,

Παντας δ' ελεγχας και διεξελθων φίλους,
 Πατερα, γεραιαν δ' η σφ' ετικτε μητερα,
 Ουχ' ευρε πλην γυναικος, ητις ηθελε
 Θανεειν προ κεινου——

He try'd his friends all round, their love profess

had both a father and a mother then living. But Love wrought in her heart an affection for him so far surpassing theirs, that she proved them to be, in comparison with herself, strangers to his blood, and in name only his relations. When, therefore, she had executed her undertaking, the Gods themselves, as well as men, deemed the achievement so singularly noble, that out of many persons, eminent for many virtues, she was added to the number of those select few distinguished by being restored to life again after death as a reward for their distinguished excellence: for to her also was her departed soul sent back again by the Gods, admiring at the heroic greatness of her resolution. So much do they encourage us to make love our care, by bestowing superior honours on all such as exercise upon that subject in particular superior virtue. But Orpheus the son of Oeager the Gods dismissed from those invisible regions, without granting him to succeed in the purpose of his journey thither; showing him only the phantom of his wife, but not restoring to him the reality: for that he appeared effeminate and cowardly, suitable to his profession, that of a mere sidler; not daring to die for the sake of love, like Alceſtis; but contriving actually to go alive to the other world. For this did the Gods assign him an adequate punishment, ordaining his death to be by women. In a very different way disposed they of Achilles, the son of Thetis, in sending him to the islands of the bleſt: because, though he had heard from the goddess his mother[†], that he must soon die himself after he had slain Hector—but that, if he slew not Hector, he should return home and live to a good old age,—he dared to make death his choice; not only hazarding his life in aid of his friend Patroclus, as ready to die that he might save him, but afterwards avenging his death at the expence of his own life, as resolute not to survive him. This exalted

Proving how real; his father who begat,
His mother fond who bore him; yet found none,
None but the faithful partner of his bed,
Content to die, his dearer life to save.

The next sentence alludes to some passages in the scene between Admetus and his father Phereas in the same play: to which we refer such of our readers as study oratory, and know the usefulness of comparing together passages in fine writers, where different turns are given to a thought fundamentally the same.—S.

[†] See Homer's Iliad, book 18th.

virtue of his the Gods paid a singular regard to; and rewarded with their choicest favours the regard which he had shown to friendship, in setting so high a value on the man who admired and loved him. For Æschylus talks idly, when he says that Achilles was the admirer of Patroclus; Achilles, whose excellence, though he was but in the dawn of manhood, surpassed not only Patroclus, but all the other Grecian heroes. True it is, that the Gods confer superior honours on all virtue, to the exercise of which love and friendship minister occasion: but they more wonder, more approve, and bestow greater rewards, where the person admired feels all the force of friendship and affection for the admirer, than where the noblest offices of friendship are performed by the other party. For the admirer has more of divinity in him than the person admired, as being full of the God who inspires and possesses him. For this cause did the Gods reward Achilles with a higher degree of happiness than they did Alcestis; for to her they gave only a second life on earth, but to the hero they assigned his mansion in the islands of the blest. Thus have I performed my part, in asserting Love to be the eldest in age and of highest dignity amongst the Gods; and to be in a peculiar manner the author of virtue and happiness to all of human kind, whilst they continue in life, and when departed.

Such, Aristodemus told me, was the discourse made by Phædrus. After Phædrus, spoke some others, whose speeches, he said, he did not well remember: omitting these, therefore, he repeated next that of Pausanias, who began thus:—

THE SPEECH OF PAUSANIAS.

IN my opinion, Phædrus, the subject was not fairly and distinctly set before us, when it was proposed in general terms, that we should make encomiums upon Love. This, indeed, would have been right, were there but one Love, or if Love were but of one kind. But since the truth is otherwise, the better way is to declare first, which Love it is our present business to praise. To put this matter, therefore, on a right footing, I shall, in the first place, distinguish that Love whose praises we ought to celebrate; and then do my best to celebrate them myself, in a manner worthy of his Deity. We all know that it is the office of Love to attend always upon Venus. If then there

were only one Venus, there had been no occasion for more than one Love. But since there are two Venuses, there must of necessity be two Loves. For it is undeniable, that two different Goddesses¹ there are, each of whom is a Venus: one of them elder, who had no mother, and was born only from Uranus, or Heaven, her father; she is called the celestial Venus: the other, younger, daughter of Jupiter and Dione; and to her we give the name of the vulgar Venus. Agreeably to this account, it is proper to call that Love who attends on the latter Venus by the name of the vulgar Love, the other by the name of the celestial. All the Gods, indeed, it is our duty to honour with our praises: but we ought to distinguish, as well as we are able, each by his peculiar attributes; that we may give to each his due praise. For every action or operation is attended with this condition: the doing it, considered simply in itself, is neither base nor honourable: as for instance, every one of the things² we are now doing, drinking, singing, or discoursing, is in itself a matter of indifference; but the manner of doing it determines the nature of the thing. Rightly performed, it is right and honourable; performed in a wrong manner, it is wrong and dishonourable. So

¹ This distinction between the two Venuses, laid down by Pausanias as the foundation of his argument throughout his speech, is not a fanciful one of his own; but is a part of ancient mythology. It is sufficiently confirmed and illustrated by the following passage in Xenophon's Symposium; a sentence which he puts into the mouth of Socrates. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μία ἐστὶν Ἀφροδίτη, ἣ δῖται, οὐρανια τε καὶ πανδημος, οὐκ οἶδ' (καὶ γὰρ Ζεὺς, ὃ αὐτὸς δοκῶν εἶναι, πολλὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει) ὅτι γε μέντοι χωρὶς ἑκάτερα βωμοὶ τε εἰσὶ καὶ ναοὶ καὶ θυσαί, τῇ μὲν πανδημῷ ῥαδιουργοτεραί, τῇ δ' οὐρανίᾳ ἀγροτεραί, οἶδ' αἰκασαὶ δ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς πρώτας τὴν μὲν πανδημὸν τῶν σωματικῶν ἐπιτεμπεῖν, τὴν δ' οὐρανίαν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐργῶν. "Now, whether in reality there be one Venus only, or whether there be two, a celestial Venus and a vulgar one, I know not: (for Jupiter also, whom I presume to be but one and the same being, has many surnames given him;) but this I know, that altars are raised, temples built, and sacrifices offered to each of these two Venuses distinctly; to the vulgar one, such as are common, trivial, and of little worth; to the celestial one, such as are more valuable, pure, and holy. Agreeably to this, it may be supposed of the different Loves, that those of the corporeal or sensual kind are inspired by the vulgar Venus; but that love of the mind, and friendship, a delight in fair and comely deeds, and a desire of performing such ourselves, are inspired by Venus the celestial."—S. For a theological account of these two Venuses, see the notes on the Cratylus.—T.

² In the Greek, instead of οἷον, ὃ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν, we suppose it ought to be read, οἷον, ὃν νῦν π. π. For the sentence thus proceeds, ἢ πίνειν, ἢ ἀδείν, ἢ διαλεγέσθαι, (in every one of which verbs the article τοῦ seems to be implied,) οὐκ ἐστὶ τούτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν.—S.

likewise,

likewise, not every Love is generous or noble, or merits high encomiums ; but that Love only who prompts and impels men to love generously and nobly. The attendant of the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, suffering himself to be employed in any the meanest actions : and this Love it is who inspires the mean and the worthless. Those who are the most addicted to this love, are, in the first place, the least disposed to friendship ; in the next place, they are more enamoured of the bodies than of the minds of their paramours ; and besides, they choose from the objects of their passion the filliest creatures they can light on : for, confining their views to the gratification of their passion by the act of enjoyment, they are regardless in what manner they gratify it, whether basely or honourably. Hence it comes, that in the pursuit of their loves, and afterwards in the enjoyment, they are equally ready for any action which offers itself, whether good or bad, indifferently. For the Love who inspires them is born of that younger Venus, in whose generation there is a mixture of the male and the female ; whence it is that she partakes of both. But the other Love is sprung from the celestial Venus ; from her whose properties are these :—in the first place, she partakes not of the female, but of the male only ; whence she is the parent of friendship : then, she is in age the elder, and a stranger to brutal lust ; and hence it happens, that as many as are inspired by this love addict themselves to friendship, conceiving an affection for that which by nature is of greater strength and understanding. Now, whether the man who is under the influence of love feels the genuine impulse of this generous affection, is easy to discern. For, if so, he fixes not his love on any person who is not arrived at the maturity of her understanding. But, commencing their loves from this date, one may well presume them duly qualified, both of them, to live together throughout life, partners in all things. Nor is the lover likely in this case to act like one who, after discovering some childish folly in the person he has chosen, exposes her, and turns her into ridicule, forfeits his faith to her and forsakes her, and attaches himself to a new mistress. To prevent this, there ought to be a law, that no man should make choice of too young a person for the partner of his bed ; because, what so young a person may hereafter prove, whether good or bad, either in mind or body, the event is so uncertain. Men of virtue indeed themselves to themselves make
this

this a law: but upon those vulgar lovers we should put a public restraint of this kind; in the same manner as we restrain them, as much as possible, from entering into amorous intrigues with any women above the rank of servitude. For they are of this sort of lovers, they who bring upon their mistresses reproach and shame; and have given occasion to that verse of one of the poets, in which he has dared to vilify the power of Love, by pronouncing,

'Tis loss of honour to the fair
To yield, and grant the lover's prayer.

But he said this only with a view to lovers of this kind, from seeing their untimely haste and eagerness, their ingratitude and injustice. For certainly no action governed by the rules of justice and of decency can any way merit blame. Now, the rules concerning love established in other states are easy to be understood, as being plain and simple; but our own laws, and those of Sparta upon this head, are complex and intricate. For in Elis¹, and amongst the Bœotians, and in every other Grecian state where the arts of speaking flourish not, the law² in such places absolutely makes it honourable to gratify the lover; nor can any person there, whether young or old, stain such a piece of conduct with dishonour: the reason of which law, I presume, is to prevent the great trouble they would otherwise have in courting the fair, and trying to win them by the arts of oratory, arts in which they have no abili-

¹ It is remarkable that Xenophon, in his Banquet, where he distinguishes between the virtuous friendship established among the Spartans, and the libidinous commerce authorized by fashion and common practice amongst the Bœotians and Eleans, cites this Pausanias as one who had confounded them together, and given them equal praises. He there likewise attributes to Pausanias some of the same sentiments, and those of the most striking kind, which Plato records as delivered by Phædrus in his speech. We cannot help imagining that Xenophon, in citing Pausanias, alludes to what was said at Agatho's entertainment: and if our conjecture be true, that little circumstantial difference confirms the account given by Plato in the main, and argues it to have some foundation at least in real fact.—S.

² The word *law* here, and wherever else it occurs in this speech, from hence to the end of it, means not a written law, a positive precept or prohibition in express terms, but custom and fashion. For the general acceptance of any rule of conduct, whether rational or not, obtains by length of time the authority of law with the people who follow it; as it receives the essence of law in a civil sense, from the common consent which first established it.—S.

ties. But in Ionia, and many other places ¹, and in all barbarian countries universally, the same conduct is ordained and held to be dishonourable. For the tyrannical governments under which the people of those countries live, discountenance that way of mutual love, and bring it into disrepute. But the same fate in those countries attends philosophy, or the love of wisdom; as it does no less the love of manly exercises. And the reason, I presume, in all these cases is the same; it is not the interest of the rulers there to have their subjects high-spirited or high-minded; nor to suffer strong friendships to be formed amongst them, or any other ties of a common or joint interest: and these are the usual and natural effects of love, as well as of those other studies and practices prohibited by tyrants. Those who formerly tyrannized over Athens experienced this to be true. For the firm and stable friendship between Aristogiton ² and Harmodius was the destruction of their tyranny. Thus we find, that wherever the stricter ties of love and friendship are forbidden or discouraged, it is owing to vice, to lust of power, and of whatever is the private interest of the governor; to want of spirit and courage, and every other virtue, in the governed: and that wherever they are enjoined or encouraged simply and without restriction, it is owing to a littleness and laziness of soul in those who have the making of the laws. But in our own state the laws relating to this point are put upon a better footing; though, as I said before, it is not obvious or easy to comprehend their meaning. For, when we consider, that with us it is reputed honourable for men openly to profess love, rather than to make a secret of it; and to fix their best affections on such as excel in the accomplishments of mind, though inferior to others of their sex in outward beauty; that every one highly favours and

¹ The Greek text in this place is greatly corrupted. Stephens has tried to amend it by some alterations, but without success: for it is probable that more than a few words are wanting. We have, therefore, contented ourselves with the sense of this passage; which we think misrepresented by the former translators. For, by the "many other places," we imagine that Plato means, besides Sicily, (where in those days tyranny or arbitrary sway commonly prevailed,) all those northern parts of Greece likewise, where the government was absolutely monarchical. For Ionia, Sicily, and all places where the Greek language was spoken by the people, Plato would certainly distinguish from those countries where the vulgar language was different; these last being by the Grecians termed barbarians.—S.

² The story is told by Thucydides, and many other ancient writers; but in a manner the most agreeable to the mind of our author in this place by Herodotus.—S.

applauds

applauds the lover, as not thinking him engaged in any designs which are base or unbecoming a man ; that success in love is held an honour to the lover ; disappointment, a dishonour ; and that the law allows the lover liberty to do his utmost for the accomplishing his end ; and permits such strange actions to be commended in him, such, as were a man to be guilty of in any other pursuit than that of love, and as the means of succeeding in any other design, he would be sure of meeting with the highest reproaches from philosophy. For if, with a view either of getting money out of any person, or of attaining to any share in the government, or of acquiring power of any other kind, a man should submit to do such things as lovers ordinarily practise to gain their mistresses, supplicating and begging in the humblest manner, making vows and oaths, keeping nightly vigils at their doors, and voluntarily stooping to such slavery as no slave would undergo, both his friends and his enemies would prevent him from so doing ; his enemies reproaching him for his servility and illiberality ; his friends admonishing him and ashamed for him. But in a lover all this is graceful ; and the law grants him free leave to do it uncensured, as a business highly commendable for him to undertake and execute. But that which is more than all the rest prodigious is, that the Gods, though they pardon not the crime of perjury in any besides, yet excuse in a lover the violation of his oath, if the opinion of the multitude be true ; for oaths in love, they say, are not binding. Thus the Gods, as well as men, give all kinds of licence to the lover ; as says the law established in our state. Viewing now the affair in this light, a man would imagine that among us not only love in the lover, but a grateful return likewise from the beloved party, was reputed honourable. But when we see the parents of the youthful fair appointing governesses and guardians over them, who have it in their instructions not to suffer them to hold discourse in private with their lovers ; when we see their acquaintance, and their equals in age, and other people besides, censuring them, if they are guilty of such a piece of imprudence, and the old folks not opposing the censurers, nor reprehending them as guilty of unjust censures ; in this view, a man would be apt to think that, on the contrary, we condemned those very things which he might otherwise suppose we had approved of. But, upon the whole, the case, I believe, stands thus : The affair of love, as I said at first, considered simply and generally, is neither right nor wrong ; but, carried on and accomplished with
honour,

honour, is fair and honourable; transacted in a dishonourable manner, is base and dishonourable. Now, it is a dishonour to a maiden to gratify a vicious and bad lover, or to yield to him from base and unworthy motives: but in granting favours to a good and virtuous lover, and complying with his love from generous and noble views, she does herself an honour. The vicious lover is he of the vulgar sort, who is in love with the body rather than the mind. For he is not a lasting lover, being in love with a thing which is not lasting; since, with the flower of youth¹ when that is gone which he admired, the lover himself too takes wing and flies away, shaming all his fine speeches and fair promises. But the man who is in love with his mistress's moral character, when her disposition and manners are settled in what is right, he is a lover who abides through life, as being united with that which is durable and abiding. Our law wills accordingly, that all lovers should be well and fairly proved; and that, after such probation, upon some the favours of the fair should be bestowed, to others they should be constantly refused. It encourages, therefore, the lover to pursue, but bids the beloved party fly: by all ways of trial, and in every kind of combat, making it appear of which sort the lover is, and of which sort his mistress. For this reason it is that the law deems it dishonourable, in the first place, to be won soon or easily; in order that time may be gained; for of the truth of many things time seems to be the fairest test: in the next place, it is held dishonourable for the fair one to be won by considerations of profit or power; whether she be used ill, or terrified, and therefore yield, through want of noble endurance; or whether she be flattered with riches or rank, and despise not such kind of obligations. For none of these things appear fixed or durable; much less can they give rise to any generous friendship. There remains then one only way, in which, according to our law, the fair one may honourably yield, and consent to her lover's passion. For, as any kind of servitude which the lover undergoes of his own free choice in the service

¹ The Greek of this passage, *ἀμα γὰρ τῷ του σώματος ἀνθεί ληγοντι, ὅνπερ ἡρα*, we have translated according to the following minute alteration of only one word, *ἀμα γὰρ—ανθεί, ληγοντος ὅνπερ ἡρα*. The very next words, *οἰχεται αποπταμενος*, allude to a verse of Homer's, the 71st in the second book of the Iliad; where he speaks of the departure of the dream sent to Agamemnon. By which allusion Plato teaches the fair and young, that the promises of such lovers as are here spoken of are flattering and deceitful, and, like that false dream, tend only to delude and ruin.—S.

of his mistress is not by our law deemed adulation, nor accounted a matter of disgrace; so, on the other part, there is left only one other servitude or compliance not disgraceful in the fair; and this is that which is for the sake of virtue. For it is a settled rule with us, that whoever pays any court or attendance, whoever yields any service or compliance to another, in expectation of receiving by his means improvement in wisdom, or in any other branch of virtue, is not by such voluntary subjection guilty of servility or base adulation. Now these two rules are to correspond one with the other, and must concur to the same end, the rule relating to lovers, and this which concerns philosophy and every other part of virtue, in order to make it honourable in the fair one to comply with her lover's passion. For, when the lover and his mistress meet together, bringing with them their respective rules, each of them; the lover, his—that it is right to minister any way to the service of his mistress; the fair one; hers—that it is right to yield any service or compliance to the person who improves her in wisdom and in virtue; the one also, with abilities to teach and to make better; the other, with a desire of instruction and the being bettered;—then, both those rules thus corresponding and conspiring, in these circumstances only, and in no other, it falls out, by a concurrence of all the necessary requisites, to be honourable in the fair one to gratify her lover. Besides, in this case it is no dishonour to her to be deceived: but, in the case of compliance on any other terms, she incurs shame equally, whether she be deceived or not. For if, on a supposition of her lover's being wealthy, she yields to him with a view of enriching herself, but is disappointed, and gets nothing from her paramour, whom at length she discovers to be poor, it is not at all the less dishonourable to her: because such a woman discovers openly her own heart, and makes it appear, that for the sake of wealth she would yield any thing to any person: and this is highly dishonourable and base. But if, imagining her lover to be a good man, and with a view to her own improvement in virtue through the friendship of her lover, she yields to him, and is deceived, finding him a bad man, unpossessed of virtue, her disappointment, however, is still honourable to her: for a discovery has been also made of her aims; and it has appeared evident, that as a means to acquire virtue, and to be made better, she was ready to resign to any man her all: and this is of all things the most generous and noble. So entirely and absolutely honourable is it in the fair one to comply for the sake
of

of virtue. This is that Love, the offspring of the celestial Venus, himself celestial; of high importance to the public interest, and no less valuable to private persons; compelling as well the lover, as the beloved, with the utmost care to cultivate virtue. All the other Loves hold of the other Venus, of her the vulgar. Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute on this sudden call to the subject you have proposed to us, the praise of Love.

Paufanias here pausing,—for I learn from the wife to use parities¹ in speaking, and words of similar sound; Aristodemus told me, it came next in turn to Aristophanes to speak: but whether from repletion, or whatever else was the cause, he happened to be seized with a fit of the hiccups², and consequently became unfit for speech-making. Upon which, as he sat next to Eryximachus the physician, he addressed him thus: Eryximachus, says he, you must either drive away my hiccups, or speak in my turn till they have left me.—To which Eryximachus replied, Well; I will do both. I will speak in your turn, and you, when your hiccups are gone, shall speak in mine: and while I am speaking, if you hold your breath for a considerable time, your hiccups, perhaps, will have an end. Should they continue, notwithstanding, then gargle your throat with water. But if they are very obstinate, take some such thing as this feather, and tickle your nose till you provoke a sneezing. When you have sneezed once or twice³, your hiccups will cease, be they ever

¹ These little ornaments of style were introduced into oratory, and taught first by Gorgias; who, it is probable, had observed them there, where every beauty and ornament of speech, great or little, is to be found, that is, in Homer. Isocrates, who had studied the art of oratory under Gorgias, seems to have received from him what his own judgment when mature afterwards rejected, the immoderate and ill-timed use of those superficial ornaments. The foregoing speech of Paufanias, in imitation of Isocrates, abounds with various kinds of them, and those the most puerile and petty; which it was impossible for us to preserve or imitate, in translating those passages into English; because, though all languages admit them, yet every language varies from every other in the signification of almost all those words where they are found. An instance of this appears in the passage now before us, where the Greek Πausανου δε παυσσμενου, translated justly, runs thus, “When Paufanias had ceased speaking,” that is, had ended his speech. But all similarity of sound would thus entirely be destroyed. As, therefore, it was necessary in this place to preserve it in some measure, however imperfectly, we found ourselves obliged here to make sense give way to sound.—S.

² See the Life of Plato by Olympiodorus, in Vol. I. of this work.—T.

³ Hippocrates, in Aphorism. sect. vi. n. 13. and Celsus, in lib. ii. c. 8. assure us, that “if sneez-

ever so violent.—As soon as you begin your speech, says Aristophanes, I shall set about doing what you bid me.—Eryximachus then began in this manner :

THE SPEECH OF ERYXIMACHUS.

SINCE Pausanias, after setting out so excellently well, ended his discourse imperfectly, it seems a task incumbent on me, to finish the argument which he began. For, in distinguishing two different kinds of Love, he made, I think, a very proper and just distinction. But that Love gives us an attraction not only to beautiful persons, but to many other things beside; and that he dwells not only in human hearts, but has also his seat in other beings, in the bodies of all animals, and in the vegetable productions of the earth; in fine, that he lives throughout all nature; my own art, that of medicine, has given me occasion to observe; and to remark, how great and wonderful a God is Love, stretching every where his attractive power, and reaching at all things, whether human or divine. I shall instance first in medicine; that I may pay my first regards to my own profession. I say then, that our bodies partake of this twofold love. For bodily health and disease bear an analogy to the two different dispositions of the soul mentioned by Pausanias. And as the body in a state of health, and the body when diseased, are in themselves very different one from the other, so they love and long for very different things. The love in a healthy body is of one kind; the love in a diseased body is of another kind, quite different. Now, as Pausanias says, it is honourable to comply with a good lover, but dishonourable to yield to one who is vicious: so is it with respect to the body: whatever is in a sound and healthy state, it is commendable and right to please; it is the physician's duty so to do, and the effectual doing of it

ing comes upon a man in a fit of the hiccups, it puts an end to the disorder." Upon this general rule, no doubt, was founded the present prescription of Eryximachus. Dr. G. E. Stahl, however, used to tell his pupils, as appears from his Collegium minus, cap. 53. that the rule indeed was true, where the sneezing was spontaneous, or the work of nature; but that a sneezing procured by art, or forced, was never recommended. "Sternutationes," says he, "sponte singultui supervenientes, solvunt quidem singultum; sed arte productæ non commendantur." But we must remark, that this great modern is here putting the case, not of the hiccups when they are the only disorder; but of a malignant fever, and those symptomatic hiccups which are often the concomitants of that and other dangerous diseases.—S.

denotes him truly a physician¹. But to gratify that which is diseased and bad, is blameable²; and the physician, who would practise agreeably to the rules of art, must deny it the gratification which it demands³. For medical science, to give a summary and brief account of it, is the knowledge of those amorous passions of the body, which tend to filling and emptying⁴. Accordingly, the man who in these passions or appetites can distinguish the right love from that which is wrong, he has most of all men the science belonging to a physician. And the man who is able to effect a change, so as in the place of one of those loves to introduce the other; and knows how to infuse love into those bodies which have it not, yet ought to have it; and how to expell a love with which they are but ought not to be

¹ The words used by Plato, in this place, are still stronger, and signify—"denominates him a physician." For the preservation of health, through a right use of the non-naturals, that is, such a one as is agreeable to nature, respecting the difference of sex, age, temperament of body, climate, season of the year, and other circumstances, was accounted in the days of Plato not only a part, but the principal one too, of the art of medicine; and was by the old Greek physicians carried to a degree of accuracy and perfection absolutely unknown or totally neglected in after-ages.—S.

² This passage is illustrated by that of Hippocrates, near the end of his treatise de Morbo Sacro. *Χρη—μη αυξειν τα νοσηματα, αλλα σπεινειν τρυχειν, προσφεροντας τη νοση το πολεμωτατον ικαστη, μη το φιλον και συνθεσιν υπο μιν γαρ της συνθεσας θαλλει και αυζεται, υπο δε του πολεμου φινει και αμαυρουται.* Having spoken of nourishment, he says, that "the physician should take care not to nourish and increase diseases, but as soon as possible to exhaust and wear them out; applying to every disease that which is hostile and repugnant to it the most, not that which is friendly, of the same temper with it, or habitual to it: for by the latter it acquires growth and vigour; by the former it decays and is extinguished." This, by the way, is the foundation of an excellent practice rule; and that is, in chronic diseases sometimes to change the medicines, though at first found ever so beneficial, when they are become too familiar, and the disease is habituated to bear them; for they would then by degrees lose their efficacy.—S.

³ To administer proper remedies, says our great master, is to counteract the genius or nature of the disease; and never to concur or correspond with it. *Ισως αντιστον, [ε. και] μη ομοιοειν τη παθι.* Hippoc. Epidem. l. vi. § 5. n. 7.—S.

⁴ What follows, when stripped of the metaphor necessary on the occasion, is the same thing with this of Hippocrates, *Τα εναντια των εναντιων εστιν ιηματα.* *Ιατρικη γαρ εστι προσθεσις και αφαιρεισις αφαιρεισις μιν των υπερβαλλαντων, προσθεσις δε των ελλειποντων. ο δε καλλιστα τουτο ποιων, αριστος ιητρος.* Lib. de Flatibus, not far from the beginning. "Contraries are a cure one for the other. For the practice of the art of medicine consists of two operations, adding and subtracting; or supplying and drawing off; a drawing off of that which is over-abundant, a supplying of that which is deficient. Whoever can perform these in the best manner, he is the best physician."—S.

possessed;

possessed; he is a skilful practiser of his art. For those things in the body which are most at variance must be able to reconcile to each other¹, and to conciliate amity between them and mutual love. The things most at variance are such as are the most contrary one to the other; as the cold is to the hot, the bitter to the sweet, the dry to the moist, and all others of that sort². Into these things, thus at variance, our ancestor Æsculapius had power to inspire a spirit of love and concord; and, as our friends here the poets tell us, and as I believe, framing into a system the rules for so doing, was properly the author of our art. So that medicine, in the manner I have described, is all under the direction and management of Love. So is the gymnastic art in like manner³; and so is the art of agriculture⁴. And that music is so too, is evident to every man who considers the nature of this art with the least attention; and is perhaps the very thing which Heraclitus meant to say: for his way of expressing himself is inaccurate and obscure. “The one⁵,” says he, “disagreeing with itself, yet proceeds in amicable concord; like the harmony made by the bow and lyre.” Now it

¹ See Hippocrates, throughout his treatise de Naturâ Hominis.—S.

² That is, all such contrary qualities in the humours of the body as are distinguishable by sense.—S.

³ The end of the medical art is health; that of the gymnastic is strength, or an athletic habit of body. But in the means they make use of to gain their several ends, favouring and indulging the disposition of body which is right, counteracting and correcting such as are wrong, these arts are exactly analogous one to the other.—S.

⁴ The genius and condition of the soil bear an analogy to the temperament and present state of the body; the different kinds of manure and other cultivation are analogous to food and medicine. A good soil is improved by a manure homogeneous to it; a bad soil meliorated by an opposite method of cultivation, altering its nature and condition. As to the metaphor, the same has been always used in agriculture to this day. We say, that such a soil loves such a manure; and that such a tree, plant, or other vegetable, loves and delights in such a soil; when they are correspondent, when the nature of the one is fitted to that of the other, and is favourable to it in making it thrive and flourish.—S.

⁵ The author of the treatise *Περὶ κόσμου*, *Concerning the world*, printed among the works of Aristotle, and usually ascribed to him, though not from any decisive authority, cites the following passage from the same Heraclitus, which may serve to illustrate the present: *συναφείας οὐρα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐρα, συμφερόμενοι καὶ διαφερόμενοι, συναδὸν καὶ διαδόν, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα*. i. e. “You must connect the perfect and the imperfect, the agreeing and the disagreeing, the consonant and the dissonant, and from all things one, and from one all things.” In which passage, by *the one from all things* he means the universe; and by *all things from one*, he inuates the subsistence of all things from *the one*, the ineffable principle of all.—T.

is very absurd to say, that in harmony any disagreement can find place ; or that the component parts of harmony can ever disagree. But his meaning perhaps was this ; that things in their own nature disagreeing, that is, sounds, some shrill and others deep, at length brought to an agreement by the musical art, compose harmony. For harmony cannot consist of shrill and deep sounds, whilst they remain in disagreement : because harmony is consonance, or a conspiracy of sounds ; and consonance is one kind of agreement : but it is impossible that any agreement should be between disagreeing things, so long as they disagree : and no less impossible is it, that things between which there is no agreement should at the same time harmonize together, so as to produce harmony. And as it is with sound so is it with motion ; the quick measures and the slow ones, by nature disagreeing, but afterwards brought to agree together, compose rhythm. In both these cases ¹, where things differ and are opposite to one another, it is the art of music which brings about the reconciliation and agreement ; just as the art of medicine does in the former case ² ; inspiring them in the same manner with the spirit of love and concord. And thus musical science is the knowledge of those amorous conjunctions whose offspring are harmony and rhythm. Now in the systems themselves, whether of harmony or of rhythm, there is no difficulty at all in knowing the amorous conjunctions : for here love is not distinguished into two kinds. But when the intention is to apply rhythm and harmony to the ears of some audience, then comes the difficulty ; then is there need of a skilful artist, whether in composing the odes, and setting them to music, or in making a right choice of those ready composed and set ³, and properly adapting them to the geniuses of youth. For here that distinction takes place ; here must we recur again to that rule of Pausanias, that the decent, the well-ordered, and the virtuous it is right to gratify,

¹ That of disagreeing sounds, and that of disagreeing measures of time.—S.

² That of the disagreeing qualities of the humours in a human body.—S.

³ Poetry and music were employed by the Grecian masters of education as a principal means to form the manners of their youth, to inspire them with becoming sentiments, and excite them to worthy actions. In the choice, therefore, of poetry and music, proper for this purpose, great judgment was used, and much care taken. It was not left, as now-a-days, to the fancy or humour of men, whose profession is only to teach words, or musical notes, with their several combinations. Legislators and magistrates then thought it an object the most worthy of their own attention : and

gratify, for the sake of preserving their love, and of improving such as are yet deficient in virtue. The Love by whom these are inspired is the noble, the celestial; that Love who attends the celestial muse. But the attendant of Polyhymnia, and the follower of every muse at random, is the other Love, he of the vulgar kind: whom we ought cautiously to indulge, whenever we indulge him; that he may enjoy his own pleasures without introducing disorder and debauchery. And this is an affair of no less difficulty than in our art it is to manage prudently the appetites which regard the table; so as to permit them the enjoyment of their proper pleasures, without danger of diseases. Thus, in the practice of music, and of medicine, and in every other employment, whether human or divine, we are to preserve, as far as consistently we may, both Loves: for both are to be found in all things ¹. Full of both is the constitution of the annual seasons. And when those contraries in nature before mentioned, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, under the influence of the modest Love, admit a sober correspondence together, and temperate commixture; they bring along with them, when they come, fair seasons, fine weather, and health to men, brute animals, and plants, doing injury to none. But when that Love who inspires lawless and ungoverned passion prevails in the constitution of the season, he corrupts, injures and ruins many of the fair forms of nature. For the usual fruits of this Love are plagues, and other preter-natural diseases, which come upon animals, and vegetables too; mildews, hail-storms, and blights being generated from the irregular state of the amorous affections in those elementary beings, and the want of temperance in their conjunctions: the knowledge of which their amorous affections, and consequent conjunctions, considered as owing to the aspects of the heavenly bodies, and as respecting the seasons of the year, is called astronomy. Further, all kinds of sacrifice, and all the subjects of the diviner's art ², those agents employed in carrying on

the greatest philosophers, who framed models of government according to ideal perfection, or laid down maxims fit to be observed by every wise state, treat it as a subject of highest importance; and accordingly are very exact and particular in explaining the natural effects of every species of music, or musical poetry, on the mind. See Plato's Republic, b. ii. and iii. his Laws, b. ii. and vii. and Aristotle's Politics, b. viii.—S.

¹ That is, the rational, the regular, and the sober, together with the sensual, the lawless, and the wild or infinite. See Plato's Philebus, throughout.

² Such as dreams, omens, the flight of birds, &c.

a reciprocal

a reciprocal intercourse between the Gods and mortals, are employed with no other view than to preserve the right love, and cure that which is wrong. For every species of impiety is the usual consequence of not yielding to and gratifying the better Love, the regular; and of not paying to him, but to the other Love¹, our principal regards, in every thing we do relating to our parents, whether living or deceased, and in every thing relating to the Gods. In all such cases, to superintend the Loves, to cherish the right, and cure the wrong, is the business of divination. And thus Divination is an artist, skilled in procuring and promoting friendliness and good correspondence between the Gods and men, through her knowledge of what amorous affections in men tend to piety and justice, and what are opposite to these, and lead the contrary way. So widely extensive, so highly predominant, or rather all-prevailing, is the power of Love. Of all love in general this is true; but especially, and the most true is it, of that Love who attains his ends in the attainment of good things, and enjoys them without ever exceeding the bounds of temperance, or violating the laws of justice. For it is this Love who bears the chief sway both in the human nature and the divine; it is this Love who procures for us every kind of happiness; enabling us to live in social converse one with another, and in friendship with beings so much superior to ourselves, the Gods. It is possible now after all, that, in the panegyric I have made on Love, I may have omitted, as well as Pausanias, many topics of his due praise: it has not, however, been done designedly; and if I have left aught unsaid, it is your business, Aristophanes, to supply that deficiency: or, if your intentions are to celebrate the God in a different way, now that your hiccups are over, you may begin.

To this Aristophanes replied, I am now indeed no longer troubled with my hiccups: but they would not be easy before I brought the sneezings to them. I wonder that a modest and decent part of the body should be in love with and long for these ticklings, or be pleased with such boisterous

¹ In the Greek text some corruption has here crept in. Stephens has endeavoured to amend it in a manner agreeable to Plato's style in other places, it must be confessed. Yet we must prefer the omission of the word *περι* before *τον ἑνερπον*, because the sentence is made much easier by this alteration; and because the accidental insertion of the word *περι* may easily be accounted for; as will appear to any good critic in this way, who will be pleased to consult the original.—S.

roaring noises, such as sneezing is: for, as soon as I had procured it a good sneezing, immediately it was quiet.—Eryximachus upon this said, Friend Aristophanes, consider what you are about: you are raising up a spirit of ridicule here, just as you are going to begin your speech; and put me upon the watch, to lay hold of something or other in it for the company to laugh at, when you might, if you pleased, have spoken in quiet.—To which Aristophanes in a good-humoured way replied, You are in the right, Eryximachus: what I said just now, let it be looked on as unsaid. But, pray, do not watch me. For I am in pain for the speech I am going to make; not for fear there should be any thing in it to laugh at; for a laugh would be an advantage gained to me, and the natural product of my muse; but for fear it should be really in itself ridiculous.—You shoot your bolt, Aristophanes, said Eryximachus, and then think to march off. But take care of what you say, and expect to be called to a strict account for it. Perhaps, however, I shall be gracious enough to spare you.—Aristophanes then began:

THE SPEECH OF ARISTOPHANES.

MY intentions, Eryximachus, are to speak in a way very different, I assure you, from the way taken by you and Pausanias in your speeches. To me men seem utterly insensible what the power of Love is. For, were they sensible of it, they would build temples and erect altars to him the most magnificent, and would offer to him the noblest sacrifices. He would not be neglected as he is now, when none of these honours are paid him, though, of all the Gods, Love ought the most to be thus honoured. For, of all the Gods, Love is the most friendly to man, his relief¹ and remedy in those evils the perfect cure of which would be productive of the highest happiness to the whole human race. I will do my best, therefore, to make his power known to you, and you shall teach it to others. But you must first be informed what the human nature is, and what changes it has undergone. For our nature of old was different from what it is at present. In the first place,

¹ *ἰατρος τούτων*, that is, *κακῶν*, not *ανθρωπῶν*, as Racine, and all the former translators except Cornarius, erroneously imagined. Their mistake was owing plainly to the wrong punctuation in all editions of the original in this place.—S.

there

there were antiently three sorts ¹, or subordinate species, of the human kind; not as at present, only two, male and female; there being, then, a third species beside, which partook of both the others: the name only of which species now remains, the species itself being extinct and lost. For then existed actually and flourished hermaphrodites, who partook of both the other species, the male and the female. But they are now become merely a name, a name of abuse and of reproach. In the next place, the entire form of every individual of the human kind was cylindrical; for their bodies, back and sides together, were every where, from top to bottom, circular. Every one had four hands, and the same number of legs. They had two faces, each, upon their round necks, every way both alike: but these two faces belonged but to one head; on the sides of which were placed these faces, opposite one to the other. Each had also four ears, and two distinctions of the sex. From this description, it is easy to conceive how all the other parts of the human body were doubled. They walked upon whichever legs they pleased, on any side; and, as they walk now, upright. But when any one wanted to go with expedition, then, as tumblers, after pitching on their hands, throw their legs upward, and bring them over, and thus tumble themselves round; in the same manner did the people of those days, supported by their eight limbs alternately, and wheeled along with great dispatch. Now you are to know, that these three species of the human race were precisely so many in number, and their bodies made in such a form, for this reason,—because the male kind was produced originally by the sun, the female rose from the earth, and the third, which partook of the other two, was the offspring of the moon;

¹ Plato is so far from being a careless writer, that he has always some concealed and important meaning, even in things apparently the most trivial and absurd. For what can be apparently more absurd than this account which Aristophanes gives of the changes which the human nature has undergone? And yet it occultly insinuates a very important truth, that kindred human souls, both of a male and female characteristic, were in a more perfect state of existence united with each other, much more profoundly than they can be in the present state. However, though it insinuates a more perfect condition of being, yet it is by no means that of the soul in its highest state of felicity. For the *cylindric* bodies indicate its being still conversant with, or *rolling* about, generation, i. e. the regions under the moon. Plato, therefore, probably indicates in this fable an *aërial* condition of being. For though the soul, while living there in a descending condition, is in reality in a fallen state, yet she is more perfect than when resident on the earth. Agreeably, and perhaps with allusion to this fable, which I doubt not is of greater antiquity than Plato, Pythagoras defined a friend to be *a man's other self*.—T.

for the moon, you know, partakes of both the others, the sun and the earth. The bodies, therefore, of each kind were round, and the manner of their running was circular, in resemblance of their first parents. Their force and strength were prodigious; their minds elevated and haughty; so they undertook to invade heaven. And of them is related the same fact which Homer relates of Ephialtus and Otus, that they set about raising an ascent up to the skies, with intention to attack the Gods. Upon which Jupiter and the other Deities consulted together what they should do to these rebels¹; but could come to no determination about the punishment proper to be inflicted on them. They could not resolve upon destroying them by thunder, as they did the giants; for thus the whole human race would be extinct; and then the honours paid them by that race would be extinct together with it, and their temples come to ruin. Nor yet could they suffer those mortals to continue in their insolence. At length Jupiter, after much consideration of so difficult a case, said, I have a device, by which the race of men may be preserved, and yet an end put to their insolence; as my device will much diminish the greatness of their strength. For I intend, you must know, to divide every one of them into two: by which means their strength will be much abated, and at the same time their number much increased, to our advantage and the increase of our honour. They shall walk upright upon two legs; and if any remains of insolence shall ever appear in them, and they resolve not to be at quiet, I will again divide them, each into two; and they shall go upon one leg, hopping. As he said, so did he; he cut all the human race in twain, as people cut eggs² to salt them for keeping. The face, together with the half-

¹ Human souls, though in a more excellent condition of being when living in the air than when inhabitants of the earth, yet when they are descending, or gravitating to earth, they may be justly called rebels, because they not only abandon their true country, but are hostile to its manners and laws. Hence, as they no longer cherish, but oppose, legitimate conceptions of divine natures, they may be justly said to be hostile to the Gods.—T.

² The Greek original in this place stands at full length thus: *ὡς περ οἱ ταῦα τεμνοντες καὶ μελλοῦ-
τες τὰριχενειν, ἢ ὡς περ οἱ ταῦα ταῖς θρίξιν.* Now the absurdity of supposing eggs ever to have been cut with hairs, when knives, much better instruments for that purpose, were at hand, first led us to imagine that the passage might be corrupt. On a little examination, it appeared probable to us, from the repetition of the words *ὡς περ οἱ ταῦα*, that the latter part of this sentence was nothing more than a various reading in the margin of some antient copy. Trying, then, the two last words,

half-neck of every half-body, he ordered Apollo to turn half round, and fix it on that side where the other half of the body was cut off; with intention that all people, viewing themselves on that side where they had suffered the loss of half themselves, might be brought to a sober way of thinking, and learn to behave with more modesty. For what remained necessary to be done, he bid him exercise his own healing art.—Accordingly, Apollo turned the face of every one about to the reverse of its former situation: and drawing the skin together, like a purse, from all parts of the body, over that which is now called the belly, up to one orifice or opening, he tied up at the middle of the belly this orifice, now called the navel. He then smoothed most part of the wrinkles of the skin, after having framed the bones of the breast under it; in the same manner as shoemakers smooth the wrinkles of the leather, when they have stretched it upon the last. But a few wrinkles, those on the belly and navel, he let remain, for a memorial of their old crime and punishment. Now, when all the human race were thus bisected, every section longed for its fellow half. And when these happened to meet together, they mutually embraced, folded in each other's arms, and wishing they could grow together and be united. The consequence of this was, that they both died, through famine, and the other evils naturally brought on by idleness. And if one of these halves died, and left the other behind, the surviving half was immediately employed in looking about for another partner; and whether it happened to meet with the half of a whole woman, (which half we now call a woman,) or with the half of a whole man, they were continually embracing. After all, Jupiter, seeing them thus in danger of destruction, took pity on them, and contrived another device; which was, to place the distinction of sex before: for till then this had still remained on the other side; and

ταῖς θρίξιν, by the abbreviations common in old manuscripts, we made our conjecture still more probable (to ourselves at least) by reading the latter part of the sentence thus:—*ἢ, ὥσπερ τα ὡα τεμνοντες εἰς ταριχεύειν*, which words we suppose written in the margin after this manner, *ἢ ὥσπερ δι τα ὡα τ. εἰς ταριχεύειν*, the initial letter of *τεμνοντες* being put for the whole word, as usual in such cases. Thus the last words, being read (as it was common to do for the greater expedition) by some ignorant librarian to the new copyist, literally as they were written, were easily mistaken by a writer unattentive to the sense, and made *ταῖς θρίξιν*. That it was customary with the ancients to salt and pickle eggs for keeping, after boiling them hard, (it is to be supposed,) and cutting them in two, we learn from Alexis the comic poet, as cited by Athenæus, pag. 57 and 60, as also from Columella: which last-mentioned author tells us further, that sometimes they were hardened for that purpose in a pickle heated over the fire.—S.

they

they had engendered, not one with another, but with the earth, like grasshoppers. This scheme Jupiter carried into execution; and thus made the work of generation to be thenceforth carried on by both sexes jointly, the female conceiving from the male. Now, in making this the sole way of generating, Jupiter had these ends in view: that, if a man should meet with a woman, they might, in the embrace, generate together, and the human kind be thus continued; but if he met with another man, that then both might be forfeited with such commixture; and that, immediately ceasing from their embraces, they might apply themselves to business, and turn their studies and pursuits to the other affairs of life. From all this it appears how deeply mutual love is implanted by nature in all of the human race; bringing them again to their pristine form; coupling them together; endeavouring out of two to make one, and thus to remedy the evils introduced into the human nature. So that every one of us at present is but the tally of a human creature; which has been cut like a polypus¹, and out of one made two. Hence it comes, that we are all in continual search of our several counterparts, to tally with us. As many men, accordingly, as are sections of that double form called the hermaphrodite, are lovers of women: and of this species are the multitude of rakes. So, on the other hand, as many women as are addicted to the love of men are sprung from the same amphibious race. But such women as are sections of the female form are not much inclined to men; their affections tend rather to their own sex: and of this kind are the Sapphic lovers. Men, in like manner, such as are sections of the male form, follow the males: and whilst they are children, being originally fragments of men, it is men they love, and it is in men's company and caresses they are most delighted. Those children and those youths who are of this sort are the best, as being the most manly in their temper and disposition. Some people, I know, say, they are shameless and impudent: but in this they wrong them; for it is not impudence and want of modesty, but it is manly assurance, with a manly temper and turn of mind, by which

¹ All learned naturalists know the great uncertainty we are in now-a-days concerning the rarer animals of all kinds mentioned by the ancients. Under this difficulty of ascertaining what animal is meant by the *ψύλλα* mentioned here by Plato, we have translated it a polypus, because the wonderful property ascribed here to the *ψύλλα* is the same with that in the polypus, which a few years since afforded great entertainment to the virtuosi in many parts of Europe.—S.

they

they are led to associate with those whom they resemble. A shrewd conjecture may hence be formed, from what race they originally spring; a conjecture justified by their conduct afterwards. For only boys of this manly kind, when they arrive at the age of maturity, apply themselves to political affairs¹: and as they advance further in the age of manhood, they delight to encourage and forward the youth of their own sex in manly studies and employments; but have naturally no inclination to marry and beget children: they do it only in conformity to the laws, and would choose to live unmarried, in a state of friendship. Such persons as these are indeed by nature formed for friendship solely, and to embrace always whatever is congenial with themselves. Now, whenever it fortunes that a man meets with that very counterpart of himself, his other half, they are both smitten with love in a wondrous manner; they recognise their antient intimacy; they are strongly attracted together by a consciousness that they belong to each other; and are unwilling to be parted, or become separate again, though for ever so short a time. Those pairs who of free choice live together throughout life, are such as have met with this good fortune. Yet are none of them able to tell what it is they would have one from the other. For it does not seem to be the venereal congress. In all appearance, it is not merely for the sake of this that they feel such extreme delight in the company of each other; and seek it, when they have it not, with so eager a desire. It is evident, that their souls long for some other thing, which neither can explain; something which they can only give obscure hints of, in the way of ænigmas; and each party can only guess at in the other, as it were, by divination. But when they are together, and caressing each other, were Vulcan to stand by with his tools in his hand, and say, "Mortals! what is it ye want, and would have, one from the other?"—and finding them at a loss what to answer, were he to demand of them again, and say, "Is this what ye long for; to be united together with the most entire union, so as never, either by night or day, to be separate from each other? If ye long for this, I will melt you down, both of you together, and together form you both again; that, instead of two, ye may become one; whilst ye live, living a joint life, as one person; and when ye

¹ Aristophanes in this sentence hints at Pausanias: but for fear his hint should not be apprehended by the company, he takes care to explain it to them himself, near the conclusion of his speech, by an ironical and affected caution in guarding against the being so understood.—S.

come to die, dying at once one death ; and afterwards, in the state of souls departed, continuing still undivided. Consider now within yourselves, whether ye like the proposal, and whether ye would be glad to have it carried into execution."—I am certain, that not a single mortal to whom Vulcan should make this offer would reject it. It would appear that none had any other wish ; and every man would be conscious to himself, that the secret desire which he had of old conceived in his heart, was at length brought to light and expressed in clear language, that is, to be mingled and melted in with his beloved, and out of two to be made one. The cause of which desire in us all is this, that our pristine nature was such as I have described it ; we were once whole. The desire and pursuit of this wholeness of our nature, our becoming whole again, is called Love. For, as I said, we were antiently one : but now, as a punishment for our breach of the laws of justice, the Gods have compelled us to live asunder in separate bodies : just as the people of Arcady are treated by the Spartans¹. If, therefore, we behave not to the Gods with reverence and decency, there is reason to fear we shall be again cleft in sunder, and go about with our guilt delineated in our figure, like those who have their crimes engraven on pillars, our noses slit, and our bodies split in two. The consideration of this should engage every man to promote the universal practice of piety toward the Gods ; that we may escape this misfortune, and attain to that better state, as it shall please Love to guide and lead us. Above all, let none of us act in opposition to this benign Deity ; whom none oppose but such as are at enmity with the Gods. For, if we are reconciled to Love, and gain his favour, we shall find out and meet with our naturally beloved, the other half of ourselves ; which

¹ As Arcadia consisted chiefly of plains and pasture lands, the people of that country had for many ages led a pastoral kind of life, dispersed in small villages ; and lived in the enjoyment of perfect peace and liberty. But in process of time, when they were in danger of falling under the yoke of the Spartans, their neighbours, whom they observed a warlike people, growing in greatness, and aspiring to the dominion of all the Peloponnesus, they began to build and fortify cities, where they assembled and consulted together for their common interests. This union gave them courage, not only to be auxiliaries in war to the enemies of the Spartans, but at length, as principals themselves, to make frequent inroads into the Spartan territories. The Spartans, therefore, carrying the war into the country of the Arcadians, compelled them to demolish the fortifications of their chief cities, and even to quit their habitations there, and return to their ancient manner of living in villages.—S.

at present is the good fortune but of few. Eryximachus now must not carp at what I say, on a suspicion that I mean Pausanias and Agatho: though perhaps they may be of the fortunate few: but I say it of all in general, whether men or women, through the whole human race, that every one of us might be happy, had we the perfection of Love, and were to meet with our own proper paramours, recovering thus the similitude of our pristine nature. If this fortune then be the best absolutely, it follows, that the best in our present circumstances must be that which approaches to it the nearest; and that is, to meet with partners in love, whose temper and disposition are the most agreeable and similar to our own. In giving glory to the divine cause of this similarity and mutual fitness, we celebrate in a proper manner the praise of Love; a deity who gives us in our present condition so much relief and consolation, by leading us to our own again; and further, gives us the fairest hopes, that, if we pay due regard and reverence to the Gods, he will hereafter, in recovering to us our antient nature, and curing the evils we now endure, make us blest and happy.

Thus, Eryximachus, you have my speech concerning Love, a speech of a different kind from yours, and no way interfering with what you have said. Therefore, as I desired of you before, do not, I pray you, make a jest of it; that we may hear, peaceably and quietly, all the speeches which remain to be spoken; or rather both the speeches; for I think only those of Agatho and Socrates are yet behind.—Well; I shall not disobey you, said Eryximachus: for I must acknowledge that I have been highly entertained and pleased with your speech. If I was not perfectly well assured that Socrates and Agatho were deeply versed in the science of Love, I should much fear they would be at a loss for something to say, so copiously and so variously has the subject been already handled. But now, notwithstanding this, I am under no concern about the success of those great masters.—I do not wonder, said Socrates, that you are free from all concern, Eryximachus, about the matter; since you have come off so honourably yourself, and are out of all danger. But if you were in the circumstances I am in, much more in those which I shall be in when Agatho shall have made his speech, your fears would be not a few, and your distresses, like mine at present, no trifles.—I see, said Agatho, you have a mind, Socrates, by such suggestions, to do as enchanters do with their drugs, that is, to disorder and disturb my

thoughts, with imagining this company here to be big with expectations of hearing some fine speech from me.—I must have forgotten then, Agatho, said Socrates, the courage and greatness of mind which you discovered lately, and of which I was a spectator, when you came upon the stage, together with the actors just going to exhibit your compositions; when you looked so large an audience in the face without being in the least daunted; I must have forgotten this, if I thought you could be now disturbed on account of us, who are comparatively so few in number.—I hope, Socrates, said Agatho, you do not imagine me so full of a theatre, as not to know that a few men of sense make an assembly more respectable and awful to a man who thinks justly, than a multitude of fools.—I should be greatly mistaken indeed, said Socrates, if I imagined in you, Agatho, any thing which favoured of rusticity or ill breeding. I am satisfied enough, that if you met with any whom you supposed wise, you would regard them more than you would the multitude. But I doubt we have no pretensions to any such particular regard, because we were at the theatre, and made a part of that multitude. The case, I suppose, is in truth this: Were you in the presence of other sort of men, that is, the wise; in reverence to them, perhaps, you would be ashamed if you were then employed in any action you thought unbecoming or dishonourable. Is it not so? or how say you?—It is true, said Agatho.—And would you not, said Socrates to him again, revere the multitude too, and be ashamed even in their presence, if you were seen by them doing any thing you thought base or wrong?—Phædrus here interposed; and said, My friend Agatho, if you go on giving answers to all the questions put to you by Socrates, he will be under no manner of concern, what becomes of our affair of the speeches, or what the rest of us here are doing in the mean time. It is sufficient for him, if he has but somebody to talk with in his own way, especially if it be a person who is handsome. I must confess I take much pleasure myself in hearing Socrates dispute: but it is necessary for me to look to the affair I set on foot myself, that of the panegyrics on Love, and to take care that I have a speech from every person in this assembly. When you have, each of you, paid your tribute to the God, you may then dispute, with all my heart, at your own pleasure.—You say well, Phædrus, said Agatho; and nothing hinders but that I begin my speech. For I shall not want frequent opportunities of disputing again with Socrates.

THE SPEECH OF AGATHO.

I SHALL begin by showing in what way a panegyric on Love ought to be made ¹, and then proceed that way in making one myself. For none of those who have gone before me have, in my opinion, celebrated the praise of Love; but all have made it their sole business to felicitate human kind upon the good they enjoy through the beneficence of that God. For what he is in himself, he from whom all this happiness is derived, none of them has shown. Now, whatever the subject of our panegyric be, there is but one right way to take in the composing it: and that is, the showing how excellent is the nature, and how good are the operations or effects, of that person or thing we are to praise. In this way it is that we ought to make our panegyrics on Love; praising, first, the excellence and absolute goodness of his own nature, and then his relative goodness to us in the blessings he bestows. According to this method, I take upon me, in the first place, to say, if without offence to what is sacred and divine I may be allowed to say it, that, though all the Gods enjoy a state of blessedness, yet Love is blest above all others, as he excells them all in beauty and in virtue. The most beautiful he must be, for these reasons: first, in that he is the youngest of the Gods, my Phædrus! Of this he himself gives us a convincing proof, by his running away from Old Age, and outrunning him who is evidently so swift-footed. For Old Age, you know, arrives and is with us sooner than we desire. Between Love and him there is a natural antipathy: so that Love comes not within a wide distance of him ²; but makes his abode with

¹ The following speech abounds with wit; but it is wit of a rambling and inconsistent kind, without any fixed idea; so far is it from aiming at truth. The beginning of it is a just specimen of the whole. For after Agatho has undertaken to give a description of the person and qualities of Love under the very first article of this description, the youthfulness of Love, he uses the word *ἔρως*, in no fewer than four different senses. In the first place, he means, as Socrates afterwards observes of him, that which is loved, rather than that which loves; that is, outward beauty, rather than the passion which it excites. Immediately he changes this idea for that of the passion itself. Then at once, without giving notice, he takes a flight to the first cause of orderly motion in the universe. And this he immediately confounds with the harmony of nature, the complete effect of that cause.

² We have taken the liberty of translating here, as if in the Greek it was printed οὐδ' ἔρως παρὰ πλεονάζειν, and not οὐδ' οὐτος, π. π.—S.

youth, and is always found in company with the young. For, as the old proverb rightly has it, "Like always goes to like." I must own, therefore, though I agree with Phædrus in many other of his opinions, I cannot agree with him in this, that Love is elder than Saturn and Japetus. Of all the Gods, I affirm, he is the youngest, and enjoys perpetual youth. Accordingly I contend, that, if any such events happened among the Gods as Hesioid and Parmenides report, they were occasioned by the power of Necessity, not that of Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no castrations¹, no chains, none of those many other acts of violence had been done or suffered amongst them: but friendship and peace had flourished in heaven, as they now do, and have ever done, since Love began his reign, and became chief amongst the Gods. Thus then it appears that Love is young. Nor is he less delicate and tender. But he wants a poet, such as Homer was, to express in fit terms how great his tenderness. Now Homer, where he tells us that Ate or Mischief was a goddess, of a subtle and fine frame, thus describes the tenderness and delicacy of her feet;

The tender-footed Goddess shuns the ground;
With airy step, upon the heads of men
Sets her fine treading, and from head to head
Trips it along full nimbly.—

The poet here produces a fair proof, I think, of her tenderness, her going on the soft place rather than the hard. The same argument shall I make use of, to prove the tenderness of Love. For he neither walks on the ground, nor goes upon human heads (which in truth are places not altogether soft); but the softest places possible to be found does Love make the places of his range, and of his dwelling too. For in the manners and in the souls of Gods and men he fixes his abode: not in all souls indiscriminately; for, if he lights on any whose manners are rough, away he marches, and takes up his residence in tender souls, whose manners are the softest. Since, therefore, with his feet, and all over his fine frame, he endures not to touch any but the softest persons, nor in any but their softest parts, he cannot but be extremely delicate and tender. Thus have we seen that Love is full of

¹ For the proper manner in which these things are to be understood, see the apology for the fables of Homer, in Vol. I. of this work.—T.

youth, delicacy and tenderness. He is, besides, of a soft and yielding substance. For it would be impossible for him to diffuse himself through every part of us, and penetrate into our inmost soul, or to make his first entry and his final exit unperceived by us, if his substance were hard and resisting to the touch. But a clear proof of his yielding, easy and pliant form is that gracefulness of person, which it is certain belongs to him in the highest degree by the acknowledgment of all: for Ungracefulness and Love never agree, but are always visibly at variance. That he excels in beauty of colour, is evident from his way of life, in that he is continually conversant with flowers, his own likenesses. For Love resides not in a body, or in a soul, or any other place, where flowers never sprung; or, if they did, where they are all fallen, and the place quite deflowered. But wherever a spot is to be found flowery and fragrant, he there seats himself and settles his abode. Concerning the beauty of this deity thus much is sufficient¹; though much still remains unsaid. I am to speak next on the subject of his virtue². And here the highest praise which can be attributed to any being is justly due to Love; that he does no injury to God or man; nor by God or man can he be injured. He never acts through compulsion or force himself; for compulsion or force cannot reach Love: nor ever forces he or compels others; for every being obeys freely and willingly every dictate and command of Love: where both parties then are willing, and each is freely consenting to the other, those in the city who are kings, the laws, say there is no injustice done. But not only the perfection of justice belongs to Love; he is equally endued with consummate temperance. For to be superior to pleasure, and to govern the desires of it, is every where called temperance. Now it is universally agreed, that no pleasure is superior to Love; but, on the contrary, that all pleasures are his inferiors. If so, they must be subjects and servants, all of them, to Love; and he must rule, and be the master. Having dominion thus over all pleasures and all desires, in

¹ Thus far Agatho has confounded the object of Love, the amiable, with the passion itself, considered as refined, and peculiarly belonging to the human species.—S.

² From allegory, and metaphor, and true wit, Agatho descends to pun and quibble, and playing on words, with scarce a semblance of just thought. In this next part of his description he means, by Love, that grosser part of the passion, common to all animals: and this too he confounds with the satisfaction of it through enjoyment.—S.

the highest degree must be temperate. Then, in point of valour, not Mars himself can pretend to vie with Love. For it is not, Mars has Love, but Love has Mars¹; the Love, as same says, of Venus. Now the person who has another in his possession must have the mastery over that person whom he possesses. The subduer and master then of him who in valour excels all others, must himself in that virtue excel without exception all. Thus we have already shown the justice, temperance, and fortitude of this God. To show his wisdom is yet wanting: and I must do my best to be no way wanting to my subject. In the first place then, that I may honour my own art, like Eryximachus, with my first regards, in the wisdom of poetry Love is so great a master, that he is able to make any one a poet². For, though a man be ever so much a stranger to the Muses, yet, as soon as his soul is touched by Love, he becomes a poet. It concerns me to lay a particular stress on this argument, to prove Love an excellent poet³, in all that kind of creative power⁴ which is the proper province of the Muses. For no being can impart to another that which itself has not, or teach another

¹ To apprehend the wit of this passage, we must observe, that the word *has* is here used in two senses: in the first part of the sentence, it means the soul being affected with the passion; in the next, it means the passion possessing the soul. There is the same double meaning of the word *habet* in the Latin, and every modern language derived from it; and it is no solecism in English. But there seems to be more wit and smartness in a repartee of Aristippus, in which he played on the same word, though somewhat differently; when, on his being reproached with having Laïs, a celebrated courtesan, for his mistress, he replied, *Εχω, ἀλλ' οὐκ έχωμαι*. True, I have her, that is, enjoy her; but she has not me; that is, has me not in her power.—S.

² Agatho, in this part of his description, uses the word Love in three different senses: first, as it means that fine passion in the human species only, which, by rousing and improving the faculties of the soul, supplies the want and does the office of genius: next, as it means the passion, whose power is exerted chiefly in the body, and, by exciting every animal to the work of generation, executes the ends for which nature implanted it in them all; lastly, as it means a particular genius or strong bent of the mind from nature to some particular study, which seldom fails of improving and perfecting every art.—S.

³ In this sentence Agatho justifies the character which Socrates had given of him just before, and shows himself a truly polite and well-bred man. For, upon his mention of the art of poetry, in which he had lately appeared so excellent, he here modestly declines the attributing any merit in that respect to his own poetic genius, as if he was a favourite of the Muses; and with great gallantry transfers the praise, bestowed upon himself, to Love; as if Love, and not the Muses, had inspired him.—S.

⁴ Plato has here contrived an opportunity for Agatho to play upon a word, or use it in more senses

other than that which itself knows not. In the other kind of the creative power, the making of animals, it is undeniably to the wisdom of this deity that all living things owe their generation and production. Then, for the works of the mechanic arts, know we not that every artist who hath Love for his teacher becomes eminent and illustrious; but that the artist whom Love inspires not and animates never rises from obscurity? The bowman's art, the art of healing, and that of divination, were the inventions of Apollo, under the guidance of Love, and the influence of his auspicious power. So that the God of Wisdom himself, we see, was the disciple of the God of Love. Prompted by Love, the Muses invented the art of music, Vulcan the art of working metals, Minerva the art of weaving, and Jupiter the art of well governing the Gods and mortals. From the beginning of that æra were the affairs of the Gods well settled; from the time when Love arose and interposed among them,—the Love certainly of beauty; for disorder and deformity are by no means the objects of Love. Antecedent to that time it was, as I observed before, that those many sad and strange accidents, they tell us, befell the Gods: it was when Necessity reigned and ruled in all things. But as soon as the charms of beauty gave birth to the God whom we celebrate, with him rose every good which blesses either Gods or mortals.—Thus, Phædrus, in the first place Love, as he appears to me, is most excellent himself in beauty and in virtue; in the next place, he is the cause of the like excellencies in other beings. I feel within me an inclination to make a verse or two on this subject, on the effects which Love produces:—

senses than one. For the Greek word *ποιησις*, which we have translated creative power, signifies not only making or creation, but poetry too: as the word *ποιητης* signifies both creator and poet. Taking advantage of these different meanings, Agatho attributes *ποιησις*, or creation, to each of the three kinds of Love mentioned in note 2, p. 486, as the work or effect of each. To the first he attributes poetry, an art which creates, as it were, or makes out of nothing real, out of the mere imagination of the poet, its own subject. To the next he justly ascribes the making or generating of animals in a way peculiar to Nature; who, beginning from the smallest materials, and collecting all the rest by insensible degrees from all neighbouring quarters, forming all the while, and animating whilst the forms, seems to create out of nothing too. And Love, in the sense in which he uses the word last, he no less justly supposes to have the principal hand in making the most excellent works of every art, where the artist hath his subject-matter ready created, and lying all at once before him, and apparently, therefore, creates nothing but the form.—S.

The

The rugged main he smoothes, the rage of men
 He softens; thro' the troubled air he spreads
 A calm, and lulls the unquiet soul to rest.

It is he who frees us from reserve and strangeness; and who procures us openness and intimacy: it is he who establishes social meetings and assemblies, such as this of ours: in festival entertainments, in dances, and in feasts, he is the manager, the leader, and the founder; introducing courtesy and sweetness, banishing rusticity and savageness; dispensing abroad benevolence and kindness, restraining malignity and ill-will: propitious, gracious, and good to all: the admired spectacle of wise men, the heart-felt delight of Gods: the envy of those to whose lot he falls not, the acquisition of such only as are fortunate: the parent of delicacy and tenderness, of elegance and grace, of attractive charms and amorous desires: observant of good, overlooking evil: in difficulties, in fears, in silent wishes, and in soft addresses, the protector, the encourager, the patron, and the inspirer: of Gods and men, of all linked together, the beauty and the ornament: a guide to all which is good and amiable, the best and the most charming: whom it is the duty of every one to follow; joining in chorus to his praise, or bearing part in that sweet song sung by Love himself, with which he softens the heart and soothes the mind of every God and mortal.—This is my speech, Phædrus, which I consecrate to Love; a speech, partly jocose and partly serious, such as the best of my poor abilities in wit and eloquence are able to furnish out.

When Agatho had done speaking, Aristodemus told me, the room rang with the applauses of the company; all of them loudly declaring, that Agatho's speech on Love was worthy of himself, and worthy of the God in whose honour it was spoken.—Upon which Socrates, directing his eyes to Eryximachus, said, Well, what think you now, you son of Acumenus? Think you not that I had good grounds for those fears I told you I was under? and that I spake prophetically, when I said that Agatho would make an admirable speech, and that I should be driven to distress?—The first thing, replied Eryximachus, I think you foretold truly, "that Agatho's speech would be excellent;"—but the other, that "yourself would be driven to distress," I do not believe was a true prophecy.—How, my good friend, said

said Socrates, should I avoid being at a loss, and distressed for something to say? or how, indeed, could any other person, who was to speak, after a speech on the same subject so full of beauty and variety? It was not, I must acknowledge, in all respects, and in all the parts of it, equally admirable: but who, that heard the conclusion, could help being astonished at the elegant choice of words, and beauty of the diction? For my part, when I consider how little I shall be able to say any thing that will not fall far short of it, I should be tempted to run away for very shame, had I any possibility of making my escape. For, whilst he was speaking, he put me in mind of Gorgias: and, to say the truth, that which Homer relates struck me at that time very sensibly. Now, thought I, what if Agatho should at the last send forth the head of that formidable speaker Gorgias¹ to assault my imagination; and thus

¹ This passage in the Greek runs this:—*Εφοβουμην μη μοι τελευταν ὁ Αγαθων Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινὸν λεγείν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πεμφθῆς, κ. τ. λ.* In this, as also in the preceding sentence, where Gorgias is mentioned, Cornarius would have us read *Γοργίου*, instead of *Γοργίου*, and consequently, in this last, *δεινός* instead of *δεινὸς*, referring this attribute to Agatho; and quite insensible, as it seems, to the many strokes of humour in this passage: for he gravely gives this notable reason for his alteration,—that the head of Gorgias, truly, had no such power as is here attributed to it. But he has forgotten to clear up a small difficulty which attends his alteration; and that is, how Agatho the Handsome, for so he was commonly called, or Agatho's handsome speech, should immediately put Socrates in mind of the Gorgon's head. The train of thought here is evidently this: Agatho put Socrates in mind of Gorgias, through the similitude of their styles; the thought of Gorgias put him in mind of Gorgon, through the similitude of their names; and, perhaps, because he thought them both alike *πελωρα*, prodigies; and the thought of Gorgon brought to his mind the following passage in Homer's *Odyssæy*, l. xi.

————— ἐμε δὲ χλωρὸν θεὸς κρεί,
Μη μοι Γοργεῖν κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελωροῦ,
Εξ αἰδὸς πεμφθῆεν ἀγαυῇ Περσεφονείᾳ.

Pale fear then seized me, and the dreadful thought,—
—Now should the Gorgon's head, that prodigy
Terrific, by stern Proserpine be sent,
Forth from her viewless realm, to assault my eyes,
Visible in all its horrors!——

It is easy to observe, that Socrates not only alludes humorously to Homer's thought in this passage, but, to heighten the humour, has used several of Homer's words. We have followed him in so doing, where it was possible for us; adapting these passages one to the other in the translation.

thus should, by the conclusion of his speech, stop my speech, and turn into stone my speaking faculties!—I considered, how ridiculous it was in me to profess myself a great master in love matters, and consent to bear a part with you in making panegyrics on Love, when at the same time I was entirely ignorant of the affair we undertook, and knew not the right way to celebrate the praise of any thing. For I was so silly¹ as to imagine that we ought never to say any thing but what was true in our encomiums on any subject whatever; that the real properties of it were the materials which lay before us, as it were, to work on; and that the business of a panegyrist was nothing more than out of these materials to select the handsomest and best, and frame them together in the most skilful and the best manner. Prepossessed with this imagination, I had entertained a strong opinion that I should speak well on the subject proposed, because I well knew what praises were with truth to be ascribed to Love. Whereas I now find that this is not the right way of making a panegyric; but that, when we praise, we are to attribute to our subject all qualities which are great and good, whether they truly belong to it or not. Should our encomiums happen to be false, the

doing, where it was possible for us; adapting these passages one to the other in the translation. But in one of the words, an important one to the humour, we found it scarcely possible. For the word *δεινός*, here in Homer, signifies terrible, or frightful; and the same word as used here by Plato signifies great, weighty, or powerful. Now in English both these meanings are not to be expressed fully and exactly by the same word. The word "formidable," however, though it would weaken the sense in Homer, may serve to express the allusion in Plato to Homer's "terrific." This double meaning of the word *δεινός*, and the similitude of sound between Gorgon and Gorgias, or between *Γοργεῖν* [*κεφαλή*] and *Γοργεῖν*, seem to be humorous imitations of the style of Agatho and Gorgias, who were, both of them, fond of such puns and puerilities. It is necessary to take notice of some other words in this passage, because Stephens has thrown in a suspicion of their not being genuine, the words *ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*,—probably imagining them to be a marginal gloss on the word *λεγεῖν*: whereas they are in truth absolutely necessary to the sense; *λόγῳ* here being opposed to *εργῳ*, to the actual sending forth, and presenting visibly, the head of Gorgias. Besides that the omission of those words would much diminish the glare of another Gorgiasism, which seems intended in *λεγεῖν*, *λόγῳ*, and *λογον*, the repetition of the words "speak" and "speech."—S.

¹ Socrates, having satirized Agatho's style, with regard to the affected ornaments of it, and its want of simplicity; but doing it with that delicate and fine humour in which he led the way to all the politer satirists, particularly to the Roman poet Horace, and our own Addison; proceeds now, in that ironical way peculiar to himself, to satirize the sentiments in Agatho's speech, with regard to their want of truth, justness of thought, and pertinence to the subject.—S.

falsehood of them, to be sure, is not material. For the proposal, it seems, was this, that each of us should make a panegyric, which, by common consent, was to pass and be taken for a panegyric made on Love; and not to make a panegyric properly belonging to Love, or such a one as he truly merited. Hence it is, I presume, that you gather from all quarters every topic of praise, and attribute to Love all kinds of perfection; representing him and his operations to be of such a nature, that he cannot fail of appearing in the highest degree beautiful and good—to all those I mean who are unacquainted with him—for he certainly can never be deemed so by those who know him: and thus the panegyric is made fine and pompous. But, for my part, I was an utter stranger to the composing of panegyrics after this manner; and in my ignorance it was that I agreed to be one of the composers. Only with my tongue, therefore, did I engage myself: my mind was no party to the agreement. And so farewell to it; for I shall never make panegyrics in this way: I should not, indeed, know how. Not but that I am ready to speak the truth concerning the subject proposed, if you have any inclination to hear it, and if I may be allowed to speak after my own manner; for I mean not to set my speech in competition with any of yours, and so run the risk of being deservedly laughed at. Consider, therefore, Phædrus, for it is your affair, whether such a kind of speech as you have to expect from me would be agreeable to you; and whether you would like to hear the truth spoken concerning Love in terms no higher than are adequate and fitting, and with such a disposition of the several particulars as shall happen to arise from the nature of the subject. Phædrus, then, and the rest of the company, made it their joint request to him, that he would speak in the manner which he himself judged to be the most proper.—But stay, said Socrates; give me leave first to propose to Agatho a few questions; that, after we have agreed together on some necessary premises, I may the better proceed to what I have to say. You have my consent, said Phædrus; so propose your questions.—Socrates then, as Aristodemus told me, began in this manner:—

INTRODUCTION TO THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

IN my opinion, my friend Agatho, you began your speech well, in saying that we ought in the first place to set forth the nature of Love, what he

is in himself, and afterward to show his effects, and what he operates in others. This introduction of yours I much approve of. Now, then, tell me further concerning Love: and since you have so fairly and amply displayed the other parts of his nature and character, answer me also to this question, whether Love is a being of such a kind as to be of something¹; or whether he is of nothing? I ask you not, whether he is of some father or mother; for the question, whether Love is the love of father or mother, would be ridiculous; but I mean it in the same sense as if the subject of my question was the very thing now mentioned, that is, a father; and the question itself was, whether a father was the father of something, or not: in this case you would certainly answer, if you answered rightly, that a father was the father of a son or of a daughter:—would you not?—Certainly I should, said Agatho.—And an answer of the same kind you would give me, said Socrates, if I asked you concerning a mother.—Agatho again assented.—Answer me now, said Socrates, to a question or two more, that you may the better apprehend my meaning. Suppose I were to ask you concerning a brother, with regard to that very circumstance, his being a brother, is he brother to some person or not?—Agatho answered in the affirmative.—And is not this person, said Socrates, either a brother or a sister?—To which when Agatho had assented, Try then, said Socrates, to tell me concerning Love; is it the love of nothing, or of something?—Of something, by all means, replied Agatho.—Whatever you think that something to be, said Socrates, for the present keep your thought to yourself; only remember it. And let me ask you this question further, relating to Love: Does Love desire that something of which it is the love, or does it not?—Desires it, answered Agatho, without doubt.—Whether, when possessed of that which it desires, of that which it is in love with, does it then desire it? or only when not possessed of it?—Only when not possessed of it, it is probable, replied Agatho.—Instead of being probable, said Socrates, consider if it be not necessary that every being which feels any desire should desire only that which it is in want of; and that as far as any being is free from want, so far it must be free also from desire. Now to me, Agatho, this appears in the highest

¹ That is, whether his nature is absolute, not of necessity inferring the coexistence of any other being; or whether it is relative, in which the being of some correlative is implied.—S.

degree necessary. But how does it appear to you?—To me in the same manner, replied Agatho.—You say well, said Socrates. I ask you then, Can a man whose size is large wish to be a man of large size? or a man who is strong, can he wish to be strong?—The impossibility of this, replied Agatho, follows from what we have just now agreed in. For the man who is what he would wish to be, must in that respect, and so far, be free from want.—True, said Socrates: for, if it were possible that the strong could wish to be strong, the swift wish to be swift, and the healthy wish to be healthy, one might then perhaps imagine it equally possible in all cases of the like kind, that such as are possessed of any thing good or advantageous could desire that which they already have. I mention this in general, to prevent our being imposed upon. For the person who enjoys any of these advantages, if you consider, Agatho, must appear to you to have of necessity at present that which he has, whether he wills it, or not: and how can this ever be the object of his desire? Should any man, therefore, say thus: I, who am now in health, desire to be healthy; or, I, who now have riches, desire to be rich, and long for those very things which I have; we should make him this reply:—You mean, friend, you that are at present possessed of riches, or health, or strength, would be glad to continue in possession of them always: for at this present you possess them, whether you will or not. When you say, therefore, that you desire what is present with you, consider, whether you mean any other thing than this; you would be glad that what is present with you now might be present with you for the time to come. Would he not acknowledge, think you, that this was his only meaning?—Agatho agreed that he would.—This then, said Socrates, is to love and desire that from which he is now at some distance, neither as yet has he; and that is, the preserving of what he possesses at the present, and his continuing in possession of it for the future.—It certainly is so, replied Agatho.—This man, therefore, said Socrates, and every one who feels desire, desires that which lies not ready for his enjoyment, that which is not present with him,

¹ In Stephens's edition of the original we here read, *αλλο τι ὁμολογοῖ αν*; as if the confession was demanded from Agatho in his own person. In all the former editions, however, it is rightly printed, *ὁμολογοῖτ' αν*. But we presume they are all wrong in giving us *αλλο τι* [*δια δυοιν*] instead of *αλλοτι* [*δι' ενος*] *whether*; misled probably by the preceding sentence, where *αλλο τι* signifies *any other thing*, and is therefore rightly there divided into two words.—S.

that which he has not, that which he himself is not, and that which he is in want of; such things only being the objects of love and of desire.—Agatho to this entirely assented.—Come then, said Socrates, let us agree upon these conclusions: Is not Love, in the first place, love of something? in the next place, is it not love of that which is wanting?—Clearly so, replied Agatho.—Now then, said Socrates, recollect what it was you told us in your speech was the proper object of Love. But I, if you please, will remind you of it. I think you said something like this, “that the affairs of the Gods were put in good order, and well established, through love of things beautiful: for that things of opposite kind to these could never be the objects of love.” Did you not tell us some such thing?—I own it, answered Agatho.—You own the truth, my good friend, replied Socrates. Now, if this be as you say, must not Love be love of beauty, and not of deformity?—I agree, said Agatho.—And have you not agreed too, said Socrates, that Love is love of something which is wanting, and not of any thing possessed already?—True, replied Agatho.—It follows then, said Socrates, that Love is not in possession, but in want, of beauty.—It follows of necessity, said Agatho.—Well then, said Socrates, that to which beauty is absolutely wanting, that which is totally unpossessed of beauty, do you call that beautiful?—Certainly not, replied Agatho.—Are you still then, said Socrates, of the same opinion, that Love is beautiful, if we have reasoned rightly?—Agatho then made answer: I am in danger, Socrates, of being found ignorant in the subject I undertook to praise.—You have honestly and fairly spoken, said Socrates. And now answer me to this little question more: Think you not that every thing good is also fair and beautiful?—I do, replied Agatho.—If then, said Socrates, Love be in want of beauty, and if every thing good be fair and beautiful, Love must be in want of good too.—I am not able, replied Agatho, to argue against you, Socrates; and therefore I admit it to be true what you say.—You are not able, my beloved Agatho, said Socrates, to argue against the truth: for to argue against Socrates is nothing difficult. And here shall I dismiss you from being further questioned. But the discourse concerning Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima the prophetess, a woman wise and knowing in these and many other subjects; so profoundly knowing, that when the plague seemed to be approaching Athens, and when the people offered sacrifice to avert it, she caused the coming of that distemper
to

to be delayed for the space of ten years ; (she it was who instructed me in the knowledge of all things that appertain to Love ;) a discourse, I say, on this subject, which I once heard from her, I will try if I can relate again to you ; laying down, for the foundation of it, those points agreed on just now between me and Agatho ; but purposing, however, to relate the whole of this by myself, as well as I am able.

THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

RIGHT and proper is it, Agatho, to follow the method marked out by you ; in the first place, to declare what kind of a being Love is, and afterwards to show what are the effects produced by him. Now I think the easiest way that I can take, in executing this plan, will be to lay before you the whole of this doctrine in the very manner and order in which I myself was examined and lectured on the subject by Diotima. She began with me, on my saying to her much the same things that were asserted just now by Agatho ; that Love was a deity excellent in goodness, and was also one of those who were fair and beautiful. And she refuted me with the same arguments I have made use of to refute Agatho ; proving to me that Love, according to my own account of him, was neither beautiful nor good. How say you, Diotima ? then said I. Is Love an ugly and an evil being ?—Soft, replied she ; no abusive language : do you imagine that every being who is not beautiful, must of course be ugly ?—Without doubt, answered I.—And every being who is not wise, said she, do you conclude it must be ignorant ? Do you not see there is something between wisdom and ignorance¹ ?—I asked her, what that could be.—To think of things rightly, as being what they really are, without being able to assign a reason why they are such. Do you not perceive, said she, that this is not to have the science or true knowledge of them ? For, where the cause or reason of a thing remains unknown², how can there be science ? Nor yet is it ignorance : for that which

¹ See the *Meno* near the conclusion, and the fifth and seventh books of the *Republic*. It may suffice for the present to observe, that true opinion is a medium between wisdom properly so called, i. e. an intellectual knowledge of the causes and principles of things, and ignorance.—T.

² We have here taken the liberty to paraphrase a little, for the sake of rendering this passage more

which errs not from the truth, how should that be ignorance? Such then is right opinion, something between wisdom and ignorance.—You are certainly in the right, said I.—Deem it not necessary then, said she, that what is not beautiful should be ugly; or that what is not good must of consequence be evil. To apply this to the case of Love; though you have agreed, he is neither good nor beautiful, yet imagine not he must ever the more on that account be ugly and evil; but something between those opposites.—Well, said I, but he is acknowledged by all to be a powerful God, however.—By all who know him, do you mean, said she, or by all who know him not?—By all universally, replied I.—Upon which she smiled, and said, How, Socrates, should he be acknowledged a powerful God by those who absolutely deny his divinity?—Who are they? said I.—You yourself, replied she, are one of them, and I am another.—Explain your meaning, said I.—My meaning, said she, is easy to be explained. For answer me to this question: Say you not that the Gods are, all of them, blest and happy? or would you offer to say of any one of the Gods, that he was not a blest and happy being?—Not I, for my part, said I, by Jupiter.—By a happy being, said she, do you not mean a being possessed of things fair, beautiful and good?—It is granted, answered I.—And you granted before, said she, that Love, from his indigence and want of things good and beautiful, desired those things of which he was destitute.—I allowed it.—How then, said she, can he be a God, he who is destitute of things fair, beautiful and good?—It appears, said I, that he by no means can.—You see then, said she, that, even in your own judgment, Love is no God.—What! said I, must Love then be a mortal?—Far from that, replied she.—Of what nature was he then? I asked her.—Of like kind, answered she, with those natures we have just now been speaking of, an intermediate one, between the mortal and

more easy to be understood. In the Greek it runs thus, *αλογον γαρ πραγμα πως αν ειη επιστημη*; Aristotle expresses the same meaning in the same concise way, thus, *μετα λογου γαρ η επιστημη*. Ethic. Nicomach. lib. vi. cap. 6. where *λογος* is the same thing with that which Plato in his Meno calls *λογισμος αιτιας*, that is, the rational account of a thing, deriving it from its cause. For the cause [the formal cause] of every particular truth is some general truth, in which that particular is virtually included. Accordingly, in a perfect syllogism we may see the truth of the conclusion virtually included in the truth of the major proposition. Nor can we properly be said to know any one truth, till we see the whole of that higher truth, in which the particular one is contained.—S.

the immortal.—But what in particular, O Diotima?—A great dæmon¹,
replied

¹ The following admirable account of Love, in which it is shown why he is called by Plato a great dæmon, is from the MS. commentary of Proclus on the First Alcibiades :

There are different properties of different Gods : for some are artificers of wholes, of the form of beings, and of their essential ornament : but others are the suppliers of life, and are the sources of its various genera : but others preserve the unchangeable order, and guard the indissoluble connection of things : and others, lastly, who are allotted a different power, preserve all things by their beneficent energies. In like manner every amatory order is the cause to all things of conversion to divine beauty, leading back, conjoining, and establishing all secondary natures in the beautiful, replenishing them from thence, and irradiating all things with the gifts of its light. On this account it is asserted in The Banquet that *Love* is a great dæmon, because Love first demonstrates in itself a power of this kind, and is the medium between the object of desire and the desiring nature, and is the cause of the conversion of subsequent to prior natures. The whole amatory series, therefore, being established in the vestibule of the cause of beauty, calls upwards all things to this cause, and forms a middle progression between the object of Love and the natures which are recalled by Love. Hence it pre-establishes in itself the exemplar of the whole dæmoniacal order, obtaining the same middle situation among the Gods as dæmons between divine and mortal natures. Since, therefore, every amatory series possesses this property among the Gods, we must consider its uniform and occult summit as ineffably established in the first orders of the Gods, and conjoined with the first and intelligible beauty ; but its middle process as shining forth among the supermundane Gods, with an intellectual condition ; but its third progression as possessing an exempt power among the liberated Gods ; and its fourth as multifariously distributed about the world, producing many orders and powers from itself, and distributing gifts of this kind to the different parts of the world. But after the unific and first principle of Love, and after the tripartite essence perfected from thence, a various multitude of Loves shines forth with divine light, from whence the choirs of angels are filled with Love ; and the herds of dæmons full of this God attend on the Gods who are recalled to intelligible beauty. Add too, that the army of heroes, together with dæmons and angels, are agitated about the participation of the beautiful with divine bacchanalian fury. Lastly, all things are excited, revive and flourish, through the influx of the beautiful. But the souls of such men as receive an inspiration of this kind, and are naturally allied to the God, assiduously move about beauty, and fall into the realms of generation, for the purpose of benefiting more imperfect souls, and providing for those natures which require to be saved. The Gods indeed and the attendants on the Gods, abiding in their proper habits, benefit all following natures, and convert them to themselves : but the souls of men descending, and touching on the coast of generation, imitate the beneficent providence of the Gods. As, therefore, souls established according to some other God descend with purity into the regions of mortality, and benefit souls that revolve in it ; and some indeed benefit more imperfect souls by prophecy, others by mystic ceremonies, and others by divine medicinal skill : so likewise souls that choose an amatory life are moved about the deity who presides over beautiful natures, for the purpose of taking care of well-born souls. But from apparent beauty they are led back to divine beauty, and together with themselves elevate those who are the objects of their love.

replied she. For the dæmon-kind ¹ is of an intermediate nature between the divine and the human.—What is the power and virtue, said I, of this intermediate

And this also divine Love primarily effects in intelligibles: for he unites himself to the object of love, extends to it the participants of his power, and inserts in all things one bond, and one indissoluble friendship with each other, and with the beautiful itself. Souls, therefore, possessed with love, and participating the inspiration thence derived, in consequence of using an undefiled vehicle, are led from apparent to intelligible beauty, and make this the end of their energy. Likewise enkindling a light in more imperfect souls, they also lead these back to a divine nature, and are divinely agitated together with them about the fountain of all-perfect beauty.

But such souls as from a perverse education fall from the gift which is thence derived, but are allotted an amatory nature, these, through their ignorance of true beauty, are busily employed about that which is material and divisible, at which also they are astonished in consequence of not knowing the passion which they suffer. Hence they abandon every thing divine, and gradually decline into impiety and the darkness of matter. They appear indeed to hasten to a union with the beautiful, in the same manner as perfectly amatory souls; but they are ignorant of the union, and tend to a dissipated condition of life, and to the sea of dissimilitude. They are also conjoined with the base itself, and material privation of form. For where are material natures able to pervade through each other? Or where is apparent beauty, pure and genuine, being thus mingled with matter, and replete with the deformity of its subject? Some souls, therefore, genuinely participate the gifts of Love, and by others these gifts are perverted. For as according to Plotinus the defluxion of intellect produces craft, and an erroneous participation of wisdom sophistry, so likewise the illumination of Love, when it meets with a depraved recipient, produces a tyrannic and intemperate life.

After this, in another part of the same admirable commentary, he presents us, as he says, with some of the more arcane assertions concerning Love; and these are as follow:

Love is neither to be placed in the first nor among the last of beings. Not in the first, because the object of Love is superior to Love: nor yet among the last, because the lover participates of Love. It is requisite, therefore, that Love should be established between the object of love and the lover, and that it should be posterior to the beautiful, but prior to every nature endued with love. Where then does it first subsist? How does it extend itself through the universe, and with what monads does it leap forth?

There are three hypostases, therefore, among the intelligible and occult Gods; and the first indeed is characterized by *the good*, understanding *the good itself*, and residing in that place where according to the oracle the paternal monad abides: but the second is characterized by wisdom, where the first intelligence flourishes; and the third by *the beautiful*, where, as Timæus says, the most beautiful of intelligibles abides. But there are three monads according to these intelligible causes subsisting uniformly according to cause in intelligibles, but first unfolding themselves into light

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¹ For a copious account of dæmons, their nature, species, and employments, see the second Note on the First Alcibiades.

intermediate kind of being?—To transmit and to interpret to the Gods, said she,

in the ineffable order* of the Gods, I mean *faith*, *truth*, and *love*. And *faith* indeed establishes all things in good; but *truth* unfolds all the knowledge in beings; and lastly, *love* converts all things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This triad indeed thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods, and imparts to all things by its light a union with intelligible itself. It also unfolds itself differently in different orders, every where combining its powers with the idioms of the Gods. And among some it subsists ineffably, incomprehensibly, and unifically; but among others, as the cause of connecting and binding; and among others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again it subsists intellectually and paternally; there, in a manner entirely motive, vivific, and effective: here, as governing and assimilating; there, in a liberated and undefiled manner; and elsewhere, according to a multiplied and divisive mode. Love, therefore, supernally descends from intelligibles to mundane concerns, calling all things upwards to divine beauty. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all things with knowledge. And lastly, faith proceeds through the universe, establishing all things unically in good. Hence the oracles assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity through this triad. Intelligibles themselves, indeed, do not require the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides. For it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to itself; but the convertor of subsequent into prior, and the anagogic and perfecting cause of imperfect natures.

The oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing in all things: and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima calls Love a great dæmon, because it every where fills up the medium between desiring and desirable natures. And, indeed, that which is the object of Love vindicates to itself the first order, but that which loves is in the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle situation between each, congregating and collecting together that which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods it unites intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks calls this Love blind; for he says "feeding in his breast blind, rapid Love:" ποιμανὼν πρᾶπτεδασιν ἀνομματον μὲν ἔρως. But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself: for a bond is a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account the oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a copulator: for, proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all following natures with each other, and with itself. Hence, it conjoins all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods; but it conjoins us with both Gods and dæmons. In the Gods, indeed, it has a primary subsistence, in dæmons a secondary one, and in partial souls a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles. Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence: for every genus of Gods is superessential. But in dæmons it subsists according to essence; and in souls according to illumination. And this triple order appears similar to

* i. e. In the summit of that order which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

she, what comes from men; and to men, in like manner, what comes from the Gods; from men their petitions and their sacrifices; from the Gods, in return, the revelation of their will. Thus these beings, standing in the middle rank between divine and human, fill up the vacant space, and link together all intelligent nature. Through their intervention proceeds every kind of divination, and the priestly art relating to sacrifices, and the mysteries and incantations, with the whole of divination and magic. For divinity is not mingled with man; but by means of that middle nature is carried on all converse and communication between the Gods and mortals, whether in sleep or waking. Whoever has wisdom and skill in things of this kind is a dæmoniacal man: the knowing and skilful in any other thing, whether in the arts, or certain manual operations, are illiberal and fordid. These dæmons are many and various. One of them is Love.—But, said I, from what parents was he born?—The history of his parentage, replied she, is somewhat long to relate: however, I will give you the relation. At the birth of Venus, the Gods, to celebrate that event, made a feast; at which was present, amongst the rest, Plenty¹, the son

the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which is, indeed, their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect Timæus himself signifies. That Love, therefore, which subsists in the Gods must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect: for this is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect: for this is essential, and is perfected from itself, in the same manner as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and which infers an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we consider Love as coordinate with this intellectual difference: for in intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult hypostasis: and if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to cause. And it appears to me that Plato, finding that intelligible intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great Dæmon, was himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner. Very properly, therefore, does Diotima call it a great dæmon; and Socrates conjoins the discourse about Love with that concerning Dæmons. For, as every thing dæmoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so also the discourse concerning a dæmoniacal nature is conjoined with that concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the object of love and the lover; and a dæmon is a medium between man and divinity.—T.

¹ By *Plenty*, the son of Counsel, we must understand that divine cause of abundance which subsists in Jupiter the demiurgus of the world. For Jupiter is called *Μητις*, or Counsel, by Orpheus, as we are informed by Proclus in *Tim.* p. 102. *Poverty* is Matter, which in itself is destitute of

son of Counsel. After they had supped, Poverty came a-begging, an abundance of dainties being there, and loitered about the door. Just then Plenty, intoxicated with nectar¹, (for as yet wine² was not) went out into the gardens of Jupiter; and oppressed with the load of liquor that he had drunk, fell asleep³. Poverty, therefore, desiring through her indigence to have a child from Plenty, artfully lay down by him, and became with child of Love. Hence it is that Love is the constant follower and attendant of Venus, as having been begotten on the birth-day of that Goddess: being also, by his natural disposition, fond of all beauty, he is the more attached to Venus herself on account of her being beautiful. Now, as Love is the son of Plenty and of Poverty, the condition of his life and fortune is as follows: In the first place, he is always poor; and is far from being either fair or tender, as the multitude imagine him; for he is rough, and hard, and dry, without shoes to his feet, and without a house or any covering to his head; always grovelling on the earth, and lying on the bare ground, at doors, and in the streets, in the open air; partaking thus of his mother's disposition, and living in perpetual want. On the other hand, he derives from his father's side qualities very different from those others: for hence it is that he is full of designs upon the good and the fair: hence it is that he is courageous, sprightly, and prompt to action; a mighty sportsman, always contriving some new device to entrap his game: much addicted to thought, and fruitful in expedients; all his life philosophizing; powerful in magic and enchantment, nor less so in sophistry. His nature is not mortal, in the common

all things, but is filled as far as it can be filled from *Plenty*, whose overflowing fullness terminates in its dark and rebounding feat. Plato, therefore, in calling Love the offspring of *Plenty* and *Poverty*, appears to comprehend its whole series. For Love, considered as the same with Desire, is, according to its subsistence in Jupiter, the son of *Plenty*; but, according to its ultimate subsistence, it is the offspring of Matter: for Matter also desires good, though her desire is most debile and evanescent. But by *Poverty* being pregnant with Love at the birth of Venus, Plato occultly intimates that the divine abundance in the demiurgus of the world proceeds into matter in conjunction with the illuminations of divine beauty.—T.

¹ Intoxication with nectar signifies that divine energy through which divine natures are enabled to provide immutably for all things.—T.

² This signifies nothing more than that wine belongs to the sensible, and not to the intelligible world. By the gardens of Jupiter, we may conceive that the splendour, grace, and empyrean beauty of the demiurgic illuminations of the maker of the universe are signified.—T.

³ Sleep, when applied to divine natures, signifies an energy separate from sensibles.—T.

way

way of mortality, nor yet is it immortal, after the manner of the immortal Gods; for sometimes, in one and the same day, he lives and flourishes, when he happens to fare well; and presently afterwards he dies; and soon after that revives again, as partaking of his father's nature. Whatever abundance flows in upon him is continually stealing away from him: so that Love is never absolutely in a state either of affluence or of indigence. Again, he is seated in the midst between Wisdom and Ignorance. For the case is this with regard to wisdom:—None of the Gods philosophize, or desire to become wise; for they are so; and if there be any other being beside the Gods who is truly wise, neither does such a being philosophize. Nor yet does philosophy, or the search of Wisdom, belong to the Ignorant¹. For on this very account is the condition of Ignorance so wretched, that notwithstanding she is neither fair, good, nor wise, yet she thinks she has no need of any kind of amendment or improvement. So that the ignorant, not imagining themselves in need, neither seek nor desire that which they think they want not.—Who are they then, O Diotima, said I, who philosophize, if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?—That is evident, said she: even a child may now discover that they must be such as stand in the middle rank of being; in the number of whom is Love. For wisdom is among the things of highest beauty; and all beauty is the object of love. It follows therefore of necessity, that Love is a philosopher, or a lover of wisdom; and that, as such, he stands between the adept in wisdom and the wholly ignorant. This, as well as all the rest of his condition, is owing to his parentage; as he derives his birth from a father wise and rich in all things, and from a mother unwise and in want of all things. Such, dear Socrates, is the nature of this dæmon. But that you had other thoughts of that being, whom you took for Love, is not at all surprising. For, if I may guess from the description you gave of him yourself, you seem to have taken for Love that which is beloved, not that which loves: and from this mistake it arose, as I imagine, that Love appeared to you in all respects so beautiful. For the object of love, the amiable, is truly beautiful and delicate, is perfect and completely blest. But to the subject of love, the lover, belongs a different nature, such a

¹ This passage in the Greek original is thus printed: *αὐτοὶ γὰρ τούτοις ἐστὶ χαλεποὶ ἀμαθία*; but we presume that either the last word of these should be printed *ἀμαθίαι*, figuratively meaning *amali*, or else, that the first words should be thus printed, *αὐτῶν γὰρ τούτων*.—S.

one as I have described to you.—Be it granted such, Diotima, said I; for what you tell me bids fair to be the truth. But now, such being his nature, of what advantage is he to human kind?—This, Socrates, said she, in the next place, I shall do my best to teach you. Already then it appears what kind of being Love is, and of what parents he was born: and that his object is beauty you yourself have asserted. Now what answer shall we make should we be asked this question, “O Socrates and Diotima! how or in what respect mean ye, when ye say that beauty is the object of Love?”—To express the meaning of my question in plainer terms, said she, What is it which the lover of beauty longs for?—To be in possession, said I, of the beloved beauty.—Your answer, said she, draws on a further question: What will be the state or condition of that man who is in possession of his beloved beauty?—I told her, I could by no means answer readily to such a question.—Suppose then, said she, that changing the subject of the question, and putting good in the place of beauty, one were to ask you thus, and say, Answer me, Socrates, to this question, What is it which the lover of good longs for?—To be in possession of that good, answered I.—And what, she asked me again, will be the state of that man who is in possession of good?—This, said I, is a question I can answer with much less difficulty, thus: that such a man will be happy.—Right, said she; for by the possessing of good things it is that the happy are in that happy state which they enjoy. Nor is there any room to question further, and ask, Why, or for the sake of what, a man wishes to be happy; but a conclusive answer appears to have been given, fully satisfactory.—True, said I, without dispute.—Now this wishing and this longing, said she, let me ask you, whether in your opinion it is common to all men; whether you think that all wish to be always in possession of things good; or how otherwise?—I think just so, replied I, that such a wish is common to all.—Well then, Socrates, said she, must we not acknowledge that all men are in love; seeing that the affections of them all are always fixed on the same things? or shall we say that some are in love, and some are not?—It is a thought, said I, which, I confess, a little surprises me.—Be not surprised, said she; for the case is nothing more than this, that the name of love, which belongs to all love in general, we appropriate to one particular kind of love, singled out from the others, which we distinguish by other names.—To make me conceive your meaning more perfectly, said I, can—

I, cannot you produce some other case parallel to this?—I can, said she. The following case is parallel: Making or creating, you know, comprehends many kinds of operation. For all cause by which any thing proceeds out of non-being into being[†] is creation. So that all the operations and all the works executed through any of the arts, are indeed so many creations: and all the artists and the workmen are real creators, makers, or poets.—True, said I.—And yet you know, continued she, they are not all of them called poets or makers, but are distinguished by different names: whilst one particular kind of creation, that which is performed in metre through the Muse's art, is singled out from the other kinds; and the name, to which they have all an equal right, is given to that alone. For that alone is called poesy or making: and the artists in this species of creation only are peculiarly distinguished by the name of poets or makers.—Perfectly right, said I.—Just so is it then in the case of Love, said she. Universally all desire of things good, and all that longing after happiness, which is in every individual of human kind, is the mighty Deity of Love, who by secret ways and stratagems subdues and governs the hearts of all. His votaries in many various ways, such as those engaged in the pursuit of wealth, or strength of body, or wisdom, are not said to be in love; nor is the name of lover allowed to any such. But to those only who are devoted to Love in one particular way, and addict themselves to one certain species of love, we appropriate those terms of love, and lovers, and the being in love, which ought to be considered as general terms, applicable in common to all the different kinds.—In all appearance, said I, you are entirely in the right.—She proceeded, however, to confirm the truth of what she had said, in the following manner:—There is a saying, continued she, that lovers are in search of the other half of themselves. But my doctrine is, that we love neither the half, nor even the whole of ourselves, if it happen not, my friend, some way or other to be

[†] *Being* does not here signify being or entity in general, but the particular form or essence of any thing, the being what it is. So non-being, just before, does not signify absolute non-entity, but the non-being of some particular thing, or the want of some form, which is afterwards introduced into existence. Accordingly *creation*, immediately after, signifies not what is now-a-days generally understood by that term, a making of something out of mere nothing; for Plato seems to have had no notion of the possibility of this; but here is to be understood the making some form or being, in the sense just now mentioned, newly to exist, a particular one, which existed not before.—S.

good.

good. For we are willing to have our feet and our hands cut off, though our own, if we deem them incurably and absolutely evil. It is not to what is their own that men have so strong an attachment, nor do they treat it so tenderly on that account, unless there be a man who thinks good to be his own, and properly belonging to him, but evil to be foreign to his nature. So true is it, that there is no other object of love to man than good alone. Or do you think there is?—By Jupiter, said I, there appears to me no other.—Is this now sufficient for us? said she: and have we done justice to our argument if we finish it with this simple and slender conclusion, that all men love what is good?—Why not? said I.—What? said she; must we not add this, that they long to have possession of the loved good?—This, said I, must be added.—And not only now to have possession of it, said she again, but to have possession of it for ever too; must not this be added further?—This further, said I.—Love then, in fine, said she, is the desire of having good in perpetual possession.—Most true, said I; in every tittle you are right.—Since then, said she, this general desire is found always to subsist and to operate in all, can you tell me in what particular way it operates on those who are commonly said to be in love? what the aim is of such lovers, and what the work or effect of this kind of love?—Were I able to tell, O Diotima, replied I, I should not have been so full of admiration at your wisdom; nor should I have applied myself to you to be taught these very things, if I already knew them.—Well, said she, I will teach you then. The aim of these lovers, and the work of this love, is to generate upon the beautiful as well in a mental way as in that which is corporeal.—Your words, said I, have need of some diviner to interpret them: I confess I do not apprehend their meaning.—I will express myself then, said she, in plainer language. All of human race, O Socrates, are full of the seeds of generation, both in their bodies and in their minds: and when they arrive at maturity of age, they naturally long to generate. But generate they cannot upon the ugly or uncomely, and only upon the fair and the agreeable. For the work of generation is carried on, you know, by means of the natural commerce between the two sexes: and this is a work above human art, it is divine. For to conceive and to impregnate is to immortalize the kind: it is producing immortality out of an animal which is mortal. In each of the sexes, therefore, is some immortal and divine principle, the cause of conception in the one, and of impregnation in

the other. But in neither of them can this principle operate effectually, unless the subject on which it operates be suitable to it and corresponding. Now deformity and ugliness but ill suit with aught which is divine. Beauty alone agrees with it and corresponds. For Beauty is that celestial influence which favours, and that goddess who patronizes, the work of generation. Hence, whenever that which teems with generative power approaches that which is beautiful, it smiles benignly; and through the delight it feels, opening and diffusing itself abroad, breeds or generates. But whenever it meets with that which is deformed or ugly, it grows morose, saddens, and contracts itself; it turns away, retires back, and generates not; but, restraining the swollen power within, which is ready to burst forth, it bears the burthen with uneasiness. Hence it is that they who are full of this, and long to generate, employ much of their creative power upon that which is beautiful: it is because the beautiful frees them from those generative throes with which they labour. But, Socrates, this is not, as you imagined, the love of beauty.—What is it then? said I.—It is the love, replied she, of generating and begetting issue, there where we find beauty.—Be it so, said I.—It certainly is so, she replied.—But, said I, what has Love to do with generating?—Because generating, answered she, perpetuates and in some manner immortalizes that which is mortal. Now, that the desire of immortality must always accompany the love of good, follows from what we before agreed in, that love was the desire of having good in perpetual possession. For the necessary consequence of that position is this, that Love desires immortality.

All these things learned I formerly in a conversation with Diotima, discoursing upon Love. At another time she thus questioned me: What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cause of that love, and that desire which lately was the subject of conversation between you and me? Do you not observe, how vehement are the passions of all brute animals¹ when the season comes

¹ The following account of the generation of animals and their succession in a continued series of individuals, by which the kind is for ever kept up in existence, gives us a just representation of all outward nature: for it is in the same manner that the world itself, though continually passing away, and changing in every part, yet remains for ever the same in its whole and entire form; life continually arising, and repairing the ruins made by death in every kind of things; and

comes in which they couple? Birds as well as beasts, you may perceive them all sick with love: so intense is their desire, in the first place, to generate and breed. Nor is their ardour less afterwards in the rearing of their young. In defence of these, you see them ready to engage in fight, the weakest animals with the strongest. To support these, you see them willingly themselves perishing with famine; in short, doing and suffering for their sakes the utmost possible. Those indeed of human kind, continued she, one might imagine acted thus from a motive of reason in themselves: but, in brute animals, can you assign the cause why the affections of love should be so deep and strong?—I told her, I was at a loss to account for it.—And do you think, said she, ever to become a thorough adept in the science of love, if you are at a loss in a case so easy?—It is for this very reason, said I, Diotima, as I lately told you, that I come to you for instruction: it is because I am sensible how much I want it. Do you, therefore, teach me what the cause is of those vehement affections you mentioned just now, and of every other sentiment and passion incident to love.—Upon which she said, If you believe that love is, what you have often owned it to be, the desire of having good in perpetual possession, you will be at no loss to conceive what the cause is of those affections. For the case of brute animals and that of the human kind are in this respect exactly the same; in both the same principle prevails; the mortal nature seeks to be perpetuated, and, as far as possible, immortalized. Now this is possible in one only way, that is, by generation; in which some new living thing is constantly produced to supply the place of the deceased old one. And in no other manner than this is life continued to any individual being, of which we say that it lives still, and pronounce it to be the same being. Thus every man, for instance, from his infancy on to old age, is called the same person; though he never has any thing in him which abides with him, and is continually a new man; having lost the man he was in his hair, in his flesh, in his bones, in his blood, in fine in his whole body. Nor in his body only, but in his soul

and the fresh growth keeping pace with the decay. To preserve this living beauty in such its immortality and unfading youth, animals have those affections, impulses or instincts, here described, given to them, as imparted from the mundane soul: analogous to which are the powers of gravitation, attraction, mixture, cohesion, and others of like kind, which are indeed so many vital powers given to the insensible parts of the universe, as partaking of the life of nature.—S.

too, does he undergo incessant change. His ways, his manners, his opinions, his desires and pleasures; his fears and sorrows; none of these ever continue in any man the same; but new ones are generated and spring up in him, whilst the former fade and die away. But a paradox much greater than any yet mentioned is with regard to knowledge: not only some new portions of knowledge we acquire¹, whilst we lose others, of which we had before been masters; and never continue long the same persons as to the sum of our present knowledge; but we suffer also the like change in every particular article of that knowledge. For what we call meditation supposes some knowledge to have actually, as it were, left us; and indeed oblivion is the departure of this knowledge: meditation then, raising up in the room of this departed knowledge a fresh remembrance in our minds, preserves in some manner and continues to us that which we had lost; so as to make the memory of it, the likeness, seem the very same thing. Indeed every thing mortal is preserved in this only way, not by the absolute sameness of it for ever, like things divine, but by leaving behind it, when it departs, dies, or vanishes, another in its room, a new being, bearing its resemblance. By this contrivance in nature, Socrates, does body, and every other thing naturally mortal, partake of immortality. Immortal after a different manner is that which naturally is immortal. Wonder not, therefore, that all beings are by nature lovingly affected towards their offspring. For this affectionate regard, this love, follows every being for the sake of immortality.—These things, said I, O Diotima, wisest of women! undoubtedly are so.—To which she, in the language of the most accomplished sophists, replied, You may be assured, Socrates, it is the truth. Nor is it less plain, from instances of a different kind, that immortality is the great aim and end of all. For, if you observe how the love of fame and glory operates on men, and what effect it has upon their conduct, you must wonder at their folly in labouring so much and suffering so greatly in the pursuit of it, unless you consider the mighty power of that passion which possesses them, a zeal to become illustrious in after-ages, and to acquire a fame that may last for ever and be immortal. For this, more than for the sake of their families or friends, are

¹ All this necessarily follows from the nature of the human soul; all her *energies* being *temporal*, though her *essence* is eternal. She is however able to energize super-temporally through a union with an intellect superior to her own.—T.

they

they ready to encounter dangers, to expend their treasures, to undergo the severest hardships, and to meet death itself. Do you think, continued she, that Alceſtis would have died for her husband Admetus to preſerve his life? or that Achilles would have died for his friend Patroclus to avenge his death? or that your Athenian Codrus would have died for his children's ſake to ſecure to them the ſucceſſion of his kingdom? had they not imagined their virtue would live for ever in the remembrance of poſterity, as it actually does throughout all Greece at this very day. Aſſure yourſelf their conduct had been quite different, had they not been full of this imagination. For, with a view to the immortality of virtue, and the never-dying glory which attends it, have all great actions ever been performed; a view which inſpires and animates the performers, in proportion to the degree of their own perſonal worth and excellence. For they are governed by that univerſal paſſion, the deſire of immortality. But though immortality be thus fought by all men, yet men of different diſpoſitions ſeek it by different ways. In men of certain conſtitutions, the generative power lies chiefly and eminently in their bodies. Such perſons are particularly fond of the other ſex, and court intimacies chiefly with the fair: they are eaſily enamoured in the vulgar way of love; and procure to themſelves, by begetting children, the preſervation of their names, a remembrance of themſelves which they hope will be immortal, a happineſs to endure for ever. In men of another ſtamp, the faculties of generation are, in as eminent a degree, of the mental kind. For thoſe there are who are more prolific in their ſouls than in their bodies; and are full of the ſeeds of ſuch an offspring as it peculiarly belongs to the human ſoul to conceive and to generate. And what offspring is this, but wiſdom and every other virtue? Thoſe who generate moſt, and who are parents of the moſt numerous progeny in this way, are the poets, and ſuch artiſts of other kinds as are ſaid to have been the inventors of their reſpective arts. But by far the moſt excellent and beauteous part of wiſdom is that which is converſant in the founding and well-ordering of cities and other habitations of men; a part of wiſdom diſtinguiſhed by the names of temperance and juſtice. When the ſoul of any man has been teeming with the ſeeds of this wiſdom from his youth (and of divine ſouls it is the native property thus to teem), as ſoon as he arrives at maturity of age, and thoſe ſeeds are fully ripened, he longs to
ſow

sow them in the souls of others, and thus to propagate wisdom. In this situation of his mind, his whole employment, I suppose, is to look about and search for beauty, where he may generate; for never can he generate on aught which is ugly or uncomely. Meeting first then with outward beauty, that of the body, he welcomes and embraces it; but turns away from where he sees deformity in the body; for his soul is full of love. But if, in his further and deeper search, he has the good fortune to meet with the inward and hidden beauty of a well-natured and generous soul, he then entirely attaches himself, and adheres closely to the whole person in whom it is found, the compound of soul and body. He now finds in himself a facility and a copiousness of expression when he entertains this partner of his soul with discourses concerning virtue; by what means it is acquired; what is a character completely good; what studies should be pursued; what arts be learnt; and how time should be employed in order to the forming such a character. Desirous, therefore, thus to form and perfect the object of his love, he undertakes the office of preceptor. Indeed, whilst he is conversing intimately with that which is fair, those seeds of wisdom, which he was before big with, burst forth spontaneous, and he generates. From this time, whether in the presence or absence of his mistress, his mind and memory become prompt and active; and he readily produces all his mental store. Both the parents then join in cherishing, rearing up, and cultivating the fruits of their love and amorous converse. Hence it is that a friendship of the firmest kind cements such a pair; and they are held together by a much stricter band of union than by an offspring of their bodies; having a common and joint interest in an offspring from themselves more beautiful and more immortal. Who would not choose to be the father of such children, rather than of mortals sprung from his body? Who that considers Homer, Hesiod, and other excellent poets, with the admiration they deserve, would not wish for such an issue as they left behind them, an issue of this mental kind, such as perpetuates their memory with the highest honour, and procures for them an immortality of fame? Or such a posterity, said she, as that whose foundation Lycurgus laid at Lacedæmon, a race of which himself was the first father, the preservers of their country and of all Greece? Amongst yourselves, what honours are paid to the memory of Solon, who begat the Laws! And abroad as well as at home how illustrious
are

are the names of many others, Barbarians as well as Grecians, who have exhibited to the world many noble actions, and have thus begotten all kinds of virtue! To men like these have temples often been erected, on account of such their progeny: but never was any man thus honoured on account of his mortal merely human offspring. In the mysteries of Love thus far perhaps, Socrates, you may be initiated and advanced.¹ But to be perfected, and to attain the intuition of what is secret and inmost², introductory to which is all the rest, if undertaken and performed with a mind rightly disposed, I doubt whether you may be able. However, said she, not to be wanting in a readiness to give you thorough information, I will do my best to conduct you till we have reached the end. Do but you your best to follow me. Whoever then enters upon this great affair in a proper manner, and begins according to a right method, must have been from his earliest youth conversant with bodies that are beautiful. Prepared by this acquaintance with beauty, he must, in the first place, if his leader³ lead aright, fall in love with some one particular person, fair and beauteous; and on her beget fine sentiments and fair discourse. He must afterwards consider, that the beauty of outward form, that which he admires so highly in his favourite fair one, is sister to a beauty of the same kind, which he cannot but see in some other fair. If he can then pursue this corporeal beauty, and trace it wherever it is to be found, throughout the human species, he must want

¹ We have here a pause, or break, more solemn and awful than any to be met with elsewhere in Plato. But it has great propriety in this place, as it becomes the sublime and mysterious character of Diotima; and as it is necessary, besides, for ushering in with the greater solemnity those very sublime and mysterious speculations which follow it.—S.

² Great decorum of character is here observed in putting into the mouth of the prophetess a metaphor, taken from the method of initiation into those religious mysteries which at that time were held in the highest reverence. For, to make this initiation perfect, three orderly steps or degrees were to be taken. The first was called purgation, the second illumination, and the third intuition; to which last but few persons were ever deemed worthy to be raised.—Agreeable to this gradation is the method observed by Diotima in her initiation of Socrates into the mysteries of wisdom. Her confutation of his pretended former notions, but, in reality, of the preceding speeches in this dialogue, answers to the purgative part of initiation into the religious mysteries. Her succeeding positive instructions in the true doctrine of Love answer to the illuminative part. And what remains of her discourse, as she herself here plainly gives us to understand, alludes to the last part of the religious initiation, the intuitive.—S.

³ That is, his demon.—T.

understanding

understanding not to conceive, that beauty is one and the same thing in all beauteous bodies. With this conception in his mind, he must become a lover of all visible forms, which are partakers of this beauty; and in consequence of this general love, he must moderate the excess of that passion for one only female form, which had hitherto engrossed him wholly: for he cannot now entertain thoughts extravagantly high of the beauty of any particular fair one, a beauty not peculiar to her, *but* which she partakes of in common with all other corporeal forms that are beauteous. After this, if he thinks rightly, and knows to estimate the value of things justly, he will esteem that beauty which is inward, and lies deep in the soul, to be of greater value and worthy of more regard than that which is outward, and adorns only the body. As soon, therefore, as he meets with a person of a beauteous soul and generous nature, though flowering forth but a little in superficial beauty, with this little he is satisfied; he has all he wants; he truly loves, and assiduously employs all his thoughts and all his care on the object of his affection. Researching in his mind and memory, he draws forth, he generates such notions of things, such reasonings and discourses, as may best improve his beloved in virtue. Thus he arrives, of course, to view beauty in the arts¹, the subjects of discipline and study; and comes to discover, that beauty is congenial in them all. He now, therefore, accounts all beauty corporeal to be of mean and inconsiderable value, as being but a small and inconsiderable part of beauty. From the arts he proceeds further to the sciences, and beholds beauty no less in these². And by this time having

¹ The word here used by Plato is *ἐπιτηδεύματα*, in which he means to include all the particulars of right discipline; every study, and every exercise enjoined or recommended by antient policy to the youth of good families and fortunes; in a word, all the accomplishments formed by a liberal education. These may all be reduced to three kinds; habits of regular and polite behaviour, knowledge of the liberal arts, and practice of the liberal exercises of the body. But as all of them depend on principles of art, and are acquired by study and discipline, we have used these very words *art*, *study*, and *discipline*, in translating Plato's *ἐπιτηδεύματα*, as the most expressive of his whole meaning.—S.

² The sciences here meant are those by the Platonists termed mathematical, as being the *μαθηματικά*, the learning, which they deemed a necessary preparation for the study of true philosophy. These were arithmetic, geometry, music in its theory, and astronomy. In these sciences every step which the mind takes is from beauty to beauty: for every theorem new to the mind in any of these

ing seen, and now considering within himself, that beauty is manifold and various, he is no longer, like one of our domestics who has conceived a particular affection for some child of the family, a mean and illiberal slave to the beauty of any one particular, whether person or art, study or practice; but betaking himself to the ample sea of beauty, and surveying it with the eye of intellect, he begets many beautiful and magnificent reasonings, and dianoëtic conceptions in prolific philosophy, till thus being strengthened and increased, he perceives what that one¹ science is which is so singularly great, as to be the science of so singularly great a beauty.² But now try, continued she, to give me all the attention you are master of. Whoever then is advanced thus far in the mysteries of Love by a right and regular progress of contemplation, approaching now to perfect intuition, suddenly he will discover, bursting into view, a beauty astonishingly admirable; that very beauty, to the gaining a sight of which the aim of all his preceding studies and labours had been directed: a beauty, whose peculiar characters are these: In the first place, it never had a beginning, nor will ever have an end, but always is, and always flourishes in perfection, unsusceptible of growth or of decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful only when looked at one way, or seen in one light; at the same time that, viewed another way, or seen in some other light, it is far from being beautiful: it is not beautiful only at certain times, or with reference only to certain circumstances of things; being at other times, or when things are otherwise circumstanced, quite the contrary: nor is it beautiful only in some

these sciences opens to her view some proportion or symmetry, some harmony or order, undiscovered before. Each different science seems a different world of beauty, still enlarging on the mind's eye, as her views become more and more extensive in the science. For proportion in arithmetic differs from proportion in geometry; musical proportion differs from them both; and the science of the celestial orbs, of their several revolutions, their mutual aspects, and their distances from each other, and from their common centre, is couversant in each of those three different proportions, and comprehends them all.—S.

¹ This one science is comprehended in Plato's dialectic, concerning which see the Introduction to the *Parmenides*.—T.

² This, which is the last pause in the speech, intended to renew and invigorate the attention, is very requisite in this place; for it precedes a description as admirable and as full of wonder as the being which it describes: and accordingly the strongest attention is here expressly demanded.—S.

places, or as it appears to some persons; whilst in other places, and to other persons, its appearance is the reverse of beautiful. Nor can this beauty, which is indeed no other than the beautiful itself, ever be the object of imagination; as if it had some face or hands of its own, or any other parts belonging to body: nor is it some particular reason, nor some particular science. It resides not in any other being, not in any animal, for instance; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor in any other part of the universe: but, simple and separate from other things, it subsists alone with itself, and possesses an essence eternally uniform. All other forms which are beautiful participate of this; but in such a manner they participate, that by their generation or destruction this suffers no diminution, receives no addition, nor undergoes any kind of alteration. When from those lower beauties, re-ascending by the right way of Love, a man begins to gain a sight of this supreme beauty, he must have almost attained somewhat of his end. Now to go, or to be led by another, along the right way of Love, is this: beginning from those beauties of lower rank, to proceed in a continual ascent, all the way proposing this highest beauty as the end; and using the rest but as so many steps in the ascent; to proceed from one to two, from two ¹ to all beautiful bodies; from the beauty of bodies to that of souls ²; from the beauty of souls to that of arts; from the beauty of arts to that of disciplines; until at length from the disciplines he arrives at that discipline which is the discipline of no other thing than of that supreme beauty; and thus finally attains to know what is the beautiful itself.—Here is to be found, dear Socrates, said the stranger-prophets ³, here if any where, the happy life, the

¹ Plato, in speaking of the ascent in corporeal beauty, very properly says, that after passing from *one* to *two*, we must proceed to *all* beautiful bodies: for it is necessary to ascend rapidly from the beauty of body to a higher beauty. Mr. Sydenham, therefore, by changing the word *two* (though used by Plato) for *many* in his translation, has, I conceive, entirely perverted the accurate sense of the present passage.—T.

² In the Greek original there seems here to be a considerable omission, which we have endeavoured to supply as follows: the supplemental words being those included between these marks []; *απο των καλων σωματος [επι τας καλας ψυχας, και απο των καλων ψυχων] επι τα καλα επιτηδεύματα, κ. τ. λ.* Some such words are plainly necessary to make this recapitulation agreeable to the account at large given before.—S.

³ In all editions of the Greek original we here read *Μαντινναι*. This seems to have been the ground

the ultimate object of desire to man : it is to live in beholding this consummate beauty ; the sight of which if ever you attain, it will appear not to be in gold ¹, nor in magnificent attire, nor in beautiful youths or damsels : with such, however, at present, many of you are so entirely taken up, and with the sight of them so absolutely charmed, that you would rejoice to spend your whole lives, were it possible, in the presence of those enchanting objects, without any thoughts of eating or drinking, but feasting your eyes only with their beauty, and living always in the bare sight of it. If this be so, what effect, think you, would the sight of beauty itself have upon a man, were he to see it pure and genuine, not corrupted and stained all over with the mixture of flesh, and colours, and much more of like perishing and fading trash ; but were able to view that divine essence, the beautiful itself, in its own simplicity of form ? Think you, said she, that the life of such a man would be contemptible or mean ; of the man who always directed his eye toward the right object, who looked always at real beauty, and was conversant with it continually ? Perceive you not, said she, that in beholding the beautiful with that eye, with which alone it is possible to behold it, thus, and thus only, could a man ever attain to generate, not the images or semblances of virtue, as not having his intimate commerce with an image or a semblance ; but virtue true, real, and substantial, from the converse and embraces of that which is real and true. Thus begetting true virtue, and bringing her up till she is grown mature, he would become a favourite of

ground on which Harry Stephens and Dr. Davis built their supposition, that the word *μαυτινη*, where it occurred in a prior passage, was a corrupt reading, and should be changed into *Μαυτινη*. But we are inclined to think, that the passage now before us ought to be accommodated to that, rather than to this ; especially since the reading of *μαυτινη* in this place, as well as in that other, is favoured by the Latin translation of Ficinus ; a translation which has always had the authority of a manuscript allowed it, as having been made from a manuscript copy, not consulted by any of the editors, with an exactness almost verbal, and accordingly with very little regard to style, and with no great attention to the sense.—S.

¹ I am sorry to say that nothing can be more absurd than the notes of Mr. Sydenham on this part of the dialogue. In consequence of being perfectly ignorant of the polytheism of the Greeks, he is continually offering violence to the meaning of Plato, in order to make that philosopher join with him in ridiculing the religion of Greece. Hence, according to Mr. Sydenham, Plato, when he says that the beautiful itself is not in gold, nor in beautiful youths or damsels, intends by it to ridicule gilt statues, and the notion that such beautiful forms as those of Ganymede and Hebe were the ornaments of the court of heaven, and the delight of Jupiter himself!—T.

the Gods; and at length would be, if any man ever be, himself one of the immortals.—The doctrines which I have now delivered to you, Phædrus, and to the rest of my friends here, I was taught by Diotima, and am persuaded they are true. Full of this persuasion myself, I endeavour to persuade others, and to show them, that it is difficult for any man to find a better guide or assistant to him than Love, in his way to happiness. And on this account, I further contend, that every man ought to pay all due honours to that patron of human nature. For my own part, I make it my chief study to cultivate the art which Love teaches, and employ myself upon the subjects proper for the exercise of that art with a particular attention; encouraging others to follow my example, and at all times, as well as now, celebrating the power and virtue of Love as far as I am able.—This speech, Phædrus, you may accept, if you are so pleased, for a panegyric in praise of Love: or if you choose to call it by any other name, and to take it in any other sense, be that its right name, and that its proper acceptation.

THE SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES having thus spoken, the rest praised his oration; but Aristophanes endeavoured to say something, because Socrates in his speech had mentioned him. On a sudden, however, a loud knocking was heard at the door of the porch, together with the voices of the intoxicated, and the sound of the pipe. Upon this Agatho said to the servants, See who are there; and if there is any one among them fit for this company, call him in: if not, say that we are no longer drinking. Not long after this the voice of Alcibiades, who was very much intoxicated, was heard in the court, asking where Agatho was, and commanding to be led to him. The flute-player, therefore, and some other of his companions, brought him to Agatho, and stood with him at the doors, he being crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, having many fillets on his head, and exclaiming, All hail, my friends! Either receive as your associate in drinking a man very much intoxicated, or let us depart, crowning Agatho alone, for whose sake we came. For I could not, says he, be with you yesterday; but now I come with fillets on my head, that, from my own, I may crown the head of the wisest and the most beautiful person, if I may be allowed so to speak. Do you, therefore, laugh at

me as one intoxicated? However, though you may laugh, I well know that I speak the truth. But tell me immediately, whether I may come in to him or not; and whether you continue drinking or not? All the company, therefore, was in an uproar, and ordered him to enter and seat himself; which he accordingly did, and called for Agatho. Agatho, therefore, came, led by his companions; and Alcibiades at the same time taking off his fillets, that he might crown him, did not see Socrates, though he sat before him, but sat near Agatho, and between him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him that he might sit. Alcibiades, therefore, being seated, saluted and crowned Agatho: and then Agatho said, Boys, take off the shoes of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the third among us. Alcibiades said, By all means, but asked, Who is this third drinking companion of ours? and at the same time turning himself round saw Socrates; but seeing him, he started, and exclaimed, O Hercules! what is this? Are you again sitting here to ensnare me? as it is usual with you to appear suddenly where I least expected to find you. And now for what purpose are you here? And why do you sit in this place, and not with Aristophanes, or with some other who is ridiculous, and wishes to be so? But you have contrived to sit with the most beautiful of the guests. Then Socrates said to Agatho, See if you can assist me; for the love of this man is not to me a vile thing; since from the time in which I began to love him I am no longer at liberty either to behold or speak to any beautiful person. Or does not he, in consequence of emulating and envying me in amatory affairs, contrive wonderful devices, and also revile and scarcely keep his hands from me? See, therefore, that he does not do this now, but conciliate us; or, if he should attempt violence, assist me: for the mania of this man, and his amatory impulse, very much terrify me.—Alcibiades then said, There is no occasion for any conciliation between you and me. I shall, however, at some other time take vengeance on you for these things. But now, Agatho, says he, give me some of the fillets, that I may crown the wonderful head of this man, that he may not blame me that I have crowned you, but not him who vanquishes all men in discourse, not only lately as you have done, but at all times. And at the same time receiving the fillets, he crowned Socrates, and seated himself. Being seated, therefore, he said, Come, gentlemen, drink, for you appear to me to be sober. This, however, is not to be allowed; for it was agreed that we should drink. I therefore engage to be
your

your leader in drinking, till you have drunk enough. But, Agatho, pass the cup, if there is any large one. Or, rather, there is no occasion for this; but Bring hither, boy, said he, that cooling vessel, which seems to hold more than eight cotylæ¹. Having filled this vessel, he first drank himself, and afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and at the same time said, This stratagem of mine, gentlemen, is nothing to Socrates; for, let him drink as much as any one may command, he will not be in the least intoxicated². Socrates, therefore, the boy having poured out of the large vessel, drank. But then Eryximachus said, How shall we do, Alcibiades? Shall we neither say any thing, nor sing any thing, over the cup; but act exactly like those that are thirsty? Upon this Alcibiades said, Hail, Eryximachus! best of men, sprung from the best and most prudent of fathers. And hail to you, said Eryximachus. But what shall we do? That which you order us; for it is necessary to be obedient to you. For a man who is a physician is equivalent to many others. Command, therefore, whatever you please. Hear then, said Eryximachus. Before you entered, it seemed to us to be proper that every one, beginning at the right hand, should deliver an oration in praise of Love, to the best of his ability. All the rest of us, therefore, have delivered our orations; and it is just, since you have not spoken, but have drunk, that you also should deliver one: and when you have spoken, you may order Socrates to do whatever you please, and he may also order him on his right hand, and in a similar manner with respect to the rest. Eryximachus then said, You speak well, Alcibiades; but it is not equitable that a man intoxicated should engage in a verbal competition with those that are sober. But, O blessed man, has Socrates persuaded you with respect to any

¹ That is, $7\frac{1}{2}$ this of a peck.

² What Plato says near the end of his first book of Laws concerning drinking largely, may serve as a comment on what is here, and in other parts of this oration, related of Socrates: "If some one," says he, "confiding in his own nature, and being properly prepared by meditation, should not refuse to exercise himself with many drinking associates, and should evince, in the necessary consumption of the liquor, a power so transcendent and strong, as neither greatly to err through impudence, nor to be changed through virtue; but towards the end of the liquor should depart without being intoxicated, fearing any human potion the least of all things;—in this case, he would do something well." And to this Clinias, one of the persons of the dialogue, replies: "Certainly. For such a one, by thus acting, would conduct himself with temperance and modesty." Plato, doubtless, alluded to Socrates in writing this.

thing

thing which he just now said? Or do you know that every thing which he said is just the contrary? For if I, he being present, should praise any one, whether God or man, except himself, he would not keep his hands from me. Will you not predict better things? said Socrates. By Neptune, said Alcibiades, say nothing to these things; for I shall praise no other person when you are present. Do so then, said Eryximachus: if you will, praise Socrates. How do you say? said Alcibiades. Does it seem to you fit, O Eryximachus, that I should attack this man, and revenge myself before you? So then, said Socrates, what have you in your mind? Will you praise me for things ridiculous? or what will you do? I shall speak the truth. But see if you permit me. Indeed, said Socrates, I not only permit, but order you to speak the truth. I shall by all means do so, said Alcibiades. But observe, if I should assert any thing that is not true, stop me when you please, and say that in this I have spoken falsely; for I shall not willingly lie in any thing. And do not wonder if, in consequence of recollecting, I narrate different circumstances from different places; for it is not an easy thing for a man in my condition to enumerate readily, and in succession, thy wonderful nature. But, gentlemen, I will thus endeavour to praise Socrates through images. He indeed will, perhaps, suspect that I shall turn my discourse to things ridiculous; but the image will be for the sake of truth, and not for the sake of the ridiculous.

I say, then, that Socrates is most similar to those Silenuses that are seated in the workshops of statuaries, which the artists have fabricated with pipes or flutes in their hands; and which, when they are bisected, appear to contain within statues ¹ of the Gods. And I again say, that he resembles the

¹ Corresponding with this is the following passage from the Scholia of Maximus on the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite: Ενεinoi γαρ (i. e. Γραιci) δια τινας ανδριαντας εποiουν, μητε χειρας, μητε ποδας εχοντας, ους ερμας εκαλουν. εποiουν δε αυτους διακειους θυρας εχοντας, καθαπερ τοιχοπυργητικους. εσωθεν ουν αυτων επιθεταν αγαλματα, αν εσεβον θεων, εξωθεν δε απεκλειον τους ερμας: εφαινοντο ουν ος ερμαι ευτελεις, σταθεν δε τούτων, θεων αυτων καλλωπισμους ειχον. Dionysii Opera, tom. ii. p. 209. i. e. "The Greeks made certain statues, having neither hands nor feet, which they called Hermæ. They fashioned these with avenues, like turrets on a wall. Within these, therefore, they placed the statues of the Gods whom they worshipped; but they closed the Hermæ externally. Hence these Hermæ appeared to be things of no value; but inwardly they contained the ornaments of the Gods themselves."

fatyr Marfyas. That your outward form, therefore, is fimilar to thefe, O Socrates, even you yourfelf will not deny; but that you alfo refemble them in other things, hear in the next place. You are contumelious: or are you not? For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witneffes. Are you not alfo a piper much more wonderful than Marfyas¹? For he charmed men through inftruments, by a power proceeding from the mouth; and he alfo accomplifhes this even now, when any one ufes that modulation. For I call the modulation of Olympus² that of Marfyas, becaufe he inftructed Olympus in it. That harmony, therefore, whether it is produced by a good piper, or by a bad female player on the pipe, alone detains the hearers, and manifefts, becaufe it is divine, thofe that ftand in need³ of the Gods and the myfteries; but you in this refpect only differ from that harmony, that you effect this very fame thing by mere words without inftruments. We, therefore, when we hear fome other perfon relating the difcourfe of another, though he that relates it fhould be a very good rhetorician, yet we pay, as I may fay, no attention to it; but when any one hears you, or another perfon, relating your difcourfes, though he that repeats them fhould be a bad fpeaker, and whether it be a woman, or a man, or a lad, that is the auditor, we are aftonifhed and poffeffed. I therefore, my friends, unlefs I fhould appear to be very much intoxicated, will tell you upon oath in what manner I have been affected by the difcourfes of this man, and how I am even now affected.

¹ A celebrated piper of Celæne in Phrygia. He was fo skilful in playing on the flute, that he is generally confidered as the inventor of it. It is fabled of him, that he challenged Apollo to a trial of his skill as a mufician; and, being vanquifhed, the God flayed him alive.

² Olympus was both a poet and a mufician: he was the difciple of Marfyas, and flourifhed before the Trojan war.

³ Proclus, in his MS. Commentary on the Firft Alcibiades, where he makes a divifion of mufical inftruments, obferves, that thofe of an exciting nature were moft adapted to enthuftaftic energy. Hence, fays he, in the myfteries, and in the greateft of myftic facrifices, the pipe is ufeful; for they employ its motive power in order to excite the dianoëtic part to divinity. *Τὰ δὲ κινητικά πρὸς ἐνθουσιαστικὰ οἰκειότατα· διὸ δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μυστηρίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς χρῆσιμος αὐλὸς. χρῶνται γὰρ αὐτοὺ τῷ κινητικῷ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἐγερσιν ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον.* Such, therefore, as were excited by the melody of the pipe in a very fmall degree, may be fuppofed to be implied by thofe that ftand in need of the Gods and myfteries; as the other machinery of the myfteries, in conjunction with the pipe, would neceffarily produce that excitation which the pipe alone was, in fuch as thefe, incapable of effecting.

For

For when I hear him, my heart leaps much more than that of those who celebrate the mysteries of the Corybantes; and my tears flow from his discourses. I also see many others affected in the same manner. But when I hear Pericles, and other good rhetoricians, I think, indeed, that they speak well, but I suffer nothing of this kind; nor is my soul agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if it were in a servile condition. But by this Marfyas I am often so affected, that it appears to me I ought not to live while I lead such a life as I do. You will not, Socrates, say that these things are not true. And even now I perceive that, if I were willing to listen to him, I could not bear it, but should be affected in the very same manner. For he would compel me to acknowledge, that, being yet deficient in many things, I neglect myself, but attend to the affairs of the Athenians¹. By violence, therefore, restraining my ears, I depart from him, flying, as it were, from the Syrens, lest I should sit with him till I became old. From him alone likewise, of all men, I suffer that which no one would think to be in me, to be ashamed of something. But I am abashed before him alone. For I am conscious that I am unable to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to be done; but when I depart from him, I am vanquished by the honour which I receive from the multitude. I therefore avoid, and fly from him; and when I see him I am ashamed, in consequence of what I had consented to do. And often, indeed, it would be a pleasure to me no longer to see him among men: and yet again, if this should happen, I well know that I should be in a much greater degree afflicted; so that I am ignorant in what manner I should use this man. And from the modulations, indeed, of this satyr, both I and many others have suffered such-like things.

But hear from me how much he resembles such things as I shall assimilate him to, and what a wonderful power he possesses. For be well assured of this, that no one of you knows him; but I will manifest him, since I have begun to speak. You see then that he is disposed in a very amatory manner towards beautiful things; and that he is always conversant with and astonished about these. And again, he knows all things, and yet knows nothing²; so that this figure of him is very Silenical; for he is externally invested

¹ See the First Alcibiades.

² Very few have penetrated the profound meaning of Socrates when he said that he knew nothing.

invested with it, like a carved Silenus. But when he is opened inwardly, would you think, O my fellow guests, how replete he is with temperance? Know also, that neither if any one is beautiful, does he pay any attention to his beauty, but despises it far beyond what you would suppose; nor does he esteem any one for being rich; or for possessing any other honour from the things which are considered as blessed by the multitude. But he thinks that all these possessions are of no worth, and that we are nothing. He also passes the whole of his life among men in irony and jest; but when he is serious and is opened, I know not whether any one of you has seen the images which are within. I however once saw them, and they appeared to me to be so divine, golden, all-beautiful and wonderful, that I was determined to act in every respect conformably to the advice of Socrates. Thinking too that he paid great attention to my beauty, I considered this as my gain, and as a circumstance wonderfully fortunate, as I conceived that by gratifying Socrates I should hear from him all that he knew. For I formed a great opinion of my beauty, and thought it admirable. Thus conceiving, as prior to this I had never been with him alone without an attendant, I then dismissed my attendant, and remained with him alone: for it is necessary to narrate every thing to you truly.

But now attend to me; and if I lie, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was with him, O my fellow guests, I alone with him alone, and expected that he would immediately speak to me in such a manner as lovers are accustomed to speak to the objects of their love in solitude; and I was delighted with the expectation. Nothing however of this kind took place; but he discoursed with me as usual till evening, and then departed. After this, I incited him to engage with me in gymnastic exercises, expecting that I should effect something by this mean. We engaged, therefore, in these exercises, and often wrestled together, no one being present. But what occasion is there to say more? I did not in the least accomplish my purpose. Not succeeding, therefore, in this in any respect, it appeared to me that I should attack the man more strenuously, since it was my determination to ensnare him. Hear now then what the thing was. I invited him to sup

thing. But he doubtless intended to signify by this the nothingness of human compared with divine knowledge. For to *know* that this is the true condition of human knowledge, it is necessary to know previously all the natures superior to man.

with

with me, in reality forming the same stratagem as a lover would for the objects of his love. He did not readily accept my invitation: however, some time after he accepted it. But when he came, as soon as he had supped, he wished to depart; and then I being ashamed consented to his going away. Again however attacking him, after supper, I discoursed with him a considerable part of the night; and when he again wished to depart, observing that it was late, I compelled him to stay. He reposed, therefore, in a bed next to mine, and in which he had supped; and no other person besides us slept in the house. Thus far then, what I have said is well, and might have been said to any one; but you must not hear me narrate what follows without first admitting the proverb, that wine without childhood ¹ and with childhood is true. Besides, to leave in obscurity the proud deed of Socrates appears to me unjust in one who undertakes to praise him. To which I may add, that I am affected in the same manner as he is who is bitten by a viper: for they say he is not willing to tell his feelings except to those that are in a similar condition, as they alone can know them, and will pardon every thing which he may dare to do and say through the pain. I, therefore, have been bit by that which gives more pain, and which indeed causes the most acute of all pains. For those who have the heart or soul, or whatever else it may be proper to call it, bit and wounded by philosophic discourses, find the pain to be much more acute than that produced by the bite of the viper, and are impelled by it to do and say any thing; when such discourses are received in a soul juvenile and not ignoble. Again, therefore, looking at Phædrus, Agatho, Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes, and, in short, Socrates, and the rest of the company; Since all of you, said he, partake with me of the mania and Bacchic fury of philosophy, on this account let all hear me. For you will pardon what I then did, and what I now say. But let the servants, or any other profane ² and rustic person that may be present, close their ears with mighty gates.

¹ Meaning that wine makes both children and others speak the truth.

² Plato when he wrote this had doubtless that Orphic verse in his mind,

Φηξομαι οἷς θεμις ἐστὶ, θυρας δ' ἐπιθεσθαι βίβηλοι.

i. e. "I speak to those to whom it is lawful; shut your gates, ye profane." And Proclus informs

gates. When, therefore, the lamp was extinguished, and the servants had left the room, it appeared to me requisite to employ no dissimulation towards him, but freely to tell him my sentiments. And I said, moving him, Socrates, are you asleep? Not yet, he replied. Do you know then, what I conceive? About what particularly? said he. You appear to me, I replied, to be the only lover worthy of me, though you are not forward in courting me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it would be very stupid, not to gratify you in this particular, and in any thing else of which you may be in want, whether it be my property, or my friends: for nothing is to me more honourable than to become the best of men. But I think that no one can give me more assistance in this than you. And I should much more fear the reprehensions of the wife, in not gratifying such a man, than I should fear the many and the unwise by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard me, said, very ironically, and very much after his usual manner, O beloved Alcibiades, you appear in reality to be no vile person, if what you say concerning me is true, and there is in me a certain power, through which you can be made better, and if also you perceive in me an immense beauty, and very much excelling the elegance of your form. If, therefore, perceiving this, you endeavour to have communion with me, and to change beauty for beauty, you strive to possess much more than I do; for instead of the opinion you endeavour to obtain the truth of beauty, and conceive that you shall in reality exchange brags for gold. But, O blessed youth, consider more maturely, nor let me be concealed from you, who am nothing. For then indeed the
fight

us in his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades, that there was an inscription in the Eleusinian grove forbidding the uninitiated to enter into the adyta or secret recesses of the temple. *Τοις γὰρ εἰς τὸ τῶν Ἐλευσινίων τεμενὸς εἰσιόντιν, εἰρηλὸν τὸ πρόγραμμα μὴ χωρεῖν εἰσὼ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀμνητοῖς οὖσι καὶ ἀτέλειστοις.*

Alcibiades, therefore, as he is about to relate a circumstance which, considered independently of the design with which it is mentioned, is indecent, very properly forbids the profane to be auditors of it. For in this he follows the mysteries, in which, as I have shown in my Dissertation on them, p. 123, the indecent was introduced. In the mysteries too, as exhibitions of this kind were designed to free the initiated from licentious passions by gratifying the fight, and at the same time vanquishing desire through the awful sanctity with which these rites were accompanied, so what is now related by Alcibiades is introduced by Plato, in order to liberate his countrymen from an unnatural vice. So that it benefits the reader at the same time that it exalts the character

fight of the dianoëtic power begins to perceive acutely, when that of the eye loses its acme. You, however, are as yet at a distance from these things. Having heard him, I replied, With respect to myself the particulars are such as I have told you, nor have I said any thing different from what I conceive; but do you advise in such a manner as you may think best both for you and me. This, said he, you say well: for in future let us, consulting together, do that which appears to be best for us, both about these and other particulars. Having heard and replied to these things, and ceasing to speak, as if I had thought that he was wounded with a dart, I rose, and would not suffer him to speak any more; and wrapping myself round with this old garment (for it was winter), I reclined in it, embracing in my arms this truly divine and wonderful man, and thus lay the whole night. And again, Socrates, neither will you say that I have asserted these things falsely. But though I acted in this manner, yet he was victorious, and despised, ridiculed, and even insulted my beauty. And as, O my fellow guests, you are judges of the haughtiness of Socrates, I call the Gods and Goddesses to witness, that I rose from Socrates no otherwise than if I had slept with my father, or my elder brother.

What then do you suppose were my thoughts after this, conceiving that I had been despised, but admiring the nature, the temperance and fortitude of this man? conceiving that I had met with such a man for prudence and fortitude, as I should never have expected to find? Hence I could not be in any respect angry with him, nor could I abandon his conversation, nor discover any means of alluring him. For I well knew that it is much more difficult to subdue him by money, than it was to vanquish Ajax by the

character of Socrates. Admirably, therefore, is it observed by Jamblichus, (De Myst. p. 22.) "that as in comedies and tragedies, on beholding the passions of others we repress our own, render them moderate, and are purified from them; in like manner in the mysteries, by seeing and hearing things indecent, we are liberated from the injury with which the performance of them is attended." He adds, "Things of this kind, therefore, are introduced for the sake of healing our soul, moderating the maladies which adhere to it through generation, and freeing it from its bonds; and hence Heraclitus very properly called them *remedies*. *Δια τούτο ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλοτρία πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάθη, καὶ μετρωτέρᾳ ἀπεργαζόμεθα, καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν· ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς, θεάμασι τίσι καὶ ἀκυσμασι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, ἀπολυόμεθα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργῶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν συμπίπτουσης βλάβης. Θεραπείας οὖν ἵνεκα τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς, καὶ μετριότητος τῶν διὰ τὴν γένεσιν προσφυόμενων αὐτῇ κακῶν, λύσεις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν, καὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς χάριν, τὰ τοιαῦτα προσάγεται· καὶ διὰ τούτα ἀκινῆτος αὐτὰ ἀνεὰ Ἡρακλείτης προσηπεν.*

sword; and that by which alone I thought he might be ensnared deceived me. Hence I wandered about dubious, and more enslaved by this man than any one by any other. All these things, therefore, were at that time effected by me. After this, he was my associate and my daily guest in the military expedition against Potidæa. And here, in the first place, he not only surpassed me, but all others, in labours. Hence, when we were compelled through a deficiency of provisions to fast, as is sometimes the case in armies, the rest were nothing to him with respect to endurance. Again, in feasts at the military table, he alone was the only person that appeared to enjoy them; and though he was unwilling to drink, yet when compelled he vanquished all the rest. And what is the most wonderful of all, no one ever saw Socrates intoxicated. However, it seems to me that a confutation of this will immediately follow¹. But with respect to endurance in the severity of the winter (for the winter there is very severe), he performed wonders; and once, the cold being so dreadful that no one could venture out of his tent, or, if he did venture, he was very abundantly clothed, and had his feet bound and wrapt in wool and sheep-skins, Socrates then went out with just the same clothing as before this he was accustomed to wear. He likewise marched through the ice without shoes, more easily than others with shoes. But the soldiers beheld him as one who despised them. And thus much for these particulars.

Again, what this strenuous man did and endured in that army, it is worth while to hear. For thinking deeply about something one morning, he stood considering it; and though he was not able to discover what he was investigating, he did not desist, but stood exploring. It was now too mid-day, and the soldiers perceived him, and wondering, said one to the other, that Socrates had stood from the morning cogitating². At length some of the

Ionian

¹ Alcibiades says this as being intoxicated himself.

² Socrates is not the only instance of this dominion of the rational soul over the body, but a similar abstraction is related of other philosophers. It is said of Xenocrates, the disciple of Plato, that he was for one hour every day abstracted from body. Archimedes was so intent on geometrical figures that he was insensible to the capture of his country, and to the enemy standing before him. Plotinus, as his disciple Porphyry informs us, was often so abstracted from body, as to be united by an ineffable energy with the highest God; and this also once happened to Porphyry. Heraclitus and Democritus, in order to obtain this abstraction in perfection, withdrew into solitude.

Ionian soldiers when it was evening, having supped (for it was then summer), laid themselves down on the bare ground, that they might observe whether he continued in the same posture through the night. But he stood till it was morning and the sun rose; after which he departed, having first adored the sun. If you are also willing, hear how he conducted himself in battle; for it is but just to relate this. For in that engagement in which the commanders of the army conferred on me those rewards which are usually given to such as have conducted themselves best in battle, no other man saved me than Socrates; for, as I was wounded, he was not willing to leave me, but preserved both my arms and me. And I indeed, O Socrates, at that time urged the commanders to give you the rewards which are bestowed on the most valiant; and for saying this, you neither blame me, nor accuse me of speaking falsely. The commanders, however, looking to my dignity, wished to give me those rewards, you also being more desirous that I should receive them than yourself.

Further still, O fellow guests, it was well worth while to behold Socrates when our army fled from Delium; for I happened to be in that battle among the cavalry, but Socrates was among the foot. The ranks, therefore, being broken, he and I aches retreated; and I meeting with and seeing the troops, immediately exhorted them to take courage, and said that I would not abandon them. Here then I could see Socrates better than at Potidæa; for I was in less fear, because I was on horseback. In the first place, therefore, he greatly surpassed Laches in prudent caution; and, in the next place, he appeared to me, O Aristophanes, to carry himself loftily, as you also say he does here, and darting his eye around calmly to survey both friends and enemies; so that it was manifest to every one, and even to him that was at a considerable distance, that he who touched this man

tude. Hence the former of these through intense study was of a sorrowful aspect; and the latter, when he began to recall his intellect from the senses, and was impeded by his eyes, blinded himself. In short, all those who have made great discoveries in the regions of science have accomplished this by retiring from body into the sublime tower of intellect. Hence Plato says in the *Phædrus*, that the intellects of philosophers especially recover the wings of the soul, because they are always attentive to divine concerns; and on this account he at one time calls such philosophers divine, and at another sons of the Gods. Hence too Aristotle says, in his *Problems*, that all who have excelled in any art have been melancholy, whether they were born such, or whether they became such by continued meditation.

would

would be very strenuously resisted. Hence both he and his companion retreated with security; for scarcely was any one attacked who thus conducted himself in the battle, but they pursued those that fled rapidly and in disorder.

There are many other things, indeed, in which Socrates is admirable, and for which he might be praised. And in other pursuits, others perhaps may merit the same praise; but to resemble no man, neither of the antients nor the moderns, this is a circumstance worthy of all wonder. For such as Achilles was, such also it may be conjectured was Brasidas¹ and others: and again, such as Pericles was, such also it may be said were Antenor and Nestor. And there are likewise others that after the same manner may be compared with others. But such a prodigy is this man, both as to himself and his discourses, that no one by searching will find any man that nearly resembles him, neither among those of the present age nor among the antients. He can, therefore, only be said to resemble, both in himself and his discourses, those things to which I have compared him, viz. no one among men, but the Silenuses and Satyrs. For I omitted to mention this before, that his discourses are most similar to the Silenuses when opened. For the discourses of Socrates, to him who is willing to hear them, will at first appear to be perfectly ridiculous; since the nouns and verbs which he employs externally enfold a certain gift of a reviling Satyr. For he speaks of asses and their burthens, of copper-smiths, shoe-makers and tanners, and he always appears to say the same things through the same; so that every unskilful and ignorant man will ridicule his words. But he who beholds his discourses when opened, and penetrates into their depth, will, in the first place, find that they alone of all other discourses contain intellect within them; and, in the next place, that they are most divine, are replete with numerous images of virtue, and have a very ample extent, or rather extend themselves to every thing which it is fit he should consider who intends to become a truly worthy man. These then are the things, my fellow guests, for which I praise and also for which I blame Socrates. I have likewise inserted in them the injuries which he has done me. Nor has he alone acted in this manner towards me, but also towards Charmides the son of Glaucō, Euthydemus the

¹ Brasidas was a famous Spartan general, who, after many great victories obtained over Athens and other Grecian states, died of a wound at Amphipolis, which Cleon the Athenian had besieged.

son of Diocles, and very many others; for he has deceived these, as if he had been their lover, when at the same time he rather became the beloved object himself. Hence, I caution you, O Agatho, not to be deceived by this man, but, knowing what I have suffered, take care, and do not, as the proverb says of fools, become wise by experience.

Aristodemus related, that when Alcibiades had thus spoken, the freedom of his speech excited a general laugh, because he appeared to have for Socrates an amatory regard. Socrates, therefore, said, You seem to me, O Alcibiades, to be sober; for, otherwise, you would not have attempted in so elegant and circuitous a manner to conceal that for the sake of which you have said all these things, nor would you have asserted that which, as if foreign from the purpose, you have added at the end; as if the intention of all that you have said was not to separate me and Agatho. For you think that I ought to love you and no other, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no one besides. Neither is this Satyric and Silenic drama of yours concealed from, but is perfectly evident to, us. But, dear Agatho, may none of these his contrivances succeed! and let us endeavour that nothing may separate you and me. To this Agatho replied, Indeed, Socrates, you appear to speak the truth; and I infer that he fits between you and me, that he may separate us. He will, however, derive no advantage from this; for I will come and sit next to you. By all means, said Socrates, come hither, and sit below me. O Jupiter! Alcibiades exclaimed, how much do I suffer from this man! He thinks it is necessary to surpass me in every thing; but, O wonderful man, suffer Agatho, if no one else, to sit between us. It is impossible, said Socrates: for you have praised me, and it is necessary that I should now praise him sitting at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines under you, he certainly will not again praise me before he has been praised by me. But cease, O dæmoniacal man, and do not envy my praise of the lad; for I very much desire to pass an encomium on him. Excellent! excellent! said Agatho to Alcibiades: there is no reason why I should stay here, but there is every reason that I should change my seat, that I may be praised by Socrates. These things, said Alcibiades, are usual: when Socrates is present, it is impossible for any other to share the favours of the beautiful. And now observe how easily, and with what persuasive language, he draws this youth to him. After this Agatho rose, that he might sit by Socrates: but on a sud-

den many revellers came to the gates, and, finding them open, in consequence of some one having gone out, they entered and seated themselves. Hence, all things were full of tumult; and as there was no longer any order observed, every one was compelled to drink a great quantity of wine. Aristodemus therefore said, that Eryximachus and Phædrus, and some others, went home to take some sleep; but that he slept there very abundantly, the nights being long, and rose about daybreak, the cocks then crowing. When, therefore, he had risen, he saw that some of the guests were asleep, and that others had departed; but that Agatho, Aristophanes, and Socrates, were the only persons awake, and were drinking to the right hand out of a great bowl. He also added, that Socrates was discoursing with them; but that he did not recollect what the discourse was, because he was not present at the beginning of it, as he was then asleep. However, the sum of it, he said, was this, that Socrates compelled them to acknowledge that it was the province of the same person to compose comedy and tragedy; and that he who was by art a tragic, was also a comic poet. When they had assented to these things by compulsion, and not very readily, Aristodemus said, they fell asleep; and that Aristophanes fell asleep first, and afterwards, it being now day, Agatho; but that Socrates, they being asleep, rising, went out, he as usual following him. And lastly, that Socrates went to the Lyceum, and, having washed himself as at another time, conversed there the whole day, and in the evening went home to rest,

THE END OF THE BANQUET.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PARMENIDES

AND

PHÆDRUS.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PARMENIDES.

FROM THE MS. COMMENTARY * OF PROCLUS ON THAT DIALOGUE.

THE beginning of this admirable Commentary, which is dedicated to Asclepiodotus the physician, is as follows:—"I beseech all the Gods and Goddesses to lead my intellect to the proposed theory, and, enkindling in me the splendid light of truth, to expand my dianoëtic power to the science of beings, to open the gates of my soul to the reception of the divine narration of Plato, and, conducting, as to a port, my knowledge to the most splendid of being, to liberate me from an abundance of false wisdom, and the wandering about non-beings, by a more intellectual converse with real beings, through which alone the eye of the soul is nourished and watered, as Socrates says in the *Phædrus*. And may the intelligible Gods impart to me a perfect intellect; the intellectual, an anagogic power; the supermundane rulers, an energy indissoluble and liberated from material knowledge; the governors of the world, a winged life;

* Though I have already cited largely from this admirable Commentary, yet I rejoice in the opportunity which is afforded me of making the following additions from it. There is not, perhaps, among the writings of the antients any one which, on the whole, is so well calculated to lead the lover of wisdom gradually to a knowledge of the most sublime, arduous, and felicitous doctrines of the philosophy of Plato. Inestimably great are the benefits which I have derived from the study of it; and it is my earnest wish that the reader of these and the preceding extracts may be able to strengthen this testimony of its excellence by his own experience. For, if I may be allowed to prophesy, this Work, if not at present, will at some future period be the source of the greatest good to mankind, and will be admired and studied as it deserves, while the duration of writings of a different kind, though now so popular, will, when compared with the extent of this, be fleeting like that of morning dreams.

the

the angelic choirs, a true unfolding into light of divine concerns; beneficent dæmons, a plenitude of inspiration from the Gods; and heroes, a magnanimity permanently venerable and elevated! And, in short, may all the divine genera perfectly prepare me for the participation of the most inspective and mystic theory which Plato unfolds to us in the *Parmenides*, with a profundity adapted to the things themselves! And mayest thou*, who art truly agitated with divine fury, in conjunction with Plato, who wert my associate in the restoration of divine truth, my leader in this theory, and the true hierophant of these divine doctrines, fill me with thy most pure intellectual conceptions! For, with respect to this type of philosophy, I should say, that it came to men for the benefit of terrestrial souls; that it might be instead of statues, instead of temples, instead of the whole of sacred institutions, and the leader of safety both to the men that now are, and to those that shall exist hereafter†.—Εὐχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πασαις, ποδηγήσασθαι μου τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὴν προκειμένην θεωρίαν, καὶ φῶς ἐν ἐμοὶ στίλβον τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναψήσαντας ἀναπλωσθαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμην, ἀνοίξαίτε τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐμῆς πύλας εἰς ὑπόδοχὴν τῆς ἐνθεοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑφήγησews, καὶ ὀρμίσαντας μου τὴν γνῶσιν εἰς τὸ φανότατον τοῦ ὄντος, παύσαιμὲ τῆς πολλῆς δόξοσοφίας, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα πλάνης, τὴ περὶ τὰ ὄντα νοερωτάτῃ διατριβῇ, παρ' ᾧ μόνον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα τρέφεται τε καὶ ἀρδεύεται καθάπερ φησὶν ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαῖδρῳ Σωκράτης· ἐνδύναται τε μοι, νοῦν μὲν τέλει, τοῖς νοητοῖς θεοῖς· δύναμιν δὲ ἀναγωγῶν, τοῖς νοεροῖς· ἐνεργεῖαν δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀφειμένην τῶν ὑλικῶν γνῶσεων, τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὄντων ὅλων ἡγεμοναῖς· ζῶν δὲ ἐπετερωμένην, τοῖς τὸν κόσμον λαχόνταῖς· ἐκφάνσιν δὲ τῶν θεῶν ἀληθῆν, τοῖς ἀγγελικοῖς χοροῖς· ἀποπλήρωσιν δὲ τῆς παρὰ θεῶν ἐπινοίας, τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δαιμοναῖς· μεγαλοφρονα δὲ καὶ σεμνὴν καὶ ὑψηλὴν κατὰ στάσιν, τοῖς ἥρωσι· πάντα δὲ ἀπλῶς θεῖα γενεή, παρὰ σκευὴν ἐνθῆναι μοι τέλει εἰς τὴν μετουσίαν τῆς ἐποπτικωτάτης τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ μυστικωτάτης θεωρίας, ἣν ἐκφαίνει μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ *Παρμενίδῃ* μετὰ τῆς προσηκουσῆς τοῖς πράγμασι βαθυτέτος· ἀνηπλώσῃ δὲ ταῖς ἐαυτοῦ καθαρωτάταις ἐπιστολαῖς ὁ τῷ Πλάτῳ μὲν συβακχεύσας ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ ὁμοστίος καταστὰς (lege ὁμοστοιχῶς κατασταστῆς) τῆς θείας ἀληθείας, τῆς δὲ θεωρίας ἡμῖν γενομένης ταύτης ἡγεμῶν, καὶ τῶν θεῶν

* Proclus here invokes his preceptor Syrianus; by which it appears that this Commentary was written after the death of that great philosopher.

† This concluding sentence forms the motto to this translation of Plato's works.

τουτων λογων ουτως ἱεροφαντης. ὃν ἐγὼ φαῖναι ἀν φιλοσοφίας τυπον εἰς ἀνθρώπους ελθεῖν ἐπ' εὐεργεσία των τῆδε ψυχων, ἀντι των ἀγαλματιων, ἀντι των ἱερων, ἀντι της ὅλης ἀγιστείας αὐτης, καὶ σωτηρίας ἀρχηγον τοῖς γε νυν οὖσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς εἰσαυθὶς γενησομένοις.

Page 37. *When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, &c.*

The Italic philosophers, says Proclus, being conversant with the speculation of the forms of beings, concerned themselves but little with the philosophy of objects of opinion; but those of Ionia paid little attention to the theory of intelligibles, but minutely considered nature, and the works of nature. Socrates and Plato, however, participating of both these philosophies, gave perfection to the subordinate, and unfolded the more elevated. This, indeed, Socrates manifests in the Phædo, when he says, that formerly he was a lover of physiology, but that afterwards he recurred to forms and the divine causes of beings. Hence, that which they demonstrate in their philosophy, by giving perfection both to the Ionic and Italic doctrines, this Plato appears to me to have indicated by the present circumstance; and what is wonderful in it, and sufficiently explanatory of the things which are here discussed, those from Ionia come to Athens, that they may partake of more perfect dogmas: but those from Athens do not for the same reason go to Italy, that they may partake of the Italic philosophy; but, on the contrary, being at Athens, they there communicate their proper dogmas. Thus, also, those who are able to look to beings themselves, will perceive that things first are every where present with unimpeded energy, as far as to the last of things, through such as are middles; that such as are last are perfected through middles; and that middles receive into themselves that which is imparted by first natures, but move and convert to themselves such as are last. Let, therefore, Ionia be a symbol of nature; but Italy of an intellectual essence; and Athens of that which has a middle subsistence, through which, to excited souls, there is an ascent from nature to intellect. This, therefore, Cephalus immediately says in the Introduction, that coming from Clazomenia to Athens for the sake of hearing the discourses of Parmenides, he met in the forum with Adimantus and Glauco, and through these becoming acquainted with Antiphon, heard the discourses, which he related as he had learnt them from Pythodorus, who had heard them from Parmenides. Through this also it is indicated, that

that he who is to be led back to an intelligible essence ought, in the first place, to be excited from body, and to fly from a communion with it: for the body is the habitation of the soul. In the next place, that he should connect himself with the allotment of Minerva among wholes, through the participation of which allotment, it is no longer wonderful that the soul should become a spectator of first entities, and through these arrive at the inspection of the unities of beings. But if you are not only willing to speak in this manner, but still more universally, you may say, that the Gods who govern nature, and the all-various powers of material forms, and who also contain the whole of indivisible and sensible reasons, are suspended from the first cause, and, being illuminated by Minerva, are converted to the intellectual region, and hastily withdraw themselves from the mundane system; for this also is said to be the habitation of the Gods which it contains. By this conversion, also, they are led to the united multitude of beings, and there, through divine power, proceed to the monad of all multitude. For what is here said by Plato affords an image of these things to those that are not entirely unacquainted with such-like speculations. For every physical form is worse than multitude; but the multitude above this is, indeed, as it is said to be, multitude, but also participates of a coordinate unity. But prior to this is the exempt one, to which there is an ascent through the duad as a medium. The departure, therefore, from Clazomenia evinces an energy exempt from physical reasons; but the meeting with Adimantus and Glauco in the forum indicates the dominion of the duad in united multitude; and the association with Antiphon through these, the returning to their unity, by which they derive perfection, and a plenitude of divine goods. For in every order of Gods there is a monad, and the dominion of the duad, and the whole of distributed is conjoined with the monad, through united multitude, and the duad it contains, which is the mother, and, as it were, root of this multitude.

These things, as I have said, afford an image of the Gods themselves, and will present to those who are willing to follow the analogy, an abundance of conception. For you may observe that the Clazomenians are many, but that Adimantus and Glauco are two; and through these two the many communicate with Antiphon, who is one. And it is evident that every where the multiplied enjoys the monad through the duad; that things secondary are always suspended from the natures prior to them; and that

all

all are extended to the one Parmenidean intellect. For the Clazomenians are in want of Adimantus and Glauco; these lead the Clazomenians to Antiphon; Antiphon fills them with the discourses of Pythodorus; and Pythodorus is the messenger of the conversation of Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. These two again are united to Parmenides, and wish to adhere to his doctrine; Socrates, indeed, looking to the multitude of forms, but Zeno uniting this multitude, and hastening to *the one* itself. We may also contemplate their order as follows:—Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates, preserve an image of the whole of the divine order; but those that follow are assimilated to the secondary genera. And Pythodorus, indeed, may be ranked according to the summit of dæmons, announcing and transmitting to secondary such things as proceed from primary natures. For both these pertain to this summit; the one as to that which is filled, the other as to that which fills. But Antiphon may be ranked according to the dæmoniacal order itself. For this order uses appetite and impulses, and, in short, assumes a secondary life. Hence, he is represented as skilled in the equestrian art. He, therefore, is filled from those that are first, but fills those after him with an anagogic conversation from more elevated natures. But the Clazomenians are analogous to souls conversant with generation, who require, indeed, the assistance of proximate dæmons, but all of them aspire after that which is on high, and the participation of divine discourse. Hence, leaving their habitation the body, they proceed from ignorance to intellectual prudence, for this is Athens, and, in the first place, are united to the dæmons above them, to whom the forum and the duad pertain, and an ascent through the duad to the monad. But, in the second place, they are extended through these to certain angels and Gods: for all association and converse between men and Gods, both when asleep and when awake, are through dæmons; as Diotima says in *The Banquet*. Again, therefore, according to another mode, we may transfer the analogy from things to persons: and it is necessary, prior to the mystic theory of things themselves, to exercise our dianoëtic power in these as in images. For the men also immediately meeting with Adimantus and Glauco, the brothers of Antiphon, on their coming to Athens, possess an image of another theological conception, that ascending souls derive much assistance from good fortune, which co-arranges them with such things as are proper, and where, and in such a manner as is proper; and also that we

do not alone require the gifts of good fortune in externals, but in the anagogic energies of the soul. Hence Socrates says in the *Phædrus* that mania about the objects of love is given to the lover by the Gods with the greatest good fortune. And deducing souls from the intelligible, he says that different souls descend into bodies with different fortunes. Prior to bodies, therefore, they experience the gifts of fortune, and are governed by it, and led to that which is adapted to their nature. Very properly, therefore, are returning souls here said to be conjoined with the causes which give perfection to them through a certain fortune. And you may again see how here also the order of the persons is preserved: for they meet with Adimantus and Glauco. But that of these men Glauco was the more perfect, Socrates manifests in *The Republic*; for he there says, that he always admired the nature of Glauco. So that, if Adimantus was the inferior, he very properly says that they met with Adimantus and Glauco: for the imperfect is first connected with the more imperfect, and through these partakes of the more perfect.

The very first sentence also manifests the character of the dialogue; for it is void of the superfluous, is accurate and pure. And indeed concise, pure, and spontaneous language is adapted to intellectual projections. Nor does Plato alone preserve this propriety of diction, but Parmenides also in his poetry, though the poetic form of composition is accustomed to use metaphors, figures, and tropes; but at the same time he embraces the unadorned, the simple, and the pure form of enunciation. This is evident from such like expressions, as "being approaches to being" (*εὖν γὰρ εὖντι πελαζει*); and again, "since they now subsist together" (*ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ*); likewise, "it is not fit that there should be any thing, either greater or smaller;" (*οὔτε τι μείζον, οὔτε τι βαιότερον πέλει χρεὼν ἐστὶ*;) and every thing else of this kind. So that it rather appears to be prose than poetical language. It is evident, therefore, in this Introduction of Plato, first, that he has chosen a rapid form of diction; for this is adapted to the things themselves. In the second place, he has attended to conciseness, together with the figure of the impetuous, which entirely binds together the diction, and rapidly gives completion to the conception. And, in the third place, he proceeds through the most necessary words, cutting off all such particulars from the narration, as some one for the sake of ornament might sophistically add.

P. 38. *And upon our begging him to relate the discourses, &c.*

The request of the Clazomenians represents the genuine adherence of souls to their proper leaders. For they can no otherwise obtain a union and revolve in conjunction with the Gods, than through these dæmons. But a knowledge of them, in the first place, precedes the request: for how can they make a request of those of whose nature they are ignorant, and also of the benefits of which they are the leaders? In the next place, a desire of the participation of them succeeds. For it is necessary to aspire after the things of which we are in want, since without aspiring we shall not be in the order of those that are indigent. But the unwillingness of Antiphon to comply, presents us with an image of the occult and ineffable power of divine causes. For a divine nature, wherever it may be, is with difficulty apprehended and known, and is scarcely unfolded to souls, even when they genuinely receive its participation, and a communion with it. For they require to be accustomed to the divine splendour which divine dæmons exhibit to souls extended to them, and hastening through them to perceive every thing divine. But to souls firmly and stably receiving them, these dæmons expand and unfold divine truth. And this is the narration: an expanding and unfolding of things concealed, and an anagogic perfection imparted to souls from divine dæmons.

P. 38. *Antiphon, therefore, said that Pythodorus related, &c.*

It appears to me, says Proclus, that the reduction of all the persons to Parmenides, indicates much of the truth of the things themselves. For all the multitude and all the orders of beings are united about their divine cause. And this is indicated to the more sagacious, by saying in succession, Antiphon, Pythodorus, Zeno, Parmenides. The mention also of the Panathenæa contributes to the whole design of the dialogue: for we learn from history, that in the celebration of this festival the Athenians dwelt together. Again, therefore, here also the multitude is united and coarranged about the Goddess who presides over the city. But this was the end of the dialogue, to suspend all things from *the one*, and clearly to show that every thing is thence derived. The assertion too, that these men did not come to Athens, but to the Panathenæa, is no small praise. They came, therefore, for the sake of the Goddess and the festival,

and not for ostentation, nor to philosophize in a popular way, which is rejected by the Pythagoreans. For a thing of this kind is the business of a sophist, and of men intent on gain.

P. 38. *That Parmenides was very much advanced in years, &c.*

An elderly man among the Greeks was limited by seventy years. Parmenides, therefore, was very elderly. But he was called an old man who passed beyond this decad. The countenance also of Parmenides was graceful through his life: for a certain elegance and venerableness descends from the soul in worthy men, and extends as far as to the body. These things, however, may be much more perfectly surveyed in the soul itself. Thus, for instance, the soul possesses the elderly, from being full of intellect and science. For it is usual to call intellectual disciplines, and those which embrace the whole of nature, hoary, as it is evident from the *Timæus*, in which those souls are called juvenile with whom there is no hoary discipline, viz. who do not according to their summit participate of intellectual light. For the black belongs to the worse, as the white to the better coordination. But the soul is καλη δε και αγαθη την οψιν*, as extending its eye to intelligible *beauty*, and to the *goodness* which gives subsistence to all things, and through the participation of which all things are *good*. We may still, however, more perfectly survey these things in the Gods, according to analogy. For where do the *elderly* and the *hoary* subsist in such a manner as in them? Which are likewise celebrated by theologists among the paternal Gods. Where, also, are *the beautiful* and *the good*, such as they possess? Plato also, in saying unitedly καλον αγαθον, speaks in a manner the most adapted to those natures in whom *the one* and *the good* are the same.

P. 38. *But that Zeno was nearly forty years old, &c.*

Such was Zeno, perhaps indeed *graceful* and *tall* in his person, but much more so in his discourses. For such things as Parmenides delivered in an intorted and contracted manner, these Zeno evolved, and extended into *long* discussions. And hence the scurrilous Timon calls him either-tongued, as being at the same time skilled in confutation and narration. If also he is said to have been beloved by Parmenides, the

* i. e. Literally of a *beautiful* and *good* aspect.

ascent indeed to both was to one and the same divinity: for this is the peculiarity of the truly amatory art. But if you are willing to speak more perfectly, and to say that in the Gods themselves things secondary are contained in such as are first, and that all things, in short, are conjoined to being itself from which the progression and extension to beings are derived, you will not, I think, be very remote from the truth.

P. 38. *He likewise said that he met with them together with Pythodorus, &c.*

Let their meeting with Pythodorus be a symbol to those who look to paradigms, of the Gods becoming first unfolded into light through angels, and in the order of angels: for a house is a symbol of the order of each. But this meeting being beyond the walls, signifies the exempt and incomprehensible nature of the Gods. As, therefore, all appear collected in the house of Pythodorus, some from the city, and others elsewhere, so also the governors of the world and the intelligible Gods become apparent in angels, and are known by us through the essence of these.

P. 38. *Where also Socrates came, &c.*

Here we may perceive how Socrates, through a disposition naturally good in the extreme, earnestly follows these divine men, and how he does not associate with sophists and the wise for the same causes. For he associates with the former in order to confute their ignorance and pride, but with the latter in order to call forth their science and intellect. Here, therefore, he becomes the leader of the lovers of philosophy: for all of them desire to hear, but they obtain their desire together with and through him. But these things as well as the former are images of the Gods. Socrates was young, a young leader, Plato all but repeating what he says in the Phædrus, "the mighty leader Jupiter first proceeds, and the army of Gods and dæmons follows him." For intellect being every where allotted a convertive order, leads upwards, and together with itself converts all the multitude suspended from it. Socrates also being young is a symbol of the youthfulness which is celebrated in the Gods. For theology calls Jupiter himself and Bacchus *boys* and *young*; and, in short, theologists thus call the intellectual when compared with the intelligible and paternal. But the desire of the writings of Zeno symbolically manifests how

here those which are the third in order, first participate of the powers which are emitted in those of the middle rank, but afterwards are conjoined with their summits, and have communion with their intelligibles.

P. 38. *Zeno himself read to them, &c.*

Plato here affords us a wonderful indication of divine concerns; and he who is not asleep to analogies will see in these images a sublime theory. For, in the first place, Parmenides not being present at the beginning, but when the discourse was finished, is a symbol of more divine causes unfolding themselves to subordinate, after a perfect participation of proximate natures, but not before. The discourse of Zeno therefore, being completed, the great Parmenides appears; and together with him Pythodorus and Aristotle enter, of which two the former is Zenonic, but Aristotle is in a certain respect coarranged with Parmenides; for he disposes, together with him, the hypotheses, doing nothing else than answering. But here Parmenides, as we have often said, is analogous to that which is every where first among divine natures, whether it be the first being, or the intelligible, or in whatever other way you may think fit to denominate it: for this is in all the divine orders, and in each of the Gods. Hence he fills all that hear him with divine conceptions, imitating that order which adorns all things, first, middle, and last: for he gives perfection to Zeno, the middle being every where from that summit: but he perfects Socrates through both himself and Zeno; just as there the progression of third is through first and middle natures. He also perfects Pythodorus, but not simply from himself alone, but in conjunction with Zeno and Socrates. But he gives perfection to Aristotle last of all, and from himself alone. For something is imparted from Parmenides as far as to the last habit, to which the energy and power of Zeno do not proceed. Just as the production of the first being naturally extends further than that of life. But Zeno is himself filled from Parmenides, but fills in one way Pythodorus as his disciple, but in another way Socrates as one that explores together with him. Pythodorus, too, is not only able to participate of Zeno, but also of Socrates. For, in divine natures, the middle extends its energy to that which is posterior to itself, and proceeds through all things, imparting mere aptitude to the last of its participants, which
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it again perfects in conjunction with the natures proximately suspended from it. So that the former participation indicates the imperfect representation of things first, which it imparts energizing prior to secondary natures. But the second participation indicates a perfection of representation subsisting through things proximate. And Socrates, who is the third, gives completion to the triad which pervades through all numbers, and subsists analogous to the intellect which is there, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. Hence he first participates of the doctrines of Zeno, and is conjoined through him with Parmenides; just as in the Gods, the intellect in each is proximately filled with a certain divine life, but through this is united with the intelligible itself, and its proper hyparxis. But Pythodorus, as being arranged according to the unfolding genus, is the disciple of Zeno, and participates of the prolific doubts of Socrates. For the Gods give subsistence to angels from middle and third powers, and not from such as are first; for these are generative of Gods. And Aristotle is analogously arranged to souls which through a divine afflatus are often conjoined with the most divine natures, but afterwards fall from this blessedness. For it is nothing wonderful, that a soul which is now entheastically disposed should again choose an atheistical and dark life. But he is filled from Parmenides alone; since in the Gods also, it is the property of such as are first to impart to souls of this kind a certain participation of divine light, through transcendency of power. Thus theologists denominate an intellectual life Saturnian, but not Jovian, though the ascent is through the mighty Jupiter. But as Jupiter, being filled from his father, and ascending to him as to his proper intelligible, elevates also that which is posterior to himself; in like manner souls, though they make their ascent together with Jupiter, yet that intellectual life fills the middle and third orders of them, and, in the last place, souls which energize enthusiastically about it. Nor should you wonder if divine natures have such an order with respect to each other, since you may also behold in philosophers themselves, how he who among these is more perfect is also more powerful, and benefits a greater number. Thus Cebes or Simmias benefits himself alone, or some other similar to himself; but Socrates benefits himself, and these, and Thrasy-machus. In like manner Parmenides, being more powerful, benefits him who has the least aptitude of those that are assembled. But he manifests the obscurity of the participation by calling him the youngest of those that are present; which is a symbol.

symbol of an imperfect habit ; and by adding that he afterwards became one of the thirty tyrants ; whence also we justly considered him as analogous to those souls that once lived enthusiastically, and in conjunction with angels, just as he makes his entrance together with Pythodorus, but who afterwards fall from this power. For Pythodorus remains in his proper habits, so that he also partakes of another conversation ; just as the angelic tribe always remains wholly beneficent, and fills secondary with the participation of divine natures. But Aristotle instead of a philosopher becomes a tyrant. For souls which possess a life of this kind according to habitude and not essentially, sometimes depart from this order, and descend into the realms of generation : for a tyranny is a symbol of the life in generation ; since such a life becomes situated under the throne of Necessity, in consequence of being led under passive, unstable and disordered appetite. For Aristotle having been one of the thirty tyrants that governed Athens, contains a representation of a gigantic and earth-born life, which rules over Minerval and Olympian goods. When reason and intellect take the lead in such souls, then Olympian benefits and those of Minerva have dominion, and the whole life is royal and philosophic ; but when multitude, or in short that which is worse and earth-born, holds the reins of empire, then the whole life is a tyranny. If, therefore, Plato says that Aristotle was one of the thirty tyrants, it will appear to be the same as if he had said, that he is analogous to souls who at one time energize enthusiastically, and at another rank among the earth-born race, and who, by submitting their life to those most bitter tyrants the passions, become themselves tyrants over themselves. And perhaps the philosopher manifests through these things, that it is not impossible for the same soul to evolve different lives, and at one time to philosophize, and at another to live tyrannically ; and again to pass from a tyrannic to a philosophic life.

P. 38. *If beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar, &c.*

Through these and the other arguments of Zeno it is shown that it is impossible for the many to have a subsistence when deprived of *the one*. Beginning from hence too, we shall find a concise way to the first principle of things. It is necessary, therefore, that there should either be many principles not participating of a certain one, or that there

here should be one principle only void of multitude, or many principles participating of *the one*, or one containing multitude in itself. But if there are many principles destitute of *the one*, all such absurdities will happen, as the arguments of Zeno adduce to those who assert that beings are many without *the one*. If there are many principles, but which participate of a certain one, i. e. which have a certain one co-subsistent with them, that participated one must proceed to its participants from another one which has a prior subsistence: for every one which is something belonging to other things proceeds from that which is simply one. But if there is one principle possessing in itself multitude, it will be a whole, and will consist from the many parts or elements which it contains. And this will not be the truly one, but a passive one, as we learn from the Sophista. In consequence of this, too, it will neither be simple nor sufficient, things which it is necessary the principle should possess. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be one principle of all things void of multitude. And thus much we may collect from all the arguments of Zeno.

We may also observe that Socrates again imitates his paradigm intellect, expanding himself and his intellections to Zeno, and calling forth his science. For in the paradigms of these men the subordinate suspend the whole of their energy from the middle natures, and, through an expansion of their proper powers, are supernally filled with more perfect goods.

P. 39. *Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince by contesting, &c.*

Parmenides, establishing himself in *the one*, and surveying the monad of all beings, does not convert himself to multitude and its dissipated subsistence; but Zeno flies from multitude to *the one*, and takes away multitude. For the former of these two is similar to one purified, elevated, and having laid aside the multitude in himself; but the latter to one ascending, and laying aside multitude, and this because he is not entirely separated from it. Hence contention (*το διαμαχεσθαι*) is adapted to him; for he does not yet possess a tranquil life, separated from impediments; nor, as it opposes multitude, does it yet end in *the one* alone. But this contention, and this ending through many arguments in the same negative conclusion, manifest to Socrates that the many do not subsist separate from *the one*: for Plato assimilates the path

through negations to a battle. Thus in the Republic he exhorts to discourse about *the good*, as if piercing through a battle, thinking it fit to speak of it in no other way than through negative conclusions. And here it is necessary, indeed, not to consider the word *contending* carelessly; but through this we should make it known, that both in this place, and in the Republic, *contention* is intended by Plato to signify *negations*. As each of the arguments too of Zeno is self-perfect, and demonstrative of the conclusion, this is the peculiarity of scientific power.

P. 40. *Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, &c.*

Parmenides leading upwards all beings to the exempt one being, or being itself, and withdrawing his conceptions from that which is multiplied and distributed, to the one monad of all the multitude of beings, the many on the contrary give the multitude of beings a precedency to intellect and union, and do not even consider being itself as the principle; but they assert that distributed multitude simply subsists, and receives a progression into being separate from being itself. That thus thinking, however, they defame the doctrine of Parmenides, is evident. For, Parmenides being of opinion that being should be considered as alone characterized by unity, separate from multitude, they on the contrary establish multitude deprived of unity; though indeed it is impossible that multitude should not participate of *the one*: for every multitude is of *the one*. All multitudes, therefore, and all the bulks of bodies, are vanquished by the participation of unity. Hence if multitude requires *the one*, but *the one* is unindigent of multitude, it is better to call being one, than the many alone subsisting by themselves separate from the participation of *the one*. And Parmenides indeed, evincing that being is one, gives subsistence also to the multitude of beings, not only to that of sensibles, but likewise to the multitude of intelligibles: for in these there is a divine number of all things united to each other. Empedocles also afterwards perceiving this, as being himself a Pythagorean, calls the whole of an intelligible nature a sphere, as being united to itself, and asserts that it attracts to itself, through beauty, the beautifying and uniting God. For all things there, loving and desiring each other, are eternally united to each other. Their love also is intelligible, and their association and mixture are ineffable. But the many being exiles from union, and the monad of beings, and
through

through their life, which is divisible and distributed, being drawn down to multitude, to multiform opinions, to indefinite phantasies, to passive senses and material appetites, consider the manics themselves separate from their union, and do not see in what manner these manys are vanquished, through the coordinated monads which they contain, how things indefinite are subject to definite measures, and how dissipated natures subsist in sympathy and in union through the participation of things common; and not perceiving this, they wander from the truth, and basely revile and deride the doctrine of Parmenides. Zeno, therefore, knowing that they were thus affected, becomes indeed a corrector of multitude, but a leader to intellect from folly, and a guardian of the doctrine of his preceptor. And at first he persuades to recur from these multitudes to the unities in the many, and to behold how this multitude, though tending to infinity, is at the same time vanquished by the monad of beings, and is held together by a certain unity which it contains. But he persuades, assuming an hypothesis pleasing to the vulgar, viz. the subsistence of multitude deprived of unity: for thus their assertion is easily confuted; since, if they had established the many together with *the one*, they would not as yet be confuted through his arguments. Parmenides also himself manifests in his hypothesis, that he is accustomed to show that the same thing is similar and dissimilar, no otherwise than by receiving *the many* separate from *the one*.

Zeno, therefore, as we have said, considers these many deprived of *the one*, which accedes to, and is contained in them. Nor yet does he consider intelligibles alone, nor sensibles alone, but, in short, all such things as are said to be many in the intelligible and sensible orders. For it is the province of a more perfect and principal science to extend the same method to all things of a similar form, and to survey in all things that which is analogous. Whether, therefore, there is intelligible, or sensible, or intellectual, or dianoëtic multitude, all this is assumed at present. Hence it is requisite to discover how multitudes are no where to be found deprived of *the one*. For, if they were deprived of *the one*, they would be at the same time similar and dissimilar; since things which do not participate of *one* and the same are dissimilar to each other; and again, according to this very thing, they communicate with each other, viz. by not participating of *the one*. But things which possess something common and the same are similar; so that the same things are both similar and dissimilar. If, therefore, the many are without a participation of *the one*, according to this one thing, the non-participation

ticipation of *the one*, they will be both similar and dissimilar; viz. considered as possessing this in common they will be similar, but considered as not possessing *the one* they will be dissimilar: for, because they are passive to this very thing, the non-participation of *the one*, they are similar; so that the same things are both similar and dissimilar. For, in short, the possession of nothing common is itself common to them: and hence the assertion subverts itself. Indeed, the things which are shown to be both similar and dissimilar are again shown to be neither similar nor dissimilar. For, if they do not partake of *the one*, they are, in short, not similar; since similars are similar by the participation of a certain one; for similitude is a certain oneness. And again, if they do not participate of *the one*, this is common to them; but things of which there is something common, these according to this very thing are not dissimilar. So that the many are neither similar nor dissimilar. It is impossible, therefore, that multitude can subsist deprived of *the one*, because so many absurdities happen to those who adopt such an hypothesis. For it is a dire thing that contradiction should concur; but more dire that this should be the case with contraries; and it is the most dire of all things that both contraries and contradictions should be consequent to the assertion. By showing, therefore, that the same thing is similar and dissimilar, we have collected contraries; but by showing that the same thing is similar and not similar, and neither of these, we have collected contradictions. For the similar is a contradiction to the not similar, and the dissimilar to the non-dissimilar.

Hence also we may be able to evince that it is impossible there should be many first principles. For, with respect to these many principles, whether do they participate of one thing, or not of one thing? For, if they participate, that which they participate will be prior to them, and there will no longer be many principles, but one principle. But if they do not participate, they will be similar to each other, in consequence of this non-participation being common to them, and dissimilar so far as they do not participate of a certain common one. But this is impossible, that the same things according to the same should be both similars and dissimilars. In like manner we may collect that these many principles are neither similars nor dissimilars. But if they were participants of a certain one, we could not collect that they are dissimilars according to the participation of this one; but only that they are similars: and thus we shall subvert the subsistence of many first principles.

Through this method, therefore, Zeno evinces that it is impossible to separate the many

many from *the one*, and rises from multitude to the monads of the many, that we may perceive what the nature is of the exempt unities of things. For the coordinated monads are images of those that are uncoordinated. But Socrates agitating the discourse about ideas; supposing things common to have a subsistence themselves by themselves, and surveying another multitude in them, thinks it proper that Zeno should also transfer this method to forms, and make it apparent in these, how the similar is dissimilar, and the dissimilar similar. And shortly after Proclus further observes as follows :

Socrates, before he enters on the doubts in which a formal essence is involved, asks Zeno whether he admits that forms have a subsistence, and whether or not he is among those who embrace this cause as well as himself; and, in short, what opinion he has concerning them. For the Pythagoreans were contemplators of forms; and Socrates himself manifests this in the Sophista, calling the wise men in Italy, the friends of forms. But he who especially venerates and clearly establishes forms is Socrates, from the investigation concerning definitions discovering the nature of the things defined; and passing from these as images to formal causes themselves. He, therefore, in the first place, asks if Zeno also himself admits that there are forms, and venerates this essence of all things, subsisting from and established in itself, and not requiring any other seat, which he characterizes by the words *itself by itself* (αὐτο καὶ αὐτο), conceiving that these words are properly adapted to this essence. For they indicate the unmingled, simple, and pure nature of forms. Thus, through the word *itself*, he signifies the simplicity of those things; but, through the words *by itself*, their purity unmingled with secondary natures. And indeed, through the words *by itself*, he separates forms from the things predicated of the many. For which among these is *by itself*? since it possesses its subsistence in a habitude to subjects, is collected from sensible perception, is the object of opinion, and is accommodated to the conceptions* of the phantasy. But by the word *itself* he separates forms from that which is common in particulars, and which is definable : for this is contained in

* A thing of this kind is in modern language *an abstract idea*. Such ideas as they are of an origin posterior, must also be subordinate to sensibles; and the soul, if she has no higher conceptions, must even be viler than matter itself; matter being the recipient of essential forms, and the soul of such as are generated from these.

something different from itself, and subsists together with matter; whence also it is filled with internal change, and is in a certain respect mortal, through communion with that which is material. By no means, therefore, must it be said, that forms which subsist by themselves, which are established on a sacred foundation, and are immaterial and eternal, are the same with material forms of posterior origin, and which are full of variety and habitude. For the former are unmingled, undefiled and simple, and are eternally established in the demiurgus of the universe; possessing the undefiled and the pure from inflexible deity, which proceeds together with the demiurgus, but the simple from the demiurgic intellectual essence, which is single and impartible, and, as the Chaldaean theologists would say, has a fontal subsistence. You may also say that the term *itself* separates form from those conceptions which are derived from sensibles (*εἰσθητά*). For no one of these is *itself*; since they accord with the things of which they are the conceptions, belong to and subsist in others. But the words *by itself* separate form from that which subsists in particulars, and which is in something different from itself.

Neither, therefore, must we admit their opinion who say that idea is the same with that which is common in the many: for ideas subsist prior to the things which are common in sensibles, and the latter derive their subsistence from the former. Nor must we assent to those who consider ideas as the same with those conceptions which we derive from sensibles, and who, in consequence of this, inquire how there are not also ideas of individuals, and of things which are contrary to nature. For the conceptions of these things are entirely secondary to the particulars from which they are excited, and are in us, and not in the power that adorned the universe, and in whom we say ideas subsist. Nor yet must we admit the opinion of those who connect ideas with spermatie reasons. For the reasons or productive principles in seeds are imperfect; and those in nature, which generates seeds, are destitute of knowledge. But ideas subsist in energy always the same, and are essentially intellectual. If, therefore, we wish to define their idiom through things which are more known, we must receive from physical reasons, the producing that which they produce, by their very being; but from the reasons of art, the being gnostic of the things which they make, though they do not make by their very being. Hence we say that ideas are demiurgic, and at the same time intellectual causes of all things which are perfected according to nature,

nature, being immovable, prior to things moved, simple prior to composites, and separate prior to the things which are inseparable from matter. On this account, Parmenides does not cease discoursing concerning them, till at the end of his arguments he says that they are Gods; through this signifying all that we have previously observed.

With respect to the similar and the dissimilar, these subsist primarily in the demiurgus, or, to speak more clearly, they have in him a fontal subsistence; since they subsist more conspicuously in the assimilative Gods, and especially in the paternal Deities of that order, as is evident from the second hypothesis of this dialogue. But since the demiurgus possesses the one fountain of these, the form of similitude is also contained in him, presubsisting in the one monad of ideas. The demiurgus, therefore, is a monad comprehensive of many divine monads, which impart to each other their proper idioms: one, the idiom of purity; another, of an assimilative essence; and another of something else, according to which they are allotted their proper hyparxis. For it must not be thought that forms indeed presubsist, as the causes of things which are generated according to them, but that there is not a different idea by which generated natures become similar and dissimilar to forms. Both similitude, however, and dissimilitude, are immaterial, pure, simple, uniform, and eternal essences; the former being collective, unific, the cause of bound, and uniform; and the latter, the source of division, internal change, and infinity. But the order of these ideas is neither in the most generic nor in the most specific of forms. For the most generic are such forms as are participated by all beings, so that there is not any thing whatever which does not subsist from the participation of these, such as *essence*, *sameness*, *difference*; since these pervade to all beings. For what is there void of essence? what of difference? what of sameness? Do not all things possess a certain hyparxis? And are they not essentially separated from other things; and do they not also communicate with them? If this be the case, this triad is the common cause of all beings. But the most specific ideas are such as are naturally adapted to be participated by individual forms, such as man, horse, dog; and each of this kind. For these proximately generate the monads in individuals, such as man in particulars, and dog and horse in the many, and in a similar manner each of the rest. But the forms which subsist between these, have indeed a very extended subsistence, but do not energize in all beings.

Thus,

Thus, for instance, justice subsists in souls, but not in wood and stones. Among these middle forms, therefore, similitude and dissimilitude must be ranked : for though they are participated by most, yet not by all things ; since, as Proclus well observes, where is there either similitude or dissimilitude among infinities ?

P. 40. *For if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, &c.*

Forms are not to be considered as entirely unmingled, and without communication with each other, but each is that which it is, preserving its idiom pure ; and at the same time it participates of others without confusion, not as becoming something belonging to them, but as receiving the idiom of that which it participates, and to this imparting its own idiom. Thus, for instance, sameness participates of difference, not being difference, and difference participates of sameness, so far as they communicate with each other. Thus also similitude and dissimilitude participate of each other ; but neither is similitude dissimilitude, nor dissimilitude similitude. Nor, so far as the one is similitude, is it dissimilar, nor, so far as the other is dissimilitude, similar. For the expression *so far as*, is twofold. In the first place, it is used when one thing is always accompanied with another ; as if some one should say, So far as there is air, according to this there is also light ; and so far as there is light, according to this there is also air. But admitting that there is illuminated air, yet neither is air light, nor light air, but air is in light, and light in air ; because the parts of air and light are situated near each other, and there is no one of these according to which the other is not also beheld. But this expression is also used after another manner, when it is applied to any thing which always essentially introduces another thing ; as when we say, Man is a recipient of science. For it is not true that light is in the air, or air in light, according to this signification, since air does not entirely cointroduce light, as we say man cointroduces a recipient of science ; since the essence of air is different from that of light. Similitude, therefore, participates of dissimilitude according to the former of these modes ; for there is nothing belonging to it which does not participate of dissimilitude ; and yet the being of the former is different from that of the latter. For it does not participate in one part and not in another, since nothing impedes its pervading through dissimilitude ; nor is its impartible nature of such a kind that it participates of it in one respect,

respect, and in another remains unmingled with it. For the whole proceeds through the whole, similitude through dissimilitude, and in like manner dissimilitude through similitude. Not, indeed, that each, in consequence of being that which it is, participates of the other; but while it participates it preserves its own essence pure. This, therefore, is the peculiarity of incorporeal forms: to pervade through each other without confusion; to be distinct from each other without separation; and to be more united than things which are corrupted together, through their impartible nature; and to be more distinct from each other than things which are here separated, through their unmingled purity.

Socrates, therefore, says Proclus, doubting whether forms subsist in conjunction with each other, calling on Zeno to assist him in the solution of this doubt, and apprehending that forms are not so mingled that the similar itself is the dissimilar, calls a dogma of this kind a *prodigy*, and rejects any such mixture. But again, suspecting that forms, through the union of intelligibles, participate in a certain respect of each other, he says he should *wonder* if any one were able to show that this is the case, employing for this purpose the language of one suspecting. And at length inferring that they may be both united and separated, he calls him who is able to demonstrate this *admirable*. And here you see the order of ascent: for Socrates in the first place denies; in the second place, he has a suspicion of the truth; and in the third place, he is firmly convinced of the truth through demonstration. And neither is his negation of the mixture of forms blamable; for, according to the mode which he alludes to, they are unmingled: nor is his suspicion false; for in one respect they are able to participate of each other, and in another they do not mutually communicate. And his last decision is most true; for they are both united with and separated from each other.

P. 41. *Does it also appear to you that there is a certain species or form of justice, &c.*

A divine and demiurgic intellect comprehends things multiplied unitedly, things partible impartibly, and things divided indivisibly. But it is soul which first divides things which presubsist in intellect according to supreme union; and this is not only true of our soul, but likewise of that which is divine. For, because it is not allotted intellections which are alone established in eternity, but desires to comprehend the

collected energy of intellect, aspiring after the perfection which it contains, and its simple form of intelligence,—hence, it runs round intellect, and by the transitions of its projective energies divides the impartible nature of forms, perceiving the beautiful itself, the just itself, and every other form separately, and understanding all things by surveying one at a time, and not all things at once. For, in short, as it ranks in the third order from *the one*, it very properly possesses an energy of this kind. For that is one alone, and is prior to intellection. But intellect understands all things as one; and soul understands all things by surveying one at a time. Division, therefore, first subsists in soul; and hence theologians say, that in the lacerations of Bacchus the intellect of the God was preserved undivided by the providence of Minerva. But soul is that which is first distributed into parts; and to this a section into seven parts first pertains. It is, therefore, no longer wonderful, that, divine forms presubsisting unitedly in the demiurgic intellect, our soul should apply herself to them divisibly, and should at one time survey the first and most common forms; at another, those which possess a middle form; and at another time, the most partial and as it were individual forms. For, since even a divine soul divides that which is impartible by its transitive adhesions and contacts, what ought we to say concerning a partial soul such as ours? Must it not, much prior to this, apprehend partly and divisibly things which subsist together and in each other? It is, therefore, by no means wonderful that inquiries and answers should at different times apprehend different forms; just as external discourse divides the one and simple conception of the soul, and temporally passes through the united conceptions of intellect.

The forms, however, which were before mentioned by Socrates are most generic and common, viz. unity, multitude, similitude, dissimilitude, permanency, motion; but those which are now presented to our view are partly secondary to these, and partly not; just as, with respect to human virtue, we say that it is partly subordinate to, and partly better than, the soul: for, so far as it is perfective of it is better than the soul, but, so far as it is something belonging to, and subsisting in, the soul, it is subordinate to it. In like manner the good*, the beautiful, and the just, are partly more excellent than forms which produce essences, and are partly inferior to them. For, so

* Viz. the good, considered as subsisting among ideas, and not as that good which is supersensual, and the principle of all things.

far as they are most generic, these also communicate with them; but the latter are the primary causes of being to sensibles, and the former are the sources of their perfection; the just proceeding as far as to souls, and adorning and perfecting these, but the beautiful extending its illuminations even as far as to bodies. Hence Socrates in the *Phædrus* says, that beauty has the prerogative of being the most apparent and the most lovely of all things; but that the splendour of justice is not visible in the imitations of it which are here. Again, the good perfects all things according to the peculiar essence of each. For the beautiful perfects according to the symmetry of form with respect to matter; and symmetry then subsists when that which is naturally more excellent rules over that which is naturally inferior. According to this symmetry, therefore, the beautiful shines in bodies. But the good illuminates according to the perfect; and is present to every thing invested with form, when it possesses perfection from nature. In this triad, therefore, the first is the good, the second the beautiful, and the third the just.

But that there are forms or ideas of these, and of all such as these, as, for instance, of temperance, fortitude, prudence, we shall find, by considering that every virtue, and every perfection according to virtue, assimilates us to a divine nature, and that, by how much the more it is inherent in us, by so much the nearer do we approach to an intellectual life. If, therefore, the beautiful and the good, and every virtue, assimilate us to intellect, intellect will entirely possess the intellectual paradigms of these. For, with respect to the similar, when it is said to be similar to that which is more excellent, then, that which is more excellent possesses that primarily which the subordinate nature receiving becomes similar to it. The forms of the virtues, therefore, must necessarily subsist in intellect prior to soul. Each of these, however, must be considered in a twofold respect, viz. as a divine unity, and as an intellectual form. Thus, for instance, the just which subsists in forms is not the same with that which subsists in the Gods. For the former is one particular idea, is a part of another, and possesses intelligence proceeding as far as to souls; but the latter is a certain whole, and proceeds in its providential energies as far as to the last of things. It also originates from the first intellectual Gods; for there it is first apparent. But the former is an idea contained in the demiurgic intellect. Thus also, with respect to the beautiful, that which subsists as a form is different from that which is the unity of divine beauty. And

the energy of the latter, indeed, is directed to the Gods so far as they are Gods, and first originates from the first intelligible; but the former is in ideas, and is beheld about ideas. And lastly, with respect to the good, one is essential, and the other, as we have before observed, is supereffential.

P. 42. *I mean hair, clay, and mud, or any thing else which is vile and abject, &c.*

It is necessary, says Proclus, either that there should only be ideas of things which subsist according to nature, or also of things which are contrary to these; and if only of things according to nature, that there should alone be ideas of things perpetual, or also of each of the things which are not perpetual. And if there are alone ideas of things perpetual, they must either be of such as are essential, or also of such as are unessential. And if of the essential, they must either be alone confined to wholes, or also extend to parts; and if to wholes alone, either to such as are alone simple, or also to such as are composed from these. Such then being the division of ideas, we say, that of intellects proceeding from one intellectual essence it is not proper to establish paradigms: for that of which there is a paradigm must necessarily be an image. But to call an intellectual essence an image, is of all things the most absurd: for every image is the idol (*ειδωλον*) or resemblance of that of which it is the image; and the Elcan guest in the Sophista expressly denominates an idol *not true being*. If, therefore, every intellectual essence belongs to true being, it will not be proper to denominate it either an image or an idol. For, indeed, every intellectual nature is impartible, and the progression of it is effected through sameness; whence also secondary intellects subsist in unproceeding union in such as are first, and are partially what the intellect which ranks as a whole is totally. But it is necessary in the image that dissimilitude should be mingled with similitude; through the latter of which the image is converted to its paradigm. In intellectual essences, therefore, there are not image and paradigm, but cause alone, and things proceeding from cause. Whence also theologists, placing many fountains in the demiurgic intellect, assert that there is one of the multitude of ideas. Hence, not every thing which proceeds from the demiurgus proceeds according to a formal cause; but such things as make a more extended progression, and such as possess a partible essence, these subsist from an ideal cause. But the other

fountains are generative of intellectual and divine hypostases. We must not, therefore, establish in intellect a paradigmatic cause of every intellectual essence, but a cause alone which is characterized by unity, and is divine.

In the next place, it is requisite to consider if there is a primary cause of souls in forms, and whether there is one or many. But that there is, indeed, a certain monad of them in the demiurgus, in which monad every number of souls is comprehended monadically, is evident from the nature of things, and from the doctrine of Plato. For, if soul is the first generated nature, and that which is primarily partible, it is necessary that the impartible form should precede things partible, and the eternal, things which are in any way generated. And if, as time is to eternity, so is soul to intellect, but time is the image of eternity, it is also necessary that soul should be the image of intellect. And if in being there is not only life, as Socrates says in the *Philebus*, but also soul, it is necessary to consider the soul which is there as the paradigm of the multitude of souls proceeding from intellect, and as comprehending, after the manner of unity, both their order and their number. But if there is not one form of rational souls alone, but there are also many forms after the one, since all of them are immortal, it is necessary that there should be a paradigm of each. Again, however, it is impossible that the preceding multitude should be just as numerous as that which abides: for progression increases quantity, but diminishes power. We must therefore say, that there is a monad in the divine intellect, which is paradigmatic of all souls, from which the multitude of them flows, and which unitedly comprehends the measure that bounds their number. But with this monad a second number is connate, divided, and paradigmatic of divine souls, containing the proper paradigm of each, and one form, from which divine souls proceed first, and afterwards the multitude coordinate with each. Thus, from the paradigm of the soul of the sun, the divine soul of the sun first proceeds; in the next place, all such angelic souls as are of a solar characteristic; in the third place, such as are of a dæmoniacal rank about the sun; and, in the last place, such as are partial: on which account also there are coordinations of parts to wholes, and of attendants to their leaders; the one intellectual cause of them imparting union and connection to their progression. In like manner, also, the paradigm of the lunar soul first generates the divine soul about the moon, afterwards the angelic, then the dæmoniacal, and then that which is partial; and the intellectual

intellectual monad comprehends all the number of these. The like also takes place in other divine souls; for each has a separate idea: but the orders of angelic, dæmoniacal, or partial souls, which follow them, participate of the one idea. And as the one monad of the paradigms of souls which are there, gives subsistence to the one soul of the world, so the many monads produce the multitude of souls; and the former comprehends the whole multitude uniformly, but the latter, the measures of their proper series. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, primarily comprehends the forms of divine souls, which it first generates; but each of these forms is one and at the same time many; for it *causally* contains all the multitude of the souls subsisting under it. And thus every soul subsists according to a certain proper paradigm; but all do not after the same manner participate of the same form. Antient theologists also having the same conceptions on this subject say, that the total causes of souls, which generate the whole series of them, are different from the partial causes, through which they derive a separation according to species, and a division as it were into individual souls.

In the next place, with respect to irrational souls, it is evident that there is also an intelligible paradigm of these; if we consider irrational souls to be all secondary lives, and which are divisible about bodies. Whence then do these derive their perpetuity? It must necessarily indeed be from a certain immovable and intellectual cause: and it appears that this is accomplished as follows:

Again then, one monad and one idea must be arranged prior to these, whether it be fontal or sensitive nature, or in whatever other way you may be willing to call it. For it may be said that irrational souls derive their subsistence from the one demiurgic sense, through a gnostic idiom; but through orexis or appetite, from the highest or fontal nature, which subsists prior to the multitude of natures. From these causes, therefore, the multitude of perpetual but naturally irrational souls proceeds; this multitude subsisting partly in eternal vehicles, in which also it is established according to a certain number, and the formal measure which is there. For every perpetual multitude is bounded; and prior to every bounded multitude *that* subsists which bounds and numbers this multitude. These irrational also proceed from rational souls, or rather from the paradigms which they contain: for, through these, here also they are suspended from rational souls, because there the one measure of them, together with

the multitude of forms, at the same time generates this number of these. Divine souls indeed, and such as are pure, preserve also their irrational nature undefiled; but partial employ irrational souls, as they have a composite life, the more excellent part having dominion in some, and being frequently in a state of subjection in others. From these perpetual irrational souls, such as are mortal are allotted their generation; these also being preserved according to species, through their intellectual paradigm, but the individuals perishing, because they derive their subsistence from the junior * Gods, as the irrational prior to these are generated from those supernal souls whose fabricating energy is complicated with the monad of the whole of their series. Souls that perish, therefore, have a certain analogy to the divine causes from which they derive their subsistence, and immortal souls to their formal causes.

In the third place, let us consider how we are to admit a paradigm of Nature. For we must not, as Plato says, establish forms of fire, water, and motion, but deprive nature, which is the source of these, of an intellectual cause. Theologists indeed place the fountain of it in the vivific Goddess Rhea; for they say that immense Nature is suspended from the shoulders of the goddess. But, according to Plato, we must say that the form of it subsists in the demiurgic intellect, which form is the origin of every natural vehicle. Timæus also says, that the demiurgus pointed out to souls the *nature* of the universe, and the laws of fate: for in him the one nature of all things, and the comprehension of those fatal decrees according to which he arranges and divides the universe, subsist. For, if it is the demiurgus who speaks, he converts souls to himself: but, if this be the case, he also shows to them the nature of the universe, and the laws of fate, subsisting in himself. Hence the one form of nature is there; but the souls also that use, produce the natures which are inspired from them; and these perpetual natures again generate partial and temporal natures. It may be concluded, therefore, that the paradigm of natures unitedly comprehends in the demiurgic intellect the number of such as have a perpetual subsistence; but that the separated causes of perpetual natures are contained in Vulcan, who according to theologists is the fabricator of the form of body alone. For from this divinity every physical order, and the number of natures, proximately subsist and are revived.

* See the Timæus.

In the fourth place, with respect to bodies, must we not admit that the one and total cause of these is in the first demiurgus, which cause comprehends all the number of the bodies that rank as wholes? but, after this monad, that the separated causes of bodies which rank as parts subsist in the fabricating cause of a corporeal nature? This, indeed, must necessarily be the case: for he who comprehends the one mundane form is the first father of the universe; and those things which are generated through necessity must consequently be parts; and these require the providence of that power which fabricates bodies. Besides, this also is evident, that, as we said of souls, it is here likewise requisite to assert that there are intellectual and formal causes of divine bodies; for the vehicles of dæmons and partial souls participate of these causes in a second and third gradation. Thus, for instance, the form of the solar body generates also the solar vehicles of dæmons and partial souls; and hence, as soul is to soul, so is vehicle to its proper sphere. And, in short, since there is a multitude of divine causes, the causes of bodies must be considered as subsisting differently in different divinities. Thus, in Vulcan, the fabricator of body, the separated causes of bodies, so far as bodies, subsist; but in the generative principles of souls they subsist psychically; and in Jupiter, the demiurgus of wholes, they subsist as animals, thence deriving their hypostasis both according to souls and bodies.

It now remains that we consider, with respect to matter, whether there is also a form of this. And here perhaps it is necessary, that as in souls, natures, and bodies, fabrication does not begin from the imperfect; so likewise in matter, prior to that which is formless, and which has an evanescent being, that which is in a certain respect form, and which is beheld in one boundary and permanency, will be the paradigm of matter. This likewise will possess a twofold generation. viz. from its paradigm, and from a divine cause alone: for every thing intellectual produces in conjunction with divinity; but divinity proceeds by itself, and as far as to things which do not possess their generation from intellectual form.

After having, therefore, considered the simple hypostases of beings, let us direct our attention to the things composed from these,—I mean animals and plants. For there will be intellectual paradigms of all these; because not the genus alone but likewise the species of each gives completion to the universe, and makes it more similar to its paradigm. For the intelligible world comprehends all such animals intelligibly

as the apparent world contains sensibly. Each therefore of these is assimilated to a certain intellectual form: but animal itself, or the extremity of the intelligible triad, comprehends unitedly and intelligibly the causes of souls, bodies, and animals. For, as it contracts in the tetrad of ideas all the number of them, so it preassumes according to union the distributed causes of things which are as it were simple, and also of such which are as it were composite in intellects. For, in short, the universal and the essential are thence derived. Or whence do things possess the never-failing, if there is no eternal cause? Whence that which is common, and which extends to a multitude of things? For whatever is derived from the circular motion of the heavens is partial, since the motion itself of the heavens is in a certain respect partial. But that universal should be generated from that which is partial, is among the number of things impossible. Every form, therefore, both of plants and animals, thence subsists according to a certain intellectual paradigm. For every thing generated, and every thing which has in any respect a subsistence, has its being from a cause. Whence then are these visible forms, and from what cause? Shall we say, from one that is mutable? But this is impossible. They must, therefore, derive their subsistence from an immovable cause, since they are perpetual. And we say that an intellectual is a cause of this kind: for it abides perfectly in eternity. Shall we admit, therefore, that there are not only forms of species, but also of particulars? as, for instance, of Socrates, and of every individual, not so far as he is a man, but so far as he is a particular individual. But if this be the case, must not the mortal be necessarily immortal? For, if every thing which is generated according to idea is generated according to an immovable cause, and every thing which subsists according to an immovable cause is immutable in essence, Socrates, and each individual of the human species, will be established according to a perpetual sameness of essence; which is impossible. It is likewise absurd that idea should at one time be the paradigm of something, and at another not. For eternal being possesses whatever it does possess eternally; and hence, that which is paradigmatic will either not possess form, or will always possess it; since it would be absurd to assert that there is any thing accidental among ideas. If therefore it is a paradigm, it is necessary that the image of it also should be perpetual: for every paradigm is the paradigm of an image. But if it is at one time essential, and at another not, it will also at one time be a paradigm, and at

another not. Besides, is it not necessary to be persuaded by Socrates, who says that we are led to admit the subsistence of ideas, that we may have the one prior to the many? For, if there are ideas of particulars, there will be one prior to one, or rather infinites prior to finites; since, sensible natures being finite, ideas will be infinite. Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this: for things nearer to *the one* are more bounded, according to number, than such as are more remote from it. And hence it appears that there can be no ideas of individuals. Since, however, every thing which is generated is generated from a certain cause, we must also admit that there are causes of individuals; the *one general cause* being the order of the universe, but the many causes, the motion of the heavens, partial natures, the characteristic peculiarities of the seasons, climates, and the inspective guardians of these. For, the cause being moved moves together with itself, in a certain respect, that which is generated from it. Hence, from the idioms of the presiding causes, different appropriate figures, colours, voices, and motions are imparted to different animals. For the generations are various in different places, and partial natures not only proceed from the whole of nature, but receive something from the idiom of seeds, and are fashioned by verging to bodies, and becoming as it were eminently corporeal, through departing from themselves. We see, therefore, that they do not subsist from a paradigmatic cause: for it is not the same thing to subsist from a cause, and to be generated according to a paradigm. For cause is multifariously predicated, one of which is the paradigmatic.

Again, with respect to parts, shall we say that there are also ideas of these, so that there is not only a paradigm of man, but also of finger and eye, and every thing of this kind! Indeed, because each of these is universal and essence, it subsists from a certain stable cause; but because they are parts, and not wholes, they are subordinate to an impartible and intellectual essence. For there is no absurdity in admitting that such things as are not only parts, but wholes, subsist according to that essence; but it is absurd to admit this of such things as are parts only. For the generation of wholes is from thence, since the uniform, prior to the multiplied, and the whole, prior to part, is thence derived. Will it not, therefore, be right to assert of all such things, that the causes of them are not intellectual, (for every intellect is impartible, and consequently wholes subsist in it prior to parts, and impartible prior to partible natures,) but that they are psychical and physical. For that which is primarily partible is in souls, and

after these in natures. Here, therefore, there is a reason and form of finger and tooth, and of each of these. And the wholeness of these, indeed, presubsists in intellect, but that which in the one also comprehends multitude is in souls. That which vitally distributes the one from the multitude is in natures; and that which makes a division accompanied with interval is in bodies. In short, it must not be denied that there are definite dæmoniacal causes of these, as invocations upon the finger, eye, and heart evince: but of the wholes which comprehend these parts there are divine causes.

In the next place let us consider accidents. Have these then also ideas, or is there also a twofold consideration about these? For some of them are perfective of, and give completion to, essences, such as similitude, beauty, health, and virtue; but others subsist indeed in essences, yet do not give completion to, nor perfect them, such as whiteness, blackness, and every thing of this kind. Things, therefore, which give completion to, and are perfective of, essences have paradigmatic causes precedentiously; but things which are ingenerated in bodies are indeed produced according to reason, and the temperament of bodies is not sufficient to their generation, but form is derived inwardly from nature, yet they are not produced according to a certain definite intellectual cause. For the essential, the perfective, and the common, pertain to forms; but that which is deprived of all these subsists from some other cause, and not from the first forms. For nature, receiving the order of forms proceeding into corporeal masses, divides wholes from parts, and essences from accidents, which prior to this were united and impartible; expanding these by her divisive powers. It is not indeed possible, that things perfectly divided should immediately subsist from things united, and things most partial from such as are most common; but a division must necessarily be produced from the condition of subjection in the natures which subsist between. We must therefore admit, that there is a cause of figure which is the prolific source of all figures, and one monad of numbers which is generative of all numbers; since even the monad which is with us evinces that it contains unitedly the even and the odd, and all the forms of numbers. What then ought we to think concerning the monad which is there? Must it not be, that it is uniformly the cause of all things, and that its infinite power generates also in us infinite number? Indeed, this must necessarily be the case, since the monad which is here proceeds as the image of that.

In the next place, with respect to things artificial, shall we say that there are ideas

also of these? Socrates, indeed, in the Republic, does not refuse to speak of the idea of a bed, and of a table; but there he calls the productive principle in the dianoëtic part of the artist, idea, and says that this productive principle is the progeny of divinity, because he was of opinion that the artificial itself is imparted to souls from divinity. For, if it should be said that the forms of these are in intellect, whether do these pervade to the sensible world immediately, or through nature as a medium? For, if immediately, it will be absurd, since a progression of this kind nowhere subsists in other forms, but such things as are nearer to intellect are the first participants of ideas. But if through nature as a medium, because the arts are said to imitate nature, much prior to art nature will possess the forms of things artificial. But all things which are generated from nature live, and undergo generation and increase, if they belong to things which are generated in matter: for nature is a certain life, and the cause of things vital. It is however impossible that a bed, or any thing else which is the production of art, should live and be increased. And hence things artificial will not have preexisting ideas, nor intellectual paradigms of their subsistence. If, however, some one should be willing to call the sciences arts, we must make the following division:—Of arts, such as lead back the soul, and assimilate it to intellect, of these we must admit that there are ideas, to which they assimilate us: for figure, and the intelligence of figure, are similar, and also number, and the intelligence of number. We must admit, therefore, that there are ideas of arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy, not indeed so far as they are applied to practical purposes, but so far as they are intellectual, and inspective of divine forms. For these indeed conjoin us with intellect, when, like the Coryphæan philosopher in the Theætetus, we astronomize above the heavens, survey the intellectual harmony according to which the demiurgus generated souls and this universe, and contemplate that number which subsists in all forms occultly and separately, and the intellectual figure, which is generative of all figures, and according to which the father of the universe convolves the world, and gives to each of the elements its proper figure. Of these, therefore, we must establish ideas, and of such other sciences as elevate souls to intellect, and the assistance of which we require in running back to the intelligible. But, with respect to such sciences as pertain to the soul while sporting and employing herself about mortal concerns, and administering to human indigence, of these there are no intellectual forms, but the soul possesses a power in opinion,

nion, which is the fruitful source of theorems, and is naturally adapted to generate and judge of such-like particulars. There are, however, by no means separate forms of the arts, or of things artificial. But it is not wonderful that the causes of these should subsist in dæmons, who are said to be the inspective guardians of arts, and to impart them to men; or that they should also be symbolically in the Gods. Thus, for instance, a certain dæmon of the order of Vulcan is said to preside over the brazier's art, and to contain the form of this art; but the mighty Vulcan himself is said symbolically to fabricate the heavens from brass. In a similar manner, there is a certain Minerval dæmon who presides over the weaver's art, Minerva herself being celebrated as weaving in a different and demiurgic manner the order of intellectual forms.

In the next place, with respect to evil, must we say that there is such thing as evil itself, the idea of evils? or shall we say, that as the form of things endued with interval is impartible, and of things multiplied, monadic, so the paradigm of things evil is good? For the assertion is by no means sane, which admits that evil itself subsists among ideas, lest we should be compelled to say that divinity himself is the cause of those evils of which he contains the paradigms; though we, when we look to those paradigms, become better than we were before. But if some one should say that the form of evils is good, we ask, whether it is alone good in its essence, or also in its energy? For, if in its essence alone, it will be productive of evil by its energy, which it is not lawful to assert; but if in its energy also, it is evident that what is generated by it will be good. For the effect of beneficent power and energy is good, no less than the effect of fire is hot. Evil, therefore, so far as evil, is not generated according to a certain paradigm. But if, as Parmenides also says, every idea is a God, and no God, as we learn from the Republic, is the cause of evil, neither must we say, that ideas being Gods are the causes of evil. But paradigms are the causes of the things of which they are paradigms; and hence, no idea is the cause of evil.

From all that has been said, we may summarily collect that ideas are of universal essences, and of the perfections in these. For the good, the essential, and the perpetual, are most adapted to forms; the first of these pervading from the first cause, the second from the highest being, and the third from eternity, to the first order of forms. From these three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a certain paradigmatic intellectual cause, and what subsist from other principles,

and not from an intellectual paradigm. For hair, though it should be a leading part, will not be there; for it has been shown that other things are there, and not parts. But clay is an indefinite mixture of two elements not subsisting according to a physical reason; since we are also accustomed to connect together ten thousand other particulars for our use. We do not however refer any thing of this kind to form: for these works are either the offspring of art, or of a deliberative tendency to things in our power. And as to mud, since it is a certain evil of that with which it subsists, it cannot subsist from ideas, because, as we have shown, nothing evil is generated from thence. On this account these things, because they are exits and privations of ideas, do not from them derive their origin. For darkness is a privation of light; but the sun, being the cause of light, is not also the cause of its privation. In like manner, intellect, being the cause of knowledge, does not also give subsistence to ignorance, which is the privation of knowledge; and soul, being the supplier of life, does not also impart a privation of life. But if some one should say that intellect knowing good knows also evil, and on this account should place evil in intellect, to this we must reply, that there is no paradigm of evil in intellect, but that it possesses a knowledge of evil; and that this is the paradigm of all the knowledge of evil, which he who receives is benefited. For ignorance is evil, but not the knowledge of ignorance, this being one knowledge both of itself and of ignorance. For, if we thus speak, we shall neither introduce ideas of things evil, as some of the Platonists have, nor shall we say that intellect alone knows things of a more excellent nature, as others have asserted; but, ranking between both, we shall admit that it has a knowledge of evils, but we shall not introduce a paradigmatic cause of these, since it would be evil.

The following translation of extracts from the beginning of the MS. of Damascius *περί αρχῶν*, OR CONCERNING PRINCIPLES, may be considered as an admirable comment on the concluding part of the first hypothesis of this dialogue, where it is inferred (p. 160.) that *the one* neither *is* one, nor *is*; and that it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. The extracts are taken and translated from the MS. in the Bodleian library. The difficulty of translating these extracts, like the sublimity which they contain, can be known only to a few.

Whether

Whether shall we say that the one principle of all things is beyond all things? or that it is something belonging to all things, being as it were the summit of the things proceeding from it? And shall we say that all things subsist together with it, or that they are posterior to and originate from it? For if some one should assert this, how will the principle be something external to all things? For, those things are in short all, of which no one whatever is absent. But the principle is absent, as not ranking among all things. All things, therefore, are not simply posterior to the principle, but besides the principle. Further still, all things must be considered as many finite things: for things infinite will plainly not be all. Nothing, therefore, will be external to all things. For *allness* (*παντοτης*) is a certain boundary and comprehension, in which the principle is the boundary upwards, and that which is the ultimate procession from the principle, the boundary downwards. All things, therefore, subsist together with the boundaries. Again, the principle is coordinated with the things which proceed from the principle; for it is said to be and is the principle of them. The cause also is coordinated with the things caused, and that which is first with the things posterior to the first. But things of which there is one coordination, being many, are said to be all; so that the principle also is among all things. And, in short, we call such things as we conceive to subsist in any way whatever, all things; and we also conceive the principle to subsist. Hence we are accustomed to call all the city, the governor and the governed, and all the race, the begetter and the begotten. But if all things subsist together with the principle, will not the principle be something belonging to all things, the principle also being assumed in conjunction with all things? The one coordination, therefore, of all things, which we say is all, is without a principle, and without a cause, lest we should ascend to infinity. It is however necessary that every thing should either be the principle, or from the principle. All things, therefore, are either the principle, or from the principle. But if the latter be the case, the principle will not subsist together with all things, but will be external to all things, as the principle of the things proceeding from it. If the former be admitted, what will that be which will proceed from all things, as from the principle? All things, therefore, are neither the principle, nor from the principle*. Further still, all things are in a certain respect beheld subsisting in multitude, and a certain separa-

* For the principle so far as it is the principle ranks among all things.

ion. For we cannot conceive the all without these. How, therefore, do a certain separation and multitude directly appear? Or are not all things every where in separation and multitude? But is *the one* the summit of the many, and *the monad* the united subsistence of things which are separated from each other? And, still further, is *the one* more simple than *the monad*? In the first place, however, if this be said, every monad is number, though subsisting contractedly and in profound union; and thus the monad also is all things. And, in the next place, *the one* is not something belonging to *the many*; for thus it would give completion to *the many*, in the same manner as each of other things. But as numerous as are the many according to a certain division, so numerous also will *the one* be prior to division, according to the every way impartible. For it is not *the one* as that which is smallest, as Speusippus appears to say, but it is *the one* as all things. For by its own simplicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to be one. Hence all things proceed from it, because it is itself all things prior to all. And as that which has an united subsistence is prior to things which are separated from each other, so *the one* is *many* prior to *the many*. But when we expand every conception belonging to our nature to all things, then we do not predicate all things after the same manner, but in a triple respect at least; viz. *unically*, *unitedly*, and in a *multiplied* manner. All things, therefore, are from *the one*, and with reference to *the one*, as we are accustomed to say. If then, according to a more usual manner of speaking, we call things which consist in multitude and separation all things, we must admit that *the united*, and in a still greater degree *the one*, are the principles of these. But if we consider these two as all things, and assume them in conjunction with all other things, according to habitude and coordination with them, as we have before said, we must then investigate another principle prior to all things, which it is no longer proper to consider as in any way all things, nor to co-arrange with its progeny. For if some one should say that *the one*, though it is all things which have in any respect a subsistence, yet is *one* prior to *all things*, and is more *one* than *all things*; since it is *one* by itself, but *all things* as the cause of all, and according to a coordination with all things;—if this should be said, *the one* will thus be doubled, and we ourselves shall become doubled, and multiplied about its simplicity. For by being *the one* it is all things after the most simple manner. At the same time also, though this should be said, it is necessary that the principle of all things should

should be exempt from all things, and consequently that it should be exempt from the most simple *allness*, and from a simplicity absorbing all things, such as is that of *the one*. Our soul, therefore, prophesies that the principle which is beyond all things that can in any respect be conceived, is uncoordinated with all things. Neither, therefore, must it be called principle, nor cause, nor that which is first, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor, in short, is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For, whatever we conceive or consider is either something belonging to all things, or is all things, although analysing we should ascend to that which is most simple, which is the most comprehensive of all things, being as it were the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings: for, of beings, that which has an united subsistence, and is perfectly without separation, is the extremity, since every being is mingled from elements which are either *bound* and *infinity*, or the progeny of these. But *the one* is simply the last boundary of *the many*. For we cannot conceive any thing more simple than that which is perfectly one; which if we denominate the principle, and cause, the first and the most simple, these and all other things are there only according to *the one*. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of *the one* the distributed multitude which is in ourselves; unless we despise these appellations also, because *the many* cannot be adapted to *the one*. Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it could, it would in this respect be *many*. Or these things also will be contained in it, according to *the one*. For the nature of *the one* is all-receptive, or rather all-producing, and there is not any thing whatever which *the one* is not. Hence all things are as it were evolved from it. It is, therefore, properly cause, and the first, the end, and the last, the defensive enclosure of all things, and the *one* nature of all things; not that nature which is in things, and which proceeds from *the one*, but that which is prior to them, which is the most impartible summit of all things whatever, and the greatest comprehension of all things which in any respect are said to have a being.

But if *the one* is the cause of all things, and is comprehensive of all things, what ascent will there be for us beyond this also? For we do not strive in vain, extending ourselves to that which is nothing. For that which is not even *one*, is not according to the most just mode of speaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is

something beyond *the one*? for *the many* require nothing else than *the one*. And hence *the one* alone is the cause of *the many*. Hence also *the one* is entirely cause, because it is necessary that the cause of the many should alone be *the one*. For it cannot be nothing; since nothing is the cause of nothing. Nor can it be *the many*—for so far as *many* they are uncoordinated; and *the many* will not be one cause. But if there are many causes, they will not be causes of each other, through being uncoordinated, and through a progression in a circle, the same things being causes and the things caused. Each, therefore, will be the cause of itself, and thus there will be no cause of the many. Hence it is necessary that *the one* should be the cause of the many, and which is also the cause of their coordination: for there is a certain conspiring coordination, and a union with each other.

If, therefore, some one thus doubting should say that *the one* is a sufficient principle, and should add as the summit that we have not any conception or suspicion more simple than that of *the one*, and should therefore ask how we can suspect any thing beyond the last suspicion and conception we are able to frame;—if some one should thus speak, we must pardon the doubt. For a speculation of this kind is as it seems inaccessible and immense: at the same time, however, from things more known to us we must extend the ineffable parturitions of our soul, to the ineffable coextension of this sublime truth. For, as that which subsists without is in every respect more honourable than that which subsists with habitude, and the uncoordinated than the coordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn for instance than Jupiter; being than forms, and *the one* than *the many*, of which *the one* is the principle; so, in short, that which transcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than all causes and principles, and is not to be considered as subsisting in any coarrangement and habitude; since *the one* is naturally prior to *the many*, that which is most simple to things more composite, and that which is most comprehensive to the things which it comprehends. So that, if you are willing thus to speak, *the first* is beyond all such opposition, not only that which is in things coordinate, but even that which takes place from its subsistence as the first. *The one*, therefore, and the united are posterior to the first: for these causally contain multitude as numerous as that which is unfolded from them. *The one*, however, is no less one, if indeed it is not more so, because separate multitude is posterior to and not in it; and the united is no less united because it contracted in

one things separated prior to separation. Each of these, therefore, is all things, whether according to coordination, or according to their own nature. But all things cannot be things first, nor the principle. Nor yet one of them alone, because this one will be at the same time all things, according to *the one*; but we shall not yet have discovered that which is beyond all things. To which we may also add, that *the one* is the summit of *the many*, as the cause of the things proceeding from it. We may likewise say that we form a conception of *the one* according to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But that which is most venerable must necessarily be incomprehensible by all conceptions and suspicions; since also, in other things, that which always soars beyond our conceptions is more honourable than that which is more obvious: so that what flies from all our suspicions will be most honourable. But, if this be the case, it is *nothing*. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than *the one*, the other posterior to sensibles. If also we strive in vain in asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold; the one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect whatever has any subsistence. For *this* also is ineffable, as Plato says, but according to the worse, but *that* according to the better. If, too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is the most necessary advantage of all others, that all things thence proceed as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as *the one* produces *the many*, nor as *the united* things *separated*, but as the ineffable similarly produces all things, ineffably. But if in asserting these things concerning it, that it is ineffable, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and which, standing in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but signify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and disappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through indications to such as are able to understand these investigations. We also see that our parturitions suffer these things about *the one*, and that in a similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For *the one*, says Plato, if it is, is not *the one*. But if it is not, no assertion can be adapted to it: so that neither can there be a negation of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name

simple. Nor is there any opinion nor science of it; for neither are these simple: nor is intellect itself simple. So that *the one* is in every respect unknown and ineffable.

What then? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable? Or, perhaps, indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through *the one* as a medium, to the ineffable beyond *the one*, which is now the subject of discussion; and this by an ablation of *the one*, in the same manner as he leads us to *the one* by an ablation of other things. For, that he gives to *the one* a certain position is evident from his *Sophista*, where he demonstrates that it subsists prior to being, itself by itself. But if, having ascended as far as to *the one*, he is silent, this also is becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner of the antients, concerning things in every respect unspeakable: for the discourse was, indeed; most dangerous, in consequence of falling on idiotical ears. Indeed, when discoursing concerning that which in no respect has any subsistence, he subverts his assertions, and is fearful of falling into the sea of dissimilitude, or, rather, of unsubstantiating void. But if demonstrations do not accord with *the one*, it is by no means wonderful: for they are human and divisible, and more composite than is fit. Indeed, they are not even adapted to being, since they are formal, or rather they are neither adapted to forms nor essences. Or, is it not Plato himself, who in his *Epistles** evinces that we have nothing which is significant of form, no type, nor name, nor discourse, nor opinion, nor science? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend ideas by its projecting energies, which we cannot possess while busily engaged in discourse. If, therefore, we even energize intellectually, since in this case our intellection is characterized by form, we shall not accord with *the united* and with being. And if at any time we are able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and discordant with *the one*. If, also, we energize according to the most profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive *the one itself*, yet even this is expanded only as far as to *the one*, if there is a knowledge of *the one*; for this we have not yet determined. At the same time, however, let us now apply ourselves to the discussion of things of such great importance, through indications and suspicions, being purified, with respect to unusual conceptions, and led through analogies and negations, despoiling what we possess with respect to these, and advancing from things more dishonour-

* See the seventh *Epistle* of Plato.

able with us to things more honourable. Shall we therefore say, that the nature which we now investigate as the first, is so perfectly ineffable, that it must not even be admitted concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that *the one* is ineffable, as flying from all composition of words and names, and all distinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be apprehended in a manner the most simple and comprehensive, and that it is not one alone as the idiom of one, but as *one all things*, and one prior to all things, and not one which is something belonging to all things? These, indeed, are the parturitions of the soul, and are thus purified with respect to *the simply one*, and that which is truly the one cause of all things. But, in short, we thus form a conception of *the one* which we contain as the summit or flower of our essence, as being more proximate and allied to us, and more prompt to such a suspicion of that which nearly leaves all things behind it. But, from some particular thing which is made the subject of hypothesis, the transition is easy to that which is simply supposed, though we should in no respect accede to it, but, being carried in that which is most simple in us, should form a suspicion concerning that which is prior to all things. *The one*, therefore, is thus effable, and thus ineffable; but that which is beyond it is to be honoured in the most perfect silence, and, prior to this, by the most perfect ignorance*, which despises all knowledge.

Let us, therefore, now consider, in the second place, how it is said to be perfectly unknown. For, if this be true, how do we assert all these things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much discussion about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality uncoordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, and is nothing of all things, nor even *the one itself*, these very things are the nature of it. Besides, with respect to its being unknown, we either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. But if the latter, how do we say that it is perfectly unknown? And if we know this, in this respect therefore it is known. Or shall we say that it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore deny one thing of another, not knowing that which is the subject of the negation; nor can we say that

* As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worse than knowledge, so the silence in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates is succeeded by an ignorance superior to all knowledge. Let it, however, be carefully remembered, that such an ignorance is only to be obtained after the most scientific and intellectual energies.

it is not this or that, when we can in no respect reach it. How, therefore, can we deny of that of which we are perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is just as if some one who was blind from his birth should assert that heat is not in colour. Or perhaps, indeed, he also will justly say, that colour is not hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of colour, except that it is not tangible: for he knows that he does not know it. Such a knowledge, indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of his own ignorance. And we also, when we say that the first is unknown, do not announce any thing of it, but we confess the manner in which we are affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is not in the colour, nor yet his blindness, but in him. The ignorance, therefore, of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge of that which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing known. But if knowledge is in that which is known, being as it were the splendour of it, so some one should say ignorance is in that which is unknown, being as it were the darkness of it, or obscurity, according to which it is unknown by, and is unapparent to, all things,—he who says this is ignorant, that as blindness is a privation, so likewise all ignorance, and that as is the invisible, so that of which we are ignorant, and which is unknown. In other things, therefore, the privation of this or that leaves something else. For that which is incorporeal, though invisible, yet is intelligible: and that which is not intelligible by a certain intelligence, leaves at the same time something else. But if we take away every conception and suspicion, this also we must say is perfectly unknown by us, about which we close every eye*. Nor must we assert any thing of it, as we do of the intelligible, that it is not adapted to be seen by the eyes, or as we do of *the one*, that it is not naturally adapted to be understood by an essential and abundant intellect: for it imparts nothing by which it can be apprehended, nothing which can lead to a suspicion of its nature. For neither do we only say that it is unknown, that being something else it may naturally possess the unknown, but we do not think it fit to predicate of it either *being*, or *the one*, or *all things*, or *the principle of all things*, or, in short, *any thing*. Neither, therefore, are these things the nature of it, viz. *the nothing*, *the being beyond all things*, *supercasual subsistence*, and *the uncoordinated with all things*; but these are only ablations of things posterior to it. How, therefore, do we speak concerning it? Shall we say,

* Παν ὅμμα μυσμέν.

that,

that, knowing these posterior things, we despise them with respect to the position, if I may so speak, of that which is in every respect ineffable? For, as that which is beyond some particular knowledge is better than that which is apprehended by such knowledge, so that which is beyond all suspicion must necessarily be most venerable; not that it is known to be so, but possessing the most venerable as in us, and as the consequence of the manner in which we are affected about it. We also call this a prodigy, from its being entirely incomprehensible by our conceptions: for it is through analogy, if that which in a certain respect is unknown, according to a more excellent subsistence, is superior to that which is in every respect known. Hence, that which is in every respect unknown according to a more excellent subsistence, must necessarily be acknowledged to be supreme, though it indeed has neither the supreme, nor the most excellent; nor the most venerable: for these things are our confessions about that, which entirely flies from all our conceptions and suspicions. For by this very assertion, that we can form no suspicion of it, we acknowledge that it is most wonderful; since, if we should suspect any thing concerning it, we must also investigate something else prior to this suspicion, and either proceed to infinity in our search, or stop at that which is perfectly ineffable. Can we, therefore, demonstrate any thing concerning it? and is that demonstrable which we do not think fit to consider as a thing whose subsistence we can even suspect? Or, when we assert these things, do we not indeed demonstrate *concerning* it, but not *it*? For neither does it contain the demonstrable, nor any thing else. What then? Do we not opine concerning it these things which we now assert? But if there is an opinion of it, it is also the object of opinion. Or shall we say we opine that it is not these things? for Aristotle also says that there is true opinion. If, therefore, the opinion is true, the thing likewise is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in consequence of the thing subsisting, the opinion also is true. Though, indeed, how will it be, or how will that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or shall we say this is true, that it is not these things, and that it is not known? Is it therefore truly false, that it is these things, and that it is known? Or shall we say that these things are to be referred to privations, and to that which in a certain respect is not, in which there may be a falling from the hypothesis of form? Just as we call the absence of light darkness. For, light not existing, neither is there any darkness. But to that which is never and in no respect being, nothing among beings can,

can, as Plato says, accede. Neither, therefore, is it non-being, nor, in short, privation; and even the expression *never in no respect* (το μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς) is incapable of signifying its nature. For this expression is being, and *signification* is something belonging to beings. Likewise, though we should opine that it is not in any respect, yet at the same time since it thus becomes the object of opinion, it belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly calls that which never and in no respect is, ineffable and incapable of being opined, and this according to the worse than the effable and opinion, in the same manner as we say the supreme is according to that which is better than these. What then, do we not think and are we not persuaded that the supreme thus subsists? Or, as we have often said, do not these things express the manner in which we are affected about it? But we possess in ourselves this opinion, which is therefore empty, as is the opinion of a vacuum and the infinite. As therefore we form a phantastic and fictitious opinion of these, though they are not, as if they were, just as we opine the sun to be no larger than a sphere whose diameter is but a foot, though this is far from being the case;—so, if we opine any thing concerning that which never and in no respect is, or concerning that of which we write these things, the opinion is our own, and the vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think that we apprehend the supreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to us, so much does it transcend our conceptions. How, therefore, do we demonstrate that there is such an ignorance in us concerning it? And how do we say that it is unknown? We reply, in one word, Because we always find that what is above knowledge is more honourable; so that what is above all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found to be most honourable. But it is sufficient to the demonstration that it cannot be found. We also say that it is above all things; because, if it were any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there would be something common to it with all things, viz. the being known. But there is one coordination of things in which there is something common; so that in consequence of this it will subsist together with all things. Hence it is necessary that it should be unknown.

In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the known, though they are relatively inherent at the same time. As, therefore, we say that the same thing is relatively large and small, so also we say, that a thing is known and unknown with reference to different things. And as the same thing, by participating of the

two forms, the great and the small, is at the same time both great and small, so that which at the same time participates of the known and the unknown is both these. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to sense, but is known to intellect. For the more excellent will not be privation, the inferior at the same time being form; since every absence, and a privation of this kind, is either in matter or in soul; but all things are present in intellect, and still more in a certain respect in the intelligible. Unless, indeed, we denominate privation according to a more excellent subsistence, as we say that is not form which is above form; and that is not being which is superessential; and that is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a transcendence which surpasses all things. If, therefore, *the one* is the last known of things which are in any respect whatever known or suspected, that which is beyond *the one* is primarily and perfectly unknown; which also is so unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor can we accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us whether it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about it, nor can we know it, neither as known, nor as unknown. Hence, we are on all sides subverted, in consequence of not being able to reach it in any respect, because it is not even one thing; or rather, it is not that which is not even one thing. Hence, it is that which in no respect whatever has any subsistence; or it is even beyond this, since this is a negation of being, and that which is not even one thing is a negation of *the one*. But that which is not one thing, or, in other words, that which is nothing, is a void, and a falling from all things. We do not, however, thus conceive concerning the ineffable. Or shall we say that *nothing* is twofold, the one being beyond, and the other below, all things? For *the one* also is twofold, *this* being the extreme, as *the one* of matter, and *that* the first, as that which is more ancient than being. So that with respect to *nothing* also, *this* will be as that which is not even the last one, but *that*, as neither being the first one. In this way, therefore, that which is unknown and ineffable is twofold, *this*, as not even possessing the last suspicion of subsistence, and *that*, as not even being the first of things. Must we, therefore, consider it as that which is unknown to us? Or this indeed is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown even to much-honoured intellect, if it be lawful so to speak. For every intellect looks to the intelligible; and the intelligible is either *form* or *being*. But may not divine knowledge know it; and may it not be known to this superessentially? This knowledge, however, applies itself

to *the one*, but that which we are now investigating is beyond *the one*. In short, if it also is known, in conjunction with others, it will also be something belonging to all things; for it will be common to it with others to be known, and thus far it will be coordinated with others. Further still, if it is known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It will, therefore, define it. Every boundary, however, ascends ultimately as far as to *the one*; but *that* is beyond *the one*. It is, therefore, perfectly incomprehensible and invisible, and consequently is not to be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that knowledge is of things which may be known, as beings, or as having a subsistence, or as participating of *the one*. But this is beyond all these. Further still, *the one* also appears to be unknown, if it is necessary that what is known should be one thing, and that which knows another, though both should be in the same thing. So that *the truly one* will not know itself: for it does not possess a certain duplicity. There will not, therefore, be in it that which knows, and that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, considered according to *the one itself* alone, and as being conjoined with *the one*, be united with that which is simple, according to duplicity. For how can the double be conjoined with the simple? But if he knows *the one* by *the one*, that which knows, and also that which is known, will be *one*, and in each the nature of *the one* will be shown, subsisting alone and being *one*. So that he will not be conjoined as different with that which is different, or as that which is gnostic with that which is known, since this very thing is one alone; so that neither will he be conjoined according to knowledge. Much more, therefore, is that which is not even *the one* unknown. But if *the one* is the last thing known, we know nothing of that which is beyond *the one*; so that the present rhapsody is vain. Or shall we say we know that these things are unworthy to be asserted, if it be lawful so to speak, of the first hypothesis, since, not yet knowing even intelligible forms, we despise the images which subsist in us of their eternal and impartible nature; since these images are partible, and multifariously mutable. Further still, being ignorant of the contracted subsistence of intelligible species and genera, but possessing an image of this, which is a contraction of the genera and species in us, we suspect that being itself resembles this contraction, but is at the same time something more excellent; and this must be especially the case with that which has an united subsistence. But now we are ignorant of *the one*, not contracting, but expanding all things to it;

and in us simplicity itself consists, with relation to the all which we contain, but is very far from coming into contact with the all-perfect nature of *the one*. For *the one* and *the simple* in our nature, are in the smallest degree that which they are said to be, except that they are a sign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus also assuming in intellect every thing which can be in any respect known or suspected, we think fit to ascribe it as far as to *the one*; if it be requisite to speak of things unspeakable, and to conceive things which are inconceivable. At the same time, also, we think fit to make that the subject of hypothesis, which cannot be compared, and is uncoordinated with all things, and which is so exempt, that neither in reality does it possess the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from something, and is not in every respect exempt, as possessing habitude to that from which it is exempt, and, in short, preceding in a certain coordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly exempt the subject of hypothesis, we must not even suppose it to be exempt. For, accurately speaking, its proper name will not be verified when ascribed to *the exempt*; for in this case it would at the same time be coordinated; so that it is necessary even to deny this of it. Likewise, negation is a certain sentence, and that which is denied is a certain thing; but that of which we are now endeavouring to speak is not any thing. Neither, therefore, can it be denied, nor spoken of, nor be in any way known: so that neither is it possible to deny the negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonstration of what we say, is a perfect subversion of language and conceptions. What end, therefore, will there be of the discourse, except the most profound silence, and an acknowledgment that we know nothing of that which it is not lawful, since impossible, to lead into knowledge?

May it not, therefore, be said by some one who ventures to make such-like inquiries, if we assert something concerning it from things of a posterior nature, since in these the monad is every where the leader of a certain proper number; for there is one first soul and many souls, one first intellect and many intellects, one first being and many beings, and one first unity and many unities;—if this be the case, may it not be said that in a similar manner it is requisite there should be one ineffable and many ineffables? If this then be admitted, it will be necessary to say that the ineffable is ineffably prolific. It will, therefore, generate a proper multitude. Or may we not say, that these and such-like conceptions arise from forgetting what has been before asserted?

For there is nothing common between it and other things; nor will there be any thing pertaining to it among things which are spoken of, or conceived, or suspected. Neither, therefore, can *the one* nor *the many*, neither *the prolific* nor *the productive*, nor that which is in any respect a cause, neither any analogy nor similitude can be ascribed to it. For it is especially necessary to induce quiet, in that which is arcane, firmly abiding in the adytum of the soul. But if it be necessary to indicate something concerning it by negations, we must say that it is neither one nor many, neither prolific nor unprolific, neither cause nor causeless; thus in reality subverting ourselves, I know not how, by negations to infinity. Shall we, therefore, thus trifling adduce that which in no respect has any subsistence whatever? For to this all these assertions are adapted, and after all these the very subversion itself, as the Elean philosopher teaches us. This question indeed is not difficult to solve; for we have before said that all these things apply to that which is not in any respect, in consequence of its being worse than all these, but they apply to the first, in consequence of admitting it to be better than all these. For the things denied are not denied of each after the same manner; but upwards things less, if it be lawful so to speak, are denied of that which is more excellent; and downwards, things better of that which is worse, if it be possible so to speak. For we deny things both of matter and *the one*, but in a twofold respect, after the above-mentioned manner. This question then, as I have said, is easily solved.

Again, therefore, it may be said, Does not something proceed from it to the things which are here? Or how indeed should this not be the case, if all things are from it? For every thing participates of that from which it proceeds. For, if nothing else, it thence possesses that which it is, respiring its proper principle, and converting itself to it as much as possible. What indeed should hinder it from imparting something of itself to its progeny? What other medium is there? And how is it not necessary that the second should always be nearer to the one principle than the third? and the third than the fourth? And if this be the case, must it not also less depart from it? If this too be the case, must it not also more abide in the boundary of its nature? Hence, too, must it not also be more assimilated to it, so that it likewise will be adapted to participate of it, and so that it will participate of it? How also could we suspect these things concerning it, unless we contained a certain vestige of it,—a vestige

hastening as it were to be conjoined with it? Shall we, therefore, say that being arcane bestows an arcane participation on all things, through which there is in every thing something arcane? For we acknowledge that some things are more arcane than others, *the one* than *being*, *being* than *life*, *life* than *intellect*, and thus always in succession after the same manner; or rather inversely; from matter as far as to a rational essence, these things subsist according to the worse, but those according to the better, if it be lawful so to speak. May we not however say that he who admits this will also make a progression from the first, and a certain arcane order of things proceeding, and that thus we shall introduce all such effables to the arcane, as we have condistributed with the effable? We shall therefore make three monads and three numbers, and no longer two; viz. the essential, the unical, or that which is characterized by unity, and the arcane. And thus we shall admit what we formerly rejected, i. e. multitude in the arcane, and an order of things first, middle, and last. There will also be permanency, progression and regression; and, in short, we shall mingle much of the effable with the ineffable. But if, as we have said, the term *it* or *those* can not be introduced to that arcane nature which we consider as above *the one* and *the many* neither must any thing else besides *the one* be admitted as prior to the many, nor any thing else be condistributed with the many in participation. Neither, therefore, is it participated, nor does it impart any thing of itself to its progeny; nor is every God arcane prior to its being one, as it is one prior to its being essence. May we not say, therefore, that language here being subverted evinces that this nature is arcane by conceiving contraries according to every mode from things posterior to it? And why is this wonderful, since we are also involved in similar doubts concerning *the one*? Indeed, is not this also the case concerning being and that which is perfectly united?

In another part, near the beginning of the same admirable work, he remarks that *the one* in every thing is the mere true thing itself. Thus, for instance, *the one* of man is the mere true man, that of soul is the mere true soul, and that of body the mere true body. Thus also *the one* of the sun, and *the one* of the moon, are the mere true sun and moon. After which he observes as follows: Neither *the one* nor all things accords with the nature of *the one*. For these are opposed to each other, and distribute our conceptions. For, if we look to the simple and *the one*, we destroy its immensely great perfection: and if we conceive all things subsisting together, we
abolish

abolish *the one* and the simple. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided idioms. At the same time, however, aspiring after the knowledge of it, we connect all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend this mighty nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, or contracting the peculiar nature of *the one*, and rejoicing in that which is simple and the first in speaking of the most ancient principle, we thus introduce *the one itself* as a symbol of simplicity; since we likewise introduce *all things* as a symbol of the comprehension of all things. But that which is above or prior to both we can neither conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful that we should suffer these things about it, since the distinct knowledge of it is unical, which we cannot perceive? Other things too of this kind we suffer about *being*. For, endeavouring to perceive *being*, we dismiss it, but run round the elements of it, bound and infinity. But if we form a more true conception of it, that it is an united plenitude of all things, in this case the conception of *all things* draws us down to multitude, and the conception of *the united* abolishes that of all things. Neither however is this yet wonderful. For, with respect to forms also, when we wish to survey any one of these, we run round the elements of it, and, striving to perceive its unity, we obliterate its elements. At the same time, however, every form is one and many; not indeed partly one, and partly many, but the whole of it is through the whole a thing of this kind. Not being able, therefore, to apprehend this collectively, we rejoice in acceding to it with a distribution of our conceptions. But always adhering in our ascent, like those who climb clinging with their hands and feet to things which extend us to a more impartible nature, we obtain in a certain respect a compensation in the distribution, of that which is uniform. We despise, therefore, this with respect to the collected apprehension of it, which we cannot obtain, unless a certain vestige of collected intelligence in our nature is agitated. And this is the light of truth, which is suddenly enkindled, as if from the collision of fire stones. For our greatest conceptions, when exercised with each other, verge to a uniform and simple summit as their end, like the extremities of lines in a circle hastening to the centre. And though even thus they subsist indeed with distribution, yet a certain vestige of the knowledge of form which we contain is pre-excited; just as the equal tendency of all the lines in a circle to terminate in the middle affords a certain obscure representation of the centre. After the same manner

manner also we ascend to being, in the first place, by understanding every form which falls upon us as distributed, not only as impartible, but also as united, and this by confounding, if it be proper so to speak, the multitude in each. In the next place, we must collect every thing separated together, and take away the circumscriptions, just as if making many streams of water to be one collection of water, except that we must not understand that which is united from all things, as one collection of water, but we must conceive that which is prior to all things, as the form of water prior to divided streams of water. Thus, therefore, we must expand ourselves to *the one*, first collecting and afterwards dismissing what we have collected, for the super-expanded transcendency of *the one*. Ascending, therefore, shall we meet with it as that which is known? Or, wishing to meet with it as such, shall we arrive at the unknown? Or may we not say that each of these is true? For we meet with it afar off as that which is known; and when we are united to it from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of *the one*, then are we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown instead of being gnostic. This contact, therefore, as of one with one, is above knowledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which is known. As however the crooked is known by the straight, so we form a conjecture of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge. *The one*, therefore, is so far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things, however, the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but, on the contrary, less known; knowledge being dissolved by *the one* into ignorance, since, as we have before observed, where there is knowledge there also is separation. But separation from *the one* is inclosed in union; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. Thus, too, the analogy of Plato requires. For first we endeavour to see the sun, and we do indeed see it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach to it, by so much the less do we see it; and at length we neither see other things, nor it, the eye becoming spontaneously dazzled by its light. Is, therefore, *the one* in its proper nature unknown, though there is something else unknown besides *the one*? *The one* indeed wills to be by itself, but with no other; but the unknown beyond *the one* is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge neither knows nor is ignorant, but has with respect to itself super-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this *the one*

itself

itself is darkened: for, being very near to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. On this account, Plato in speaking of it finds all his assertions subverted: for it is near to the subversion of every thing, which takes place about the first. It differs from it however in this, that it is *one* simply, and that according to *the one* it is also at the same time all things. But the first is above *the one* and all things, being more simple than both these.

P. 166. *Note. Such then is the intelligible triad.*

In order to convince the reader that the doctrine here delivered of the intelligible triad is not a fiction devised by the latter Platonists, I shall present him with the following translation from the same excellent work of Damascius (Περὶ ἀρχῶν,) *Concerning principles**, in which the agreement of all the ancient theologists concerning this triad is most admirably evinced.

The theology contained in the Orphic rhapsodies concerning the intelligible Gods is as follows:—*Time* is symbolically placed for the one principle of the universe; but *æther* and *chaos*, for the two posterior to this one: and *being*, simply considered, is represented under the symbol of an egg. And this is the first triad of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the second triad they establish either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or a white garment, or a cloud: because from these Phanes leaps forth into light. For, indeed, they philosophize variously concerning the middle triad. But Phanes here represents intellect. But conceiving him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as *intellect*†, Ericapæus as *power*, and Phanes as *father*. But whether or not are we to consider the middle triad according to the three-shaped God, while conceived in the egg‡? for the middle always represents each of the extremes; as in this instance, where the egg and the three-shaped God subsist together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which is united; but that the three-shaped and really multiform God is the separating and discriminating cause of that which is

* Vide Wolfii Anecd. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252.

† 'Ως νοῦν is omitted in the original.

‡ This is not an interrogative sentence in the original, but certainly ought to be so.

intelligible

intelligible. Likewise, the middle triad subsists according to the egg, as yet united ; but the third * according to the God who separates and distributes the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanicus is as follows. According to them *water* and *matter* were the first productions from which earth was secretly drawn forth : so that water and earth are established as the two first principles : the latter of these having a *dispersed* subsistence, but the former conglutinating and connecting the latter. But they are silent concerning the principle prior to these two, as being ineffable : for, as there are no illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence sufficiently evinced. But the third principle posterior to these two, *water* and *earth*, and which is generated from them, is a *dragon*, naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle having the countenance of the God himself. They add, likewise, that he has wings on his shoulders, and that he is called *undecaying Time*, and *Hercules* ; that *Necessity* resides with him, which is the same as *Nature*, and incorporeal *Adrastia*, which is extended throughout the universe, whose limits she binds in amicable conjunction. But, as it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as established according to essence, and assert, besides this, that it subsists as male and female, for the purpose of exhibiting the generative causes of all things.

I likewise find in the Orphic rhapsodies, that, neglecting the two first principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in silence, the third principle, posterior to the two, is established by the theology as the original ; because this first of all possesses something effable and commensurate to human discourse. For, in the former hypothesis, the highly revered and undecaying *Time*, the father of æther and chaos, was the principle : but in this *Time* is neglected, and the principle becomes a *dragon*. It likewise says that there was a triple offspring ; moist æther, an infinite chaos, and cloudy and dark Erebus ; delivering this second triad analogous to the first : this being potential, as that was paternal. Hence, the third procession of this triad is dark Erebus : its paternal and summit æther, not according to a simple but intellectual subsistence : but its middle, infinite chaos, considered as a progeny or procession, and among these parturient, because from these the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then is the third intelligible triad ? I answer, The egg ; the duad of the natures of male and female

* To τριτον is, I conceive, erroneously omitted in the original.

which it contains, and the multitude of all-various seeds, residing in the middle of this triad : and the third among these is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his shoulders ; but in his inward parts naturally possessing the heads of bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, invested with the all-various forms of wild beasts. This last then must be considered as the *intellect* of the triad ; but the middle progeny, which are *many* as well as *two*, correspond to *power*, and the egg itself is the *paternal principle* of the third triad : but the third God of this third triad, this theology celebrates as *Protogonus*, and calls him *Jupiter*, the disposer of all things and of the whole world ; and on this account denominates him *Pan*. And such is the information which this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible principles of things.

But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the theology of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is passed over in silence, as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal enunciation. Eudemus, therefore, commences his genealogy from *Night*, from which also Homer begins : though Eudemus is far from making the Homeric genealogy consistent and connected, for he asserts that Homer begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent that *Night* is according to Homer the greatest divinity, since she is revered even by Jupiter himself. For the poet says of Jupiter—" that he feared lest he should act in a manner displeasing to swift *Night* *." So that Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods from *Night*. But it appears to me that Hesiod, when he asserts that *Chaos* was first generated, signifies by *Chaos* the incomprehensible and perfectly united nature of that which is intelligible : but that he produces *Earth* † the first from thence, as a certain principle of the whole procession of the Gods. Unless perhaps *Chaos* is the second of the two principles : but *Earth* ‡, *Tartarus*, and *Love* form the triple intelligible. So that

* Αἴθερ γὰρ μὴ νυκτὶ θεῖη ἀποδυμῖα βέλτοι. Iliad. lib. ξ. ver. 261.

† Τῆν is printed instead of Γῆν.

‡ As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the Gods which Hesiod celebrates by the epithets of *Earth*, *Heaven*, &c. cannot be the visible *Heaven* and *Earth* : for Plato in the *Cratylus*, following the Orphic doctrine concerning the Gods, as will appear in our notes on that dialogue, plainly shows, in explaining the name of Jupiter, that this divinity, who is subordinate to *Saturn*, *Heaven*, *Earth*, &c. is the artificer of the sensible universe ; and consequently *Saturn*,
Heaven,

that *Love* is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible order, considered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus denominated by Orpheus in his rhapsodies. But *Earth* for the first, as being first established in a certain firm and essential permanency. And *Tartarus* for the middle, as in a certain respect exciting and moving forms into distribution. But *Acufilaus* appears to me to establish *Chaos* for the first principle, as entirely unknown; and after this, two principles, *Erebus* as male, and *Night* as female; placing the latter for *infinity*, but the former for *bound*. But from the mixture of these, he says * that *Æther*, *Love*, and *Counsel* are generated forming three intelligible hypostases. And he places *Æther* as the summit; but *Love* in the middle, according to its naturally middle subsistence; but *Metis* or *Counsel* as the third, and the same as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the history of Eudemus, from these he produces a great number of other Gods. But Epimenides establishes *Air* and *Night* as the two first principles; manifestly reverencing in silence the one principle prior to these two. But from *Air* and *Night* *Tartarus* is generated, forming, as it appears to me, the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature from the two. And this mixture is called by some an intelligible medium, because it extends itself to both the summit and the end. But from the mixture of the extremes with each other an egg is generated, which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another progeny proceeds. But according to Pherecydes Syrius, the three first principles are, a *Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature*, *Time* †, and an *Earthly Nature*: one of these subsisting, as I conceive, prior to the other two. But

Heaven, Earth, &c. are much superior to the mundane deities. Indeed, if this be not admitted, the *Theogony* of Hesiod must be perfectly absurd and inexplicable. For why does he call Jupiter, agreeably to Homer, (πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε), "*father of Gods and men*?" Shall we say that he means literally that Jupiter is the father of *all* the Gods? But this is impossible; for he delivers the generation of Gods who are the parents of Jupiter. He can, therefore, only mean that Jupiter is the parent of all the mundane Gods: and his *Theogony*, when considered according to this exposition, will be found to be beautifully consistent and sublime; whereas, according to modern interpretations, the whole is a mere chaos, more wild than the delirious visions of Swedenborg, and more unconnected than the *fishy* rant of the stool-preaching methodist. I only add, that τῶν is erroneously printed in the Excerpta of Wolfius for γῶν.

* Φῦμι in the original should doubtless be γῦμι.

† Χθονος is printed for γωνος.

he asserts that *Time* generates from the progeny of itself, *Fire*, *Spirit*, and *Water*: which signify, as it appears to me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from these, distributed into five profound recesses, a numerous progeny of Gods is constituted, which he calls *five-times animated* (πεντεμυχος); and which is, perhaps, the same as if he had said *πεντεκοσμος*, or a *five-fold world*. But we may probably discourse on this subject at some other opportunity. And thus much may suffice at present concerning the hypothesis derived from the Grecian fables, which are both many and various.

But with respect to the theology of the barbarians, the Babylonians seem to pass over in silence the one principle of the universe. But they establish two principles, *Tauthe* and *Apafoon*. And they consider *Apafoon* as the husband of *Tauthe*, whom they denominate the mother of the Gods; from whom an only-begotten son *Moomis* was produced: which, as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced from two principles*. But from these another procession is derived, *Dache* and *Dachus*. And likewise a third from these, *Kiffure* and *Affoorus*. And from these again three deities are produced, *Anus*, *Illinus*, and *Aus*. But from *Aus* and *Dache* a son called *Belus* is produced, who they say is the demiurgus of the world. But with respect to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, some of them call all the intelligible and united world *Place*, and some of them *Time*: from which a good divinity and an evil demon are distributed; *Light* and *Darkness* subsisting prior to these, according to the assertions of others. However, both the one and the other, after an undistributed nature, consider that nature as having a subsistence which distributes the twofold coordination of better natures: one of which coordinations *Orosmades* presides over, and the other *Arimanius*. But the Sidonians, according to the same historian, place before all things *Time*, *Desire*, and *Cloudy Darkness*. And they assert, that from the mingling of *Desire* and *Darkness* as two principles, *Air* and a gentle *Wind* were produced: *Air* evincing the summit of the intelligible triad; but the gentle *Wind* raised and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the intelligible. And again, that from both these the bird *Otus*, similar to a night raven, was produced; representing, as it appears to me, intelligible intellect. But as we find (with-

* That is, from *bound* and *infinity*.

out the assistance of Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Moschus, places *Æther* and *Air* as the two first principles, from which the intelligible God *Oulomus* was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the summit of the intelligible order. But from this God (yet proceeding together with him) they assert that *Chouforus* was produced, being the first unfolding procession. And after this *an egg* succeeds; which I think must be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding *Chouforus* is intelligible power, because this is the first nature which distributes an undistributed subsistence: unless, perhaps, after the two principles *Æther* and *Air*, the summit is *one Wind*; but the middle *two Winds*, the *south-west* and the *south*; for in a certain respect they place these prior to *Oulomus*. But *Oulomus* himself is intelligible intellect: and unfolding *Chouforus** the first order after the intelligible series. And the *egg itself* is heaven: from the bursting of which into two parts, the sections are said to have become heaven and earth. But with respect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is related of them by Eudemus. According to certain Egyptian philosophers, however, among us, *an unknown Darknefs* is celebrated in some Egyptian writings as the one principle of the universe, and this *thrice pronounced as such*: but for the two principles after the first, they place *water* and *sand*, according to Heraclitus; but according to the more antient writer Asclepiades, *sand* and *water*; from which, and after which, the first *Kamephis* is generated. But after this *a second*, and from this again *a third*; by all which the whole intelligible distribution is accomplished. For thus Asclepiades determines. But the more modern Heraclitus says, that the Egyptians, denominating the third Kamephis from his father and grandfather, assert that he is *the Sun*; which, doubtless, signifies in this case intelligible intellect. But a more accurate knowledge of these affairs must be received from the above-mentioned authors themselves. It must, however, be observed, that with the Egyptians there are many distributions of things according to union; because they unfold an intelligible nature into characteristics, or peculiarities of many Gods, as may be learned from such as are desirous of consulting their writings on this subject.

Thus far Damascius; from which curious and interesting relation the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the antient theologists with each other

* *Χουωφορος* should be read instead of *Χουωφορος*.

in celebrating the intelligible triad, and venerating in silence the ineffable principle of things, but may likewise behold the origin of the christian trinity, its deviation from truth, and the absurdity, and even impiety, with which a belief in it is unavoidably attended. Consonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the Chaldeans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes Picus, in his *Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldean theologists* *. “ The intelligible coordination (says he) is not in the intellectual coordination, as Amasis the Egyptian asserts, but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed in the abyss of the first unity, and under the obscurity of the first darkness.” *Coordinatio intelligibilis non est in intellectuali coordinatione, ut dixit Amasis Ægyptius, sed est super omnem intellectualem hierarchiam, in abyſſo primæ unitatis, et sub caligine primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abscondita.*

But from this triad it may be demonstrated, that all the processions of the Gods may be comprehended in six orders, viz. the *intelligible order*, the *intelligible and at the same time intellectual*, the *intellectual*, the *supermundane*, the *liberated*, and the *mundane* †. For the *intelligible*, as we have already observed, must hold the first rank, and must consist of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, i. e. must *abide*, *proceed*, and *return*, and this super-essentially; at the same time that it is characterized, or subsists principally according to *being*. But, in the next place, that which is both *intelligible* and *intellectual* succeeds, which must likewise be triple, but must principally subsist according to *life*, or *intelligence*. And, in the third place, the *intellectual* order must succeed, which is *triplely convertive*. But as, in consequence of the existence of the sensible world, it is necessary that there should be some demiurgic cause of its existence, this cause can only be found in *intellect*, and in the last hypostasis of the *intellectual triad*. For all forms in this hypostasis subsist according to all-various and perfect divisions; and forms can only fabricate when they have a perfect intellectual separation from each other. But since fabrication is nothing more than *procession*, the demiurgus will be to the posterior order of the Gods what *the one* is to the orders prior to the *demiurgus*; and consequently he will be that secondarily which the first cause of all is primarily. Hence, his

* Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54.

† i. e. Θεοὶ νοητοὶ, νοητοὶ καὶ νοετοί, νοετοί, ὑπερνοεταί, ἀπολυτοὶ ἢ πνεύματα, et εἰρηνοεταί.

first production will be an order of Gods analogous to the *intelligible* order, and which is denominated *supermundane*. After this he must produce an order of Gods similar to the *intelligible* and *intellectual* order, and which are denominated *liberated* Gods. And in the last place, a procession correspondent to the *intellectual* order, and which can be no other than the *mundane* Gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterized according to diversity, and is allotted the boundary of all universal hypostases.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PHÆDRUS.

Page 323: *It alone uses contemplative intellect, &c.*

By the governor of the soul in this place a partial intellect is meant. For this intellect is proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects; and to which we convert ourselves, when we are purified through philosophy, and conjoin our intellectual power with its intelligence. This partial intellect is participated by all other proximate dæmoniacal souls, and illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render our reason intellectual. In short, as every partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain dæmon, and every dæmon has a dæmoniacal intellect above itself, hence, every partial soul will have this intellect ranked prior to itself as an impartible essence. Of this intellect, therefore, the first participant will be a dæmoniacal soul, but the second, the partial souls under this, which also makes them to be partial. It also appears that the intellect immediately above every dæmon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the dæmon which proximately participates it, but that it also comprehends the number of the souls which are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of these. Every partial soul, therefore, will have as an indivisible essence its proper paradigm, which this intellect contains, and not simply the whole intellect, in the same manner as the dæmon which is essentially its leader. Hence the impartible belonging to every partial soul may be accurately defined to be the idea of that soul, comprehended in the one intellect which is destined to be the leader of the dæmoniacal series under which every such soul is arranged. And thus it will be true, that the intellect of every partial soul is alone
supernally

supernally established among eternal entities, and that every such soul is a medium between the impartible above it, and the impartible nature below it. This, then, is the intelligence prior to the soul, and which the soul participates, when its intellectual part energizes intellectually. This also is the intellect which Plato in the *Timæus* indicates under the appellation of *intelligence*, when he says “that true being is apprehended by *intelligence* in conjunction with reason; and to which he likewise alludes in the latter part of the same dialogue, where he says, “that this intelligence is in the Gods, but that it is participated by a few only of the human race.”

P. 322. *Likewise Jupiter the mighty leader, &c.*

IT is said by Plato* in the *Phædrus*, that there are twelve leaders who preside over the universe, who govern all the mundane Gods, and all the companies of dæmons, and who sublimely march to an intelligible nature. It is likewise asserted that Jupiter presides over these twelve Gods, who drives a winged chariot, who distributes all things in order, takes care of and leads all the attendant army, first to an *elevated place of speculation* within the heavens, and to those blessed contemplations and evolutions of intelligibles which it contains; but afterwards to that *subcelestial arch* which proximately embraces the heavens, and which the heavens contain: and after this arch they proceed into heaven and to the *back of heaven*. And in this place divine souls are said to stand, and, whilst they are carried along with the heavens, to contemplate every superior essence. But prior to the heavens there is said to be a *place* which is called *supercelestial*, in which *true essence*, the *plain of truth*, the *kingdom of Adrastia*, and the *divine choir of virtues*, reside: and it is asserted that by the intelligence of these monads souls are nourished and benefited, while they follow the revolution of the heavens.

And thus much is asserted in the *Phædrus*, where Socrates clearly speaks, as one agitated by a divine impulse, and touches on mystical concerns. But it is requisite to consider, in the first place, what this *heaven* may be, which Socrates speaks of, and in what order of beings it is placed. For, having discovered this, we may then con-

* This account of that divine order which was denominated by ancient theologists *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellectual*, is extracted from the fourth book of Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*.

template the subcelestial arch, and the back of heaven ; since each of these is assumed according to an habitude, or alliance to heaven ; the one, indeed, being primarily situated above, and the other primarily placed under heaven.

What then is that heaven to which Jupiter brings the Gods ? If we call it sensible, after the manner of some, it will be necessary that the more excellent genera should naturally be converted to things subordinate. For Jupiter, that great leader in the heavens, if he is himself carried to this sensible heaven, and leads to this all the attendant Gods, he must himself have a conversion to things inferior and posterior to himself. And this, together with Jupiter, must be the case with all the deities and dæmons that are suspended from him ; though the same Socrates in the *Phædrus* asserts, that even a partial soul, when in a perfect state, revolves on high, and governs the universe. How, then, can the leaders of total souls be converted to this sensible heaven, and exchange their intelligible place of survey for a worse condition ?—they, who through these souls preside over the universe, that they may illuminate mundane natures, with an absolute and liberated power ! Besides, what blessed intellections can the Gods obtain by contemplating this sensible heaven ? And what evolutions can there be there of the whole knowledge of sensible concerns ? since on this hypothesis Plato must be condemned for producing a relation of no value with respect to the knowledge of the intelligible Gods. For the Gods perfectly know things subsisting in this sensible region, not by a conversion to them, but because they contain the causes of them in themselves. Hence, in consequence of knowing themselves, they likewise know in a causal manner and govern these sensible concerns, not surveying them, and verging to things which are governed, but through love converting subordinate natures to themselves. It is not, therefore, lawful for the Gods, by whom all heaven is governed, and who consider it as worthy their providential care, ever to subsist under its revolution. Nor, indeed, is there any beatitude in the contemplation of things situated under the heavens. Nor are the souls who are converted to a contemplation of this kind in the number of the blessed, and among such as follow the Gods ; but they rank among those who exchange intelligible aliment for the food of opinion, and such as Socrates represents those lame souls, who have broken their wings, and are in a merged condition. Since, then, circumstances of this kind belong to partial souls, who do not rank in the number of the blessed, how can we refer a conversion

version to this sensible heaven to the leading Gods? Besides, Socrates asserts, that souls standing on the back of heaven are carried round by the celestial revolution. But Timæus and the Athenian guest say, that souls perform all things in the heavens from their own motions, and externally invest bodies by their powers; and that in consequence of living their own life, through the whole of time, they impart to bodies secondary powers of motion. How, then, can these things accord with those who consider this heaven as sensible? For souls do not contemplate, and, as it were, dance round intelligibles, in consequence of the revolution of the heavens: but, through the unapparent circumvolution of souls, bodies themselves are carried round in a circle, and about these perform their revolutions. If any one, therefore, should say that this is the sensible heaven, and that souls are at the same time carried round with its revolutions, and are distributed according to its back, profundity, and subcelestial arch, it is necessary to admit that many absurdities will ensue.

But if any one asserts, that the heaven to which Jupiter leads all his attendant Gods and dæmons is intelligible, he will unfold the divine narrations of Plato, in a manner agreeable to the nature of things, and will follow his most celebrated interpreters. For both Plotinus and Jamblichus consider this as a certain intelligible heaven. And prior to these, Plato himself in the *Cratylus*, following the Orphic theogony, calls Saturn indeed the father of Jupiter, and Heaven the father of Saturn. And he unfolds the Demiurgus of the universe by certain appellations, investigating the truth which names contain. And he denominates the Demiurgus as one who contains a divine intellect: but Heaven as the intelligence of first intelligibles. For Heaven, says he, is first looking to things on high. And hence, Heaven subsists prior to every divine intellect with which the mighty Saturn is said to be replete; but it understands superior natures, and whatever is situated beyond the celestial order. The mighty Heaven, therefore, is allotted a middle kingdom between intelligibles and intellects.

For, indeed, the celestial revolution in the *Phædrus* is *intelligence*, by which all the Gods, and their attendant souls, obtain the contemplation of intelligibles. For intelligence is between intellect and the intelligible. In this medium, therefore, we must establish the whole Heaven; and we must assert that it contains one bond of the divine orders; being, indeed, the father of the intellectual race, but generated by the

kings prior to itself, whom it is said to behold. We must also consider it as situated between the supercelestial place and subcelestial arch.

Again, therefore, if the supercelestial place is indeed that imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we establish there so great a divine multitude, and this separated, viz. truth, science, justice, temperance, the meadow, and Adraſtia? For neither are the fountains of virtues proper to the intelligible Gods, nor separation and variety of forms. For such things as are first and most characterized by unity, extend the demiurgic intellect of wholes to an intelligible exemplar, and to the comprehension of forms which there subsist. But, in the Phædrus, Socrates asserts that a partial intellect contemplates the supercelestial place. For this (as it is beautifully said by our ancestors) is the governor of the soul. If, then, it is requisite to investigate the difference of intelligibles from this analogy, as the demiurgic intellect is imparticipable, but that which is partial is participable; so with respect to that which is intelligible, the intelligible of the demiurgus is the first paradigm of first intelligibles, but the intelligible of a partial intellect is the paradigm of secondary intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are allotted an intelligible supremacy as among intellectuals. But if the supercelestial place is situated above the celestial revolution, but is inferior to the intelligible triads, because it is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, but is not unknown, and is divided according to a multitude of forms, and contains a variety of powers, and the meadow which is there nourishes souls, and is visible to their natures, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with an ineffable union, at the same time that they are not known by them, through intelligence:—if this be the case, it is necessary that the supercelestial place should be situated between the intelligible nature and the celestial revolution. But also, if Plato himself establishes true essence in this place, must he not consider this place as intelligible, and as participating first intelligibles? For, because it is essence, it is intelligible; but, because it is true essence, it participates of being. And if it contains in itself a multitude of intelligibles, it cannot be placed in the first triad. For *one being* is there, and not a multitude of beings. But if it possesses a various life, which the *meadow* evinces, it is inferior to the second triad. For intelligible life is one, and without separation. And from its shining with divided forms, all-various orders, and prolific powers, it is inferior to the third or all-perfect triad. If, therefore, the supercelestial place is posterior to these in

antiquity and power, but is placed above the celestial order, it is indeed intelligible, but is the summit of the intellectual Gods. And on this account aliment is thence derived to souls. For that which is intelligible is aliment, because first intelligibles are said to nourish souls; and these are the beautiful, the wise, and the good. For with these, according to Plato, the winged nature of the soul is nourished, but is corrupted, and perishes through things of a contrary nature. These things, however, subsist there in an exempt manner, and through union and silence. But the supercelestial place is said to nourish through intelligence and energy, and to fill the blessed choir of souls with intelligible light, and the prolific rivers of life.

But after the supercelestial place, and Heaven itself, the subcelestial arch is situated, which, as is evident to every one, is placed under, and not in the Heavens: for it is not called by Plato a *celestial*, but a *subcelestial* arch. And that it is likewise proximately situated under the celestial revolution, is evident from what is said concerning it. But if it is requisite that the subcelestial arch, thus subsisting, should be established as the same with the summit of intellectuals, and not as the same with the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, it will be necessary to contemplate what remains. For the intellectual summit separates itself from the celestial kingdom: but the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is conjoined, and every way surrounded with this kingdom. And this *summit* establishes the whole of intellect and intellectual multitude, and (as Socrates says) the blessed transitions of the Gods. But the *extremity* bounds alone the celestial series, and supplies to the Gods an ascent to Heaven. For when the Gods ascend to the banquet, and delicious food, and to the plenitude of intelligible good, then they proceed on high to the subcelestial arch, and through this to the celestial revolution. Hence, if you assert that the subcelestial arch perfects the Gods, and converts them to the whole of heaven, and to the supercelestial place, you will not wander from the conceptions of Plato. For the Gods are nourished with the intelligible, with the meadow, and the divine forms which the supercelestial place contains. But they are replenished with this aliment through the subcelestial arch: for through this they participate of the celestial revolution. They revolve, therefore, through the subcelestial arch; but they receive a vigorous intelligence from the celestial order, and they are replenished with intelligible goods from the supercelestial place. It is evident, therefore, that the supercelestial
place

place is allotted an intelligible summit; but the celestial revolution obtains a middle extent, and the subcelestial arch possesses an intelligible extremity. For all things are contained in this. And intellect indeed is endued with a convertive power; but the intelligible is the object of desire. And divine intelligence fills up the middle; perfecting indeed the conversions of divine natures, and conjoining them with such as are first; but rendering the desires of intelligibles apparent, and replenishing secondary natures with preceding goods. And thus I think we have sufficiently treated concerning the order of these three.

Perhaps, however, some one may inquire, why we characterize according to this medium the whole progression of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual Gods; and why of the extremes we call one supercelestial, but the other subcelestial, from its habitude to the middle; demonstrating of the one exempt transcendency, but of the other a proximate and conjoined hypobasis (i. e. subject basis, or foundation). To this then we shall briefly answer, that this whole genus of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is connective of both these extremes, to some things indeed being the cause of conversion, but to others of an unfolding into light, and a presence extended to secondary natures. As, therefore, we call all the intelligible Gods paternal and unical, characterizing them from the summit, and assert that they are the boundaries of wholes, the fabricators of essence, the causes of perpetuity, and the authors of the production of form; in the same manner we evince that these middle Gods, from the medium which they contain, are the leaders of the bonds of wholes. For this whole middle order is vivific, connective, and perfective. But its summit indeed unfolds the impressions of intelligibles, and their ineffable union. But its termination converts the intellectual Gods, and conjoins them with intelligibles. And its middle leads this order as to a centre, and establishes the total genera of the Gods. For, through a tendency to the middle, we attribute also to the extremes a habitude of transcendency and subjection; denominating the one above, and the other beneath the middle.

Let us now consider what the negations are by which Plato celebrates this middle order of Gods. Those sacred genera, therefore, the connective, the perfective, and the paternal, of those divine natures which are properly called intellectual, are proximately established after the intelligible summit of all intellectuals. For this summit,

being exempt from these, also transcends all the intellectual Gods. For what every genus of Gods is to *the one*, that the three orders posterior to, are to this summit. Plato, therefore, denominates the celestial order, which connects wholes, and illuminates them with intelligible light, *colour*; because this apparent beauty of the heavens is resplendent with all-various colours and light. Hence he calls *that* Heaven intellectual colour and light. For the light proceeding from *the good* is in the order superior to this unknown and occult, abiding in the adyta of the Gods; but it is unfolded in this order, and from the unapparent becomes apparent. And on this account it is assimilated to colour, the offspring of light. Further still: if Heaven is sight looking to things on high, according to the definition of Socrates in the Cratylus, the intelligible of it is very properly called colour, which is conjoined with sight.

The cause, therefore, of the intelligibles in *Heaven* is *without colour*, and is exempt from them. For sensible colour is the offspring of the solar light. But the sub-celestial arch, which proximately subsists after the celestial order, is called by Plato *figure*: for the arch itself is the name of a figure. And, in short, in this order Parmenides also places intellectual figure; but first attributes *contact* to the summit of intellectuals, as is evident from the conclusions of the Parmenides. For, in the first hypothesis, taking away *figure* from *the one*, he uses this as a medium, that *the one* does not *touch* itself. *Contact*, therefore, here first subsists, and is here according to cause. For of such things as the demiurgus is proximately the cause, of these the father prior to him is paradigmatically the cause. Hence *contact* here is the paradigm of the liberated Gods. These three orders, therefore, are successive, viz. *colour*, *figure*, and *contact*. And of these the supercelestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is *without colour*, *without figure*, and *without contact*.

In the next place, let us consider the triad which is celebrated by Socrates as pre-subsisting in the supercelestial place, viz. *the plain of truth*, *the meadow*, and *the aliment of the Gods*. The *plain of truth*, therefore, is intellectually expanded to intelligible light, and is illuminated with the splendours which thence proceed. But *the meadow* is the prolific power of life, and of all-various reasons, and is the comprehension of the primary causes of life, and the cause of the variety and the procreation of forms. For meadows in this sensible region are fertile with forms and productive powers, and
contain

contain water, which is a symbol of vivific energy. But the nourishing cause of the Gods is a certain intelligible union, comprehending in itself the whole perfection of the Gods, and filling them with vigour and power, that they may provide for secondary natures, and possess an immutable intelligence of such as are first. The Gods, however, participate of these uniformly on high, but with separation in their progressions. Of the aliment, also, one kind is called by Plato ambrosia, and the other nectar. Here, too, we may observe, that the charioteer who is nourished with intelligibles participates of the perfection illuminated from the Gods unically, but the horses divisibly; first of ambrosia, and afterwards of nectar. For it is necessary that they should remain firmly and immovably in more excellent natures, from ambrosia; but that they should immutably provide for secondary natures, through nectar; since they say that ambrosia is a solid, but nectar a liquid nutriment. Hence, the nutriment of nectar signifies that in providence which is unrestrained, indissoluble, and which proceeds to all things with perfect purity. But the nutriment of ambrosia signifies that which is permanent, and which is firmly established in more excellent natures. But from both it is implied, that the Gods are permanent, and at the same time proceed to all things; and that neither their undeviating energy, and which is unconverted to subordinate natures, is unprolific, nor their prolific power and progression, without stability: but, being permanent, they proceed, and, being established in prior natures, provide for things secondary with consummate purity.

THE END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

THE
WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.
HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

IN FIVE VOLUMES
VOL. IV.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;

NINE OF THE DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM;

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

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THE THEÆTETUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

SCIENCE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE THEÆTETUS.

THE following very learned and admirable dialogue is on a subject which, to a rational being, is obviously of the utmost importance. For what can be more important to such a being than an accurate knowledge of things human and divine, practical and theoretic? And as such a knowledge cannot be obtained without science, the inquiry what science is, must consequently rank among those investigations that are the most useful and necessary to man.

As this dialogue is wholly of the maieutic kind, Socrates, with admirable skill, acts the part of a midwife towards Theætetus, one of the principal persons of the dialogue, in leading forth his conceptions concerning science into light. For this purpose, he, in the first place, asks him what science is? and Theætetus replies, that science is geometry and arithmetic, together with other disciplines of this kind, and the several arts. This answer is however rejected by Socrates, as by no means according with the question; because, when asked what science is, he replies by enumerating how many sciences there are, and on what subjects they are employed. In the next place, Socrates introduces the definition of Protagoras, that science is sense. For Protagoras asserted, that man is the measure of all things, and that every thing was to every man such as it appeared to him. This doctrine was, indeed, founded in the philosophy of Heraclitus, of which the principal dogma was this, that nothing is permanent, but that all things are in a continual flux. Socrates, however, confutes this opinion, because, if it were admitted, the perceptions of the intoxicated and insane, of those who dream, and of those whose senses are vitiated by disease, would be true, because they appear to be so, though at the same time they are evidently false. From this

hypothesis also, all men would be similarly wise, the opinions of the most illiterate in geometry would be as true as any geometrical theorems; and in the actions of human life the means of accomplishing any end would be indifferent, and consequently all deliberation and consultation would be vain¹.

In order to demonstrate that science is not sense, Socrates, in the first place, obtains this from Theætetus, that sense arises from the soul perceiving corporeal things externally situated, through several organs of the body. And secondly, that one sense, or organical perception, cannot take cognizance of the object of another; as sight cannot see sounds, nor the hearing hear light and colours. Hence he infers, that when we compare the objects of several senses together, and consider certain things which are common to them all, this cannot be sense, or organical perception, because one sense cannot consider the object of another. And if there is any thing common to both, it cannot perceive it by either organ. Thus, for instance, when we consider sound and colour together, and attribute several things to them in common, as, in the first place, essence, and in the next place, sameness in each with itself, and difference from the other; when we also consider that both of them are two, and each of them one, by what sense or organ does the soul perceive all these things which are common both to sound and colour? It cannot be by the senses of sight or hearing, because these cannot consider each other's objects; nor can any other corporeal organ be found by which the soul may passively perceive all these, and consider the objects of both those senses of sight and hearing. Hence, Theætetus is made to confess that the soul does not organically perceive these things by any sense, but by itself alone without any corporeal organ.

Theætetus, therefore, being convinced that science is not sense, in the next place defines it to be true opinion. This, however, is confuted by Socrates, because rhetoric also produces true opinion when its assertions are true, but yet cannot produce science. For there never can be any science of

¹ This absurd opinion is very subtly opposed by Sextus Empiricus. If, says he, every imagination be true, then the imagination that not every imagination is true will also be true, and so the assertion that every imagination is true will be false. *Εἰ πάντα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθὴ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον ἐστὶ ἀληθές: καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθὴ γενήσεται ψεῦδος.*

things which are perpetually in motion, and which subsist differently at different times. Such, however, are human affairs with which orators are conversant, especially when they induce their hearers to believe that of which they are themselves doubtful. After this, Theætetus adds the definition of Leucippus and Theodorus the Cyrenæan, that science is true opinion in conjunction with reason; and hence, that things which possess reason can be known, but by no means those which are deprived of it. This, however, is also confuted by Socrates, who shows, that whether reason (*logos*) signifies external speech, or a procession through the elements of a thing, or definition, science cannot be true opinion in conjunction with reason.

Though Socrates, therefore, confutes all these definitions of science, as being erroneous, yet he does not inform us what science is; for this would have been contrary to the character of the dialogue, which, as we have already observed, is entirely maieutic, and consequently can do no more than present us with the conceptions of Theætetus fairly unfolded into light. As all these conceptions, therefore, are found to be false, we must search elsewhere for an accurate definition of science.

What then shall we say science is, according to Plato? We reply, that considered according to its first subsistence, which is in intellect, it is *the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal entities*; but in partial souls, such as ours, it is a *dianoëtic perception of eternal beings*; and is, consequently, a perception neither eternal nor uniform, because it is transitive, and accompanied with the intervention of oblivion.

THE THEÆTETUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUCLID ¹ ,		SOCRATES,
TERPSIO,		THEODORUS,
And THEÆTETUS ² .		

ARE you just now come, O Terpsio, or is it some time since you came from the country?

TER. I have left the country for a considerable time, and have been seeking for you about the forum, and wondered that I could not find you.

EUC. I was not in the city.

TER. Where then was you?

EUC. As I was going down to the port, I met with Theætetus, who was carried along from the camp at Corinth to Athens.

TER. Was he alive or dead?

EUC. He was living, but could hardly be said to be so: for he was in a very dangerous condition, through certain wounds: and, what is worse, he was afflicted with a disease while in the camp.

TER. Was it a dysentery?

EUC. It was.

¹ This Euclid was a celebrated philosopher and logician of Megara. The Athenians having prohibited the Megarians from entering their city on pain of death, this philosopher disguised himself in woman's clothes that he might attend the lectures of Socrates. After the death of Socrates, Plato and other philosophers went to Euclid at Megara to shelter themselves from the tyrants who governed Athens.

² This Theætetus is mentioned by Proclus on Euclid (lib. ii. p. 19), where he gives a short history of geometry prior to Euclid, and is ranked by him among those contemporary with Plato, by whom geometrical theorems were increased, and rendered more scientific.

TER. What a man do you speak of as in a dangerous condition !

EUC. A worthy and good man, O Terpsio : for I just now heard certain persons paying him very great encomiums for his military conduct.

TER. Nor is this wonderful : but it would be much more wonderful if this had not been the case. But why was he not carried to Megara ?

EUC. He hastened home ; for I both entreated and advised him to do so : but it was against his will. And besides this, attending him in his journey, when I again left him, I recollected, and was filled with admiration of Socrates, who often spoke in a prophetic manner about other things, and likewise about this. For a little before his death, if I am not mistaken, meeting with Theætetus, who was then a young man, and discoursing with him, he very much admired his disposition. Besides this, when I came to Athens, he related to me his discourses with Theætetus, which very much deserve to be heard ; and observed, that he would necessarily be renowned, if he lived to be a man. And it appears indeed that he spoke the truth.

TER. But can you relate what those discourses were ?

EUC. Not verbally, by Jupiter : but as soon as I returned home, I committed the substance of them to writing, and afterwards at my leisure wrote nearly the whole of them, through the assistance of memory. As often too as I came to Athens, I asked Socrates about such particulars as I could not remember, and, on my return hither, made such emendations as were necessary ; so that I have nearly written the whole discourse.

TER. True. For I have heard you assert the same thing before : and in consequence of always desiring to urge you to relate this discourse I am come hither. But what should hinder this from taking place at present ? For I am perfectly in need of rest, as coming from the country.

EUC. I likewise accompanied Theætetus as far as Erineus ; so that rest will not be unpleasant to me. Let us go, therefore, and while we rest a boy shall read to us.

TER. You speak well.

EUC. This then is the book, O Terpsio. But it was not composed by me, as if Socrates related it to me, as in reality he did, but as if he was discoursing with the persons with whom he said he discoursed. But he said that these were, the geometrician Theodorus, and Theætetus. That

we

we may not, therefore, in the course of the writing, be troubled with the frequent repetition of I say, and He said, He assented, or He denied, I have introduced Socrates himself discoursing with them.

TER. And this is not at all improper, O Euclid.

EUC. Here, boy, then, take the book and read.

SOC. If, O Theodorus, I was more attentive to those in Cyrene than to any others, I should inquire of you respecting them, if any young men there applied themselves to geometry, or any other philosophic study. But now, as I love those less than these, I am more desirous to know which of our young men are likely to become worthy characters. For such as these I explore myself as far as I am able, and inquire after them of others, with whom I see young men associating. But you have by no means a few followers: and this very justly. For you deserve to be followed, both for other things, and for the sake of geometry. If, therefore, you have met with any young man who deserves to be mentioned, it would give me pleasure to hear some particulars respecting him.

THEO. Indeed, Socrates, it is in every respect fit both that I should relate, and that you should hear, what a youth I have met with from among your citizens. And if he were beautiful, I should be very much afraid to mention him, lest I should appear to be enamoured with him. But, now, (do not be indignant with me,) he is not handsome. For he resembles you, having a flat nose, and prominent eyes: but he has these in a less degree than you. You see I speak freely to you. Know then, that I have never yet met with any young man (though I have associated with many) who naturally possesses a good disposition in such a wonderful degree. For it is difficult to find one who is docile, remarkably mild, and who besides this may compare with any one for fortitude. Indeed, I do not think there ever were any, nor do I see any with these qualifications. For some are acute indeed, as this one, sagacious, and of a good memory; but they are for the most part prone to anger, and are hurried along precipitately like ships without their ballast, and are rather naturally furious than brave. And again, those whose manners are more sedate are in a certain respect sluggish and full of oblivion, when they apply themselves to disciplines. But the young man I am speaking of applies himself to disciplines and investigations in so easy, blameless, and ready a manner, that it may be compared to the silent

flux of oil; so that it is wonderful that such a great genius should accomplish these things in such a manner.

Soc. You announce well. But of which of our citizens is he the son?

THEO. I have heard the name, but I do not remember it. But he is in the middle of those who are now approaching to us. For both he, and these who are his companions, were just now anointed beyond the stadium; but now they appear to me, in consequence of having been anointed, to come hither. Consider, however, if you know him.

Soc. I do know him. He is the son of Euphronius the Sunienſian, who was entirely such a man as you have just related the son to be; and who, besides being a worthy character, left behind him a very large estate.

THEO. His name, O Socrates, is Theætetus. But certain of his guardians appear to me to have dissipated his estate. However, notwithstanding this, he is wonderfully liberal with respect to money, Socrates.

Soc. You speak of a generous man: Order him to come to me, and sit with us.

THEO. I will.—Theætetus, come hither to Socrates.

Soc. By all means come, Theætetus, that I may behold myself, and see what sort of a face I have. For Theodorus says it resembles yours. But if we had each of us a lyre, and he should say that they were similarly harmonized, ought we immediately to believe him, or should we consider whether he says this as being a musician?

THEÆ. We should consider this.

Soc. On finding, therefore, this to be the case, should we not be persuaded by him? but, if he was ignorant of music, should we not disbelieve him?

THEÆ. True.

Soc. Now, therefore, I think, if we are at all careful respecting the similitude of our faces, that we should consider if he speaks as being a painter, or not.

THEÆ. So it appears to me.

Soc. Is, therefore, Theodorus a painter?

THEÆ. Not that I know of.

Soc. Nor is he a geometrician?

THEÆ. He is perfectly so, Socrates.

Soc. Is he also skilled in astronomy, logic, music, and such other disciplines as follow these?

THEÆ. He appears to be so to me.

Soc. If, therefore, he says that we resemble each other in a certain part of our body, at the same time praising or blaming this resemblance, it is not altogether worth while to pay much attention to him.

THEÆ. Entirely so, Socrates.

Soc. Take notice, therefore, O friend Theætetus, it is your business to evince, and mine to consider. For know, that Theodorus having praised in my hearing many strangers and citizens, has not praised any one of them so much as just now he did you.

THEÆ. It is well, Socrates; but consider whether he did not speak jokingly.

Soc. It is not usual for Theodorus to do so. But do not reject what is granted, in consequence of believing that he spoke this in jest, lest he should be compelled to bear witness. For no one can object to what he said. Persist, therefore, confidently in what is granted.

THEÆ. It is proper, indeed, to do so, if it seems fit to you.

Soc. Tell me, then,—Do you learn any geometry of Theodorus?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. Do you, likewise, learn things pertaining to astronomy, harmony, and computation?

THEÆ. I endeavour to do so.

Soc. For I also, O boy, both from this man, and from others who appear to me to understand any thing of these particulars, endeavour to learn them; but, at the same time, I am but moderately skilled in them. There is, however, a certain trifling thing of which I am in doubt, and which I wish to consider along with you, and these that are present. Tell me, therefore, whether to learn is not to become wiser in that which any one learns?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But I think that the wise are wise by wisdom.

THEÆ. Certainly.

Soc. But does this in any respect differ from science?

THEÆ. What?

Soc.

Soc. Wisdom. Or are not those who have a scientific knowledge of any thing, also wise in this thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Is, therefore, science the same as wisdom?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. This, therefore, is that which I doubt; and I am not able sufficiently to determine by myself what science is. Have we then any thing to say to this? What do you say it is? And which of us can first give this information? But he who errs, and is perpetually detected in an error, shall sit as an ass, as the boys say when they play at ball. But he who shall be found to speak without error shall be our king, and shall order whatever he wishes us to answer. Why are you silent? Have I, O Theodorus, behaved in a rustic manner, through my love of conversation, and through my desire to make you discourse and become friends with each other?

THEO. A thing of this kind, O Socrates, is by no means rustic. But order some one of these young men to answer you. For I am unaccustomed to this mode of discourse; and my age does not permit me to become accustomed to it now. But a thing of this kind is adapted to these young men, and they will be greatly improved by it. For, in reality, youth is adapted to every kind of improvement. But, as you began with, do not dismiss Theætetus, but interrogate him.

Soc. Do you hear, Theætetus, what Theodorus says? whom I am of opinion you will not disobey. For you would neither be willing to do so, nor is it lawful for a young man to be unpersuaded by a wise man, when he commands in things of this kind. Tell me, therefore, in a proper and ingenuous manner, what science appears to you to be?

THEÆ. It is fit to comply, Socrates, since you command me. And if I in any respect err, do you correct me.

Soc. We shall by all means do so, if we are able.

THEÆ. It appears to me, then, that sciences are such things as any one may learn of Theodorus, such as geometry, and the other particulars which you just now enumerated. And besides these, the shoemaker's art, and the arts of other workmen; and that all and each of these are no other than science.

Soc. Generously and munificently, O friend, when asked by me concern-

ing one thing, have you given many, and things various, instead of that which is simple.

THEÆ. How so? Why do you say this, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps what I say is nothing: but I will tell you what I think. When you speak of the shoemaker's art, do you speak of any thing else than the science of making shoes?

THEÆ. Of nothing else.

Soc. But what when you speak of the carpenter's art? Do you speak of any thing else than the science of operations in wood?

THEÆ. Of nothing else than this.

Soc. In both therefore you define that of which each is the science.

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But that which we asked, O Theætetus, was not this, of what things there is science, nor how many sciences there are; for we did not inquire, wishing to enumerate them, but in order to know what science itself is. Or do I say nothing?

THEÆ. You speak with perfect rectitude.

Soc. But consider also this. If any one should interrogate us respecting any vile and obvious thing, as, for instance, clay, what it is, if we should answer him, that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles are made, or certain other artificial substances, should we not be ridiculous?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

Soc. In the first place, indeed, what can we think he who asks this question can understand from our answer, when we say that clay is that from which pans, puppets and tiles, or certain other artificial substances are made? Or do you think that any one can understand the name of a thing, when he does not know what that thing is?

THEÆ. By no means.

Soc. Neither, therefore, will he understand the science of shoes who does not know what science is.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor, again, will he understand the currier's art, nor any other art, who is ignorant of science.

THEÆ. It is so.

Soc. The answer, therefore, is ridiculous, when any one, being asked what science

science is, gives for an answer the name of any art. For he answers, that there is a science of a certain thing, when this is not what he was asked.

THEÆ. It seems so.

Soc. And, in the next place, when he might have given a short and simple answer, he wanders immensely. As in the question concerning clay, a short and simple answer might have been given, that clay is earth mingled with moisture. At the same time, dismissing the consideration of that which is composed of clay.

THEÆ. Now, indeed, Socrates, it thus appears to me to be easy. For you seem to ask that which lately came into my mind as I was discoursing with your namesake here, Socrates.

Soc. What was that, Theætetus?

THEÆ. Theodorus here has written a treatise on powers, concerning magnitudes of three and five feet, evincing that they are not commensurable in length¹ to a magnitude of one foot: and thus proceeding through every number as far as to a magnitude of seventeen feet, in this he stops his investigation. A thing of this kind, therefore, occurred to me, since there appear to be an infinite multitude of powers, we should endeavour to comprehend them in one thing, by which we may denominate all these powers.

Soc. Is a thing of this kind discovered?

THEÆ. It appears so to me. But do you also consider.

Soc. Speak then.

THEÆ. We give to the whole of number a twofold division: one, that which may become equally equal, and which we assimilate among figures to a square, calling it quadrangular and equilateral.

Soc. And very properly.

THEÆ. But that number which subsists between this², such as three and five, and every number which is incapable of becoming evenly even, but which is either more less, or less more, and always contains a greater and a lesser side, we assimilate to an oblong figure, and call it an oblong number.

¹ Magnitudes commensurable in length are such as have the proportion to each other of number to number. As the square roots, therefore, of 3 and 5 feet cannot be obtained, those roots are incommensurable in length with the square root of one foot.

² Equally equal, or square numbers, are such as 4, 9, 16, 25, &c. and the numbers which subsist between these, and which Plato calls oblong, are 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, &c.

Soc.

Soc. Most excellent. But what follows?

THEÆ. Such lines as square an equilateral and plane number, we define to be length; but such as square an oblong number, powers; as not being commensurate¹ to them in length, but to planes, which are capable of being commensurable. And about solids there is another thing of this kind.

Soc. Best of men, O boys: so that Theodorus cannot, as it appears to me, be accused of giving a false account.

THEÆ. But, indeed, Socrates, I am not able to answer you concerning science as I am concerning length and power; though you appear to me to inquire after a thing of this kind. So that again Theodorus appears to be false.

Soc. But what? If, praising you for running, he should say that he never met with any youth who ran so swift, and afterwards you should be vanquished in running by some adult who is a very rapid runner, do you think he would have less truly praised you?

THEÆ. I do not.

Soc. But with respect to science, (as I just now said,) do you think it is a trifling thing to find out what it is, and not in every respect arduous?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I think it is arduous in the extreme.

Soc. Confide, therefore, in yourself, and think what Theodorus said. Endeavour, too, by all possible means to obtain a reason both of other things, and likewise of science, so as to know what it is.

THEÆ. It appears we should do so, O Socrates, for the sake of alacrity.

Soc. Come then: for you explained just now in a beautiful manner. Endeavour, imitating your answer respecting powers, that just as you comprehended these, which are many, in one species, so you may comprehend many sciences in one reason or definition.

THEÆ. But know, O Socrates, that I have often endeavoured to accomplish this, on hearing the questions which are discussed by you. But I can neither persuade myself that I can say any thing sufficient on this occasion, nor that I can hear any one discoursing as you advise; nor yet am I able to desist from investigation.

¹ That is to say, the sides or roots of oblong numbers, such as the above, are incommensurable in length, or are surds.

Soc.

Soc. You are tormented with the pangs of labour, friend Theætetus, not because you are empty, but because you are full.

THEÆ. I do not know, Socrates : but I tell you what I suffer.

Soc. O ridiculous youth, have you not heard that I am the son of the generous, and at the same time severe, midwife Phænarete ?

THEÆ. I have heard this.

Soc. And have you also heard that I study the same art ?

THEÆ. By no means.

Soc. Know, however, that it is so : but do not betray me to others. For they are ignorant, my friend, that I possess this art ; and in consequence of being ignorant of this, they do not assert this respecting me, but they say that I am a most absurd man, and that I cause men to doubt. Or have you not heard this ?

THEÆ. I have.

Soc. Shall I tell you the reason of this ?

THEÆ. By all means.

Soc. Conceive every thing pertaining to midwives, and you will easily understand what I mean. For you know, that none of them deliver others, while they yet conceive and bring forth themselves, but when they are no longer capable of conceiving.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. But they say that Diana is the cause of this ; who being herself a virgin takes care of births. She does not, therefore, permit those that are barren to be midwives, because human nature is too imbecil to undertake an art in which it is unexperienced : but she orders those to exercise this profession, who from their age are incapable of bearing children ; by this honouring the similitude of herself.

THEÆ. It is likely.

Soc. And is not this also probable and necessary, that those who are pregnant, or not, should be more known by midwives than by others ?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Midwives, likewise, by medicaments and enchantments, are able to excite and alleviate the pangs of parturition, to deliver those that bring forth with difficulty, and procure a miscarriage when the child appears to be abortive.

THEÆ. It is so.

Soc. Have you not also heard this concerning them, that they are most skilful bride-maids, as being perfectly wise, with respect to knowing what kind of man and woman ought to be united together, in order to produce the most excellent children?

THEÆ. I did not altogether know this.

Soc. But you know that they glory in this more than in cutting the navel. For do you think it belongs to the same, or to a different art, to take care of and collect the fruits of the earth, and again, to know in what ground any plant or seed ought to be sown?

THEÆ. To the same art.

Soc. But in women, my friend, do you think the art pertaining to the care of offspring differs from that of collecting them?

THEÆ. It is not likely that it does.

Soc. It is not. But through the unjust and absurd conjunction of man and woman, which is called bawdry, midwives as being chaste avoid acting in the capacity of bride-maids, fearing lest by this mean they should be branded with the appellation of bawds, since it alone belongs to legitimate midwives to act as bride-maids with rectitude.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Such then is the office of midwives; but it is less arduous than the part which I have to act. For it does not happen to women, that they sometimes bring forth images, and sometimes realities. But this is a thing not easy to discriminate. For, if it did happen, to distinguish what was true from what was false would be to midwives the greatest and the most beautiful of all works. Or do you not think it would?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But to my art other things belong which pertain to delivery; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it considers their souls as parturient, and not their bodies. But this is the greatest thing in our art, that it is able to explore in every possible way, whether the dianoëtic part of a young man brings forth an image, and that which is false, or something prolific and true. For that which happens to midwives happens also to me: for I am barren of wisdom. And that for which I am reproached by many, that I interrogate others, but that I do not give an
answer

answer to any thing, is truly objected to me, owing to my possessing nothing of wisdom. But the cause of this is as follows: Divinity compels me to act as a midwife, but forbids me to generate. I am not, therefore, myself in any respect wise; nor is there any invention of mine of such a kind as to be the offspring of my soul. But of those who converse with me, some at first appear to be entirely void of discipline, but all to whom Divinity is propitious, during the course of the conversation, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others. This likewise is clear, that they do not learn any thing from me, but that they possess and discover many beautiful things in themselves: Divinity indeed, and I being the cause of the midwife's office. But this is evident from hence: Many, in consequence of not knowing this, but believing themselves to be the cause, and despising me, perhaps through the persuasions of others, have left me sooner than was proper; and after they have left me through associating with depraved characters, have become as to what remains abortive. Likewise, through badly nourishing what they have brought forth through my assistance they have destroyed it, in consequence of preferring things false and images to that which is true. Lastly, they have appeared both to themselves and others to be unlearned. One of these was Aristides the son of Lyfimachus, and many others; who when they again came to me, in consequence of wanting my conversation, and being affected in a wonderful manner, some of them my dæmoniacal power restrained me from conversing with, but with others he permitted me to converse, who at length made a considerable proficiency. For those that associate with me suffer this in common with the parturient; they are tormented, and filled with doubt and anxiety, and this in a far greater degree than the parturient. This torment my art is able both to excite and appease. And such is the manner in which they are affected. But sometimes, O Theætetus, I very benignantly unite in marriage with others those who do not appear to me to be pregnant, as I know that they do not require my assistance; and (as I may say in conjunction with Divinity) I very sufficiently conjecture with whom it will be advantageous to them to be united. And many of these indeed I have delivered to Prodicus, and many others to wise and divine men. For the sake of this, O most excellent youth, I have been thus prolix in relating these things to you. For I suspect, as you also think, that you are tormented in conse-

quence of being pregnant with something internally. Commit yourself therefore to me as being the son of a midwife, and as being myself skilled in what pertains to parturition. Endeavour, too, cheerfully to answer me what I shall ask you, and to the best of your ability. And if in consequence of considering what you say, it shall appear to me that you have conceived an image, and not that which is true, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered of their first child, if I privately remove and throw it away. For many, O wonderful young man, are so affected towards me, that they are actually ready to bite me, when I throw aside any trifle of theirs, not thinking that I do this with a benevolent design; since they are very far from knowing that no divinity is malevolent to men, and that I do not perform any thing of this kind through malevolence. But it is by no means lawful for me to admit that which is false, and destroy that which is true. Again, therefore, from the beginning O Theætetus, endeavour to inform me what science is; but by no means endeavour to speak beyond your ability. For if Divinity is willing and affords you strength, you will be able.

THEÆ. Indeed, Socrates, since you thus urge me, it would be base for any one not to offer what he has to say, with the greatest alacrity. It appears then to me that he who has a scientific knowledge of any thing, perceives that which he thus knows; and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than sense.

SOC. Well and generously answered, O boy: for it is requisite thus to speak what appears to be the case. But come, let us consider this in common, whether this offspring is any thing solid or vain. Do you say that science is sense?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. You appear, indeed, to have given no despicable definition of science, but that which Protagoras¹ has given: though he has said the same thing, in a somewhat different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things; of beings so far as they have a being, and of non-beings so far as they are not. Have you ever read this?

¹ This sophist was of Abdera in Thrace. He was the disciple of Democritus, and an atheist. This his absurd opinion that science is sense, may however be considered as the fountain of experimental philosophy.

THEÆ. I have read it often.

Soc. Does he not, therefore, speak thus : such as particulars appear to me, such are they to me ; and such as they appear to you, such are they to you : but you and I are men ?

THEÆ. He does speak in this manner.

Soc. But do you not think it probable that a wise man will not trifle, nor speak like one delirious ? Let us, therefore, follow him thus : When the same wind blows, is not sometimes one of us stiff with cold, and another not ? And one in a small degree, but another extremely cold ?

THEÆ. This is very much the case.

Soc. Whether, therefore, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in itself cold or not cold ? Or shall we be persuaded by Protagoras, that to him who is stiff with cold, the wind is cold ; but to him who is not, that it is not cold ?

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Does it, therefore, appear so to each ?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. But for a thing to appear, is it the same as to be perceived ?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. Phantasy, therefore, and sense are the same in things hot, and every thing else of this kind. For such as every one perceives things to be, such they are and appear to be to every one.

THEÆ. So it seems.

Soc. Sense, therefore, is always of that which has a being, and is without falsehood, as being science.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Whether or no, therefore, by the Graces, was Protagoras a man perfectly wise ; and did he obscurely signify this to us who rank among the vulgar, but speak the truth to his disciples in secret ?

THEÆ. Why, Socrates, do you say this ?

Soc. I will tell you, and it is by no means a despicable assertion. There is not any thing which is itself essentially one thing¹ ; nor can you properly denominate

¹ This is true only of the sensible world ; nor does Socrates make this assertion with a view to any thing else than the flowing and unreal condition of matter and its inherent forms. For the sensible world, as I have before observed in a note on the Orphic hymn to Nature, from its

denominate any thing, as endued with some particular quality. But if you denominate it as great, it will appear to be small; and if heavy, light. And all things subsist in such a manner, as if nothing was one thing, or any thing particular, or endued with a certain quality. But from their lation, motion, and mixture with each other, all things become that which we said they were, and are not rightly denominated by us. For there is not any thing, which at any time *is*, but it is always in generation, or *becoming to be*. And in this all the wise in succession consent, except Parmenides¹; viz. Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles: and of the poets, those who rank the highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy, indeed, Epicharmus, and in tragedy, Homer. For when this latter calls Ocean² and mother Tethys the origin of the Gods, he asserts that all things are the progeny of flux and motion. Or does he not appear to say this?

THEÆ. To me he does.

Soc. Who then can contend against such an army, and which has Homer for its leader, without being ridiculous?

THEÆ. It is not easy, O Socrates.

Soc. It is not indeed, Theætetus. Since this may be a sufficient argument in favour of their assertion, that motion imparts to things the appearance of being, and of becoming to be; but rest of non-being, and perishing. For heat and fire, which generate and govern other things, are themselves generated from lation and friction. But these are motions. Or are not these the origin of fire?

material imperfection, cannot receive the whole of divine infinity at once; but can only partake of it gradually and partially, as it were by drops in a momentary succession. Hence it is in a continual state of flowing and formation, but never possesses real being; and is like the image of a lofty tree seen in a rapid torrent, which has the appearance of a tree without the reality; and which seems to endure perpetually the same, yet is continually renewed by the continual renovation of the stream.

¹ See the Sophista and Parmenides.

² Ocean, considered according to its first subsistence, as a deity, belongs, according to the Grecian theology, to that order of Gods which is called intellectual, and of which Saturn is the summit. This deity also is called a fountal God, *πρωταυς θεος*, and is said by Homer to be the origin of the Gods, because he gives birth to their procession into the sensible universe. In short he is the cause to all secondary natures of every kind of motion, whether intellectual, psychical, or natural: but Tethys is the cause of all the separation of the streams proceeding from Ocean, conferring on each a proper purity of natural motion. See more concerning these deities in the Notes on the Cratylus.

THEÆ. They are.

Soc. And besides this, the genus of animals originates from the same things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But what? Is not the habit of the body corrupted by rest and indolence, but for the most part preserved by exercise and motion?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. But does not habit in the soul possess disciplines through learning and meditation, which are motions; and is it not thus preserved and made better? But through rest, which is negligence and a privation of discipline, it does not learn any thing, or if it does, it forgets it. Is not this the case?

THEÆ. Very much so.

Soc. Motion, therefore, is good, both with respect to soul and body; but rest is the very contrary.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. I add further, with respect to times of serenity and tranquillity, and all such as these, that rest putrefies and destroys, but that other things preserve. And besides this, I will bring the affair to a conclusion by forcing the golden chain into my service. For Homer intended by this to signify nothing else than the sun¹; because, as long as the sun and its circulation are moved, all things will be, and will be preserved, both among Gods and men. But if this should stand still, as if it were bound, all things would be dissolved, and that which is proverbially said would take place, viz. all things would be upwards and downwards.

THEÆ. But Homer appears to me also, O Socrates, to signify that which you say.

Soc. In the first place, therefore, O best of young men, conceive thus respecting the eyes: that which you call a white colour is not any thing else external to your eyes, nor yet in your eyes; nor can you assign any place

¹ Agreeably to this explanation of Homer's golden chain, Plato, in the sixth book of his Republic, calls the light of the sun "a bond the most honourable of all bonds." Hence, according to Plato, the circulation of the sun connects and preserves all mundane natures, as well as its light; and as the sun has a supermundane as well as a mundane subsistence, as we shall show in the notes on the Cratylus, it must also be the source of connection to those Gods that are denominated supermundane.

to it. For, if you could, it would now have an orderly position, and would abide, and be no longer in generation.

THEÆ. But how?

Soc. Let us follow what we just now said, establishing nothing as essentially one thing; and thus black and white, and any other colour, will appear to us to be generated from the darting forth of the eyes to a convenient lation. And every thing which we denominate a colour, will neither be that which darts forth, nor that which is darted forth, but something between these, which becomes peculiar to every thing. Or do you strenuously contend, that such as every colour appears to you, such also it appears to a dog, and every other animal?

THEÆ. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. But what with respect to another man? Will you contend that any thing appears to him in a similar manner as to you? Or rather, that a thing does not appear the same to you, because you are never similar to yourself?

THEÆ. This appears to me to be the case rather than that.

Soc. If, therefore, that which we measure, or that which we touch, was great, or white, or hot, it would never, by falling upon any thing else, become a different thing, because it would not be in any respect changed. But if that which is measured or touched by us, was either great, or white, or hot, it would not, in consequence of something else approaching to it, or becoming passive, become itself any thing else, as it would not suffer any thing. Since now, my friend, we are in a certain respect easily compelled to assert things wonderful and ridiculous, as Protagoras himself would acknowledge, and every one who assents to his doctrines.

THEÆ. How is this, and what things do you speak of?

Soc. Take a small example, and you will understand all that I wish. If we compare four to six dice, we say that the six are more than four, and that the two are to each other in a sesquialter ratio: but if we compare twelve to the six, we say that the six are less than, and are the half of, twelve. Nor is it possible to say otherwise. Or can you endure to say otherwise?

THEÆ. Not I, indeed.

Soc. What then? If Protagoras, or any other, should say to you, O Theætetus, can any thing become greater or more in any other way than by being increased? What would you answer?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. If, O Socrates, I should answer to the present question, what appears to me to be the case, I should say that it cannot: but if I should reply to the former question, in order that I might not contradict myself, I should say that it might.

Soc. Well and divinely said, by Juno, my friend. But, (as it appears) if you should answer that it is so, that saying of Euripides might be adopted: for the tongue would be irreprehensible for us, but not the mind.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. If, therefore, I and you were skilful and wise, after we had examined every thing belonging to our minds, we should then make trial of each other from our abundance, and sophistically approaching to this contest, should make our arguments strike against each other. But now, as being rude and unskilful, we wish, in the first place, to contemplate the things themselves in themselves, that we may know what it is which we dianoëttically perceive, and whether we accord with each other, or not.

THEÆ. I wish this to be the case by all means.

Soc. And so do I. But since we are thus disposed, let us in a quiet manner, as being abundantly at leisure, again consider, not morosely, but examining ourselves in reality, what the nature is of these appearances within us. And, on the first consideration of these, we shall say (as I think) that nothing at any time ever becomes greater or lesser, neither in bulk, nor in number, as long as it is equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. And, in the second place, that to which nothing is either added or taken away, will neither at any time ever be increased, or corrupted, but will always be equal.

THEÆ. And, indeed, very much so.

Soc. And shall we not also say, in the third place, that a thing which was not formerly, but subsists afterwards, cannot exist without making and being made?

THEÆ. So, indeed, it seems.

Soc. These three things, then, which are acknowledged by us, oppose each other in a hostile manner in our soul, when we speak about dice, as above, or when we say that I, who am so old, am neither increased, nor suffer a contrary passion in myself; while you, who are a young man, are now greater,

greater, and afterwards less, since nothing is taken away from my bulk, but yours is increased. For, through a length of time, I am what I was not formerly, being no longer in a state of progressive increase: for without making, it is impossible that a thing can be made. But losing nothing of my bulk, I do not at any time become less. And there are ten thousand other things of this kind, which happen to ten thousand other persons, if we admit these things. Speak, Theætetus: for you appear to me not to be unskilled in things of this kind.

THEÆ. By the Gods, Socrates, I wonder in a transcendent manner what these things are: and, truly, sometimes looking at them, I labour under a dark vertigo.

SOC. Theodorus, my friend, appears not to have badly conjectured concerning your disposition; since to wonder is very much the passion of a philosopher. For there is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And he who said¹ that Iris is the daughter of Thaumás², did not genealogize badly. But whether do you understand on what account these things, from which we say Protagoras speaks, are such as they are, or not?

THEÆ. I do not yet appear to myself to understand.

SOC. Will you not, therefore, thank me, if I unfold to you the concealed truth of the conceptions of this man, or rather, of celebrated men?

THEÆ. How is it possible I should not? Indeed, I should thank you exceedingly.

SOC. Looking, round, therefore, now see that no profane person hears us. But *those are profane who think there is nothing else than that which they are able to grasp with their hands; but do not admit that actions, and generations, and every thing which is invisible, are to be considered as belonging to a part of essence.*

THEÆ. You speak, Socrates, of hard and refractory men.

SOC. They are indeed, O boy, very much destitute of the Muses: but there are many others more elegant than these, whose mysteries I am about to relate to you. But the principle of these men, from which all that we

¹ i. e. Hesiod in Theog. v. 780.

² i. e. Of wonder. Iris, therefore, being the daughter of Wonder, is the exciting cause of this passion in souls.

have just now said is suspended, is this :—That this universe is motion[†]; and that besides motion there is nothing. Likewise, that of motion there are two species; each of which is infinite in multitude, but that one species has the power of acting, and the other of suffering. From the congress and mutual friction of these a progeny is produced, infinite in multitude, but two-fold in species: one, indeed, being that which is sensible, but the other sense, which always concurs and subsists together with sensible. And the senses, indeed, are denominated by us as follows, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and the touching things hot and cold. Pleasures and pains, desires and fears, innumerable other passions without a name, and an all-various multitude which are denominated, follow these. But to each of these the sensible genus is allied, viz. all-various colours to all-various sights; and in a similar manner, voices to hearings, and other sensibles are allied to other senses.

* Plato here presents us with the substance of the atomical or mechanical philosophy, which asserted that the universe was produced by nothing else but the motion of indivisible particles, by means of which all things are generated and corrupted. It likewise asserted that all these sensible qualities which are noticed by the several senses, such as colours, sounds, flavors, odours, and the like, are not things really existing external to us, but passions or sensations in us, caused by local motions on the organs of sense. This atomical philosophy, according to Posidonius the Stoic, as we are informed by Strabo*, is more antient than the times of the Trojan war, and was first invented by one Moschus a Sidonian, or rather, if we prefer the testimony of Sextus Empiricus†, a Phœnician. This Moschus is doubtless the same person with that Moschus the physiologist, mentioned by Jamblichus‡ in his Life of Pythagoras. For he there informs us that Pythagoras, during his residence at Sidon in Phœnicia, conversed with the prophets that were the successors of Moschus the physiologist, and was instructed by them. Hence it appears that this physiology was not invented either by Epicurus or Democritus.

Plato, as may be collected from his Timæus, adopted this physiology: for he there resolves the differences of the four elements into the different geometrical figures of their insensible parts; and in so doing he likewise followed the Pythagoreans. However, he differed from the atomists in this, as I have observed in the Introduction to the Timæus, that he assigned commensuration and active fabricative powers to these insensible figures, which they did not; and he likewise differed from them in his arrangement of earth.

* 'Εἰ δὲ πιστεῦσαι τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ το περὶ τῶν ἀτομῶν δόγμα παλαιὸν ἐστίν, ἀνδρὸς Σιδωνίου Μοσχῶν προ τῶν Τροϊκῶν χρόνων γεγενῆστος. Lib. xvi.

† Advers. Mathematic. p. 367.

‡ Τοῖς τε Μοσχῶν τοῦ φυσιολογοῦ προφηταῖς ἀπογοναῖς καὶ τρις ἄλλοις, καὶ Φοινικίαις ἱεροφάνταις.

What then is the intention of this discourse, O Theætetus, with reference to the former? Do you understand what it is?

THEÆ. Not very much, Socrates.

SOC. But see whether it can in a certain respect be finished. For it wishes to assert that all these things are, as we have said, moved, and that there is swiftneſs and ſlowneſs in their motions. So far, therefore, as their motions are ſlow, they poſſeſs motion in the ſame, and towards things near, and thus generate. But things thus generated are more ſlow. And again, ſo far as their motions are ſwift, they poſſeſs a motion towards things at a diſtance, and thus generate: but the things thus generated are more ſwift. For they are borne along, and their motion naturally ſubſiſts in lation. When, therefore, the eye and any thing commenſurate to this generate by approximation, whiteness, and the ſenſe connate to this, which would never have been produced if each of theſe had been directed to ſomething elſe, then, in the interim, ſight tending to the eyes, and whiteness to that which together with it generates colour, the eye becomes filled with viſion, and then ſees, and becomes not ſight, but an eye ſeeing. But that which in conjunction with it generates colour becomes filled with whiteness, and is made not whiteness, but a thing white; whether it is wood or ſtone, or any thing elſe which may happen to be coloured with a colour of this kind. And in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to other things, ſuch as the hot and the hard, &c. we muſt conceive that no one of theſe is eſſentially any thing; but, as we have already obſerved, that all things, and of all-various kinds, are generated in their congruence with each other, from motion. Since, as they ſay, there is no ſtability in conceiving, that either that which acts, or that which ſuffers, is any one thing. For neither is that which acts any thing till it meets with that which is paſſive, nor that which is paſſive till it meets with that which acts. For that which meets with and produces any thing, when it falls upon another, then renders that which is paſſive apparent. So that from all this, that which we ſaid in the beginning follows, that there is not any thing which is eſſentially one thing, but that it is always becoming to be ſomething to ſome particular thing, but is itſelf entirely exempt from being. Indeed, juſt now we frequently uſed the term *being*, compelled to this by cuſtom and ignorance; but, according to the aſſertions of the wiſe,

we ought not to predicate any thing, either of any other, or of myself, or of this, or that, or call it by any other name which signifies permanency, but we should affirm according to nature, that they are generated and made, corrupted and changed. For, if any one asserts that they stand still, he may easily be confuted. But it is requisite thus to speak of things separately, and of many things collected together; in which collection, man, a stone, every animal, and species are placed. Do not these things, O Theætetus, appear to you to be pleasant; and are they not agreeable to your taste?

THEÆ. I do not know, Socrates: for I cannot understand respecting yourself, whether you assert these things as appearing to be so to you, or in order to try me.

Soc. Do you not remember, my friend, that I neither know any of these particulars, nor make any of them my own, but that I am barren of them? Likewise, that I act the part of a midwife towards you, and that for the sake of this I enchant you, and place before you the doctrines of each of the wise, that you may taste them, till I lead forth your dogma into light? But when I have led it forth, I then examine whether it appears to be vain and empty, or prolific. But boldly and strenuously, in a becoming and manly manner, answer what appears to you to be the truth respecting the things I shall ask you.

THEÆ. Ask then.

Soc. Tell me then again, whether it is your opinion that nothing has a being, but that the good, and the beautiful, and every thing which we just now enumerated, always subsist in becoming to be?

THEÆ. When I hear you discoursing in this manner, the assertion appears to be wonderful, and it seems that what you discuss should be admitted.

Soc. Let us, therefore, not omit what remains. But it remains that we should speak concerning dreams, diseases, and, besides other things, of insanity; likewise, concerning whatever is seen or heard, or in any other way perceived perversely. For you know that in all these the doctrine which we just now related, will appear without any dispute to be confuted; since the senses in these are more deceived than in any thing else: and so far is it from being the case that things are such as they appear to every one, that, on the contrary, no one of those things which appear to have a being can in reality be said to be.

THEÆ. You speak with the greatest truth, Socrates.

Soc. What, then, O boy, can remain for him to say, who asserts that sense is science, and that things which appear to every one are to that individual what they appear to be?

THEÆ. I am averse to reply, Socrates, since I know not what to say; because just now when I was speaking you terrified me. For, in reality, I cannot hesitate to grant, that those who are insane, or dreaming, think falsely, since some among the former of these consider themselves as Gods, and those that dream think they fly like birds.

Soc. Whether or no, therefore, are you aware of this dubious question concerning these particulars, and especially concerning perceptions in sleep, and when we are awake?

THEÆ. What question is this?

Soc. That which I think you have often heard, when it is asked, as at present, by what arguments any one can evince, whether we are asleep, and all our thoughts are dreams, or whether we are in a vigilant¹ state, and in reality discourse with each other.

THEÆ. And indeed, Socrates, it is dubious by what arguments any one can evince this. For all things follow, as it were, reciprocally the same things. For, with respect to our present discourse, nothing hinders but that our appearing to converse with each other may be in a dream: and when in sleep we appear to relate our dreams, there is a wonderful similitude in this case to our conversation when awake.

Soc. You see, then, it is not difficult to doubt, since it is dubious whether things are dreams or vigilant perceptions; and especially since the time which we devote to sleep is equal to that which we devote to vigilance: and in each of these our soul anxiously contends, that the present dogmas are the most true. So that in an equal time we say that these things and those are true; and in a similar manner we strenuously contend for their reality in each.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. The same may be said, therefore, respecting disease and insanity, except that in these the time is not equal.

¹ Sense is nothing more than a dreaming perception of reality; for sensibles are merely the images of true beings.

THEÆ. Right.

Soc. What then, Shall truth be defined by the multitude and paucity of time?

THEÆ. But this, indeed, would be very ridiculous.

Soc. Have you any thing else by which you can clearly show which of these opinions are true?

THEÆ. It does not appear to me that I have.

Soc. Hear, therefore, from me, what they will say who define appearances to be always true to those to whom they appear. For I think they will say, interrogating you in this manner: O Theætetus, does that which is in every respect different, possess a certain power which is the same with another thing? And must we not admit, that a thing in every respect different is not partly the same, and partly different, but that it is wholly different?

THEÆ. It is impossible, therefore, that it should possess any thing the same, either in power, or in any thing else, since it is altogether different.

Soc. Must we not, therefore, necessarily confess, that a thing of this kind is dissimilar?

THEÆ. It appears so to me.

Soc. If, therefore, any thing happens to become similar or dissimilar to any thing, whether to itself or to another, so far as it is similar must we not say it becomes same, but, so far as dissimilar, different?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. Have we not said before, that there are many, and indeed an infinite number of things which act, and in a similar manner of things which suffer?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. And besides this, that when one thing is mingled with another and another, it does not generate things which are the same, but such as are different?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Shall we speak of me and you, and other things after the same manner? As, for instance, shall we say that Socrates when well is similar to Socrates when ill, or dissimilar?

THEÆ. Do you mean to ask whether the whole of Socrates when ill is similar or dissimilar to the whole of Socrates when well?

Soc. You understand me perfectly well. This is what I mean.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I answer, then, that it is dissimilar and different.

Soc. Whether, therefore, is it so, considered as dissimilar?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. And would you speak in a similar manner respecting those that are asleep, and all such particulars as we just now discussed?

THEÆ. I should.

Soc. But does not each of those things which are naturally capable of effecting any thing, when it receives Socrates as well, use me as a different man from what it does when it receives me as ill?

THEÆ. Is it possible it should not?

Soc. And do we not generate from each things that are different, I being the patient, and that thing the agent?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But when I drink wine, being well, it appears to me to be pleasant and sweet.

THEÆ. Certainly.

Soc. But, from what has been granted, an agent and a patient generate sweetness and sense, both being borne along together. And sense, indeed, existing from the patient, causes the tongue to perceive; but sweetness, from the wine being borne along about it, causes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to a healthy tongue.

THEÆ. The former particulars were entirely allowed by us to subsist in this manner.

Soc. But when I drink wine, being diseased, my tongue does not in reality receive it the same as before: for it now approaches to that which is dissimilar.

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But Socrates thus affected, and the drinking the wine again generate other things; about the tongue a sensation of bitterness; but about the wine, bitterness generated and borne along. And the wine, indeed, is not bitterness, but bitter; and I am not sense, but that which is sentient.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. I therefore, thus perceiving, do not ever become any thing else. For of a different thing there is a different sense, which renders the perceiver various and different. Nor does that which thus affects me become a thing
of

of this kind, by concurring with another thing, and generating the same. For, generating another thing from another, it would become itself various.

THEÆ. These things are so.

Soc. Nor, indeed, am I such to myself, nor is that thing generated such to itself.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

Soc. But it is necessary that I should become sentient of something, when I become sentient: for it is impossible that I should be sentient, and yet sentient of nothing. And it is likewise necessary that that thing should become something to some one, when it becomes sweet or bitter, or any thing of this kind. For it is impossible that a thing can be sweet, and yet sweet to no one.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. It remains then, I think, that we should mutually be, if we are; and if we are becoming to be, that we should be mutually in generation; since necessity binds our essence. But it does not bind it to any other thing, nor yet to ourselves. It remains, therefore, that we are bound to each other. So that, if any one says a certain thing is, or is becoming to be, it must be understood that it is, or is becoming to be something, or of something, or to something. But it must not be said that it is in itself either that which is, or which is becoming to be. Nor must we suffer this to be said, either by the thing itself, or by any other, as the discourse we have already discussed evinces.

THEÆ. Entirely so, Socrates.

Soc. Since that which affects me, belongs to me and not to another, do not I also perceive it, and not another?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. My sense, therefore, is true to me. For it always belongs to my essence. And I, according to Protagoras, am a judge of things which have a being pertaining to myself, that they are, and of non-beings, that they are not.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. How then is it possible, since I am not deceived, and do not stagger in my dianoëtic part, either about things which are, or things in generation, that I should not possess scientific knowledge of things which I perceive?

THEÆ. There is no reason why you should not.

Soc. It was beautifully, therefore, said by you, that science is nothing else than sense. And the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus, and all of this

tribe,

tribe, that all things are moved like streams, accords with that of the most wise Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; and with that of Theætetus, that, things subsisting in this manner, sense is science. For do we not, O Theætetus, say, that this is as it were your offspring recently born, but delivered by me by the midwife's art? Or how do you say?

THEÆ. It is necessary to say so, Socrates.

Soc. But this, as it appears, we have scarcely been able to generate, whatever it may be. Since however it is delivered, celebrating the usual solemnities on the fifth day after the nativity, let us run through a circle of disputations, considering whether it does not deceive us, and is not worthy of being educated, but is vain and false. Or do you think that you ought by all means to nourish your offspring, and not abandon it? Or could you endure to see it reprobated, and not be very much offended if any one should take it away from you, as being your first born?

THEO. Theætetus, Socrates, could endure this. For he is not morose. But by the Gods tell me, if this is not the case.

Soc. You are sincerely a philologist, and a good man, Theodorus: for you think I am a sack of discourse, out of which I can easily take words, and say that these things are not so. But you do not understand the truth of the case, that no assertions proceed from me, but always from him who discourses with me. Indeed I know nothing, except a small matter, viz. how to receive a reason from another wise man, and apprehend it sufficiently. And now I endeavour to determine this question, by means of Theætetus, and not from myself.

THEO. You speak well, Socrates; and, therefore, do as you say.

Soc. Do you know, Theodorus, what it is I admire in your associate Protagoras?

THEO. What is it?

Soc. In other respects his assertion, that a thing is that which it appears to any one, is, I think, a very pleasant one; but I wonder that at the beginning of his discourse, when he speaks of truth, he did not say, that a swine or a cynocephalus¹, or any other more unusual thing endued with sense, is the measure of all things, that he might begin to speak to us magnificently, and in a manner perfectly contemptuous; evincing that we should admire

¹ An animal which has nothing pertaining to a dog except the head.

him for his wisdom as if he were a God, when at the same time with respect to understanding, he is not at all superior to a little frog, much less to any other man. Or how shall we say, Theodorus? For if that of which each person forms an opinion through sense is true to each, and no other *passion* ^r of any one judges better than this, and one person is not better qualified to judge whether an opinion is true or false than another, but, as we have often said, every one is alone able to form an opinion of things pertaining to himself, and all these are right and true,—then why, my friend, is Protagoras so wise, that he is thought to be justly worthy of instructing others, and receiving a mighty reward for so doing, while we are considered as more unlearned, and are advised to become his disciples, though each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Or how is it possible not to say that Protagoras asserts these things in order to seduce the people? I pass over in silence, what laughter both myself and my obstetric art must excite; and besides this, as I think, the whole business of discourse. For will not the consideration and endeavour to confute the phantasies and opinions of others, since each is true, be nothing more than long and mighty trifles, if the truth ^s of Protagoras is true, and he does not in sport speak from the adytum of his book?

THEO. As I am a friend, Socrates, to Protagoras, as you just now said, I cannot suffer with my consent that he should be confuted, nor yet am I willing to oppose your opinion. Again, therefore, take to yourself Theætetus; for he appears to have attended to you in a very becoming manner.

SOC. If then, Theodorus, you should go to the palæstræ at Lacedæmon, and should see among those that are naked some of a base form, would you not think it worth while to exhibit your own naked figure?

THEO. But what do you think, if, complying with my request, they should permit me, as I hope you will at present, to be a spectator without being drawn to the gymnasium, my limbs being now stiff, and engaging in wrestling with one who is younger, and whose joints are more supple than mine?

SOC. But, if this be the case, Theodorus, and it is friendly to you, then, according to the proverb, it is not hostile to me. Let us, therefore, again go to the wise Theætetus. But answer me, in the first place, Theætetus, to what we just now discussed, Would you not wonder, if on a sudden you

^r Socrates here very properly calls sense a *passion*; for it is a passive perception of things.

^s Socrates says this in derision of what Protagoras calls the truth.

should appear to be not inferior in wisdom, either to any man or God? Or do you think that the Protagorean measure pertains less to Gods than to men?

THEÆ. I do not by Jupiter. And I very much wonder at your question. For when we discussed in what manner it might be said, that what appears to any one is true to any one, it appeared to me to be perfectly well said, but now the very contrary has rapidly taken place.

Soc. My dear boy, you are as yet a youth, and are therefore easily obedient to and persuaded by conversation. For to these things Protagoras or any one of his sect would say: O generous boys, and aged men, you here sit together, conversing and calling on the Gods, concerning whom, whether they are or are not, I do not think it proper either to speak or write. Likewise hearing the things which the multitude admit, these you assert: and among others, that it would be a dire thing if every man did not far surpass every brute in wisdom; but you do not adduce any demonstration, or necessity, that it should be so, but only employ probability. Which if Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should employ when geometrizing, he would be considered as undeserving of notice. Do you, therefore, and Theodorus consider, whether you should admit persuasion and probable arguments, when discoursing about things of such great consequence.

THEÆ. But, Socrates, both you and we should say that this would not be just.

Soc. Now, however, as it appears from your discourse, and that of Theodorus, another thing is to be considered.

THEÆ. Entirely another thing.

Soc. Let us, therefore, consider this, whether science is the same with sense, or different from it? For to this in a certain respect the whole of our discourse tends: and for the sake of this we have agitated these particulars, which are both numerous and wonderful. Is it not so?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Do we then acknowledge that all such things as we perceive by seeing and hearing, we at the same time scientifically know? So that for instance, shall we say, that we do not hear the Barbarians, when they speak, before we have learned their language or that, without this, we both hear them and at the same time know what they say? And again, whether

when

when ignorant of letters, but looking at them, we do not see them, or shall we strenuously contend that we know, if we see them?

THEÆ. We should say this, Socrates, that, if we see and hear things, we know them scientifically; and that in the latter of these instances, on perceiving the figure and colour we scientifically know the letters; and that in the former instance, we at the same time both hear and know the sharpness and flatness of the sounds: but that what grammarians and interpreters teach respecting these things, we neither perceive nor scientifically know by seeing or hearing.

Soc. Most excellently said, Theætetus. Nor is it worth while to oppose you in these things, that you may thence make a greater proficiency. But consider also this other thing which will take place, and see how it may be repelled.

THEÆ. What is that?

Soc. It is this: If any one should ask whether it is possible that a person can be ignorant of that which he has a scientific knowledge of, while he yet remembers it, and preserves it, then when he remembers it. But I shall be prolix, as it appears, through desiring to inquire whether any one does not know that which he has learnt and remembers.

THEÆ. But how is it possible he should not, Socrates? For, otherwise, what you say would be a prodigy.

Soc. Do I, therefore, rave or not? Consider. Do you not then say that to see is to perceive, and that sight is sense?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. Has not, therefore, he who sees any thing a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, according to the present discourse?

THEÆ. He has.

Soc. But what, do you not say that memory is something?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. But whether is it of nothing or something?

THEÆ. Of something, doubtless.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, of those things which he learns and perceives?

THEÆ. It is of such things as these.

Soc. But what, does any one ever remember that which he sees?

THEÆ. He does remember it.

SOC. Does he likewise when he shuts his eyes? or, when he does this, does he forget?

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, would be a dire thing to say.

SOC. And yet it is necessary to say so, if we would preserve the former discourse: but if not, it must perish.

THEÆ. And I indeed by Jupiter suspect so, though I do not sufficiently understand: but tell me in what respect it must be so.

SOC. In this. We say that he who sees any thing has a scientific knowledge of that which he sees: for it is confessed by us that sight and sense, and science are the same.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

SOC. But he who sees, and has a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, if he shuts his eyes, he remembers indeed that thing, but does not see it. Is it not so?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. But not to see is not to know scientifically; since to see is to have a scientific knowledge.

THEÆ. True.

SOC. It happens, therefore, that when any one has a scientific knowledge of any thing, and still remembers it, he does not know it scientifically, since he does not see it; which we say would be monstrous, if it should take place.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

SOC. But it appears that something impossible would happen, if any one should say that science and sense are the same.

THEÆ. It appears so.

SOC. Each, therefore, must be confessed to be different.

THEÆ. So it seems.

SOC. As it appears then, we must again say from the beginning what science is. Though what shall we do, Theætetus?

THEÆ. About what?

SOC. We appear to me, like dunghill cocks, to leap from our disputation, before we have gained the victory, and begin to crow.

THEÆ. How so?

SOC. Though we have assented to the established meaning of names, yet

we appear to have contradicted this meaning, and to have been delighted in so doing, in our discourse: and though we have confessed ourselves not to be contentious but wise, yet we are ignorant that we do the same as those skilful men.

THEÆ. I do not yet understand what you say.

Soc. But I will endeavour to explain what I understand about these things. For we inquired whether any one who has learnt and remembers a thing, has not a scientific knowledge of that thing: and we evinced that he who knows a thing, and with his eyes shut remembers it, but does not see it, at the same time is ignorant of and remembers it. But that this is impossible. And so the Protagorean fable is destroyed, and at the same time yours, which asserts that science and sense are the same.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. But this I think, my friend, would not be the case if the father of the other fable were alive, but he would very much defend it. But now, being an orphan, we reproachfully deride it. For the guardians which Protagoras left, and of which Theodorus is one, are unwilling to assist it. But we, for the sake of justice, should venture to give it assistance.

THEO. Indeed, Socrates, I am not one of the guardians of the doctrine of Protagoras, but this ought rather to be said of Callias the son of Hipponicus. For we very rapidly betook ourselves from mere words to geometry. Nevertheless, we shall thank you if you assist this doctrine.

Soc. You speak well, Theodorus. Consider, therefore, the assistance which I shall give. For he who does not attend to the power of words, by which, for the most part, we are accustomed to affirm or deny any thing, must assent to things more dire than those we have just mentioned. Shall I tell you in what respect, Theætetus?

THEO. Tell us in common, therefore: but let the younger answer. For, if he errs, it will be less disgraceful.

Soc. But I speak of a most dire question; and I think it is this. Is it possible that he who knows any thing can be ignorant of this thing which he knows?

THEO. What shall we answer, Theætetus?

THEÆ. I think it is not possible.

Soc. But this is not the case, if you admit that to see is to know scientifically.

fically. For what ought you to reply to that inevitable question, which, as it is said, is shut up in a well, if any one should ask you, O intrepid man, whether, on covering one of your eyes with your hand, you can see your garment with the covered eye?

THEÆ. I think I should say, Not with this, but with the other eye.

Soc. Would you not, therefore, see, and at the same time not see, the same thing?

THEÆ. I should in a certain respect.

Soc. But he will say, I neither ordered you to answer thus, nor did I ask in what respect you might be said to see, but whether, if knowing a thing scientifically, you also did not scientifically know it. But now you confess that not seeing, you see: and prior to this you acknowledged, that to see was to have a scientific knowledge, and that not to see, was not to know scientifically. Think what will happen to you from these things.

THEÆ. I think the very contrary to what we admitted will take place.

Soc. But, perhaps, O wonderful youth, you will suffer many things of this kind, if any one should ask you whether it is possible to know scientifically, in an acute and dull manner, and near, but not at a distance; vehemently and with remission, and in ten thousand other ways. For an insidious man, armed with a shield, and led to discussion by hire, when you admit science and sense to be the same, will drive you to hearing, smelling, and such like senses, and there detaining, will confute you, and will not dismiss you, till having admired his exquisite wisdom you are bound by him. And being thus brought into captivity and bound, you will be obliged to redeem yourself for a sum of money which is agreed upon by him and you. But you will perhaps say, After what manner can Protagoras defend his opinions? Shall we endeavour to say something else?

THEÆ. By all means.

Soc. But all this which we have said in defence of him, will, I think, be ineffectual. For, despising us, he will say: That good man, Socrates, when he was asked by a boy, whether any one could at the same time remember a thing, and be ignorant of it, was frightened, and in his fear denied that any one could; and, through being unable to look straight forward, made me appear ridiculous in his discourses. But, most sluggish Socrates, the thing is thus: When by inquiry you consider any one of my assertions, if he whom
you

you interrogate answers in the same manner as I should answer, and is deceived, in this case I am confuted. But if he answers in a different manner, he alone whom you interrogate is deceived. For, in the first place, do you think that any one would grant you, that memory can be present to him who no longer suffers a passion of such a kind as he once suffered? It is far from being the case. Or do you think he would hesitate to acknowledge, that the same thing may at the same time be both known and not known? Or, if he should fear to assert this, do you think he would admit that any one thing is dissimilar to another, before it is itself made dissimilar to that which has a being? Or rather, that this is something, and not those; and that those will become infinite, if dissimilitude has a subsistence; admitting that it is requisite to avoid the mutual hunting of words. But, (he will say) O blessed man, approach in a still more generous manner to what I say, and confute, if you are able, my assertion, that peculiar senses do not belong to each of us; or that, if they are peculiar, that which appears will not any thing the more belong only to one individual. Or, if it is necessary it should exist, it may be denominated by him to whom it appears. But when you speak of swine and cynocephali, you not only grunt yourself, but you persuade those that hear you to do this at my writings; and in this respect do not act well. For I say, that the truth subsists, as I have written: for each of us is the measure both of beings and non-beings. But one thing differs widely from another, because they appear to one person different from what they do to another. I am likewise far from asserting, that there is any such thing as wisdom, or a wise man. But I call him a wise man who, changing the condition of him to whom things appear and are evil, causes them to appear and to be good to such a one. Do not, therefore, pursue my discourse in words only, but still in a clearer manner thus learn what I say. And in order to this, recollect what was said before, that to a sick man the things which he tastes appear and are bitter; but that to him who is well they are and appear to be the contrary. But it is not proper to make either of these the wiser on this account: (for this is impossible) nor must it be asserted, that he who is sick is an ignorant person, because he entertains such opinions, and that he who is well is wise, because he thinks differently; but that he is changed into a different habit. For one habit is better than another. In a similar manner, too, in erudition, there is a mutation from one habit to a better. But the physician effects

effects a mutation by medicines, and the sophist by discourses. For no one can cause him who thinks falsely to think afterwards truly. For it is not possible for any one to have an opinion of things which are not, or of things different from what he suffers. But the things which he suffers are always true. And I think that he, who, through a depraved habit of soul, forms opinions of things allied to himself, may, through a good habit, be made to entertain opinions of different things, which some, through ignorance, denominate true phantasms. But I say that some things are better than others, but that they are by no means more true. Likewise, friend Socrates, I am far from calling the wife frogs. But I call those that are wise in things pertaining to bodies, physicians; and in things pertaining to plants, husbandmen. For I say that these men insert in their plants, when any one of them is diseased, useful, healthy, and true senses, instead of such as are depraved: but that wise men and good rhetoricians cause things that are good to appear just to cities, instead of such as are base. For such things as appear to each city to be just and beautiful, these are to that city such as it thinks them to be. But a wise man, instead of such particulars as are noxious to cities, causes them to become and to appear to be advantageous. After the same manner a sophist, when he is thus able to discipline those that are instructed, is a wise man, and deserves a great reward from those he instructs. And thus some are more wise than others, and yet no one entertains false opinions. And this must be admitted by you, whether you are willing or not, since you are the measure of things. For this assertion is preserved in these; against which, if you have any thing else which you can urge from the beginning, urge it, by adducing opposing arguments. But if you are willing to do this by interrogations, begin to interrogate. For neither is this to be avoided, but is to be pursued the most of all things, by him who is endued with intellect. Act, therefore, in this manner, lest you should be injurious in interrogating. For it is very absurd, that he, who, by his own confession, applies himself to the study of virtue, should in discourse accomplish nothing else than injustice. But he acts unjustly in a thing of this kind, who does not exercise himself separately in contending, and separately in discoursing: and who in the former jests and deceives as far as he is able, but in the latter acts seriously, and corrects him with whom he discourses; alone pointing out to him those errors by which he was deceived, both by himself and the former

former discussions. If, therefore, you act in this manner, those who discourse with you will accuse themselves of their own perturbation and perplexity, but not you. They will likewise follow and love you, but hate themselves, and will fly from themselves to philosophy; that, becoming different from what they were, they may liberate themselves from their former habits. But if you act in a manner contrary to this, as is the case with the multitude, the very contrary will happen to you; and you will cause those that associate with you, when they become elderly, to hate this pursuit, instead of being philosophers. If, therefore, you will be persuaded by me, then, as was said before, bringing with you a mind neither morose nor hostile, but propitious and mild, you will truly consider our assertion, that all things are moved, and that whatever appears to any one, whether to an individual or a city, is that very thing which it appears to be. And from hence you will consider, whether science and sense are the same with, or different from, each other; nor will you, as was the case just now, discourse from the established custom of words and names, which drawing the multitude in a casual manner, mutually involve them in all-various doubts. Such, O Theodorus, is the assistance, which to the utmost of my power I have endeavoured to give to your associate. These are small things, indeed, from the small. But, if he were alive, he would more magnificently defend his own doctrines.

THEO. You jest, Socrates: for you have very strenuously assisted the man.

SOC. You speak well, my friend. But tell me: Do you take notice that Protagoras just now, when he was speaking, reproached us, that when we were discoursing with a boy, we opposed his doctrines with a puerile fear; and besides this, that forbidding us to jest, and venerating moderation in all things, he exhorted us to discuss his doctrines seriously?

THEO. How is it possible, Socrates, I should not take notice of this?

SOC. What then? Do you order us to obey him?

THEO. Very much.

SOC. Do you see, therefore, that all these, except you, are boys? If then we are persuaded by him, it is requisite that you and I, interrogating and answering each other, should seriously examine his doctrine, that he may not have to accuse us that we have again considered his assertion, jesting, as it were, with young men.

THEO. But what? Will not Theætetus much better follow you in your investigation than many that have long beards?

SOC. But not better than you, Theodorus. Do not, therefore, think that I ought by all possible means to assist your deceased associate, but not afford you any assistance. But come, best of men, follow me a little, till we see this, whether you ought to be the measure of diagrams, or whether all men are, like you, sufficient with respect to astronomy, and other things in which you deservedly appear to excel.

THEO. It is not easy for him, O Socrates, who sits with you, to refuse an answer to your questions. But I just now spoke like one delirious, when I said that you would permit me not to divest myself of my garments, and that you would not compel me like the Lacedæmonians. But you appear to me rather to tend to the manners of Sciron¹. For the Lacedæmonians order us either to strip or depart: but you seem to me rather to act like Antæus. For you do not dismiss him who engages with you, till you have compelled him to wrestle with you in arguments, naked.

SOC. You have most excellently, Theodorus, found out a resemblance of my disease. But I am, indeed, more robust than these. For an innumerable multitude of Herculeses and Theseuses, who were very powerful in discourse, have contended with me, and have been very much wearied: but, notwithstanding this, I have not in the least desisted; with so dire a love of this exercise am I seized. Do not, therefore, through envy, refrain from exercising yourself with me, and benefiting at the same time both me and yourself.

THEO. I shall no longer oppose you. Lead me, therefore, wherever you please. For it is perfectly necessary that he who is confused should endure this fatal destiny which you have knit; yet I shall not attempt to exert myself beyond what I promised you.

SOC. This will be sufficient. But diligently observe this with respect to me, that I do not, through forgetfulness, adopt a puerile mode of discourse, so as that we may again be exposed to censure.

THEO. I will endeavour to do this, as far as I am able.

¹ This was a celebrated thief in Attica, who plundered the inhabitants of the country, and hurled them from the highest rocks into the sea, after he had obliged them to wait upon him, and to wash his feet. Theseus attacked him, and treated him as he had treated travellers.

Soc.

Soc. Let us, therefore, again resume this in the first place, which we discussed before, and see whether we properly or improperly reprobate the assertion of Protagoras, that every one is sufficient to himself with respect to wisdom. For Protagoras has granted us, that even some among the wise differ with respect to better and worse. Has he not?

THEO. Yes.

Soc. If, therefore, he being himself present acknowledges this, and we do not admit it through his assistance, there is no occasion to establish it by refusing the arguments in its favour. But now, since some one may consider us as not sufficient assertors of his doctrine, it will be better, as the case is, to assent to this position in a still clearer manner. For it is of no small consequence whether this takes place or not.

THEO. It is true.

Soc. Not from other things, therefore, but from his own assertions, we acquire our mutual assent in the shortest manner possible.

THEO. How so?

Soc. Thus. Does he not say that what appears to any one is that very thing to him to whom it appears?

THEO. He does say so.

Soc. Therefore, O Protagoras, we speak the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and we say, that no one can partly think himself wiser than others, and others partly wiser than himself. But in the greatest dangers, when in armies, or in diseases, or in tempests at sea, do not men look to the governors in each of these as Gods, and consider them as their saviours; these governors at the same time being superior in nothing else than in knowledge? And in all human affairs, do not men seek after such teachers and governors, both of themselves and other animals, as are thought to be sufficient to all the purposes of teaching and governing? And in all these, what else shall we say, than that men are of opinion that there is wisdom and ignorance among themselves?

THEO. Nothing else.

Soc. Do they not, therefore, think that wisdom is true dianoëtic energy, but ignorance false opinion?

THEO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. What then, O Protagoras, shall we assert? Shall we say that men always form true opinions; or that their opinions are sometimes true and sometimes false? For, from both these assertions, it will happen that they do not always form true opinions, but both true and false. For consider, Theodorus, whether any one of the followers of Protagoras, or you yourself, will contend, that there is no one who thinks that there is not some one who is unlearned, and forms false opinions.

THEO. But this is incredible, Socrates.

SOC. But the assertion, that man is the measure of all things, necessarily leads to this.

THEO. How so?

SOC. When you judge any thing from yourself, and afterwards declare your opinion of that thing to me, then, according to the doctrine of Protagoras, your opinion is true to you; but, with respect to us, may we not become judges of your judgment? Or shall we judge that you always form true opinions? Or shall we not say that an innumerable multitude of men will continually oppose your opinions, and think that you judge and opine falsely?

THEO. By Jupiter, Socrates, there is, as Homer says, a very innumerable multitude who will afford me sufficient employment from human affairs.

SOC. But what? Are you willing to admit we should say, that you then form true opinions to yourself, but such as are false to an innumerable multitude of mankind?

THEO. This appears to be necessary, from the assertion of Protagoras.

SOC. But what with respect to Protagoras himself? Is it not necessary, that if neither he should think that man is the measure of all things, nor the multitude, (as, indeed, they do not think this,) that this truth which he has written should not be possessed by any one? But if he thinks that man is the measure, but the multitude do not accord with him in opinion, do you not know, in the first place, that by how much greater the multitude is to whom this does not appear to be the case, than to whom it does, by so much the more it is not than it is?

THEO. It is necessary; since, according to each opinion, it will be and will not be.

SOC. In the next place, this thing will subsist in the most elegant manner. For he, with respect to his own opinion, will admit, that the opinion of those that dissent from him, and by which they think that he is deceived, is in a certain degree true, while he acknowledges that all men form true opinions.

THEO. Entirely so.

SOC. Will he not, therefore, admit that his own opinion is false, if he allows that the judgment of those who think he errs is true?

THEO. It is necessary.

SOC. But others will never allow themselves to be deceived; or do you think they will?

THEO. They will not.

SOC. Protagoras, however, from what he has written, will acknowledge that this opinion is true.

THEO. It appears so.

SOC. From all, therefore, that Protagoras has asserted, it may be doubted, or rather will be granted by him, that when he admits that he who contradicts him forms a true opinion, neither a dog, nor any man, is the measure of all things, or of any one thing, which he has not learned. Is it not so?

THEO. It is.

SOC. Since, therefore, this is doubted by all men, the truth of Protagoras will not be true to any one, neither to any other, nor to himself.

THEO. We attack my associate, Socrates, in a very violent manner.

SOC. But it is immanifest, my friend, whether or not we are carried beyond rectitude. For it is likely that he, as being our elder, is wiser than we are. And if suddenly leaping forth he should seize me by the shoulders, it is probable that he would prove me to be delirious in many things, as likewise you who assent to me, and that afterwards he would immediately vanish. But I think it is necessary that we should make use of ourselves such as we are, and always speak what appears to us to be the truth. And now then shall we say that any one will grant us another thing, that one man is wiser or more ignorant than another?

THEO. It appears so to me.

SOC. Shall we say that our discourse ought especially to persist in this to which we have subscribed, in order to assist Protagoras,—I mean, that many things

things which are apparent are such as they appear to every one, viz. things hot, dry, sweet, and all of this kind? And if in some things it should be granted that one person differs from another, as about things salubrious and noxious, Protagoras would assert, that not every woman, boy, and brute, is sufficient to cure itself by knowing what is salubrious, but that in this case, if in any, one differs from another.

THEO. So it appears to me.

Soc. With respect to political concerns, therefore, such as things beautiful and base, just and unjust, holy and unholy, are such opinions respecting these, as each city legally establishes for itself, true opinions to each? And in these, is neither one individual, nor one city wiser than another? But in the establishment of what is advantageous, or the contrary, to a city, Protagoras would doubtless grant that one counsellor is better than another, and that the opinion of one city is more true than that of another. Nor will he by any means dare to say, that what a city establishes in consequence of thinking that it is advantageous to itself, is to be preferred before every thing. But cities, with respect to what is just and unjust, holy and unholy, are willing strenuously to contend, that none of these have naturally any essence of their own, but that what appears to be true in common is then true when it appears, and as long as it appears. And those who do not altogether speak the doctrine of Protagoras, after this manner lead forth their wisdom. But with respect to us, Theodorus, one discourse employs us emerging from another, a greater from a less.

THEO. We are not, therefore, idle, Socrates.

Soc. We do not appear to be so. And indeed, O blessed man, I have often as well as now taken notice, that those who have for a long time been conversant with philosophy, when they go to courts of justice deservedly appear to be ridiculous rhetoricians.

THEO. Why do you assert this?

Soc. Those who from their youth have been rolled like cylinders in courts of justice, and places of this kind, appear, when compared to those who have been nourished in philosophy and such-like pursuits, as slaves educated among the free-born.

THEO. In what respect?

Soc.

Soc. In this, that these latter, always, as you say, abound in leisure, and at leisure peaceably discourse, just as we at present engage in a digressive conversation for the third time. In like manner, they, if any question occurs more pleasing to them than the proposed subject of discussion, are not at all concerned whether they speak with brevity, or prolixity, if they can but be partakers of reality. But the others when they speak are always busily engaged; (for defluent water urges) nor is it permitted them to discourse about that which is the object of their desire; but their opponent places before them necessity, and the formula of a book, without which nothing is to be said, which they call an oath respecting calumny, on the part of the plaintiff and defendant. Their discourses too are always concerning a fellow slave, against the master, who sits holding the action in his hand. Their contests likewise never vary, but are always about the same thing: and their course is often respecting life itself. So that, from all these circumstances, they become vehement and sharp, knowing that the master may be flattered by words, and that they shall be rewarded for it in reality; and this because their souls are little and distorted. For slavery from childhood prevents the soul from increasing, and deprives it of rectitude and liberty; compelling it to act in a distorted manner, and hurls into tender souls mighty dangers and fears; which not being able to endure with justice and truth, they immediately betake themselves to falsehood and mutual injuries, and become much bent and twisted. So that, their dianoëtic part being in a diseased condition, they pass from youth to manhood, having rendered themselves as they think skilful and wise. And such are men of this description, O Theodorus. But are you willing that I should give you an account of men belonging to our choir, or that, dismissing them, we should again return to our proposed investigation; lest, as we just now said, we should too much digress?

THEO. By no means, Socrates. For you very properly observed, that we, as being in the choir of philosophers, were not subservient to discourse, but discourse to us, and that it should attend our pleasure for its completion. For neither a judge nor a spectator, who reproves and governs, presides over us, as is the case with the poets.

Soc. Let us speak then, since it is agreeable to you, about the Coryphæi.

phæi¹. For why should any one speak of those that are conversant with philosophy in a depraved manner? In the first place then, the Coryphæi, from their youth, neither know the way to the forum, nor where the court of justice or senate house is situated, or any other common place of assembly belonging to the city. They likewise neither hear nor see laws nor decrees, whether promulgated or written. And as to the ardent endeavours of their companions to obtain magistracies, the associations of these, their banquets, and wanton feastings accompanied with pipers, these they do not even dream of accomplishing. But whether any thing in the city has happened well or ill, or what evil has befallen any one from his progenitors, whether male or female, these are more concealed from such a one than, as it is said, how many measures called choes the sea contains. And besides this, he is even ignorant² that he is ignorant³ of all these particulars. For he does not abstain from them for the sake of renown, but in reality his body only dwells and is conversant in the city; but his dianoëtic part considering all these as trifling, and of no value, he is borne away, according to Pindar, on all sides, geometrizing about things beneath, and upon the earth, astronomizing above the heavens, and perfectly investigating all the nature of the beings which every whole contains, but by no means applying himself to any thing which is near.

THEO. How is this, Socrates?

SOC. Just, O Theodorus, as a certain elegant and graceful Thracian

¹ The virtues are either physical, which are mingled with the temperaments, and are common both to men and brutes; or they are ethical, which are produced from custom and right opinion, and are the virtues of well-educated children; or they are political, which are the virtues of reason adorning the rational part as its instrument; or they are cathartic, by which the soul is enabled to withdraw from other things to itself, and to free itself, as much as the condition of human nature permits, from the bonds of generation; or they are theoretic, through which the soul, by giving itself wholly to intellectual energy, hastens to become as it were intellect instead of soul. This last order of the virtues is that by which Plato now characterizes the Coryphæan philosophers. The other virtues are also mentioned by him in other dialogues, as we shall show in our notes on the Phædo.

² The multitude, as I have elsewhere observed, are ignorant that they are ignorant with respect to objects of all others the most splendid and real; but the Coryphæan philosopher is ignorant that he is ignorant, with respect to objects most unsubstantial and obscure. The former ignorance is the consequence of a defect, but the latter of a transcendancy of gnostic energy.

maid-servant, is reported to have said to Thales, when while astronomizing he fell into a well, that he was very desirous of knowing what the heavens contained, but that he was ignorant of what was before him, and close to his feet. In the same manner all such as are conversant in philosophy may be derided. For, in reality, a character of this kind is not only ignorant of what his neighbour does, but he scarcely knows whether he is a man or some other animal. But what man is, and what a nature of this kind ought principally to do or suffer, this he makes the object of his inquiry, and earnestly investigates. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

THEO. I do: and you speak the truth.

SOC. For in reality, my friend, when a man of this kind is compelled to speak (as I said before) either privately with any one, or publicly in a court of justice, or any where else, about things before his feet, and in his view, he excites laughter not only in Thracian maid-servants, but in the other vulgar, since through his unskilfulness he falls into wells and every kind of ambiguity. Dire deformity, too, causes him to be considered as a rustic. For when he is in the company of slanderers he has nothing to say reproachful, as he does not know any evil of any one, because he has not made individuals the objects of his attention. Hence, not having any thing to say, he appears to be ridiculous. But when he is in company with those that praise and boast of others, as he is not only silent, but openly laughs, he is considered as delirious. For, when he hears encomiums given to a tyrant, or a king, he thinks he hears some swineherd, or shepherd, or herdsman proclaimed as happy, because he milks abundantly; at the same time, he thinks that they feed and milk the animal under their command in a more morose and insidious manner. And that it is necessary a character of this kind should be no less rustic and undisciplined through his occupation, than shepherds; the one being enclosed in walls, and the other by a sheep-cot on a mountain. But when he hears any one proclaiming that he possesses ten thousand acres of land, or a still greater number, as if he possessed things wonderful in multitude, it appears to him that he hears of a very trifling thing, in consequence of being accustomed to survey the whole earth. As often, too, as any one celebrates the nobility of his family, evincing that he has seven wealthy grandfathers, he thinks that this is entirely the praise of a dull mind, and which surveys a thing of a trifling nature;

nature ; through want of discipline being incapable of always looking to the universe, and of inferring by a reasoning process, that every man has had innumerable myriads of grandfathers and progenitors, among which there has often been an innumerable multitude of rich and poor, kings and slaves, Barbarians and Grecians. But when any one celebrating his progenitors enumerates five-and-twenty of them, and refers their origin to Hercules the son of Amphitryon, it appears to him a thing unworthy to be mentioned. For, as it is entirely owing to fortune that any one is able to enumerate five-and-twenty progenitors from Hercules, he would laugh even if any one could enumerate fifty from the same origin ; considering such as unable to reason, and liberate themselves from the arrogance of an insane soul. But, in every thing of this kind, the coryphæus we are describing will be ridiculed by the vulgar, partly because he will be considered by them as arrogant, and partly because he is ignorant of and dubious about things before his feet.

THEO. You entirely, Socrates, speak of things which take place.

SOC. But when any one, my friend, draws him on high, and is willing that he should abandon the consideration of whether I injure you, or you me, for the speculation of justice and injustice, what each of them is, and in what they differ from all other things, or from each other ; or that, dismissing the inquiry whether a king is happy who possesses abundance of gold, he should ascend to the contemplation of a kingdom, and universally of human felicity and misery, of what kind they are to any one, and after what manner it is proper for human nature to acquire this thing and fly from that ;—about all these particulars, when that little sharp soul so conversant with law is required to give a reason, then he in his turn is affected worse than the coryphæus. For he becomes giddy, through being suspended from a lofty place of survey, and being unaccustomed to look so high. He is also terrified, filled with uncertainty, and speaks in a barbaric manner ; so that he does not, indeed, excite laughter in the Thracian vulgar, nor in any other undisciplined person (for they do not perceive his condition), but in all those whose education has been contrary to that of *slaves*. And such, O Theodorus, is the condition of each ; the one whom we call a philosopher, being in reality nourished in liberty and leisure ; and who, though he ought not to be blamed, yet appears to be stupid and of no value, when he engages in servile offices, since he neither knows how to bind together bundles of cover-

lids,

lids, nor to make sauce for banquets, nor compose flattering speeches. But the other of these characters is able to accomplish all these servile offices with celerity and ease, but knows not how to clothe himself dexterously in a liberal manner; nor how in harmonious language properly to celebrate the true life of the Gods and blessed men.

THEO. If, O Socrates, you could persuade all men to assent to what you say, as you have persuaded me, there would be more peace and less evil among men.

SOC. But it is impossible, Theodorus, that evils should be destroyed; (for it is necessary that there should be always something contrary to good) nor yet can they be established in the Gods; but they necessarily revolve about a mortal nature, and this place of our abode. On this account we ought to endeavour to fly from hence thither, with the utmost celerity. But this flight consists in becoming as much as possible similar to divinity. And this similitude is acquired by becoming just and holy, in conjunction with prudence. But, O best of men, it is not altogether easy to procure persuasion, that vice is not to be avoided, and virtue pursued, for the sake of those things which the vulgar adopt, viz. that we may not seem to be vicious, but may seem to be good: for these are, as it is said, the nugacities of old women, as it appears to me. The truth however is as follows: Divinity is never in any respect unjust, but is most just. And there is not any thing more similar to him, than a man when he becomes most just. About this, the true skill of a man, his nothingness and sloth are conversant. For the knowledge of this is wisdom and true virtue; but the ignorance of it, a privation of discipline, and manifest improbity. Every thing else which appears to be skill and wisdom, when it takes place in political dynasties, is troublesome, but when in arts illiberal. It will be by far the best, therefore, not to permit him who acts unjustly, and who speaks or acts impiously, to be skilled in any art, on account of his cunning. For a character of this kind will exult in his disgrace, and will not think that he is a mere trifle, and the burthen of the earth, but he will consider himself to be such a man as ought to be preserved in a city. The truth, therefore, must be spoken, that such men as these are by so much the more that which they think they are not, from their not thinking the truth respecting themselves. For they are ignorant of the punishment of injustice, of which

they ought by no means to be ignorant. For this punishment does not consist, as it appears to me, in stripes and death (which those who do not act unjustly sometimes suffer), but in that which it is impossible to avoid.

THEO. What do you mean?

SOC. Since, my friend, there are two paradigms in the order of things, one of a divine nature, which is most happy, the other of that which is destitute of divinity, and which is most miserable, these men, not perceiving that this is the case, through folly and extreme insanity, secretly become similar to one of these paradigms, through unjust actions, and dissimilar to the other. But for such conduct they are punished, while they lead a life correspondent to that to which they are assimilated. If, likewise, we should say that these men, unless they are liberated from their dire conduct, will not, when they die, be received into that place which is pure from evil, but that after death they will always retain the similitude of the life they have lived upon earth, the evil associating with the evil,—if we should thus speak, these dire and crafty men would say that they were hearing nothing but jargon and reverie.

THEO. And very much so, Socrates.

SOC. I know they would speak in this manner, my friend. But this one thing happens to them, that if at any time it is requisite for them to give a reason privately respecting the things which they blame; and if they are willing to continue disputing in a manly manner for a long time, without cowardly flying from the subject, then at length, O blessed man, this absurdity ensues, that they are not themselves pleased with their own assertions, and their rhetoric so entirely fails them, that they appear to differ in no respect from boys. Respecting men of this kind, therefore, let thus much suffice, since our discourse for some time has been entirely a digression. For, if we do not stop here, in consequence of more matter always flowing in, the subject which we proposed from the first to discuss will be overwhelmed. Let us, therefore, return to our former inquiry, if it is agreeable to you.

THEO. Things of this kind, Socrates, are not unpleasant to me to hear. For, in consequence of my age, I can easily follow you. But let us, if you please, resume our inquiry.

SOC. We were, therefore, arrived at that part of our discourse in which we said, that those who considered essence as subsisting in lation, and that a thing

thing which appeared to any one is always what it appears to be, to him to whom it appears, were willing strenuously to assert this in other things, and not less so respecting what is just; as that what any city establishes as appearing just to itself, this more than any thing is just, so far as it continues to be established. But, with respect to good, no one is so bold as to contend, that whatever a city establishes, through an opinion of its being useful to itself, will be useful to it as long as it is established, unless any one should assert this of a mere name. But this would be a scoff with respect to what we are saying. Or would it not?

THEO. Entirely so.

SOC. But does not a city consider the thing named, and not merely the name?

THEO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. But that which it denominates, that it doubtless regards in the business of legislation, and establishes all the laws, so far as it is able, most useful to itself. Or does it establish laws, looking to any thing else?

THEO. By no means.

SOC. Does it, therefore, always accomplish its purpose, or is it often deceived in its opinion?

THEO. I think it is often deceived.

SOC. If any one, however, should inquire respecting every species, in what the useful consists, he would still more readily acknowledge this. But the useful in the business of legislation is in a certain respect concerning the future time. For, when we establish laws, we establish them that they may be useful in futurity.

THEO. Entirely so.

SOC. Let us, therefore, thus interrogate Protagoras, or any one of his votaries. Man, as you say, O Protagoras, is the measure of all things, of things white, heavy, light, and the like. For, as he contains a criterion in himself, and thinks conformably to the manner in which he is acted upon, he forms an opinion of things true to himself, and which are true in reality. Is it not so?

THEO. It is.

SOC. Shall we also say, O Protagoras, that he contains in himself a criterion of things future; and that such things as he thinks will happen, such things

things do happen to him thinking so? So that, for instance, when any idiot thinks that he shall be attacked with a fever, and that a heat of this kind will take place, but a physician is of a different opinion, which of these opinions shall we say will be verified in futurity? Or shall we say that both will be verified? and that the physician will not be affected either with heat or fever, but that the idiot will suffer both?

THEO. This, indeed, would be ridiculous.

SOC. But I think, likewise, that the opinion of the husbandman, and not of the harper, would prevail, respecting the future sweetness or roughness of wine.

THEO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Nor would a master of the gymnasium think better respecting that consonance, or dissonance, which would in future appear to him to be consonant or dissonant, than a musician.

THEO. By no means.

SOC. And when a banquet is to be prepared, will not the opinion of a cook respecting its future agreeableness be preferred to that of any other person who is unskilled in seasoning? For we do not oppose the assertion respecting that which is, or was, agreeable; but, respecting that which in future will appear, and will be agreeable to any one, whether is every one to himself the best judge, or whether are you, O Protagoras, better able to foresee what will probably take place in doubtful affairs than an idiot?

THEO. I think, Socrates, that Protagoras professes in these greatly to excel all men.

SOC. O miserable man! no one, by Jupiter, would have followed him, and given him a considerable sum of money, if he had not persuaded his disciples that in future it would happen, and would appear to be the case, that neither any diviner, nor other person, would judge better than himself.

THEO. Most true.

SOC. But does not the establishment of laws, and the useful, regard futurity? And does not every one acknowledge, that a city, though governed by laws, often necessarily wanders from that which is most useful?

THEO. Very much so.

SOC. We have, therefore, sufficiently urged against your preceptor, that he must necessarily confess, that one man is wiser than another, and that
such

such a one is a measure ; but that there is no necessity that I, who am void of science, should become a measure, as his discourse just now compelled me to be, since, whether I am willing or not, I am so.

THEO. From that, Socrates, it appears to me, that his doctrine is particularly convincing, and from this also, that it makes the opinions of others valid. But cities reprobate his assertions, and by no means think them to be true.

SOC. In many other things, Theodorus, it may be inferred, that not every opinion of every one is true. But, with respect to the passion present to every one, from which the senses and opinions according to these are produced, it is more difficult to apprehend that they are not true. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose. For, when they occur, they cannot be confuted : and those who say that they are clear and sciences, perhaps say the truth. And Theætetus here did not assert foreign from the purpose, that sense and science are the same. Let us, therefore, approach nearer, as the doctrine of Protagoras orders us, and consider whether this essence, which is thus borne along, emits an entire or a broken sound. For the contention about it is neither mean nor among a few.

THEO. It is very far, indeed, from being mean, but it is very much circulated about Ionia. For the followers of Heraclitus discourse about it very strenuously.

SOC. On this account, friend Theodorus, we should rather consider this affair from the beginning, in the same manner as it is discussed by them.

THEO. By all means, therefore. For, with respect to these Heraclitics, Socrates, or as you say Homeric, and such as are still more antient than these, about Ephesus, and who wish to be considered as skilful persons, it is no more possible to discourse with them than with men raging mad. For their writings are indeed borne along. But as to waiting patiently in discourse and inquiry, and continuing quiet during questioning and answering, this is present with them less than nothing ; or rather, these men are so far from possessing any rest, that their privation of it even transcends that which is less than nothing. But if any one asks them a question, they immediately draw, as from a quiver, certain dark ænigmatical words, and dart them at you. And if you ask the reason of this, they will again strike you with another dark shower of words, but with the names changed. But you will

never bring any thing to a conclusion with them, nor do they ever conclude any thing among themselves. Indeed, they take very good care that there shall not be any thing stable, either in their discourse, or in their souls; thinking, as it appears to me, that this very thing itself is stable. But these are the weapons with which they strenuously fight, and which, as far as they are able, they on all sides hurl forth.

Soc. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen these men fighting, but have never seen them when peaceably disposed. For they are not your associates. But I think they speak such things as these, when at leisure, to their disciples, whom they wish to render similar to themselves.

THEO. What disciples, blessed man? For, among men of this kind, one is not the disciple of another, but they spring up spontaneously, wherever each of them happens to be seized with a fanatic fury; and at the same time each thinks that the other knows nothing. From these, therefore, as I just now said, neither willingly nor unwillingly will you ever receive a reason. But it is necessary that we should consider the affair as if it was a problem.

Soc. You speak to the purpose. But, with respect to the problem, we receive one thing from the ancients, (who concealed in verse their meaning from the multitude,) that Ocean and Tethys are the generation of all other things, that all things are streams, and that nothing abides. But from the moderns, as being more wise, the thing is so clearly demonstrated, that even curriers, on hearing them, are able to learn their wisdom, and lay aside their foolish opinion, that some things stand still, and others are moved. And learning that all things are moved, they venerate the authors of this doctrine. But we have almost forgotten, Theodorus, that others evince the very contrary to this opinion; I mean, that the proper name of the universe is the immovable, and such other assertions as the Melissæans and Parmenideans, opposing all these, strenuously defend—as, that all things are one, and that this one abides in itself, not having a place in which it can be moved. What then shall we say to all these, my friend? For, proceeding by small advances, we have secretly fallen into the midst of both of them. And if we fly, without in any respect resisting, we shall be punished like those in the palæstræ playing in a line, who, when they are caught on both sides, are drawn in contrary directions. It appears therefore to me, that we should first of all consider those with whom we began—I mean the flowing philosophers—and,

if they appear to say any thing to the purpose, that we should draw ourselves together with them, and endeavour to fly from the others. But if those who consider the universe as stable shall appear to have more truth on their side, we should fly to them from those who move even things immovable. And if it shall appear that neither of them assert any thing sufficient, we shall become ridiculous, in consequence of thinking that we, who are men of no importance, can say any thing to the purpose, when we only reprobate men very antient, and perfectly wise. Consider therefore, Theodorus, whether it is expedient to proceed into such a mighty danger.

THEO. Nothing ought to prevent us, Socrates, from considering what each of these men say.

SOC. Let us consider their assertions then, since you so earnestly desire it. It appears, therefore, to me, that this speculation should commence from motion,—I mean, what that motion is by which they say all things are moved. But what I wish to say is this: whether they say there is one species of motion, or, as it appears to me, two. Nor do I alone wish to know this myself, but that you also may partake, together with me, of this information, that we may in common be affected in such a manner as is proper. Tell me, therefore, do you say a thing is moved when it changes one place for another, or is turned round in the same place?

THEO. I do.

SOC. Let this, therefore, be one species. But when any thing abiding in the same place becomes old, or, from being white, becomes black, or, from being soft, hard, or is changed by any other internal change, may not this be deservedly called another species of motion?

THEO. It appears so to me.

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be these two species of motion, viz. alliation, or internal change, and lation.

THEO. Rightly said.

SOC. Having, therefore, made this division, let us now discourse with those who assert that all things are moved, and thus interrogate them: Whether do you say that every thing is moved both ways, viz. according to lation and alliation, or that one thing is moved both ways, and another only in one way?

THEO. By Jupiter, I know not what to say, but I think they would reply, that every thing is moved both ways.

SOC. Otherwise, my friend, things would appear to them to be both moved and stand still, and it would not be in any respect more proper to assert that all things are moved, than that they stand still.

THEO. Most true.

SOC. Since, therefore, it is necessary they should be moved, and that no one thing should not be moved, all things will always be moved with every kind of motion.

THEO. It is necessary.

SOC. Consider, likewise, this respecting their assertions,—I mean concerning the generation of heat, or whiteness, or any thing else. Do we not say that they assert, that each of these is borne along, together with sense, between the agent and the patient? And that the patient, indeed, is sensible, but not yet become sense: but that the agent is that which effects something, but is not quality? Perhaps, therefore, quality may appear to you to be an unusual name, and you do not understand me thus speaking collectively. Hear me, then, according to parts. For the agent is neither heat nor whiteness, but becomes hot and white; and so with respect to other things. For do you not recollect that we have observed before, that nothing is any one thing essentially, neither that which is an agent, nor that which is a patient, but that from the concurrence of both with each other, sense, and things sensible, being generated, some things became certain qualities, but others sentient?

THEO. I recollect. For how is it possible I should not?

SOC. As to other things, therefore, we shall omit the consideration, whether they speak in this manner concerning them, or not. But let us alone attend to this thing, for the sake of which we are now discoursing; and let us ask them, are all things moved, and do they flow as you say? For is not this what they say?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Are they not, therefore, moved with both those motions which we enumerated, viz. lation and alliation?

THEO. Undoubtedly; since it is necessary that they should be perfectly moved.

Soc. If, therefore, they were only borne along, but were not internally changed, we might be able to say what kind of things flow that are borne along. Or how shall we say?

THEO. Thus.

Soc. But since neither a flowing white thing permanently continues to flow, but is changed, so that there is even a flux of its whiteness, and a transition into another colour, and we are not able to discover that it abides in this, can we with rectitude pronounce it to be any particular colour?

THEO. But how is it possible, Socrates, that we can pronounce this of a thing white, or of any thing else of a similar kind, since, while we speak about it, it is always privately departing, because continually flowing?

Soc. But what shall we say of any one of the senses, as of seeing or hearing? Does any thing in seeing or hearing ever abide?

THEO. This ought not to be the case, since all things are moved.

Soc. We must say, therefore, that neither does any one see more than not see, or use any other of the senses more than not use them, since all things are in every respect moved.

THEO. We must say so.

Soc. But sense is science, as we say, I and Theætetus.

THEO. You do say so.

Soc. On being asked, therefore, what science is, we must answer, that it is not more science than not science.

THEO. So it appears.

Soc. An emendation, therefore, of the answer will very opportunely present itself to us, when we desire to evince that all things are moved, in order that the answer may appear to be right. But this it seems will appear, that if all things are moved, every answer to every question will be similarly right which says, that a thing subsists and yet does not subsist in a certain particular manner, or, if you will, that it is in generation, that we may not stop them by our discourse.

THEO. Right.

Soc. Except in this, Theodorus, that we should say it is so, and yet is not so. But it is requisite not even to speak in this manner, (for neither will it be any longer moved thus, nor yet not thus,) but another word must be employed by those that speak in this manner, because they have no words by which

they can denominate things according to their hypothesis, unless, perhaps, they use the expression *not in any particular manner*. But this will be particularly adapted to them, when spoken an infinite number of times.

THEO. It will thus, indeed, be accommodated to them in the highest degree.

SOC. We have therefore, Theodorus, done with your friend, nor can we grant him, that every man is the measure of all things, or any man, unless he is endued with wisdom. Nor must we admit that science is sense, according to the doctrine that all things are moved; unless Theætetus here says otherwise.

THEO. You speak most excellently, Socrates. For, these things being brought to a conclusion, it is proper that I also should have done with Protagoras, according to our compact.

THEÆ. But not so, Theodorus, till you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who assert that the universe is immovable, as you just now mentioned.

THEO. As you are a young man, Theætetus, you teach those that are advanced in years to act unjustly, by transgressing compacts. But prepare yourself to answer Socrates in the remaining part of this inquiry.

THEÆ. Doubtless I shall, if he wishes it: yet it would give me great pleasure to hear what I mentioned.

THEO. You incite horses to the plain when you incite Socrates to discourse. Ask, therefore, and hear.

SOC. But, O Theodorus, I appear to myself as if I should not comply with Theætetus in his request.

THEO. But why should you not comply?

SOC. Though I should be ashamed to speak concerning Melissus and others, who assert that the universe is one and immovable, lest I should appear to revile them in an insolent manner, yet I should be less ashamed with respect to them than with respect to Parmenides. For, that I may use the words of Homer, Parmenides appears to me to be both venerable and skilful. For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very much advanced in years, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profundity perfectly generous. I am afraid, therefore, lest we should neither understand the meaning of his words, and much more, lest we should be deficient in

in apprehending the conceptions contained in his writings: and what is greatest of all, left with respect to the subject of our present inquiry, what science is, we should leave the consideration of it unfinished, through employing contumelious language. Besides, the question which we have now excited, and which contains in itself an ineffable multitude of particulars, would be unworthily treated, if discussed in a careless manner; and on the other hand, if it is extended to too great a length, it will prevent the discovery of science. But it is proper that neither of these should take place, but that we should endeavour, by the obstetric art, to free from confinement the fœtus of Theætetus respecting science.

THEÆ. It is proper indeed to do so, if it seems requisite to you.

Soc. Again, therefore, Theætetus, in addition to what has been said above, consider this. Do you say that science is sense or not?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. If then any one should ask you, by what it is that a man sees things white and black, and hears sounds flat and sharp, you would answer, I think, that it is by the eyes and ears.

THEÆ. I should.

Soc. But to use nouns and verbs with facility, without entering into an accurate investigation of them, is for the most part a thing not ignoble; but rather the contrary to this is servile. Sometimes, however, this is necessary: as in the present case we are compelled to examine whether your answer is right or not. For, consider whether the answer is more right, that we see by, or that we see through, the eyes; and that we hear by, or that we hear through, the ears?

THEÆ. It appears to me, Socrates, that it is more proper to consider the eyes and ears as things through which, rather than as things by which, we perceive.

Soc. For it would be a dire thing, O boy, if many senses were seated in us, as in wooden horses, and did not all of them tend to one certain idea, whether this is foul, or whatever else it may be proper to call it; and by which, through the senses as organs, we perceive sensible objects.

THEÆ. This appears to me to be the case, rather than that.

Soc. On this account I diligently investigate these things with you, that we may discover whether by one certain thing belonging to us we perceive things

things black and white, through the eyes, but certain other particulars through the other organs of sense ; and whether, when interrogated, you are able to refer all such things as these to the body. But perhaps it will be better that you should answer to these inquiries, than that I should be entangled with a multiplicity of questions from you. Tell me, therefore : Do you admit that the things through which you perceive the hot and the dry, the light and the sweet, belong each of them to the body, or to any thing else ?

THEÆ. To nothing else.

SOC. Are you also willing to acknowledge that such things as you perceive through one power it is impossible to perceive through another ? As, that what you perceive through hearing you cannot perceive through seeing, and that what you perceive through seeing you cannot perceive through hearing ?

THEÆ. How is it possible I should not be willing ?

SOC. If, therefore, you dianoëttically perceive any thing about both these, you do not accomplish this through any other organ ¹, nor yet through any other do you perceive respecting both of them.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly not.

SOC. But, with respect to sound and colour, do you not, in the first place, dianoëttically conceive this concerning both of them, that both have a subsistence ?

THEÆ. I do.

SOC. And, therefore, that the one is different from the other, and the same with itself ?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. And again that both are two, and each one ?

THEÆ. And this also.

SOC. Are you also able to consider whether they are similar or dissimilar to each other ?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

SOC. But through what is it that you dianoëttically conceive all these things about them ? For you can neither apprehend any thing common

¹ That is, this is not accomplished through any other organ than the dianoëtic power. Plato very properly here uses the word *dianoia*, because he is *scientifically* considering what *science* is.

respecting

respecting them, through the hearing, nor the sight. Further still, this also is an instance of what we say. For, if it were possible to consider this of both, whether or not they are salt, you know you would be able to assign that by which you considered this; and this would appear to be neither sight nor hearing, but something else.

THEÆ. But what should hinder this power from operating through the tongue?

SOC. You speak well. But with respect to that power which through a certain thing shows you that which is common to all things, and that which is common to these, and through which you denominate a thing to be, or not to be, through what instruments does it perceive the several particulars about which we were just now inquiring?

THEÆ. You speak of essence and non-being, similitude and dissimilitude, same and different, and the two species of numbers. For it is evident that you inquire through what instrument of the body we perceive by the soul, the even and the odd, and such other things as are consequent to these.

SOC. You follow, Theætetus, surpassingly well; for these are the very things about which I interrogate.

THEÆ. But by Jupiter, Socrates, I know not what to say, except that which appeared to me at first, that there is not any peculiar organ to these as there is to sensible particulars, but it appears to me that the soul itself considers by itself such things as are common in all things.

SOC. You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not, as Theodorus said, deformed. For he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But, besides being beautiful, you have done well with respect to me. For you have liberated me from a very copious discourse, since it appears to you that the soul considers some things by itself, and others through the powers of the body. For this was what appeared to me to be the case, and which I wished might likewise appear so to you.

THEÆ. It certainly does appear so to me.

SOC. Among what things, therefore, do you place essence? For this especially follows in all things.

THEÆ. I place it among those things which the soul itself by itself aspires after.

SOC.

Soc. Do you say the same of the similar and the dissimilar, of same and different?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But what of the beautiful and the base, good and evil?

THEÆ. It appears to me that the soul principally considers the essence of these in mutually comparing them with each other, and considering in itself things past and present with reference to such as are future.

Soc. Take notice also of this: the soul perceives the hardness of a thing hard, through the touch, and in a similar manner the softness of a thing soft; or does it not?

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But the essence of these, what they are, their mutual contrariety, and the essence of this contrariety, the soul endeavours to discriminate by retiring into herself, and comparing them with each other.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. But is not a power of perceiving such passions as extend to the soul through the body naturally present both with men and brutes, as soon as they are born? And is not reasoning about the essence and utility of these, generated in those in whom it is generated, with difficulty, in a long course of time, through a variety of particulars, and through discipline?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Can we, therefore, apprehend the truth by that by which we cannot apprehend essence?

THEÆ. Impossible.

Soc. But can any one possess science of a thing, when at the same time he does not apprehend the truth of that thing?

THEÆ. But how can he, Socrates?

Soc. Science, therefore, is not inherent in passions, but is inherent in a reasoning process about them. For by this, as it appears, we may be able to touch upon essence and truth? But this cannot be effected by passions.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Can you, therefore, call passion and science the same thing, when there is such a great difference between them?

THEÆ. It would not be just to do so.

SOC. But what name do you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, becoming hot, and becoming cold?

THEÆ. I should give to all these the name of perception. For what other name can be given to them?

SOC. Do you, therefore, call the whole of this sense?

THEÆ. Necessarily so.

SOC. But we said that this was not capable of touching upon truth, because it could not apprehend the essence of a thing.

THEÆ. It certainly cannot.

SOC. Neither, therefore, can it touch upon science.

THEÆ. It cannot.

SOC. Science, therefore, and sense, Theætetus, can never be the same.

THEÆ. It appears, Socrates, they cannot.

SOC. And now it becomes most eminently apparent, that science is something different from sense. But we did not begin this conversation for the sake of finding out what science is not, but that we might discover what it is. At the same time, we have advanced thus far, as to be convinced that we must not at all seek for it in sense, but in that name which the soul then possesses when it is conversant with beings, itself by itself.

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, is I think called *to opine*.

SOC. You suspect¹ rightly, my friend. And now again consider from the beginning, obliterating all that has been already said, whether you can see more clearly, since we have proceeded thus far. And again tell me what science is.

THEÆ. It is impossible, Socrates, to say that every opinion is science, because there are false opinions. But it appears that true opinion is science. And this is my answer. But if in the course of the inquiry it shall not appear to be so, as it does at present, I shall endeavour to say something else.

¹ Socrates, in saying that Theætetus *suspects rightly*, indicates that he has not a dianoëtic and scientific conception of the name in which science is to be found. For this name is *dianoia*, or the dianoëtic power of the soul, whose very essence, as we have elsewhere observed, consists in reasoning scientifically. Hence he very properly says *opbos yap oisi*, You suspect rightly. For his conception was nothing more than a vague conjecture or suspicion; at the same time that it was as accurate as could be obtained by mere suspicion.

Soc. In this manner, Theætetus, it is proper to act—I mean, to speak with alacrity, and not, as you were at first, be averse to answer. For, if we thus conduct ourselves, we shall either find that which is the object of our search, or we shall in a less degree think that we know that which we do not by any means know. Nor will a thing of this kind be a despicable gain. And now then what do you say? Since there are two species of opinion, one true, and the other false, do you define science to be true opinion?

THEÆ. I do. For this now appears to me to be the case.

Soc. Is it, therefore, worth while again to resume the discourse about opinion?

THEÆ. What do you mean?

Soc. I am now disturbed, and often have been, so that I am involved in much doubt, both with respect to myself and others, as I am not able to say what this passion in us is, and after what manner it is generated in the soul.

THEÆ. How is this?

Soc. I am now speaking of false opinion; and am considering whether we shall omit the discussion of it, or speculate about it in a different manner from what we did a little before.

THEÆ. But why should you be dubious in this affair, Socrates, if you see the manner in which it is proper to act? For you and Theodorus said just now not badly, respecting leisure, that nothing urges in inquiries of this kind.

Soc. You very properly remind me. For perhaps it will not be foreign from the purpose again to tread in the same steps. For it is better to finish a little well, than much insufficiently.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. What then shall we say? Shall we say that every opinion is false? or that some of us entertain false opinions, and others true—as if this was naturally the case with respect to opinions?

THEÆ. We should doubtless speak in this manner.

Soc. Does not this happen to us, as well about all things, as about each thing, that we either know or do not know? For at present I omit to speak of learning and forgetting, as subsisting between these, because it contributes nothing to our design.

THEÆ. But, Socrates, nothing else remains respecting every particular, except knowing or not knowing it.

Soc.

SOC. Is it not therefore necessary, that he who forms an opinion should either form an opinion of things of which he knows something, or of things of which he knows nothing?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

SOC. Is it not likewise impossible, that he who knows a thing should not know it, or that he who does not know it should know it?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Does, therefore, he who opines falsely respecting the things which he knows, opine that these are not the things which he knows, but different from them, but of which he has at the same time a knowledge? And though he knows both, is he ignorant of both?

THEÆ. But this, Socrates, is impossible.

SOC. Does he, therefore, think that the things of which he is ignorant are certain other things of which likewise he is ignorant? And can he who neither knows Theætetus nor Socrates ever be induced to think that Socrates is Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?

THEÆ. How is it possible he can?

SOC. Nor, again, can any one think that the things which he knows are the same as those of which he is ignorant; or that the things of which he is ignorant are the same as those which he knows.

THEÆ. For this would be monstrous.

SOC. How then can any one entertain false opinions? For it is impossible to opine in ways different from these; since we either know or do not know all things. But in these it by no means appears possible to opine falsely.

THEÆ. Most true.

SOC. Whether, therefore, ought we to consider the object of our inquiry, not by proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being and non-being?

THEÆ. How do you say?

SOC. It is not a simple thing; because he who, with respect to any thing, opines things which are not, must unavoidably opine falsely, in whatever manner the particulars pertaining to his dianoëtic part may subsist.

THEÆ. It is proper it should be so, Socrates.

Soc. How then shall we answer, Theætetus, if any one should ask us (but it is possible that what I say may take place), What man can opine that which is not, whether respecting beings themselves, or whether considered itself by itself? To this, as it appears, we should reply, that he can then opine about that which is not, when opining he does not opine the truth. Or how shall we say?

THEÆ. In this manner.

Soc. Does a thing of this kind, therefore, take place elsewhere?

THEÆ. Of what kind?

Soc. That some one sees something, and yet sees nothing.

THEÆ. But how can he?

Soc. But if he sees one certain thing, he sees something which ranks among beings. Or do you think that *the one* does not rank among beings?

THEÆ. I do not.

Soc. He, therefore, who sees one certain thing sees a certain being.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. And, therefore, he who hears a certain thing hears one certain thing, and a certain being.

THEÆ. He does so.

Soc. And does not he also who touches a certain thing touch one certain thing, and that which has a being, since it is one thing?

THEÆ. And this also.

Soc. And does not he who opines opine one certain thing?

THEÆ. I grant it.

Soc. He, therefore, who opines that which has no being opines nothing.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. But he who opines nothing does not opine in any respect.

THEÆ. It is evident, as it appears.

Soc. It is impossible, therefore, to opine that which is not, either about beings, or itself by itself.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. To opine falsely, therefore, differs from opining things which are not.

THEÆ. It appears that it differs.

Soc.

Soc. For neither is false opinion inherent in us in this manner, nor in the manner which we considered a little before.

THEÆ. It is not.

Soc. Perhaps, therefore, we may denominate this as follows.

THEÆ. How?

Soc. We say that a certain foreign opinion is a false opinion, when some one, by an alteration in his dianoëtic energy, says that a certain thing is a different thing. For thus he always opines that which has a being, but he opines one thing instead of another; and, in consequence of erring in that which he considers, he may be justly said to opine falsely.

THEÆ. You now appear to me to have spoken with the greatest rectitude. For, when any one opines that which is deformed instead of that which is beautiful, or that which is beautiful instead of that which is deformed, then he truly opines falsely.

Soc. It is evident, Theætetus, that you despise, and do not reverence me.

THEÆ. In what respect?

Soc. I do not think I appear to you to have apprehended that which is truly false, when asked whether the swift and the slow, the light and the heavy, or any other contraries, do not become contrary to themselves, according to their own nature, but according to the nature of things which are contrary to them. This, therefore, I dismiss, lest you should be confident in vain. But is it agreeable to you, as you say, that to opine falsely is the same as to opine foreign to the purpose?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. It is possible, therefore, according to your opinion, to establish by the dianoëtic power one thing as another, and not as that thing which it is¹.

THEÆ. It is possible.

Soc. When, therefore, the dianoëtic power does this, is it not necessary that it should either cogitate about both these, or about one of them?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. And, therefore, it must either cogitate about them both together, or separately.

¹ This is effected when the dianoëtic power converts itself to imagination, and in consequence of this produces false reasoning.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Most excellent.

SOC. But do you call dianoëtic energy the same as I do?

THEÆ. What do you call it?

SOC. The discourse which the soul itself evolves in itself about the objects of its consideration. I explain the thing to you like an unskilful person. For the soul, when it energizes dianoëticly, appears to me to do nothing else than discourse with itself¹, by interrogating and answering, affirming and denying. But when, having defined, it asserts without opposition, whether more slowly or more rapidly, then I call this opinion². So that I denominate to opine, to speak, and opinion, a discourse not directed to any other, nor accompanied with voice, but directed to itself. But what do you call it?

THEÆ. The same.

SOC. When any one, therefore, opines that one thing is another, he says to himself, as it appears, that one thing is another.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Recollect, whether if at any time you say to yourself, that the beautiful is more than any thing base, or that the unjust is just, or, which is the summit of all, whether you ever attempt to persuade yourself, that that which is one thing is more than any thing another thing. Or, on the contrary, have you never dared even in sleep to say to yourself, that things even are entirely odd, or any thing else of this kind?

THEÆ. Certainly never.

SOC. Do you think, then, that any other person, whether he is in a sane or an insane condition, will seriously dare to say to himself, and this accompanied with persuasion, that a horse is necessarily an ox, or two things one thing?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. If, therefore, to opine is for a man to speak to himself, no one, while he says and opines both these, and touches upon both with his soul, will say and opine that one of those is the other. But we will dismiss, if you

¹ As the dianoëtic is accurately considered a scientific energy, it is very properly defined by Socrates to be a discourse of the soul with itself. Or, in other words, it is an energy of the rational soul, directed to itself, and not converted to the phantasy.

² Opinion is the conclusion of the dianoëtic energy. See the Sophista.

please, this word *the other*. For my meaning is this : that no one will opine that the base is the beautiful, or any thing else of this kind.

THEÆ. You have my permission, Socrates, to dismiss this word ; and the case appears to me to be as you say.

Soc. He, therefore, who opines both these cannot opine that one of them is the other.

THEÆ. So it appears.

Soc. And again, he who only opines one of these, but by no means the other, can never opine that one of them is the other.

THEÆ. True. For he would be compelled to touch upon that about which he does not opine.

Soc. Neither, therefore, can he who opines both, nor he who only opines one of them, opine foreign to the purpose. So that he will say nothing, who defines false opinion to be heterodoxy. For neither will false opinion appear to reside in us in this manner, nor in that which we have already mentioned.

THEÆ. It does not appear that it will.

Soc. But, Theætetus, if this should not appear to be the case, we should be compelled to confess many things, and of an absurd nature.

THEÆ. What are these ?

Soc. I will not tell you, till I have endeavoured to consider the affair in every possible way. For I should be ashamed, with respect to that of which we are in doubt, if we were compelled to confess what I now say. But if we shall discover the object of our search, and become free, then we may speak concerning others, as suffering these things, while we shall be raised beyond the reach of ridicule. But if we should be involved in inextricable doubts, and thus become abject, and filled with nausea, then, I think, we should permit our discourse to trample on us, and use us as it pleases. Hear, then, whether I have found out any passage to the object of our inquiry.

THEÆ. Only speak.

Soc. I shall not say that we rightly consented, when we acknowledged that it was impossible any one could opine that the things which he knows are things which he does not know, and thus be deceived : but I say that this is in a certain respect possible.

THEÆ. Do you say that which I suspected might be the case when we made this assertion, as that I knowing Socrates, and seeing another person at a distance whom I do not know, might think it was Socrates, whom I do know? For that which you say takes place in a thing of this kind.

Soc. Are we not, therefore, driven from the hypothesis which caused us to acknowledge, that, with respect to things which we know, we are ignorant of them, at the same time that we know them?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. We must not, therefore, establish this hypothesis, but the following: and perhaps some one will in a certain respect assent to us, or perhaps will oppose us. But we are now in that situation in which it is necessary to examine the discourse which perverts all things. Consider, therefore, whether I say any thing to the purpose. Is it then possible for any one who formerly was ignorant of something, afterwards to learn that thing?

THEÆ. It certainly is possible.

Soc. And can he not also learn another and another thing?

THEÆ. Why should he not?

Soc. Place for me, for the sake of an example, one waxen image[†] in our souls: in this soul a greater image, and in that a lesser: and in this of purer, but in that of impurer and harder wax: and in some again of a moister kind, but in others sufficiently tempered.

THEÆ. I place it.

Soc. We must say, then, that this is a gift of Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses; and that in this, whatever we wish to remember of things which we have seen, or heard, or understood, is impressed like images made by a seal, by insinuating itself into our senses and conceptions. And further, that we remember and know that which is impressed in this waxen image, as long as the impressed figure remains; but when it is destroyed, or can be no longer impressed, we forget and cease to know.

THEÆ. Be it so.

[†] What is here said must not be understood literally; for Plato was by no means of opinion that images are fashioned by external objects in the soul. But nothing more is here meant, than either that the soul naturally possesses these images, or that, taking occasion from external motions, and the passions of body, she conceives forms in herself by her own native power.

Soc. Consider, therefore, whether he who knows these impressions, and attends to what he either sees or hears, can after this manner opine falsely?

THEÆ. After what manner?

Soc. With respect to what he knows, at one time opining that he knows, and at another time that he does not know. For we improperly granted above, that it was impossible for this to happen.

THEÆ. But how do you now say?

Soc. It is requisite thus to speak about these things, defining them from the beginning: That it is impossible that he who knows any thing, and has a monument of it in his soul, but does not perceive it, can opine that it is something else which he knows, and the image of which he possesses, but does not perceive. And again, it is impossible that any one can opine that what he knows is that which he does not know, and of which he does not possess the image: or that what he does not know is that which he knows. It is likewise impossible for any one to opine that what he perceives is some other sensible object different from what he perceives: or that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive: or that what he does not perceive is something which he does perceive. Nor, again, can any one opine that what he knows and perceives, and of which he has a sensible image, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he in like manner possesses a sensible image: or that what he knows and perceives, and of which he possesses an image in a proper manner, is the same as that which he simply knows: or that what he knows and perceives, and similarly retains, is that which he perceives: or again, that what he neither knows nor perceives is the same as that which he simply does not know: or that what he neither knows nor perceives is the same as that which he does not perceive. For in all these it is impossible to opine falsely. It remains, therefore, that false opinion must take place in some things of this kind, if it has any subsistence.

THEÆ. In what things, therefore? that I may see whether I can learn better from these. For at present I do not follow you.

Soc. In those things which any one knowing, opines that they are certain other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know,

but perceives; or which both knowing and perceiving, he opines that he knows and perceives.

THEÆ. I now leave you behind, at a greater distance than before.

Soc. Hear then again as follows: I knowing Theodorus, and remembering in myself what kind of man he is, and in like manner Theætetus, sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not: and sometimes I touch them, and sometimes not; and hear or perceive them with some other sense: but sometimes I do not apprehend any thing respecting you by any sense, yet nevertheless I remember you, and know you in myself.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Learn this, therefore, the first of the things which I wish to evince to you, that it is possible for a man not to perceive that which he knows, and that it is likewise possible for him to perceive it.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. Does it not often happen that a man does not perceive that which he does not know, and likewise often happen that he perceives it only?

THEÆ. This also is true.

Soc. See, then, if you can now follow me better. Socrates knows Theodorus and Theætetus, but sees neither of them, nor is any other sense present with him respecting them. Can he ever in this case opine in himself, that Theætetus is Theodorus? Do I say any thing, or nothing?

THEÆ. You speak pertinently; for he cannot thus opine.

Soc. This then was the first of those things which I said.

THEÆ. It was.

Soc. But the second was this, that while I know one of you, but do not know the other, and perceive neither of you, I can never opine that he whom I know is the man whom I do not know.

THEÆ. Right.

Soc. But the third was this, that while I neither know nor perceive either of them, I can never opine that he whom I do not know is some other person whom I do not know: and in a similar manner think that you again hear all that was said above, in which I can never opine falsely respecting you and Theodorus, neither while knowing nor while ignorant of both; nor while knowing one, and not knowing other. And the same may be said respecting the senses, if you apprehend me.

THEÆ. I do apprehend you.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that I must then opine falsely, when knowing you and Theodorus, and preserving in that waxen image, as in a seal ring, the impression of both of you for a long time, and not sufficiently seeing both of you, I endeavour, by attributing the proper impression of each to my particular sight, so to harmonize this impression to the vestige of sight, that a recognizance may take place: but afterwards failing in the attempt, and changing like those that change their shoes, I transfer the vision of each to a foreign impression, and err by being similarly affected to the passions of sight in mirrors, where things on the right hand flow back to those on the left hand. For then heterodoxy takes place, and I opine falsely.

THEÆ. It appears, Socrates, that the passion of opinion is such as in a wonderful manner you have represented it to be.

SOC. Still further, when knowing both of you, I besides this perceive one of you, and not the other, then I have a knowledge of him whom I do not perceive, but not according to sense; which is what I said before, but you did not then understand me.

THEÆ. I did not.

SOC. This however I said, that he who knows and perceives one of you, and has a knowledge of you according to sense, will never opine that this object of his knowledge and perception is some other person whom he knows and perceives, and of whom he has a knowledge according to sense. Was not this what I said?

THEÆ. It was.

SOC. But in a certain respect that which I just now said is omitted,—I mean, that false opinion then takes place, when any one knowing and seeing both of you, or possessing any other sense of both of you, and likewise retaining your images in his soul, has not a proper perception of either of you, but, like an unskilful archer, wanders from and misses the mark, which is therefore denominated a falsehood.

THEÆ. And very properly so.

SOC. When, therefore, sense is present to one of the impressions, and not to the other, and that which belongs to the absent sense is adapted to the sense then present, in this case the dianoëtic part is entirely deceived. And, in one word, it is not possible, as it appears, either to be deceived, or to have

a false opinion, respecting things which a man has neither ever known or perceived, if we now say any thing to the purpose. But respecting things which we know and perceive, in these opinion is rolled about and evolved, becoming both true and false. And when it collects and marks its proper resemblances in an opposite and straight forward direction, then it is true, but when in a transverse and oblique direction, false.

THEÆ. These things, therefore, Socrates, are beautifully said.

Soc. And you will much more say so, when you hear what follows. For to opine the truth is beautiful, but to lie is base.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. They say, therefore, that hence the following particulars take place. When that waxen image in the soul is profound, abundant, smooth, and sufficiently perfect, then the several particulars which proceed through the senses, being impressed in this heart ¹ of the soul, (as Homer calls it, obscurely signifying its similitude to wax,) so as to become pure signatures, and of sufficient profundity,—in this case they become lasting. And, in the first place, men with such impressions as these are docile: in the next place, they are endued with a good memory: and, in the third place, they do not change the impressions of the senses, but opine the truth. For, as these impressions are clear, and situated in an ample region, they swiftly distribute sensible particulars to their proper resemblances, which are called beings; and such men are denominated wise. Or does it not appear so to you?

THEÆ. It does in a transcendent degree.

Soc. When, therefore, any one's heart is hairy (which the perfectly wise poet has celebrated), or when it is of a muddy nature, and not of pure wax, or when it is very moist, or hard, then it is in a bad condition. For those in whom it is moist are indeed docile, but become oblivious; and those in whom it is hard are affected in a contrary manner. But men in whom it is hairy and rough, in consequence of its possessing something of a stony nature, mingled with earth or clay, these contain obscure resemblances. The resemblances too are obscure in those in whom this heart is hard: for in this case it has no profundity. This likewise happens to those in whom it is moist: for, in consequence of the impressions being confounded, they

¹ For *καρ* or *καρ* is the heart, and *κερος* is wax.

swiftly become obscure. But if, besides all this, they fall on each other, through the narrowness of their receptacle, since it belongs to a little soul, then the resemblances become still more obscure. All such as these, therefore, opine falsely. For when they see, or hear, or think about any thing, as they are unable swiftly to attribute things to their resemblances, they judge erroneously; because they see, hear, and understand for the most part perversely. And such as these are called deceivers, and are said to be ignorant of things.

THEÆ. You speak with the greatest rectitude of all men, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we say, then, that false opinions reside in us?

THEÆ. Very much so.

Soc. And true opinions likewise?

THEÆ. And true opinions.

Soc. I think, therefore, it has been sufficiently acknowledged by us, that these two opinions have a subsistence more than any thing.

THEÆ. It has in a transcendent degree.

Soc. A loquacious man, Theætetus, appears in reality to be a dire and unpleasant man.

THEÆ. With reference to what do you speak in this manner?

Soc. With reference to my own indocility, and real loquacity, at which I am indignant. For what else than a loquacious man can he be called, who through his stupidity draws discourse upwards and downwards, not being able to procure persuasion, and who with difficulty abandons an assertion?

THEÆ. But why are you indignant?

Soc. I am not only indignant, but I am fearful what I should answer, if any one should ask me, O Socrates, have you found that false opinion is neither in the mutual energies of the senses, nor in dianoëtic energies, but in the conjunction of sense with the dianoëtic energy? But I think I should say, boasting, as if we had discovered something beautiful, that we had found it to be so.

THEÆ. What has been just now evinced appears to me, Socrates, to be no despicable thing.

Soc. Do you, therefore, he will say, assert that we can never opine, that a man whom we alone dianoëtically conceive, but do not see, is a horse,
which

which we neither at present see, nor touch, nor perceive by any other sense, but only dianoëttically conceive? I think I should say that I do assert these things.

THEÆ. And very properly.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, follow, he will say, according to this reason, that no one will ever think eleven, which he only dianoëttically perceives, to be twelve, which he only dianoëttically perceives? What answer would you give?

THEÆ. I should answer, that some one seeing or touching eleven things, might opine them to be twelve; but that he would never opine in this manner respecting the numbers which he possesses in his dianoëtic part.

Soc. But what, he will say, do you think that any one can speculate about five and seven—I do not mean five and seven men, or any thing else of this kind, but five and seven themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax—so as never to opine falsely respecting them? Or will not some men, when they consider these things by themselves, and inquire about their amount, opine that they are eleven, and others that they are twelve? Or will all men say and opine that they are twelve?

THEÆ. By Jupiter they will not; but the greater part will opine that they are eleven. And if any one should ask them the amount of more numbers, their answer would be still more erroneous. For I think that you rather speak about every number.

Soc. You think rightly. Consider, therefore, whether this ever happens, that any one opines that the twelve which are impressed in his soul are eleven?

THEÆ. It seems this does happen.

Soc. Does not this then revolve to the former assertions? For he who suffers that which he knows, opines that it is some other thing which he also knows, which we said was impossible: and from this very circumstance we are compelled to confess, that there is no such thing as false opinion, lest the same person should be forced to know and at the same time not to know the same things.

THEÆ. Most true.

Soc. Hence it appears that false opinion must be otherwise defined than a mutation of the dianoëtic energy with respect to sense. For, if this was a
true

true definition, we should never be deceived in dianoëtic conceptions themselves. But now there is either no such thing as false opinion, or, if there is, a man may be ignorant of that which at the same time he knows. And which of these will you choose?

THEÆ. You have proposed an ambiguous choice, Socrates.

Soc. But it appears that reason will not permit both these to take place. At the same time, however (for all things must be attempted), what if we should endeavour to divest ourselves of shame?

THEÆ. How?

Soc. By being willing to say what it is to have a scientific knowledge of a thing.

THEÆ. But why would this be impudent?

Soc. You do not appear to understand that the whole of our discourse from the beginning is an investigation of science, as if we did not know what it is.

THEÆ. I understand you.

Soc. But does it not appear to be the part of impudent persons, to show what it is to have a scientific knowledge, at the same time that they are ignorant what science is? But, Theætetus, it is now some time since we have not spoken with purity. For we have ten thousand times employed the terms, We know, and We do not know, We have a scientific knowledge, and We have not a scientific knowledge, as if we mutually understood something, in which at the same time we are ignorant what science is. But at present, if you are willing, we will use the terms, to be ignorant, and to understand, in such a manner as it is proper to use them, since we are destitute of science.

THEÆ. But how in this case, Socrates, shall we be able to discourse?

Soc. Not at all while I remain as I am. But I might be able, if I was contentious: and now, if any contentious person was present, he would say that he abstained from such terms, and would very much deter us from what I say. But, as we are bad, man, are you willing I should dare to say what it is to know scientifically? For it appears to me to be worth while.

THEÆ. Dare then, by Jupiter. For you will greatly deserve to be pardoned for the attempt.

Soc. Have you heard what at present they say it is to know scientifically?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Perhaps so; but at present I do not remember.

Soc. They say that it is the habit of science.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. We, therefore, shall make a trifling alteration, and say that it is the possession of science.

THEÆ. But in what do you say this differs from that?

Soc. Perhaps in nothing. But when you have heard that which appears to me to be the case, examine it together with me.

THEÆ. I will, if I can.

Soc. To *possess*, therefore, does not appear to me to be the same as to *have* a thing. Thus, if any one buys a garment, and, having the power of using it when he pleases, does not wear it, we should not say that he *has* the garment, but that he *possesses* it.

THEÆ. And very properly.

Soc. See then whether it is possible to possess science in this manner, without having it: just as if some one having caught certain wild doves¹, or other wild birds, and having constructed an aviary for them at home, should feed and nourish them. For in a certain respect we should say that he always *has*, because he *possesses* them. Should we not?

THEÆ. We should.

Soc. But in another respect we should say that he by no means *has* them, but that he has a power, since he has shut them up for his own use, in an inclosure of his own, of taking and having them when he pleases, and of again dismissing them: and that he can do this as often as it is agreeable to him.

THEÆ. Exactly so.

Soc. Again, as before we devised I know not what waxen figment in the fowl, so now let us place a certain aviary containing all sorts of birds in the fowl; some of which fly in flocks, apart from others; but others again fly in

¹ It is justly observed by Proclus, in his admirable Commentary on the first book of Euclid's Elements, p. 3, that Socrates here, mingling the jocose with the serious, assimilates the sciences which are in us to doves. He also says that they fly away, some in flocks, and others separate from the rest. For the sciences that are more common contain in themselves many that are more partial; and those that are distributed according to species, touching on the objects of their knowledge, are separated from, and unjoined with, each other, in consequence of originating from different primary principles.

small companies; and some fly alone, wherever they may happen to find a passage.

THEÆ. Let it be so: but what follows?

Soc. It is requisite to say, that this receptacle is empty in children: but in the place of birds we must understand sciences, and say, that he who possesses science, and confines it in this inclosure, learns or discovers that thing of which he possesses the science; and that this is to have a scientific knowledge.

THEÆ. Be it so.

Soc. But again, consider, when any one is willing to investigate sciences, and receiving to *have* them, and afterwards dismiss them, by what names all these particulars ought to be expressed. Shall we say by the same names as at first, when sciences were *possessed*, or by other names? But from what follows you will more clearly understand what I say. Do you not call arithmetic an art?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. Suppose this to be the hunting of the sciences of all the even and the odd.

THEÆ. I suppose it.

Soc. But I think by this art the arithmetician has the sciences of numbers in his power, and delivers them to others.

THEÆ. He does so.

Soc. And we say that he who delivers these sciences teaches, but that he who receives them learns; and that he who *has* them, in consequence of possessing them in that inclosure which we mentioned, knows scientifically.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. But attend to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect arithmetician know scientifically all numbers? For the sciences of all numbers are in his soul.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Does not a man of this kind sometimes enumerate with himself internally, and sometimes externally, such things as have number?

THEÆ. Certainly.

Soc. But to number is considered by us as nothing else than the speculation of the quantity of any number.

THEÆ. It is so.

Soc. He, therefore, who has a scientific knowledge, by thus speculating, appears not to know, though we have confessed that he knows every number. Do you hear these ambiguities?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. When, therefore, we assimilated sciences to the possession and fowling of doves, we said that fowling was twofold; one kind being prior to acquisition, and subsisting for the sake of possession; but the other being posterior to acquisition and possession, and subsisting for the sake of receiving and having in the hands things which were formerly possessed. So these sciences, which any one had formerly been endued with by learning, and which he had known before, may again be learnt, by resuming and retaining the science of every particular which he formerly possessed, but which he has not at hand in his dianoëtic part.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. On this account, I just now inquired how names respecting these things were to be used, as when an arithmetician numbers, or a grammarian reads. For, in either case, he who knows again applies himself to know by himself what he already knows.

THEÆ. But this is absurd, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we therefore say, that the grammarian reads, or the arithmetician numbers, things of which he is ignorant, though we have granted that the one knows all letters, and the other every number?

THEÆ. But this also is irrational.

Soc. Are you, therefore, willing we should say, that we are not at all concerned how any one may employ the names of knowing and learning? But since we have determined that it is one thing to *possess*, and another to *have*, science, we must say that it is impossible for any one not to possess that which he does possess. So that it will never happen that any one does not know that which he does know; though about this very thing false opinion may be received. For it may happen that we may take the science of one thing for the science of another, when, hunting after some one of our inward sciences, we erroneously receive instead of it some other that flies away. As when any one opines that eleven things are twelve: for then, receiving the science of eleven things instead of twelve, he takes out of his aviary a pigeon instead of a dove.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It is reasonable to suppose so.

Soc. But when he receives that which he endeavours to receive, then he is free from falsehood, and opines things which are. And after this manner false and true opinion subsist: and thus none of the particulars which disturbed us before will be any longer an impediment to us. Perhaps, therefore, you assent to me: or how will you do?

THEÆ. Assent to you.

Soc. We are then now freed from the dilemma respecting a man knowing and at the same time not knowing a thing. For it will no longer happen that we shall not possess that which we do possess, whether we judge falsely or not. However, a more dire passion than this appears to me to present itself to the view.

THEÆ. What is that?

Soc. If the permutation of sciences should ever become false opinion.

THEÆ. But how?

Soc. In the first place, is it not absurd, that he who has the science of any thing should be ignorant of that thing, not through ignorance, but through the science of the thing? And in the next place, that he should opine this thing to be that, and that thing this? And is it not very irrational to suppose, that when science is present the soul should know nothing, but should be ignorant of all things? For, from this assertion, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present may enable a man to know something, and cause blindness to see, if science ever makes a man to be ignorant of any thing.

THEÆ. Perhaps, Socrates, we have not properly introduced birds, as we alone placed sciences in the soul, but we ought at the same time to have placed the various kinds of ignorance flying in companies; and a man employed in fowling, at one time receiving science, and at another time ignorance, about the same thing: through ignorance opining what is false, but through science the truth.

Soc. It is by no means easy, Theætetus, not to praise you. However, again consider what you have said. For let it be as you say. But he who receives ignorance, you will say, opines things false. Is it not so?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. But yet he will not think that he opines falsely.

THEÆ. He will not.

Soc. But that he opines truly. And he will be affected with respect to those things in which he errs, like one endued with knowledge.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. He will therefore opine that he has by fowling obtained science, and not ignorance.

THEÆ. It is evident.

Soc. Hence, after having made a long circuit, we have again fallen into the first doubt. For that reprover whom we mentioned before will laughingly say to us, O best of men, whether can he who knows both science and ignorance opine that what he knows is some other thing which he also knows? or, knowing neither of these, can he opine that a thing which he does not know is some other thing which he does not know? or, knowing one of these, and not the other, can he opine that what he knows is that which he does not know? or that what he does not know is that which he does know? Or, again, tell me whether there are sciences of sciences, and of the various kinds of ignorance, which he who possesses, and incloses in other certain ridiculous aviaries, or waxen figments, knows so far as he possesses them, though he has them not at hand in his soul? And thus you will be compelled to revolve infinitely about the same thing, without making any proficiency. What shall we reply to these things, Theætetus?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, Socrates, I do not know what ought to be said.

Soc. Does not, therefore, O boy, the discourse of this man very properly reprove us, and evince that we have not done right in investigating false opinion prior to science, and leaving science undiscussed? But it is impossible to know this till we have sufficiently determined what science is.

THEÆ. It is necessary, Socrates, to suspect at present, as you say.

Soc. What then can any one again say from the beginning respecting science? For we are not yet weary of speaking.

THEÆ. Not in the least, if you do not forbid it.

Soc. Tell me, then, in what manner we can so speak concerning science as not to contradict ourselves.

THEÆ. In the same manner as we attempted before, Socrates; for I have not any thing else to offer.

Soc. In what manner do you mean?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. That true opinion is science. For to opine truly is without error; and every thing that proceeds from it is beautiful and good.

Soc. He who in fording a river, Theætetus, is the leader of others, if interrogated respecting the depth of the water, will answer that the water will show its own depth. In like manner, if, entering into the present subject, we inquire, the impediment to our passage will, perhaps, present to us the object of our search: but, if we remain where we are, nothing will become manifest.

THEÆ. You speak well: but let us proceed and consider.

Soc. Is not this, therefore, a thing of brief consideration? For the whole of art, and its professors, evince that art is not science.

THEÆ. How so? And who are these professors?

Soc. Those that excel all others in wisdom, and who are called orators and lawyers. For these persuade, but do not teach by their art, and cause their hearers to opine whatever they please. Or do you think there are any teachers so skilful, as to be able in cases of robbery, and other violences, to evince sufficiently the truth of the transactions by means of a little water?

THEÆ. I by no means think there are: but these men persuade.

Soc. But do you not say that to effect persuasion is the same thing as to produce opinion?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded respecting things which he who sees can alone know, but by no means otherwise, is it possible that thus judging by report, and receiving true opinion without science, they can judge rightly respecting things of which they are persuaded, if we admit that they judge well?

THEÆ. I entirely think they can.

Soc. But, my friend, if true opinion, judgment, and science are the same, that consummate judge can never opine with rectitude without science: but now each appears to be something different.

THEÆ. I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard a certain person say concerning science, but I now remember. But he said that true opinion in conjunction with reason is science, but that without reason it is void of science; and that things cannot be known scientifically of which there is no reason, but that things may be thus known which have a reason.

Soc.

Soc. How well you speak ! But tell me how he divided things which may be scientifically known, and which cannot be so known, that we may see whether you and I similarly understand them.

THEÆ. I do not know that I can discover how he divided these ; but I can follow another person discoursing.

Soc. Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I also appear to have heard from certain persons that the first elements ¹, as it were, from which we and other things are composed cannot be rationally described. For they say that each of these can alone be denominated by itself, but cannot be called any thing else, neither as that which is nor as that which is not ; because essence, or non-essence, would thus be assigned to it. But it is requisite to add nothing, if any one speaks of a thing itself alone. For neither the term this, nor that, nor each, nor alone, nor any other such appellations, should be employed, because these are applied to things in a circular progression, and are different from the things to which they are added. But it is necessary, if possible, to speak of the thing itself, and, if it has a proper definition, to assert something respecting it, without the addition of any thing else. Now, however, no one of things first can be made the subject of discourse ; for it does not admit of any thing else than a denomination. But the things composed from these, as they are themselves woven together, so from the weaving together of their names discourse is produced. For the connection of names is the essence of discourse. Hence, the elements themselves are ineffable and unknown, but at the same time are objects of sense : but syllables are known and effable, and may be apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one receives a true opinion of any thing, without reason, then his soul perceives the truth respecting it, but he does not know the thing ; because he who is incapable of giving and receiving a reason concerning a thing must be destitute of science respecting it. But when he receives a reason, then he may be able to know all these, and acquire science in perfection. Have you not, therefore, heard a dream, or is it any thing else ?

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

¹ Prodicus the Chian, imitating Leucippus, asserted that the elements of things, because they are simple, and therefore without definition, are unknown ; but that composites, since they can be defined, may be known.

Soc. Is it, therefore, agreeable to you that we should establish science to be true opinion in conjunction with reason?

THEÆ. Very much so.

Soc. Have we, therefore, Theætetus, this very day detected that which formerly many wise men investigating grew old before they discovered?

THEÆ. To me, Socrates, what was just now said appears to be well said.

Soc. And it is very fit it should: for what science can there be without reason and right opinion? But one of the assertions does not please me.

THEÆ. What is that?

Soc. That which appears to be very elegantly said; that the elements of speech are unknown, but the genus of syllables known.

THEÆ. Is not this right?

Soc. Take notice. For we have as hostages of discourse those very paradigms, which he employing said all that I have related.

THEÆ. What are these paradigms?

Soc. The things pertaining to letters, viz. elements and syllables. Or do you think that he who said what we have related spoke in this manner looking to any thing else than these?

THEÆ. To nothing else than these.

Soc. Let us, therefore, receiving these, examine them, or rather ourselves, whether we learn letters in this manner, or not. In the first place, then, have syllables a definition, but not the elements?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

Soc. To me, also, it very much appears to be so. If, therefore, any one should thus ask respecting the first syllable of the word Socrates, O Theætetus, viz. what is *So*? what would you answer?

THEÆ. That it is *S* and *o*.

Soc. You have, therefore, this definition of the syllable.

THEÆ. I have.

Soc. But come, in a similar manner give me a definition of the letter *S*.

THEÆ. But how can any one speak of the elements of an element? For *S*, Socrates, is only a certain sound of mute letters, the tongue, as it were, hissing: but of the letter *B* there is neither voice nor sound, nor of most of the elements. So that it is very well said that they are ineffable, among which

which the well-known seven vowels are alone vocal, but have not any reason or definition.

SOC. This therefore, my friend, we have rightly asserted respecting science.

THEÆ. So it appears.

SOC. But have we rightly shown that a syllable is known, but not an element?

THEÆ. It is likely.

SOC. But with respect to this syllable, whether shall we say that it is both the elements; and, if there are more than two, that it is all those elements? Or shall we say that it is one certain idea produced from the composition of the elements?

THEÆ. It appears to me that we should say it is all the elements.

SOC. See, then, with respect to the two letters *S* and *o*, which form the first syllable of my name, whether he who knows this syllable knows both these letters?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

SOC. He knows, therefore, *S* and *o*.

THEÆ. Yes.

SOC. But what, if he knows each, and, knowing neither, knows both?

THEÆ. But this would be dire and absurd, Socrates.

SOC. But if it is necessary to know each, if any one knows both, it is necessary that he who in any future time knows a syllable should previously know all the elements: and so that beautiful assertion escaping from us will disappear.

THEÆ. And very suddenly too.

SOC. For we did not well secure it. For, perhaps, a syllable ought to have been adopted, and not the elements; but one certain species produced from them, and which is different from the elements.

THEÆ. Entirely so: and perhaps the thing takes place in this manner rather than in that.

SOC. We should consider, therefore, and not in so effeminate a manner betray a great and venerable assertion.

THEÆ. We ought not, indeed.

SOC. Let a syllable then, as we just now said, be one idea produced from several according elements, as well in letters as in all other things.

THEÆ. Ent rely so.

SOC.

Soc. It ought not, therefore, to have any parts.

THEÆ. Why not?

Soc. Because the whole of that which has parts must necessarily be all the parts. Or do you say that a whole which is produced from parts is one certain species different from all the parts?

THEÆ. I do.

Soc. But with respect to the all, and the whole, whether do you call each of these the same, or different?

THEÆ. I have not any thing clear to say; yet since you order me to answer with alacrity, I will venture to say that each of these is different.

Soc. Your alacrity, Theætetus, is right; but whether your answer is so, we must consider.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. Does not the whole, therefore, differ from the all, according to your present assertion?

THEÆ. It does.

Soc. But do all things and the all differ in any respect? As when we say one, two, three, four, five, six: or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and one, or five and one;—whether in all these do we say the same thing, or that which is different?

THEÆ. The same thing.

Soc. Do we say any thing else than six?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

Soc. According to each mode of speaking, therefore, we find that all are six.

THEÆ. We do.

Soc. Again, therefore, we do not say any one thing when we say all things.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

Soc. Do we say any thing else than six things?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

Soc. In things, therefore, which consist from number, we say that the all is the same with all things.

THEÆ. So it appears.

VOL. IV.

N

Soc.

SOC. Should we not, therefore, say respecting them, that the number of an acre is the same as an acre?

THEÆ. We should.

SOC. And in a similar manner that the number of a stadium is a stadium?

THEÆ. Yes.

SOC. And so respecting the number of an army, and an army itself, and all other such like particulars? For every number, being an all, is each of these particulars.

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. But is the number of each of these any thing else than parts?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

SOC. Such things, therefore, as have parts consist of parts.

THEÆ. It appears so.

SOC. But it is acknowledged that all the parts are the all, since every number is the all.

THEÆ. It is so.

SOC. The whole, therefore, is not from parts: for it would be the all, in consequence of being all the parts.

THEÆ. It does not appear that it is.

SOC. But does a part belong to any thing else than to a whole?

THEÆ. It belongs to the all.

SOC. You fight strenuously, Theætetus. But is not the all, then this very thing the all, when nothing is wanting to it?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

SOC. And is not, after the same manner, the whole that which it is, when nothing is wanting to it? And is it not true, that that which is in want of any thing, in consequence of this deficiency, is neither the whole, nor the all?

THEÆ. It now appears to me, that the whole and the all in no respect differ from each other.

SOC. Do we not say that the whole and the all are all the parts of that of which they are the parts?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

SOC. Again, therefore, that we may resume what we attempted before,
if

if a syllable is not elements, must it not necessarily follow that it has not elements as parts of itself? or that, if it is the same with them, it must with them be similarly known?

THEÆ. It must.

Soc. Left, therefore, this should take place, we must establish the one to be different from the other.

THEÆ. We must.

Soc. But if elements are not parts of a syllable, can you assign any other things which are parts of a syllable, and yet are not the elements of it?

THEÆ. I should by no means grant, Socrates, that things which are not the elements can be the parts of a syllable. For it is ridiculous, neglecting the elements, to proceed in search of other things.

Soc. According to the present reasoning, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable will be in every respect one particular impartible idea.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. Do you remember, therefore, my friend, that we admitted a little before, and thought it was well said, that there could be no reason or definition of things first, from which other things are composed, because each thing considered itself by itself is not a composite; and that neither the term 'to be' can with propriety be accommodated to it, nor the term 'this,' because these are asserted as things different and foreign; and that this very circumstance causes a thing to be ineffable and unknown?

THEÆ. I do remember.

Soc. Is any thing else, therefore, than this the cause of any thing being uniform and impartible? For I see no other cause.

THEÆ. It does not appear that there is any other.

Soc. Will not a syllable, therefore, be a species of this kind, since it has no parts, and is one idea?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, a syllable is many elements, and a certain whole, and these elements are its parts, syllables and elements may be similarly known, and are similarly effable, since all the parts appear to be the same with the whole.

THEÆ. And very much so.

Soc. But if a syllable is one impartible thing, a syllable and an element are equally ineffable and unknown. For the same cause renders them such.

THEÆ. I cannot say otherwise.

Soc. We must not, therefore, admit the assertion, that a syllable is a thing known and effable, but an element the contrary.

THEÆ. We must not, if we are persuaded by this reasoning.

Soc. But what again, if any one should assert the contrary, would you not rather admit it from those things of which you were conscious when you learnt your letters?

THEÆ. What things are those?

Soc. As that you endeavoured to learn nothing else than how to know the elements by your eyes and ears, each itself by itself, that the position of them, when they were pronounced or written, might not disturb you.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

Soc. But is the learning to play on the harp in perfection any thing else than the ability of knowing what sound belongs to every chord? For this every one agrees should be called the elements of music.

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

Soc. As, therefore, we are skilled in elements and syllables, if it was requisite to conjecture from these respecting other things, we should say that the genus of the elements possessed a much clearer and more principal knowledge than that of syllables, with respect to receiving each discipline in perfection. And if any one should say that a syllable is a thing known, but that an element is naturally unknown, we should think that he jested either voluntarily or involuntarily.

THEÆ. And very much so.

Soc. But, as it appears to me, there are yet other demonstrations of this thing. We must not, however, on account of these particulars, forget the thing proposed by us, viz. to investigate the assertion, that reason united with true opinion becomes most perfect science.

THEÆ. It is proper, therefore, to consider this.

Soc. Come then, inform me what is the signification of the word *logos*: for it appears to me to signify one of three things.

THEÆ. What are they?

SOC. The first will be to make its own dianoëtic conception apparent, through voice, in conjunction with verbs and nouns; thus impressing opinion in the flux through the mouth, as in a mirror, or in water. Or does not *logos* appear to you to be a thing of this kind?

THEÆ. It does: and we say that he who does this speaks.

SOC. Cannot, therefore, every one do this—I mean, point out with more or less swiftness what appears to him respecting particulars—unless he is either naturally deaf or dumb? And thus it will follow, that whoever opines any thing rightly will appear to opine in conjunction with *logos*; and true opinion will never subsist without science.

THEÆ. True.

SOC. We must not, therefore, easily condemn him who asserts science to be that which we just now mentioned, as if he said nothing. For perhaps this was not his meaning; but, being asked what each particular is, he might be able to answer the interrogator, through the elements.

THEÆ. How do you mean, Socrates?

SOC. The same as Hesiod¹, when he speaks of a chariot as composed of a hundred pieces of wood; which I am not able to say, nor do I think you are. But we should be contented, if, when asked what a chariot is, we were able to say that it is wheels, an axis, plankings, arches, and a yoke.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

SOC. But he perhaps would think we are ridiculous, just as if we were asked concerning your name, and should answer by a syllable; considering us indeed in what we say as thinking and speaking properly, but that we are grammarians, and that we possessed and spoke grammatically the definition of the name of Theætetus. He would likewise say, that no one can speak scientifically about any thing, till he has brought it to a conclusion through the elements, in conjunction with true opinion, as we observed before.

THEÆ. We did so.

SOC. After this manner, therefore, he would think we may possess true opinion respecting the chariot; but that he who is able to pervade its essence

¹ The future editors of Hesiod may increase the fragments of that poet with this part of a verse,

——— ἵκανον δὲ τι δοῦραθ' ἀμαλῆς.

through those hundred pieces of wood, can also comprehend its logos or definition, in conjunction with true opinion; and, instead of being one that opines, will thus possess art and science, respecting the essence of the chariot, determining the whole of it, through its elements.

THEÆ. Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?

SOC. If it appears so to you, my friend, and if you admit that this discursive process through an element respecting every thing is logos, or reason, and that this is the case with the process through syllables, or that it is something still greater, void of reason. Tell me what you think, that we may consider it.

THEÆ. But I very much admit this.

SOC. But do you admit it in such a manner as to think that any one has a scientific knowledge of any thing, when the same thing appears to him at different times to belong to different things; or when he opines different things at different times of the same thing?

THEO. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. Have you forgotten that both you and others thought in this manner, when you first learnt your letters?

THEÆ. Do you mean to say, that we thought that at one time one letter, and at another time another, belonged to the same syllable; and that the same letter was at one time to be referred to its proper syllable, and at another time to a different syllable?

SOC. This is what I mean.

THEÆ. By Jupiter, I do not forget; nor do I think that those who are thus affected possess a scientific knowledge.

SOC. What then, when any one at that time writing the word *Theætetus*, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and accordingly writes these letters; and again attempting to write *Theodorus*, opines that he ought to write *Th* and *e*, and writes these letters, shall we say that he knows scientifically the first syllable of your names?

THEÆ. But we just now acknowledged, that he who is affected in this manner does not yet know.

SOC. Does any thing, therefore, hinder the same person from being affected in the same manner respecting the second, third, and fourth syllable?

THEÆ. Nothing hinders.

SOC.

Soc. Will not such a one, therefore, in consequence of his discursive process through an element, write Theætetus with true opinion when he writes it in its proper order?

THEÆ. It is evident he will.

Soc. Will he not, therefore, be still void of science, but opine rightly, as we said?

THEÆ. Yes.

Soc. And will he not possess reason in conjunction with right opinion? For he wrote making a discursive process through an element, which we acknowledge is *logos* or reason.

THEÆ. True.

Soc. There is, therefore, my friend, such a thing as right opinion in conjunction with reason, which it is not yet proper to call science.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. We are enriched then, as it appears, with a dream, while we opine that we possess a most true definition of science.

THEÆ. Or we ought not yet to blame. For perhaps some one may not define *logos* in this manner, but may choose the remaining species of the three, one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be right opinion in conjunction with reason.

Soc. You have very properly reminded me: for one species still remains. For the first species was an image as it were of dianoëtic conception in voice; and the second, that which we just now mentioned, a procession to the whole through an element.

THEÆ. But what do you say the third is?

Soc. That which the multitude would say it is, to be able to assign a certain mark by which the object of inquiry differs from all other things.

THEÆ. Can you give me as an instance a certain *logos* of this kind respecting any thing?

Soc. If you are willing, I think it will be sufficient for you to admit respecting the sun, that it is the most splendid of all the natures that revolve in the heavens round the earth.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

Soc. Take then that for the sake of which this was said. But it is that which we just now mentioned: that when you receive the difference of any thing,

thing, by which it differs from other things, you will receive, as some say, the *logos* or definition : but as long as you touch upon any thing common, you will have the definition of those things to which this something common belongs.

THEÆ. I understand you : and it appears to me very proper to call a thing of this kind *logos*.

SOC. But he who, in conjunction with right opinion, receives the difference by which any thing whatever is distinguished from other things, will be endued with science respecting that of which he formerly possessed opinion.

THEÆ. We say it is so.

SOC. Now therefore, Theætetus, in consequence of approaching nearer to what is said, as to a certain adumbration, I find I do not in the least understand it ; but, while I beheld it at a distance, it appeared to me that something was spoken to the purpose.

THEÆ. But how is this ?

SOC. I will tell you, if I can. When I have a right opinion respecting you, if I likewise receive your definition, then I know you ; but if not, then I only opine. Is it not so ?

THEÆ. It is.

SOC. But *logos*, or definition, was an interpretation of your difference.

THEÆ. It was.

SOC. When, therefore, I only opine, I do not perceive by the dianoëtic energy any one of those things by which you differ from others.

THEÆ. You do not, as it appears.

SOC. I, therefore, only dianoëticly perceive something common, which you possess no less than another.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

SOC. By Jupiter, then, inform me how, in a thing of this kind, I rather opine you than any other ? For, suppose me thus dianoëticly considering : This is Theætetus, who is a man, and has nostrils, eyes, and a mouth, and in like manner each of the other members. Does this dianoëtic conception cause me to perceive Theætetus more than Theodorus ? or, as it is said, more than the last of the Mysians ?

THEÆ. How should it ?

SOC. But if I not only dianoëticly consider that he has nostrils and eyes,
but

but likewise that he has a flat nose and prominent eyes, shall I opine you more than myself, or any other such person?

THEÆ. You will not.

Soc. But I think I shall not opine in myself, Theætetus, till a certain monument of his flat nose, exhibiting its difference from other flat noses which I perceive, is impressed in me, and in like manner other particulars from which you are composed; which, if I had met with you yesterday, would remind me, and cause me to form a right opinion respecting you.

THEÆ. Most true.

Soc. Right opinion, therefore, respecting every thing will be conversant with difference.

THEÆ. It appears so.

Soc. What then will be the consequence if reason is assumed together with right opinion? For it would be ridiculous if any one should order us to opine in what it is that any thing differs from other things.

THEÆ. How so?

Soc. For, respecting things of which we have a right opinion, so far as they differ from others, he would order us to assume a right opinion of them, so far as they differ from others. And thus, like the circumvolution of a whip, or a pestle, or the like, from this mandate nothing would be said. For it might more justly be called the mandate of one blind; since it would order us to receive things which we possess, that we might learn things which we opine; and thus would be perfectly similar to the mandate of one deprived of sight.

THEÆ. Tell me what it is you just now asked.

Soc. If some one, O boy, ordering us to receive reason, should at the same time order us to know, but not opine difference, reason would be a pleasant thing, and the most beautiful of all things pertaining to science. For to know is in a certain respect to receive science. Is it not?

THEÆ. It is.

Soc. When asked, therefore, as it appears, what science is, he would answer, that it is right opinion with the science of difference. For, according to him, this will be the assumption of reason.

THEÆ. It appears so.

SOC. But it is in every respect foolish for us, who are investigating science, to say that it is right opinion with science, either of difference or of any thing else. Neither sense therefore, Theætetus, nor true opinion, nor reason in conjunction with true opinion, will be science.

THEÆ. It does not appear that they will.

SOC. Are we, therefore, pregnant and parturient, my friend, with any thing further respecting science, or have we brought forth every thing?

THEÆ. By Jupiter, through you I have already said more than I had in myself.

SOC. Does not, therefore, all this show that the obstetric art has brought for us that which is vain, and which does not deserve to be nourished?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

SOC. If, therefore, after this you should endeavour to become pregnant with other things, and your endeavour should be successful, you will, through the present discussion, be full of better things. But if you should be empty, you will be less troublesome to your companions, and more moderate and mild; in consequence of not thinking that you know things which you do not know. For thus much my art is able to accomplish, but nothing more. Nor do I know any thing of those particulars which are and have been known to great and wonderful men. But this obstetric art I and my mother are allotted from divinity; she about women, and I about ingenuous and beautiful youths. Now, therefore, I must go to the porch of the king, to answer to the accusation of Melitus. But to-morrow, Theodorus, we will again return hither.

THE END OF THE THEÆTETUS.

THE

THE POLITICUS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

A KINGDOM.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE POLITICUS.

AS there is one end for which nature, or rather the author of nature, produced the parts of the human body, and another for which he formed the whole man, so likewise he directed an individual of the human species to one end, a family to another, and again a city and kingdom to another. And lastly, that is to be considered as the best end, for the sake of which he produced the whole human race. Let no one however think, that though there is a certain end of every partial association among mankind, yet there is none of the whole; and that though there is order in the parts of human life, yet there is confusion in the whole; or, in short, that though the parts possess union from being directed to one end, yet the whole is dispersed and unconnected: for, if this were admitted, parts would be more honourable than the whole; though the former subsist for the sake of the latter, and not the latter for the sake of the former. Hence it is necessary that there should be a certain end of the human race, and that it should consist in those energies through which it may imitate as much as possible things supernal; by science speculating things natural, human and divine; by prudence properly managing human affairs; and by piety cultivating and venerating divinity. An end, therefore, of this kind requires a twofold life, consisting both in action and contemplation, yet so constituted as that action may subsist for the sake of contemplation, as that which is more excellent and divine.

Plato in this dialogue demonstrates that this end can alone be obtained by the human race, under the government of a king who possesses consummate probity and science. Hence employing a most accurate division which is
essentially

essentially necessary to definition and science, and in which Plato and his genuine disciples excelled in a transcendent degree, he Homerically denominates a king the shepherd and curator of the human race. This king, too, he compares to a physician; since such a one, by imposing laws both on the willing and the unwilling, procures salutary remedies for his subjects. But he more frequently calls a governor and curator of this kind, a politician than a king, signifying by this that he will be so humane and mild, that among the citizens he will appear to be a fellow-citizen, and will evince that he is rather superior to them in justice, prudence and science, than in any other endowments. He likewise asserts, that the man who far surpasses all others in justice and prudence is born a king, though he should live the life of a private individual: and it may be collected from his other dialogues as his opinion, that royal authority should be given to the older and more worthy, a senate of whom should be the colleagues of the king, forming, as it were, a certain aristocracy, or government of the most excellent men. As he proves too in this dialogue that a royal surpasses every other form of government, he likewise shows that a tyranny is the worst kind of dominion, since it governs neither by law nor intellect, but by unrestrained impulse and arbitrary will. As the next in excellence to a royal government, he praises an aristocracy, but reprobates an oligarchy, or the government of a few: and he considers a popular government as deserving praise in the third degree, if it governs according to law. After this he discusses the duty of a king, and shows that it consists in providing such things as are necessary for the human race, and especially such as contribute to its felicity, in prudently judging what arts are subservient to this end in peace and war, in public and private conduct; and in exercising sovereign authority in conjunction with the senate.

With respect to what he says of the motion of the spheres and the kingdoms of Saturn and Jupiter, the mystic meaning of this fabulous narration will be unfolded in the notes on this dialogue.

THE POLITICUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES,		A GUEST,
THEODORUS,		And SOCRATES Jun.

SOCRATES.

I AM greatly indebted to you, Theodorus, for making me acquainted with Theætetus and this guest.

THEO. Perhaps, Socrates, you will be indebted to me the triple of this, after these men have made you a politician and a philosopher.

SOC. Be it so. But shall we say we have heard this of you, who are most skilful in reasoning, and in things pertaining to geometry?

THEO. What is that, Socrates?

SOC. That we should consider each of these men as of equal worth, though they are more remote from each other in honour than accords with the analogy of your art.

THEO. By our God Ammon, Socrates, you have properly, justly, and promptly reproved me for my error in computation! But I shall speak with you about this at some other time. But do not you, O guest, in any respect be weary in gratifying us, but discuss for us, in order, either a politician first, or, if it is more agreeable to you, a philosopher.

GUEST. We shall do so, Theodorus, as soon as we attempt this discussion, nor shall we desist till we arrive at the end of it. But what ought I to do respecting Theætetus here?

THEO. About what?

GUEST. Shall we suffer him to rest, and take in his stead Socrates here, as our associate in the discussion? Or how do you advise?

THEO. As you say, take Socrates in his stead: for, both being young men, they will easily by resting be able to endure every kind of labour.

SOC. And indeed, O guest, both of them appear to be allied to me in a certain respect. For you say that one of them (Theætetus) appears to resemble me in the formation of his face; and the other possesses a certain alliance, through having the same name as myself. But it is requisite that we who are allied should always readily recognize this alliance by discourse. With Theætetus, therefore, I yesterday joined in discourse, and to-day I have heard him answering this guest: but neither of them has yet discoursed with Socrates here. It is, however, proper that he should be considered. Let him then answer me some other time, but at present let him answer you.

GUEST. Let it be so, Socrates. Do you hear this, Socrates junior?

SOC. JUN. I do.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, assent to what he says?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, that you will be no impediment to our discussion; and perhaps it is requisite that much less should I be an impediment. But after a sophist, it is necessary, as it appears to me, that we should investigate a politician. Tell me, therefore, whether this character should be placed among the number of those that possess a scientific knowledge. Or how shall we say?

SOC. JUN. That it ought.

GUEST. We must, therefore, make a division of the sciences, just as we made a division in our investigation of the sophist.

SOC. JUN. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But yet it appears to me, Socrates, that we should not divide in the same manner.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But after another manner.

SOC. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. Who then can find the political path? For it is requisite to find it, and, separating it from other things, to impress it with one idea, and, marking the other deflections, with another species, to make our soul conceive that all the sciences are comprehended in two species.

SOC. JUN. I think, O guest, that this is your business, and not mine.

GUEST.

GUEST. But indeed, Socrates, it is also requisite that it should be yours when it becomes apparent to us.

SOC. JUN. You speak well.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, the arithmetic, and certain other arts allied to this, divested of action, and do they not afford knowledge alone?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But those arts which pertain to architecture, and the whole of manual operation, possess, as it were, science connate with actions, and at the same time give completion to bodies produced by them, which before this had not a being.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. After this manner, therefore, divide all sciences, calling one practiç, and the other gnostiç alone.

SOC. JUN. Let there be, therefore, one whole science, and two species of it.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, shall we consider and denominate a politician, a king, a despot, and the governor of a family, as one and the same thing? Or shall we say there are as many arts pertaining to these as there are names? Or rather follow me hither.

SOC. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. To the consideration of this. If any private person is able to advise sufficiently a public physician, is it not necessary to call him by the name of that art which he who is advised professes?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. And if any private person is able to give advice to a king, shall we not say that such a one possesses that science which the king himself ought to possess?

SOC. JUN. We shall.

GUEST. But is not the science of a true king royal?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. And may not he who possesses this science, whether he is a private man, or a ruler, be in every respect rightly called, according to this art, royal?

SOC. JUN. He may, justly.

GUEST. And are not the governor of a family and a despot the same?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what? Is it of any consequence, with respect to empire, whether the city is of a small or of an ample size?

SOC. JUN. It is of no consequence.

GUEST. It is evident, therefore (which is the thing we were just now inquiring), that there is one science respecting all these. But we do not think it is of any consequence whether any one denominates this science royal, or political, or œconomic.

SOC. JUN. For of what consequence can it be?

GUEST. This too is evident, that every king is able to do but a little with his hands, and the whole of his body, towards the possession of empire, but much by the wisdom and strength of his soul.

SOC. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, we should say that a king is more allied to the gnostic than to the manual, and, in short, to the practical science?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We must, therefore, combine into the same the political science and a politician, the royal science and a royal man, as all these are one thing.

SOC. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, proceed in an orderly manner, and after this divide the gnostic science.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Attend, then, and inform me whether we can apprehend any way of escape in this.

SOC. JUN. Tell me of what kind.

GUEST. Of this kind. There is a certain logistic art.

SOC. JUN. There is.

GUEST. And this I think entirely belongs to the gnostic arts.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But the logistic art knows the difference in numbers. Shall we, therefore, attribute to it any further employment than that of distinguishing and judging about things known?

SOC. JUN. Why?

GUEST.

GUEST. For no architect works himself, but rules over workmen.

SOC. JUN. It is so.

GUEST. And he imparts indeed knowledge, but not manual operation.

SOC. JUN. He does.

GUEST. He may justly, therefore, be said to participate of the gnostic science.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But I think this belongs to the office of a judge, not to possess the end, nor to be liberated, in the same manner as the reckoner is liberated, but to order every manual operator that portion of work which is adapted to him, till that which they are commanded to do receives its completion.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, all such things as these gnostic, and likewise such as are consequent to the logistic art? And do not these two genera differ from each other in judgment and mandate?

SOC. JUN. They appear to do so.

GUEST. If, therefore, we should divide the whole of the gnostic science into two parts, denominating the one mandatory, and the other judicial, may we not say that we have made an elegant division?

SOC. JUN. Yes, according to my opinion.

GUEST. But those that do any thing in common are delighted when they accord with each other.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As far, therefore, as we accord in this particular we shall bid farewell to the opinions of others.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Come, then, inform me in which of these arts we must place a royal character. Must we place him in the judicial art, as a certain spectator? Or rather, shall we place him in the commanding art, acting as a despot?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly, rather in this.

GUEST. Let us again consider whether the commanding art admits of distinction. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckster differs from his art who sells his own goods, so the royal genus from the genus of public criers.

Soc. JUN. How so?

GUEST. Hucksters, first receiving the saleable works of others, afterwards sell them again themselves.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. In like manner, the tribe of criers, receiving the mandates of others, again imparts them to others.

Soc. JUN. Most true.

GUEST. What then? Shall we mingle the royal into the same with the interpretative, commanding, prophetic, and præconic¹ genus, and with many other arts allied to these, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we just now assimilated, we should at present assimilate a name? since this genus of those who command their own concerns is nearly without a name. And thus we shall so divide these as to place the royal genus among the number of those that command their own concerns, neglecting every other particular, which any one may denominate as he pleases. For our method was adopted for the sake of a ruler, and not for the sake of the contrary.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Since, therefore, this is sufficiently separated from those, and is brought by division from that which is foreign to that which is domestic, it is necessary that this again should be divided, if we have yet any compliant section in this.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me in dividing.

Soc. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. Do we not find that all such as rule by command issue out their commands for the sake of the generation of something?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And, indeed, it is not in every respect difficult to give a twofold division to all generated natures.

Soc. After what manner?

GUEST. Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.

Soc. JUN. They are so.

¹ i. e. Pertaining to criers.

GUEST.

GUEST. If we wish to cut the commanding division into these parts of the gnostic science, we should accordingly cut them.

Soc. JUN. According to what?

GUEST. One part of it should be assigned to the genera of inanimate natures, and the other to the genera of such as are animated. And thus the whole will receive a twofold division.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. One part, therefore, we must omit, and resume the other; the whole of which we must again divide into two parts.

Soc. JUN. But inform me which of these is to be resumed.

GUEST. By all means, that which rules over animals. For it is not the province of the royal science to command things inanimate, like the architectonic science; but, being of a more generous nature, it always possesses its power in animals, and about things pertaining to them.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. With respect to the generation and nurture of animals, attention to the latter is confined to one animal, but the care belonging to the former extends in common to the whole herd.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But we do not find that the attention of the politic science is of a private nature, like that of an ox-driver, or an equerry; but it is rather similar to the attention paid by him who feeds horses and oxen.

Soc. JUN. This appears to be the case.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, with respect to the nurture of animals, shall we denominate the nurture of a flock the common nurture of many, or a certain common nutrition?

Soc. JUN. Both may be adopted in discourse.

GUEST. You have answered well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying serious attention to names, you will appear in old age to be more rich in intellectual prudence. Let us, therefore, now do as you advise. But do you understand how some one, by showing that the nurture of a herd is twofold, will render that which is now investigated in things double, to be sought after in halves?

Soc. JUN. I endeavour to do so: and it appears to me that there is one kind of nurture of men, and another of brutes.

GUEST. You have divided in every respect promptly and valiantly. We must however to the utmost of our power be careful that we may not suffer this again.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. That we do not take away one small part in opposition to many and great parts, nor yet take it away without species, but always in conjunction with species. For it is most beautiful to separate immediately the object of inquiry from other things, if the separation is rightly made; just as you a little before hastily thought respecting division, in consequence of perceiving the discourse tending to mankind. Though indeed, my friend, it is not safe to divide with subtilty: but it is more safe to proceed dividing through media; for thus we shall more readily meet with ideas. But the whole of this confers to the objects of our investigation.

SOC. JUN. How do you mean, O guest?

GUEST. I will endeavour to speak yet more clearly, on account of the benevolence of your nature, Socrates. It is impossible, therefore, to evince the things now proposed in such a manner that nothing shall be wanting: but yet we must endeavour to rise a little higher in our speculation, for the sake of perspicuity.

SOC. JUN. In what respect then do you say we have not just now rightly divided?

GUEST. In this respect, that if any one should attempt to give a twofold division to the human genus, he would divide just as many of the present day divide. For these separate the Grecian genus apart from all others, as one thing; and denominate all other kinds of men, which are innumerable, unmixed, and discordant with each other, by one appellation, that of Barbarians; and through this one appellation, the genus itself appears to them to be one. But this is just as if some one, thinking that number should be divided into two species, should cut off ten thousand from all numbers, as one species, and, giving one name to all the rest, should think that this genus will become separate and different from the other through the appellation. He however will divide in a more beautiful manner, and more according to species, and a two-fold division, who cuts number into the even and odd, and the human species into male and female; and who then separates the Lydians or Phrygians, or certain other nations, from all others, when he is incapable
of

of finding the genus and at the same time part of each of the divided members.

SOC. JUN. Most right. But inform me, O guest, how any one may more clearly know that genus and part are not the same, but different from each other.

GUEST. O Socrates, best of men, you enjoin me no trifling thing. And, indeed, we have now wandered further from our proposed discourse than is fit; and yet you order us to wander still more. Now, therefore, let us again return thither, whence we have digressed, as it is fit we should; and hereafter we will at leisure investigate the question proposed by you. However, do not by any means think that you have heard this clearly determined from me.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. That species and part are different from each other.

SOC. JUN. Why so?

GUEST. When any thing is a species of something, it is also necessary that it should be a part of the thing of which it is said to be the species: but it is by no means necessary that a part should be a species. Always consider me, therefore, Socrates, as asserting this rather than that.

SOC. JUN. Be it so.

GUEST. But inform me after this.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. Respecting that whence we have digressed hither. For I think that we principally digressed in consequence of your being asked how the nurture of a herd should be divided, and very readily answering that there were two kinds of animals, the one human, and the other comprehending the whole of the brutal species.

SOC. JUN. True.

GUEST. And you then appeared to me, having taken away a part, to have thought that the remainder should be left as one genus of all brutes, because you could call all of them by the same name, viz. brutes.

SOC. JUN. These things were so.

GUEST. But this, O most valiant of men, is just as if some other prudent animal, as for instance a crane, should after your manner call cranes rational, thus exalting himself, and consider them as forming one genus among other

animals, but, comprehending all the rest together with men, should perhaps denominate them nothing else than brutes. We should endeavour, therefore, to avoid every thing of this kind.

SOC. JUN. How?

GUEST. By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may be less exposed to this mistake.

SOC. JUN. For there is no occasion.

GUEST. We, therefore, then erred in this respect.

SOC. JUN. In what respect?

GUEST. That part of the gnostic science which is commanding was determined by us to be of that kind which is employed in the nurture of animals, viz. of gregarious animals. Was it not?

SOC. JUN. It was.

GUEST. The whole animal genus, therefore, was then divided into the tame and wild. For those animals that are naturally capable of being rendered gentle are called tame; but those that are not are denominated wild.

SOC. JUN. Well said.

GUEST. But the science which we are in search of, was and is in tame animals, and is to be investigated among such of these as are gregarious. Is it not so?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. We must not, therefore, divide as then, looking to all animals, nor must we divide hastily, in order that we may rapidly comprehend the politic science. For this would cause us to suffer that which the proverb speaks of.

SOC. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. By dividing too hastily, we shall finish more slowly.

SOC. JUN. And it would very properly cause us to suffer, O guest.

GUEST. Be it so then. But let us again from the beginning endeavour to divide the common nurture of animals. For perhaps the discourse itself being brought to a conclusion will more clearly unfold that which you desire. But tell me this.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. What perhaps you have often heard from certain persons. For I do not think you have met with those who tame fish about the Nile, or the royal

royal lakes. But perhaps you have been a spectator of the taming of these in fountains.

SOC. JUN. I have been a spectator of this, and I have heard of the former from many.

GUEST. You have likewise heard and believe that geese and cranes are fed by certain persons, though you have never wandered about the Thessalian plains.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. I have asked you all these questions, because the nurture of herds of animals is partly aquatic and partly terrestrial.

SOC. JUN. It is so.

GUEST. Does it not, therefore, appear to you, as well as to me, that the science respecting the common nurture of animals should receive a twofold division, and that one part should be denominated that which nourishes in moisture, and the other that which nourishes in dryness?

SOC. JUN. It does appear to me.

GUEST. But we do not in the same manner inquire to which of these arts the royal science belongs. For it is evident to every one.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For every one can divide the nurture of herds in dryness.

SOC. JUN. How?

GUEST. Into the volant and gradient.

SOC. JUN. Most true.

GUEST. That the political science, however, is to be investigated among gradient animals, is, as I may say, obvious to the most stupid. Or do you not think it is?

SOC. JUN. I do.

GUEST. But it is requisite that, dividing the art of feeding animals, like an even number, we should show that it is twofold.

SOC. JUN. This is evident.

GUEST. Moreover, the part to which our discourse impels us appears to extend itself in two certain paths; the one being short, in consequence of separating a small from a large part; but the other long, from preserving that precept which we mentioned before, that we ought to divide through

media, as this is the most ample division. It is permitted us, therefore, to proceed in either of these paths, as is most agreeable to us.

Soc. JUN. Is it then impossible to proceed in both?

GUEST. Not in both at once, O wonderful youth! But it is evident that it is possible to proceed in them separately.

Soc. JUN. I will choose, therefore, to proceed in each apart from the other.

GUEST. It is easy so to do, since what remains is but short. In the beginning, indeed, and middle of our journey we should have found it difficult to comply with this mandate. But now, since it appears to be best, let us first proceed in the longer road. For, as we have but recently engaged in this affair, we shall more easily journey through it. But look to the division.

Soc. JUN. Say what it is.

GUEST. The pedestrian genus of such tame animals as are gregarious must be divided by us according to nature.

Soc. JUN. Why?

GUEST. Because they must be divided into such as are without horns, and into such as are horned.

Soc. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. Dividing then the art of feeding pedestrian animals, describe the condition of each part. For, if you should be willing to name them, you would be involved in difficulties more than is becoming.

Soc. JUN. How then is it proper to speak of them?

GUEST. Thus. Since the science of feeding animals receives a twofold division, one member of it consists in the horned part of the flock, but the other in that part which is without horns.

Soc. JUN. Let these things be so said: for they are sufficiently shown to be so.

GUEST. Again, therefore, it will appear to us, that a king feeds a certain herd of mutilated hornless animals.

Soc. JUN. For how is it possible this should not be evident?

GUEST. Breaking this, therefore, in pieces, we will endeavour to exhibit that which is transacted by a king.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, are you willing we should divide this herd into what is called the fissured and the solid hoof? Or shall we divide it into common and private generation? For you understand me.

SOC. JUN. What kind of generation do you mean?

GUEST. That of horses and asses, which naturally generate from each other.

SOC. JUN. They do.

GUEST. But the remaining species, belonging to the one herd of tame animals, do not promiscuously mingle with each other, but those only of the same kind copulate together.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But whether does the political science appear to take care of the common, or of the private generation of animals?

SOC. JUN. It is evident that it takes care of the unmingled generation of animals.

GUEST. It is evident, then, as it seems, that we should give a twofold division to this, as we did to the preceding particulars.

SOC. JUN. It is indeed necessary.

GUEST. But we have already nearly separated into minute parts every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs among gregarious cattle.

SOC. JUN. It is not. But how shall we divide these two?

GUEST. After that manner, which it is just you and Theætetus should adopt in distributing, since you have touched on geometry.

SOC. JUN. What manner is that?

GUEST. By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.

SOC. JUN. How do you say?

GUEST. Is the condition of the human genus in any other way naturally adapted to progression than as a diameter, in power a biped?

SOC. JUN. In no other way.

GUEST. But again, the condition of the remaining genus is, according to the power of our power, a diameter, since it naturally consists of twice two feet.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly. And now I nearly understand what you wish to evince.

GUEST. But besides these things, do we perceive, Socrates, a circumstance worthy of laughter, which happened to us in making the former division?

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. The human genus, mingled and concurring with a genus the most generous and tractable of all others.

Soc. JUN. I perceive it, and likewise that it is a very absurd circumstance.

GUEST. Is it not fit that the slowest things should arrive last of all?

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. But we do not perceive this, that a king appears still more ridiculous when running together with the herd, and performing his course in conjunction with him who is exercised in the best manner with respect to a tractable life.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. For now, Socrates, that is more apparent which was said by us in our investigation of a sophist.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. That, in such a method of discourse as this, he neither pays more attention to what is venerable than what is not, nor does he prefer the small to the great, but always accomplishes that which is most true.

Soc. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. After this, that you may not accuse me, as you have inquired what is the shorter way to the definition of a king, I will, in the first place, consider this.

Soc. JUN. By all means, do so.

GUEST. But I say that a gradient animal ought to have been divided by us above into the biped and quadruped genus; and perceiving that man then alone remained in conjunction with the volant genus, the biped herd should again have been divided into the winged and without wings. But this division being made, and being evinced by that art which is the nurse of men, a political and royal character should be placed over it, like a charioteer, and the reins of the city should be given to him, in consequence of this science being adapted to him.

Soc.

SOC. JUN. You have answered me beautifully, and as if you had been discharging a debt; and you have added a digression, by way of interest, and as the completion of your discourse.

GUEST. Come, then, let us connect, by recurring from the beginning to the end, the discourse concerning the name of the politic art.

SOC. JUN. By all means.

GUEST. One part, therefore, of the gnostic science was asserted by us in the beginning to be of a commanding nature; and we said that the part of this science which commands from itself was assimilated to this. Again, we asserted that the nurture of animals was a part of the self-commanding science, and that this was not the smallest part. Likewise, that the nurture of herds was a species of the nurture of animals; and that the art which is nutritive of animals without horns, especially belongs to the art of feeding pedestrian animals. Again, it is necessary to connect not less than the triple of this part, if any one is desirous of comprehending it in one name, viz. the science of an unmingled genus of feeding. But a section from this, which alone remains, and which feeds men, as ranking among bipeds, is the part which we are now exploring, and which we denominate royal, and at the same time political.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do you therefore think, Socrates, that we have really done well, as you say?

SOC. JUN. In what?

GUEST. I mean that the thing proposed by us has been in every respect and sufficiently discussed. Or has our investigation been particularly deficient in this, that it has given, indeed, a description of the thing, but such a one as is not perfectly finished?

SOC. JUN. How do you say?

GUEST. I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly.

SOC. JUN. Do so.

GUEST. Since, therefore, it has appeared that there are many pastoral arts, the politic science is one of these, and is the curator of one certain herd.

SOC. JUN. It is.

GUEST. Our discourse defined this to be neither the nurse of horses, nor of any other brutes, but to be the common nutritive science of men.

SOC. JUN. It did so.

GUEST. But let us contemplate the difference of all shepherds and kings.

SOC. JUN. What is the difference ?

GUEST. If any one possessing the name of another art should assert and vindicate to himself the nutrition in common of the human herd, what should we say ?

SOC. JUN. How is this ?

GUEST. Just as if all merchants, husbandmen, and cooks, and besides these the professors of gymnastic, and the genus of physicians, should verbally oppose the shepherds of the human race, whom we have called politicians, and should assert that the care of nurturing men belonged to them, and that they were not only shepherds of the herds of men, but even of rulers themselves.

SOC. JUN. And would not their assertion be right ?

GUEST. Perhaps so. And let us also consider this. For we know that no one would contend with a herdsman about things of this kind ; since he is, doubtless, the nurse, the physician, and as it were brideman of a herd, and is alone skilled in the obstetric art respecting parturition and offspring. No one, besides, is better calculated, by such sport and music as the nature of cattle is capable of receiving, of consoling, and by alluring arts mitigating, with instruments, or the mere mouth, the herd committed to his care. And the same may be said of other shepherds. Or may it not ?

SOC. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. How, then, will our discourse respecting a king appear to be right and entire, since we assert that he alone is the shepherd and nurse of the human herd, when at the same time ten thousand others contend for the same office ?

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Did we not, therefore, a little before very properly fear, when we suspected lest we should only introduce a certain royal figure, and should not perfectly define a political character, unless we comprehended those that are connected with this character, and who profess themselves to be equally shepherds ; and, separating a king from them, alone exhibited him pure ?

SOC. JUN. Our fear, indeed, was most right.

GUEST. This therefore, Socrates, must be done by us, unless we intend to disgrace our discourse at the end.

Soc.

SOC. JUN. But this must by no means take place.

GUEST. Again, therefore, we must proceed in another way from another beginning.

SOC. JUN. In what way?

GUEST. By nearly inserting a jest. For it is requisite to employ a copious part of a long fable¹, and to act in the same manner with what remains of our

¹ The substance of this fable is beautifully explained by Proclus, in his fifth book on the Theology of Plato, as follows:

“ This universe is very properly said to have twofold lives, periods and convolutions; one of these being Saturnian, and the other Jovian. According to the former of these periods, too, every thing good springs spontaneously, and every animated nature possesses a blameless and unwearied life; but the latter is the source of material error, and of an abundantly mutable nature. For, as there is a twofold life in the world, the one unapparent and more intellectual, but the other more natural and apparent, and the one being bounded by providence, but the other proceeding in a disorderly manner according to fate,—hence this latter, which is multiform, and perfected through nature, is suspended from the Jovian order; but the former, which is more simple, is intellectual and unapparent, and is suspended from that of Saturn. This the Elean guest clearly indicates, by calling one of the circulations Jovian, and the other Saturnian. Though Jupiter also is the cause of the unapparent life of the universe, is the supplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection, yet he leads upwards all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and, being a leader, together with his father gives subsistence to the whole mundane intellect. Each of these periods, indeed, viz. the apparent and unapparent, participates of both these Gods; but the one is more Saturnian, and the other is in subjection to the kingdom of Jupiter. That the mighty Saturn, therefore, is allotted the other kingdom of the Gods prior to him, the Elean guest clearly evinces in what he says prior to the fable, viz. that we have heard from many of the kingdom which Saturn obtained; so that, according to this wise man also, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence, as his father Heaven contains the middle centres of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders, and supplies the whole of intellectual energy, first to the Gods; in the second place, to the genera superior to man; and in the last place, to partial souls such as ours, when they are able to extend themselves to the Saturnian place of survey. For this universe, and all the mundane Gods, perpetually possess this twofold life, and imitate the Saturnian intellection through unapparent and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter through providential attention to secondary concerns; and, in short, through the apparent fabrication of things. But partial souls at one time energize intellectually, and consecrate themselves to Saturn, and at another time according to the characteristic of Jupiter, and with unrestrained energy provide for subordinate natures. When they revolve, however, analogously to these deities, they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and adorn sensibles, and live both these lives in the same manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods are twofold, one intellectual and the other providential. Their paradigms also are twofold: of the one the Saturnian

our discussion, as we did above, viz. always to take away a part from a part, till we arrive at the summit of our inquiry. Is it not proper to act in this manner?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Give me then, after the manner of boys, all your attention to the fable: for you are not very much removed from puerile years.

SOC. JUN. Only relate it.

Saturnian intellect, and of the other the Jovian;—since even the mighty Jupiter himself has a twofold energy; by intellect, indeed, adhering to intelligibles, but by demiurgic fabrication adorning sensible.

“ Since, therefore, the revolutions are twofold, not only in wholes but likewise in partial souls, in the Saturnian period, says the Elean guest, the generation of men is not from each other, as in apparent men, nor, as the first man with us is alone earth-born, so, in partial souls, the one first soul is earth-born; but this is the case with all of them. For they are led upwards from last and earthly bodies, and they receive an unapparent, deserting a sensible, life. But neither do they verge to old age, and change from younger to older; but on the contrary they become more vigorous, and proceed intellectually in a path contrary to generation, and resolve as it were that variety of life, which in descending they made a composite. Hence, likewise, all the symbols pertaining to youth are present with those souls when they pass into such a condition of being; for they lay aside every thing which adheres to them from generation. And when they are distributed about Saturn, and live the life which is there, he says fruits are produced in abundance from the trees, and many other things spring spontaneously from the earth. The inhabitants also are naked and without beds, and for the most part are fed, dwelling in the open air: for they possess an indissoluble temperament of the seasons. The grass likewise springing abundantly from the earth supplies them with soft couches. These and such like goods, souls derive from this mighty deity, according to the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled with vivifying good, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes, but do not extend to themselves, from partial energies, perfection and beatitude. For doxastic nutriment possesses divisible and material apprehensions, but that which is intellectual, such as are pure, indivisible and spontaneous; which the spontaneous here obscurely signifies. The fruits also imparted from the earth signify the perfection of the prolific intellect of the Gods, and which illuminates souls with a sufficiency from themselves. For, through an unenvying abundance of goods, they are also able to impart to secondary natures felicity in a convenient measure. Neither, therefore, are they invested with garments, as when they proceed into generation, nor do they abound with additions of life, but are themselves pure, by themselves, from all composition and variety; and exciting their own intellect, they are extended by their intellectual father to these divine benefits. They likewise participate of total goods, being guarded by the intellectual Gods; and receiving from them the measures of a happy life, they pass the whole of their existence with facility. And lastly, establishing a sleepless and undefiled life in the generative powers of intelligibles, and being filled with intellectual fruits, and nourished with immaterial and divine forms, they are said to live the life which belongs to the government of Saturn.”

GUEST.

GUEST. There were then, and still will be, many memorials of antient affairs; and among others, there is one prodigious relation respecting the contention of Atreus and Thyestes. For you have heard and remember what is then said to have happened.

Soc. JUN. Perhaps you speak of the prodigy respecting the golden ram.

GUEST. By no means: but respecting the mutation of the rising and setting of the sun, and the other stars. For whence they now rise they did then set: and their rising was from a contrary place. Divinity, therefore, then giving a testimony to Atreus, changed the heavens into the present figure.

Soc. JUN. This also is reported.

GUEST. We have likewise heard from many respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.

Soc. JUN. We have from very many.

GUEST. And were not those antient men born from the earth, and not generated from each other?

Soc. JUN. This also is one of the things which are said to have happened formerly.

GUEST. All these things, therefore, proceed from the same circumstance, and ten thousand others besides these, and which are still more wonderful. But, through length of time, some of them have become extinct, and others are related in a dispersed manner, separate from each other. But that circumstance which is the cause of this taking place has not been mentioned by any one. It must, however, now be related: for the relation will contribute to the demonstration of the nature of a king.

Soc. JUN. You speak most beautifully. Speak, therefore, and do not omit any thing.

GUEST. Hear, then. Divinity himself sometimes conducts this universe in its progression, and convolves it: but at another time he remits the reins of his government, when the periods of the universe have received a convenient measure of time. But the world is again spontaneously led round to things contrary, since it is an animal, and is allotted wisdom from him who cooperated with it from the first in harmonizing all its parts with the whole. This progression, however, to things contrary is naturally implanted in it through the following cause.

Soc. JUN. Through what cause?

GUEST. To subsist always according to the same, and in a similar manner, and to be the same, alone belongs to the most divine of all things: but the nature of body is not of this order. But that which we call heaven and the world, receives many and blessed gifts from its producing cause. However, as it participates of body, it cannot be entirely void of mutation: nevertheless, as far as it is able, it is moved in the same, and according to the same, with one lation. Hence it is allotted a circular motion, because there is the smallest mutation of its motion. But nearly nothing is able to revolve itself, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful that this should at one time move in one way, and at another time in a different way. From all this, therefore, it must be said, that the world neither always revolves itself, nor that the whole of it is always convolved by Divinity with twofold and contrary convolutions: nor, again, that two certain Gods convolve it, whose decisions are contrary to each other. But that must be asserted which we just now said, and which alone remains, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cause, receiving again an externally acquired life, and a renewed immortality from the demiurgus; but that at another time, when he remits the reins of government, it proceeds by itself, and, being thus left for a time, performs many myriads of retrograde revolutions, because it is most great, and most equally balanced, and accomplishes its progressions with the smallest foot.

SOC. JUN. All that you have said appears to be very probable.

GUEST. From what has been said, therefore, we may now, by a reasoning process, apprehend that circumstance which we said was the cause of all wonderful things. For it is this very thing.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. That the circular motion of the universe is at one time accomplished as at present, and at another time in a contrary manner.

SOC. JUN. But how is this the cause of all wonderful things?

GUEST. It is requisite to think that this mutation is the greatest and most perfect of all the celestial conversions.

SOC. JUN. It is likely.

GUEST. It is proper, therefore, to think that the greatest mutations then happen to us who are the inhabitants of the world.

SOC. JUN. And this also is likely.

GUEST. But do we not know that the nature of animals sustains with difficulty great, numerous, and all-various mutations?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Hence, the greatest corruptions of other animals then necessarily take place, and very few of the human race remain. And to these many other wonderful and novel circumstances at the same time happen; but this is the greatest, and follows that revolution of the universe in which a conversion is effected contrary to the present.

SOC. JUN. What circumstance do you mean?

GUEST. That which takes place the first of all, when, in whatever age a mortal animal is constituted, he is no longer seen advancing to old age, but is again changed to the contrary, and naturally becomes, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs, too, of those more advanced in years then became black¹, and the cheeks of those that had beards became smooth; and thus each was restored to the past flower of his age. The bodies, likewise, of such as were in the bloom of youth, becoming smoother and smaller every day and night, again returned to the nature of a child recently born: and such were assimilated to this nature, both in soul and body. And at length their bodies, rapidly wasting away, perished. But the dead bodies of those who at that time died through violence were in like manner immanifestly, and in a few days, corrupted.

SOC. JUN. But what was then, O guest, the generation of animals, and after what manner were they produced from each other?

GUEST. It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another. But, as it is said that there was once an earth-born race, this race was at that period restored back again from the earth. This information, too, was delivered to us by those our first progenitors, who lived immediately after the close of the last revolution. For they were public witnesses of the truth of our assertions, which at present are disbelieved, though improperly, by the multitude. For I think this particular ought to be attended to, as consequent to a part of the narration. For, if old men tended to the nature of boys, it follows, that such as were dead, but laid in

¹ Plato, in what he here asserts of the Saturnian age, wonderfully accords with Orpheus, who, as we are informed by Proclus in Plat. Theol. lib. v. mystically says, "that the hairs of the face of Saturn are always black, and never become hoary."

the earth, must be again restored from thence, revive again, and follow that revolution of the universe, in which generation is convolved in a contrary order; and that the earth-born race, which according to this reason is necessarily produced, should thus be denominated and defined, viz. such of them as Divinity has transferred into another destiny.

SOC. JUN. This very much follows from what has been said above. But with respect to the life which you say was under the power of Saturn, did it subsist in those revolutions, or in these? For it is evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun happens in both these revolutions.

GUEST. You follow the discourse well. But, in answer to your question respecting all things being produced spontaneously for mankind, this by no means is the case in the present, but happened in the former revolution. For then Divinity was first the ruler and curator of the whole circulation; just as now the several parts of the world are locally distributed by ruling Gods. Divine dæmons, too, were allotted, after the manner of shepherds, animals according to genera and herds; each being sufficient for all things pertaining to the several particulars over which he presided. So that there was nothing rustic, no mutual rapine, no war, nor sedition of any kind; and ten thousand other things took place, which are the consequences of such a period. But what is said respecting the spontaneous life of these men is asserted because Divinity himself fed them, and was their curator; just as men who are of a more divine, are the shepherds of brutes, who are of a baser, nature. In consequence, too, of men being fed by Divinity, there were no politics, nor possessions of women and children. For all these were restored to life from the earth, and without having any recollection of former events. But all such things as these were absent. The inhabitants, too, had fruits in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, which did not grow through the assistance of agriculture, but were spontaneously given by the earth. And for the most part they were naked, slept without coverlids, and were fed in the open air. For the temperament of the seasons was innoxious to them. They had soft beds, too, from grass, which germinated in unenvying abundance from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you have heard what was the life of men under the reign of Saturn: but you yourself have seen what the condition of the present life is, which is said to be under Jupiter. But are you able, and likewise willing, to judge which of these is the more happy?

SOC.

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that I should after a manner judge for you?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. If, therefore, those that were nurtured by Saturn in so much leisure, and with the power not only of conversing with men, but with brutes, used all the above-mentioned particulars for the purpose of philosophy, associating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what respect it differed from others as to the common possession of prudence; from all this it may be easily inferred, that the men of those times were incomparably more happy than those that exist at present. But if, being abundantly filled with meats and drinks, their discourses with each other, and with brutes, were such as at present they are related to have been, from this also, in my opinion, their superior felicity may be very easily inferred. At the same time, however, we shall dismiss these particulars till some sufficient judge of them shall arise, who will unfold to us whether the men of that period were inclined to sciences and discourse. But let us now relate on what account we introduced the fable, that we may after this bring to a conclusion what remains. For, after the time of all these was consummated, and it was requisite that a mutation should take place, and besides this, the whole terrestrial genus being consumed, as all the generations of every soul had received their completion, and as many seeds having fallen on the earth as were destined to each soul,—then the governor of the universe, laying aside as it were the handle of his rudder, departed to that place of survey whence he contemplates himself. But then fate and connate desire again convolved the world. All those Gods, therefore, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greatest daemon, knowing what had now happened, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world becoming inverted, conflicting with itself, and being agitated by an impulse contrary to its beginning and end, and likewise making an abundant concussion in itself, produced again another corruption of all-various animals. After these things, however, and the expiration of a sufficient length of time, the tumult, confusion, and concussions ceased, and the world, becoming tranquil and adorned, again proceeded in its usual course, possessing a providential care and dominion, both over itself and

the natures which it contains ; remembering, to the utmost of its power, the instructions of the demiurgus and father¹. At the beginning, therefore, it accomplished this more perfectly, but at the end more remissly. But the cause of this is the corporeal form of the temperature, and which was nursed together with an antient nature. For it was a participant of much disorder before it arrived at the present ornament. For, from its composing artificer, indeed, it possesses every good ; but, from its former habit, all that atrocity and injustice which subsist within the heavens. And these the world both possesses from that former habit, and inserts in animated natures. The world, therefore, when nourishing the animals which it contains, in conjunction with the governor, brings forth small evils, and mighty goods : but when it is separated from him, during the nearest time of its departure, it conducts all things beautifully. At a more distant period, however, and from oblivion being generated in it, the property of its former dissonance rules with greater force. And at the last period of time it becomes deflorescent ; and producing small goods, but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both itself, and the natures which it contains, being dissolved. Hence that God who adorned the world, then perceiving the difficulties under which it labours, and anxious lest, being thus tempestuously agitated, it should be dissolved by the tumult, and be plunged into the infinite sea of dissimilitude, again resumes the helm, and adorns and corrects whatever is diseased and dissolved through the inordinate motion of the former period, and renders the world immortal and unconscious of age. This, therefore, is the end of the whole narration. But this is sufficient to show the nature of a king to such as attend to what has been already said. For, the world being again converted to the present path of generation, the progression of its age again stopped, and it imparted novel things, the very contraries to what it then imparted. For animals proximate to death, on account of their smallness, are increased. But bodies recently born from the earth, hoary, again dying, descend into the earth ; and all other things are transmuted, imitating and following the condition of the universe. The imitation, likewise, of motion, generation, and nutriment, follows all things from necessity. For it is no longer possible for an animal

¹ i. e. Jupiter. See the *Timæus*.

to be produced in the earth, through other things mutually composing it; but, as the world was destined to be the absolute ruler of its own progression, after the same manner its parts also were destined by a similar guidance to spring forth, generate, and nourish, as far as they are able. But we have now arrived at that for the sake of which the whole of our discourse was undertaken. For, with respect to other animals, many particulars, and of a prolix nature, might be discussed; such as, from what things they are severally composed, and through what causes they were changed: but the particulars respecting men are shorter, and more to our purpose. For, mankind being destitute of the guardian care of the dæmon whose possession we are, and who is the shepherd of our race, and as many animals who are naturally cruel became transported with rage, hence men, now imbecil, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by such animals. And besides this, men in those first times were unskilful, and had no knowledge of the arts, because the earth spontaneously afforded them nutriment: but they did not know how to procure it, because they were not compelled by any previous necessity. From all these causes they were involved in the greatest difficulties. Hence, those gifts which are said to have been formerly imparted to us by the Gods were imparted with necessary instruction and erudition: fire, indeed, from Prometheus¹, but the arts from Vulcan and Minerva. Again, seeds and plants were imparted by other divinities; and, in short, all such things as are the support of human life. For men, as we have said, were not left destitute of the guardian care of the Gods; and it became requisite that they also should pay attention to the concerns of life, in the same manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born in a different manner at different periods. And let this be the end of the fable. But we shall make it useful to discover how far we have erred in the above definition of a royal and political character.

SOC. JUN. In what respect, and how far, do you say we have erred?

GUEST. Partly less, and in a more generous manner, and partly in a greater degree, and more abundantly.

SOC. JUN. How?

¹ Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls; and the fire which he imparted to mortals is the rational soul itself, because this like fire naturally tends upwards, or, in other words, aspires after incorporeal natures.

GUEST.

GUEST. Because, while we were asked respecting a king and politician belonging to the present circulation and generation, we adduced a shepherd of a herd of men belonging to the contrary period ; and in consequence of this shepherd being a God, and not a man, we transgressed abundantly : but again, because we evinced that this shepherd was the governor of the whole city, but yet did not say after what manner, in this respect we asserted what is true, but were deficient as to the whole and the perspicuous ; and on this account we erred less in this latter case than in the former.

Soc. JUN. True.

GUEST. We ought, therefore, as it seems, to think that we shall then have perfectly described a political character when we have defined the mode of governing a city.

Soc. JUN. Beautifully said.

GUEST. On this account we related that fable, not only that those might be pointed out who oppose the royal character we are now investigating with respect to the nurture of a herd, but that we might more clearly perceive him who alone ought to be called a pastor, since after the manner of a shepherd and herdsman he takes care of the nurture of the human race.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine shepherd is still greater than that which belongs to a king ; and that the politicians of the present day are naturally much more similar to subjects than governors, and in a manner more allied to these participate of discipline and nurture.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But we must not inquire whether they have been more or less so, and whether they are naturally so or not.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us thus resume our inquiry. We said, then, that there was a self-commanding art respecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common ; and this art we then directly called the herd-nourishing art. Do you recollect ?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. In this, therefore, we erred. For we have not by any means comprehended in a definition the political character, nor given it a name ; but its name as yet flies from us.

Soc.

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. To nourish the several herds of animals belongs to all other shepherds; but we have not given a fit name to the political character, which requires the application of something common.

SOC. JUN. You speak the truth, if this common something can be obtained.

GUEST. But is it not possible to apply healing, as that which is common to all things, without either defining nutriment, or any other thing? and to introduce another certain art, either pertaining to the nurture of herds, or therapeutic, or adapted to take care of something; and thus to comprehend the political character together with others, since reason signifies that this ought to be done?

SOC. JUN. Right. But after this, in what manner must the division be made?

GUEST. As before we divided the herd-nourishing art into the gradient and winged tribes, and into the horned and without horns, in the same manner we should divide the art pertaining to the care of herds, which will thus be similarly comprehended in our discourse, together with the kingdom of Saturn.

SOC. JUN. It appears so. But go on with your inquiries.

GUEST. If, then, the name of the art pertaining to the care of herds had been thus adopted, no one would have opposed us, as if there were no careful attention whatever; just as then it was justly contended, that there is no art in us which deserves the appellation of nutritive; and that, if there were any such art, it belongs to many things prior to, and preferable to, any thing pertaining to kings.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But no other art endeavours to accomplish this more, and in a milder manner, as if it paid a careful attention to the whole of human communion, than the royal art.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But after these things, Socrates, do you perceive how very much we have erred about the end?

SOC. JUN. What kind of error have we committed?

GUEST. We have erred in this, that though we have conceived that there

is a certain nutritive art of a biped herd, yet we ought not immediately to have called it royal and politic, as if entirely complete.

SOC. JUN. Why not?

GUEST. In the first place, as we have said, the name ought to be accommodated more to attentive care than to nutriment: and in the next place, this attentive care ought to be divided. For it will receive no small sections.

SOC. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. The sections will be a divine shepherd, and a human curator.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. And again, it is necessary to give a twofold distribution to human care.

SOC. JUN. What are the two parts?

GUEST. The violent and the voluntary.

SOC. JUN. What then?

GUEST. And erring in this, with greater ineptitude than is becoming, we considered a king and a tyrant as the same, though they are most dissimilar both in themselves and in their mode of government.

SOC. JUN. True.

GUEST. Now, therefore, again correcting ourselves (as I have already said), we shall divide human care into the violent and the voluntary.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. And the violent we shall call tyrannic: but the voluntary, and the attention paid to the herds of voluntary biped animals, we shall denominate politic. We shall therefore evince, that he who possesses this art and care is truly a king and a politician.

SOC. JUN. And thus the demonstration, O guest, respecting political affairs will, as it appears, be perfect.

GUEST. It will be well for us, Socrates, if this is the case. But it is requisite that these things should not only be apparent to you, but likewise to me, in common with you. But at present a king appears to me not to possess as yet a perfect figure: but just as statuaries, who by hastening their work sometimes unseasonably, and adding more and larger things than are fit, finish it more slowly; so we at present have not only rapidly and magnificently evinced that we erred in the former part of our discussion, in consequence of thinking that great paradigms should be employed about a king,
but

but we reviled the wonderful bulk of the fable, and were compelled to use a greater part of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a more prolix demonstration, and have not entirely finished the fable. But, indeed, our discourse, like an animal, appears to have its exterior delineation sufficiently perfect, but is not yet perspicuous, through paint, and the mixture of colours. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by words and discourse, to such as are able to follow the disquisition, than by painting, and the whole of manual operation ; but other things are to be exhibited through the operations of the hand.

SOC. JUN. This, indeed, is rightly said : but show me why you say you have not yet spoken sufficiently.

GUEST. It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things perspicuously, without examples. For each of us appears to know all things as in a dream¹, and again to be ignorant of all things according to a wakeful perception.

SOC. JUN. How do you say this ?

GUEST. We appear at present to have moved very absurdly the passion respecting science which is in us.

SOC. JUN. In what respect ?

GUEST. The example, O blessed youth, which I have adduced will again require an example.

SOC. JUN. Why ? Tell me, and do not in any respect be remiss on my account.

GUEST. I will, since you are prepared to follow me. For we know what boys do as soon as they have acquired a knowledge of their letters.

SOC. JUN. What is that ?

GUEST. They sufficiently perceive each of the elements in the shortest and easiest syllables, and are able to speak the truth concerning them.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, being again dubious about these in other syllables, they are deceived in opinion and discourse.

¹ The soul possesses a twofold knowledge, one indistinct, but the other distinct, scientific, and without ambiguity. For we essentially contain the reasons of things, and breathe, as it were, the knowledge of them ; but we do not always possess them in energy.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. May they not, therefore, thus be easily, and in the most beautiful manner, led to things which they do not yet know?

SOC. JUN. How?

GUEST. By leading them first to those syllables in which they have had right opinions respecting these very same things; but, when we have thus led them, to place before them things which they do not yet know; and, by comparing them together, to show them that there is the same similitude and nature in both the complications, till the things conceived by true opinion are presented to the view compared with all the unknown particulars. But these being presented to the view, and examples of them produced, it will cause them to denominate that which is different in all the elements of every syllable as different from other things; but that which is the same, as always the same, according to things the same with itself.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. This, therefore, we sufficiently comprehend, viz. that the generation of a paradigm then takes place, when that which is the same in another divided particular being rightly conceived by opinion, and accommodated to each, produces one true opinion of both.

SOC. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. Shall we therefore wonder, if our soul, suffering the same thing naturally about the elements of all things, at one time is established in certain particulars by truth itself about each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other particulars, about all things? And that when, in certain commixtions, it thinks rightly, it should again be ignorant of these very same things, when it is transferred to long and difficult syllables of things?

SOC. JUN. There is nothing wonderful in this.

GUEST. For how, my friend, can any one, beginning from false opinion, arrive at any, even the smallest part of truth, and thus acquire wisdom?

SOC. JUN. Nearly no one.

GUEST. If, therefore, these things naturally subsist in this manner, you and I shall not in any respect err, if we first of all endeavour to perceive the nature of the whole paradigm in another small and partial paradigm; and after this, betaking ourselves to the paradigm of a king, which is the greatest
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of all paradigms, and deriving it from lesser things, endeavour again, through a paradigm, to know by art the remedy of political affairs, that we may be partakers of wakeful perceptions instead of a dream.

Soc. JUN. Perfectly right.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us resume the former part of our discourse, viz. that since an innumerable multitude, together with the royal genus, doubt respecting the government of a city, it is requisite to separate all these from the royal genus, and to leave it by itself. And for this purpose we said it was requisite that we should have a certain paradigm.

Soc. JUN. And very much so.

GUEST. But what paradigm can any one adduce which both contains political concerns, and is the smallest possible, so that he may sufficiently find the object of his investigation? Are you willing, by Jupiter, unless we have something else at hand, that we choose the weaving art? Not the whole, indeed, if it is agreeable to you: for, perhaps, the weaving of wool will be sufficient. For it may happen that this part being chosen may testify that which we wish to evince.

Soc. JUN. For why should it not?

GUEST. Shall we therefore now, with respect to this part of the weaving art, act in the same manner as we did above, viz. divide every particular by cutting the parts of parts? and, passing over all things in the shortest manner possible, return to that which is useful to our present purpose?

Soc. JUN. How do you say?

GUEST. My answer to you shall be an explanation of the thing.

Soc. JUN. You speak most excellently.

GUEST. Of all the things which we fabricate and possess, some are for the sake of doing something, and others are auxiliaries against any inconvenience we may suffer. And of auxiliaries, some are alexipharmic¹, as well divine as human; but others are subservient to defence. And of things subservient to defence, some consist of warlike apparatus, and others are inclosures. And of inclosures, some are veils, and others are defences against heat and cold. But of defences, some are coverings, and others are apparel. And of apparel, one part is an under veil, and another a surrounding cover-

¹ i. e. Remedies of evils.

ing. And of furrounding coverings, some are simple, and others composite. But of the composite, some are perforated, but others are connected together without perforation. And of those that are without perforation, some are composed from the nerves of things growing out of the earth, but others are hairy. And of the hairy, some are conglutinated by water and earth, but others are themselves connected together with themselves. To these auxiliaries and coverings, which are wrought from the same things being bound together, we give the name of garments. But we call that art which is especially conversant with garments, vestific, from the thing itself, in the same manner as above we called the art respecting a city politic. We likewise say that the weaving art, so far as for the most part it weaves garments, differs in nothing but the name from the vestific art; just in the same manner as we formerly observed that a royal differed only nominally from a political character.

Soc. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. But after this we should thus reason : that some one may, perhaps, think it has been sufficiently shown that the weaving art is conversant with garments, but may not be able to perceive, that though it is not yet distinguished from things which cooperate near together, it is separated from many other things of a kindred nature.

Soc. JUN. Tell me what things of a kindred nature.

GUEST. You do not understand what has been said, as it seems. It appears, therefore, that we should return from the end to the beginning. For, if you understand propinquity, we have now separated this from the weaving art, by distributing the composition of coverings into things put under, and things furrounding us.

Soc. JUN. I understand you.

GUEST. We have likewise separated every kind of fabrication from thread and broom, and all such plantal productions as we just now called nerves. We also defined the compressive art, and the composition which employs perforation and sewing, which for the most part pertains to the currier's art.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. We also separated the fabrication of simple coverings from skins, and of such coverings as are employed in building, and in the whole of the tectonic, and in all other arts which are employed in stopping the effluxions
of

of water. Also such arts as procure restraints in joining, and violent actions, and which are employed about the construction of doors, and distribute the parts of the cementing art. We have likewise divided the armour-making art, which is a section of the great and all-various power effective of defence. We also defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of cooking, which is conversant with alexipharmics; and we left a certain art, which appears to be that we are in pursuit of, viz. which defends against cold, produces woollen vestments, and is called the art of weaving.

SOC. JUN. It seems so.

GUEST. But we have not yet, O boy, perfectly discussed this matter. For he who is first engaged in the making of garments appears to act in a manner directly contrary to the weaver.

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. For the work of the weaver is a certain knitting together.

SOC. JUN. It is.

GUEST. But the work of him who first engages in the making of garments consists in dissolving things joined together.

SOC. JUN. What kind of work is this?

GUEST. The work of the art of carding wool. Or shall we dare to call the art of carding wool the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. But if any one should call the art effective of the thread and woof in a loom the weaving art, he would assert a paradox, and give it a false name.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But whether shall we say that the whole attention and care of the fuller and the mender contribute nothing to the making of garments? Or shall we also call these weaving arts?

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. But all these contend with the power of the weaving art, respecting the care and the making of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greatest part, but likewise assigning to themselves great portions of the same art.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Besides these, it further appears requisite, that the arts effective of the

the instruments through which the weaver accomplishes his work, should be considered as concauses of every work accomplished by weaving.

SOC. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, will our discourse about the weaving art, a part of which we have chosen, be sufficiently defined, if we assert that it is the most beautiful and the greatest of all the arts which are employed about woollen garments? Or shall we thus, indeed, speak something of the truth, but yet neither clearly nor perfectly till we have separated all these arts from it?

SOC. JUN. This will be the case.

GUEST. Must we not, therefore, in the next place act in this manner, that our discourse may proceed in an orderly series?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. In the first place, therefore, let us consider two arts which subsist about all things.

SOC. JUN. What are they?

GUEST. One is the concause of generation, and the other is the cause itself.

SOC. JUN. How?

GUEST. Such arts as do not fabricate the thing itself, but prepare instruments for the fabricators, without which instruments the proposed work cannot be effected,—these are concauses: but those which fabricate the thing itself are causes.

SOC. JUN. This distinction is reasonable.

GUEST. In the next place, those arts which produce the distaff, and the shuttle, and such other instruments as contribute to the making of garments,—all these I call concauses: but those which pay attention to and fabricate garments I call causes.

SOC. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. But, of causes, it will be proper especially to collect that which pertains to the washing of garments, and that which is skilled in mending, and all the therapeutic care about these, since the cosmetic art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller's art.

SOC. JUN. It will so.

GUEST. But there is one art comprehending that part which cards wool
and

and spins, and likewise every thing pertaining to the making of garments, and which is called by all men the wool-working art.

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. The art of carding wool, and the half of that art which uses the shuttle, and that art which separates from each other things joined together, —all these, in short, form a part of the wool-working art, of which there are two great parts, one collective, and the other separative.

SOC. JUN. There are so.

GUEST. The art of carding wool, therefore, and all those other arts which we just now mentioned, belong to the separative part. For that art which divides in wool and thread, after one manner with the shuttle, and after another with the hands, has all the names which we have just now mentioned.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Again, we must take a part of the collective part, and of the wool-working art contained in it; but we must pass by all such things of a separating nature as we happen to find there, and bisect the wool-working art, together with the collective and separative section.

SOC. JUN. Let us divide them.

GUEST. It will be proper for you, therefore, Socrates, to divide the collective, together with the wool-working part, if we wish to apprehend sufficiently the proposed weaving art.

SOC. JUN. It will be requisite.

GUEST. It will indeed: and we say, therefore, that one part of it is streptic, or conversant with rolling, and the other symplectic, or complicative.

SOC. JUN. Do I then understand you? For you appear to me to say that the elaboration of the thread is streptic.

GUEST. Not the elaboration of this only, but likewise of the woof. Or can we find any generation of it which is not streptic?

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Define also each of these: for perhaps you will find the definition reasonable.

SOC. JUN. In what respect?

GUEST. In this. We say that the work of the wool-carder, when it is drawn out into length and breadth, is a certain fracture.

Soc. JUN. We do.

GUEST. This, when it is turned by the distaff, and becomes a solid thread, is called flamen: but they say that the art which directs this is stemonie, or conversant with stuff to be woven.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But such things as receive a loose contortion, and by the implication of the thread with the attraction of the polish acquire a measured softness,—of these we call what is spun the woof, but the art itself which presides over these, woof-spinning.

Soc. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. And now that part of the weaving art which we proposed is obvious to every one. For, with respect to a part of the collective art in the working of wool, when it accomplishes that which is woven by a fit knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven is called a woollen garment, but the art presiding over this, textorian.

Soc. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. Be it so. But why then did we not immediately answer, that the plectic art is that which weaves together the woof and the thread, instead of proceeding in a circle, and defining many things in vain?

Soc. JUN. It does not appear to me, O guest, that we have said any thing in vain.

GUEST. This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O blessed youth, it will be seen that you will often hereafter fall into this disease. Nor is it wonderful. But hear a certain discourse, which is proper to be delivered respecting all such particulars as these.

Soc. JUN. Only relate it.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in the first place, behold the whole of excess and deficiency, that we may praise and blame according to reason whatever is said with more prolixity or brevity than is becoming in disputations of this kind.

Soc. JUN. It will be proper so to do.

GUEST. But I think we shall do right by discoursing about these things.

Soc. JUN. About what things?

GUEST. About prolixity and brevity, and the whole of excess and deficiency. For the art of measuring is conversant with all these.

Soc.

SOC. JUN. It is.

GUEST. We will divide it, therefore, into two parts. For it is requisite to that after which we are hastening.

SOC. JUN. Inform me how this division is to be made.

GUEST. Thus. One part according to the communion of magnitude and parvitude with each other; but the other part according to the necessary essence of generation.

SOC. JUN. How do you say?

GUEST. Does it not appear to you to be natural, that the greater ought to be called greater than nothing else than the lesser? and again, that the lesser should not be lesser than any thing than the greater?

SOC. JUN. To me it does.

GUEST. But what? Must we not say that what surpasses the nature of mediocrity, and is surpassed by it, whether in words or actions, is that by which especially good and bad men differ from each other?

SOC. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. These twofold essences, therefore, and judgments of the great and the small must be established; but not, as we just now said, with reference to each other only. But, as we now say, they are rather partly to be referred to each other, and partly to mediocrity. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requisite?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If some one refers the nature of the greater to nothing else than the nature of the lesser, he will not refer it to mediocrity. Or will he?

SOC. JUN. He will not.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, divide the arts themselves, and all their works, according to this reasoning? And shall we not entirely take away the political science which we are now investigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all such things as these guard against that which is more or less than mediocrity, not as if it had no subsistence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in actions. And after this manner preserving mediocrity, they effect every thing beautiful and good.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If, therefore, we take away the politic science, will not our investigation after this of the royal science be dubious?

Soc. JUN. Very much so.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, as in our investigation of a sophist, we compelled non-being to be, after discourse about it fled from us, so now shall we compel the more and the less to become measured, not only with reference to each other, but likewise to the generation of mediocrity? For no one can indubitably become a politician, or knowing in any thing else pertaining to actions, unless he assents to this.

Soc. JUN. We ought, therefore, especially to do this now.

GUEST. This, Socrates, is a still greater work than that; though, as we may remember, that was very prolix. But a thing of this kind may be supposed respecting them, and very justly.

Soc. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. That there is occasion for what we are now speaking of, in order to evince what is accurate respecting this thing. Further still, with respect to the present particulars, it appears to me to have been shown sufficiently, that this discourse will afford us magnificent assistance, as leading us to think that all arts are to be similarly measured according to the more and the less, not only among themselves, but likewise with reference to the generation of mediocrity. For, this having a subsistence, they also are: and, these subsisting, this also is. And either of these being taken away, neither of them will subsist.

Soc. JUN. This indeed is right. But what follows?

GUEST. We should evidently divide the art of measuring (as we have said) into two parts; placing as one of its parts all those arts which measure number, length, breadth, depth, and velocity, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, such arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the seasonable and the fit, and all such as fly from the extremes to the middle.

Soc. JUN. Each of these sections is great, and they differ much from each other.

GUEST. That, Socrates, which is sometimes asserted by many of those elegant men, who think they assert something wise, when they say that the art of measuring is conversant with all generated natures, is now asserted by us. For all artificial things after a certain manner participate of measure; but, in consequence of not being accustomed to divide according to species,
these

these men immediately collect into the same these things which so widely differ from each other, and consider them as similar. And, again, they do the very contrary to this: for things which are different they do not divide according to parts, though it is requisite that, when any one first perceives the communion of many things, he should not desist till he perceives all the differences in it which are placed in species: and again, when he perceives all-various dissimilarities in multitudes, he cannot desist from this difficult perception, till, having inclosed all such things as are allied in one similitude, he comprehends them in the essence of a certain genus. And thus much may suffice respecting these particulars, and concerning defect and excess. This only must be carefully observed, that two genera of measures about these particulars have been invented, and that we should remember what they are.

Soc. JUN. We will remember.

GUEST. But, after this discussion, let us assume another respecting the objects of our investigation, and the whole purport of this discourse.

Soc. JUN. What is it?

GUEST. If any one should ask us respecting the custom of those that learn their letters, when they are asked from what letters a word is composed, shall we say that the inquiry is then made for the sake of one word only, or that they may become more skilful in every thing pertaining to grammar?

Soc. JUN. Evidently that they may become more skilful in the whole of grammar.

GUEST. But what again? Is our inquiry respecting a politician undertaken by us more for the sake of the politician, than that we may become more skilful in every discussion?

Soc. JUN. This also is evident, that it is undertaken on this latter account.

GUEST. No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to investigate the art of weaving, for its own sake alone: but I think most men are ignorant, that there are certain sensible similitudes of things which are naturally capable of being easily learnt, and that there is no difficulty in making these manifest, when any one wishes to point them out to some one inquiring a reason respecting them, not in conjunction with things, but with facility,

facility, without assigning a reason. But of things the greatest and the most honourable, there is not any image clearly fabricated for men, which being exhibited by him who wishes to fill the soul of the inquirer, can, by being harmonized to some one of the senses, sufficiently fill the soul. Hence it is requisite to meditate how we may be able to give and receive a reason for every thing. For incorporeal natures, as they are the most beautiful and the greatest of all things, can alone be clearly pointed out by reason, but by nothing else. And all we have said at present is asserted for the sake of these things. But the consideration of every particular is more easily effected in small things than in such as are great.

SOC. JUN. You speak most beautifully.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, remember on what account all these things have been said by us?

SOC. JUN. On what account?

GUEST. Principally on account of the difficulty in which we were involved, through the prolix discourse about the weaving art, and the revolution of the universe. We likewise considered the discourse of the sophist about the essence of non-being, as full of prolixity. And on all these accounts we terrified ourselves, fearing lest we should speak superfluously in conjunction with prolixity. Consider, therefore, all these things as said by us, in order that we may not suffer any thing of this kind again.

SOC. JUN. Be it so. Only discuss what remains.

GUEST. I say, therefore, it is requisite that both you and I should be mindful of what we have now said, as often as brevity or prolixity of discourse is blamed, not judging the prolixities by one another, but according to that part of the measuring art, which we said above ought to be remembered with a view to the becoming.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But yet all things are not referred to this. For we do not require in order to obtain pleasure a prolixity which harmonizes with nothing, unless as a certain appendix. Nor is it proper to make the easy and rapid discovery of the object of our investigation our principal intention; but this ought to be considered by us as a secondary thing. But we should by far most especially, and in the first place, honour the method which is able to divide according to species. We should likewise by no means be indignant with

with a discourse, however extended, which renders the hearer more inventive; and the same must be said of a discourse however short. Further still, it becomes him who blames long discourses in disquisitions such as these, and who does not admit circular periods, not to condemn them altogether rapidly, and immediately, but to show first that we shall be more fit for discussion, and more capable of discovering things by reason, by shorter discourses: but we should neither pay any attention to, nor even seem to hear any other praise or blame. And thus much may suffice for these things, if it also seems so to you. Let us, therefore, again return to the political character, introducing the before-mentioned paradigm of the weaving art.

Soc. JUN. You speak well: and let us do as you say.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, the office of a king to be separated from that of many shepherds, or rather from that of all those who have the charge of herds?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But we say that the consideration of causes and concauses respecting a city remains, which are first to be divided from each other.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. You know, therefore, that it is difficult to bisect these. But the cause of this will, I think, in the course of our inquiry be not less apparent.

Soc. JUN. It will be proper, therefore, so to do.

GUEST. Let us, then, divide them into parts, like victims, since we cannot bisect them: for it is always requisite to cut into the nearest number possible.

Soc. JUN. How, therefore, shall we do at present?

GUEST. Just as we did above: for we placed all such instruments as are subservient to weaving, as concauses.

Soc. JUN. We did.

GUEST. The same thing, therefore, must be done by us now, and it is still more necessary than it was then. For such things as fabricate in a city either a small or a large instrument are all of them to be considered as concauses; since without these a city could never subsist, nor yet the politic science. But yet again we do not establish any one of these as the business of the royal science.

Soc. JUN. We do not.

GUEST. We likewise attempt to accomplish a difficult thing, in separating this genus from others. For he who says that it is an instrument of some particular

particular being, appears to speak probably : but at the same time we must say that this is different from the possessions belonging to a city.

Soc. JUN. In what respect ?

GUEST. Because it has not this power. For causes do not adhere to generation as an instrument, but on account of the safety of that which is fabricated.

Soc. JUN. What kind of thing do you mean ?

GUEST. An all-various species produced from things dry and moist, fiery and without fire, and which we call by one appellation, a vessel, though it is an abundant species : but I think this does not at all belong to the science we are investigating.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But the third species, or that of possessions, appears to be multi-form, consisting of the terrestrial and aquatic, the much-wandering and the sedentary, the honourable and the ignoble ; and it has one name, because the whole of it subsists for the sake of a certain sitting, as it always becomes a seat to something.

Soc. JUN. What kind of thing is it ?

GUEST. It is that which is called a vehicle, a thing which is not entirely the work of the politic science, but rather of the tectonic, ceramic¹, and calcotypic².

Soc. JUN. I understand you.

GUEST. Must we then mention a fourth species of these, in which most of the things formerly spoken of by us are contained ? viz. every kind of garment, many arms, walls, all inclosures, consisting either of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things. And since all these are constructed for the sake of defence, the whole may most justly be called a fortification ; and, for the most part, may more properly be considered as much more the work of the architect and weaver than of the politician.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Are we, therefore, willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning, painting, and music, together with such arts as use these ; from which certain imitations are devised for the sake of procuring us pleasure, and which may be justly comprehended in one name ?

¹ i. e. Pertaining to the potter's art.

² i. e. Pertaining to the brazier's art.

SOC. JUN. In what name?

GUEST. They may be denominated sportive.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. This one name, therefore, accords with all these: for no one of them does any thing seriously, but all their operations are for the sake of sport.

SOC. JUN. This also I nearly understand.

GUEST. But ought we not to place as a sixth all-various species, and, which is the offspring of many other arts, that art which prepares bodies for all the above-mentioned particulars?

SOC. JUN. Of what art are you speaking?

GUEST. That art which digs gold and silver, and other metals, out of the bowels of the earth; likewise that which cuts down trees, that which constructs something by shaving off the hair, the knitting art, that which cuts off the barks of trees, and the skins of animals, and all such arts as are conversant with things of this kind. Also, such arts as procure cork, books, and bonds, fabricating composite species from genera which are not composite. The whole of this we call the first-born possession of mankind, simple, and by no means the work of the royal science.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. The possession of nutriment, and such things as when mingled with the body can, by their parts, administer to its wants, must be ranked in the seventh place. And the whole of this must be denominated by us nutriment, unless we have any thing better to adopt instead of it. However, we may place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, gymnastic, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to these more properly than to the politic science.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Nearly, therefore, all possessions, except those of tame animals, may I think be found in these seven genera. But consider: for it was most just that the species which we called first-born should be introduced first; and after this, instrument, vessel, vehicle, fortification, that which is sportive, and cattle. But if any thing of no great consequence is latent, which may be accommodated to some one of these, we omit it; such as the idea of coin, of seals, and of every thing impressed or carved. For these things are

not very much allied to the genus; but some accord with it, for the purpose of ornament, others as subservient to instruments, violently, indeed, but at the same time they may be drawn to this end. But the nurture of herds which we before distributed, seems to comprehend the whole possession of tame animals, slaves being excepted.

Soc. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. The genus of slaves, and of all servants, remains, in which I prophesy, that those who contend with a king respecting the thing woven will become apparent, in the same manner as above, those that knit, and those that comb wool, and such others as were then mentioned by us, contended with the weavers. But all the others who were called by us concauses, together with the works just now mentioned, are set aside, and are separated from royal and political action.

Soc. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. Let us then, approaching nearer, consider the rest, that we may more firmly perceive them.

Soc. JUN. It is, therefore, requisite to do so.

GUEST. We shall find, then, that the greatest servants, so far as we can see in this affair, are engaged in a pursuit, and possess a property the very contrary to what we have expected.

Soc. JUN. What are these?

GUEST. Men acquired by purchase; whom, beyond all controversy, we ought to call slaves, and of whom we should assert, that they by no means vindicate to themselves the royal art.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what shall we say of those free-born men who voluntarily engage in the servile employments mentioned by us above, viz. who transmit the works of husbandry, and of the other arts, to each other, and who are engaged in mutual traffic, domestic or foreign, whether they change money for other things, or like for like, (whom we denominate money-changers, pilots, and hucksters,) shall we say that these will contend for any part of the politic science?

Soc. JUN. Perhaps merchants will.

GUEST. But yet we never find that those mercenaries who readily offer their services to every one vindicate to themselves the royal science.

SOC. JUN. For how can they?

GUEST. What then shall we say of those that act in this servile capacity every where?

SOC. JUN. Of whom are you speaking? and of what kind of servile offices?

GUEST. I speak of the tribe of criers, and of those who become wise respecting letters¹, and often act in the capacity of servants, together with certain other persons who are very skilful in the labours pertaining to government. What again shall we say of these?

SOC. JUN. That which you just now said, that they are servants, but no rulers in cities.

GUEST. I do not think, therefore, I was looking at a dream, when I said that many on this account would be seen strenuously contending for the royal science, though it may appear to be very absurd to seek after these in any servile portion.

SOC. JUN. Very much so, indeed.

GUEST. Let us, besides, approach still nearer to those whom we have not yet examined. But these are such as possess a certain portion of ministrant science about divination. For they are considered as interpreting to men things proceeding from the Gods.

SOC. JUN. They are.

GUEST. The genus too of priests, as established by law, knows in what manner we should offer gifts, through sacrifices, to the Gods, so as to render the divinities propitious to us; and likewise, after what manner we should request of them, by prayer, the possession of good things. But both these are parts of the ministrant art.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. Now, therefore, we appear to me to touch, as it were, upon a certain vestige of the object of our search. For the figure of priests and prophets is very replete with prudence, and receives a venerable opinion through the magnitude of the undertakings. Hence, among the Egyptians, a king is not allowed to govern without the sacerdotal science; so that, if any one belonging to another genus of men usurps the kingdom, he is afterwards

¹ Viz. grammarians.

compelled to be initiated in their mysteries, that he may be skilled in the sacerdotal science. Further still, in many places belonging to the Greeks, we shall find that the greatest sacrifices of this kind are under the direction of the greatest magistrates; and the truth of what I assert is particularly evinced among you. For, when a king is elected, they say that the most venerable of all the antient sacrifices, and such as are most peculiar to the country, are to be consigned to the care of the new king.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. We should, therefore, consider these kings chosen by lot, together with the priests, their servants, and a certain other numerous crowd, which just now became manifest to us, apart from our former assertions.

SOC. JUN. Of whom are you speaking?

GUEST. Of certain very wonderful persons.

SOC. JUN. Why so?

GUEST. As I was just now speculating, the genus of them appeared to me to be all-various. For many men resemble lions and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are similar to satyrs, and to imbecil and multiform wild beasts. They likewise rapidly change their ideas and their power into each other. And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myself to have just now perceived these men for the first time.

SOC. JUN. Speak: for you seem to behold something unusual.

GUEST. I do: for the unusual or wonderful happens to all men from ignorance. And I myself just now suffered the very same thing: for I was suddenly involved in doubt on perceiving the choir of civil concerns.

SOC. JUN. What choir?

GUEST. The greatest enchanter of all sophists, and the most skilled in this art, who must be separated from truly political and royal characters, though this is difficult in the extreme, if we intend to see clearly the object of our investigation.

SOC. JUN. We must by no means omit to do this.

GUEST. We must not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. Is not a monarchy one of our political governments?

SOC. JUN. It is.

GUEST. And after a monarchy I think an oligarchy may be placed.

SOC.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But is not the third scheme of a polity the government of the multitude, and which is called a democracy?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. May not these three become after a manner five, since they produce two other names from themselves?

SOC. JUN. What are these two?

GUEST. Those who now look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and riches, law and the transgression of law, which take place in these governments, and who give a twofold division to each of the two, and call monarchy by two names, as affording two species, viz. tyrannic and royal.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But they denominate a city which is governed by a few an aristocracy and an oligarchy.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But no one is ever accustomed to change the name of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their consent, and whether they accurately defend the laws or not.

SOC. JUN. True.

GUEST. What then? Shall we think that any one of these polities is right, thus bounded by these definitions, viz. by one, and a few, and a many, by riches and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, by written laws, and the privation of laws?

SOC. JUN. What should hinder?

GUEST. Consider more attentively, following me hither.

SOC. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. Shall we abide by that which was asserted by us at first, or shall we dissent from it?

SOC. JUN. Of what assertion are you speaking?

GUEST. I think we said that a royal government was one of the sciences.

SOC. JUN. We did.

GUEST. Yet we did not consider it as any one science indiscriminately; but we selected it from the other sciences, as something judicial and presiding.

SOC. JUN. We did.

GUEST. And of the presiding science, dividing one part, as belonging to in-

animate works, and the other as belonging to animals, we have proceeded thus far, not forgetting that we were scientifically employed; but we have not yet been able to determine with sufficient accuracy what this science is.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, understand this, that the definition must not be made by the few, nor by the many, nor yet by the voluntary or involuntary, nor by poverty or riches, but according to a certain science, if we follow what has been formerly delivered?

SOC. JUN. But, indeed, it is impossible that this should not be done.

GUEST. From necessity, therefore, we must now consider in which of these the science respecting the government of men happens to subsist; this government being nearly the greatest of all others, and the most difficult to obtain. For it is requisite to inspect it, that we may perceive what are the things which must be taken away from a prudent king, and who those are that pretend to be, and persuade the multitude that they are, politicians, but who are by no means so.

SOC. JUN. Our former reasoning evinces that it is requisite to act in this manner.

GUEST. Does it then appear to you that the multitude in a city is able to acquire this science?

SOC. JUN. How can they?

GUEST. In a city, therefore, consisting of a thousand men, is it possible that a hundred or five hundred of the inhabitants can sufficiently acquire this science?

SOC. JUN. If this were the case, it would be the most easy of all arts. For we know that among a thousand men there cannot be found so great a number of those that excel the other Greeks in the game of chess, much less can there be found as many kings. But, according to our former reasoning, it is requisite to call him royal who possesses the royal science, whether he governs or not.

GUEST. You very properly remind me: but I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it subsists rightly, ought to be investigated about one person, or two, or altogether about a few.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And, as we now think, those that govern according to a certain
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art are to be considered as political and regal characters, whether they govern the willing or the refractory, whether according to or without written laws, and whether they are rich or poor. For we call those who heal the maladies of the body, no less physicians, whether they cure by cutting, or burning, or any other painful application, the voluntary or the refractory; and whether from writings or without writings; and whether they are poor or rich. In all these cases we say that they are no less physicians, so long as they proceed according to art, in purging or some other way attenuating the body, or in causing it to increase; and so long as, alone regarding the good of the body, they restore it from a worse to a better habit, and preserve it when thus restored. After this manner alone, as I think, we must say that the definition of the medicinal or any other government is rightly made.

SOC. JUN. And very much so.

GUEST. It is necessary, therefore, as it seems, that that polity alone must in the highest degree be rightly established, in which the governors are found to be truly, and not in appearance only, scientific; whether they govern according to laws, or without laws; whether they rule over the obedient, or the refractory; and whether they are rich or poor. For no one of these is of any consequence with respect to rectitude of government.

SOC. JUN. Beautifully said.

GUEST. Nor yet is it of any consequence, whether they purge the city with a view to its good, by putting to death or banishing certain persons; or whether they send out colonies, like a swarm of bees, and thus diminish the people; or whether, introducing certain foreigners, they make citizens of them, and thus increase the city. For, so long as, employing science and justice, they cause the city, to the utmost of their power, to pass from a worse to a better condition, and preserve it in this state,—so far, and according to such definitions, we say that a polity is alone rightly established; but that such others, as we have mentioned, are neither genuinely nor truly polities. We must likewise willingly say that such polities as imitate this are consonant to reason, and tend to things more beautiful, but that such as do not; tend to deformity by an imitation of things evil.

SOC. JUN. Other things indeed, O guest, appear to have been discussed sufficiently: but it is not easy to admit your assertion, that it is requisite to govern without laws.

GUEST.

GUEST. You have got before me a little, Socrates, by your question. For I was going to ask you, whether you admit all these things, or whether you find any difficulty in any thing that has been said. It is however evident, that we now wish to inquire concerning the rectitude of those that govern without laws.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. After a certain manner it is evident that legislation pertains to the royal science: but it is best, not for the laws to prevail, but a man who is royal in conjunction with prudence. Do you know why?

Soc. JUN. Inform me.

GUEST. Because law cannot, by comprehending that which is most excellent, and at the same time most accurately just, for all men, always enjoin that which is best. For the dissimilarities of men and actions, and the unceasing restlessness, as I may say, of human affairs, do not permit any art whatever to be exhibited respecting all things, and through every time. Shall we admit these assertions?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we see that law nearly endeavours to accomplish this very thing, like a certain arrogant and ignorant man, who does not suffer any thing to be done contrary to his own orders, nor any one to ask whether it would not be better to make some new regulation, contrary to what he has ordained.

Soc. JUN. True. For the law does as you say.

GUEST. But it is impossible that a thing which is simple should prevail in things which are never at any time simple.

Soc. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. The cause, therefore, must be found out why it is necessary to establish laws, since law does not possess the greatest rectitude.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Are there not, therefore, among us, as also in other cities, certain exercises of men collected together, whether belonging to the course, or to any thing else which is undertaken for the sake of contention?

Soc. JUN. There are very many such exercises.

GUEST. Come then, let us again recall to our memory the mandates of those who preside over gymnastic exercises according to art.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. What are their mandates ?

GUEST. They do not think that a subtle division should be made, according to each individual, so as to enjoin that which is adapted to the body of each ; but that attention should be paid to what is more common, and which is advantageous for the most part, and to a many.

Soc. JUN. Excellent.

GUEST. Hence at present assigning equal labours to collected bodies of men, they at the same time impel them to begin the contest together, and to rest from the race, from wrestling, and from all the labours of the body, at one and the same time.

Soc. JUN. They do so.

GUEST. We, therefore, think that the legislator who presides over the herds of men, and enjoins them what is just respecting their compacts with each other, cannot, while he gives laws to them collectively, accurately assign what is fit to each individual.

Soc. JUN. This is likely to be the case.

GUEST. But I think that in a less subtle way he will establish laws for the multitude, and for the most part, both written and unwritten, and such as are agreeable to the manners of the country.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can any one attend sufficiently to individuals through the whole of life, and accurately enjoin what is adapted to each ? For, though he who possesses the royal science could, I think, do this, he would scarcely prescribe for himself those impediments which are called laws.

Soc. JUN. It appears so, O guest, from what has been now said.

GUEST. Rather, O most excellent youth, from what will be said.

Soc. JUN. What is that ?

GUEST. This. For we thus say to ourselves : If a physician, or master of gymnastic, intending to travel, and to be absent from those under his care for a long time, should think that those who are exercised, or those who are sick, would not remember his precepts, he will wish to write commentaries for them. Or how shall we say ?

Soc. JUN. That he will wish to do so.

GUEST. But what ? If the physician should return sooner than he thought,

will he venture to order them certain other things besides those contained in his writings, if any thing better should occur for the sick, through winds, or any thing else, which is wont to take place through Jupiter, contrary to expectation? Will he think that he ought strenuously to persevere in his former injunctions, neither himself ordering any thing else, nor the sick man daring to do any thing different from his written prescriptions; these being medicinal and salubrious, but things of a different nature, noxious, and contrary to art? Or rather, every thing of this kind happening about all things according to science and true art, will not his edicts become the most ridiculous of all others?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But shall not he who writes things just and unjust, beautiful and base, good and evil, and who establishes unwritten laws for the herds of mankind, who live in cities according to written laws,—shall not he, I say, who has written laws according to art, or any other who resembles him, be permitted on his return to enjoin things different from these? Or, rather, would not this interdiction appear in reality to be no less ridiculous than the former?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you know, therefore, what the multitude say respecting a thing of this kind?

SOC. JUN. I do not at present remember.

GUEST. But it is very specious. For they say, if any one has found out laws better than those that are already established, and can persuade his citizens that they are better, he should establish them; otherwise not.

SOC. JUN. Do they not, therefore, say rightly?

GUEST. Perhaps so. But if some one should introduce that which is best, not by persuasion, but by force, what name must be given to this violence? Or, rather, first answer me respecting the former particulars.

SOC. JUN. Of what particulars are you speaking?

GUEST. If any one who is properly skilled in the medical art should not persuade but compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, to do that which is better, but at the same time contrary to written prescriptions, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather any thing than a transgression of art, or a noxious error? And should we not say that

every thing will happen to the compelled person, rather than any thing noxious and contrary to art from the compelling physicians?

SOC. JUN. You speak most true.

GUEST. But what is that error to be called which is contrary to the political art? Must it not be denominated base, evil, and unjust?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. But come, will not he be the most ridiculous of all men, who should blame the violence of those that force men to act more justly, better, and more beautifully than before, contrary to written precepts, and the laws of their country? And ought not every thing rather to be asserted of those that are thus compelled, than that they suffer things base, unjust, and evil?

SOC. JUN. Your assertion is most true.

GUEST. But if he who compels is rich, will his compulsions be just,—but, if he is poor, unjust? Or shall we not rather say, that he who effects what is advantageous, whether he persuades or does not persuade, whether he is rich or poor, and whether he acts according or contrary to written injunctions, will act conformably to the most true definition of the right government of a city? For a wise and good man will always govern in this manner, always attending to the advantage of his subjects, in the same manner as a pilot is watchful for the safety of the ship and the sailors. And as the pilot preserves the sailors, not by written mandates but by exhibiting to them laws according to art, after the same manner an upright polity will be produced by those who are thus able to govern, by exhibiting a strength of art better than the laws. And, in short, prudent governors never err in any part of their conduct, as long as they observe this one thing, viz. by always distributing that which is most just to the citizens, in conjunction with intellect and art, to preserve them, and, from being worse, render them better to the utmost of their power.

SOC. JUN. These assertions cannot be contradicted.

GUEST. Nor yet those.

SOC. JUN. What assertions do you mean?

GUEST. That no multitude whatever can receive that science, by which a city is governed according to intellect, but that an upright polity must be investigated about a small number, and a few, and one person; and that other polities are to be considered as imitations, as we observed a little before,

some resembling this in a more beautiful, and others in a more deformed manner.

SOC. JUN. How do you say this? For I do not understand what you just now said respecting imitations.

GUEST. He would not act badly, who, after introducing a discourse of this kind, should desist before he had shown the error which is at present committed.

SOC. JUN. What error do you mean?

GUEST. It is requisite to investigate a thing of that kind, which is not altogether usual, nor yet easy to perceive; but at the same time we must endeavour to apprehend it. For, since an upright polity is that alone of which we have spoken, do you not know that other polities ought to be preserved, while they use the institutions of this, and do that which we just now praised, though it is not most right?

SOC. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. That no citizen shall dare to act in any respect contrary to the laws, and that he who dares to do so shall be punished with death, and shall suffer all extreme punishments. This is most right and beautiful in the second place; for that which was just now mentioned must be ranked in the first place. But we should unfold the manner in which that which we call secondary subsists. Or should we not?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But let us again return to images, to which it is always necessary to assimilate royal governors.

SOC. JUN. What kind of images?

GUEST. The generous pilot, and, as Homer says, the physician, who is of equal worth with many others. Let us consider the affair by devising a certain figure in these things.

SOC. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. Such a one, as if we all conceived that we suffered the most dire things from these persons. For such of us as they wish to save, they do save; and such as they wish to injure, they injure by cutting and burning; at the same time ordering money to be given them as a reward for this, not spending any thing themselves on the sick, but they and their familiars making use of others. And lastly, receiving money either from the kindred or

from certain enemies of the sick man, they cause him to die. Pilots too effect ten thousand other things of this kind. For they designedly leave men by themselves in certain recesses, and, committing an error in navigation, hurl them into the sea, and injure them in other respects. In consequence of considering these things, let us suppose that we consult how we may deprive these arts of their independent authority, so that they may no longer possess absolute power, either over slaves or the free-born. Hence, we assemble together for this purpose, and convene either all the people, or the rich only. In this assembly, obscure individuals and mechanics give their opinion respecting the ship and diseases; viz. after what manner medicines, and medical instruments, should be employed about the diseased; and likewise ships and nautical instruments in navigation, in the dangers to which ships are subject, through the winds, the sea, and pirates, and when there is occasion to fight with long ships against others of the like kind. Let us likewise suppose that the opinions, either of certain physicians and pilots, or of other private persons, given in this assembly, are inscribed in triangular tables and pillars, and that certain unwritten customs of the country are established, according to which in all future times navigation is to be conducted, and remedies for the sick administered.

Soc. JUN. You have spoken of very absurd things.

GUEST. Let us likewise suppose that yearly governors of the multitude are established, whether chosen by lot from the rich, or from all the people; and let them govern both ships and the diseased, according to those written institutions.

Soc. JUN. These things appear still more difficult.

GUEST. Let us likewise see what is consequent to these things. For when the year of each governor is expired, it will be necessary that courts of justice should be established, which are composed either of chosen rich men, or from all the people, for the purpose of calling the governors to account, and reproving them when requisite. Let every one likewise who is willing be permitted to accuse the governors, as neither governing the ships, during the year, according to the written injunctions, nor according to the antient manners of their ancestors. And let the same things be permitted to take place respecting those that cure the diseased. But let those
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that are convicted be punished in whatever manner the judges shall think fit.

SOC. JUN. He, therefore, who voluntarily governs these men will most justly suffer from them, and receive whatever punishment they please.

GUEST. Further still, it will be requisite that a law should be established for all these, that if any one introduces a mode of piloting different from the written institutions, or shall be found investigating the salubrious, and the truth of the medicinal art, contrary to the writings, about winds, heat and cold, or devising any thing whatever, about affairs of this kind ;—in the first place, he shall neither be called a pilot nor a physician, but a certain boastful and garrulous sophist ; and, in the next place, he shall be brought before a court of justice, by any person who is willing, as one who corrupts other young men, and persuades them that every one should be permitted to pilot ships, and cure the diseased, not according to the laws, but according to his own will. And if any one shall be found persuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written mandates, he shall be punished in the extreme. For nothing ought to be wiser than the laws. Besides, no one should be ignorant of the medicinal and the salubrious, nor of nautical affairs. For every one who is willing is permitted to learn the written mandates, and the customs of his country. If these particulars, Socrates, should take place about these sciences, viz. about military concerns, the whole of hunting, and painting, imitation, and architecture, the formation of instruments of every kind, agriculture, botany ; or, again, about the care pertaining to horses, and herds of cattle of every kind, prophecy, the whole of servile offices, the game of chess, the whole of arithmetic in its simple state, whether it is conversant with planes or depths, or swiftness and slowness ;—if these particulars, I say, should take place about these sciences, so as to cause them to be effected according to the written mandates, and not according to art, what shall we say ?

SOC. JUN. It is evident that all arts must be entirely subverted, without ever being restored, in consequence of the law which forbids investigation. So that life, which is at present difficult, would then be perfectly intolerable.

GUEST. But what will you say to this ? If we should compel each of the above-mentioned particulars to take place according to written injunctions,
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and should appoint as the guardian of these writings a man either chosen by suffrage, or chance, but who paying no attention to them, either for the sake of a certain gain, or private pleasure, should endeavour, though ignorant of every thing, to act contrary to these mandates ; would not this be a greater evil than the former ?

SOC. JUN. It most truly would.

GUEST. For he who should dare to act contrary to those laws which have been established from long experience by those who, consulting how to gratify the people, have persuaded them to adopt them, will commit an error of a very extended nature, and subvert every action in a much greater degree than written mandates are capable of effecting.

SOC. JUN. How is it possible he should not ?

GUEST. Hence, as it is said, there is a second navigation for those that establish laws and written mandates respecting any thing whatever, viz. that neither one person, nor the multitude, should ever be suffered to do any thing at any time contrary to them.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Will not these writings, therefore, be certain imitations of truth, composed by intelligent men, in the greatest perfection of which they are capable ?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, if we remember, we have said, that a man truly knowing in political concerns will do many things from art, without paying any attention to written mandates, when any thing occurs to him better than what he has left behind him in writing.

SOC. JUN. We did say so.

GUEST. And if any thing better than what is established by law should occur either to an individual, or to the people at large, will they not in this case, to the utmost of their power, act in the same manner as the true politician ?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. If, therefore, they should act in this manner, without possessing science, they would attempt to imitate that which is true, but the whole of their imitation would be vicious ; but if their conduct is the effect of art, this is no longer an imitation, but is a thing itself most true.

SOC. JUN. It is so in every respect.

GUEST.

GUEST. It was likewise acknowledged by us above, that the multitude is incapable of receiving any art whatever.

SOC. JUN. It was.

GUEST. If, therefore, there is a certain royal art, the multitude of the rich, and the whole of the people, can never receive this politic science.

SOC. JUN. For how can they?

GUEST. It is requisite then (as it seems) that such-like polities, if they intend to imitate as much as possible that true polity which is governed according to art by one man, must never do any thing contrary to their written laws, and the customs of their country.

SOC. JUN. You speak most beautifully.

GUEST. When, therefore, the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate such a polity an aristocracy: but when they pay no attention to the laws, an oligarchy.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. And again, when one man governs according to the laws, imitating him who is endued with science, then we call such a one a king, not distinguishing by name him who governs with science from the monarch who governs with opinion according to the laws.

SOC. JUN. We appear to do so.

GUEST. If, therefore, one man governs, who truly possesses a scientific knowledge of government, he is entirely called by this name a king, and by no other: for this alone, of the five names of the polities just now mentioned, belongs to him.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. But when one man governs neither according to the laws, nor according to the customs of the country, but at the same time pretends that he possesses a scientific knowledge, and that it is best to act in this manner, contrary to the written mandates, though a certain intemperate desire and ignorance are the leaders of this imitation, must not a man of this kind be called a tyrant?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Thus, then, we say, a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy, will be produced; mankind indignantly bearing the authority of a monarch, and not believing that any man will ever be found worthy

worthy of such a government, so as to be both willing and able to govern with virtue and science, and properly distribute to all men things just and holy. They are likewise fearful, that one man endued with absolute power will injure, oppress, and slay whomsoever he pleases: though, if such a character should arise, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved, and his administration, on account of its accurate rectitude, would alone render a polity happy.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But now, since no such king is to be found in cities, who, as if produced in a swarm of bees, excels from the very beginning both in body and soul, it is requisite, as it seems, that men assembling together should compose written institutions, treading in the footsteps of the most true polity.

SOC. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. And shall we wonder, Socrates, that in such-like polities those evils should take place which we behold at present, and which will subsist in future, when they rest on the foundation of written mandates and long established customs, and not on the firm basis of science? Or ought we not rather to admire how strong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have subsisted for an immense length of time in this condition, yet some of them have continued stable, and have not been subverted; at the same time many of them, like vessels merged in the sea, have perished, do perish, and will perish, through the depravity of the pilots and sailors, who are involved in the *greatest* ignorance respecting the greatest concerns; for though they know nothing about political affairs, yet they think their knowledge of the political science is the most clear of all scientific knowledge.

SOC. JUN. Most true.

GUEST. As, therefore, all these erroneous polities are full of difficulties, we should consider in which it is the least difficult and burthensome to live; for, though this is superfluous with respect to our present inquiry, yet, perhaps, universally we all of us do all things for the sake of this.

SOC. JUN. It is impossible it should not be requisite to consider this.

GUEST. Of three things, therefore, they say that one is remarkably difficult, and at the same time easy.

SOC. JUN. How do you say?

GUEST. No otherwise than as I said before, that there are three polities, a monarchy, the government of a few, and the government of a many; which three polities were at first mentioned by us in a confused manner.

Soc. JUN. There were.

GUEST. Bisecting, therefore, each of these, we shall produce six, separating from these the upright polity, as a seventh.

Soc. JUN. How so?

GUEST. We must distribute monarchy into the royal and the tyrannic; but the polity which is not composed from a multitude, into an aristocracy and oligarchy, which form an illustrious division. Again, we formerly considered the polity which is composed from a multitude as simple, and called it a democracy, but we must now establish this as twofold.

Soc. JUN. How so? And after what manner do we make this division?

GUEST. Not at all different from the others, though the name of this is now twofold. But to govern according to the laws, and to transgress the laws, is common both to this and the other polities.

Soc. JUN. It is so.

GUEST. Then, indeed, when we were investigating an upright polity, this section was of no use, as we have shown above: but since we have separated it from the others, and have considered the others as necessary, in these we divide each according to the legal, and the transgression of law.

Soc. JUN. It appears so from what has now been said.

GUEST. A monarchy, therefore, when conjoined with good written institutions, which we call laws, is the best of all the six polities; but when subsisting without law is grievous, and most burthenfome to live under.

Soc. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. But the polity which is composed of not many, ought to be considered by us as a medium, in the same manner as a few is a medium between one and many. But again, we should consider the polity which is composed of many as in all things imbecil, and as incapable, when compared with the others, of accomplishing either any great good or great evil; in consequence of authority in this polity being divided according to small parts among many. Hence, this is the worst of all these legal polities, but the best of all such as are illegal. And where all are intemperate, it is best to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worst

to

to live in. The first and best condition of life is in the first polity, the seventh being excepted. For this must be separated from all the other polities, in the same manner as divinity from men.

SOC. JUN. These things appear thus to subsist and happen; and that must be done which you mention.

GUEST. Ought not, therefore, the governors of all these polities (the governor of the scientific polity being excepted) to be withdrawn, as not being truly political but seditious characters; and as presiding over the greatest images, and being such themselves? And as they are the greatest imitators and enchanterers, are they not the greatest sophists of sophists?

SOC. JUN. This appellation seems to pertain, with the greatest rectitude, to those that are called politicians.

GUEST. Be it so. This, indeed, is as a drama for us; just as we lately said that we saw a certain Centauric and Satyric Bacchic choir, which was to be separated from the politic art, and now this has scarcely been separated by us.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. But another thing still more difficult than this remains, which is more allied to the royal genus, and which at the same time it is more difficult to understand. And we appear to me to be affected in a manner similar to those that purify gold.

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. Those workmen first of all separate earth, stones, and many other things; but, after this, such things as are allied to gold remain, which are honourable, and alone to be separated by fire,—I mean brass and silver, and sometimes diamonds. These being with difficulty separated by fusion, scarcely suffer us to see that which is called perfectly pure gold.

SOC. JUN. So it is said respecting these things.

GUEST. After the same manner, we also appear now to have separated from the politic science things different, and such as are foreign and not friendly, and to have left such as are honourable and allied to it. But among the number of these, the military and judicial arts, and that rhetoric which communicates with the royal science, persuading men to act justly, and which, together with that science, governs the affairs of cities, may be ranked. These if some one should after a certain manner separate with facility, he will show naked and alone by himself that character which we are investigating.

SOC. JUN. It is evident that we should endeavour to do this.

GUEST. For the sake of an experiment, therefore, it will be evident: but we should endeavour to render it apparent through music. Inform me, therefore.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. Have we any discipline of music, and universally of the sciences, concerning manual operations?

SOC. JUN. We have.

GUEST. But what? Shall we say that any one among these is a certain science which teaches us what we ought to learn respecting these things, and what we ought not? Or how shall we say?

SOC. JUN. We must say that there is.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, confess that this is different from the others?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But whether must we say that no one of them rules over the other? or that the others rule over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?

SOC. JUN. That this science ought to rule over the others, which teaches us, whether it is requisite to learn any one of them, or not.

GUEST. You assert, therefore, that it ought to rule over both the teacher and the learner.

SOC. JUN. Very much so.

GUEST. And do you likewise assert, that the science which judges whether it is requisite to persuade or not, should rule over him who is able to persuade?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. To what science, therefore, shall we attribute that which persuades the multitude and the crowd, through mythology, but not through doctrine?

SOC. JUN. I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the rhetoric science.

GUEST. But again, to what science shall we attribute the power of judging, whether we should act towards certain persons through persuasion, or through a certain violence; or, universally, whether we ought ever to employ either persuasion or violence?

Soc.

SOC. JUN. To that which rules over the arts of persuasion and discourse.

GUEST. But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the politician.

SOC. JUN. You speak most beautifully.

GUEST. Thus, therefore, the rhetoric appears to have been very rapidly separated from the politic science, as being another species, but subservient to this science.

SOC. JUN. Certainly.

GUEST. But again, what must we conceive respecting this power?

SOC. JUN. What power?

GUEST. That by which we war upon those against whom we have declared war. Whether shall we say that this is endued with, or deprived of, art?

SOC. JUN. How can we conceive that power to be deprived of art which the commanding art and all warlike actions employ?

GUEST. But shall we consider that power which is able to consult scientifically, whether it is proper to engage in war, or make peace, as different from this, or the same with it?

SOC. JUN. From what has been before established, it necessarily follows that it must be different.

GUEST. Must not, therefore, the military science have dominion over the warrior, if we in a similar manner follow what has been before advanced?

SOC. JUN. It must.

GUEST. What science then shall we endeavour to evince as the despot of the whole of the military art, which is thus skilful and mighty, except the truly royal science?

SOC. JUN. No other whatever.

GUEST. We must not, therefore, consider the science of military commanders as the same with the political, to which it is subservient.

SOC. JUN. It is not proper we should.

GUEST. But come, let us contemplate the power of judges who judge rightly.

SOC. JUN. By all means.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, capable of doing more than merely judging what is just or unjust, respecting such compacts as are legal, and which have

been

been established by royal authority; employing for this purpose its own proper virtue, so as never to wish to dissolve mutual accusations, either through the influence of certain gifts, or fear, or pity, or hatred, or love, contrary to the order of the legislator?

SOC. JUN. It will never wish to act in this manner; but that which you have mentioned is nearly the employment of this power.

GUEST. We find, therefore, that the strength of judges is not royal, but is the guardian of the laws, and subservient to the royal science.

SOC. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. This also must be observed, that no one of the abovementioned sciences will appear to be the politic science to him who perceives all of them. For the province of the truly royal science is not to act itself, but to rule over those that are able to act, since it knows the dominion and impulse of those that are the greatest in the city, respecting what is opportune and the contrary: but it is the province of the other sciences to do as they are ordered.

SOC. Right.

GUEST. Hence, since the sciences which we have just now discussed neither rule over each other nor themselves, but each is conversant with a certain proper employment of its own, they are justly denominated according to the peculiarity of their actions.

SOC. JUN. It appears so.

GUEST. But rightly comprehending by a common appellation the power of that science which rules over all these, and takes care of the laws, and of every thing in the city, we may most justly, as it seems, call it the politic science.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, discuss this science at present, according to the paradigm of the weaving art, since all the genera pertaining to a city have become manifest to us?

SOC. JUN. And very much so.

GUEST. We must therefore, as it seems, relate what the royal connection is, after what manner it weaves together, and what kind of web it produces for us.

SOC. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST.

GUEST. It is, indeed, a thing difficult to be evinced ; but, as it appears, it is necessary it should be unfolded.

SOC. JUN. It must, by all means.

GUEST. For, that a part of virtue differs from the species of virtue, may be easily proved from the opinion of the multitude, in opposition to the contentious.

SOC. JUN. I do not understand you.

GUEST. But again, thus consider. For I think that you consider fortitude as one part of virtue.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. And likewise, that temperance is different from fortitude, but that the former is a part of the same thing as the latter.

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. We must dare to unfold a certain wonderful discourse respecting these things.

SOC. JUN. Of what kind ?

GUEST. That after a certain manner they are in many things very adverse and contrary to each other.

SOC. JUN. How do you say ?

GUEST. My assertion is by no means usual. For all the parts of virtue are said to be friendly to each other.

SOC. JUN. It is so said.

GUEST. Let us consider, therefore, with the greatest attention, whether this is so simple, or differs more than any thing from these, in things of a kindred nature.

SOC. JUN. Inform me how we are to consider.

GUEST. In all such things as we call beautiful it is proper to investigate, and refer them to two species contrary to each other.

SOC. JUN. You speak most clearly.

GUEST. Have you ever then either praised yourself, or heard some other person praising sharpness and swiftness, either in bodies or souls, or the motion of voice, or in such imitations of these as musical and graphical imitations exhibit ?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly I have.

GUEST.

GUEST. Do you likewise remember after what manner praise is bestowed in each of these?

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, be able to point out to you my conceptions of this in words?

SOC. JUN. What should hinder?

GUEST. You seem to think a thing of this kind easy. Let us consider it, therefore, in subcontrary genera. For often, and in many actions, when we admire the swiftness, vehemence, and acuteness of thought, body, or voice, we praise them, and at the same time employ one of the appellations of fortitude.

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. In the first place, we say it is acute and strenuous, swift and virile, and in a similar manner vehement: and, universally, we praise all these natures, by applying this name to them in common.

SOC. JUN. We do.

GUEST. But what? Do we not often praise in many actions the species of quiet generation?

SOC. JUN. And very much so.

GUEST. Do we not, therefore, in praising these, assert things contrary to what we did in praising those?

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. We say that each of these is quiet and temperate, and we admire these when they take place about cogitation; but about actions, we admire the slow and the soft, about voice, the smooth and the grave, all rhythmical motion, and the whole of the muse which employs slowness opportunely; and to all these we give the appellation of the moderate, and not of fortitude.

SOC. JUN. Most true.

GUEST. But when both these take place unseasonably, we then blame each of them, and call them by contrary names.

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. When they appear to be unseasonably acute, swift, and hard, we then call them insolent and insane; but when they are unseasonably grave, slow,

flow, and soft, we call them timid and slothful. And we nearly find that these, and the nature of fortitude and temperance, are for the most part contrary to each other, as being hostile and seditious forms, and which are never mingled together in actions about things of this kind. We shall likewise find by investigation, that those who possess these in their souls, are discordant with each other.

Soc. JUN. Where do you say?

GUEST. In all those particulars which we have just now mentioned, and, it is probable, in many others. For, I think, praising some things as their own property, on account of their alliance to both, but blaming others as things foreign, they become very adverse to each other in many things.

Soc. JUN. They appear to do so.

GUEST. This difference, therefore, is the sport of these species. But a disease the most baneful of all others happens to cities about things of the greatest consequence.

Soc. JUN. About what things?

GUEST. About the whole apparatus of living, as it is likely it should. For those who are remarkably modest are always prepared to live a quiet life, attending privately to their own concerns, and being after a certain manner disposed to associate peaceably both with their fellow citizens and foreigners. Through this love, however, which is more unseasonable than is fit, when they do that which they wish to accomplish, they become secretly enervated, and render young men similarly affected. Hence, they are always subject to injuries; and in a short time themselves, their children, and the whole city, often by slow degrees, from being free become slaves.

Soc. JUN. You speak of a severe and dire passion.

GUEST. But those that verge more to fortitude, do they not incite the cities to which they belong to war, through a more vehement desire of a life of this kind than is becoming, and thus rendering many nations and potentates hostile to their country, either entirely subvert it, or bring it in subjection to the enemy?

Soc. JUN. They do.

GUEST. How is it possible, therefore, we should not say, that in these things both genera are in the greatest degree adverse to each other?

SOC. JUN. It is impossible we should say otherwise.

GUEST. Have we not, therefore, found that which we were considering in the beginning, that certain parts of virtue, which are not small naturally, differ from each other, and that they likewise cause those that possess them to do the same?

SOC. JUN. It appears we have.

GUEST. Let us again too consider this.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. Whether there is any thing belonging to synthetic sciences which has any one of its works, though it should be the vilest, composed from things evil and at the same time useful? Or shall we say, that every science always rejects things evil to the utmost of its power, and receives such as are apt and useful? and that from these, which are both similar and dissimilar, collected into one, it fabricates one certain power and idea?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The truly political science, therefore, according to nature, will never be willing that a city should be composed from good and bad men; but it is very evident that it will first of all examine every thing by discipline, and, after the examination, will commit this employment to such as are able to instruct others, and at the same time be subservient to others, itself commanding and presiding: just in the same manner as the weaving art presides over the wool-combers, and others that prepare the materials for weaving, and gives such orders to the preparatory workmen as it thinks will best contribute to the work it has in view.

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. The royal science appears to me to do the very same, permitting those that instruct and educate others according to law, alone to exercise and teach that which being effected according to its temperance will produce worthy manners. But it punishes with death, exile, and the greatest disgrace, those that are unable to participate of fortitude, temperance, and such other things as tend to virtue, but through a depraved nature are violently impelled to impiety, insolence and injustice.

SOC. JUN. This is said to be the case.

GUEST. But those that are rolled like cylinders in ignorance and an abject spirit, it subjugates to servile employments.

Soc. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. It preserves and defends, therefore, such as are naturally qualified for acquiring the generous and the noble, when properly disciplined, and who through art can be mingled with each other. And such among these as verge more to fortitude, it considers as resembling strong thread in the loom on account of their solid manners; but such as verge more to modesty, as similar to fat and soft matter; and, that we may use an image from the weaving art, as resembling saffron-coloured thread. And such as tend contrary to these, it endeavours to bind together and connect after the following manner.

Soc. JUN. After what manner?

GUEST. In the first place, according to the allied, it harmonizes together the eternal part of their soul with a divine bond. But after that which is divine it harmonizes together their vivific part with human bonds.

Soc. JUN. How again is this?

GUEST. When true opinion becomes stably inherent in the soul respecting things beautiful, just and good, and the contraries to these, we say that the divine in the dæmoniacal genus is produced.

Soc. JUN. It is proper it should.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, know that a politician and a good legislator ought alone to be able, with the Muse of the royal science, to effect this in those that are properly disciplined, and whom we have just now mentioned?

Soc. JUN. It is fit this should be the case.

GUEST. But he, Socrates, who cannot accomplish a thing of this kind, must by no means be called by the names which we are now investigating.

Soc. JUN. Most right.

GUEST. What then? Must not a brave soul, when it receives truth of this kind, become mild, and thus be willing in the highest degree to partake of things just? But when it does not receive it, must it not be considered as verging more to a certain savage nature?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what? Will not a soul of a modest nature, when receiving these opinions, become truly temperate and moderate in a polity? But when

it does not partake of the things we are speaking of, will it not be most disgracefully branded with stupidity?

SOC. JUN. Entirely so.

GUEST. Must we not say, that this connection and binding together of the evil with each other, and of the good with the evil, can never become stable, and that no science will ever seriously attempt to accomplish this with such as these?

SOC. JUN. For how can it?

GUEST. But in those alone who are endued with worthy manners from the first, and who are educated according to nature, this bond is naturally implanted through the laws. In these, too, this art is a remedy; and, as we said before, the natural virtue of the parts is the more divine bond of things dissimilar, and tending to contraries.

SOC. JUN. Most true.

GUEST. Since this divine bond exists, there is scarcely any difficulty in either understanding the other bonds which are human, or in bringing them to perfection when understood.

SOC. JUN. How so? And what are these bonds?

GUEST. The communions of alliances and children, and those respecting private locations and marriages. For many respecting these things are not properly bound together for the purpose of begetting children.

SOC. JUN. Why?

GUEST. Is it worth while to relate how anxiously they pursue riches and power in these things?

SOC. JUN. It is not.

GUEST. But it will be more just to speak of those who make the human race the object of their care, and to consider if they do any thing improperly.

SOC. JUN. It will.

GUEST. They do not indeed at all act from right reason, but pursue present pleasure; and in consequence of being delighted with those similar to themselves, and of not loving those that are dissimilar, they attribute the greatest part to molestation.

SOC. JUN. How so?

GUEST. Those that are modest seek after their own manners, and as
much

much as possible marry those that are endued with them, and likewise marry their own offspring to such as resemble themselves. The genus about fortitude acts in the same manner, pursuing its own nature; when at the same time it is requisite that both genera should act in a manner entirely contrary.

Soc. JUN. How, and on what account?

GUEST. Because this is the natural condition of fortitude, that when it has been unmingled for many generations with a temperate nature, it is florid with strength in the beginning, but in the end becomes entirely efflorescent with insanity.

Soc. JUN. It is likely.

GUEST. Again, a soul very full of shame, and void of audacious fortitude, when it has subsisted in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unreasonably fluggish, and at last perfectly mutilated.

Soc. JUN. And this also is likely to happen.

GUEST. We have said that there is no difficulty in binding men with these bonds, if both genera have one opinion respecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of royal weaving, viz. never to suffer temperate manners to subsist apart from such as are valiant, but, weaving together both these, from according opinions, honor, dishonor, and glory, to collect from these a web smooth, and, as it is said, well woven, and always to commit in common the authority of governors in cities to these.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. Where it happens that one governor is sufficient, a president should be chosen who possesses both these; but where more than one is necessary, parts of these must be mingled together. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, just, and salutary; but they require acrimony, and a certain acute and practical temerity.

Soc. JUN. These things also appear so to me.

GUEST. Again, fortitude with respect to justice and caution is more indigent than those other virtues; but it excels them in actions. But it is impossible that all things pertaining to cities, both of a private and public nature, should subsist beautifully, unless both these are present.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We must say then that this end of the web of politic action is
then

then rightly woven, when the royal art, connecting the manners of brave and temperate men by concord and friendship, collects together their life in common, producing the most magnificent and excellent of all webs;—and besides this, when, embracing in common all others in the city, both slaves and free-born, it holds them together by this texture, and governs and presides over the city in such a manner that nothing may in any respect be wanting which is requisite to its felicity.

Soc. JUN. You have finished, O guest, your description of the royal and political character most beautifully.

THE END OF THE POLITICUS.

THE

THE MINOS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

L A W.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MINOS.

LAW, considered according to its first subsistence in Deity, is justly defined by Plato to be *a distribution of intellect* (*von διανοησις*). As it originates, therefore, from deity, and is thence participated by the human soul, it does not depend for its being among men on arbitrary will and mutual compact, but is truly an evolution of one of those eternal ideas or forms which the soul essentially contains. He, therefore, who diligently attends to what is said by Plato in this dialogue, in his *Laws*, and *Republic*, concerning law, will find that it is a true mode of governing, which directs the governed to the best end through proper media, establishing punishments for such as transgress, and rewards for those that are obedient to this mode. Hence the institutions of princes, when they are not true, and do not proceed to the best end in a right path, are by no means laws, but decrees and edicts: for a work is frequently denominated legitimate from law, just from being legitimate, and good, right and true from being just; and therefore law is necessarily good and true. It also follows that law properly so called is eternal and perfectly immutable: for that which is changed by times, places and opinions, is not a law, but an institute.

According to Plato, too, it appears that there are four species of laws. The first of these are Saturnian, or, in other words, subsist in that deity, who according to ancient theologists is the summit of the intellectual order. These laws are mentioned by Plato in the *Gorgias*, where Socrates says, "This was the law in the times of Saturn, and now also subsists in the Gods." The second are Jovian, and are indicated in the *Laws*, where the Athenian guest

says "that Justice follows Jupiter, being the avenger of those who desert the divine law." The third are fatal, as we learn from the *Timæus*, where it is said that the Demiurgus "disclosed to souls the laws of Fate." And the fourth are human. Since law, therefore, has a divine origin, all the illustrious framers of laws with the greatest propriety referred the invention of them to Deity. Hence Zoroaster, when he delivered laws to the Bactrians and Persians, ascribed the invention of them to Oromasis; Hermes Trismegistus the Egyptian legislator referred the invention of his laws to Mercury; Minos the Cretan lawgiver to Jupiter; Charondas the Carthaginian to Saturn; Lycurgus the Lacedæmonian to Apollo; Draco and Solon the Athenian legislators to Minerva; Pompilius the Roman lawgiver to Ægeria; Zalmoxis the Scythian to Vesta; and Plato, when he gave laws to the Magnetians and Sicilians, to Jupiter and Apollo.

THE MINOS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND MINOS.

SOCRATES.

WHAT is law with us?

MIN. About what kind of law do you interrogate?

Soc. What is that by which law differs from law, according to this very thing, the being law? For consider what I ask you. For I ask as if I should inquire what gold is; and if you in a similar manner should ask me, about what kind of gold I inquire, I should think you would not rightly interrogate. For neither does gold differ in any thing from gold, so far as it is gold, nor a stone from a stone, so far as it is a stone. And in like manner, neither does law differ in any thing from law; but all laws are the same. For each of them is similarly law; nor is one more, but the other less so. I ask you, therefore, the whole of this very thing, what law is; and if you have an answer at hand give it me.

MIN. What else, Socrates, will law be than things established by law?

Soc. Does speech also appear to you to be things which are spoken? or sight things which are seen? or hearing things which are heard? Or is speech one thing, and are things spoken another? Is sight one thing, and are things seen another? Is hearing one thing, and are things heard another? And, is law one thing, and are things established by law another? Is this the case, or how does it appear to you?

MIN. This now appears to me to be the case.

Soc. Law, therefore, is not things established by law.

MIN. It does not appear to me that it is.

Soc. What law, therefore, may be, let us thus consider. If some one should ask us respecting those things of which we have just now spoken, since you say that things visible are seen by the sight, what the sight is by which they are seen? we should answer him, that it is a sense which through the eyes manifests colours to us. And if he should again ask us what the hearing is by which things are heard? we should reply, that it is a sense which through the ears manifests to us sounds. In like manner, if he should ask us, since legal institutions are legally established by law, what is law by which they are thus established? whether is it a certain sense, or manifestation? in the same manner as things which are learnt, are learnt by science rendering them manifest. Or is it a certain invention? just as things which are discovered are invented: as, for instance, things salubrious and noxious are discovered by medicine; but the conceptions of the Gods, as prophets say, by divination. For the divining art is with us an invention of such like things: Or is it not?

MIN. Entirely so.

Soc. Which of these, therefore, may we especially presume law to be? Shall we say it is these dogmas and decrees?

MIN. It appears so to me. For what else can any one say law is? So that it appears the whole of this which you ask, viz. law, is the dogma of the city.

Soc. You call, as it seems, law, political opinion.

MIN. I do.

Soc. And perhaps you speak well; but perhaps we shall know better in the following manner. Do you say that some men are wise?

MIN. I do.

Soc. Are not the wise, therefore, wise by wisdom?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But what? are the just, just by justice?

MIN. Entirely so.

Soc. Are the legitimate, therefore, also legitimate by law?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. And the illegitimate, illegitimate by a privation of law?

MIN. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. And are the legitimate just ?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But the illegitimate unjust ?

MIN. Unjust.

Soc. Are not justice and law, therefore, things most beautiful ?

MIN. They are.

Soc. And are not injustice and illegality most base ?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. And does not one of these preserve cities and every thing else, but the other destroy and subvert them ?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. It is necessary, therefore, dianoëticallly to consider law as something beautiful, and to investigate it as good.

MIN. How should we not ?

Soc. Have we not, therefore, said that law is the dogma of the city ?

MIN. We have said so.

Soc. What then ? Are not some dogmas good, and others bad ?

MIN. They are.

Soc. Law however is not bad.

MIN. It is not.

Soc. It is not, therefore, right simply to determine that law is the dogma of the city.

MIN. It does not appear to me that it is.

Soc. The assertion, therefore, does not accord with the truth, that law is a base dogma.

MIN. It does not.

Soc. Law however appears also to me to be a certain opinion. And since it is not a base opinion, is not this, therefore, evident, that it is a good opinion, if law is opinion ?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But is not a certain good, a true, opinion ?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. Is, therefore, true opinion the discovery of being ?

MIN. It is.

Soc.

Soc. Law, therefore, is the discovery of being.

MIN. But, Socrates, if law is the discovery of being, how is it that we do not always use the same laws about the same things, since beings are discovered by us?

Soc. Nevertheless law wishes to be the discovery of being; but men, as it seems, not always using the same laws, are not always able to discover that which law wishes, viz. being. But come, let us see if it will hence become evident to us, whether we always use the same laws, or different laws at different times; and if all of us use the same laws,¹ or different persons different laws.

MIN. But this, Socrates, is not difficult to know, that neither do the same persons always use the same laws, nor different persons always different laws. Thus, for example, it is not a law with us to sacrifice men, but this is considered as unholy; but the Carthaginians sacrifice men, this being holy and legal with them; so that some of them sacrifice their sons to Saturn, as perhaps you have heard. And not only do Barbarian men use laws different from ours, but also those in Lycia. And as to the progeny of Athamas², what sacrifices do they perform, though they are Greeks? You also know and have heard what laws we formerly used concerning the dead, cutting the throats of the victims before the dead body was carried out, and calling those that carry the sacrifices to the dead. And those still prior to these buried the dead at home; but we do none of these. Ten thousand instances likewise of this might be adduced. For the field of demonstration is very wide, that neither we always think invariably the same with ourselves, nor men with each other.

Soc. It is by no means wonderful, O best of men, if you speak rightly, and this should be concealed from me. But till you by yourself declare what appears to you, in a long discourse, and I again do the same, we shall never, as I think, agree. If however a common subject of speculation is proposed, we shall perhaps accord. If, therefore, you are willing, interrogating me, consider together with me in common. Or, if it is more agreeable to you, instead of interrogating, answer.

MIN. But I wish, Socrates, to reply to any question you may propose.

¹ Athamas was the son of Æolus, and king of Thebes in Bœotia.

Soc. Come then. Whether do you think that just things are unjust, and unjust things just? Or that just things are just, and unjust things unjust?

MIN. I indeed think that just things are just, and unjust things unjust.

Soc. Is this opinion, therefore, entertained among all men, as well as here?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. Among the Persians also?

MIN. And among the Persians too.

Soc. But is this opinion always entertained?

MIN. Always.

Soc. Whether are things which attract more, thought by us to be heavier, but things which attract less, lighter? or the contrary?

MIN. Not the contrary: but things which attract more are heavier, and things which attract less are lighter.

Soc. Is this the case, therefore, in Carthage and in Lycia?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. Things beautiful, as it seems, are every where thought to be beautiful; and things base to be base: but things base are not thought to be beautiful, nor things beautiful base.

MIN. It is so.

Soc. As we may say, therefore, in all things, beings are thought to be, and not non-beings, both with us and with all others.

MIN. It appears so to me.

Soc. He, therefore, who wanders from being wanders from that which is legitimate.

MIN. Thus, Socrates, as you say, these things always appear legitimate both to us and to others. But when I consider that we never cease transposing laws upwards and downwards, I cannot be persuaded by what you say.

Soc. Perhaps you do not perceive that these things thus transposed continue to be the same. But thus consider them together with me. Did you ever meet with any book concerning the health of the sick?

MIN. I have.

Soc. Do you know, therefore, to what art this book belongs?

MIN. I know that it belongs to the art of medicine.

Soc.

Soc. Do you, therefore, call those who are scientifically skilled about these things, physicians?

MIN. I call them so.

Soc. Whether, therefore, do those that have a scientific knowledge think the same things about the same, or do some of these think differently from others about the same things?

MIN. They appear to me to think the same things.

Soc. Whether, therefore, do the Greeks alone accord with the Greeks about things of which they have a scientific knowledge, or do the Barbarians also both accord with each other about such things, and with the Greeks?

MIN. There is an abundant necessity that both Greeks and Barbarians who possess a scientific knowledge should accord in opinion with each other.

Soc. You answer well. Do they not, therefore, always accord?

MIN. Yes, always.

Soc. Do not physicians also write those things about health which they think to be true?

MIN. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Things medicinal, therefore, and medicinal laws, these are the writings of physicians.

MIN. Things medicinal, certainly.

Soc. Whether, therefore, are geometrical writings also geometrical laws?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. Of whom, therefore, are the writings and legitimate institutions concerning gardening?

MIN. Of gardeners.

Soc. Those laws, therefore, pertain to gardening.

MIN. They do.

Soc. Are they not, therefore, the laws of those who know how to manage gardens?

MIN. How should they not?

Soc. But gardeners possess this knowledge.

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But of whom are the writings and legitimate institutions concerning food?

MIN. Of cooks.

Soc. Those, therefore, are cooking laws.

MIN. Cooking.

Soc. And of those, as it seems, who know how to manage the preparation of food.

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But cooks, as they say, possess this knowledge.

MIN. They do possess it.

Soc. Be it so. But of whom are the writings and legal institutions concerning the government of a city? Are they not of those who scientifically know how to govern cities?

MIN. It appears so to me.

Soc. But do any others than politicians and kings possess this knowledge?

MIN. They alone possess it.

Soc. These writings, therefore, are political, which men call the writings of kings and good men.

MIN. You speak the truth.

Soc. Those, therefore, who possess a scientific knowledge do not at different times write differently about the same things.

MIN. Certainly not.

Soc. If, therefore, we see certain persons doing this, whether shall we say that those who act in this manner are scientific or unscientific?

MIN. Unscientific.

Soc. Shall we, therefore, say that what is right in every particular is legitimate, whether it be medicinal, or pertain to cooking, or to gardening?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But with respect to what is not right, this we no longer assert to be legitimate.

MIN. No longer.

Soc. It, therefore, becomes illegitimate.

MIN. Necessarily so.

Soc. Hence, in writings concerning things just and unjust, and, in short, concerning the orderly distribution of a city, and the manner in which it ought to be governed, that which is right is a royal law; but that which is not right does not appear to be a royal law, because science is wanting: for it is illegal.

MIN. It is.

Soc. We have rightly, therefore, acknowledged that law is the invention of being.

MIN. So it appears.

Soc. Further still, this also we should consider in it: who is it that scientifically knows how to sow seeds in the earth?

MIN. The husbandman.

Soc. Does he then sow fit seeds in each soil?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. The husbandman, therefore, is a good distributor of these things, and his laws and distributions in these particulars are right.

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But who is a good dispensator of pulsations for melodies, and distributes such things as are fit? And whose laws also, if he has any, are right?

MIN. The laws of the piper, and those of the harper.

Soc. He, therefore, who is most legitimate in these things is in the most eminent degree a piper.

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But who in the best manner distributes nutriment to the bodies of men? Does not he do this who distributes that which is fit?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. The distributions, therefore, and the laws of this man are the best; and he who is most legitimate about these things is the most excellent distributor.

MIN. Entirely so.

Soc. Who is he?

MIN. The instructor of children.

Soc. Does he know how to feed the flock of the human body in the best manner?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But who is he that feeds in the best manner a flock of sheep? What is his name?

MIN. A shepherd.

Soc. The laws, therefore, of the shepherd are the best for the sheep.

MIN. They are.

Soc.

Soc. And those of the herdsman for oxen.

MIN. Yes.

Soc. But whose laws are the best for the souls of men? Are they not those of a king?

MIN. They are.

Soc. You speak well. Can you, therefore, tell me who among the ancients was a good legislator in the laws pertaining to pipes? Perhaps you do not recollect. Are you, therefore, willing that I should remind you?

MIN. Perfectly so.

Soc. Marfyas, then, and his beloved Olympus the Phrygian were of this description.

MIN. True.

Soc. The harmony produced by the pipes of these men is most divine, and alone excites and unfolds those that stand in need of the Gods¹. It likewise alone remains to the present time as being divine.

MIN. These things are so.

Soc. But who among the ancient kings is said to have been a good legislator, and whose legal institutions even now remain as being divine?

MIN. I do not recollect.

Soc. Do you not know who they were that used the most ancient laws of the Greeks?

MIN. Do you speak of the Lacedæmonians, and Lycurgus the legislator?

Soc. These institutions, however, have not perhaps been established three hundred years, or very little more than this. But do you know whence the best of their laws were derived?

MIN. They say, from Crete.

Soc. Do they, therefore, of all the Greeks use the most ancient laws?

MIN. Yes.

Soc. Do you know then who among these were good kings? I mean Minos and Rhadamanthus, the sons of Jupiter and Europa, by whom these laws were framed.

MIN. They say, Socrates, that Rhadamanthus was a just man, but that Minos was rustic, morose and unjust.

¹ See the speech of Alcibiades in *The Banquet*.

SOC. You relate, O best of men, an Attic and tragical fable.

MIN. Are not these things reported of Minos?

SOC. They are not by Homer and Hesiod, whose authority is greater than that of all the tragic poets from whom you assert these things.

MIN. But what do they say about Minos?

SOC. I will tell you, lest you as well as the many should be guilty of impiety. For there is not any thing which is more impious than this; *nor is there any thing of which we ought to be more afraid, than of offending against THE GODS either in word or in deed*¹. And next to this we should be fearful of offending against divine men. We should however be very cautious, when we praise or blame any man, that we do not speak erroneously; and for the sake of this it is necessary that we should learn to know good and bad men. For divinity is indignant when any one blames a man similar to himself, or praises one dissimilar to him: but the former of these is the good man. Nor ought you to think that stones, pieces of wood, birds and serpents are sacred, but that men are not so: for a good man is the most sacred, and a depraved man the most defiled, of all things. Now, therefore, since Homer and Hesiod pass an encomium on Minos, on this account I thus speak, *lest you, being a man sprung from a man, should sin in what you say against a hero the son of Jupiter*. For Homer², speaking of Crete, that there are many men and ninety cities in it, says that among these is Gnosus, a great city in which Minos reigned, who for nine years conversed with the mighty Jupiter. This then is Homer's encomium of Minos, which though short is such as he does not give to any one of his heroes. For that Jupiter is a sophist³, and that the art itself is all-beautiful, he evinces as well in many other places as here. For he says that Minos conversed nine years with Jupiter, and went to be instructed by him, as if Jupiter were a sophist. That Homer, therefore, does not bestow this honour of being instructed by Jupiter on any other hero than Minos alone, must be considered as a wonderful praise. Ulysses also, in speaking of the dead⁴, represents Minos judging

¹ This among many other passages must convince the most careless reader, that Plato was a firm believer in the religion of his country.

² Odyss. lib. xix. ver. 172, &c.

³ That is, one endued with wisdom; for this is the original meaning of the word.

⁴ Odyss. lib. xi.

with a golden sceptre in his hand; but neither here nor in any other place does he speak of Rhadamanthus as judging, or as conversing with Jupiter. On this account I say that Minos is extolled by Homer beyond all other heroes. For that being the son of Jupiter, he was only instructed by Jupiter, contains no transcendency of praise. For the verse which says that Minos reigned nine years, and conversed with the mighty Jupiter, signifies that he was the associate of Jupiter; since *οἶποι* are discourses, and *οἰσιότης* is an associate in discourse. Hence, for nine years Minos went to the cavern of Jupiter, learning some things, and teaching others, which during these nine years he had received from Jupiter. There are however some who conceive *οἰσιότης* to signify the associate of Jupiter in drinking and sport. But that those who thus conceive say nothing to the purpose, may be inferred from this, that, as both the Greeks and Barbarians are numerous, there are none among these who abstain from banquets, and that sport to which wine belongs, except the Cretans and the Lacedæmonians, who were instructed by the Cretans. In Crete, too, this is one of the other laws which Minos established, that men should not drink with each other to intoxication. And this indeed is evident, that he made those things to be laws for his citizens which he thought to be beautiful. For Minos did not, like a base man, think one thing, and do another different from what he thought; but his association with Jupiter was as I have said through discourse, in order to be instructed in virtue. Hence he established these laws for his citizens through which Crete is perpetually happy, and also Lacedæmon, from the time in which it began to use these laws, in consequence of their being divine. But Rhadamanthus was indeed a good man; for he was instructed by Minos. He did not however learn the whole of the royal art, but that part of it which is of the ministrant kind, and which possesses authority in courts of judicature; and hence he is said to have been a good judge. For Minos employed him as a guardian of the laws in the city; but he used Talus¹ for this purpose through the rest of Crete. For Talus thrice every year went through the villages in order to preserve the laws in them, and carried with him the laws written in tables of brass; whence also he was called brazen. Hesiod also asserts things similar to these of Minos. For,

¹ A son of Cres, the founder of the Cretan nation.

having mentioned his name, he says^{*} that he was the most royal of mortal kings, and that he reigned over many neighbouring men, having the sceptre of Jupiter, with which also he governed cities. And he calls the sceptre of Jupiter nothing else than the discipline of Jupiter, by which he governed Crete.

MIN. On what account then, Socrates, came the report to be spread that Minos was an unlearned and morose man?

SOC. On that account through which you, O best of men, if you are prudent, and every other man who intends to be celebrated, will be cautious never to offend a poet. For poets are able to effect much with respect to opinion, both in praising men and blaming them. In this particular, therefore, Minos erred when he warred on this city, in which there is much other wisdom, together with tragic and other poets of every description. But the tragedy here is antient, not originating, as is generally thought, from Thespis, nor from Phrynicus; but, if you consider, you will find that it is a very antient invention of this city. Tragedy indeed is of all poetry the most pleasing to the vulgar, and the most alluring; to which applying ourselves we have taken vengeance on Minos, for which he has compelled us to pay those tributes. In offending us, therefore, Minos erred; whence, in reply to your question, he became infamous. For that he was a good man, a friend to law, and a good shepherd of the people, as I have before observed, this is the greatest token, that his laws are immutable, in consequence of having well discovered the truth concerning the government of a city.

MIN. You appear to me, Socrates, to have discovered a probable reason.

SOC. If, therefore, I speak the truth, do not the Cretans, the citizens of Minos and Rhadamnathus, appear to you to have used the most antient laws?

MIN. They do.

SOC. These, therefore, were the best legislators of the antients, and were also shepherds of men; just as Homer likewise says, that a good general is the shepherd of the people.

MIN. Entirely so.

SOC. Come then, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship, if any one who

^{*} What Plato here cites from Hesiod is not to be found in any of the writings of that poet now extant.

is a good legislator and shepherd of the body should ask us what those things are which when distributed to the body will make it better, we should well and briefly answer, that they are nutriment and labour, the former of which by increasing, and the latter by exercising, give stability to the body.

MIN. Right.

Soc. If, therefore, after this, that good legislator and shepherd should also ask us what those things are which being distributed to the soul make it better, what shall we answer, that we may not be ashamed of ourselves and of our age?

MIN. I am no longer able to answer this question.

Soc. It is however disgraceful to the soul of each of us, if we should appear to be ignorant of things pertaining to our souls, in which good and evil are contained, but to be knowing in particulars pertaining to the body, and to other things.

THE APOLOGY

OF

SOCRATES.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

THE elevation and greatness of mind for which Socrates was so justly celebrated by antiquity, are perhaps no where so conspicuously displayed as in this his Apology. In a situation in which death itself was presented to his view, he neither deviates from the most rigid veracity, nor has recourse to any of those abject arts, by which in similar circumstances pity is generally solicited and punishment sometimes averted. His whole discourse, indeed, is full of simplicity and noble grandeur, and is the energetic language of conscious innocence and offended worth.

The causes that occasioned this Apology were as follow :—Aristophanes, at the instigation of Melitus, undertook, in his comedy of *The Clouds*, to ridicule the venerable character of Socrates, on the stage; and the way being once open to calumny and defamation, the fickle and licentious populace paid no reverence to the philosopher, whom they had before regarded as a being of a superior order. When this had succeeded, Melitus stood forth to criminate him, together with Anytus and Lycon; and the philosopher was summoned before the tribunal of the Five Hundred. He was accused of making innovations in the religion of his country, and corrupting the youth. But as both these accusations must have been obviously false to an unprejudiced tribunal, the accusers relied for the success of their cause on perjured witnesses, and the envy of the judges, whose ignorance would readily yield to misrepresentation, and be influenced and guided by false eloquence and fraudulent arts. That the personal enemies indeed of Socrates, vile characters,

raeters, to whom his wisdom and his virtue were equally offensive, should have accused him of making innovations in the religion of Greece, is by no means surprising; but that very many of modern times should have believed that this accusation was founded in truth, and that he endeavoured to subvert the doctrine of polytheism, is a circumstance which by the truly learned reader must be ranked among the greatest eccentricities of modern wit. For to such a one it will most clearly appear from this very Apology, that Socrates was accused of impiety for asserting that he was connected in a very transcendent degree with a presiding dæmon, to whose direction he confidently submitted the conduct of his life. For the accusation of Melitus, that he introduced other novel dæmoniacal natures, can admit of no other construction. Besides, in the course of this Apology he asserts, in the most unequivocal and solemn manner, his belief in polytheism; and this is indubitably confirmed in many places by Plato, the most genuine of his disciples, and the most faithful recorder of his doctrines. The testimony of Xenophon too on this point is no less weighty than decisive. "I have often wondered," says that historian and philosopher¹, "by what arguments the Athenians who condemned Socrates persuaded the city that he was worthy of death. For, in the first place, how could they prove that he did not believe in the Gods in which the city believed? since it was evident that he often sacrificed at home, and often on the common altars of the city. It was also not unapparent that he employed divination. For a report was circulated, that signals were given to Socrates, according to his own assertion, by a dæmoniacal power; whence they especially appear to me to have accused him of introducing new dæmoniacal natures. He however introduced nothing new, nor any thing different from the opinion of those who, believing in divination, make use of auguries and oracles, symbols and sacrifices. For these do not apprehend that either birds, or things which occur, know what is advan-

¹ Πολλakis ἐθαύμασα, τίσι ποτε λόγοις Ἀθηναῖοις ἐπείσαν οἱ γραφάμενοι Σωκράτην, ὡς ἀξίος εἶναι θανάτου τῆ πόλεως.—Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐνομίζεν ὅτις ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, ποῖα ποτ' ἐχρησάτο τεκμηρίω; θύων τε γὰρ φανερός ἦν πολλακίς μὲν οἰκοί, πολλακίς δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν τῆς πόλεως βωμῶν· καὶ μαντικὴ χρῆσιμος, οὐκ ἀφανὴς πρὸ διετετυγμῆτο γὰρ, ὡς φασὶ Σωκράτης τὸ δαίμονιον ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτῶν αἰτιασάσθαι, καὶ αἶνα δαίμονια εἰσφέρειν. ὃ δ' οὐδὲν καινομένον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες, οἰωνοὺς τε χροῦνται, καὶ φημῶν, καὶ συμβόλοις, καὶ θυσίαις. οὗτοι τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι τοὺς οἰωνοὺς, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας εἶδεναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαρτυρομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν· ἡρεκίως οὕτως ἐνομίζην. P. 441.

tageous to the diviners; but they are of opinion that the Gods thus signify to them what is beneficial; and he also thought the same. Again, in another place, he observes as follows: "Socrates¹ thought that the Gods take care of men not in such a way as the multitude conceive. For they think that the Gods know some things, but do not know others. But Socrates thought that the Gods know all things, as well things said and done, as those deliberated in silence. That they are also everywhere present, and signify to men concerning all human affairs. I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians could ever be persuaded that Socrates was not of a sound mind respecting the Gods, as he never said or did any thing impious concerning them. But all his sayings and all his actions pertaining to the Gods were such as any one by saying and doing would be thought to be most pious." And lastly, in another place he observes, "That it was evident that Socrates worshipped the Gods the most of all men²."

After such unequivocal testimony, no other reason can be assigned for that strange position of the moderns, that Socrates ridiculed the religion of his country, than a profound ignorance of one of the most important tenets of the heathen religion, and which may also be considered as ranking among the first of the most magnificent, scientific, and divine conceptions of the human mind. The tenet I allude to is this, that the essential, which is the most perfect energy of deity, is deific; and that his first and immediate progeny must as necessarily be Gods, that is, beings transcendantly similar to himself, and possessing those characteristics *secondarily* which he possesses *primarily*, as heat is the immediate offspring of fire, and coldness of snow. From being unacquainted with this mighty truth, which is coeval with the universe itself, modern theologists and sophists have dared to defame the religion of Greece, and, by offering violence to the sacred pages of antiquity,

¹ Και γὰρ ἐπιμελεισθαι θεοὺς ἐνομίζεν ἀνθρώπων, οὐχ ὅν τρόπον οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν. οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ οἰοῦνται τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ μὲν εἶδεναι, τὰ δ' οὐκ εἶδεναι· Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα μὲν πᾶσι θεοῖς εἶδεναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα· πανταχοῦ δὲ παρῆναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάντων. θαυμάζω οὖν, ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπεισέστησαν Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν, τὸν ἀσεβὲς μὲν εὐδῆποτε περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐτ' εἰπόντα οὐτε πράξαντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ λεγόντα καὶ πραττόντα περὶ θεῶν, διὰ τίς αὖ καὶ λέγων καὶ πραττὼν εἴη τε καὶ νομίζωτο εὐσεβέστατος. P. 443.

² Φανερόν ην θεραπεύων τοὺς θεοὺς, μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. P. 450.

have made the great Socrates himself become the patron of their own shallow and distorted conceptions. But to return to the Apology.

Lyfias, one of the most celebrated orators of the age, composed an oration, in a laboured and pathetic style, which he offered to Socrates to be pronounced as his defence in the presence of his judges. Socrates however refused it, observing, that a philosopher ought to be conspicuous for magnanimity and firmness of soul. Hence, in his Apology, he paid no attention to the splendor of diction, but trusted wholly to the intrinsic dignity of his sentiments. He contented himself with speaking to his judges as he used to do in common discourse, and with proposing questions to his accusers. Hence his defence was entirely the spontaneous effusions of his genius; simple and plain, yet nervous and dignified.

Several persons who assisted in the court upon this occasion, besides Plato, drew up the Apology of Socrates. Among the rest Xenophon compiled one from the relation of Hermogenes the son of Hipponicus, for he himself was not then at Athens. None of them are extant, however, but those of Plato and Xenophon. And of these, the first is in every respect worthy the greatest disciple of Socrates; but the other presents us with an imperfect copy, because composed by a disciple that was absent. This imperfect copy, however, sufficiently proves that the substance of this Apology is accurate, how much soever it may have been amended by passing through such a hand as that of Plato.

THE APOLOGY

OF

S O C R A T E S.

I KNOW not, O Athenians, how you may be affected by my accusers: I indeed have through them almost forgotten myself, so persuasively have they spoken; though, as I may say, they have not asserted any thing which is true. But among the multitude of their false assertions I am most surprised at this, in which they say that you ought to beware of being deceived by me, as if I were an eloquent speaker. For that they should not be ashamed of asserting that which will be immediately confuted by me in reality, since in the present instance I shall appear to you to be by no means eloquent,—this seems to me to be the consummation of impudence; unless they call him eloquent who speaks the truth. For, if they assert this, I shall indeed acknowledge myself to be a rhetorician, though not according to their conceptions. They have not then, as I said, asserted any thing which is true; but from me you will hear all the truth. Not, by Jupiter, O Athenians, that you will hear from me a discourse splendidly decorated with nouns and verbs, and adorned in other respects, like the harangues of these men; but you will hear me speaking in such language as may casually present itself. For I am confident that what I say will be just, nor let any one of you expect it will be otherwise: for it does not become one of my age to come before you like a lad with a studied discourse. And, indeed, I very much request and beseech you, O Athenians, that if you should hear me apologizing in the same terms and modes of expression which I am accustomed to use in the Forum, on the Exchange and public Banks, and in

other places, where many of you have heard me,—that you will neither wonder nor be disturbed on this account; for the case is as follows:—I now for the first time come before this tribunal, though I am more than seventy years old; and consequently I am a stranger to the mode of speaking which is here adopted. As, therefore, if I were in reality a foreigner, you would pardon me for using the language and the manner in which I had been educated, so now I request you, and this justly, as it appears to me, to suffer the mode of my diction, whether it be better or worse, and to attend to this, whether I speak what is just or not: for this is the virtue of a judge, as that of an orator is to speak the truth.

In the first place, therefore, O Athenians, it is just that I should answer the first false accusations of me, and my first accusers, and afterwards the latter accusers. For many have been accusers of me to you for many years, and who have asserted nothing true, of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his accomplices, though these indeed are powerful in persuading; but those are still more so, who having been conversant with many of you from infancy, have persuaded you, and accused me falsely. For they have said, that there is one Socrates, a wise man, studious of things on high, and exploring every thing under the earth, and who also can make the worse to be the better argument. These men, O Athenians, who spread this report are my dire accusers. For those who hear it think that such as investigate these things do not believe that there are Gods. In the next place, these accusers are numerous, and have accused me for a long time. They also said these things to you in that age in which you would most readily believe them, some of you being boys and lads; and they accused me quietly, no one speaking in my defence. But that which is most irrational of all is this, that neither is it possible to know and tell their names, except some one of them should be a comic¹ poet. Such however as have persuaded you by employing envy and calumny, together with those who being persuaded themselves have persuaded others,—with respect to all these, the method to be adopted is most dubious. For it is not possible to call them to account here before you, nor to confute any one of them; but it is necessary, as if fighting with shadows, to make my defence and refutation without any to answer me. Consider, therefore, as I have

¹ Meaning Aristophanes.

said,

said that my accusers are twofold, some having accused me lately, and others formerly; and think that it is necessary I should answer the latter of these first; for you also have heard these my accusers, and much more than you have those by whom I have been recently accused. Be it so. I must defend myself then, O Athenians, and endeavour in this so short a space of time to remove from you the calumny which you have so long entertained. I wish, therefore, that this my defence may effect something better both for you and me, and that it may contribute to some more important end. I think however that it will be attended with difficulty, and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. At the same time let this terminate as Divinity pleases. It is my business to obey the law, and to make my apology.

Let us repeat, therefore, from the beginning what the accusation was, the source of that calumny in which Melitus confiding brought this charge against me. Be it so. What then do my accusers say? For their accusation must be formally recited as if given upon oath. It is this: SOCRATES ACTS WICKEDLY, AND WITH CRIMINAL CURIOSITY INVESTIGATES THINGS UNDER THE EARTH, AND IN THE HEAVENS. HE ALSO MAKES THE WORSE TO BE THE BETTER ARGUMENT; AND HE TEACHES THESE THINGS TO OTHERS. Such is the accusation: for things of this kind you also have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes¹: for there one Socrates is carried about, who affirms that he walks upon the air, and idly asserts many other trifles of this nature; of which things however I neither know much nor little. Nor do I say this as despising such a science, if there be any one wise about things of this kind, lest Melitus should charge me with this as a new crime; but because, O Athenians, I have no such knowledge. I adduce many of you as witnesses of this, and I call upon such of you as have at any time heard me discoursing, and there are many such among you, to teach and declare to each other, if you have ever heard me speak much or little about things of this kind. And from this you may know that other things also, which the multitude assert of me, are all of them of a similar nature: for no one of them is true. For neither if you have heard any one assert that I attempt to teach men, and that I make money by so doing,—

¹ See The Clouds of that poet, ver. 112 et seq. et ver. 188.

neither is this true. This indeed appears to me to be a beautiful thing, if some one is able to instruct men, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, and Hippias the Elean. For each of these, in the several cities which he visits, has the power of persuading the young men, who are permitted to apply themselves to such of their own countrymen as they please without any charge, to adhere to them only, and to give them money and thanks besides for their instruction. There is also another wise man, a Parian, who I hear has arrived hither. For it happened that I once met with a man who spends more money on the sophists than all others,—I mean Callias the son of Hipponicus. I therefore asked him, for he has two sons, O Callias, said I, if your two sons were two colts or calves, should we not have some one to take care of them, who would be paid for so doing, and who would make them beautiful, and the possessors of such good qualities as belong to their nature? But now, since your sons are men, what master do you intend to have for them? Who is there that is scientifically knowing in human and political virtue of this kind? For I think that you have considered this, since you have sons. Is there such a one, said I, or not? There certainly is, he replied. Who is he? said I. And whence is he? And for how much money does he teach? It is Evenus the Parian, said he, Socrates, and he teaches for five minæ (15l.). And I indeed have considered Evenus as blessed, if he in reality possesses this art, and so elegantly teaches. I, therefore, should also glory and think highly of myself, if I had a scientific knowledge of these things; but this, O Athenians, is certainly not the case.

Perhaps, however, some one may reply: But, Socrates, what have you done then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For unless you had more curiously employed yourself than others, and had done something different from the multitude, so great a rumour would never have been raised against you. Tell us, therefore, what it is, that we may not pass an unadvised sentence against you. He who says these things appears to me to speak justly, and I will endeavour to show you what that is which has occasioned me this appellation and calumny. Hear, therefore; and though perhaps I shall appear to some of you to jest, yet be well assured that I shall tell you all the truth. For I, O Athenians, have acquired this name through nothing else than a certain wisdom. But of what kind is this wisdom? Perhaps it is human wisdom. For this in reality I appear to possess. Those indeed

indeed whom I just now mentioned possessed perhaps more than human wisdom, which I know not how to denominate: for I have no knowledge of it. And whoever says that I have, speaks falsely, and asserts this to calumniate me. But, O Athenians, be not disturbed if I appear to speak somewhat magnificently of myself. For this which I say is not my own assertion, but I shall refer it to one who is considered by you as worthy of belief. For I shall adduce to you the Delphic Deity himself as a testimony of my wisdom, if I have any, and of the quality it possesses. You certainly then know Chærepho: he was my associate from a youth, was familiar with most of you, and accompanied you in and returned with you from your exile. You know, therefore, what kind of a man Chærepho was, and how eager in all his undertakings. He then, coming to Delphi, had the boldness to consult the oracle about this particular. Be not, as I said, O Athenians, disturbed: for he asked if there was any one more wise than I am. The Pythian priestess, therefore, answered that there was not any one more wise. His brother can testify to you the truth of these things; for Chærepho himself is dead.

Consider then on what account I assert these things: for I am going to inform you whence this calumny against me arose. When, therefore, I had heard this answer of the oracle, I thus considered with myself, What does the God say? and what does he obscurely signify? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise, either in a great or in a small degree. What then does he mean in saying that I am most wise? For he does not lie, since this is not lawful to him. And for a long time, indeed, I was dubious what he could mean. Afterwards with considerable difficulty I betook myself to the following mode of investigating his meaning. I went to one of those who appear to be wise men, that here if any where I might confute the prediction, and evince to the oracle that this man was more wise than I. Surveying, therefore, this man, (for there is no occasion to mention his name, but he was a politician;) while I beheld him and discoursed with him, it so happened, O Athenians, that this man appeared to me to be wise in the opinion of many other men, and especially in his own, but that he was not so. And afterwards I endeavoured to show him that he fancied himself to be wise, but was not. Hence I became odious to him, and also to many others that were present. Departing,

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therefore,

therefore, I reasoned with myself that I was wiser than this man. For it appears that neither of us knows any thing beautiful or good : but he indeed not knowing, thinks that he knows something; but I, as I do not know any thing, neither do I think that I know. Hence in this trifling particular I appear to be wiser than him, because I do not think that I know things which I do not know. After this I went to another of those who appeared to be wiser than him; and of him also I formed the same opinion. Hence also I became odious to him and many others.

Afterwards however I went to others, suspecting and grieving and fearing that I should make enemies. At the same time however it appeared to me to be necessary to pay the greatest attention to the oracle of the God, and that, considering what could be its meaning, I should go to all that appeared to possess any knowledge. And by the dog¹, O Athenians, (for it is necessary to tell you the truth,) that which happened to me was as follows. Those that were most celebrated for their wisdom appeared to me to be most remote from it; but others who were considered as far inferior to them possessed more of intellect. But it is necessary to relate to you my wandering, and the labours as it were which I endured, that the oracle might become to me unconfuted. For after the politicians I went to the poets both tragic and dithyrambic, and also others, expecting that I should here immediately find myself to be less wise than these. Taking up, therefore, some of their poems which appeared to me to be the most elaborately written, I asked them what was their meaning, that at the same time I might learn something from them. I am ashamed indeed, O Athenians, to tell you the truth; but at the same time it must be told. For, as I may say, all that were present would have spoken better about the things which they had composed. I discovered this, therefore, in a short time concerning the poets, that they did not effect by wisdom that which they did, but by a certain genius and from enthusiastic energy, like prophets and those that utter oracles. For these also say many and beautiful things, but they understand nothing of what they say. Poets, therefore, appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner. And at the same time I perceived

¹ Ῥαδαμανθὸς ὅρκος οὗτος, ὃ κατὰ κύνην, ἢ χηνός, ἢ πλατάνου, ἢ κριού, ἢ τινὸς ἄλλου τοιούτου. Schol. Græc. in Plat. p. 5. i. c. "This is the oath of Rhadamanthus, who swore by the dog, or the goose, or the plane tree, or the ram, or something else of this kind."

that

that they considered themselves, on account of their poetry, to be the wisest of men in other things, in which they were not so. I departed, therefore, also from them, thinking that I surpassed them by the very same thing in which I surpassed the politicians.

In the last place, therefore, I went to the artificers. For I was conscious to myself that I knew nothing, as I may say, but that these men possessed knowledge, because I had found them acquainted with many and beautiful things. And in this indeed I was not deceived; for they knew things which I did not, and in this they were wiser than I. But, O Athenians, good artificers also appeared to me to have the same fault as the poets. For each, in consequence of performing well in his art, thought that he was also most wise in other things, and those the greatest. And this their error obscured that very wisdom which they did possess. I therefore asked myself in behalf of the oracle, whether I would choose to be as I am, possessing no part either of their wisdom or ignorance, or to have both which they possess. I answered, therefore, for myself and for the oracle, that it was advantageous for me to be as I am.

From this my investigation, O Athenians, many enmities were excited against me, and such as were most grievous and weighty, so that many calumnies were produced from them; and hence I obtained the appellation of *the wise man*. For those that hear me think that I am wise in these things, the ignorance of which I confute in others. It appears however, O Athenians, that Divinity is wise in reality, and that in this oracle he says this, that human wisdom^{*} is but of little, or indeed of no worth; and it seems that he used my name, making me an example, as if he had said, He, O men, is the wisest among you, who, like Socrates, *knows* that he is in reality of no worth with respect to wisdom. These things, therefore, going about, I even now inquire and explore in obedience to the God, both among citizens and strangers, if any one of them appears to me to be wise; and when I find he is not, giving assistance to the God, I demonstrate that he is not wise. And in consequence of this employment I have no leisure

^{*} This is the key to the profound meaning of Socrates when he said that he *knew* that he knew nothing. For, as I have elsewhere observed, he only intended by this to signify the nothingness of human when compared with divine knowledge.

worth mentioning either for public or private transactions; but I am in great poverty through my religious cultivation of the God.

Besides, the youth that spontaneously follow me, who especially abound in leisure, as being the sons of the most wealthy, rejoice on hearing men confuted by me; and often imitating me, they afterwards endeavour to make trial of others. In which attempt I think they find a numerous multitude of men who fancy that they know something, but who know little or nothing. Hence, therefore, those who are tried by them are angry with me, and not with them, and say that there is one Socrates a most wicked person, and who corrupts the youth. And when some one asks them what he does, and what he teaches, they have nothing to say, but are ignorant. That they may not however appear to be dubious, they assert things which may be readily adduced against all that philosophize, as, that he explores things on high and under the earth, that he does not think there are Gods, and that he makes the worse to be the better reason. For I think they are not willing to speak the truth, that they clearly pretend to be knowing, but know nothing. Hence, as it appears to me, being ambitious and vehement and numerous, and speaking in an elegant and persuasive manner about me, they fill your ears, both before and now calumniating in the extreme. Among these, Melitus, Anytus, and Lycon, have attacked me; Melitus indeed being my enemy on account of the poets; but Anytus on account of the artificers and politicians; and Lycon on account of the orators. So that, as I said in the beginning, I should wonder if I could remove such an abundant calumny from your minds in so short a time. These things, O Athenians, are true; and I thus speak, neither concealing nor subtracting any thing from you, either great or small; though I nearly know that I shall make enemies by what I have said. This however is an argument that I speak the truth, that this is the calumny which is raised against me, and that the causes of it are these. And whether now or hereafter you investigate these things, you will find them to be as I have said. Concerning the particulars, therefore, which my first accusers urged against me, let this be a sufficient apology to you.

In the next place, I shall endeavour to reply to Melitus, that good man and lover of his country, as he says, and also to my latter accusers. For again, as being different from the former accusers, let us take the oath

of these men for calumny. The accusation then is as follows: Socrates, it says, acts unjustly, corrupting the youth; and not believing in those Gods in which the city believes, he introduces other novel dæmoniactal natures. Such then is the accusation; of which let us examine every part. It says, therefore, that I act unjustly by corrupting the youth. But I, O Athenians, say that Melitus acts unjustly, because he intentionally trifles, rashly bringing men into danger, and pretending to be studious and solicitous about things which were never the objects of his care. But that this is the case I will endeavour to show you.

Tell me then, O Melitus, whether you consider it as a thing of the greatest consequence, for the youth to become the best of men?—I do.—Come, then, do you therefore tell them what will make them better? For it is evident that you know, since it is the object of your care. For, having found me to be a corrupter of youth, as you say, you have brought me hither, and are my accuser; but come, inform me who it is that makes them better, and signify it to this assembly. Do you see, O Melitus, that you are silent, and have not any thing to say? Though, does it not appear to you to be shameful, and a sufficient argument of what I say, that this is not the object of your attention? But tell me, O good man, who it is that makes them better.—The laws.—I do not, however, ask this, O best of men, but what man it is that first knows this very thing, the laws.—These men, Socrates, are the judges.—How do you say, Melitus? Do they know how to instruct the youth, and to make them better?—Especially so.—But whether do all of them know how? or do some of them know, and others not?—All of them.—You speak well, by Juno, and adduce a great abundance of those that benefit. But what? Can these auditors also make the youth better, or not?—These also.—And what of the senators?—The senators also can effect this.—But, O Melitus, do some of those that harangue the people in an assembly corrupt the more juvenile; or do all these make them better?—All these.—All the Athenians therefore, as it seems, make them to be worthy and good, except me, but I alone corrupt them. Do you say so?—These very things I strenuously assert.—You charge me with a very great infelicity. But answer me: Does this also appear to you to be the case respecting horses, viz. that all men can make them better, but that there is only one person that

that corrupts them? or does the perfect contrary of this take place, so that it is one person who can make them better, or, at least, that those possessed of equestrian skill are very few; but the multitude, if they meddle with and make use of horses, corrupt them? Is not this the case, O Melitus, both with respect to horses and all other animals? It certainly is so, whether you and Anytus say so, or not. For a great felicity would take place concerning youth if only one person corrupted, and the rest benefited them. However, you have sufficiently shown, O Melitus, that you never bestowed any care upon youth; and you clearly evince your negligence, and that you pay no attention to the particulars for which you accuse me.

Further still, tell me, by Jupiter, O Melitus, whether it is better to dwell in good or in bad politics? Answer, my friend: for I ask you nothing difficult. Do not the depraved always procure some evil to those that continually reside near them; and do not the good procure some good?—Entirely so.—Is there then any one who wishes to be injured by his associates, rather than to be benefited? Answer, O good man: for the law orders you to answer. Is there any one who wishes to be injured?—There is not.—Come then, whether do you bring me hither, as one that corrupts the youth, and makes them depraved willingly, or as one who does this unwillingly?—I say that you do it willingly.—But what, O Melitus, is it possible that you, who are so much younger than I am, should well know that the depraved always procure some evil to those that are most near to them, and the good some good; but that I should have arrived at such ignorance as not to know that, if I make any one of my associates depraved, I shall be in danger of receiving some evil from him; and that I, therefore, do this so great an evil willingly, as you say? I cannot be persuaded by you, O Melitus, as to these things, nor do I think that any other man would: but either I do not corrupt the youth, or I corrupt them unwillingly. So that you speak falsely in both assertions. But if I unwillingly corrupt them, the law does not order me to be brought hither for such-like involuntary offences, but that I should be taken and privately taught and admonished. For it is evident that, if I am taught better, I shall cease doing that which I unwillingly do. But you, indeed, have avoided me, and have not been willing to associate with and instruct me; but you have brought me hither, where the law orders those who
require

require punishment, and not discipline, to be brought. Wherefore, O Athenians, this now is manifest which I have said, that Melitus never paid the smallest attention to this affair.

At the same time, however, tell us, O Melitus, how you say I corrupt the youth. Or is it not evident, from your written accusation, that I teach them not to believe in the Gods in which the city believes, but in other new divine powers? Do you not say that, teaching these things, I corrupt the youth?—Perfectly so: I strenuously assert these things.—By those very Gods, therefore, Melitus, of whom we are now speaking, speak in a still clearer manner both to me and to these men. For I cannot learn whether you say that I teach them to think that there are not certain Gods, (though I myself believe that there are Gods, for I am by no means an atheist, nor in this respect do I act unjustly,) not, indeed, such as the city believes in, but others, and that this it is for which you accuse me, that I introduce other Gods; or whether you altogether say that I do not believe there are Gods, and that I teach this doctrine also to others.—I say this, that you do not believe that there are Gods.—O wonderful Melitus, why do you thus speak? Do I then think, unlike the rest of mankind, that the sun and moon are not Gods?—He does not, by Jupiter, O judges: for he says that the sun is a stone, and that the moon is earth.—O friend Melitus, you think that you accuse Anaxagoras; and you so despise these judges, and think them to be so illiterate, as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of these assertions. Besides, would the youth learn those things from me, which they might buy for a drachma at most in the orchestra, and thus might deride Socrates if he pretended they were his own, **ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY ARE LIKEWISE SO ABSURD**¹? But, by Jupiter, do I then appear to you to think that there is no God?—None whatever, by Jupiter.—What you say, O Melitus, is incredible, and, as it appears to me, is so even to yourself. Indeed, O Athenians, this man appears to me to be perfectly insolent and intemperate in his speech, and to have in reality written this accusation, impelled by a certain insolence, wantonness, and youthfulness. For he seems, as it were, to have composed an ænigma in order to try me, and to have said

¹ This assertion, among many others, affords an incontestable proof that Socrates believed in the religion of his country: for he here clearly says, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras, which made the sun and moon to be no Gods, is *absurd*.

to himself, Will the wise Socrates know that I am jesting, and speaking contrary to myself? Or shall I deceive him, together with the other hearers? For he appears to me to contradict himself in his accusation, as if he had said, Socrates is impious in not believing that there are Gods, but believing that there are Gods. And this, indeed, must be the assertion of one in jest.

But let us jointly consider, O Athenians, how he appears to me to have asserted these things. And do you, O Melitus, answer us, and, as I requested you at first, be mindful not to disturb me if I discourse after my usual manner. Is there then any man, O Melitus, who thinks that there are human affairs, but does not think that there are men? Pray answer me, and do not make so much noise. And is there any one who does not think that there are horses, but yet thinks that there are equestrian affairs? or who does not think that there are pipers, but yet that there are things pertaining to pipers? There is not, O best of men. For I will speak for you, since you are not willing to answer yourself. But answer also to this: Is there any one who thinks that there are dæmoniacal affairs, but yet does not think that there are dæmons?—There is not.—How averse you are to speak! so that you scarcely answer, compelled by these things. Do you not, therefore, say that I believe in and teach things dæmoniacal, whether they are new or old? But indeed you acknowledge that I believe in things dæmoniacal, and to this you have sworn in your accusation. If then I believe in dæmoniacal affairs, there is an abundant necessity that I should also believe in the existence of dæmons. Is it not so?—It is.—For I suppose you to assent, since you do not answer. But with respect to dæmons¹, do we not think either that they are Gods, or the sons of Gods? Will you acknowledge this or not?—Entirely so.—If, therefore, I believe that there are dæmons as you say, if dæmons are certain Gods, will it not be as I say, that you speak ænigmatically and in jest, since you assert that I do not think there are Gods, and yet again think that there are, since I believe in dæmons? But if dæmons are certain spurious sons of the Gods, either from Nymphs, or from certain others, of whom they are said to be the offspring, what man can believe that there are sons of the Gods, and yet that there are no Gods? For this would be just as absurd, as if some one should think that there are colts and mules, but

¹ For a copious account of dæmons, see the Notes on *The Banquet*.

should

should not think that there are horses and asses. However, O Melitus, it cannot be otherwise but that you have written this accusation, either to try me, or because there was not any crime of which you could truly accuse me. For it is impossible that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of intellect, that one and the same person can believe that there are dæmoniacal and divine affairs, and yet that there are neither dæmons, nor Gods, nor heroes. That I am not, therefore, impious, O Athenians, according to the accusation of Melitus, does not appear to me to require a long apology; but what I have said is sufficient.

As to what I before observed, that there is a great enmity towards me among the vulgar, you may be well assured that it is true. And this it is which will condemn me, if I should happen to be condemned, viz. the hatred and envy of the multitude, and not Melitus, nor Anytus; which indeed has also happened to many others, and those good men, and will I think again happen in futurity. For there is no reason to expect that it will terminate in me. Perhaps, however, some one will say, Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have applied yourself to a study, through which you are now in danger of being put to death? To this person I shall justly reply, That you do not speak well, O man, if you think that life or death ought to be regarded by the man who is capable of being useful though but in a small degree; and that he ought not to consider this alone when he acts, whether he acts justly, or unjustly, and like a good or a bad man. For those demigods that died at Troy would, according to your reasoning, be vile characters, as well others as the son of Thetis, who so much despised the danger of death when compared with disgraceful conduct, that when his mother, who was a goddess, on his desiring to kill Hector, thus I think addressed him—My son, if you revenge the slaughter of your friend Patroclus, and kill Hector, you will yourself die, for said she, death awaits you as soon as Hector expires:—Notwithstanding this, he considered the danger of death as a trifle, and much more dreaded living basely, and not revenging his friends. For he says, May I immediately die, when I have inflicted just punishment on him who has acted unjustly, and not stay here an object of ridicule, by the crooked ships, and a burden to the ground? Do you think that he was

² Iliad. lib. xviii. ver. 94, &c.

folicitous about death and danger? For this, O Athenians, is in reality the case: wherever any one ranks himself, thinking it to be the best for him, or wherever he is ranked by the ruler, there as it appears to me he ought to abide, and encounter danger, neither paying attention to death nor to any thing else before that which is base.

I therefore, O Athenians, should have acted in a dire manner, if, when those rulers which you had placed over me had assigned me a rank at Potidea, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I should then have remained where they stationed me, like any other person, and should have encountered the danger of death; but that, when Divinity has ordered, as I think and apprehend, that I ought to live philosophising, and exploring myself and others, I should here through fear of death or any other thing desert my rank. For this would be dire: and then in reality any one might justly bring me to a court of judicature, and accuse me of not believing in the Gods, in consequence of not obeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking myself to be wise when I am not. For to dread death, O Athenians, is nothing else than to appear to be wise, without being so: since it is for a man to appear to know that which he does not know. For no one knows but that death may be to man the greatest of goods; but they dread it, as if they well knew that it is the greatest of evils. And how is it possible that this should not be a most disgraceful ignorance, I mean for a man to suspect that he has a knowledge of that of which he is ignorant? But I, O Athenians, differ perhaps in this from the multitude of men; and if I should say that I am wiser than some one in any thing, it would be in this, that not having a sufficient knowledge of the things in Hades, I also think that I have not this knowledge. But I know that to act unjustly, and to be disobedient to one more excellent, whether God or man, is evil and base. I shall never, therefore, fear and avoid things which for aught I know may be good, before those evils which I know to be evils. So that neither if you should now dismiss me, (being unper-suaded by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought hither at first, or that, when brought hither, it was impossible not to put me to death, telling you that if I escaped, all your sons studying what Socrates had taught them would be corrupted,) if besides these things you should say to me, O Socrates, we now indeed shall not be persuaded by Anytus, but we shall dismiss you, though on this condition,

condition, that afterwards you no longer busy yourself with this investigation, nor philosophise, and if hereafter you are detected in so doing, you shall die,—if, as I said, you should dismiss me on these terms, I should thus address you: O Athenians, I honour and love you: but I obey Divinity rather than you; and as long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease to philosophise, and to exhort and indicate to any one of you I may happen to meet, such things as the following, after my usual manner. O best of men, since you are an Athenian, of a city the greatest and the most celebrated for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed of being attentive to the means of acquiring riches, glory and honour, in great abundance; but to bestow no care nor any consideration upon prudence² and truth, nor how your soul may subsist in the most excellent condition? And if any one of you should contend with me, and say that these things are the objects of his care, I should not immediately dismiss him, nor depart, but I should interrogate, explore, and reason with him. And if he should not appear to me to possess virtue, and yet pretend to the possession of it, I should reprove him as one who but little esteems things of the greatest worth, but considers things of a vile and abject nature as of great importance. In this manner I should act by any one I might happen to meet, whether younger or older, a stranger or a citizen; but rather to citizens, because ye are more allied to me. For be well assured that Divinity commands me thus to act. And I think that a greater good never happened to you in the city, than this my obedience to the will of Divinity. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading both the younger and older among you, neither to pay attention to the body, nor to riches, nor any thing else prior to the soul; nor to be so much concerned for any thing, as how the soul may subsist in the most excellent condition. I also say that virtue is not produced from riches, but riches from virtue, as likewise all other human goods, both privately and publicly. If, therefore, asserting these things, I corrupt the youth, these things will be noxious; but if any one says that I assert other things than these, he says nothing. In addition to this I shall say, O Athenians, that whether you are persuaded by Anytus or not, and whether you dismiss me or not, I shall not act otherwise, even though I should die often.

² Meaning *intellectual prudence*, which is the contemplation of the forms contained in intellect.

Be not disturbed, O Athenians, but patiently hear what I shall request of you; for I think it will be advantageous for you to hear. For I am about to mention certain other things to you, at which perhaps you will be clamorous; though let this on no account take place. Be well assured then, if you put me to death, being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me more than yourselves. For neither Melitus nor Anytus injures me; for neither can they. Indeed, I think it is not lawful for a better to be injured by a worse man. He may indeed perhaps condemn me to death, or exile, or disgrace; and he or some other may consider these as mighty evils. I however do not think so; but, in my opinion, it is much more an evil to act as he now acts, who endeavours to put a man to death unjustly. Now, therefore, O Athenians, it is far from my intention to defend myself, (as some one may think,) but I thus speak for your sake, lest in condemning me you should sin against the gift of Divinity. For, if you should put me to death, you will not easily find such another (though the comparison is ridiculous) whom Divinity has united to this city as to a great and generous horse, but sluggish through his magnitude, and requiring to be excited by a certain fly. In like manner Divinity appears to have united such a one as I am to the city, that I might not cease exciting, persuading and reproving each of you, and every where sitting among you through the whole day. Such another man, therefore, will not easily arise among you. And if you will be persuaded by me, you will spare me. Perhaps, however, you, being indignant, like those who are awakened from sleep, will repulse me, and, being persuaded by Anytus, will inconsiderately put me to death. Should this be the case, you will pass the rest of your time in sleep, unless Divinity should send some other person to take care of you. But that I am such a one as I have said, one imparted to this city by Divinity, you may understand from hence. For my conduct does not appear to be human, in neglecting every thing pertaining to myself and my private affairs for so many years, and always attending to your concerns, addressing each of you separately, like a father, or an elder brother, and persuading you to the study of virtue. And if indeed I had obtained any emolument from this conduct, and receiving a recompense had exhorted you to these things, there might be some reason for asserting that I acted like other men; but now behold, even my accusers themselves, who have so shamelessly calumniated me in every thing else,

elfe, have not been so impudent as to charge me with this, or to bring witnesses to prove that I ever either demanded or solicited a reward. And that I speak the truth, my poverty I think affords a sufficient testimony.

Perhaps, therefore, it may appear absurd, that, going about and involving myself in a multiplicity of affairs, I should privately advise these things, but that I should never dare to come to your convention, and consult for the city. The cause of this is that which you have often heard me every where asserting, viz. because a certain divine and dæmoniacal ^r voice is present with me, which also Melitus in his accusation derided. This voice attended me from a child; and, when it is present, always *dissuades* me from what I intended to do, but never *incites* me. This it is which opposed my engaging in political affairs; and to me its opposition appears to be all-beautiful. For be well assured, O Athenians, if I had formerly attempted to transact political affairs, I should have perished long before this, and should neither have benefited you in any respect, nor myself. And be not indignant with me for speaking the truth. For it is not possible that any man can be safe, who sincerely opposes either you, or any other multitude, and who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from taking place in the city; but it is necessary that he who in reality contends for the just, if he wishes even but for a little time to be safe, should live privately, and not engage in public affairs.

I will present you with mighty proofs of these things, not words, which you honour, but deeds. Hear then the circumstances which have happened to me, that you may know that I shall not yield to any one contrary to what is becoming, through dread of death; though at the same time by not yielding I shall perish. For I, O Athenians, never bore the office of magistrate ² in the city, but I have been a senator: and it happened that our Antiochean tribe governed, when you thought proper to condemn the ten generals collectively, for not taking up the bodies of those that perished in the naval battle ³; and in so doing acted illegally, as afterwards appeared to

¹ See the note at the beginning of the First Alcibiades for a full account of the dæmon of Socrates.

² The people of Athens were divided into tribes, and fifty men were chosen by turns out of each, who governed thirty-five days, and were called Prytani or Senators.

³ This battle was fought by Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, against the ten Athenian generals, who obtained the victory.

all of you. At that time I alone of the Prytaneans opposed you, that you might not act contrary to the laws, and my suffrage was contrary to yours. When the orators also were ready to point me out and condemn me, and you likewise were exhorting and vociferating to the same end, I thought that I ought rather to encounter danger with law and justice, than adhere to you, not establishing what is just, through fear of bonds or death. And these things indeed happened while the city was yet a democracy; but when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty sent for me and four others to the Tholus¹, and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, in order to be put to death²; for by these orders they meant to involve many others in guilt. Then indeed I, not in words but in deeds, showed them, if the assertion is not too rustic, that I made no account of death; but that all my attention was directed to this, that I might do nothing unjust or unholy. For that dominion of the Thirty, though so strong, did not terrify me into the perpetration of any unjust action. But when we departed from the Tholus, the four indeed went to Salamis, and brought with them Leon; but I returned home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death, if that government had not been rapidly dissolved. These things many of you can testify.

Do you think, therefore, that I could have lived for so many years, if I had engaged in public affairs, and had acted in a manner becoming a good man, giving assistance to justice, and doing this in the most eminent degree? Far otherwise, O Athenians: for neither could any other man. But I, through the whole of my life, if I do any thing publicly, shall appear to be such a man; and being the same privately, I shall never grant any thing to any one contrary to justice, neither to any other, nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say are my disciples. I however was never the preceptor of any one; but I never repulsed either the young or the old that were desirous of hearing me speak after my usual manner. Nor do I discourse when I receive money, but refrain from speaking when I do not receive any; but I similarly offer myself to be interrogated by the rich and the poor: and if any one is willing to answer, he hears what I have to say. Of

¹ The Tholus was a kind of clerks office, where the Prytani dined, and the clerks sat.

² This happened in the second year of the 39th Olympiad.

these too, whether any one becomes good or not, I cannot justly be said to be the cause, because I never either promised or taught them any discipline. But if any one says that he has ever learnt or heard any thing from me privately which all others have not, be well assured that he does not speak the truth.

Why therefore some have delighted to associate with me for a long time ye have heard, O Athenians. I have told you all the truth, that men are delighted on hearing those interrogated who think themselves to be wise, but who are not: for this is not unpleasant. But, as I say, I am ordered to do this by Divinity, by oracles, by dreams, and by every mode by which any other divine destiny ever commanded any thing to be done by man. These things, O Athenians, are true, and might easily be confuted if they were not. For if, with respect to the youth, I corrupt some, and have corrupted others, it is fit, if any of them have become old, that, knowing I gave them bad advice when they were young, they should now rise up, accuse and take vengeance on me; but if they themselves are unwilling to do this, that their fathers, or brothers, or others of their kindred, should now call to mind and avenge the evil which their relatives suffered from me. But in short many of them are here present, whom I see:—In the first place, Crito, who is of the same age and city that I am, and who is the father of this Critobulus: in the next place, Lyfanius the Sphecian, the father of this Æschines; and further still, Antipho the Cephisian, the father of Epigenes. There are also others whose brothers are in this assembly, viz. Nicostratus the son of Zotidas, and the brother of Theodotus. And Theodotus indeed is dead, and so has no occasion for his brother's assistance. Paralus also is here, the son of Demodochus, of whom Theages was the brother; likewise Adimantus the son of Aristo, the brother of whom is this Plato; and Æantidorus, of whom Apollodorus is the brother. I could also mention many others, some one of whom Melitus, especially in his oration, ought to have adduced as a witness. If however he then forgot to do so, let him now produce him, for he has my consent; and if he has any thing of this kind to disclose, let him declare it. However, you will find the very contrary of this to be the case, and that all these are ready to assist me who have corrupted and injured their kindred, as Melitus and Anytus say. It might indeed perhaps be reasonable to suppose that those whom I have corrupted would assist me; but what

other reason can the relatives of these have, who are not corrupted, and who are now advanced in age, for giving me assistance, except that which is right and just? For they know that Melitus lies, and that I speak the truth. Be it so then, O Athenians: and these indeed, and perhaps other such-like particulars, are what I have to urge in my defence.

Perhaps, however, some one among you will be indignant on recollecting that he, when engaged in a much less contest than this, suppliantly implored the judges with many tears; that he also brought his children hither, that by these he might especially excite compassion, together with many others of his relatives and friends: but I do none of these things, though, as it may appear, I am brought to extreme danger. Perhaps, therefore, some one thus thinking may become more hostile towards me, and, being enraged with these very particulars, may give his vote with anger. If then any one of you is thus affected, I do not think it by any means right; but if he should be, I shall appear to myself to speak equitably to such a one by saying that I also, O best of men, have certain relatives. For, as Homer says, I am not sprung from an oak, nor from a rock, but from men. So that I also, O Athenians, have relations, and three sons; one now a lad; but the other two, boys: I have not however brought any one of them hither, that I might supplicate you on that account to acquit me. Why is it then that I do none of these things? It is not, O Athenians, because I am contumacious, nor is it in contempt of you. And as to my fearing or not fearing death, that is another question. But it does not appear to me to be consistent either with my own glory or yours, or that of the whole city, that I should do any thing of this kind at my age, and with the reputation I have acquired, whether true or false. For it is admitted that Socrates surpasses in something the multitude of mankind. If, therefore, those among you who appear to excel either in wisdom, in fortitude, or any other virtue, should act in such a manner as I have seen some when they have been judged, it would be shameful: for these, appearing indeed to be something, have conducted themselves in a wonderful manner, thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying, as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. These men, as it appears to me, would so disgrace the city, that any stranger might apprehend that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue, and who are promoted to the magistracy and other honours in preference

preference to the rest, do not in any respect surpass women. For these things, O Athenians, ought not to be done by us who have gained some degree of reputation, nor should you suffer us to do them, if we were willing; but you should show that you will much sooner condemn him who introduces these lamentable dramas, and who thus makes the city ridiculous, than him who quietly expects your decision.

But exclusive of glory, O Athenians, neither does it appear to me to be just for a judge to be entreated, or to acquit any one in consequence of being supplicated; but in my opinion he ought to teach and persuade. For a judge does not fit for the purpose of showing favour, but that he may judge what is just: and he takes an oath that he will not show favour to any, but that he will judge according to the laws. Hence it is neither fit that we should accustom you, nor that you should be accustomed to swear: for in so doing neither of us will act piously. Do not, therefore, think, O Athenians, that I ought to act in such a manner towards you as I should neither conceive to be beautiful, nor just, nor holy; and especially, by Jupiter, since I am accused of impiety by this Melitus. For it clearly follows, that if I should persuade you, and, though you have taken an oath, force you to be favourable, I might then indeed teach that you do not think there are Gods; and in reality, while making my defence, I should accuse myself as not believing in the Gods. This however is far from being the case: *for I believe that there are Gods more than any one of my accusers*; and I refer it to you and to Divinity to judge concerning me such things as will be best both for me and you¹.

That I should not, therefore, O Athenians, be indignant with you because you have condemned me, there are many reasons, and among others this, that it has not happened to me contrary to my expectation; but I much rather wonder that there should have been so great a number of votes on both sides. For I did not think that I should have wanted such a few additional votes for my acquittal. But now, as it seems, if there had been only three more votes, I should have escaped condemnation. Indeed, as it

¹ After Socrates had thus spoken, votes were taken by the judges, and he was condemned by a majority of three voices. His speech after his condemnation commences in the paragraph immediately following.

appears to me, I now have escaped Melitus; and I have not only escaped him, but it is perfectly evident that unless Anytus and Lyco had risen to accuse me, he had lost his thousand ¹ drachmas, since he had not the fifth part of the votes on his side.

Melitus then thinks that I deserve death. Be it so. But what punishment², O Athenians, shall I assign to myself? Is it not evident that it will be such a one as I deserve? What then do I deserve to suffer or to pay, for not having during my life concealed what I have learned, but neglected all that the multitude esteem, riches, domestic concerns, military command, authority in public assemblies, and other magistracies? for having avoided the conspiracies and seditions which have happened in the city, thinking that I was in reality a more worthy character than to depend on these things for my safety? I have not, therefore, applied myself to those pursuits, by which I could neither benefit you nor myself; but my whole endeavour has been to benefit every individual in the greatest degree; striving to persuade each of you, that he should pay no attention to any of his concerns, prior to that care of himself by which he may become a most worthy and wise man; that he should not attend to the affairs of the city prior to the city itself; and that attention should be paid to other things in a similar manner. What then, being such a man, do I deserve to suffer? A certain good, O Athenians, if in reality you honour me according to my desert; and this such a good as it is proper for me to receive. What then is the good which is adapted to a poor man who is a benefactor, and who requires leisure that he may exhort you to virtue? There is not any thing more adapted, O Athenians, than that such a man should be supported at the public expense in the Prytaneum; and this much more than if some

¹ An accuser was obliged to have one half of the votes, and a fifth part more, or else he was fined in a thousand drachmas, i. e. nearly 26l. 3s. 4d.

² When the criminal was found guilty, and the accuser demanded a sentence of death, the law allowed the prisoner to condemn himself to one of these three punishments, viz. perpetual imprisonment, a fine, or banishment. This privilege was first enacted on the behalf of the judges, that they might not hesitate to pass sentence on those who, by condemning themselves, owned their guilt. Socrates, therefore, in obedience to the laws, and in order to proclaim his innocence, instead of a punishment demanded a reward worthy of himself.

one of you had been victorious in the Olympic games with horses, or in the two or four-yoked car. For such a one makes you *appear* to be happy, but I cause you *to be* so: and he is not in want of support, but I am. If, therefore, it is necessary that I should be honoured according to what is justly my desert, I should be honoured with this support in the Prytaneum.

Perhaps, therefore, in saying these things, I shall appear to you to speak in the same manner as when I reprobated lamentations and supplications. A thing of this kind, however, O Athenians, is not the case, but rather the following. I am determined not to injure any man willingly; though I shall not persuade you of this, because the time in which we can discourse with each other is but short. For if there was the same law with you as with others, that in cases of death the judicial process should not continue for one day only but for many, I think I should be able to persuade you. But now it is not easy in a short time to dissolve great calumnies. Being however determined to injure no one, I shall be very far from injuring myself, and of pronouncing against myself that I am worthy of evil and punishment. What then? Fearing lest I should suffer that which Melitus thinks I deserve, which I say I know not whether it is good or evil, that I may avoid this, shall I choose that which I well know to be evil, and think that I deserve this? Whether then shall I choose bonds? But why is it necessary that I should live in prison, in perpetual subjection to the eleven magistrates? Shall I pay a fine then, and remain in bonds till it is discharged? But this is what I just now said: for I have not money to pay it. Shall I then choose exile? For perhaps I shall be thought worthy of this. I should however, O Athenians, be a great lover of life, if I were so absurd as not to be able to infer that if you, being my fellow citizens, could not endure my habits and discourses, which have become to you so burthensome and odious, that you now seek to be liberated from them, it is not likely that others would easily bear them. It is far otherwise, O Athenians. My life would be beautiful indeed were I at this advanced age to live in exile, changing and being driven from one city to another. For I well know that, wherever I may go, the youth will hear me when I discourse, in the same manner as they do here. And if I should repell them, they also would expell me, persuading the more elderly to this effect. But if I should not repell them, the fathers and

and kindred of these would banish me on account of these very young men themselves.

Perhaps however some one will say, Can you not, Socrates, live in exile silently and quietly? But it is the most difficult of all things to persuade some among you, that this cannot take place. For if I say that in so doing I should disobey Divinity, and that on this account it is impossible for me to live a life of leisure and quiet, you would not believe me, in consequence of supposing that I spoke ironically. And if, again, I should say that this is the greatest good to man, to discourse every day concerning virtue, and other things which you have heard me discussing, exploring both myself and others; and if I should also assert that an uninvestigating life is to be rejected by man, much less, were I thus to speak, would you believe me. These things however, O Athenians, are as I say; but it is not easy to persuade you that they are so. And at the same time I am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. Indeed, if I were rich, I would amerce myself in such a sum as I might be able to pay; but now I am not in a condition to do this, unless you would allow the fine to be proportioned to what I am able to pay. For thus perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of silver (3*l.*). But Plato here, O Athenians, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, exhort me to pay thirty minæ, (90*l.*) for which they will be answerable. I amerce myself, therefore, in thirty minæ; and these will be my securities for the payment¹.

Now, O Athenians, your impatience and precipitancy will draw upon you a great reproach, and give occasion to those who are so disposed, to revile the city for having put that wise man Socrates to death. For those who are willing to reproach you will call me a wise man, though I am not. If, therefore, you had waited but for a short time, this very thing, my death, would have happened to you spontaneously. For behold my age, that it is far advanced in life, and is near to death. But I do not say this to all of you, but to those only who have condemned me to die. This also I say to them:

¹ Socrates having amerced himself in obedience to the laws, the judges took the affair into consideration, and, without any regard to the fine, condemned him to die. After the sentence was pronounced, Socrates addressed them as in the next paragraph.

Perhaps

Perhaps you think, O Athenians, that I was condemned through the want of such language, by which I might have persuaded you, if I had thought it requisite, to say and do any thing, so that I might escape punishment. Far otherwise: for I am condemned through want indeed, yet not of words, but of audacity and impudence, and because I was unwilling to say such things to you as you would have been much gratified in hearing, I at the same time weeping and lamenting, and doing and saying many other things unworthy of me, as I say, but such as you are accustomed to hear and see in others. But neither then did I think it was necessary, for the sake of avoiding danger, to do any thing illiberal, nor do I now repent that I have thus defended myself; but I should much rather choose to die, after having made this apology, than to live after that manner. For neither in a judicial process, nor in battle, is it proper that I or any other should devise how he may by any means avoid death; since in battle it is frequently evident that a man might easily avoid death by throwing away his arms, and suppliantly converting himself to his pursuers. There are also many other devices in other dangers, by which he who dares to do and say any thing may escape death. To fly from death however, O Athenians, is not difficult, but it is much more difficult to fly from depravity; for it runs swifter than death. And now I indeed, as being slow and old, am caught by the slower; but my accusers, as being skilful and swift, are caught by the swifter of these two, improbity. Now too, I indeed depart, condemned by you to death; but they being condemned by truth, depart to depravity and injustice. And I acquiesce in this decision, and they also. Perhaps, therefore, it is necessary that these things should subsist in this manner, and I think they subsist properly.

In the next place, I desire to predict to you who have condemned me, what will be your fate. For I am now in that situation in which men especially prophecy¹, viz. when they are about to die. For I say, that you, my murderers, will immediately after my death be punished², by dying in a

¹ That men are often prophetic at the point of death is an opinion which may be traced as far as to the time of Homer, and is doubtless of infinite antiquity.

² This prediction was fulfilled almost immediately after the death of Socrates. The Athenians repented of their cruelty; and his accusers were universally despised and shunned. One of them, Melitus, was torn in pieces; another, Anytus, was expelled the Heraclea, to which he fled for shelter; and others destroyed themselves. And, in addition to this, a raging plague soon after desolated Athens.

manner,

manner, by Jupiter, much more severe than I shall. For now you have done this, thinking you should be liberated from the necessity of giving an account of your life. The very contrary however, as I say, will happen to you: for many will be your accusers, whom I have restrained, though you did not perceive it. These too will be more troublesome, because they are younger, and will be more indignant against you. For, if you think that by putting men to death you will restrain others from upbraiding you that you do not live well, you are much mistaken; since this mode of liberation is neither sufficiently efficacious nor becoming. But this is the most beautiful and the most easy mode, not to disturb others, but to act in such a manner that you may be most excellent characters. And thus much I prophesy to those of you who condemned me.

But to you who have acquitted me by your decision, I would willingly speak concerning this affair during the time that the magistrates are at leisure, and before I am brought to the place where it is necessary I should die. Attend to me, therefore, O Athenians, during that time. For nothing hinders our conversing with each other, as long as we are permitted so to do; since I wish to demonstrate to you, as friends, the meaning of that which has just now happened to me. To me then, O my judges, (and in calling you judges I rightly denominate you,) a certain wonderful circumstance has happened. For the prophetic voice of the dæmon, which opposed me in the most trifling affairs, if I was about to act in any thing improperly, prior to this, I was continually accustomed to hear; but now, though these things have happened to me which you see, and which some one would think to be the extremity of evils, yet neither when I departed from home in the morning was the signal of the God adverse to me, nor when I ascended hither to the place of judgment, nor when I was about to speak,—though at other times it frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. But now, in this affair, it has never been adverse to me, either in word or deed. I will now, therefore, tell you what I apprehend to be the cause of this. For this thing which has happened appears to me to be good; nor do those of us apprehend rightly who think death to be an evil; of which this appears to me to be a great argument, that the accustomed signal would have opposed me, unless I had been about to do something good.

After this manner too we may conceive that there is abundant hope that
death

death is good. For to die is one of two things. For it is either to be as it were nothing¹, and to be deprived of all sensation; or, as it is said, it is a certain mutation and migration of the soul from this to another place. And whether no sensation remains, but death is like sleep when unattended with any dreams, in this case death will be a gain. For, if any one compares such a night as this, in which he so profoundly sleeps as not even to see a dream, with the other nights and days of his life, and should declare how many he had passed better and more pleasantly than this night, I think that not only a private man, but even the great king himself, would find so small a number that they might be easily counted. If, therefore, death is a thing of this kind, I say it is a gain: for thus the whole of future time appears to be nothing more than one night. But if again death is a migration from hence to another place, and the assertion is true that all the dead are there, what greater good, O my judges, can there be than this? For if some one arriving at Hades, being liberated from these who pretend to be judges, should find those who are true judges, and who are said to judge there, viz. Minos and Rhadamanthus, Æacus and Triptolemus, and such others of the demigods as lived justly, would this be a vile journey? At what rate would you not purchase a conference with Orpheus and Musæus, with Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often, if these things are true. For to me the association will be admirable, when I shall meet with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and any other of the antients who died through an unjust decision. The comparing my case with theirs will, I think, be no unpleasing employment to me. But the greatest pleasure will consist in passing my time there, as I have done here, in interrogating and exploring who among them is wise, and who fancies himself to be but is not so. What, O my judges, would not any one give for a conference with him who led that mighty army against Troy, or with Ulysses, or Sisyphus, or ten thousand others, both men and women, that might be mentioned? For to converse and associate with these would be an inestimable felicity. For I should not be capitally condemned on this account by those that dwell there; since they are in other respects more happy than those that

¹ The reader must not imagine by this that Socrates calls in question the immortality of the soul; for this, as he will see, he demonstrates in the *Phædo*.

live here, and are for the rest of time immortal, if the assertions respecting these things are true.

You, therefore, O my judges, ought to entertain good hopes with respect to death, and to be firmly persuaded of this one thing, that to a good man nothing is evil, neither while living nor when dead, and that his concerns are never neglected by the Gods. Nor is my present condition the effect of chance; but this is evident to me, that now to die, and be liberated from the affairs of life, is better for me. On this account the accustomed signal did not in this affair oppose me. Nor am I very indignant with those that accused and condemned me, though their intention in so doing was to injure me; and for this they deserve to be blamed. Thus much however I request of them: That you will punish my sons when they grow up, if they cause you the same molestation that I have; and if they shall appear to you to pay more attention to riches or any thing else than to virtue, and shall think themselves to be something when they are nothing, that you will reprobate them as I do you, as neglecting the care of things to which they ought to attend, and conceiving themselves to be of some consequence when they are of no worth. If ye do these things, your conduct both towards me and my sons will be just. But it is now time to depart hence,—for me indeed to die, but for you to live. Which of us however will arrive at a better¹ thing, is perfectly immanifest except to Divinity.

¹ It is always good for a good man to die with respect to himself; but it is often better for the community that he should live. It is likewise frequently better for a bad man to live than to die, in order that his latent vices may be called forth into energy; and besides this, he is frequently an instrument in the hand of Divinity of good to others. Socrates, therefore, with no less accuracy than profundity says, that Divinity only knows whether it is better for him to die, than for his accusers to live; for this could only be ascertained by a very extensive knowledge of futurity; and consequently could only be manifest to Divinity.

THE CRITO:

OR

CONCERNING TRUE AND JUST OPINION.

THE CRITO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CRITO.

SCENE.—*The Prison of SOCRATES.*

SOCRATES.

WHY came you at this early hour, Crito? Or is it not yet morning?

CRITO. It is.

SOC. But what time of the morning is it?

CRITO. It is now the break of day.

SOC. I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you.

CRITO. He is accustomed to me, Socrates, in consequence of my frequently coming hither; and he is also in a certain respect under obligations to me.

SOC. Did you come just now, or some time ago?

CRITO. It is a considerable time since I came.

SOC. But why did you not immediately call me, and not sit down in silence?

CRITO. Not so, by Jupiter, Socrates; nor should I myself be willing to be so long a time awake and in sorrow. But I have for some time admired you, on perceiving how sweetly you slept. And I designedly did not call you, that you might continue in that pleasant condition. Indeed I have often

¹ The Crito is disposed after a manner so regular and plain, that it requires no Introduction. I shall therefore only observe, that it admirably teaches us to despise the opinions of the vulgar, to endure calamities patiently, and to consider the good of the whole as incomparably more important than that of a part.

and

and formerly through the whole of your life considered you as happy on account of your manners, but far more so in the present calamity, because you bear it so easily and mildly.

SOC. But it would be absurd, Crito, if a man of my age were to be indignant when it is necessary for him to die.

CRI. And yet others, Socrates, equally old, when they have been involved in such-like calamities, have notwithstanding their age been indignant with their present fortune.

SOC. It is so. But why did you come to me so early?

CRI. I come, Socrates, bearing a message not unpleasant to you, as it appears to me, but bitter and weighty to me and to all your associates; and which I indeed shall bear most heavily.

SOC. What is it? Is the ship¹ come from Delos, on the arrival of which it is necessary I should die?

CRI. Not yet; but it appears to me, from what certain persons coming from Sunium have announced, and who left it there, that it will arrive to-day. From these messengers, therefore, it is evident that it will be here to-day; and consequently it will be necessary for you, Socrates, to die to-morrow.

SOC. But with good fortune, Crito: and if it please the Gods, be it so. Yet I do not think that it will arrive here to-day.

CRI. Whence do you infer this?

SOC. I will tell you. For on the day after, or on the very day in which the ship arrives, it is necessary that I should die.

CRI. Those that have power over these things say so.

SOC. I do not, therefore, think it will come this, but the next day. But I infer this from a certain dream which I saw this night a little before you came; and you appear very opportunely not to have disturbed me.

CRI. But what was this dream?

SOC. A certain woman, beautiful, of a pleasing aspect and in white raiment, seemed to approach, and calling me to say, The third day hence, O Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia².

CRI.

¹ See The Phædo, near the beginning.

² What this woman said to Socrates in a dream is taken from the ninth book of the Iliad, and belongs to the speech of Achilles on the embassy to him from Agamemnon. The original is

CRI. What a strange dream, Socrates !

Soc. Manifest however, as it appears to me, O Crito.

CRI. Very much so, as it seems. But, O blessed Socrates, be now persuaded by me, and save yourself. For, if you die, not one calamity only will befall me ; but, exclusively of being deprived of you, an associate so necessary as I never have found any other to be, those who do not well know me and you, will think that I might have saved you if I had been willing to spend my money, but that I neglected to do so. Though what can be more base than such an opinion, by which I should appear to value riches more than my friends ? For the multitude will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, though we endeavoured to effect your escape.

Soc. But why, O blessed Crito, should we so much respect the opinion of the multitude ? For the most worthy men, whose opinion ought rather to be regarded, will think these things to have been so transacted as they were.

CRI. Nevertheless you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude. For the present circumstances now evince that the multitude can effect not the smallest of evils, but nearly the greatest, if any one is calumniated by them.

Soc. I wish, O Crito, the multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good : for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise, nor destitute of wisdom ; but they do whatever casually takes place.

CRI. Let these things be so. But answer me, Socrates, whether your concern for me and the rest of your associates prevents you from escaping hence, lest we should be molested by calumniators, as having fraudulently taken you from hence, and be forced either to lose all our property, or a great sum of money, or to suffer something else besides this ? For, if you fear any such thing, bid farewell to it. For we shall be just in saving you from this danger, and, if it were requisite, from one even greater than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not act otherwise.

Soc. I pay attention to these things, Crito, and also to many others.

ἡματι κιν τριτατῇ Φθίνν εἰς ὦλον ἵκοιμην. As Socrates applied what is here said in the dream to a returning to his true country, the intelligible world, he confirms the explanation of the Trojan war which we have given from Proclus in the Notes on the Phædrus.

CRI.

CRI. Do not, therefore, dread these things. For those who have agreed to save you, and to take you from hence, demand no great sum for this purpose. And, in the next place, do you not see how poor your calumniators are, and that on this account your liberty may be purchased at a small expense? My property too, which I think is sufficient, is at your service. And if, out of regard to me, you do not think fit to accept my offer, these guests here are readily disposed to pay what may be necessary. One also among them, Simmias the Theban, has brought with him a sum of money sufficient for this purpose. Cebes, too, and very many others are ready to do the same: so that, as I said, neither fearing these things, should you hesitate to save yourself, nor should you be troubled on leaving the city (as in court you said you should) from not knowing how to conduct yourself. For in many other places, wherever you may go, you will be beloved. And if you are disposed to go to Thessaly, you will there find my guests, who will pay you every attention, and will render your abode there so secure, that no one in Thessaly will molest you. Besides this, Socrates, neither do you appear to me to attempt a just thing, in betraying when you might save yourself; and in endeavouring to promote the earnest wishes of your enemies, who strive to destroy you. To this I may also add, that you appear to me to betray your own children, whom it is incumbent on you to maintain and educate; and, as far as pertains to you, leave them to the guidance of chance; though it is likely that such things will happen to them as orphans are wont to experience. However, either it is not proper to beget children, or it is requisite to labour in rearing and instructing them when begotten. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent mode of conduct; though it is proper that you should choose such things as a good and brave man would adopt, especially as you profess to have made virtue the object of your attention through the whole of life. I am, therefore, ashamed both for you, and those familiars who are our associates as well as yours, lest the whole affair concerning you should appear to have been accomplished through a certain cowardice on our part. And in the first place, your standing a trial which might have been prevented; in the next place, your defence; and, in the last place, the extremity to which you are now brought, will be placed to the account of our viciousness and cowardice, and will be considered as so many ridiculous circumstances which

might have been avoided, if we had exerted ourselves even in a trifling degree. See, therefore, O Socrates, whether these things, besides being evil, will not also be disgraceful both to you and us. Advise then with yourself quickly, though indeed there is no time for consultation; for on the following night all this must be done. But, if we delay, it will be impossible to effect your escape. By all means, therefore, be persuaded by me, Socrates, and do not in any respect otherwise.

Soc. My dear Crito, your alacrity is very commendable, if it is attended with a certain rectitude; but if not, by how much the greater it is, by so much is it the more blameable. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether these things ought to be done or not. For I am a man of that kind, not only now but always, who acts in obedience to that reason which appears to me on mature deliberation to be the best. And the reasons which I have formerly adopted, I am not able now to reject in my present fortune, but they nearly appear to me to be similar: and I venerate and honour the same principles as formerly; so that, unless we have any thing better to adduce at present than these, be well assured that I shall not comply with your request, not though the power of the multitude should endeavour to terrify us like children, by threatening more bonds and deaths, and ablations of property.

CRI. How, therefore, may we consider these things in the best manner?

Soc. If, in the first place, we resume that which you said concerning opinions, considering whether it was well said by us or not, that to some opinions we ought to pay attention, and to others not; or rather indeed, before it was necessary that I should die, it was well said, but now it becomes evident that it was asserted for the sake of discussion, though in reality it was merely a jest and a trifle. I desire, however, O Crito, to consider, in common with you, whether that assertion appears to me in my present condition to be different, or the same, and whether we shall bid farewell to or be persuaded by it. But thus I think it is every where said by those who appear to say any thing pertinently, that, as I just now asserted of the opinions which men opine, some ought to be very much attended to, and others not. By the Gods, Crito, does not this appear to you to be well said? For you, so far as relates to human power, are out of danger of dying to-morrow, and such a calamity as the present will not seduce you into

a false decision. Consider then: does it not appear to you to have been asserted with sufficient rectitude, that it is not fit to reverence all the opinions of men, but that some should be honoured and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men, but those of some and not those of others? What do you say? Are not these things well said?

CRI. Well.

Soc. Are not worthy opinions, therefore, to be honoured, but base opinions not?

CRI. They are.

Soc. And are not worthy opinions those of wise men; but base opinions those of the unwise?

CRI. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Come then, let us again consider how things of this kind were asserted. Whether does he who is conversant in gymnastic exercises pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of that one man alone who is a physician, or the preceptor of boys in their bodily exercises?

CRI. Of that one alone.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, proper that he should fear the blame and embrace the praise of that one, but not the praise and blame of the multitude?

CRI. Evidently.

Soc. In this manner, therefore, he ought to act and exercise himself, and also to eat and drink, which appears fit to the one who presides and knows, rather than in that which may appear to be proper to all others.

CRI. Certainly.

Soc. Be it so. But if he is disobedient to that one, and disregards his opinion and his praise, but honours the opinion and praise of the multitude, who know nothing, will he not suffer some evil?

CRI. How is it possible he should not?

Soc. But what is this evil, whither does it tend, and to which of the things pertaining to him who is disobedient?

CRI. Evidently to his body, for this it corrupts.

Soc. You speak well. We must form the same conclusion, therefore, Crito, in other things, that we may not run through all of them. With respect,

respect, therefore, to things just and unjust, base and beautiful, good and evil, and which are now the subjects of our consultation, whether ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude, and to dread it, or that of one man if there is any one knowing in these things, whom we ought to reverence and fear rather than all others; to whom if we are not obedient, we shall corrupt and injure that which becomes better by the just, but is destroyed by the unjust? Or is this nothing?

CRI. I think, Socrates, we ought to follow the opinion of that one.

Soc. Come then, if not being persuaded by the opinion of those that are judges, we destroy that which becomes better by the salubrious, but is corrupted by the infalubrious, can we live after this destruction? But is not this very thing of which we are speaking the body?

CRI. Yes.

Soc. Can we, therefore, live after the body is depraved and corrupted?

CRI. By no means.

Soc. But can we live when that is corrupted which is injured by the unjust, but benefited by the just? Or shall we think that to be viler than the body, whatever it may be, pertaining to us, about which justice and injustice subsist?

CRI. By no means.

Soc. It is, therefore, more honourable.

CRI. By far.

Soc. We should not, therefore, O best of men, be so very much concerned about what the multitude say of us, but what that one man who knows what is just and unjust, and what truth itself is, asserts respecting us. So that you did not act rightly at first, in introducing the opinion of the multitude concerning things just, beautiful and good, and the contraries of these, as that to which we ought to pay attention. Though some one may say that the multitude are able to destroy us.

CRI. Some one, Socrates, may indeed say so.

Soc. True. But, O wonderful man, the assertion which we have discussed appears to me to be dissimilar and prior to this: and again consider whether this is still granted by us, that we are not to admit the merely living, but living well, to be a thing of the greatest consequence.

CRI. It is granted.

Soc. And is this also granted, or not, that it is the same thing to live well, beautifully, and justly?

CRI. It is.

Soc. From what has been assented to, therefore, this must be considered, whether it is just for me to endeavour to depart hence, the Athenians not dismissing me, or whether it is not just. And if it should appear to be just indeed, we should endeavour to accomplish it; but if not, we must bid farewell to the attempt. For as to the considerations which you adduce concerning money, opinion, and the education of children, see, Crito, whether these are not in reality the reflections of the vulgar, who rashly put men to death, and if it were in their power would recall them to life, and this without being at all guided by intellect. But by us, since reason requires it, nothing else is to be considered than as we just now said, whether we shall act justly in giving money and thanks to those who may lead me hence; or whether in reality, both we that are led from hence and those that lead us, shall not in all these things act unjustly. And if it should appear that we in so doing shall act unjustly, we must by no means pay attention to these things, rather than to the consideration whether we shall do any thing unjustly, not even if it should be necessary for us to die, staying here and being quiet, or to suffer any thing else whatever.

CRI. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak well; but see what is to be done.

Soc. Let us consider, O good man, in common; and if you can in any respect contradict what I say, contradict me, and I will assent to you; but if you cannot, cease, O blessed man, to repeat often to me the same thing, that I ought to depart hence, though the Athenians are unwilling. For I shall think it a great thing if you can persuade me thus to act, but not if you attempt this contrary to my will. See then, whether the beginning of this consideration satisfies you, and endeavour to answer the interrogation in such a way as you especially think it is proper.

CRI. I will endeavour.

Soc. Shall we say then, that we should by no means willingly act unjustly? Or may we in a certain respect act unjustly, and in a certain respect not? Or is to act unjustly by no means neither good nor beautiful, as we have often confessed before, and as we just now said? Or are all those things which we formerly

formerly assented to dissipated in these few days; and has it for some time been concealed from us, that though we are so old, yet in seriously discoursing with each other, we have in no respect differed from children? Or does it not thus subsist more than any thing, as we then said, whether the multitude admit it or not? And whether it be necessary that we should suffer things still more grievous, or such as are milder than these, at the same time shall we say or not that to act unjustly is evil and base to him who thus acts?

CRI. We shall say so.

Soc. By no means, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

CRI. We ought not.

Soc. Neither, therefore, ought he who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is by no means proper to act unjustly.

CRI. So it appears.

Soc. But what then? Is it proper to do evil to any one, O Crito, or not?

CRI. It is not proper, Socrates.

Soc. But what? Is it just to repay evil with evil, as the multitude say, or is it not just?

CRI. By no means.

Soc. For he who does evil to men, differs in no respect from him who acts unjustly.

CRI. Your assertion is true.

Soc. Neither, therefore, is it proper to return an injury, nor to do evil to any man, however you may be injured by him. But see, Crito, while you acknowledge these things, that you do not assent to them contrary to your opinion. For I know that these things appear to and are opined by very few. But those to whom these things appear, and those to whom they do not, disagree with each other in their decisions; and it is necessary that these should despise each other, while they look to each other's deliberations. Do you therefore consider, and very diligently, whether it thus appears to you in common with me, and whether deliberating we should begin from hence, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when suffering evil to revenge it by doing evil in return; or, whether you will depart and not agree with us in this principle. For it thus appears to me both formerly and now; but if it in any respect appears otherwise

to you, speak and inform me. And if you acquiesce in what has been said above, hear what follows.

CRI. But I do acquiesce and accord with you. Speak, therefore.

Soc. I will say then that which is consequent to this, or rather I will ask you, whether when a man has promised to do things that are just, he ought to do them, or to break his promise.

CRI. He ought to do them.

Soc. From these things then thus consider. If we should depart hence without the consent of the city, shall we do evil to certain persons, and those such as we ought not in the smallest degree to injure, or shall we not? And shall we acquiesce in those things which we assented to as being just; or shall we not?

CRI. I cannot reply to your question, Socrates: for I do not understand it.

Soc. But thus consider. If to us, intending to escape from hence, or in whatever manner it may be requisite to denominate it, the Laws and the Republic should present themselves in a body, and thus address us,—Tell us, O Socrates, what is it you intend to do? Do you conceive that by this thing which you attempt, you will destroy any thing else than, as far as you are able, us the Laws, and the whole city? Or does it appear to you to be possible for that city to subsist and not be subverted, in which Justice is not only without strength, but is likewise divested of its authority and corrupted by private persons?—What should we say, Crito, to these things, and to others of a similar kind? For much might be said, and particularly by rhetoricians, on the subversion of that law which provides that sentences once passed shall not be infringed. Shall we say to them that the city has not passed an equitable sentence upon us? Shall we say this, or something else?

CRI. This, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Will not the Laws then thus address us? O Socrates, has it not been admitted by us and you, that you should acquiesce in the sentence which the city has passed? If, therefore, we should wonder at the Laws thus speaking, perhaps they would say, Be not surprised, O Socrates, at what we have asserted, but answer, since you are accustomed both to interrogate and reply. For what is the charge against us and the city, for which you
endeavour

endeavour to destroy you? Did we not first beget you? And was it not through us that your father married your mother, and planted you? Tell us, therefore, whether you blame these laws of ours concerning marriage as improper? I should say I do not blame them. But do you blame those laws concerning the nurture and education of children in which you were yourself instructed? Or did not the laws framed for this purpose order in a becoming manner when they commanded your father to instruct you in music and gymnastic? I should say they ordered well. Since then we begot and nourished and educated you, can you deny that both you and your progenitors are our offspring and servants? And if this be the case, do you think that there is an equality¹ of justice between us and you, and that it is just for you to attempt to do those things to us which we endeavour to do to you? Or will you admit that there is no equality of justice between you and your father, or master, if you happen to have either of them, so that you are not to return to these any evil you may suffer from them, nor, when they reproach you, contradict them, nor, when they strike you, strike them again, nor do many other things of a similar nature; but that against your country and the Laws it is lawful for you to act in this manner, so that if we endeavour to destroy you, thinking it to be just, you also should endeavour, as far as you are able, to destroy in return, us the Laws and your country, and should say that in so doing you act justly,—you who in reality make virtue the object of your care? Or, are you so wise as to be ignorant that your country is more honourable, venerable and holy, than your mother and father, and all the rest of your progenitors, and ranks higher both among the Gods and among men endued with intellect? That it is also more necessary for a man to venerate, obey and assent to his country, when conducting itself with severity, than to his father? Likewise that he should be persuaded by it, and do what it orders? That he should quietly suffer, if it orders him to suffer? And that, if it commands him to be beaten, or confined in bonds, or sends him to battle to be wounded or slain, he should do these things, and that it is just to comply? And that he should neither decline nor recede from nor desert his rank; but in war, in a court

¹ Wholes in the order of nature are more excellent than parts; and in consequence of this, as being more honourable, there is no reciprocity of obligation between the two.

of justice, and every where, the commands of the city and his country should be obeyed ; or he should persuade his country to that which is naturally just ; but that it is not holy to offer violence either to a mother or a father, and much less to one's country ?—What shall we say to these things, Crito ? Shall we acknowledge that the Laws speak the truth or not ?

CRI. To me it appears that they do.

Soc. Consider, therefore, O Socrates, perhaps the Laws will say, whether our assertion is true, that your present attempt against us is unjust. For we are the authors of your birth, we nourished, we educated you, imparting both to you and all the other citizens all the good in our power, at the same time proclaiming, that every Athenian who is willing has the liberty of departing wherever he pleases, with all his property, if after having explored and seen the affairs of the city, and us the Laws, we should not be constituted according to his wishes. Nor does any one of us the Laws impede or forbid any one of you from migrating into some colony, or any other place, with all his property, if we and the city do not please him. But, on the other hand, if any one of you continues to live here after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice, and govern the city in other particulars, we now say, that he in reality acknowledges to us, that he will do such things as we may command. We also say, that he who is not obedient is triply unjust, because he is disobedient to his begetters, and to those by whom he was educated ; and because, having promised to be persuaded by us, he is neither persuaded, nor does he persuade us, if we do any thing improperly ; though at the same time we only propose, and do not fiercely command him to do what we order, but leave to his choice one of two things, either to persuade us, or to obey our mandates ; and yet he does neither of these.

And we say that you also, O Socrates, will be obnoxious to these crimes if you execute what you intend to do ; nor will you be the least, but the most obnoxious of all the Athenians. If, therefore, I should ask them the reason of this, they would perhaps justly reproach me by saying, that I promised to submit to all these conditions beyond the rest of the Athenians. For they would say, This, O Socrates, is a great argument with us, that both we and the city were pleasing to you ; that you especially of all the Athenians would never have dwelt in it, if it had not been particularly agreeable to you. For you never left the city for any of the public spectacles except once, when you
went

went to the Isthmian games, nor did you ever go elsewhere, except in your military expeditions. You never went any other journey like other men; nor had you ever any desire of seeing any other city, or becoming acquainted with any other laws; but we and our city were sufficient for you, so exceedingly were you attached to us, and so much did you consent to be governed by our mandates. Besides, you have procreated children in this city, in consequence of being pleased with it. Further still, in this very judicial process, you might have been condemned to exile, if you had been willing, and might then have executed with the consent of the city what you now attempt without it. Then however you carried yourself loftily, as one who would not be indignant, if it were requisite that you should die; but you preferred, as you said, death to exile. But now you are neither ashamed of those assertions, nor do you revere us the Laws, since you endeavour to destroy us. You also do that which the most vile slave would do, by endeavouring to make your escape contrary to the compacts and agreements according to which you consented to become a member of this community. In the first place, therefore, answer us this very thing, whether we speak the truth in asserting, that you consented to be governed by us in reality, and not merely in words? Do we in asserting this speak the truth? What shall we say to these things, Crito? Can we say any thing else than that we assent to them?

CRI. It is necessary so to do, Socrates.

Soc. Do you not then, they will say, violate these compacts and agreements between us; which you consented to neither from necessity nor through deception, nor in consequence of being compelled to deliberate in a short time; but during the space of seventy years, in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us, and the compacts had appeared to you to be unjust? You however neither preferred Lacedæmon nor Crete, which you are perpetually saying are governed by good laws, nor any other city of the Greeks or Barbarians; but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind, and other mutilated persons. So much did the city and we the Laws please you beyond the rest of the Athenians. For who can be pleased with a city without the laws? But now you do not abide by the compacts. You will however abide by them if you are persuaded by us, Socrates, and do not become ridiculous by escaping from the city.

For consider what advantage can be derived either to yourself or your friends by violating those compacts. For in consequence of your escaping from hence, it is nearly evident that your friends will be exposed to the danger either of banishment, or of the loss of their property. And as for yourself, if you retire to any neighbouring city, whether Thebes or Megara (for both are governed by good laws), you will be considered, Socrates, as an enemy to their polity. And such as have any regard for their country will look upon you as a corrupter of the laws. You will also confirm them in their good opinion of your judges, who will appear to have very properly condemned you. For he who is a corrupter of the laws will very much appear to be a corrupter of youth and of stupid men. Will you then avoid these well-governed cities, and men of the most elegant manners? Supposing you should, will it, therefore, be worth while for you to live? Or, should you go to these cities, will you not blush, Socrates, to discourse about the same things as you did here, viz. that virtue and justice, legal institutes, and the laws, should be objects of the greatest attention to men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You must necessarily think so. But perhaps, avoiding these cities, you will go to Theffaly, to the guests of Crito. For there there is the greatest disorder and intemperance. And perhaps they will willingly hear you relating how ridiculously you escaped from prison, investing yourself with a certain apparatus, such as a skin, or something else which those that make their escape are accustomed to provide, and thus altering your usual appearance.

Do you think no one will say, that you, though an old man, and likely to live but a very little longer, have dared to desire life with such sordid avidity, and to transgress the greatest laws? Perhaps this will be the case, though you should not have offended any one. But if you should, you will hear, Socrates, many things unworthy of you. You will however live obnoxious, and in subjection to all men. But what will you do in Theffaly besides feasting? having come to Theffaly as to a supper. And where shall we find those discourses concerning justice, and the other virtues?—But do you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may nurture and instruct them? What then? Bringing them to Theffaly, will you there educate them, making them to be stranger guests, that they may also derive this advantage from you? Or, if you should not do this, but should leave them here, will they be better nurtured and

educated in your absence? for your friends will take care of them. Do you suppose then that your children will be taken care of by your friends if you go to Theffaly, and that they will be neglected by them if you depart to Hades? If indeed any advantage is to be derived from those that call themselves your friends, it is proper to think that they will not.

But, O Socrates, being persuaded by us your nurses, neither pay more attention to your children, nor to life, nor to any thing else than to justice, that, when you arrive at Hades, you may be able to defend all these particulars to the rulers there. For if, transgressing the laws, you should thus act, it will neither be better, nor more just, nor more holy to yourself, nor to any one of your friends; nor will it be more advantageous to you when you arrive at Hades. But you will depart, if you do depart, not injured by us the Laws, but by men. If however you should so disgracefully escape, returning injury for injury, and evil for evil, transgressing your agreements and compacts with us, and injuring those whom you ought not to injure in the smallest degree, viz. yourself, your friends, your country, and us;—in this case, we shall be indignant with you as long as you live; and in another life, our brothers the Laws who reside in Hades will not benevolently receive you; knowing that you attempted, as far as you was able, to destroy us. Let not Crito, therefore, rather than us, persuade you to do what he says.

Be well assured, my dear friend Crito, that I seem to hear these things, just as those who are agitated with Corybantic fury appear to hear the melody of pipes. And the sound of these words, like the humming of bees, in my ears, renders me incapable of hearing any thing else. You see then what appears to me at present; and if you should say any thing contrary to these things, you will speak in vain. At the same time, if you think that any thing more should be done, tell me.

CRIT. But, Socrates, I have nothing further to say.

SOC. Desist, therefore, Crito, and let us adopt this conduct, since Divinity persuades us thus to act.

THE END OF THE CRITO.

THE PHÆDO:

A

DIALOGUE

ON

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHÆDO.

THE following dialogue is no less remarkable for the masterly manner of its composition, than for the different effects which the perusal of it is related to have formerly produced. For the arguments which it contains for the immortality of the soul, are said to have incited Cleombrotus to suicide, and to have dissuaded Olympiodorus, an eminent Platonic philosopher, from its perpetration. Indeed, it is by no means wonderful that a person like Cleombrotus, ignorant (as his conduct evinces) that the death so much inculcated in this dialogue is a philosophic, and not a natural death, should be led to an action which is in most cases highly criminal. This ignorance however is not peculiar to Cleombrotus, since I am afraid there are scarcely any of the present day who know that it is one thing for the soul to be separated from the body, and another for the body to be separated from the soul, and that the former is by no means a necessary consequence of the latter.

This philosophic death, or separation of the soul from the body, which forms one of the most leading particulars of the dialogue, is no other than the exercise of the cathartic virtues, of which the reader will find a copious explanation in the following notes. That these virtues are not figments of the latter Platonists, as some ignorant verbalists have rashly asserted, is not only evident from the first part of this dialogue, but from the Golden Pythagorean verses, which are certainly of greater antiquity than even the writings of Plato: for the following is one of the precepts in these verses—

Ἀλλ' εἰργον βρωτων, ὡν εἰπομεν, ἐν τε καθάρμοις,
Ἐν τε γυσει ψυχῆς κρινων

i. e. "Abstain

i. e. "Abstain from the foods of which we have spoken in the PURIFICATIONS and SOLUTION of the soul." And the employment of cathartic virtue entirely consists in *purifying* the soul and liberating it from all attachment to the body, as far as the condition of its union with it will permit.

Of the arguments adduced by Socrates in this dialogue, some, as will be shown in the notes, only demonstrate that the soul subsisted prior to, and will survive the dissolution of, the body, but do not prove that it has a *perpetual* existence; but others demonstrate, and with an invincible force, that the soul is *truly immortal*. Should it seem strange, and to those who are not deeply skilled in the philosophy of Plato it doubtless will, that Socrates in no part of this dialogue introduces that argument for the immortality of the soul which he adopts in the *Phædrus*, an argument drawn from the rational soul being the origin of motion, and which may be said to possess adamantine strength,—it is necessary to observe, in answer to this doubt, that, in the *Phædrus*, Socrates demonstrates the immortality of every rational soul, viz. the human, dæmoniacal and divine; but in the *Phædo* he alone demonstrates the immortality of the human soul.

But though some of the arguments in this dialogue are perfectly demonstrative, yet certain modern writers, from not understanding, have not only attempted to invalidate them, but have been induced to imagine that Socrates himself, convinced of their insufficiency, insinuates in the course of the dialogue the necessity of a divine revelation in order to obtain a full conviction of this most important truth. As this is an opinion no less dangerous than erroneous, I shall present the reader with the passage that gave occasion to it, and then unfold to him from ancient sources its genuine explanation.

About the middle of this dialogue, then, Simmias observes as follows:—
 "As to myself, Socrates, I am perhaps of the same opinion about these particulars as yourself; that to know them clearly in the present life is either impossible, or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been said in every possible way, and to desist before, by an arduous investigation on all sides, weariness is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is necessary in things of this kind either to learn or to discover the manner of their subsistence; or, if both these are impossible, then by receiving the best of human reasons, and that which is

the most difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and sail in it through the ocean of life, unless some one should be able to be carried more safely and with less danger by means of a firmer vehicle, or a certain *divine reason*." Here, in the first place, it must be observed, that it is Simmias who thus speaks, an imperfect disciple of his great master, as is evident from many parts of this dialogue, and not Socrates himself. And, in the next place, though it should be urged that Socrates himself is here said by Simmias to have admitted that "to know these particulars ¹ clearly in the present life is either impossible or a thing very difficult to obtain," it must be observed, that Socrates thus speaks from a deep conviction that this sublime truth, the immortality of the soul, could not be fully comprehended by his auditors, who were very far from being masters in philosophy, and that this must be the case with the multitude in general. Hence, he says, it is either impossible or very difficult to obtain this knowledge.—To the *multitude* it is impossible, and to the *few* very difficult, because it requires many preparatory disciplines, and a genius naturally adapted to sublime speculations.

In the third place, by a *firmer vehicle, or a certain divine reason*, Socrates does not allude to a divine tradition, since this affords no higher evidence than that of opinion. It is well observed, therefore, by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Scholia on this dialogue, that by this *θεῖος λόγος*, or *divine reason*, we must understand *self-beholding intellect*, which, agreeably to Plato's description of it in the Phædrus, associates with Deity itself. Τῷ δ' ἀσφαλεστέρος, καὶ ἀκινδυνότερος, καὶ βεβαιότερος, καὶ θεῖος λόγος; οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὡς φασιν ὁ θεὸς ἐκδοθεῖς, δοξαστικός γὰρ ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος; ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ εἰρημένος αὐτοπτικός νοῦς, ὁ θεὸς τῷ ὄντι συνῶν, ὡς ἐν Φαιδρῳ. In order however to understand what Olympiodorus means by *self-beholding intellect*, it is necessary to observe, that there are four modes of knowledge which we are able to acquire in the present life. The first of these results from opinion, by which we learn *that* a thing is, without knowing *the why*: and this constitutes that part of knowledge which was called by Aristotle and Plato *παιδεία*, or erudition; and which consists in moral instructions, for the purpose of purifying ourselves from immoderate passions. But the second is produced by the sciences; in which, from establishing certain principles as hypotheses, we deduce necessary conclusions, and arrive

¹ Viz. the particulars pertaining to the past and future existence of the soul.

at the knowledge of *the why* (as in the mathematical sciences); but at the same time we are ignorant with respect to the principles of these conclusions, because they are merely hypothetical. The third species of knowledge is that which results from Plato's dialectic; in which, by a progression through all ideas, we arrive at the first principle of things, and at that which is no longer hypothetical; and this by dividing some things and analysing others, by producing many things from one thing, and one thing from many. But the fourth species is still more simple than this; because it no longer uses analyses or compositions, definitions or demonstrations, but by a simple and self-vivifying energy of intellect speculates things themselves, and by intuition and contact becomes one with the object of its perception; and this energy is the *divine reason* which Plato speaks of in the present passage, and which far transcends the evidence of the most divine revelation; since this last is at best but founded in opinion, while the former surpasses even the indubitable certainty of science.

In short, that Socrates, and consequently Plato, firmly believed in this most important truth, is evident from the Phædrus and the tenth book of the Republic; and in the seventh Epistle of Plato there is the following remarkable passage:—*πειθεσθαι δε ουτως αει χρη τοις παλαιοις τε και ιεροις λογοις ηδη μηνουσιν ημιν αθανατον ψυχην ειναι, δικαστας τε ισχειν, και τινειν τας μεγαistas τιμωριας, οταν τις απαλλαξη του σωματος.* i. e. "It is proper indeed always to believe in *antient and sacred discourses*, which announce to us that the soul is immortal, and that it has judges of its conduct, and suffers the greatest punishments when it is liberated from the body." From which passage we also learn, that the immortality of the soul is a doctrine of the highest antiquity, and that it was delivered in the sacred writings of the heathens.

I shall only observe further, that the character of Socrates, as exhibited in this dialogue, in the Crito, and in the Apology, is so transcendently great, and displays such a perfection of justice, fortitude and piety, that it may be considered as a most splendid instance of the moral and intellectual excellence which human nature is capable of attaining, and an example of consummate wisdom and virtue, which will be imitated by the few in all future ages.

THE PHÆDO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

ECHECRATES AND PHÆDO.

ECHECRATES.

WERE you present, Phædo, with Socrates that day when he drank the poison in prison? or did you hear an account of it from any other?

PHÆD. I myself, Echeocrates, was present.

ECHEC. What then was his discourse previous to his death? and how did he die? for I should be very glad to hear the account: for scarcely does any one of the Phliasian^{*} citizens now visit Athens; and it is some time since any stranger has arrived from thence who might afford us some clear information about these particulars. All indeed that we heard was, that he died through drinking the poison; but he who acquainted us with this had nothing further to say about other particulars of his death.

PHÆD. What! did you not hear the manner in which he was tried?

ECHEC. Yes: a certain person related this to us; and we wondered, as his sentence was passed so long ago, that he should not die till a considerable time after. What then, Phædo, was the reason of this?

PHÆD. A certain fortune happened to him, Echeocrates: for, the day before his trial, the stern of that ship was crowned which the Athenians send every year to Delos.

ECHEC. But what is the meaning of this?

^{*} Phlius was a city of Peloponnesus situated not far from the Isthmus. Vid. Strab. lib. viii. Pausan. in Corinth. et Steph. de Urb. et Pop.

PHÆD. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus formerly carried the twice seven young children to Crete, and preserved both them and himself. The Athenians, therefore, as it is reported, then vowed to Apollo, that if the children were preserved, they would lead every year a sacred spectacle to Delos; which, from that time, they regularly send every year to the God. As soon, therefore, as the preparations for the sacred spectacle commence, the law orders that the city shall be purified, and that no one shall be put to death by a public decree till the ship has arrived at Delos, and again returned to Athens. But this sometimes takes a long time in accomplishing, when the winds impede their passage; but the festival itself commences when the priest of Apollo has crowned the stern of the ship. Now this, as I told you, took place on the day preceding the trial; and on this account that length of time happened to Socrates in prison between his sentence and his death.

ECHEC. And what, Phædo, were the circumstances respecting his death? what were his sayings and actions? and who of his familiars were present with him? or would not the magistrates suffer that any should be admitted to him, so that he died deprived of the presence of his friends?

PHÆD. By no means; but some, and indeed many, were present with him.

ECHEC. Endeavour to relate all these particulars to us in the clearest manner, unless you have some business which may prevent you.

PHÆD. But I am at leisure, and will endeavour to gratify your request: for indeed to call to mind Socrates, whether I myself speak or hear others, is to me always the most pleasant of all things.

ECHEC. Truly, Phædo, others who hear you will be affected in the same manner: but endeavour, as much as you are able, to narrate every circumstance in the most accurate manner.

PHÆD. And indeed I myself, who was present, was wonderfully affected; for I was not influenced with pity, like one present at the death of a familiar: for this man, O Echecrates, appeared to me to be blessed, when I considered his manner and discourses, and his intrepid and generous death. Hence it appeared to me, that he did not descend to Hades without a divine destiny, but that there also he would be in a happy condition, if this can ever be asserted of any one. On this account I was entirely uninfluenced with

with pity, though apparently I ought not to have been, on so mournful an occasion; nor yet again was I influenced by pleasure through philosophical converse, as I used to be; for our discourses were of this kind. But, to speak ingenuously, a certain wonderful passion, and an unusual mixture of pleasure and grief, were present with me, produced by considering that he must in a very short time die. And, indeed, all of us who were present were nearly affected in the same manner, at one time laughing, and at another weeping: but this was eminently the case with one of us, Apollodorus; for you know the man, and his manner of behaviour.

ECHEC. How is it possible that I should not?

PHÆD. He, therefore, was remarkably affected in this manner; and I myself, and others, experienced great trouble and confusion.

ECHEC. Who then, Phædo, happened to be present?

PHÆD. Of the natives, Apollodorus, Critobulus, and his father Crito, were present; likewise Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æschines, and Antisthenes¹. And besides these, Ctesippus² the Pœanian, Menexenus, and some other Athenians were present: but Plato I think was sick.

ECHEC. Were there no strangers?

PHÆD. Yes: Simmias the Theban, Cebes³, and Phædonides; and among the Megarensians, Euclid and Terpsion.

ECHEC. But what! were not Aristippus⁴ and Cleombrotus there?

PHÆD. By no means: for they were said to be at Ægina.

ECHEC. Was any other person present?

PHÆD. I think those I have mentioned were nearly all.

ECHEC. Will you now then relate what were his discourses?

¹ This Antisthenes, as principally imitating Socrates in his endurance and contempt of pleasure, was the author of the Cynic sect, and the preceptor of Diogenes.

² See the Euthydemus, in which the disposition of Ctesippus is described.

³ This Cebes is the author of the allegorical tale now extant.

⁴ A philosopher of Cyrene, and founder of the Cyrenaic sect. What is here said concerning the absence of Aristippus and Cleombrotus is well explained by Demetrius in his book *περί Ερμηνείας*. "Plato, he observes, says this in order to reprove Aristippus and Cleombrotus, who were feasting in Ægina at the time that Socrates was in prison, and did not fail to see their friend and master, though they were then at the entrance of the Athenian harbour. Plato however does not clearly relate these particulars, because his narration would have been an open defamation."

PHÆD.

PHÆD. I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For we were always accustomed to visit Socrates, myself and others meeting in the morning at the place where he was tried, for it was very near to the prison. Here we waited every day till the prison was opened, discoursing among ourselves, for it was not opened very early in the morning; but, as soon as we could be admitted, we went to Socrates, and generally spent the whole day with him. And then, indeed, we met together sooner than usual; for the day before, when we left the prison, we heard that the ship from Delos was returned. We determined, therefore, among ourselves, to come very early in the morning to the usual place; and we met together accordingly: but when we arrived, the goaler, who used to attend upon us, told us to wait, and not enter till he called us. For, says he, the eleven magistrates are now freeing Socrates from his bonds, and announcing to him that he must die to-day. But not long after this he returned, and ordered us to enter. When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his fetters, but Xantippe (you know her) holding one of his children, and sitting by him. As soon, therefore, as Xantippe saw us, she began to lament in a most violent manner, and said such things as are usual with women in affliction; and among the rest, Socrates (says she), this is the last time your friends will speak to you, or you to them. But Socrates looking upon Crito, Crito (says he), let some one take her home. Upon which some of Crito's domestics led her away, beating herself, and weeping bitterly. But Socrates, sitting upright on the bed, drew up his leg, and, stroking it with his hand, said at the same time, What a wonderful thing is this, my friends, which men call *the pleasant and agreeable!* and how admirably is it affected by nature towards that which appears to be its contrary, *the painful!* for they are unwilling to be present with us both together; and yet, if any person pursues and receives the one, he is almost always under a necessity of receiving the other, as if both of them depended from one summit. And it seems to me (says he), that if Æsop had perceived this he would have composed a fable from it, and would have informed us, that Divinity, being willing to reconcile contending natures, but not being able to accomplish this design, conjoined their summits in a nature one and the same; and that hence it comes to pass, that whoever partakes of the one is soon after connected

nected with the other. And this, as it appears, is the case with myself at present; for the pain which was before in my leg, through the bond, is now succeeded by a pleasant sensation.

But here Cebes replying, said, By Jupiter, Socrates, you have very opportunely caused me to recollect: for certain persons have asked me concerning those poems which you composed, viz. the Fables of Æsop which you versified, and your exordium to Apollo, and other pieces of composition; and, among the rest, Evenus lately inquired with what design you did this after coming here, when before you have never attempted any thing of the kind. If, therefore, you have any desire that I may have an answer ready for Evenus, when he again interrogates me on this occasion (and I am certain that he will do so), tell me what I must say to him. You may truly inform him (says he), Cebes, that I did not compose these verses with any design of rivalling him, or his poems (for I knew that this would be no easy matter); but that I might try to explore the meaning of certain dreams, and that I might make a proper expiation, if this should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to exercise. For in the past part of my life the same dream has often occurred to me, exhibiting at different times a different appearance, yet always advising me the same thing; for it said, Socrates, make and exercise music. And indeed, in the former part of my life, I considered that this dream persuaded and exhorted me respecting what I should do, in the same manner as those in the races are exhorted; for, by persuading me to exercise music, it signified that I should labour in philosophy, which is the greatest music. But now since my sentence has taken place, and the festival of the God has retarded my death, it appeared to me to be necessary, that, if the music which the dream has so often exhorted me to undertake should happen to be of the popular sort, I should by no means resist its persuasions, but comply with the exhortation: for I considered that it would be more safe for me not to depart from hence before I had made an expiation by composing verses, and obeying the dream. Thus, in the first place, I composed some verses in honour of the God to whom the present festival belongs; but after the God, considering it necessary that he who designs to be a poet should make fables and not discourses, and knowing that I myself was not a mythologist, on these accounts I versified the fables of Æsop,

Ælop, which were at hand, and were known to me; and began with those first, that first presented themselves to my view.

Give this answer, Cebes, to Evenus: at the same time bid him farewell for me; and tell him, if he is wise he will follow me. But I shall depart, as it seems, to-day; for such are the orders of the Athenians.—Upon this Simmias replied, What is this, Socrates, which you command me to tell Evenus? for I often meet with him; and from what I know of him, I am certain that he will never willingly comply with your request.—What then (says Socrates), is not Evenus a philosopher?—To me he appears to be so (says Simmias).—Both Evenus, therefore, will be willing to follow me, and every one who is worthy to partake of philosophy; not perhaps indeed by violently * depriving himself of life, for this they say is unlawful. And at
the

* Socrates says, that perhaps the philosopher will not destroy himself, for this is not lawful. This the text shows through two arguments, the one mythical and Orphic, but the other dialectic and philosophic. But before we consider the text, says Olympiodorus, let us show by appropriate arguments that suicide is not lawful. Divinity possesses twofold powers, anagogic and providential; and the powers which are providential of things secondary are not impeded by the anagogic, and which are converted to them, but he energizes at once according to both. In like manner, nothing hinders but that a philosopher, since he is an imitator of Divinity, (for philosophy is an assimilation to Deity,) may at once energize cathartically, and with a providential care of secondary natures: for there is nothing great in living cathartically when separated from the body after death; but, while detained in the body, it is generous to be intent on purification. The second argument is this: As a divine nature is always present to all things, and some things participate of it more or less, through their proper aptitude or inaptitude; so also it is necessary that the soul should be present to the body, and should not separate itself from it. But the body participates or does not participate of it, through its proper aptitude or inaptitude. Thus, in the Theætetus, the Coryphæan philosopher is represented as not knowing where the Forum is situated, but as being even ignorant that he is ignorant of sensible particulars; and this while he is in the body. The third argument is as follows: It is necessary that a voluntary bond should be voluntarily dissolved; but that an involuntary bond should be dissolved with an involuntary solution, and not in a promiscuous manner. Hence a physical life, being involuntary, must be dissolved with an involuntary solution, i. e. by a physical death; but the impassioned life in us, which subsists according to pre-election or free will, must be dissolved with a voluntary solution, i. e. with purification, or the exercise of the cathartic virtues.

With respect to the text, it shows through two arguments, as we have observed, that suicide is not lawful; and of these the mythical argument, according to Olympiodorus, is as follows:—According to Orpheus, there are four governments: the first that of Heaven, which Saturn received, cutting

the same time, as he thus spoke, he withdrew his leg from the bed, and placed it on the ground; and afterwards continued to discourse with us, in a sitting posture,

cutting off the genitals of his father. After Saturn, Jupiter reigned, who hurled his father into Tartarus. And after Jupiter Bacchus reigned, who they say was lacerated by the Titans, through the stratagems of Juno. It is also said that the Titans tasted his flesh, and that Jupiter being enraged hurled his thunder at them; and that from the ashes of their burnt bodies men were generated*. Suicide, therefore, is not proper, not, as the text seems to say, because we are in a certain bond the body, (for this is evident, and he would not have called this arcane,) but suicide is not lawful, because our body is Dionysiacal: for we are a part of Bacchus, if we are composed from the ashes of the Titans who tasted his flesh. Socrates, therefore, fearful of disclosing this arcane narration, because it pertained to the mysteries, adds nothing more than that we are in the body, as in a prison secured by a guard; but the interpreters, when the mysteries were declining, and almost extinct, owing to the establishment of a new religion, openly disclosed the fable.

But the allegory of this fable, says Olympiodorus, is of that kind as when Empedocles asserts that the intelligible and sensible worlds were generated according to parts; not that they were produced at different times, for they always are, but because our soul at one time lives according to the intelligible, and then the intelligible world is said to be generated, and at another time according to the sensible world, and then the sensible world is said to be generated. So likewise with Orpheus, those four governments do not subsist at one time, and at another not, for they always are; but they obscurely signify the gradations of the virtues according to which our soul contains the symbols of all the virtues, the theoretic and cathartic, the politic and ethic, For it either energizes according to the theoretic virtues, the paradigm of which is the government of Heaven, and on this account Heaven receives its denomination *παρα του τα ανω οραν*, from *beholding the things above*; or it lives cathartically, the paradigm of which is the kingdom of Saturn, and on this account Saturn is denominated as *a pure intellect*, through *beholding himself*, *θιον ο κρονους τις αν δια το εαυτον οραν*; and hence he is said to devour his own offspring, as converting himself to himself: or it energizes according to the political virtues, the symbol of which is the government of Jupiter; and hence Jupiter is the demiurgus, as energizing about secondary natures: or it lives according to the ethical and physical virtues, the symbol of which is the kingdom of Bacchus; and hence it is lacerated, because the virtues do not alternately follow each other.

But Bacchus being lacerated by the Titans signifies his procession to the last of things; for of these the Titans are the artificers, and Bacchus is the monad of the Titans. This was effected by the stratagems of Juno, because this goddess is the inspective guardian of motion and progression; and hence, in the *Iliad*, she continually excites Jupiter to a providential attention to secondary

* Παρα τῷ Ὀρφει τεσσαρες βασιλειαὶ παραδιδονται. πρωτη μὲν ἡ τοῦ Οὐρανοῦ, ἣν ὁ Κρονος διεδεξατο ἐκτεμνων τὰ αἰδια τοῦ πατερος. μετὰ δὲ τὸν Κρονον ὁ Ζεὺς ἐβασίλευσε κατὰ τὰρταρον τῶν πατερῶν. ἐπειτὰ τοῦ Διὰ διεδεξατο ὁ Διόνυσος, ὃν φασὶ κατ' ἐπιβουλήν τῆς Ἥρας τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ Τίτῆνας σπαραττεῖν, καὶ τῶν σαρκῶν αὐτοῦ ἀπογενεσθαι* καὶ τοὺτους ὀργισθεὶς ὁ Ζεὺς ἐκεραυνώσῃ, καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἱμάτων τῶν ἀναδεδειγμένων ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄλλης γενέσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

posture, the remaining part of the time. Cebes¹, therefore, inquired of him, How is this to be understood, Socrates, that it is not lawful to commit suicide,

¹ Socrates and Cebes are here speaking about two different kinds of death; the latter about a physical, and the former about a pre-elective or free-will death.

natures. Bacchus also, says Olympiodorus, presides over generation, because he presides over life and death. Over life, because over generation; but over death, because wine produces an enthusiastic energy, and at the time of death we become more enthusiastic, as Proclus testifies together with Homer; for he became prophetic when he was dying. Tragedy and comedy also are referred to Bacchus; comedy from its being the sport of life, and tragedy through the calamities and the death in it. Comic, therefore, do not properly accuse tragic writers as not being Dionysiacal, when they assert that these things do not pertain to Bacchus. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans, the thunder manifesting conversion: for fire moves upwards. Jupiter, therefore, converts them to himself. And this is the mythical argument.

But the dialectic and philosophic argument is as follows:—The Gods take care of us, and we are their possessions: it is not proper, therefore, to free ourselves from life, but we ought to convert ourselves to them. For if one of these two things took place, either that we are the possessions of the Gods, but they take no care of us; or, on the contrary, that we are not the possessions of the Gods, it might be rational to liberate ourselves from the body: but now, as neither of these takes place, it is not proper to dissolve our bonds.

On the contrary, however, it may be said that suicide according to Plato is necessary. And, in the first place, he here says that a philosopher will not *perhaps* commit suicide, unless Divinity sends some great necessity, such as the present: for the word *perhaps* affords a suspicion that suicide may *sometimes* be necessary. In the second place, Plato admits that suicide may be proper to the worthy man, to him of a middle character, and to the multitude and depraved: to the worthy man, as in this place; to the middle character, as in the Republic, where he says that suicide is necessary to him who is afflicted with a long and incurable disease, as such a one is useless to the city, because Plato's intention was that his citizens should be useful to the city, and not to themselves; and to the vulgar character, as in the Laws, when he says that suicide is necessary to him who is possessed with certain incurable passions, such as being in love with his mother, sacrilege, or any thing else of this kind.

Again it may be said, from the authority of Plotinus, that suicide is sometimes necessary, and also from the authority of the Stoics, who said that there were five ways in which suicide was rational. For they assimilated, says Olympiodorus, life to a banquet, and asserted that it is necessary to dissolve life through such-like causes as occasion the dissolution of a banquet. A banquet, therefore, is dissolved either through a great necessity unexpectedly intervening, as through the presence of a friend suddenly coming; or it is dissolved through intoxication taking place; and through what is placed on the table being morbid. Further still, it is dissolved after another manner through a want of things necessary to the entertainment; and also through obscene and base language. In like manner life may be dissolved in five ways. And, in the first place,

suicide, and yet that a philosopher should be willing to follow one who is about to die?—What (says he), Cebes, have not you and Simmias heard your familiar Philolaus¹ discourse concerning things of this kind?—We have

place, as at a banquet, it may be dissolved through some great necessity, as when a man sacrifices himself for the good of his country. In the second place, as a banquet is dissolved through intoxication, so likewise it is necessary to dissolve life through a delirium following the body: for a delirium is a physical intoxication. In the third place, as a banquet is dissolved through what is placed on the table being morbid, thus too it is necessary that life should be dissolved when the body labours under incurable diseases, and is no longer capable of being ministrant to the soul. In the fourth place, as a banquet is dissolved through a want of things necessary to the entertainment, so suicide is proper when the necessities of life are wanting. For they are not to be received from depraved characters; since gifts from the defiled are small, and it is not proper for a man to pollute himself with these. And, in the fifth place, as a banquet is dissolved through obscene language, so likewise it is necessary to dissolve life when compelled by a tyrant to speak things arcane, or belonging to the mysteries, which a certain female Pythagorean is said to have done. For, being compelled to tell why she did not eat beans, she said, I may eat them if I tell. And afterwards being compelled to eat them, she said, I may tell if I eat them; and at length bit off her tongue, as the organ of speech and taste.

What then shall we say? for the discourse is brought to a contradiction. And how can it be admitted that suicide is unlawful? Or, may we not say that a liberation from life is not necessary so far as pertains to the body; but that it is rational when it contributes a greater good to the soul? Thus, for instance, suicide is lawful when the soul is injured by the body. As, therefore, it is unholy not to give assistance to a friend when he is scourged, but, if he is scourged by his father, it is not becoming to assist him; so here suicide is unlawful when committed for the sake of the body, but rational when committed for the sake of the soul; since this is sometimes advantageous to it.

I only add, that according to Macrobius it is said, in the arcane discourses concerning the return of the soul, “that the wicked in this life resemble those who fall upon smooth ground, and who cannot rise again without difficulty; but that souls departing from the present life with the defilements of guilt are to be compared to those who fall from a lofty and precipitous place, from whence they are never able to rise again.” “Nam in arcanis de animæ reditu disputationibus fertur, in hac vita delinquentes similes esse super æquale solum cadentibus, quibus denuo sine difficultate præsto sit surgere: animas vero ex hac vita cum delictorum fordibus recedentes, æquandas his, qui in abruptum ex alto præcipitique delapsi sunt, unde facultas nunquam sit refurgendi. Somn. Scip. cap. xiii. Suicide, therefore, is in general unlawful, because it is not proper to depart from life in an unpurified state.

¹ Philolaus, says Olympiodorus, was a Pythagorean, and it was usual with the Pythagoreans to speak through ænigmas. Hence silence was one of the peculiarities of this sect; through silence indicating the arcane nature of Divinity, which it is necessary a philosopher should imitate. But Philolaus said in ænigmas that suicide is not proper: for he says, we ought not to turn

have not, Socrates, heard any thing clearly on this subject.—But I (says Socrates) speak in consequence of having heard; and what I have heard I will not enviously conceal from you. And perhaps it is becoming in the most eminent degree, that he who is about to depart thither should consider and mythologize about this departure: I mean, what kind of a thing we should think it to be. For what else can such a one be more properly employed about, till the setting ¹ of the sun?

On what account then, Socrates, says Cebes, do they say that it is unlawful for a man to kill himself? for I myself have some time since heard from Philolaus, when he resided with us, and from some others, that it was not proper to commit such an action; but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one.—Prepare yourself, then (says Socrates), for perhaps you may be satisfied in this particular: and perhaps it may appear to you wonderful, if this alone of everything else is something simple, and by no means happens to a man like other events, but still remains the same, even with respect to those to whom it is better to die than to live; though,

back when going to a temple, nor cut wood in the way. By the latter of these he manifests that we should not divide and cut life; for life is a way: and by the former he indicates the meditation of death. For the life of a future state is sacred; since our father and country are there. He says, therefore, that he who lives cathartically should not turn back, i. e. should not cut off the cathartic life. But Cebes met with Philolaus in Boeotia; for he associated with him in Thebes. Olympiodorus also, after observing that it was the custom of the Pythagoreans to live as in a common life, making all their possessions common, adds as follows:—"If, therefore, any one among them was found to be unadapted to philosophy, they led him out together with his property, made a cenotaph or empty tomb, and lamented as if it were for one who was going a journey. But a certain person named Cylo coming among them, and experiencing this treatment, set fire to the school, and all the disciples were burnt except two, Philolaus and Hipparchus. Philolaus, therefore, came to Thebes in order to perform funeral sacrifices to his deceased preceptor. He also performed them to Lyfias, who was there buried, and in whose name Plato has written a dialogue, which is inscribed, Lyfias, or Concerning Friendship." *Εἰ τις οὖν ἀναισιγνήδεις εὐρεθῇ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, ἐξηγόν αὐτὸν μετὰ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ κενόταφιον ἐποιοῦν, καὶ ὥσπερ περὶ ἀποχόμενον ἀποδύροντο. Κυλῶν δὲ τὴν εἰσελθὼν καὶ πεπονθὼς τοῦτο ὤρνηε πυρὶ τῷ διδασκαλίῳ, καὶ πάντες ἐκαύθησαν πλὴν δύο Φιλόλαον καὶ Ἰππάρχον. ἦλθεν οὖν ὁ Φιλόλαος εἰς Θέβας ἀφείλον χρεᾶς τῷ οἰκίῳ διδασκαλῷ τίνεσσι, καὶ ἐκεῖ τεθαμμένῳ ποιήσασθαι τῷ Λυσίῳ, οὗ καὶ κατὰ ὁμωνυμίαν γέγραπται τῷ Πλάτῳ διαλογὸς, Λυσίς ἢ Περὶ φιλίας.*

¹ It was a law, says Olympiodorus, with the Athenians, to put no one to death in the day, just as it was an injunction with the Pythagoreans, not to sleep in mid-day, when the sun exhibits his most strenuous energy.

perhaps,

perhaps, it may seem wonderful to you, that it should be better for those men to die, in whom it would be unholy to benefit themselves by suicide, and who ought to expect some other, as a benefactor on this occasion.—Then Cebes, gently laughing, Jupiter knows that (says he, speaking in his own tongue).—For this indeed (says Socrates) appears to be irrational; and yet, perhaps, it is not so, but has a certain reason on its side. For the discourse which is delivered about these particulars, in the arcana of the mysteries, *that we are placed as in a certain prison secured by a guard, and that it is not proper for any one to free himself from this confinement, and make his escape*, appears to me to be an assertion of great moment, and not easy to be understood. But this appears to me, O Cebes, to be well said, that the Gods take care of us, and that we who are men are one of the possessions belonging to the Gods. Or does not this appear to you to be the case?—It does to me (says Cebes).—Would not you, therefore, if any one of your servants ¹ should destroy himself, when at the same time you did not signify that you was willing he should die, would you not be angry with him? and if you had any punishment, would you not chastise him?—Entirely so (says he).—*Perhaps*, therefore, it is not irrational to assert, that a man ought not to kill himself before Divinity lays him under a certain necessity ² of doing so, such as I am subject to at present.

This, indeed (says Cebes), appears to be reasonable. But that which you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers would very readily be willing to die, appears to be absurd, if what we have asserted is agreeable to reason,

¹ How from human affairs, says Olympiodorus, do we conjecture that things pertaining to the Gods subsist in a similar manner? For they are not like us, passive. May we not say that he assimilates them analogously, but politically and œconomically? For it is evident that the paradigms of every mundane providential care are previously comprehended in the Gods. But reconciliation and vengeance must be conceived to take place in a very different manner in the Gods. For the former is the rising of their proper light when the darkness of guilt is dispersed; and the latter is a secondary punishing providence, about the apostatizing soul.

² Necessity is four-fold: for one kind is internal, and the other external; and each of these is twofold, viz. good and evil. But the paradigms of that which is inwardly good are the will of Divinity, and that of the just man; and of that which is inwardly evil, the pre-election of the depraved man. But of that necessity which is externally good, the paradigm is the will of Fate imparting precedaneous goods; and of that which is externally evil, the bestowing of things violent, contrary to nature, and corruptive.

that Divinity ¹ takes care of us, and that we are one of his possessions; for it is irrational to suppose that the most prudent men should not be grieved, when departing from that servitude in which they are taken care of by the Gods, who are the best of governors. For such a one will by no means think that he shall be better taken care of when he becomes free: but some one who is deprived of intellect may perhaps think that he should fly from his master, and will not consider that he ought not to fly from a good master, but that he should by all means abide in his service. Hence he will depart from him in a most irrational manner: but he who is endowed with intellect will desire to live perpetually with one who is better than himself. And thus, Socrates, it is reasonable that the contrary of what you just now said should take place: for it is proper that the prudent, when about to die, should be sorrowful, but that the foolish should rejoice.—Socrates, therefore, upon hearing this, seemed to me to be pleased with the reasoning of Cebes; and looking upon us, Cebes (says he) never suffers any thing to pass without investigation, and is by no means willing to admit immediately the truth of an assertion.—But indeed (says Simmias), Cebes, O Socrates, appears to me to say something now to the purpose. For with what design can men, truly wise, fly from masters who are better than themselves, and, without any

¹ Every thing naturally provides for things subordinate; but the Gods exert a providential energy prior to all things, and according to *hyparxis*. For each is a *goodness*, because the highest God is *the good*, and providence is the energy of goodness, and imparts essential good. Divinity too may be said to take care of man, because from being worse he makes him better; but man cultivates Divinity because he is made better by him. Observe too, that as, in the universe, intellect subsisting after the Gods is first converted to them, so likewise in us *intellect* is extended to Divinity, but *ignorance* turns from a divine nature. By intellect, however, here, we must understand, not that alone which is gnostic, but also that which is orectic or appetitive, both in the universe and in us: for intellect possesses both desire and knowledge, because it is the first animal. This being admitted, we shall no longer be disturbed by the doubt, whether orectic is better than gnostic perfection; or, in other words, whether virtue is better than science: for the one is not perfect without the other.

Should it be inquired how the Gods are our masters, since a *master*, so far as a master, does not consider the good of his servant, but his own good; for in this he differs from a *governor*; and should it also be said, What good can the Gods derive from man? we reply with Olympiodorus, that the Gods make all things precedaneously on account of themselves; and that they are excellent in proportion as they are exempt from other things. But they *govern* according to a certain coordination with us; and by how much the more we subject ourselves to, by so much the more do we participate of them, as wholly giving ourselves up to them, and neglecting that which is properly our own.

reluctance,

reluctance, free themselves from their servitude? And Cebes appears to me to direct his discourse to you, because you so easily endure to leave us, and those beneficent rulers the Gods, as you yourself confess.—You speak justly (says Socrates); for I think you mean that I ought to make my defence, as if I was upon my trial.—By all means, says Simmias.

Be it so then (says Socrates): and I shall endeavour that this my apology may appear more reasonable to you than it did to my judges. For, with respect to myself (says he), O Simmias and Cebes, unless I thought that I should depart, in the first place, to other¹ Gods who are wise and good, and, in the next place, to men who have migrated from the present life, and are better than any among us, it would be unjust not to be troubled at death: but now believe for certain, that I hope to dwell with good men; though this, indeed, I will not confidently assert: but that I shall go to Gods who are perfectly good rulers, you may consider as an assertion which, if any thing of the kind is so, will be strenuously affirmed by me. So that, on this account, I shall not be afflicted at dying, but shall entertain a good hope that something remains for the dead; and, as it was formerly said, that it will be much better hereafter for the good than the evil.—What then, Socrates (says Simmias), would you have departed with such a conception in your intellect, without communicating it to us? Or will you not render us also partakers of it? For it appears to me, that this will be a common good; and at the same time it will be an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say.—I will endeavour to do so (says he). But let us first consider what that is which it appears to me Crito some time since was desirous of saying. What else (says Crito) should it be, Socrates, except what he who is to give you the poison has long ago told me, that you ought to speak as little as possible? For he says that those who dispute become too much heated, and that nothing of this kind ought to be introduced with the poison, since those who do not observe this caution are sometimes obliged to drink the poison twice or thrice.—Let him (says Socrates) only take care of his proper employment, as one who must administer the poison twice; and even, if occasion requires, thrice. I was almost certain

¹ By *other Gods*, Socrates means such as are supermundane, or of an order superior to the ruling divinities of the world. In short, those Gods are here signified that are unconnected with body.

(says Crito) that this would be your answer; but he enjoined me to do this, as I said, some time since. Permit him to do so (says Socrates); but I am desirous of rendering to you, as my judges, the reason, as it appears to me, why a man who has truly passed his life in the exercise of philosophy should with great propriety be confident when about to die, and should possess good hopes of obtaining the greatest advantages after death; and in what manner this takes place I will endeavour, Simmias and Cebes, to explain:

Those who are conversant with philosophy in a proper manner, seem to have concealed from others that the whole of their study is nothing else than how to die and be dead¹. If this then is true, it would certainly be absurd, that those who have made this alone their study through the whole of life, should when it arrives be afflicted at a circumstance upon which they have before bestowed all their attention and labour. But here Simmias laughing, By Jupiter (says he), Socrates, you cause me to laugh, though I am very far from desiring to do so at present: for I think that the multitude, if they heard this, would consider it as well said respecting philosophers; and that men of the present day would perfectly agree with you, that philosophers should in reality desire death, and that they are by no means ignorant that men of this description deserve to suffer death. And indeed, Simmias, they would speak the truth, except in asserting that they are not ignorant of it: for both the manner in which true philosophers desire to die, and how they are worthy of death, is concealed from them. But let us bid farewell to such as these (says he), and discourse among ourselves: and to begin, Do you think that death is any thing? Simmias replied, Entirely so. Is it any thing else than a liberation of soul from body? and is not this to die², for the body to be liberated from the soul, and to subsist apart by itself? and likewise for the soul to be liberated from the body, and to be essentially

¹ It is well observed by Olympiodorus, that *to die* (*ἀποθνήσκειν*) differs from *to be dead* (*τεθνηῶαι*). For the cathartic philosopher *dies* in consequence of meditating death; but the theoretic philosopher is *dead*, in consequence of being separated from the passions.

² Plato beautifully defines death to be a separation of the body from the soul, and of the soul from the body. For, with respect to souls that are enamoured with body, the body is indeed separated from the soul, but not the soul from the body, because it is yet conjoined with it through habitude or alliance, from which those shadowy phantasms are produced that wander about sepulchres.

separate?

separate? Is death any thing else but this?—It is no other (says Simmias).—Consider then, excellent man, whether the same things appear to you as to me; for from hence I think we shall understand better the subjects of our investigation. Does it appear to you that the philosopher is a man who is anxiously concerned about things which are called pleasures, such as meats and drinks?—In the smallest degree, Socrates (says Simmias).—But what, is he sedulously employed in venereal concerns?—By no means.—Or does such a man appear to you to esteem other particulars which regard the observance of the body, such as the acquisition of excellent garments and sandals, and other ornaments of the body? whether does he appear to you to esteem or despise such particulars, employing them only so far as an abundant necessity requires?—A true philosopher (says Simmias) appears to me to be one who will despise every thing of this kind.—Does it, therefore, appear to you (says Socrates), that the whole employment of such a one will not consist in things which regard the body, but in separating himself from the body as much as possible, and in converting himself to his soul?—It does appear so to me.—Is it not, therefore, first of all evident, in things of this kind, that a philosopher, in a manner far surpassing other men, separates his soul in the highest degree from communion with the body?—It appears so.—And to *the many*, O Simmias, it appears that he who accounts nothing of this kind pleasant, and who does not partake of them, is not worthy to live; but that he nearly approaches to death who is not concerned about the pleasures which subsist through the body.—You entirely speak the truth.

But what with respect to the acquisition¹ of wisdom? Is the body an
impediment

¹ Socrates having shown from *life* that the philosopher is willing to die, now proves this from *knowledge* as follows:—The philosopher despises the senses: he who does this despises also the body, in which the senses reside: he who despises the body is averse to it: he who is averse to it separates himself from the body: and he who separates himself from the body is willing to die; for death is nothing else than a separation of the soul from the body.

But it is here necessary to observe, that there are three energies of the soul: for it either converts itself to things subordinate, and acquires a knowledge of sensibles; or it converts itself to itself, and sees all things in itself, because it is an omniform image containing the reasons of all things; or it extends itself to the intelligible, and beholds ideas. As there are, therefore, three energies of the soul, we must not suppose that the politic, cathartic and theoretic characters differ from each other: this, that the political character knows sensibles; the cathartic, the reasons in the

impediment or not, if any one associates it in the investigation of wisdom? What I mean is this: Have sight and hearing in men any truth¹? or is the case such as the poets perpetually sing, that

“ We nothing accurate or see² or hear?”

Though if these corporeal senses are neither accurate nor clear, by no means can the rest be so: for all the others are in a certain respect more depraved than these. Or does it not appear so to you?—Entirely so, says he.—When then does the soul touch upon the truth? for, when it endeavours to consider any thing in conjunction with the body, it is evidently then deceived by the body.—You speak the truth.—Must not, therefore, something of reality become manifest to the soul, in the energy of reasoning, if this is ever the case?—It must.—But the soul then reasons in the most beautiful manner, when it is disturbed by nothing belonging to the body, neither by hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor any pleasure, but subsists in the most eminent degree, itself by itself, bidding farewell to the body, and, as much as possible neither communicating nor being in contact with it, extends itself towards real being.—These things are so.—Does not the soul of a philosopher, therefore, in these employments, despise the body in the most eminent

soul; and the theoretic, ideas—since no one is in reality a philosopher who has not a knowledge of all things: but they differ in this, that the political philosopher is conversant with pleasures and pains; for he attends to the body as an instrument, and his end is not a privation, but a moderation of the passions. But the cathartic and theoretic philosophers attend to the body as a neighbouring trifle, that it may not become an impediment to their energies; and the end with them is a liberation from the passions.

¹ Plato says that there is no truth in the senses, because they do not properly know: for passion is mingled with their knowledge, in consequence of being obtained through media. For intellect is said to know accurately, because that which understands is the same with the intelligible, or the object of intellection. Besides, sense cannot sustain the accuracy of sensibles. Thus, for instance, the eye cannot bear to look at that which is white in the extreme. For sensible objects, when they are transcendent, destroy the senses. Sense, however, may be said to be always true and accurate when it is compared with assimilative knowledge, such as that of images in mirrors. When, therefore, sense is said, as it is by Aristotle, to be the principle of science, it must not be considered as the producing principle, but as agitating the soul to a recollection of universals, and as performing the office of a messenger and herald, by exciting our soul to the evolution of the sciences. The poets who assert that the senses know nothing accurately are Parmenides, Empedocles, and Epicharmus.

degree,

degree, and, flying from it, seek to become essentially subsisting by itself?—It appears so.—But what shall we say, Simmias, about such things as the following? Do we say that the *just itself*¹ is something or nothing?—By Jupiter, we say it is something.—And do we not also say, that the *beautiful* and the *good* are each of them something?—How is it possible we should not?—But did you ever at any time behold any one of these with your eyes?—By no means, says he.—But did you ever touch upon these with any other corporeal sense? (but I speak concerning all of them; as for instance, about magnitude, health, strength, and, in one word, about the essence of all the rest, and which each truly possesses.) Is then the most true nature of these perceived through the ministry of the body? or rather shall we not say, that whoever among us prepares himself to think dianoëticaally in the most eminent and accurate manner about each particular object of his speculation, such a one will accede the nearest possible to the knowledge of each?—Entirely so.—Will not he, therefore, accomplish this in the most pure manner, who in the highest degree betakes himself to each through his dianoëtic power, neither employing sight in conjunction with the dianoëtic energy, nor attracting any other sense, together with his reasoning; but who, exercising a dianoëtic

¹ The energy of our soul, as we have before observed, is triple: for it either converts itself to things subordinate, obtaining a knowledge of and adorning them, or it converts itself to itself, and acquires a knowledge of itself, or it converts itself to natures more excellent than its own. Socrates, therefore, having shown that the philosopher is willing to die, from a conversion to things subordinate, because he flies from the body, despising it; and having also shown this from a conversion to himself, because he attends to the body no further than extreme necessity obliges him; he now also shows that he is willing to die, from a conversion to things more excellent. For he wishes to know ideas; but it is impossible for the soul to know these while energizing with the body, or having this communicating with it in the investigation of them. For, if sense possesses something impartible, as is evident from the collected nature of its perception: for it knows, for instance, at once, that this particular thing is white, and not black; since, if it knew this divisibly, it would be just as if I should perceive one part of a thing, and you another*;—much more therefore does the rational soul perceive impartibly. It differs however from sense in this, that sense knows, but does not know that it knows; for it is not converted to itself, since neither body, nor things which possess their being in body, are converted to themselves; but the rational soul knows both sensibles and itself: for it knows that it knows. If this then be the case, the soul will not receive, as its associate in investigation, either the body or the senses, or the instruments of sense, if it wishes to know things accurately.

* For these partible perceptions would never produce a perception of that which is white, as one thing.

energy by itself sincere, at the same time endeavours to hunt ¹ after every thing which has true being subsisting by itself separate and pure; and who in the most eminent degree is liberated from the eyes and ears, and in short from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom by its conjunction? Will not such a man, Simmias, procure for himself real being, if this can ever be asserted of any one?—You speak the truth, Socrates (says Simmias), in a transcendent ² manner.

Is it not necessary, therefore (says Socrates), from hence, that an opinion of this kind should be present with genuine philosophers in such a manner, that they will speak among themselves as follows: In the consideration of things, this opinion, like a certain path, leads us in conjunction with reason from the vulgar track, that, as long as we are connected with a body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never sufficiently obtain the object of our desire; and this object we have asserted to be truth? For the body ³ subjects us to innumerable occupations through necessary aliment,

¹ The term *hunting*, says Olympiodorus, is adapted to intelligibles, because these are known by an unapparent power of the soul, in the same manner as hunters study to be invisible to the objects of their pursuit. ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ ΤΟ ΘΗΡΕΥΕΙΝ ΕΠΙ ΤΩΝ ΝΟΥΤΩΝ, ΔΙΟΤΙ ΑΦΑΝΕΙ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΓΙΝΩΣΚΕΤΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ, ΚΑΘΩΣΤΕΡ ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΘΗΡΑΤΑΙ ΑΦΑΝΕΣ ΣΠΟΥΔΟΥΣΙΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΘΗΡΑΜΑΣΙΝ.

² The word in the original is *ὑπερφύσως*, which is literally *supernaturally*. And, as Olympiodorus says, it is very properly used here, because the discourse is about intelligibles.

³ The *vital irrational* part of our nature is an impediment to the rational soul. But this is twofold: for it is either beheld about the body alone, as fears, desires and loves, or about things external, as wars, and the accumulation of wealth. The *gnostic irrational* part also becomes an impediment, as, for instance, the phantasy, which is always a hindrance to our intellectual conceptions. For there are two passions which it is difficult to wipe away; in knowledge the phantasy, and in life ambition; since these are the things with which the soul becomes first invested, and which she, in the last place, lays aside. For the first vital vehicle of the soul is ambition, and the first gnostic is the phantasy. Hence, says Olympiodorus, Ulysses required the assistance of the mercurial moly, and right reason, in order to fly from Calypso, or the phantasy which like a cloud becomes an impediment to reason, the sun of the soul. For the phantasy is a veil; and hence some one calls it *long veiled*. On this account, Ulysses first came to Circe, that is, Sense, as being the daughter of the Sun. The phantasy, therefore, is an impediment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence (Olympiodorus adds), when we are agitated by the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize without the phantasy? we reply, that its perceptions of universals prove that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of the phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its energies, just as a storm pursues him who sails on the sea.

and fills us with love, desire, fear, all various images, and a multitude of trifling concerns; not to mention that, if we are invaded by certain diseases, we are hindered by them in our hunting after real being; so that, as it is said, *we can never truly, and in reality, acquire wisdom through the body*. For nothing else but the body and its desires cause wars, seditions, and contests, of every kind: for all wars arise through the possession of wealth; and we are compelled to acquire riches through the body, becoming subservient to its cultivation; so that on all these accounts we have no leisure for the exercise of philosophy. But this is the extremity of all evils, that if at any time we are at leisure from its attendance, and betake ourselves to the speculation of any thing, then invading us on all sides in our investigations, it causes agitations and tumults, and so vehemently impels us, that we are not able through its presence to perceive the truth; but it is in reality demonstrated to us, that, if we are designed to know any thing purely, we must be liberated from the body, and behold things with the soul itself. And then, as it appears, we shall obtain the object of our desire, and of which we profess ourselves lovers, viz. wisdom, when we are dead, as our discourse evinces; but by no means¹ while we are alive: for, if we can know nothing purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two consequences must ensue, either that we can never possess knowledge, or that we must obtain it after death; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but never before this takes place; and while we live in the body, as it appears, we shall approach in the nearest manner possible to knowledge, if in the most eminent degree we have no association with the body, nor any communication with it (except what the greatest necessity² requires), nor are filled with its nature, but

¹ Socrates says this in consequence of looking to the knowledge which the soul can participate in the present life, and to that which it possesses when it obtains hereafter the supreme perfection of its nature. For that it is possible according to Plato to live while connected with this body not only *catbartically* but *theoretically*, and this through the whole of life, is evident from his Coryphæan philosopher in the Theætetus, who is represented as continually astronomizing above the heavens (του ουρανου υπεραστρονομουντες), and investigating the nature of every *whole* in the universe; and also from those guardians in his Republic who ascend through dialectic as far as to *the good* itself. To live here however *theoretically in perfection* is impossible, on account of the occupations and molestations of the body, which do not permit us to enjoy the theoretic energy without impediment and distracted attention.

² There are three energies pertaining to the irrational nature; viz. physical and necessary, as to be

but purify ourselves from its defiling connection, till Divinity itself dissolves our bonds. And thus being pure, and liberated from the madness of body, it is proper to believe that we shall then associate with others who are similarly pure, and shall through ourselves know every thing genuine and sincere: and this perhaps is the truth itself; for it is by no means lawful that the pure should be touched by that which is impure. And such, O Simmias, in my opinion, ought to be the discourse and sentiments of all such as are lovers of learning in a proper manner. Or does it not seem so to you?—It does, Socrates, more so than any thing.

If all this then (says Socrates) is true, my friend, much hope remains for him who arrives at that place to which I am now departing, that he shall there, if ever any where, sufficiently obtain that for the sake of which we take so much pains in the present life: so that the journey which is now assigned me will be accompanied with good hope; as will likewise be the case with any other man who thinks that he ought to prepare his dianoëtic part in such a manner that it may become as it were pure.—Entirely so (says Simmias).—But does not purification consist in this, as we formerly asserted in our discourse: I mean, in separating the soul from the body in the most eminent degree, and in accustoming it to call together and collect itself essentially on all sides from the body, and to dwell as much as possible, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, becoming by this mean liberated from the body as from detaining bonds?—Entirely so (says he).—Is not death called a solution and separation of the soul from body?—Perfectly so (says he).—But those alone who philosophize rightly¹, as we have said, always
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be nourished and to sleep; physical but not necessary, as venereal enjoyments; and those which are neither physical nor necessary, as the decoration of the body, and such things as pertain to variety of clothing: for that these last are neither physical nor necessary is evident from their not being used by other animals. As there are, therefore, these three energies, the philosopher, says Olympiodorus, neither uses those which are physical and not necessary, nor those which are neither physical nor necessary. For emissions in sleep are sufficient to him for the discharge of the seed; and he pays no attention to external decoration. He likewise uses those which are physical and necessary, no further than necessity requires. This being the case, the philosopher is willing to die, and consequently meditates death.

¹ Those only, says Olympiodorus, who philosophize rightly, i. e. with an undeviating energy, especially and always providentially attend to a solution from the body; possessing the providential energy

and especially providentially attend to the solution of the soul: and this is the meditation of philosophers, a solution and separation of the soul from the body; or do you not think so?—I do.—Would it not, therefore, as I said at first, be ridiculous for a man who has so prepared himself in the present life as to approach very near to death, to live indeed in the manner we have described, and yet, when death arrives, be afflicted? would not this be ridiculous?—How indeed should it not?—In reality, therefore (says he), O Simmias, those who philosophize rightly will meditate how to *die*; and *to be dead* will be to them of all men a thing the least terrible. But from hence consider as follows: for, if they are on all sides enemies to the body, but desire to possess the soul subsisting by itself, would it not be very irrational for them to be terrified and troubled when death approaches, and to be unwilling to depart to that place, where when they have arrived they may hope to enjoy that which they were lovers of in the present life (but they were lovers of wisdom), and to be liberated from the association of that nature to which they were always inimical? Or do you think it possible, that many should be willing, of their own accord, to descend into Hades, allured by the hope of seeing and conversing with departed beautiful youths, wives and children whom they have loved; and that the true lover of wisdom, who has exceedingly nourished* this hope, that he shall never possess wisdom as he ought any where but in Hades, should be afflicted when dying, and should not depart thither with readiness and delight? For it is necessary, my friend, to think in this manner of one who is a true philosopher; since such a one is very much of opinion, that he shall never any where, but in that place, acquire the possession of wisdom with purity; and if this be the

energy from Prometheus, but the *especially* and the *always* from Hercules. For the never-failing and the strenuous make the solution strong. In consequence, too, of being deprived of good we are afflicted, and fall into evil. We rejoice, therefore, when we are liberated from evil, and meet with good; so that, according to each of these, it is necessary to be delighted with death, both as liberating us from the hated body, and as affording us the enjoyment of what we truly desire. As fire too tends downwards by violence and through a certain artifice, but spontaneously ascends, because its *wholeness** is on high; in like manner the soul's attention to the body is the effect of compulsion, and its ascent to true being spontaneous, because its separate wholeness is there.

* See the Introduction to the Timæus.

case, would it not be very irrational, as we just now said, for a man of this kind to be terrified at death?—Very much so, by Jupiter, says he.

This then will be an argument sufficient to convince you, that he whom you behold afflicted, when about to die, is not a philosopher, but a lover of body; and this same person is a lover of riches and honours, either desiring the possession of one of these, or of both.—The case is entirely so (says he) as you represent it.—Does not then, O Simmias, that which is called fortitude eminently belong to such as are thus disposed?—Entirely so, (says he).—Does not temperance also, which even the multitude thus denominate as a virtue, through which we are not agitated by desires, but regard them with moderation and contempt; does it not, I say, belong to those only who despise the body in the most eminent degree, and live in the exercise of philosophy?—It is necessary, says he.—For, if you are willing (says Socrates) to consider the fortitude and temperance of others, they will appear to you to be absurdities.—But how, Socrates? You know (says he) that all others look upon death as the greatest of evils.—In the highest degree so, says he.—Those who are bold, therefore, among these, sustain death when they do sustain it, through the dread of greater evils.—They do so.—All men, therefore, except philosophers, are bold through fearing and dread, though it is absurd that any one should be bold through fear or cowardice.—Entirely so.—But what, are not the moderate among these affected in the same manner? and are they not temperate by a certain intemperance? Though this is in a certain respect impossible, yet a passion similar to this happens to them with respect to this foolish temperance: for, fearing to be deprived of other pleasures which at the same time they desire, they abstain from others, by others being vanquished. And though they call intemperance a subjection to pleasures; yet at the same time it happens to them, that, being vanquished by certain pleasures, they rule over others; and this is similar to what I just now said, that after a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance.—It seems so, indeed.—But, O blessed Simmias, this is by no means the right road to virtue, to change pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, fear for fear, and the greater for the lesser, like pieces of money: but that alone is the proper coin, I mean wisdom, for which all these ought to be changed. And indeed, for the sake of this, and with this every thing must in reality be bought and sold, both fortitude and temperance, justice, and,

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in one word, true virtue, which subsists with wisdom, whether pleasures and pains, and every thing else of this kind, are present or absent: but if these are separated from wisdom, and changed from one another, such virtue does not merit to be called even a shadowy description, but is in reality servile, and possesses nothing salutary and true. But that which is in reality true virtue¹ is a purification from every thing of this kind; and temperance and justice,

¹ The first of the virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in The Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the desiderative power; but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the Republic. These virtues, too, follow each other. Above these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly delivers to us these virtues in this dialogue. Prior to these, however, are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically, for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect, as we have before observed, possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the political: for, as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theætetus.

According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation of the virtues besides these, viz. the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes as it were solar form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so as that we may energize paradigmatically. And as, when possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies);

justice, fortitude, and prudence itself, are each of them a certain purification. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means

so, from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical *ελευθεριαί*, because their possessors only know *that* the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know *why* they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the politic are not telestic, i. e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, says Olympiodorus, the cathartic are denominated from the purification which is used in the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine, *απε του τα θεια οραν*. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that

The soul that uninitiated dies,
Plung'd in the blackest mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the Bacchic mysteries of the virtues (*τελετη γαρ εστιν η των αρετων βακχεια*). Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death, because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred rites.

It is here too necessary to observe, that all the virtues exhibit their proper characters, these being every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of justice, a proper energy, and adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Observe too, with Olympiodorus, that all the virtues are in the Gods: for many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise prior to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues first appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldean oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or, in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to disorder? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order.

means contemptible persons, but to have really signified formerly, in an obscure manner, *that whoever descended¹ into Hades uninitiated, and without being a partaker of the mysteries, should be plunged into mire; but that*

order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say, that through the cathartic virtues considered according to their causal subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabled to abide in his accustomed mode, as Plato says in the *Timæus*? And further still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the tower of Saturn.

¹ It is requisite, says Olympiodorus, that dialectic conceptions should either begin from divine ænigmas, unfolding the arcane truth which they contain; or that they should become established in them as in a port, and rest in the demonstrations of them; or that they should accomplish both these. Olympiodorus further observes that what is here said imitates the mystic and mundane circle of souls; for these, says he, flying from an impartible and Bacchic life, and energizing according to that which is Titanic, become fettered and imprisoned. Abiding however in punishment, and attending to themselves, they are purified from Titanic defilements, and, passing into a collected from a dispersed subsistence, they become Bacchuses, i. e. entire and perfect, according to the Bacchus that abides on high. In the mysteries too, says Olympiodorus, popular purifications first take the lead; in the next place, such as are more arcane than these; in the third place, things permanently abiding are introduced; in the fourth place, perceptions with the eyes closed (*μυσεις*); and, in the last place, an inspection of the things themselves (*εποπτεiai*). *ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γιγνόντο μὲν αἱ πανδημὴ καθαρσεις· εἰτα ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀπορρητοτέραι· μετὰ δὲ ταύτας συστάσεις παρελμβαίνοντο· καὶ ἐπὶ ταύταις μυσεις· ἐν τελείῃ δὲ ἐποπτεiai.* Hence, says he, the ethical and political virtues are analogous to the apparent purifications; but such of the cathartic virtues as reject every thing external, to the more arcane purifications. The energies also which are theoretic about intelligibles, are analogous to the things which permanently abide; but the contractions of these energies into the impartible are analogous to the perceptions with the eyes closed; and the simple intuitive perceptions of simple forms, to epoptic vision, or an inspection of the things themselves.

Olympiodorus further observes, that the scope of the mysteries is to lead back souls to that end from which as a principle they made their first descent; and in which also Bacchus established them, seating them in the throne of his proper father; or, in other words, in the whole of that life of which Jupiter is the source. He, therefore, who is initiated, necessarily dwells with the Gods, according to the scope of the initiating deities. But the greatest and most mystical sacrifices (*τελεται*), says he, are twofold; the one here, being certain preparations; and the other hereafter. The latter also, he adds, are in his opinion twofold; some taking place about the pneumatic vehicle, as here about the shelly body (*περὶ τοῦ οὐστρεῖον*), and others about the luciform vehicle. For there are three gradations of mystic as well as of philosophic ascent. For philosophers are led back to their pristine condition in the three thousandth year, as it is said in the *Phædrus*; and a chiliad, or a thousand, signifies a perfect and periodic life. He, therefore, who is uninitiated, as remaining most remote from his proper end, lies in mire here, and much more there; for he is merged in the impurity of matter.

whoever arrived there, purified and initiated, should dwell with the Gods. For, as it is said by those who write about the mysteries,

“ The thyrsus-bearers ¹ numerous are seen,
 “ But few the Bacchuses have always been.”

These few are, in my opinion, no other than those who philosophize rightly; and that I may be ranked in the number of these, I shall leave nothing unattempted, but exert myself in all possible ways. But whether or not my exertions will be properly directed, and whether I shall accomplish any thing when I arrive thither, I shall clearly know, very shortly, if Divinity pleases, as it appears to me. And this (says he), Simmias and Cebes, is my apology ², why upon leaving you, and the rulers of the present life, I ought not to be afflicted and indignant, since I am persuaded that I shall there meet with masters and companions not less good than such as are here. This indeed is incredible to many; but if my apology shall have more influence with you than with the judges of the Athenians, it will have a good effect.

¹ The thyrsus, says Olympiodorus, is a symbol of material and partible fabrication, on account of its divided continuity, whence also it is a Titannic plant. For it is extended before Bacchus instead of his paternal sceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. Besides, says he, the Titans are thyrsus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a reed, whether by this we are to understand that he draws down celestial light into generation, or impels soul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the whole of which is ungenerated, into generation. Hence Socrates Orphically calls the multitude thyrsus-bearers, as living Titannically. Olympiodorus further adds, that he who lives Bacchically, now rests from his labours, is liberated from his bonds, and dismisses his guard, or rather his confined life; and such a one is a cathartic philosopher. Some too, says he, prefer *philosophy*, as Porphyry and Plotinus, and many other philosophers; but others prefer the *hieratic* discipline, or the discipline pertaining to sacred ceremonies, as Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus, and all the *hieratic* philosophers. Plato, however, knowing that much may be said on both sides, collects the arguments into one, by calling the philosopher a Bacchus.

² The apology of Socrates is twofold, one to the Athenian judges, and the other to the most genuine of his associates. The one contending for the safety of the animal, i. e. of the composite of soul and body, but the other for the separate and proper life of the soul. The one also being a mixture of science and opinion, but the other of intellect and science. The one proceeding from the political life, but the other from the cathartic life. And the one evincing that the death which is apparent and known to all men is good; but the other, that this must be asserted of the true death, and which is only known to philosophers.

When

When Socrates had thus spoken, Cebes, renewing the discourse, said, Other things, Socrates, appear to me to be well spoken; but what you have asserted about the soul will produce in men much incredulity, who think, when it is liberated from the body, that it is no longer any where, but that, on that very day in which a man dies, it is corrupted¹ and perishes, and this immediately as it is freed from the body; and, besides this, that on its departure it becomes dissipated like wind or smoke, makes its escape, and flies away, and is no longer any where: for if it remained any where essentially collected in itself, and liberated from those evils which you have now enumerated, there would be an abundant and fair hope, Socrates, that what you have asserted is true. But it will perhaps require no small allurements and faith, in order to be persuaded that the soul remains, though the man dies, and that it possesses a certain power and prudence.—You speak the truth, Cebes (says Socrates); but what shall we do? Are you willing that we should discourse about these particulars, whether it is proper that this should be the case with the soul, or not?—Indeed (says Cebes), I shall hear with great pleasure your opinion on this subject. —For I do not think (answered Socrates) that any one who should hear this discussion, even though he should be a comic poet, could say that I trifled, and discoursed about things not accommodated to my condition. If it is agreeable to you, therefore, and it is requisite to investigate these particulars, let us consider whether the souls of dead men survive in Hades, or not.

The assertion indeed, which we now call to mind, is an ancient one, I mean that souls departing from hence exist in Hades, and that they again return hither, and are generated from the dead. And if the case is such, that living² natures are again generated from the dead, can there be any other

¹ Some, says Olympiodorus, immortalize the soul from the rational part as far as to the animated habit, as the Pythagorean Numenius. Others as far as to nature, as Plotinus. Others as far as to the irrational part, as among the ancients Xenocrates and Speusippus, but among the moderns Jamblichus and Plutarch. Others again as far only as to the rational soul, as Proclus and Porphyry. Others as far only as to intellect; for they suppose that the doxastic part is corrupted, as many of the Peripatetics. And others as far as to the whole soul; for they admit that partial souls are corrupted into the whole soul of the universe.

² The design of what is here said is not to show that the soul is immortal, but that it continues for a certain time after the dissolution of the body. Jamblichus, however, as we are informed by

Olympiodorus,

other consequence than that our souls are there? for they could not be again generated if they had no subsistence; and this will be a sufficient argument that these things are so, if it is really evident that the living cannot be generated from any thing else than the dead. But, if this is not the case, it will be necessary to adduce some other reason.—Entirely so (says Cebes).—You should not, therefore (says he), consider this assertion with respect to men alone, if you wish to learn with facility; but we should survey it as connected with all animals and plants, and, in one word, with every thing which is endued with generation. Are not all things, therefore, so generated, that they are produced no otherwise than contraries from contraries, I mean those to which any thing of this kind happens? as the beautiful is contrary to the base, and the just to the unjust; and a thousand other particulars subsist in the same manner. We should consider, therefore, whether it is necessary, respecting every thing which has a contrary, that this contrary should be generated from nothing else than that which is its contrary. As for instance, is it not necessary that, when any thing becomes greater, it should become so from being before smaller?—It is so (says he).—And is not the weaker generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower?—Entirely so.—But what if any thing becomes worse, must it

Olympiodorus, thought that each of the arguments in the *Phædo* demonstrated the immortality of the soul. But, as Olympiodorus justly observes, Jamblichus said this in consequence of energizing according to intellect enthusiastically, which, says he, was usual with him.

Proclus, or rather Syrianus, as we learn from Olympiodorus, collects that life and death are generated from each other, because life is a conjunction and death a disjunction. But these are contraries; and contraries change into each other; for that contraries change into each other, the text shows in a threefold respect. First, from induction. Secondly, from generations themselves, and the ways which lead to them: for if the ways change into each other, as for instance whitening into blackening, much more must the ends change into each other, viz. the white into the black. Thirdly, because nature would be mutilated, if one of two contraries changed into the other, and the other not; and also because in time the other would fail, and nothing would be contrary, the remainder not having any thing into which it can change. Just as if a vigilant should be changed into a sleepy state, but not on the other hand a sleepy into a vigilant state; the delusion of Endymion, as Socrates says, would take place; for not only he, but all things, would sleep. Endymion, however, is said to have slept perpetually, because he applied himself in solitude to the study of astronomy. Hence, too, he is said to have been beloved by the moon.

It is likewise necessary to observe that Plato here speaks of things which are properly contraries; and that, if he also makes mention of relatives, these, from the participation of contraries, change into each other.

not become so from the better? and if more just, must it not be generated from the more unjust?—How should it not?—We have then (says he) sufficiently determined this, that every thing is thus generated, viz. contraries from contraries.—Entirely so.—But what, is there any thing among these which has a middle subsistence between both (since all contraries are two), so as to cause two generations from this to that, and from that again to this? for between a greater and a lesser thing there is increase and diminution; and hence we say that the one is increased, but the other diminished.—It is so (says he).—And must not to be separated and mingled, to be cooled and heated, and every thing in the same manner, though sometimes we do not distinguish the several particulars by names, must they not in reality be every where thus circumstanced, be generated from each other, and be subject to a mutual generation of each into one another?—Entirely so (says he).

What then (says Socrates), is there any thing contrary to the being alive, as sleeping is contrary to waking?—Entirely so (says he).—But what is this contrary?—To be dead.—Are not these, therefore, generated from each other, since they are contraries? and since they are two, are there not two generations between them?—How should there not?—I will, therefore (says Socrates), tell you what one of these conjunctions is which I have just now spoken of, and what its generations are; do you tell me what the other is. But I say, that the one of these is *to sleep*, but the other *to awake*; and from sleeping awaking is generated, and from awaking sleeping; and the generations of these are on the one hand to be laid asleep, and on the other to be roused. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?—Perfectly so.—Do you, therefore (says he), inform me, in a similar manner, concerning life and death.—Do you not say that *living* is the contrary of *to be dead*?—I do.—And that they are generated from each other?—Certainly.—What then is generated from that which is alive?—That which is dead (says he).—But what (says Socrates) is generated from *the dead*?—It is necessary to confess (says he) that this must be *the living*.—From the dead, therefore (says he), O Cebes, living things, and men who are alive, are generated.—It appears so, (says he).—Our souls therefore (says Socrates) subsist in Hades.—So it seems.—Is not, therefore, one of the generations subsisting about these manifest? for *to die* is, I think, sufficiently clear; is it not?—

Entirely

Entirely so (says he).—What then shall we do? shall we not render back a contrary generation in its turn, but say that nature is defective and lame in this particular? Or is it necessary to assign a certain contrary generation *to the being dead*?—Entirely so, says he.—But what is this?—*To be restored back again to life*.—But (says Socrates), if there is such a thing as to revive again, will not this reviving be a generation from the dead to the living?—Perfectly so.—This then is agreed upon by us, that the living are generated from the dead no less than the dead from the living: but, this being the case, it is a sufficient argument to prove that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere, from whence they may again be generated.—It appears to me (says he), Socrates, that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted.

Take notice then (says he), O Cebes! that we have not unjustly made these concessions, as it appears to me: for if other things, when generated, were not always restored in the place of others, revolving as it were in a circle, but generation subsisted according to a right line, proceeding from one thing alone into its opposite, without recurring again to the other, and making an inflection, you know that all things would at length possess the same form, would be affected with the same passion, and would cease to be generated.—How do you say? (says he.)—It is by no means difficult (replies Socrates) to understand what I assert; but just as if there should be such a thing as falling asleep without recurring again to a vigilant state, generated from a sleepy condition, you know that all things would at length exhibit the delusions of Endymion, and would nowhere present themselves to the view, because every thing else would suffer the same as happened to him, viz. would be laid asleep. And if all things were mingled together, without ever being separated, the doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified; for all things would be at once collected in a heap. In the same manner, my dear Simmias, if all such things as participate of life should die, and after they are dead should abide in that lifeless form, and not revive again, would there not be a great necessity that all things should at length die, and that nothing should live? for if living beings are generated from other things, and living beings die, how can it be otherwise but that all things must be extinguished through being dead?—It appears to me, Socrates (says Cebes), that it can not be otherwise; and in my opinion you perfectly speak the truth:—for to me, Cebes (says Socrates), it seems to be so more than any thing,

thing, and that we have not assented to this through deception; but that there is such a thing in reality as reviving again; that the living are generated from the dead; that the souls of the dead have a subsistence; and that the condition of the good after this life will be better than at present; but of the evil, worse.

But (says Cebes, interrupting him), according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently accustomed to employ (if it is true), that learning, with respect to us, is nothing else than reminiscence¹; according to this, it is

¹ Socrates, having shown from life and death that the soul remains after its separation from the body, now shows, from discipline being reminiscence, that it subsisted prior to the body; so that from both these positions it may be collected that the soul endures for a much longer time than the body. Olympiodorus however again informs us that Jamblichus thought that each of these positions evinced the immortality of the soul. For, says he, if life and death are always from each other, the soul is perpetual; and if also disciplines are reminiscences, according to this also the soul lives for ever. So that, by uniting both the arguments, he concludes that the soul is without generation and incorruptible. However, as Olympiodorus justly observes, neither nor both of these positions demonstrate that the soul is immortal, but that it subsists for a certain time prior and posterior to the body. Hence Plato, perceiving that he had not yet sufficiently demonstrated the thing proposed, introduces other arguments in proof of it; and the fifth alone properly demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its essence.

Since however, says Olympiodorus, the discourse is now about reminiscence, and memory is proximate to reminiscence, and oblivion is opposed to memory, let us define what each of these three is, from their appellations. Reminiscence, therefore, is renewed memory*, as its name evinces. But memory is permanency of intellect†. And oblivion is as it were a certain dimness of the sight‡. For as dimness is an impediment to the sight, so oblivion is a dimness of our knowledge, as it were of our sight. For memory, which is permanency of intellect, is first beheld in intellect; since it is a stable collection of knowledge: just as *the ever* is stability of being, and *immortality* is stability of life; for it is inextinguishable life. In like manner memory is stability of knowledge. As, therefore, our soul does not possess infinite power according to knowledge, though it does according to life, hence oblivion intervening, reminiscence is a certain regeneration as it were of knowledge. Memory likewise first subsists in intellect, because intellect always understands and abides in itself; but secondarily in divine souls, as possessing transitive intellects, and not knowing all things without time, and collectively; and it subsists, in the third place, in our souls, in which oblivion also intervenes. Memory likewise is similar to eternity, perpetually subsisting about the same; but reminiscence, to time, through its transition.

But as Socrates shows from reminiscence that the soul subsisted prior to the body, the following Platonic arguments in defence of the soul's pre-existence are offered to the earnest consideration of

* Αναμνησις ἐστὶ ἀναγνωσις μνήμης.

† Μνήμη δὲ μὴνη τοῦ νοῦ.

‡ Ληθὴ δὲ ὅσον λήνη τις.

is necessary that we must have learned the things which we now call to mind in some former period of time. But this is impossible, unless our soul sub-

the reader. Unless the soul then had a being prior to her connexion with the present body, she never would be led to search after knowledge. For if the objects of her investigation were things which she had never before been acquainted with, how could she ever be certain that she detected them? Indeed it would be as impossible on this hypothesis for the soul to know any thing about them, even when she perceived them, as it would be to tell the meaning of the words of an unknown language on hearing them pronounced. The Peripatetics, in order to subvert this consequence, have recourse to an intellect in capacity, which is the passive recipient of all forms. The doubt however still remains. For how does this intellect understand? For it must either understand the things which it already knows, or things which it does not know. But the Stoics assert, that natural conceptions are the causes of our investigating and discovering truth. If, therefore, these conceptions are in capacity, we ask the same question as before; but if they are in energy, why do we investigate things which we know? Lastly, the Epicureans affirm that anticipations are the causes of our investigations. If then they say that these anticipations subsist distinctly, investigation must be vain; but if indistinctly, why do we seek after any thing besides these anticipations? Or, in other words, why do we seek after distinct knowledge, of which we have no anticipation?

Again, there are numberless instances of persons that are terrified at certain animals, such as cats, lizards, and tortoises, without knowing the cause of their terror. Thus the nephews of *Berius*, says *Olympiodorus*, that were accustomed to hunt bears and lions, could not endure the sight of a cock. The same author adds, that a certain apothecary could look undisturbed at asps and snakes, but was so exceedingly frightened at a wasp, that he would run from it crying aloud, and stupefied with terror. Thus too, says he, *Themison* the physician could apply himself to the cure of every disease except the hydrophobia; but if any person only mentioned this disease, he would be immediately agitated, and suffer in a manner similar to those afflicted with this malady. Now it is impossible to assign any other satisfactory cause of all this, than a reminiscence of having suffered through these animals in a prior state of existence.

Further still, infants are not seen to laugh for nearly three weeks after their birth, but pass the greatest part of this time in sleep; however, in their sleep they are often seen both to laugh and cry. But how is it possible that this can any otherwise happen than through the soul being agitated by the whirling motions of the animal nature, and moved in conformity to the passions which it had experienced in another life? Besides, our looking into ourselves, when we are endeavouring to discover any truth, evinces that we inwardly contain truth, though concealed in the darkness of oblivion. The delight too which attends our discovery of truth, sufficiently proves that this discovery is nothing more than a recognition of something most eminently allied to our nature, and which had been, as it were, lost in the middle space of time, between our former knowledge of the truth and the recovery of that knowledge. For the perception of a thing perfectly unknown and unconnected with our nature, would produce terror instead of delight; and things are pleasing only in proportion as they possess something known and domestic to the natures by which they are known.

lifted

sifted somewhere before it took up its residence in this human form ; so that from hence the soul will appear to be a certain immortal nature.—But, Cebes (says Simmias, interrupting him), recall into my memory what demonstrations there are of these particulars ; for I do not very much remember them at present.—The truth of this (says Cebes) is evinced by one argument, and that a most beautiful one ; that men, when interrogated, if they are but interrogated properly, will speak about every thing just as it is. At the same time, they could never do this unless science and right reason resided in their natures. And, in the second place, if any one leads them to diagrams, or any thing of this kind, he will in these most clearly discover that this is really the case.—But if you are not persuaded from this, Simmias (says Socrates), see if, from considering the subject in this manner, you will perceive as we do. For you do not believe how that which is called learning is reminiscence.—I do not disbelieve it (says Simmias) ; but I desire to be informed concerning this, which is the subject of our discourse, I mean reminiscence ; and indeed, from what Cebes has endeavoured to say, I almost now remember, and am persuaded : but nevertheless I would at present hear how you attempt to support this opinion.—We defend it then, (says Socrates) as follows : we confess without doubt, that if any one calls any thing to mind, it is necessary that at some time or other he should have previously known this.—Entirely so (says he).—Shall we not confess this also (says Socrates), that when science is produced in us, after some particular manner, it is reminiscence ? But I mean by a particular manner, thus : If any one, upon seeing or hearing any thing, or apprehending it through the medium of any other sense, should not only know it, but should also think upon something else, of which there is not the same, but a different science, should we not justly say, that he recollects or remembers the particular, of which he receives a mental conception ?—How do you mean ?—Thus (says Socrates) : In a certain respect the science of a man is different from that of a lyre.—How should it not ?—Do you not, therefore, know that lovers when they see a lyre, or a vestment, or any thing else which the objects of their affection were accustomed to use, no sooner know the lyre, than they immediately receive in their dianoëtic part the form of the beloved person to whom the lyre belonged ? But this is no other than reminiscence : just as any one, upon seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes ; and

in a certain respect an infinite number of such particulars continually occur.—An infinite number indeed, by Jupiter (says Simmias).—Is not then (says Socrates) something of this kind a certain reminiscence; and then especially so, when any one experiences this affection about things which, through time, and ceasing to consider them, he has now forgotten?—Entirely so (says Simmias).—But what (says Socrates), does it happen, that when any one sees a painted horse and a painted lyre, he calls to mind a man? and that when he beholds a picture of Simmias, he recollects Cebes?—Entirely so.—And will it not also happen, that on seeing a picture of Simmias he will recollect Simmias himself?—It certainly will happen so (says he).

Does it not therefore follow, that in all these instances reminiscence partly takes place from things similar, and partly from such as are dissimilar?—It does.—But when any one recollects any thing from similars, must it not also happen to him, that he must know whether this similitude is deficient in any respect, as to likeness, from that particular of which he has the remembrance?—It is necessary (says he).—Consider then (says Socrates) if the following particulars are thus circumstanced: Do we say that any thing is in a certain respect equal? I do not say one piece of wood to another, nor one stone to another, nor any thing else of this kind; but do we say that equal itself, which is something different from all these, is something or nothing?—We say it is something different, by Jupiter, Socrates (says Simmias), and that in a wonderful manner.—Have we also a scientific knowledge of that which is equal itself?—Entirely so (says he).—But from whence do we receive the science of it? Is it not from the particulars we have just now spoken of, viz. on seeing wood, stones, or other things of this kind, which are equals, do we not form a conception of that which is different from these? But consider the affair in this manner: Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, which sometimes remain the same, at one time appear equal, and at another not?—Entirely so.—But what, can *equals themselves* ever appear to you unequal? or can equality seem to be inequality?—By no means, Socrates.—These equals, therefore, are not the same with equal itself.—By no means, Socrates, as it appears to me.—But from these equals (says he), which are different from equal itself, you at the same time understand and receive the science of *equal itself*.—You speak most true (says he).—I it not, therefore, either similar to these or dissimilar?

milar?—Entirely so.—But indeed (says Socrates) this is of no consequence : for while, in consequence of seeing one thing, you understand another, from the view of this, whether it is dissimilar or similar, it is necessary that this conception of another thing should be reminiscence.—Entirely so.—But what will you determine concerning this (says Socrates)?—Do we suffer any thing of this kind respecting the equality in pieces of wood, and other such equals as we have just now spoken of? and do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as equal itself? and is something or nothing wanting, through which they are less equal than equal itself?—There is much wanting (says he).—Must we not, therefore, confess, that when any one, on beholding some particular thing, understands that he wishes this which I now perceive to be such as something else is, but that it is deficient, and falls short of its perfection; must we not confess that he who understands this, necessarily had a previous knowledge of that to which he asserts this to be similar, but in a defective degree?—It is necessary.—What then, do we suffer something of this kind or not about equals and equal itself?—Perfectly so.—It is necessary, therefore, that we must have previously known *equal itself* before that time, in which, from first seeing equal things, we understood that we desired all these to be such as *equal itself*, but that they had a defective subsistence.—It is so.—But this also we must confess, that we neither understood this, nor are able to understand it, by any other means than either by the sight, or the touch, or some other of the senses.—I speak in the same manner about all these. For they are the same, Socrates, with respect to that which your discourse wishes to evince. But indeed, from the senses, it is necessary to understand that all equals in sensible objects aspire after *equal itself*, and are deficient from its perfection. Or how shall we say?—In this manner: Before, therefore, we begin to see, or hear, and to perceive other things, it necessarily follows, that we must in a certain respect have received the science of *equal itself*, so as to know what it is, or else we could never refer the equals among sensibles to *equal itself*, and be convinced that all these desire to become such as *equal itself*, but fall short of its perfection.—This, Socrates, is necessary, from what has been previously said.—But do we not, as soon as we are born, see and hear, and possess the other senses?—Entirely so.—But we have said it is necessary that prior to

these we should have received the science of *equal itself*.—Certainly.—We must necessarily, therefore, as it appears, have received it before we were born.—It appears so.

If, therefore, receiving this before we were born, we were born possessing it; we both knew prior to our birth, and as soon as we were born, not only *the equal, the greater, and the lesser*, but every thing of this kind: for our discourse at present is not more concerning *the equal* than *the beautiful, the good, the just, and the holy*, and in one word, about every thing which we mark with the signature of *that which is*, both in our interrogations when we interrogate, and in our answers when we reply: so that it is necessary we should have received the science of all these before we were born.—All this is true.—And if, since we receive these sciences, we did not forget each of them, we should always be born knowing, and should always know them, through the whole course of our life: for to know is nothing else than this, to retain the science which we have received, and not to lose it. Or do we not call oblivion the loss of science?—Entirely so (says he), Socrates.—But if, receiving science before we were born, we lose it at the time of our birth, and afterwards, through exercising the senses about these particulars, receive back again those sciences which we once before possessed, will not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own proper science? and shall we not speak rightly when we call this a certain reminiscence?—Entirely so.—For this appears to be possible, that when any one perceives any thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, he may at the same time know something different from this, which he had forgotten, and to which this approaches, whether it is dissimilar or similar. So that, as I said, one of these two things must be the consequence: either that we were born knowing these, and possess a knowledge of all of them, through the whole of our life; or that we only remember what we are said to learn afterwards; and thus learning will be reminiscence.—The case is perfectly so, Socrates.

Which, therefore, will you choose, Simmias: that we are born knowing, or that we afterwards remember the particulars of which we formerly received the science?—At present, Socrates, I have no choice.—But what will be your choice in the following instance, and what will be your opinion
about

about it? Can a man, who possesses science, render a reason concerning the objects of his knowledge, or not?—There is a great necessity (says he), Socrates, that he should.—And does it also appear to you, that all men can render a reason of the particulars concerning which we have just now spoken?—I wish they could, says Simmias; but I am much more afraid, that to-morrow there will no longer be any one here who can accomplish this in a becoming manner.—You do not therefore think, Simmias, that all men know these particulars?—By no means.—They remember, therefore, the things which they have once learned.—It is necessary.—But when did our souls receive this science? for they did not receive them from those from whom we are born men.—Certainly not.—Before this period, therefore.—Certainly.—Our souls therefore, Simmias, had a subsistence before they were in a human form, separate from bodies, and possessed intellectual prudence.—Unless, Socrates, we received these sciences while we were making our entrance into the present life; for that space of time is yet left for us.—Let it be so, my friend. But in what other time did we lose these? for we were not born possessing them, as we have just now acknowledged. Did we lose them at the very time in which we received them? Or can you mention any other time?—By no means, Socrates: but I was ignorant that I spoke nothing to the purpose.

Will then the case remain thus for us, Simmias? For if those things have a subsistence which we perpetually proclaim, viz. a certain something beautiful and good, and every such essence; and if we refer to this all sensible objects, as finding it to have a prior subsistence, and to be ours, and assimilate these to it, as images to their exemplar; it is necessary that, as these have a subsistence, so likewise that our soul should have subsisted before we were born: but if these are not, this discourse will have been undertaken in vain. Is it not so? and is there not an equal necessity, both that these should have a subsistence, and that our souls should have had a being before we were born, and that the one cannot be without the other?—The same necessity, Socrates (says Simmias), appears to me to take place in a most transcendent manner; and the discourse flies to a beautiful circumstance, I mean that our soul subsisted before we were born, in a manner similar to that essence which you now speak of. For I possess nothing which is so clear to me as this, that all such things as the beautiful and the good subsist, in the most

most eminent degree, together with every thing else which you now mention ; and, with respect to myself, it is sufficiently demonstrated.—But how does it appear to Cebes ? says Socrates : for it is necessary that Cebes also should be persuaded.—In my opinion he is sufficiently so (says Simmias), although he is the most resolute of all men in not assenting to what is said. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded that our soul had a subsistence before we were born. But whether or not the soul remains after death, does not appear to me, Socrates (says he), to be yet demonstrated ; but that doubt of the multitude, which Cebes mentioned, still presses hard upon me, whether, when a man dies, the soul is not dissipated, and this is the end of its existence. For what hinders but that it may be born, and may have had a subsistence elsewhere, and this before it came into a human body ; and yet, after it departs, and is liberated from this body, may then die and be corrupted ?—You speak well, Simmias (says Cebes) ; for it appears that the half only of what was necessary has been demonstrated, I mean that our soul subsisted before we were born : but it is necessary that you should demonstrate, besides this, that it no less subsists after we are dead, than it did before we were born, in order that the demonstration may be complete.—This, Simmias and Cebes (says Socrates), is even now demonstrated, if you are only willing to connect into one and the same the present discourse and that which we before assented to ; I mean that every vital nature is generated from that which is dead. For if the soul had a prior subsistence, and it is necessary when it proceeds into the present life, and is generated man, that it should be generated from nothing else than death, and to be dead ; how is it not necessary that it should also subsist after death, since it is requisite that it should be generated again ? Its existence therefore, after death, is even now, as I said, demonstrated. But you and Simmias appear to me still more earnestly to discuss this assertion in a very pleasant manner, and to be afraid like boys, lest on the soul's departure from the body the winds should tear it in pieces, and widely disperse it, especially if any one should die during a stormy blast, and not when the heavens are serene.—Upon this Cebes laughing, Endeavour (says he), O Socrates, to persuade us of the contrary, as if we were afraid, or rather as if we were not afraid ; though, perhaps, there is some boy among us, by whom circumstances of this kind may be dreaded : him, therefore, we should endeavour to persuade not to be terrified at death,

as if it was some dreadful spectre.—But it is necessary (says Socrates) to charm him every day till he becomes well.—But from whence (says he), O Socrates, can a man acquire skill in such enchantment, since you are about to leave us?—Greece (says he), Cebes, is very spacious, in some part of which good men may be found: and there are many barbarous nations, all which must be wandered over, inquiring after an enchanter of this kind, without sparing either riches or labour, as there is nothing for which wealth can be more seasonably bestowed. But it is necessary that you should inquire among yourselves; for perhaps you will not easily find any one who is more able to accomplish this than yourselves.—Let these things be so (says Cebes): but, if you please, let us return from whence we made this digression.—It will be agreeable to me (says Socrates): for how should it not be so?—You speak well, says Cebes.

Some such thing, therefore (says Socrates), we ought to inquire of ourselves, viz. to what being the passion of becoming dissipated belongs; and respecting what we ought to fear, lest this should take place; and to whom a fear of this kind is proper: and after this, we should consider whether it is foul or not; and, as the result of these speculations, should either be confident or fearful concerning our soul.—You speak true (says he).—Is it not, therefore, a passion natural to that which is collected together, and a composite, that it should be dissolved so far as it is a composite; and that, if there is any thing without composition, to this alone, if to any other, it belongs not to suffer affections of this kind?—This (says Cebes) appears to me to be the case. But does it not follow, that things which always subsist according to the same, and in a similar manner, are in the most eminent degree in-composites; but that such things as subsist differently at different times, and never according to the same, are composites?—To me it appears so.—Let us return, therefore (says he), to the particulars of our former discourse: Whether is *essence itself* (which both in our inquiries and answers we established as having a being) that which always subsists similarly, and according to the same, or that which subsists differently at different times? And does *the equal itself, the beautiful itself*, and every thing which truly is, ever receive any kind of mutation? Or does not every thing which always truly is, and has a uniform subsistence, essentially abide in a similar manner according to the same, and never in any respect receive any mutation?—It is

necessary, Socrates (says Cebes), that it should subsist similarly, and according to the same.—But what shall we say concerning many beautiful things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of this kind, which are either equal, or beautiful; and of all such as are synonymous to these? Do these also subsist according to the same, or rather are they not entirely contrary to those, so that they neither subsist similarly according to the same, either with respect to themselves or to one another, or, in one word, in any manner whatever?—These (says Cebes) never subsist in a similar condition. These, therefore, may be touched, may be seen and perceived by the other senses; but those natures which always subsist according to the same, cannot be apprehended by any other means than the discursive energy of the dianoëtic power. But things of this kind are invisible, and cannot be seen. Are you willing, therefore (says he), that we should establish two species of beings, the one visible, and the other invisible?—Let us establish them (says he).—And that the invisible subsists always according to the same, but the visible never according to the same.—And this also (says he) we will establish.—Come then (says Socrates), is there any thing else belonging to us, than on the one hand body, and on the other soul?—Nothing else (says he).—To which species, therefore, shall we say the body is more similar and allied?—It is manifest to every one (says he), that it is allied to the visible species.—But what shall we say of the soul? Is it visible, or invisible?—It is certainly not visible to men, Socrates (says he).—But we speak of things which are visible or not so, with respect to the nature of men. Or do you think we speak of things visible to any other nature?—Of those which regard the nature of men.—What then shall we say respecting the soul, that it is visible, or cannot be seen?—That it cannot be seen.—The soul, therefore, is more similar to the invisible species than the body, but the body is more similar to the visible.—It is perfectly necessary it should be so, Socrates.

And have we not also formerly asserted this, that the soul, when it employs the body in the speculation of any thing, either through sight, or hearing, or some other sense (for to speculate through sense is to speculate through body), then, indeed, it is drawn by the body to things which never subsist according to the same, wanders¹ and is agitated, and becomes giddy like one intoxicated,
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¹ The term *wandering*, says Olympiodorus, is common both to life and knowledge; but the term

through passing into contact with things of this kind?—Entirely so.—But when it speculates any thing, itself subsisting by itself, then it departs to that which is pure, eternal, and immortal, and which possesses a sameness of subsistence: and, as being allied to such a nature, it perpetually becomes united with it, when it subsists alone by itself, and as often as it is lawful for it to obtain such a conjunction: and then, too, it rests from its wanderings, and perpetually subsists similarly according to the same, about such natures, as passing into contact with them; and this passion¹ of the soul is denominated prudence.—You speak (says he), Socrates, in every respect beautifully and true.—To which species, therefore, of things, formerly and now spoken of, does the soul appear to you to be more similar and allied?—It appears to me, Socrates (says he), that every one, and even the most indocile, must admit, in consequence of this method of reasoning, that the soul is both totally and universally more similar to that which subsists perpetually the same, than to that which does not so.—But to which is the body most similar?—To the other species.

But consider also as follows²: that, since soul and body subsist together, nature commands that the one should be subservient and obey, but that the other should rule and possess dominion. And in consequence of this, which again of these appears to you to be similar to a divine nature, and which to the mortal nature? Or does it not appear to you that the divine nature is essentially adapted to govern and rule, but the mortal to be governed and be subservient?—To me it does so.—To which, therefore, is the soul similar?—It is manifest, Socrates, that the soul is similar to the divine, but the

term *agitated* belongs to life alone; and the term *giddiness* to knowledge alone. But giddiness is an evil. For as those who are thus affected, through the inward whirl which they experience, think that things external to them are in a similar condition, so the soul, through alone beholding sensibles, thinks that all things flow and are in motion.

¹ Olympiodorus here inquires how Plato calls *prudence* a *passion* of the soul. To which he replies, that all the virtues are *passions*. For it is evident, says he, that things which participate *suffer*. Hence also *being*, considered as participating *the one*, is said by Plato to *suffer* or be *passive* to *the one*. Since, therefore, the soul participates of the prudence which subsists in intellect, or, in other words, of intellectual prudence, on this account he calls prudence the passion of the soul. Or we may say, that since the whole soul is through the whole of itself self-motive, so far as it *moves itself* it *acts*, but so far as it is *moved* it *suffers*.

² This is the third argument derived from life, that the soul rules over the body. For that which uses an instrument possesses dominion over it.

body to the mortal nature.—But consider (says he), Cebes, whether, from all that has been said, these conclusions will result to us, that the soul is most similar to the divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform and indissoluble nature, and which always subsists similarly according to the same; but that the body is most similar to the nature which is human, mortal, void of intellect, multiform, dissoluble, and which never subsists according to the same. Can we, my dear Cebes, produce any arguments to show that this is not the case?—We cannot.

What then? in consequence of all this, must it not be the property of the body, to be swiftly dissolved; but of the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or something bordering on such an affection?—How should it not?—Do you conceive, therefore (says he), that when a man dies, the visible part of him, or the body, which is situated in a visible region (and which we call a dead body subject to dissolution, ruin, and dissipation), does not immediately suffer any of these affections, but remains for a considerable space of time; and if any one dies possessing a graceful body, that it very much retains its elegant form? for, when the body is bound and buried according to the manner in which the Egyptians bury their dead, it remains almost entire for an incredible space of time; and though some parts of the body may become rotten, yet the bones and nerves, and every thing of this kind, are preserved as one may say immortal. Is it not so?—Certainly.—Can the soul, therefore, which is invisible, and which departs into another place of this kind, a place noble, pure, and invisible, viz. into Hades¹, to a beneficent and prudent God (at which place, if Divinity is willing, my soul will shortly arrive); can the soul, I say, since it is naturally of this kind, be immediately dissipated and perish on its being liberated from the body, as is asserted by the many? This is certainly, my dear Cebes and Simmias, far from being the case. But this will much more abundantly take place, if it is liberated in a pure condition, attracting to itself nothing of the body, as not having willingly communicated with it in the present life, but fled from it and collected itself into itself; an employment of this kind having been the subject of its perpetual meditation. But this is nothing else than to phi-

¹ Pluto, says Olympiodorus, is celebrated as prudent and good, because he imparts to souls the virtue and science which they lost in the realms of generation. He is also Hades, because he wipes away the visible, which is, as it were, burnt in in the nature of the soul.

philosophize rightly, and to meditate with facility, how *to be dead in reality*. Or will not this be a meditation of death?—Entirely so.—Will not the soul, therefore, when in this condition, depart to that which is similar to itself, a divine nature, and which is likewise immortal and prudent? and when it arrives thither, will it not become happy, being liberated from wandering and ignorance, terror and insane love, and from all other evils belonging to the human nature; and so, as it is said of the initiated¹, will in reality pass the rest of its time in the society of the Gods? Shall we speak in this manner, Cebes, or otherwise?—In this manner, by Jupiter (says Cebes).

But I think that if the soul departs polluted and impure from the body, as having always been its associate, attending upon and loving the body, and becoming enchanted by it, through its desires and pleasures, in such a manner as to think that nothing really is, except what is corporeal, which can be touched and seen, eaten and drunk, and employed for the purposes of venereal occupations, and at the same time is accustomed to hate, dread and avoid, that which is dark and invisible to the eye of sense, which is intelligible and apprehended by philosophy; do you think that a soul thus affected can be liberated from the body, so as to subsist sincerely by itself?—By no means (says he).—But I think that it will be contaminated by a corporeal nature, to which its converse and familiarity with the body, through perpetual association and abundant meditation, have rendered it similar and allied.—Entirely so.—But it is proper, my dear Cebes, to think that such a nature is ponderous and heavy, terrestrial and visible²; and that a soul of this kind, through being connected with such a nature, is rendered heavy, and drawn down again into the visible region from its dread of that which is invisible and Hades, and, as it is said, wanders about monuments and tombs; about which

¹ The soul when living with Divinity may be said to be truly initiated, as flying both to its own *one* or summit, and that of divine natures.

² The irrational nature is the image of the rational soul. This nature also is corporeal, consisting of a corporeal life, and a certain body more attenuated than this visible body. This image, Plato says, becomes heavy, and is seen about sepulchres. Hence souls that are still bound to the visible nature through a strong propensity to body, are said to follow this phantom; and thus they become visible through participation of the visible, or sympathy towards it. But such souls, says Olympiodorus, are not only willing, but are compelled to wander about sepulchres, as a punishment of their sympathy about the body. He adds, that the image having a connate desire towards the outward body, sometimes also draws to it the soul, with the consent of Justice.

indeed

indeed certain shadowy phantoms of souls appear, being the images produced by such souls as have not been purely liberated from the body, but which participate of the visible nature; and on this account they become visible.—It is very reasonable to suppose so, Socrates.—It is reasonable indeed, Cebes: and likewise that these are not the souls of the worthy, but of the depraved, who are compelled to wander about such places; by these means suffering the punishment of their former conduct, which was evil; and they are compelled thus to wander¹ till, through the desire of a corporeal nature, which attends them, they are again bound to a body.

They are bound, however, as it is proper they should be, to such manners as they have exercised in the present life.—But what do you say these manners are, Socrates?—As for example, that such as are addicted to gluttony, arrogant injuries, and drinking, and this without any fear of consequences, shall enter into the tribes of asses and brutes of this kind. Or do you not think it proper that they should?—You speak in a manner perfectly becoming.—But shall we not say, that such as held in the highest estimation injustice, tyranny, and rapine shall enter into the tribes of wolves, hawks, and kites? Or where else can we say such souls depart?—Into tribes of this kind, certainly (says Cebes).—It will, therefore, be manifest concerning the rest into what nature each departs, according to the similitudes of manners which they have exercised.—It is manifest (says he); for how should it not be so?—Are not, therefore (says he), those among these the most happy, and such as depart into the best place, who have made popular and political² virtue their study, which they call indeed temperance and justice, and which is produced from custom and exercise, without philosophy and intellect?—But how are these the most happy?—Because it is fit that these should again migrate into a political and mild tribe of this kind; such as bees, wasps, or

¹ "Guilty souls," says the philosopher Sallust (*De Diis et Mundo*, cap. 19.), "are punished on their departure from the present body; some by wandering about this part of the earth; others about certain of its hot or cold regions; and others are tormented by avenging dæmons. But, universally, the rational soul suffers punishment in conjunction with the irrational soul, the partner of its guilt; and through this that shadowy body derives its subsistence which is beheld about sepulchres, and especially about the tombs of such as have lived an abandoned life."

² It must here be obvious to the most careless reader, that, according to Plato, the *political* are not the *true* virtues.

ants, or into the same human tribe again, and from these become moderate men.—It is fit.

But it is not lawful for any to pass into the genus of Gods, except such as, through a love of learning, have philosophized, and departed from hence perfectly pure. And for the sake of this, my dear Simmias and Cebes, those who have philosophized rightly abstain from all desires belonging to the body, and strenuously persevere in this abstinence, without giving themselves up to their dominion; nor is it because they dread the ruin of their families, and poverty, like the multitude of the lovers of wealth; nor yet because they are afraid of ignominy and the infamy of improbity, like those who are lovers of dominion and honours, that they abstain from these desires.—For it would not, Socrates, become them so to do (says Cebes).—It would not, by Jupiter (says he).—Hence those (says he), O Cebes! who take care of their soul, and do not live in a state of subserviency to their bodies, bidding farewell to all such characters as we have mentioned above, do not proceed in the same path with these during the journey of life, because such characters are ignorant how they should direct their course; but considering that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy, and to its solution and purification, they give themselves up to its direction, and follow wherever it leads.—In what manner, Socrates?—I will tell you (says he).

The lovers of learning well know, that when philosophy receives their soul into her protection (and when she does so, she finds it vehemently bound and agglutinated to the body, and compelled to speculate things through this, as through a place of confinement, instead of beholding herself through herself; and besides this, rolled in every kind of ignorance: philosophy likewise beholds the dire nature of the confinement, that it arises through desire; so that he who is bound in an eminent degree assists in binding himself); the lovers of learning therefore, I say, know that philosophy, receiving their soul in this condition, endeavours gently to exhort it, and dissolve its bonds; and this she attempts to accomplish, by showing that the inspection of things through the eyes is full of deception, and that this is likewise the case with perception through the ears and the other senses. Philosophy too persuades the soul to depart from all these fallacious informations, and to employ them no further than necessity requires; and exhorts her to call together and collect herself into one. And besides this, to believe in no other than herself, with

respect to what she understands, herself subsisting by herself, of that which has likewise a real subsistence by itself; and not to consider that as having a true being which she speculates through others, and which has its subsistence in others. And lastly, that a thing of this kind is sensible and visible; but that what she herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. The soul of a true philosopher, therefore, thinking that he ought not to oppose this solution, abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires, griefs and fears, considering that when any one is vehemently delighted or terrified, afflicted or desirous, he does not suffer any such mighty evil from these as some one may perhaps conceive, I mean such as disease and a consumption of wealth, through indulging his desires; but that he suffers that which is the greatest, and the extremity of all evils, and this without apprehending that he does so.—But what is this evil, Socrates (says Cebes)?—That the soul of every man is compelled at the same time to be either vehemently delighted or afflicted about some particular thing, and to consider that about which it is thus eminently passive, as having a most evident and true subsistence, though this is by no means the case; and that these are most especially visible objects. Is it not so?—Entirely.—In this passion, therefore, is not the soul in the highest degree bound to the body?—In what manner?—Because every pleasure and pain, as if armed with a nail, fasten and rivet the soul to the body, cause it to become corporeal, and fill it with an opinion, that whatever the body asserts is true. For, in consequence of the soul forming the same opinions with the body, and being delighted with the same objects, it appears to me that it is compelled to possess similar manners, and to be similarly nourished, and to become so affected, that it can never pass into Hades in a pure condition; but always departs full of a corporeal nature; and thus swiftly falls again into another body, and, becoming as it were sown, is engendered; and lastly, that from these it becomes destitute of a divine, pure, and uniform association.—You speak most true, Socrates (says Cebes).

For the sake of these things therefore, O Cebes! those who are justly lovers of learning are moderate and brave, and not for the sake of such as the multitude assert. Or do you think it is?—By no means; for it cannot be.—But the soul of a philosopher reasons in this manner; and does not think that philosophy ought to free him from the body, but that when he is freed he may give himself up to pleasures and pains, by which he will again be bound

bound to the body, and will undertake a work which it is impossible to finish, reweaving a certain web of Penelope¹. But procuring tranquillity with respect to these, and following the guidance of the reasoning power, and being always conversant with this, contemplating at the same time that which is true, divine, and not the subject of opinion, and being likewise nourished by such an object of contemplation, he will think that he ought to live in this manner while he lives, and that when he dies he shall depart to a kindred essence, and an essence of this kind, being liberated from the maladies of the human nature. But from a nutriment of this kind the soul has no occasion to fear (while it makes these, O Simmias and Cebes! its study) lest, in its liberation from the body, it should be lacerated, and, being blown about and dissipated by the winds, should vanish, and no longer have anywhere a subsistence.

When Socrates had thus spoken, a long silence ensued; and Socrates seemed to revolve with himself what had been said; as likewise did the greatest part of us: but Cebes and Simmias discoursed a little with each other. And Socrates at length looking upon them, What (says he), do our assertions appear to you to have been not sufficiently demonstrated? for many doubts and suspicions yet remain, if any one undertakes to investigate them sufficiently. If, therefore, you are considering something else among yourselves, I have nothing to say; but if you are doubting about those particulars which we have just now made the subject of our discourse, do not be remiss in speaking about and running over what has been said, if it appears to you in any respect that we might have spoken better; and receive me again as your associate, if you think that you can be any ways benefited by my assistance. Upon this Simmias said, Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth: for some time since each of us being agitated with doubts, we impelled and exhorted one another to interrogate you, through our desire of hearing them solved; but we were afraid of causing a debate, lest it should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances. But Socrates, upon hearing this, gently laughed, and said, This is strange, indeed, Simmias; for

¹ As Penelope, who is the image of Philosophy, unwove by night what she had woven by day, so Ignorance reweaves what Philosophy unweaves. Hence Philosophy dissolves the soul from, but Ignorance weaves it to, the body.

I shall with difficulty be able to persuade other men that I do not consider the present fortune as a calamity, since I am not able to persuade even you ; but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now than I was prior to the present event. And, as it seems, I appear to you to be more despicable than swans with respect to divination, who, when they perceive that it is necessary for them to die, sing not only as usual, but then more than ever ; rejoicing that they are about to depart to that Deity in whose service they are engaged. But men, because they themselves are afraid of death, falsely accuse the swans, and assert that, in consequence of their being afflicted at death, their song is the result of grief. Nor do they consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold, or is afflicted with any other malady ; neither the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor the lapwing, all which they say sing lamenting through distress. But neither do these birds, as it appears to me, sing through sorrow, nor yet the swans ; but in my opinion these last are prophetic, as belonging to Apollo ; and in consequence of foreseeing the good which Hades contains, they sing and rejoice at that period more remarkably than at any preceding time. But I consider myself as a fellow-servant of the swans, and sacred to the same Divinity. I possess a divining power from our common master no less than they ; nor shall I be more afflicted than the swan in being liberated from the present life. Hence it is proper that you should both speak and inquire about whatever you please, as long as the eleven magistrates will permit. You speak excellently well (says Simmias) ; and as you give me permission, I will both tell you what are my doubts, and how far Cebes does not admit what has been said. For, as to myself, Socrates, I am perhaps of the same opinion about these particulars as yourself ; that to know them clearly in the present life is either impossible, or a thing very difficult to obtain. But not to argue about what has been said in every possible way, and to desist before by an arduous investigation on all sides weariness is produced, can only take place among indolent and effeminate men. For it is necessary, in things of this kind, either to learn or to discover the manner of their subsistence ; or, if both these are impossible, then, by receiving the best of human reasons, and that which is the most difficult of confutation, to venture upon this as on a raft, and sail in it through the ocean of life, unless some one should be able to be carried more safely,

safely, and with less danger, by means of a firmer vehicle, or a certain *divine reason*¹. I shall not, therefore, now be ashamed to interrogate, in consequence of the confession which you have made; nor shall I blame myself hereafter, that I have not spoken what appears to me at present: for, upon considering what has been said, both with myself and together with Cebes, your doctrine did not seem to be sufficiently confirmed.

And perhaps, my friend (says Socrates), you have the truth on your side; but inform me in what respect it did not seem to be sufficiently confirmed.— In this (says he); because any one may assert the same about harmony², and a lyre, and its chords; that, for instance, harmony is something invisible and incorporeal, all-beautiful and divine, in a well-modulated lyre: but the lyre and its chords are bodies, and of a corporeal nature; are composites and terrestrial, and allied to that which is mortal. When any one, therefore, shall either have broken the lyre, or cut and burst the chords, some person may contend from the same reasoning as yours, that it is necessary the harmony should yet remain, and not be destroyed (for it cannot in any respect be possible that the lyre should subsist when the chords are burst, and the chords themselves are of a mortal nature; but the harmony, which is con-nate and allied to that which is divine and immortal, will become extinct, and perish prior to the mortal nature itself); because it is necessary that harmony should be somewhere, and that the wood and chords must suffer putrefaction, before this can be subject to any passion. For I think, Socrates, that you yourself have also perceived this, that we consider the soul in the most eminent degree, as something of such a kind as to become the temperament of hot and cold, moist and dry, and such-like affections, for the reception of which our body is extended, and by which it is contained: and

¹ See the Introduction to this Dialogue.

² Harmony has a triple subsistence. For it is either harmony itself, or it is that which is first harmonized, and which is such according to the whole of itself; or it is that which is secondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The first of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and the third to body. This last too is corruptible, because it subsists in a subject; but the other two are incorruptible, because they are neither composites, nor dependent on a subject. Simmias, therefore, reasons falsely in what he here says, in consequence of looking to the third species of harmony only. Hence, the rational soul is analogous to a musician, but the animated body to harmonized chords: for the former has a subsistence separate, but the latter inseparable from the musical instrument.

that the soul is the harmony of all these, when they are beautifully and moderately tempered with each other. If, therefore, the soul is a certain harmony, it is evident that when our body suffers either intension or remission, through diseases and other maladies, the soul must from necessity immediately perish, though of the most divine nature (in the same manner as other harmonies perish, which either subsist in sounds or in the works of artificers); but the remaining parts of the body of each person must subsist for a long time, till they are either burnt or become rotten. Consider then what we shall say to this discourse, if any one should think, since the soul is the temperament of things subsisting in the body, that it perishes the first, in that which is called death.

Socrates, therefore, beholding us, and laughing as he was accustomed to do very often, Simmias (says he) speaks justly. If any one of you, therefore, is more prompt than I am; why does he not reply to these objections? for he seems not to have handled this affair badly. But it appears to me, that before we make our reply we should first hear Cebes, and know what it is which he objects to our discourse; that, in consequence of some time intervening, we may deliberate what we shall say; and that afterwards, upon hearing the objections, we may either assent to them, if they appear to assert any thing becoming; or, if they do not, that we may defend the discourse we have already delivered. But (says he) tell me, Cebes, what it is which so disturbs you, as to cause your unbelief.—I will tell you (says Cebes): your discourse seems to me to be yet in the same state, and to be liable to the same accusation as we mentioned before. For, that our soul had a subsistence before it came into the present form, is an assertion, I will not deny, of a very elegant kind, and (if it is not too much to say) sufficiently demonstrated: but that it still remains when we are dead, does not appear to me to have been clearly proved; nor do I assent to the objection of Simmias, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for it appears to me to be much more excellent than all these. Why then, says reason, do you yet disbelieve? for, since you see that when a man dies that which is more imbecil still remains, does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more lasting nature should be preserved during this period of time? Consider, therefore, whether I shall say any thing to the purpose in reply. For I, as well as Simmias, as it seems, stand in need of a certain similitude: for to me

these things appear to be asserted in the same manner, as if any one should say concerning an aged dead weaver, that the man has not yet perished, but perhaps still survives somewhere; and should exhibit as an argument in proof of this assertion a vestment woven by himself, which he wore, and which is yet safe and entire. And if he should ask some one not crediting his assertion, which is the more lasting, the genus of man or of a garment, whose subsistence consists in its use and in being worn; then should it be replied, that the genus of man is much more lasting, he might think it demonstrated, that the man is by a much stronger reason preserved, since that which is of a shorter duration has not yet perished. But I do not think, Simmias, that this is the case. For consider with yourself what I say: since every person must apprehend, that he who asserts this speaks foolishly. For this weaver, having worn and woven many such vestments, died *after* them being many, but I think *before* the last; and yet it cannot be any thing the more inferred on this account, that the man is viler or more imbecil than a vestment. And I think that the soul, with respect to the body, will receive the same similitude; and he who shall assert the same concerning these, will appear to me to speak in a very equitable manner; I mean that the soul is of a lasting nature, but the body more debile and less durable. But I should say that each soul wears many bodies, especially if it lives many years; for, if the body glides away like a stream, and is dissolved while the man yet lives, but the soul perpetually re-weaves that which is worn and consumed, it will be necessary indeed, that when the soul is destroyed it should then be clothed with the last vestment, and should perish prior to this alone. But the soul having perished, then the body will evince the nature of its imbecility, and, becoming rapidly rotten, will be perfectly dissolved: so that, in consequence of this reasoning, it is not yet proper that we should be persuaded to believe with confidence, that our soul subsists somewhere after we are dead. For, if any one should assent to him who asserts even more than you have done, and should grant that not only our soul had an existence before we were born into the present life, but that nothing hinders us from admitting that certain souls after death may still have a subsistence, exist in some future period, and often be born, and again perish (for so naturally strong is the soul, that it will preserve itself through frequent births); but this being granted, it may still follow, that it will not only labour in
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those many generations, but that, finishing its course, in some one of these deaths, it will entirely perish. But no one should say that this death and dissolution of the body, which also introduces destruction to the soul, can be known: for it is impossible that it can be perceived by any one of us. If this, however, be the case, it will not follow that he who possesses the confidence of good hope concerning death is not foolishly confident, unless he can demonstrate that the soul is perfectly immortal and undecaying: for otherwise it will be necessary, that he who is about to die should always fear for his soul, lest in the death, which is at hand, he should entirely perish through the separation of his body.

When we heard them, therefore, speak in this manner, we were all of us very disagreeably affected, as we afterwards declared to each other; because, as we were in the highest degree persuaded by the former discourse, they again seemed to disturb us and to cast us into unbelief; and this in such a manner, as not only to cause us to deny our assent to the arguments which had been already adduced, but to such as might afterwards be asserted, fearing lest either we should not be proper judges of any thing, or that the things themselves should be unworthy of belief.

ECHEC. By the Gods, Phædo, I can easily pardon you: for, while I am now hearing you, I cannot refrain from saying to myself, In what arguments can we any longer believe? For the discourse of Socrates, which a little before was exceedingly credible, is now fallen into unbelief. For the assertion, that our soul is a certain harmony, gained my assent both now and always in a wonderful manner; and now it is mentioned, it recalls as it were into my memory a knowledge that I formerly was of the same opinion. And thus I am perfectly indigent again of some other reason, as if from the very beginning, which may persuade me that the soul of a dead man does not die together with the body. Tell me therefore, by Jupiter, how Socrates pursued the discourse; and whether he, as you confess was the case with yourself, seemed troubled at these objections; or, on the contrary, answered them with facility; and whether he defended his doctrine sufficiently, or in a defective manner. Relate all these particulars to us as accurately as you can.

PHÆD. Indeed, Echecrates, I have often admired Socrates; but never more so than at that time. That he should be able indeed to say something

in reply, is perhaps not wonderful; but I especially admired, in the first place, this in him, that he received the discourse of the young men in such a pleasant, benevolent and wonderful manner; and, in the next place, that he so acutely perceived how we were affected by their objections; and lastly, that he so well cured our disturbance, recalled us, as if flying and vanquished, and caused us, in conjunction with himself, to pursue and consider the discourse.

ECHEC. But how did he do this?

PHÆD. I will tell you: I happened at that time to sit at his right hand, upon a low seat near his bed; but he himself sat much higher than I did. Stroking me on the head, therefore, and compressing the hair which hung on my neck (for he used sometimes to play with my hairs), To-morrow (says he), Phædo, you will perhaps cut off these beautiful locks.—It seems so, indeed (says I), Socrates.—But you will not (says he), if you will be persuaded by me.—But why not (says I)?—For both you and I (says he) ought to cut off our hair to-day, if our discourse must die, and we are not able to recall it to life again. And I indeed, if I was you, and I found that discourse fled from me, would take an oath after the manner of the Argives, that I would never suffer my hair to grow, till, by contesting in disputation, I had vanquished the objections of Simmias and Cebes.—But (says I) Hercules is reported not to have been sufficient against two.—Call upon me, therefore (says he), as your Iolaus¹ while the light yet lasts.—I call then (says I), not as Hercules upon Iolaus, but as Iolaus upon Hercules.—It is of no consequence (says he)..

But, in the first place, we must be careful that we are not influenced by a certain passion.—What passion (says I)?—That we do not become (says he) haters² of reason, in the same manner as some become haters of men. For no greater evil can happen to any one than to be a hater of reasons. But a

¹ Iolaus was the son of Iphiclus king of Theffaly. He assisted Hercules in conquering the Hydra, and burnt with a hot iron the place where the heads had been cut off, to prevent the growth of others.

² Four inevitable consequences attend the man who hates reason. In the first place, he must hate himself; for he is essentially rational. In the second place, he must hate truth; for this can only be discovered by the exercise of reason. In the third place, he must be a lover of that which is irrational. And, in the fourth place, he must be brutalized, as far as this is possible to man.

hatred of reason and a hatred of mankind are both produced in the same manner. For misanthropy is produced in us through very much believing without art in some particular person, and considering him as a man true, sincere, and faithful, whom in the course of a short acquaintance we find to be depraved and unfaithful; and that this is the case again with another. And when any one often suffers this disappointment, and especially from those whom he considered as his most intimate familiars and friends, at length, through finding himself thus frequently hurt, he hates all men, and thinks that there is nothing in any respect sincere in any one. Or have you never perceived that this is the case?—Entirely so (says I).—But is not this base (says he)? and is it not evident that such a one attempts to make use of men, without possessing the art which respects human affairs? For if, in a certain respect, he employed them with art, he would think, as the case really is, that men very good, or very bad, are but few in number; and that the greater part of mankind are those which subsist between these.—How do you mean (says I)?—In the same manner (says he) as about things very small and very great. Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or any thing else; and again any thing excessively swift or slow, beautiful or base, white or black? Or do you not perceive that the summits of the extremes of all these are rare and few, but that things subsisting between these are copious and many?—Entirely so (says I).—Do you not, therefore, think (says he) that if a contest of improbity should be proposed, those who hold the first rank among the base would be found to be but few?—It is agreeable to reason to think so (says I).—It is so, indeed (says he); but in this respect reasons are not similar to men (for I shall now follow you as the leader); but in this they are similar, when any one, for instance, without possessing the art belonging to discourse, believes that a certain discourse is true, and shortly after it appears to him to be false, as it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other, and the same thing happens to him about different discourses. And this is particularly the case with those who are familiar with contradictory arguments; for these you know think that they at length become most wise, and alone perceive that there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasons; but that every thing is whirled upwards and downwards, as if existing in the river Euripus, and does not abide in any one condition for
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any portion of time whatever.—You speak perfectly true (says I).—Would it not then (says he), Phædo, be a passion worthy of commiseration, if, when a certain reason is true and firm, and is capable of being understood, yet some one falling from this should be involved in doubt, because he has heard reasons, which, though remaining the same, yet have at one time appeared to be true, and at another false; and should not accuse himself and his own want of skill, but at length through grief should transfer all the blame from himself to the reasons; and thus should pass the remainder of his life, hating and slandering reasons, and deprived of the truth and science of things?—By Jupiter (says I), such a one would be miserable indeed.

In the first place, therefore (says he), we should be very careful against admitting an opinion, that no reasoning appears to be valid; but we should much rather think that we are not yet in a healthy condition, and that we ought vigorously and cheerfully to study how to be well. And this indeed ought to be the case with you and others, for the sake of the whole remainder of your life, but with me, for the sake of death itself; as there is danger at the present time, lest I should not behave philosophically, but, like those who are perfectly unskilled, contentiously. For such as these, when they controvert any particular, are not at all concerned how that subsists about which they dispute; but are alone anxious, that what they have established may appear to the persons present to be true. And I seem to myself at present to differ alone in this respect from such as these: for I am not solicitous that my discourse may appear true to those who are present (except just as it may happen in passing), but that it may appear to be so in the most eminent degree to me myself. For I thus reason, my dear friend (and see in how fraudulent a manner), that if my assertions are true, it will be a beautiful circumstance to be persuaded of their truth; but that if nothing remains for the dead, I shall at least have the advantage of being less afflicted with my present condition than others. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long (for it would be bad if it should), but shortly after this will be dissolved; and being thus prepared (says he), Simmias and Cebes, I shall now return to the discourse. But, that you may be persuaded by me, pay no attention to the person of Socrates, but be much more solicitous in assenting to the truth, if I should appear to you to assert any thing true; but if this should not be the case, oppose me with all your might, and beware, lest

through too much ardour I should deceive both myself and you, and, acting in this respect like bees, should depart from you, leaving my sting behind.

But to begin (says he) : In the first place, remind me of what you have said, if it should appear that I have forgotten it. For Simmias, I think, distrusted and was afraid lest the soul, though it is at the same time more divine and beautiful than the body, should perish before it, as subsisting in the form of harmony. But Cebes appears to me to have admitted this, that the soul is more lasting than the body ; but yet that it is perfectly uncertain, whether after the soul has worn out many bodies, and this often, it may not at length, leaving body behind, itself also perish ; so that this will be death itself, I mean the destruction of the soul, since the body perpetually perishes without ceasing. Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we ought to consider ?—They both confessed that the particulars were these.—Whether, therefore (says he), do you reject the whole of our former discourse, or do you reject some things and not others ?—They replied, We admit some things, and not others.—What then (says he) do you say about that discourse, in which we asserted that learning is reminiscence ; and that, this being the case, our soul must necessarily have subsisted somewhere before it was bound in the body ?—I indeed (says Cebes) was both then wonderfully persuaded by that discourse, and now firmly abide in the same opinion.—And I also (says Simmias) am affected in the same manner ; and I should very much wonder should I ever conceive otherwise about this particular.—But (says Socrates) it is necessary, my Theban guest, that it should appear otherwise to you, if you still continue of the opinion, that harmony is something composite, and that the soul is a certain harmony, composed from things extended through the body. For you will never assent to yourself asserting, that harmony was composed prior to the things from which it ought to be composed ; or do you think you can ?—By no means (says he), Socrates.—Do you perceive, therefore (says he), that you will not be consistent in your assertions, when you say that the soul had a subsistence before it came into a human form and into body, but that at the same time it was composed from things which then had not a being ? For neither is harmony such as that to which you assimilate it ; but the lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, have a prior existence ; but harmony is composed the last of all, and is the first dissolved. How, therefore, can this discourse be consonant with that ?—In no respect (says Simmias).—

mias).—But it certainly is proper (says he) that a discourse about harmony should be consonant, if this can ever be asserted of any other.—It is proper, indeed (says Simmias).—But this discourse of yours is not consonant. Consider, therefore, which of these assertions you will choose, that learning is reminiscence, or that the soul is harmony. I prefer the former, Socrates, by much; for the latter gained my assent without a demonstration, through nothing more than a certain probability and specious appearance; from whence also it appears evident to the multitude of mankind. But I well know, that the discourses which frame their demonstrations from assimilative reasons only are nothing more than empty boastings; and unless a man defends himself against them, they will very much deceive him, both in geometry and all other speculations. But the discourse about reminiscence and learning was delivered through an hypothesis highly worthy of reception. For in this it was said that our soul had a subsistence somewhere before it came into the present body, as it is an essence possessing the appellation of that which truly is. But, as I persuade myself, I assent to this doctrine in a manner sufficient and proper; and hence it is necessary, as it appears to me, that I should neither assent to myself nor to any other asserting that the soul is harmony.

But what (says he), Simmias? Does it appear to you that it can either belong to this harmony, or to any composition, to subsist differently from the things from which it is composed?—By no means.—And indeed, as it appears to me, it can neither perform nor suffer any thing else, besides what these perform and suffer.—He agreed it could not.—It does not, therefore, belong to harmony to be the leader of the materials from which it is composed, but to follow them.—This also he granted.—It is far, therefore, from being the case, that harmony will either be moved or sound contrary, or in any other respect be adverse to its parts.—Very far, indeed, (says he).—But what, does not every harmony naturally subsist in such a manner as to be harmony, so far as it receives a congruous temperament?—I do not understand you.—But (says he) if it were possible that it could be congruously tempered with still greater vehemence, and more in quantity, would it not be more vehemently harmony and more in quantity; but if less vehemently and less in quantity, just the contrary?—Entirely so.—But can it be said of the soul, that, even in the smallest circumstance, one soul is more vehemently and

more in quantity, or less vehemently and less in quantity, soul, than another?—By no means (says he).—Consider then (says he), by Jupiter, is it truly said, that one soul possesses intellect and virtue, and is good; but that another is foolish and vicious, and is bad?—It is truly said.—Among those, therefore, who establish the soul as harmony, what can any one call virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call the one harmony, and the other discord? And that the one, that is to say the good soul, is harmonized; and, as it is harmony, possesses another harmony in itself; but that the other is discord, and does not contain in itself another harmony?—I know not what to reply (says Simmias); but it is manifest, that he who establishes this would make some such reply. But it has been granted (says he), that one soul is not more or less soul than another; and this is no other than to confess, that one harmony is not more vehemently and more in quantity, nor less vehemently and less in quantity, harmony, than another: is it not so?—Entirely so.—But that which is neither more nor less harmony, is neither more nor less harmonized: is it not so?—It is.—But can that which is neither more nor less harmonized participate more or less of harmony¹? or does it equally participate?—Equally.—The soul, therefore, since it is not more or less soul than another, is not more or less harmonized.—It is not.—But since it is thus affected, it will neither participate more of discord nor of harmony.—By no means.—And again, in consequence of this passion, can one soul participate more of vice or virtue than another, since vice is discord, but virtue harmony?—It cannot.—But rather, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will participate of vice, since it is harmony: for doubtless the harmony, which is perfectly such, can never participate of discord.—It certainly cannot.—Neither, therefore, can the soul, which is perfectly

¹ As every rational soul is an incorporeal harmony separate from a subject, it does not admit of intensions and remissions; and, therefore, one rational soul is neither more nor less harmony than another, so far as each is *essentially* harmony. One soul, however, may be more similar to intellect, or harmony itself, than another, and, so far as it is more similar, will be more harmony in energy. Hence, virtue may be considered as the concord, and vice as the discord, of the rational and irrational nature; the former being produced from the rational harmonizing the irrational part, in consequence of being a harmony more energetic; and the latter arising from the irrational being unharmonized by the rational part, because in this case the essential harmony of the soul is more dormant than energetic. The reasoning, therefore, of Socrates does not apply to that harmony which is separate, but to that which is inseparable from body.

soul,

foul, participate of vice: for how can it, in consequence of what has been said? In consequence of this reasoning, therefore, the souls of all animals will be similarly good; since they are naturally similarly souls, with respect to the essence of soul.—To me it appears so, Socrates (says he).—If the hypothesis therefore was right, would it appear to you to be beautifully said, and that this consequence ensued, that the soul is harmony?—By no means (says he).

But what (says Socrates), among all the things which are inherent in man, would you say that any thing else governed except soul, if he be a prudent man?—I should not.—But whether does the soul govern, by assenting to the passions belonging to the body, or by opposing them? My meaning is this, that when heat and thirst are present, the soul, if it governs, will frequently draw the body to the contrary, i. e. not to drink; and hunger being present, that it shall not eat; and in a thousand other instances we may behold the soul opposing the desires of the body: may we not?—Entirely so.—Have we not above confessed, that if the soul was harmony, it would never sound contrary to the intensions, remissions, or vibrations, or any other passion belonging to its component parts, but that it would follow, and never rule over them?—We have granted this (says he); for how could we do otherwise?—But what, does not the soul now appear to act just the contrary to this, ruling over all those particulars, from which it may be said it subsists, nearly opposing all of them through the whole of life, and exercising absolute dominion over them all manner of ways, punishing some of these indeed with greater difficulty, and accompanied with pain; some through gymnastic and medicine, and some by milder methods, and some again by threats, and others by admonishing desire, anger, and fear; addressing that which it opposes, as being itself of a different nature? just as Homer does in the *Odyssey*¹, where he says of Ulysses:

“His breast he struck, and cried, My heart, sustain.

“This ill! for thou hast borne far greater pain.”

Do you think that Homer devised this in consequence of thinking that the soul is harmony, and of such a kind as to be led by the passions of the body,

¹ Lib. xix. ver. 15.

and not such as is naturally adapted to lead and govern, and which is something much more divine than harmony?—By Jupiter, Socrates, I do not think that he did.—By no means, therefore, most excellent man, shall we do well, in asserting that the soul is a *certain*¹ harmony: for by thus asserting, as it appears, we shall neither agree with Homer, that divine poet, nor be consistent with ourselves.—It is so, indeed (says he).

Let it then be so (says Socrates); and thus, as it appears, we have sufficiently appeased the patrons of the Theban harmony. But how, Cebes, and by what discourse shall we appease the patrons of Cadmus²?—You appear to me (says Cebes) to be likely to find out a way: for you have delivered this discourse against harmony in a wonderful manner, and beyond what I expected. For, while Simmias related his doubts, I thought it would be a most admirable thing, should any one be able to reply to his discourse. He therefore appears to me, in a manner perfectly extraordinary, not to have sustained the very first assault of your discourse. I should not, therefore, be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate.—My good friend (says Socrates), do not speak so magnificently, lest a certain envy should subvert our future discourse. These things, indeed, will be taken care of by Divinity. But we, approaching near in an Homeric manner, will try whether you say any thing to the purpose. This then is the sum of what you inquire: you think it proper to demonstrate that our soul is without decay, and immortal; that a philosopher who is about to die with all the confidence of hope, and who thinks that after death he shall be far more happy than in the present life, may not indulge a stupid and foolish confidence. But you

¹ That is, a harmony subsisting in, and therefore inseparable from, a subject.

² “Cadmus,” says Olympiodorus, “is the sublunary world, as being Dionysiacal, on which account Harmony is united to the God, and as being the father of the four Bacchuses. But they make the four elements to be Dionysiacal, viz. *fire*, to be *Semele*; *earth*, *Agave*, tearing in pieces her own offspring; *water*, *Ino*; and lastly, *air*, *Autonos*.” There is great beauty in conjoining *Harmonia*, or *Harmony*, the daughter of Venus and Mars, with Cadmus. For Venus is the cause of all the harmony and analogy in the universe, and beautifully illuminates the order and communion of all mundane concerns. But Mars excites the contrarieties of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and entire from all its parts. The progeny, therefore, of these two Divinities must be the *concordant discord* or *barmony* of the sublunary world. But Socrates (as Forster well observes in his notes on this dialogue) represents Cebes as another Cadmus, because, according to his doctrine, men after they are buried, like the teeth of the serpent slain by Cadmus, will revive in another form, and in a short time like the Cadmæan men will entirely perish.

say,

say, though it should be shown that the soul is something robust and deiform, and that it subsisted before we were born, yet nothing hinders but that all these arguments may not evince its immortality, but only that the soul is more lasting than the body, that it formerly existed somewhere for an immense period of time, and that it knew and performed a multitude of things. But that, for all this, it will be nothing the more immortal; but that, entering into the body of a man, it will be the principle of destruction to itself, as if connected with a disease: so that it will both lead a miserable life in the body, and at last will perish in that which is called death. But you say it is of no consequence whether it comes into body once or often, with respect to our occasion of fear: for it is very proper that he who neither knows, nor is able to render a reason, why the soul is immortal, should be afraid of death, unless he is deprived of intellect. This, I think, Cebes, is the sum of what you say; and I have repeated it often, that nothing may escape our observation; and that, if you are willing, you may either add or take away from our statement of the objections. But Cebes replied, I have nothing at present either to add or take away; but these are the objections which I make.

Socrates, therefore, after he had been silent for a long time, and considering something by himself, said, You require, Cebes, a thing of no small importance: for it is perfectly necessary to treat concerning the cause of generation and corruption. If you are willing, therefore, I will relate to you what happened to me in this investigation; and afterwards, if any thing which I shall say shall appear to you useful, with respect to persuading you in the present inquiry, employ it for this purpose.—But I am most assuredly willing (says Cebes).—Hear then my narration: When I was a young man, Cebes, I was in a wonderful manner desirous of that wisdom which they call a history¹ of nature: for it appeared to me to be a very superb affair to know the causes of each particular, on what account each is generated, why it perishes, and why it exists. And I often tossed myself as it were upwards and

¹ What Socrates here calls a *history of nature*, is what the moderns call *experimental philosophy*. The danger of directing the attention solely to this study is, as Socrates justly observes, truly great. For by speculating no other causes than such as are instrumental, and which are involved in the darkness of matter, the mental eye becomes at length incapable of beholding true and primary causes, the splendid principles of all things.

downwards ; considering, in the first place, whether after that which is hot and cold has received a certain rottenness, as some say, then animals are nourished ; and whether the blood is that through which we become prudent, or air, or fire ; or whether none of these, but the brain, is that which affords the senses of hearing, seeing, and smelling ; so that memory and opinion are generated from these, and that from memory and opinion obtaining tranquillity, science is accordingly produced ? And again considering the corruptions of these, and the properties which take place about the heavens and the earth, I at length appeared to myself so unskilful in the speculation of these, as to receive no advantage from my inquiries. But I will give you a sufficient proof of the truth of this : for I then became so very blind, with respect to things which I knew before with great clearness (as it appeared both to myself and others) through this speculation, as to want instruction both in many particulars, which I thought I had known before, and in this, why a man is increased. For I thought it was evident to every one that this took place through eating and drinking : for when, from the aliment, flesh accedes to flesh, bone to bone, and every where kindred to kindred parts, then the bulk which was small becomes afterwards great ; and thus a little man becomes a large one. Such was then my opinion ; does it appear to you a becoming one ?—To me, indeed, it does (says Cebes).—But still further, consider as follows : for I thought that I seemed to myself sufficiently right in my opinion, when, on seeing a tall man standing by a short one, I judged that he was taller by the head ; and in like manner one horse than another : and still more evident than these, ten things appeared to me to be more than eight, because two is added to them, and that a bicubital is greater than a cubital magnitude, through its surpassing it by the half.—But now (says Cebes) what appears to you respecting these ?—By Jupiter (says he), I am so far from thinking that I know the cause of these, that I cannot even persuade myself, when any person adds one to one, that then the one to which the addition was made becomes two ; or that the added one, and that to which it is added, become two, through the addition of the one to the other. For I should wonder, since each of these, when separate from one another, was one, and not then two ; if, after they have approached nearer to each other, this should be the cause of their becoming two, viz. the association through which they are placed nearer to each other. Nor yet

yet, if any person should divide one, am I able to persuade myself that this division is the cause of its becoming two. For that former¹ cause of two being produced is contrary to this. For then this took place, because they were collected near to each other, and the one was applied to the other; but now, because the one is removed and separated from the other. Nor do I any longer persuade myself, that I know why one is produced; nor, in one word, why any thing else is either generated or corrupted, or is, according to this method of proceeding: but, in order to obtain this knowledge, I venture to mingle another method of my own, by no means admitting this which I have mentioned.

But having once heard a person reading from a certain book, composed, as he said, by Anaxagoras²—when he came to that part, in which he says that intellect orders and is the cause of all things, I was delighted with this cause, and thought that, in *a certain respect*³, it was an excellent thing for intellect to be the cause of all; and I considered that, if this was the case, disposing intellect would adorn all things, and place every thing in that situation in which it would subsist in the best manner. If any one, therefore, should be willing to discover the cause through which every thing is generated, or corrupted, or is, he ought to discover how it may subsist in the best manner, or suffer, or perform any thing else. In consequence of this, therefore, it is proper that a man should consider nothing else, either about himself or about others, except that which is the most excellent and the best: but it is necessary that he who knows this should also know that which is subordinate, since there is one and the same science of both. But thus reasoning with myself, I rejoiced, thinking that I had found a preceptor in Anaxagoras, who would instruct me in the causes of things agreeably to my own conceptions; and that he would inform me, in the first place, whether

¹ Addition is no more the proper cause of two than division; but each of these is nothing but a concause. For one and one by junction become the subject or matter of the participation of the incorporeal duad; and this is likewise the case when one thing is divided.

² See an extract of some length from that work of Anaxagoras to which Plato here alludes, in the Notes on the first book of my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

³ Socrates here uses the words *in a certain respect* with the greatest accuracy: for *intellect*, considered according to its highest subsistence in the intelligible order, may be said to be the cause of all things posterior to *the one*; but *the one*, being above intellect, is truly in every respect the cause of all.

the earth is flat or round; and afterwards explain the cause and necessity of its being so, adducing for this purpose that which is better, and showing that it is better for the earth to exist in this manner. And if he should say it is situated in the middle, that he would, besides this, show that it is better for it to be in the middle; and if he should render all this apparent to me, I was so disposed as not to require any other species of cause. I had likewise prepared myself in a similar manner for an inquiry respecting the sun, and moon, and the other stars, their velocities and revolutions about each other, and all their other properties; so as to be able to know why it is better for each to operate in a certain manner, and to suffer that which it suffers. For I by no means thought, after he had said that all these were orderly disposed by intellect, he would introduce any other cause of their subsistence, except that which shows^{*} that it is best for them to exist as they do. Hence I thought that in assigning the cause common to each particular, and to all things, he would explain that which is best for each, and is the common good of all. And indeed I would not have exchanged these hopes for a mighty gain! but having obtained his books with prodigious eagerness, I read them with great celerity, that I might with great celerity know that which is the best, and that which is base.

From this admirable hope however, my friend, I was forced away, when, in the course of my reading, I saw him make no use of intellect, nor employ certain causes, for the purpose of orderly disposing particulars, but assign air, æther, and water, and many other things equally absurd, as the causes of things. And he appeared to me to be affected in a manner similar to him who should assert, that all the actions of Socrates are produced by intellect; and afterwards, endeavouring to relate the causes of each particular action, should say, that, in the first place, I now sit here because my body is composed from bones and nerves, and that the bones are solid, and are separated by intervals from each other; but that the nerves, which are of a nature capable of intension and remission, cover the bones, together with the flesh and skin by which they are contained. The bones, therefore, being suspended from their joints, the nerves, by straining and relaxing them, enable me to bend my limbs as at present; and through this cause I here sit in an

^{*} Concauses can never show that it is best for things to exist as they do; but this can only be effected by primary, viz. *effective*, *paradigmatic*, and *final* causes.

inflected position—and again, should assign other such-like causes of my conversation with you, viz. voice, and air, and hearing, and a thousand other such particulars, neglecting to adduce the true cause, that since it appeared to the Athenians better to condemn me, on this account, it also appeared to me to be better and more just to sit here, and, thus abiding, sustain the punishment which they have ordained me. For otherwise, by the dog, as it appears to me, these nerves and bones would have been carried long ago either into Megara or Bœotia, through an opinion of that which is best, if I had not thought it more just and becoming to sustain the punishment ordered by my country, whatever it might be, than to withdraw myself and run away. But to call things of this kind causes is extremely absurd. Indeed, if any one should say that without possessing such things as bones and nerves, and other particulars which belong to me, I could not act in the manner I appear to do, he would speak the truth: but to assert that I act as I do at present through these, and that I operate with this intellect, and not from the choice of that which is best, would be an assertion full of extreme negligence and sloth. For this would be the consequence of not being able to collect by division, that the true cause of a thing is very different from that without which a cause would not be a cause. And this indeed appears to me to be the case with the multitude of mankind, who, handling things as it were in darkness, call them by names foreign from the truth, and thus denominate things causes which are not so. Hence, one placing round the earth a certain vortex, produced by the celestial motion, renders by this mean the earth fixed in the centre; but another places air under it, as if it was a basis to a broad trough. But they neither investigate that power through which things are now disposed in the best manner possible, nor do they think that it is endued with any dæmoniacal strength: but they fancy they have found a certain Atlas, more strong and immortal than such a strength, and far more sustaining all things; and they think that the good and the becoming do not in reality connect and sustain any thing. With respect to myself, indeed, I would most willingly become the disciple of any one; so that I might perceive in what manner a cause of this kind subsists. But since I am deprived of this advantage, and have neither been able to discover it myself, nor to learn it from another, are you willing, Cebes, that I should show you the manner in which I made a prosperous voyage to dis-

cover the cause of things?—I am willing (says he) in a most transcendent degree.

It appeared to me therefore (says Socrates) afterwards, when I was wearied with such speculations, that I ought to take care lest I should be affected in the same manner as those are who attentively behold the sun in an eclipse: for some would be deprived of their sight, unless they beheld its image in water, or in a similar medium. And something of this kind I perceived with respect to myself, and was afraid lest my soul should be perfectly blinded through beholding things with the eyes of my body, and through endeavouring to apprehend them by means of the several senses. Hence I considered that I ought to fly to reasons, and in them survey the truth of things. Perhaps, indeed, this similitude of mine may not in a certain respect be proper: for I do not entirely admit that he who contemplates things in reasons, surveys them in images, more than he who contemplates them in external effects. This method, therefore, I have adopted; and always establishing that reason as an hypothesis, which I judge to be the most valid, whatever appears to me to be consonant to this, I fix upon as true, both concerning the cause of things and every thing else; but such as are not consonant I consider as not true. But I wish to explain to you what I say in a clearer manner: for I think that you do not at present understand me.—Not very much, by Jupiter, says Cebes.

However (says he), I now assert nothing new, but what I have always asserted at other times, and in the preceding disputation. For I shall now attempt to demonstrate to you that species of cause which I have been discoursing about, and shall return again to those particulars which are so much celebrated; beginning from these, and laying down as an hypothesis, that there is a certain something beautiful, itself subsisting by itself; and a certain something good and great, and so of all the rest; which if you permit me to do, and allow that such things have a subsistence, I hope that I shall be able from these to demonstrate this cause to you, and discover that the soul is immortal.—But (says Cebes), in consequence of having granted you this already, you cannot be hindered from drawing such a conclusion.—But consider (says he) the things consequent to these, and see whether you will then likewise agree with me. For it appears to me, that if there be any thing else beautiful, besides the beautiful itself, it cannot be beautiful on any other
other

other account than because it participates of the beautiful itself; and I should speak in the same manner of all things. Do you admit such a cause?—I admit it (says he).—I do not therefore (says Socrates) any longer perceive, nor am I able to understand, those other *wise* causes; but if any one tells me why a certain thing is beautiful, and assigns as a reason, either its possessing a florid colour, or figure, or something else of this kind, I bid farewell to other hypotheses (for in all others I find myself disturbed); but this I retain with myself, simply, unartificially, and perhaps foolishly, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, than either the presence, or communion, or in whatever manner the operations may take place, of the beautiful itself. For I cannot yet affirm how this takes place; but only this, that all beautiful things become such through the beautiful itself. For it appears to me most safe thus to answer both myself and others; and adhering to this, I think that I can never fall, but that I shall be secure in answering, that all beautiful things are beautiful through the beautiful itself. Does it not also appear so to you?—It does.—And that great things, therefore, are great, and things greater, greater through magnitude itself; and things lesser, lesser through smallness itself?—Certainly.—Neither, therefore, would you assent, if it should be said that some one is larger than another by the head, and that he who is lesser is lesser by the very same thing, i. e. the head: but you would testify that you said nothing else than that, with respect to every thing great, one thing is greater than another by nothing else than magnitude, and that through this it is greater, i. e. through magnitude; and that the lesser is lesser through nothing else than smallness, and that through this it is lesser, i. e. through smallness. For you would be afraid, I think, lest, if you should say that any one is greater and lesser by the head, you should contradict yourself: first, in asserting that the greater is greater, and the lesser lesser, by the very same thing; and afterwards that the greater is greater by the head, which is a small thing; and that it is monstrous to suppose, that any thing which is great can become so through something which is small. Would you not be afraid of all this?—Indeed I should (says Cebes, laughing).—Would you not also (says he) be afraid to say that ten things are more than eight by two, and that through this cause ten transcends eight, and not by multitude and through multitude? And in like manner, that a thing which

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is two cubits in length is greater than that which is but one cubit, by the half, and not by magnitude? for the dread is indeed the same.—Entirely so (says he).—But what? one being added to one, will the addition be the cause of their becoming two? or if one is divided, and two produced, would you not be afraid to assign division as the cause? Indeed you would cry with a loud voice, that you know no other way by which any thing subsists, than by participating the proper essence of every thing which it participates; and that in these you can assign no other cause of their becoming two, than the participation of the duad; and that it is proper all such things as are about to become two, should participate of this, and of unity, whatever is about to become one. But you would bid farewell to these divisions and additions, and other subtilties of this kind, and would leave them to be employed in answering, by those who are wiser than yourself. And fearing, as it is said, your own shadow, and your own unskilfulness, you would adhere to this safe hypothesis, and answer in the manner I have described. But if any one should adhere to this hypothesis, you would refrain from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting from thence, and whether they were consonant or dissonant to one another. But when it is necessary for you to assign a reason for your belief in this hypothesis, you will assign it in a similar manner, laying down again another hypothesis, which shall appear to be the best among supernal natures, till you arrive at something sufficient. At the same time you will by no means confound things by mingling them together, after the manner of the contentious, when you discourse concerning the principle and the consequences arising from thence; if you are willing to discover any thing of true beings. For by such as these, perhaps, no attention is paid to this. For these, through their wisdom, are sufficiently able to mingle all things together, and at the same time please themselves. But you, if you rank among the philosophers, will act, I think, in the manner I have described.—Both Simmias and Cebes said, You speak most truly.

ECHEC. By Jupiter, Phædo, they assented with great propriety: for he appears to me to have asserted this in a manner wonderfully clear; and this even to one endued with the smallest degree of intellect.

PHÆD. And so indeed, Echecrates, it appeared in every respect to all who were present.

ECHEC.

ΕΧΗΕC. And well it might : for it appears so to us, now we hear it, who were not present. But what was the discourse after this ?

If I remember right, after they had granted all this, and had confessed that each of the several species was something, and that others participating of these received the same denomination, he afterwards interrogated them as follows : If then you allow that these things are so, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates, but less than Phædo, do you not then assert that both magnitude and parvitude are inherent in Simmias ?—I do.—And yet (says he) you must confess, that this circumstance of Simmias surpassing Socrates does not truly subsist in the manner which the words seem to imply. For Simmias is not naturally adapted to surpass Socrates, so far as he is Simmias, but by the magnitude which he possesses : nor, again, does he surpass Socrates so far as Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates possesses parvitude with respect to his magnitude.—True.—Nor, again, is Simmias surpassed by Phædo, because Phædo is Phædo, but because Phædo possesses magnitude with respect to the parvitude of Simmias.—It is so.—Simmias, therefore, is allotted the appellation of both small and great, being situated in the middle of both ; exhibiting his smallness to be surpassed by the greatness of the one, and his greatness to the other's smallness, which it surpasses. And at the same time, gently laughing, I seem (says he) to have spoken with all the precision of an historian ; but, notwithstanding this, it is as I say.—He allowed it.—But I have mentioned these things, in order that you may be of the same opinion as myself. For to me it appears, not only that magnitude is never willing to be at the same time both great and small, but that the magnitude which we contain never desires to receive that which is small, nor be surpassed ; but that it is willing to do one of these two things, either to fly away, and gradually withdraw itself, when its contrary the small approaches to it, or to perish when it arrives ; but that it is unwilling, by sustaining and receiving parvitude, to be different from what it was. In the same manner as I myself receiving and sustaining parvitude, and still remaining that which I am, am nevertheless small. But that being great dares not to be small. And in like manner *the small*, which resides in us, is not willing at any time *to subsist in becoming to be great, or to be great* : nor does any thing else among contraries, while it remains that which it was, with at the same time *to subsist in becoming to be, and to be*, its contrary ; but

it:

it either departs or perishes in consequence of this passion.—It appears so to me (says Cebes) in every respect.

But a certain person, who was present, upon hearing this (I do not clearly remember who it was), By the Gods (says he), was not the very contrary of what you now assert admitted by you in the former part of your discourse, viz. that the greater was generated from the less, and the less from the greater; and that generation among contraries plainly took place from contraries? But now you appear to me to say, that this can never be the case. Upon this Socrates, after he had extended his head a little further, and had listened to his discourse, said, You very manfully put me in mind; yet you do not understand the difference between what is now and what was then asserted. For then it was said, that a contrary thing was generated from a contrary; but now, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself, neither that contrary which subsists in us, nor that which subsists in nature. For then, my friend, we spoke concerning things which possess contraries, calling the contraries by the appellation of the things in which they reside; but now we speak of things which receive their denomination from the contraries residing in them. And we should never be willing to assert that these contraries receive a generation from one another. And at the same time, beholding Cebes, he said, Did any thing which has been said by this person disturb you also?—Indeed (says Cebes) it did not; and at such a time as this there are not many things which can disturb me.—We ingenuously, therefore (says he), assent to this, that a contrary can never become contrary to itself.—Entirely so (says Cebes).

But still further (says he), consider whether you agree with me in this also. Do you call *the hot* and *the cold* any thing?—I do.—Are they the same with snow and fire?—They are not, by Jupiter.—*The hot*, therefore, is something different from *fire*, and *the cold* from *snow*.—Certainly.—But this also is, I think, apparent to you, that snow, as long as it is such, can never, by receiving heat, remain what it was before, viz. snow, and at the same time become hot; but, on the accession of heat, must either withdraw itself from it, or perish.—Entirely so.—And again, that fire, when cold approaches to it, must either depart or perish; but that it will never dare, by receiving coldness, still to remain what it was, i. e. fire, and yet be at the same time cold.—You speak truly (says he).—But (says Socrates) it happens to some

of these, that not only the species itself is always thought worthy of the same appellation, but likewise something else, which is not indeed that species, but which perpetually possesses the form of it as long as it exists. But in the following instances my meaning will perhaps be more apparent: for the odd number ought always to possess that name by which we now call it: should it not?—Entirely so.—But is this the case with the odd number alone (for this is what I inquire)? or is there any thing else which is not indeed the same with the odd, but yet which ought always to be called odd, together with its own proper name, because it naturally subsists in such a manner, that it can never desert the form of the odd? But this is no other than what happens to the number three, and many other things. For consider, does not the number three appear to you to be always called by its proper name, and at the same time by the name of the odd, though *the odd* is not the same as *the triad*? Yet the triad, and the pentad, and the entire half of number, naturally subsist in such a manner, that though they are not the same as *the odd*, yet each of them is always odd. And again, two and four, and the whole other order of number, though they are not the same as *the even*, yet each of them is always even: do you admit this or not?—How should I not (says he)?—See then (says Socrates) what I wish to evince. But it is as follows: It has appeared, not only that contraries do not receive one another, but that even such things as are not contrary to each other, and yet always possess contraries, do not appear to receive that idea which is contrary to the idea which they contain; but that on its approach they either perish or depart. Shall we not, therefore, say that three things would first perish, and endure any thing whatever, sooner than sustain to be three things, and at the same time to be even?—Entirely so (says Cebes).—And yet (says Socrates) the duad is not contrary to the triad.—Certainly not.—Not only, therefore, do contrary species never sustain the approach of each other, but certain other things likewise cannot sustain the accession of contraries.—You speak most true (says he).

Are you willing, therefore (says he), that, if we are able, we should define what kind of things these are?—Entirely so.—Will they not then, Cebes (says he), be such things as compel whatever they occupy, not only to retain their idea, but likewise not to receive a contrary to it?—How do you mean?—Exactly as we just now said. For you know it is necessary, that

whatever things the idea of three occupies should not only be three, but likewise odd.—Entirely so.—To a thing of this kind, therefore, we assert, that an idea contrary to that form, through which it becomes what it is, will never approach.—It cannot.—But it becomes what it is through the odd: does it not?—Certainly.—But is not the contrary to this the idea of the even?—It is.—The idea of the even, therefore, will never accede to three things.—Never.—Are not three things, therefore, destitute of the even?—Destitute.—The triad, therefore, is an odd number.—It is.—The things which I mentioned then are defined, viz. such things, which, though they are not contrary to some particular nature, yet do not at the same time receive that which is contrary; just as the triad in the present instance, though it is not contrary to the even, yet does not any thing more receive it on this account: for it always brings with it that which is contrary to the even; and in like manner the duad to the odd, and fire to cold, and an abundant multitude of other particulars. But see whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not receive a contrary, but likewise that the nature which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches, will never receive the contrariety of that which it introduces. But recollect again, for it will not be useless to hear it repeated often. Five things will not receive the form of the even; neither will ten things, which are the double of five, receive the form of the odd. This¹, therefore, though it is itself contrary to something² else, yet will not receive the form of the odd; nor will the sesquialter, nor other things of this kind, such as the half and the third part, ever receive the form of the whole, if you pursue and assent to these consequences.—I most vehemently (says he) pursue and assent to them.

Again, therefore (says Socrates), speak to me from the beginning; and this not by answering to what I inquire, but, in a different manner, imitating me. For I say this, in consequence of perceiving another mode of answering, arising from what has now been said, no less secure than that which was established at first. For, if you should ask me what that is, which, when inherent in any body, causes the body to be hot, I should not give you that cautious and unskilful answer, that it is heat, but one more elegant deduced from what we have just now said; I mean, that it is fire. Nor, if you

¹ That is, the double.

² That is, the half.

should

should ask me what that is, which when inherent in a certain body, the body is diseased, I should not say that it is disease, but a fever. Nor, if you should ask what that is, which when inherent in a number, the number will be odd, I should not say that it is imparity, but unity, and in a similar manner in other particulars. But see whether you sufficiently understand my meaning.—Perfectly so (says he).—Answer me then (says Socrates), what that is, which when inherent in the body, the body will be alive?—Soul¹ (says he).—Is this then always the case?—How should it not (says he)?—Will soul, therefore, always introduce life to that which it occupies?—It will truly (says he).—But is there any thing contrary to life, or not?—There is.—But what?—Death.—The soul, therefore, will never receive the contrary to that which it introduces, in consequence of what has been already admitted.—And this most vehemently so (says Cebes).

But what? how do we denominate that which does not receive the idea of the even?—Odd (says he).—And how do we call that which does not receive justice, and that which does not receive music?—We call (says he) the one unjust, and the other unmusical.—Be it so.—But what do we call that which does not receive death?—Immortal (says he).—The soul does not receive death?—It does not.—The soul, therefore, is immortal.—Immortal.—Let it be so (says he).—And shall we say that this is now demonstrated? Or how does it appear to you?—It appears to me, Socrates, to be most sufficiently demonstrated.—What then (says he), Cebes, if it were necessary to *the odd* that it should be free from destruction, would not three things be indestructible?—How should they not?—If, therefore, it was also necessary that a thing void of heat should be indestructible, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unliquefied? For it would not perish; nor yet, abiding, would it receive the heat.—You speak the truth (says he).—In like manner, I think if that which is void of cold was indestructible, that when any thing cold approached to fire, the fire would neither be extinguished nor destroyed, but would depart free from damage.—It is necessary (says he).—Hence (says Socrates) it is necessary to speak in this manner concerning that which is immortal: for, if that which is immortal is indestructible, it is impossible that the soul, when

¹ This, which is the fifth argument, properly and fully demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its essence.

death approaches to it, should perish. For it follows, from what has been said, that it does not receive death, and of course it will never be dead. Just as we said, that three things will never be even, nor will this ever be the case with that which is odd : nor will fire ever be cold, nor yet the heat which is inherent in fire. But some one may say, What hinders but that the odd may never become the even, through the accession of the even, as we have confessed ; and yet, when the odd is destroyed, the even may succeed instead of it ? We cannot contend with him who makes this objection, that it is not destroyed : for the odd is not free from destruction ; since, if this was granted to us, we might easily oppose the objection, and obtain this confession, that the odd and three things would depart, on the approach of the even ; and we might contend in the same manner about fire and heat, and other particulars : might we not ?—Entirely so.—And now, therefore, since we have confessed respecting that which is immortal, that it is indestructible, it must follow that the soul is, together with being immortal, likewise indestructible : but if this be not admitted, other arguments will be necessary for our conviction. But there is no occasion for this (says he). For it is scarcely possible that any thing else should be void of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is subject to dissolution.

But I think (says Socrates) that Divinity, and the form itself of life, and if any thing else besides this is immortal, must be confessed by all beings to be entirely free from dissolution. All men, indeed (says he), by Jupiter, must acknowledge this ; and much more, as it appears to me, must it be admitted by the Gods. Since, therefore, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, will not the soul, since it is immortal, be indestructible ?—It is perfectly necessary.—When, therefore, death invades a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies ; but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, and withdraws itself from death.—It appears so.—The soul, therefore (says he), O Cebes, will, more¹ than any thing, be immortal and indestructible ; and our souls will in reality subsist in Hades. And therefore (says he), Socrates, I have nothing further to object to these arguments, nor any reason why I should disbelieve their reality : but if either Simmias, or any person present, has any thing to say, he will do well not to be silent : for

¹ Socrates says, with great propriety, that the soul will be immortal *more than any thing*. For soul is *essentially vital* ; and *immortality is stability of life*.

I know

I know not what other opportunity he can have, besides the present, if he wishes either to speak or hear about things of this kind.—But indeed (says Simmias) I have nothing which can hinder my belief in what has been said. But yet on account of the magnitude¹ of the things about which we have discoursed, and through my despising human imbecility, I am compelled to retain with myself an unbelief about what has been asserted.—Indeed, Simmias (says Socrates), you not only speak well in the present instance, but it is necessary that even those first hypotheses which we established, and which are believed by us, should at the same time be more clearly considered: and if you sufficiently investigate them, you will follow reason, as it appears to me, in as great a degree as is possible to man. And if this becomes manifest, you will no longer make any further inquiry.—You speak true (says he).

But it is just, my friends (says he), to think that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care and attention, not only for the present time, in which we say it lives, but likewise with a view to the whole of time: and it will now appear, that he who neglects it must subject himself to a most dreadful danger. For, if death were the liberation of the whole man, it would be an unexpected gain to the wicked to be liberated at the same time from the body, and from their vices together with their soul: but now, since the soul appears to be immortal, no other flight from evils, and no other safety remains for it, than in becoming the best and most prudent possible. For when the soul arrives at Hades, it will possess nothing but discipline and education, which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, in the very beginning of their progression thither. For thus it is said: that the dæmon² of each person, which was allotted to him while living, endeavours

¹ Simmias says this, in consequence of not having arrived at the summit of philosophical attainments, and, therefore, not seeing the full force of this fifth argument of Socrates. For it possesses a most wonderful and invincible strength; and by those that understand it will be acknowledged to have all the force of geometrical demonstration. Socrates himself insinuates as much as this, when he says in reply to Simmias, that by sufficiently investigating the hypotheses on which this argument is founded, we shall follow reason in as great a degree as is possible to man, and at length make no further inquiry. That is, we shall at length perceive this truth by the projecting energies of intellect, which is a degree of evidence, as I have already observed in the Introduction to this dialogue, superior to that of any tradition however divine.

² Since there are in the universe, says Olympiodorus, things which subsist differently at different times

endeavours¹ to lead each to a certain place, where it is necessary that all of them, being collected together, after they have been judged, should proceed to Hades, together with their leader, who is ordered to conduct them from hence thither. But there receiving the allotments proper to their condition, and abiding for a necessary time, another leader brings them back hither again, in many and long periods of time. The journey, therefore, is not such as Telephus asserts it to be in Eschylus. For he says that a simple path leads to Hades: but it appears to me that the path is neither simple nor one. For there would be no occasion of leaders, nor could any one ever wander from the right road, if there was but one way. But now it appears to have many divisions and dubious turnings: and this I conjecture from our holy and legal rites. The soul, therefore, which is properly adorned with virtue,

times, and since there are also natures which are conjoined with the superessential unities, it is necessary that there should be a certain middle genus, which is neither immediately suspended from Deity, nor subsists differently at different times according to better and worse, but which is always perfect, and does not depart from its proper virtue; and is immutable indeed, but is not conjoined with the superessential. The whole of this genus is dæmoniacal. There are also different genera of dæmons: for they are placed under the mundane Gods. The highest of these subsists according to *the one* of the Gods, which is called an unisic and divine genus of dæmons. The next according to the intellect which is suspended from Deity, and is called intellectual. The third subsists according to soul, and is called rational. The fourth according to nature, which is denominated physical. The fifth according to body, which is called corporeal-formed. And the sixth according to matter, and this is denominated material. Or after another manner it may be said, Olympiodorus adds, that some of these are celestial, others ethereal, others aerial, others aquatic, others terrestrial, and others subterranean. With respect to this division, it is evident that it is derived from the parts of the universe. But irrational dæmons originate from the aerial governors, whence also the Oracle says, "being the charioteer of the aerial, terrestrial and aquatic dogs."

περὶ τὸν ἐλάττηρα κινήσων χθονίων τε καὶ ὑγρῶν.

Our guardian dæmons, however, belong to that order of dæmons which is arranged under the Gods that preside over the ascent and descent of souls.

¹ Olympiodorus observes here, that the dæmon endeavours to lead the soul, as exciting its conceptions and phantasies; at the same time, however, yielding to the self-motive power of the soul. But in consequence of the dæmon exciting, one soul follows voluntarily, another violently, and another according to a mode subsisting between these. Olympiodorus further observes that there is one dæmon who leads the soul to its judges from the present life; another, who is ministrant to the judges, giving completion, as it were, to the sentence which is passed; and a third who is again allotted the guardianship of life.

and which possesses prudence, willingly follows its leader, and is not ignorant of its present condition: but the soul which still adheres to body through desire (as I said before), being for a long space of time terrified about it, and struggling and suffering abundantly about the visible place, is with violence and great difficulty led away by its presiding dæmon. And when it arrives at that place where other souls are assembled, all the rest fly from and avoid this unpurified soul, which has been guilty either of unjust slaughter, or has perpetrated such deeds as are allied to this, and are the works of kindred souls; nor is any one willing to become either its companion or leader. But such a soul wanders about, oppressed with every kind of anxiety and trouble, till certain periods of time are accomplished: and these being completed, it is driven by necessity to an abode accommodated to its nature. But the soul which has passed through life with purity and moderation, obtaining the Gods for its companions and leaders, will reside in a place adapted to its purified condition.

There are indeed many and admirable places belonging to the earth¹; and the earth itself is neither of such a kind, nor of such a magnitude, as those

¹ With respect to the earth which is here mentioned, Olympiodorus informs us, that some of the antients considered it as incorporeal, others as corporeal, and each of these in a twofold respect. For those who considered it as incorporeal said that it was either an idea, or nature; but of those who considered it as corporeal, some asserted that it was the whole world, and others the sublunary region. Plato, however, as is evident from the text, appears to speak of this our earth.

Olympiodorus adds, that as the earth is a *pleroma** of the universe, it is a God. For, if the universe is a God, it is evident that the parts from which it derives its completion must also be Gods. Besides, if the earth contains Divinities, much more must it be itself a God, as Timæus also says. Hence, intellect and a rational soul must be suspended from it, and consequently it must have a luciform prior to this apparent body.

Again, that the universe is spherical, may be shown from its final cause. For a sphere imitates *the one*, because it is the best and most indissoluble of figures, as being free from angles, and the most capacious of all things. This is also evident from its paradigmatic cause, because *animal itself*, or the extremity of the intelligible order, to which looking, the demiurgus fabricated the world, is all-perfect. And further still, this is evident from its producing cause. For the demiurgus made it to be perpetual and indissoluble, and both the circle and sphere are figures of this kind.

Further still, as every part of the whole, which ranks as a whole, imitates the universe in the *whole* and the *all*, so likewise in figure. Every whole, therefore, in the universe, is spherical, and

* i. e. A whole, which gives completion to the universe.

consequently

those who are accustomed to speak about it imagine, as I am persuaded from a certain person's account.—How is this, Socrates (says Simmias)? For I myself also have heard many things about the earth; and yet perhaps not these particulars which have obtained your belief. I should therefore be glad to hear you relate them.—Indeed, Simmias (says he), the art of Glaucus does not appear to me to be necessary, in order to relate these particulars; but to evince their truth, seems to me to be an undertaking beyond what the art of Glaucus can accomplish. Besides, I myself perhaps am not able to accomplish this; and even though I should know how, the time which is allotted me to live, Simmias, seems by no means sufficient for the length of such a discourse. However, nothing hinders me from informing you what I am persuaded is the truth, respecting the form of the earth, and the places which it contains.—And this information (says Simmias) will be sufficient.—I am persuaded, therefore (says he), in the first place, that if the earth is in the middle of the heavens, and is of a spherical figure, it has no occasion of air, nor of any other such-like necessity, to prevent it from falling: but that the perfect similitude of the heavens to themselves, and the equilibrium of the earth, are sufficient causes of its support. For that which is equally inclined, when placed in the middle of a similar nature, cannot tend more or less to one part than another; but, subsisting on all sides similarly affected, it will remain free from all inclination. This is the first thing of which I am persuaded.—And very properly so (says Cebes).—But yet further (says he), that the earth is prodigiously¹ great; that we

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consequently this must also be true of the earth. It is likewise evident that the earth is in the middle. For, if the universe is spherical, it subsists about the centre: the parts of the universe, therefore, which rank as wholes will also subsist about centres, and consequently this will be the case with the earth. Let it, however, be admitted, that it subsists about a centre, but whence is it evident that it subsists about the centre of the universe? We reply, that if it is the most gross of all the bodies, it will be the last of them; for the most attenuated of bodies, as being able to pervade through each other, possess the higher place, conformably to the order of attenuation; and the earth the lower.

¹ That the earth is very great, says Olympiodorus, is evident from the Atlantic island surpassing in magnitude both Asia and Libya. It is also evident from the putrefaction of the places which we inhabit, since such places cannot rank as first. It is likewise evident from the summits of things secondary wishing to be assimilated to the extremities of things prior to them; so that the summit of earth must be attenuated and pellucid, similar to the most precious stones and metals,

who dwell in places extending from Phasis to the pillars of Hercules, inhabit only a certain small portion of it, about the Mediterranean sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh; and that there are many others elsewhere, who dwell in many such-like places. For I am persuaded, that there are every where about the earth many hollow places of all-various forms and magnitudes; into which there is a confluence of water, mists, and air: but that the earth itself, which is of a pure nature, is situated in the pure heavens, in which the stars are contained, and which most of those who are accustomed to speak about such particulars denominate æther. But the places which we inhabit are nothing more than the dregs of this pure earth, or cavities into which its dregs continually flow. We are ignorant, therefore, that we dwell in the cavities of this earth, and imagine that we inhabit its upper parts. Just as if some one dwelling in the middle bottom of the sea, should think that he resided on its surface, and, beholding the sun and the other stars through the water, should imagine that the sea is the heavens; but through sloth and im-

metals. And lastly, this is evident from the profundity of the hollows in which we dwell, and the height of the mountains; for these evince that the spheric superficies of the earth is larger than that which is generally considered as its surface. On this summit of the earth, therefore, the true heavens are visible. They are also seen near, and not through æther only, and with more beautiful eyes. According to Ammonius Hermeas, too, whom Olympiodorus calls the Interpreter, the stars themselves, as I have before observed, are not seen by us here, but inflammations of them in the air. And perhaps, says he, this is the meaning of that assertion of Heraclitus, "enkindling measures and extinguishing measures." For he certainly did not say this of the sun itself, but of the sun with reference to us.

Olympiodorus further observes, that there is a triple division of the earth, according to the three Saturnian deities Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto: for to these, says Homer, heaven and earth are common. But if common, it is evident that these two are divided among them. Hence, in the heavens, the innerratic sphere belongs to Jupiter; from thence, as far as to the sphere of the sun, to Neptune; and the remaining part of the heavens to Pluto. If there is also a division of the earth according to the universe, it must be divided into celestial, terrestrial, and middle. For Olympian earth is honoured, as well as that which is properly terrestrial. There must, therefore, be a certain middle earth. If, likewise, there is a division of the earth conformably to that of an animal, for the earth is an animal, it must be divided into the head, middle parts, and feet.

It is also beautifully observed by Olympiodorus, that each of the elements has the dodecahedron in common, as preparatory to becoming a sphere. Hence, says he, the earth has from itself the cubic, water the icosaedric, air the octahedric, and fire the pyramid; but from the supermundane Gods the dodecahedron is imparted to all of them, as preparatory to intellectual participation, which is sphericity, or the reception of a spherical figure.

becility having never ascended to the top of the sea, nor emerged from its deeps into this region, has never perceived how much purer and more beautiful it is than the place which he inhabits, nor has received this information from any other who has beheld this place of our abode. In the very same manner are we affected: for, dwelling in a certain hollow of the earth, we think that we reside on its surface; and we call the air heaven, as if the stars passed through this, as through the heavens themselves. And this likewise, in the same manner as in the above instance, happens to us through our imbecility and sloth, which render us incapable of ascending to the summit of the air. For, otherwise, if any one could arrive at its summit, or, becoming winged, could fly thither, he would be seen emerging from hence; and just as fishes, emerging hither from the sea, perceive what our region contains, in the same manner would he behold the several particulars belonging to the summit of the earth. And besides this, if his nature was sufficient for such an elevated survey, he would know that the heavens which he there beheld were the true heavens, and that he perceived the true light and the true earth. For this earth which we inhabit, the stones which it contains, and the whole region of our abode, are all corrupted and gnawed, just as things in the sea are corroded by the salt: for nothing worthy of estimation grows in the sea, nor does it contain any thing perfect; but caverns and sand, and immense quantities of mud and filth, are found in it wherever there is earth. Nor are its contents to be by any means compared with the beauty of the various particulars in our place of abode. But those upper regions of the earth will appear to be yet far more excellent than these which we inhabit. For, if it is proper to tell you a beautiful fable, it is well worth hearing, Simmias, what kind of places those are on the upper earth, situated under the heavens.

It is reported then, my friend (says he), in the first place, that this earth, if any one surveys it from on high, appears like globes covered with twelve skins, various¹, and distinguished with colours; a pattern of which are the colours

¹ The earth is distinguished with colours, says Olympiodorus, according to the *physical* variety of colours; according to the defluxions of celestial illuminations from Mars and the Sun; and according to incorporeal lives, which proceed as far as to sensible beauty. With respect to the elements likewise on the summit of the earth, water there is as vapour, and as moist air; but air is æther,

colours found among us, and which our painters use. But there the whole earth is composed from materials of this kind, and such as are much more splendid and pure than our region contains: for they are partly, indeed, purple, and endued with a wonderful beauty; partly of a golden colour; and partly more white than plaster or snow; and are composed from other colours in a similar manner, and those more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. For the hollow parts of this pure earth, being filled with water and air, exhibit a certain species of colour, shining among the variety of other colours in such a manner, that one particular various form of the earth continually presents itself to the view. Hence, whatever grows in this earth grows analogous to its nature, such as trees, and flowers, and fruits: and again, its mountains and stones possess a similar perfection and transparency, and are rendered beautiful through various colours; of which the stones so much honoured by us in this place of our abode are but small parts, such as sardin-stones, jaspers, and emeralds, and all of this kind. But there nothing subsists which is not of such a nature as I have described; and there are other things far more beautiful than even these. But the reason of this is because the stones there are pure, and not consumed and corrupted, like ours, through rottenness and salt, from a conflux of various particulars, which in our places of abode cause filthiness and disease to the stones and earth, animals and plants, which are found among us. But this pure earth is adorned with all these, and with gold and silver, and other things of a similar nature: for all these are naturally apparent, since they are both numerous and large, and are diffused every where throughout the earth; so that to behold it is the spectacle of blessed spectators. This earth too contains many other animals¹ and men, some of whom inhabit its middle parts; others

æther, and æther is the summit of æther. If, also, there are mountains there, it is evident, says he, that from their nearness they reach the heavens. In short, he adds, the æthers of the elements are there, as the Chaldean oracles say.

¹ These forms of life, says Olympiodorus, on the summit of the earth, subsist between the forms of perpetual animals and those that live but for a short time. For a medium is every where necessary. But the excellent temperature of the seasons and the elements causes the inhabitants there to die easily, and to live long. And what is there wonderful in this, says Olympiodorus, since this in a certain respect is the case with the Ethiopians, through the symmetry of the air? He adds, if also Aristotle relates, that a man lived here without sleep, and nourished by the solar-form air

others dwell about the air, as we do about the sea; and others reside in islands which the air flows round, and which are situated not far from the continent. And in one word, what water and the sea are to us, with respect to utility, that air is to them: but what air is to us, that æther is to the inhabitants of this pure earth. But the seasons there are endued with such an excellent temperament, that the inhabitants are never molested with disease, and live for a much longer time than those who dwell in our regions; and they surpass us in sight, hearing, and prudence, and every thing of this kind, as much as air excels water in purity—and æther, air. And besides this, they have groves and temples of the Gods, in which the Gods dwell in reality; and likewise oracles and divinations, and sensible perceptions of the Gods, and such-like associations with them. The sun too, and moon, and stars, are seen by them such as they really are; and in every other respect their felicity is of a correspondent nature.

And in this manner indeed the whole earth naturally subsists, and the parts which are situated about it. But it contains about the whole of its ambit many places in its concavities; some of which are more profound and extended than the region which we inhabit: but others are more profound, indeed, but yet have a less chasm than the places of our abode; and there are certain parts which are less profound¹, but broader than ours. But all these are in many places perforated into one another under the earth, according to narrower and broader avenues, and have passages of communication through which a great quantity of water flows into the different hollows of the earth, as into bowls; and besides this, there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth, and of hot and cold waters; likewise a great quantity of fire, mighty rivers of fire, and many of moist mire, some of which are purer, and others more muddy; as in Sicily there are rivers of mud, which flow before a stream of fire, which is itself a flaming torrent.

alone, what ought we to think of the inhabitants which are there? Και τι θαυμαστον, ότι και οι Αιθιοπες ωδε πως εχουσι δια την των αέρων συμμετριαν. και ει ενταυθα ιστορει Αριστοτελης ανθρωπον αυπνον και μονη τω ηλιοειδει τρεφομενον αέρι, τι χρη περι των εκει οισθαι.

¹ Plato, says Olympiodorus, directs his attention to the four quarters of the globe: for since there are two which we inhabit, viz. Europe and Asia, there must also be two others according to the antipodes. Καταστοχάζεται δε των τεσσαρων τμηματων, επειδη δυο καθ' ημας εισιν, η Ευρωπη και η Ασια: ώστε δυο αλλοι κατα τους αντιποδας.

*
And

And from these the several places are filled, into which each flows at particular times. But all these are moved upwards and downwards, like a hanging vessel, situated in the earth. This hanging vessel too, through a certain nature of this kind, is one of the chasms of the earth; and this the greatest, and totally perforated through the whole earth. And of this Homer¹ thus speaks:

Far, very far, where under earth is found
A gulf, of every depth, the most profound:

which he elsewhere and many other poets denominate Tartarus². For into this chasm there is a conflux of all rivers, from which they again flow upwards. But each derives its quality from the earth through which it flows. And the reason why they all flow into, and again out of this chasm, is because this moisture cannot find either a bottom or a basis. Hence it becomes elevated, and fluctuates upwards and downwards: and this too is the case with the air and spirit³ which are situated about it. For they follow this moisture, both when they are impelled to more remote places of the earth, and when to the places of our abode. And as in respiration the flowing breath is perpetually expired and inspired, so there the spirit, which is elevated together with the moisture, causes certain vehement and immense winds during its ingress and departure. When the water, therefore, being impelled, flows into that place which we call downwards, then the rivers flow through the earth into different channels, and fill them; just as those who pour into another vessel

¹ Iliad. lib. viii.

² Tartarus, says Olympiodorus, is the extremity of the universe, and subsists oppositely to Olympus. But Tartarus is a deity, the inspective guardian of that which is last in every order. Hence, says he, we have a celestial Tartarus, in which Heaven concealed his offspring; a Saturnian Tartarus, in which also Saturn concealed his offspring; and also a Jovian of this kind, which is demiurgic.

³ As fire, water, and air, are in the middle of the earth, much vapour must be there, as Olympiodorus justly observes, water being analysed into vapour through fire. Earth also being an animal, and living, must be willing to respire, as it were, and must make certain reflexes by its inspirations and expirations. Further still, its luciform must be its first vehicle, and its apparent must be this corporeal bulk. It must, therefore, require a middle, or aerial vehicle, the province of which is to cherish and move more attenuated bodies, through its all-various motion.

Olympiodorus further observes, that of Tartarus, and Earth which is conjoined with Heaven, Typhon, Echidna, and Python, form as it were a certain Chaldaic triad, the inspective guardian of all inordinate fabrication.

the water which they have drawn. But when this water, departing from thence, is impelled hither, it again fills the rivers on the earth; and these, when filled, flow through channels and through the earth; and when they have severally passed through the avenues, which are open to each, they produce seas, lakes, rivers, and fountains. Flowing back again from hence under the earth, and some of them streaming round longer and more numerous places, but others round such as are shorter and less numerous, they again hurl themselves into Tartarus; and some indeed much more profoundly, but others less so, than they were drawn: but the influxions of all of them are deeper than the places from which they flow upwards. And the effluxions of some are in a direction contrary to their influxions, but in others both take place according to the same part. There are some again which entirely flow round in a circle, folding themselves like snakes, once or often about the earth; and being bent downwards as much as possible, they are again hurled forth on each side till they arrive at the middle, but never beyond this. For each part of the earth becomes steep to both these streams.

The other rivers, indeed, are many, great, and various: but among this abundance there are certain streams, four[†] in number, of which the greatest, and which circularly flows round the earth the outermost of all, is called the Ocean. But that which flows opposite, and in a contrary direction to this, is Acheron; which, flowing through other solitary places, and under the earth, devolves its waters into the Acherusian marsh, into which many souls

[†] The four rivers which are here mentioned are, says Olympiodorus, according to the Interpreter (i. e. Ammonius Hermeas), the four elements in Tartarus. Of these Ocean is water; Cocytus, or rather Styx, is earth; Pyriphlegethon is fire; and Acheron is air. But Styx is opposed to Pyriphlegethon, as heat to cold; and Acheron to Ocean, as air to water. Hence also Orpheus * calls the Acherusian lake aerial. However, says Olympiodorus, the position of the rivers does not correspond to this interpretation. For Ocean is first, and in the higher place. Under this is Acheron. Under this again, Pyriphlegethon; and in the last place, Cocytus. Besides, all of them are called rivers, though the elements are different. It is better therefore, says he, to consider the allotments, and the places themselves of souls, as receiving a fourfold division, according to depth. And prior to the places, we should consider the divine idioms, viz. the definitive, according to Ocean; the cathartic, according to Acheron; that which punishes through heat, according to Pyriphlegethon: and that which punishes through cold, according to Cocytus.

* Διο και Ορφευς την Αχερουσιαν λιμνην αήριαν καλεῖ.

of the dead pass; and abiding there for certain destined spaces of time, some of which are more and others less extended, they are again sent into the generations of animals. The third river of these hurls itself forth in the middle, and near its source falls into a mighty place, burning with abundance of fire, and produces a lake greater than our sea, and hot with water and mud. But it proceeds from hence in a circle, turbulent and noisy, and, surrounding the earth, arrives both elsewhere and at the extremities of the Acherusian marsh, with the water of which it does not become mingled; but, often revolving itself under the earth, flows into the more downward parts of Tartarus. And this is the river which they still denominate Pyriphlegethon; the streams of which send forth disverged rivers to various parts of the earth. But the fourth river, which is opposite to this, first falls as it is said into a place dreadful and wild, and wholly tinged with an azure colour, which they denominate Styx: and the influxive streams of this river form the Stygian marsh. But falling into this, and receiving vehement powers in its water, it hides itself under the earth, and, rolling round, proceeds contrary to Pyriphlegethon, and meets with it in the Acherusian marsh, in a contrary direction. Nor is the water of this river mingled with any thing, but, revolving in a circle, it hurls itself into Tartarus, in a course opposite to Pyriphlegethon. But its name, according to the poets, is Cocytus.

These being thus naturally constituted, when the dead arrive at that place into which the dæmon leads each, in the first place they are judged, as well those who have lived in a becoming manner, and piously, and justly, as those who have not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and ascending the vehicles¹ prepared for them, arrive in these at the Acherusian lake, and dwell there; till being purified, and having suffered punishment for any injuries they may have committed, they are enlarged; and each receives the reward of his beneficence, according to his deserts. But those who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, because they have perpetrated either many and great sacrileges, or many unjust slaughters, and such as are contrary to law, or other things of this

¹ These vehicles are aerial: for souls are moved locally according to the vehicles which are suspended from them. And these aerial vehicles, as being corruptible, are naturally adapted to receive punishment.

kind—these, a destiny adapted to their guilt hurls into Tartarus, from which they will *never*[†] be discharged. But those who are found to have committed curable, but yet mighty crimes, such as those who have been guilty through anger of any violence against their father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their lives penitent for the offence, or who have become homicides in any other similar manner; with respect to these, it is necessary that they should fall into Tartarus: but after they have fallen, and have dwelt there for a year, the waves hurl them out of Tartarus; and the homicides indeed into Cocytus, but the violators of fathers and mothers into Pyriphlegethon. But when, being borne along by these rivers, they arrive at the Acherusian marsh, they here bellow and invoke one part those whom they have slaughtered, and another part those whom they have injured. But, invoking these, they suppliantly entreat that they would suffer them to enter into the lake, and forgive them. And if they persuade them to do this, they depart, and find an end to their maladies: but if they are unable to accomplish this, they are carried back again into Tartarus, and from thence again into the rivers. And they do not cease from suffering this, till they have persuaded those they have injured to forgiveness. For this punishment was ordained them by the judges. But those who shall appear to have lived most excellently, with respect to piety—these are they, who, being liberated and dismissed from these places in the earth, as from the abodes of a prison, shall arrive at the pure habitation on high, and dwell on the ætherial earth^{*}. And among these, those who are sufficiently purified by philosophy shall live without bodies, through the whole of the succeeding time, and

[†] Let not the reader imagine, that by the word *never*, here, an eternal duration is implied; for Divinity does not punish the soul as if influenced by anger, but, like a good physician, for the sake of healing the maladies which she has contracted through guilt. We must say, therefore, as Olympiodorus well observes, that the incurable soul is punished *eternally*, calling eternity her life and the partial period of her existence. “For, in reality (says he), souls which have offended in the highest degree cannot be sufficiently purified in one period, but are *continually* in life, as it were, in Tartarus; and this period is called by Plato eternity.”

^{*} Observe here, that those who have lived a holy and guiltless life, without philosophy, will after death dwell on the summit of the earth; and their bodies will consequently consist of the most attenuated air. Those who have philosophized politically, says Olympiodorus, will live in the heavens with luciform bodies. And those that are perfectly purified will be restored to the supermundane place, without bodies.

shall

shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these, which it is neither easy to describe, nor is the present time sufficient for such an undertaking.

But for the sake of these particulars which we have related, we should undertake every thing, Simmias, that we may participate of virtue and prudence in the present life. For the reward is beautiful, and the hope mighty. To affirm, indeed, that these things subsist exactly as I have described them, is not the province of a man endued with intellect. But to assert that either these or certain particulars of this kind take place, with respect to our souls and their habitations—since our soul appears to be immortal—this is, I think, both becoming, and deserves to be hazarded by him who believes in its reality. For the danger is beautiful; and it is necessary to allure ourselves with things of this kind, as with enchantments: and, on this account, I produced the fable which you have just now heard me relate. But, for the sake of these, it is proper that the man should be confident about his soul, who in the present life bidding farewell to those pleasures which regard the body and its ornaments, as things foreign from his nature, has earnestly applied himself to disciplines, as things of far greater consequence; and who having adorned his soul not with a foreign but its own proper ornament, viz. with temperance and justice, fortitude, liberty and truth, expects a migration to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever he shall be called upon by Fate. You, therefore (says he), Simmias and Cebes, and the rest who are here assembled, will each depart in some period of time posterior to the present; but

Me now calling, Fate demands:

(as some tragic poet would say) and it is almost time that I should betake myself to the bath. For it appears to me better to wash myself before I drink the poison, and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body.

When, therefore, he had thus spoken,—Be it so, Socrates (says Crito): but what orders do you leave to these who are present, or to myself, or respecting your children, or any thing else in the execution of which we can particularly oblige you?—None such as are new (says he), Crito, but that which I have always said to you; that if you take care of yourselves, you will always perform in whatever you do that which is acceptable to myself,

myself, to my family, and to your own selves, though you should not promise me any thing at present. But if you neglect yourselves, and are unwilling to live according to what has been now and formerly said, as vestiges of direction in your course, you will accomplish nothing, though you should now promise many things, and in a very vehement manner.—We shall take care, therefore (says Crito), to act as you desire. But how would you be buried?—Just as you please (says he), if you can but catch me, and I do not elude your pursuit. And at the same time gently laughing, and addressing himself to us, I cannot persuade Crito (says he), my friends, that I am that Socrates who now disputes with you, and methodizes every part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how I ought to be buried. But all that long discourse which some time since I addressed to you, in which I asserted that after I had drunk the poison I should no longer remain with you, but should depart to certain felicities of the blessed, this I seem to have declared to him in vain, though it was undertaken to console both you and myself. Promise, therefore (says he), for me to Crito, just the contrary of what he promised to my judges. For he promised that I should not run away; but do you engage that when I die I shall not stay with you, but shall depart and entirely leave you; that Crito may more easily bear this separation, and may not be afflicted when he sees my body either burnt or buried, as if I suffered some dreadful misfortune; and that he may not say at my interment, that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well assured of this (says he), excellent Crito, that when we do not speak in a becoming manner, we are not only culpable with respect to our speech, but likewise affect our souls with a certain evil. But it is proper to be confident, and to say that my body will be buried, and in such a manner as is pleasing to you, and which you think is most agreeable to our laws.

When he had thus spoken he rose, and went into a certain room, that he might wash himself, and Crito followed him: but he ordered us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, accordingly, discoursing over and reviewing among ourselves what had been said; and sometimes speaking about his death, how great a calamity it would be to us; and sincerely thinking that we, like those who are deprived of their father, should pass the rest of our life in the condition of orphans. But when he had washed himself, his sons were brought to him

him (for he had two little ones, and one considerably advanced in age), and the women belonging to his family likewise came in to him : but when he had spoken to them before Crito, and had left them such injunctions as he thought proper, he ordered the boys and women to depart ; and he himself returned to us. And it was now near the setting of the sun : for he had been absent for a long time in the bathing-room. But when he came in from washing, he sat down ; and did not speak much afterwards. For then the servant of the eleven magistrates came in, and standing near him, I do not perceive that in you, Socrates, says he, which I have taken notice of in others ; I mean, that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, being compelled by the magistrates, I announce to them that they must drink the poison. But, on the contrary, I have found you at the present time to be the most generous, mild, and the best of all the men that ever came into this place : and, therefore, I am well convinced that you are not angry with me, but with the authors of your present condition. You know those whom I allude to. Now, therefore (for you know what I came to tell you), farewell, and endeavour to bear this necessity as easily as possible. And at the same time bursting into tears, and turning himself away, he departed. But Socrates looking after him, And thou too (says he), farewell ; and we shall take care to act as you advise. And at the same time turning to us, How courteous (says he) is the behaviour of that man ! During the whole time of my abode here, he has visited and often conversed with me, and proved himself to be the best of men ; and now how generously he weeps on my account ! But let us obey him, Crito, and let some one bring the poison, if it is bruised ; but if not, let the man whose business it is bruise it himself. But, Socrates (says Crito), I think that the sun still hangs over the mountains, and is not yet set. And at the same time I have known others who have drunk the poison very late, after it was announced to them ; who have supped and drunk abundantly ; and who have enjoyed the objects of their love. Therefore, do not be in such haste ; for there is yet time enough. Upon this Socrates replied, Such men, Crito, act with great propriety in the manner you have described (for they think to derive some advantage by so doing), and I also with great propriety shall not act in this manner. For I do not think I shall gain any thing by drinking it later, except becoming

ridiculous to myself through desiring to live, and being sparing of life when nothing of it any longer remains. Go, then (says he), be persuaded, and comply with my request.

Then Crito, hearing this, gave the sign to the boy that stood near him. And the boy departing, and having staid for some time, came, bringing with him the person that was to administer the poison, and who brought it properly prepared in a cup. But Socrates, beholding the man—It is well, my friend (says he); but what is proper to do with it? for you are knowing in these affairs.—You have nothing else to do (says he), but when you have drunk it to walk about, till a heaviness takes place in your legs; and afterwards lie down: this is the manner in which you should act. And at the same time he extended the cup to Socrates. But Socrates received it from him—and indeed, Echecrates, with great cheerfulness; neither trembling, nor suffering any alteration for the worse in his colour or countenance: but, as he was accustomed to do, beholding the man with a bull-like aspect, What say you (says he) respecting this potion? Is it lawful to make a libation of it, or not?—We only bruise (says he), Socrates, as much as we think sufficient for the purpose.—I understand you (says he): but it is certainly both lawful and proper to pray to the Gods, that my departure from hence thither may be attended with prosperous fortune; which I entreat them to grant may be the case. And at the same time ending his discourse, he drank the poison with exceeding facility and alacrity. And thus far, indeed, the greater part of us were tolerably well able to refrain from weeping: but when we saw him drinking, and that he had drunk it, we could no longer restrain our tears. But from me, indeed, notwithstanding the violence which I employed in checking them, they flowed abundantly; so that, covering myself with my mantle, I deplored my misfortune. I did not indeed weep for him, but for my own fortune; considering what an associate I should be deprived of. But Crito, who was not able to restrain his tears, was compelled to rise before me. And Apollodorus, who during the whole time prior to this had not ceased from weeping, then wept aloud with great bitterness; so that he infected all who were present, except Socrates. But Socrates, upon seeing this, exclaimed—What are you doing, excellent men? For, indeed, I principally sent away the women, lest they should produce a disturbance of this

kind. For I have heard that it is proper¹ to die joyfully and with propitious omens. Be quiet, therefore, and summon fortitude to your assistance.—When we heard this we blushed, and restrained our tears. But he, when he found during his walking that his legs felt heavy, and had told us so, laid himself down in a supine position. For the man had ordered him to do so. And at the same time he who gave him the poison, touching him at intervals, considered his feet and legs. And after he had vehemently pressed his foot, he asked him if he felt it. But Socrates answered he did not. And after this he again pressed his thighs: and thus ascending with his hand, he showed us that he was cold and stiff. And Socrates also touched himself, and said, that when the poison reached his heart he should then leave us. But now his lower belly was almost cold; when uncovering himself (for he was covered), he said (which were his last words): Crito, we owe a cock² to Æsculapius. Discharge this debt, therefore, for me, and do not neglect it.—It shall be done (says Crito): but consider whether you have any other commands. To this inquiry of Crito he made no reply; but shortly after moved himself, and the man covered him. And Socrates fixed his eyes. Which when Crito perceived, he closed³ his mouth and eyes. This, Echecrates, was the end
of

¹ The Pythagoreans, says Olympiodorus, thought it proper to die joyfully, because death is a good and sacred thing; and because sometimes a contrary conduct destroys that impulse by which the soul is led back to her true felicity. Besides this, when the soul departs in sorrow, a crowd of dæmons who are lovers of body are by this mean evoked; and who, in consequence of rejoicing in a life conversant with generation, render the pneumatic vehicle of the soul heavy.

² Should it be asked, says Olympiodorus, why Socrates desired that a cock might be offered for him to Æsculapius, we reply, that by this mean he might heal the diseases which his soul had contracted in generation. Perhaps too, says he, according to the oracle, he was willing to return to his proper principles, celebrating Pæon. Olympiodorus adds, that Socrates is said by Plato to have been the best of men, because he was in every respect good; the most prudent, according to knowledge; and the most just, according to desire.

³ The meaning of the Attic symbols respecting those that die is, according to Olympiodorus, as follows: The closing of the mouth and eyes signifies the cessation of external energy, and the conversion of the soul to that which is inward. The being laid on the earth recalls to our memory, that the soul is conjoined with wholes. The washing of the dead body indicates purification from generation. The anointing the parts of the body signifies a divulsion from the dark mire of matter, and that divine inspiration is evoked. But the burning signifies the being led to that which is on high, and to an impartible nature. And the being laid in the earth indicates a conjunction
tion

of our associate ; a man, as it appears to me, the best of those whom we were acquainted with at that time, and, besides this, the most prudent and just.

tion with intelligibles. Τίνων συμβόλα τα περι τους αποιχομένους πατρία αττικά. το μεν ουν καμινειν, του παυειν μεν της εξω ενεργειας, προς δε την εισω επιστρεφειν. το δε επι γης τιθεναι του αναμνησκειν όπως αν τοις ὅλοις ἡ ψυχη συναφθει. το δε λουειν, το αποκαθαιρειν της γενεσεως. το δε μυριζειν, το αποσπαν μεν του βορβορου της ὕλης, την δε θειαν επιπνοίαν προκαλεισθαι. το δε κειν, το περιαγειν εις το ανω, και το αμεριστον. το δε εντιθεναι τη γη το συναπτειν τοις νοητοις.

THE END OF THE PHÆDO.

THE

THE GORGIAS:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE PRINCIPLES WHICH LEAD TO POLITICAL FELICITY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE GORGIAS.

IT is necessary in the first place, says Olympiodorus¹, to investigate the dramatic apparatus of the dialogue; in the second place, its scope; in the third place, the division of it; in the fourth place, the persons in it, and the analogy of the persons; and in the fifth place, (that which is investigated by many, though it does not deserve to be discussed, and was not doubted by men of greater antiquity,) on what account Plato introduces Gorgias here, who was very far from being contemporary with Socrates.

The dramatic apparatus then is as follows: Gorgias, the Leontine, came from the Leontines in Sicily, as an ambassador to the Athenians, respecting a confederation, and the war against the Syracusians. He had also with him Polus, who delighted in rhetoric; and he dwelt in the house of Callicles, the public orator of the Athenians. This Callicles, too, was delighted with skilful rhetoricians, but made pleasure the end of life, and deceived the Athenians, always addressing them in the language of Demosthenes, "What do you wish? What shall I write? In what can I gratify you?" Gorgias, therefore, displayed his art, and so captivated the Athenian people, that they called the days in which he exhibited *festivals*, and his periods *lamps*. Whence Socrates, perceiving the people thus deceived, and being able to extend good to all the youth, formed the design of saving the souls both of the Athenians and of Gorgias himself. Taking, therefore, with him Chærepho the philosopher, who is mentioned by Aristophanes, they went to the house of Callicles, and there their conferences and investigations of theorems took place.

¹ In his MS. Scholia on this Dialogue.

But he went with Chærepho, and did not go alone, that he might show how scientific men conducted themselves and discoursed. And thus much for the apparatus of the dialogue.

With respect to its scope, it has appeared to be different to different persons. For some say that the design of Plato was to discourse concerning rhetoric; and they inscribe it "Gorgias, or concerning Rhetoric;" but improperly: for they characterize the whole from a part. Others again say, that the dialogue is concerning justice and injustice; showing that the just are happy, and the unjust unfortunate and miserable. Likewise, that by how much the more unjust a man is, by so much the more is he miserable; that in proportion as his injustice is extended by time, in such proportion is he more miserable; and that if it were immortal, he would be most miserable. These too receive the scope of the dialogue from a part, viz. from the arguments against Polus. Others say that its scope is to speak concerning the demiurgus. But these also collect the scope from a part; because in the fable in the latter part of this dialogue the demiurgus is mentioned. These, however, speak absurdly, and foreign from the purpose. We say, therefore, that its scope is *to discourse concerning the principles which conduct us to political felicity.*

Since, then, we have mentioned principles and a polity, let us speak concerning principles universally, and concerning political felicity, and also what the principles are of the political science. The principles, therefore, of every thing are six. *Matter*, as with a carpenter wood. *Form*, the writing table, or something of this kind. *That which makes*, as the carpenter himself. *The paradigm*, that to which directing his phantasy, he made the table. *The instrument*, the saw perhaps, or the axe. And *the end*, that on account of which it was made. The multitude, therefore, and rhetoricians, not looking to truth, say that *the matter* of the political science is the body which is preserved; *the form*, luxury; *the producing cause*, rhetoric; *the paradigm*, a tyranny; *the instrument*, persuasion; and *the end*, pleasure. And such are their assertions. We however say that the *matter* is soul, and this not the rational, but that which consists of three¹ parts: for it imitates a polity. And as in cities there are governors, foldiers, and mercenaries; so, in us,

¹ i. e. Of reason, anger, and desire.

reason is analogous to the governor; anger to the soldier, subsisting as a medium, and being obedient to reason, but commanding and ranking the mercenaries, that is desire. The *matter*, therefore, is the soul considered as divided into three parts. For the political character wishes to be angry and to desire, with respect to such things as are proper, and when it is proper. Just as the lowest string of a musical instrument accords with the highest, and emits the same sound with it, though more acute. For thus desire is conjoined with reason. But *the form* is justice and temperance. *The producing cause* is a philosophic life. But *the paradigm* is the world. For the political philosopher arranges all things in imitation of the universe, which is replete with excellent order. For this universe is *order* (κόσμος) according to Plato, and not disorder (ἀκόσμη). Manners and discipline are *the instrument*. And *the end* is good. It must, however, be observed, that good is twofold, one of which pertains to us in the present life, but the other we possess hereafter¹. *Political good*, therefore, belongs to us in the present, but *theoretic good* will be our portion in another life. To Gorgias, therefore, the discourse is about the *producing cause*; to Polus, about the *formal*; and to Callicles, about the *final*. Nor is it wonderful if all appear to be in all. For in the producing cause the rest are found, and in the others all: for there is a certain communion among them, and they pervade through each other. But they derive their order from that which abounds.

Hence, therefore, the division of the dialogue becomes apparent. For it is divided into three parts: into the discourse with Gorgias; into that with Polus; and into that with Callicles. It is necessary also to observe, that justice and temperance are peculiarly said to be the form of the political science. For it is necessary to know that all the virtues contribute to political felicity, but especially these two. Hence Plato always makes mention of these, as being neglected by men. For they wish to know the other two, though not perfectly, yet fictitiously, and under a false appellation. Hence they say, Such a one is a prudent man; he knows how to enrich himself. And in a similar manner with respect to fortitude; but they neglect the other two. There is, however, occasion for these, since they proceed through all

¹ Though a few are able to exercise the *theoretic* as well as the *political* virtues in the present life, yet we can only possess the good of the former in perfection hereafter.—For an accurate account of these virtues, see the Notes on the Phædo.

the parts of the soul. For as he who in the city performs his proper work, and gives to every man that which is his due, is said to be just; in like manner justice rules in the soul, when reason, anger, and desire, respectively perform the office accommodated to each. If this be the case, temperance then subsists in the soul, when each part does not desire that which is foreign to its nature.

In the next place, it is worth while to inquire into the number and analogy of the persons. Five persons, therefore, are introduced, viz. Socrates, Chærepho, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. Of these, Socrates is analogous to that which is intellectual and scientific; Chærepho to right opinion; Gorgias to distorted opinion; for he was not entirely vanquished by injustice, but was dubious whether he should be persuaded or not. But Polus is analogous to injustice, and to one who is alone ambitious; and Callicles is analogous to a swinish nature, and which is a lover of pleasure. Some, however, doubt on what account the orators are three, but the philosophers two; and why the number of the orators is indivisible¹, but that of the philosophers divisible. We say, however, that this is not true. For Socrates imitates the *monad*² looking to *the one*. And divinity (or *the one*) is simple, produced from nothing. Hence the hymn to him says, "From whom all things emerge into light; but thy subsistence alone is not on account of any thing³." Chærepho also imitates the monad, but that which is material and inseparable from matter; but Socrates the separate monad. And as subordinate do not proceed to better, or better to subordinate natures, without a medium, on this account Chærepho has a middle order; and consequently it is incumbent on him to transmit that which the extremes possess.

It now remains to inquire how Plato makes mention of Gorgias. I say, therefore, in the first place, that there is nothing absurd in a writer recording unknown men, and introducing them as discoursing with each other. And, in the second place, we say that Socrates and Gorgias were contemporaries. For Socrates lived in the third year of the 77th Olympiad: and Empedocles the Pythagorean, the preceptor of Gorgias, associated with him. To which we may add, that Gorgias wrote a treatise concerning Nature, not

¹ For three, being an odd number, is indivisible.

² The *monad* is the united subsistence of separated multitude; but *the one* is the summit of multitude.

³ Εξ ὧ πάντα πεφυνη· οὐ δ' οὐδενος οὐνεκα μόνος.

inelegant,

inelegant, in the 84th Olympiad ; so that this was twenty-eight or a few more years before Socrates. Besides, Plato, in the *Theætetus*, says that Socrates, when a very young man, met with Parmenides, when he was very much advanced in years, and found him to be a most profound man. But Parmenides was the preceptor of Empedocles, who was the preceptor of Gorgias. And Gorgias was very old : for, according to history, he died in the one-hundred-and-ninth year of his age. So that these two lived about the same time.

I shall only observe, in addition to what Olympiodorus has said, that Plato does not condemn all orators, but those only who study to persuade their hearers to embrace whatever they please, whether it be good or bad, false or true ; such as were Lysias the Theban, Tisias, and Gorgias. But, in the *Phædrus*, he prefers Pericles and Isocrates to all the other orators, because they combined eloquence with philosophy. He also adds, that a legitimate orator ought to understand the reasons of things, the laws of manners, the powers of words, and the different dispositions of men ; that he should know how to compose words adapted, as much as possible, to the genius of his hearers ; and that he should not be so anxious that what he says may be pleasing to men, as that it may be acceptable to Divinity.

THE GORGIAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CALLICLES,		CHÆREPHO,
SOCRATES,		GORGIAS,
And POLUS.		

CALLICLES.

IN this manner, Socrates, they say it is requisite to engage in war and contention.

SOC. But have we not, according to the proverb, come after the festival? and are we not late?

CAL. And, indeed, after a very elegant festival. For Gorgias, a little before, exhibited to us many and beautiful things.

SOC. But Chærepho, O Callicles, was the cause of our being so late: for he compelled us to waste our time in the forum.

CHÆR. It is, however, of no consequence, Socrates: for I can apply a remedy, as Gorgias is my friend, who either now, or at some future time, will, if you please, exhibit the same things to us.

CAL. But what, Chærepho, does Socrates desire to hear Gorgias?

CHÆR. We are certainly come hither for this very purpose.

CAL. Whenever, therefore, you please, come to me at my house: for Gorgias resides with me, and will exhibit to you whatever you desire.

SOC. You speak well, Callicles. But will he be willing to discourse with us now? For I wish to inquire of the man what the power of his art is, and what it is he professes and teaches. But the other things which you speak of, he may show us some other time.

CAL. There is nothing like asking ¹ him, Socrates : for this is one of the things which he exhibited. He, therefore, just now promised all that are in the house, that he would answer any question that might be asked him.

Soc. You certainly speak well. Ask him, therefore, Chærepho.

CHÆR. What must I ask him ?

Soc. What he is.

CHÆR. How do you say ?

¹ Rhetoric, says Olympiodorus, is twofold ; the one being art, and the other skill. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire, on what account skill is not art ? It is justly then observed in the Phædrus, that he who intends to discourse about any thing should first define, and afterwards teach : for he who does not do this must necessarily totally err. Thus, for instance, in investigating if the soul is immortal, we ought not immediately to show that it is immortal ; but, previous to this, we should make a division, and say that soul is not one thing, but many things. For there is both rational and irrational soul : and there is also a plantal soul,—whence likewise we say that plants live. We say, then, that the rational soul is both immortal and not immortal. It is not immortal, indeed, if we consider the immortal according to a subsistence perpetual and uniform ; but it is immortal both in its essence and energy.

Again, the definition of art is twofold. For art is a method proceeding in an orderly path in conjunction with phantasy. Olympiodorus adds in conjunction with phantasy, in order to distinguish it from nature. For nature also proceeds in an orderly way, but not with phantasy. Again, art is a system of conclusions, coexercised to a certain end, beneficial to some of the purposes of life. According to the first definition, therefore, rhetoric, falsely so denominated, may be called an art. For it proceeds in an orderly path ; in the first place, arranging the poem ; and afterwards the state or condition (*καταστάσις*), and what is consequent to this. But it is not an art according to the second definition, since this can only apply to true rhetoric, which assigns the causes of what it asserts. Indeed, not only rhetoric, falsely so called, is an art, according to the first definition, but also cookery, and the dressing of hair. For to cook is not the province of any casual person, but of one who possesses skill, and proceeds in a certain way. In like manner, the decoration of the hair has a knowledge of ointments, and knows how to adorn the hairs. The rhetoric, therefore, which knows not how to assign the cause of what it asserts, but proceeds to both fides, i. e. to the true and the false, is not an art. For art is that which has one good end. But true rhetoric, which subsists under the political character, is an art. For, as the rational physician knows how to cure an ophthalmus, so likewise the empiric. But the former, who also acts according to art, can assign the causes of what he does, which the empiric cannot. Again, if some one should ask in what art differs from science, since art also assigns causes, we reply, that science produces the knowledge of things whose subsistence is perpetual and uniform, but art the knowledge of things flowing. Shall we say, therefore, that the physiologist is not scientific who investigates things flowing and material ? By no means : for his investigation is not of things material, but he refers them to universals, and explores the hypothesis of universal physical natures. So that Plato reprobates false and not true rhetoric.

Soc.

SOC. Just as, if he should happen to be an artificer of shoes, he would answer you that he was a shoemaker. Or do you not understand what I say?

CHÆR. I do; and I will ask him. Tell me, O Gorgias, did Callicles here say true, that you promised to answer whatever should be asked you?

GORG. He spoke the truth, Chærepho: for I just now made this promise: and I say that no one has asked me any thing new for many years.

CHÆR. You will, therefore, answer easily, Gorgias.

GORG. We shall make trial of this, Chærepho.

POL. Do so, by Jupiter: but if you please, Chærepho, discourse with me: for Gorgias appears to me to be weary; as he has just now discussed many particulars.

CHÆR. But what, Polus, do you think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

POL. Of what consequence is 'it, if you are answered sufficiently?

CHÆR. It is of no consequence: but, since you are willing, answer me.

POL. Ask.

CHÆR. I ask you then, if Gorgias were knowing in that art¹ in which his brother Herodicus is skilled, by what name we might justly call him? Might we not call him the same as his brother?

POL. Entirely so.

CHÆR. Calling him, therefore, a physician, we should rightly denominate him?

POL. We should.

CHÆR. But if he were skilled in that art in which Aristopho, the son of Aglaophon, is skilled, or his brother, what should we then rightly call him?

¹ There are two kinds of rhetoric, says Olympiodorus; but of these the genera, and the ends, and the ways, are different. For the genus of true rhetoric is art; but, of the false, skill. Again, the end of the true is good; but, of the false, persuasion, whether the thing persuaded to be done, or not, be good or bad. And again, the way of the true is to know the powers of the soul; but, of the false, not to know them. *Dōctrinal* faith also is the way of the true; but *credible* that of the false. For the geometrician wishes to persuade, but in a demonstrative way, and not from credibility, as the rhetorician. As, therefore, the medicinal art announces health through different auxiliaries, so rhetorics proceed through different forms. As a knife, therefore, is not of itself either good or bad, but is beneficial, or the contrary, to him who uses it; so rhetoric is not of itself beautiful, but is beneficial to him who uses it.

POL.

POL. Evidently, a painter.

CHÆR. But now, since he is knowing in a certain art, what can we properly call him?

POL. O Chærepho! there are many arts in men which are from skill¹ skilfully discovered. For skill causes our life to proceed according to art; but unskilfulness according to fortune. Of each of these, different persons differently participate: but the best participate of the best; in the number of which is Gorgias here, who participates of the most beautiful of arts.

SOC. Polus, Gorgias appears to be very well furnished for discourse; but he does not fulfil his promise to Chærepho.

GORG. In what principally, Socrates?

SOC. He does not appear to me altogether to answer what he was asked.

GORG. But do you, if you please, ask him.

SOC. Not if you yourself would be willing to answer me; for this would be much more agreeable to me. For it is evident to me that Polus, from what he said, has applied himself more to what is called the rhetoric art than to the art of discourse.

POL. Why do you say so, Socrates?

SOC. Because, Polus, when Chærepho asked you in what art Gorgias was skilled, you praised indeed his art, as if any one had blamed it, but you did not say what the art itself is.

POL. Did I not answer, that it was the most beautiful of arts?

SOC. Very much so. But no one asked you concerning the quality of the art of Gorgias, but what it was, and what Gorgias ought to be called; in

¹ Experiment (*πειρα*), says Olympiodorus, differs from skill (*εμπειρια*). For skill is asserted of actions, but experiment of things artificial according to a part. And again, experiment is conversant with things partial, but skill with things more universal. Skill, therefore, does not produce art, if skill is of things subordinate; for, if it did, superior would be produced from inferior natures. But it may be said, Do we not arrive at skill from experiment, and at art from skill? We reply, that experiment, indeed, contributes to skill, and skill to art; but they are not producing causes. This, however, takes place from our possessing the gnostic reasons of things, and being excited by sensibles. As, therefore, he who makes the sparks which have for a long time been concealed in ashes apparent, is not said to have made light, but to have rendered it manifest; and in like manner, he who purifies the eye from an ophthalmia does not produce light, but contributes to the presence of it to the eye: so the reasons in us require that which may cause us to recollect. For we are analogous to a geometrician sleeping. So that skill is not effective.

the same manner as Chærepho proposed to you before, and you answered him beautifully, and with brevity. Now, therefore, inform me in the same manner, what the art of Gorgias is, and what we ought to call Gorgias. Or rather, do you, O Gorgias, tell us yourself what we ought to call you, as knowing in a certain art.

GORG. A person skilled in rhetoric.

SOC. Ought we, therefore, to call you a rhetorician?

GORG. And a good one, Socrates, if you wish to give me a name; which; as Homer says, I pray may be the case.

SOC. But I do wish.

GORG. Denominate me, therefore.

SOC. Shall we say too, that you are able to make others rhetoricians?

GORG. I profess this not only here, but elsewhere.

SOC. Are you willing therefore, Gorgias, we should proceed in the mode of discourse we just now adopted, viz. by question and answer, employing on some other occasion that prolixity of speech which Polus just now began to use? But do not deceive me in what you promised, but be willing to answer with brevity what is asked you.

GORG. There are, Socrates, certain answers which must necessarily be prolix: however, I will endeavour to answer you in the shortest manner possible. For this is one of the things which I profess, viz. that no one can say the same things in fewer words than myself.

SOC. I have occasion, Gorgias, for this brevity: and I request that you will now give me a specimen of it, reserving prolixity of speech for another time.

GORG. I will give you a specimen; and such a one that you will say you never heard a shorter discourse.

SOC. Come, then (for you say that you are knowing in the rhetorical art, and that you can make others rhetoricians), is not rhetoric conversant with a certain thing, in the same manner as the weaving art is employed about the making of garments?

GORG. It is.

SOC. And is not music, therefore, conversant with the production of melodies?

GORG. Yes.

SOC.

Soc. By Juno, Gorgias, I am delighted with your answers, because they are the shortest possible.

GORG. I entirely think, Socrates, that I shall give you satisfaction in this respect.

Soc. You speak well. But answer me in this manner respecting the rhetorical art, and inform me of what thing it is the science.

GORG. Of discourses.

Soc. Of what discourses, Gorgias? Is it of such discourses as those employ who show the sick by what mode of living they may become well?

GORG. It is not.

Soc. The rhetorical art, therefore, is not conversant with all discourses.

GORG. It certainly is not.

Soc. But yet it enables men to speak.

GORG. It does.

Soc. Does it impart the power of intellection in those things in which it imparts the ability of speaking?

GORG. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Does not, therefore, the medicinal art, of which we just now spoke, render us able to understand and speak about the maladies of the sick?

GORG. Necessarily so.

Soc. The medicinal art, therefore, as it appears, is conversant with discourses.

GORG. It is.

Soc. And is it not conversant with discourses about diseases?

GORG. Especially so.

Soc. The gymnastic art, therefore, is also conversant with discourses about the good and bad habit of bodies.

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. And, indeed, other arts, O Gorgias, will subsist in this manner. For each of them will be conversant with those discourses which are employed about that particular thing of which each is the art.

GORG. It appears so.

Soc. Why, therefore, do you not call other arts rhetorical, since they are conversant with discourses, and you call this very thing which is employed about discourses, rhetoric?

GORG. Because, Socrates, all the science of other arts is conversant, as I may say, with manual and such-like operations; but nothing belonging to the rhetorical art is manual, since all its action and authority subsist through discourses. On this account, I think that the rhetorical art is conversant with discourses, and I affirm that in this I speak rightly.

SOC. I understand what kind of an art you wish to call it; but perhaps I may comprehend it yet still more clearly. However, answer me. Have we not arts?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. I think that, with respect to all the arts, some are very much employed in operation, and stand very little in need of discourse; but others do not require it at all, but accomplish their design in silence; such as the arts of painting and statuary, and many others. You appear, therefore, to me to say that the rhetorical art is not conversant with such arts as these. Or do you not?

GORG. You apprehend my meaning very well, Socrates.

SOC. But there are other arts which accomplish the whole of their intention through discourse, and either require, as I may say, nothing of operation, or very little, such as the arithmetic, logistic, pættutic¹, and many other arts; some of which have discourses nearly equal to their operations; but with many the discourses surpass the operations: and, universally, all their action and authority subsist through discourses. You appear to me to say that rhetoric ranks among things of this last kind.

GORG. You speak the truth.

SOC. Yet I do not think you are willing to call rhetoric any one of these, though you said that the rhetorical art was that which possessed its authority through discourse. For some one disposed to be troublesome might ask, Do you therefore, Gorgias, say that the arithmetical is the rhetorical art? But I do not think that you call either the arithmetical, or the geometrical, the rhetorical art.

GORG. You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend me perfectly well.

SOC. Now, therefore, complete the answer to my question. For, since rhetoric is one of those arts which very much use discourse, and there are

¹ The art of chefs.

other arts of this kind, endeavour to tell us about what particular thing in discourse the authority of rhetoric is exercised. Just as if any one should ask me respecting the arts which I lately mentioned, O Socrates, what is the arithmetical art, I should say as you did just now, that it is one of the arts which possesses all its power through discourse. And if he should again ask me about what it is conversant, I should answer, About the knowledge of the even and the odd, viz. what the nature is of each. But if he should further ask me, What do you call the logistick art? I should answer, that this also is one of those arts which possess all their authority through discourse. And if he should ask me about what it is conversant, I should answer, like those who write decrees in the Senate-house, that the logistick in other respects subsists in the same manner as the arithmetical art (for each is employed about the even and the odd); but that it differs in this, that it considers the amount of the even and odd, both with respect to themselves and to each other. And if any one should ask me about what the discourses of astronomy are employed, in consequence of my saying that it ranked among those arts the whole of whose authority consists in discourse, I should say that they are employed about the lation of the stars, of the sun and the moon, viz. how they are related to each other with respect to swiftness.

GORG. And you would answer very properly, Socrates.

SOC. Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those arts which accomplish every thing, and derive all their authority through discourse. Is it not?

GORG. It is.

SOC. Tell me then, what that particular thing is, about which the discourses are conversant which rhetoric employs.

GORG. The greatest and the best, Socrates, of human concerns.

SOC. But, Gorgias, what you now say is ambiguous, and in no respect clear. For I think you have heard that convivial song, which is sung at banquets, in which the singers thus enumerate: that to be well is the best thing; but to be beautiful ranks in the second place; and, as the author of the song says, to be rich without fraud, in the third place¹.

GORG.

¹ These verses, according to the Greek Scholia of Ruhnkenius, are by some ascribed to Simonides, and by others to Epicharmus. But they form a part of one of those songs which were

GORG. I have heard it; but why do you say this?

SOC. Because there those artificers will immediately present themselves to you, who are celebrated by the author of this song; viz. the physician,

were sung at entertainments, and were called *σκολια*, *scolia*. They mostly consisted of short verses, and were sung by the few of the company that were best skilled in music. These *scolia* were chiefly used by the Athenians; yet they were not unknown in other parts of Greece, where several celebrated writers of *scolia* lived, such as Anacreon of Teos, Alcæus of Lesbos, Praxilla of Sicily, and others. Their arguments were of various kinds; some of them being ludicrous and satirical, others amorous, and many of them serious. Those of a serious nature sometimes contained a practical exhortation or sentence, such as that which is now cited by Plato. And sometimes they consisted of the praises and illustrious actions of great men.

But the following additional information on this subject, from the MS. Scholia of Olympiodorus on this dialogue, will I doubt not be gratefully received by all lovers of antiquity, as the whole of it is not to be found in any other writer.

Olympiodorus then, after observing that Plato admitted music in his republic, though not the popular, but that which adorns the soul, adds as follows: "The ancients especially used music in their banquets; since banquets excite the passions. A choir, therefore, was formed. And if they danced from the left hand to the right hand part, a thing of this kind was called *progreffion* (*προόδος*); but if to the left hand, *epode* (*επόδος*); and if to the middle, it was called *mesodos* (*μεσόδος*). Again, if, turning in a backward direction, they went to the right hand part, it was called *strophe* (*στροφή*); but if to the middle, *mesodos* (*μεσόδος*); and if to the more left hand parts, *antistrophe* (*αντιστροφή*). Of these also Stesichorus makes mention. But these things were symbolical: for they imitated the celestial motions. For the motion from the left to the right hand parts is western; but that from the right to the left, eastern. In like manner those that began to sing, and who moved to the middle, and ended the dance, obscurely signified by all this the earth, which is a certain *beginning*, as being the centre; a *middle*, through its position; and an *end*, as being the dregs of the universe. When, therefore, the music partially ceased, they used wine mixed with myrtle; and some one taking it, and singing, did not give it to the person next to him, but to the one opposite to him. Afterwards, he gave it to the first, and he again to the second, and the communication became *scolia*. And the part here is called *scolion*. Μαλιστα τοιουν εν τοις συμπουσις μουσικη εκεχρηντο· επειδη τα συμπουσια διατε ην εις παθος κηνησα· χορος ουν εγενετο· και ει μεν απο αριστερων επι το δεξιον μερος εφεροντο, εκαλειτο προδος το τοιουντον· ει δε επι το αριστερον εποδος· ει δε επι το μεσον, μεσodos, και παλιν, ει επι το οπισθεν στραφεις, επι το δεξιον μερος εσαν, στροφή εκαλειτο· ει δε επι το μεσον, μεσodos· ει δε επι το αριστερον αντιστροφή· τουτων μεν ουν και Στεσιχορος μεμνηται· συμβολικα δε ταυτα ησαν· επιμυνεται γαρ τας ουρανιους κηησεις· η μεν γαρ ατα των αριστερων εις τα δεξια δυτικη εστιν· η δε απο των δεξιων επι τα αριστερα ανατολικη· ωσαντως και οι αρχομενοι αδειν και μεσυντες και ληγοντες, την γην ηνιττοντο, η τις αρχη μεν εστιν ως κεντρον· μεση δε δια την θεσιν· τελευτη δε ως υποσταβη του παντος· επει τοιουνν εξελιμνην κατὰ μερος η μουσικη, μυρρινας εκεχρηντο. και ελαμβανε τις αυτην, και αδων ου παρειχετο μετ' αυτων, αλλα τη κατὰ ατικην αυτου· ειτα εκεινος τη πρωτη· και παλιν εκεινος τη δευτερη· και σκολια η μεταδοσις εγενετο· και ενταυθα το σκολιον μερος ειρηται.

Information similar to the above may be found in the Greek Scholia on Hephæstion, but by no means so complete.

the

the master of gymnastic, and the collector of wealth. And, in the first place, the physician will say: Gorgias, O Socrates, deceives you. For his art is not employed about that which procures the greatest good to men, but this is the province of my art. If, therefore, I should ask him, What are you who assert these things? he would perhaps say that he is a physician. What then do you say? Or is the employment of your art the greatest good? How is it possible, perhaps he will say, Socrates, it should not, since the work of my art is health? For what can be a greater good to men than health? But if after this the master of gymnastic should say, I should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could show you that there is greater good in his art than I can evince there is in mine, I should again say to him, And what are you, O man? and what is your work? he would say, I am a master of gymnastic, and my employment consists in rendering the bodies of men beautiful and strong. But after the master of gymnastic, the collector of wealth would say, despising all others, as it appears to me, Consider, Socrates, whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or any other person? I should therefore say to him, What then, are you the artificer of this good? He would say that he is. And what are you? A collector of money. What then? Do you think that riches are the greatest good to men? Undoubtedly, he will say. To this we shall reply, Gorgias here contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is evident, therefore, that after this he will say, And what is this good? Let Gorgias answer. Think then, Gorgias, that you are thus interrogated by them and me, and answer, What is this, which you say is the greatest good to men, and of which you are the artificer?

GORG. That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to rule over others in their own city.

Soc. What then do you say this is?

GORG. The ability of persuading by words in a court of justice judges, in the senate-house senators, and in a public assembly the hearers, and in every other convention of a political nature. Likewise through this art you will make the physician and the master of gymnastic your slaves. And as to the collector of money, it will appear that he exercises his employment, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak, and persuade the multitude.

Soc.

Soc. Now you appear to me, Gorgias, very nearly to evince what kind of an art rhetoric is in your opinion : and if I understand you, you say that the rhetorical art is the artificer of persuasion, and that the whole of its employment and its very summit terminate in this. Or are you able to say any thing further respecting rhetoric, than that it is able to cause persuasion in the souls of the hearers ?

GORG. I have nothing further to say, Socrates ; but you appear to me to have sufficiently defined it. For this is its summit.

Soc. But hear, Gorgias. For I well know, as I persuade myself, that if ever any one, discoursing with another, wished to know that about which he discoursed, this is my case. And I think that you are likewise affected in the same manner.

GORG. But to what purpose is all this, Socrates ?

Soc. I will now tell you. I very clearly perceive that I do not know what the rhetorical persuasion is which you speak of, or with what particulars it is conversant : and though I conjecture what I think you say, and about what you speak, yet I do not the less cease to ask you, what you assert rhetorical persuasion to be, and about what it is employed. Though I, therefore, suspect that for the sake of which it subsists, yet I do not ask on your account, but for the sake of discourse, that it may proceed in such a manner as to render apparent in the highest degree the subject of the present discussion. For consider whether I appear to interrogate you justly : just as, if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis, and you should answer me that he paints animals,—might I not justly inquire of you, what are the animals which he paints, and how he paints them ?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. And would not my inquiry be made on this account, because there are many other painters who paint many other animals ?

GORG. It would.

Soc. But if there were no one besides Zeuxis that painted animals, you would have answered properly.

GORG. Undoubtedly.

Soc. This being the case, then, inform me respecting rhetoric, whether it appears to you that the rhetorical art alone produces persuasion, or whether
this

this is effected by other arts? But my meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing persuade that which he teaches, or not?

GORG. He does persuade, Socrates, and the most of all things.

Soc. Again, if we should speak respecting the same arts as we did just now, does not the arithmetical art teach us such things as pertain to number; and does not an arithmetician do the same?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. Does he not, therefore, also persuade?

GORG. He does.

Soc. The arithmetical art, therefore, is the artificer of persuasion.

GORG. It appears so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask us what persuasions it produces, and about what, we should reply, that it produces preceptive persuasions about the quantity of the even and the odd. And in like manner we might show, that the other arts which we just now mentioned are effective of persuasions, and what these persuasions are, and about what they are employed. Or might we not?

GORG. We might.

Soc. The rhetorical art, therefore, is not alone effective of persuasion.

GORG. True.

Soc. Since, therefore, it does not alone effect this, but likewise other arts accomplish the same thing, we may justly after this make the same inquiry concerning the rhetorical art as we did about the painter; viz. what kind of persuasion rhetoric produces, and about what its persuasion is employed. Or does it not appear to you to be just to make such inquiry?

GORG. It does.

Soc. Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.

GORG. I say, therefore, Socrates, that rhetoric is the cause of the persuasion which is produced in courts of justice, and in other public associations, as I just now said; and likewise that this persuasion is employed about things just and unjust.

Soc. And I likewise did suspect, Gorgias, that you would give this answer respecting rhetorical persuasion. But do not wonder if a little after this I shall ask you a thing of such a kind as indeed appears to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat. For, as I before observed, I ask not

for your sake, but that the discourse may be brought to a conclusion in an orderly manner, that we may not accustom ourselves by conjecture to snatch from each other what is said. But do you finish your hypothesis in such a manner as is most agreeable to you.

GORG. You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.

Soc. Come then, let us also consider this. Do you say that to learn is any thing?

GORG. I do.

Soc. Again, do you say that to believe is any thing?

GORG. I do.

Soc. Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to believe are the same, and likewise that discipline and faith are the same, or that they differ from each other?

GORG. I think, Socrates, that they differ from each other.

Soc. And you think well: but you may know that you do so from hence. For if any one should ask you, Are there such things, Gorgias, as false and true belief? you would, I think, say there are.

GORG. I should.

Soc. But what, is there such a thing as true and false science?

GORG. There is not.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, that true and false science are not the same.

GORG. True.

Soc. But those that learn, and those that believe, are persuaded.

GORG. They are.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we should establish two species of persuasion, one of which produces faith without knowledge, but the other science?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. Whether, therefore, does the rhetorical art produce persuasion in courts of justice, and other numerous assemblies, respecting things just and unjust? And is it that persuasion from which faith without knowledge is produced, or that from which knowledge arises?

GORG. It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which faith is produced.

Soc. The rhetorical art, therefore, as it seems, is the artificer of the persuasion

persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.

GORG. It is so.

SOC. A rhetorician, therefore, does not teach courts of justice, and other numerous assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only procures belief concerning these. For he, doubtless, is not able to teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.

GORG. He, doubtless, is not.

SOC. But come, let us see what we should say concerning the rhetorical art. For I, indeed, as yet, am not able to understand what I say. When an assembly, then, is held in a city, respecting the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artists, does the rhetorician then do any thing else than refrain from giving his advice? For it is evident that, in each election, he who is the most consummate artist ought to be chosen. Nor in consultations respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, will any other advice be attended to but that of architects. Nor, again, in the election of commanders, or any military order, in times of war, or in deliberations respecting the capture of certain places, will rhetoricians be consulted, but those that are skilled in military affairs. Or how do you say, Gorgias, respecting things of this kind? For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is very proper to inquire of you about the things pertaining to your art. And believe that I shall benefit you by acting in this manner. For, perhaps, some one who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple: and I nearly perceive a collected multitude who, perhaps, are ashamed to interrogate you. These, therefore, being interrogated by me, think that you also are asked by them, What would be the consequence, Gorgias, if we should associate with you? About what particulars shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just alone and the unjust; or respecting those things which Socrates just now mentioned? Endeavour, therefore, to answer them.

GORG. But I will endeavour, Socrates, clearly to unfold to you all the power of the rhetorical art. For you have beautifully led the way. For you doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were partly the consequence of the advice of Themis-

toeles, and partly of Pericles, but were not built from the advice of artificers.

SOC. These things are said, Gorgias, respecting Themistocles: but I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall.

GORG. And when an election is made respecting the particulars of which you speak, you see, Socrates, that rhetoricians are the persons that give advice, and whose opinion respecting these things vanquishes.

SOC. Wondering, therefore, that this is the case, Gorgias, I some time ago asked you, what the power of the rhetorical art is. For, while I consider it in this manner, it appears to me to be something divine with respect to its magnitude.

GORG. If you knew all, Socrates, you would find, as I may say, that it comprehends under itself all powers. But of this I will give you a great example. For I have often, with my brother, and other physicians, visited certain sick persons, who were unwilling either to drink the medicine, or suffer themselves to be cut or burnt by the physician, in consequence of the inability of the physician to persuade them; but these I have persuaded by no other art than the rhetorical. I say further, that if a rhetorician and a physician should in any city verbally contend with each other in a place of disputation, or any other assembly, which ought to be chosen in preference, a rhetorician or a physician, the decision would by no means be given in favour of the physician, but of the rhetorician, if he was willing to be chosen. And if the rhetorician should contend with any other artist, he would persuade his hearers that he ought to be chosen in preference to any other. For there is not any thing about which the rhetorician will not speak more persuasively to the multitude than any other artist. Such, therefore, and so great is the power of this art. Indeed, Socrates, the rhetorical art ought to be used like every other contest. For in other contests it is not proper for any one to strike, pierce, and slay his friends, because he has learned to contend in boxing, in the pancratiun, and with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies. Nor, by Jupiter, if some one going to the palæstra, whose body is in a flourishing condition, and becoming a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father and mother, or any other of his kindred or friends, it would not on this account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the masters of gymnastics,

gymnastics, and those who instruct men to fight with arms. For they impart these arts to their pupils, in order that they may use them justly against enemies, and those that injure others, defending themselves, but not offering violence to others. But such a one, as I have just mentioned, acting perversely, does not rightly employ his strength and art. The teachers, therefore, are not base characters, nor is art to be blamed, nor is it to be considered as on this account base: but I think those are to be considered so who do not use these arts properly. The same may be said of the rhetorical art. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and about every thing; so that, in short, he can persuade the multitude respecting whatever he pleases more than any other: but yet physicians ought not to suffer in our opinion, nor other artificers, because this can be done by rhetoricians. But the rhetorical art, as well as that pertaining to contest, is to be used justly. In my opinion, however, if any one becoming a rhetorician acts unjustly through this power and art, it is not proper to hate and expel from cities the teacher of rhetoric; for he imparts the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other applies it to contrary purposes. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not use rhetoric properly, but not him by whom it is taught.

Soc. I think, Gorgias, that you are skilled in a multitude of arguments, and that you have perceived this in them, that it is not easy for men to dissolve their conference respecting things of which they endeavour to discourse, by mutually defining, learning from others, and teaching themselves: but that, if they contend about any thing, and the one says that the other does not speak with rectitude or clearness, they are indignant, and think it is said through envy of themselves, and through a desire of victory, and not in consequence of exploring the thing proposed in the disputation: and that some, indeed, depart in a shameful manner, after they have reviled others, and spoken and heard such things about themselves as cause those that are present to be indignant, that they have deigned to become auditors of such men as these. But on what account do I assert these things? Because you now appear to me to speak not altogether conformably to what you first said respecting the rhetorical art. I am afraid, therefore, to confute you, lest you should think that I do not speak with an ardent desire that the thing itself may

may become manifest, but that my discourse is directed to you. If, therefore, you are such a man as I am, I shall willingly interrogate you; but if not, I shall cease my interrogations. But among what kind of men do I rank? Among those who are willingly confuted, if they do not speak the truth, and who willingly confute others when they assert what is false; and who are not less pleased when they are confuted than when they confute. For I consider the former to be as much a greater good than the latter, as for a man to liberate himself from the greatest evil rather than another. For I do not think that any evil happens to men of such a magnitude as false opinion respecting the things which are the subject of our present discourse. If, therefore, you say that you are a man of this kind, let us converse; but if it appears to you that we ought to desist, let us bid farewell to our discussion, and dissolve the discourse.

GORG. But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you have mentioned. Perhaps, however, it is proper to attend to those that are present. For, some time since, before I came to you, I evinced many things to the persons now present: and now, perhaps, if we discourse, we shall extend our discussion to a great length. Some attention, therefore, ought to be paid to the persons present, lest we should detain any of them, when at the same time they wish to do something else.

CHÆR. Do but attend, Gorgias and Socrates, to the clamour of these men, who wish to hear if you say any thing. As to myself, therefore, I am not so engaged, that, leaving these and the former discourses, I can do any thing better.

CAL. By the Gods, Chærepho, I also have been present at many conferences; but I do not know that I was ever so delighted as with the present disputation: so that you will gratify me, should you be even willing to discourse the whole day.

SOC. But indeed, Callicles, nothing prevents, with respect to myself, if Gorgias is willing.

GORG. After this, Socrates, it would be shameful that I should not be willing, especially as I have announced that any one might ask what he pleased. But, if it is agreeable to these men, discourse, and ask any question you please.

SOC. Hear then, Gorgias, the particulars which I wondered at in the discourse

course which you just now made. For, perhaps, what you said is right, and I did not rightly apprehend you. Did you not say that you could make any one a rhetorician, who was willing to be instructed by you?

GORG. I did.

Soc. And, therefore, that you could enable him to speak in a persuasive manner about every thing to the multitude, not by teaching but persuading?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. You say, therefore, that a rhetorician is more capable of persuading with respect to what pertains to the health of the body, than a physician.

GORG. I did say that this was the case in a crowd.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that which takes place in a crowd the same as that which takes place among the ignorant? For, doubtless, among those endued with knowledge, the rhetorician will not be more capable of persuading than the physician.

GORG. You speak the truth.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, follow, that if the rhetorician is more capable of persuading than the physician, he will be more capable of persuading than one endued with knowledge?

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. And this, not being a physician?

GORG. Yes.

Soc. But he who is not a physician must, doubtless, be ignorant of those things in which a physician is skilled.

GORG. It is evident.

Soc. He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable of persuading among the ignorant than he who is endued with knowledge, since a rhetorician is more capable of persuading than a physician. Does this happen to be the case, or any thing else?

GORG. In this instance this happens to be the case.

Soc. Can the same thing, therefore, be said respecting a rhetorician and the rhetorical art, in all the other arts? I mean, that the rhetorical art has no occasion to know how things themselves are circumstanced, but that it discovers a certain device of persuasion, so as that a rhetorician may appear to the ignorant to know more than those endued with knowledge.

GORG. Is there not great facility in this, Socrates, that a man who has not
learned

learned the other arts, but has learned this one, may become in no respect inferior to artificers?

Soc. Whether, from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior, or not, to others, we will shortly consider, if it contributes any thing to our disputation. But let us now first of all consider this: Whether a rhetorician is affected in the same manner respecting the just and the unjust, the base and the becoming, good and evil, as respecting that which pertains to health, and other things of which there are other arts: I mean, that he does not know what is good, or what is evil, what is becoming, or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust; but is able to devise persuasion respecting them, so as among the ignorant to appear more knowing than one endued with knowledge, at the same time that he is himself ignorant? Or is it necessary that he should know these? and is it requisite that he who is about to learn the rhetorical art should, when he comes to you, previously possess a knowledge of these? But if he does not, shall we say that you, who are a teacher of rhetoric, will not instruct such a one in any of these things (for it is not your province), but that you will cause him to appear knowing in such particulars among the multitude, at the same time that he is ignorant of them, and to seem to be a good man when he is not good? Or, in short, are you not able to teach him the rhetorical art, unless he previously knows the truth respecting these things? Or how do such-like particulars take place, Gorgias? And, by Jupiter, as you just now said, unfold to me what the power is of the rhetorical art.

GORG. But I think, Socrates, that if such a one should happen to be ignorant, he would learn these things from me.

Soc. Granted: for you speak well. And if you make any one a rhetorician, it is necessary that he should know things just and unjust, either before he is under your tuition, or afterwards, in consequence of being instructed by you.

GORG. Entirely so.

Soc. What then? Is he who learns things pertaining to building, tectonic, or not?

GORG. He is.

Soc. And is he, therefore, who learns things pertaining to music, a musician?

GORG.

GORG. Yes.

SOC. And he who learns things pertaining to medicine, a physician? And so, according to the same reasoning, in other things, he who learns any thing is such as science renders its votaries.

GORG. Entirely so.

SOC. Does it not, therefore, follow from this reasoning, that he who learns just things is just?

GORG. Entirely so.

SOC. But does not he who is just act justly?

GORG. Yes.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, necessary that a rhetorician should be just, and that he who is just should be willing to act justly?

GORG. It appears so.

SOC. A just man, therefore, will never be willing to act unjustly.

GORG. It is necessary.

SOC. But, from what has been said, it is necessary that a rhetorician should be just.

GORG. It is.

SOC. A rhetorician, therefore, will never be willing to act unjustly.

GORG. It does not appear that he will.

SOC. Do you remember, therefore, that you said a little before, that the preceptors of youth ought not to be called to account, nor expelled from cities, if a pugilist does not use in a becoming manner the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And that, in a similar manner, if a rhetorician unjustly uses the rhetoric art, the preceptor is not to be called to account, nor expelled from the city, but he who acts unjustly, and does not properly use the rhetorical art? Were these things said, or not?

GORG. They were said.

SOC. But now it appears that this very same rhetorician will never act unjustly. Or does it not?

GORG. It appears so.

SOC. And in the former part of our discourse, Gorgias, it was said that the rhetorical art is conversant with discourses, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was not this asserted?

GORG. It was.

Soc. I, therefore, in consequence of your asserting these things, thought that the rhetorical art could never be an unjust thing, as it always discourses concerning justice. But, since a little after you said that a rhetorician might use the rhetorical art unjustly, I wondered at the assertion; and thinking that what was said did not accord with itself, I said, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as it is in my opinion, then it would be worth while to discourse, but if not, we should bid farewell to discussion. Afterwards, however, while we were considering, you seem to have again confessed that it was impossible a rhetorician could use the rhetorical art unjustly, and be willing to do an injury. To determine, therefore, sufficiently, how these things take place, requires, by the dog, Gorgias, no brief discussion.

POL. But what, Socrates? Do you really form such an opinion of the rhetorical art as you now say? Or do you think Gorgias is ashamed that he has not acknowledged to you, that a rhetorician knows things just, beautiful, and good, and that, if any one goes to him who is ignorant of these things, he will instruct him in them? From this confession, something contrary will, perhaps, take place in the discourse. This, however, is what you love, since you lead interrogations to things of this kind. But what man do you think will deny that he knows things just, and teaches them to others? To bring the discourse, therefore, to things of this kind, is very rustic.

Soc. O most excellent Polus! we designedly procure associates and children, that when, through being advanced in years, we fall into error, you that are younger being present may correct our life both in words and deeds. And now, if I and Gorgias err in any respect in what we have asserted, do you who are present correct us: for it is just so to do. And I wish you would retract any thing that has been granted, if it appears to you that it has not been properly admitted, if you only take care of one thing for me.

POL. What is that?

Soc. That you would avoid in future prolixity of discourse, which at first you attempted to use.

POL. But what, may I not be permitted to speak as much as I please?

Soc. O best of men, you would be used very unworthily, if, having come to Athens, where liberty of speech is permitted more than in any part of Greece, you alone should here be deprived of this liberty. But, on the contrary, consider, if you should speak in a prolix manner, and be unwilling to

to answer what is asked you, should not I be used unworthily, if it is not permitted me to depart, and not hear you? But if you are at all concerned for what has been said, and wish to correct it (as you just now said), then, retracting whatever you think fit, and alternately asking and being asked, confute in the same manner as I and Gorgias. For, indeed, you say that you know the same things as Gorgias. Or do you not?

POL. I do.

SOC. Will not you, therefore, also exhort any one to ask you whatever he pleases, as knowing how to answer him?

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. And now you may do whichever of these you please, viz. either ask or answer.

POL. I shall do so. And do you answer me, Socrates. Since Gorgias appears to you to doubt respecting the rhetorical art, what do you say he is?

SOC. Do you ask me what his art is?

POL. I do.

SOC. It does not appear to me to be any art, that I may speak the truth to you.

POL. But what does the rhetorical art appear to you to be?

SOC. A thing which you say produces art, in the book which I just now read.

POL. What do you call this thing?

SOC. A certain skill.

POL. Does the rhetorical art, therefore, appear to you to be skill?

SOC. To me it does, unless you say otherwise.

POL. But of what is it the skill?

SOC. Of procuring a certain grace and pleasure.

POL. Does not the rhetorical art, therefore, appear to you to be a beautiful thing, since it is capable of imparting delight to mankind?

SOC. But what, O Polus? Have you already heard me saying what the rhetorical art is, that you after this ask me, if it does not appear to me to be a beautiful thing?

POL. Have I not heard you say that it is a certain skill?

SOC. Are you willing, therefore, since you honour gratification, to gratify me in a trifling thing?

POL. I am.

SOC. Ask me then now, whether cooking appears to me to be an art ?

POL. I ask you then, what kind of an art is cooking ?

SOC. It is no art, Polus.

POL. But tell me what it is.

SOC. I say, then, it is a certain skill.

POL. Inform me what skill.

SOC. I say it is the skill of procuring grace and pleasure, Polus.

POL. But is cooking the same as rhetoric ?

SOC. By no means, but a part of the same study.

POL. Of what study are you speaking ?

SOC. Left it should be too rustic to speak the truth, I am averse to speak, on account of Gorgias, lest he should think that I deride his pursuit. But I do not know whether this is that rhetoric which Gorgias studies. For just now, it was by no means apparent to us, from the disputation, what is his opinion. But that which I call rhetoric, is a part of a certain thing which does not rank among things becoming.

GORG. Tell me, Socrates, what this thing is ; and do not be in the least ashamed because I am present.

SOC. This thing therefore, Gorgias, appears to me to be a certain study, not of a technical nature, but belonging to a soul which sagaciously conjectures, which is virile, and endued with a natural skill of conversing with men. But I call the summit of it adulation. It likewise appears to me that there are many other parts of this study, and that one of these is cookery ; which, indeed, appears to be an art, but, according to my doctrine, is not an art, but skill and exercise. I likewise call rhetoric a part of this study, together with the sophistic artifice, and that which pertains to the allurements of outward form. And these four parts belong to four things. If, therefore, Polus wishes to inquire, let him ; for he has not yet heard what part of adulation I assert rhetoric to be : but he does not perceive that I have not yet answered, and asks me if I do not think that rhetoric is beautiful. But I shall not answer him, whether I think rhetoric is beautiful or base, till I have first of all answered what rhetoric is. For it will not be just, Polus, to do otherwise. But if you wish to hear, ask me what part of adulation I assert rhetoric to be.

POL.

POL. I ask, then, and do you answer me what part it is.

SOC. Will you, therefore, understand when I have answered? For rhetoric, according to my doctrine, is an image of the politic part.

POL. What then? Do you say that it is something beautiful, or that it is something base?

SOC. I say that it is something base: for I call things evil base; since it is requisite I should answer you, as now knowing what I assert.

GORG. By Jupiter, Socrates, but neither do I myself understand what you say.

SOC. It is likely, Gorgias: for I do not yet speak any thing clearly. But Polus here is a young man and acute.

GORG. However, dismiss him; and inform me how it is you say that rhetoric is an image of the politic part.

SOC. But I will endeavour to tell you what rhetoric appears to me to be. And if it is not what I assert it to be, let Polus here confute me. Do you not call body something, and likewise soul?

GORG. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, think that there is a certain good habit of each of these?

GORG. I do.

SOC. But what? Is this only a habit which appears to be good, but which is not in reality? As, for instance, many appear to have their bodies in a good condition, when at the same time no one, except a physician, and some one skilled in gymnastics, can easily perceive that these are not in a good condition.

GORG. You speak the truth.

SOC. I say that a thing of this kind takes place both in body and soul, which causes both body and soul to appear to be in a good condition, when at the same time they are not so.

GORG. These things take place.

SOC. But come, I will explain to you in a still clearer manner, if I am able, what I say. As there are two things, I say there are two arts: and one of them, which pertains to the soul, I call politic; but the other, belonging to the body, I cannot in like manner distinguish by one appellation. But since the culture of the body is one, I call the two parts gymnastic and

GORG.

dicine. But in the politic art I establish legislation, as corresponding to gymnastic, and justice as reciprocating with medicine. These communicate with each other, as subsisting about the same thing, viz. medicine communicates with gymnastic, and justice with legislation; but at the same time they differ in a certain respect from each other. But since these are four, and always procure remedies, looking to that which is best, one part of them curing the body, and the other the soul, the adulatory power perceiving this, I do not say knowing, but conjecturing it, in consequence of giving to itself a fourfold distribution, and entering under each of the parts, it feigns itself to be that under which it enters. And it is not, indeed, in the least concerned for that which is best; but always, through that which is pleasant, hunts after folly, and deceives; so as to appear to be of great worth. Cookery, therefore, enters under medicine, and feigns that it knows the best aliment for the body. So that if a cook and a physician should contend with each other among boys, or among men as stupid as boys, which of them possessed the knowledge of good and bad aliment, the physician would die through hunger. This, therefore, I call adulation; and I say, O Polus, that a thing of this kind is base. For this I say to you, that it looks to the pleasant without regarding that which is best. But I do not call it an art, but skill, because it has no reason by which it can show what the nature is of the things which it introduces; so that it is unable to tell the cause of each. But I do not call that an art which is an irrational thing. If you are doubtful respecting these things, I am willing to give you a reason for them. The adulation, therefore, pertaining to cookery is, as I have said, placed under medicine; but, after the same manner, the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is placed under gymnastic: and this artifice is productive of evil, is deceitful, ignoble, and illiberal, deceiving by figures and colours, by smoothness and the senses; so as to cause those who attract to themselves foreign beauty, to neglect that which is properly their own, and which is procured through gymnastic. That I may not, therefore, be prolix, I wish to tell you, after the manner of geometricians (for perhaps you can now follow me), that the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnastic as cookery to medicine. Or rather thus, that the artifice respecting the allurements of outward form is to gymnastic as the sophistic to the legislative power: and that cookery is to medicine as rhetoric to justice.

justice. As I have said, they are thus distinguished by nature : but as sophists and rhetoricians are proximate to each other, they are mingled in the same, and about the same things, and do not possess any thing by which they can benefit themselves, or be benefited by other men. For, if the soul did not preside over the body, but the body over itself, and cookery and medicine were not considered and judged of by the soul, but the body itself judged, estimating things by its own gratifications; then, friend Polus, that doctrine of Anaxagoras would abundantly take place, (for you are skilled in these things,) viz. that all things would be mingled together in the same, things salubrious, medicinal, and pertaining to cookery, subsisting undistinguished from each other. You have heard, therefore, what I assert rhetoric to be, viz. that it is a thing reciprocating with cookery in the soul, as that in the body. Perhaps, therefore, I have acted absurdly, since, not permitting you to use prolixity of discourse, I myself have made a long oration. I deserve however to be pardoned : for, if I had spoken with brevity, you would not have understood me, nor have been able to make any use of my answer to you, but would have required an exposition. If, therefore, when you answer, I in my turn am not able to reply, do you also extend your discourse : but, if I can, suffer me to reply ; for it is just. And now, if you can make any use of this answer, do so.

POL. What then do you say ? Does rhetoric appear to you to be adulation ?

SOC. I said, indeed, that it was a part of adulation. But cannot you remember, Polus, though so young ? What then will you do when you become advanced in years ?

POL. Do, therefore, good rhetoricians appear to you to be considered in the same place as vile flatterers in cities ?

SOC. Do you propose this as a question, or as the beginning of a certain discourse ?

POL. As a question.

SOC. They do not then appear to me to be considered in the same place as vile flatterers in cities.

POL. How not to be considered ? Are they not able to accomplish the greatest things in cities ?

SOC.

SOC. They are not, if you allow that to be endued with power is good to him who is endued with it.

POL. But this indeed I do say.

SOC. Rhetoricians, therefore, appear to me to possess the least power of all men in cities.

POL. But what, do they not like tyrants slay, take away possessions, and banish from cities whomever they please?

SOC. By the dog, Polus, I am doubtful with respect to each of the things said by you, whether you assert these things yourself, and exhibit your own opinion, or interrogate me.

POL. But I interrogate you.

SOC. Be it so, my friend. But do you not ask me two things at once?

POL. How two things?

SOC. Did you not just now say, that rhetoricians like tyrants slew whomever they pleased, deprived them of their possessions, and expelled them from cities?

POL. I did.

SOC. I therefore say to you that these are two questions, and I shall give you an answer to both. For I say, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants possess the least power of all men, in cities, as I just now said. For, in short, they accomplish nothing which they wish to accomplish; and yet they do that which appears to them to be best.

POL. Is not this, therefore, to possess the power of accomplishing great things?

SOC. It is not, as says Polus.

POL. Do I say not? On the contrary, I say it is.

SOC. By Jupiter, not you. For you said that to be able to do great things is good to him who possesses this power.

POL. And I now say so.

SOC. Do you think, therefore, it is a good thing, if any one void of intellect does that which appears to him to be best? And do you call this the ability of accomplishing something great?

POL. Not I.

SOC. Will you not, therefore, evince that rhetoricians are endued with intellect,

intellect, and, confuting me, show that rhetoric is an art, and not adulation? For, if you do not confute me, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will not by so doing obtain any thing good. But power is, as you say, good; though, for a man to do without intellect whatever he pleases, you also have acknowledged to be evil. Or have you not?

POL. I have.

SOC. How then can rhetoricians or tyrants be able to accomplish any thing great in cities, unless Polus evinces, against Socrates, that they do whatever they please?

POL. Is it possible any one can speak so absurdly?

SOC. I do not say that they accomplish what they wish: but confute me if you can.

POL. Did you not just now acknowledge, that they accomplished things which appeared to them to be best?

SOC. And I now acknowledge this.

POL. Do they not, therefore, do that which they wish to do?

SOC. I say they do not.

POL. But do they do that which they think fit?

SOC. I say they do.

POL. You speak importunately and unnaturally.

SOC. Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may speak to you in your own way; but, if you are capable of interrogating me any further, evince in what it is I am deceived; but if not, do you yourself answer.

POL. But I am willing to answer, that I may also know what you say.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do men appear to you to wish this, which every individual accomplishes, or that for the sake of which they accomplish this which they accomplish? As for instance, whether do those who take medicines from a physician appear to you to wish this which they do, viz. to drink the medicine, and suffer pain; or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they take the medicine?

POL. They doubtless wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine.

SOC. Does not the like happen to navigators, and to those who are engaged in other employments, viz. that the object of their wishes is not that which

each of them does (for who would wish to fail, to encounter dangers, and to be entangled with a multiplicity of affairs?); but, in my opinion, the object of their wishes is that for the sake of which they venture on the sea, viz. to acquire riches. For they fail for the sake of wealth.

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. In like manner, with respect to all other things, he who does any thing for the sake of some particular thing does not wish this which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

POL. It is so.

SOC. Is there any thing, therefore, in the whole of existence, which is neither good nor evil? Or is there a medium between these, which is neither good nor evil?

POL. It is abundantly necessary, Socrates, that there should.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, say that wisdom and health, riches, and other things of this kind, are good, but the contraries of these evil?

POL. I do.

SOC. But do you say that things which are neither good nor evil are of such a kind, that they sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither; such as to sit, to run, to walk, and to fail; and again, such things as stones, wood, and other things of this kind? Are not these the things which you speak of? Or do you denominate other certain things neither good nor evil?

POL. I do not: but these are the things.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do men, when they act, accomplish these things which subsist as media, for the sake of things good, or things good for the sake of these media?

POL. Doubtless, the media for the sake of things good.

SOC. Pursuing good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it is better so to do; and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same good. Or is it not so?

POL. It is.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, when we slay, or banish or deprive any one of his possessions, think that it is better for us to do these things than not to do them?

POL.

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. Those, therefore, that do all these things do them for the sake of good.

POL. I say so.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, grant, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something, but that for the sake of which we do these things?

POL. We especially admit this.

SOC. We do not, therefore, simply wish to slay, exterminate, or deprive any one of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them, but by no means if they are noxious. For we desire good things, as you say, but not such as are neither good nor evil, nor yet such as are evil. Do I, therefore, Polus, appear to you to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?

POL. You speak the truth.

SOC. Does it not follow, therefore, if we assent to these things, that if any one slays, exterminates from a city, or takes away the possessions of another, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is worse,—does it not follow, that in so doing he acts in a manner which to him seems fit?

POL. Yes.

SOC. Does he, therefore, do the things which he wishes to do, if these things are evil? Why do you not answer?

POL. But he does not appear to me to do the things which he wishes.

SOC. Will, therefore, a man of this kind be able to accomplish great things in a city, if to be able to accomplish great things is something good, according to your confession?

POL. He will not.

SOC. I therefore said true, when I said that a man might do that in a city which seemed fit to him, and yet not be able to accomplish great things, nor do that which he wished to do.

POL. As if, Socrates, you would not admit, that it is possible for you to do what you please in a city, rather than that it is not possible, and that you would not be envious when you saw any one slaying or taking away the possessions of another, or confining in bonds whomever he pleased.

Soc. Do you speak justly or unjustly ?

Pol. Whichever of these he may do, is he not in each of these actions to be envied ?

Soc. Good words, I beseech you, Polus.

Pol. But why ?

Soc. Because it is not proper, either to envy those that are not to be envied, or the unhappy ; but they ought to be pitied.

Pol. But what ? Does this appear to you to be the case respecting the men of whom I speak ?

Soc. Undoubtedly.

Pol. Does he, therefore, who justly slays any one whom he thinks fit, appear to you to be miserable, and an object of pity ?

Soc. He does not to me, indeed ; nor does he appear to me to be an object of envy.

Pol. Did you not just now say that he was miserable ?

Soc. I said, my friend, that he was miserable who slew another unjustly, and that, besides this, he was to be pitied ; but that he who slew another justly was not to be envied.

Pol. He indeed who dies unjustly is an object of pity, and is miserable.

Soc. But less so, Polus, than he who slays another ; and less than he who dies justly.

Pol. How so, Socrates ?

Soc. Thus : because to do an injury is the greatest of evils.

Pol. But is this really the greatest of evils ? Is it not a greater evil to suffer an injury ?

Soc. By no means.

Pol. Would you, therefore, rather be injured than do an injury ?

Soc. I should rather indeed have no concern with either of these. But if it were necessary that I should either do an injury, or be injured, I should choose the latter in preference to the former.

Pol. Would you not, therefore, receive the power of a tyrant ?

Soc. I would not, if you say that to tyrannize is what I say it is.

Pol. But I say it is that which I just now mentioned, viz. for a man to

do in a city whatever he pleases; to slay or banish any one, and do every thing according to his own opinion.

Soc. O blessed man, attend to what I say. If in a crowded forum, taking a dagger under my arm, I should say to you, O Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now fallen to my lot: for, if it appears to me that any one of these men whom you see ought immediately to die, he dies; and if it appears to me that any one of them ought to lose his head, he is immediately beheaded; or if his garment should be torn asunder, it is immediately torn. Such mighty power do I possess in this city. If, therefore, in consequence of your not believing me, I should show you the dagger, perhaps on seeing it you would say: After this manner, Socrates, all men are capable of effecting great things, since thus armed you may burn any house that you please, all the docks and three-banked galleys of the Athenians, together with all their ships as well public as private. But this is not to possess the ability of effecting great things,—I mean, for a man to do whatever he pleases. Or does it appear to you that it is?

POL. It does not after this manner.

Soc. Can you, therefore, tell me why you blame a power of this kind?

POL. I can.

Soc. Tell me then.

POL. Because it is necessary that he who acts in this manner should be punished.

Soc. But is not the being punished an evil?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, O wonderful man, again appear to you, on the contrary, that to be able to accomplish great things is good, if acting in a useful manner follows him who does what he pleases? And this, as it appears, is to be able to effect great things: but the contrary to this is evil, and the ability of accomplishing small things. But let us also consider this. Have we not acknowledged that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of, viz. to slay, exterminate, and deprive men of their possessions, and sometimes not?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. This then, as it appears, is acknowledged both by you and me.

POL. It is.

Soc.

SOC. When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Inform me what boundary you establish.

POL. Answer yourself, Socrates, to this question.

SOC. I say therefore, Polus, if it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, that it is better when any one does these things justly, but worse when he does them unjustly.

POL. It is difficult to confute you, Socrates; but may not even a boy convince you that you do not speak the truth?

SOC. I shall give the boy, therefore, great thanks, and I shall be equally thankful to you if you can confute me, and liberate me from my nugacity. But be not weary in benefiting a man who is your friend, but confute me.

POL. But, Socrates, there is no occasion to confute you by ancient examples. For those things which happened lately, and even but yesterday, are sufficient to convince you, and to show that many unjust men are happy.

SOC. Who are these?

POL. Do you not see Archelaus here, the son of Perdiccas, governing Macedonia?

SOC. If I do not, at least I hear so.

POL. Does he, therefore, appear to you to be happy or miserable?

SOC. I do not know, Polus: for I have not yet associated with the man.

POL. What then? if you associated with him, would you know this? And would you not otherwise immediately know that he is happy?

SOC. I should not, by Jupiter.

POL. It is evident then, Socrates, you would say, that neither do you know that the great king¹ is happy.

SOC. And I should say the truth. For I do not know how he is affected with respect to discipline and justice.

POL. But what? Is all felicity placed in this?

SOC. As I say, it is, Polus. For I say that a worthy and good man and woman are happy; but such as are unjust and base, miserable.

POL. This Archelaus, therefore, according to your doctrine, is miserable.

SOC. If, my friend, he is unjust.

POL. But how is it possible he should not be unjust, to whom nothing of

¹ i. e. The king of Persia.

the government which he now possesses belongs? as he was born of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas; who according to justice was himself the slave of Alcetas; and, if he had been willing to act justly, would have served Alcetas in the capacity of a slave; and thus, according to your doctrine, would have been happy. But now he is become miserable in a wonderful degree, since he has committed the greatest injuries. For, in the first place, sending for his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which Perdiccas had taken from him, and entertaining and intoxicating both him, and his son Alexander, who was his uncle, and nearly his equal in age, he afterwards hurled them into a cart, and, causing them to be taken away by night, destroyed both of them by cutting their throats. And though he has committed these injuries, he is ignorant that he is become most miserable, and does not repent of his conduct. But, a little after, he was unwilling to nurture and restore the government to his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven years of age, and who had a just right to the government, though by so doing he would have been happy: but hurling the youth into a well, and there suffocating him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he fell into the well and died, through pursuing a goose. This man, therefore, as having acted the most unjustly of all in Macedonia, is the most miserable, and not the most blessed, of all the Macedonians. And, perhaps, every one of the Athenians, beginning from you, would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.

Soc. In the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you, because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, but to have neglected the art of discourse. And now, without relating any thing further, this is a discourse by which even a boy might convince me. And, as you think, I am now convicted, by this narration, of having said that he who acts unjustly is not happy. But whence, good man? For, indeed, I did not grant you any of the particulars which you mention.

POL. You are not willing to grant them. For the thing appears to you as I say.

Soc. O blessed man! For you endeavour to confute me in a rhetorical manner, like those who in courts of justice are thought to confute. For there some appear to confute others, when they procure many respectable witnesses of what they say; but he who opposes them procures one certain witness,

witness, or none at all. But this mode of confutation is of no worth with respect to truth. For sometimes false witness may be given against a man, by many men of great reputation. And now, respecting what you say, nearly all Athenians and strangers accord with you in these things. And if you were willing to procure witnesses against me to prove that I do not speak the truth, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and his brothers with him, would testify for you, by whom there are tripods placed in an orderly succession in the temple of Bacchus. Or, if you wish it, Aristocrates the son of Scellius, of whom there is that beautiful offering in the Pythian temple. Or again, if you wish it, the whole family of Pericles, or any other family, that you may think proper to choose out of this city, will testify for you. But I, who am but one, do not assent to you. For you do not force me, but, procuring many false witnesses against me, you endeavour to eject me from my possessions and the truth. But I, unless I can procure you being one, to testify the truth of what I say, shall think that I have not accomplished any thing worthy to be mentioned respecting the things which are the subject of our discourse. Nor shall I think that you have accomplished any thing, unless I being one, alone testify for you, and all those others are dismissed by you. This, therefore, is a certain mode of confutation, as you and many others think : but there is also another mode, which I on the contrary adopt. Comparing, therefore, these with each other, we will consider whether they differ in any respect from each other. For the subjects of our controversy are not altogether trifling ; but they are nearly something the knowledge of which is most beautiful, but not to know it most base. For the summit of these things is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who is not. As, for instance, in the first place, respecting that which is the subject of our present discourse, you think that a man can be blessed who acts unjustly and is unjust ; since you are of opinion that Archelaus is, indeed, unjust, but happy. For, unless you say to the contrary, we must consider you as thinking in this manner.

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. But I say that this is impossible. And this one thing is the subject of our controversy. Be it so then. But will he who acts unjustly be happy if he is justly punished ?

POL. In the smallest degree ; since he would thus be most miserable.

SOC.

Soc. If, therefore, he who acts unjustly happens not to be punished, according to your opinion he is happy.

POL. So I say.

Soc. But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly, and is unjust, is miserable. And, indeed, he is more miserable if, when acting unjustly, he is not justly punished; but he is less miserable if he is punished, and justice is inflicted on him both by Gods and men.

POL. You endeavour, Socrates, to assert wonderful things.

Soc. And I shall also endeavour, my associate, to make you say the same things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, therefore, the things about which we differ are these. But do you also consider. I have already said in some former part of our discourse, that to do an injury is worse than to be injured.

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. But you say that it is worse to be injured.

POL. I do.

Soc. And I say that those who do an injury are miserable; and I am confuted by you.

POL. You are so, by Jupiter.

Soc. As you think, Polus.

POL. And perhaps I think the truth.

Soc. But, on the contrary, you think that those who act unjustly are happy, if they escape punishment.

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. But I say that they are most miserable: and that those who suffer punishment for acting unjustly are less miserable. Are you willing to confute this also?

POL. But it is more difficult to confute this than that, Socrates.

Soc. By no means, Polus: but it is impossible that this should be the case. For that which is true can never be confuted.

POL. How do you say? If a man acting unjustly is detected in attempting to acquire absolute power by stratagem, and in consequence of being detected is put on the rack, is castrated, and has his eyes burnt; and after he has suffered many other mighty and all-various torments, sees his wife and children suffering the same, and at last is either crucified, or incruised

with pitch ; will he be more happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he obtains despotic power, and passes through life ruling in the city, doing whatever he pleases, and envied, and accounted happy, both by his citizens and strangers ? Do you say that these things cannot be confuted ?

SOC. You terrify, and do not confute us, generous Polus : but just now you testified for us. At the same time remind me of a small particular, whether you say that such a one endeavours to gain absolute power unjustly ?

POL. I do.

SOC. By no means, therefore, will either of these be more happy, neither he who has unjustly obtained the tyranny, nor he who is punished. For, of two that are miserable, one cannot be more happy than the other ; but he is the more miserable of the two who escapes punishment, and obtains the tyranny. Why do you laugh at this, Polus ? Is this another species of confutation, to laugh when any one asserts something, and not confute him ?

POL. Do you not think you are confuted, Socrates, when you say such things as no man would say ? For only ask any man if he would.

SOC. O Polus, I am not among the number of politicians. And last year, when I happened to be elected to the office of a senator, in consequence of my tribe possessing the chief authority, and it was requisite I should give sentence, I excited laughter, through not knowing how to give sentence. Do not, therefore, now order me to pass sentence on those who are present. But if you have no better modes of confutation than these (as I just now said), assign to me a part of the discourse, and make trial of that mode of confutation which I think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what I say, viz. him with whom I discourse ; but I bid farewell to the multitude. And I know how to decide with one person, but I do not discourse with the multitude. See, therefore, whether you are willing to give me my part in the argument, by answering to the interrogations. For I think that you and I, and other men, are of opinion, that to do an injury is worse than to be injured ; and not to suffer, than to suffer punishment.

POL. But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself nor any other man is of this opinion. For would you rather be injured than do an injury ?

SOC. Yes ; and so would you, and all other men.

POL. Very far from it : for neither I, nor you, nor any other, would say so.
SOC.

Soc. Will you not, therefore, answer?

POL. By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.

Soc. Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the beginning: Whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to do an injury, or to be injured?

POL. It appears to me it is worse to be injured.

Soc. But which is the more base? To do, or to suffer, an injury? Answer me.

POL. To do an injury.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?

POL. By no means.

Soc. I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful and the good are the same, and likewise the evil and the base.

POL. I do not.

Soc. But what will you say to this? Do you not call all beautiful things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, and pursuits, beautiful, without looking to any thing else? As, for instance, in the first place, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say that they are beautiful, either according to their usefulness to that particular thing to which each is useful, or according to a certain pleasure, if the view of them gratifies the beholders? Have you any thing else besides this to say, respecting the beauty of body?

POL. I have not.

Soc. Do you not, therefore, denominate other things beautiful after this manner, such as figures and colours, either through a certain pleasure, or utility, or through both?

POL. I do.

Soc. And do you not in a similar manner denominate sounds, and every thing pertaining to music?

POL. Yes.

Soc. And further still, things which pertain to laws and pursuits are certainly not beautiful, unless they are either advantageous or pleasant, or both.

POL. It does not appear to me that they are.

Soc. And does not the beauty of disciplines subsist in a similar manner?

POL. Entirely so. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, since you define the beautiful by pleasure and good.

SOC. Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, viz. by pain and evil?

POL. Necessarily so.

SOC. When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful than the other, or when some other thing transcends in beauty either one or both of these, it must be more beautiful either through pleasure, or advantage, or both.

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. And when, of two things, one is more base, it must be more base through transcending either in pain or evil. Or is not this necessary?

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. But, in the first place, let us consider whether to do an injury surpasses in pain the being injured; and whether those suffer greater pain that injure, than those that are injured.

POL. This is by no means the case, Socrates.

SOC. The former, therefore, does not transcend the latter in pain.

POL. Certainly not.

SOC. Will it not therefore follow, that, if it does not transcend in pain, it will no longer transcend in both?

POL. It does not appear that this will be the case.

SOC. Must it not, therefore, transcend in the other?

POL. Yes.

SOC. In evil?

POL. So it appears.

SOC. Will it not therefore follow, that to do an injury, since it transcends in evil, is worse than to be injured?

POL. Evidently so.

SOC. If, therefore, something else were not admitted by the multitude of mankind, and by you formerly, it would follow that to do an injury is worse than to be injured.

POL. It would.

SOC. Now, however, it appears to be worse.

POL. So it seems.

SOC. Would you, therefore, admit that which is worse and more base, rather than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus (for you will

will not be injured by so doing), but answer generously, committing yourself to discourse as to a physician ; and either admit or reject what I ask.

POL. But I should not, Socrates, prefer that which is worse and more base to that which is less so.

SOC. But would any other man ?

POL. It does not appear to me that he would, according to this reasoning.

SOC. I therefore spoke the truth when I asserted, that neither I, nor you, nor any other man, would rather do an injury than be injured ; for it would be worse to do so.

POL. So it appears.

SOC. Do you not therefore see, Polus, that, when argument is compared with argument, they do not in any respect accord ? But all others assent to you, except myself. However, you, who are only one, are sufficient for my purpose, both in assenting and testifying ; and I, while I ask your opinion alone, bid farewell to others. And thus is this affair circumstanced with respect to us. But, after this, let us consider that which was the occasion of doubt to us in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of evils for him to be punished who acts unjustly, as you think, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished in this case, as I, on the contrary, think. But let us consider this affair in the following manner : Do you call it the same thing for him to suffer punishment who has acted unjustly, and to be justly punished ?

POL. I do.

SOC. Can you therefore deny that all just things are beautiful, so far as they are just ? Consider the affair, and answer me.

POL. It appears to me that they are, Socrates.

SOC. Consider also this : When a man performs any thing, must there not necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent ?

POL. It appears so to me.

SOC. Does it, therefore, suffer that which the agent performs, and of the same kind as that which he performs ? But my meaning is this : If any one strikes, is it not necessary that something should be struck ?

POL. It is necessary.

SOC. And if he who strikes, strikes vehemently and swiftly, must not that which is struck be in the same manner struck ?

POL. Yes.

Soc. A passion, therefore, of such a kind is in that which is struck, as the striker produces.

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one burns, is it not necessary that something should be burned?

POL. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And if he burns vehemently, or so as to cause pain, must not that which is burned be burned in such a manner as he who burns burns?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. And will not the same reasoning take place if any one cuts? For something will be cut.

POL. Yes.

Soc. And if the cut is great or deep, or attended with pain, that which is cut will be cut with such a cleft as the cutter cuts.

POL. It appears so.

Soc. In short, see if you grant what I just now said respecting all things, viz. that such as the agent produces, such does the patient suffer.

POL. I do grant it.

Soc. These things, therefore, being admitted, whether is the being punished, to suffer, or to do something?

POL. Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer something.

Soc. Must it not, therefore, be by some agent?

POL. Undoubtedly. And by him who punishes.

Soc. But does not he who rightly punishes, punish justly?

POL. Yes.

Soc. Does he act justly, or not, by so doing?

POL. Justly.

Soc. Must not, therefore, he who is punished, in consequence of being punished, suffer justly?

POL. It appears so.

Soc. But is it not acknowledged that just things are beautiful?

POL. Entirely so.

Soc. Of these, therefore, the one does, and the other (who is punished) suffers, that which is beautiful.

POL. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. But if things are beautiful, are they not also good? For they are either pleasant or useful.

Pol. It is necessary they should.

Soc. He therefore who is punished suffers that which is good.

Pol. It appears so.

Soc. He is benefited, therefore.

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Does it not, therefore, follow (as I understand advantage), that the soul becomes better if it is punished justly?

Pol. It is probable.

Soc. The soul, therefore, of him who is punished is liberated from vice.

Pol. It is.

Soc. And hence it is liberated from the greatest evil. But consider thus: In the acquisition of wealth, do you perceive any other human evil than poverty?

Pol. No other.

Soc. But what, in the constitution of the body? do you call imbecility, disease, deformity, and things of this kind, evils, or not?

Pol. I do.

Soc. Do you think, therefore, that in the soul also there is a certain depravity?

Pol. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Do you not then call this injustice, ignorance, timidity, and the like?

Pol. Entirely so.

Soc. Since, therefore, riches, body, and soul, are three things, will you not say that there are three depravities, want, disease, injustice?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Which, therefore, of these depravities is the most base? Is it not injustice, and, in short, the depravity of the soul?

Pol. Very much so.

Soc. But, if it is most base, is it not also the worst?

Pol. How do you say, Socrates?

Soc. Thus. That which is most base is always so either by procuring the

the greatest pain, or injury, or both, from what has been previously acknowledged by us.

POL. Especially so.

SOC. But is it not at present acknowledged by us, that injustice, and the whole depravity of the soul, are most base?

POL. It is.

SOC. Are not these, therefore, either most troublesome, and most base, through transcending in molestation, or from the injury which attends them, or from both?

POL. It is necessary.

SOC. Is therefore to be unjust, intemperate, timid, and unlearned, the cause of greater pain than to be poor and diseased?

POL. It does not appear to me, Socrates, to be so, from what has been said.

SOC. Another depravity of the soul, therefore, transcending in a certain mighty detriment, and wonderful evil, is the most base of all things; since, according to your assertion, it is not so, from transcending in pain.

POL. So it appears.

SOC. But, indeed, that which transcends in the greatest of all detriments must be the greatest evil of all things.

POL. It must.

SOC. Injustice, therefore, intemperance, and the other depravity of the soul, are each of them the greatest evil of all things.

POL. So it appears.

SOC. What is the art, therefore, which liberates from poverty? Is it not that which procures money?

POL. Yes.

SOC. But what is that art which liberates from disease? Is it not the medicinal?

POL. Necessarily so.

SOC. And what is that which liberates from depravity and injustice? If you cannot answer this question with the like facility, consider thus: Whither, and to whom, do we conduct those that are diseased in body?

POL. To physicians, Socrates.

SOC.

Soc. But whither do we conduct those who act unjustly, and live intemperately?

POL. You say, to the judges.

Soc. And is it not, therefore, that they may be punished?

POL. I say so.

Soc. Do not then those that punish rightly punish by employing a certain justice?

POL. It is evident they do.

Soc. The art, therefore, which procures money liberates from poverty; the medicinal art, from disease; and punishment, from intemperance and injustice.

POL. So it appears.

Soc. Which, therefore, of these do you consider as the most beautiful?

POL. Of what things are you speaking?

Soc. Of the art of procuring money, the medicinal art, and punishment.

POL. Punishment, Socrates, excels by far.

Soc. Does it not, therefore, again produce either abundant pleasure, or advantage, or both, since it is the most beautiful?

POL. Yes.

Soc. Is it, therefore, pleasant to be cured by a physician? and do those who are cured rejoice?

POL. It does not appear to me that they do.

Soc. But it is beneficial to be cured. Is it not?

POL. Yes.

Soc. For it liberates from a great evil: so that it is advantageous to endure pain, and be well.

POL. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Will the man, therefore, who is cured by a physician be thus most happy with respect to his body, or ought this to be said of him who has never been diseased?

POL. Evidently of him who has never been diseased.

Soc. For, as it seems, a liberation from disease would not be felicity; but, on the contrary, this is to be asserted of the non-possession of it from the first.

POL. It is so.

Soc. But what? Which of two men is the more miserable, he who is diseased in body, or he who is diseased in soul? He who is cured by a physician, and liberated from disease, or he who is not cured, and is diseased?

POL. He who is not cured, as it appears to me.

Soc. Will it not, therefore, follow, that to suffer punishment will be a liberation from the greatest of evils, depravity?

POL. It will.

Soc. For punishment produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and becomes the medicine of depravity.

POL. It does.

Soc. He, therefore, is most happy who possesses no vice in his soul, since this appears to be the greatest of evils.

POL. It is evident.

Soc. But he doubtless ranks in the second degree of felicity, who is liberated from vice.

POL. It is likely.

Soc. But this is the man who is admonished, reprovèd, and who suffers punishment.

POL. He is.

Soc. He, therefore, lives in the worst manner who possesses injustice, and is not liberated from it.

POL. It appears so.

Soc. Is not, therefore, such a one, a man who, having committed the greatest injuries, and employing the greatest injustice, causes it to come to pass, that he is neither admonished, nor restrained in his conduct, nor punished; just as you said was the case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful noblemen?

POL. It seems so.

Soc. For the conduct of these, O best of men, is nearly just as if some one afflicted with the greatest diseases should prevent the physicians from inflicting on him the punishment of his bodily maladies, fearing as if he were a child to be burned and cut, because these operations are attended with pain. Or does it not appear so to you?

POL. It does.

Soc. And this through being ignorant, as it seems, of the nature of health,
and

and the virtue of the body. For, from what has been now acknowledged by us, those who escape punishment, Polus, appear to do something of this kind; viz. they look to the pain attending punishment, but are blind to its utility; and are ignorant how much more miserable it is to dwell with a foul not healthy, but corrupt, unjust and impious, than to have the body defeated. Hence they do every thing that they may escape punishment, but are not liberated from the greatest evil; and procure for themselves riches and friends, and the ability of speaking in the most persuasive manner. But if we have assented to the truth, Polus, do you perceive what consequences follow from our discourse? Or are you willing that we should collect them?

POL. I am, if agreeable to you.

SOC. Does it, therefore, happen that injustice and to act unjustly are the greatest evil?

POL. It appears so.

SOC. And it likewise appears that to suffer punishment is a liberation from this evil.

POL. It does appear.

SOC. But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil.

POL. Yes.

SOC. To act unjustly, therefore, ranks in the second degree of evils, as to magnitude; but, when acting unjustly, not to suffer punishment is naturally the greatest and the first of all evils.

POL. It is likely.

SOC. Are we not, therefore, my friend, dubious about this thing? you considering Archelaus as happy, who commits the greatest injustice, and suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary thinking, that whether it is Archelaus, or any other man whatever, who when acting unjustly is not punished, it is proper that such a one should surpass in misery other men; and that always he who does an injury should be more wretched than he who is injured, and he who escapes than he who suffers punishment. Are not these the things which were said by me?

POL. Yes.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, shown that these assertions are true?

POL. It appears so.

SOC. Be it so. If these things then are true, Polus, what is the great utility

utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now assented to by us, every one ought especially to guard himself from acting unjustly, as that through which he will possess a sufficiency of evil. Is it not so?

POL. Entirely so.

SOC. But if any man acts unjustly himself, or some one committed to his care, he ought willingly to betake himself thither, where with the utmost celerity he may be punished by a judge, just as if he was hastening to a physician; lest, the disease of injustice becoming inveterate, it should render the soul insincere and incurable. Or how must we say, Polus, if the things before acknowledged by us remain? Is it not necessary that these things should after this manner accord with those, but not in any other way?

POL. For what else can we say, Socrates?

SOC. For the purpose, therefore, of apologizing, either for our own injustice, or that of our parents, or associates, or children, or country, rhetoric affords us, Polus, no utility. Unless, on the contrary, any one apprehends that he ought especially to accuse himself, and afterwards his domestic associates, and any other of his friends, whom he may find acting unjustly; and that conduct of this kind ought not to be concealed, but should be led forth into light, that he by whom it is committed may be punished, and restored to health. Likewise, that he should compel both himself and others to lay aside fear, and with his eyes shut, and in a virile manner, deliver himself up, as to a physician, to be cut and burnt, pursuing the good and the beautiful, without paying any regard to pain: delivering himself to be beaten, if he has acted in such a manner as to deserve this chastisement; and in like manner to bonds, to fines, to exile, and even to death; being the first accuser of himself, and all his familiars, without sparing either himself or them, but employing rhetoric for this very purpose; that, the crimes becoming manifest, they may be liberated from the greatest of evils, injustice. Shall we speak in this manner, Polus, or not?

POL. These things appear to me, Socrates, to be absurd; but, from what has been before said, they will, perhaps, be assented to by you.

SOC. Must not, therefore, either those objections be solved, or these things necessarily follow?

POL. This, indeed, must be the case.

SOC. But again, let us transfer the affair to the contrary side, if it is requisite
that

that any one should act basely, whether he is an enemy, or some other person, only admitting that he is not injured by an enemy; for this is to be guarded against. If, then, an enemy injures another, we should endeavour by all possible means, both by actions and words, that he may not be punished, nor brought before a judge: but, if he is brought before him, we should devise some method by which he may escape, and not suffer punishment. And if this enemy has by force taken away a great quantity of gold, he should not restore it, but, possessing, spend it on himself and his associates in an unjust and impious manner. Likewise, if he acts in such a manner as to deserve death, we should be careful that he does not die at any time, but, that being a depraved character, he may be immortal; but, as this is not possible, that he may live being such for an extended period of time. Rhetoric, Polus, appears to me to be useful for purposes of this kind; since to him who has no intention to act unjustly, its utility, if it has any, is not, in my opinion, great: for it certainly has not at all appeared in the former part of our discourse.

CAL. Inform me, Chærepho, does Socrates assert these things seriously, or in jest?

CHÆR. He appears to me, Callicles, to jest in a transcendent degree: but there is nothing like asking him.

CAL. There is not, by the Gods! and I desire to do it. Tell me, Socrates, whether we must say that you are now in earnest, or in jest? For, if you are in earnest, and these things which you say are true, is not our human life subverted, and are not all our actions, as it seems, contrary to what they ought to be?

SOC. If there were not a certain passion which, remaining the same, is different in different men, but some one of us should suffer a certain passion different from others, it would not be easy for such a one to exhibit his own passion to another. I speak in this manner from considering, that I and you now happen to suffer the same thing; for, being two, we each of us love two things: I, indeed, Alcibiades the son of Clinias, and Philosophy; and you likewise two, the Athenian people, and Demus the son of Pyrilampes. I continually, therefore, perceive you, though you are skilful, unable to contradict the objects of your love, however they may oppose you, and in whatever manner they may assert a thing to take place; but you are changed by them upwards and downwards. For, in the convention, if, when you say any thing,

thing, the Athenian people says it is not so,—changing your own opinion, you speak conformably to theirs : and you are affected in the same manner towards the beautiful son of Pyrilampes ; for you cannot oppose the wishes and discourses of the objects of your love. So that, if any one, in consequence of what you say being the effect of compulsion through these, should wonder at its absurdity, perhaps you would say to him, if you wished to speak the truth, that unless some one causes the objects of your love to desist from such assertions, neither can you desist from them. Think, therefore, that it is proper to hear other things of this kind from me ; and do not wonder that I speak in this manner ; but cause Philosophy, the object of my love, to desist from such assertions. For she says, my friend, what you now hear from me ; and she is much less insane than the other object of my love. For Clinicus, here, says different things at different times ; but the assertions of Philosophy are always the same. But she says things which will now cause you to wonder : you have, however, been present at her discourses. Either, therefore, confute her for what I just now said, and evince, that to act unjustly, and when acting unjustly not to suffer punishment, is not the extremity of all evils : or, if you suffer this to remain unconfuted, then, by the dog, one of the deities of the Egyptians, Callicles will not accord with you, O Callicles, but will dissent from you through the whole of life : though I think, O best of men, that it is better for my lyre to be unharmonized and dissonant, and the choir of which I might be the leader (for many men do not assent to but oppose what I say), than that I, being one, should be dissonant with and contradict myself.

CAL. You appear, Socrates, to employ a juvenile audacity in your discourses, as being in reality a popular orator : and now you assert these things in a popular manner, suffering that same passion of Polus, which he accused Gorgias of suffering from you. For he said that Gorgias, when asked by you, whether if any one ignorant of things just, and willing to learn rhetoric, should come to him, he would teach him, was ashamed, and said that he would teach him ; and this because men are accustomed to be indignant if any one denies a thing of this kind. Through this concession, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself. But you were delighted with this very circumstance ; for which he then very properly, as it appeared to me, derided you. And now he again suffers the very same thing. But I,

indeed, do not praise Polus for granting you, that to do an injury is more base than to be injured. For, from this concession, he being impeded by you in his discourse, had not any thing further to say, being ashamed to mention what he thought. For you in reality, Socrates, lead to these troublesome and popular assertions, while you profess to be in search of truth; assertions which are not naturally, but only legally beautiful. For these for the most part are contrary to each other, viz. nature and law. If any one, therefore, is ashamed, and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself. But you, perceiving this subtle artifice, act fraudulently in discourses. For, if any one asserts that things which are according to nature are according to law, you privately ask him, if things which belong to nature belong to law; as in the present disputation respecting doing an injury and being injured, when Polus spoke of that which is more base according to nature, you pursued that which is more base according to law. For, by nature, every thing is more base which is worse, as to be injured; but, by law, it is worse to do an injury. For to be injured is not the passion of a man, but of some slave, to whom to die is better than to live; and who, being injured and disgraced, is incapable of defending either himself or any other person committed to his care. But I think that those who establish laws are imbecil men, and the multitude. Hence they establish laws with a view to themselves and their own advantage, and make some things laudable, and others blamable, with the same intention. They likewise terrify such men as are more robust, and who are able to possess more than others, by asserting that to surpass others in possessions is base and unjust; and that to endeavour to possess more than others is to act unjustly. For, in my opinion, these men are satisfied with possessing an equal portion, in consequence of being of a more abject nature. Hence, to endeavour to possess more than the multitude is, according to law, unjust and base; and they call this committing an injury. But I think nature herself evinces, that the better should possess more than the worse, and the more powerful than the more imbecil. But she manifests in many places, both in other animals, and in whole cities and families of men, that the just should be established in such a manner, as that the more excellent may rule over, and possess more than, the less excellent. For, with what kind of justice did Xerxes war upon Greece? or his father on the Scythians? or ten thousand other things of this kind which might be adduced?

adduced? But I think that they do these things according to the nature of the just, and indeed, by Jupiter, according to the law of nature; not, perhaps, according to that law which we establish, while we fashion the best and most robust of our fellow-citizens, receiving them from their childhood like lions, and enslaving them by incantations and fascination; at the same time asserting that the equal ought to be preserved, and that this is beautiful and just. But, in my opinion, if there should be any man found with sufficient strength of mind,—such a one, shaking off these things, and breaking them in pieces, abandoning and trampling upon your writings, magical allurements, incantations, and laws contrary to nature, will, by rebelling, from being a slave, appear to be our master; and in this case, that which is just according to nature will shine forth. It appears to me that Pindar also evinces the truth of what I assert, in the verses in which he says, that “Law is the king of all mortals and immortals; and that he does that which is most just violently, and with a most lofty hand. And this, he adds, I infer from the deeds of Hercules, who drove away the oxen of Geryon unbought¹.” He nearly speaks in this manner; for I do not perfectly remember the verses. He says then, that Hercules drove away the oxen of Geryon, without having either purchased them, or received them as a gift; as if this was naturally just, that oxen, and all other possessions, when the property of the worse and inferior, should yield to the better and more excellent. Such then is the truth of the case: but you will know that it is so, if, dismissing philosophy, you betake yourself to greater things. For philosophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if any one moderately meddles with it in his youth; but, if he is conversant with it more than is becoming, it corrupts the man. For, if he is naturally of a good disposition, and philosophizes at an advanced period of life, he must necessarily become unskilled in all things in which he ought to be skilled, who designs to be a worthy, good, and illustrious man. For these men are unskilled in the laws of the city, and in those arguments which he ought to use, who is conversant with the compacts of men, both in public and private. They are likewise entirely unskilled in human pleasures and desires, and, in short, in the manners of men. When, therefore, they engage in any private or political undertaking, they become ridiculous. Just as, in my opi-

¹ These words are cited from some one of the lost writings of Pindar.

nion, politicians are ridiculous when they meddle with your disputations and arguments. For that saying of Euripides here takes place: "Every one shines in this, and to this hastens; consuming the greater part of the day, in order that he may become better than himself¹." But that in which a man is inferior he avoids and flanders; and praises that in which he excels, through his benevolence towards himself, thinking that after this manner he praises himself. But I think it is most right to partake of both these. Of philosophy, indeed, it is beautiful to participate, so far as pertains to discipline, nor is it base for any one to philosophize while he is a youth: but it is a ridiculous thing, Socrates, for a man still to philosophize when he is advanced in years. And I own myself similarly affected towards those who philosophize, as to those who stammer and sport. For when I see a boy whom it yet becomes to discourse, thus stammering and engaged in play, I rejoice, and his conduct appears to me to be elegant and liberal, and such as is proper to the age of a boy. But when I hear a little boy discoursing with perspicuity, it appears to me to be an unpleasant circumstance, offends my ears, and is, in my opinion, an illiberal thing. And when any one hears a man stammering, or sees him engaged in play, he appears to be ridiculous, unmanly, and deserving chastisement. I therefore am affected in the same manner towards those who philosophize. For, when I see philosophy in a young man, I am delighted, and it appears to me becoming, and I consider the young man as liberal; but when I find a youth not philosophizing, such a one appears to me illiberal, and who will never think himself worthy of any beautiful or generous thing. But when I behold a man advanced in years, yet philosophizing, and not liberated from philosophy, such a one, Socrates, appears to me to require chastisement. For to this man, as I just now said, it happens that he becomes effeminate, though born with the best disposition, in consequence of his avoiding the middle of the city, and the forum, in which, as the poet says, men become greatly illustrious; and that, concealing himself from the public view, he passes the remainder of his life with three or four lads, muttering in a corner; but he never utters any thing liberal, great, and sufficient. But I, Socrates, am affected in an equitable and friendly manner towards you. For it seems that the same thing now happens to me

¹ These verses are taken from the *Antiope* of Euripides, and are edited by Barnes among the fragments of that tragedy.

which happened to Zethus towards Amphion in Euripides, whom I have already mentioned; since it occurs to me to say to you what he said to his brother: that you neglect, Socrates, what you ought to attend to, and destroy the generous nature of your soul, by adorning it with a certain juvenile form; and that in consultations pertaining to justice you do not speak with rectitude, nor apprehend what is probable and persuasive, nor consult for others in a strenuous manner. Though, friend Socrates, (do not be angry with me, for I speak to you with benevolence,) does it not appear to you shameful, that any one should be affected in such a manner as I think you are, and others who always make great advances in philosophy? For now, if some one arresting you, or any other, should lead you to prison, asserting that you had acted unjustly, when you had not, you know you would not be able in any respect to benefit yourself; but, being seized with a giddiness, you would yawn, and not have any thing to say: and that ascending to a court of justice, and meeting with an accuser perfectly vile and base, you would die, if he wished to punish you with death. And indeed, Socrates, how can that art possess any wisdom, which, when possessed by a man of a naturally good disposition, renders him worse, and neither able to assist himself, nor preserve either himself or any other from the greatest dangers, but causes him to be plundered by enemies of all his possessions, and live in the city devoid of honour? Indeed (if I may speak in a more rustic manner), it may be allowable to slap the face of such a man with impunity. But, good man, be persuaded by me, and desist from confuting. Cultivate an elegant knowledge of things, and employ yourself in studies which will cause you to appear wise, leaving to *others* these graceful subtilties, whether it is proper to call them deliriums, or mere trifles,

“Which leave *you* nothing but an empty house:”

and emulating, not those men who are able to confute such trifling things as these, but those with whom there are possessions, renown, and many other goods.

Soc. If, Callicles, I should happen to have a golden soul, do you not think I should gladly find one of those stones by which they try gold, particularly if it was one of the best sort; to which if I should introduce my soul, and it should acknowledge to me my soul was well cultivated, should I not
then

then well know that I was sufficiently good, and that it was not necessary any further trial should be made of me?

CAL. Why do you ask this, Socrates?

SOC. I will now tell you. I think that I, in meeting with you, met with a gain of this kind.

CAL. Why so?

SOC. I well know that you agree with me in those opinions which my soul entertains of certain particulars, and that you acknowledge them to be true. For I perceive that he who intends sufficiently to explore, whether the soul lives uprightly or not, ought to possess three things, all which you possess, viz. science, benevolence, and freedom of speech. For I meet with many who are not able to make trial of me, through not being wise as you are; but others are wise, indeed, but are unwilling to speak the truth to me, because they are not concerned about me as you are. But these two guests, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed wise, and my friends, but are deficient in freedom of speech, and are more bashful than is becoming. For how should it be otherwise? since they are so very bashful that each dares to contradict himself, before many men, and this too about things of the greatest consequence. But you possess all these requisites, which others have not. And you are both well instructed, as many of the Athenians affirm, and are benevolent to me. I will tell you what argument I use. I know that you four, Callicles, mutually partake of wisdom, viz. you, and Tisander the Aphidnan¹, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausiclydes the Cholargean. I likewise once heard you deliberating how far wisdom is to be exercised: and I know that this opinion prevailed among you, that we should not strenuously endeavour to philosophize with accuracy; but you admonished each other to be cautious, lest, through being more wise than is proper, you should be corrupted without perceiving it. Since, therefore, I hear you giving me the very same advice as you gave your most intimate associates, it is to me a sufficient argument, that you are truly benevolent to me. And besides this, that you can use freedom of speech, and not be ashamed, both you yourself say, and the oration, which you a little before made, testifies. But the case is this: If, in the things which are now discussed by us, you in any particular consent with

¹ Aphidnæ and Cholarges were two Attic villages.

me, this may be considered as sufficiently explored by you and me, and as no longer requiring any further examination. For you would never have assented to such a thing, either through a defect of wisdom, or too much bashfulness. Nor yet, again, would you have assented in order to deceive me: for you are, as you acknowledge, my friend. In reality, therefore, your and my assent has now its true end. But the consideration, Callicles, of those things respecting which you reproved me, is of all things the most beautiful, viz. what kind of person a man ought to be, what he ought to study, and how far he should study, both when an elderly and a young man. For, with respect to myself, if there is any thing pertaining to my life in which I do not act rightly, I well know that I do not voluntarily err, but that this happens through my ignorance. Do you, therefore, as you began to admonish me, not desist, but sufficiently show me what this is which I ought to study, and after what manner I may accomplish it. And if you find me now assenting to you, but afterwards not acting conformably to the concessions which I have made, then consider me as perfectly indolent: and in this case, as being a man of no worth, you should afterwards no longer admonish me. But, resuming the subject from the beginning, inform me how you and Pindar say, that it is naturally just for the more excellent to take away by force the possessions of the less excellent, and for the better to rule over the worse, and possess more than the depraved. Do you say that the just is any thing else than this? Or do I rightly remember?

CAL. These things I then said, and I now say.

SOC. But whether do you call the same thing better and more excellent? For I could not then understand what you said: whether you call the stronger the more excellent, and say it is requisite that the more imbecil should listen to the more strong; just as you then appeared to show me, that great invaded small cities, according to natural justice, because they are more excellent and strong; (as if the more excellent, the stronger, and the better, were the same;) or is it possible that a thing can be better, and at the same time inferior and more imbecil? and that it can be more excellent, and at the same time more depraved? or is there the same definition of the better and the more excellent? Define this for me clearly, whether the more excellent, the better, and the more strong, are the same, or different?

CAL. But I clearly say to you, that they are the same.

SOC.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the multitude naturally more excellent than one person; since they establish laws for one, as you just now said?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

Soc. The laws, therefore, of the multitude are the laws of such as are more excellent.

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. Are they not then the laws of such as are better? For the more excellent are, according to your assertion, far better.

CAL. Yes.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the legal institutions of these naturally beautiful, since those who establish them are more excellent?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. Do not, therefore, the multitude think (as you just now said) that it is just to possess the equal, and that it is more base to do an injury than to be injured? Are these things so, or not? And here take care that you are not caught through bashfulness. Do the multitude, or not, think that to possess the equal, but not more than others, is just? and that it is more base to do an injury than to be injured? Do not deny me an answer to this, Callicles; that, if you assent to me, I may be confirmed in my opinion by you, as being a man whose assent is sufficient to the clear knowledge of a thing.

CAL. The multitude, then, do think in this manner.

Soc. Not by law therefore only is it more base to do an injury than to be injured, or just to have equality of possessions, but likewise according to nature. So that you appear not to have spoken the truth above, nor to have rightly accused me, in saying that law and nature are contrary to each other; which I also perceiving, I have acted fraudulently in my discourse with you, by leading him to law, who says a thing is according to nature; and to nature, who says a thing is according to law.

CAL. This man will not cease to trifle. Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed, at your time of life, to hunt after names, and, if any one errs in a word, to make it an unexpected gain? For, did you think I said any thing else than that the more excellent were better? Did I not some time since tell you, that I considered the better and the more excellent as the same? Or did you suppose I said, that if a crowd of slaves, and all sorts of men of no worth,

worth, except perhaps they might possess bodily strength, should be collected together, and establish certain things, that these would be legal institutions?

SOC. Be it so, most wise Callicles: do you mean as you say?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. But I, O divine man, some time since conjectured that you said something better than this; and therefore I asked you, desiring clearly to know what you said. For you doubtless do not think that two are better than one, nor that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger. But again from the beginning tell me who those are which you say are better, when at the same time they are not stronger. And, O wonderful man, previously instruct me in a milder manner, that I may not leave you.

CAL. You speak ironically, Socrates.

SOC. By Zethus, Callicles, your familiar, you have now said many things ironically to me. But come, tell me who you say are better.

CAL. Those that are more worthy.

SOC. You see, therefore, that you yourself mention names, but evince nothing. Will you not tell me whether you say that the better and more excellent are more prudent, or that this is the case with certain others?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I say that these are more prudent, and very much so.

SOC. Often, therefore, according to your assertion, one wise man is better than ten thousand men that are unwise; and it is proper that he should govern, but the others be governed, and that the governor should possess more than the governed. For you appear to me to wish to say this (for I do not hunt after words), if one man is more excellent than ten thousand.

CAL. But these are the things which I say. For I am of opinion that this is the just according to nature, viz. that he who is better and more prudent should rule over and possess more than such as are depraved.

SOC. I attend to what you say. But what will you again now say? If we, who are many, were crowded together in the same place as at present, and abundance of food and drink was placed for us in common, but we were men of all-various descriptions, some of us being strong, and others weak, and one of us should happen to be more skilful respecting these things, as being a physician, but at the same time should be (as is likely)

stronger than some, and weaker than others,—would not this man, since he excels us in prudence, be better and more excellent with respect to these things?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Ought he, therefore, to have more of this food than us, because he is better? Or is it proper that in governing he should distribute all things; but that, in consuming and using them for his own body, he should not possess more than others, unless with detriment to himself? But that he should possess more than some, and less than others. But if he is the most imbecil of all, then he who is best should possess the least of all. Is it not so, O good man?

CAL. You speak of meat and drink, and physicians, and trifles; but I do not speak of these.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do you say that a more prudent is a better man? Do you say so, or not?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And do you not say that he who is better than others ought not to possess more than others?

CAL. He ought not to possess more of meat and drink.

SOC. I understand you. But perhaps he ought of clothes: and it will be proper that he who is most skilled in weaving should have the largest garment, and should walk about invested with garments more numerous and more beautiful than those of others.

CAL. What kind of garments do you mean?

SOC. But with respect to shoes, indeed, it is requisite that he who is more prudent than others, and is the best of men, should have more of them than others. And a shoemaker perhaps ought to walk with the largest shoes on his feet, and to have them in the greatest abundance.

CAL. About what kind of shoes do you talk in this trifling manner?

SOC. But if you will not assert such things as these, perhaps you will the following: for instance, perhaps it will be requisite that a husbandman who in cultivating the land is a prudent, worthy and good man, should possess more seeds than others, and sow them more abundantly in his own ground.

CAL.

CAL. How you always say the same things, Socrates!

Soc. Not only the same things, Callicles, but likewise respecting the same things.

CAL. Sincerely, by the Gods, you are always speaking about shoemakers, fullers, cooks, and physicians, as if these were the subject of our discourse.

Soc. Will not you, therefore, tell me, what the things are of which he who is better and more prudent than others, by possessing more than others, possesses justly? Or will you neither endure me suggesting, nor speak yourself?

CAL. But I said some time since what these particulars are. And in the first place, I do not call those that are better than others shoemakers, or cooks, but those who are skilled in the affairs of a city, so as to know after what manner it will be well inhabited, and who are not only prudent but likewise brave, able to accomplish what they conceive to be best, and are not wearied through effeminacy of soul.

Soc. You see, most excellent Callicles, that you and I do not reason about the same things. For you say that I always assert the same things; and I, on the contrary, that you never say the same things about the same. But at one time you define the better and more excellent to be the stronger, but at another time those that are more prudent: and now again you come with something else; for certain persons that are braver are said by you to be better and more excellent characters. But, O good man, tell me at length, who you say those better and more excellent characters are, and about what they are conversant.

CAL. But I have said that they are such as are prudent and brave, with respect to the affairs of a city. For it is fit that these should govern cities: and this is the just, that these should have more than others, the governors than the governed.

Soc. But what of these governors considered with respect to themselves? Ought they to have more, as governors, or as governed?

CAL. How do you say?

Soc. I speak of every one as governing himself. Or is there no occasion for a man to govern himself, but only others?

CAL. What do you mean by a man governing himself?

Soc.

Soc. Nothing various, but just as the vulgar call a man who is temperate, and master of himself, one that governs his pleasures and desires.

CAL. How pleasant you are ! You speak of the foolishly temperate.

Soc. How so ? There is not any one who is ignorant that this is not what I say.

CAL. But this is very much what you say, Socrates ; since how can that man be happy who is a slave to any one ? But this which I now freely tell you, is becoming and just according to nature ; viz. that he who intends to live properly, should suffer his desires to be as great as possible, and should not restrain them : but to these, as the greatest possible, it will be sufficient to be subservient, through fortitude and prudence, and always to fill them with such things as they require. This, however, I think, is not possible to the multitude. And hence they blame such persons as I have mentioned, concealing their own impotency through shame ; and say that intemperance is base, enslaving, as I said before, men of a better nature than themselves ; and in consequence of their inability to satisfy their own pleasures, they praise through their slothfulness temperance and justice. For what in reality can be more base and evil than temperance, to men who from the first happen to be either the sons of kings, or who are naturally sufficient to procure for themselves a tyranny, or a dynasty ? who, when it is lawful for them to enjoy good things without any impediment, impose a master on themselves, viz. the law, discourse, and the censure of the multitude ? Or how is it possible that they should not become miserable through the beauty of justice and temperance, while they impart no more to their friends than to their enemies ; and this while they possess the supreme authority in their own city ? But in reality, Socrates, that which you say you pursue subsists in the following manner : Luxury, intemperance, and liberty, if attended with proper assistance, are virtue and felicity ; but these other things are nothing more than ornaments, compacts contrary to nature, the nugacities of men, and of no worth.

Soc. In no ignoble manner, Callicles, do you freely attack the discourse : for you now clearly say what others think, indeed, but are unwilling to say. I beg, therefore, that you would not by any means relax, that it may in reality become evident how we ought to live. Tell me then : do you say that desires ought not to be repressed, if any one intends to be that which he

ought to be? and that, suffering them to be as great as possible, he ought to procure their full satisfaction from some other person? and that this constitutes virtue?

CAL. I do say these things.

SOC. Those, therefore, that are not in want of any thing are not rightly said to be happy.

CAL. For thus stones and dead bodies would be most happy.

SOC. But, indeed, as you also say, life is a grievous thing. For I should not wonder if Euripides¹ spoke the truth when he says: "Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die, is not to live?" And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from one of the wise, that we are now dead; and that the body is our sepulchre; but that the part of the soul in which the desires are contained is of such a nature that it can be persuaded, and hurled upwards and downwards. Hence, a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, or an Italian, denominated, mythologizing, this part of the soul a tub, by a derivation from the probable and the persuasive; and like-

¹ Euripides (in Phryxo) says, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the soul coming hither, as she imparts life to the body, so she partakes of a certain privation of life; but this is an evil. When separated, therefore, from the body, she lives in reality: for she dies here, through participating a privation of life, because the body becomes the cause of evils. And hence it is necessary to subdue the body.

The meaning of the Pythagoric fable which is here introduced by Plato is as follows: We are said then to be dead, because, as we have before observed, we partake of a privation of life. The sepulchre which we carry about with us is, as Plato himself explains it, the body. But Hades is the unapparent, because we are situated in obscurity, the soul being in a state of servitude to the body. The tubs are the desires, whether they are so called from hastening to fill them as if they were tubs, or from desire persuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, therefore, i. e. those that have a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire tub: for these have their tub full, or, in other words, have perfect virtue. But the uninitiated, viz. those that possess nothing perfect, have perforated tubs. For those that are in a state of servitude to desire always wish to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this account they have perforated tubs, as being never full. But the sieve is the rational soul mingled with the irrational. For the soul is called a circle, because it seeks itself, and is itself sought; finds itself, and is itself found. But the irrational soul imitates a right line, since it does not revert to itself like a circle. So far, therefore, as the sieve is circular, it is an image of the rational soul, but, as it is placed under the right lines formed from the holes, it is assumed for the irrational soul. Right lines, therefore, are in the middle of the cavities. Hence, by the sieve, Plato signifies the rational in subjection to the irrational soul. The water is the flux of nature: for, as Heraclitus says, moisture is the death of the soul.

wife

wife he called those that are stupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He further said, that the intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of the soul in which the desires are contained was like a pierced tub, through its insatiable greediness. But this man, Callicles, evinced, directly contrary to you, that of such as were in Hades (which he called *aeides*, or the invisible) those were most miserable who were not initiated, and that their employment consisted in carrying water to a pierced tub in a similarly pierced sieve. The sieve, therefore, as he who spoke with me said, is the soul. But he assimilated the soul of the unwise to a sieve, because, as this is full of holes, so their soul is unable to contain any thing, through incredulity and oblivion. These assertions may, indeed, in a certain respect, be very justly considered as unusual; but they evince what I wish to show you, if I could but persuade you to change your opinion, that, instead of having an insatiable and intemperate life, you would choose one that is moderate, and which is sufficiently and abundantly replete with things perpetually present. But can I in any respect persuade you? And will you, changing your opinion, say that the moderate are more happy than the intemperate? Or shall I not at all persuade you? And will you nothing the more alter your opinion, though I should deliver in fables many things of this kind?

CAL. You have spoken this more truly, Socrates.

SOC. But come, I will exhibit to you another image from the same gymnasium, as that which I just now exhibited to you. For consider, whether you would speak in this manner concerning the life of a temperate and intemperate man,—I mean, as if two men had each of them many tubs; and that the tubs belonging to one of these were entire and full, one of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and many others of them with a multitude of many other things. Likewise, that each of these various liquors was rare and difficult to be obtained, and was procured with many labours and difficulties. Let us suppose, therefore, that this man whose tubs are thus full neither draws any liquor from them, nor is at all concerned about them, but, with respect to them, is at rest. Let it be possible also to procure liquors for the other, though with difficulty; but let his vessels be pierced, and defective, and let him always be compelled, both night and day, to fill them, or, if he does not, to suffer the most extreme pain. Will you therefore say, since such is the life of each, that the life of the intemperate is more happy than that

of the moderate man? Can I in any respect persuade you by these things, that a moderate is better than an intemperate life? Or shall I not persuade you?

CAL. You will not persuade me, Socrates. For he whose vessel is full has not any pleasure whatever: but this is, as I just now said, to live like a stone, when once filled, neither rejoicing nor grieving: but living pleasantly consists in an abundant influx.

SOC. Is it not therefore necessary, if there is an influx of many things, that there should also be an abundant efflux? and that there should be certain large holes as passages for the effluxions?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. On the contrary, therefore, you speak of a certain life of the bird called Charadrius, and not of that of a dead body, or a stone. But tell me, do you speak of any such thing as the being hungry, and, when hungry, of eating?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And of the being thirsty, and, when thirsty, of drinking?

CAL. I say so; and likewise that he who possesses all other desires, and is able to satisfy them, will live rejoicing in a happy manner.

SOC. Well done, O best of men! Proceed as you have begun, and do not be hindered by shame. But it is likewise requisite, as it seems, that neither should I be restrained by shame. And, in the first place, inform me whether he who is scabby, and itches, who has abundantly the power of, and passes his life in, scratching, lives happily?

CAL. How absurd you are, Socrates, and perfectly vulgar!

SOC. Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and Gorgias, and made them ashamed. But do not you be astonished, nor ashamed: for you are brave: but only answer.

CAL. I say, then, that he who scratches himself lives pleasantly.

SOC. Does he not, therefore, live happily, if he lives pleasantly?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. I again ask you, whether this will be the case if he only itches in his head, or any other part of the body. See, Callicles, what you should answer, if any one asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession. And all the parts being thus affected, would not, in short, this life of catamites be
dire,

dire, base, and miserable? Or will you also dare to call these happy, if they possess in abundance what they require?

CAL. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to bring the discourse to things of this kind?

SOC. Do I bring it hither, O generous man? Or does not he rather, who says in so shameless a manner, that such as rejoice, however they may rejoice, are happy; and does not define what pleasures are good, and what are evil? But further still, now tell me, whether you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good?

CAL. But my assertion would not differ from itself, if that which I say is different I should also say is the same.

SOC. You subvert, Callicles, what was said in the first part of our discourse; nor can you any longer sufficiently investigate things with me, if you speak contrary to your opinion.

CAL. But you, Socrates, do the same.

SOC. Neither, therefore, do I, nor you, act rightly in so doing. But, O blessed man, see whether it is not a good thing to rejoice in perfection. For many base consequences, and a multitude of other things, appear to attend the particulars which I just now obscurely signified, if they should take place.

CAL. It is as you think, Socrates.

SOC. But do you in reality, Callicles, strenuously assert these things?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Let us, therefore, enter on the discussion, as if you were serious.

CAL. And extremely so.

SOC. Come, then, since it is agreeable to you, divide as follows: Do you call science any thing?

CAL. I do.

SOC. And did you not just now say, that there is a certain fortitude, together with science?

CAL. I did say so.

SOC. You spoke, therefore, of these two, as if fortitude was something different from science.

CAL. Very much so.

SOC. But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?

CAL.

CAL. They are certainly different, O most wise man.

SOC. Is fortitude also different from pleasure?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Come, then, that we may remember these things, viz. that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and fortitude are both different from each other and the good; and that Socrates of Alopecia did not assent to these things. Or did he assent to them?

CAL. He did not assent.

SOC. But I think that neither will Callicles when he rightly beholds himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who do well are affected in a manner entirely contrary to those who do ill?

CAL. I do.

SOC. If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, must they not necessarily subsist in the same manner as health and disease? For, certainly, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time liberated from health and disease.

CAL. How do you say?

SOC. Taking any part of the body you please, as, for instance, the eyes, consider whether some man is diseased with an ophthalmy.

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. He certainly is not, if at the same time his eyes are well.

CAL. By no means.

SOC. But what? When he is liberated from the ophthalmy, is he then also liberated from the health of his eyes, and, lastly, at the same time liberated from both?

CAL. In the least degree.

SOC. For I think this would be wonderful and absurd. Or would it not?

CAL. Very much so.

SOC. But I think he will alternately receive one, and lose the other.

CAL. So I say.

SOC. And will he not, therefore, in a similar manner receive and lose strength and weakness?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. And swiftness and slowness?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. And with respect to things good, and felicity, and the contraries of these things, evil and infelicity, will he alternately receive and be liberated from each of these?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, we should find certain things from which a man is at the same time liberated, and which he at the same time possesses, certainly these would not be good and evil. Do we mutually assent to these things? Well consider, and answer me.

CAL. But I assent in a transcendent degree.

Soc. Let us then recur to what we assented to before. Do you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or troublesome? I say, to be hungry.

CAL. That it is troublesome.

Soc. But it is pleasant for him who is hungry to eat?

CAL. It is.

Soc. I understand you: but to be hungry you say is troublesome. Do you not?

CAL. I do.

Soc. And is it not likewise troublesome to be thirsty?

CAL. Very much so.

Soc. Whether, therefore, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you acknowledge that all indigence and desire is troublesome?

CAL. I do acknowledge it: but do not ask me.

Soc. Be it so. But do you say it is any thing else than pleasant, for a man who is thirsty to drink?

CAL. I say it is nothing else.

Soc. In this thing, therefore, which you speak of, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful. Is it not?

CAL. It is.

Soc. But is not to drink a repletion of indigence, and a pleasure?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. Do you not therefore say that drinking is attended with joy?

CAL. Very much so.

Soc. And do you not say that to be thirsty is painful?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you, therefore, perceive what follows? I mean, that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices; when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. Or does not this happen together, according to the same place and time, whether you consider the soul or the body? For I think it is of no consequence which of these you consider. Are these things so, or not?

CAL. They are.

SOC. But you say it is impossible that he who is happy should at the same time be unhappy.

CAL. I do say so.

SOC. But you have granted that he who is disquieted may rejoice.

CAL. It appears so.

SOC. To rejoice, therefore, is not felicity, nor to be disquieted, infelicity? So that the pleasant is something different from the good?

CAL. I know not what these particulars are, Socrates, which you sophistically devise.

SOC. You know, though you pretend not, Callicles. In consequence of trifling, too, you proceed to what was before said; that you may know how wise you are that admonish me. Does not each of us at the same time cease from being thirsty, and at the same time receive pleasure from drinking?

CAL. I do not know what you say.

GORG. By no means, Callicles, act in this manner; but answer at least for our sakes, that the discourse may be brought to a conclusion.

CAL. But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, viz. he asks and confutes trifling things, and such as are of no worth.

GORG. But of what consequence is this to you? This is altogether no concern of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever manner he pleases.

CAL. Ask, then, since Gorgias thinks proper, these trifling and vile questions.

SOC. You are happy, Callicles, because you are initiated in great mysteries prior to the small: but I do not think this is lawful. Answer me, therefore, the question which you left unanswered, viz. whether each of us does not at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive delight?

CAL.

CAL. I say so.

Soc. And with respect to hunger, and other desires, do we not at the same time cease to feel them, and to receive delight?

CAL. We do.

Soc. Do we not, therefore, at one and the same time experience a cessation of pains and pleasures?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. But we do not at one and the same time experience a cessation of things good and evil, as you did acknowledge: but now do you not acknowledge this?

CAL. I do. But what then?

Soc. That things good are not the same with such as are pleasant, nor things evil with such as procure molestation. For, from these we are liberated at once, but not from those, because they are different. How, therefore, can things pleasant be the same with such as are good, or things troublesome with such as are evil? But, if you please, consider the affair thus: for I think that neither in this will you accord with yourself. Consider now. Do you not call the good good, from the presence of good things, in the same manner as you call those beautiful to whom beauty is present?

CAL. I do.

Soc. But what? Do you call those good men who are foolish and timid? For you did not just now; but you said that good men were brave and prudent. Or do you not call the brave and prudent, good?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. But what? Have you ever seen a stupid boy rejoicing?

CAL. I have.

Soc. And have you not also seen a stupid man rejoicing?

CAL. I think I have. But to what purpose is this?

Soc. To none: but answer.

CAL. I have seen such a one.

Soc. But have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and rejoicing?

CAL. I say I have.

Soc. But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wise, or the foolish?

CAL. I do not think there is much difference.

Soc. This is sufficient. But have you ever in war seen a coward?

CAL. Undoubtedly I have.

Soc. What then? On the departure of the enemies, which have appeared to you to rejoice the more, cowards or the brave?

CAL. Both have appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, certainly in nearly the same degree.

Soc. It is of no consequence. Cowards, therefore, also rejoice?

CAL. And very much so.

Soc. And those that are stupid, likewise, as it seems?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. But, when enemies approach, do cowards only grieve? or is this also the case with the brave?

CAL. With both.

Soc. Do they, therefore, similarly grieve?

CAL. Perhaps cowards grieve more.

Soc. But, when the enemies depart, do they rejoice more?

CAL. Perhaps so.

Soc. Do not, therefore, as you say, the stupid and the wife, cowards and the brave, similarly grieve and rejoice, but cowards more than the brave?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. But the wife and brave are good, but cowards and the stupid, bad?

CAL. They are.

Soc. The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve similarly?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. Are, therefore, the good and the bad similarly good and bad? or are the good yet more good, and the bad more bad?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I do not know what you say.

Soc. Do you not know that you said the good were good, through the presence of things good, and the bad through the presence of things evil? And that pleasures were good things, and pains bad?

CAL. I do know it.

Soc. Are not, therefore, good things, viz. pleasures, present with those that rejoice, if they rejoice?

CAL.

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Are not, therefore, those that rejoice good, in consequence of things good being present?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But what? Are not things evil, viz. pains, present with those that are disquieted?

CAL. They are present.

SOC. But do you not say that the evil are evil, through the presence of things evil? Or do you no longer say so?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Those, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but those that are disquieted are evil?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And those that are more so, more, but those that are less so, less? and those that are similarly so, similarly?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do you say, therefore, that the wise and the stupid rejoice and grieve similarly; and that this is likewise the case with cowards and the brave? Or that cowards rejoice and grieve more than the brave?

CAL. I do.

SOC. Collect, therefore, in common with me, what will be the consequence of what we have assented to. For, as it is said, it is beautiful to speak and consider twice, and even thrice, beautiful things. Do we say, then, that he who is prudent and brave is good, or not?

CAL. We do.

SOC. But that he is a bad man who is stupid and a coward?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And again, that he who rejoices is good?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But that he is a bad man who is disquieted?

CAL. Necessarily so.

SOC. Likewise, that to be disquieted, and rejoice, are similarly good and evil; but perhaps more evil than good?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Does not, therefore, a bad man become similarly bad and good, with

the good man, or even more good? Do not these things follow, and likewise those prior things, if any one says that the same things are pleasant and good? Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles?

CAL. A while^oago, Socrates, I said that I listened and assented to you, considering that if any one grants you any thing, though in jest, this you gladly lay hold of after the manner of lads. Just as if you could think that either I or any other person did not believe that some pleasures are better, and others worse.

SOC. Hey-day, Callicles, how crafty you are! And you use me as if I were a boy; at one time asserting that these things subsist in this manner, and at another in a different manner; and thus deceiving me. Though, from the first, I did not think that I should be voluntarily deceived by you, because you are my friend. But now I am deceived. And now, as it seems, it is necessary, according to the antient proverb, that I should make good use of the present opportunity, and receive what you give. But it appears that what you now say is this, that with respect to pleasures some are good, and others bad. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Are, therefore, the profitable good, but the noxious evil?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And are those profitable which accomplish a certain good, but those evil, which effect a certain evil?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. Do you, therefore, speak of such things as the following; as, for instance, in the body, those pleasures of eating and drinking which we just now spoke of; and do you think that if some of these produce in the body health or strength, or some other corporeal virtue, they are good, but that the contraries of these are evil?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And in like manner, with respect to pains, are you of opinion that some are worthy, and others base?

CAL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Are not, therefore, such pleasures and pains as are worthy, to be chosen and embraced?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC.

Soc. But such as are base, not ?

CAL. It is evident.

Soc. For it appeared, if you remember, that all things are done by us, viz. by me and Polus, for the sake of things good. Does it, therefore, appear also to you, that the good is the end of all actions ? Likewise, that all other things ought to be done for its sake ; but that it is not to be obtained for the sake of other things ? Will you then make a third with us in the same opinion ?

CAL. I will.

Soc. Both other things, therefore, and such as are pleasant, ought to be done for the sake of things good, but not things good for the sake of such as are pleasant ?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. Is every man, therefore, able to choose such pleasant things as are good, and likewise such as are evil ? Or must this be the province of a man endued with art ?

CAL. Of a man endued with art.

Soc. But let us again recall to our memory what I said to Polus and Gorgias. For I said (if you remember) that there were certain preparations, some as far as pleasure, preparing this alone, but ignorant of the better and the worse ; but others that knew the nature both of good and evil. I likewise placed among the preparations respecting pleasures, cooking as a skill pertaining to the body, but not an art ; but among the preparations respecting the good I placed the medicinal art. And, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, Callicles, do not think that you ought to jest with me, nor answer me casually contrary to your opinion, nor again receive my assertions as if I was in jest. For you see that our discourse is about this, after what manner it is proper to live, than which, what can any man endued with the smallest degree of intellect more seriously discuss ? I mean, whether we should adopt that mode of life to which you exhort me, engaging in such employments of a man, as speaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and managing political affairs, after the manner which you adopt ; or whether we should betake ourselves to a philosophic life, and consider what it is in which it differs from the former life. Perhaps, therefore, as I just now said, it is best to make a division ; and after we have divided, and assented

affented to each other, to confider, if thefe two fpecies of life have an exiftence, in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to be purfued. But perhaps you do not yet underftand what I fay.

CAL. I do not.

Soc. But I will fpeak to you ftill more clearly. Since you and I have agreed that there is fomething good, and likewife fomething pleafant, and that the pleafant is different from the good, but that in each of them there is a certain exercife and preparation of acquifition, one being the hunting after the pleafant, and the other of the good; do you, in the firft place, grant me this, or do you not grant it?

CAL. I do grant it.

Soc. But come, confent with me in what I faid to thefe men, if I then appeared to you to fpeak the truth. But I faid that cooking did not appear to me to be an art, but fkill; and that medicine is an art. For I faid that medicine confiders the nature of that which it cures, and the caufe of the things which it does, and that it is able to give an account of each of thefe: but that cooking very inartificially proceeds to pleafure, to which all its attention is directed, neither confidering in any refpect the nature nor the caufe of pleafure, but being entirely irrational, numbering nothing (as I may fay), depending wholly on ufe and fkill, and only preferving the memory of that which ufually takes place, by which alfo it may impart pleafures. In the firft place, therefore, confider whether thefe things appear to you to have been fufficiently faid, and that there are alfo certain other ftudies of this kind refpecting the foul, fome of which depend on art, and beftow a certain attention to that which is beft in the foul; but others neglect this, confidering, in the fame manner as cooking with refpect to the body, only the pleafure of the foul, and in what manner it may be procured; neither confidering which is the better or the worfe of pleafures, nor attending to any thing elfe than gratification only, whether it is better or worfe. For to me, Callicles, thefe things appear to take place; and I fay that a thing of this kind is flattery, both refpecting body and foul, and any thing elfe the pleafure of which is feduloufly attended to by any one, without paying any regard to the better and the worfe. But whether do you entertain the fame opinion refpecting thefe things with us, or do you oppofe them?

CAL.

CAL. I do not, but grant them, that your discourse may come to an end, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.

Soc. But whether does this take place respecting one soul, but not respecting two and many souls?

CAL. It does not. But it takes place respecting both two and many souls.

Soc. May it not, therefore, be lawful to gratify souls collected together, without paying any attention to what is best?

CAL. I think so.

Soc. Can you, therefore, tell me what those studies are which effect this? Or rather, if you are willing, on my asking, assent to whichever appears to you to be one of these, but to that which does not do not assent. And, in the first place, let us consider the piper's art. Does it not appear to you to be a thing of this kind, Callicles; viz. which only pursues our pleasure, but cares for nothing else?

CAL. It does appear to me.

Soc. Are not, therefore, all such studies as these like the harper's art in contests?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. But what? Does not the erudition of choirs, and the dithyrambic poetry, appear to you to be a thing of this kind? Or do you think that Cineas¹ the son of Meles is in the smallest degree solicitous that he may say any thing by which his hearers may become better? Or is he not rather solicitous about that which may gratify the crowd of spectators?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that this latter is the case respecting Cineas.

Soc. But what with respect to his father Meles? Does he appear to you to play on the harp, looking to that which is best? Or does not he also regard that which is most pleasant? For in singing he pleasingly pains the spectators. But consider, does not the whole of the harper's art, and dithyrambic poetry, appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?

CAL. To me it does.

Soc. But what of the venerable and wonderful poetry of tragedy? What does it strive to accomplish? Do its endeavour and study, as appears to you, alone consist in gratifying spectators? or also in striving not to say any thing which may be pleasing and grateful to them, but at the same

¹ A bad dithyrambic poet, according to the Scholiast ad *Ranas* Aristoph.

time base ; and that, if any thing happens to be unpleasant and useful, this it may say and sing, whether it gratifies the spectators or not ? According to which of these modes does the poesy of tragedy appear to you to consist ?

CAL. It is evident, Socrates, that it is more impelled to pleasure, and the gratification of the spectators.

SOC. Did we not, therefore, Callicles, just now say that a thing of this kind is flattery ?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Come then, if any one should take from all poesy, melody, rhythm, and measure, would any thing else than discourses remain ?

CAL. Necessarily nothing else.

SOC. Are not, therefore, these discourses delivered to a great multitude of people ?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. Poesy, therefore, is a certain popular speech. Or do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres ?

CAL. To me they do.

SOC. Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among a people consisting of boys, and at the same time women and men, slaves and the free-born ; and which we do not altogether approve. For we said that it was adulation.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Be it so. But what shall we say that rhetoric is, which subsists among the Athenian people, and the people consisting of free-born men in other cities ? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to speak with a view to that which is best, directing their attention to this, that the citizens through their discourses may become the best of men ? Or are they also impelled to the gratification of the citizens ? and, neglecting public for the sake of private advantage, do they converse with the people as with boys, alone endeavouring to gratify them, without being in the least concerned whether through this they become better or worse ?

CAL. This which you ask is not a simple thing. For some rhetoricians are solicitous in what they say for the good of the citizens : but others are such as you represent them.

SOC. It is sufficient. For, if this also is twofold, one part of it will be adulation,

adulation, and base harangue; but the other, which causes the souls of the citizens to become most excellent, will be beautiful; and will always strive to speak such things as are best, whether they are more pleasant or more unpleasant to the hearers. But you never have seen this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can say that some one of the rhetoricians is a character of this kind, why have you not informed me who he is?

CAL. But, by Jupiter, I cannot instance to you any rhetorician of the present day.

SOC. But what? Can you instance any one of the antient rhetoricians, who was the means of rendering the Athenians better, after he began to harangue them, when previous to this they had been worse? For I do not know who such a one is.

CAL. But what? Have you not heard that Themistocles was a good man, and likewise Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles here, who died lately, and whose harangues you also have heard?

SOC. Yes; if that virtue, Callicles, which you before spoke of is true, viz. for a man to replenish both his own desires and those of others. But if this is not the case, but, as we were afterwards compelled to confess, those desires are to be embraced, the replenishing of which renders a man better, but not those which render him worse, and if there is a certain art of this, as we also acknowledged, can you say that any one of these was a man of this kind?

CAL. I have not any thing to say.

SOC. But if you seek in a becoming manner you will find. Let us however, sedately considering, see if any one of these was a character of this kind. Is it not true that a good man, who says what he says with a view to the best, does not speak casually, but looking to something? in the same manner as all other artists, each of whom regards his own work, and does not rashly choose what he introduces to his work, but so that the subject of his operation may have a certain form—as, for instance, if you are willing to look to painters, architects, shipwrights, and all other artificers, and to consider how, whichever of them you please, places whatever he places in a certain order, and compels one thing to be adapted to and harmonize with another, until the whole thing is constituted with regularity and ornament. And indeed, both other artificers, and those which I just now mentioned, who are employed about the body, viz. the masters of gymnastic, and physicians,

adorn in a certain respect, and orderly dispose the body. Do we grant that this is the case, or not?

CAL. It is the case.

Soc. A house, therefore, when it acquires order and ornament, will be a good house, but a bad one, when it is without order?

CAL. I say so.

Soc. And will not this in like manner be the case with a ship?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. And may we not assert the same things also respecting our bodies?

CAL. Entirely so.

Soc. But what with respect to the soul? Will it be in a good condition, when it acquires disorder, or when it acquires a certain order and ornament?

CAL. It is necessary, from what has been said, to grant that the latter must be the case.

Soc. What then, in the body, is the name of that which subsists from order and ornament? Perhaps you will say it is health and strength.

CAL. I do.

Soc. But what again is the name of that which subsists in the soul from order and ornament? Endeavour to find and mention it, in the same manner as the former name.

CAL. But why do not you say what it is, Socrates?

Soc. If you had rather, I will. But, if I speak well, do you assent to me; if not, confute, and do not indulge me. To me then it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of the body is the healthful, from which health and every other virtue of the body are produced in the body. Is it so, or not?

CAL. It is.

Soc. But the name belonging to the orderly disposition and ornament of the soul is the legitimate and law; whence also souls become legitimate and adorned with modest manners: but these are justice and temperance. Do you assent, or not?

CAL. Be it so.

Soc. Will not, therefore, that good rhetorician who is endued with art, looking to these things, introduce all his orations and actions to souls? and, if he should bestow a gift, bestow it, and, if he should take any thing away, take

take it; always directing his attention to this, that justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and that they may be liberated from injustice: likewise that temperance may be produced in them, and that they may be liberated from intemperance: and, in short, that every virtue may be planted in them, but vice expelled? Do you grant this, or not?

CAL. I do grant it.

SOC. For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased, and in a miserable condition, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or any thing else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary, but even less, according to a just mode of reasoning? Is this the case?

CAL. Be it so.

SOC. For I think it is not advantageous for a man to live with a miserable body; for thus it would be necessary to live miserably. Or would it not?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Do not, therefore, physicians for the most part permit a man in health to satisfy his desires, (as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases, or when thirsty to drink,) but never permit, as I may say, a diseased man to be satiated with things which he desires? Do you also grant this?

CAL. I do.

SOC. But is not the same mode, O most excellent man, to be adopted respecting the soul; viz. that as long as it is depraved, in consequence of being stupid, intemperate, unjust and unholy, it ought to be restrained from desires, and not permitted to do any thing else than what will render it better? Do you say so, or not?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. For such a mode of conduct will indeed be better for the soul.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not, therefore, to restrain any one from what he desires to punish him?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than intemperance, contrary to what you just now thought.

CAL. I do not know what you say, Socrates: but ask something else.

Soc. This man will not suffer himself to be benefited by suffering this of which we are speaking, viz. punishment.

CAL. I am not at all concerned about any thing which you say; and I have answered you these things for the sake of Gorgias.

Soc. Be it so. But what then shall we do? Shall we dissolve the conference in the midst?

CAL. You know best.

Soc. But they say it is not lawful to leave even fables in the midst, but that a head should be placed on them, that they may not wander without a head.

CAL. How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be persuaded by me, you will bid farewell to this discourse, or carry it on with some other person.

Soc. What other, then, is willing? for we must not leave the discourse unfinished.

CAL. Cannot you yourself finish the discourse, by either speaking to yourself, or answering yourself?

Soc. In order, I suppose, that the saying of Epicharmus may be verified, viz. I being one am sufficient to accomplish what was before said by two. And it appears most necessary that it should be so. But, if we do this, I think it will be proper that all of us should in a friendly manner strive to understand what is true, and what false, respecting the subjects of our discourse. For it will be a common good to all for this to become manifest. I will, therefore, run over the affair in the manner in which it appears to me to take place. But, if I shall seem to any of you not to grant myself things which truly are, it will be proper that you should apprehend and confute me. For I do not say what I do say as one endued with knowledge, but I investigate in common with you. So that, if he who contends with me appears to say any thing to the purpose, I will be the first to concede to him. But I say these things on condition that you think it fit the discourse should be completed: but if you do not assent to this, let us bid farewell to it, and depart.

GORG. But it does not appear to me, Socrates, proper to depart yet, but that you should pursue the discourse. It likewise seems to me that this is the opinion of the rest of the company. For I also am willing to hear you discussing what remains.

Soc.

Soc. But indeed, Gorgias, I should willingly have discoursed still longer with Callicles here, till I had recompensed him with the oration of Amphion, instead of that of Zethus. But as you are not willing, Callicles, to finish the discussion in conjunction with me, at least attend to me, and expose me if I shall appear to you to assert any thing in an unbecoming manner. And if you confute me, I shall not be indignant with you, as you are with me, but you will be considered by me as my greatest benefactor.

CAL. Speak then yourself, good man, and finish the discourse.

Soc. Hear me then repeating the discourse from the beginning. Are the pleasant and the good the same?—They are not the same, as I and Callicles have mutually agreed.—But whether is the pleasant to be done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant?—The pleasant for the sake of the good.—But is the pleasant that, with which when present we are delighted; and the good that, through which when present we are good?—Entirely so.—But we are good, both ourselves, and all other things that are good, when a certain virtue is present.—To me this appears to be necessary, Callicles.—But, indeed, the virtue of each thing, of an instrument, and of the body, and again of the soul, and every animal, does not fortuitously become thus beautiful, but from order, rectitude, and art, which are attributed to each of them.—Are these things, therefore, so? For I say they are.—The virtue of every thing, therefore, is disposed and adorned by order.—So, indeed, I say.—Hence, in each thing, a certain order becoming inherent, which is domestic to each, renders each thing good.—It appears so to me.—The soul, therefore, which has a certain order of its own, is better than the soul which is without order.—It is necessary.—But the soul which has order is orderly.—For how is it possible it should not?—But an orderly soul is temperate.—This is very necessary.—A temperate soul, therefore, is good. I, indeed, am not able to say any thing besides these things, O friend Callicles. But do you, if you have any thing else, teach me.

CAL. Proceed, good man.

Soc. I say, then, if a temperate soul is good, the soul which is affected in a manner contrary to that of the temperate is vicious. But such a soul will be destitute of intellect, and intemperate.—Entirely so.—And, indeed, a temperate man acts in a proper manner, both towards Gods and men. For he would not be temperate if he acted in an improper manner.—It is necessary that these things

things should be so.—And besides this, by acting in a proper manner towards men he will act justly, and by a proper conduct towards the Gods he will act piously. But it is necessary that he should be just and holy, who acts in a just and holy manner.—It must be so.—It is likewise necessary that such a one should be brave. For it is not the province of a temperate man either to pursue or avoid things which ought neither to be pursued nor avoided: but it is proper that he should both avoid and pursue things and men, pleasures and pains, and bravely endure when it is requisite. So that there is an abundant necessity, Callicles, that the temperate man, being just, brave, and pious, as we have described him, should be a perfectly good man: likewise, that a good man should do in a becoming and beautiful manner whatever he does; and that he who acts well should be blessed and happy. And lastly, it is necessary that the unworthy man, and who acts ill, should be miserable. But such a man will be one who is directly contrary to the temperate man, viz. he will be the intemperate character which you praised. I, therefore, lay down these things, and assert that they are true. But if they are true, temperance must be pursued and cultivated, as it appears, by him who wishes to be happy, and he must fly from intemperance with the utmost celerity. He must likewise endeavour to live in such a manner as not to require any degree of punishment: but if he does require it, or any other of his family,—or if this is the case with a private person, or a city,—justice must be administered, and punishment inflicted, if such wish to be happy. This appears to me to be the mark with our eye directed to which it is proper to live: and all concerns, both private and public, should tend to this, viz. if any one wishes to be happy, to act in such a manner that justice and temperance may be ever present with him; not suffering his desires to be unrestrained, and endeavouring to fill them; which is an infinite evil, and causes a man to live the life of a robber. For a character of this kind can neither be dear to any other man, nor to Divinity. For it is impossible there can be any communion between them: but where there is no communion there can be no friendship. The wise too, Callicles, say that communion, friendship, decorum, temperance, and justice, connectedly comprehend heaven and earth, Gods and men. And on this account, my friend, they call this universe *kosmos*, or *order*, and not *akosmia*, or *disorder*, and *akolasia*, or *intemperance*. However, you appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you
are

are wise. But you are ignorant that geometric equality is able to accomplish great things, both among Gods and men. On the contrary, you think that every one should strive to possess more than others: for you neglect geometry.—Be it so, then.—However, this our discourse must either be confuted, viz. it must be shown that those who are happy are not happy from the possession of justice and temperance, and that those who are miserable are not miserable from the possession of vice; or, if our discourse is true, we must consider what consequences result from it. Indeed, Callicles, all those former things are the consequences concerning which you asked me if I was speaking in earnest. For I said that a man should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he acted in any respect unjustly, and that rhetoric was to be used for this purpose. Hence, those things which you thought Polus granted through shame are true, viz. that by how much it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it the worse; and that he who would be rightly skilled in rhetoric ought to be just, and endued with a scientific knowledge of things just; which, again, Polus said that Gorgias acknowledged through shame.

This then being the case, let us consider what are the things for which you reprove me, and whether they are well said, or not. You assert, then, that I can neither assist myself, nor any of my friends or domestics, nor save myself from the greatest dangers: but that I am obnoxious to the arbitrary will of any one, like men of infamous characters (though this is nothing more than the juvenile ardour of your discourse), so as either to be struck in the face, or deprived of my property, or expelled from the city, or, which is the extremity of injustice, to be slain. And to be thus circumstanced, according to your doctrine, is the most shameful of all things. But, according to my doctrine, (which has indeed been often mentioned, yet nothing hinders but that it may again be repeated,) I do not say, Callicles, that to be struck in the face unjustly is a most shameful thing; nor yet for my body, or my purse, to be cut; but that to strike and cut unjustly me and mine, is a thing more shameful and base. And that to defraud, enslave, break open the house, and, in short, to injure in any respect me and mine, is to him who does the injury more base and shameful than to me who am injured. These things, which appeared to us to subsist in this manner in the former part of our

discourse, are contained and bound in adamantine reasons, though it is somewhat rustic to make such an assertion. However, unless you can dissolve these reasons, or some one more robust than yourself, it is impossible that he who speaks otherwise than I now speak can speak in a becoming manner. For I always assert the same thing, viz. that I know not how these things subsist: and that no one of those whom I have ever met with, as at present, if unable to say otherwise, would be ridiculous. I therefore again determine that these things thus subsist. But, if this is the case, and injustice is the greatest of evils to him that acts unjustly; and it is still a greater evil, if possible, though this is the greatest, for him who acts unjustly not to be punished; what assistance will that be, which, when a man is unable to afford himself, he is in reality ridiculous? Will it not be that which averts from us the greatest detriment? But there is an abundant necessity that this should be the most shameful assistance, viz. for a man to be incapable of assisting either himself, or his friends and domestics; that the next to this should be that which pertains to the second evil; and the third, that which pertains to the third evil; and thus in succession, according to the magnitude of each evil. Thus also does the beauty of being able to give assistance, and the deformity of not being able, subsist. Does the thing take place in this manner, or otherwise, Callicles?

CAL. No otherwise.

SOC. Since, therefore, these things are two, to do an injury, and to be injured, we say that to do an injury is a greater, but to be injured, a less evil. By what means, then, may a man so assist himself as to possess both these advantages—I mean, that which arises from not doing an injury, and that which is the consequence of not being injured? Is it by power, or will? But I say thus: Will a man, if he is unwilling to be injured, not be injured? Or, if he has procured the power of not being injured, will he not be injured?

CAL. It is evident that he will not, if he has procured the power.

SOC. But what with respect to acting unjustly? Whether, if any one is unwilling to do an injury, is this sufficient (for in this case he will not commit an injury), or is it requisite that for this purpose he should procure a certain power and art, as one who will do an injury, unless he has learned and cultivated these? Why do you not answer me this question, Callicles: whether

ther I and Polus appear to you to be rightly compelled to acknowledge this, or not? since we confess that no one is willing to act unjustly, but that those who injure others do it unwillingly.

CAL. Let it be so, Socrates, that your discourse may be brought to a conclusion.

SOC. For this purpose, therefore, a certain power and art, as it appears, are to be procured, in order that we may not act unjustly.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. What then is the art which will enable a man not to be injured in any respect, or at least in the smallest degree? Consider, if it appears to you in the same manner as to me. For to me it appears thus: that he ought either to govern in a city, or obtain the tyranny, or be the associate of the most powerful person in a polity.

CAL. Do you see, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you say any thing beautifully? This you appear to me to have said in a manner entirely beautiful.

SOC. Consider also, whether I appear to you to speak well in what follows: Those seem to me to be friends in the highest degree, concerning whom ancient and wise men say, "similar to similar." Does it not also appear so to you?

CAL. To me it does.

SOC. Does it not therefore follow, that when a tyrant who is rustic and unlearned governs, if there is any one in the city much better than him, the tyrant will fear such a one, and will never be able to be cordially his friend?

CAL. It does follow.

SOC. Nor yet, if any one in the city should be much worse than the tyrant, would he be able to be his friend. For the tyrant would despise him, nor ever pay attention to him as a friend.

CAL. This also is true.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend to such a one deserving to be mentioned, who, in consequence of being endued with similar manners, would praise and blame him, be willing to be governed, and to be subject to him that governs. Such a one in this city will be able to accomplish great things, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. If, therefore, any young man in this city should thus think with himself, "After what manner may I be able to accomplish great things, and be injured by no one?" this, as it appears, must be the way, viz. he must immediately from his youth be accustomed to rejoice and be afflicted with the same things as his master, and render himself in the highest degree similar to him. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. Will it not therefore follow, that such a man will not be injured, and, as you say, that he will be able to accomplish great things in a city?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Will he not, therefore, be able to refrain from acting unjustly? Or will this be far from being the case, if, when the governor is unjust, he is similar to him, and is able to accomplish great things with him? But I think that the very contrary will take place, and that such a one will render himself able to act unjustly in the highest degree, without being punished for his unjust conduct. Will he not?

CAL. It appears so.

SOC. Will not, therefore, the greatest evil be present with him, in consequence of being corrupted and depraved in his soul, through the imitation and power of his master?

CAL. I do not know whither you are always turning the discourse, Socrates, upwards and downwards. Or do you not know, that he who is imitated can, if he pleases, slay and take away the possessions of him who is not imitated?

SOC. I know it, good Callicles, unless I am deaf; for, a little before, I often heard this from you and Polus, and nearly, indeed, from all in the city. But do you also hear me: for he may indeed slay whom he pleases; but, being a depraved character, he may slay one who is worthy and good.

CAL. And is not this a circumstance grievous to be borne?

SOC. Not to a man endued with intellect, as the discourse evinces. Or do you think that a man should endeavour to live to a most extended period, and should apply himself to those arts which always preserve us from dangers—in the same manner as that rhetoric which preserves in courts of justice, and which you exhorted me to cultivate?

CAL. I do indeed, by Jupiter, and I rightly advised you.

Soc. But what, O best of men, does the science of swimming also appear to you to be a venerable thing?

CAL. By Jupiter, it does not.

Soc. And, indeed, this also saves men from death, when they fall into such a danger as requires the aid of this science. But if this science appears to you to be a small thing, I will mention to you a greater than this, viz. that of piloting a ship, which not only saves lives, but also bodies and possessions, from extreme danger, in the same manner as rhetoric. And this, indeed, is moderate and modest, and is not haughty with a grandeur of ornament, as if it accomplished something transcendent. But since it accomplishes the same things as the judicial art, if it saves any from Ægina hither, it demands, I think, two oboli; but if from Egypt, or Pontus, if it demands a great sum, on account of the great benefit it has conferred, through saving those I just now mentioned, viz. ourselves and children, our riches and wives, and conducting them to the port, this sum is usually two drachms. And the man who possesses this art, and accomplishes these things, going out of the ship, walks near the sea and the ship, in a moderate garb. For he knows, I think, how to reason with himself, that it is uncertain whom he may assist of those that sail with him, not suffering them to be merged in the sea, and whom he may injure, as knowing that neither the bodies nor souls of those who depart from his ship are in any respect better than they were when they entered into it. He will, therefore, reason with himself, that the case is not as if some one who is afflicted in his body with great and incurable diseases should happen not to be suffocated, because this man is indeed miserable for having escaped death, and has not derived any advantage from him; but that if any one labours under many and incurable diseases in that which is more honourable than body, viz. in his soul, such a one ought to live; and that he will benefit him, whether he saves him from the sea, or from a court of justice, or from any thing else. But he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live; because he must necessarily live badly. On this account, it is not usual for a pilot to be arrogant, though he saves us; nor yet, O wonderful man, for an artificer of machines, who is sometimes able to save a multitude in no respect inferior to that which is saved by the general of an army, or a pilot, or any other person. For sometimes he saves whole cities. Does it appear to you that he is to be compared with a lawyer? Though, if he

should wish to speak, Callicles, such things as you are accustomed to speak, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with words, asserting and calling on you to consider that you ought to be the artificers of machines, as if other things were of no consequence. For he would have enough to say. But you nevertheless would despise him and his art, and would call him by way of reproach a maker of machines. Nor would you be willing to give your daughter to his son in marriage, nor his daughter to your son. Though, if you consider what the particulars are from which you praise your own profession, with what justice can you despise the artificer of machines, and the rest whom I have just now mentioned? I know you will say that your profession is better, and consists of better things. But if that which is better is not what I say it is, but this very thing is virtue, i. e. for a man to save himself and his possessions, whatever kind of man he may happen to be, then your reprehension of the artificer of machines, of the physician, and of other arts, which are instituted for the sake of preservation, is ridiculous.

But, O blessed man, see whether or not the generous and the good are not something else than to save and be saved. For perhaps to live for a period of time however extended, is not to be wished, nor too much sought after, by him who is truly a man; but leaving these things to the care of Divinity, and believing in prophetic women, that no one can avoid fate, he will afterwards consider by what means he may pass the remainder of his life in the most excellent manner. But will this be effected by rendering himself similar to the polity in which he dwells? If this then were the case, it is necessary that you should become most similar to the Athenian people, if you wish to be dear to them, and to be able to accomplish great things in the city. But consider whether this is advantageous to you and me; and whether we should not, O divine man, be exposed to the same misfortune which they say happened to the Thessalian¹ women in drawing down the moon. But, indeed, our choice of this power in the city should be with the most friendly. If however you think that any man whatever is able to deliver a certain

¹ According to Suidas (in Proverbio *ἐπὶ σαυτῷ τὴν σελήνην καθέλκεις*) the Thessalian women who drew down the moon are said to have been deprived of their eyes and feet. And hence, says he, the proverb is applied to those who draw down evils on themselves. It is necessary to observe that witches formerly were able to cause the *appearance* of drawing down the moon to take place. See my Notes on Pausanias, vol. iii. p. 324.

art of this kind, which will cause you to possess mighty power in this city, even when you are dissimilar to the polity, and whether this power is for the better, or the worse,—in this case you appear to me, Callicles, not to consider the affair in a proper light. For it is not requisite that you should be a mimic, but that you should be naturally similar to them, if you design to effect a genuine friendship with the Athenian people, and, by Jupiter, besides this with Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Whoever, therefore, shall render you most similar to these will also render you, since you desire to be skilled in civil affairs, both a politician and a rhetorician. For every one is delighted with orations adapted to his own manners, but is indignant with such as are foreign from them; unless you, O beloved head, say otherwise. Can we say any thing against these things, Callicles?

CAL. I do not know how it is, but you appear to me, Socrates, to speak well. But yet that which happens to many happens also to me: for I am not entirely persuaded by you.

SOC. For the love of Demus, Callicles, which is resident in your soul, opposes me: but if we should often and in a better manner consider these things, you would perhaps be persuaded. Remember, therefore, that we said there were two preparations, which in every thing were subservient to the cultivation both of body and soul: one associating with these with a view to pleasure; but the other with a view to that which is best, not by gratifying, but opposing. Are not these the things which we then defined?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not, therefore, the one of these which looks to pleasure ignoble, and nothing else than adulation?

CAL. Let it be so, if you please.

SOC. But the other endeavours that this which we cultivate may be the best possible, whether it is body or soul.

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Whether, therefore, are we after this manner to take upon ourselves the care of a city and its citizens, I mean when the citizens are rendered the best possible? For without this, as we have found in what has been previously said, it is of no use to bestow any other benefit; viz. unless the dianoëtic part of those who are to receive either abundance of riches, or dominion

dominion over certain persons, or any other power, is beautiful and good. Shall we lay this down, as being the case?

CAL. Entirely so, if it is more agreeable to you.

SOC. If, therefore, Callicles, when publicly transacting political affairs, we should publicly exhort each other to the art of building either walls, or docks, or temples, or, in short, buildings of the largest kind, whether would it be necessary that we should consider and examine ourselves, in the first place, if we knew or were ignorant of the art of building, and by whom we were instructed in it? Would this be requisite, or not?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. In the second place, therefore, this ought to be considered, whether we have ever built any private edifice, either for any one of our friends, or for ourselves; and whether this edifice is beautiful or deformed. And if on considering we find that our masters were good and illustrious, and that we have built, in conjunction with our masters, many beautiful edifices, and many without their assistance, after we left our masters,—if we find this to be the case, ought we not, if endued with intellect, to betake ourselves to public works? But if we can neither evince that we had a master, and have either raised no buildings, or many of no worth, would it not in this case be stupid in us to attempt public works, and to exhort each other to such an undertaking? Shall we say that these things are rightly asserted, or not?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And is not this the case with all other things? And if we should engage publicly in medical affairs, exhorting each other as if we were skilful physicians, ought not you and I to consider as follows: By the Gods, how is Socrates affected in his body with respect to health? Or is there any other person, whether a slave or free-born, who by the help of Socrates is liberated from disease? And indeed I think I may consider other things of this kind respecting you. And if we do not find any one, stranger or citizen, man or woman, whose body has been benefited by our assistance, will it not, by Jupiter, Callicles, be truly ridiculous, that we should proceed to that degree of folly as to attempt, according to the proverb¹, to

¹ This proverb, according to Zenobius, is applied to those who pass over the first disciplines, and immediately apply themselves to the greater. Just as if some one learning the potter's art should attempt to make a tub before he had learned how to make tables, or any other small utensil.

teach a potter in making a tub, before we have transacted many things privately, as they might happen to occur, and have happily accomplished many things, and been sufficiently exercised in the medical art, and should endeavour to exhort others like ourselves to exercise medicine publicly? Does it not appear to you that a conduct of this kind would be stupid?

CAL. It does.

Soc. But now, O best of men, since you have just begun to transact public affairs, and you exhort me to the same, reproaching me at the same time that I do not engage in them, ought we not mutually to consider as follows: What citizen has Callicles made a better man? Is there any one who, being before depraved, unjust, intemperate, and unwise, has through Callicles become a worthy and good man, whether he is a stranger or a citizen, a slave or free-born? Tell me, Callicles, if any one should ask you these things, what would you say? Whom would you assert to be a better man from associating with you? Are you averse to answer, if there is as yet any private work of this kind accomplished by you, before you engage in public affairs?

CAL. You are contentious, Socrates.

Soc. But I do not ask through a love of contention, but in consequence of really wishing to know, after what manner you think government ought to be conducted by us. Or would you, when applying yourself to public affairs, attend to any thing else than that we citizens may be rendered the best of men? Or have we not often acknowledged that this ought to be done by a politician? Have we, or not, acknowledged this? Answer. We have acknowledged it. I will answer for you. If, therefore, a good man ought to procure this for his city, now having recollected, inform me respecting those men whom you a little before mentioned, if they any longer appear to you to have been good citizens,—I mean Pericles and Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles.

CAL. To me they do.

Soc. If, therefore, they were good men, did not each of them render their fellow-citizens better instead of worse? Did they render them so, or not?

CAL. They did.

Soc.

Soc. When Pericles, therefore, began to speak to the people, were they not worse than when he addressed them for the last time?

CAL. Perhaps so.

Soc. It is not proper to say 'perhaps', O best of men; but this must be a necessary consequence from what has been granted, if he was a good citizen.

CAL. But what then?

Soc. Nothing. But besides this inform me, whether the Athenians are said to have become better men through Pericles, or on the contrary were corrupted by him. For I hear that Pericles rendered the Athenians indolent, timid, loquacious, and avaricious, having first of all rendered them mercenary.

CAL. You hear these things, Socrates, from those whose ears are broken.

Soc. However, I no longer hear these things; but both you and I clearly know that Pericles at first was much celebrated, and was not condemned by the Athenians by any ignominious sentence, at the very time when they were worse; but when he had made them worthy and good, then towards the close of his life they fraudulently condemned him, and were on the point of putting him to death as if he had been an unworthy man.

CAL. What then? Was Pericles on this account a bad man?

Soc. Indeed, a person of this kind who has the care of asses, horses, and oxen, appears to be a bad character, if, receiving these animals neither kicking backwards, nor pushing with their horns, nor biting, he causes them to do all these things through ferocity of disposition. Or does not every curator of an animal appear to you to be a bad man, who, having received it of a milder nature, renders it more savage than when he received it? Does he appear to you to be so, or not?

CAL. Entirely so, that I may gratify you.

Soc. Gratify me also in this, by answering whether man is an animal, or not.

CAL. Undoubtedly he is.

Soc. Did not Pericles, therefore, take care of men?

CAL. Yes.

Soc. What then? Is it not requisite, as we just now acknowledged, that they

they should become through him more just, instead of more unjust, if he, being a good politician, took care of them?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. Are not, therefore, the just mild, as Homer¹ says? But what do you say? Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. But, indeed, he rendered them more savage than when he received them: and this against himself; which was far from being his intention.

CAL. Are you willing I should assent to you?

SOC. If I appear to you to speak the truth.

CAL. Be it so, then.

SOC. If, therefore, he rendered them more savage, must he not also have rendered them more unjust, and worse characters?

CAL. Be it so.

SOC. From this reasoning, therefore, it follows, that Pericles was not a good politician.

CAL. You, indeed, say not.

SOC. And, by Jupiter, you say so too, from what you have acknowledged. But, again, tell me respecting Cimon. Did not those who were the objects of his care punish him by an ostracism, and so as that for ten years they might not hear his voice? And they acted in a similar manner towards Themistocles, and, besides this, punished him with exile. But they decreed that Miltiades, who fought at the battle of Marathon, should be hurled into the Barathrum; and unless the Prytanis had defended him, he would have fallen into it. Though these, if they had been good men, as as you say they were, would never have suffered these things. Indeed, it can never happen that good charioteers should at first not be thrown from their cars; but, when they have disciplined their horses, and have themselves become better charioteers, that they should then be thrown from them. This is never the case, either in driving a chariot, or in any other employment. Or does it appear to you that it is?

CAL. It does not.

SOC. Our former assertions, therefore, as it appears, are true, viz. that we

¹ Odyss. vii. ver. 120.

do not know any good politician in this city : but you acknowledge that you know of none at present, but that formerly there were some ; and the names of these you have mentioned : but these have appeared to be equal to the politicians of the present day. So that, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use rhetoric truly (for otherwise they would not have fallen into disgrace), nor yet did they employ adulation.

CAL. But indeed, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of the present day will ever accomplish such undertakings as were accomplished by any one of those I mentioned.

SOC. Neither, O divine man, do I blame these men, so far as they were servants of the city ; but they appear to me to have been more skilful ministers than those of the present day, and more adapted to procure for the city such things as it desired. But in persuading, and at the same time compelling, the citizens to repress their desires, and not indulge them, by means of which they would become better men, in this those former politicians in no respect differed from such as exist at present ; for this, indeed, is alone the work of a good citizen. But, with respect to procuring ships, walls, and docks, and many other things of this kind, I also agree with you, that those were more skilful than these. I, therefore, and you, act ridiculously in this disputation. For during the whole time of our conversation we have not ceased to revolve about the same thing, and to be mutually ignorant of what we said. I think, therefore, that you have often acknowledged and known, that there is this twofold employment, both respecting the body and soul : and that the one is ministrant, by which we are enabled, if hungry, to procure food for our bodies, and, if thirsty, drink ; if cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and other things which the body requires. And I will designedly speak to you through the same images, that you may more easily understand. If any one then supplies these things, being either a victualler, or a merchant, or an artificer of some one of them, viz. a baker, or a cook, a weaver, shoemaker, or tanner, it is by no means wonderful that, being a person of this kind, he should appear, both to himself and others, to be a curator of the body ; I mean, to all those who are ignorant that, besides all these, there is a certain gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body in reality pertains ; to which it belongs to rule over all these arts, and to use their respective works ; in consequence of knowing what is good and bad in solid or liquid

liquid aliment, with respect to the virtue of the body, while all the other arts are ignorant of this. On this account, it is necessary that these arts should be servile, ministrant, and illiberal, respecting the concerns of the body; but that gymnastic and medicine should be justly the mistresses of these. That the very same things, likewise, take place in the soul, you appeared at the same time to grant me, as if knowing what I said; but a little after you asserted that there had been worthy and good citizens in this city. And when I asked you who they were, you appeared to me to exhibit just such men, with respect to political concerns, as if, in consequence of my asking about gymnastic affairs, who have been, or are at present, good curators of bodies, you should seriously answer me, that Thearion the baker, and Mithæcus, who wrote on the Sicilian art of cooking, and Sarambus the victualler, were wonderful curators of bodies; the first of whom made admirable bread; the second procured admirable food; and the third admirable wine. Perhaps, therefore, you will be indignant if I should say to you, O man, you understand nothing respecting gymnastic. You have told me of men who are the ministers and purveyors of desires, but you do not understand any thing beautiful and good concerning them; who, if it should so happen, while they fill the bodies of men, and render them gross, and are praised by them for so doing, at the same time destroy their antient flesh. These, therefore, through their unskilfulness, do not accuse men given to feasting, as the causes of the diseases with which they are infested, and of the loss of their antient flesh, but those who happen to be then present, and give them some advice. But, after a long time, when repletion introduces disease, in consequence of having taken place without the healthful, then they accuse and blame these advisers, and would injure them if they were able; but praise those ministers of their desires, and the causes of their maladies. And now you, O Callicles, act in a manner most similar to this; for you praise those who delight such-like men with feasting, and who satiate them with the objects of their desire, and say that they make the city great; but who do not perceive that the city is swoln, and inwardly in a bad condition, through those antient men. For, without temperance and justice, they have filled the city with ports and docks, with walls and tributes, and such-like trifles. When, therefore, this accession of imbecility arrived, they accused the advisers that were then present, but praised Themistocles,

Cimon, and Pericles, who were the causes of the maladies : but you perhaps, unless you are careful, they will apprehend, together with my associate Alcibiades, since they have destroyed those ancient particulars, besides those which they have acquired ; though you are not the causes, but perhaps the con-causes, of the evils. Indeed, I perceive that a very stupid affair takes place at present, and I hear that it has taken place with respect to ancient men. For I see that when a city conducts itself towards any political character, as one that acts unjustly, such a one is indignant, and complains as suffering grievously, though he has conferred many benefits on the city. Are, therefore, such unjustly destroyed by the city, according to their assertion ? But, indeed, their assertion is entirely false. For he who presides over a city can never be unjustly cut off by the city over which he presides. For those who profess themselves to be politicians, appear to be the same with those that call themselves sophists. For the sophists, though wise in other things, act absurdly in this respect. Proclaiming themselves to be teachers of virtue, they often accuse their disciples of acting unjustly towards them, by defrauding them of their wages, and other testimonies of gratitude for the benefits they receive from them. But what can be more irrational than such an accusation ?—I mean, that men who have become good and just, being freed from injustice by their preceptor, and having obtained justice, should yet act unjustly from that very thing which they have not ? Does not this, my friend, appear to you to be absurd ? You compel me in reality, Callicles, to make a public harangue, because you are unwilling to answer me.

CAL. But cannot you speak unless some one answers you ?

SOC. I seem, indeed, as if I could. For now I extend my discourses, since you are not willing to answer me. But, O good man, tell me, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to you irrational, that he who says he can make another person a good man, should blame this man, that, having become good through his instructions, and being so now, he is, notwithstanding, an unworthy character ?

CAL. To me it appears so.

SOC. Do you not, therefore, hear those who profess to instruct men in virtue speaking in this manner ?

CAL. I do. But why do you speak about men of no worth ?

SOC. But what will you say respecting those men, who, while they assert
that

that they preside over the city, and are careful that it may be the best possible, again accuse it, when it so happens, as the worst of cities? Do you think that these differ in any respect from those? O blessed man! a sophist and a rhetorician are the same, or they are something near and similar, as I and Polus have said. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is something all-beautiful, and despise the sophistic art. In reality, however, the sophistic art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the legislative than the judicial profession, and gymnastic than medicine. But I think public speakers and sophists alone ought not to complain that the thing which they teach is evil to themselves; or, if they do, that they must accuse themselves at the same time of not having in any respect benefited those whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And, indeed, it will be proper to impart benefit to these alone, if they asserted what is true. For, if some one should receive any other benefit, as, for instance, the power of running swiftly, through the instructions of a master of gymnastic, perhaps he would be averse to recompense him, if the master of gymnastic benefited him without having made an agreement that he should be paid for his trouble as soon as he had enabled him to run swiftly. For men, I think, do not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Or do they not?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. If, therefore, any one should take away this,—I mean injustice,—would it not follow, that there would be no occasion to fear lest he should suffer injustice; but that to him alone it would be safe to impart this benefit, if any one is in reality able to form good men? Is it not so?

CAL. I say so.

SOC. Hence, as it appears, there is nothing base in taking money for giving advice about other things, as, for instance, respecting building, or other arts.

CAL. So it appears.

SOC. But, with respect to this action,—I mean, how any one may be rendered the best of men, and may govern his own family, or the city, in the most excellent manner,—it is reckoned base to withhold advice, unless money is given to the adviser. Is it not so?

CAL. Yes.

SOC. For it is evident that the reason is this: that, of all benefits, this alone renders him who is benefited desirous of making a recompense. So that it appears to be a beautiful sign, if he who imparts the benefit is in his turn benefited; but by no means if he is not. Are these things so, or not?

CAL. They are.

SOC. Define, therefore, to which mode of healing the maladies of a city you exhort me: whether to that of contending with the Athenians, that they may become the best of men, as if I were a physician; or to that by which I may minister to their wants, in order to obtain their favour. Tell me the truth, Callicles. For it is but just, that, as you began to speak to me freely, you should continue to impart your conceptions. And now speak well and generously.

CAL. I say, therefore, that I exhort you to act as ministrant to the city.

SOC. You exhort me, therefore, most generous man, to employ flattery.

CAL. Unless you had rather be the prey of the Myrians; which will be the case, if you do not act in this manner.

SOC. Do not say, what you often have said, that any one who is willing might slay me, lest I again should say, that an unworthy would slay a good man; nor yet that he might take away whatever I possessed, lest I also should again say, that after he has taken away my possessions he would not derive any advantage from them; but that, as he has unjustly deprived me of them, he will also, having received them, use them unjustly; and if unjustly, basely; and if basely, wickedly.

CAL. You appear to me, Socrates, to believe that you shall never suffer any of these things, as being one who lives at a distance, and that you shall never be brought before a court of justice by a man, perhaps, entirely depraved and vile.

SOC. I am therefore, O Callicles, in reality stupid, unless I think that any one in this city may suffer whatever may happen to take place. But this I well know, that if I was brought before a court of justice, and I should be in danger respecting any one of these particulars which you mention, he who brings me thither will be a depraved man. For no worthy man will bring one who is innocent before a court of justice. Nor would it be any thing wonderful,

wonderful, if in this case I should be condemned to death. Are you willing I should tell you why I should expect these things?

CAL. By all means.

SOC. I think that I, in conjunction with a few Athenians, (that I may not say alone,) apply myself to the true political art, and alone of those of the present day perform things political. As, therefore, the discourses which I make are not composed for the sake of popular favour, but with a view to that which is best, and not to that which is most pleasant,—and as I am not willing to do those elegant things which you now advise me to do,—I should not have any thing to say in a court of justice. But the same discourse occurs to me which I addressed to Polus. For I should be judged in the same manner as a physician would be judged among boys, when accused by a cook. For consider what would be the apology of such a man, when apprehended by these, if any one should accuse him, as follows: O boys, this man fabricates for you many evils, and corrupts both you and the youngest of you. For, by cutting, burning, emaciating, and almost suffocating you, he makes you desperate; and likewise by giving you the most bitter potions, and compelling you to be hungry and thirsty; not delighting you, as I do, with many pleasant and all-various dainties. What do you think the physician would have to say in such a bad situation? If he spoke the truth, would he not say, I have done all these things, boys, for the sake of health? But, upon this, in what manner do you think these judges would exclaim? Would they not loudly exclaim?

CAL. Perhaps it may be proper to think so.

SOC. Do you not think, therefore, that he would be perfectly at a loss what to say?

CAL. Entirely so.

SOC. And I also know that I should be affected in the very same manner, on coming into a court of justice. For I should not be able to mention any pleasures which I had imparted to them, and which they consider as benefits and advantages. But I neither emulate those that impart them, nor those to whom they are imparted. And if any one should say that I corrupt young men, by causing them to doubt, or accuse elderly men, by employing bitter discourses, either privately or publicly, I should not be able to say that
which

which is the truth, that I assert and do all these things justly ; and that it is your province, O judges, to act in this manner, and to do nothing else. So that, perhaps, I should suffer whatever might happen to be the consequence.

CAL. Does therefore, Socrates, that man appear to you to be in a good condition in a city who is thus circumstanced, and is unable to help himself?

SOC. He does, if he is in that condition, Callicles, which you have often allowed, viz. if he can assist himself, and has not either said or done any thing unjustly respecting men or Gods. For it has often been acknowledged by us, that this is the best aid which any one can impart to himself. If, therefore, any one can prove that I am incapable of affording this assistance either to myself or another, I shall be ashamed, whether I am convicted of this impotency before many, or a few, or alone, by myself alone. And if I should be punished with death on account of this impotency, I should be indignant. But if I should die through the want of adulatory rhetoric, I well know that you would behold me bearing death easily. For no one fears to die, who is not entirely irrational and effeminate : but he fears to act unjustly ; since, for the soul to come to Hades full of unjust actions, is the extremity of all evils. But, if you please, I wish to show you by a certain narration that this is the case.

CAL. Since you have finished the other things which remained to be completed, finish this also.

SOC. Hear then, as they say, a very beautiful narration ; which you indeed will, I think, consider as a fable ; but I consider it as a relation of facts. For the particulars of the ensuing narration are true. As Homer says, then, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, divided^{*} the government among themselves, after

* The ineffable principle of things did not produce sensibles by his own *immediate* energy : for there would have been a privation of order, if we had been directly produced by the first cause. And, in the progression of things, the similar is always unfolded into subsistence prior to the dissimilar. By how much greater, therefore, one cause is than another, by so much does one effect surpass another. Hence, he who possesses science in a higher degree produces more illustrious disciples. It is necessary, therefore, that other powers greater than we are should be produced by the first cause, and thus that we afterwards should be generated from these : for we are the dregs of the universe. These mighty powers, from their surpassing similitude to the first God, were very

after they had received it from their father. This law¹, therefore, respecting men subsisted under Saturn, and always was, and now is, established among the Gods,

very properly called by the antients Gods; and were considered by them as perpetually subsisting in the most admirable and profound union with each other, and the first cause; yet, so as amidst this union to preserve their own essence distinct from that of their ineffable cause.

But these mighty powers are called by the poets a *golden chain*, on account of their connection with each other, and incorruptible nature. One of these powers you may call *intellectual*; a second, *visific*; a third, *Pæonian*, and so on; which the antients desiring to signify to us by names, have symbolically denominated. Hence (says Olympiodorus, in MS. Comment. in Gorgiam) we ought not to be disturbed on hearing such names as a Saturnian power, the power of Jupiter, and such-like, but explore the things to which they allude. Thus, for instance, by a Saturnian power rooted in the first cause, understand a pure intellect: for Κρονος, or Saturn, is κρος νους, i. e. ὁ καθ'αυτος, or, a *pure intellect*. Hence, those that are pure, and virgins, are called κοραι. On this account, too, poets * say that Saturn devoured his children, and afterwards again sent them into the light, because intellect is converted to itself, seeks itself, and is itself sought: but he again refunds them, because intellect not only seeks and procreates, but produces into light and profits. On this account, too, he is called ἀγκυλομετης, or *inflected counsel*, because an inflected figure verges to itself. Again, as there is nothing disordered and novel in intellect, they represent Saturn as an old man, and as slow in his motion: and hence it is that astrologers say, that such as have Saturn well situated in their nativity are prudent, and endued with intellect.

Further still: the ancient theologists called life by the name of Jupiter, to whom they gave a twofold appellation, δια and ζῆνα, signifying by these names that he gives *life through* himself. They also assert that the sun is drawn by four horses, and that he is perpetually young, signifying by this his power, which is motive of the whole of nature subject to his dominion, his fourfold conversions, and the vigour of his energies. But they say that the moon is drawn by two bulls: by two, on account of her increase and diminution; but by *bulls*, because, as these till the ground, so the moon governs all those parts which surround the earth.

Plato says, therefore, that Jupiter and Neptune distributed the government from Saturn; and since Plato does not fashion a political but a philosophical fable, he does not say, like the poets, that they received the kingdom of Saturn by violence, but that they divided it. What then are we to understand by receiving law from Saturn? We reply that law is the distribution of intellect; and we have before observed that Saturn signifies intellect. Hence law is thence derived.

Again, mundane natures, says Olympiodorus, are triple; for some are celestial, others terrestrial,

¹ Neither *was* nor *will be* can be asserted of a divine nature: for *was* is past, and no longer is, and *will be* is imperfect, and is not yet. But nothing of this kind can be conceived of Divinity. As, therefore, Plato introduces this as a fable, on this account he uses the term *was*; but since the fable is not poetic, but philosophic, he also introduces the word *always*.

* This is asserted by Hesiod in his Theogony.

Gods, viz. that the man who has passed through life in a just and holy manner, when he dies, departing to the islands of the blessed, shall dwell in all

refrtrial, and others between these, viz. the fiery, ærial, aquatic. And of these, Jupiter possesses the celestial, Pluto the terrestrial, and Neptune those between. Again, through these things the powers presiding over these natures are signified. For Jupiter on this account has a sceptre, as signifying the judicial; but Neptune a trident, as presiding over the triple nature in the middle; and Pluto a helmet, on account of the obscure. For, as a helmet conceals the head, so this power (i. e. Pluto) belongs to things unapparent. Nor must it be thought that philosophers worship stones and images as things divine: but since, living according to sense, we are not able to arrive at an incorporeal and immaterial power, images are devised for the purpose of recalling to the memory divine natures; that, seeing and reverencing these, we may form a conception of incorporeal powers. This, therefore, is also said by the poets, that Jupiter mingling with Themis begot three daughters, Equity, Justice, and Peace. Equity, therefore, reigns in the innerratic sphere: for there the same motion subsists perpetually, and after the same manner, and nothing is there distributed. But Justice rules in the planetary spheres: for here there is a separation * of the stars; and where there is separation, there justice is necessary, that an harmonious distribution may be made according to desert. And Peace reigns over terrestrial natures, because contention is among these; and where there is contention, there peace is necessary. But there is a contention here of the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry. Hence they say that Ulysses wandered on the sea by the will of Neptune. For they signify by this, that the Odysean life was neither terrestrial, nor yet celestial, but between these. Since, therefore, Neptune is the lord of the middle natures, on this account they say that Ulysses wandered through the will of Neptune, because he had the allotment of Neptune. Thus also they speak of the sons of Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, regarding the allotments of each. For we say that he who has a divine and celestial polity is the son of Jupiter; that he who has a terrestrial polity is the son of Pluto; and that he is the son of Neptune whose polity or allotment is between these. Again, Vulcan is a certain power presiding over bodies; and hence he says of himself in Homer:

All day I fell

because his attention to bodies is perpetual. On this account, also, he operates with bellowses (ἐν φύσiais ἐργάζεται) viz. in natures (ἀντί του ἐν ταῖς φύσεσι). For this power leads forth nature to the care of bodies. Since, therefore, Plato makes mention here of the islands of the blessed, of punishment, and a prison, let us unfold what each of them is. Geographers then say that the islands of the blessed are about the ocean, and that souls depart thither that have lived well. This, however, is absurd, for souls thus would live a stormy life. What then shall we say? The solution is this: Philosophers assimilate the life of men to the sea, because it is turbulent, prolific, bitter, and laborious. But it is necessary to know that islands are raised above the sea, being more

* Viz. the planets are distributed into different spheres, and are not all of them contained in one sphere, like the fixed stars.

all felicity, removed from evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the prison of punishment and justice, which they call Tartarus. But the judges of these, during the reign of Saturn, and even recently, Jupiter possessing the government, were living judges of the living, judging on that very day on which any one happened to die. In consequence of this they judged badly. On this account, therefore, Pluto, and those to whom the care of the islands of the blessed was committed, went to Jupiter, and informed him that men came to them who were unworthy, whether they were accusers or the accused. But Jupiter said, I will prevent this in future. For now judgments are badly exercised; because those that are judged are judged clothed; for they are judged while living. Many, therefore, says he, whose souls are depraved are invested with beautiful bodies, are noble by birth, and rich; and when judgment of their conduct takes place, many witnesses appear in their behalf, testifying that they have lived justly. Hence the judges are astonished at these things, and are at the same time themselves clothed, while judging, as prior to their soul being concealed they have a veil before their eyes and ears, and the whole of their body¹. All these things, indeed, are placed before them, as well their own vestments

elevated. Hence, they call that polity which transcends the present life and generation, the islands of the blessed; and these are the same with the Elysian fields. On this account, also, Hercules accomplished his last labour in the Hesperian regions, signifying by this, that, having vanquished a dark and terrestrial life, he afterwards lived in day, that is, in truth and light.

Philosophers, then, are of opinion that the earth is cavernous, like a pumice stone, and that it is perforated as far as to its ultimate centre. They likewise think that about the centre there are different places, and certain fiery, cold, and Charonian powers, as the exhalations of the earth evince. The last place, therefore, is called Tartarus. Hence it is necessary to know that souls that have lived viciously remain in this place for a certain time, and are punished in their pneumatic vehicle: for those that have sinned through the sweetness of pleasure can only be purified by the bitterness of pain.

Again, souls that are hurled into Tartarus are no longer moved: for it is the centre of the earth, and there is not any place beneath it. For, if they were moved, they would again begin to ascend; since all beyond the centre is upwards. Hence, the prison is there of dæmons and terrestrial presiding powers: for by Cerberus, and things of this kind, they signify dæmoniacal powers.

¹ Such, says Olympiodorus, is the fable, which, agreeably to the nature of a fable, does not preserve *together* things which always subsist together, but divides them into prior and posterior. It also first speaks of the more imperfect, and afterwards of the perfect: for it is necessary to advance

vestments as the vestments of those that are judged. In the first place, therefore, says he, they must be deprived of the power of foreseeing death : for now they do foresee it. Hence, Prometheus¹ must be ordered to make this
 faculty

vance from the imperfect to the perfect. When the fable, therefore, says that the judges were living judges of the living, judging on that very day in which any one happened to die, and that in consequence of this they judged badly ; this signifies that we judge badly, but divine judges well. For they know who ought to be sent to Tartarus, and who to the islands of the blessed. The fable, therefore, looking to our judgment, and beginning from the imperfect, says that formerly they judged badly ; but, proceeding to the perfect, it says that now they judge justly. Jupiter does not effect this from himself, but at the request of Pluto, because subordinate convert themselves to superior natures.

Again, let us show what is meant by the judges being formerly in bodies, but now naked. Here, therefore, again the fable divides, and calls us from the more imperfect to the perfect. It is necessary to know, therefore, that our life is obscurely signified by this, both in the present state of existence, and hereafter. For, in this life, both we and those that we judge are in bodies ; and hence deception takes place. In consequence of this, from judging passively, we do not send to Tartarus a depraved character, as one who is miserable, but, on the contrary, to the islands of the blessed. But, in another life, both the judges and those that are judged are naked.

¹ *Prometheus*, says Olympiodorus, is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls : for to exert a *providential energy* is the employment of the rational soul, and, prior to any thing else, to know itself. Irrational natures, indeed, perceive through percussion, and prior to impulsion know nothing ; but the rational nature is able, prior to information from another, to know what is useful. Hence, *Epimetheus* is the inspective guardian of the irrational soul, because it knows through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, therefore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational souls. But *fire* signifies the rational soul itself ; because, as fire tends upwards, so the rational soul pursues things on high. But you will say, Why is this fire said to have been stolen ? Because that which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Since, therefore, the rational soul is sent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth, as to a foreign region, on this account the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it concealed in a reed ? Because a reed is cavernous (*σπυργωδης*), and therefore signifies the flowing body (*το ρευστον σωμα*), in which the soul is carried. But why was the fire stolen, contrary to the will of Jupiter ? Again, the fable speaks as a fable : for both Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on high ; but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates particulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents, indeed, the superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling ; for he wishes the soul always to abide on high : but the inferior character, Prometheus, obliges her to descend. Jupiter, therefore, ordered *Pandora* to be made. And what else is this than *the irrational soul* *, which is of a feminine characteristic ? For, as it was

* The reader must remember, that the true man, or the rational soul, consists of *intellect*, the *διανοητικα* power, and *opinion* ; but the summit of the irrational life is the *phantasy*, under which *desire*, like a many-headed savage beast, and *anger*, like a raging lion, subûst.

faculty in them cease: and afterwards they must be judged divested of all these things; for it is requisite that they should be judged when dead. It is likewise requisite that the judge should be naked and dead, speculating the soul itself, with the soul itself, every one dying suddenly, destitute of all his kindred, and leaving all that ornament on the earth, that the judgment may be just. I therefore having known these things before you, have made my sons judges; two indeed from Asia¹, Minos and Rhadamanthus; and one from Europe, Æacus. These then, after their death, shall judge in the meadow, in the highway, where two roads extend, the one to the islands of the blessed, and the other to Tartarus. And Rhadamanthus shall judge those from Asia, but Æacus those from Europe. But I will confer this additional dignity upon Minos, that he shall decide whatever may be inscrutable to the other judges, that the judgement respecting the path of men may be most just.

These are the things, O Callicles, which I have heard, and believe to be true: and from this narration I infer that a thing of the following kind must take place. Death, as it appears to me, is nothing else than the dissolution of two things, viz. of the soul and body from each other. But when

necessary that the soul should descend to these lower regions, but, being incorporeal and divine, it was impossible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium, hence she becomes united with it through the irrational soul. But this irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed on it some particular gift. And this signifies that the illuminations which terrestrial natures receive take place through the celestial bodies*.

¹ Asia is eastern, but Europe has a more western situation. But eastern parts are analogous to celestial natures, through light; but Europe through its curvature to terrestrial natures. Through these two, therefore, viz. Asia and Europe, a celestial and terrestrial polity are signified. There is also a middle polity, which Plato signifies through the doctrine of the extremes. For, having spoken of a celestial and terrestrial polity, he also manifests that which has a middle subsistence; just as above, having spoken of those that are sent to the islands of the blessed, and those that are hurled into Tartarus, he likewise manifests souls which are characterized by a middle life.

In the next place, in order to know what is meant by the meadow, and the roads in which they judge, it is necessary to observe that the ancients call generation moist, on account of its flowing nature, and because the mortal life flourishes here. The place of judgment, therefore, is said to be in æther, after the places under the moon, and this is called a meadow through its moisture and variety.

* For the irrational soul is an *immaterial body*, or, in other words, *vitalized extension*, such as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantasy; and the celestial bodies are of this kind.

they are mutually separated, each of them possesses its own habit, not much less than when the man was living; the body conspicuously retaining its own nature, attire, and passions. So that, for instance, if the body of any one while living was large by nature, or aliment, or from both, the body of such a one when dead will also be large; and if corpulent, it will be corpulent when dead; and so with respect to other things. And if any one while living was studious to obtain long hair, the hair also of the dead body of such a one will be long. Again, if any one while living had been whipped, and retained as vestiges of the blows in his body scars from scourges, or other wounds, his dead body also is seen to preserve the same marks. And if the limbs of any one were broken or distorted while he lived, these also will be conspicuous when he is dead. And, in short, whatever was the condition of the body of any one while living, such will be its condition entirely, or for the most part, for a certain time, when dead. The same thing also, Callicles, appears to me to take place respecting the soul; viz. that all things are conspicuous in the soul, after it is divested of body, as well whatever it possesses from nature¹, as those passions which the man acquired in his soul, from his various pursuits. When, therefore, they come to the judge², those from Asia to Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus stopping them contemplates the soul of each, not knowing to whom it belongs; but often seizing the soul of the great king, or of any other king

¹ We must not think from this, says Olympiodorus, that vice is natural to the soul. For, since the soul is incorporeal and immortal, if it naturally possessed vice, vice also would be immortal; which is absurd. By the term *from nature*, therefore, Plato means the soul living in conjunction with things base; so that vice is as it were coessentialized with it, the soul becoming subservient to the temperaments of the body. The soul, therefore, suffers punishment for this, because, being in short self-motive, and connected with anger and desire, and certain corporeal temperaments, she does not harmonize these, and lead them to a better condition, by her self-motive power. For, as a physician very properly scourges him who has an ophthalmia, not because he labours under this disease, but because he has touched and agitated his eyes, and has not preserved the form enjoined by the physician; in like manner the demiurgus punishes souls, as not subduing by their self-motive power the passions which were imparted to them for their good: for it is necessary that they should be vanquished, and employed to a good and not to a bad purpose.

² Plato here presents us with a fable, but he does not suffer it to be poetical, but likewise adds demonstrations: for this is the peculiarity of philosophical fables. See the general Introduction to this work.

THE PHILEBUS:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.

or potentate, he beholds nothing sound in such a soul, but sees that it has been vehemently whipped, and that it is full of scars, through the perjuries and injustice impressed in it by its several actions; that all things in it are distorted ¹ through falsehood and arrogance, and that nothing is right, in consequence of its having been educated without truth. He likewise sees that such a soul through power, luxury, and intemperate conduct, is full of inelegance and baseness. On seeing however a soul in this condition, he directly ² sends it into custody with disgrace; whither when arrived, it will suffer

¹ For when the soul is defiled and wounded by the passions nothing in it is *straight*.

² Again, Olympiodorus observes as follows: It is necessary to know that souls which have moderately sinned, are punished but for a short time, and afterwards being purified ascend. But when I say they ascend, I do not mean locally, but vitally: for Plotinus says that the soul is elevated, not with feet, but by life. But souls that have committed the greatest crimes are *directly* sent to Tartarus; Plato using the word *εὐθύς*, *directly*, instead of *συνεχῶς*; a right line being the shortest of lines which have the same extremities. It is here however worth while to doubt why Plato says they are always judged, and are never purified. What then, is there never any cessation of their punishment? If however the soul is always punished, and never enjoys good, she is always in vice. But punishment regards some good. It is not proper, therefore, that the soul should always continue in a state contrary to nature, but that she should proceed to a condition according to nature. If, therefore, punishment does not in any respect benefit us, nor bring us to a better condition, it is inflicted in vain. Neither God, however, nor nature does any thing in vain.

What then are we to understand by the *ever*? We reply as follows: There are seven spheres, that of the moon, that of the sun, and those of the other planets; but the inerratic is the eighth sphere. The lunar sphere, therefore, makes a complete revolution more swiftly: for it is accomplished in thirty days. That of the sun is more slow: for it is accomplished in a year. That of Jupiter is still slower: for it is effected in twelve years. And much more that of Saturn; for it is completed in thirty years. The stars, therefore, are not conjoined with each other in their revolutions, except rarely. Thus, for instance, the sphere of Saturn and the sphere of Jupiter are conjoined with each other in their revolutions, in sixty years. For, if the sphere of Jupiter comes from the same to the same in twelve years, but that of Saturn in thirty years, it is evident that when Jupiter has made five, Saturn will have made two revolutions: for twice thirty is sixty, and so likewise is twelve times five; so that their revolutions will be conjoined in sixty years. Souls, therefore, are punished for such like periods. But the seven planetary spheres conjoin their revolutions with the inerratic sphere, through many myriads of years; and this is the period which Plato calls *τοὺς αἰῶνας ἑκατόν*, *for ever*. Souls, therefore, that have been patricides or matricides, and universally souls of this description, are punished *for ever*, i. e. during this period. Should however some one say, If a soul that has been guilty of parricide should die to-day, and sixty months, or years, or days after, a conjunction of the revolutions of the seven planets with the inerratic sphere should take place,

for a man who has great power of acting unjustly, to pass through life justly. Yet there are a few men of this kind; for they have existed both here and elsewhere, and I think there will be hereafter worthy and good men, who will be endued with the virtue of administering justly things committed to their trust. A character of this kind, and of great celebrity among the other Greeks, was Aristides the son of Lyfimachus. But the greater part, O most excellent man, of potentates are bad men. As I said, therefore, after Rhadamanthus has taken any soul into his custody, he does not know any thing else respecting it, neither who it is, nor from whom it originated. But he only knows that it is a depraved soul; and seeing this, he sends it to Tartarus; signifying at the same time whether it appears to be curable or incurable. But the soul arriving thither suffers the punishments due to its offences. Sometimes, too, Rhadamanthus beholding the soul of one who has passed through life with truth, whether it is the soul of a private man, or of any other—but I say, Callicles, especially of a philosopher, who has transacted his own affairs, and has not been engaged in a multiplicity of concerns in life—when this is the case, Rhadamanthus is filled with admiration, and dismisses the soul to the islands of the blessed. The same things also are done by Æacus. And each of them judges, holding a rod¹ in his hand. But Minos, who is the inspector, is the only one that sits having a golden² sceptre, as the Ulysses of Homer³ says he saw him:

A golden sceptre in his hand he holds,
And laws promulgates to the dead.

I therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these narrations, and consider how I may appear before my judge, with my soul in the most healthy condition. Wherefore, bidding farewell to the honours of the multitude, and looking to truth, I will endeavour to live in reality in the best manner I am able, and when I die to die so. I likewise call upon all other men, and you also I exhort to this life, and this contest, instead of that which you have adopted,

¹ By the *rod*, says Olympiodorus, the straight, and the equality of justice, are signified.

² Again, says Olympiodorus, the *sceptre* signifies *equality*, but *golden* the *immaterial*. For gold alone does not suit, to which all other material natures are subject.

³ Od. *fl.* xi. ver. 756.

and which I say is to be preferred to all the contests here. And I upbraid you because you will not be able to assist yourself, when that judicial process shall take place of which I have just been speaking. But when you shall come before that judge who is the son of Ægina, and he laying hold of shall examine you, you will there yawn, and be seized with a giddiness, no less than I am here. Some one too, perhaps, will strike you ignominiously on the face, and treat you in a manner perfectly disgraceful. These things, however, perhaps appear to you to be nothing more than the tales of an old woman, and you accordingly despise them. Nor would it be at all wonderful that these things should indeed be despised by us, if by investigation we could find any thing better and more true. But now you three, who are the wisest of all the Greeks existing at present, viz. you, Polus, and Gorgias, see it cannot be shown that it is requisite to live any other life than this, which appears also to be advantageous hereafter. But among so many arguments, while others are confuted this alone remains unmoved, viz. that we ought to be more afraid of doing an injury than of being injured; and that a man ought more than any thing to endeavour not to appear to be good, but to be so in reality, both in private and public. Likewise, that if any one is in any respect vicious, he should be punished; and that this is the next good to the being just, viz. to become just, and to suffer through chastisement the punishment of guilt. And further, that all adulation, both respecting a man's self and others, and respecting a few and a many, is to be avoided; and that rhetoric, and every other action, is always to be employed with a view to the just. Being, therefore, persuaded by me, follow me to that place, whither when you arrive you will be happy, both when living and dead, as my discourse evinces. Suffer, too, any one to despise you as stupid, and to load you with disgrace if he pleases. And, by Jupiter, do you, being confident, permit him to strike this ignominious blow. For you will not suffer any thing dire, if you are in reality worthy and good, and cultivate virtue: and afterwards, when we have thus exercised ourselves in common, then, if it shall appear to be requisite, we will betake ourselves to political concerns, or deliberate on whatever we please, as we shall then be better qualified to deliberate than now. For it is shameful, in the condition we appear to be in at present, to boast of ourselves with juvenile audacity, as if we were some-

thing; we who are never unanimous about the same things, and things of the greatest consequence; at such a degree of unskilfulness have we arrived. Let us employ, therefore, as a leader, the reasoning which now presents itself to the view,—I mean, that which signifies to us that the best mode of life consists in cultivating justice and the other virtues. This, then, let us follow, and exhort others to the same, but not that, in which you confiding exhorted me: for it is, Callicles, of no worth.

THE END OF THE GORGIAS.

THE

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHILEBUS.

THE design of this dialogue is to discover what is the chief good of man ; and in order to effect this in the most perfect manner, it is divided into twelve parts. In the first part, therefore, Plato proposes the subject of discussion, viz. what the good of man is, and whether wisdom or pleasure is more conducive to the attainment of this good. In the second part, he explains the condition of a voluptuous life, and also of a life according to wisdom, that it may be seen which of the two most contributes to felicity, and also whether some third state of life will appear, which is better than either of these ; and that, if this should be the case, it may be seen whether pleasure or wisdom is more allied to the perfection of this life. In the third part, he shows how this discussion should be conducted, and that division and definition should precede demonstration. In the fourth, he describes the conditions of the good, and shows that neither wisdom nor pleasure is the chief good of man. In the fifth part, he investigates the genus of pleasure, and also of wisdom, and unfolds those two great genera of things *bound* and *the infinite*, principles the next in dignity to the ineffable cause of all ; from which two he exhibits that which is mixt, and prelages the cause of the mixture. In the sixth part, because through those genera certain sparks of knowledge are enkindled, he enters on the comparison between pleasure and wisdom. In the seventh, he more largely explains the cause of the mixture, and continues the comparison more clearly. In the eighth part, the principles and genera being now unfolded, he investigates the

the differences ; inquires, in what pleasure and pain consist, which among these are properly produced from passion, and how many parts they contain. In the ninth part, he investigates, in what science properly consists, and, having divided it, shows that a certain third life presides over wisdom, and wisdom over pleasure. In the tenth part, it appears how pleasure and wisdom are mingled together, and that our good consists in a composition of this kind. In the eleventh part, he inquires what it is in that composition from the dominion of which felicity is produced ; in which part both our good and good itself become conspicuous. And, in the twelfth and last part, all the kinds of good which are pursuable as ends are enumerated in order, according to the relative value of each of them to man.

"The subject of this dialogue," says Mr. Sydenham, "is introduced by stating the different opinions of Socrates and Philebus concerning the nature of that good wherein the happiness of man is to be found ; opinions which, it seems, they had just before severally avowed. Philebus, a man strongly prepossessed with the doctrine of Aristippus, had asserted that this good was pleasure, meaning pleasurable sensation, or pleasure felt through the outward senses. On the other hand Socrates had supposed the sovereign good of man to be placed in mind, and in the energies of mind on mental subjects. Philebus, in support of his own assertion, had been haranguing for a long time together, after the manner of the sophists, until he found his spirits and imagination, or perhaps his stock of plausible arguments, quite exhausted. He had, therefore, desired his friend Protarchus, a young gentleman who appears to have been a follower of Gorgias, to take up the controversy, and carry it on in his stead and behalf. Protarchus had consented, and had engaged himself so to do. Immediately on this engagement, at this very point of time the present dialogue commences: accordingly it is carried on chiefly between Socrates and Protarchus. But as Philebus is the principal person whose opinion combats against that of Socrates, and as no higher character is given to Protarchus than that of accessory, or second to Philebus, in this argumentative combat, the dialogue now before us, very properly and consistently with the rule which Plato seems to have laid down to himself in naming his dialogues, has the name given to it of Philebus."

This admirable dialogue is replete with some of the most important dogmas

of the Platonic theology, as will appear from our notes upon it ; and by those who are capable of knowing wholes from parts it may be collected from what is here said, that intellect has not the same order with the first cause of all. For, if our intellect is the image of the first intellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined according to this alone, it necessarily follows that the cause of good is established above intellectual perfection. *The good*, therefore, or the ineffable principle of things, has a super-intellectual subsistence, agreeably to what is asserted in the Sixth Book of the Republic.

I shall only add, as is well observed by Mr. Sydenham, that the apparent form of this dialogue is *dramatic* ; the genius of it, *didactic* ; and the reasoning, for the most part *analytical*.

THE PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS, PHILEBUS.

SCENE.—*The LYCEUM.*

SOCRATES.

CONSIDER¹ now, Protarchus, what the doctrine of Philebus is, which you are taking upon yourself to second and support; and what things said by me you are going to controvert, if they should be found such as are not agreeable to your mind. Will you permit me to state, in a summary way, the difference between my positions and those of Philebus?

PROT. By all means.

SOC. Philebus then says, that the good of all animals is joy, and pleasure, and delight², and whatever else is congenial to them, and harmonizes with all other things of the same kind. And what I contend for is, that those things are not the best; but that to be wise, and to understand³, and
to

¹ The beginning of this dialogue supposes that much conversation had passed, immediately before, between Socrates and Philebus.—S.

² This part of the sentence, to give it a literal translation, runs thus: *that it is good for all animals to rejoice, and (to feel) pleasure and delight, &c.*—But in translating it we chose to give it that meaning which is rightly presumed by Socrates to be agreeable to the sentiments of Philebus; for otherwise there would be no opposition between the opinion of Philebus and his own.—S.

³ How is intellect, says Olympiodorus, spoken of with relation to pleasure? For, in the first place, appetite (*orexis*) rather is divided in opposition to knowledge; but appetite and pleasure are not the same. And, in the next place, there is a certain pleasure in knowledge. To this we may
reply,

remember, and whatever is of kin to them, right opinions, and true reasonings, are better things than pleasure, and more eligible to all beings universally, that is, to such as are capable of receiving the participation of them; and that to all beings which have that capacity, the actual partaking of them is of all things the most advantageous, not only to those beings which are, but to those also which are to come. Do we not, O Philebus, you and I, severally lay down some such hypotheses as these?

PHIL. Exactly such, O Socrates!

reply, that there is a pleasure in knowledge, in consequence of its participation of appetite. For to be pleasantly affected when we apprehend the object of knowledge, arises from the assumption of appetite. But to the other question we may reply, that the investigative is analogous to the orectic power: for investigation, being as it were a gnostic orexis (appetite), is a way to a certain end; just as orexis hastens to a certain thing. But the possession of the object of appetite is analogous to knowledge, which is the possession of truth.

Again, the vital and the orectic are not the same. For life is also predicated of knowledge; since knowledge moves, and that which knows is moved, which is especially the peculiarity of life. But that which knows is moved when it investigates, not when it has arrived at the end, which knowledge signifies.

Again, good is predicated both of knowledge and orexis: for knowledge is beneficial, and is the cause of union with the object of knowledge. But the good of orexis is, as it were, practical, and we wish not to know, but to be passive to it, and we embrace it more nearly, but do not endure to have it at a distance. But we can endure the object of knowledge, though at a distance; for we wish to know and not to be it. What, however, shall we say the orectic is? For it is not common good; since this also pertains to knowledge. Nor is it something unknown: for orexis subsists together with knowledge. It is, therefore, a certain good which is known. Hence, it moves from itself the perceiver. But this is the beautiful; since orexis, considered according to its common acceptance, is nothing else than love; though love is a strenuous orexis. For the more and the less produce no alteration according to species; but the strenuous is intenseness alone. Further still, the pleasant is the attendant of orexis; but the pleasant is apparent beauty. For apparent good is benignant and lovely to all animals. But may not the beautiful be thus related to the good, according to indication? For, in the first place, the good is above idea; but things which are in forms are more allied to us. For the good is the formal object of orexis; but the beautiful is the formal object of love; just as being is the formal object of knowledge. Orexis, however, differs in species from love. For, if orexis is assumed in common, it is extended to one common good. But, if the ends are separated, the powers also which hasten towards them must be separated. For the contact which, according to its idiom, is called friendship, *φιλία*, and which makes a union with good, is one thing, and the power which harmonizes with this must be called desire, *ἐπιτομία*; but the power which, according to indigence, urges the multitude is another; and a thing of this kind is denominated love, *εὔρος*, and hastens to the beautiful.—T.

SOC. And will you, Protarchus, take up the controversy, as I have just now stated it?

PROT. Of necessity¹ I must. For Philebus, the champion of our side, is tired and gives out.

SOC. Now it is right and proper for us to discover, by all means possible, the full force and meaning of both those hypotheses; and not to give over till we have determined the controversy between them.

PROT. I agree with you, it is.

SOC. Let us agree in this too, besides.

PROT. In what?

SOC. That we should, each of us², endeavour to set forth what state and what affection³ of the soul is able, according to our different hypotheses, to procure for every man a happy life. Is it not our business to do?

PROT.

¹ Necessity is threefold: for it is either self-perfect, associating with *the good*; or material, with which indigence and imbecility associate; or it is as that which is referred to an end, as navigation with a view to gain. Thus Proclus.—T.

² The Greek of this sentence, in all the editions of Plato, is *αὐτῶν ἑκατέρος*. But all the translators interpret, as if they read in the MSS. *ἡμῶν ἑκατέρος*: a reading which is clearly agreeable to the sense of the passage, and makes it easier to be understood. In the printed reading the word *αὐτῶν* must refer to *λογῶν*, which is more remote, and has been rather implied than expressed; *αὐτῶν ἑκατέρος* will then mean *the argument of each*; but to say, *the argument should endeavour*, is in a style too figurative and bold to be used by any profane writer.—S.

³ In the Greek,—*ἔστιν καὶ διαθεσις*.—All the differences between *ἔστις* and *διαθεσις* are accurately shown by Aristotle in his *Categories*, cap. viii. and in his *Metaphysics*, lib. iv. sec. 19. In the sentence now before us, the difference between them is this: *διαθεσις ψυχῆς*, an *affection of the soul*, is the soul's present but transient state; *ἔστις ψυχῆς*, a *state of the soul*, is the soul's permanent affection. Thus we say of a man, that he is in a joyous state of mind, when the joy with which he is affected is of some standing, and is likely to continue: but of a man in whose soul joy is just now arisen, we say, that he is seized (that is, affected suddenly) with joy. And thus again we say, that the mind is in a thoughtful state, when it has been for some time actually thinking, and is not easy to be diverted from thinking on: but when a thought arises suddenly within us, in an unthinking state of mind, and amidst the wanderings of fancy, we say that a thought strikes us, that is, suddenly affects our mind. It must not however be concealed, that *ἔστις* and *διαθεσις*, which we have here translated by the words *state* and *affection*, usually mean *habit* and *disposition*. But the affinity between this their usual meaning, and that which they have in the passage now before us, will appear, from considering, that, as the soul acquires certain habits of acting, through frequently-repeated acts of the same kind,—so she is fixed in some certain state, through frequent impressions made on her where she is passive, or through frequent energies of her own where she is active;

PROT. Certainly it is.

SOC. Well then : You say that it is that of rejoicing ; we, that it is that of understanding and thinking rightly.

PROT. True.

SOC. But what if there should appear some other, preferable to both of these, but more nearly of kin to pleasure ? should we not in this case be both of us confuted, and obliged to yield the preference to a life which gives the stable possession of those very things wherein you place human happiness ? However, at the same time it must be agreed, that a life of pleasure would be found more eligible than a life of knowledge or intellection.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. But if that better state of the soul should appear to be more nearly allied to knowledge, in that case, knowledge would be found to have the advantage over pleasure, and pleasure must give place. Do ye not agree with me, that these things are so ? or how otherwise say ye that they are ?

PROT. To me, I must confess, they seem to be as you represent them.

SOC. But to Philebus how seem they ? What say you, Philebus ?

PHIL. To me pleasure seems, and will always seem, to be the superior, whatever it be compared with. And you, Protarchus, will be at length convinced of it yourself.

PROT. After having resigned to me the management of the debate, you can no longer be the master of what should be yielded to Socrates, and what should not.

PHIL. You are in the right. But, however, I have discharged my duty ; and I here call the Goddess herself to witness it.

PROT. We too are witnesses of the same ; and can testify your making of the assertion which you have just made. But now, as to that examination, O Socrates ! which is to follow after what you and I have agreed in, whether Philebus be willing to consent, or however he may be disposed, let us try to go through with it, and bring it to a conclusion.

active ; a state, to which those impressions from without, and those energies within, gradually lead her ;—and also that, in like manner as some certain previous disposition of the soul is necessary to every single act which is voluntary, so is it also necessary to the receiving of every impression from without, and to the performing of every energy within.—S.

Soc.

Soc. By all means, let us; beginning with that very Goddess who, according to him, is called Venus, but whose true name is Pleasure¹.

PROT. Perfectly right.

Soc. The fear² which I have always in me concerning the proper names of the Gods, is no ordinary kind of fear; but surpasses the greatest dread. Hence, in the present case, with regard to Venus, whatever name be agreeable to the Goddess, by that would I choose to call her. But as to pleasure³, how various a thing it is, I well know. And with this, as I just now said, ought we to begin, by considering and inquiring into the nature of pleasure first. For we hear it called, indeed, by one single name, as if it were one simple thing: it assumes, however, all sorts of forms, even such as

¹ Why is Pleasure, says Olympiodorus, a Goddess, according to Philebus? May we not say, As that which is the object of desire, and as an end? But why is Venus a Goddess? Shall we say, As lovely? Perhaps they are Goddesses, because they are both concerned in the procreations of animals, the one as a presiding power, the other as a passion. Why, too, is Pleasure not considered as a Goddess by any of the ancients? Because, says Proclus, it neither is a predeceant good, nor immediately beautiful, nor has a middle subsistence, and different from both these. We must say, however, that Pleasure, according to Jamblichus, is a Goddess, and is recognized in temples by Proclus the Laodicean.

Again, no one of the ancients says that Venus is Pleasure. What then is the reason of this? May we not say, that it is because Venus has a copulative power, and that a certain pleasure follows copulation? And also, that this pleasure is accompanied with much of the deformed? Venus, however, is beautiful, not only that Venus which is divine, but that also which belongs to nature. And in theology, the idiom of *Venus* is different from that of *Euphrosyne*, *Delight*.—T.

² Why does Socrates, says Olympiodorus, so much venerate the names of the Gods? Shall we say, Because formerly things adapted were consecrated to appropriate natures, and because it is unbecoming to move things immovable? or, that names are adapted to the nature of the Gods, according to what is said in the *Cratylus*? or, that these names are vocal images of the Gods, according to Democritus? But how does a worthy man fear? Either very properly the divine wrath; or this fear is a veneration, but not a certain passion attended with dread. I shall only observe, in addition to what is said by Olympiodorus, that this passage, among a multitude of others, proves, beyond all possibility of contradiction, that Socrates believed in the existence of divine beings, the immediate progeny of the ineffable cause of all, or, in other words, was a polytheist.—T.

³ Pleasure subsists together with motion; for it is the attendant of it. But the motion of intellect is an immutable energy; that of soul, a mutable energy; and that of an animal, a passive energy. But that of a plant is passion only.—T.

² Viz. by none of the Greek theologians.

are the most unlike one to another. For observe : we say that the intemperate man has pleasure ; and that the temperate man has pleasure also,—pleasure in being what he is, that is, temperate. Again : we say that pleasure attends on folly, and on the man who is full of foolish opinions and foolish hopes ; that pleasure attends also on the man who thinks wisely,—pleasure in that very mental energy, his thinking wisely. Now any person who would affirm these pleasures to be of similar kind, would be justly deemed to want understanding.

PROT. The pleasures which you mention, O Socrates, are indeed produced by contrary causes ; but in the pleasures themselves there is no contrariety. For how should pleasure not be similar to pleasure, itself to itself, the most similar of all things¹ ?

SOC. Just so, colour too, my friend, differs not from colour in this respect, that it is colour, all. And yet, we all of us know that black, besides being different from white, happens to be also its direct contrary. So figure, too, is all one with figure, after the same manner, in the general. But as to the parts of that one general thing, some are directly contrary to others ; and between the rest there happens to be a kind of infinite diversity. And many other things we shall find to be of this nature. Believe not then this position, that things the most contrary are all of them one. And I suspect that we shall also find some pleasures quite contrary to other pleasures.

PROT. It may be so. But how will that hurt my side of the question ?

SOC. In that *you* call them, dissimilar as they are, by another name ; (shall we say ?) for all *pleasant* things you call *good*. Now that all pleasant things are pleasant, admits of no dispute. But though many of them are evil, and many indeed good, as I readily acknowledge, yet all of them you call good ; and at the same time you confess them to be dissimilar in their natures, when a man forces you to this confession. What then is that, the same in every

¹ This was the very language, or manner of expression, used by a sect of philosophers called Cyrenæans, from Cyrene, the native city of Aristippus, their master. For the Cyrenæans held, says Iacærtius, *μη διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς*, *that pleasure differs not from pleasure*. Whence it appears probable, that Philebus derived his notions and expressions on this point from some of the disciples of Aristippus, if not from Aristippus himself. For this philosopher, after he had for some time conversed with Socrates, for the sake of whose conversation he came to Athens, departed thence, and went to Ægina ; where he professed the teaching of philosophy, and where he resided till after the death of Socrates.—S.

pleasure,

pleasure, in the evil pleasures equally with the good, from which you give to all pleasures the denomination of good?

PROT. What is that, O Socrates, which you say? Do you imagine that any person, after having asserted that pleasure is the good, will admit your supposition? or will suffer it to pass uncontradicted, that only some pleasures are good, but that other pleasures are evil?

SOC. However, you will acknowledge that pleasures are unlike one to another, and some even contrary to others?

PROT. By no means; so far as they are pleasures, every one of them.

SOC. We are now brought back again to the same position, O Protarchus! There is no difference between pleasure and pleasure; all pleasures are alike, we must say: and the similar instances, just now produced, in colours and in figures, have had, it seems, no effect upon us. But we shall try, and talk after the manner of the meanest arguers, and mere novices in dialectic.

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. I mean, that if I, to imitate you, and dispute with you in your own way, should dare to assert that two things, the most unlike, are of all things the most like to each other, I should say nothing more than what you say: so that both of us would appear to be raver disputants than we ought to be; and the subject of our dispute would thus slip out of our hands, and get away. Let us resume it, therefore, once more: and, perhaps, by returning to similitudes¹, we may be induced to make some concessions each of us to the other.

¹ The sense and the reasoning require a small alteration to be here made in the Greek copies of Plato, by reading, instead of *τας ὁμοίας*,—*τας ὁμοιοτητας*, *similitudes*, or rather *τα ὅμοια*, *similes*.—Similes of the kind here meant are by Aristotle, in his Art of Rhetoric, lib. ii. cap. 20. edit. Du Vall, justly styled *τα Σωκρατικά*, *Socratic*, because frequently employed by Socrates. They are not such as those for which the imagination of a poet skims over all nature, to illustrate some things by superficial resemblances to them in other things: neither are they such as the memory of an orator ransacks all history for, to prove the certainty of some doubtful fact by examples on record, which agree with it in a few circumstances: but they are such as the reason of an accomplished master of dialectic chooses out from subjects near at hand, to prove the truth of some uncertain or controverted position, by the analogy it bears to some other truth which is obvious, and clear, and will be readily admitted. Such a simile, bearing the plainest and most striking analogy with what is to be proved, is actually produced, immediately after this preface to it, by Socrates. But not a word is there in what follows concerning similar pleasures; and *τας ὁμοίας*, *alike* or *similar*, cannot be joined with, or belong to, any preceding noun, beside *ἡδονας*. As to the word *returning*, in the present sentence, it refers to those similes produced before of colour and of figure.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Say how.

SOC. Suppose me to be the party questioned; and suppose yourself, Protarchus, to interrogate me.

PROT. Concerning what?

POL. Concerning prudence, and science, and intelligence, and all the rest of those things which in the beginning of our conversation I said were good, when I was asked what sort of a thing good was; must I not acknowledge these to be attended with the same circumstance which attends those other things celebrated by you?

PROT. What circumstance?

SOC. The sciences, viewed all of them together, will seem to both of us not only many, and of diverse kinds, but dissimilar too, some to others. Now if besides there should appear a contrariety¹ in any way, between some of them and others, should I deserve to be disputed with any longer, if, fearful of admitting contrariety between the sciences, I were to assert that no one science was dissimilar to any other science? For then the matter in debate between us, as if it were a mere fable, being destroyed, would vanish: while we saved ourselves by an illogical retreat. But such an event ought not to happen, except this part of it,—the saving of ourselves. And now the equality, which appears thus far between your hypothesis and mine, I am well enough pleased with. The pleasures happen to be found many and dissimilar; many also and diverse are the sciences. The difference, however, between your good and mine, O Protarchus, let us not conceal: but let us dare to lay it fairly and openly before us both; that we may discover, (if those who are closely examined will make any discovery,) whether pleasure or wisdom ought to be pronounced the chief good of man, or whether any third thing, different from either: since it is not, as I presume, with this view that we contend, that my hypothesis, or that yours, may prevail over its antagonist; but that which hath the truth on its side, we are both of us to contend for and support.

PROT. This is certainly our duty.

¹ *Contrariety* in the sciences is nothing more than *diversity*. For one science is not in opposition to, or hostile to, another; since secondary are subservient to prior sciences, and from them derive their proper principles.—T.

Soc. But this point further we should, both of us together, settle on the surest ground.

PROT. What point do you mean?

Soc. That which puzzles and perplexes all persons who choose to make it the subject of their conversation: nay, sometimes some others, who have no such intention, are led to it unawares in conversation upon other subjects.

PROT. Express what you mean in plainer terms.

Soc. I mean that which fell in our way but just now, the nature of which is so full of wonders. For that many are one¹, and that one is many, is wonderful to have it said; and either of those positions is easy to be controverted.

PROT. Do you mean such positions as this,—that I Protarchus, who am by nature one person, am also many? and such as these others,—that myself, and other persons the reverse of me,—the great also and the little, the heavy and the light, are one and the same? with a thousand positions more which might be made of like kind?

Soc. The wonders, O Protarchus, which you have now spoken of, relating to the one and many, have been hackneyed in the mouths of the vulgar; but by the common agreement, as it were, of all men, they are now laid aside, and are never to be mentioned: for they are considered as childish and easy objections, and great impediments also to discourse. It is now also agreed, never to introduce into conversation, as an instance of one and many, the members or parts into which any single thing may be considered as divisible. Because, when a respondent has once admitted and avowed, that all these [*members or parts*] are that *one* thing, which is thus at the same time *many*, he is refuted and laughed at by his questioner, for having been driven to assert such monstrous absurdities as these,—that a single one is an infinite multitude, and an infinite multitude only one.

PROT. What other things, then, not hackneyed among the vulgar, nor as yet universally agreed on, do you mean, O Socrates, relating to this point?

Soc. I mean, young man, when a thing is proposed to be considered, which is one, but is not of the number or nature of things generated and pe-

¹ See the Parmenides.—T.

rishable. For as to the ones of this latter sort, it is agreed, as I just now said, to reject them, as unworthy of a serious confutation. The ones which I mean are such as man, ox, beauty, good. When these *henads*¹, or such as these, are proposed for subjects of debate, much serious attention is given them; and when they come to be divided, any one of them into many, much doubt and controversy arises.

PROT. Upon what points?

SOC. In the first place, whether such monads should be deemed to have true being. In the next place, how it is that these monads, every one of them being always the same, and never generated, nor ever to be destroyed, have, notwithstanding, one and the same stability common to them all². And lastly, Whether we should suppose every such monad to be dispersed and spread abroad amongst an infinity of things generated or produced, and thus, from being one, to become many; or whether we should suppose it to remain entire, itself by itself³, separate and apart from that multitude. But, of all suppositions, this might appear the most impossible, that one and the same

¹ Plato, says Olympiodorus, calls the summits of forms *monads* and *henads*. He calls them *henads*, with reference to the appropriate multitude of which they are the leaders: but *monads*, with reference to the supersensual. Or we may say, that there are twofold summits of forms, the one *essential*, and the other *characterized by unity*, as it is said in the *Parmenides*.—See the Notes on the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. From hence the ignorance of Cudworth is apparent, who, in his *Intellectual System*, p. 555, considers the doctrine of *henads* derived from the first one, or *the one itself*, as a fiction of the latter Platonists.—T.

² This second question supposes the first question decided in favour of the true being of the monads. For, if universals are held to be only names, invented to denote unreal fancies or factitious notions, it is trifling and idle to inquire whence they derive stability; this being an affection, or property, of real beings only,—unless it be as merely nominal, notional, or fantastic, as those things are to which it is attributed.—The sentence now before us in the Greek is printed thus: πως αὐ ταυτας, μιαν ἐκαστην οὐσαν αὐ τὴν αὐτην, καὶ μὴτε γενεσιν μὴτε οὐδεὶν προερχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότητα μιαν ταυτην. The Greek text must here be faulty; and, to make good sense of it, it is necessary to make a small alteration or two,—by reading *εχεν* instead of *ειναι*, and *καὶ αὐτην* instead of *ταυτην*. In translating this passage, we have presumed it ought to be so read; and the meaning, intended to be conveyed by it, we suppose to be this:—“it must needs seem strange, that distinct beings, not generated, some of them by others, but all equally eternal, without intercommunity or interchange between them, should, nevertheless, have one and the same nature, that of *monad* or *unity*, and one and the same property of their being, that of *stability*.”—S.

³ In the Greek we here read—αὐτην αὐτῆς χωρὶς. But it is presumed that we ought to read—αὐτην ἐφ’ αὐτῆς χωρὶς.—S.

thing should be in a single one, and in many, at the same time. These points, O Protarchus, which regard such instances as I have mentioned, and not such as were mentioned by you, these are they, which, for want of being rightly settled, create all the difficulties and doubts we meet with in discourse; but when once they are settled rightly, they clear the way with ease.

PROT. Then, it seems, we are to labour these points first.

SOC. I should think we ought.

PROT. And that we consent to it, you may take for granted, all of us here. Philebus, indeed, it is best perhaps, at present, not to discompose by asking him questions, now that he is quiet.

SOC. Very well; but in what way shall we begin the discussion of these points in so wide a field of controversy? Shall we begin thus?

PROT. How?

SOC. We say, in speaking of these monads, (each of which is one, but, on a logical examination of it, appears to be divisible into many,) that they run throughout every sentence in our discourse, every where and always; and that, as their being shall never have an end, so neither does it first begin in the present age. Now this perpetual attendant upon all speech proceeds, as it seems to me, from something immortal and undecaying within ourselves. And hence it is, that the youth every where, when they have thus had a taste of it, are overjoyed at their having thus found a treasure of wisdom. Transported, therefore, with the delight it gives them, they apply it to every subject of discourse: sometimes they collect particulars from all quarters, and roll them into one; then they unroll them again, and part them asunder. After having in this way puzzled themselves in the first place, they question and puzzle the person next at hand, whether he be their equal in age, or younger than themselves, or older, sparing neither father nor mother, nor any one else who will attend to them, scarcely other animals more than man: it is certain they would not exempt any who speak a foreign language only, could they but find somewhere an interpreter.

PROT. Do you not see, O Socrates, how numerous we are, and that all of us are young? and are you not afraid that, if you rail at us, we shall all join Philebus, and attack you jointly? However (for we apprehend your meaning), if you can by any means or contrivance easily rid of us of these perplexities,

perplexities, which hinder the progress of our inquiry, and can devise some better way of managing the argument, do you but give your mind to the prosecution of it, and we shall do our utmost to follow and attend you. For the present debate is of no trifling concern, Socrates.

SOC. Indeed it is not, O boys! as Philebus called you. No better way then is there, nor can there be, than that, which I am always a great lover of; but often before now it has slipped away from my sight, and has left me, as it were, in a desert, at a loss whither to turn me.

PROT. Let us but know what way you mean.

SOC. To point out the way is not very difficult; but to travel in it, is the most difficult of all things. For all such human inventions as depend on art are, in this way, discovered and laid open. Consider then the way which I am speaking of.

PROT. Do but tell it us then.

SOC. A gift ¹ of the Gods to men, as it appears to me, by a certain Prometheus ² hurled from the Gods along with a fire the most luminous. From
the

¹ This gift is the *dialectic* of Plato, of which we have given an ample account in the Introduction to, and Notes on, the *Parmenides*. I shall only observe at present, that this vertex of the sciences consists of four parts, viz. *division*, *definition*, *demonstration*, and *analysis*. Of these, the *divisive* art, says Olympiodorus, is connate with the progression of things; but the *analytic* with their conversion. And the *definitive* and *demonstrative* arts, which have a middle situation, are similar to the hypostasis, or subsisting nature of things. The *definitive*, however, is analogous to that hypostasis which subsists from itself; but the *demonstrative* to that which is suspended from its cause.—T.

² Prometheus, says Olympiodorus, does not produce good, as unfolding into light, but as a Titan. For he employs a providential care upon rational essences which proceed to the extremity, just as Epimetheus provides for irrational natures. For irrational natures proceed to a care of things subordinate, and, having proceeded, distribute the whole of divine Providence. Again, the fire which Prometheus stole, and gave to men, is every anagogic essence and perfection, distributed through him to the last of things. Hence it is said to have been *stolen*, because an *anagogic* essence is *deduced*; but through him, because it is alone deduced Titanically,—but other Gods give subsistence to a form of this kind.

Again, that every generated nature is one and many, is nothing wonderful; for these natures are partible, and partipate of many habitudes; but how is this the case with every intelligible essence? In the first place, we may say that each is a monad, and also a number, according to the series of the monad; as, for instance, the beautiful, and things beautiful. In the second place, that the monad is both that which it is, and all other things according to commixtion. In the third place,

the men of antient times, men better than we are, and dwelling nigher to the Gods, this tradition of it hath descended to us,—that those beings said to be for ever derive their essence from one and many; and therefore have in themselves bound and infinity connatural to them: that, being in the midst of things so constituted as they are, we ought to suppose and to search for some one idea in every thing around us; for that, since it is there, we shall, on searching, be sure to find it: that, after we have found it, we are next to look for two, if two only are next; otherwise three, or some other number: again, that every one of this number we are to examine in like manner: until at length a man not only perceives, that the one, with which he began, is one, and many, and infinite, but discovers also how many it contains: for, that a man never should proceed to the idea of infinite, and apply it immediately to any number, before he has fully discovered all the definite number which lies between the infinite and the one: but that, having completed this

place, it both consists from the genera of being and one idiom. In the fourth place, the idiom is multiplied together with the many; but there is a certain impartible summit in all the many. In the fifth place, this summit is an united form, but there is also something in it above form. And, in the sixth place, this summit is at the same time the united, but not *the one*. Further still, as all things are from one and many, it is necessary that these two principles should be arranged prior to all things; the former being the cause to all things of unity, and the latter of multitude. They must likewise evidently be posterior to the first cause; for that is *at once* the cause of all things.

Again, in the extremities of things infinite multitude is beheld, but in the summit a monad presubsists, according to every form. But infinite multitude would not be generated, unless in the monad which generates it an infinite power was preassumed. Nor would every individual in infinities be bounded, unless bound preceded to the last of things. Progression subsists through all appropriate media, from the monad to infinite multitude. And, in the first place, this is seen in multitude capable of being participated. For progression is not immediately from *the one* to the infinite, but to two and three, and the following numbers. And, in the next place, the progression of bodies is of this kind, for it has no vacuum together with its variety. In the third place, the generative power of the monad being both one and many, at once generates all things according to the whole of itself; things secondary being always consequent to such as are prior.

Further still, says Olympiodorus, the divisive method proceeds together with the progression of forms, not cutting off the continuity of subjection, nor introducing a vacuum, but proceeding through all the media, from the one to the infinite. The business of the divisive method is first to place *the one* every where before the many. Secondly, to place the finite before infinite multitude. Thirdly, always to define according to quantity, the lesser before the greater number. Fourthly, to omit no number of things which give completion to progression. Fifthly, to select
 numbers

this discovery, we should then finish our search ; and dismissing into infinity every one of all those numbers, we should bid farewell to them. The Gods, as I before said, have given us to consider things in this way, and in this way to learn them, and teach them one to another. But the wise men of these days take any monad whatever, and divide it into many with more conciseness than they ought, and with more prolixity too, since they never come to an end : for immediately after the monad they introduce infinity, overlooking all the intermediate numbers ; the express mention of which, or the omission of them, distinguishes such dialectical and fair debates as ours, from such as are contentious and sophistical.

PROT. Part of what you say, Socrates, I seem to apprehend tolerably well : but the meaning of some things which you have now said, I should be glad to hear you express in plainer terms.

numbers adapted to respective forms ; the triadic, for instance, or the hebdomadic, to Minerva, and in a similar manner in all the rest. For different numbers proceed according to different forms ; as also of the Gods, there are different numbers according to different Divinities. For of monads themselves, one progression is monadic, as that of the monad ; another dyadic, as that of the dyad ; and in a similar manner with the rest : so that there is not a division of all things into two. Sixthly, to divide through forms, but not through form and negation, according to the opinion of Aristotle : for no number is produced from form and negation. Seventhly, to produce every monad into division in its proper order, whether it be in that of bound, or in that of infinity : for each is every where. Ninthly, to produce things oppositely divided, according to antithesis, whether certain media are discovered, or not. Tenthly, not to leave the media in the extent (*ἐν τῷ πλατεῖ*). Eleventhly, to ascribe different numbers appropriately to different orders, as the number twelve to supermundane natures, and the number seven to intellectuals. Twelfthly, to see where the lesser numbers are more excellent, and where they are subordinate, and in a similar manner with respect to the greater. For the mundane decad is subordinate to the supermundane duodecad ; but the intellectual hebdomad is superior to it.

Again, the analytic art is subordinate to the divisive : for the latter is from a cause, but the former from a sign ; and the latter from on high surveys things more subordinate, but the former beholds downwards things on high ; and the latter stops at nothing sensible, but the former at first stands in need of sense. Thus, the latter giving subsistence and producing, nearly makes the whole of the proceeding essence ; but the former converting, confers on that which has proceeded a departure from the subordinate, and an adherence to the more excellent nature. On which account progression is more essential than conversion, and is therefore more excellent. So that procession is superior to conversion, and the essential to the anagogic. In the descent of the soul, however, since progression is here an apostacy from better natures, ascent which corresponds to conversion is better than progression or descent.—T.

Soc.

Soc. The whole of what I have said, Protarchus, is evident in letters. In these, therefore, which have been taught you from your childhood, you may easily apprehend my meaning.

PROT. How in letters?

Soc. Voice, that issues out of the human mouth, may be considered as one general thing, admitting of an infinite number of articulations, not only in all men taken together, but also in every individual man.

PROT. Without doubt.

Soc. Now we are not made knowing in speech, or sound articulate, through the knowledge either of the infinity or of the oneness of its nature: but to know how many, and what, are the parts into which it is naturally divided,—this it is which makes any of us a grammarian, or skilled in grammar.

PROT. Most certainly.

Soc. And further, that by which a man comes to be skilled in music is this very thing.

PROT. How so?

Soc. Musical sound¹, which is the subject matter of this art, may be considered in itself as one general thing.

PROT. Without dispute.

¹ In the Greek, the term used here, as well as just before, (where this translation hath the word *voice*,) is *φωνη*. It there signified articulated vocal sound, or *speech*: it here signifies musical sound of the voice, or *vocal music*. We see then that *φωνη*, *human voice*, is by Plato supposed to be a common genus, divisible into those two sorts or species. It is expressly so laid down by Nicomachus, (Harmonic. Enchirid. pag. 3, edit. Amst.) in these words:—Τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ διδασκαλείου δύο ἐφασκόν, ὡς ἑνὸς γένους, εἰδὴ ὑπαρχειν· καὶ τὸ μὲν συνεχεῖς ἰδίως ὀνομαζόν· τὸ δὲ διαστηματικόν. Such [writers concerning music] as came out of the Pythagorean school say, that of human voice [in general], as of one genus, there are two species. One of these two they properly named continuous, the other discrete. These two technical terms he afterward explains, by showing us that the continuous is that voice which we utter in discoursing and in reading; (and therefore, by Aristoxenus and by Euclid termed *φωνη λογικῇ*) and that the discrete is the voice issued out of our mouths in singing; (and thence termed *φωνη μελωδικῇ*) for, in this latter case, every single sound is distinguished by a certain or measured tone of the voice. The same division of *φωνη* is laid down, and a similar account of it is given, by Aristoxenus in Harmonic. Element. pag. 8 & 9, edit. Amst.—S.

Soc.

Soc. And let us suppose two kinds of it, the grave and the acute, and a third kind between those two, the homotonous, or how otherwise¹?

PROT. Musical sound in general is so to be distinguished.

Soc. But with the knowledge of this distinction only, you would not yet be skilled in music; though without knowing it you would be, as to music, quite worthless.

PROT. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But, my friend, when you have learnt the intervals² between all musical sounds, from the more acute to the more grave, how many they are in number, and into what sorts they are distinguished; when you have also learnt the bounds³ of these intervals, and how many systems⁴ are composed

¹ Homotony of sound is made when a string of some stringed instrument of music, having the same degree of tension with a similar string of some other, yields, in conjunction with it, the same musical tone; or when two different voices utter at the same time musical sounds, neither of which is more acute, or more grave, than the other. In both cases, the sameness of the sound is also termed *ὁμοφωνία*: for *φωνή*, voice, is (metaphorically) attributed to all musical instruments; (see Nicomachus, pag. 5 and 6.) as, on the other hand, tone is (by an easy metaphor) attributed to the human voice, modulated by the will in the trachea, or *aspera arteria*: for this natural wind-instrument, in English aptly named the wind-pipe, while it transmits the air breathed out from the lungs, receives any degree of tension it is capable of, at the pleasure of the mind. In like manner, a repetition of the same tone from a single human voice, as well as from a single monochord, is termed a monotony.—S.

² An interval is the distance [or difference *κατὰ τόπον*, with regard to place] between any two musical sounds, (between that which is acute relatively to the other, and that other which is relatively a grave,) however near together they may be, or however remote from each other, on any scale of music. In proportion to the nearness or remoteness of these two sounds, the interval between them is, in mathematical language, said to be small or great; that is, it is short or long. So that different musical intervals, like all other different distances from place to place, essentially differ one from another in magnitude or length. And on this essential difference are founded all the other diversities of the intervals.

³ The bounds of each interval are those two musical sounds, from either of which there is made an immediate step or transition to the other. Of all musical sounds the three principal were: *ἡμικτὴν* the most grave, *πικρὴν* the most acute, and *μεσὴν* the middle between those other two, on the most ancient scale of music; which consisted of only seven sounds, produced by striking on the same number of strings, all of different lengths. We account those three just now mentioned the principal, because the first and easiest division of any quantity, whether it be continuous or discrete, is into two equal parts, or halves: the most distinguishable points or bounds of it, therefore, however it be afterwards subdivided, are the two extremes and the middle. Accord-

posed out of them; (which our predecessors having discovered, delivered down to us, who come after them, by the name of harmonies¹; and having discovered

ingly Plato, in his 4th book *De Republicâ*, edit. Cantab. pag. 314, speaking of the *νεατη*, the *ὑπατη*, and the *μεση*, the highest, the lowest, and the middle sound in music, calls them *οὗτοι τρεῖς ἁρμονίαι*, the *three bounds of harmony*; and likens to them the three most evidently distinguished parts of the soul,—the rational part, the highest; the concupiscible, the lowest; and the irascible, between them both.—S.

* A system is a composition of three or more musical sounds; or (what amounts to the same thing) it is an extent, comprehending two or more intervals. Of these systems the general diversities are laid down by Aristides, pag. 15 & seq. But in his definition of a system (as it is printed) an important error deserves notice. For we there read—*πλειονων ἢ δυοιν*, *more than two*: instead of which we ought to read—*δυοιν ἢ πλειονων*, *two or more*; or else—*πλειονων ἢ ἑνος*, *more than one*: which last are the very words used by Aristoxenus, Euclid, and Gaudentius, in their definitions of a system. The error probably arose from some manuscript copy of Aristides happening to be not easily legible in this place. The transcriber of it, therefore, we suppose, consulted Baccheius; who in his definition of a system useth the words—*πλειονων ἢ δυοιν*. These words are right indeed in Baccheius, because they are by him applied to *φθόγγων*, musical sounds, agreeably to our first definition; but they would be wrong in Aristides, where he is speaking, not of *φθόγγων*, but of *διαστηματων*, the intervals of those sounds, agreeably to our second definition. On the many diversities and variations to be made in so large a field of systems, are founded those many different forms, figures, or modes of harmony, or sorts of tunes, (the Greek writers call them *εἶδη*, *μορφαι*, *σχηματα*, *τροποι*, and *τοιαι ἁρμονίαι*,) the general kinds of which, according to Aristides, pag. 25, are these—the Doric, the Phrygian, and the Lydian. If this be true, all the other modes are to be considered as subordinate to these three; and indeed they seem, some of them, to be intensions, others to be remissions, and others to be mixtures, of those the more moderate and simple.—S.

¹ The word *ἁρμονία*, *harmony*, was used in different senses by the old Grecian writers. We learn from Nicomachus, that the most antient writers on music gave the name of harmony to that most perfect consonance, the diapason. Aristoxenus and Euclid mean, by the term harmony, that kind of melody which is called enharmonic. Plato and Aristotle, when they speak of harmony in the singular number, without the addition of an epithet denoting the sort, mean by that term the idea which is commonly now-a-days expressed by the term music; probably, because it was the first discovered of those sciences, as well as the first invented of those arts, which were antiently comprehended together in one general idea, expressed in one word, and termed music. But when the same great philosophers speak of harmonies in the plural number, they mean those different forms or modes of harmony whose specific differences depend on the different systems, or on the different order of those systems of which they are severally composed. To the term harmony in this latter sense only, (as it signifies a mode of harmony,) agrees the following definition of it, given us by Theo, and, long after him, by Pcellus:—

discovered other such affections¹ in the motions of the body, and in words², measuring these by numbers, they have taught us to call them rhythms³ and metres; bidding us to infer from hence, that every *one-and-many* ought to be searched into and examined in the same way;) when you have learnt all those things, and comprehend them in this ample manner, with all their several diversities and distinctions, then are you become skilled in music. And by considering in the same way the nature of any other kind of being, when you thus fully comprehend it, you are become in that respect intelligent and wise. But the infinite multitude of individuals, their infinite variety, and the infinite changes incident to each, keep you *infinitely far off* from intelligence and wisdom: and as they make you to be behind other men in every path of knowledge, they make you inconsiderable, and of no

Phellus:—Ἀρμονία ἐστὶ συστηματικὴν συντάξιν. *A harmony* (not harmony in general) *is a composition* (or an ordering together) *of systems*. On this definition Bouillaud, in his Notes to Theo, pag. 250, judiciously observes,—*Vocat hic harmoniam quos alii appellant τροπους seu τόνους*. On this subject we shall only observe further, that the synthesis of harmony, presented to us by Plato, in the whole passage now before us, beginning from simple φθόγγοι, or musical sounds, (which are the elements or primary constituent parts of harmony,) is exactly the same, and proceeds in the same order, with that synthesis which is taught by all the ancient Greek writers on music: one proof among many, this, of Plato's knowledge in the theory of music. Agreeably to which observation, Plutarch, in his Treatise περὶ Μουσικῆς, informs us, that Plato applied his mind closely to the science of music; having attended the Lectures of Draco the Athenian, and those of Metellus of Agrigentum. Or if we suppose that Plato, in this part of the present dialogue, did no more than faithfully record the doctrine of Socrates, our supposition is very justifiable; for Socrates in his old age studied music under Connus.—S.

¹ That is, such relations and proportions, (or, to make use of musical terms,) such steps and transitions, intervals and bounds, systems and compositions, in the motions of the body, and in words, as are analogous to the affections of musical sounds, called by those very names. The Greek word, which we have rendered into English by the word *affections*, in the passage of Plato now before us is πάθος, and, translated literally, signifies *passions*. For, whatever situation, condition, or circumstance, any being or thing is placed in by some other,—or by its relation to some other,—in whatever way it is acted on, or affected by, that other,—such situation, &c. of the being or thing so placed, so acted on, or so affected, was by the Greek philosophers termed a πάθος, a *passion* of such being; because in that respect the being is passive.—S. I shall only observe, in addition to what Mr. Sydenham has said, that the word *passion* always signifies, both with Plato and Aristotle, a *participated property* of any being.—T.

² In the printed Greek of this passage we read only,—ΕΝΤΕ ΤΑΙΣ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣΙΝ ΑὐΤΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ—immediately after which,—ΕΝΤΕ ΠΡΗΜΑΣΙΝ,—ought to follow, but is omitted.—S.

³ Rhythm, in general, is an order of homogeneous motions measured by time.

account, not to be numbered amongst the knowing in any subject; because you never consider any thing thoroughly, and are unable to give a true account of it, never looking at the definite number which it contains.

PROT. Excellently well, O Philebus, as it appears to me, has Socrates spoken in what he has now said.

PHIL. It appears so too to me myself. But how does all this speech of his concern our controversy? What was the design or drift of it?

SOC. A very pertinent question, O Protarchus, this, proposed to us by Philebus.

PROT. Indeed it is: and by all means give it an answer.

SOC. That will I do, as soon as I have gone through the little yet remaining of the subject on which I have been speaking. For, as the man who applies himself to the consideration of any kind of things whatever ought not, as I have said, to throw his eye at once upon the infinite, but upon some definite number in the first place; so, on the other hand, when a man is obliged to set out from the infinite, he ought not to mount up immediately to the one, but to some certain number, in each of whose ones a certain multitude is contained; and thus gradually rising from a greater to a less number, to end in one. As an instance of what I have now said, let us resume the consideration of letters.

PROT. In what way?

SOC. Whoever it was, whether some God, or some divine man, (the Egyptian reports say that his name was Theuth¹,) who first contemplated the infinite nature of the human voice, he observed, that amongst the infinity of the sounds it uttered the vowel sounds² were more than one, they were many. Again, other utterances he observed, which were not indeed vowels³,
but

¹ See the Notes on the Phædrus, vol. iii.—T.

² That is, sounds purely vocal; whence the letters by which they are distinguished are called vowels; in the utterance of which sounds the voice solely is employed, whilst the other organs of speech remain inactive.—S.

³ In the Greek of this passage, as it is printed by Aldus and by Stephens, we here read—φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, φθόγγου δὲ μετεχόντα τινος—a reading which may be tolerably well supported by what soon follows. But the margin of the first Basil edition of Plato has suggested to us a reading, in which appears a distinction more obvious and plain than there is between φωνή and φθόγγος, *voice* and *sound of the voice*. For, in that margin, we are directed to read the word *ἄντα* (sound, perhaps, in

but partook, however, of some kind of vocal sound¹; and that of these also there was a certain number². A third sort of letters also he set apart, those which are now called mutes by us³. After this he distinguished every one of these letters which are without any vocal sound, whether perfect or imperfect⁴: the vowels also, and those of middle sort, every one of them, he distinguished

in some manuscript copy of Plato) immediately after the word *φωνης*, and before the words *μεν ου*, in this sentence. Now these two words *φωνης οντα*, put together, very little differ from *φωνεντα*, a word which gives to this part of the sentence a meaning quite agreeable to the tenor of the whole of it, and to the language of all grammarians.—S.

¹ These were by the old grammarians called *ἡμιφωνα*, *semi-vowels*; because, in their very formation by the organs of speech, they are, of necessity, so far accompanied by the voice, as to give a half-vocal sound, without the open aid of any vowel.—S.

² The Greek grammarians enumerate eight of these semi-vowels.—S.

³ Socrates, by expressing himself in this manner, concerning the general name of this third sort of letters, as if it were then newly given them at Athens, seems to disapprove it. Perhaps the antient term *συμφωνα*, *consonants*,—a term applied by the new grammarians to the *ἡμιφωνα*, *semi-vowels*, as well as to the *αφωνα*, *mutes*,—was, in his judgment, properly applicable to those letters only which yield of themselves no sound at all. For mutes, as they are called, cannot be pronounced even imperfectly and obscurely, as semi-vowels can, without the concurrence of some vowel, some sound perfectly vocal.—S.

⁴ In the Greek,—*αφθογγα και αφωνα*—evidently meaning such as are neither vowels nor semi-vowels. It should seem, therefore, that by *φωνη* Plato meant a perfect and clear vocal sound, such as we utter in pronouncing a vowel singly; and that by *αφθογγος* he meant that imperfect and obscure sound of the voice made in the forming and pronouncing of a semi-vowel, unaided by a vowel. Now if this be true, then may the printed reading of that passage, to which belongs note 3 in the preceding page, be justified. Aristotle, however, who treats of this subject in his *Poetics*, cap. 20, recognizes not any such distinction between *φωνη* and *αφθογγος*: for he attributes *φωνη ακουσση*, a vocal sound, such as may be heard, to the semi-vowels no less than to the vowels; and states the difference between these two sorts of letters thus:—The voice in uttering the vowels proceeds *ανευ προσβολης*, that is, it makes no *allision* against any parts of the mouth, those upper organs of speech, so as to be impeded in its free and full exit: but the expressing of the semi-vowels is *μετα προσβολης*, the voice in uttering them makes such *allision*, and meets with some degree of *resistance*: by the *allision* it is, indeed, articulated; but by the resistance, the passages through the mouth being straitened, it becomes weaker, and is diminished,—except it be in some syllable; for here a vowel will never fail to assist in the delivery, by giving the voice a free passage into the air. Now Aristotle is indisputably right in attributing to a semi-vowel, by itself, *φωνη*, *vocem*, a vocal sound: but his learned commentator Victorius is equally right in giving to this vocal sound the epithets *obscura*, *tenuis*, & *exilis*; since it is but half of the full and whole vowel-sound: and Plato may fairly be allowed to distinguish the half-sound by a particular name, and

distinguished in the same manner: and when he had discovered how many letters there were of each sort, to every one, and to all of them together, he gave the name of element. But perceiving that none of us could understand any one of them by itself alone, without learning them all, he considered that this connection, or common bond between them, was one; and that all these letters made in a manner but one thing: and as he perceived that there was one art in all these, he called it, from its subject matter, the art of letters.

PHIL. This which Socrates now says, O Protarchus, I understand still more plainly than what he said just before; and am at no loss to apprehend what relation each of the subjects about which he has spoken has to the other. But as to that article in which his argument on the first of those subjects appeared to me to be defective, I am at a loss still.

SOC. To know what those instances are to the purpose; is not this your meaning?

PHIL. Just so. This very thing it is that Protarchus and myself are all this while in search of.

SOC. In search still, do you say, when you are just now arrived at it?

PHIL. How so?

SOC. Was not the point originally in dispute between us this: Whether wisdom or pleasure was the more eligible?

PHIL. Certainly it was.

SOC. And do we not admit that each of them is one thing?

PHIL. Without doubt.

SOC. Now then must come this question, arising naturally from what was said a little before the mention of music and grammar,—In what way (or by what division) are wisdom and pleasure, each of them, one and many? or how is it, that neither of them breaks into infinite multitude directly; but that each contains some certain number before it pass into infinity?

PROT. Upon no trivial question, O Philebus, on a sudden has Socrates, after having led us a large round-about way, I know not how, thrown us. And now consider, which of us two shall answer to the question he has pro-

to call it *φθγγός*. But we know not how to agree with him, if he says that a semi-vowel does not partake of the vowel-sound; because the half of any thing whatever seems to partake, to be a part, or to have a share of its whole. For this reason it is that we incline to that emendation of the printed Greek text proposed in note 3 in page 484.—S.

posed.

posed. It would be ridiculous in me, who have undertaken the support of your argument, to make an absolute revolt on account of my disability in regard to the present question; and so to remit over again to you the task of giving an answer to it: but I think it would be much more ridiculous for both of us to fail. Consider, then, what we shall do in this case, where Socrates seems to interrogate us concerning the species of pleasure;—whether it is divisible into different species, or not; and, if it be, what is the number of these species, and how they differ in their nature: and the like questions he seems to put to us concerning knowledge and intelligence.

SOC. Your conjecture is perfectly right, O son of Callias! and, if we are not able to answer to these questions upon every monad, as to its likeness, sameness, and contrariety,—unless, I say, we can do this,—the instances just now produced have shown, that none of us, in any matter we had to handle, would ever be of any worth at all.

PROT. The case, O Socrates, seems indeed to be not very different from your representation of it. Well, it is certainly a fine thing to know all things, for a wise and prudent person: but I think the best thing next to that is for a man not to be ignorant of himself. With what design I have now said this, I shall proceed to tell you. This conversation, O Socrates, you have granted to us all, and have given yourself up to us, for the purpose of investigating what is the best of human goods. For, when Philebus had said that it consisted in pleasure, and delight, and joy, and all things of the like nature, you opposed him on this point, and said, it consisted not in these things, but in those which we often repeat the mention of; and we are right in so doing, that the opinions on each side, being always fresh in our memories, may the more easily be examined. You then, it seems, say, what I shall be right in again repeating, that intellect, science, art, and whatever is allied to them, are better things than Pleasure with her allies; and therefore, that the possession, not of these, but of those greater goods, ought to be the object of our aim. Now these positions being laid down severally on each side, as subject-matters of our debate, we in a jocular way threatened, that we would not suffer you to go home quietly before it was brought to a fair determination. You complied, and promised us to contribute all you could towards the accomplishment of that end. We insist therefore that, as
children

children say, you must not take away again what is fairly given. But, in the present inquiry, forbear proceeding in your usual way.

Soc. What way do you mean?

Prot. Bringing us into straits and embarrassments; propounding questions to which we should not be able on the sudden to give a proper answer. For we are not to imagine that our present inquiry is brought to a conclusion, merely because all of us are at a loss what to answer. If, therefore, we are unable to extricate ourselves from these difficulties, you must help us out; for so you promised. Consider, then, what to do on this occasion; whether to distinguish pleasure and knowledge, each of them, into their proper species; or whether to pass it by, if you choose to take a different way, and can find some other means of deciding the matter now controverted between us.

Soc. No harm then need I be afraid of any longer to myself, since you have said this¹. For your leaving to my own choice what ways and means to make use of, frees me from all apprehensions on my own private account. But, to make it still easier to me, some God, I think, has brought things to my remembrance.

Prot. How do you mean? What things?

Soc. Having formerly heard, either in a dream², or broad awake, certain sayings, I have them now again present to my mind;—sayings concerning pleasure and knowledge, that neither of them is of itself good, but some third thing, different from both of those, and better than either. Now if this should discover itself to us clearly, pleasure is then to be dismissed from any pretensions to the victory. For we should then no longer expect to find that pleasure and good are the same thing: or how say you?

Prot. Just so.

Soc. We shall have no occasion then, in my opinion, for distinguishing the

¹ Alluding to those jocular threats employed by the young gentlemen, then in the Lyceum, and gathered around Socrates, to engage him in this dialectic inquiry.—S.

² Olympiodorus here justly observes, that we possess the reasons of things as in a dream, with respect to a separate life supernally perfected; but as in a vigilant state with respect to the exertion of them through sense. Perhaps however, says he, it is better to consider the vigilant state with respect to the distinct evolution, but the dreaming state, with respect to the indistinct subsistence of knowledge.—T.

several species of pleasure. And in the progress of our inquiry it will appear more evidently still that I am in the right.

PROT. Having begun so happily, proceed, and finish with the same success.

SOC. Let us, first, agree upon a few little points beside.

PROT. What are those?

SOC. In what condition or state of being is *the good*? Must it of necessity be perfect¹? or may it want perfection?

PROT. Of all things, O Socrates, it is the most perfect.

SOC. Well; and is it also sufficient?

PROT. Without doubt: and in this respect it excels all other things.

SOC. But further: This also, I presume, is of all things the most necessary to say of it, that every being to whom it is known, hunts after, and desires it, as choosing the possession of it above all things; and, indeed, caring for no other things, except such as are constantly attended with the enjoyment of good.

PROT. There is no possibility of contradicting this.

SOC. Now, then, let us consider and judge of the life of pleasure and the life of knowledge: and to do this the better, let us view them each apart from the other.

¹ *The desirable*, says Olympiodorus, proceeds from the intelligible father*; *the sufficient* from power; and *the perfect* from the paternal intellect. In reality, however, perfection is the third from essence: for the middle is life. But if this be true, it is evident that *the end* is different from *perfection*; for the latter is the last; but the former the first, to which essence, life, and intellect, and therefore all things converge. So that in every form, in a similar manner, *the end* will be the summit, and that which connectedly contains the whole; but *perfection* will be the third, subsisting after essence and life: for it is necessary that a thing should be, and should live, that it may become perfect.

Again, *the perfect* is spread under *the sufficient*, in the same manner as *the full* under *the super-full*, and *the sufficient* under *the desirable*. For things when full excite to desire. The *first end*, likewise, is above *the desirable*, *the sufficient*, and *the perfect*. For that is simple and ineffable; and hence Socrates does not say that it is composed from the elements; but that these elements possess indefinitely a portion of *the good*. It is better, however, to call the coordinated common contraction (*συμπεσμα*) of the three a portion of the good, though this is anonymous. For *the good* is all things, and not only these three; nor is it alone the end, but is truly all things prior to all. Besides, the end which is now the object of consideration is knowable, so that there will be another end more common than this.—T.

* That is, from the summit of the intelligible order.—See the Parmenides.

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. Thus: Let us suppose a life of pleasure, unaccompanied by intelligence; and, on the other hand, a life of intelligence, unaccompanied by pleasure. For, if either of them be good, it must be complete and sufficient, in want of no aid from any other quarter. But, if either of them should appear to be indigent of aught, or insufficient, we are no longer to imagine this to be that real and true good we are in search of.

PROT. In such a case, how could we?

SOC. Shall we then examine their pretensions thus separately, making your own mind the judge?

PROT. With all my heart.

SOC. Answer then to my questions.

PROT. Propose them.

SOC. Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer, were it made you, to live all your life with a sense and feeling of pleasures the most exquisite?

PROT. Undoubtedly. Why not?

SOC. Suppose you were in full possession of this, would you not think that something beside was still wanting to you?

PROT. I certainly should not.

SOC. Consider now, whether you would not be in want of wisdom, and intelligence, and reasoning, and such other things as are the sisters of these; at least whether you would not want to *see* something.

PROT. Why should I, when I had in a manner all things, in having continual joy?

SOC. Living thus then continually all your life, would the most exquisite pleasures give you any joy?

PROT. Why not?

SOC. Having neither intellect, nor memory, nor science, nor opinion,—in the first place of this very thing, your possession of joy, you must of necessity be ignorant, and unable to say whether you then had any joy, or not, being void of all just discernment or knowledge of things present.

PROT. I must.

SOC. Being also void of memory, it would be impossible for you to remember that you ever had any joy; or to preserve even the least memorial of a joy then present: wanting also right opinion, you could not so much

as think you had any joy, though in the midst of it : unable also to reason or draw consequences, you could not possibly conclude that ever you should have any joy to come. Thus you would live the life, not of a man, but of a sea-sponge, or of an oyster. Are these things so? or ought we to think otherwise concerning them?

PROT. A life of mere pleasure must be such as you have described it.

SOC. Do we think, then, that such a life is eligible?

PROT. The description of it, O Socrates, has silenced me entirely for the present.

SOC. Nay; let us not shrink so soon from pursuing our inquiries; but proceed to the consideration of that other life, the life of intellect.

PROT. What kind of life is that?

SOC. Let us consider, whether any of us would choose to live with wisdom, and intellect, and science, and a perfect memory of all things; but without partaking of pleasure, whether great or small; and, on the other hand, without partaking of pain; wholly exempt from all feelings of either kind.

PROT. To me, O Socrates, neither of these lives appears eligible; and I think never would appear so to any other man.

SOC. What think you of a middle life, where both of them are mixed together—a life composed of the other two?

PROT. Composed of pleasure do you mean, on the one hand, and of intellect and wisdom on the other hand?

SOC. Just so: such a life do I mean.

PROT. Every man would certainly prefer such a kind of life to either of the other two.

SOC. Perceive we now what the result is of our discoursing thus far on the subject now before us?

PROT. Perfectly well; it is this: that three lives have been proposed for our consideration, and that neither of the two first-mentioned appears sufficient or eligible for any one, neither for man, nor any other animal.

SOC. Is it not evident, then, with regard to the point in controversy, that neither of those two lives can give the possession of the good? for, whichever of them had such a power, that life would be sufficient, perfect, and eligible

also to all those animals¹ who are capable of living in the continual enjoyment of the good all their lives. And whoever of us should give any other life the preference to that, would make his election contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, though not willingly, because through ignorance, or some unhappy necessity.

PROT. What you say is highly probable indeed.

Soc. That we ought not to think that Goddess of Philebus to be the same thing with the good, has been shown, I think, sufficiently.

PHIL. Neither is that intellect of yours, O Socrates, the good; for it will be found deficient in the same respects.

Soc. Mine perhaps, O Philebus, may; but not that intellect which is divine and true; for it is otherwise, I presume, with this. However, I do not contend for the chief prize of victory, in behalf of the life of intellect against the middle or mixed life. But what to do with the second prize, and which life to bestow it on, is next to be considered. For the cause of that happiness which the mixed life affords, one of us, perhaps, may ascribe to intellect, the other of us to pleasure. And thus, neither of these two would be man's sovereign good, and yet one or other of them may perhaps be supposed the cause of it. Now on this point I would still more earnestly contend against Philebus,—that not pleasure, but intellect, is the nearest allied, and the most similar to that, whatever it be, by the possession of which the mixed life becomes eligible and good. And if this account be true, pleasure can never be said to have any just pretensions either to the first or to the second prize of excellence. Still further is she from coming in for the third prize, if any credit may be given for the present to that intellect of mine.

PROT. Indeed, O Socrates, it seems to me that Pleasure is now fallen: your reasons have been like so many blows given her; under the force of which, fighting for the master-prize, she lies vanquished. But I think, how-

¹ In the Greek,—*πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις*, to all plants and animals. But are plants capable of living a life of sensual pleasure? or brute animals, a life of science and understanding? We are, therefore, inclined to think, that Plato's own words were *πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις*: for immediately he subjoins an explanation of his meaning, and limits the word *πᾶσι*, all, to such only as are endued with reason; and that the word *φευ* was written in the margin of some manuscript, opposite to the words *πᾶσι τοῖς*, by a reader, astonished at the boldness of the expression *πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις*, and not sufficiently attentive to the qualifying words subjoined.—S.

ever, that we must say it was prudent in Intellect not to contend for that prize; for she would otherwise have met with the same fate. Now if Pleasure should also lose the prize of second value, as already she has lost the highest, she must entirely fall into disgrace with her own lovers: for even to them she would no longer appear to merit such honour as they paid to her before.

Soc. Well then; is it not the better way to dismiss her now directly, and not give her pain, by inspecting into her too nicely, and discovering all her imperfections?

PROT. What you now say goes for nothing, Socrates.

Soc. Do you mean, because I supposed an impossible thing when I supposed that pain might be given to pleasure?

PROT. Not on that account only, but because you are sensible that none of us will give you a discharge before you have brought these arguments to a conclusion.

Soc. Ah! the copious matter of argument, O Protarchus, still behind! and scarcely is any part of it very manageable on the present occasion¹. For, whoever stands forth as the champion of Intellect to win the second prize for her, must, as it appears to me, take another way of combating, and has need of other weapons different from those reasons I before made use of: some, however, of the same may, perhaps, be of use again. Must we then proceed in that manner?

PROT. By all means.

Soc. But let us begin cautiously, and endeavour to lay down right principles.

PROT. What principles do you mean?

Soc. All things which are now in the universe let us divide into two sorts, or rather, if you please, into three.

¹ Aldus's edition of Plato, by omitting the word *οὐδέ* in this sentence, gives a quite contrary turn to it. Stephens, in his edition, has inserted the *οὐδέ*: and this reading we have preferred to the former; because it makes much better sense, and is agreeable also to Ficinus's translation from the Medicean manuscript. It is strange that Grynæus, who undertook to revise that translation, should depart from it here, where it is evidently right, to follow the erroneous reading in the Aldine edition. Cornarius, Serranus, Bembo, and Grou, were not so misled.—S.

PROT.

PROT. You should tell us what difference between things it is, with respect to which you make that division.

SOC. Some things which have been already mentioned let us reaffume.

PROT. What things?

SOC. God, we said, has exhibited *the infinite*, and also *the bound* of beings.

PROT. Very true.

SOC.

* Proclus, in Platon. Theol. p. 132, observes, that Plato here, according to the theology of his country, establishes two principles after *the one*. And, according to Philolaus, the nature of beings is connected from things *bounded* and things *infinite*. If beings, therefore, subsist from *bound* and *the infinite*, it is evident that these two must be prior to beings, or, in other words, must be superessential. Hence, as *bound* and *the infinite* are superessential, Socrates with great propriety says that "God has exhibited them." For their procession from the highest God is ineffable, and they may be rather said to be *arcane manifestations* from him than his *productions*. Mr. Sydenham, from being unacquainted with the sublime theology of the Greeks, has totally mistaken the profound meaning of this passage in his translation, which is as follows:—"The Gods, we said, have shown us the infinite of things, and also their bound." For the original is *τον θεον ελεγουμεν που, το μεν απειρον δειξει των οντων, το δε περας*.

Should it be asked, says Olympiodorus, how the two elements *bound* and *infinity* are better than that which is mixed, since these two elements are the principles of being; we reply, that these principles must be considered as total orders more simple than that which is mixt; and that secondary principles proceed from these two, in the first mixt, which are subordinate to the mixt, in the same manner as elements are every where subordinate to that which is composed from them.

Again, neither is perfect separation in the second* order: for the fabrication of form first pertains to intellect; and the first intellect is pure intellect. Hence, Jamblichus says that the monads of forms subsist in this, meaning by monads that which is unseparated in every form. On this account it is intellectual as in intellectuals, and is the cause of formal essence, just as the second is the cause of life, and the third of the fabrication of form in intellectuals.

Again, the egg, the paternal intellect, occult number; and, in short, that which is the third from *bound*, respectively signify the third God, according to theologists, and consequently each is the same as that which is mixt from bound and infinity.

Further still, the one principle which gives subsistence to, and is the end of, all things, contains the final as superior to the producing; for hypostasis is through the ends. But the first principle is both these according to *the one*: and the two principles *bound* and *infinity* distribute these; *bound* subsisting according to the final, and *infinity* according to the producing cause.

* The reader must remember that the intelligible order consists of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, and that each of these receives a triadic division.—See the Notes on the Parmenides.

Again,

SOC. Let us take these for two of the species of things; and for a third let us take that, which is composed of those two mixed together. But I deserve, methinks, to be laughed at for pretending thus to distinguish things, and to enumerate their several species.

PROT. Why so, my good friend?

SOC. A fourth kind appears to have been omitted by me.

PROT. Say, What?

SOC. Of that commixture, the combination of the former two, consider the cause: and beside those three species, set me down this cause¹ for a fourth.

PROT. Will you not want a fifth species too, for a cause of disunion and separation?

SOC. Perhaps I may; but not, I believe, at present. However, should there be occasion for it, you will pardon me, if I go in pursuit of a fifth life.

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Of these four species, then, in the first place dividing the three, and perceiving that two of these, when both are divided, and their divisions separated, are, each of them, many;—then, gathering together the many of each, and uniting them again, let us endeavour to understand in what manner each of them is, at the same time, one and many.

PROT. Would you but express your meaning more plainly, I might, perhaps, apprehend it.

SOC. I mean, then, by the two, which I propose to be now considered, the same which I mentioned at the first; one of them *the infinite*, and the other *bound*. That *the infinite* is, in some manner, many, I will attempt to show: and let *bound* wait a while.

PROT. It shall.

Again, Socrates establishing that which is mixt as a certain cause of union, the cause of separation is also investigated. This cause, however, will be the *difference* which subsists after the intelligible, as we learn from the Parmenides. For the intelligible is united alone. But it would be better to make *the one* the cause of all things; *bound* the cause of union; *infinite* of separation; and *the mixt* that which participates of both. Observe, too, that the more and the less are every where, but in intelligibles according to a superior and inferior degree of power.—T.

¹ That is, the ineffable principle of things.—T.

SOC. Give me now your attention. It is, I confess, a difficult and doubtful thing, that, which I would have you to consider. Consider it, however. First, with regard to hotter and colder, in things, see if you can think of any bound. Or would not the more and the less, residing in the kinds themselves of things, hinder, so long as they reside there, an end from being fixed to them? For, if ever they receive an end, to an end also are their very beings then brought.

PROT. Most certainly true.

SOC. And in speaking of either the colder or the hotter of any two things, we constantly attribute to them the more and the less.

PROT. And very much so.

SOC. Reason then constantly suggests to us that the *colder* and the *hotter* have no end: and being thus without any end, they are altogether boundless.

PROT. I am strongly inclined to agree with you, Socrates in this point.

SOC. Well have you answered, my friend Protarchus; and well have you reminded me, that the *strongly*, which you mentioned, and the *faintly*, have the same power as the *more* and the *less*. For, wherever they reside, they suffer not any thing to be just *so much*; but infusing either the more *intense* or the more *remiss* into every action, they always produce in it either the *more* or the *less*; while the just *so much* flies away and vanishes from before them. For, as it was just now observed, were they not to drive away the just *so much*, or did they permit *this*, and the *moderate*, to enter into the regions of the *more* and the *less*, or of the *intense* and the *remiss*, these very beings must quit their own places: because, if they admitted the just *so much*, the *hotter* and the *colder* would be gone. For the *hotter*, and in like manner the *colder*, is always advancing forward, and never abides in the same spot: but the just *so much* stops, and stays, having finished its progress. Now, according to this reasoning, the *hotter* must be *boundless*; and so must also be the *colder*.

PROT. So it appears indeed, Socrates. But, as you rightly said, it is not easy to apprehend these things. Questions, however, relating to them, again and again repeated, might perhaps show that the questioner and the respondent were tolerably well agreed in their minds concerning them.

SOC. You say well: and we should try so to do. But at present, to avoid lengthening

lengthening out this argument, by enumerating every infinite, consider, whether we may take this for the characteristic mark of the nature of all infinities.

PROT. What mark do you mean?

SOC. Whatever things appear to us to be increasing or diminishing, or to admit of intenseness and remission, or the too much, and all other such attributes, we ought to refer all these to the genus of the infinite; collecting, as it were, all of them in one, agreeably to what was before said; that whatever things were divided and separated we ought to assemble together and combine, as well as we are able, affixing to all of them the mark of some one nature;—if you remember.

PROT. I remember it well.

SOC. Every thing, then, which rejects all such attributes, and admits only such as are quite the contrary,—in the first place, the equal and equality, and, after the equal, the double, and every other relation which one number bears to another, and one measure to another,—all these things, I say, in summing up, and referring them to bound, think you not that we should do right? or how say you?

PROT. Perfectly right, O Socrates.

SOC. Well: but the third thing made up, and consisting of the other two, what characteristic shall we assign to this?

PROT. You, as I presume, will show it to me.

SOC. Divinity indeed may; if any of the Gods will hearken to my prayers.

PROT. Pray, then, and *survey*.

SOC. I survey: and some God, O Protarchus, is now, methinks, become favourable to us.

PROT. How do you mean? and by what sign do you know it?

SOC. I will tell you in plain words: but do you follow them closely.

PROT. Only speak.

SOC. We mentioned just now the hotter and the colder; did we not?

PROT. We did.

SOC. To these then add the drier and the moister; the more numerous and the fewer; the swifter and the slower; the larger and the smaller; and whatever things beside, in our late account of them, we ranked under one head,—that which admits of the nature of the more and the less.

PROT. You mean the infinite.

SOC. I do: and mingle together with this that which we spoke of next afterward,—the race of bound.

PROT. What race do you mean?

SOC. Those things which we did not (as we ought to have done) assemble together under one head, in the same manner as we assembled together the race of the infinite. But you will now, perhaps, do what was then omitted. And when both the sorts are assembled, and viewed together, the race of bound will then become manifest.

PROT. What things do you speak of? and how are they to be assembled?

SOC. I speak of that nature in which are comprised the equal and the double; and whatever else puts an end to contest between contrary things; and, introducing number, makes them to be commensurate one with another, and to harmonize together.

PROT. I apprehend your meaning to be, that, from the commixture of those two, a certain progeny will arise between them in every one of their tribes.

SOC. You apprehend me rightly.

PROT. Relate then the progeny of these commixtures.

SOC. In *diseases*, does not the right commixture of those two produce the *recovery of health*?

PROT. Entirely so.

SOC. And in the acute and the grave, in the swift also and the slow, which are all of them infinite, does not the other sort, received among them, and begetting bounds, constitute the perfection of all the Muse's art?

PROT. Certainly so.

SOC. And in weather excessively either cold or hot, does not the entrance of that other kind take off the excess, the vehement, and the infinite,—generating in their stead, not only the moderate and the measured, but symmetry also, and correspondence between their measures?

PROT. Without dispute.

SOC. And do not propitious seasons, and all their fair productions, arise to us from hence, from the mixture of things which are infinite with things which have a bound?

PROT. Doubtless.

Soc. A thousand other things I forbear to mention; as, for instance, strength and beauty, the attendants upon health of body; and in the soul other excellencies, very many and very noble. For Venus herself, O good Philebus! observing lawless lust, and all manner of vice every where reigning, the love of pleasure being in all men boundless, and their desires of it insatiable, she herself established a law and an order, setting bounds to pleasure and desire. This you said was to lessen and to impair pleasure; but I maintain, that, on the contrary, it preserved pleasure from decay. And you, Protarchus! what think you of it?

Prot. For my part, I am entirely of your mind, Socrates.

Soc. I have shown you then those three kinds, if you apprehend my meaning.

Prot. Partly, I suppose, I do. By one of those three, I suppose, you mean the infinite; by another, the second sort, you mean that which in all beings is the bound; but what you mean by the third sort, I have no strong apprehension of.

Soc. Because the care of that third sort, my friend, has amazed you with its multitude. And yet, the infinite also appeared to contain many tribes: but as they were all of them stamped with the character of more and less, they were seen clearly to be one.

Prot. True.

Soc. Then, as to bound; that neither contained many, nor found we any difficulty in admitting the nature of it to be one.

Prot. How could we?

Soc. It was not at all possible, indeed. Of those two sorts, then, all the progeny,—all the things produced into being through those measures, which are effected in the immoderate, when bounds are set to the infinite,—in summing up all these things together, and comprehending them in one, understand me to mean, by the third sort, this one.

Prot. I understand you.

Soc. Now, besides these three, we are further to consider, what that kind is which we said was the fourth. And as we are to consider it jointly, see whether you think it necessary, that all things which are produced into being should have some cause of their production.

Prot. I think it is: for, without a cause, how should they be produced?

SOC. The nature then of the efficient differs from the cause in nothing but in name : so that the efficient and the cause may be rightly deemed one.

PROT. Rightly.

SOC. So, likewise, the thing effected, and the thing produced into being, we shall find to differ in the same manner, in nothing but in name, or how ?

PROT. Just so.

SOC. In the nature of things, does not the efficient lead the way ? and does not the effect follow after it into being ?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Cause, therefore, is not the same thing with that which is subservient to cause in the producing of its effect, but a thing different.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. Did not the things which are produced into being, and the things out of which they are all of them produced, exhibit to us the three genera ?

PROT. Clearly.

SOC. That, then, which is the artificer of all these, the cause of them, let us call the fourth cause ; as it is fully shown to be different from those other three.

PROT. Be it so.

SOC. But the four sorts having been now described, every one of them distinctly, we should do well, for memory's sake, to enumerate them in order.

PROT. No doubt of it.

SOC. The first then I call infinite ; the second bound ; the third essence ¹ mixt and generated from these : and in saying ² that the cause of this mixture and this production is the fourth, should I say aught amiss ?

PROT. Certainly not.

SOC. Well now : what is next ? How proceeds our argument ? and with what design came we along this way ? Was it not this ? We were inquiring

¹ As essence, therefore, is plainly asserted by Socrates to be mixt and generated from bound and infinity, it is evident that *bound* and *infinity* are superessential. For cause is every where superior to its effect.—T.

² The edition of Plato by Aldus, and that by Stephens, in this place erroneously give us to read λεγων, instead of the evidently right reading, which is λεγων, exhibited in the Basil editions.—S.

who had a right to the second prize of victory ; whether Pleasure had, or Wisdom : was it not so ?

PROT. It was.

SOC. Now then, since we have thus divided these genera, may we not happily form a more finished judgment concerning both the very best and the second-best of those things which originally were the subjects of dispute between us ?

PROT. Perhaps we may.

SOC. We made no difficulty, I think, of setting down for conqueror, the mixt life, the life of pleasure and wisdom together. Was it not so ?

PROT. It was.

SOC. We perceive then of what sort the mixt life is, and to which kind it is to be referred.

PROT. Evidently.

SOC. And I think we shall agree, that it is part of the third sort. For the mixt life is not to be referred solely to any one of the infinities, mixed with some one only of the bounds : it is a life of all such things together as are infinite in their own nature, but are under the restraint of bound. So that the mixt life, this winner of the prize, may be rightly said to be a part of the third sort.

PROT. Most rightly.

SOC. It is well. But that life of yours, O Philebus, a life of pleasure simple and unmixed, to which of the three sorts may we rightly say that it belongs ? But before you pronounce, answer me first to this question.

PHIL. Propose it then ¹.

SOC. Concerning pleasure and pain ; have they in their own nature any bounds ? or are they among those things which admit the more and the less ² ?

PHIL. Pleasure, O Socrates ! to be sure, admits the more. For it would not comprehend every good in it, if it were not by nature infinite, with-re-

¹ Aldus, in his edition of Plato, gave these words to Protarchus ; though nothing is more plain than that Plato meant them for Philebus. The Basil editors restored them to the right owner : and it is strange that Stephens either knew it not, or did not acknowledge it.—S.

² In all the editions of the Greek we here read *εσσι* instead of *εστων*. We are ignorant of any authority for using so strange an enallage ; and therefore we suppose it an erroneous reading.—S.

spect to the multitude which it contains, and the increase which it is capable of.

Soc. Nor can pain be imagined, O Philebus, to comprehend every evil. So that we must consider of some other thing, different from the nature of the infinite, for the imparting of any good to pleasures. It is admitted, that your life of pleasure is the issue of things unbounded, and belongs, therefore, to the infinite. But to which of the sorts before mentioned, O Protarchus and Philebus, may we refer wisdom, and science, and intellect, without being guilty of impiety? For it appears to me that we incur no trifling danger in answering the present question, whatever be our answer, whether right or wrong.

PHIL. You magnify that God of yours, O Socrates, very highly, methinks.

Soc. So do you, my friend, that Goddess of yours. The question, however, ought to be answered by us.

PROT. Socrates says what is right, O Philebus, and we must do as he says we ought.

PHIL. Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourself my part in the debate?

PROT. It is true that I have. But in the present case I find myself much at a loss how to answer. I must therefore request, O Socrates, that you yourself will take the office of prophet to us; lest, by some mistake, I should offend the combatant¹ whom you favour, and by finging out of tune should spoil the harmony².

¹ This evidently is a metaphor taken from the contentions usual at that time between dramatic poets during the feasts of Bacchus, for the fame of superiority in their art. For the Grecians of those days had an emulation to excell in the musical entertainments of the mind, as well as in the gymnastic exercises of the body. To inspire them with that emulation, combats in poetry and music, as well as in gymnastic, were instituted by their legislators: and the contenders in either kind were alike termed *αγωνισται*, combatants. The metaphorical combatants meant by Protarchus are Mind and Pleasure.—S.

² In continuing the metaphor taken from theatrical contests, Protarchus likens himself to one of the chorus in a tragedy or comedy, and Socrates to the *χορυφαίος*, or *χορηγός*, the chief or leader of the whole band. For, in the chorus songs, it was the office of the chief, or president, to lead the vocal music, keeping it in time and tune with the instrumental: and in the dialogue scenes, wherever the chorus bore a part, their president spoke alone for them all.—S.

Soc.

SOC. You must be obeyed, Protarchus. Indeed there is nothing difficult in your injunctions. But, in asking you to which of the two abovementioned kinds intellect and science were to be referred,—when I was magnifying, as Philebus says, the subject of my question,—the joke, which I intended to soften the solemnity of it, confused your thoughts, I find, in good earnest.

PROT. Very thoroughly so, I confess, O Socrates.

SOC. And yet it was an easy question. For, on this point, there is a consent and harmony among all the wise, dignifying thus themselves,—that *Intellect is king of heaven and earth*. And this which they say is perhaps¹ well said. But let us, if you are willing, consider the nature of this genus more amply, and not in so concise a manner.

PROT. Consider it in what manner you think best, without regarding the length of the inquiry: for the length will not be disagreeable to us.

SOC. Fairly spoken. Let us begin, then, by proposing this question.

PROT. What?

SOC. Whether shall we say that the power of the irrational principle governs all things in the whole universe, fortuitously and at random? or shall we, on the contrary, agree with our ancestors and predecessors, in affirming that a certain admirable intellect and wisdom orders all things together, and governs throughout the whole?

PROT. Alike in nothing, O Socrates, are these two tenets. That which you mentioned just now is, in my opinion, impious. But, to hold that Intellect disposes all things in a beautiful order, is agreeable to that view which we have of the world, of the celestial bodies, and of the whole circumvolution of the heavens. For my own part, I should never speak nor think any otherwise on this subject.

SOC. Is it then your pleasure that we add our voices to those of the ancients, and openly avow that tenet to be ours; not contenting ourselves with a bare repetition of the sayings of others, in hopes of escaping danger to ourselves; but resolved to run all risk together, and to share in undergoing the

¹ Socrates does not say this as being himself doubtful whether Intellect is king of heaven and earth, but because those with whom he was conversing had not arrived at a scientific knowledge of this dogma.—T.

censures of some great and formidable man, when he asserts that in the whole of things there is no order¹?

PROT. How can I do otherwise than join with you in this?

SOC. Attend now to the argument which comes on next to be considered.

PROT. Propose it then.

SOC. In the bodies of all animals, somehow, we discover that fire, water, and air, must be in their composition by nature; and earth, which gives support to the other ingredients in their frame, we see plainly: as mariners say, when they are tossed about in a thunder-storm at sea, and desery land.

PROT. True: and tossed about indeed are we too in these discourses; but for a port to anchor in we are entirely at a loss.

SOC. Let us proceed then: Concerning each of those elementary ingredients in our frame, understand this.

PROT. What?

SOC. That which there is in us of each element is small and inconsiderable; no where in any part of our frame have we it at all unmixed and pure; neither has it in us a power worthy of its nature. Take one of them for a sample, by which you may estimate all the rest. Fire in some manner there is in us; fire² there is also in the universe.

PROT. Most certainly.

SOC. Now the fire which is in our composition is weak and inconsiderable: but that which is in the universe is admirable for the multitude of it, for the beauty which it exhibits, and for every power and virtue which belong to fire.

PROT. Perfectly true.

SOC. Well then: is the fire of the universe generated, fed, and ruled by the fire which we have in us? or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of every other living thing, receive its being, support, and laws, from the fire of the universe?

¹ That the person here alluded to is Critias, one of the thirty oligarchic tyrants, cannot be doubted of by those who are acquainted with his character, and the injurious treatment he gave to Socrates. A considerable fragment of his atheistic poetry is extant in Sextus Empiricus, pag. 562.—S.

² Socrates is here speaking of the difference between the *wholes* of the universe, and the *parts* to which these wholes are prior, as being their cause. See the Introduction to the Timæus.—T.

PROT.

PROT. This question of yours does not deserve an answer.

SOC. Rightly said. And you would answer in the same manner, I suppose, if your opinion was asked concerning the earthy part of every animal here, compared with the earth in the universe; and just so concerning the other elementary parts of animal bodies mentioned before.

PROT. What man, who made a different answer, would ever appear to be of sound mind?

SOC. Scarcely would any man. But attend to what follows next. Wherever we find these four elements mixed together and united, do we not give to this composition the name of body?

PROT. We do.

SOC. Apprehend the same thing then with regard to this, which we call the world. This should be considered as a body in the same manner, being composed of the same elements.

PROT. You are perfectly in the right.

SOC. To the whole of this great body, then, does the whole of that little body of ours owe its nourishment, and whatever it has received, and whatever it possesses? or is the body of the universe indebted to ours for all which it is and has?

PROT. There is no reason, O Socrates, for making a question of this point, neither.

SOC. Well: what will you say to this point then?

PROT. What point?

SOC. Must we not affirm these bodies of ours to be animated with souls?

PROT. It is evident that we must.

SOC. But from whence, O my friend Protarchus, should our bodies derive those souls of theirs, if that great body of the universe, which has all the same elements with our bodies, but in much greater purity and perfection, was not, as well as ours, animated with a soul?

PROT. It is evident, O Socrates, that from no other origin could they derive them.

SOC. Since, therefore, O Protarchus, we acknowledge these four genera, bound, infinite, the compound of both those, and the genus of cause, to be in all bodies; and since we find, that in this part of the universe to which we

belong there are beings of that fourth sort,—causes, which produce souls, build up bodies for those souls to dwell in¹, and heal those bodies when diseased;—causes, also, which create and frame other compositions, and amend them when impaired;—causes these, to every one of which we gave a particular name, betokening a particular kind of wisdom or skill:—since, I say, we are persuaded of these things, surely we can by no means think that the whole heaven, in the larger parts of which are the same four genera, and these undepraved and pure, can have any other cause than a nature who is full of contrivance and design, and in whom the most beautiful and noble things all unite.

PROT. It would not be at all reasonable to think it can.

SOC. If this then be absurd, we may the better assert, as a consequence of our reasoning, that in the universe there are, what we have several times repeated, *infinite* in great quantity, and *bound* sufficient; and besides these, a *cause*, not inconsiderable or mean, which, by *mixing* them properly together, marshals and regulates the years, the seasons, and the months,—a cause, which with the greatest justice we may term *wisdom* and *intellect*.

PROT. With the greatest justice, indeed.

SOC. But further, wisdom and intellect could never be without soul².

¹ In the Greek of this passage we read—*ψυχὴν τε παρέχον καὶ σῶμα σκῆαν ἐμποιοῦν*.—Ficinus translates the two last words of it thus:—"dum imprimit umbram." But this being obscure, an error in the Greek manuscripts was justly suspected by the subsequent translators, Cornarius and Serranus; the former of whom proposes instead of *σκῆαν* to read *ὑψέαν*; and the latter imagines that we should read *σώμασκιαν* as one word. Grynæus and Bembo never attempt an emendation of the printed Greek, even where it is most apparently erroneous. And Monf. Grou has taken the easy way of not translating the two last words. But all the difficulty vanishes, if, instead of *σκῆαν* we read *σκηνος*, a *tabernacle* or *tent*; a word metaphorically used by the Pythagoreans to signify the human body, as being but a slight temporary dwelling for the soul. See Timæus the Locrian, in several passages; and a fragment of Ocellus the Lucanian, de Lege, in Stobæus's Eclogæ Phys. cap. 16. See also Æschines the Socratic, pag. 128, edit. Horrei; the Greek index to which will furnish the learned reader with examples of the same metaphor, used by several Greek writers in the succeeding ages.—S.

² That is, soul is consubstant with wisdom and intellect. If this be the case, it is evident that when Plato in the Timæus speaks of the *generation* of soul by the *demiurgus*, whom he there expressly calls *intellect*, he does not mean by *generation* a temporal production, but an *eternal procession* from cause. And in the same manner, what he there says of the *generation* of the universe is to be understood. Hence, those are to be derided who assert that the world, according to Plato, was produced in time.—T.

PROT.

PROT. By no means.

SOC. You will affirm, then, that in the nature of Jupiter there is a kingly soul and a kingly intellect, through the power of cause¹; and that in the other Gods there are other beautiful things, whatever they are, by which their Deities love to be distinguished, and from which they delight in taking their respective denominations.

PROT. Certainly I shall.

SOC. The discourse we have now had together on this subject, O Protarchus, think it not idle, and to no purpose. For it supports that doctrine of our ancestors, that the universe is for ever governed by intellect.

PROT. Indeed it does.

SOC. And besides, it has furnished us with an answer to my question,—to what genus intellect is to be referred; in making it appear that intellect is allied to that which we said was the cause of all things, one of our four genera. For now at length you plainly have our answer.

PROT. I have; and a very full and sufficient answer it is: but I was not aware what you were about.

SOC. A man's attention to serious studies, O Protarchus, is sometimes, you know, relaxed by amusements.

PROT. Politely said.

SOC. And thus, my friend, to what genus intellect belongs, and what power it is possessed of, has been now shown tolerably well for the present.

PROT. It has, indeed.

SOC. And to what genus also belongs pleasure, appeared before.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Concerning these two, then, let us remember these conclusions,—that intellect is allied to cause, and is nearly of this genus; and that pleasure is infinite in her own nature, and belongs to that genus which, of itself, neither has nor ever will have in it either a beginning, or a middle, or an end.

PROT. We shall not fail to remember them both.

¹ That is to say, a kingly soul, and a kingly intellect, subsist in Jupiter, the artificer of the universe according to cause. For Jupiter, as a Deity, is a supersensiential unity, in which all things have a causal subsistence.—T.

SOC. Now we ought to consider next, in which genus either of those two things, intelligence and pleasure, is found to have a seat; and in what state or condition those beings must be in whom either of them is produced, at the time of its production. And first in the case of pleasure: for, as we inquired to which genus she belonged, before we considered of which sort was intellect; so, with regard to the points also now proposed, she is the first to be examined¹. But, separately from the consideration of pain, we should never be able fully to explore the nature of pleasure.

PROT. Well: if we are to proceed in this way, let us then in this way proceed².

SOC. Are you of the same opinion with me concerning their rise and production?

PROT. What opinion is that?

SOC. Pain and pleasure appear to me, both of them, to arise, according to nature, in that which is a common genus.

PROT. Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera mentioned before is meant by the term common.

SOC. What you desire, O wonderful man! shall be done, to the best of my ability.

PROT. Fairly said.

SOC. By this common genus, then, we are to understand that which, in recounting the four sorts, we reckoned as third.

PROT. That which you mentioned next after both the infinite and bound: that in which you ranked health, and also, as I think, harmony.

SOC. Perfectly right. Now give me all possible attention.

PROT. Only speak.

SOC. I say, then, that whenever the harmony in the frame of any animal is broken, a breach is then made in its constitution, and at the same time rise is given to pains.

¹ Cornarius and Stephens, both of them, perceived the Greek of this sentence to be erroneous. But the emendations proposed by them appear insufficient. Ficinus's translation from the Florentine MS. helps to restore the right reading thus:—*Δει δὲ, —ιδεῖν ἡμᾶς· καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὥσπερ—οὕτω καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ προτέρων* [sc. *δεῖ ιδεῖν*].—S.

² In the edition of Plato by Aldus, and in that also by Stephens, this sentence, by a strange mistake, is printed as if it were spoken by Socrates.—S.

PROT.

PROT. You say what is highly probable.

SOC. But when the harmony is restored, and the breach is healed, we should say that then pleasure is produced : if points of so great importance may be dispatched at once in so few words.

PROT. In my opinion, O Socrates, you say what is very true : but let us try if we can show these truths in a light still clearer.

SOC. Are not such things as ordinarily happen, and are manifest to us all, the most easy to be understood ?

PROT. What things do you mean ?

SOC. Want of food makes a breach in the animal system, and at the same time gives the pain of hunger.

PROT. True.

SOC. And food, in filling up the breach again, gives a pleasure.

PROT. Right.

SOC. Want of drink also, interrupting the circulation of the blood and humours, brings on us corruption, together with the pain of thirst ; but the virtue of a liquid, in moistening and replenishing the parts dried up, yields a pleasure. In like manner, preternatural suffocating heat, in dissolving the texture of the parts, gives a painful sensation : but a cooling again, a refreshment agreeable to nature, affects us with a sense of pleasure.

PROT. Most certainly.

SOC. And the concretion of the animal humours through cold, contrary to their nature, occasions pain : but a return to their pristine state of fluidity, and a restoring of the natural circulation, produce pleasure. See, then, whether you think this general account of the matter not amiss, concerning that sort of being which I said was composed of infinite and bound,—that, when by nature any beings of that sort become animated with soul, their passage into corruption, or a total dissolution, is accompanied with pain ; and their entrance into existence, the assembling of all those particles which compose the nature of such a being, is attended with a sense of pleasure.

PROT. I admit your account of this whole matter ; for, as it appears to me, it bears on it the stamp of truth.

SOC. These sensations, then, which affect the soul by means only of the body, let us consider as one species of pain and pleasure.

PROT. Be it so.

SOC. Consider now the feelings of the soul herself, in the expectation of such

such a pain or of such a pleasure,—antecedent to the pleasure expected, an agreeable feeling of hope and alacrity,—antecedent to the pain expected, the uneasiness of fear.

PROT. This is, indeed, a different species of pleasure and pain, independent of the body, and produced in the soul herself through expectation.

SOC. You apprehend the matter rightly. Now the consideration of these feelings of pain and pleasure, which immediately affect the soul herself, (and seem to be produced in her, each of them, unmixed and genuine,) will, as I imagine, clear up that doubt concerning pleasure,—whether the whole kind be eligible, or whether a particular species of it be the proper object of our choice. And in the latter case, pleasure and pain (in general), like heat and cold, and all other things of this sort, will deserve sometimes to be embraced, and at other times to be rejected; as not being good in themselves, but admitting the nature of good to be superadded to them only at some times, and some of them only.

PROT. You are perfectly in the right. It must be in some such way as this that we ought to investigate the things we are in pursuit of.

SOC. If, then, what we agreed in be true,—that animal bodies feel pain, when any thing befalls them tending to their destruction,—pleasure, when they are using the means of their preservation,—let us now consider what state or condition every animal is in, when it is neither suffering aught that tends to its destruction, nor is engaged in any action, or in the midst of any circumstances, tending to its preservation. Give your earnest attention to this point, and say, whether it is entirely necessary, or not, that every animal at that time should feel neither pain nor pleasure, in any degree, great or small.

PROT. It is quite necessary.

SOC. Besides the condition then of an animal delighted, and besides the opposite condition of it under uneasiness, is not this a different, a third, state or condition of an animal?

PROT. Without dispute.

SOC. Be careful then to remember this judgment of ours. For on the remembering of it, or not, greatly will depend our judgment concerning the nature of pleasure. But, to go through with this point, let us, if you please, add a short sentence more.

PROT. Say what.

Soc.

SOC. You know, nothing hinders a man who prefers the life of wisdom from living all his life in that state.

PROT. In the state, do you mean, of neither pleasure nor uneasiness?

SOC. I do: for, when we compared together the different lives, it was supposed, that whoever should choose the life of intellect and wisdom was not to have pleasure either in a great or in a small degree.

PROT. That was the supposition.

SOC. He must live, therefore, such a life¹. And perhaps it is by no means absurd, to deem that life to be of all lives the most Godlike.

PROT. It is not indeed probable, that the Gods feel either the pleasurable sensation, or its opposite.

SOC. Highly, indeed, is it improbable. For neither of them is consistent with the divine nature. But we shall consider further of this point afterwards, if it should appear to be of any service to our argument; and shall apply it to the purpose of winning the second prize for intellect, though we should not be able to make use of it so as to win for her the first.

PROT. Very justly said.

SOC. Now that species of pleasure which we said is proper to the soul herself, is all produced in her by means of memory.

PROT. How so?

SOC. But, before we consider of this point, I think we should premise some account of memory,—what it is: and still prior to an account of memory, some mention too, methinks, ought to be made of sense, if we are to have this subject appear tolerably plain to us².

PROT. Explain your meaning.

SOC. Of those things which are incident to our bodies in every part, coming from all quarters around us, and affecting us in various ways,—some

¹ In the Greek, the first words of this sentence of Socrates, and the first word also of the next sentence, spoken by Protarchus, ought for the future to be printed thus—"Ουκέν and not Ουκέν.—The wrong accentuation of these passages in all the editions seems owing to the error of Ficinus, who mistook both the sentences for interrogations: and the mistakes are continued by Grynæus. Serranus's translation is guilty of the same mistakes: but in those of Cornarius, Bembo, and Grou, they are corrected.—S.

² The Greek of this passage, it is presumed, ought to be read thus—επιτη μάλλει ταυθ' ἡμῶν
 * τ. λ.—S.

spend all their force upon the body, without penetrating to the soul, leaving this entirely untouched and free; others extend their power through the soul as well as through the body; and some of this latter sort excite a vehement agitation in them both, jointly and severally. Do you admit this?

PROT. Be it admitted.

SOC. If we should say of those things, the power of which is confined to the body, and reaches not the soul, that the soul is deprived of knowing them; but of other things which befall us, and have a power to pervade both the body and the soul, that of these the soul hath the knowledge; should we not thus say what is most true?

PROT. Without dispute.

SOC. But when I say that the soul is deprived of knowing the former sort, do not suppose my meaning to be, that oblivion happens to her in this case. For oblivion is the departure of memory. But of the accidents now spoken of the soul never had a memory. And of that which neither is nor ever was, it is absurd to say that any loss can happen to us. Is it not?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Only then alter the terms.

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. Instead of saying that the soul is deprived of knowing what the body suffers, when she is not affected by any motions produced in the body by those ordinary occurrences,—what we termed a privation of knowledge, let us now term insensibility.

PROT. I apprehend your meaning.

SOC. But when the soul and the body are affected, both of them in common, by any of those occurrences, and in common also are moved or agitated¹,—in giving to this motion the name of sensation, you would not speak improperly.

¹ In the Greek of this passage, instead of *γιγνομενον*, the participle singular, agreeing with *σωμα*, we ought to read *γιγνομενα*, the plural, agreeing with the two preceding substantives, *ψυχην* and *σωμα*, coupled together; according to a rule, the same in the grammars of the Greek and Latin languages. For the words of this sentence, placed in the order of their grammatical construction, are these,—*Τῷ κοινῇ κινεῖσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κοινῇ γιγνομενα ἐν ἐνὶ παθεῖ, —ταυτὴν τὴν κίνησιν* *κ. τ. λ.* If Stephens had perceived this, he would not have adopted Cornarius's alteration of the text.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Now then do we not apprehend what it is which is commonly called sense or sensation?

PROT. What should hinder us?

SOC. And of memory¹, if one should say that it was the retaining of sensations, it would not be ill defined, in my opinion.

PROT. I think so too.

SOC. Do we not hold, that memory differs from remembrance?

PROT. Perhaps it does.

SOC. Do they not differ in this respect?

PROT. In what respect?

SOC. When the soul alone, unaided by the body, recovers and resumes within herself as much as possible the state which heretofore she was in, when she was affected jointly with the body, we say that the soul then remembers. Do we not?

PROT. Certainly we do.

SOC. So we do also, when the soul, after having lost the memory of something which she had sensibly perceived, or of something which she had learnt, recalls and recollects the memory of it again, herself within herself: and all this we term remembrance, and a recovery of things slipped out of our memory².

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Now the end for the sake of which we have been considering these faculties of the soul is this.

PROT. For the sake of what?

SOC. That we may apprehend³, as well and as clearly as we are able, what is the pleasure of the soul abstracted from the body, and at the same

¹ Memory, says Olympiodorus, is triple, viz. irrational, rational, and intellectual. Each of these likewise is twofold, viz. phantastic, sensitive; dianoëtic, doxastic; essential, divine.—T.

² In the printed Greek we here read—*αναμνησεις και μνημας*.—So that *memory* and *remembrance* are now confounded together; and the difference but just before made between them is annulled. It is therefore apprehended, that we ought to read—*αναμνησεις και μνημας αναμνησεις*.—S.

³ All the editions of Plato give us here to read—*ἵνα μη—λαβομεν κ. τ. λ.* From this sentence, thus absurdly printed, Cornarius, in his marginal lemmas, extracted the following curious precept,—“*Voluptas & cupiditas animæ, absque corpore, vitanda.*” *Pleasure and desire in the soul herself, abstracted from the body, are to be avoided.* The French translator has judiciously rejected the negative particle in this sentence.—S.

time may apprehend also what is desire. For the nature of both these things seems to be discovered in some measure by showing the nature of memory and of remembrance.

PROT. Let us then, O Socrates, now explain how such a discovery follows from perceiving the nature of these faculties of ours.

SOC. In treating of the rise of pleasure, and of the various forms which she assumes, it will be necessary for us, I believe, to consider a great variety of things. But, before we enter on so copious a subject, we should now, I think, in the first place, consider the nature and origin of desire.

PROT. Let us then: for we must not lose any thing.

SOC. Nay, Protarchus! we shall lose one thing, when we shall have found the objects of our inquiry; we shall lose our uncertainty about them.

PROT. You are right in your repartee. Proceed we then to what is next.

SOC. Was it not just now said, that hunger, and thirst, and many other things of like kind, were certain desires?

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. What is it, then, which is the same in all these things,—that, with respect to which we give to all of them, notwithstanding the great difference between them, one and the same appellation?

PROT. By Jupiter, Socrates! it is, perhaps, not easy to say: it ought, however, to be declared.

SOC. Let us resume the mention of that with which we began the consideration of this subject.

PROT. Of what in particular?

SOC. Do we not often speak of being thirsty?

PROT. We do.

SOC. And do we not mean by it some kind of emptiness?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Is not thirst a desire?

PROT. It is.

SOC. A desire of drink is it?

PROT. Of drink.

SOC. Of being replenished by drink: is it not¹?

¹ A future editor of Plato may consider, in the Greek of this sentence, whether *δα* should not be inserted before the word *παρατος*.—S.

PROT. I suppose it is.

SOC. Whoever of us then is emptied, desires, it seems, a condition the reverse of what has befallen him. For whereas he is emptied, he longs to be filled again.

PROT. Most evidently so.

SOC. Well now: is it possible that a man, who at the first¹ is empty, should apprehend, either by sense or by memory, what it is to be full,—a condition, in which he neither is at the time, nor ever was heretofore.

PROT. How can he?

SOC. We are agreed, that the man who desires has a desire of something.

PROT. Without dispute.

SOC. Now it is not the condition in which he is that he desires. For he suffers thirst, that is, an emptiness: but he desires to be full.

PROT. True.

SOC. Something, therefore, belonging to the man who is thirsty must apprehend in some manner what it is to be full.

PROT. It must, of necessity.

SOC. But it is impossible that this should be his body: for his body is supposed to suffer emptiness.

PROT. Right.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that his soul apprehends what it is to be full, by means of her memory.

PROT. Plainly so.

SOC. For, indeed, by what other means could his soul have such an apprehension?

PROT. Hardly by any other.

SOC. Perceive we now, what consequence follows from this reasoning of ours?

PROT. What consequence?

SOC. It proves that desire doth not arise in the body.

PROT. How so?

SOC. Because it shows that the aim and endeavour of every animal is to

¹ That is, at the beginning of his sensitive life.—S.

be in a condition opposite to the feelings with which the body is at that time affected.

PROT. It certainly shows this.

SOC. And the inclination by which it moves toward this opposite condition, shows the remembrance of a condition opposite to those present feelings and affections.

PROT. Clearly.

SOC. Our reasoning, then, in proving that memory leads us toward the objects of our desire, shows at the same time what is the general inclination and desire of the soul; and what is the moving principle in every animal.

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. Our conclusion, therefore, will by no means admit of an opinion that the body suffers hunger, or thirst, or is affected with any other such desire.

PROT. Most true.

SOC. Let us observe this also further, regarding these very subjects now under consideration. Our reasoning seems to me as if it meant to exhibit in those very things a certain kind of life.

PROT. What things do you mean? and what kind of life do you speak of?

SOC. I mean the being filled, and the being emptied, and all other things tending either to the preservation of animal life, or to the destruction of it; and whatever things ordinarily give pain,—yet, coming in a change from things contrary, are sometimes grateful.

PROT. True.

SOC. But what when a man is in the midst of these contrary conditions, and is partaking of them both?

PROT. How do you mean in the midst?

SOC. When he is afflicted with an anxious sense of his present bad condition, but at the same time has a remembrance of past delights; he may enjoy an intermission of his pain, without having as yet the cause of it removed¹;

now

¹ Thus have we rendered into English the Greek of this sentence as it is printed. But we are much inclined to adopt the emendation *και παυεται μεν*, proposed by Stephens in the margin of his edition:

now do we affirm, or do we deny, that he is at that time in the midst of two contrary conditions?

PROT. It must be affirmed.

SOC. Is he afflicted or delighted wholly?

PROT. By Jupiter, he is in a manner afflicted doubly: in his body, from his present condition; in his soul, from a tedious expectation, longing for relief.

SOC. How is it, O Protarchus, that you suppose his affliction to be doubled? Is not a man whose stomach is empty sometimes in a state of hopefulness, with assurance of having it filled? and on the contrary, is he not at other times in a condition quite hopeless?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Do you not think that, when he is in hopes of being filled, he is delighted with the remembrance of fulness? and yet that, being empty at the same time, he is in pain?

PROT. He must be so.

SOC. In such a state, therefore, man and other animals are at the same time afflicted and delighted.

PROT. It seems so to be.

SOC. But what think you when a man is empty, and hopeless of obtaining fulness? must he not, in such a condition, suffer double pain? with a view to which particular condition it was, that just now you supposed the memory of past delight, in all cases, to double the present pain.

PROT. Most true, Socrates.

SOC. Now of this inquiry into these feelings of ours we shall make this use.

PROT. What use?

SOC. Shall we say that all these pains and pleasures are true? or that they are all false? or that some of them are true, and others false?

PROT. How should pleasures or pains, O Socrates, be false?

edition: only changing *καὶ* into *ἢ*. If our learned readers are of the same opinion, and think with us, that two different cases are here stated by Socrates; in both of which there is a mixture of anxiety and delight, but not a mixture of the same kind; then, instead of—*he may enjoy*, the translation should be—*or when he enjoys*, &c.—S.

Soc.

SOC. How is it then, O Protarchus, that fears may be either true or false? that expectations may be true, or not? Or, of opinions, how is it that some are true, and others false?

PROT. Opinions, I admit, may be of either kind: but I cannot grant you this of these other feelings.

SOC. How say you? We are in danger of starting a disquisition of no small importance.

PROT. That is true.

SOC. But whether it has any relation to the subjects which have preceded, this, O son of an illustrious father¹! ought to be considered.

PROT. Perhaps, indeed, it ought.

SOC. Tell me then: for, as to myself, I am continually in a state of wonderment about these very difficulties now proposed.

PROT. What difficulties do you mean?

SOC. False pleasures are not true; nor true pleasures false².

PROT.

¹ We cannot conceive to what purpose this compliment to Protarchus is here introduced, unless it be by way of a simile; to represent the dignity and excellence of the matters before discussed; and, by reminding Protarchus of his illustrious birth, to signify to him,—that, as he ought not to degenerate from his ancestors, so neither ought any new matters to be brought upon the carpet, if, in their weight and value, they fall short of those which have preceded. Perhaps also an intimation is thus given by Plato to his readers, that one of the subjects of inquiry just now mentioned by Socrates,—that concerning *opinions*,—immediately related to that other concerning *pleasures*, as to their truth or falsehood. In the Greek of this passage, it is probable that the printed reading κεινυ του ανδρος is erroneous; and that Plato wrote κλειτου ανδρος; but that, in after ages, a reader of some manuscript copy of this dialogue, where instead of κλειτου was written κλεινυ, (and Hesychius interprets κλεινυς by the more usual terms ενδοξος, ονομαστος,) on collating it with another M.S. copy, where he found κλειτου written, wrote του in the margin of the former copy, opposite to the syllable νευ, with which, perhaps, a new line began; that afterwards a transcriber of this copy received του into the text of his own transcript, just before ανδρος, supposing it to be a word casually omitted in the former copy; and that, last of all, when κλεινου του ανδρος was discovered to be a solecism in the Greek syntaxis, κλεινου, a word very uncommon, was easily changed into κεινου, and the construction was thus purified.—S.

² In the Greek we read only,—ψευδεις, αι δ' αληθεις ουκ εστιν ηδοναι. All the translators of Plato into other languages justly suppose this sentence to be imperfect in the beginning of it: but in their way of supplying the words omitted, it is nothing more than a repetition of the question proposed before, without any new additional matter. Socrates, in fact, is now entering on a proof of the distinction between the true pleasures and the false: and we presume, that he here builds

PROT. How is it possible they should ?

SOC. Neither in a dream, then, nor awake, is it possible, as you hold, not even if a man is out of his senses through madness, or has lost the soundness of his judgment any other way, is it possible for him ever to imagine that he feels delight, when he is by no means sensibly delighted ; or to imagine that he feels pain, when actually the man feels none.

PROT. All of us, O Socrates, constantly suppose these facts to be as you have now stated them.

SOC. But is it a right supposition ? or should we examine whether it is right, or not ?

PROT. We ought to examine it, I must own.

SOC. Let us then explain a little more clearly what was just now said concerning pleasure and opinion. Do we not hold the reality of our having an opinion ?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. And the reality of our having pleasure ?

PROT. To be sure.

SOC. Further : it is something, that which is the object of our opinion.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. And something also that is with which whatever feels a pleasure is delighted.

PROT. Most certainly.

SOC. In the having, then, of an opinion, whether we are right or wrong in entertaining that opinion, the reality of our having it abides still.

PROT. How can a man lose an opinion whilst he has it ?

SOC. In the enjoying also of any pleasure, whether we do right or wrong to enjoy it, it is certain that the reality of the enjoyment still remains.

PROT. To be sure, these things are so.

SOC. On what account is it, then, that we are used to call some opinions true, and others false ; yet to pleasures only we allow the attribute of true ;

his proof on that **prime axiom** on which is founded all demonstration, viz. " Things cannot be what they are, and yet different from what they are, at the same time."—In the passage, therefore, now before us, it seems probable that the sentence, to be made agreeable to the sense of it, is to be completed thus;—*Ἀληθεὶς αἱ μὲν ψευδὲς, ψευδὲς αἱ δ' ἀληθεὶς, οὐκ εἰσιν ἡδοναί.* The error of omitting the first words is easy to be accounted for.—S.

notwith-

notwithstanding that pleasure and opinion, both of them, equally admit reality in the having of them?

PROT. This ought to be considered.

SOC. Is it that falsehood and truth are incident to opinion? so that, by the supervening of one or other of these, opinion becomes something beside what in itself it is; and every opinion is thus made to have the quality of being either false or true. Do you say that this ought to be considered?

PROT. I do.

SOC. And beside this: supposing that opinions universally do admit of attributes and qualities; whether only pleasure and pain are what they are in themselves simply, and never admit any quality to arise in them; ought we not to settle this point also by agreement between us?

PROT. It is evident that we ought.

SOC. But it is easy enough to perceive, that these also admit the accession of some qualities. For of pleasures and pains we agreed awhile since, that some are great, others little; and that each sort admits of vehemence and of intension.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. And if either to any pleasure, or to any opinion, there be added the quality of evil, shall we not affirm the opinion thus to become evil, and the pleasure evil in the same manner?

PROT. Without doubt, O Socrates.

SOC. And what, if rectitude, or the opposite to rectitude, accede to any of them, shall we not say, that the *opinion* is *right*, if rectitude be in it? and shall we not ascribe the same quality to *pleasure*, on the same supposition?

PROT. Of necessity we must.

SOC. And if the object of our *opinion* be mistaken by us, must we not in such a case acknowledge that our *opinion* is *erroneous*, and not right; and that we are not right ourselves in entertaining such an opinion?

PROT. Certainly we must.

SOC. But what, if we discover ourselves to be mistaken in the object of our *grief* or of our *pleasure*, shall we give to this *grief*, or to this *pleasure*, the epithet of *right*, or *good*, or any other which is fair and honourable?

PROT. We certainly cannot, where a mistake is in the pleasure.

SOC.

SOC. And surely pleasure is apt to arise in us oftentimes, accompanied, not with a *right* opinion, but with an opinion which is *false*.

PROT. Indisputably so. And the opinion, O Socrates, then and in that case, we should say was a false opinion. But to the *pleasure* itself no man would ever give the appellation of *false*.

SOC. You are very ready, O Protarchus, at supporting the plea made use of by Pleasure on this occasion.

PROT. Not at all so. I only repeat what I have heard.

SOC. Do we make no difference, my friend, between such a pleasure as comes accompanied with right opinion or with science, and that kind of pleasure which often arises in every one of us at the same time with false opinion or ignorance¹?

PROT. It is probable, I own, that no little difference is between them.

SOC. Let us now come to the consideration of what the difference is.

PROT. Proceed in whatever way you think proper.

SOC. I shall take this way then.

PROT. What way?

SOC. Some of our opinions are false, and others of them are true: this is agreed.

PROT. It is.

SOC. Pleasure and pain, as it was just now said, oftentimes attend on either of them indifferently; on opinions, I mean, either true or false.

PROT. Certainly so.

SOC. Is it not from memory and from sense that opinion is produced in us, and that room is given for a diversity of opinions on every subject?

PROT. Most undoubtedly.

SOC. I ask you, then, whether or no, as to these things, we deem ourselves to be of necessity affected thus?

PROT. How?

SOC. Oftentimes, when a man looks at something which he discovers at a

¹ Stephens's edition of Plato agrees with all the prior editions in giving us to read *avoiar* in this place: but that learned printer, in his latter annotations, pag. 75, justly observes, that instead of *avoiar* we ought to read *ayvoviar*. That emendation was made before Stephens by Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, pag. 333. Ignorance is here opposed to knowledge, as false opinion is opposed to true. The Medicean manuscript exhibits the right reading, as appears from the Latin of Ficinus.—S.

great distance, but does not discern very clearly, will you admit that he may have an inclination to judge of what he sees?

PROT. I do admit the case.

SOC. Upon this, would not the man question himself in this manner?

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. What is that which appears as if it was standing under some tree by the cliff there? Do you not suppose that he would speak those words to himself, looking at some such appearances before him, as I have mentioned?

PROT. No doubt of it.

SOC. Hereupon, might not this man then, making a conjecture, say to himself, by way of answer,—It is a man?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. But walking on, perhaps he might discern it to be but the work of some shepherds, and would say again to himself,—It is only a statue.

PROT. Most certainly he would.

SOC. And if he had any companion with him, he would speak out aloud what he had first spoken within himself, and repeat the very same words to his companion: so that what we lately termed an opinion would thus become a speech.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. But if he were alone, this very thing would be a thought still within him; and he might walk on, keeping the same thought in his mind, a considerable way.

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Well now: does this matter appear to you in the same light as it does to me?

PROT. How is that?

SOC. The soul in that case seems to me to resemble some book.

PROT. How so?

SOC. The memory, coinciding with the senses, together with those passions of the soul which attend this memory and the present sensation, seem to me as if they concurred in writing sentences at that time within our souls. And when the scribe writes what is true, true opinions and true sentences are by him produced within us: but when our scribe writes what is false, then what we think, and what we say to ourselves, is contrary to the truth.

PROT.

PROT. I heartily agree to your account of this matter, and acknowledge those joint scribes within the soul.

SOC. Acknowledge also another workman within us, operating at that time.

PROT. What is he?

SOC. An engraver, who follows after the scribe; engraving within the soul images of those thoughts, sentences, and sayings.

PROT. How and when is this done?

SOC. It is, when that which a man thinks and says to himself, concerning the object of his sight, or of any other outward sense, he separates from the sensation which he has of it; and views somehow within himself the image of that thought, and of that saying. Or is there no such thing as this ever produced within us?

PROT. Nothing is more certain.

SOC. The images of true thoughts and true sentences, are they not true? and the images of those which are false, are they not themselves also false?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Now if we have pronounced thus far rightly, let us proceed to the consideration of one point further.

PROT. What is that?

SOC. Whether all the operations of this kind, such as are naturally performed within our souls, regard only things present and things past, but not things to come; or whether any of them have a reference to these also.

PROT. Difference of time makes no difference in these matters.

SOC. Did we not say before, that pleasures and pains of the soul, by herself, arise in us prior to those pleasures and pains which affect the body? so as that we feel antecedent joy and grief in the prospect of things to come hereafter.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Those writings, then, and those engravings, which, as we held just now, are performed within us, do they respect the past and the present time only? and have they no concernment with the future?

PROT. About the future very much are they concerned, and chiefly.

SOC. In saying this, do you mean that all these things are expectations of the future; and that we are, all of us, throughout life, full of expectations?

PROT. The very thing I mean.

SOC. Now, then, since we are thus far agreed, answer to this further question.

PROT. What is it?

SOC. A man who is just, and pious, and entirely good, is he not beloved by Divinity?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. And what of the unjust and entirely bad man? is not the reverse of it true of him?

PROT. How can it be otherwise?

SOC. Now every man, as we said just now, is full of a multitude of expectations.

PROT. True.

SOC. Sayings there are, written within every one of us, to which we give the name of expectations.

PROT. There are.

SOC. And phantasies also, engraven in us. Thus, for instance, a man often sees in imagination plenty of money flowing into him, and by those means many pleasures surrounding him; and views himself, engraven within himself, as highly delighted.

PROT. That often is the case.

SOC. Of these engravings, shall we say that good men, because of the divine favour, have generally those which are true; and bad men, generally those of the contrary sort? or shall we deny it?

PROT. It cannot be denied.

SOC. Bad men, then, have pleasures engraven within them also; but these are of the false sort.

PROT. No doubt of it.

SOC. Wicked men, therefore, delight mostly in false pleasures; the good, in pleasures which are true.

PROT. It must of necessity be so.

SOC. According to this account, there are, in the souls of men, such pleasures as are false; though in a most ridiculous manner they imitate, and would fain pass for, true pleasures: pains also there are with the like qualities.

PROT.

PROT. Such pleasures and such pains there are.

SOC. May not a man who indulges fancy at random, and embraces opinions of any kind whatever, always really¹ think and believe some things to be, which neither are nor ever were, and sometimes such as never will be?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. And they are the false semblances and seemings of these unreal things, which produce in him those false opinions, and occasion him to think thus falsely. Are they not?

PROT. They are.

SOC. Well then: should we not say of the pains and pleasures felt by those bad men, that their condition corresponds with the case of false opinions?

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. May not a man who courts and embraces pleasure at random, pleasure in general, of any kind whatever, may not such a man always really feel delight from things which are not, and sometimes from things which never were,—often too, and perhaps the most frequently, from things which will never be?

PROT. This must of necessity be granted.

SOC. Should not the same be said of fears and desires, and all things of the like sort, that these also are sometimes false?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Well now: can we say of opinions, that they are bad, or that they are good, any otherwise than as they prove to be false, or prove to be true²?

PROT. No otherwise.

SOC. And I should think, that pleasures too we apprehend not to be bad on any other account, than as they are false.

PROT. Quite the contrary, O Socrates. For hardly would any man put to the account of falsehood any of the evils brought on by pain and pleasure; since many and great evils accede to them from other quarters.

¹ In the Greek of this sentence, before the word *ατις*, we ought to read *οπως* instead of *οιτως*. This appears from a sentence soon after, concerning a man *really delighted* with the thoughts of *things unreal*. Both the sentences refer to what was said before, where the same word is used in the same sense as it is here.—S.

² It is observed by Cornarius, that after the word *ψευδεις*, in the Greek of this sentence, all the printed editions omit the words *και αληθεις*: the sense evidently demands them; and they are not wanting in the Medicean MS., as appears from Ficinus's Latin translation.—S.

SOC.

SOC. Pleasures which are evil, through the evil they occasion, we shall speak of by and by, if we shall continue to think it requisite: but we are now to speak of a multitude of pleasures felt by us, and frequently arising in us,—pleasures which are false in yet another way. And this other way of considering pleasure we shall have occasion, perhaps, to make use of in forming a right judgment of the several sorts of it.

PROT. By all means let us speak of these, if any such pleasures there are.

SOC. And there are such, O Protarchus, in my opinion. But as long as this opinion lies by us unexamined, it is impossible for it to become certain or incontestable.

PROT. Fairly said.

SOC. Now, therefore, let us advance to this other argument, like champions to the combat.

PROT. Come we on then.

SOC. We said, if we remember, a little while since, that as long as the wants of the body, which are called desires in us, remain unsatisfied, the body all that time will be affected distinctly, and in a different manner from the soul.

PROT. We remember that it was so held.

SOC. In such a case, that within us, which desired, would be the soul, desiring to have her body in a state contrary to its present condition; and that which felt uneasiness or pain from the condition it was in, would be the body.

PROT. Things would be thus with us.

SOC. Now compute these things together, and consider the amount.

PROT. Say what.

SOC. In such a case, it comes out that pains and pleasures are placed together, each by the other's side; and that together, each by the other's side, arise in us a feeling of emptiness, and a desire of its contrary, fulness: for so it has just now appeared.

PROT. It is indeed apparent.

SOC. Has not this also been said? and does it not remain with us a point settled between us by agreement?

PROT. What?

SOC. That pain and pleasure, both of them, admit of the more and of the less; and that they both are of the infinites.

PROT.

PROT. It was so said and agreed.

SOC. Is there not, then, some way in which we may judge of pain and pleasure rightly?

PROT. What way, and how do you mean?

SOC. In judging of them, are we not wont, in every case, readily to try them by these marks,—which of them is the greater, and which is the less,—which of them hath the nature of its kind the most,—and which is more intense than the other,—in comparing either a pain with a pleasure, or one pain with another pain, or one pleasure with another pleasure?

PROT. Such comparisons are often made: and from these comparisons we are wont to form our judgment and our choice.

SOC. Well now: in the case of magnitudes, does not the distance of visible objects, some of which are seen remote, and others near, render their real magnitudes uncertain, obscuring the truth of things, and producing false opinions? and does not the same thing hold true with regard to pains and pleasures? is not the same effect produced by the same means in this case also?

PROT. Much more feelingly, O Socrates.

SOC. But in this case it happens contrary to what was in the case mentioned a little before.

PROT. What happens, say you?

SOC. In that case, the true and the false opinions entertained by us impart to the pains and pleasures which attend them, their own qualities of truth and falsehood.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But, in the case which I am now speaking of, the pains and pleasures being viewed afar off and near, continually changing [their aspects with their distances], and being set in comparison together, [it happens that] the pleasures [at hand] compared with the [remote] pains, appear greater and more intense [than they really are], and [that] the pains, compared with the pleasures, [have an appearance] quite the contrary.

PROT. Such appearances must of necessity arise by these means.

SOC. As far, therefore, as the pains and pleasures appear less or greater than they really are, if from the reality you separate this appearance of what neither of them is, and take it by itself thus separated, you will not say that

it is a right appearance ; nor will you venture to assert, that this additional part of pain and pleasure is right and true.

PROT. By no means.

SOC. After these discoveries, let us look if we can meet with pleasures and pains still falser, and more remote from truth, than those already mentioned, which are not only in appearance what they are called, but are felt also by the soul.

PROT. What pleasures and pains do you speak of?

SOC. We have more than once said, that when the frame of any animal is on its way to dissolution, through mixtures and separations, repletions and evacuations, the increase of some, and the diminution of other parts of it, that in such a condition of its body, pains, aches, and oppressions, with many other uneasy feelings, to which are given various names, are wont to arise in us.

PROT. True : this observation has been again and again repeated.

SOC. And that, when all things in our bodily frame return to their natural and sound state, together with this recovery, we receive some pleasure from within ourselves.

PROT. Right.

SOC. But how is it when none of these changes are operating in our bodies?

PROT. At what times, O Socrates, may this be?

SOC. The question, O Protarchus, which you have now put to me is nothing to the purpose.

PROT. Why not?

SOC. Because it will not hinder me from putting again my question to you.

PROT. Repeat it then.

SOC. I shall put it thus : If at any time none of those things were passing within us, what condition should we of necessity be in, as to pleasure and pain, at such a time?

PROT. When no motion was in the body either way, do you mean?

SOC. Exactly so.

PROT. It is plain, O Socrates, that we should feel neither any pleasure nor any pain at such a time.

Soc.

Soc. Perfectly well answered. But now in your question I suppose you meant this,—that some or other of those things were of necessity passing within us continually at all times; agreeably to this saying of the wise,—“that all things are in perpetual flow, going upward and downward.”

Prot. So they tell us: and this saying of theirs is, methinks, worthy of regard.

Soc. Undoubtedly it is: for it is said by men who are worthy, themselves, to be regarded. But this subject, which we have thus lighted on, I would willingly decline. Now I have it in my thoughts to avoid it this way; but you must accompany me.

Prot. What way?

Soc. Be it so, then, let us say to these wise men: but you, Protarchus, answer me to this question: Do animals feel all the alterations which they continually undergo? or, whilst we are growing, or suffering in any part of our bodies any other change, are we sensible of these internal motions? Is not quite the contrary true? for almost every thing of this kind passing within us passes without our knowledge.

Prot. Certainly so.

Soc. It was, therefore, not right in us to say, as we did just now, that all the alterations which happen to our bodies, and all the motions within them, produce either pains or pleasures.

Prot. Certainly not right.

Soc. And it would be better, and less liable to censure, to lay down this position.

Prot. What position?

Soc. That great changes within give us pains and pleasures; but that such as are inconsiderable, or only moderate, produce neither pleasures nor pains.

Prot. This is more justly said than the other sentence, indeed, Socrates.

Soc. If, then, these things are so, we meet with the life mentioned before recurring to us here again.

Prot. What life?

Soc. That which is exempt from all sensations, both of pain and pleasure.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. Hence, we find there are three kinds of life proposed to our consideration:

ation: one of them full of pleasure, another full of pain; the third neutral, and free from both. Or how otherwise would you determine upon these points?

PROT. No otherwise I, for my part: for three different kinds of life appear to me in what has been said.

SOC. To have no pain, therefore, cannot be the same thing as to have pleasure.

PROT. Certainly it cannot.

SOC. But whenever you hear a man say, that it is the most pleasurable of all things to live all one's life free from pain, what do you take to be his thought and meaning?

PROT. He means and thinks, as I take it, that it is a pleasure not to have any pain.

SOC. Well now: let there be any three things whatever: to instance in things of honourable name, let us suppose one of them to be gold, another to be silver, and the third to be neither gold nor silver.

PROT. We shall suppose so.

SOC. That which is neither, is it possible for it any way to become either gold or silver?

PROT. By no means.

SOC. The middle life, therefore, if it were said to be pleasurable, or if it were said to be painful, would not be spoken of in either way, rightly and agreeably to the true nature of things; nor would any person who entertains either of those opinions concerning it think rightly.

PROT. Certainly not.

SOC. And yet, my friend, we find that there are persons who actually speak and think thus amiss.

PROT. It is very evident.

SOC. Do these persons really feel pleasure¹ whenever they are free from pain?

¹ We have ventured to suppose an error in the Greek of this passage; and that we ought to read *χαίρουσιν οὗτοι*, instead of the printed words—*χαίρειν οἱονται*. For, without such an alteration, Socrates in his next sentence (where these very words—*χαίρειν οἱονται*—appear again, and where they are very proper) is guilty of mere tautology; and his argumentation proceeds not the least *step*, but halts during that whole sentence.—S.

PROT.

PROT. So they say.

SOC. They must imagine, then, that they are pleased; for otherwise they would not say so.

PROT. They do, it seems, imagine it.

SOC. They have a wrong opinion then of pleasure; if it be true that pleasure, and freedom from pain, have each a distinct nature, different from that of the other.

PROT. Different, indeed, we have concluded them to be.

SOC. And are we willing to abide by our late conclusion, that the subjects still under examination are three distinct things? or do we choose to say that they are only two? Do we now say that pain is man's evil, and that deliverance from pain is man's good, and is that to which is given the appellation of pleasure?

PROT. How come we, O Socrates, to propose this point to be reconsidered by us now? for I do not apprehend your drift.

SOC. In fact, O Protarchus, you do not apprehend who are the direct enemies to Philebus.

PROT. To whom do you give that character?

SOC. To persons who are said to have a profound knowledge of nature: these persons say that pleasures have no reality at all.

PROT. What do they mean?

SOC. They say that all those things which Philebus and his party call pleasures are but deliverances from pain.

PROT. Is it your advice, then, O Socrates, that we should hearken to these persons? or how otherwise?

SOC. Not so: but to consider them as a kind of diviners, who divine not according to any rules of art; but, from the austerity of a certain genius in them not ignoble, have conceived an aversion to the power of Pleasure, and deem nothing in her to be solid; but all her attractive charms to be mere illusions, and not [true] pleasure. It is thus that we should regard these persons, especially if we consider their other harsh maxims. You shall in the next place hear what pleasures seem to me to be true pleasures: so that, from both the accounts compared together, we may find out the nature of Pleasure, and form our judgment of her comparative value.

PROT. Rightly said.

SOC. Let us then follow after them, as our allies, wherever their austerity shall lead us. For I suppose they would begin their argument with some general principle, and propound to us some such question as this,—whether, if we had a mind to know the nature of any particular quality of things, for instance, the nature of the hard, whether or no we should not comprehend it better by examining the hardest things, than we should by scrutinizing a various multitude of the less hard. Now, Protarchus, you must make an answer to these austere persons, as if you were making it to me.

PROT. By all means: and I make this answer to them,—that to examine such bodies as exceed all others in hardness is the better way.

SOC. In like manner, then, if we had a mind to know the nature of pleasure in general, we are not to consider the multitude of little or mean pleasures, but those only which are called extreme and exquisite.

PROT. Every man would grant you the truth of this your present argument.

SOC. The pleasures which are always within our reach, those which we often call the greatest, do they not belong to the body?

PROT. There is no doubt of it.

SOC. Are the [bodily] pleasures which are produced in those persons who labour under diseases, greater than the pleasures [of the same kind] felt by those who are in health? Now let us take care not to err, by making too precipitate an answer.

PROT. What danger is there of erring?

SOC. Perhaps we might pronounce in favour of those who are in health.

PROT. Probably we should.

SOC. But what? are not those pleasures the most excessive which are preceded by the strongest desires?

PROT. This cannot be denied.

SOC. The afflicted with fevers, or with diseases of kin to fevers, are they not more thirsty than other persons? do they not more shake with cold? and suffer they not in a greater degree other evils which the body is subject to? Do they not feel their wants more pressing? and feel they not greater pleasures when they have those wants supplied? Or shall we deny all this to be true?

¹ In all the editions of the Greek we here read *αποπληρουμένων* but certainly we ought to read *αποπληρουμένοι*.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Your representation of those cases clearly is right.

SOC. Well then: should we not be clearly right in saying, that whoever would know what pleasures are the greatest must not go to the healthy, but to the sick, to look for them? Be careful now not to imagine the meaning of my question to be this,—whether the sick enjoy pleasures more, in number, than the healthy: but consider me as inquiring into high degrees of pleasure; and by what means, and in what subjects, the vehemence or extreme of it always is produced. For we are to find out, we say, what the nature is of pleasure, and what those persons mean by pleasure who pretend that no such thing as pleasure has any being at all.

PROT. Tolerably well do I apprehend your argument.

SOC. And possibly, O Protarchus, you will equally well show the truth of it. For, tell me; in a life of boundless luxury see you not greater pleasures (I do not mean more in number, but more intense and vehement,) than those in the life of temperance? Give your mind to the question first, and then answer.

PROT. I apprehend what you say: and the great superiority of the pleasures enjoyed in a luxurious life I easily discern. For sober and temperate persons are on all occasions under the restraint of that maxim, now become a proverb, which advises them to avoid the too much of any thing; to which advice they are obedient. But an excess of pleasure, even to madness, possessing the souls of the unwise and intemperate, as it makes them frantic, it makes them conspicuous, and famed for being men of pleasure.

SOC. Well said. If this, then, be the case, it is evident that the greatest pleasures, as well as the greatest pains, are produced in a morbid and vicious disposition of the soul or of the body; and not when they are in their sound and right state.

PROT. Certainly so.

SOC. Ought we not then to instance in some of these pleasures, and to consider what circumstances attend them on account of which it is that they are styled the greatest?

PROT. That must be done.

SOC. Consider now what circumstance attends the pleasures which are produced in certain maladies.

PROT. In what maladies?

SOC. In those of the base or indecent kind;—pleasures, to which the persons whom we termed austere have an utter aversion.

PROT. What pleasures do you mean?

SOC. Those which are felt in curing the itch, for instance, by friction; and in other maladies of like kind, such as need no other medicine.

NOW the sensation thence arising in us, in the name of the Gods, what shall we say of it? Pleasure is it? or shall we term it pain?

PROT. A mixt sort of sensation, O Socrates, seems to arise from this malady, partaking of both pain and pleasure.

SOC. It was not, however, for the sake of Philebus that I brought this last subject into our discourse: it was because we should never be able to determine the point now before us, unless we had taken a view of these mixt pleasures, and of others also which depend on these. Let us proceed, therefore, to consider such as have an affinity with them.

PROT. Such, do you mean, as partake of pleasure and pain by means of their commixture?

SOC. That is my very meaning. Of these mixt feelings, then, some belong to the body; and in the body are these generated. Others are of the soul; and these have in the soul their residence. We shall find also pleasures mingled with pains, where the soul and the body have, each of them, a share. Now these mixtures [though composed of contraries] are, in some cases, termed only pleasures; in other cases, only pains.

PROT. Express yourself more fully.

SOC. When a man, whether in a sound or in a decaying state of his body, feels two contrary sensations at the same time; as when, chilled with cold, he is warming himself; or sometimes, when overheated, he is cooling himself; with a view, I suppose, to his enjoying one of those sensations, and to his deliverance from the other: in such cases, what is called the bitter-sweet, through the difficulty met with in driving away the bitter part, causeth a struggle within, and a fierce meeting together of opposite qualities and sensations.

PROT. It is perfectly true, what you have now said.

SOC. Are not some of these mixt sensations composed of pain and pleasure in equal proportion? and in others is not one of them predominant?

PROT. Without doubt.

Soc. Among those, then, in which there is an overplus of pain, I reckon that of the malady termed the itch, and all other pruriencies and itchings, when nothing more than a slight friction or motion is applied to them, such as only dissipates what humours are at the surface, but reaches not the fermentation and turgescence of those humours which lie deep within. In this condition, the diseased often apply heat to the parts which pain them, and then the opposite extreme, through impatience, and uncertainty which way to take. Thus they excite inexpressible pleasures first, and then the contrary, in the interior parts, compared with the pains felt in the exterior, which yet are mixed with pleasures, according as the humours are driven outwardly or inwardly. For by violently dispersing the morbid matter where it is collected, and by compelling it together from places where it lies dispersed, pleasures and pains are at once excited, and arise by each other's side.

Prot. Most true.

Soc. Now wherever, in any case of this kind, a greater quantity of pleasure is mingled, the smaller quantity of pain creates but a slight uneasiness, no more than what serves to tickle: whilst, on the other hand¹, the great excess of pleasure spread throughout convulseth the whole frame, and sometimes causeth involuntary motions; operating also every change of colour in the countenance, every variety of posture in the limbs, and every different degree of respiration;—and within the soul it energizes in transports, uttered madly in exclamations.

Prot. Entirely so.

Soc. Further: a man in such a condition, O my friend! is apt to say of himself, and others are apt to say of him, that he is dying, as it were, through excess of pleasure. From this time for ever after he is wholly intent on pursuing the like pleasures; and the more so, the more he happens to be intemperate, and less under the government of prudence. Thus he calls these pleasures the greatest, and accounts him the happiest of men who spends his whole time, as far as possible, in the enjoyment of them.

Prot. You have described all this, O Socrates, just as it happens to the bulk of mankind, according to their own sense and opinion.

Soc. But all this, O Protarchus, relates only to such pleasures mixed with

¹ In the Greek, as it is printed, we read το δ' αὐτῆς ἡδονῆς: but we should choose to read το δ' αὐτῆς ἰ.—S.

pains as arise solely in the body, in its superficial parts and interior parts alternately. And as to those feelings of the soul which meet with a contrary condition of the body, when pleasure in the one is mixed with pain in the other, so as that both are ingredients in one composition, we speak of those before; such as a desire of fulness, under a sense of emptiness in the body; when hope administers delight, while the emptiness gives a pain. We did not, indeed, consider them at that time as evidences of the present point; but we now say, that in all those cases (and the number of them is infinite) where the condition of the soul is different from that of the body, a mixture of pain and pleasure happens to be produced.

PROT. You are, I believe, perfectly in the right.

SOC. Among the mixtures of pain and pleasure, there is a third kind remaining, yet unmentioned.

PROT. What kind is that?

SOC. That where such pleasures and pains as we said arise frequently in the soul, herself by herself, are mixed together.

PROT. In what cases, say we, are these mixtures found?

SOC. Anger, fear, and desire, and lamentation, love, emulation, and envy, and all other such passions of the soul herself, do you not suppose them to give pain and uneasiness to the soul?

PROT. I do.

SOC. And shall we not find these very passions fraught with wondrous pleasures? In the passions of resentment and anger, do we need to be reminded of what the poet says¹,—that

though resentment raise
Choler, like smoke, in even the prudent breast;
The luscious honey from its waxen feat
Distills not half such sweetness.

And do we not remember, in lamentations and desires, the pleasures we have felt mingled with the pains which those passions produce?

PROT. It is true: our passions do affect us in the manner you have mentioned, and no otherwise.

SOC. And have you not observed, at tragic spectacles presented on the stage, with how much pleasure the spectators shed tears?

¹ Homer, in the eighteenth book of his Iliad, ver. 108, &c.

PROT.

PROT. I certainly have.

SOC. But have you attended to the disposition of your soul at the acting of a comedy? Do you know that there also we feel pain mixed with pleasure?

PROT. I do not perfectly well comprehend that.

SOC. It is not perfectly easy, O Protarchus, at such a time, to comprehend what mixed passions possess the soul in every case of that kind.

PROT. Not at all easy, I believe.

SOC. However, let us consider what our feelings are at that time; and the more attentively, on account of their obscurity; that we may be able to discover with the greater ease what mixture there is of pain and pleasure in other cases.

PROT. Say on, then.

SOC. The passion known by the name of envy, will you set it down for a sort of pain in the soul, or how?

PROT. Even so.

SOC. And yet the man who envies another will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils which befall him.

PROT. Clearly so.

SOC. Now ignorance is an evil; and so is what we term want of sense.

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. From these premises you may perceive what is the nature of ridicule and the ridiculous.

PROT. You must tell me what it is.

SOC. Every particular vice takes its name from some particular bad habit in the soul. But total viciousness, the habit of wickedness in all respects, is the direct contrary of that habit which the Delphic inscription adviseth us to acquire.

PROT. That of knowing one's self do you mean, O Socrates?

SOC. I do. And the contrary to this advice of the oracle would be,—not to know one's self in any respect at all.

PROT. Certainly it would.

SOC. Try now to divide this ignorance of ourselves into three kinds.

PROT. How, say you, should this be done? for I am not able to do it.

SOC. Do you say that I should make this division in your stead?

PROT. I not only say it, but desire you so to do.

SOC. Well then : whoever is ignorant of himself, must he not be thus ignorant, in one or other of these three respects ?

PROT. What three ?

SOC. First, with respect to external possessions, in imagining himself wealthier than he really is.

PROT. Many persons there are who labour under this sort of ignorance.

SOC. Yet more numerous are they, in the next place, who imagine themselves handsomer in their persons, nobler in their air, or graced with some other corporeal advantage in a higher degree than actually they are.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. But the number is by far the greatest, I presume, of such as are mistaken in themselves, with respect to the third kind of excellence, that which belongs to the soul, by fancying themselves possessed of more virtue than in truth they have.

PROT. Nothing is more certain.

SOC. Among the virtues and excellencies of the soul, is not wisdom that to which the generality of mankind lay claim with the greatest earnestness, and in regard to which they are full of contention, opinionativeness, and false notions ?

PROT. Evidently so.

SOC. Now the man who should say that ignorance and error, in any of these respects, were evils, would say what is true.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But we are to make still another division of this ignorance of a man's self, O Protarchus, if we would discover the odd mixture of pain and pleasure in that mirthful envy which is excited by comedy,—a division into two sorts.

PROT. Into what two sorts do you mean ?

SOC. To those persons who foolishly entertain any such false opinion of themselves it necessarily happens, as it does to all men in general, that strength and power attend on some ; while the fate of others is quite the contrary.

PROT. It must be so.

SOC. According to this difference then between them, distinguish those ignorant

ignorant persons into two sorts. And all those whose self-ignorance is attended with weakness, and with a want of power to be revenged on such as laugh at them, you may justly say that they are open to ridicule, and may call their characters properly ridiculous. But as to the others, who have power to take their revenge, if you should say that these are to be dreaded, as being powerful and hostile, you would give a very right account of them. For such ignorance, armed with power, is powerful to do mischief; and not only itself is hostile and hurtful to all persons within its reach, but so likewise are all its images and representatives. But self-ignorance, without strength and power, is to be ranked among the things which are ridiculous, and is a proper object of ridicule.

PROT. There is much of truth in what you say. But I do not as yet perceive clearly what mixture there is of pain and pleasure in our feelings on such occasions.

SOC. You are, in the first place, to apprehend the force of envy in these cases.

PROT. Show it me then.

SOC. Is not sorrow, on some occasions, felt unjustly? and is it not the same case with joy and pleasure?

PROT. No doubt can be made of it.

SOC. There is neither injustice, nor envy, in rejoicing at the evils which befall our enemies.

PROT. Certainly there is not.

SOC. But if at any time, when we see an evil happening to our friends, we feel no sorrow,—if, on the contrary, we rejoice at it,—are we not guilty of injustice?

PROT. Without dispute.

SOC. Did we not say that it was an evil to any person to be ignorant of himself?

PROT. We did, and justly too.

SOC. If there be in any of our friends a false conceit of their own wisdom, or of their own beauty, or of whatever else we mentioned, when we divided ignorance of one's self into three kinds, is not this conceit an object of ridicule, where it is attended with impotence and weakness; but an object

of hatred, if power and strength¹ are joined with it? or do we deny, what I just now said, that the having of such a false opinion, if it be not hurtful to others, is an object of ridicule?

PROT. You said what is entirely true.

SOC. And do we not acknowledge this false conceit to be an evil, as being built on ignorance?

PROT. Most heartily.

SOC. Whether do we feel delight or sorrow when we laugh at it?

PROT. It is plain that we feel delight.

SOC. Did we not say, that whenever we feel delight from the evils which happen to our friends, it is envy which operates in us that unjust delight?

PROT. It must be envy.

SOC. Our reasoning then shows, that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in a friend, mixing thus delight with envy, we mix together pleasure and pain. For we acknowledged long ago that envy gives uneasiness and pain to the soul; and we have admitted, that laughing yields delight. Now in these cases they arise, both of them, at the same time.

PROT. True.

SOC. We see, then, from the conclusion of our argument, that in mournful spectacles, and no less in comedies, not only as they are acted on the stage, but as they are presented to us also in the tragedy and comedy of real life, and in a thousand intermediate occurrences, pains and pleasures are blended together.

PROT. It would be impossible, O Socrates, for a man not to acknowledge this, were he ever so zealous an advocate for the opposite side.

SOC. When we entered on the present subject, we proposed to consider anger, desire and grief, fear and love, jealousy and envy, and such other passions of the soul; promising ourselves to find in them those mixed feelings which again and again we had been speaking of: did we not?

PROT. We did.

SOC. Do we perceive that we have dispatched already all which relates to grief, and envy, and anger?

¹ It is hoped that no future editor of Plato will be either so absurd, or so careless, as to follow all the former editors in printing *μν* (instead of *αν*) *εἰρημνεα*, in the Greek of this passage.—S.

PROT.

PROT. We perceive it clearly.

SOC. But there is much yet remaining.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. For what reason, principally, do you suppose it was that I explained to you the mixed feeling which a comedy occasions in us? Do you not conceive, that it was to show myself able to explain to you with much more ease, the like mixture of pain and pleasure in fear, in love, and in the other passions? and that after you had seen the truth of it in one instance, you might discharge me from the necessity of proceeding to the rest, or of lengthening out the argument any further; but might receive it for a truth, without limitation or exception, that the body without the soul, and the soul without the body, and both together likewise, are, in many things, which affect them severally or jointly, full of a sense of pleasures mingled with pains. Say, then, whether you will dismiss me, or make it midnight before we finish. But I imagine that, after I shall have added a few things more, I shall obtain from you my dismissal: for I shall be ready to give you an account of all these things at large tomorrow; but at present am desirous of proceeding to what remains on this subject; that we may come to a decision of the point in controversy, as Philebus hath enjoined us.

PROT. You have well spoken, O Socrates; and as to what remains, go through with it in whatever way it is agreeable to yourself.

SOC. Well then: after the mixed pleasures we are to proceed, by a kind of natural necessity, to the several pleasures which are unmixed and pure.

PROT. Perfectly well said.

SOC. The nature of these I shall endeavour to explain to you, by converting to my own use, with a little alteration, what is said of them by others. For I do not entirely give credit to those persons who tell us, that all pleasure consists in a cessation from uneasiness and pain. But, as I said before, I make use of these persons as witnesses, in confirmation of this truth,—that some things there are which seem to be pleasures, but by no means are so in reality; and of this also,—that some other pleasures there are, many and great in imagination, accompanied with pains, but at the same time with relief from greater pains, amid the distresses of the body and of the soul.

PROT. But what pleasures are those, O Socrates, which a man would deem rightly of, in supposing them to be true?

SOC.

SOC. The pleasures¹ which are produced in us from seeing beauteous colours and beauteous figures; many pleasures also of the smell, and many others arising in us from the hearing of sounds; in a word, whatever pleasures we feel from perceiving the presence of any thing, whose absence we are insensible of, or at least occasions no pain in us, all these are unmixed and pure.

PROT. How do you explain this general account, O Socrates?

SOC. The meaning of it, indeed, is not directly obvious: but we must endeavour to make it evident. I mean, then, by beauteous figures, not, as most men would suppose I meant, the beauty of living forms, or their statues; but the straight and the round, whether in surfaces², or in solids³; according to which are fashioned the turner's works, and those of the carpenter, by means of his rules and angles. For the figures which I mean, if you apprehend me, have no relative beauty, like those other beauteous forms⁴; but in their own nature, separately considered, are always absolutely beautiful; and the beholding of them gives us certain peculiar pleasures, not at all similar to the pleasures excited in us by any kind of motion. And as to colours, I mean such as bear the like stamp of absolute beauty⁵, and yield also pleasures of a peculiar nature. But do we apprehend these things? or what say we to them?

¹ Of pleasures, says Olympiodorus, those that excite a vehement agitation are such as are attended with pain, but the energetic alone are such as are beheld in a perfect animal when energizing. Again, of pure pleasures, the corporeal are such as the vision of commensurate light; those pertaining to the soul are such as result from the speculation and apprehension of a certain intelligible; but those which belong to both, viz. to body and soul, are such as those of health, in which the soul also rejoices; the pleasure in this case beginning from the motion of the soul, but descending as far as to the body.—T.

² That is, rectilinear plane figures, such as triangles, rectangles, and circles.—S.

³ Such as pyramids and cubes, spheres, cylinders and cones.—S.

⁴ The parts of every mathematical simple figure, whether it be right-lined or circular, are, all of them, similar and commensurable.—The beauty of figure in all animals, on the contrary, arises from the proportions of dissimilar parts, measured, not by any common measure, but by the respective ends and uses for which they are severally designed by nature.—S.

⁵ Such as the beautiful colours of many flowers; or as those of a clear morning or evening sky: not such as the colour of a complexion, the tincture of a skin,—in the human species,—a colour belonging only to that species, and relatively agreeable, as it indicates health of body, and a purity of the blood and humours.—S.

PROT.

PROT. I endeavour, O Socrates, to comprehend your full meaning: but endeavour you yourself to explain thoroughly the whole of it.

SOC. As to sounds, I mean such as are smooth, clear, and canorous, conveying some pure and simple melody¹, without relation to any other sounds, but singly of themselves musical: of such I speak, and of the connatural pleasures which attend them.

PROT. That such pleasures also there are, I readily acknowledge.

SOC. The pleasures felt by us from certain odours are, indeed, of a kind less divine than the pleasures just now mentioned; but in respect of their being equally pure, and not, of necessity, mixed with pains, I rank them all under the same head. For in whatever pleasures there happens to be found this quality of entire freedom from pain, all these I oppose to those other pleasures with which pain is complicated. Now, if you observe, we have already spoken of two different kinds of pleasure.

PROT. I do observe.

SOC. To these let us now add the pleasures taken in the mathematical sciences; unless we are of opinion that such pleasures are of necessity preceded by a thirst of learning them; and that, when tasted and enjoyed, they raise a thirst of more and more; so that, from our beginning to learn them, they are all along attended with uneasiness.

PROT. I think that such uneasiness is not at all necessary.

SOC. Well: but suppose that, having attained to full possession of them, we happen afterwards to lose some part through forgetfulness, do you see no uneasiness arising hence?

PROT. None at all from the nature of the thing itself: but when the knowledge is wanted to be applied to some use in human life, then a man is uneasy at having lost it, on account of its usefulness.

SOC. And we are at present, my friend, actually concerned about those feelings only which arise in us from the nature of the knowledge itself, without any regard to the usefulness of it in computing or measuring.

PROT. You are right then in saying, that, in mathematical knowledge, a forgetfulness frequently befalls us, without giving us any uneasiness.

¹ Such is that of many species of birds, whose whistling is all monotonous. Such also is that of the Æolian harp, on which the vibrations are made solely by the air in motion.—S.

SOC. These pleasures, therefore, the pleasures of science, we must acknowledge to be unmixed with pains. But these pleasures belong not to the vulgar multitude, being enjoyed only by a very few.

PROT. All this must certainly be acknowledged.

SOC. Now, then, that we have tolerably well distinguished between the pure pleasures and those which are rightly called impure, let us further add these distinctions between them,—that the vehement pleasures know not moderation nor measure; while those of the gentler kind admit of measure, and are moderate: and that greatness and intenseness, and the contrary qualities, the frequency also and the rareness of repetition, are attributes of such pleasures only as belong to the boundless genus,—to that which is perpetually varying in its quantities and motions through the body and through the soul,—while the pleasures to which the like variations never happen, belong to the contrary genus, and are allied to all things wherein symmetry is found.

PROT. Perfectly right, O Socrates.

SOC. The pleasures, beside these assortments of them, are to be further distinguished thus.

PROT. How?

SOC. We should consider whether the purity and the simplicity of pleasures serve to discover what true pleasure is: or whether the truth of pleasures may best be known from their intenseness, their multitude, their greatness and their abundance.

PROT. What is your view, Socrates, in proposing this to be considered?

SOC. To omit nothing by which the nature of pleasure, and that of knowledge, may be set in the clearest light; and not to leave it undiscovered, whether or no some kinds of each of them are pure, while other kinds are impure; that thus, what is pure and simple in each being brought before us to be judged of, you and I, and all this company, may the more easily form a right judgment.

PROT. Very rightly said.

SOC. Well then: all those kinds of things which we commonly say are pure, let us consider of in the following way: but first let us choose out some one among them for an instance to consider of.

PROT. Which would you have us choose?

SOC.

Soc. Among the principal of those kinds, let us, if you please, consider the white kind of things.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. In what way, then, might we have any thing which is called white, with the most perfect and pure whiteness? whether by having the greatest number of things which are white, and the largest of the kind in size, or by having what is white in the highest degree, and not tinged with the least degree of any other colour?

Prot. Evidently, by having what is of the most simple and unmixed whiteness.

Soc. Rightly said. Shall we not then determine that this pure white is the truest, and at the same time the most beautiful of all whites; and not that which is of the largest size, and whose number is the greatest?

Prot. Most certainly we shall.

Soc. In pronouncing, then, that a little of purely white is whiter, and of a more beautiful and true whiteness, than a great quantity of the mixed white, we shall say what is entirely right.

Prot. Without the least doubt.

Soc. Well then: I suppose we shall have no occasion to produce many such instances to prove the truth of our conclusion concerning pleasure; the instance already brought seems sufficient for us to perceive at once, that a little of pleasure, pure, and free from pain, is more pleasant, more true, and perfect, as well as more comely, than pleasure where pain is mingled, be there ever so much of it, or be it ever so vast and vehement.

Prot. By all means: the instance you gave in whiteness, is an argument from analogy, sufficient for the proof of it.

Soc. But what think you now of this? Have we not heard it said concerning pleasure, that it is a thing always in generation, always produced anew, and having no stability of being, cannot properly be said to be at all? For some ingenious¹ persons there are who endeavour to show us, that such

¹ In the Greek—*νομοί*, *nomoi* and *trim*, that is, in their reasonings and discourses;—subtle arguers, or fine logicians;—a character which distinguished the school of Zeno the Eleatic. It will presently be seen, that the persons here spoken of philosophized on the principles of the Eleatic sect, and probably were some of the same Zeno's Athenian disciples.—S.

is the nature of pleasure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it.

PROT. Why so?

SOC. I shall recount to you the whole of their reasoning on this point, my friend Protarchus, by putting a few questions to you.

PROT. Do so: and begin your questions.

SOC. Are there not in nature two very different kinds of things: this, in itself alone complete; that, desirous always of the other?

PROT. How do you mean? and what things do you speak of?

SOC. One of them is by nature always of high dignity and value; the other, falling far short of it, and always indigent.

PROT. Express yourself a little more clearly.

SOC. Have we not seen some of the fair sex who excelled in beauty and in virtue? and have we not seen their lovers and admirers?

PROT. Often.

SOC. Analogous then to these two different sorts of persons, see if you cannot discover two different kinds of things, to one or other of which different kinds belongs every thing, commonly said to have a being: the third be to the saviour*.

PROT. Speak your meaning, O Socrates, in plainer terms.

SOC. I mean nothing, O Protarchus, but what is very simple and easy to be seen. But our present argument is pleased to sport itself. However, it means no more than this,—that there is a kind of things which are always

* This whole sentence in all the editions of the Greek is thus printed,—Τούτοις τοίνυν εοικότες δυοῖν οὐσι, δὴ ἀλλὰ ζητεῖ, κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λεγόμεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἑτέρῃ.—A sentence quite unintelligible to us. Monf. Grou very justly apprehends some error in the text. We presume, that this sensible and elegant translator never saw the emendation proposed by Cornarius; for that, otherwise, he would have embraced it, and have made his version, as we have ours, agreeable to that emendation: which is no more than a change of the last word—ἑτέρῃ into σωτηρί. The sentence, thus amended, concludes with this proverbial saying,—*the third to the saviour*. It was a form of words antiently used at the feast of every victor in the Olympic games, when he made an accustomed libation out of the third cup or glass, Διὶ σωτηρί, *to Jupiter*, in his character of *saviour* in all difficulties and dangers. A speech so well known to all the Grecians, easily passed into a proverb: and it is alluded to as such by Plato in his *Charmides*, in his *Republic*, and in his *Seventh Epistle*.—S.

for the sake of some other ; and there is also a kind of things for whose sake always is produced whatever hath any final cause of its production.

PROT. I find it difficult to understand your meaning, after your many explanations of it.

SOC. Perhaps, young man, it will be understood better as we proceed in the reasoning on this subject.

PROT. I make no doubt of it.

SOC. Let us now make another division of things into two different kinds.

PROT. What kinds are they ?

SOC. The generation ¹ of all things is one kind of things ; and the being of all is a different kind.

PROT. I admit your difference between being and generation.

SOC. You are perfectly in the right. Now, whether of these two is for the sake of the other ? Shall we say that generation is for the sake of being ? or shall we say that being is for the sake of generation ?

PROT. Whether or no that which is termed being, is what it is for the sake of generation, is this your present question ?

SOC. Apparently it is.

PROT. In the name of the Gods, how can you ask so strange a question ?

SOC. My meaning in that question, O Protarchus, is of such a kind as this other ;—whether you would choose to say that ship-building is for the sake of shipping, rather than you would say that shipping is for the sake of ship-building : and all other things of like kind, O Protarchus, I include in the question which I ask you.

PROT. But for what reason, O Socrates, do you not give an answer to it yourself ?

SOC. I have no reason to refuse that office ; do you but go along with me in my answer.

PROT. Certainly I shall.

¹ *Effence* and *generation*, says Olympiodorus, are fourfold. For that which is sensible is generation, and the intelligible is effence. In a similar manner, that which is subcelestial is generation, and that which is celestial is effence. Further still, in the third place, generation is a procession to form, and form itself is effence. In the fourth place, mutation about a subject is generation, and the subject itself is effence ; as, for instance, quality about body. But every where generation is for the sake of effence : for effence is the cause of generation—T.

SOC. I say, then, that for the sake of generation, it is true, that medicines are composed; the instrumental parts, prepared by nature, and all the materials of it, provided: but that every act of generation is for the sake of some being; generation in every species, for the sake of some being belonging to that species; and universally, all generation, for the sake of universal being.

PROT. Most evidently so.

SOC. If pleasure, then, be of such a nature as to be generated always anew, must not the generating of it be always for the sake only of some being?

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. Now that, for the sake of which is always generated whatever is generated for some end, must be in the rank of things which are good: and that which is generated for the sake of any other thing, must of necessity, my friend, be placed in a different rank of things.

PROT. Certainly it must.

SOC. Shall we not be right, then, in placing pleasure in a rank of things different from that of good; if it be true, that pleasure has no stable being, but is always generated anew?

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. Therefore, as I said in beginning this argumentation, we are much obliged to the persons who have given us this account of pleasure,—that the essence of it consists in being always generated anew, but that never has it any kind of being. For it is plain, that these persons would laugh at a man who asserted, that pleasure and good were the same thing.

PROT. Certainly they would.

SOC. And these very persons would certainly laugh at those men, wherever they met with them, who place their chief good and end in generation.

PROT. How, and what sort of men do you mean?

SOC. Such, as in freeing themselves from hunger, or thirst, or any of the uneasinesses from which they are freed by generation, are so highly delighted with the action of removing those uneasinesses, as to declare they would not choose to live without suffering thirst and hunger, nor without feeling all those other sensations which may be said to follow from such kinds of uneasinesses.

PROT. Such, indeed, there are, who seem to be of that opinion.

Soc. Would not all of us say that corruption was the contrary of generation ?

Prot. It is impossible to think otherwise.

Soc. Whoever, then, makes such a life his choice, must choose both corruption and generation, rather than that third kind of life, in which he might live with the clearest discernment of what is right and good, but without the feeling of either pain or pleasure.

Prot. Much absurdity, as it seems, O Socrates, is to be admitted by the man who holds that human good consists wholly in pleasure.

Soc. Much, indeed. For let us argue further thus.

Prot. How ?

Soc. Since no good nor beauty is in bodies, nor in any other things beside the soul ; is it not absurd to imagine, that in the soul pleasure should be the only good ; and that neither fortitude, nor temperance, nor understanding, nor any of the other valuable attainments of the soul, should be numbered among the good things which the soul enjoys ? Further too, is it not highly irrational to suppose, that a man afflicted with pain, without feeling any pleasure, should be obliged to say that evil only, and no good, was with him at the time when he was in pain, though he were the best of all men ? And is it not equally absurd, on the other hand, to suppose that a man in the midst of pleasures must be, during that time, in the midst of good ; and that the more pleasure he feels, the more good he is filled with, and is so much the better man ?

Prot. All these suppositions, O Socrates, are absurdities in the highest degree possible.

Soc. It is well. But now let us not employ ourselves wholly in searching into the nature of pleasure ; as if we industriously declined the examination of intellect and science ; but in these also, if there be any thing putrid or unsound, let us have the courage to cut it all off, and throw it aside ; till, coming to a discovery of what is entirely pure and sound therein, the discovery may be of use to us in comparing the truest parts of intellect and science with the truest parts of pleasure, and in forming our judgment concerning the superiority of either from that comparison.

Prot. Rightly said.

Soc. Do we not hold, that mathematical science is partly employed in

the service of the mechanic arts, and partly in the liberal education and discipline of youth? or how think we on this subject?

PROT. Exactly so.

SOC. Now, as to the manual arts¹, let us consider, in the first place, whether some of these depend not on science more than others; and whether we ought not to look on those of the former sort as the more pure, and on these others as the more impure.

PROT. Certainly we ought.

SOC. And in each of these we should distinguish and separate the leading arts from the arts which are led and governed by them.

PROT. What arts do you call the leading arts? and why do you give that epithet to them?

SOC. I mean thus: from all the arts were a man to separate and lay aside those of numbering, of measuring, and of weighing, what remained in every one of them, would become comparatively mean and contemptible.

PROT. Contemptible, indeed.

SOC. For room would be then left only for conjecture, and for exercise of the senses, by experience and habitual practice; and we should then make use of no other faculties beside those of guessing and aiming well, (to which, indeed, the multitude give the name of arts) increasing the strength of those faculties by dint of assiduity and labour.

PROT. All which you have now said must, of necessity, be true.

SOC. The truth of it is evident in all musical performances throughout. For, in the first place, harmony is produced, and one sound is adapted to another, not by measuring, but by that aiming well which arises from constant exercise. It is evident too in musical performances on all wind-instruments: for in these the breath, by being well aimed as it is blown along, searches and attains the measure of every chord beaten. So that music has in it much of the uncertain, and but a little of the fixed and firm.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. And we shall find the case to be the same in the arts of medicine and agriculture, in the art of navigation also, and the military art.

¹ In the Greek of this passage it is presumed that we ought to read *χειροτεχνιας*, and not, as it is printed, *χειροτεχνικας*,—and also to read *εστι* instead of *ενι*.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Most clearly so.

SOC. But in the art of building we shall find, as I presume, many measures made use of, and many instruments employed; by which it is made to surpass in accuracy many things which are called sciences.

PROT. How so?

SOC. It is so in ship-building, and house-building, and in many other works of carpentry. For in these, I think, the art useth the straight-rule, and the square, the turning-lath and the compasses, the plummet and the marking-line.

PROT. You are entirely right, O Socrates: it is so as you say.

SOC. The arts, therefore, as they are called, let us now distinguish into two sorts;—those which music is at the head of, as they are less accurate than some others; and these others which partake of accuracy the most, at the head of which is architecture.

PROT. This distinction is allowed of.

SOC. And let us set down those arts for the most accurate which we lately said were the prime or leading arts.

PROT. You mean, if I mistake not, arithmetic, and those other arts which you mentioned together with it but just now¹.

SOC. The very same. But, O Protarchus, must we not say that each of these arts is twofold? or how otherwise?

PROT. What arts do you speak of?

SOC. Arithmetic, in the first place. Must we not say of this, that the arithmetic of the multitude is of one sort, and that the arithmetic of those who apply themselves to philosophy² is of another sort?

PROT. What is the difference by which the one may be distinguished from the other?

SOC. The difference between them, O Protarchus, is far from being inconsiderable. For the multitude in numbering, number by unequal ones put together; as two armies of unequal force; two oxen of unequal size; two things, the smallest of all,—or two, the greatest,—being compared with others of the same kind. But the students in philosophy would not under-

¹ Namely, *mensuration* and *statics*.—S.

² Meaning the students in mathematics. For the study of the mathematical sciences was deemed by Plato the best introduction to the knowledge of intelligible things.—S.

stand what a man meant, who, in numbering, made any difference between some and other of the ones which composed the number.

PROT. You are perfectly right in saying that no inconsiderable difference lies in the different manner of studying and using numbers; so as to make it probable that two different sorts there are of arithmetic.

SOC. Well: and what of calculation in trade, and of mensuration in building? Does the latter of these arts not differ from mathematical geometry? nor the other from calculations made by the students in pure mathematics. Shall we say that they are, each of them, but one art? or shall we set down each of them for two?

PROT. For my part, I should give my opinion agreeably to your division of arithmetic; and should say that each of these arts also was twofold.

SOC. You would give a right opinion. But with what design I brought these distinctions on the carpet do you conceive?

PROT. Perhaps I do. But I could wish that you yourself would declare what was your design.

SOC. These distinctions seem to me to have shown to us, that in science there is that very circumstance attending it which we had before discovered to be in pleasure; the one thus answering to the other. For, having found that some sort of pleasure was purer than some other sort, we were inquiring whether the same difference was to be found with regard to science; and whether one sort of this also was purer than some other.

PROT. It is very manifest that your distinctions between the several arts were introduced for this very purpose.

SOC. Well then: have we not discovered, in what has been said, that some arts are clearer than others, having more light within them; and that others are more involved in obscurity and darkness?

PROT. Evidently so.

SOC. And has not the course of our argument led us to take notice of some art, bearing the same name with some other art; and first, to suppose them both to be, as they are commonly imagined, but one art; then, to consider them as two different arts; to examine each with regard to its clearness and purity; and to inquire which of the two has in it the most accuracy, whether that which is cultivated by students in philosophy, or that which is exercised by the multitude?

PROT.

PROT. Our argument seems to bring on this inquiry.

SOC. And what answer, O Protarchus, should we make to such a question?

PROT. O Socrates, we are now advanced so far as to discover an amazingly wide difference between the parts of our knowledge in point of clearness.

SOC. It will, therefore, be the easier for us to answer to that question.

PROT. Without doubt. And let us affirm, that those leading arts greatly excel the others with regard to clearness; and that such of those brighter arts themselves as are studied by real students in philosophy, display, in measures and in numbers, their vast superiority all other arts, with regard to accuracy and truth¹.

SOC. Granting these things to be what you say they are, let us, on the credit of what you have said, boldly answer to those persons who are so formidable in argumentation, thus:

PROT. How?

SOC. That there are two sorts of arithmetic; and that, dependant on these, there is a long train of arts, each of them, in like manner, twofold under one denomination.

PROT. Let us give to the persons whom you call formidable that very answer, O Socrates, with a confidence of its being right.

SOC. Do we then affirm, that in these sciences there is an accuracy the highest of all.

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. But the power of dialectic, O Protarchus, if we gave to any other science the preference above her, would deny that superiority.

PROT. What power is it to which we are to give that name?

SOC. Plainly that power, O Protarchus, by which the mind perceives all that accuracy and clearness of which we have been speaking. For I am entirely of opinion, that all persons, endued with even the smallest portion of understanding, must deem the knowledge of the real essence of things—the knowledge of that kind of being whose nature is invariable—to be by far the

¹ This whole sentence, beginning with the words "and let us affirm," is, in Stephens's edition, very improperly given to Socrates; and consequently the sentence following, with equal impropriety, to Protarchus. The Basil editions are both right; the Aldine not clear.—S.

most certain and true knowledge. But you, Protarchus, to what art or science would you give the distinction of pre-eminence?

PROT. As to me, O Socrates, I have often heard Gorgias maintaining in all places, that the art of persuasion has greatly the advantage over all other arts in overruling all things, and making all persons submit to it, not by constraint, but by a voluntary yielding; and therefore, that of all arts it is by far the most excellent. Now I should not choose to contradict or oppose either you or him.

SOC. As much as to say, if I apprehend your meaning rightly, that you cannot for shame desert your colours.

PROT. Let your opinion of these matters now prevail; and the ranks of the several arts be settled as you would have them.

SOC. Am I now to blame for your making a mistake?

PROT. What mistake have I made?

SOC. The question, my friend Protarchus, was not which art, or which science, is superior to all the rest, with regard to greatness, and excellence, and usefulness to us; but of which art the objects are the brightest, the most accurate, and true, though the art itself brought us little or no gain: this it is, which is the present subject of our inquiry. Observe, then, Gorgias will have no quarrel with you: for you may still allow to his art the preference above all others, in point of utility and profit to mankind. But, as I said before concerning white, that be there ever so little of it, so it be pure, it excels a large quantity of an impure white, with regard to the truth of whiteness; just so is it with the study which I have been commending; it excels all others with regard to truth itself. And now that we have considered this subject attentively, and discussed it sufficiently, laying aside all regards to the usefulness of the sciences and arts, as well as to the reputation which they bear in the world, and thoroughly sifting them to find out the purity of intellect and wisdom,—if there be in the soul any faculty of loving truth above all things, and of doing whatever she does for the sake of truth,—let us consider whether it is right to say that we have this faculty improved chiefly by dialectic, or whether we must search for some other art fitter for that purpose, and making it more her proper business.

PROT. Well: I do consider the point proposed; and I imagine it no easy matter

matter to admit that any other science or art seeks and embraces truth so much as this.

SOC. Say you this from having observed that many of the arts, even such as profess a laborious inquiry after truth, are, in the first place, conversant only with opinions, and exercise only the imagination; and that methodically, and according to a set of rules, they then search into things which are the subjects only of such opinions¹? and do you know, that the persons who suppose themselves to be inquiring into the nature of things are, all their lives, inquisitive about nothing more than this outward world, how it was produced, what causeth the changes which happen therein, and how those changes operate their effects? Should we acknowledge all this so to be, or how otherwise?

PROT. Just so.

SOC. Whoever of us then addicts himself to the study of nature in this way, employs his time and care, not about the things which always are in being, but about things which are either newly come into being, or which are to come, or which have been already, and are past.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. What clearness, therefore, what certainty, or exact truth, can we expect to find in these things, none of which had ever any stability or sameness in them, nor ever will have any, nor have such of them as now exist any, even during their existence?

PROT. How can it be expected?

SOC. Concerning things in which there is not the least stability, how can we form any stable notions?

PROT. I suppose it not possible.

SOC. Of those things, then, there is neither intelligence, nor any sort of

¹ Meaning, as we presume, such as the philosophers of the Ionic sect, by Aristotle styled *φυσικοί*, *naturalists*. For we learn from D. Laertius that Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras, and the last professor and teacher of the doctrine of those philosophers, did, in the time of Socrates, introduce into Athens their way of philosophizing; which was none other than that spoken of in this passage. It seems therefore probable, that the Athenian scholars of Archelaus are the very persons whose studies are here shown to fall short of attaining to the knowledge of truth, or the true nature of things. The same judgment of Socrates concerning these Ionic physiologists we find recorded by Xenophon in Memorabil. lib. i. cap. 1. sec. 11.—S.

science to be acquired; at least not such as contains the highest degree of certainty.

PROT. It is not probable that there is.

SOC. We ought, therefore, both you and I, to lay aside the consideration of what Gorgias or Philebus said, and to establish on a firmer basis this truth.

PROT. What truth?

SOC. This:—Whatever is in us of stable, pure, and true, it has for the objects of it—either the beings which always are, and remain invariable, entirely pure and unadulterate; or [if these are beyond the reach of our sight] then such as are the nearest allied to them, and are second in the ranks of being: for all other things come after those first beings; second, and so on in order.

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. The noblest, therefore, of the names given to things of this kind, is it not perfectly right to assign to those of this kind, which are the noblest?

PROT. It is reasonable so to do.

SOC. Are not intellect and wisdom the noblest of those names?

PROT. They are.

SOC. Rightly then are these names in accurate speech appropriated to the intelligence and contemplation of real being.

PROT. Certainly so.

SOC. And the things for the excellency of which I at the first contended, are the very things to which we give these names.

PROT. Clearly are they, O Socrates.

SOC. Well now: were a man to say that the nature of intellect and the nature of pleasure lay severally before us, like two different sorts of materials before some workman, for him to mix or join together, and from them, and in them, to compose his designed work,—would he not make a fair comparison suitable to the task which our inquiry has engaged us in?

PROT. A very fair comparison.

SOC. Should we not, then, in the next place, set about mixing them together?

PROT. Why should we not?

SOC. Would it not be our best way to begin this work by recollecting and repeating those things over again?

PROT.

PROT. What things?

SOC. Those we have often mentioned before. For, I think, the proverb says well:—"Again and again that which is right, by repeating it, to recall into our minds."

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. In the name of Jupiter, then, come on. The whole of our controversy began, I think, with stating the point in question, to this effect.

PROT. How?

SOC. Philebus affirms that pleasure is the right mark set up by nature for all animals to aim at; that they all ought to pursue pleasure; that the good of them all is this very thing, pleasure; and that *good* and *pleasant*, these two attributes, belong but to one subject, as they both have but one and the same nature: on the other hand, Socrates denies this to be true; and maintains, in the first place, that as the two names, *good* and *pleasant*, are two different names, different also are the things so denominated; in the next place, that the nature of good differs from that of pleasure; and that intelligence, or mind, partakes of the properties of good more than pleasure does, and is allied nearer to its nature. Were not some such positions as these, O Protagoras, severally laid down by us?

PROT. They were.

SOC. But was not this point agreed on between us at that time, and do we not still agree in it?

PROT. What point?

SOC. That the nature of good itself is more excellent than the nature of any other thing in this respect?

PROT. In what respect?

SOC. This: that whatever animal being hath the constant, entire, and full possession of good itself, such a being has no want of any thing beside, having always a most perfect and complete sufficiency. Is it not so?

PROT. It certainly is.

SOC. Have we not endeavoured to consider separately a life of pleasure and a life of intellect, each unmixed with the other,—a life of pleasure without intellect, and in like manner, a life of intellect without the smallest degree of pleasure?

PROT. We have.

Soc.

SOC. Did either of those lives appear to us at that time to be sufficient for the happiness of any man?

PROT. How was it possible?

SOC. But if at that time any mistake was committed, let it be now revised and rectified. In order to which, let us take memory, science, wisdom, and right opinion, comprehending them all in one idea, and consider whether any man, without having something of that kind, would accept of pleasure, were it offered to him, either in the greatest abundance, or in the most exquisite degree; whether, indeed, he would regard the having or the receiving of any thing whatever; as he would not, in that case, have a right thought or opinion of his having any pleasure; neither would he know what he felt or had at present; nor would he remember in what condition or circumstances he had been at any time before. In like manner concerning wisdom, consider, whether a man would choose to have it without a mixture of any pleasure in the least, rather than to have the same wisdom attended with pleasures of certain kinds; and whether a man would prefer the having of all possible pleasures, without wisdom, to the having of them accompanied with some portion of wisdom.

PROT. It is impossible, O Socrates, for a man to make any such choice as you have supposed. And there is no occasion to repeat these questions again and again.

SOC. Not pleasure, then, nor wisdom, either of them alone, can be the perfect and consummate good, eligible to all men, that which we are inquiring after.

PROT. Certainly not.

SOC. Of this good, then, we are to give a clear and full description, or at least some sketch, that we may know where the second prize of excellence, as we called it, ought to be bestowed.

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. Have we not, then, taken a way by which we may find out our chief good?

PROT. What way do you mean?

SOC. As if we were in search of any particular man, and were already well informed of the place of his abode, we should have made a great progress toward finding the man himself.

PROT.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. And our reasoning has now declared to us clearly, what it pointed to before, that, not in the unmixed life, but in the mixed, we are to seek for happiness.

PROT. Certainly so.

SOC. But in a proper and well-tempered mixture we may reasonably hope to discover what we are in search of with more certainty than we could by an ill-made composition.

PROT. With much more.

SOC. Let us, then, set about mixing and making the composition, first praying to the Gods for their assistance; whether it be Bacchus¹, or Vulcan, or some other of the Gods, who presides over the mixture of these ingredients.

PROT. Let us, by all means, do so.

SOC. And now, as it were, two cisterns, or vases, are set before us; the vase of pleasure², as of honey; and the vase of intellect, cool and sober, as of some hard and healthful water. These, then, we are to mix together in the best manner we are able.

PROT. With all my heart.

SOC. Come, then: but first say, whether by mingling all pleasure with all wisdom we may best obtain our end, the having of a proper and due mixture.

¹ There are Gods, says Olympiodorus, that preside over temperament; over the physical and mundane, Vulcan; but over the psychical and supermundane, Bacchus. The mingling idiom, indeed, proceeds as far as to the last hyparxis. Thus, for instance, Vulcan being the leader of physical temperament, first produces this idiom in himself; afterwards, in the mundane intellect which presides over nature; in the third place, in a soul of this kind, in a similar manner; and lastly, in the physical world according to hyparxis. In like manner, Bacchus unfolding in himself the principle of psychical temperament after a divine manner, in the next place establishes this in intellect intellectually, according to hyparxis in soul, and in a binding mode in the animated body. And still higher than these, Jupiter is the principle of intellectual temperament. There are also other principles of temperament more partial than Bacchus and Vulcan. Plato mentions these two, as being about to mingle all the supermundane and mundane mixtures; but he omits the Jovian temperament, as being superior to the things proposed in this dialogue.—T.

² Pleasure is compared to honey, says Olympiodorus, because it possesses sweetness and the ecstatic. And hence the Pythagoric saying, that souls fall into generation through honey (*διο και πυθαγορειος λογος, δια μελιτος πιπτειν εις γενειν τας ψυχας*). But intellect is compared to water, because it is sober.—T.

PROT. Perhaps we might.

SOC. But it is dangerous to make the experiment. And I believe that I can point out a way to mix them with more safety.

PROT. Say what way.

SOC. Concerning pleasures, I think, we held, that some more truly deserved that name than others of them; and of arts, that some were more accurate and exact than others.

PROT. Undoubtedly so.

SOC. And that the sciences also differed one from another in like manner: for that some kinds of science have for their objects only such things as arise into being and afterwards perish; whereas another kind directs its view to things which are neither generated nor destroyed, but always are in being, always have the same properties, and preserve always the same relations. And this kind of science, with regard to the truth of it, we deemed more excellent than the other kinds.

PROT. Entirely right.

SOC. In the first place, therefore, mixing together the purest parts of pleasure and of wisdom, when they have been thus distinguished from the less pure, if we view those purest parts of each in combination, are they not, thus combined, sufficient to furnish out, and present us with, an ample view of that life which is desirable? or is any thing further, any ingredient of a different kind, wanting to perfect the composition?

PROT. So as you propose, and only so, it seems to me necessary for us to do.

SOC. Let us, then, suppose a man to have in his mind the idea of justice itself, so as to know what it is in its own essence, and to be able to give an account of it in consequence of that knowledge. Let us also suppose him to have the like knowledge of all other beings.

PROT. Be such a man supposed.

SOC. Will this man now sufficiently possess science by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine sphere itself; whilst he is ignorant of that sphere, and of those circles with which the eyes of men are conversant? Will that knowledge of his be sufficient for his use in building, and in other arts where lines and circles are to be drawn?

PROT. Ridiculous we should call our condition here, O Socrates, if our knowledge were thus confined to things ideal and divine.

Soc. How do you say? Arts which are neither certain nor pure, using untrue rules, and conversant with untrue circles, are we to throw such arts into the composition, and mix them with the other ingredients?

Prot. It is necessary for us; if, whenever we are any where abroad, we are desirous of finding our way home.

Soc. Are we to add music too?—an art which, not long since we said, is wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

Prot. Of necessity we must, as it appears to me, if the life which we are to lead shall ever deserve to be called life, or be at all worth the having.

Soc. Would you, then, like a door-keeper, when he is pushed and pressed by a throng of people, yield to them, set the doors wide open, and suffer all the sciences to rush in, the less pure mingling themselves among the perfectly pure?

Prot. I see not, O Socrates, for my part, how any man would be hurt by receiving all the other sciences, if he was already in possession of the first and highest.

Soc. I may safely then admit them all to come pouring in, like the torrents of water in that fine poetical simile of Homer's¹, rushing down into a valley from the mountains which surround it.

Prot. By all means, let them be all admitted.

Soc. Let us now return to the vase of pleasure. For when we thought of mixing pleasure and knowledge together, the purer parts of pleasure did not present themselves immediately to our minds: but, from our affectionate regard to science, we suffered all kinds of it to crowd in before any of the pleasures.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. It is now time for us to consult about the pleasures; whether we should let them all come thronging in, or whether we should admit those of the true sort first.

Prot. It makes a great difference in point of safety, to let in, the first, such only as are true.

Soc. Let these, then, be admitted. But how shall we proceed? Must we not do, as we did with the several kinds of science, admit as many pleasures also as are of the necessary sort?

¹ Iliad, lib. iv. ver. 453.

PROT. Without doubt, the necessary pleasures also, by all means.

SOC. But now, as we held it both safe and advantageous in going through life to be acquainted with every art,—if we are of the same opinion with regard to pleasures,—if we hold it conducive to our good, and at the same time harmless, to enjoy every sort of pleasure in the course of our lives,—in this case, we are to intermix all sorts of pleasure with all the kinds of science.

PROT. What say we then as to this point? and how ought we to act?

SOC. This question, O Protarchus, should not be put to us. But the pleasures themselves, and the other assembly also, that of the sciences and arts, are to be examined, each party concerning the other, in this manner.

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. Friends, we shall say, [*addressing our question to the pleasures first*] whether we ought to call you pleasures, or whatever is your right name, would ye choose to live in the same place with all kinds of wisdom, or to live without wisdom? To this interrogatory they must, I think, answer thus:

PROT. How?

SOC. That seeing, as was said before, were wisdom and pleasure to be left, each of them, alone, single, and destitute of aid, neither of them would have any virtue or power at all, nor would any advantage arise from either,—we deem it best that all the kinds of wisdom should dwell with us, one kind of wisdom with each of us, one who is suitable to the peculiar nature of its companion, and is perfectly acquainted with her power and influence.

PROT. And well have ye now answered, we shall say to them.

SOC. After this, we are to demand of wisdom and intellect, in the same manner, thus:—Have ye any occasion for pleasures to be mixed among you? On the other side, we may suppose wisdom and intellect to interrogate us; and what sort of pleasures, they would perhaps say, is it that ye mean?

PROT. Probably they would.

SOC. And to this question of theirs our answer would be this:—Beside those true pleasures, we should say, do ye further want the pleasures of the intense and exquisite kind to dwell with you? How is it possible, O Socrates, they would then perhaps say, that we should want these? These, who give a thousand hindrances to all our proceedings; and who, by their fury and madness, are always creating disturbance in the souls where we dwell;—these, who had they been there first, would never have suffered us

to

to have admittance ; and who entirely spoil our children, there born, by letting forgetfulness in upon them, for want of care to guard the dwelling-place. But the other pleasures mentioned by you, the true and the pure, you are to know that they are nearly related to us, and belong to our family : and beside these, the pleasures who are accompanied by health and sobriety ; such, also, as are the followers of all virtue, like the train of some Goddesses, every where attending her ; let all of these come and mix amongst us. But those pleasures who are always found in company with folly, and with all kinds of vice, it is very absurd for a man to mingle with intellect,—if he desires to see a mixture as clear, untroubled, and well-tempered as possible to be made ;—and if he would from thence try to discover what the nature is of good, not only in man, but also in the universe ; from which discovery some notion is to be gained, by a sort of divination, of what the idea is of good itself. Shall we not say that intellect and science, in thus answering, have spoken prudently and consistently with themselves, pleading in their own cause, and at the same time in behalf of memory and right opinion ?

PROT. By all means ought we.

SOC. But in our mixture it is necessary to add this also ; for without it no one thing could ever be.

PROT. What is that ?

SOC. Whatever has not truth mixed with it in the composing of it, can never be produced into true existence ; or, could it be produced, it never can be lasting.

PROT. How is it possible that it should ?

SOC. Certainly no way. Now if any thing further be yet wanting to perfect our composition, declare it, you and Philebus. For the mixture which we have now made in speculation, appears to me to have been as perfectly well composed as if it were some incorporeal world meant for the good government of an animated body.

PROT. And be assured, O Socrates, that to me it has had the same appearance.

SOC. Might we not, then, rightly say, that we were now arrived at the dwelling-place of the good, and were standing in its vestibules ?

PROT. I think we might.

SOC. And now what should we deem to be the greatest excellence in the

composition, and to be also the chief cause that such a mixture must be grateful to all? For when we shall have discerned what this is which is so grateful and so excellent, we shall then consider to which of the two, to pleasure or to intellect, it is related the most nearly, and familiar the most intimately, in the constitution of the universe.

PROT. Right: it will be of the greatest service to us in determining this point.

SOC. And there is, indeed, no difficulty in discovering the cause, why some mixtures are most valuable, and others good for nothing.

PROT. Explain your meaning.

SOC. No person is ignorant of this.

PROT. Of what?

SOC. That in every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever be the quantity of it¹, if measure pervades it not, and if thence it obtains not symmetry and proportion, all the ingredients must of necessity be spoiled, besides the spoiling of the whole composition. For, in such a case, no one thing is really tempered by any other thing; but a confused and disorderly assemblage is made of various things jumbled together; which, like a concurrence of bad accidents in life, is a real misfortune to the persons who are to use it.

PROT. It is very true.

SOC. The power of the good then is transferred, we find, into that province where dwells the nature of the beautiful. For every where, from measure and mediocrity, and from symmetry and proportion, arise beauty and virtue.

PROT. Certainly so.

SOC. And we said before that truth also was an ingredient in the composition.

PROT. We did.

SOC. If, then, we are not able to discover the nature of good itself in one single idea,—yet, taking it in three ideas together, in beauty, symmetry, and

¹ In all the editions of the Greek we here read—*ὅπως*, *however it be made*. But this is contradictory to the meaning of the sentence; for the meaning is this,—that “every right and good mixture must be made in one certain manner only, viz. by *measure*.”—We may fairly therefore presume, that Plato wrote, not *ὅπως*, but *ὁπωςαυ*, (or, by elision, *ὅπως*), with a view to the magnitude of the universe.—S.

truth,

truth¹, we may conceive it as one thing; and most justly attributing to it the cause of whatever is graceful or agreeable in the composition, we may most truly say, that by means of this, as being good itself, the whole proves to be such as it is, thus agreeable, and thus graceful.

PROT. Most truly, indeed.

SOC. Now then, O Protarchus, any person may be a competent judge between pleasure and wisdom to decide, whether of the two is nearest allied

¹ The one principle of all things, says Olympiodorus, presides over every thing, according to that which he is. Hence, the light proceeding from him is truth, and subsists as the object of desire to all things. On this account, too, this light is the first beauty, the cause of things beautiful, bounding every thing in its proper measure; and hence it is celebrated as measure. Again, the one principle is not a contracted comprehension of the three monads, beauty, symmetry, and truth: for it is the cause of all things. But that which is mixed is the contraction of all things, as the end, and not as the contraction of essences; so that the one principle may be more justly denominated the end of ends. Again, the three monads subsist arcanelly in the first principle; unically, and according to one, in bound; multiiformly, and as it were according to the parturition of separation, in infinity; but according to the first separation, though not perfectly divided, nor yet intellectually, in the third God, who is the cause of the mixed, so far as it is mixed. Again, *the good* is analogous to truth: for the good to every thing is to be that which it in reality is; but the just is analogous to symmetry. For this is the measure of that which pertains to every thing, in the same manner as the commensurate. Further still, Jamblichus says, that the three monads proceeding from *the good* adorn intellect; but it is immanifest what intellect, whether that which subsists after life, or the paternal intellect which is celebrated in essence. Besides, in the Orphic writings, these three monads become apparent in the mythological egg. The followers of Syrianus, however, make a division, and survey truth in the *first being*, as being perfectly replete with that which it is, and in no respect admitting in itself non-being. But they survey beauty in *life*, as being prolific, and rejoicing in progressions. For, after that which is perfectly without separation, life introduces a parturition, as it were, of separation. And they contemplate symmetry in *intellect*, because in this forms are first separated and harmoniously coordinated. You may also divide them into the principles after the one principle of all things. For you may justly ascribe *truth* to *bound*; *beauty* to *infinity*, through its progression; and *symmetry* to *that which is mixed*.

Proclus, in Theol. Plat. p. 140, observes, "that Jamblichus appears to him to have bounded the intelligible in these three monads, symmetry, truth, and beauty; and through these to have unfolded the intelligible Gods in the Platonic theology." He adds, "it is also apparent why Socrates speaks of this triad as subsisting in the vestibules of *the good*. (See p. 563). For that which is primarily being, in consequence of its union with *the good*, participates of this triad. Hence, because *the good* is the measure of all things, the first being is commensurate. Because *the good* is prior to being, the first being truly subsists. And because the former is desirable, the latter shines forth as the beautiful itself."—T.

to the supreme good, and of higher value than the other is, both to men and Gods.

PROT. What the decision must be is clear. However, it is the better way to go through the recital of it in explicit words.

SOC. Each of those three, then, let us compare, severally, with pleasure, and again with intellect. For we are to see and determine whether of these two it is that each of those three is most congenial to, and to give sentence accordingly.

PROT. Do you speak of beauty, and truth, and mediocrity?

SOC. I do. Now take, in the first place, O Protarchus, truth; and look at all the three together, intellect, truth, and pleasure: and after you have considered them a sufficient time, say whether, in your opinion, intellect, or whether pleasure, is nearer of kin to truth.

PROT. What need is there of time to consider of this point? for, I presume, that very great is the difference between intellect and pleasure in this respect. Of all things in the world, pleasure is the most addicted to lying: and it is said, that in the pleasures of Venus, which seem to be the greatest, even perjury is pardoned by the Gods; it being supposed that pleasures, like children, have not the least intellect in them to know what they say. But intellect is either the same thing with truth, or it is of all things the most like to it, and the truest.

SOC. Next, then, consider mediocrity in the same manner¹; and say whether you think that pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or that wisdom possesses more of it than pleasure.

PROT. This which you have now proposed for a subject of consideration is not less easy than the other. For there cannot, in my opinion, be found any thing more immoderate in its nature than pleasure and extravagant joy; nor any thing which has more of measure in it than intellect and science.

SOC. You have well said. But proceed further now to the third. Do you say that intellect partakes of beauty more than any species of pleasure partakes of it? and that intellect is more excellent than pleasure in this respect? or that the contrary is true?

¹ Cornarius, and Stephens after him, rightly observe, that in the Greek of this sentence we ought to read *ὡσαυτως*; and not, as it is printed, *ὡς ὅτε*.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Did ever any man then, O Socrates, whether awake or dreaming, see or imagine wisdom and intellect to be in any matter, or in any manner, unhandsome or unbecoming, whether in reflecting on the past, or in perceiving the present, or in looking forward to the future?

SOC. Right.

PROT. But whenever we see any person immersed in pleasures, in those pleasures too which are of all perhaps the greatest,—when we behold what a ridiculous figure the man makes in the very act of enjoying them,—or view what is of all spectacles the most unseemly, the consequence of his enjoyment,—we ourselves are ashamed; and all such things, as far as possible, we conceal, veiling them with night and darkness, as not being fit objects for the light to look on.

SOC. Every where then, O Protarchus, you will declare, speaking yourself to all persons about you, and publishing abroad by messengers, that the possession of pleasure is neither of supreme nor of secondary worth: but that whatever is of all things the most excellent and valuable, is to be found in measure, in the moderate, and the seasonable, and in all things¹ of that kind, whose nature and essence we ought to deem eternal.

PROT. Their supreme excellence appears from what has been said and proved.

SOC. And that the next in value are symmetry and beauty, the perfect and the sufficient, and whatever else is congenial to these.

PROT. So it seems.

SOC. In the third degree of excellence, if I divine aright, you would not greatly mistake the truth if you were to place intellect and wisdom.

PROT. Perhaps I should not.

SOC. And is not the fourth rank due to those things which we assigned to the soul herself, as her own proper goods, sciences, and arts, and right opinions, a fourth order of goods, following next after the first three? ought we

¹ Monf. Grou has observed, very justly, that the word *εἰρησθαι*, in the latter part of this sentence, is an error in the text: and instead of it, he proposes the word *ἡρσθαι*. Grynæus, the corrector of Ficinus's translation of Plato, seems, in his rendering the Greek word in this place into Latin by the words *sortita esse*, (*to have obtained an allotment of*,) either to have read *εἰλησθαι* in some manuscript, or else to have thus amended the text by a happy conjecture of his own.—S.

not here to place them, if they are more nearly related to the good than they are to pleasure?

PROT. Perhaps we ought.

SOC. Then follow, fifth in order, the pleasures of that sort which we described to be unmixed with pain, and denominated pure, such as those consequent to sensation, but belonging to the soul herself when she is engaged in the sciences¹.

PROT. It may be so.

SOC.

With the sixth race——(says Orpheus)
Close we the finish'd series of our song².

Our disquisition, too, seems to be now finished, and to close with passing our sixth sentence. After all this, nothing remains for us to do but to affix a head, as it were, to the whole body of our inquiry.

PROT. It is fit that we should.

SOC. Come, then: the third to the favour. Let us commemorate him whose aid brought the argument to a conclusion; calling him to witness the truth of it.

PROT. Whom do you mean?

SOC. Philebus laid down this position: that the good was all and every kind of pleasure in full abundance.

PROT. By commemorating the favour, it seems then, Socrates, you meant that we should resume the original argument of our inquiry.

SOC. Well: but let us observe what followed. I, viewing with dislike that position just now mentioned,—the tenet, not of Philebus only, but of

¹ In the Greek of this sentence, the word *ἐπιστημᾶς* ought to be either quite expunged, or changed for the word *ἡδονᾶς*, or immediately preceded by the preposition *περὶ*. The purest pleasures, those of science, are certainly not sciences themselves.—S.

² This verse of Orpheus we meet with again in Plutarch's Treatise concerning the Delphic Inscription *Εἰ*, and in no other antient author whom we are acquainted with. It is introduced by Plutarch no otherwise than as a part of the present passage in Plato, which is there quoted; and not so as to give us any light into the poet's own meaning in that verse. But if we may form a probable conjecture from Plato's application of it, it was the end of a description of five different ages of the world, with regard to men's manners and ways of life.—S.

thousands

thousands beside in all ages,—on the other hand asserted, that intellect was a thing far better and more beneficial to human life than pleasure.

PROT. That was your position.

SOC. But then, suspecting that many other things had pretensions to the same character of being the good, I engaged, if something¹ should appear better than both of those, to combat for the second prize, in behalf of intellect against pleasure; that pleasure, in her claim to so much as this, might be defeated.

PROT. You did engage so to do.

SOC. Afterwards, on trial, it was very sufficiently proved that neither of our favourites answered the character of complete good.

PROT. Perfectly true.

SOC. Intellect, therefore, and pleasure, were, both of them, quite dismissed from having any thing to do in the controversy concerning good itself; as each of them wanted self-sufficiency, and that power which attends the sufficient and perfect.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But after we had discovered a third thing preferable to either of those two, we found the nature of intellect to approach nearer to the nature of this conqueror, and to be much more familiar with this form than pleasure.

PROT. We certainly did.

SOC. The sixth² and lowest place, then, according to the judgment now given as the result of this inquiry, belongs to the power of pleasure *unbounded*.

PROT. So it appears.

¹ All the editions of Plato give us to read *το* instead of *τι* in this sentence. Ficinus, however, translates as if in the Medicean manuscript he read *τι*, which undoubtedly is the true reading; and herein he is followed by all the translators who came after him.—S.

² A very gross error has infected all the editions and all the translations of Plato in this place. For in all the editions we read *πρῶτον* the *first*, instead of *ἕκτον* the *sixth*. Now the *first* rank was before assigned solely to the *pure* pleasures. The *sixth* and last rank, therefore, remains to *Pleasure*, one of the three great subjects of this dialogue; to *pleasure*, pretending to be the only or the chief good of man, and by Philebus avowed and contended for as such; *pleasure in general* and undistinguished; *pleasure at random*, from whatever quarter it comes;—in Plato's own words, vol. ii, p. 40, edit. Steph. *παρὰπαν, ἑκασθεν, καὶ ἐκῇ χαρμῇ*. But the very next sentence of Socrates puts it beyond all doubt, that pleasure of sense, *sensual pleasure*, is here meant.—S.

Soc. But the first place belongs to her, as bulls ¹ would say, and horses ², and all beasts whatever of the savage kind : for it appears so from the manner in which they pursue pleasure. And on the credit of these animals, just as the judgment of diviners depends on the flight of birds, sentence is pronounced by the multitude, that pleasures have the greatest power in making our lives happy. For the loves and joys of brute animals they deem a stronger evidence, and fitter to be credited, than the sayings of men prophetically uttered in all places though inspiration of the philosophic muse.

PROT. That you have said what is most agreeable to truth, O Socrates, we are, all of us, now agreed.

Soc. Now then ye will dismiss me.

PROT. There is a little, O Socrates, still remaining to be considered. For you must not quit the company before it breaks up : and I will put you in mind of what you have left unsaid. ³

¹ In the Greek of this sentence, we presume that the word *οὐκ* ought to be changed into *ὡς*.—S.

² Porphyry, in his Treatise *περί αποχής ἐμφυλων*, lib. iii. sec. i. writes thus : Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ἡδύνη διαμφισπένοντας εἶναι τὸ τέλος, οὐδ' ἂν πάντες, εἴη, σὺς καὶ τραγοὶ τοῦτω συνανοίεν, πεισθῆσθαι ἂν ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τὸ εὐδαιμόν ἡμῶν κείσθαι, ἐστ' ἂν νοῦς ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι κρατῇ. "To certain persons who were disputing on this point,—whether pleasure was the ultimate end of man, Socrates said that, were all the swine and goats in the world to join in applauding this man, (*the advocate for pleasure*) yet he should never be persuaded that human happiness consisted in being pleased, so long as mind excelled and prevailed in all things." If Porphyry in this alluded to the very emphatical passage in Plato now before us, he seems to have improved the force of it not a little ; unless, in his copy of this dialogue, he read *σὺς καὶ τραγοὶ* instead of *βοεὺς καὶ ἵπποι*.—S.

³ This dialogue both begins and ends abruptly. Hence Olympiodorus asks, why it is without a beginning and an end ? And he solves this question very properly as follows : " Shall we say that this is because *the good* is uncircumscribed, and has neither beginning nor end ? But it may be said, that on the contrary it is necessary *the good* should have a beginning and end ; a beginning of such a kind, that there is not another beginning prior to it, and an end beyond which there is not any other end. Perhaps therefore, it is better to say with our preceptor, that the mixt life has an end, and such a one as is adapted to all animals. So that the dialogue is very properly without a beginning, for the purpose of indicating that there is a certain good beyond that which it investigates. And again, for the same reason, it is without an end : for there is also another end more ancient than its end."

THE END OF THE PHILEBUS.

THE

THE
SECOND ALCIBIADES:
A
DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
PRAYER.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE SECOND ALCIBIADES.

THE Second Alcibiades, which in the supposed time of it is subsequent to the first of the same name, is on a subject which ranks among the most important to a rational being ; for with it is connected piety, which is the summit of virtue. Hence, as all nations in the infinity of time past have believed in the existence of certain divine powers superior to man, who beneficently provide for all inferior natures, and defend them from evil ; so likewise they worshipped these powers by numerous religious rites, of which prayer formed no inconsiderable part. The exceptions, indeed, to this general belief of mankind are so few that they do not deserve to be noticed. For we may say, with the elegant Maximus Tyrius¹, that, “if through the whole of time there have been two or three atheists, they were govelling and insensate men, whose eyes wandered, whose ears were deceived, whose souls were mutilated, a race irrational, barren, and useless, resembling a timid lion, an ox without horns, a bird without wings.” All others, as well those engaged in public affairs, as philosophers who explored the hidden causes of things, most constantly believed that there were Gods, viz. one first ineffable source of all things, and a multitude of divine powers proceeding from, and united with, him ; and always endeavoured to render these divine natures propitious, by sacrifice and prayer. Hence, the Chaldeans among the Assyrians, the Brahmins among the Indians, the Druids among the Gauls, the Magi among the

¹ In his Dissertation “What God is according to Plato.” See Reiske’s edition, p. 317.

Persians, and the tribe of priests among the Egyptians, constantly applied themselves to the worship of Divinity, and venerated and adored the Gods by various sacred ceremonies, and ardent and assiduous prayers.

As the leading design, therefore, of the following dialogue is to show the great importance of prayer, I persuade myself, that I cannot do any thing more illustrative of this design, or more beneficial to the reader, than to present him with the divinely luminous conceptions of Porphyry, Jamblichus, Proclus, and Hierocles on prayer, together with what the pseudo Dionysius has stolen from the Platonic philosophers on this subject. As these observations never yet appeared in any modern language, and as they are not to be equalled in any other writer for their profundity and sublimity, I trust no apology will be requisite for their length. Previous to their insertion, therefore, I shall only give the following definition of prayer, viz. that it is a certain force supernally imparted to the soul, elevating and conjoining her to Divinity, and which always unites in a becoming manner secondary with primary natures.

Porphyry then observes¹, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men, because it is a conjunction with a divine nature. But the similar loves to be united to the similar. And a worthy man is most similar to the Gods. Since those also that cultivate virtue are enclosed in body as in a prison, they ought to pray to the Gods that they may depart from hence. Besides, as we are like children torn from our parents, it is proper to pray that we may return to the Gods, as to our true parents: and because those that do not think it requisite to pray, and convert themselves to more excellent natures, are like those that are deprived of their fathers and mothers. To which we may add, that as we are a part of the universe, it is fit that we should be in want of it: for a conversion to the whole imparts safety to every thing. Whether, therefore, you possess virtue, it is proper that you should invoke that which causally comprehends² the whole of virtue. For that which is all-good will also be the cause to you of that good which it is proper for you to possess.

¹ Vide Procl. in Tim. p. 64.—T.

² The word used by Porphyry here is *πρσινδνφος*, which always signifies in Platonic writings *causal comprehension*; or the occult and indistinct prior to the actual and separate subsistence of things. After this manner numbers subsist causally in the monad.—T.

Or whether you explore some corporeal good, there is a power in the world which connectedly contains every body. It is necessary, therefore, that the perfect should thence be derived to the parts of the universe. Thus far Porphyry, who was not without reason celebrated by posterior philosophers for his *εποπρεπή νοήματα*, or conceptions adapted to sacred concerns.

Let us now attend to Jamblichus¹, whom every genuine Platonist will acknowledge to have been justly furnished *the divine*.

As prayers, through which sacred rites receive their perfect consummation and vigour, constitute a great part of sacrifice, and as they are of general utility to religion, and produce an indissoluble communion between the Divinities and their priests, it is necessary that we should mention a few things concerning their various species and wonderful effects. For prayer is of itself a thing worthy to be known, and gives greater perfection to the science concerning the Gods. I say, therefore, that the *first* species of prayer is *collective*, producing a contact with Divinity, and subsisting as the leader and light of knowledge. But the *second* is the *bond of consent and communion with the Gods*, exciting them to a copious communication of their benefits prior to the energy of speech, and perfecting the whole of our operations previous to our intellectual conceptions. But the *third* and most perfect species of prayer is *the seal of ineffable union with the Divinities*, in whom it establishes all the power and authority of prayer: and thus causes the soul to repose in the Gods, as in a divine and never-failing port. But from these three terms, in which all the divine measures are contained, suppliant adoration not only conciliates to us the friendship of the Gods, but supernally extends to us three fruits, being, as it were, three Hesperian apples of gold². The *first* pertains to *illumination*; the second, to a *communion of operation*; but through the energy of the *third* we receive a *perfect plenitude of divine fire*. And sometimes, indeed, supplication *precedes*; like a forerunner, preparing the way before the sacrifice appears. But sometimes it *intercedes as a mediator*: and sometimes *accomplishes the end of sacrificing*. No operation, however, in sacred concerns can succeed without the intervention of prayer. Lastly,

¹ De Myst. sec. 5, cap. 26.—T.

² This particular respecting the *apples of gold* is added from the version of Scutellius, who appears to have made his translation of Jamblichus from a more perfect manuscript than that which was used by Gale.—T.

the continual exercise of prayer nourishes the vigour of our intellect, and renders the receptacles of the soul far more capacious for the communications of the Gods. It likewise is the *divine key* which unfolds to men the penetralia of the Gods; accustoms us to the splendid rivers of supernal light; in a short time perfects our inmost recesses, and disposes them for the inevitable embrace and contact of the Gods; and does not desist till it raises us to the summit of all. It likewise gradually and silently draws upwards the manners of our soul, by divesting them of every thing foreign from a divine nature, and clothes us with the perfections of the Gods. Besides this, it produces an indissoluble communion and friendship with Divinity, nourishes a divine love, and enflames the divine part of the soul. Whatever is of an opposing and contrary nature in the soul it expiates and purifies; expels whatever is prone to generation, and retains any thing of the dregs of mortality in its ethereal and splendid spirit; perfects a good hope and faith concerning the reception of divine light; and in one word, renders those by whom it is employed the familiars and domestics of the Gods. If such, then, are the advantages of prayer, and such its connection with sacrifice, does it not appear from hence, that the end of sacrifice is a conjunction with the demiurgus of the world? And the benefit of prayer is of the same extent with the good which is conferred by the demiurgic causes on the race of mortals. Again, from hence the *anagogic, perfective, and replenishing* power of prayer appears; likewise how it becomes efficacious and unific, and how it possesses a common bond imparted by the Gods. And in the third and last place, it may easily be conceived from hence how prayer and sacrifice mutually corroborate, and confer on each other a sacred and perfect power in divine concerns.

The following translation (from p. 64) of Proclus on the *Timæus*, containing the doctrine of Jamblichus on prayer, with the elucidations of Proclus, may be considered as an excellent commentary on the preceding observations.

All beings are the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the progression of things which perpetually subsist and cohere from permanent causes, is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but immediately subsists from the Gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may be from the Divinities: and this is no less true, even though asserted of matter
itself.

itself. For a divine nature is not absent from any thing, but is equally present to all things. Hence, though you consider the last of beings, in these also you will find Divinity: for *the one* is every where; and in consequence of its absolute dominion, every thing receives its nature and coherence from the Gods. But as all things proceed, so likewise they are not separated from the Gods, but radically abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence: for where can they recede, since the Gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace? For whatever is placed as separate from the Gods has not any kind of subsistence. But all beings are contained by the Gods, and reside in their natures after the manner of a circular comprehension. Hence, by a wonderful mode of subsistence, all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can be, separated from the Gods; (for all generated natures, when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the wide-spreading immensity of non-being,) but they are after a manner established in the divine natures: and, in fine, they proceed in themselves, but abide in the Gods. But since in consequence of their progression it is requisite that they should be converted, and return, and imitate the egress and conversion of the Gods to their ineffable cause, that the natures, thus disposed, may again be contained by the Gods, and the first unities, according to a *teleurgic*, or perfective triad, they receive from hence a certain secondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to the goodness of the Gods; that after they have rooted their principle in the Divinities, they may again, by conversion, abide in them, and form as it were a circle, which originates from, and terminates in, the Gods. All things, therefore, both abide in, and convert themselves to, the Gods; receiving this power from the Divinities, together with twofold symbols according to essence: the one, that they may abide there; but the other, that having proceeded, they may convert themselves: and this we may easily contemplate, not only in souls, but also in inanimate natures. For what else ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers but the symbols which they are allotted by nature, some of which contract a familiarity with *this* and some with *that* series of Gods? For nature supernally depending from the Gods, and being distributed from their orders, impresses also in bodies the symbols of her familiarity with the Divinities. In some, indeed, inserting solar symbols, but in others lunar, and in others again the occult characters of some other God. And these, indeed,

convert themselves to the Divinities: some as it were to the Gods simply, but others as to particular Gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of the Gods. The Demiurgus of the universe, therefore, by a much greater priority, impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might be able to abide in themselves, and again convert themselves to the sources of their being: through the symbol of unity, conferring on them stability; but through intellect affording them the power of conversion.

And to this conversion prayer is of the greatest utility: for it conciliates the beneficence of the Gods through those ineffable symbols which the father of the universe has disseminated in souls. It likewise unites those who pray with those to whom prayer is addressed; copulates the intellect of the Gods with the discourses of those who pray; excites the will of those who perfectly comprehend good, and produces in us a firm persuasion, that they will abundantly impart to us the beneficence which they contain: and lastly, it establishes in the Gods whatever we possess.

But to a perfect and true prayer there is required, first, a knowledge of all the divine orders to which he who prays approaches: for neither will any one accede in a proper manner, unless he intimately beholds their distinguishing properties: and hence it is that the Oracle¹ admonishes, "*that a fiery intellection obtains the first order in sacred veneration.*" But afterwards there is required a conformation of our life with that which is divine; and this accompanied with all *purity, chastity, discipline, and order*. For thus while we present ourselves to the Gods, they will be provoked to beneficence; and our souls will be subjected to theirs, and will participate the excellences of a divine nature. In the third place, a certain contact is necessary, from whence, with the more exalted part of the soul, we touch the divine essence, and verge to a union with its ineffable nature. But there is yet further required an accession and inhesion, (for thus the Oracle calls it, while it says, "*the mortal adhering to fire will possess a divine light,*") from whence we receive a greater and more illustrious part of the light proceeding from the Gods. In the last place, a union succeeds with the unity of the Gods, restoring and establishing unity to the soul, and causing our energy to become

¹ Viz. one of the Chaldean Oracles.—T.

one with divine energy : so that in this case, we are no longer ourselves, but are absorbed, as it were, in the nature of the Gods ; and residing in divine light, are entirely surrounded with its splendour. And this is, indeed, the best end of prayer, the conjunction of the soul's conversion with its permanency ; establishing in unity whatever proceeds from the divine unities ; and surrounding our light with the light of the Gods.

Prayer, therefore, is of no small assistance to our souls in ascending to their native region : nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of that good which proceeds from prayer, but the very contrary takes place ; since prayer is not only the cause of our ascent and reversion, but with it is connected piety to the Gods, that is, the very summit of virtue. Nor, indeed, ought any other to pray than he who excels in goodness : (as the Athenian guest in Plato admonishes us,) for to such a one, while enjoying by the exercise of prayer familiarity with the Gods, an efficacious and easy way is prepared for the enjoyment of a blessed life. But the contrary succeeds to the vicious : since it is not lawful for purity to be touched by impurity. It is necessary, therefore, that he who generously enters on the exercise of prayer should render the Gods propitious to him ; and should excite in himself divine conceptions, full of intellectual light : for the favour and benignity of more exalted beings is the most effectual incentive to their communication with our natures. And it is requisite, without intermission, to dwell in the veneration of Divinity : for, according to the poet, "*the Gods are accustomed to be present with the mortal constantly employed in prayer.*" It is likewise necessary to preserve a stable order of divine works, and to produce those virtues which purify the soul from the stains of generation, and elevate her to the regions of intellect, together with *faith, truth, and love* : to preserve this triad and hope of good, this immutable perception of divine light, and segregation from every other pursuit ; that thus solitary, and free from material concerns, we may become united with the solitary unities of the Gods : since he who attempts by multitude to unite himself with unity, acts preposterously, and dissociates himself from Divinity. For as it is not lawful for any one to conjoin himself by that which is not, with that which is ; so neither is it possible with multitude to be conjoined with unity. Such, then, are the consequences primarily apparent in prayer, viz. that its essence is the cause of associating our souls with the Gods ; and that on this account it unites and

copulates all inferior with all superior beings. For, as the great *Theodorus*¹ says, *all things pray, except the FIRST*.

But the perfection of prayer, beginning from more common goods, ends in divine conjunction, and gradually accustoms the soul to divine light. And its efficacious and vigorous energy both replenishes us with good, and causes our concerns to be common with those of the Gods. We may also rationally suppose that the causes of prayer, so far as they are *effective*, are the vigorous and efficacious powers of the Gods, converting and calling upwards the soul to the Gods themselves. But that, so far as they are *perfective*, they are the immaculate goods of the soul, from the reception of which, souls are established in the Gods. And again, that so far as they are *paradigmatical*, they are the primary fabricating causes of beings; proceeding from *the good*, and conjoined with it by an ineffable union. But that so far as they are *formal*, or possess the proportion of forms, they render souls similar to the Gods, and give perfection to the whole life of the soul. Lastly, so far as they are *material*, or retain the proportion of matter, they are the marks or symbols conferred by the Demiurgus on the essences of souls, that they may be awakened to a reminiscence of the Gods who produced both them and whatever else exists.

But we may also describe the modes of prayer, which are various, according to the genera and species of the Gods. For of prayers, some are *fabricative*; others of a *purifying nature*; and others, lastly, are *vivific*. I call those *fabricative* which are offered for the sake of showers and winds. For the fabricative Gods (*δημιουργοί*) are also the causes of these: on which account, it is customary with the Athenians to pray to such Divinities for the sake of obtaining winds procuring serenity of weather. But I call those prayers of a *purifying nature*, which are instituted for the purpose of averting diseases originating from pestilence, and other contagious distempers: such as are written in our temples. And lastly, those prayers are *vivific* with which we venerate the Gods who are the causes of vivification, on account of the origin and maturity of fruits. Hence it is that prayers are of a perfective nature, because they elevate us to these divine orders: and those who consider such prayers in a different manner, do not properly apprehend in what their na-

¹ Viz. Theodorus Asinæus, a disciple of Porphyry.—T.

ture and efficacy consist. But again, with respect to the things for which we pray, those which regard the *safety of the soul* obtain the first place; those which pertain to *the proper disposition and strength of the body*, the second; and those claim the last place which pertain to *external concerns*. And lastly, with respect to the distribution of the times in which we offer up prayers, it is either according to the seasons of the year, or the centres of the solar revolution; or we establish multifarious prayers according to other such-like conceptions.

With the above admirable passages the following extract from Jamblichus de Myst. sec. 1. cap. 12. may be very properly conjoined. Its design is to show, that the Gods are not agitated by passions, though they appear to be moved through the influence of prayer.

Prayers are not to be directed to the Gods, as if they were passive, and could be moved by supplications: for the divine irradiation which takes place through the exercise of prayer, operates spontaneously, and is far remote from all material attraction; since it becomes apparent through divine energy and perfection; and as much excels the voluntary motion of our nature, as the divine will of *the good* surpasses our election. Through this volition, the Gods, who are perfectly benevolent and merciful, pour their light without any parsimony on the supplicating priests, whose souls they call upwards to their own divine natures; impart to them a union with themselves, and accustom their souls, even while bound in body, to separate themselves from its dark embrace, and to be led back by an ineffable energy to their eternal and intelligible original. Indeed it is evident that the safety of the soul depends on such divine operations. For while the soul contemplates divine visions, it acquires another life, employs a different energy, and may be considered, with the greatest propriety, as no longer ranking in the order of man. For it often lays aside its own proper life, and changes it for the most blessed energy of the Gods. But if an ascent to the Gods, through the ministry of prayer, confers on the priests purity from passion, freedom from the bonds of generation, and a union with a divine principle, how can there be any thing passive in the efficacy of prayer? For invocation does not draw down the pure and impassive Gods to us who are passive and impure; but, on the contrary, renders us who are become through generation impure and passive, immutable and pure.

But

But neither do invocations conjoin, through passion, the priests with the Divinities, but afford an indissoluble communion of connection, through that friendship which binds all things in union and consent. Nor do invocations incline the intellect of the Gods towards men, as the term seems to imply; but, according to the decisions of truth, they render the will of men properly disposed to receive the participations of the Gods; leading it upwards, and connecting it with the Divinities by the sweetest and most alluring persuasion. And on this account the sacred names of the Gods, and other divine symbols, from their anagogic nature, are able to connect invocations with the Gods themselves.

And in chap. 15 of the same section, he again admirably discourses on the same subject as follows:

That which in our nature is divine, intellectual, and one, or (as you may be willing to call it) intelligible, is perfectly excited by prayer from its dormant state; and when excited, vehemently seeks that which is similar to itself, and becomes copulated to its own perfection. But if it should seem incredible that incorporeal natures can be capable of hearing sounds, and it is urged, that for this purpose the sense of hearing is requisite, that they may understand our supplications; such objectors are unacquainted with the excellency of primary causes, which consists in both knowing and comprehending in themselves at once the universality of things. The Gods, therefore, do not receive prayers in themselves through any corporeal powers or organs, but rather contain in themselves the effects of pious invocations; and especially of such as through sacred cultivation are consecrated and united to the Gods: for, in this case, a divine nature is evidently present with itself, and does not apprehend the conceptions of prayers as different from its own. Nor are supplications to be considered as foreign from the purity of intellect: but since the Gods excel us both in power, purity, and all other advantages, we shall act in the most opportune manner, by invoking them with the most vehement supplications. For a consciousness of our own nothingness, when we compare ourselves with the Gods, naturally leads us to the exercise of prayer. But through the benefits resulting from supplication we are in a short time brought back to the object of supplication; acquire its similitude from intimate converse; and gradually obtain divine perfection, instead of our own imbecility and imperfection.

Indeed he who considers, that sacred prayers are sent to men from the Gods themselves ; that they are certain symbols of the divine natures ; and that they are only known to the Gods, with whom in a certain respect they possess an equal power ; I say, he who considers all this, cannot any longer believe that supplications are of a sensible nature, and that they are not very justly esteemed intellectual and divine : and must acknowledge it to be impossible that any passion should belong to things the purity of which the most worthy manners of men cannot easily equal.

Nor ought we to be disturbed by the objection which urges, that material things are frequently offered in supplications ; and this as if the Gods possessed a sensitive and animal nature. For, indeed, if the offerings consisted solely of corporeal and composite powers, and such as are only accommodated to organical purposes, the objection would have some weight : but since they participate of incorporeal forms, certain proportions, and more simple measures ; in this alone the correspondence and connection of offerings with the Gods ought to be regarded. For, whenever any affinity or similitude is present, whether greater or less, it is sufficient to the connection of which we are now discoursing : since there is nothing which approaches to a kindred alliance with the Gods, though in the smallest degree, to which the Gods are not immediately present and united. A connection, therefore, as much as is possible, subsists between prayers and the Gods : at the same time prayers do not regard the Divinities as if they were of a sensitive or animal nature ; but they consider them as they are in reality, and according to the divine forms which their essences contain.

In the third place, let us attend to the admirable observations on prayer of Hierocles, who, though inferior in accuracy and sublimity of conception to Jamblichus and Proclus, yet, as Damascius well observes, (in his *Life of Isidorus* apud Phot.) he uncommonly excelled in his dianoëtic part, and in a venerable and magnificent fluency of diction. The following is a translation of his Comment on the Pythagoric verse :

——— Ἀλλ' ἐρχεσθαι ἐπ' ἔργον
Θεοῖσιν ἐπευξάμενος τελεσθαι.

i. e. "Betake yourself to the work, having implored the Gods to bring it to perfection."

The verse briefly describes all that contributes to the acquisition of good,
viz.

viz. the self-moved nature of the soul, and the co-operation of Divinity. For, though the election of things beautiful¹ is in our power, yet, as we possess our freedom of the will from Divinity, we are perfectly indigent of his co-operating with and perfecting the things which we have chosen. For our endeavour appears to be similar to a hand extended to the reception of things beautiful; but that which is imparted by Divinity is the supplier and the fountain of the gift of good. And the former, indeed, is naturally adapted to discover things beautiful; but the latter to unfold them to him by whom they are rightly explored. But prayer is the medium between two boundaries, viz. between investigation by us, and that which is imparted by Divinity, properly adhering to the cause which leads us into existence, and perfects us in well-being. For how can any one receive well-being unless Divinity imparts it? And how can Divinity, who is naturally adapted to give, give to him who does not ask, though his impulses arise from the freedom of his will? That we may not, therefore, pray only in words, but may also corroborate this by deeds; and that we may not confide only in our own energy, but may also beseech Divinity to co-operate with our deeds, and may conjoin prayer to action, as form to matter; and, in short, that we may pray for what we do, and do that for which we pray, the verse conjoining these two, says, "Betake yourself to the work, having implored the Gods to bring it to perfection." For neither is it proper alone to engage with alacrity in beautiful actions, as if it were in our power to perform them with rectitude, without the co-operation of Divinity; nor yet should we be satisfied with the words of mere prayer while we contribute nothing to the acquisition of the things which we request. For thus we shall either pursue atheistical virtue (if I may be allowed so to speak) or unenergetic prayer; of which the former, being deprived of Divinity, takes away the essence of virtue; and the latter, being sluggish, dissolves the efficacy of prayer. For how can any thing be beautiful which is not performed according to the divine rule? And how is it possible that what is done according to this should not entirely require the co-operation of Divinity to its subsistence? For virtue is the image of Divinity in the rational soul; but every image requires its paradigm, in order to its generation, nor is that which it possesses sufficient, unless it looks

¹ By things beautiful, with Platonic writers, every thing excellent and good is included.—T.

to that from the similitude to which it possesses the beautiful. It is proper, therefore, that those should pray who hasten to energetic virtue, and having prayed, that they should endeavour to possess it. It is likewise requisite that they should do this, looking to that which is divine and splendid, and should extend themselves to philosophy, adhering at the same time in a becoming manner to the first cause of good. For that *tetractys*¹, the fountain of perennial nature, is not only the eternal cause of being to all things, but likewise of well-being, expanding proper good through the whole world, like undecaying and intellectual light. But the soul, when she properly adheres to this light, and purifies herself like an eye to acuteness of vision, by an attention to things beautiful, is excited to prayer; and again, from the plenitude of prayer she extends her endeavours, conjoining actions to words, and by divine conferences giving stability to worthy deeds. And discovering some things, and being illuminated in others, she endeavours to effect what she prays for, and prays for that which she endeavours to effect. And such indeed is the union of endeavour and prayer.

In the last place, the pseudo Dionysius has decorated his book *On the Divine Names* with the following admirable observations on prayer, stolen² from writers incomparably more sublime than any of the age in which he pretended to have lived.

Divinity is present to all things, but all things are not present to him; but when we invoke him with all-sacred prayers, an unclouded intellect, and an aptitude to divine union, then we also are present to him. For he is neither in place, that he may be absent from any thing, nor does he pass from one thing to another. But, indeed, to assert that he is in all things, falls far short of that infinity which is above, and which comprehends, all things. Let us therefore extend ourselves by prayer to the more sublime intuition of his

¹ This *tetractys*, which is the same as the *phanes* of Orpheus, and the *αὐτοῦτον*, or *animal itself*, of Plato, first subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order, and is thence participated by Jupiter, the fabricator of the universe. See the Introduction to the *Timæus*.—T.

² Fabricius, in the 4th vol. of his *Bibliotheca Græca*, has incontestably proved that this Dionysius lived several hundred years after the time of St. Paul; and observes, that his works are, doubtless, composed from Platonic writings. In confirmation of this remark, it is necessary to inform the learned reader, that the long discourse on Evil in the treatise of Dionysius, *περὶ θεῶν οὐρανοῦ*, appears to have been taken almost verbatim from one of the lost writings of Proclus *On the Subsistence of Evil*, as will be at once evident by comparing it with the *Excerpta* from that work, preferred by Fabricius in *Biblioth. Græc.* tom. viii. p. 502.—T.

divine and beneficent rays. Just as if a chain, consisting of numerous lamps, were suspended from the summit of heaven, and extended to the earth. For if we ascended this chain, by always alternately stretching forth our hands, we should appear indeed to ourselves to draw down the chain, though we should not in reality, it being present upwards and downwards, but we should elevate ourselves to the more sublime splendours of the abundantly-luminous rays. Or, as if we ascended into a ship, and held by the ropes¹ extended to us from a certain rock, and which were given to us for our assistance; we should not in this case draw the rock to us, but we in reality should move both ourselves and the ship to the rock. Just as, on the contrary, if any one standing in a ship pushes against a rock fixed in the sea, he indeed effects nothing in the firm and immovable rock, but causes himself to recede from it: and by how much the more he pushes against, by so much the more is he repelled from the rock. Hence, prior to every undertaking, and especially that which is theological, it is necessary to begin from prayer, not as if drawing down that power which is every where present, and is at the same time no where, but as committing and uniting ourselves to it by divine recollections and invocations.

I shall only add, that the antients appear very properly to have placed this dialogue in the class which they called *maieutic*: and, as Mr. Sydenham justly observes, “the outward form of it, from the beginning to the end, is *dramatic*; the *catastrophe* being a change of mind in Alcibiades, who resolves to follow the advice of Socrates, by forbearing to specify, in his addresses to Divinity, his wants and his wishes, till he shall have attained to a sense of his real indigence through the knowledge of his real good, the only right and proper object of prayer.”

¹ This part is stolen from the Commentaries of Simplicius on Epictetus, as is evident from the following extract: Τὴν τὴν ἡμῶν ἐπιστροφὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν (θεὸν) ὡς αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἡμᾶς λεγόμεν· τοιοῦτον τι πασχόντες, οἷον οἱ πέτρας τινὲς παραλίας καλῶν ἐκψύχοντες, καὶ τῷ κινεῖν ἐπισπαρβαὶ ἑαυτοὺς τε καὶ τὸ ἀκράτιον τῇ πέτρᾳ προσαγόντες· καὶ δι’ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ὑπομένει δέκοντες οὐκ αὐτοὶ προσεῖναι τῇ πέτρᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πέτραν κατ’ ὀλίγον ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἰέναι· μεταμελῆσαι δέ, καὶ κτενέειν, καὶ εὐχαί, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀναλογισαὶ τῷ καθ’ ὃ. p. 223, 8vo i. e. “We speak of this our conversion to Divinity, as if it was a conversion of him to us; being affected in somewhat the same manner as those who, fastening a rope to a certain rock in the sea, and drawing both themselves and the boat to the rock by pulling it, appear, through their ignorance of this circumstance, not to approach themselves to the rock, but think that the rock gradually approaches to them. For repentance, supplication, prayer, and things of this kind, are analogous to the rope.”

THE SECOND ALCIBIADES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

SOCRATES, ALCIBIADES.

SCENE.—*The Way to the TEMPLE of JUPITER*¹.

SOCRATES.

ALCIBIADES! are you going to the temple to make your petitions to the God?

ALC. Your conjecture is perfectly right, Socrates.

¹ At Athens were two edifices, built in honour of Jupiter. One of these was a most magnificent temple, called the Olympium, and situate in the lower city. The other was only a chapel in the upper city, sacred to Ζεύς ὁ σωτήρ, *Jupiter the [universal] saviour*, and adjoining to another chapel, sacred to Ἀθηνᾶ ἡ σωτήρ, *Minerva the saviour* [of Athens]. Both these chapels stood at the entrance of the treasury; one probably on each side, as guardians of the public money: and this treasury stood at the back of that beautiful temple of Minerva, called the Parthenon. Now had Socrates met Alcibiades in the ascent, which led first to the Parthenon, and thence to the chapels behind it, no reason appears for his supposing that Alcibiades was going to pay his devotions to Jupiter, rather than to Minerva, the guardian Deity of Athens. But the masculine article τοῦ, used in this place by Plato before the noun Σέως, forbids us to imagine that Minerva could be here meant. For at Athens, as Minerva was styled ἡ Σεῶς, *the Goddess*, by way of eminence, so Jupiter was styled either simply Σεῶς, *God*, or ὁ Σεῶς, *the God*, as being Supreme. Beside this, we are to observe, that in the chapel of Jupiter in the upper city, he was worshipped in a particular character, as the preserver of his votaries in dangers from which they had escaped; as not only is to be presumed from the title of Saviour, by which he was there invoked, but also is clearly proved from the *Plutus* of Aristophanes, act. 5, sc. 2, and from the oration of Lycurgus against Leocrates, p. 168 and 253, edit. Taylor. Now there is not the least appearance that Alcibiades had had any signal deliverance from danger, or that he was now going to offer a thanksgiving sacrifice, as it was customary to do on such occasions. From all this we justly may conclude, that the scene of this dialogue lies in a direct leading to the temple of Olympian Jupiter in the lower city.—S.

Soc. Indeed your countenance appears close and cloudy; and your eyes are turned toward the ground, as if you were wrapped in some profound thought¹.

ALC. What profound thoughts could a man have at such a time, Socrates?

Soc. Thoughts, Alcibiades, such as seem to me of the highest importance. For tell me, in the name of Jupiter, do you not think, when we happen, whether in private or in public, to be making our petitions to the Gods, that sometimes they grant a part of those petitions, and reject the rest; and that to some of their petitioners they hearken, but are deaf to others?

ALC. No doubt of it.

Soc. Do you not think, then, that much previous consideration is requisite to prevent a man from praying unwittingly for things which are very evil, but which he imagines very good; if the Gods at that time when he is praying to them should happen to be disposed to grant whatever prayers he happens to make? As Œdipus, they say, inconsiderately² prayed the Gods that his sons might divide their patrimony between them by the sword³. Instead,

¹ The first symbolical precept which the Pythagorean philosophers gave to their disciples was this: "When you go from your house with intention to perform your devotions at the temple, neither speak nor do any thing in the way thither concerning any business of human life"—A precept recorded, among others of like kind, by Jamblichus, in the last of his *λογoi προτρεπτικοι*, and rightly there interpreted, p. 134, to this purport:—that a man ought to purify his mind, by abstracting it from earthly cares, and from all objects of sense, whenever he contemplates divine things; because these are abstracted or pure from matter themselves; and pure naturally joins and unites with homogeneous pure. Further, divine things being stable, and always the same, but human things unstable, and for ever changing; they are in this respect also heterogeneous, and, as the same great Platonist elsewhere elegantly speaks, incommensurable, the one sort of things with the other; so that they mix not amicably together in the mind.—S.

² This sentence is evidently meant to prove the necessity of much consideration before a man prays; by showing, from the example of Œdipus, the mischiefs often consequent to rash and unpremeditated prayer. An opposition, therefore, seems intended between the *αυρινα* in this passage, and the *προσυνεσις*, *premeditation*, or *previous consideration*, above recommended. Accordingly, we have ventured, against the opinion of Ernestus, in his Notes to Xenophon's Memorab. lib. iv. cap. 7, to give this *opposed meaning* here to the word *αυρινα*, by rendering it in English *inconsiderately*; a meaning very little different from the primary and usual sense of the word, in which it signifies the same with *παρ'αυρινα*, that is, *immediately, directly, without delay*.—S.

³ The same relation of this curse is given by Euripides, in *Phœnissæ*, ver. 68; by Sophocles, in *Œdipus Colon.* ver. 1437, 1447, et seq. (where Œdipus himself reiterates the curse:) and by the Scholiast on *Æschylus*, in *Septem apud Thebas*, ver. 613, 713, 729, and 853.—S.

therefore,

therefore, of praying for his family, as he might have done, that the evils which it then suffered might be averted, he cursed it by praying¹ that more might be superadded. The event of which curse was this, that not only what he prayed for was accomplished, but from that accomplishment followed other evils, many and terrible, which there is no need to enumerate².

ALC. But, Socrates, you have now spoken of a man who was insane, for who, think you, in his sound mind would venture to make such sort of prayers?

Soc. Whether is it your opinion, that to be insane is to be in a state of mind contrary to that which is sound?

ALC. I am quite of opinion that it is.

Soc. And are you not of opinion, too, that there are men who want understanding, and men who have not that want?

¹ Curses in those ancient days were prayers addressed to the Infernal Deities,—to Tartarus,—to primæval Night, but chiefly to the daughters of Night, the Eumenides. For no Deities who dwelt in light were imagined to be the authors of evil ever to any. In conformity with these practices and opinions, Sophocles, in the last of the two passages cited from him in note 7, and Statius, in his Thebaid, lib. i. ver. 56 et seq., give to this curse, pronounced by Œdipus against his sons, the form of a prayer, addressed to those powers of darkness. Hence appears the ignorance of the author of the *κικλίκη Θηβαία*, or old Greek ballad of the Siege of Thebes, cited by the scholiast on Sophocles, p. 577, edit. P. Steph. For, after he has told a very silly tale, how the two sons of Œdipus, having had an ox killed for a sacrifice, sent a joint of it to their father who was then blind,—and how Œdipus had expected the prime piece of all,—he concludes this part of the story in manner and form following; that is to say, being interpreted (as it ought to be) in ballad style and ballad metre,

As soon as e'er he understood
 'Twas only the ache-bone,
 For him too mean, unworthy food;
 Against the ground, in wrathful mood,
 He straightway dash'd it down.

 Then pray'd he to th' immortals all,
 But chief to Jove on high,
 That each by th' other's hand might fall;
 And so to Pluto's darksome hall
 They both at once might fly.—S.

² The particulars are briefly related by Appollodorus, in Bibliothec. lib. iii. cap. 6 and 7.—S.

ALC. I am.

SOC. Come, then, let us consider what sort of men these are. You have admitted, that men there are who want understanding, men who do not want it, and other men, you say, who are insane.

ALC. True.

SOC. Further now; are there not some men in a good state of health?

ALC. There are.

SOC. And are there not others in a bad state of health?

ALC. Certainly.

SOC. These, then, are not the same men with those.

ALC. By no means.

SOC. Whether now are there any men who are in neither of those states?

ALC. Certainly, none.

SOC. For every man must of necessity either *have* good health, or *want* good health.

ALC. I think so too.

SOC. Well: do you think after the same manner with regard to the having of understanding and the want of understanding?

ALC. How do you mean?

SOC. Do you think it to be necessary¹, that a man should either *have* or *want* a good understanding? Or is there, besides, some third and middle state, in which a man neither *has* nor *wants* a good understanding?

ALC. There certainly is not.

SOC. Every man, then, of necessity must be either in the one or in the other of those two conditions.

ALC. So it seems to me.

¹ In all the printed editions of the Greek we here read, Δοκεῖ σοι δεῖν εἶναι, *Do you think it possible*, &c. And Cornarius, as if he found this reading in the Hefenstein manuscript, translates it into Latin thus: *Videtur tibi fieri posse*, &c. Ficinus and Stephens translate it, as if they had read in their manuscripts, Δοκεῖ σοι δεῖν εἶναι, *Do you think that a man ought to be*, &c. Neither of these readings can be right, because they, both of them, make this dialectical question to be *foolish* as well as *impertinent*; and because also either of them spoils the argumentation. To make the inference, in the next sentence of Socrates, just and conclusive, we must here read Δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκασιὶ εἶναι, as we have supposed in translating it. The necessity of making this emendation in the Greek text was seen also by Dacier, as appears from his French translation.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Do you not remember that you admitted this, that insanity was contrary to soundness of understanding?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And do you not remember that you admitted this also, that there was no middle or third state, in which a man neither *has* nor *wants* a good understanding?

ALC. I admitted this too.

Soc. But how can two different things be contrary to one and the same thing?

ALC. It is by no means possible.

Soc. Want of understanding, therefore, and insanity, are likely to be found the same thing.

ALC. It appears so.

Soc. If then we should pronounce that all fools were madmen¹, we should pronounce rightly, Alcibiades.

ALC. We should.

Soc. In the first place, your equals in age, if any of them happen to be fools, as indeed they are, and some of your elders too, all these we must pronounce madmen. For consider, are you not of opinion, that in this city there are few wise men, but a multitude of fools, whom you call madmen?

ALC. I am of that opinion.

Soc. Can you imagine then, that, living in the same city with so many madmen, we should live with any ease or comfort? or that we should not have suffered from them long ago, have been buffeted, and pelted, and have met with all other mischiefs which madmen are wont to perpetrate? But consider, my good sir, whether we live not here in a different state of things.

ALC. What is then the truth of the case, Socrates, with respect to the multitude? For it is not likely to be what I just now imagined.

¹ That the philosophers of the Stoic sect derived from Socrates that celebrated paradox of theirs, *παντας τοὺς ἀφρονες μανεύειν*, *that all fools are mad*, is a just observation of Cicero's in Tuscul. Disputat. l. iii. § 5; and Dr. Davis, in his notes thereon, shows the justness of it, by referring to the passage in Plato now before us.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Neither do I think it is so myself. But we should consider it in some such way as this.

ALC. In what way do you mean?

Soc. I will tell you. We presume that some men there are who are ill in health: do we not?

ALC. Certainly we do.

Soc. Do you think it necessary then that every man, who is ill in health, should have the gout, or a fever, or an ophthalmy¹? do you not think that a man, without suffering from any of these diseases, may be ill of some other? For diseases, we suppose, are of many various kinds, and not of those only.

ALC. I suppose they are.

Soc. Do you not think that every ophthalmy is a disease?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And do you think that every disease, therefore, is an ophthalmy?

ALC. By no means, not I. Yet still I am at a loss about your meaning.

Soc. But if you will give me your attention, in considering the matter, both of us together, we shall go near to find the truth of it.

ALC. I give you, Socrates, all the attention I am master of.

Soc. Was it not agreed by us, that every ophthalmy was a disease; though not every disease an ophthalmy?

ALC. It was agreed so.

Soc. And I think it was rightly so agreed. For all persons who have a fever have a disease; not all, however, who have a disease have a fever; neither have they all of them the gout, nor all of them an ophthalmy. Every thing indeed of this kind² is a disease; but they whom we call physicians say that diseases differ in their effects on the human body. For

¹ We have no single word in our language to denote that disease of the eyes, called by the Grecian physicians *οφθαλμία*, the word here used by Plato. They meant by it such a ferous inflammation of the eyes, or defluxion of humours on them, as in Latin is called *lippitudo*.—S.

² That is, every continued indisposition of the body; whether the whole body suffer from it throughout, as in a fever; or whether it be seated in any organical part serving to motion, as in the gout; or serving to sensation, as in an ophthalmy. Plato, in his choice of similitudes and instances, where they are requisite to illustrate his subject, (and he never uses any but on such occasions,) is always so exquisitely curious, and often, as here, so scientifically judicious, that, with respect to this ingredient in good writing on ideal or intellectual subjects, we know of no writer who is his equal.—S.

all diseases are not alike, neither are they all attended with like symptoms; but each of them operates with a power peculiar to itself, and yet diseases are they all. Just as it is with respect to workmen; for workmen we suppose some men are, do we not¹?

ALC. Certainly we do.

SOC. Such as shoemakers, smiths, statuarys, and a great multitude of others, whom it is needless to enumerate distinctly. All these have different parts of workmanship divided amongst them; and they all are workmen. They are not, however, smiths, nor shoemakers, nor statuarys, indiscriminately all of them together. Just so folly is divided amongst men. And those who have the largest share of it, we call madmen; such as have a portion somewhat less, we call senseless and stupidified²: but if we choose to speak of these in gentler terms, some of us say they are magnanimous³; others call them simpletons; and others again, harmless and inexperienced in the world and speechless⁴. You will also find, if you reflect, many other names given them beside these. But they are all comprised under the general term, folly or want of understanding. There is, however, a difference between them, as one art differs from another, one disease from another. Or how otherwise doth the case seem to you?

ALC. To me exactly as you represent it.

SOC. This point, therefore, being settled, let us from hence return back again. For it was proposed, I think, in the beginning of our inquiry, to be

¹ In the Socratic manner of arguing from answers given to interrogations, the interrogating party asserts nothing positively; nor even lays down the most certain principles for a foundation of the future reasoning, until they are admitted for truths by the responding party.—S.

² In the Greek, *εμβροχνητους*, literally to be translated thunder-stricken. For the effect of lightning, (when attended by thunder,) and indeed of all æthereal or electrical fire, is to stupify, at least for a time, whatever animal it strikes.—S.

³ This euphemismus is applied in the way of raillery or good-humour, to such men as want sense or understanding in the common affairs of human life; as men really magnanimous, being usually regardless of things really little and appearing so to them, are looked upon as fools or as senseless by the multitude, to whom those little things appear great and important.—S.

⁴ In the Greek, *ἔννεμος*, a word which, in the proper sense of it, is applied only to infants before they have attained to the use of speech. This epithet, and the two preceding it, are used in the way of extenuation or apology; the first for the wholly useless or unserviceable in any affair; the next for the silly or easy to be imposed on; the last for the silent from want of ideas, having nothing to say.—S.

considered by us, what sort of men wanted understanding, and what sort were men of good understanding. For it was agreed that some there were of each sort. Was it not?

ALC. It was so agreed.

Soc. Whether then do you suppose, that such persons have a good understanding who know how they ought to act, and what they ought to say?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And what persons do you apprehend to be wanting in understanding? are they not such as are ignorant in both those cases?

ALC. These very persons.

Soc. Will not these persons then, who are ignorant of what they ought to do and to say, both say and do what they ought not without being sensible of it?

ALC. It appears so.

Soc. Well then, Alcibiades, of this sort of persons, I said, was *Œdipus*. And you may find many in our own times, who, though they are not seized with sudden anger, as he was, yet pray for things hurtful to themselves; not suspecting evil in them, and imagining nought but good. *Œdipus* indeed, as he did not wish for any thing good, so neither did he imagine the thing he prayed for to be good. But some others there are, whose minds are in a disposition quite contrary to that of *Œdipus*. For you yourself, in my opinion, if the God to whom you are going to offer your petitions should appear to you, and, before you had made any petition to him, should ask you, "whether your desires would be satisfied with your becoming tyrant of Athens;" and (if you held this favour cheap, and no mighty grant) should add further, "and tyrant of all Greece;" and, if he should perceive that you deemed it still too little for you, unless you were tyrant¹ of all Europe, should promise you that also; and not merely promise, but make you so immediately on the spot, if you were in haste to have all the Europeans acknowledge Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, for their lord and master; in this case, it is my opinion, that you yourself would march away full of joy, as if the greatest good had befallen you.

ALC. I believe, Socrates, that I should; and that so would any other man whatever, had he met with such an adventure.

¹ The word *tyrant*, every where in Plato, signifies a despotic or arbitrary monarch.—S.
Soc.

Soc. You would not, however, accept of absolute dominion over the estates and persons of all the Grecians and Barbarians together, on condition of giving your life in exchange for it.

ALC. I suppose not. For why should I, when it could be of no use to me?

Soc. And, if you knew that you should make an ill use of it to your own detriment, would you not also in such a case refuse it?

ALC. Certainly I should.

Soc. You see, then, how dangerous it is, either inconsiderately to accept of it, when offered, or to wish and pray for it of yourself; since a man, by having it, may suffer great detriment, if not the total loss of his life. In confirmation of this, we could mention many persons who longed after tyranny, and laboured to obtain it, as if some mighty good were to be enjoyed from it; but having obtained it, were, from plots and conspiracies to deprive them of it, forced to part with their very lives. Nay, it cannot, I suppose, have escaped your own hearing, what happened as it were but yesterday, that Archelaus, tyrant of the Macedonians, was murdered by his favourite; for this favourite was no less fond of the tyranny, than the tyrant was of him; and imagined that, by obtaining the tyranny himself, he should be made a happy man; but that, after he had held the tyranny three or four days, he himself was, in his turn, secretly murdered by some others, who had conspired against him. Amongst our own fellow citizens, also, you see, (for this we have not from the report of others, but have been eye-witnesses of it ourselves,) that of those who succeeded in their ambition to command our armies, some were banished¹, and still at this day live in exile from the city; others lost their lives²; and such as seem to have fared the best, such as had gone through many terrifying dangers³ in their campaigns,

¹ Thucydides, the son of Melesias, had been banished by ostracism, four or five years before what we suppose the time of this dialogue; and we nowhere read, that ever he was recalled from exile; nor indeed is it probable that he was, at least during the life of Pericles.—S.

² This was the case of Callias, the son of Calliades; he was slain in battle, about the time when the above-mentioned Thucydides was banished from Athens. See Thucydides the Historian, lib. i. §. 61, 2, and 3.—S.

³ In the Greek, *δια πολλων κινδυνων ελθo τις και φ.εαν*.—But we should be glad to have the *αυτοισι*

campaigns, and were returned to their own country, have ever afterwards suffered at home, from sycophants and detractors, a siege as fierce and as dangerous as any from open enemies in the field, so that some of them at length wished they had never known how to command an army, much rather than ever to have born the burden of that command. Indeed if the dangers and toils, which they underwent, had tended to their advantage, they would have had something plausible to plead in behalf of their ambition: but their case is quite the reverse of that. In the same manner, with respect to the having of children, you will find many men who wish and pray for them; but after they have¹ them, are brought, on that very account, into the greatest calamities and griefs: for some, whose children were incurably wicked, have spent all their after days in sorrow; and some, who had good children, but lost them by some bad accident, have been reduced to a state of mind no less miserable than the others, and, like them, have wished that their children never had been born. And yet, notwithstanding the evidence of these and many other cases of like kind, it is rare to find a man who would refuse those gifts of fortune, were they offered to him; or who, could he obtain them by his prayers, would forbear to pray for them. Few men would reject even a tyranny, if offered them; or the chief command of an army; or many other things, which often bring more mischief than benefit to the possessor. Nay, there are few men, of those who happen not to have them at present, who would not be glad if ever they came into their possession. And yet such, as obtain them, every now and then recant their wishes, and pray to be disencumbered of what they before prayed to have. I suspect, therefore, that in reality men accuse the Gods unjustly², in saying, that the evils which they suffer come from them:

For on themselves they draw, through their own crimes,

thority of some antient manuscript, for reading the last word in this sentence *πῶν*, instead of *ρῶν* not only because the word *πῶν* conveys a better meaning, but because also the words *οἱ κινδύνοι τε καὶ πῶνιο* in the next sentence evidently appear to have respect to the mention of them both, made just before.—S.

¹ Perhaps the word *ἔδη* in the Greek, which, as it is printed, precedes the word *γενέσθαι*, should be transferred from thence hither, that we might here read *ἔδη γενημένων*.—S.

² This passage evidently alludes to a speech of Jupiter in Homer's *Odyssey*, lib. i. v. 32, et seq.—S.

(or

(or follies should we say ?)

More griefs than fate allots to human life.

And to me, Alcibiades, it seems probable, that some wise man or other, happening to be connected with certain persons void of understanding, and observing them to pursue and to pray for things, which it were better for them still to be without, but which appeared to them good, composed for their use a common prayer¹; the words of which are nearly these—

Sov'reign of Nature! grant us what's good,
Be it, or not, the subject of our pray'rs;
And from thy supplicants, whate'er is ill,
Tho' supplicating for it, still avert.

Now in this prayer, it seems to me, that the poet says what is right; and that whoever makes use of it, incurs no danger. But if you have any thing to say against it, speak your mind.

ALC. It is a difficult matter, Socrates, to speak against any thing which is rightly said. But what I am thinking of is, how many evils are brought on men by ignorance: since to this it seems owing, that we labour to procure for ourselves the greatest mischiefs, without knowing what we are about; and how extreme our ignorance is, appears in our praying for them. And yet no man would imagine that to be his own case; and every one supposes himself sufficiently knowing, to pray for things the most advantageous to himself, and to avoid praying for things the most mischievous: for to pray for these things would in reality be like a curse, and not a prayer.

Soc. But perhaps, my good friend, some man or other, who happens to be wiser than you or I, might say, that we are wrong, in laying the blame so rashly on ignorance, unless we proceed to specify what things we mean

¹ It is necessary to observe, that this prayer is adapted solely to that part of mankind (and a very numerous part it is) who have not arrived at a *scientific* knowledge of divine concerns, and therefore know not what to pray for as they ought. See an excellent remark on this passage from Proclus in a note on the Republic, vol. i. p. 443. Mr. Sydenham, from mistaking the intention of this prayer, has made Socrates assert, without any authority from the text, that the author of it composed it for his own use as well as that of the ignorant. Hence he translates, "composed for his own use and theirs a common prayer."—T.

the ignorance of. To some persons also, in certain conditions and circumstances, ignorance is a good; though it be an evil to those others we have been speaking of.

ALC. How say you? Is it possible there should be any thing, which it is better for any person in any condition whatever to be ignorant of than to know?

Soc. I think it is: are not you of the same opinion?

ALC. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. Well now;—but observe, I am not going to charge you with having a will, disposed to have ever perpetrated¹ a deed, like that of Orestes, upon his own mother, as it is reported; or like that of Alcæon, or whoever else happened to act in the same manner.

ALC. Mention not such a horrid deed, I beseech you, Socrates.

Soc. The man, who acquits you of a disposition to have acted in that

¹ That part of the story of Orestes, which is here alluded to, is well known to those who are versed in Greek learning, from the *Χορηγοί* of Æschylus, the *Electra* of Sophocles, and the *Electra* of Euripides.—For the story of Alcæon, we refer them to the old Scholia on Homer's *Odyssey*, lib. xi. v. 326; or to Servius's Commentary on Virgil's *Æneid*, lib. vi. v. 445. It is told more at large by Apollodorus, in lib. iii. cap. 6 and 7. But lest such of our readers, as happen to be unlearned in the history of ancient Greece, should mistake the meaning of this passage; they are to be informed that Orestes and Alcæon were guilty of so atrocious a crime, as the murder of their own mothers, out of a mistaken notion of filial piety, and an ignorance of the bounds of duty towards a father. Orestes was the son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. His mother, in the absence of his father during the siege of Troy, carried on an amour with Ægisthus, cousin-german to Agamemnon. At her husband's return home, after the destruction of Troy, she and her paramour procured his death; which was afterwards avenged by his children: for Orestes, at the instigation of his sister Electra, slew the adulterous pair together. Alcæon was the son of Amphiaræus and Eriphyle. This lady betrayed her husband into a situation in which he must inevitably lose his life. He knowing how she had acted, and foreseeing the event, enjoined his son Alcæon to avengè his death on Eriphyle, by taking away her life. In neither of these cases, cited here by Plato, does there appear any malice in the young princes against their mothers; no spirit of revenge for personal injuries done to them; no lust of riches or of dominion; in short, no selfish passion or appetite whatever; no other intention than to perform an imagined act of duty to their fathers, by doing such an act of justice on their mothers as belonged not to them to execute. It appears, that both of these unhappy princes perpetrated a deed so unnatural, from erroneous notions of duty, justice, and honour; that is, through want of moral wisdom, or true prudence. We apprehend, therefore, that the drift of Plato in this passage is to prove, from these sad instances of the fatal effects of ignorance in the laws of nature and reason, the necessity of applying our minds to the study of moral science, in order to act rightly and to be happy.—S.

manner, you ought not, Alcibiades, to bid him avoid the mention of such a deed; but much rather ought you to lay that injunction on a man who should express a contrary opinion of you; since the deed appears to you so horrid, as not to admit a casual mention of it in conversation. But do you think that Orestes, had he been a wise and prudent man, and had he known how it was best for him to act, would have dared to be guilty of any such action?

ALC. By no means.

Soc. Nor, I suppose, would any other man.

ALC. Certainly, not.

Soc. The ignorance therefore of what is best is an evil thing; and whoever is ignorant of that best will always suffer evil.

ALC. So I think.

Soc. And did not he think so too? and do not all other men think the same?

ALC. I cannot deny it.

Soc. Further then, let us consider this also. Supposing, that it should come into your head all at once, from a sudden fancy of its being the best thing you can do, to take a dagger with you, and go to the house of Pericles, your guardian and your friend; and supposing that, when you came there, upon your asking if Pericles was within, with intention to kill him only and no other person, you should receive this answer, He is within;—I do not say, that you have a will or inclination to verify any of these suppositions; I say no more than this—supposing you should be seized with such a fancy¹, (and nothing, I think, hinders a man, who is ignorant of what is best, from being at some time or other so seized,) in that case an opinion might be conceived, that the worst thing a man can do is, in some circumstances, the best: do not you think it might?

ALC. Certainly so.

Soc. If then, upon being admitted to his presence, you should see and

¹ In the Greek, *ει, ομαι, δοξει σοι οπερ ουδεν κωλυει*, κ. τ. λ. The word *ομαι* here seems to be out of its proper place, and to belong to the *parentbetical* part of this sentence, thus, *ει δοξει σοι οπερ*, (or rather, as Stephens conjectures, *οτιπερ*,) *ομαι, ουδεν κωλυει δεπου τω γε αγνοουντι το βελτιστον παρασθηναι ποτε δεξαι εττι*, κ. τ. λ.—S.

yet not know him, but should mistake him for some other person, I ask you, whether you would, notwithstanding that, be so furious as to kill him?

ALC. No, by Jupiter; I do not imagine that I should.

Soc. For you would not be so furious as to kill any person, whom chance threw in your way; but him only at whom you aimed. Is it not for this reason that you would not kill him?

ALC. Without doubt.

Soc. And if you attempted the same thing ever so often, and still mistook Pericles, whenever you were about to execute your design, you never would lay violent hands on him.

ALC. Certainly I should not.

Soc. Well; and can you think that Orestes would ever have laid violent hands on his mother, if in like manner he had mistaken her for some other person?

ALC. I think he would not.

Soc. For he too had it not in his mind to kill any woman he should chance to meet with, nor the mother of any man whatever, but his own mother only.

ALC. It is true.

Soc. To mistake therefore, and not to know whings of that kind, is better for men who are in such dispositions, and who are seized with such imaginations.

ALC. It appears so to be.

Soc. Do you now perceive, that for some persons, in some circumstances, to be ignorant of some things, is a good, and not, as you just now imagined it, an evil?

ALC. It seems to me probable.

Soc. Further; if you are willing to consider what follows after this, though it be strange and paradoxical, you may perhaps be of opinion that there is some truth in it¹.

ALC. Above all things, Socrates, tell me what.

¹ Immediately before *εἴη*, which is the last word of this sentence in the Greek, the word *τι* seems to be omitted.—S.

Soc. That the acquisition of other sciences, without the science ¹ of what is best, is, I may venture to say, likely to be found rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful to the person who has acquired them². And consider it in this way: do you not think it necessary that, when we are about to engage in any affair, or to speak on any subject, we should really know, or at least should fancy that we know, the subject we are about to speak on, or the affair we are going so readily to engage in?

ALC. I do think it is.

Soc. And do not our public orators, either knowing, or fancying that they know, what the city ought to do, give us accordingly their counsel off hand on every occasion? Some of them, on the subject of war and peace; others, when the affair of building walls, or that of furnishing the port-towns with proper stores, is in debate. In a word, all the negotiations between our city and any other, and all our domestic concerns, are they not conducted just as these orators advise?

ALC. True.

Soc. Observe then, how we proceed in this argument, if possible. Some men you call wise, and others you call foolish.

ALC. I do.

Soc. Foolish do you not call the many, and wise the few?

ALC. Just so.

Soc. And do you not give those different epithets to those two sorts of persons, in consideration of something in which they differ?

ALC. I do.

Soc. Whether do you call him a wise man, who knows how to harangue the people on those subjects of debate we mentioned, without knowing what advice is the best in general, and what on the present occasion?

¹ The words των αλλων επιστημων, in the Greek of this sentence, are sufficient to show, that, presently afterwards, we ought to read *ανευ της του βελτιστου* [sc. επιστημης]. And this reading, if it wanted confirmation, is indisputably confirmed by a subsequent passage, in which the very same paradoxical position, having been proved, is repeated as a conclusion from the proofs.—S.

² The last word of this sentence in the Greek, we presume, should be read, not *αυτα*, as it is printed; but, either *αυτας* [sc. επιστημης], or *αυτο* [sc. κτημα]. The latter of these two emendatory readings is confirmed by that passage, to which we have referred in the preceding note.—S.

ALC. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor him neither, I suppose, who hath the knowledge of military affairs, but knows not when it is best to go to war, nor how long a time to continue it. Is not my supposition just?

ALC. It is.

Soc. Neither then do you call him a wise man, who knows how to procure another man's death, or the confiscation of his estate, or the banishment of him from his country, without knowing on what occasion, or what person, it is best so to persecute.

ALC. Indeed I do not.

Soc. The man, therefore, who possesses any knowledge of such a kind, if that knowledge of his be attended with the knowledge also of what is best, (and this I presume to be the same with the knowledge of what is beneficial; is it so?

ALC. Certainly it is:)

Soc. We shall say, that he is a wise man, and sufficiently well able to judge for himself, and to be also a counsellor to the city. But of the man who has not the knowledge of what is beneficial¹, we shall say the contrary. Or what is your opinion that we ought to say?

ALC. Mine agrees with yours.

Soc. Well now; let us suppose a man skilled in horsemanship, or in shooting with a bow, or in wrestling, or boxing, or other combat; or in any thing else which art teaches: what do you say concerning him who knows what is executed best, in that art which he has learnt? The man, for instance, who knows what is performed best in horsemanship, do you not say of him, that he is skilled in the horseman's art?

ALC. I do.

Soc. And the man who knows what is performed best in wrestling, I presume you say of him, that he is skilled in the wrestler's art. Of a man who has the like knowledge in music, you say, that he is skilled in the

¹ In the Greek, as it is printed, we here read ποικίλτα, a word which is foreign to the sense. From what goes before, we conjecture the right reading to be either ωφελούτα, that is, ωφελειν επιωταμενον, or else ποιούτα, that is, such a one as before described, ὃ παρίπτεται ἢ του βελτιστου επισημη, whose particular knowledge or skill is attended with the science of what is best.—S.

musician's

musician's art. And of men who have the like knowledge in the performances of other arts, you speak after a like manner: or how otherwise?

ALC. No otherwise than just as you say.

SOC. Do you think now, that a man, skilled in any of these arts, must of necessity be a wise man? or shall we say, that he wants much of being so?

ALC. Much indeed does he, by Jupiter.

SOC. Suppose then a commonwealth, composed of good bowmen and musicians, of wrestlers too and other artists; and mixed with these, such persons as we just now mentioned¹, such as understand military affairs, and such as know how to persecute a man to death; and superadded to them, your politicians, swollen with the pride of managing state-affairs; all these people void of the science of what is best; and not a man of them knowing when, or in what case, it is best to exercise the particular skill or knowledge that each man is master of; what sort of a commonwealth do you think this would prove?

ALC. But a bad one, Socrates, I think for my part.

SOC. Neither would you, I suppose, hesitate to pronounce it so, when you saw every one of these men ambitious of being honoured, and making it his chief business in the commonwealth,

To attain to more, and still more, excellence?

(by excellence I mean that which is the best in his own art,) but in what is

¹ Instead of *οἷς ἀπὲς ἐπρηκαμεν*, printed here in the Greek, we suspect that we ought to read *ὡς α. εἰ.*—S.

² Plutarch, towards the end of his treatise *περὶ ἀδολεσχίας*, concerning *Talkativeness*, cites the two following verses, which appear to be taken out of some ancient Greek poet,

Νέμει το πλῆιστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρῳ,
'Ὅν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνῃ κρατίστος ἦν.

He makes it the chief business of the day,
T' attain to more, and still more, excellence.

In the passage now before us, we find the *latter* of these two verses cited by Plato, word for word. The *former* of them indeed he has a little altered; but only just so much as to adapt it to his own purpose; which could not be done without weaving it into his own prosaic style.—S.

best for the public, and best also for himself¹, generally mistaken; as being, I suppose, without rational principles, and governed only by opinion. In this case, should we not be right in pronouncing that such a commonwealth was full of great disorder and of lawless doings?

ALC. Right indeed, by Jupiter.

Soc. Did we not think it necessary for us, either to fancy that we know, or really to know previously, the business we are going to engage in, or off-hand to speak upon?

ALC. We did.

Soc. And did we not also think, that if a man engages in any business which he knows, and his knowledge of it be attended with the knowledge of what is beneficial, he will be in a way of profiting both the public and himself²?

ALC.

¹ In the Greek, *αυτον αυτω βελτιστου*, Stephens perceiving this to be quite ungrammatical, proposes, by a very scholar-like as well as sensible emendation, that instead of *αυτον* we should read *αυτου*. But perhaps the word *αυτου* was altogether intruded here by some transcriber, inattentive to the grammatical construction of this sentence, but who observed the words *αυτον αυτω* used in many following sentences, which have the same meaning with that now before us.—S.

² This interrogative sentence of Socrates no less evidently refers to a former sentence beginning with these words, *The man therefore*—a sentence that will greatly help us in amending this; the Greek of which, as it is printed, runs thus: *Ουκουν και μιν πραττει α τις οιδεν, η δοκει ειδεναι, παρεπιται δη το ωφελιμης και λυσιτελουτως ημας ιζειν, και τη πολει και αυτον αυτω*. Now in this sentence the words *η δοκει ειδεναι* not only are not found in the sentence to which this refers, and the sense of which it repeats with but little variation in the words, but they also convey a meaning contrary to the mind of Socrates. For he takes every occasion to inculcate, that only a man's real knowledge, shown by his speeches, or his actions, and not his own false conceit of it, nor other men's too high opinion of it, can be of any lasting advantage either to himself or to others. Of equal moment with this interpolation, (a fault to which the words *οιθηναι ειδεναι* in the preceding sentence, where they are used rightly, seem to have given occasion,) is another fault in the sentence now before us, an omission of the words *η του βελτιστου επιστημη*, or others to the same purport. For, without some such words, this sentence, in which Socrates delivers his opinion in the way of a question, is quite contradictory to his opinion, delivered but a little before in that sentence above referred to. Our supposition, that such words are here omitted in the printed editions of Plato, but ought to be inserted, is confirmed by the Latin of Ficinus, who translated faithfully from a manuscript copy of Plato, (probably the Medicean,) with which Grynæus afterwards compared and corrected that translation. For both Ficinus and Grynæus, in their Latin, insert these words; "*addit autem scientiam optimi.*" In this sentence also are wanting

ALC. How could we think otherwise?

SOC. But that if it be attended with ignorance of what is beneficial, the contrary will happen; he will neither profit the public nor himself?

ALC. Certainly we thought he would not.

SOC. And what? are you still of the same opinion? or have you in any respect altered your way of thinking about these matters?

ALC. Not at all: I think as I did still.

SOC. Let me ask you then, whether you did not say that you called the many fools, and the few wise men?

ALC. I acknowledge it.

SOC. And do we not still say, that the many are mistaken in their opinion of what is best, for that they are generally, I suppose, without rational principles, and only governed by opinion?

ALC. We still say the same.

SOC. It is the interest, therefore, of the many not to be knowing in any affairs, nor to conceit themselves knowing; if what affairs they know, or conceit they know, they will be the more forward to engage in; and, engaging in them, will receive more harm than benefit.

wanting the words *εδοκει ἡμιν*; unless Plato purposely omitted them, as thinking it needless to repeat them, after they had been expressed in the question immediately preceding. There remains yet another fault in this sentence, the word *ἡμας*, a word which the grammatical construction by no means admits of. If our conjectural emendation of this sentence, which we now beg leave to offer to the learned, should appear to be a just one, it will appear at the same time, on examination, that all the faults in it, as printed, are owing originally to a mere *transposition* of some of the words in transcribing it, an error frequently found in ancient manuscripts, and the cause of those many additional errors, as well in printed as in written copies, which were afterwards committed with intention to correct the former. The proposed reading is this; *Οὐκ οὖν, καὶ μὲν πρᾶττῃ ἃ τις οὐδὲ, παρεπεταί δὲ εἶδεναι το ὠφελιμον, [οὐ παρεπεταί δὲ ἡ τοῦ βελτιστοῦ ἐπιστήμη, as Ficinus and Grynæus seem to have read,] εἰδοκεῖ ἡμιν, δυστειλεσύντως εἶναι τῇ πολλῇ, καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.—S.*

¹ This sentence, interrogative also, is thus printed in the Greek; *Ἐὰν δὲ γ', οἱμαί, παναντία τούτων, οὐτε τῇ ποιεῖ, οὐτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ*: it plainly respects that passage cited in the last preceding note. The sense of it therefore must be the same with the sense of that: to express which sense exactly, we presume that we ought here to read, as follows; *Ἐὰν δ' ἀγνοία [sc. τοῦ ὠφελιμοῦ παρεπεταί], παναντία τούτων, κ. τ. λ.* There is thus, we see, but little alteration made, even in the letters; and the corruption of this passage was not perhaps made with more ease, than that with which the genuine reading has been restored.—S.

ALC.

ALC. What you say is very true.

SOC. Do you see then; do I not appear to have been actually in the right, when I said, that the acquisition of other sciences, without the science of what is best, is rarely beneficial, and generally hurtful, to the person who has acquired them?

ALC. If I did not think so at that time, yet now, Socrates, I do.

SOC. It is incumbent therefore on every civil state, and every private person, if they would manage their affairs rightly, to depend absolutely on this science; just as the sick patient depends on his physician; or as the mariner, who would escape the dangers of the voyage, depends on the commander of the vessel. For¹ without this science, the more vehemently an inward gale² impels a man, whether it arise from the consideration of his wealth, or bodily strength, or some other advantage of the same kind with either of those, so much the greater miscarriages will of necessity it seem befall him, from those very advantages. And, in like manner, the man who has acquired what is called much learning, and many arts, but is destitute of this science, and is driven along by each of the others, will not he meet with, and justly too indeed, a very tempestuous voyage? and supposing him to continue still at sea, without a commander of the vessel in which he sails,

¹ Of this passage in the Greek, Monsieur Dacier says, "C'est un des plus difficiles endroits de Platon." Indeed, as it is printed, it is quite unintelligible. For, after a comma put at the word *πλεον*, it proceeds thus; *ὅτι περὶ ἀν μὴ προτερον ἐπουρησεν το της ψυχης. Αὐτο γὰρ ταυτης, ὁ περι, κ. τ. λ.* But what if it were printed thus? Putting a full stop at *πλεον*, let the next sentence immediately begin, *Αὐτο γὰρ ταυτης, ὅτι περὶ ἀν λαβερτερον ἐπουρησεν το της ψυχης, ὁ περι, κ. τ. λ.* All the difficulty is now vanished by this slight transposition, and an easy alteration of *μὴ προτερον* to *λαβερτερον*, a word perhaps mistaken by the writer to whom it was read, from his not being so thoroughly well versed in the language of Homer, as a man must be before he can every where understand the language of Plato. *Προτερον* therefore being, as we suppose by this mistake, written in some manuscript copy of this dialogue, it is probable that some reader of it afterwards, who saw the absurdity of that word, condemned it by writing in the margin *μὴ προτερον*, and that the next half-learned transcriber, instead of omitting *προτερον*, took *μὴ αὐτο* into the text. Both these spurious words are rightly omitted in the Hefenstein manuscript, as we are informed by Cornarius; but the genuine word, in the mean time, was lost.—S.

² In the Greek, *το της ψυχης*, by which we understand *το της ψυχης πνευμα* in the nominative case before *ἐπουρησεν*, and not as Cornarius imagined, *το πλεον*, or *ἀκατιον*, in the accusative case after that verb.—S.

it will not be long ¹ before he perishes. So that to such a man very applicable, I think, is that verse where the poet says of some person, in dispraise of him,

Much knew he, and in many things had skill;
But whate'er things he knew, he knew them ill.

ALC. How, Socrates, doth this verse of the poet fall in with what we are speaking of? for to me it seems nothing to the purpose.

Soc. Very much to the purpose is it. But poets, you must know, write enigmatically almost all of them, but this poet more especially. For it is the genius of poetry in general to use an enigmatical language; and it is not for any ordinary person to understand it. But when, besides this difficulty, the poetical genius, so enigmatical in itself, seizes a man who is backward in communicating his knowledge, unwilling to tell us plainly what he means, and desirous to conceal his wisdom as much as possible from the world ², it appears in the highest degree difficult to find out the real meaning of any such poet. For you can by no means think that Homer ³, so very divine a poet as he was, could be ignorant, how impossible it was for a man, who possessed any science whatever, not to know it well. But he expresses himself enigmatically, I suppose, by using, instead of the words *evil* ⁴, and *to know*,

¹ In the Greek, *χρονον ου μακρον βιον θενω*. Stephens proposes *βιον θενω* to be read for the two last words. And we embrace his proposal of reading *βιον*, but conjecture the right reading of the very last word to be rather *βιωω*.—S.

² From this passage it appears, what opinion either Plato himself, or other learned men in his time, entertained of Homer, as a philosopher. For he here represents the great poet as possessed of some profound knowledge, which he thought proper and prudent to conceal from the bulk of mankind; and therefore making the discovery of it so difficult, on purpose that only those, whose genius led them to philosophy, and whose outward circumstances of fortune permitted them to follow their genius, might be able to make such a discovery from his writings.—S.

³ We see, that the ancient poem, entitled, from the name of the hero of it, *Margites*, in which was the verse above cited, is expressly attributed to Homer by Plato in this place; as it also is by Aristotle, in his *Poetics*, cap. 4, and in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, lib. vi. cap. 7. What ancient writers have acceded to their opinion, and what others have differed from it, may be seen in Fabricii *Bibliotheca Græcâ*, l. ii. c. 2, § 24, n° 17.—S.

⁴ In the Greek, *αντι του κακου*, we suspect the right reading to be *αντι του κακου*, that is, *αντι του ουκατος* KAKON, instead of the noun *evil*: as *αντι του επιστασθαι*, just after, means *αντι του ηνικατος απαριμφατου και πρωτοτυπου ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ*, instead of the infinitive and primitive verb *to know*.—S.

the

the derivative words, *ill*, and *he knew*¹. If then we use the two proper words, there is formed this sentence, in plain prose indeed, but expressive of the poet's meaning,—*He was knowing and skilled in many things, but to know all those things was to him an evil.*—It is evident then, that if much knowledge was to him an evil, what knowledge he had was worthless, and he himself was some worthless fellow ; supposing any credit to be due to the conclusions from our past reasonings.

ALC. And I think, Socrates, it is their due : for I should hardly give credit to any other rational conclusions, if I denied it to those.

SOC. And you think rightly too. But in the name of Jupiter, let us proceed. For you see, how great are the perplexities attending the subject in which we are engaged ; you see also, what the nature is of those perplexities. And you seem to me to have a share in them yourself ; as you never rest from changing your thoughts over and over again upon this subject ; discarding the opinions, which you had before so ardently embraced, and continuing no longer in the same mind. Should the God then, to whom you are going to make your prayers, appear to you, now after all our conclusions ; and should he ask you, before you had presented any petition whatever to him—whether or no your desires would be satisfied, if you obtained any of those dominions mentioned in the beginning of our argument ;—or should he leave to yourself the naming of what you wished for ;—in which way, think you, could you best avail yourself of this opportunity ? whether in accepting any of the grants offered you, or in naming some other thing you wished for ?

ALC. Now, by the gods, Socrates, I should not know what to say to such a proposal. Indeed, I think, that it would be rash in me to make any decisive answer at all ; and that great caution is absolutely requisite in such a case ; to prevent a man from praying unwarily for things evil, while he imagines them to be good ; and from doing as you said, soon afterwards recanting his choice, and praying to be delivered from what he had before prayed to have.

¹ We have here a specimen of Plato's uncommon skill in philosophical or universal grammar. It appears, not only by his deducing the adverb ΚΑΚΩΣ, *ill*, from the substantive noun ΚΑΚΟΝ, *evil*, but also by (what shows a much deeper theory of words, considered as the parts of speech,) his deriving ΗΠΙΣΤΑΤΟ, *he knew*, a verb of the indicative mode, from the infinitive, or most general verb, ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, *to know*. See Mr. Harris's *Hermes*, b. i. ch. xi. and viii.—S.

SOC.

Soc. Did not then the poet, whom I cited in the beginning of this argument, know somewhat more than we do, in supplicating Jupiter to avert from us what is evil, even though we prayed for it?

ALC. Indeed I think so.

Soc. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, O Alcibiades! admiring and imitating this of the poet, or whether they had of themselves considered the subject in the same manner as he did, every one of them in private, and all of them in public, make a prayer similar to his: for they beseech the Gods to grant them such good things as at the same time are beautiful; and nothing more were they ever heard to pray for. Accordingly, no people have hitherto been more prosperous than they. And if it has happened to them not to prosper in all things, it was not because they prayed amiss; but because the Gods, I presume, have it in their choice, either to grant a man that for which he prays, or to send him the reverse. I have a mind to relate to you somewhat else on this subject, what I once heard from certain elderly men;—that, in the differences between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, it so fell out, that whenever they came to a battle, whether by land or by sea, our city was always unsuccessful, and was never able to get one victory:—that the Athenians therefore, uneasy at these miscarriages, and at a loss for some contrivance to put an end to their pressing evils, held a council, and came to this conclusion,—that their best way would be to send to Ammon¹, and consult him what they should do; and at the same time to ask him this question farther,—on what account the Gods always give victory to the Spartans their enemies, rather than to them; though of all the Grecians, we, said they, bring them the greatest number of sacrifices, and those the fairest in their kinds; and though we, beyond all other people, have decorated their temples with the presents that are hung up in them; and in honour of the Gods have made yearly processions, the most solemn and the

¹ The oracle of Ammon was highly celebrated for the truth of its predictions. It had been antiently consulted by Hercules and by Perseus. Long afterwards it was consulted by Cræsus, when he was meditating to stop the progress of Cyrus's arms in Asia. In what veneration it was held by the Romans we learn from the ninth book of Lucan. And from the present passage in Plato, as also from the lives of Lyfander, Cimon, and Alexander, in Plutarch, it appears to have been, among the Grecians of those days, in as great vogue and credit as any oracles of their own.—S.

most costly; and have paid them a greater tribute in money than all the rest of the Grecians put together: whilst the Lacedæmonians, they said, never regard any of these things; but, on the contrary, worship the Gods in so slighting a manner, as to make their sacrifices commonly of beasts full of blemishes; and, in all other instances, fall far short of us, said they, in honouring the Gods; at the same time that the riches they are masters of are not less than ours. When the ambassadors had thus spoken, and had inquired of the Oracle, what they should do to find an end of their present misfortunes, the prophet made no other answer than this; (for without doubt the God did not permit him :) sending for the Athenian ambassadors, he spake to them these words,—Thus saith Ammon; he saith, that he prefers the pious addresses of the Lacedæmonians to all the sacrifices of all the Grecians.—These words, and no more, spake the prophet. Now it seems to me, that, by pious addresses, the God means only that prayer of theirs. And it is indeed much more excellent than the prayers of any other people. For the rest of the Grecians, when they have either led up to the altar oxen with their horns gilded, or brought rich offerings and presents to hang up in the temples, pray for whatever they happen to desire, whether it be really good or evil. The Gods therefore, when they hear their impious addresses, accept not of their costly processions, sacrifices, and presents. So that much caution and consideration seem to me requisite on this subject, what is fit to be spoken to the Gods, and what is not. You will also find in Homer sentiments similar to those I have been expressing: for he tells us, that the Trojans, on a certain night, taking up their quarters without the city walls,

In honour of the blest Immortals, slew
Unblemish'd hecatombs :—¹

and that the smoke from these sacrifices was by the winds wafted up into heaven ²:

Sweet

¹ In the Greek, Ἐρδεν ἀθανάτοισι τελείσσας ἱκατομβας; a line this not found in the copies of Homer now extant; but in Barnes's edition, supplied from this passage of Plato; and by Ernestus shown to be genuine, from the next line, which supposes the mention made of a sacrifice just before.—S.

² Κιστη δ' ἐκ πεδίου ἀνεμοὶ φέρον οὐρανὸν εἰσω. This line of Homer appears in all the editions of

Sweet odourif'rous smoke; yet by the Gods
 Rejected, and the fav'ry taste refus'd.
 For strong aversion in their holy minds
 Was rooted, against Troy's devoted tow'rs,
 Against th' injurious might of Troy's proud king,
 And 'gainst the Trojan people, who withheld
 Helen, unjustly, from her wedded lord¹.

It was of no advantage therefore, it seems, to them to sacrifice, or to offer presents, to the Gods whom they had made their enemies. For the divine nature, I presume, is not of such a kind as to be seduced by presents, like those whose trade it is to make the most of their money, and who care not by what means they are enriched. Besides, we plead very foolishly, in our expostulations with the Gods, if we think to get the better of the Lacedæmonians by such arguments. For it would be a sad thing indeed, if the Gods regarded our presents and our sacrifices, and not the disposition of the soul, when a religious and just man addressed them. Nay, in my opinion, they have much more regard to this, than they have to those pompous processions and costly sacrifices. For nothing hinders, but that any, whether private persons or civil states, let them have sinned against the Gods and against men ever so greatly, may be well able to pay the Gods such a tribute yearly. But they not being to be bribed, disdain all that outward worship; as faith the divine Oracle, and as also faith the Prophet of the Gods. It seems, therefore, that justice and prudence are honoured, above all things, by the Gods, and by men too, such as have good sense and understanding. Now the prudent and the just are no other persons than such as know what behaviour and what speech is proper to be used in our intercourse, whether with gods or with men. But I should be glad to hear from you what your thoughts are on this subject.

of that poet. Plato is here obliged to take this sentence quite out of the metre; because he is relating, only at second hand and as told by Homer, a fact, the narration of which Homer himself puts immediately into the mouth of the muse: and, for the same reason, we have given a prosaic translation of it. In the preceding line, as also in those which follow, Plato was able to preserve the metre, while he only changed the indicative verbs into infinitive.—S.

¹ The verses, here translated, are not found in any of the editions of Homer, except in that of Barnes; but, as Ernestus judiciously observes, they are altogether worthy of that greatest of all poets.—S.

ALC. For my part, I am of the same opinion with you, Socrates, and with the Oracle. And indeed it would ill become me to give my vote opposite to the judgment of the God.

Soc. Do you not remember, that you acknowledged your being much at a loss concerning prayer; for fear you should unwarily pray for evil things, imagining them to be good?

ALC. I do remember it.

Soc. You perceive then, that it is not safe for you to go and make your prayer at the temple, as you intended; lest your addresses should happen to be impious, and the God hearing them should wholly reject your sacrifice, and you perhaps should draw upon your own head some farther evil. It seems to me, therefore, that your best way is to be at quiet. For because of your magnanimity, (that fairest of names given to folly,) I suppose you would not be willing to make use of the Lacedæmonian prayer. It is necessary, therefore, that a man should wait till he has learnt what disposition he ought to be in towards the Gods and towards men.

ALC. But, Socrates, how long will it be before that time comes? and who is he that will instruct me? for I should be very glad, methinks, to see that man, and to know who he is.

Soc. It is he, whose care you are the object of. But as Homer^a says of Minerva, that she removed the mist from before the eyes of Diomede,

That he might clearly see, and gods from men
Plainly distinguish,——

so must he in the first place, as it seems to me, remove from your soul the mist that now happens to surround it; and after that he will apply those medicines, by means of which you will clearly distinguish good from evil. For, at present, I think you would not be able so to do.

ALC. Let him then remove that mist, or any other obstruction that he pleases: for he will find me readily disposed to follow any of his prescriptions, whoever the man is, if by those means I may become a better man than I am at present.

Soc. It is wonderful to consider how greatly he is disposed towards the making you so.

^a Iliad. lib. vi. ver. 127.—S.

ALC. Till that time therefore, I think, it is the better way to defer my sacrifice.

Soc. You think rightly too. For it is a safer way than to run so great a risk.

ALC. It is undeniable, O Socrates. In the mean time, however, since you seem to me to have counselled well, I shall put this crown¹ about your brows. And to the Gods we shall present crowns², and all other accustomed offerings, then, when I see that day arrived. Nor will the time be long before its arrival, if it so please the Gods.

Soc. Well, I accept of this: and should have pleasure in seeing the time come, when you yourself³ shall have received some other thing in return for your present to me. And as Creon, when Tiresias, shewing him his crown [of Gold], said, it had been given him [by the Athenians], in honour of his science, as the first-fruits of [their]⁴ victory obtained over the enemy, is by Euripides made to say,

¹ All those, who went to the temples with intent to petition the Gods for any particular favour, carried along with them crowns or garlands; and these they wore whilst they were praying. It was by such a crown, held by Alcibiades in his hand, that Socrates, in meeting him, conjectured rightly whither he was going.—S.

² The learned archbishop Potter, in his *Archæolog. Græc.* b. ii. ch. 4, very justly observes, that crowns and garlands were some of the presents offered to the Gods by their petitioners, to obtain some future benefit. And from the passage now before us we infer, that the very same crowns or garlands, worn by those petitioners during their prayers in the temples, they used, at their departure, to take off from their own heads, and to put them on the heads of the divine images; from whence afterward the priest took, and hung them up on the side walls of the temple. Plato here exhibits Alcibiades giving to Socrates the very honour which he had designed for the image of Jupiter. By this, we presume, he meant to signify, that whoever could teach wisdom and virtue, as Alcibiades supposed of Socrates, was to be esteemed and honoured as a divine man.—S.

³ In the Greek, *αλλο δε* [*f. αλλο τι*] *αντι των παρα σου δεδωτων ιδως ιδιαι δεξιματων εμαυτου*. In which sentence the last word is, we doubt not, a corrupt reading, and was by Plato written *οεζυτου*. For we cannot apprehend how a man who has received a present can be said to make a return for it, by his own receiving of any other present from the same or any other person.—S.

⁴ In this sentence all the words, enclosed within hooks, we have translated from Euripides, to render this passage of Plato clearer to those who have not read the *Phænissæ* of that poet, from which tragedy it is taken.—S.

This crown, a happy omen and preface,
 I deem, of conquest on our Theban side.
 For you know well, how tempest-toft a sea
 We sail on——¹

I, in the same manner, deem this honour, you have now done me, to be a good preface. For, as I think myself sailing on a sea, no less tempest-toft than that of Creon, I should be glad to bear away the crown of victory from the rest of your admirers².

¹ See the *Phænissæ*, v. 865.

² The fine turn, which Socrates here gives to his acceptance of the crown, presented to him by Alcibiades, is perfectly in character, being, at the same time, most ingenious, elegant, wise, modest, and polite. He accepts it not as an ensign of divine honour, as it was meant by the donor; but as a token of (future) victory; victory over his competitors for the friendship of Alcibiades, whom they endeavoured to corrupt, and success in his own endeavours to engage him wholly in the study of wisdom and the pursuit of virtue.—S.

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IN FIVE VOLUMES
VOL. V.

AMS PRESS
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AND THE REMAINDER

BY THOMAS TAYLOR:

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

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THE EUTHYPHRO:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

SANCTITY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYPHRO.

THE whole of the Euthyphro of Plato, says Ficinus, is employed in confutation; whence some Platonists have called this dialogue, as well as the Euthydemus and Greater Hippias, *elenctic*. However, as he justly observes, while Socrates confutes the false opinions which Euthyphro entertained of holiness, he presents certain vestiges of the truth to its investigators. We may collect therefore from this dialogue and the Gorgias that holiness according to Plato is that part of justice which attributes to Divinity that which is his own. But as man is a composite being, and the different parts of his composition were produced, according to the Platonic theology, from different divinities, perfect piety will consist in consecrating to each deity that part of us which he immediately gave. This definition being premised, what Plato says here and elsewhere respecting holiness will be apparent. Hence, when it is said that holiness is that which is beloved by Divinity it is true; but it is beloved by Divinity because it is holiness, and is not holiness because it is beloved by him. Likewise because it is beloved by him it may be beloved, but is not beloved because it may be beloved: for the holy is not in every respect the same with that which may be beloved; since neither does the essence of holiness consist in being the object of love, but rather in retribution and devotion.

Again, when it is said that holiness is that which is ministrant to the operations of Divinity, this also is truly said: for it is ministrant to the conversion to Divinity of that which we receive from him. And the work of Divinity

is to produce, convert, purify, illuminate, and perfect. Hence it is beautifully observed by Porphyry, "that being conjoined and assimilated to the highest God, we should offer the elevation of ourselves to him as a sacred sacrifice; for thus we shall celebrate him and procure our own salvation." He adds, "In the soul's contemplation therefore of this Divinity, unattended by the passions, the sacrifice to him receives its completion; but his progeny, the intelligible gods, are to be celebrated vocally by hymns¹." Lastly, when it is said that holiness is the science of requesting and giving to the gods, this likewise is true, though it is not a perfect definition of sanctity. For he who properly prays to Divinity, will request him to impart that by which he may be enabled to offer himself to him in the most acceptable manner.

¹ For the sake of the Platonic reader I will give the whole of this very beautiful passage. *Θυσιμεν τοιουν και ημεις· αλλα θυσιμεν, ως προσηκει, διαφορους τας θυσιας, ως αν διαφοροις δυναμεισιν προσ-αγομεντες. Θωμ μεν τω επι πασιν, ως τις απηρ σοφος εφη, μηδεν των αισθητων, μητε θυμιωντες, μητε επονομαζοντες· ουδεν γαρ εστιν ενυλον ο μη τω αυλω ευθυσ εστιν ακαθαρτον. Διο ουδε λογος τουτω ο κατα φωνην, οικειος, ουδ' ο ενδον, εταν παθει ψυχης η μεμολυσμενος· δια δε σιγης καθαρως και των περι αυτου καθαρων εννοιων θρησκευομεν αυτον. Δει αρα συναφθεντας, και ομοιωθεντας αυτη, την αυτων αναγωγην θυσιαν ιεραν προσαγαγειν τω θεω, την αυτην δε και υμνον ουσαν και ημων σωτηριαν. εν απαθει αρα της ψυχης τουδε του θεου θεωρια, η θυσια αυτη τελειται. Τοις δε αυτου εγγονοις, ιουτοις δε θεοις, νηη και την εκ του λογου υμνωδιαν προσθετιον. Απαρχης γαρ εκαστω αν δεδωκεν η θυσια, και δι αυ ημων τρεφει, και εις το ειναι συνεχει εις την θυσιαν. Ως ουν γεωργος δραγματων απαρχεται και των ακροδρυων, ουτως ημεις απαρχομεθα αυτοις, ενοιων των περι αυτων κελων, ευχαριστουτες αν ημιν δεδωκασι την θεωριαν, και οτι ημας δια της αυτων θεας αληθινως τρεφουσι, συνοντες και Φαινομενοι και τη ημετερα σωτηρια επιλαμβοντες. Porphy. de Abstinencia, lib. ii. p. 165, 4to. 1767: i. e. "Let us also sacrifice, but let us sacrifice in such a manner as is proper, offering different sacrifices to different powers. To that God, indeed, who is above all things, as a certain wise man says, neither fumigating nor consecrating any thing sensible. For there is nothing material, which, to an immaterial nature, is not immediately impure. Hence neither is external language adapted to him, nor that which is internal when it is defiled by any passion of the soul; but we should adore him in pure silence, and with pure conceptions concerning him. It is necessary, therefore, that, being conjoined and assimilated to him, we should offer the elevation of ourselves to Divinity as a sacred sacrifice; for thus we shall both celebrate him and procure our own salvation. In the soul's contemplation, therefore, of this Divinity, unattended by the passions, the sacrifice to him receives its completion; but his progeny, the intelligible gods, are to be celebrated vocally by hymns. For to each of the gods the first fruits are to be sacrificed of what he imparts to us, and through which he nourishes and preserves us. As, therefore, the husbandman offers his first fruits from handfuls of fruits and acorns, so also we should sacrifice from beautiful conceptions concerning the gods, giving thanks for those things of which they have imparted to us the contemplation, and that, through the vision of themselves, they truly nourish us, associating with and appearing to us, and shining upon us for our salvation."*

THE EUTHYPHRO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

EUTHYPHRO, SOCRATES.

EUTHYPHRO.

WHAT novel circumstance has happened, Socrates, that you, leaving the discussions in the Lyceum, are now waiting about the porch¹ of the king? For you have not an action with the king, as I have.

Soc. The Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an accusation.

EUTH. What do you say? Some one, as it seems, has accused you. For I should not think that you would accuse another.

Soc. I should not, indeed.

EUTH. Has, then, another accused you?

Soc. Certainly.

EUTH. Who is he?

Soc. I do not, Euthyphro, perfectly know the man: for he appears to me to be young, and of no note. But they call him, I think, Melitus; and he is of the town Pittheus: if you have in your recollection one Melitus, a Pitthean, who has long hair, a thin beard, and an aquiline nose.

EUTH. I do not recollect him, Socrates. But what is his accusation of you?

Soc. What is it? Not an ignoble one, as it appears to me. For it is no

¹ The king's porch was a place on the right side of the Ceramicus, where the second of the nine archons, who was called the king, presided for the space of a year. See Pausanias in Attic. lib. i. p. 5, and Meursius in Attic. Lect. lib. vi. c. 27.

despicable thing, for one who is a young man, to be knowing in a circumstance of such a magnitude. For he knows, as he says, how the youth are corrupted, and who they are that corrupt them. And he appears to be a certain wise man; and seeing my ignorance, and considering me as one who corrupts his equals in age, to have accused me to the city, as to a mother. In consequence of this, he only of the citizens seems to me to have begun rightly. For it is right to pay attention to youth, in the first place, that they may become the most excellent characters: just as it is reasonable that a good husbandman should first take care of the young plants, and after this of the others. Thus also Melitus perhaps will first cut us up who corrupt the blossoms of youth, as he says, and afterwards he will certainly pay attention to those of a more advanced age, and thus will be the cause of the most numerous and the greatest goods to the city. This is what may be expected to happen from one who makes such a beginning.

EUTH. I should wish it were so, Socrates; but I tremble, lest the contrary should happen. For, in reality, he appears to me, by trying to injure you, to begin to hurt the city from the Vestal hearth¹ itself. But tell me by what part of your conduct it is that he says you corrupt the youth?

SOC. The things of which he accuses me, O wonderful man, must be considered, when they are heard, as absurd. For he says that I am a maker of gods; and, as if I introduced new and did not believe in the ancient gods, has brought this accusation against me.

EUTH. I understand you, Socrates; it is because you say that a dæmoniacal² power is every where present with you. This accusation, therefore, is brought against you as one that introduces novelties in divine affairs; and as well knowing that the multitude are always disposed to receive such kind of calumnies. For indeed they ridicule me as one insane, when I say any thing in a public assembly concerning the gods, and predict to them future events; though I do not predict to them any thing which is not true. At the same time, however, they envy all such as we are. But indeed it is

¹ The hearth, among the Greeks, contained the household gods, of whom Vesta was the chief. Hence *to begin* from the Vestal hearth was a proverbial expression, when they spoke of beginning with what is most excellent and sacred.

² This perfectly accords with what we have cited from Xenophon, in the Introduction to the Apology of Socrates.

not fit to pay any attention to them; but we should still go on in our own way.

Soc. But, dear Euthyphro, to be ridiculed is perhaps a trifling thing. For the Athenians, as it appears to me, are not very much concerned whether or not a man is skilful in any thing, so long as he is not a teacher of his wisdom; but they are indignant with him whom they think makes others to be such, whether this is from envy, as you say, or from some other cause.

EUTH. With respect to this circumstance, therefore, how they may be affected towards me I am not very desirous to try.

Soc. For perhaps you exhibit yourself but rarely, and are not willing to teach your wisdom; but I fear lest, through philanthropy, I should appear to disclose, with too much freedom, to every man whatever I possess, not only without taking a reward, but even willingly adding one, if any person is willing to hear me. As I therefore just now said, if they were only to ridicule me, as you say they do you, there would be nothing unpleasant in passing the time in a court of justice, jesting and laughing; but if they are in earnest, how this affair may terminate is immanifest, except to you diviners.

EUTH. Perhaps, however, Socrates, the affair will be nothing; but you will plead your cause successfully, and I also think that I shall mine.

Soc. But what is the cause, Euthyphro, which you have to plead? Are you defendant or plaintiff?

EUTH. I am plaintiff.

Soc. Whom do you prosecute?

EUTH. One whom, by prosecuting, I appear to be insane.

Soc. What, then, do you pursue one that flies?

EUTH. He is very far from flying; for he is very much advanced in years.

Soc. Who is he?

EUTH. My father.

Soc. Your father? O best of men!

EUTH. He is, indeed.

Soc. But what is the crime, and of what do you accuse him?

EUTH. Of murder, Socrates.

Soc.

Soc. O Hercules ! The multitude, Euthyphro, will be ignorant how this can ever be right. For I do not think it is the province of any casual person to make such an accusation with rectitude, but of one who has made a very great proficiency in wisdom.

EUTH. Very great indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

Soc. Is it any one of your relations who has been killed by your father ? Though it certainly must be so ; for you would not prosecute your father for the murder of a stranger.

EUTH. It is ridiculous, Socrates, if you think it makes any difference whether he who is slain is a stranger or a relation, and are not persuaded that this alone ought to be attended to, whether he who committed the murder did it justly or not ; and, if justly, that he should be dismissed ; but, if unjustly, that he should be prosecuted, even though he should be your domestic, and partake of your table. For you become equally defiled with him, if you knowingly associate with such a one, and do not expiate both yourself and him, by bringing him to justice. But to apprize you of the fact : The deceased was one of our farmers, who rented a piece of land of us when we dwelt at Naxus. This man, having one day drank too much wine, was so transported with rage against one of our slaves, that he killed him. My father, therefore, ordered him to be cast into a pit, with his hands and feet bound, and immediately sent hither, to consult one of the interpreters of sacred concerns what he should do with him ; and in the mean time neglected this prisoner, and left him without sustenance as an assassin, whose life was of no consequence ; so that he died. For hunger, cold, and the weight of chains killed him, before the person my father had sent returned. Hence my father and the rest of my relations are indignant with me, because I, for the sake of a homicide, accuse my father of murder, which, as they say, he has not committed ; and if he had, since he who is dead was a homicide, they think I ought not to be concerned for the fate of such a man. For they say it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder ; so little do they know the manner in which a divine nature is affected about piety and impiety.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, Euthyphro, do you think you possess such an accurate knowledge about divine affairs, and how things holy and impious are circumstanced,

circumstanced, that these things having taken place as you say, you are not afraid, lest in prosecuting your father you should commit an impious action?

EUTH. My profession, Socrates, would be of no advantage to me, nor would Euthyphro surpass in any respect other men, unless he accurately knew all such particulars.

SOC. O wonderful Euthyphro, it will therefore be a most excellent thing for me to become your disciple, and before the determination of my process to let Melitus know that I have hitherto considered the knowledge of divine concerns as a thing of the greatest consequence; and that now, since he says I am guilty of acting in a rash manner, and introducing novelties concerning divine natures, I am become your disciple. If, therefore, I shall say, you acknowledge, O Melitus, that Euthyphro is wise and thinks rightly in such affairs, think and judge also the same of me; but if you do not entertain this opinion, call him, my preceptor, to account before you call me, as one who corrupts elderly men, viz. me and his father; me by instructing, but him by reproving and punishing. And if he is not persuaded by me, but still continues his prosecution, or accuses me instead of you, it will be necessary to say the very same things on the trial, to which I shall have previously called his attention.

EUTH. It will so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and if he attempts to accuse me, I shall find, as I think, his weak side, and he will be called to account in a court of justice long before me.

SOC. And I, O my dear associate, knowing these things, desire to become your disciple, as I am persuaded that no one, and not even Melitus himself, dares to look you in the face, though he so accurately, inartificially, and easily sees through me, that he has accused me of impiety.—Now therefore, by Jupiter, tell me that which you now strenuously contend you clearly know, viz. what kind of thing you assert holiness to be, and also unholiness, both respecting murder and other things? Or is not holiness the same with itself in every action? And again, is not unholiness, which is perfectly contrary to holiness itself, similar to itself? And does not every thing which it will be unholy to do, possess one certain idea according to unholiness?

EUTH. Certainly, Socrates.

SOC. Tell me, then, what you say holiness, and also what unholiness is?

EUTH. I say, therefore, that holiness is that which I now do, viz. to prosecute him who acts unjustly either with respect to murder or sacrilege, or any thing else of a similar nature; whether the offending person be a father or mother, or any other whatever; and that not to prosecute such a one is impious. For see, Socrates, what a great proof I will give you in law that it is so, and which I have also mentioned to others, viz. that it is right not to spare an impious man, whoever he may be. For men are firmly persuaded that Jupiter is the best and most just of gods, and yet they acknowledge that he put his father in chains, because he unjustly swallowed his children; and again, that Saturn castrated¹ his father, through other things of a similar nature: but they are indignant with me, because I prosecute my father who has acted unjustly; and thus these men assert things contrary to each other in what they say concerning the gods and concerning me.

SOC. Is this the thing then, Euthyphro, on account of which I am brought to the bar, because when any one asserts things of this kind concerning the gods, I admit them with pain; and through which, as it seems, some one calls me an offender? Now, therefore, if these things thus appear also to you who are well acquainted with such particulars, it is necessary, as it seems, that we also should admit them. For what else can we say, who acknowledge that we know nothing about such things? But tell me, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship; do you think that these things thus happened in reality?

¹ For the signification of bonds and castrations, when applied to divine natures, see p. 141 of the Introduction to the Second Book of the Republic. I shall only observe here with Proclus, that Plato was of opinion that all such narrations as these will be condemned by the multitude and the stupid through ignorance of their arcane meaning, but that they will indicate certain wonderful conjectures to the wise. Hence, though he does not admit this mode of mythologizing, yet, as is evident from what he says in the *Timæus*, he thinks we ought to be persuaded by those antients who were the offspring of the gods, and to investigate their occult conceptions. Hence too, though he rejects the Saturnian bonds, and the castrations of Heaven, when discoursing with Euthyphro and the auditors of his Republic, yet in his *Cratylus*, when he investigates names philosophically, he admits other secondary bonds about the mighty Saturn and Pluto. Plato, therefore, by no means ridicules the religion of his country in what he here says, as some moderns have pretended he does; but he admits such relations as these with pain, because he well knew that they would only be impiously perverted by, and were far beyond the comprehension of, the vulgar.

EUTH. Yes, and things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, of which the multitude are ignorant.

SOC. Do you therefore think that the gods *in reality* wage war with each other, and that there are among them dire enmities and battles, and many other such like particulars as are related by the poets, with the representation of which by good painters our temples are decorated; and in the great Panathenææ a veil¹ full of such like variegated ornaments is carried into the Acropolis. Must we say, O Euthyphro, that these things are true?

EUTH. Not these only, O Socrates; but, as I just now said, I can relate to you many other things concerning divine affairs if you are willing, which when you hear I well know that you will be astonished.

SOC. I should not wonder; but you may relate these things to me hereafter, when you are at leisure. Now, however, endeavour to tell me more clearly that which I just now asked. For you have not yet, my friend, sufficiently answered my question what holiness is, but you have only told me that this which you are now doing is holy, viz. to prosecute your father for murder.

EUTH. And I spoke the truth, Socrates.

SOC. Perhaps so. But, O Euthyphro, do you not also say that many other things are holy?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Recollect, therefore, that I did not request you to teach me one or two from among many holy things, but what that form itself is by which all holy things are holy. For you have said that things unholy are unholy by one idea; and also that things holy are holy by another. Or do you not remember?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Teach me, therefore, what this very idea is, that looking to it, and using it as a paradigm, I may say that whatever thing of this kind you or any other does is holy, and that whatever is not of this kind is unholy.

EUTH. But if you wish it, Socrates, I will also tell you this.

SOC. I do wish it.

¹ For the explanation of this veil, see the Additional Notes on the Republic, vol. i. p. 520.

EUTH. That, therefore, which is dear to the gods is holy, but that which is not dear to them is unholy.

SOC. You have now answered, O Euthyphro, most beautifully, and in such a manner as I wished you to answer. Whether truly or not however, this I do not yet know. But you will doubtless in addition to this teach me that what you say is true.

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. Come then, let us consider what we say. That which is dear to divinity, and the man who is dear to divinity, are holy; but that which is odious to divinity, and the man who is odious to divinity, are unholy. But the holy is not the same with the unholy, but is most contrary to it. Is it not so?

EUTH. It certainly is so.

SOC. And these things appear to have been well said.

EUTH. I think so, Socrates.

SOC. But has it not, O Euthyphro, also been said that there is sedition among the gods, and that they oppose and are enemies to each other?

EUTH. It has been said.

SOC. But let us thus consider, excellent man, about what particulars discord produces enmity and wrath. If, therefore, I and you differed in opinion concerning numbers, which of them were more in quantity, would this difference make us enemies, and should we be enraged with each other? Or, betaking ourselves to computation about things of this kind, should we not be quickly liberated from this dissension?

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. Hence also, if we differed concerning the greater and the lesser, should we not, by applying ourselves to measuring, soon bring our disagreement to an end?

EUTH. We should.

SOC. And, as I think, by betaking ourselves to weighing, we should be able to judge concerning the heavier and the lighter.

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

SOC. About what then disagreeing, and not being able to recur to a certain criterion, should we become enemies to, and be enraged with, each other?

other? Perhaps you cannot readily inform me; but consider whether they are such as these, viz. the just and the unjust, the beautiful and the base, good and evil. Are not these the things about which disagreeing, and not being able to arrive at a certain judgment of them, we become enemies to each other, when we do so become, you and I, and all other men?

EUTH. This, Socrates, is indeed the dissension, and it is about these things.

SOC. But what? Do not the gods, O Euthyphro, if they disagree in any respect, disagree on account of these very things?

EUTH. By an abundant necessity.

SOC. Different gods, therefore, O generous Euthyphro, according to your assertion, think different things to be just, beautiful, base, good and evil. For they never would oppose each other unless they disagreed about these things. Or would they?

EUTH. You speak rightly.

SOC. Do they not severally, therefore, love those things which they think to be beautiful, good and just, but hate the contraries of these?

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. But with respect to these very things, some of the gods, as you say, think them to be just, and others unjust; about which also being dubious, they oppose and wage war with each other. Is it not so?

EUTH. It is.

SOC. The same things therefore, as it seems, are hated and loved by the gods; and the things odious to and dear to the gods will be the very same.

EUTH. So it appears.

SOC. Hence also the same things will be holy and unholy, O Euthyphro, from this reasoning.

EUTH. It seems so.

SOC. You have not therefore, O wonderful man, answered my question. For I did not ask you this, to whom the same thing is both holy and unholy: but, as it seems, that which is dear is also odious to divinity. So that, Euthyphro, there is nothing wonderful if in this which you are now doing, viz. punishing your father, you should do that which is pleasing to Jupiter, but odious to Saturn and Heaven; and which is pleasing to Vulcan, but odious to Juno: and if any other of the gods differs from another about

this

this very circumstance, you should in like manner do that which is approved by the one and hated by the other.

EUTH. But I think, Socrates, that no one of the gods will differ from another in this affair, and assert that it is not proper for him to suffer punishment who has unjustly slain any one.

SOC. But what? Have you ever heard any man doubting, O Euthyphro, whether he who has unjustly slain another, or has done any thing else unjustly, ought to be punished?

EUTH. They never cease doubting about these things, both elsewhere and in courts of justice. For those that act unjustly in a very great degree, say and do every thing in order to escape punishment.

SOC. Do they also, O Euthyphro, confess that they have acted unjustly? And confessing this, do they at the same time say, that they ought not to be punished.

EUTH. They by no means say this.

SOC. They do not, therefore, say and do every thing. For I think they dare not say, nor even doubt this, that if they act unjustly punishment must be inflicted on them: but, as it appears to me, they deny that they have acted unjustly. Do they not?

EUTH. You speak the truth.

SOC. They are not, therefore, dubious about this, whether he who acts unjustly ought to be punished; but they perhaps doubt who he is that acts unjustly, and by what action, and when, his conduct may be considered as unjust.

EUTH. True.

SOC. Will not, therefore, the very same things happen to the gods if they oppose each other concerning things just and unjust, according to your assertion; and will not some of them say, that they act unjustly by each other, and others again deny this? Since, O wonderful man, no one, either of gods or men, dares to assert that punishment ought not to be inflicted on him who acts unjustly.

EUTH. They will: and what you now say, Socrates, is summarily true.

SOC. But those who are dubious, as well gods as men, will be dubious respecting each of the transactions; if the gods disagree about any action,
and

and some of them say that it is done justly, but others unjustly. Is it not so?

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. Come, then, my dear Euthyphro, teach me also that I may become more wise, what proof you have that all the gods think that he unjustly died, who having slain his fellow-servant, and being put in chains by the master of the deceased, perished before he that bound him received the answer from the interpreters, which was to inform him how he ought to act; and that, on account of such a man, it is right for a son to prosecute his father and accuse him of murder. Come, endeavour to demonstrate to me something clear about these things, and that all the gods consider this action to be right more than any thing. And if you demonstrate this to me sufficiently, I will never cease praising you for your wisdom.

EUTH. But perhaps, Socrates, this is no trifling employment, otherwise I could clearly demonstrate it to you.

SOC. I understand you: I appear to you to be more dull of apprehension than the judges; since you will evidently prove to them that your father's conduct was unjust, and that all the gods hate such-like actions.

EUTH. I shall demonstrate this very clearly, Socrates, if they will only hear what I have to say.

SOC. But they will hear, if you shall appear to speak well. However, while you was just now speaking, I thus thought and considered with myself: If Euthyphro should especially convince me that all the gods think a death of this kind to be unjust, in what respect shall I have the more learned from Euthyphro what the holy is, and also the unholy? For this action, as it appears, will be odious to divinity. It has not, however, yet appeared from this, what is holy, and what not. For that which is odious has also appeared to be dear to divinity. So that I will grant you this, Euthyphro, and if you please let all the gods think it to be unjust, and let them all hate it. Shall we, therefore, now make this correction in the definition, that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy; but that what some of them love, and others hate, is neither, or both? Are you willing that at present we should thus define concerning the holy and unholy?

EUTH. What should hinder, Socrates?

SOC. Nothing hinders me, Euthyphro; but do you, as to what relates to yourself,

yourself, consider whether, admitting this, you can so easily teach me what you promised?

EUTH. But I say the holy is that which all the gods love; and its contrary, the unholy, that which all the gods hate.

SOC. Shall we not therefore consider, Euthyphro, whether this is well said? Or shall we dismiss this consideration, and thus grant both to ourselves and others, that if any one only says that a certain thing is so, we shall admit that it is so? Or shall we consider what he who speaks says?

EUTH. Consider it certainly; though I think that this is now well said.

SOC. Perhaps, O good man, we shall know this more clearly. For consider as follows: Is the holy, because it is holy, beloved by the gods; or because it is beloved by them, is it holy?

EUTH. I do not know what you say, Socrates.

SOC. But I will endeavour to speak more clearly. We say that a thing may be carried, and that a thing carries; that a thing may be led, and that a thing leads; that a thing may be seen, and that a thing sees; and every thing else of this kind. Do you understand that these are different from each other, and in what they differ?

EUTH. I appear to myself to understand this.

SOC. Is therefore that which is beloved a certain thing, and that which loves another different from this?

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Tell me, therefore, whether that which may be carried, may be carried because it is carried, or for some other reason?

EUTH. For no other reason but for this.

SOC. And is this the case with that which may be led, because it is led; and with that which may be seen, because it is seen?

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. A thing therefore is not seen because it may be seen; but, on the contrary, because it is seen, on this account it may be seen. Nor because a thing may be led, on this account is it led; but because it is led, on this account it may be led. Nor because a thing may be carried, is it carried; but because it is carried, it may be carried. Is then what I wish to say evident, Euthyphro? But what I wish to say is this: If any thing is making;

ing, or suffers any thing, it is not making because it may be made ; but because it is making it may be made. Nor because it may suffer does it suffer ; but because it suffers it may suffer. Or do you not admit this to be the case ?

EUTH. I do.

Soc. Is not this therefore also the case with that which is beloved, or making, or suffering something from some one ?

EUTH. Entirely so.

Soc. This therefore subsists in the same manner as the things before mentioned : it is not beloved by those by whom it is beloved, because it may be beloved ; but because it is beloved, it may be beloved.

EUTH. It is necessary.

Soc. What then do we say concerning holiness, O Euthyphro ? Is it not this, that it is beloved by all the gods, according to your assertion ?

EUTH. Yes.

Soc. Is it therefore beloved on this account, because it is holy, or for some other reason ?

EUTH. For no other reason but on this account.

Soc. Because it is holy, therefore, it is beloved ; but not because it is beloved, on this account it is holy.

EUTH. It appears so.

Soc. Because however it is beloved by the gods, it may be beloved, and be dear to divinity.

EUTH. Undoubtedly.

Soc. That which is dear to divinity, therefore, is not holy, O Euthyphro, nor must holiness be defined to be that which is dear to divinity as you say, but it is something different from this.

EUTH. How is this, Socrates ?

Soc. Because we have acknowledged that holiness is on this account beloved because it is holy ; and not that it is holy because it is beloved. Did we not ?

EUTH. Yes.

Soc. But that which is dear to divinity, because it is beloved by the gods, from this very circumstance that it is beloved, is dear to divinity ; but not because it is dear to divinity, on this account is it beloved.

VOL. V.

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EUTH.

EUTH. True.

SOC. But, my dear Euthyphro, if that which is dear to divinity were the same with that which is holy, if holiness were beloved through its being holiness, that also which is dear to divinity would be beloved through its being dear to divinity. But if that which is dear to divinity were dear to divinity through being beloved by the gods, that which is holy would also be holy through being beloved. Now, however, you see that they are contrarily affected, as being perfectly different from each other. For the one, viz. what is dear to the gods because it is beloved, is a thing of that kind that it may be beloved; but the other, viz. holiness, because it is a thing which may be beloved, on this account is beloved. And you appear, O Euthyphro, when you was asked what holiness is, to have been unwilling to manifest the essence of it to me, but to have mentioned a certain affection pertaining to it, which this same thing holiness suffers, viz. the being beloved by all the gods; but you have not yet told me what it is. If therefore it is agreeable to you, do not conceal this from me, but again say from the beginning what holiness is, whether it be beloved by the gods, or has any other property whatever pertaining to it. For we shall not differ about this. But tell me readily what the holy, and also what the unholy is?

EUTH. But, Socrates, I cannot tell you what I conceive. For whatever position we adopt, is always some how or other circumvented, and is not willing to remain where we have established it.

SOC. The things which you have asserted, O Euthyphro, appear to be the offspring of our progenitor Dædalus¹. And if I indeed had said and adopted these things, perhaps you would have derided me, as if my works also, which consist in discourse, through my alliance with him, privately escaped, and were unwilling to remain where they were placed. But now (for they are your hypotheses) the raillery of some other person is necessary. For they are unwilling to abide with you, as it also appears to you yourself.

EUTH. But it appears to me, Socrates, that what is said ought to be exposed to nearly the same ridicule. For I am not the cause of the circuitous

¹ Dædalus was a most ingenious statuary, and is said to have made figures which moved of themselves, and seemed to be endowed with life. Socrates, therefore, calls Dædalus his progenitor, because his father was a statuary, and he himself when young exercised his father's art.

wandering of these assertions, and of their not abiding in the same place; but you appear to me to be the Dædalus. For so far as pertains to me, these things would have remained firm.

SOC. I appear therefore, my friend, to have become so much more skilful than that man in this art, in as much as he only made his own productions unstable; but I, besides my own, as it seems, make those of others to be so. And moreover, this is the most elegant circumstance pertaining to my art, that I am unwillingly wise. For I had rather that my reasonings should abide, and be established immovable, than that the riches of Tantalus, together with the wisdom of Dædalus, should become my possession. But enough of this.—Since, however, you appear to be delicate, I, in conjunction with you, will endeavour to show how you may teach me concerning holiness, and not be weary till this is accomplished. For see whether it does not appear to you to be necessary that every thing holy should be just.

EUTH. To me it does.

SOC. Is therefore every thing just also holy? or is every thing holy indeed just; but not every thing just holy, but partly holy, and partly something else?

EUTH. I do not comprehend, Socrates, what you say.

SOC. And yet you are younger no less than you are wiser than I am; but, as I said, you are delicate through the riches of your wisdom. However, O blessed man, collect yourself: for it is not difficult to understand what I say. For I assert the contrary to the poet^{*}, who says,

You Jove, the source of all, refuse to sing:
For fear perpetually resides with shame.

I therefore differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?

EUTH. By all means.

SOC. It does not appear to me, that wherever there is fear, there also there is shame. For there are many, as it seems to me, who fear diseases, poverty, and many other things of this kind, but who by no means are ashamed of these things which they fear. Does not the same thing also appear to you?

^{*} The name of this poet appears to be unknown.

EUTH. Certainly.

SOC. But wherever shame is, there also is fear. For is there any one who is ashamed of and blushes at any thing, but who does not at the same time fear and dread the opinion of improbity?

EUTH. He will certainly dread this.

SOC. It is not therefore right to say, that where there is fear, there also there is shame; but we should say that where there is shame, there also fear resides. For wherever there is fear, there is not also shame. For I think that fear extends further than shame; since shame is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number. So that it does not follow that wherever there is number, there also is the odd; but wherever there is the odd, there also there is number. Do you now apprehend me?

EUTH. Perfectly so.

SOC. Respecting a thing of this kind, therefore, I inquired above, when I asked you whether where the just was, there also the holy was; or whether where the holy was, there also the just was, but the holy was not to be found every where in conjunction with the just. For the holy is a part of the just. Does it appear to you that we should thus speak, or otherwise?

EUTH. Not otherwise; but thus. For you appear to me to speak rightly.

SOC. See then what follows: for, if the holy is a part of the just, it is necessary, as it seems, that we should discover what part of the just the holy will be. If therefore you should ask me some of the things just now mentioned, as, for instance, what part of number the even is, and what number it is, I should say that it is not scalene, but isosceles¹. Or does it not appear so to you?

EUTH. It does.

SOC. Do you therefore also endeavour in like manner to teach me what part of the just the holy is, that we may tell Melitus he must no longer act unjustly by us, nor accuse us of impiety, as having now sufficiently learnt from you what things are pious and holy, and what not.

EUTH. This part then, Socrates, of the just, appears to me to be pious

¹ Socrates calls the even number isosceles, because it can be divided into two equal numbers as if they were sides; but this is not the case with the odd number, which may therefore be compared to a scalene triangle, because as in this all the sides are unequal, so all the parts of an odd number are unequal.

and holy, viz. that which is conversant with the culture of the gods; but that which is conversant with the culture of mankind is the remaining part of the just.

Soc. And you appear to me, Euthyphro, to speak well. However, I am still in want of a certain trifling particular. For I do not yet understand what culture you mean. For you certainly do not say that such as is the culture about other things, such also is that which pertains to the gods. For instance, we say not every one knows the culture of horses, but he who is skilled in equestrian affairs. Do we not?

EUTH. Certainly.

Soc. For equestrian skill is the culture of horses.

EUTH. It is.

Soc. Nor does every one know the culture of dogs, but this belongs to the huntsman.

EUTH. It does.

Soc. For the art of hunting is the culture of dogs.

EUTH. It is.

Soc. But the grazier's art is the culture of oxen.

EUTH. Certainly.

Soc. But holiness and piety are the culture of the gods, O Euryphro. Do you say so?

EUTH. I do.

Soc. All culture, therefore, effects the same thing, viz. the good and advantage of that which is cultivated. Just as with respect to horses, you see that being cultivated by the equestrian art, they are advantaged by it and become better. Or does it not appear so to you?

EUTH. It does.

Soc. Dogs also are benefited by the huntsman's art, and oxen by that of the grazier, and all other things in a similar manner. Or do you think that culture is the injury of that which is cultivated?

EUTH. Not I, by Jupiter.

Soc. But the advantage therefore?

EUTH. How should it not?

Soc. Is holiness, therefore, since it is a culture of the gods, an advantage
to

to the gods, and does it make the gods better? And do you admit this, that when you perform any thing holy, you render some one of the gods better?

EUTH. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. Nor do I, O Euthyphro, think that you say this: it certainly is far otherwise. And for this reason I asked you what this culture of the gods is, not thinking you would say a thing of this kind.

EUTH. And you thought rightly, Socrates: for I do not say any such thing.

SOC. Be it so. But what culture of the gods will holiness be?

EUTH. That culture, Socrates, which slaves pay to their masters.

SOC. I understand. It will be a certain subserviency as it seems to the gods.

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. Can you then tell me, with respect to the art subservient to physicians, to the accomplishment of what work it is subservient? Do you not think it is subservient to health?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. But what? with respect to the art subservient to shipwrights, to the accomplishment of what work is it subservient?

EUTH. Evidently, Socrates, to that of a ship.

SOC. And is not the art subservient to architects, subservient to the building of houses?

EUTH. Yes.

SOC. Tell me, then, O best of men: with respect to the art subservient to the gods, to the accomplishment of what work will it be subservient? For it is evident that you know, because you say that you have a knowledge of divine concerns beyond that of other men.

EUTH. And I say true, Socrates.

SOC. Inform me then, by Jupiter, what that all-beautiful work is which the gods effect, employing our subserviency.

EUTH. They are many and beautiful, Socrates.

SOC. The generals of an army too, my friend, accomplish many and beautiful things; but at the same time you can easily tell what that principal thing is which they effect, viz. victory in battle. Or can you not?

EUTH.

EUTH. How is it possible I should not?

SOC. Husbandmen also, I think, accomplish many and beautiful things; but at the same time the principal thing which they produce is aliment from the earth.

EUTH. Entirely so.

SOC. Of the many and beautiful things then which the gods accomplish, what is the principal?

EUTH. I told you a little before, Socrates, that to learn accurately how all these things subsist is an arduous undertaking; but I now tell you simply this, that if any one knows how to say and do things acceptable to the gods, praying and sacrificing to them, these things are holy. Things of this kind also preserve both private houses and cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to the gods are impious, and these subvert and destroy all things.

SOC. You might, if you had been willing, Euthyphro, have told me the sum of my inquiries in a much shorter manner. But it is evident that you are not readily disposed to instruct me. For now when you drew near for this purpose you receded; though if you had answered, I should before this perhaps have learnt from you what holiness is. But now (for it is necessary that he who interrogates should follow him who is interrogated wherever he may lead) what do you again say the holy, and holiness, is? Do you not say it is a certain science of sacrificing and praying?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Is not to sacrifice to offer gifts to the gods; but to pray to request something of the gods?

EUTH. Very much so, Socrates.

SOC. From this it follows that holiness will be the science of requesting and giving to the gods.

EUTH. You have very well understood, Socrates, what I said.

SOC. For I am very desirous, my friend, of your wisdom, and I pay attention to it; so that what you say does not fall to the ground. But tell me what this subserviency to the gods is? Do you say it is to request of them and to give to them?

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Will it not follow, therefore, that to request rightly, will be to request of them those things of which we are in want?

EUTH.

EUTH. What else can it be?

SOC. And again, will not to give rightly consist in giving to them in our turn such things as they are in want of from us? For it would not be conformable to art to bestow upon any one those things of which he is not in want.

EUTH. You say true, Socrates.

SOC. Holiness, therefore, O Euthyphro, will be a certain mercantile art between gods and men.

EUTH. Let it be mercantile, if it pleases you so to call it.

SOC. But it is not pleasing to me unless it be true. Tell me therefore what advantage the gods derive from the gifts which they receive from us? For the advantage arising from their gifts is evident to every one; since we have not any good which they do not impart. But in what respect are they benefited from what they receive from us? Or have we so much the advantage in this merchandise, that we receive every good from them, but they receive nothing from us?

EUTH. But do you think, Socrates, that the gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

SOC. What is the use then, Euthyphro, of these our gifts to the gods?

EUTH. What other use do you think except honour and reverence, and, as I just now said, gratitude?

SOC. Holiness then, Euthyphro, is that which is acceptable to the gods, but not that which is profitable to, or beloved by them.

EUTH. I think it is the most of all things beloved by them.

SOC. This then again is as it seems holiness, viz. that which is dear to the gods.

EUTH. Especially so.

SOC. Asserting these things, can you wonder that your discourse does not appear to be fixed, but wandering? And can you accuse me as being the Dædalus that causes them to wander, when you yourself far surpass Dædalus in art, and make your assertions to revolve in a circle? Or do you not perceive that our discourse, revolving again, comes to the same? For you remember that in the former part of our discourse, the holy, and the dear to divinity, did not appear to us to be the same, but different from each other: or do you not remember?

EUTH.

EUTH. I do.

SOC. Now, therefore, do you not perceive that you say the holy is that which is beloved by the gods? But is this any thing else than that which is dear to divinity?

EUTH. It is nothing else.

SOC. Either therefore we did not then conclude well, or, if we did, our present position is not right.

EUTH. It seems so.

SOC. From the beginning, therefore, we must again consider what the holy is. For I shall not willingly, before I have learnt this, run timidly away. Do not then despise me, but paying all possible attention, tell me the truth in the most eminent degree. For you know it, if any man does; and you will not be dismissed like Proteus till you have told me. For if you had not clearly known what the holy, and also the unholy is, you never would have attempted, for the sake of a man who is a hireling, to accuse your father of murder, when he is now advanced in years; but you would have dreaded (lest you should not act rightly in this affair) the danger of incurring the anger of the gods, and the reproach of men. But now I well know that you clearly *suspect*¹, that you have a knowledge of what the holy and its contrary are. Tell me, therefore, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think it to be?

EUTH. It must be at some other opportunity then, Socrates: for now I am in haste, and it is time for me to leave you.

SOC. What do you do, my friend? By your departure you will throw me from the great hope I had entertained of learning from you what things are holy, and what are not so, and of liberating myself from the accusation of Melitus, by showing him that I was become wise through Euthyphro in divine concerns; that I shall no longer speak rashly, nor introduce any novelties respecting them through ignorance; and also that I shall act better during the remainder of my life.

¹ Plato here very properly uses the word *am, you suspect*, because Euthyphro not being freed from two-fold ignorance, or, in other words, being ignorant that he was ignorant, had nothing more than a *suspicion* of the nature of holiness.

THE MENO:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

V I R T U E.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MENO¹.

THIS Dialogue has been always justly entitled "Concerning Virtue." For the true subject of it is the nature and origin of virtue. The question, indeed, proposed to Socrates by Meno in the very outset of the Dialogue, is this other, "How virtue is acquired." But Socrates immediately waves the question, and draws the conversation to an inquiry "what virtue is," as of necessity previous to the inquiry, "whence it comes." However, from the result of the reasoning, we shall perceive both these questions answerable together: we shall be convinced, that none can know the nature and essence of virtue, without knowing the fountain whence it is derived; and that whoever knows what this is, cannot fail of knowing at the same time what that is in which virtue consists. For, if we attend closely to the steps or gradual advances made in these inquiries, through the course of this Dialogue, we shall discover that virtue consists in that kind of knowledge and that kind of power, taken together, the capacity of both which is in the human, as the partakes of a divine intellect, whose essence is its own object, and whose energy is the contemplation of itself, and the government of the universe. That kind of knowledge, therefore, which belongs to virtue is the knowledge of true good; and that kind of power in the soul, through which, joined to that knowledge, a man is virtuous, is the power of the

¹ The whole of this Introduction is extracted from the Argument of Mr. Sydenham to this Dialogue; excepting a few passages, which, from his not being sufficiently skilled in the more profound parts of Plato's philosophy, it was necessary to alter.—T.

intellect

intellect over the inferior part of the soul, the imagination and the passions. The gradual advances made toward this discovery form the conduct of this divine Dialogue. And the first step is to show, that virtue, though it seems to be a very complex idea, and made up of many virtues, different in their natures, and respectively belonging to different persons, is but one simple idea, though called by different names, as the particular subjects on which it operates, or the particular objects which it has in view, differ one from another. In the next step, we find that this idea includes power and government, to which account immediately are subjoined, by way of explanation, these restrictions, power well and wisely exercised, and government well and justly administered. Here then we discover that the Well, the Wisely, and the Justly, are essential to the idea of virtue. Next, we march in some obscurity: for here we see only by help of a metaphor, seemingly introduced, but in the way of a similitude, to illustrate a point sufficiently made clear already, that is, the wholeness or rather oneness of the idea of virtue. The metaphor is taken from outward figure, the definition of which being given, that it is bound, the bound of solid bodies, suggests to every disciple or studious reader of Plato, that virtue itself is bound, that virtue intellectual is the bound of things within the mind, and that virtue practical is the bound of human actions and human manners*. We then move a step further, in the same manner, by the light only of metaphor. The metaphor here is taken from the corpuscular philosophy, then newly brought into vogue by Protagoras, who had learnt it from Democritus, and by Gorgias, who had learnt it from Empedocles. And Socrates here prosecutes the subject of inquiry in this dialogue, under a pretence of giving a definition of colour, according to the doctrine of this philosophy which Meno had imbibed. Colour, he says, is owing to effluvia from the surfaces of bodies entering the pores of the organs of sight; these being exactly fitted for the reception of such effluvia: by which means those effluvia, being commensurate

* Our explication of this part of the Dialogue may perhaps appear fanciful to readers unacquainted with Plato. To obviate this appearance, we are to observe, that, as Pythagoras used to illustrate things mental by mathematical numbers, so Plato frequently illustrates them from the principles of geometry, and frequently also through sensible images, or things corporeal. And perhaps these two ways of illustration are the easiest and the plainest ways, through which we can at first be led to conceive things purely abstract, the objects of intellect.—S.

with these pores, become the objects of sight. Thus the philosopher plays with the prejudices of Meno, a disciple of the sophists, and therefore not a proper subject for his instruction; and introduces, with a professed view of only gratifying him, a point which seems very foreign to the subject, and not at all necessary to illustrate his meaning. But to his own friends and followers, who were acquainted with his doctrine, and were then near him, he thus ænigmatically insinuates that virtue and vice are as it were the colours of human actions; that by the light of mind we are able to distinguish them; that the science of virtue is as natural to the human understanding, as the perception of outward objects is to the eye of sense; that the mental eye is exactly adequate to its objects; and that all truth in general, and moral truth in particular, the present subject, is commensurate with the mind. The next advance we make discovers to us that virtue consists in a love and desire of true good, and true beauty, necessarily consequent to the knowledge of what is truly good and truly beautiful: it being impossible to forbear loving what appears beautiful, or desiring what appears good. And having already found that the idea of virtue includes power and government, we find that the whole idea of virtue is the power of preserving or of recovering true good and beauty, known to be such, and loved and desired because known. The next step brings us to the end of our journey in this inquiry concerning virtue; by showing us that the knowledge of all truth, and consequently of true good and beauty, is connatural to the soul of man: and is so, because her origin is divine, and her essence immortal. Now, the demi-urgic intellect, the source of her being, is immortal and divine, and truth eternally there resides, the stable and invariable object of intellect. Plato, therefore, in proving to us, as he does in this part of the Dialogue by an incontestable instance, that the soul of man naturally assents to and embraces truth, when fairly presented to her, and exhibited in a clear light, proves to us at the same time, that she participates of this eternal intellect and truth.

Thus much concerning the first part, about one-half the Dialogue. In the latter half the inquiry into the nature of virtue is resumed, but in a different way. For Meno, having here urged the consideration of his first question, "how virtue is acquired," Socrates, in pretending to yield at length to this inquiry, brings us round by another road to the end, which he

himself had all along in view, the teaching "what virtue is." And here it is suggested, through a geometrical enigma, in the first place, that not every soul is capable of virtue; that a certain predisposition is requisite; that the parts of the soul must be well proportioned to each other, in their natural frame, in order that the whole man may, through virtue, be made *totus teres atque rotundus*. In the next place, we find, that virtue consists not in any particular virtuous habit or habits of the soul, whether intellectual or moral, but in the prudential use and exercise of them; whence it follows, that virtue is not acquired by mere practice or habit. Thirdly, we find that virtue consists not merely in a good disposition, without being well cultivated, and consequently comes not by nature. Fourthly, that it consists not in any particular science or sciences, and therefore is not acquired by learning, and is not to be taught in the ordinary method of instruction or discipline. Preparatory to this part of the inquiry, a new character is introduced into the Dialogue, Anytus, (a great enemy to the sophists, and desirous of being thought a politician,) as a necessary person to show, that neither the professed men of wisdom, the sophists, nor the allowed men of virtue, the preservers of the Athenian state through their good government, were fit masters or teachers in the science of virtue. At length, by the help of all these negatives, we find in what it positively doth consist, that is, in true wisdom, not only derived originally from the divine mind by participation, but also inspired immediately by it through continual communication; presupposing, however, as a necessary foundation, or fit subject for the reception of this wisdom, a soul well disposed by nature, cultivated by right discipline, and strengthened by constant care and attention. But as the two first requisites, a good natural disposition, and right institution, depend on the divine Providence; and as the last, the constant practice of virtue, depends on the divine assistance; all these co-operating causes of virtue are, in the conclusion of this Dialogue, summed up by Plato in one word, *θεῖα μοῖρα*, the divine portion or allotment to men justly styled divine. Thus much may suffice at present for unfolding the subject, and delineating the parts of this Dialogue. What is here wanting in clearness, or in fulness, we shall endeavour in the notes to illustrate and to amplify. The end and design of the Dialogue is to excite men, well-disposed by nature, and prepared by the rudiments of good education, to the assiduous culture and improvement of their minds by think-
ing

ing and reasoning. This design appears, first, from the uncommon warmth and zeal with which Socrates is represented in the latter half of the Dialogue, pressing an inquiry after lost knowledge, and an endeavour to discover latent truths. The same design appears further from the long time taken up in recounting many sad instances of a neglect of virtuous studies in the youths of highest rank in Athens; the enumeration of which, being so prolix, can have no other view than to deter us from the same neglect. But the tendency of the Dialogue best appears from that effect, which the grand doctrine of it, as before explained, naturally must have on every docile and candid mind. For, if the human partakes of a divine intellect, and of all therefore which is of its essence; if truth has thus descended from Heaven into the souls of men, and Divinity himself be there, ready to communicate more and more the heart-felt knowledge of things divine and eternal to every soul which retires within itself; who would not wish thither to retire, and there, in that sacred silence, the silence of the passions, in that sacred solitude, the absence of all the objects of imagination, that flight of the alone to the alone, *φυγή μόνου προς μόνον*¹, to enjoy the presence and converse of the divinely solitary principle of things? Agreeably to this design of Plato, and also on account of the audience, which was composed partly of strangers, and partly of the friends and followers of Socrates, (as usual in that place where the conversation was held,) the inquisitive turn is given to this Dialogue, partly exciting and partly assisting, by means of leading questions, every where proposed by Socrates, and of hints thrown in here and there of his profound meaning. Meno is represented but as an humble disciple of the sophists, and presumes not to dispute or to argue like his masters. And Anytus appears as an enemy to all philosophical disputation. There is not so much as the shadow of a skirmish throughout the Dialogue. Yet the division of Plato's Dialogues, made by Thrasyllus, and followed by Albinus, led them to number it amongst those of the Peirastic kind, as not knowing where else to place it with less impropriety. The outward form of it is purely dramatic; and the character of Anytus, as here exhibited, affords a just specimen of the part he soon afterwards acted in the accusation of Socrates, and the bringing him to a public trial as a malefactor.

¹ Thus Plotinus, in the close of his last Ennead, very finely and justly expresses our sense.—S.

THE MENO:

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE,

MENO¹, SOCRATES,

A Servant Boy of Meno's, ANYTUS².

SCENE.—*The LYCÆUM*³.

¹ This is the same Meno mentioned by Xenophon, in his expedition of Cyrus the Younger, as one of the generals of the Grecian allied army in that expedition. Plutarch, in his Life of Phocion, relates, that Meno commanded all the cavalry. Certain it is from Xenophon, that he had the command of the forces sent from Thessaly. Near the end of the second book of that incomparable history above mentioned, the elegant and faithful writer of it, having before given us an instance of Meno's baseness, presents us with a portrait of him drawn at full length, the features of which are odious. But at the time of his conversation with Socrates, recited in this Dialogue, he was so young, that his mind and true character could not as yet have appeared openly, or have been known in the world. He first made a figure in the expedition with Xenophon, whilst he was still in the flower of his youth; but he was soon taken prisoner, and brought to Artaxerxes, by whose orders he was put to a lingering and ignominious death, not as an enemy but as a malefactor. Some slight strokes, however, appear even in this Dialogue, giving us a sketch of his turn of mind; as will be observed in their proper places.

² Enough has been said of this fellow, in the Introduction to this Dialogue, to prepare the reader for his appearance in the figure he there makes.

³ The following circumstances, considered together, evince the scene to be laid in the Lycæum. First, it was the place ordinarily frequented every day by Socrates, with his disciples and followers. Next, it was the place of resort for all strangers, especially the young and noble, such as Meno was, to see the Athenian youth exercise themselves, and to hear the sophists, if any happened to be at Athens, dispute and harangue. See note on the scene of the Greater Hippias. Lastly, it cannot be supposed, that Socrates should meet with Anytus, his enemy, at any other than a public place, free to all men.—S.

MENO.

MENO.

CAN¹ you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue² is to be taught; or whether it is acquired, not through teaching, but through exercise and habit;

¹ The reader will observe this to be a very abrupt way of beginning a conversation, especially with a stranger, known only by his name and character. What makes it the more remarkable is, that a young person, but just arrived at the age of manhood, should thus accost an old man in his seventieth year, venerable from his known wisdom and a long life of virtue. Some may think that Plato intended here to paint the insolent familiarity of young men of large fortune and bad education, in their manner of addressing their inferiors in point of wealth. Such a thought has, perhaps, some foundation in truth. But Plato's principal purpose, in beginning the Dialogue with an impertinent question from the mouth of Meno, is, as appears plainly from the reply of Socrates, to exhibit to us the arrogant pretensions of the sophists, and particularly of Gorgias, in taking upon themselves to answer every philosophical question proposed to them. Meno had in his own country been used to this behaviour of theirs; and Socrates had, long before this, acquired a distinguished character for his superior skill in philosophical disputations. Meno, therefore, who knew no difference between Socrates and the sophists, attacks him directly, without the ceremony of a preface, with a question, point blank, on one of the most knotty subjects of inquiry in all philosophy. For he presumed that Socrates was sitting in the Lyceum, like one of the sophists, ready to answer all such questions. The only other dramatic Dialogue of Plato which begins thus abruptly is the *Minos*. There is the same kind of propriety in both. The only difference is this, that in the *Minos*, a Dialogue between Socrates and a sophist, Socrates is the questioner; and in the *Meno*, he is the person questioned.—S.

² Many years before the time of this Dialogue, Socrates had held a disputation with Protagoras on this very point, whether virtue could be taught; a disputation, recited by Plato in a Dialogue called after the name of that great sophist. The question was then debated before a numerous audience of sophists and their followers, as well as of the friends and disciples of Socrates himself. The disputants, however, came to no agreement on the matter in dispute. The result of their conversation was only this, that Protagoras, the prince of sophists, was so generous as to bestow his commendations on the great philosopher, and was graciously pleased to say, that "he should wonder if Socrates in time did not become considerable in fame for wisdom." The commendations of a sophist, no less renowned for his philosophical knowledge, than venerable on account of his experienced age, (for he was then about 75 years old,) increased the reputation of Socrates amongst the tribe of sophists; and it is probable that these men spread the fame of that disputation throughout all Greece. It seems, therefore, as if Meno, an admirer of the sophists, and bred up under one of their disciples, was desirous of hearing Socrates himself speak on that celebrated subject of former debate. Accordingly, meeting with Socrates in a convenient place, he attacks him at once with a question on that very point. We may observe, however, that Meno here states the question in a more ample manner than that in which it had been considered in the debate between Socrates and Protagoras: for he particularly mentions all the other ways, beside that of teaching, in which it ever was supposed that virtue was attainable. So that this Dialogue, *The Meno*, though not so entertaining as *The Protagoras*, is more comprehensive and affords a wider field for speculation.—S.

or whether it comes neither by exercise, nor yet by teaching, but is by nature with those who are possessed of it; or comes it to them by some other way?

Soc. You Thessalians, Meno, have been of old eminent among the Grecians¹. You have been long admired for your superior skill in horsemanship², and famed for the great wealth you are possessed of³. But I think you have now acquired no less fame for wisdom⁴. And amongst others of you, the fellow-citizens of your friend Aristippus⁵ of Larissa have distinguished themselves not a little in this respect. Now this is entirely the work of Gorgias. For in his travels, when he came to their city, he drew the chiefs of the Aleuadian family⁶ (one of whom is your friend Aristippus), and indeed all of highest quality in the other states of

¹ The Thessalians were the most antient inhabitants of Greece; and from time to time sending out colonies from their own country, Thessaly, spread themselves by degrees over all the rest of Greece; as we are told by the old geographers.—S.

² The people who lived in Thessaly had the reputation of being the best horsemen, and in war the best cavalry, in the world. See Suidas in voce 'Ιππεις λευκοθώρακες. This was owing to their breeding of excellent horses, which were every where valued as the best, both for service and for beauty; as may be seen in the *Zeuxis* and the *Eprates* of Lucian, and in a note to The Greater Hippias. And this valuable breed of horses was favoured by the soil of their country, which was partly mountainous, and partly well watered by fine rivers running through the midst of spacious and open plains.—S.

³ In the time of Plato these people were grown very rich; but were thought to have acquired their riches chiefly by very unjust means, by fraud, by theft, and by kidnapping and selling free men as slaves: for which crimes they were infamous throughout the rest of Greece. See Xenophon. *Memorabil.* lib. i. cap. 2. § 24.—S.

⁴ Meaning the pretended wisdom taught by the sophists.—S.

⁵ This Aristippus was a man of the highest rank and power in the city of Larissa. We here find him to have been sophisticated by Gorgias: and it may justly be inferred, from the mention of him in this manner, that he himself had sophisticated Meno. But it appears in the highest degree improbable that he should be the same person with an Aristippus mentioned by Aristotle in the beginning of the third Book of his *Metaphysics*: for this latter was a sophist by profession; and the profession of a sophist was no more becoming to men of high birth and quality, than that of an itinerant quack-doctor or strolling stage-player is now-a-days amongst us. See Plato in *Protag.*—S.

⁶ This was the noblest family in Larissa. They were descended from Aleuas, one of the kings of Thessaly, of the race of Hercules; and were at this time the oligarchic tyrants of their country. Meno is here complimented in the seemingly honourable mention thus made of his friend, whom we presume to have been also his immediate instructor. For at the time supposed in this Dialogue, Gorgias was upwards of ninety years of age, and Meno a very young man.—S.

Thessaly,

Theſſaly, to be the admirers of his wiſdom¹. From him you Theſſalians learned the habit of answering to any queſtion whatever with an undaunted and a noble confidence, ſuch indeed as becomes thoſe who have a thorough knowledge of the ſubject propoſed to them. For he² in the ſame manner offered himſelf to be freely interrogated by any one of the Grecians, whom it ſhould pleaſe to aſk him, concerning any point which the party queſtioning might chooſe: and to no queſtion of any perſon did he ever reſuſe an answer. But we in this place, my friend Meno, are in a condition quite the contrary. Amongſt us there is a dearth, as it were, of wiſdom; which ſeems to have forſaken our country, and to have fled to yours. So that if you ſhould take it into your head to propoſe to any one here the queſtion you have propoſed to me, there is not a man of us who would not laugh and ſay, “ Friend ſtranger, you muſt think me wonderfully wiſe, to know whether virtue is a thing which can be taught, or by what other means it is

¹ The great reputation of Gorgias appears to have had its firſt riſe in Theſſaly. For thus Philoſtratus, in the Proem to his Lives of the Sophiſts,—*ἡρξε τῆς ἀρχαιοτερας [ἢ. σοφιστικῆς] Γεργίας ὁ Λεοντινός ἐν Θετταλῶσι*. Indeed Theſſaly was the moſt proper of all places for Gorgias to diſplay his art in, and by that means to acquire reputation. For his art was the art of deluding through ſophiſtical oratory and ſophiſtical argumentation; and theſe are the fitteſt and moſt ſucceſſful engines that can be employed for the purpoſe of deceiving. If therefore the people of Theſſaly were ſuch as they are repreſented, Gorgias could not fail of meeting there with a multitude of followers and admirers. In fact, theſe people became ſo great proficient in the art of deceiving, and ſo famous for the practice of it, that every ingenious or dextrous ſtroke of deceit was proverbially called *Θετταλον ſοφιſμα*, a Theſſalian ſophiſm. In Athenæus, p. 308, Myrtilus, the ſophiſt of Theſſaly, is called *Θετταλον παλαιſμα*, a cunning and crafty wreſtler in diſputation; or, as Euſtathius explains the term, *Θετταλος ελεγκτικος*, ſubtle in reſuting any argument. The ſame Myrtilus is called jocoſely by the ſame author, p. 11, himſelf *Θετταλον ſοφιſμα*, a Theſſalian cheat (in his way of arguing).

² Plato, in his Dialogue named Gorgias, uſhers in this great father and prince of ſophiſts by relating, that he had juſt now, at a private houſe, challenged any of the company to interrogate him on whatever point they pleaſed, and had undertaken to answer all ſorts of queſtions. This appears to have been uſual with him. For Philoſtratus reports, that when he came to Athens he had the confidence to preſent himſelf in the miſt of the theatre, and to ſay to the whole aſſembly *Προσάγει*, “ propoſe,” meaning, any argument for him to diſſert on: agreeably to which is the account given of him by Cicero in the beginning of his ſecond Book de Finibus, that he was the firſt that ever dared *in conventu poſcere queſtionem*, in public to demand the queſtion, *id eſt*, ſays Tully, *jubere dicere quæ de re quis vellet audire*, to bid any man declare what ſubject he choſe to hear a diſcourſe upon.—S.

attained :

attained: when I am so far from knowing whether it can be taught, or not, that I have not the good fortune to know so much as what virtue is." Now this, Meno, is exactly my own case. I am in the same poverty of knowledge as to this affair, and confess myself to be totally ignorant concerning the essence of virtue. How then should I be able to say what qualities are to be attributed to that which is utterly unknown to me? Or do you think it possible for a man, wholly ignorant who Meno is, to know whether Meno is a man of honour, a man of fortune, a man of a generous spirit, or whether he is the reverse of all these characters? Do you think it possible?

MENO. I do not. But in good earnest, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? and do you give me leave to carry home such a character of you, and to make this report of you in my country?

SOC. Not only that, my friend, but this further—that I never met any where with a man whom I thought master of such a piece of knowledge.

MENO. Did you never then meet with Gorgias, during his stay in this city?

SOC. I did.

MENO. And did you think that he knew nothing of the matter?

SOC. I do not perfectly remember, Meno, and therefore am not able to say directly what I then thought of him. But perhaps not only was he himself knowing in the nature of virtue, but what he used to say on that subject you also know. Do you then remind me what account he gave of virtue; or, if you are unwilling so to do, give me an account of it yourself; for I suppose you agree with him in opinion.

MENO. I do.

SOC. Let us leave him, therefore, out of the question, especially considering that he is absent. But what you yourself think virtue to be, tell me, Meno, and freely communicate your knowledge of it, that I may be happy in being convicted of having uttered what is so happily an untruth, when I said that I never any where met with a man who knew what virtue was; when, at the same time, both yourself and Gorgias shall appear to have been so well acquainted with the nature of it.

MENO. Whatever you may imagine, Socrates, it is by no means difficult to tell what you desire to know. In the first place, to instance in the
virtue

virtue of a man, nothing is easier to tell than that a man's virtue consists in his ability to manage affairs of state, and, in managing them, to be of service to the public and to its friends, to distress its enemies, and to guard, at the same time, with vigilance and circumspection, against any harm that might arise from those enemies in their turn. Then, if you would know what is the virtue of a woman, it is easy enough to run over the particulars: it is to manage well the affairs of her family, carefully to keep safe all that is in the house, and to hearken with due observance to her husband. Another kind of virtue belongs to a child, different too in a girl from what it is in a boy: so is it likewise of the aged. And if you choose to proceed further, the virtue of a free man is one thing, that of a slave is another thing. Many more virtues are there, of all sorts; so that one cannot be at a loss to tell, concerning virtue, what it is. For in every action, and in every age of life, with reference to every kind of business, some peculiar virtue belongs to each person: and in vice also, I suppose, Socrates, there is the same respective difference, and the same variety.

SOC. I think myself much favoured by Fortune, Meno; for, when I was only in quest of one virtue, I have found, it seems, a whole swarm of virtues hiving in your mind. But, to pursue this similitude, taken from bees:—Supposing, Meno, I had asked you what was the nature of a bee, and you had told me that bees were many and various, what would you have answered me if I had demanded of you further, whether you called them many and various, and differing one from another, in respect of their being bees; or whether you thought they differed not in this respect, but with regard to something else, as beauty, or size, or other thing of like kind, accidental? What answer would you have made to such a question?

MENO. I should have answered thus; that so far as they were bees, and in this respect, they differed not at all one from another.

SOC. Suppose, then, that I had afterwards said, Tell me, therefore, Meno, concerning this very nature of bees, in respect of which they do not differ, but all agree and are alike; what say you that it is? Should you have had any answer to have given me to this question?

MENO. I should.

SOC. Just so is it with the virtues. Many indeed are they, and of various kinds: but they all agree in one and the same idea; through their agree-

ment in which they are, all of them alike, virtues. This idea the man, who is asked the question which I have asked of you, ought to have in his eye when he answers it; and, copying from this idea, to draw a description of virtue. Do you not apprehend the meaning of what I say?

MENO. Tolerably well, I think I do. But I am not in the possession of it so fully as I could wish.

SOC. Take it thus then.—Do you think after this manner concerning virtue only, that the virtue of a man is one thing, the virtue of a woman another thing, and so of other respective virtues, that they are all different? or have you the same way of thinking as to the health, size, and strength of the body? Do you think the health of a man to be one thing, the health of a woman to be a thing different? or is the same idea of health every where, wherever health is, whether it be in a man, or in whatever subject it be found?

MENO. The health of a man and the health of a woman, I think, are equally and alike health, one and the same thing.

SOC. Do you not think after the same manner with regard to size and strength; that a woman, if she be strong, is strong according to the same idea, and with the same strength, which gives a strong man the denomination of strong? By the same strength I mean this, that whether strength be in a man, or in a woman, considering it as strength, there is no difference; or do you think that there is any difference between strength and strength?

MENO. I think there is not any.

SOC. And will any difference, think you then, be found in virtue, with respect to its being virtue, whether it be in a child or in an aged person, in a woman or in a man?

MENO. This case of virtue, Socrates, seems somehow to be not exactly parallel with those other instances.

SOC. Why? Did you not tell me that the virtue of a man consisted in his well-managing of civil affairs, and that of a woman in the well-managing of her household?

MENO. I did.

SOC. I ask you, then, whether it is possible to manage any affairs well, whether civil or domestic, or any other affairs whatever, without a prudent and a just management?

MENO.

MENO. By no means.

SOC. If then the management be just and prudent, must not the managers manage with justice and with prudence?

MENO. They must.

SOC. Both of them, therefore, have occasion for the same things, to qualify them for being good managers, both the woman and the man, namely, justice and prudence.

MENO. It appears they have.

SOC. And how is it in the case of a child, or that of an old man? Can these ever be good, if they are dissolute and dishonest?

MENO. By no means.

SOC. But only by their being sober and honest?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. All persons, therefore, who are good, are good in the same way; for they are good by being possessed of the same qualities.

MENO. It seems so.

SOC. Now if virtue were not the same thing in them all, they would not be good in the same way.

MENO. They would not.

SOC. Seeing, therefore, that virtue is the same thing in all of them, endeavour to recollect and tell me, what was the account given of it by Gorgias, which was the same, it seems, with the account you would give of it yourself?

MENO. What else is it than to be able to govern men? If you are in search of that, which is one and the same thing in all persons who have virtue.

SOC. It is the very thing I am in search of. But is this then the virtue of a child, Meno? And is it the virtue of a slave, to be able to govern his master? Do you think him to be any longer a slave, when he can govern?

MENO. I think he is then by no means a slave indeed, Socrates.

SOC. Neither is it proper, my friend, that he should be so. Consider this also further. You say it is virtue to be able to govern. Should we not immediately subjoin the word *justly*, and say, to govern justly? For you would not say, that to govern unjustly is virtue.

MENO. I think we should. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

Soc. Virtue is it, Meno, or some certain virtue?

MENO. How mean you by this distinction?

Soc. I mean no otherwise than as every thing else whatever is distinguished: to instance, if you please, in roundness. Of this I should say that it is some certain figure, and not thus simply and absolutely that it is figure. And for this reason should I express myself in that manner, because there are other figures beside the round.

MENO. You would thus speak rightly. And indeed, to say the truth, I myself not only call justice a virtue, but say that other virtues there are beside.

Soc. Say, what these other virtues are. As I would recount to you, were you to bid me, other figures beside the round; do you recount to me, in like manner, other virtues beside justice.

MENO. Well then; courage I think to be a virtue, and temperance another, and wisdom, and magnanimity, and a great many more.

Soc. Again, Meno, we have met with the same accident as before; we have again found many virtues, while in search of one only; though then indeed in a different way from that in which we have now alighted on them: but the one virtue, which is the same through all these, we are not able to find.

MENO. For I am not able as yet, Socrates, to apprehend such virtue as you are inquiring after, that one in all, as in other things I am able.

Soc. Probably so; but I will do the best I can to help us onward in our inquiry. Already you apprehend, in some measure, that thus it is in every thing. For should any person have asked you what was figure, the thing I just now mentioned, and you had said it was roundness; were he then to ask you, according to the same distinction which I made concerning justice, whether roundness was figure, or some certain figure; you would answer, it was some certain figure.

MENO. Without all doubt.

Soc. And would you not answer thus for this reason, because there are other figures beside the round?

MENO. For that very reason.

Soc. And were he to ask you further, of what sort those other figures were, you would tell him?

MENO.

MENO. I should.

SOC. Again ; questioned in the same manner concerning colour, what it is ? had you answered, It is whiteness ; should the questioner immediately proceed to this further question, whether whiteness is colour, or some certain colour ? you would say, Some certain colour ; because there happen to be other colours.

MENO. I should.

SOC. And if he were to bid you enumerate those other colours, you would speak of colours, which happen to be colours no less than the white.

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. If then he were to prosecute the argument, as I do, he would say, We are always getting into multitude¹ ; deal not with me in this manner : but since to all this multitude you give one common name ; since you tell me there is none of them which is not figure ; and that, notwithstanding, they are contrary some to others² ; what is this which comprehends the round as well as the straight, this thing to which you give the name of figure, and tell me that the round is figure not more than is the straight ? or do you not say this ?

MENO. I do.

SOC. I ask you, then, whether when you say this, you mean it in respect

¹ For the senses are always drawing us into multitude ; which, considered as multitude, belongs only to sensible and outward things. But as soon as any multitude, or many, are considered together, and comprehended in one idea, they become the object of mind, and are then one and many ; sense and imagination being now accompanied by mind. To this consideration of things, this comprehension of many in one, Socrates here endeavours to lead Meno in the same way in which he elsewhere leads Thætetus, that is, by means of mathematical objects, to which his mind was familiarized ; this being a step the easiest to him, and perhaps naturally the first toward the attainment of universal ideas, things purely mental. For the opening of the mind is in the first place to numbers ; thence she proceeds to figures as the bounds of body, and is at first sight delighted with figures mathematical. If afterwards she is taught the mathematical sciences, then in proportion as her powers open more and become enlarged, she easily attains to view many in one ; to view, for instance, the properties of all triangles contained in the triangle itself. And in the circle, the square, the pentagon, and all other figures, she has the same comprehensive view. With these mathematical figures Meno was well acquainted ; and upon this foundation did Socrates propose to him to consider the nature of figure in general, or that one thing in which all figures agree and are the same.—S.

² As rectilinear figures are contrary to circles ; the whole periphery of these latter being a curve line.—S.

of roundness, and that the round is not more round than is the straight? or with regard to straightness, and that the straight is not more straight than is the round?

MENO. I mean not thus, Socrates.

SOC. But it is with a view to figure, that you assert the round not more to be figure than is the straight, nor the straight more than is the round.

MENO. True.

SOC. Try then if you can tell me, what that thing is which is called by this general name of figure. Now suppose, that to an inquirer in this way concerning figure, or concerning colour, you were to say, I do not comprehend what it is you would have, man; nor do I know what it is you mean: he perhaps would wonder; and would say, Do you not comprehend that I am inquiring, what is the same in all these? Would you have nothing to say neither after this, Meno, were you to be asked, what that was in the round, in the straight, and in the other things you call figures, in all of them the same? Endeavour to find out and tell me what it is; that you may the better afterwards consider of, and answer to, the like kind of question concerning virtue.

MENO. Not so, Socrates; but do you yourself rather say what figure is.

SOC. Would you have me oblige you in this point?

MENO. By all means.

SOC. Shall you then be willing to tell me what virtue is?

MENO. I shall.

SOC. Let us then do our best; for the cause deserves it.

MENO. Without all doubt.

SOC. Come then; let us try if we can tell you what figure is. See if you can accept the following account of figure. Let us say, figure ¹ is that which of all things is the only one that always accompanies colour. Are you satisfied with this account? or do you inquire any further? For my part, I should be well contented if you would give me but as good an account of virtue ².

MENO.

¹ In this first definition of figure, Socrates considers it only as it belongs to body; that is, not mathematical figure, but corporeal; figure which always accompanies colour, because it is always seen by the same outward light, which exhibits to us the different colours of all bodies, and without which they have indeed no colour at all.—S.

² Socrates was very sensible, that his definition had not explained the nature of the thing, and that he had only described it by that which Porphyry terms *συμπεσῆναι ἀχρυστον*, an inseparable

MENO. But, Socrates, this is weak and silly.

Soc. How so?

MENO. According to your account, that is figure which always accompanies colour.

Soc. Well.

MENO. But should any person now reply, that he knew not what colour was, and was equally at a loss concerning colour and concerning figure, what could you think of the answer that you had given to his question?

Soc. I?—that I had answered with truth. And if my questioner happened to be one of your wise men, your disputers and contenders, I would tell him ¹, that I had spoken; and that, if I had not spoken rightly, it was his business to take up the argument, and to refute what I had said. But if two parties, such as you and I here, as friends, and in a friendly way, were inclined to have discourse together, their answers to each other's questions ought to be made in a milder manner, and to be more rational. Now it is perhaps more rational, that an answer should not only be agreeable to truth, but besides, should be conceived in terms confessedly understood by the party questioning. Accordingly, I shall now attempt to make you such a kind of answer. For tell me; do you not call some certain thing by the name of end, speaking of such a thing as bound or extreme? For by all these words I mean the same thing. Prodicus, indeed, might possibly dispute it with us: but you would use these expressions indifferently, that such or such a thing is bounded, or, that it has an end. This is all I mean; nothing of subtle disquisition, or nice distinction.

able accident of it, that is, a circumstance which, though accidental, or not of necessity attending on its essence, yet in fact always did attend on it, namely, the accompaniment of colour. And he here professes, that he would be satisfied with such a description of virtue denoting any circumstance which always attended on her: as if we described virtue thus; Virtue is that which always accompanies wisdom.—S.

¹ Socrates, in conversing with the sophists, never used *λογον διδασκαλικον*, the instructive method of delivering his doctrine: because, fancying themselves sufficiently knowing and wise already, they were not disposed to learn. Nor did he ever take the truly dialectical way with them; or make use of *λογον διαλεκτικον*: because they were not concerned about truth in any argument; and because also they either had not, or would not, acknowledge any first principles to argue from. But he disputed with them always in their own way, *δια λογων εριστικων*; confuting them from their own concessions, and reducing to absurdities the answers which they gave to his questions.—S.

MENO,

MENO. Well ; there is something which I call end : and I think I understand what you mean.

SOC. And is there not something which you call superficies ? another, which you call solid ? such as those, I mean, which are the subjects of geometry.

MENO. I call certain things by the names you mention.

SOC. Now then, from these premises which you admit, you may understand what I mean by figure in general. In every figure, that which bounds the solid, I call figure. And to express this in one short proposition, I should say that figure is the bound of solid.

MENO. And what say you colour is ?

SOC. You use me ill now, Meno. You put an old man to the task of answering, yet are unwilling yourself to take the trouble only of recollecting and telling me what Gorgias said that virtue was.

MENO. But I will ; after you have told me what colour is.

SOC. A man with his eyes hoodwinked might perceive from your way of conversing, Meno, that you are handsome, and still have your admirers.

MENO. How so ?

SOC. Because you do nothing but command in conversation, as fine ladies do, that are used to have their wills in all things ; for they tyrannize so long as their beauty lasts. At the same time too, perhaps, you have discovered me, how easy I am to be subdued by beauty, and how apt to stoop to it. I shall do therefore as you would have me, and shall answer to your question.

MENO. By all means do, and gratify my request.

SOC. Do you choose that I should make my answer in the style of Gorgias¹, that by this means you may apprehend it the more easily ?

MENO.

¹ Gorgias, as appears from what follows, accounted for all the sensible qualities of things, that is, for every thing perceived through any of the five outward senses, by corpuscular, or little invisible bodies, continually *εκπνεύοντα*, flowing forth, or emitted, from all larger, visible, and apparently figured bodies, and striking the sense of all sensible animals within their reach. With regard to one kind of the sensible qualities of bodies, namely, odours, whether the fragrant or the fætid, the same account is given of them by most of the modern philosophers. For they are generally held to be the effluvia of bodies odoriferous, striking and affecting either agreeably or disagreeably

MENO. I should be glad that you would do so, most undoubtedly.

SOC. Do you not hold, you and Gorgias, that certain effluvia flow forth from bodies, agreeably to the doctrine of Empedocles¹?

MENO. We hold that doctrine strongly².

SOC.

disagreeably the olfactory nerves, where the particular sense of smell is supposed to be seated. We shall presently observe, in what manner the ancient Corpuscularians, whose system was more uniform and simple than that of the moderns, extended the power of these effluvia to all the rest of the outward senses.—S.

¹ Empedocles was a Pythagorean philosopher of Agrigentum in Sicily; and wrote a poem in three books, concerning Nature, on the principles of Pythagoras. For this great founder of the Italic sect, though he applied himself chiefly to the study of mind, the governing principle in nature, as the only way to understand nature rightly, yet philosophized also on the outward and corporeal part of the universe: the elements of which, consistently with his notions of mind, he held not to be irregular and infinite, as the Atomic and Atheistic philosophers imagined: but to be formed by rule in number, and in measure, as being the work of mind. Plato, in his *Timæus*, hath introduced the Pythagorean, from whom that dialogue takes its name, telling us the measures and proportions of these elements. It sufficeth at present to say of them, that they are the four generally considered ever since as the elements of nature, fire, air, water, and earth. On this foundation Empedocles built his poem, explaining all the appearances of outward nature from the combination and motion of these four elements. His poetry was deemed by the ancients, in point of versification, equal to that of Homer. And he seems to have been a celebrated poet, before he commenced philosopher. For though it does not appear that in this poem he divulged any of the Pythagorean secrets, yet his brothers of that sect, who were all strictly united together in fellowship, did, on the publication of his poem, as fearful of the precedent (and no writings had till then been ever published by any Pythagorean), expel him from their society; at the same time making a law, that from thenceforth no poet should ever be admitted amongst them as a member of their body.—S.

² Empedocles differed from the Atomic philosophers of old in this, that he held all natural bodies, and even their minutest parts, so long as they remained parts of those bodies, to be composed of the four elements. Now as air and fire, two of those four, are active elements perpetually in motion; and as all compound bodies are more or less porous; he supposed a continual efflux of igneous and aerial particles from those bodies into whose composition they had entered, through such measures or pores, whether straight or winding, as were fitted for their passage and their exit. To supply the place of these departed particles, and to maintain the same state in the composition of the bodies they had quitted, he supposed a continual influx of fresh air and fire from without, uniting themselves to their congenial elements within, and thus becoming ingredients in the frame of the compounded or mixt bodies into which they had entered. These fresh streams he held to be almost pure and elementary air and fire, as pure however as the circumambience. But the particles, streaming forth from those bodies, he supposed to be impure, and to be mixed or combined with aqueous particles, and also with earthy ones of various kinds, according to the nature

Soc. And do you not hold certain pores ¹, into which and through which those effluvia pass?

MENO. Certainly.

Soc. And that some of those effluvia ² are adapted to some of these pores, but are either less or greater than other pores?

MENO.

nature of the body from which they issued. For the union of the four elements in compound bodies he held to be so intimate, and the particles of different elements to adhere so closely one to another, that none pass out pure as they entered; but that every particle of the subtler and lighter elements, in departing, carries along with it some particles of the grosser and heavier, earth and water. Now this is obvious to sight in moist bodies, vehemently heated by fire from without acting on them; that is, in bodies into which so great a number of igneous particles have entered as tend to operate the dissolution of those bodies. For we here see the aqueous particles, pregnant with air and fire, issuing forth and ascending in the form of steams and vapours. And that earthy particles are combined with them, we may reasonably conclude from the different colours of these steams or vapours. For the steam, which arises from pure water heated, hath always the same uniform colour. The difference therefore of colour in steams or vapours must be derived from the different kinds of earthy particles, or, as the chemists love to express themselves, the different salts, in those liquors and those moist bodies, from which the diverse coloured steams or vapours arise. The like appearances may be observed in the perspiration of animal bodies, when they suffer a higher degree than usual of intestine heat; that is, when the igneous particles within are put into vehement commotion, and set loose through violent exercise of the body: the perspired moisture we may then see, by retaining it on linen, to be tinged with the colour of those salts, which are constantly separated from the blood by the kidneys and thrown off in urine. It may perhaps not be impertinent to take notice here by the way, that Empedocles, and the rest of the ancient Elementarian physiologists, attributed this difference of earth or earthy salts, from whence they supposed all bodies to derive the difference of their colours, to different mixtures of the four elements constituting those very minute earthy particles; the mere earthy part of which is the *caput mortuum* of the chemists, if this be indeed elementary pure earth. From hence the Corpuscularians, by parity of reason, drew this conclusion; that as, in all appearance, bodies derived their different colours from the different kinds of earth which made the grosser part of their composition, the colours which reached our eyes, and which we saw, were the finest earthy particles of those bodies, combined with particles of elementary fire, the essence of light uncoloured of itself, continually streaming forth in effluvia too minute for the eye to discern their figures, and visible only in the colour.—S.

¹ Meaning here the pores of other bodies, surrounding those which emit the effluvia, and either close to them in contact, or at least near to them enough to be reached by those effluvia, before their combination is quite broken, and they are resolved into their pure elements.—S.

² The Elementarian physiologists held, that the effluvia of all compound bodies were of different figures and dimensions, according to the natures and different proportions of their composing elements. And consequently to this they must have held, that the pores of these bodies

were

MENO. Things are so framed.

Soc. And do you not admit of something which you call sight?

MENO. I do.

Soc. These premises being granted, "Now let your mind accompany my words ¹," as Pindar says. Colour then is the flowing off from figures, commensurate with the sight, and by that sense perceived ².

MENO.

were large enough for the passage and emission of their own effluvia, as well as for the admission and reception of other particles from without to supply their places. But this was not sufficient to account for the different kinds of sensation, arising in the several senses of sentient animals, from the operation and effect of the effluvia of other bodies transmitted to them. They supposed, therefore, that the pores of the organs of sense were exactly adequate, in figure and dimension, to these foreign effluvia; not all of those pores adequate to all of these effluvia indiscriminately; for this is impossible, unless the souls of any animals had the power of adapting the pores of their organs of sensation, occasionally, to the reception of all kinds of effluvia: and in this case, all such animals would be like Milton's angels, all eye, all ear: and would feel, at pleasure, the other various kinds of sensation in all parts of their bodies indifferently. But the hypothesis of those physiologists we are speaking of was this, that the organs of each sense had their pores respectively fitted to admit those effluvia which were the objects of that sense, and none other; the eye, for instance, those effluvia which gave colour; the ear, those which made sound; and that the organs of the other senses were framed in like manner. The heterogeneous effluvia, therefore, which could not enter, as being either too large for the pores, or else figured differently, passed by; and the too minute passed in and through, without affecting the sense.—S.

¹ Socrates here cites a verse from Pindar, to usher in his definition with solemnity, as if it was to be something very fine. But this solemnity is merely burlesque: for it is in mimicry of the sophists, who valued at a high rate their doctrines of this kind, and taught them to their disciples as wonderful discoveries and pieces of profound wisdom.—S.

² Aristotle tell us, in his treatise *περί αἰσθητικῆς καὶ αἰσθητῶν*, that Empedocles held the eye, that is, the sight of the eye, to be fire; meaning pure elementary fire collected in the pupil of the eye; as appears from Timæus in Plato's dialogue of his name; and that he supposed vision to be performed by the emission of light from the eye, as from a lantern. In proof of which he cites a passage out of the fine poem of Empedocles, mentioned in a preceding note. We presume it may be agreeable to many of our learned readers, if we here present them with that beautiful passage at full length; and the more so, because Stephens has strangely omitted it, with many other choice fragments of the philosophic Greek poets, in that slender collection of his which he entitles *Poësis Philosophica*. The verses are these:

Ὡς δ' ὅτε τις, παρθὸν νοέων, ὠπλισσάτο λυχνίῳ,
 Χειμερὴν διὰ νύκτα, πυρὸς σέλας αἰθόμενοι,
 Ἀψας πάντοιων ἀνεμῶν λαμπτήρας, ἀμоргουῖς, [f. ἀπειροῦς]
 Οἱ τ' ἀνεμῶν μὲν πνεῦμα διασχιδασὶν αἰντῶν·

MENO. In this answer, Socrates, I think you have answered as well as possible.

Soc.

Φῶς δ' ἐξω διαβρωσκον, ὅσον ταναυτερον νην,
 Λαμπισκεν κατὰ βῆλαν ατειρεσιν ακτινεσσιν.
 'Ὡς δὲ τοτ', [f. ποτ'] εν μηνιγξιν εεργγενον, ωγυγιον πυρ
 Λεπτησιν οδονησιν εχευατο κυκλωπα κουρηη
 Αἱ δ' ἰδατος μεν βειθος απεστεγον αμφιναοντος
 Πυρ δ' ἐξω διαβρωσκον, [f. διεβρωσκειν] ὅσον ταναυτερον νην.

We are unable to do justice to these elegant lines in a literal translation. Instead of it, therefore, we hope our English readers will not refuse to accept of the following paraphrase:

As when the trav'ler, in dark winter's night,
 Intent on journey, kindles up a light,
 The moon-like splendour of an oil-fed flame;
 He sets it in some lantern's horny frame.
 Calm and serene there fits the tender form,
 Screen'd from rough winds, and from the wintry storm.
 In vain rude airs assault the gentle fire:
 Their forces break, disperse, and they retire.
 Fences secure, though thin, the fair enclose;
 And her bright head she lifts amid her foes.
 Through the straight pores of the transparent horn
 She shoots her radiance, mild as early morn.
 Forth fly the rays; their shining path extends;
 Till, lost in the wide air, their less'ning lustre ends.
 So when the fire, fresh lighted from on high,
 Sits in the circling pupil of an eye;
 O'er it, transparent veils of fabric fine
 Spread the thin membrane, and defend the shrine;
 The subtle flame enclosing, like a mound,
 Safe from the flood of humours flowing round.
 Forth fly the rays, and their bright paths extend;
 Till, in the wide air lost, their lustres end.

After citing these verses, Aristotle is pleased to say, *ὅτε μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὅραν φησιν' ὅτε δὲ ταῖς ἀπορροαῖς ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρώμενων*. "Sometimes he [meaning Empedocles] accounts for vision in this manner; at other times, by the effluvia which proceed from the object." Now, in truth, these two seemingly different accounts are not only very consistent, the one with the other, but neither of them is sufficient, without the other, to explain how the objects of sight are seen, according to the mind of Empedocles. We say this on supposition that he agreed with Timæus, a philosopher of the same sect, who, if Plato represents him rightly, accounted for vision in the same way. He supposes, that part of the pure element of fire is seated in the eye; that the rays

issuing

Soc. It may be that you think so, because you are accustomed to a language of this kind; and because at the same time you perceive yourself, as I imagine, able from thence to account in the same way for sound¹, and smell, and many other things of like kind.

MENO. It really is so.

Soc. The answer, Meno, was theatrical and pompous; and so it pleased you more than that which I gave you concerning figure.

MENO. Indeed it did.

Soc. And yet I persuade myself, O son of Alexidemos, that not this, but that other, was the better answer. I think too, that you yourself would be of the same opinion, if you are not, as you said you were yester-

issuing from it are, in the darkness of night, extinguished by the air, which is then void of that element; but that as soon as the air, from the return of day, is filled with light, whose essence is the same pure element of fire, the rays of light, issuing from the eye, unite themselves to their kindred element without; and being in motion themselves, put into the same motion those particles of outward light with which they are united: that rays of light are in this manner extended from the eye to all bodies within a certain distance, wherever the eye directs the motion of her own rays; that these rays of light, thus extended to the surface of those bodies, meet there with the finest effluvia issuing from them, which are particles of the same element of fire, mixed and coloured with particles of the other elements, carried with them out of the same bodies; a mixture or composition by the chemists called oil: that these effluvia naturally unite themselves with the rays of light falling on the surfaces of those bodies whence they are emitted, as being chiefly of the same nature; so that those rays of light, pure and uncoloured of themselves, participate now of the colour of these effluvia; and being reflected back from bodies, into which the effluvia, streaming forth, hinder them from entering, communicate their colour, in returning, to all those continuous particles of light between the object and the eye, with which they unite themselves; forming continued rays coloured by those effluvia, and reaching home to the eye, whose pores they thus enter. Modern philosophers account for colour from different refractions of the rays of light reflected.—S.

¹ As thus; that sound was air, violently forced out of some body stricken, and propagating its motion by strokes continually repeated along the element of air, until it reach the ear; in the same manner as colour along the rays of light, until it reach the eye: that odours were the subtle oily effluvia of bodies, united with the aerial, emitted together with them, and therefore mixing with the element of air, and conveyed along it to the organ of smell: that from moist bodies, applied to the palate, juices were expressed, a grosser oil, insinuating themselves immediately into the pores of the organ of taste: that the causes of heat and cold were the sulphureous and the nitrous particles of body, or of the circumambient air, penetrating the pores of the skin, and thus affecting with those different sensations the sense of feeling.—S.

day, under a necessity of going away before the mysteries, but could stay and be initiated.

MENO. But if you would tell me many other things such as this, I would certainly stay and hear them.

SOC. My best endeavours to say other such things shall certainly not be wanting, for my own sake as well as yours. But I fear I shall not be able to utter many sentences of that kind. But now it comes to your turn to try if you can perform your part of the engagement, in giving me an account of what virtue is, virtue in general, the same in all particular virtues. And do not go on, making many out of one; as is often said jocosely of those who pound or beat any thing to pieces. But leaving virtue as it is, whole and entire, define the nature of it, and tell me what it is. Patterns of such a definition you have had from me.

MENO. I think then, Socrates, that virtue is agreeably to that of the poet,

To feel a joy from what is fair,
And [o'er it] to have pow'r!—

and accordingly I say, that virtue is this; having the desire of things that are fair, to have it in our power to gain them.

SOC. I ask you then, whether you suppose the persons who desire things that are fair, to desire things that are good?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. In giving that definition of virtue then, did you suppose that some men there were who desire things which are evil, others who desire things which are good? Do you not think, my friend, that all men desire things which are good?

MENO. I do not.

SOC. But that some desire things which are evil?

MENO. I do.

SOC. Think you that these men desire things evil, with an opinion of

¹ This scrap of poetry is taken from some old lyric poet, whose works are not remaining: it is cited for this purpose, to prepare us for a matter of great importance, to be next brought upon the carpet.—S.

their

their being good? or that, knowing them to be evil, yet they nevertheless desire them?

MENO. I answer Yes to both those questions.

SOC. Is there any man then, do you imagine, who knowing the things which are evil to be what they are, that is, evil, yet nevertheless desires them?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. What do you mean, when you say he desires them? Do you not mean, that he desires to have them?

MENO. To have them. For what can I mean besides?

SOC. Does he desire them, think you, imagining that evil things are advantageous to the person who has them, or knowing that evil things are hurtful wherever they are?

MENO. There are persons who imagine of things which are indeed evil, that they are advantageous; and there are who know them to be hurtful.

SOC. Do you think that they know the evil things to be evil, those who imagine such evil things to be advantageous?

MENO. By no means do I think that.

SOC. Is it not then evident, that such persons desire not things evil, such as know not the nature of those things which they desire; but rather, that they desire things which they imagine to be good, but which in reality are evil? So that those who are ignorant of them, and falsely imagine them to be good, plainly desire good things. Do they not?

MENO. Such sort of persons, I must own, seem to be desirous of good things.

SOC. But those others, those who desire things which are evil, as you say, and who at the same time know that evil things are hurtful to the possessor, do they know that they themselves shall receive harm from those evil things in their having them?

MENO. It is clear that they must know it.

SOC. But know they not, that such as receive harm are in evil plight, so far as harm has befallen them?

MENO. This also must they know.

SOC. And know they not besides, that such as are in evil plight are unhappy too?

MENO.

MENO. I presume they do.

SOC. Is there any man then, who chooses to be in evil plight [†], and to be unhappy?

MENO. I suppose there is not any, Socrates.

SOC. No man, therefore, O Meno, wills or chooses any thing evil; if it be true, that no man wills or chooses to be in evil plight, or to be unhappy. For indeed what else is it to be thoroughly unhappy, than to desire things which are evil, and to have them our own?

MENO. I suspect that what you say, Socrates, is true. And no man wills or chooses any thing evil.

SOC. Did you not say just now, that virtue consisted in the willing or desiring things which are good, and in the having it in our power to gain them?

MENO. I did say so; it is true.

SOC. Is not this will or desire ^{*} according to what has been said in all men? so that, in this respect, one man is not at all better than another man.

MENO. It appears so.

SOC. It appears, therefore, that if one man is better than another, he must be so in respect of his power.

MENO. Undoubtedly.

SOC. This therefore, as it seems, according to your account, is virtue, the power of gaining things which are good.

MENO. The case seems to me, Socrates, to be entirely so, as you now state it.

[†] This is referable to that verse of an old poet, cited by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, lib. iii. cap. 5.

Οὐδεις ἔκων ποτὶς, οὐδ' ἀκων μακάρ.

No man in evil willingly can rest:
No man with good unwillingly is blest.—S.

^{*} In the Greek *τούτου λεχθέντος*. But it appears from Ficinus's translation, that in his manuscript it was read *ἐκ του λεχθέντος*. The sense requires this reading; and we presume, therefore, that it ought to be so printed. We have followed both the Basil editions, and all the translations, in making the sentence interrogative: and in all future editions of Plato we hope it will be so marked.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Let us examine then if this account of yours be true: for perhaps it may be so. You say, that to be able to gain good things is virtue.

MENO. I do.

Soc. Good things do you not call such things as health and riches, that is, the possession of gold and silver, honours also in the state, and offices in the government? You do not speak of any other things as good, beside things of this kind?

MENO. No other; I mean all such sort of things.

Soc. Well then, to get money ¹ is virtue; as says Meno, the hereditary guest of the great king ². But let me ask you a question concerning this point; whether you would choose to add something to this account of virtue, and to say that virtue is to get money honestly and religiously? or whether this addition makes no difference in your account; but that, however unjustly it be acquired, you call the mere acquisition of money, equally in any way, virtue?

¹ We learn from Xenophon (in *Expedit. Cyri*, lib. ii.) that the passion predominant in Meno's soul was the love of money; that his desire of honours and of power in the state was subservient to that other his master-passion; for, that he regarded power and honour no otherwise than as the means of accumulating wealth. In the passage, therefore, before us, it seems as if Plato meant, slyly and indirectly, to exhibit to us this strong feature in the character of Meno, or rather as if Socrates had a mind, in his usual jocular manner, to exhibit to Meno a true picture of himself.

² In the more antient times of Greece, whenever men, illustrious for their birth or station in life, travelled from one Grecian state or kingdom to another, or crossed the sea to Asia, with a view of observing the manners of other people, or of learning the policy of other governments (and they seldom travelled with any different view), they were always nobly entertained at the house of some great man in every country to which they came. Persons of inferior rank, whenever they travelled, which they rarely did, were everywhere treated courteously at the public costs. In the former case, that of private entertainment, not only the noble host himself became entitled to the same hospitable reception from his guest, if ever he should return the visit on a like occasion; but the rights of mutual hospitality accrued also from thence to the descendants of both the parties. Meno it seems had this connection with the Persian monarch, being himself, probably, as well as his friend Aristippus, descended from one of the antient kings of Thessaly. However this was, that his family was very noble appears from his appointment to the command of the forces which his country sent to the assistance of Cyrus, in his youthful time of life.—Thus much for the explanation of the passage now before us. The beauty of it arises from the opposition here seen between Meno's high rank, naturally productive of high spirit, and his sordid avarice, that passion of the meanest souls.—S.

MENO.

MENO. By no means; for, to acquire it unjustly, I call vice and wickedness.

SOC. By all means, therefore, as it appears, this acquisition of money ought to be accompanied by honesty, or prudence, or sanctity, or some other part of virtue; for otherwise it will not be virtue, notwithstanding it procures for us good things.

MENO. For without that how should it be virtue?

SOC. And if a man forbear to gain money, whether for himself or others, when he cannot gain it without dishonesty, is not the forbearance of this gain also virtue?

MENO. It is apparent.

SOC. Not the gaining of these good things, therefore, must be virtue, more than the forbearance of that gain; but, as it seems, that which comes accompanied by honesty is virtue; that which is without any thing of that kind is vice and wickedness.

MENO. I think it must of necessity be as you say.

SOC. Did we not say, a little while since, that honesty and prudence, and every thing of that kind, was a part of virtue?

MENO. We did.

SOC. Then, Meno, you are in jest with me.

MENO. How so, Socrates?

SOC. Because, when I had desired you, as I did just now, not to split virtue into pieces, and had given you patterns to copy after, that you might answer as you ought; you, without paying any regard to them, tell me that virtue is the power of gaining good things with honesty or justice; yet this, you say, is only a part of virtue.

MENO. I do.

SOC. It is to be collected then, from your own concessions, that with a part of virtue, to do whatever one does, this is virtue. For justice, you say, is but a part of virtue, and so of every other thing of like kind.

MENO. What then? granting that I say this.

SOC. It follows that, having been requested to tell me what the whole of virtue is, you are far from giving such a complete account of it: for you say, that every action is virtue which is performed with a part of virtue; as though you had already told me what virtue was in the whole, and that I should

should now know it when you come to split it into parts. We must therefore, as it seems to me, take the matter again from the beginning, and recur to this question, What is virtue? Or should every action, accompanied with a part of virtue, be said to be virtue itself? For it is saying this, to say that every action, accompanied with justice, is virtue.—Do you think there is no occasion for us to resume the same question; but that a man may know a part of virtue, what it is, without knowing what virtue is itself?

MENO. I think he cannot.

SOC. For, if you remember, when I answered just now your question concerning figure, we rejected such a kind of answer as aimed at explaining the proposed subject in terms not as yet confessedly understood, but whose meaning was still the subject of inquiry.

MENO. And we did right, Socrates, in rejecting such an answer.

SOC. I would not have you imagine then, while we are as yet inquiring what virtue is, the whole of it, that by answering in terms which signify the parts of virtue, you will be able to explain to any man the nature of virtue; or, indeed, that the nature of any other thing can be explained in such a way, but that still there will be need of repeating the same question what virtue is, that which is the subject of our conversation. Or do you think that I speak idly and nothing to the purpose?

MENO. I think you speak rightly.

SOC. Begin again, therefore, and tell me what it is you hold virtue to be, you and your friend Gorgias?

MENO. Socrates, I heard, before I had conversed with you, that the only part you take in conversation is this:—You pretend to be at a loss and doubtful yourself upon all subjects, and make others too no less to be at a loss what to think and say. You seem to be now playing the same conjurers tricks upon me; you manifestly use incantations to bewitch me, and to fill me with such perplexity that I know not what to say. If you will allow me to joke a little, I think you resemble exactly, not only in form but in other respects also, that broad sea-fish called the cramp-fish; for that too never fails to give a numbness to every person who either touches or approaches it¹. You seem
to

¹ The benumbing faculty of this fish, by which it is enabled to catch its prey, is mentioned by Aristotle, in his History of Animals, b. ix. c. 37, where he tells us that some persons have been

to have done some such thing at present to me, and to have benumbed me. For I actually suffer a kind of numbness and stupidity, both in mind and body, and find myself disabled from giving you any answer; and yet have I a thousand times discoursed much about virtue, and to many persons, and extremely well too, as I thought; but I am now not in the least able to tell so much as what virtue is. I think that you have acted very prudently in never going out of your own country either by sea or land. For if you was to behave in this manner in any other city where you are a stranger, you would run a risk of being driven thence as a magician or enchanter.

Soc. You are full of craftiness, Meno; and I was very near being deceived by you.

MENO. Tell me how, Socrates, I pray you?

Soc. I know with what design you brought a simile to which you likened me.

MENO. With what design now, do you imagine?

Soc. That I, on my part, might bring some simile or resemblance of you. For this I know to be true of all handsome persons, they love to have images and pictures made of them. And indeed it is their interest; for of handsome persons the pictures are handsome too. But I shall forbear the drawing of your picture in return. And as to that which you have produced of me, if the cramp-fish be itself numb, and through its numbness benumb others also, then am I like to it, but otherwise I am not. For I do not lead others into doubtfulness on any subject, and make them be at a loss what to say; when at the same time I can easily explain the matter in hand, and have no doubts at all within my own mind: but as I am entirely distressed for true definitions of things myself; in this condition I involve in the same distresses those with whom I am conversing. Thus at present concerning the nature of virtue; what it is, I, for my part, know not: you indeed knew formerly, perhaps, before that you had touched me; but now you are like one ¹ who
knows

eye-witnesses of the manner in which it is done. Plutarch, in his Treatise of the Sagacity of Animals, relates the matter more circumstantially; and farther assures us, that this power of the numb-fish not only operates on other fish, but on men too; and that it acts at some small distance, as well as through immediate touch.—S.

¹ In all the editions of the Greek, we here read *οὐκ ἴδωμι*; *εἰ οὐκ εἶδωμι*. This reading we have

knows nothing of the matter. I am desirous, however, of considering it together with you, and of our searching out jointly what kind of a thing virtue is.

MENO. But in what way, Socrates, will you search for a thing of which you are entirely ignorant? For by what mark which may discover it will you look for it when you know none of the marks that distinguish it? Or, if you should not fail of meeting with it, how will you discern it, when met with, to be the very thing you was in search of, and knew nothing of before?

SOC. I apprehend, Meno, what it is you mean. Do you observe how captious a way of reasoning you introduce? For it follows from hence, that it is impossible for a man to seek, either for that which he knows, or for that of which he is ignorant. For no man would seek to know what he knows, because he has the knowledge of it already, and has no need of seeking for what he has. Nor could any man seek for what he is ignorant of, because he would not know what he was seeking for.

MENO. Do you not think then, Socrates, that this way of reasoning is fair and right?

SOC. Not I, for my part.

MENO. Can you say in what respect it is wrong?

SOC. I can. For I have heard the sayings of men and women who were wise, and knowing in divine things?

MENO. What sayings?

SOC. Such as I think true, as well as beautiful.

MENO. But what sayings were they? and by whom were they uttered?

SOC. Those who uttered them were of the priests and priestesses, such as made it their business to be able to give a rational account of those things in which they were employed. The same sayings are delivered also by Pindar, and many other of the poets, as many as are divine. The sayings are these;

have followed in our translation, as thinking it to be right: but it is to be observed, that Ficinus seems, from his translation, to have read in his manuscript copy of Plato, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμοὶ σοφὸς εἰ μὴ εἶδέναι*. And as this reading produceth a sense agreeable to that mask of ignorance worn by Socrates throughout this dialogue, and wherever else he is introduced conversing with any of the sophists, or of their disciples, it deserves a place amongst the various readings which it will become a future editor of Plato to collect and publish.—S.

but do you consider with yourself whether you think them true. These persons then tell us that the soul of man is immortal ; that sometimes it ends ¹, which is called dying ; and that afterwards it begins again, but never is dissolved ; and that for this reason we ought to live, throughout our lives, with all sanctity. For

STROPHE.

* When guilt of lesser crimes the soul hath stain'd,
Not meriting sharp pains for aye ;
And eight dark dreary years she hath remain'd
In Hades, barr'd from gladd'ning day ;
Preserving all that time her sense
Of good, lamenting her lost innocence ;
With sorrow if her guilt she rue,
And Proserpine should deem that sorrow true,
She accepts in full atonement such repentance due.

ANTISTROPHE.

Then the ninth year sends back the soul to light,
And former objects here on earth :
Of these, thro' death, again she loses sight ;
Again to life renews her birth.
³ At length, two trials well endur'd,
The soul, to lesser virtues well inur'd,
Is born some king, for good renown'd ;
Or sage, well learn'd in wisdom's lore profound ;
Or hero, by his prowess spreading peace around.

EPODE.

¹ That is, ends its present life, and begins a new life. For as Plato observes justly in his *Phædo*, life and death succeed each other alternately throughout nature. In the passage, however, now before us, the ending of the human soul and its beginning again may be taken in different senses. The most obvious meaning is the dissolution of that body which it inhabits, and its departure into the seeds of a new body, which it then animates, and gradually forms suitable to its own temper and disposition. This sense is agreeable to those verses immediately after cited out of Pindar.—S.

² In translating the fine fragment of Pindar, which Plato has here preserved to us, we found ourselves under a necessity of paraphrasing very largely, to free it from that obscurity in which it would otherwise appear to an English reader, partly because of the conciseness of Pindar's style, and partly because of the sentiments, taken from the ancient mythology, with which our age is little acquainted. However, we have adhered closely to the sense of our original, completing it only from the same mythology, without adding any new thoughts or conceits of our own.—S.

³ In this place we have made our translation conformable to the reading found, as we presume, by Ficinus in the manuscript from which he translated, and taken notice of by Stephens in the
margin

EPODE.

Thro' goodness, wisdom, virtue, truly great ;
 And greatly meriting advancement high ;
 Loosen'd from body, wing'd and fleet,
 Freely she mounts to purest sky ;
 Ne'er more on earth to live, ne'er more to die.
 Amongst the gods in starry sheen,
 Far off and wide thro' Nature seen,
 She fixes her abode ;
 Assuming her celestial throne,
 To godlike state of being grown,
 A deathless demi-god.
 Thence thro' the rest of time,
 In hymns religious and in holy rhyme,
 Mortals below shall lift their lays,
 The deathless demi-god to praise ;
 Who, freed from earthy dross,
 And ev'ry element of body gross,
 To intellectual bliss in heav'nly seat could climb.

The soul then being immortal, having been often born, having beheld the things which are here, the things which are in Hades, and all things, there is nothing of which she has not gained the knowledge. No wonder, therefore, that she is able to recollect, with regard to virtue as well as to other things, what formerly she knew. For all things in nature being linked together in relationship, and the soul having heretofore known all things, nothing hinders but that any man, who has recalled to mind, or, according to the common phrase, who has learnt, one thing only, should of himself recover all his ancient knowledge, and find out again all the rest of things ; if he has but courage, and faints not in the midst of his researches. For inquiry and learning is reminiscence¹ all. We therefore ought not to hearken to that sophistical way of reasoning afore-mentioned ; for our believing it to be true would make us idle. And, accordingly, the indolent, and such as are averse to

margin of his edition. Not only the sense of the fragment is bettered by that reading, but Plato's illustration of it evidently shows that he read it so himself.—S.

¹ For a defence of reminiscence, which Plato justly considers as ranking among the most important doctrines of philosophy, see the notes on the *Phædo*.—T.

taking pains, delight to hear it. But this other way of thinking, which I have just now given you an account of, makes men diligent, sets them at work, and puts them upon inquiry. And as I believe it to be true, I am willing, with your assistance, to inquire into the nature of virtue.

MENO. With all my heart, Socrates. But say you this absolutely, that we do not learn any thing; and that all, which we call learning, is only reminiscence? Can you teach me to know this doctrine to be true?

SOC. I observed to you before how full you are of craftiness, O Meno. And, to confirm my observation, you now ask me if I can teach you; I, who say that there is no such thing as teaching, but that all our knowledge is reminiscence; that I may appear directly to contradict myself.

MENO. Not so, Socrates, by Jupiter. I did not express myself in those terms with any such design; but merely from habit, and the common usage of that expression. But if any way you can prove to me that your doctrine is true, do so.

SOC. This is by no means an easy task. However, for your sake, I am willing to try and do my utmost. Call hither to me then one of those your numerous attendants, whichever you please, that I may prove in him the truth of what I say.

MENO. I will, gladly. Come hither, you.

SOC. Is he a Grecian, and speaks he the Greek language?

MENO. Perfectly well. He was born in my own family.

SOC. Be attentive now, and observe whether he appears to recollect within himself, or to learn any thing from me.

MENO. I shall.

SOC. Tell me, boy; do you know what a square space is? Is it of such a figure as (fig. 1) this?

Boy.

* The best explanatory notes to this part of the Dialogue will be mathematical figures, drawn after the manner of those used in demonstrating geometrical propositions. Socrates is here supposed, in the first place, to draw a square; and afterwards, while he is putting questions to the boy, he is supposed to be drawing new lines, such as form and bound the several other figures of which he speaks. But, in reading, the figures must be represented as already drawn; and therefore, in every part of the process, a new figure is necessary. All these we have exhibited together, printed from a copper plate; numbering each figure, and referring to each, in its proper place, by the same number. Such figures ought to have been printed in the editions of Plato himself. The

editors

Boy. It is.

Soc. A square space then is that which has (fig. 2) all these lines equal, AB, BC, CD, DA, four in number.

Boy. It is so truly.

Soc. Has it not also (fig. 3) these lines, which are drawn through the middle of it, AC and BD, equal each to the other?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Cannot you imagine a space, square like this, but larger; and another such, but lesser?

Boy. Yes, for certain.

Soc. Now if (fig. 2) the side AB should be two feet long, and the side AD should be two feet long also, how many feet square will the whole space contain? Consider it in this manner. If, in the side AB, the space should be two feet long, and in the side AD it should be but one foot; would not the square be that of two feet once told?

Boy. It would.

Soc. But since it is two feet this way as well as the other way, is it not a space of two feet twice told?

Boy. Just so.

Soc. It is then a space of two feet¹?

Boy. So it is.

Soc. How many feet are twice two? reckon them, and tell me.

Boy. Four feet, Socrates.

Soc. May not a space be made (fig. 4), EFGH, double to that other in size, but of the same kind, having, like that, all its sides equal?

Boy. Yes, sure.

Soc. How many square feet then will this space be of?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Come now, try and tell me, of what length is each of the sides in this square space. Now the sides of that square, you know, we have sup-

editors of Aristotle have not been so much wanting in this respect, where it was necessary: though sometimes indeed, through carelessness, they have printed wrong figures, which are worse than none; as, for instance, equilateral triangles instead of right-angled.—S.

¹ Meaning square feet.—S.

posed to be two feet long. Of what length then are the sides of this square, which is double in largeness to that other?

Boy. It is plain, Socrates, that they are twice as long.

Soc. You see, Meno, that I teach him none of these things which he asserts; I only ask him questions. And now this boy imagines that he knows of what length the lines are which contain a space of eight square feet. Do you not think he does?

MENO. I do.

Soc. And does he really know?

MENO. Certainly not.

Soc. But he imagines them to be twice as long as the lines, which contain a space of four square feet.

MENO. He does.

Soc. I now view him ready to recollect, from this time forward, rightly and as he ought. Now hear me, boy. You say that lines, double in length to the sides of the square $ABCD$, contain a space double to it in largeness: I mean a space of the same kind; not one way long, the other way short; but every way of equal length, like the space $ABCD$, only twice as large, that is (fig. 4), a space of eight square feet¹. Consider now whether you still think this square $EFGH$ to be measured by a line twice as long as the line which measures the square $ABCD$.

Boy. I do.

Soc. Suppose we add to the line AB , from hence, from the point B , another line of equal length (fig. 5), the line BI . Is not the line AI of a length double to that of the line AB ?

Boy. Yes, sure.

Soc. Now, from the line AI , do you say that a space will be made of eight square feet, if four lines, each of them as long as the line AI , be drawn so as to contain space?

Boy. I do.

Soc. Let us then draw (fig. 6) these four equal lines so as to contain space, AI , IK , KL , LA . Is this space now any other than that which you say is of eight square feet?

¹ Meaning a square equal in largeness to eight square feet.

Boy. No ; it is the very same.

Soc. Are there not in this space AIKL these (fig. 7) four spaces, ABMO, BIPM, MPKN, NLOM, each of which is equal to that space of four square feet, ABCD ?

Boy. So there be.

Soc. How large is the whole space AIKL ? Is it not four times as large as the space ABCD ?

Boy. To be sure it is.

Soc. Is it only double now to the space ABCD, when it is four times as large ?

Boy. No, by Jupiter.

Soc. What proportion then has it to the space ABCD ?

Boy. A quadruple one ¹.

Soc. From a line, therefore, double in length, is drawn a square space, not double, but quadruple, in largeness.

Boy. Why, it is very true.

Soc. Four times four make sixteen : do they not ?

Boy. They do.

Soc. But from a line of what length is to be drawn a square, such a one as we suppose (fig. 4) the square EFGH to be, that is a space of eight square feet ? You see that from the (fig. 6) line AI is drawn a square, quadruple in largeness to the square ABCD.

Boy. I see it.

Soc. And from the line AB, which is half of the line AI (fig. 6), a square, you see, is drawn, which is but the fourth part of the square AK.

Boy. It is.

Soc. Well ; but that square of eight feet EFGH, is it not twice as large as the square ABCD, and half as large as the square AIKL ?

Boy. It is so, to be sure.

¹ We may observe that this boy, whom Meno seems to have chosen out from his retinue on account of his ignorance and total want of education, is represented as not wholly ignorant of common arithmetic. Perhaps Socrates meant to gain some ground in his argument by this circumstance ; insinuating, that the principles of the art of numbering were natural to man, and required no teaching. Accordingly we find that the most barbarian nations, and the most uncultured persons in those which are civilized, acquire of themselves so much of that art as is necessary for the uses of common life.—S.

Soc. Must it not then be drawn from a line longer than the line AB , and shorter than the line AI ?

Boy. I think it must.

Soc. You say well; for speak that only which you think. And tell me, was not the line AB supposed to be two feet long, and the line AI four feet long?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. The side therefore of the square $EFGH$ must be shorter than a line of four feet, and longer than a line of two feet.

Boy. It must so.

Soc. Try now, and tell me how long you think it is.

Boy. Three feet long.

Soc. If then it be so, let us take half of the line BI (fig. 8), namely, BQ , and add it to the line AB ; and now this line AQ will be such a line as you speak of, a line three feet long. For the lines AB , BI , are each of them two feet long, and the line BQ is half of the line BI , and therefore is one foot long. In the same manner, let us take half of the line OL , namely OR , and add it to the line AO ; and thus the line AR will be three feet long also. For the lines AO , OL , are each of them two feet long, and the line OR is one foot long. From these two lines, AQ , AR , let us complete the square $AQSR$; and it is such a square as you were speaking of, the square of a line three feet long.

Boy. It is so.

Soc. If then the whole space be three feet long and three feet broad, it is a space of thrice three feet.

Boy. It appears so to be.

Soc. And how many feet are thrice three?

Boy. Nine.

Soc. But how many feet were there to be in a square twice as large as the square $ABCD$?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. It is not true then that from a line three feet long is to be drawn a square containing only eight square feet.

Boy. It is not.

Soc. Try and tell us then exactly how long the line must be from which
such

such a square is to be drawn. Or, if you choose not to tell us the measure of it in numbers ¹, at least point out to us from what line it may be drawn ².

BOY. Now, by Jove, Socrates, I do not know.

SOC. Do you observe, Meno, what progress this boy has already made, and whereabouts he is, in the way to recollection? You see that, from the beginning of his examination, he knew not from what line a square eight feet large was to be drawn; as indeed neither does he yet know; but he then fancied that he knew, and answered boldly as a knowing person would, without suspecting that he should ever be at a loss for a true answer. But he now finds himself at a loss, and thinks himself as ignorant as he really is.

MENO. You say what is true.

SOC. Is he not then in a better disposition with regard to the matter which he was ignorant of?

MENO. I agree with you in this too.

SOC. In making him therefore to be at a loss what to answer, and in benumbing him after the manner of the cramp-fish, have we done him any harm?

MENO. I think, we have not.

SOC. And more than this, we have advanced him a little, as it seems, in the way of finding out the truth in the subject laid before him. For, being now sensible of his ignorance, he is prepared to seek and to inquire. But he then fancied, that he could readily, at any time, and in the presence of any number of people, show with certainty, that a square, twice as large as some other square, was produced from a line twice as long.

MENO. So it seemed.

SOC. Think you then, that he would have set about seeking or learning that, which, however ignorant of it, he fancied that he knew; till he had

¹ If Socrates had not added this, he would seem to have put the boy on telling what was impossible for him to tell. For how long the side is of a square, equal in largeness to eight square feet, is impossible to be told in any whole number.—S.

² For it lay before his eyes; being the line A C (fig. 3), the diameter of the square A B C D.—S.

found himself at a loss, and felt his ignorance; and was become therefore desirous of finding it out?

MENO. I think, Socrates, that he never would.

Soc. The benumbing him then was of advantage to him.

MENO. I think it was.

Soc. Now observe how, from this sense of his ignorance, he will find out the truth in searching for it with me; though the part which I shall bear in the inquiry will be merely to ask questions, and not to teach. But be sure to mind, if any where you can catch me teaching or telling him any thing, instead of asking him his own opinions. Now, boy, tell me, is not this space (fig. 2) ABCD our square, four feet large? Do you apprehend me?

Boy. I do.

Soc. Suppose we add to it this other square (fig. 9) BTUC, equal to it in largeness?

Boy. Well.

Soc. And a third square too, this (fig. 10), DCWX, equal in largeness to either of the others?

Boy. Very well.

Soc. What, if we add another square of equal size, to fill up the corner here, this (fig. 11), UCWY?

Boy. Very well: and so it does.

Soc. Are not then these four squares equal all, ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. This whole large square then, ATYX, how much larger is it than the square ABCD?

Boy. Four times as big.

Soc. But we wanted a square only twice as big. Do you not remember?

Boy. I remember it very well.

Soc. Do not these lines, which I draw from corner to corner in each of these squares (fig. 12), BD, BU, DW, WU, cut each square in half?

Boy. They do.

Soc.

Soc. Are not these four lines drawn of equal length, these, which enclose the square space, BDWU?

Boy. They be so.

Soc. Now consider, how large this square is which is enclosed by those four lines.

Boy. Why, I do not know.

Soc. Are not those four squares (fig. 12), ABCD, BTUC, CDXW, WYUC, cut each of them in half by these four lines, BD, BU, DW, WU, drawn within them; or are they not?

Boy. They be.

Soc. In the square (fig. 12), ATYX, how many spaces are there then, as large as the space ABCD?

Boy. Four.

Soc. And how many such in the square (fig. 12), BDWU, from which half the other is cut off?

Boy. Two.

Soc. How many more are four than two?

Boy. Twice as many.

Soc. How many square feet then doth this square, BDWU, contain?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. From what line is it drawn?

Boy. From this here.

Soc. From (fig. 12) the line BD, do you say, reaching from corner to corner of the square ABCD, which contains four square feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. The sophists call such a line the diameter. If the diameter then be its name, from the diameter of a square, as you say, you boy of Meno's, may be drawn a square twice as large as the square of which it is the diameter¹.

Boy.

¹ This theorem, said to have been discovered by Pythagoras, is perhaps the most beautiful of all simple theorems in geometry: and yet is not to be found, in express terms, among those fundamental theorems, demonstrated in Euclid's Elements. It is cited, however, in the demonstration of the last proposition in the tenth book: and a reference is there made to the 47th proposition of the first book; in which indeed this fine theorem is implicitly contained: for

Boy. It is so, Socrates, for certain.

Soc. Well; what think you, Meno? Has this boy, in his answers, given any other opinion than his own?

MENO. None other: he has given his own opinion only.

Soc. And yet, but a little before, as we both observed, he had no knowledge of the matter proposed, and knew not how to give a right answer.

MENO. True.

Soc. But those very opinions, which you acknowledge to be his own, were in him all the time: were they not?

MENO. They were.

Soc. In a man therefore, who is ignorant, there are true opinions concerning those very things of which he is ignorant.

MENO. It appears there are.

Soc. Those opinions then are stirred up afresh in the mind of that boy, as fancies are in dreaming. And if he should frequently be questioned of these things, and by many different persons, you may be assured he will at length know them with as much certainty as any man.

MENO. Indeed, it seems so.

Soc. Will he not then know them without being taught them, having only been asked questions, and recovering of himself from within himself his lost knowledge?

MENO. He will.

Soc. But our recovery of knowledge from within ourselves, is not this what we call reminiscence?

MENO. Without doubt.

Soc. And this knowledge, which he now has, must he not at some time or other have acquired it, or else have always been possessed of it?

MENO. Certainly.

Omne majus continet in se minus.—Proclus, in his Commentary on the First Book of those Elements, admires Euclid, because the noble theorem, introduced here by Plato, relating only to right-angled isosceles-triangles, is by Euclid extended to all right-angled triangles, scalene as well as isosceles. We heartily join with him in this admiration; but could wish that the original theorem of Pythagoras had been subjoined, as a corollary, to that truly admirable proposition, the 47th.—S.

Soc.

SOC. Now if he was always possessed of it, he was always a person of knowledge. But if at any time he first received it, was it not in this present life? unless some person has taught him the science of geometry. For he will make his answers with no less certainty in every part of geometry, and indeed in all the other mathematical sciences ¹. Is there any one, then, who has taught the boy all this? I ask you; because you ought to know, since he was born and bred up in your family.

MENO. I am certain that no person has ever taught him those sciences.

SOC. And yet he entertains those opinions, which he has just now declared: does he not?

MENO. It appears, Socrates, that he must.

SOC. If then he had this knowledge within him ², not having acquired it in this present life, it is plain that in some other time he had learnt it and actually possessed it.

MENO. It appears so.

SOC. And was not that time then, when he was not a man?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. If true opinions then are in him, at both these times, the time when he is ³, and the time when he is not a man; opinions which, awakened and roused by questions ⁴, rise up into science; must not his soul be well furnished with this discipline ⁵ throughout all ages? for it is plain, that in every age he either is, or is not a man.

MENO. In all appearance it must be so.

¹ For every mathematical demonstration depends on viewing equal and unequal, like and unlike, in all computations, in all diagrams, and in all measures, whether of sound or of motion.—S.

² In the Greek we here find a negative, *οὐκ ᾔδει τούτο*, which, however, if it be retained, alters not the sense upon the whole; but the sentence is then to be translated thus; "If then, not having acquired this knowledge in the present life, just now he had it not," (because he had forgotten it;) &c. But the meaning seems easier to be conceived, if the *οὐκ* be omitted.—S.

³ Future editors of Plato may consider, whether we ought not here to read *ὅταν ἢ χρονον*, instead of *ὅταν ἢ χρόνον*. Cornarius also, we find, has made this emendation.—S.

⁴ We have here supposed, that the Greek of this place should be thus read, *αἱ αὖ ἐρωτήσεις ἐπηρεύθηναι*.—S.

⁵ That is, with the principles of science essential to the soul of man.—S.

SOC.

Soc. If the truth of things ¹ therefore is always in the soul, the soul should be immortal. So that whatever you happen now not to know, that is, not to remember, you ought to undertake with confidence to seek within yourself, and recall it to your mind.

MENO. You seem to me, Socrates, some how or other to speak rightly.

Soc. As to my own part, Meno, I would not contend very strenuously for the truth of my argument in other respects; but that in thinking it our duty to seek after the knowledge of things we are at present ignorant of, we should become better men, more manly, and less idle, than if we suppose it not possible for us to find out, nor our duty to inquire into, what we know not; this I would, if I was able, strongly, both by word and deed, maintain.

MENO. In this also, Socrates, you seem to me to say well.

Soc. Since then we are agreed in this point, that what a man knows not, he ought to inquire after and seek to know, are you willing that we attempt jointly to inquire into the nature of virtue?

MENO. By all means, willing. Not but that I should have most pleasure in taking into consideration, and hearing what you have to say on the question I first asked you, whether, in setting about our inquiries concerning virtue, we should consider it as a thing that may be taught, or as being by nature with those who have it, or as attainable by some other means, and what they are.

Soc. Were I to govern not only myself, Meno, but you too, we would not consider whether virtue could be taught or not, before we had inquired, in the first place, what virtue was. But since you, without so much as attempting to govern yourself, for fear (I suppose) of being less free and less a gentleman, undertake however to govern me, and actually do govern me, I shall yield to you. For indeed how can I help myself? or what is to be done without it? We are to consider then, it seems, what belongs to some certain thing, whilst yet we know not what the thing is. But if you

¹ The words of Plato are *αληθεια των οντων*.—The truth or reality of all things which are, depends on the truth of the first principles of things. For truth metaphysical is here meant. But in truths logical it is the same: all these depend on the truth of the first principles of science.—S.

still persist, however relax a little the strictness of your command, and suffer the question, whether virtue can be taught a man, or how otherwise it is attained, to be considered hypothetically. By hypothetically I mean in the same manner as geometers often treat a question; for instance, when they are asked concerning some geometrical figure¹, whether it is possible for (fig. 13) such a particular triangle to be inscribed² in (fig. 14) such a particular circle. A geometer would answer,—I know not³ as yet, of what kind this triangle is⁴. But I can make a supposition, which I think may be of use in answering your question,—this;—Supposing the triangle to be of such a kind, as that a circle being drawn about⁵ a given side of it, the whole space of the triangle be included within the circular space described around it⁶, the consequence will then be one thing; but quite another consequence will follow, if it cannot be so included⁷. Laying

¹ Or rather the largeness of the space contained in that figure. The words of Plato are *περι χωρίου*. And *χωρίον* was a term used by the old Greek mathematicians to signify the space comprehended by the lines of any geometrical figure.—S.

² The Greek word here is *εμβαθύνει*, that is, *to be extended within*. The meaning of which words seems, at first sight, to be the same with that of *εγγραφισθαι* in Euclid's Elements, Lib. iv. Def. 3. But probably there is a difference between them, as will presently be remarked.—S.

³ The angles of this triangle being not, as yet, either measured or supposed.—S.

⁴ Whether right-angled, obtuse, or acute-angled.—S.

⁵ It seems necessary here to make a small alteration in the text as it is printed: by reading ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΝ ΔΟΘΕΙΣΑΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΓΡΑΜΜΗΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΕΙΝΑΝΤΑ, instead of *παρα* and *παρτείναντα*.—Περιτείνειν seems, at first view, to have the same meaning with *περιγραφειν* in the fourth book of Euclid's Elements. The difference between them, as also between *εντείνειν* and *εγγραφειν*, will be conjectured in a subsequent note.—S.

⁶ If the alteration, made in the preceding note, be just, we are obliged, in consequence of it, to read here ΠΕΡΙΤΕΤΑΜΕΝΟΝ in the Greek, instead of *παρτεταμένον*, the word in Stephen's edition. The former editions, by a mistake still greater, give us *παρτεταμένον*. For want of this small emendation, Grynæus, who undertook to amend Ficinus's translation, was led to fancy I know not what parallelograms; which throw so much obscurity over this whole passage, that the true meaning of it has never since been so much as conjectured. Ficinus himself indeed seems to have had a shrewd guess at it, even without making the emendation; as appears by his marginal reference to the fourth book of Euclid's Elements, and by the triangles he presents us with.—S.

⁷ That is, if it be impossible to include the whole triangle within that circle, which is drawn about one of its sides. And impossible this is, when some part of the circle *ὑπερβαλλει* exceeds, or reaches beyond the circle; and *οὐκ ἔλλειπει* does not full within it, as it does in the other, the case put first. See the figures referred to. It seems to be supposed in both the cases, that it may appear by inspection, or be found by mensuration of the diameters, whether a circle, drawn about the given side of the triangle, be equal or unequal to the circle given.—S.

down therefore these two hypotheses distinctly, I can tell you what will follow, in each of these cases¹, as to the inscribing that triangle within the circle, whether it be impossible or possible. Now the same way shall we take in our inquiry concerning virtue: since we know not, either what it is, or what is to be attributed to it, we shall lay down an hypothesis concerning it; and, on the footing of that hypothesis, shall consider whether it is to be taught or not. Let us then state the question thus: Supposing virtue to be in that order of things which belongs to the soul, is virtue, on this hypothesis, to be taught, or not to be taught? In the first place, it is either a different kind of thing from knowledge, or a thing of the same kind with knowledge: and on each of these hypotheses let us inquire, whether virtue is or is not to be taught, or (as we lately expressed it) recalled to mind; for whichever of these expressions we use, let it make no difference to us. The question is then, whether virtue is to be taught. Now is it not evident to every one, that man is taught no other thing than knowledge?

MENO. To me it seems so.

Soc.

¹ In stating the question, it must be supposed as evident, that the given side of the triangle is not greater than the diameter of the given circle. For if it be greater, no such question can be proposed by any man; the absurdity of it, or impossibility of the thing proposed to be done, appears too plainly.—It should seem also, that this given side is to be made the diameter of the circle to be drawn, by taking the middle point of this side for the centre. For thus, and thus only, can the circle properly be said *περιτείνεσθαι περι την δοθεσαν γραμμην*, to be drawn around or about the given side. If this be granted; then, in the case which is put first (the possible one), that angle of the triangle, which is subtended by the given side, must be either (fig. 15) a right angle, or (fig. 16) an obtuse angle: in the other (the impossible) case, that angle must be (fig. 17) acute. If the angle be supposed a right angle, then will the circle drawn be *περιγεγραμμενον*, circumscribed about the triangle; and the triangle may also *εγγραφεσθαι*, be inscribed within the equal given circle: for every angle of it would touch the circumference of that circle. Now in the case, first supposed by Plato, had he meant this only, we presume he would have used those very words of Euclid, *περιγεγραμμενον* and *εγγραφεσθαι*. For Euclid, the author of the Elements, was one of Plato's disciples; and it is probable, besides, that the terms of geometry were settled before the time of Plato. But if the angle in question be supposed (fig. 18) an obtuse angle, then though the triangle may *εγγραφεσθαι*, be inscribed in a circle, whose diameter is greater than the side subtending the obtuse angle; yet it cannot *εγγραφεσθαι*, be inscribed (fig. 16) in a circle, whose diameter is equal to that side. However, it may properly enough be said *ενταλναι*, to be extended within such a circle; because the utmost extent of it is included within that circle. And just in the same manner, though such a circle (fig. 16) cannot be said, in speaking strictly, and according to Euclid's definition, *περιγεγραμμενον*, to be circumscribed about it; yet is the circle *περιτεννόμενον*, stretched

Soc. If virtue, therefore, be a certain kind of knowledge, it is evident that virtue is to be taught.

MENO. Undoubtedly.

Soc. We have quickly then dispatched this part of the inquiry; and are fairly come to this conclusion, that if virtue be a thing of the same kind with knowledge, it is to be taught; otherwise not.

MENO. Very true.

Soc. Next after this, it seems, that we should consider whether virtue be knowledge or of a kind different from knowledge.

MENO. We ought, I think, in the next place to consider this.

Soc. Well now; shall we suppose that virtue is a thing which is good; and shall we abide by this hypothesis, laying it down for certain that virtue is something good?

MENO. By all means.

Soc. Now if there be also any other good separated from knowledge, then perhaps virtue may not be a certain kind of knowledge. But if there be no sort of good which is not comprehended under knowledge, then a suspicion that virtue was knowledge of a certain kind would be a just suspicion.

MENO. What you say is true.

Soc. But further; is it not through virtue that we are good?

MENO. It is.

Soc. And if good, then advantageous. For all things that are good are advantageous: are they not?

MENO. They are.

Soc. Virtue then is a thing advantageous too.

stretched around it, and contains it. So by the Greek historians is a wall said περιτεισθαι, around a camp or a city, when the wall furrounds and encloses it, although no tent or house should touch the wall. But Plato's meaning is, we think, put out of dispute by the word ελλειπειν, which agrees not to a triangle that touches the circle by every one of its angles; and is compatible only to a triangle, one angle of which, at the least, falls short of the circumference of that (fig. 16) circle drawn around it. Ελλειπειν is also opposed to υπερβαλλειν. And in the latter case, supposed by Plato, where the whole triangle cannot be contained within the (fig. 17) circle drawn about the given side, the angle, which is subtended by this side, must be an acute angle; and the sides, which contain this angle, will, to meet and form the angle, reach beyond the circumference of the circle.—S.

MENO. It follows of necessity from what we just now granted.

Soc. Now let us consider what sort of things those are which profit and are advantageous to us; enumerating the particulars: health, we all say, and strength, and beauty, and riches. These things and others of like kind we call advantageous: do we not?

MENO. We do.

Soc. And say we not, that these very things are sometimes hurtful to us? or do you pronounce otherwise?

MENO. No otherwise; I say the same.

Soc. Consider now, what is the leading cause when any of these things profit us; and¹ what when they hurt us. Is it not, when right use presides in the management of them, that they profit us, and when right use is wanting, that they hurt us?

MENO. Certainly so.

Soc. Further then, let us consider things belonging to the soul. Do you admit that temperance is something in the soul; and so of justice, and fortitude, and docility, and memory, and magnanimity, and all things of like kind?

MENO. I do.

Soc. Now consider such of these things, as you think not to consist in knowledge, but to be of a kind different from knowledge. Do not these procure us sometimes hurt, and sometimes advantage? for instance, fortitude; unless fortitude is not where prudence is wanting: let our instance then be boldness. When a man is bold without reason or understanding, does he not incur mischief? And when he is bold rationally and wisely, does he not gain advantage?

MENO. It is true.

Soc. Is it not true of temperance also, and docility, that to a man who

¹ We have made our translation here conformable to the text of Plato, as printed by Stephens, and explained in the margin of his edition, *ὅταν τι, βλαπτει*. But we suspect an error in those words, and that the right reading is, *ὅταν μη, βλαπτει*. For if Plato wrote *τι*, *wrong use* ought to be mentioned in what immediately follows. But it is not; and rightly not: because wrong use is nothing positive, and can manage nothing; it is only the want of right use. As a crooked line is nothing certain or determinate; it is a deviation only from a straight line.—S.

has learnt and is provided with them, if his soul at the same time be fraught with understanding, they are advantageous; but, if he wants understanding, they are hurtful?

MENO. Most undoubtedly.

SOC. In a word, all the abilities of the soul, whether they be of the active kind or of the passive, under the conduct of prudence, do they not tend to happiness; but managed with imprudence, do they not produce the contrary effect?

MENO. It is probable they do.

SOC. If virtue then be one of those things belonging to the soul, and if it be of necessity, as you say, always advantageous, virtue must be prudence: for we see, that all other things belonging to the soul are of themselves neither advantageous nor hurtful; but let there be added to them imprudence or prudence, and they thus become either hurtful or advantageous. Now according to this reasoning, virtue being always advantageous, must be some kind of prudence.

MENO. To me it seems so.

SOC. Now then as to those other things, which we said just now were sometimes beneficial and sometimes hurtful, riches, and the rest of external goods; I ask whether or no as prudence, presiding in the soul, and governing her other powers and possessions, applies them to our advantage; and as imprudence, having the lead, turns them all to mischief; whether in the same manner the soul, rightly using and administering those outward things, employs them for our benefit, but by a wrong use renders them prejudicial and pernicious?

MENO. Most certainly.

SOC. And are not things administered and used rightly by a soul possessed of prudence; but amiss and ill by a soul possessed with folly?

MENO. They are.

SOC. Thus then we may pronounce it to hold good universally: to man all external things¹ depend on his soul; and all things belonging to the soul itself depend on prudence for their being good and beneficial to him. Now

¹ In the Greek *τα αλλα*, all other things; all which are not within the soul. The stoical word we have used is exactly agreeable to the mind of Plato.—S.

it follows from this reasoning, that prudence is always advantageous. But did we not just now say the same of virtue too?

MENO. True.

SOC. We conclude, therefore, that prudence is virtue; either the whole of virtue, or some part at least.

MENO. What has been said seems to me, Socrates, to have been well said.

SOC. If then it be so, the good are not good by nature.

MENO. It seems to me, they are not.

SOC. For then, this too would follow. If the good were good by nature we should have, somewhere or other, persons who knew which of our youth were good and virtuous in their natures; and these, when they had discovered them to us, we should take and guard in the citadel, putting our seal on them more carefully than we should on gold; that no person might corrupt them, and that when they arrived at the age of manhood, they might become useful to the state.

MENO. It is likely, Socrates, that in that case this would be done.

SOC. Since the good, therefore, are not good by nature, whether are they good by teaching or not?

MENO. I think it now necessary to hold this in the affirmative. And it is plain, Socrates, that if virtue be knowledge, according to our hypothesis before, then it may be taught.

SOC. Perhaps so, by Jove. But I fear we did amiss in admitting that hypothesis.

MENO. And yet very lately it seemed to be maintained fairly.

SOC. But I suspect, it ought not only to have lately seemed to be maintained fairly, but to seem so at present, and hereafter too, if there be any thing in it sound or faultless.

MENO. What is the matter now? in what respect do you find fault with it? and why doubt of its being true, that virtue is a kind of knowledge?

SOC. I will tell you, Meno. That virtue is to be taught, supposing it to be a science, or some kind of knowledge, this position of ours I call not into question, nor have any doubt of its being true. But consider whether I appear not to have reason for doubting the truth of the supposition, that

virtue

virtue is a kind of knowledge. For answer me to this question; whatever is taught, I speak not of virtue only, but of every other subject of discipline or teaching, must there not be of necessity both teachers of it and scholars?

MENO. I think there must.

SOC. That thing, therefore, on the contrary, of which there are neither teachers nor scholars to be found, should we not think rightly, in thinking it probable that it is not the subject of teaching?

MENO. True. But do you really think that no masters are to be found who teach virtue?

SOC. Though I have often sought about, and inquired if there were any teachers of virtue, with my utmost endeavours I cannot find any. And yet I invite many persons to join with me in the search, especially such as I might presume to have the most experience in that affair. And just now, Meno, in happy time, is this man¹ sat down by us, who may be a party in our inquiry. And it should seem reasonable for us to make him a party: for, in the first place, he is the son of the wealthy and the wise Anthemion, a man who is become rich, not by accident, nor yet by legacy, as he has done to whom the riches of Polycrates² are now of late devolved, Ismenias³ of Thebes, but having acquired his wealth through his own wisdom and industry; and then as to his other good qualities, he is a citizen who is thought neither contemptuous and insolent, nor ostentatious and giving.

¹ Shewing Anytus to Meno, without mentioning his name, because Meno was well acquainted with him, as being at that time entertained at his house. It is probable, that Anytus had now seated himself close to Socrates, to catch at some words or other in his discourse with Meno, for a better handle to the accusation he was now meditating against him.—S.

² The Polycrates, whom we presume to be here meant, was tyrant of Samos, so famous for succeeding in every affair that he engaged in, (as we learn from Herodotus, lib. iii.) that Lucian, in his *Charon*, calls him *πανευδαίμων*, *fortunate in all things*; and so immensely rich, that the same Lucian, in his *πλοιοι*, ranks him with Cræsus in that respect. The unhappy end he met with, in being murdered by one of his slaves, at the procurement of one of his courtiers, Orontes, a Persian nobleman by birth, who seized on all his vast riches, was fortunate for Ismenias, to whom at length they came by legacy.—S.

³ Ismenias was commander in chief of all the Theban forces, and ambassador from Thebes at the court of Artaxerxes, where he ingratiated himself so much by his address, in complying with the ceremonial of that haughty court, without departing from the dignity of a free Grecian, that he not only met with success in the public ends of his embassy, but obtained that prodigious increase.

giving trouble to all about him, but behaves decently and conducts himself like a modest and frugal man. And besides all this, he has educated and instructed his son here excellently well, in the opinion of the Athenian multitude; for they elect him to the highest offices in the state. Such men it is right to make of our party, when we are inquiring after masters who teach virtue, whether any are to be found and who they are. Join yourself therefore, Anytus, to us, to me, and Meno here, your guest at Athens, in our inquiry concerning virtue, who are the teachers of it. And consider the question thus; Suppose this Meno had an inclination to be made a good physician, and applied to us for our advice in the affair, to what masters should we send him? should we not send him to the physicians?

ANY. By all means.

Soc. And to make him a good carrier¹, should we not send him to the carriers?

ANY. To be sure.

Soc. And in all other subjects of instruction, should we not take the same way?

ANY. Without doubt.

Soc. But concerning this point, let me ask you another question. In sending him to the physicians, we say we should do well, if we intended the making him a good physician. Now when we say this, do we not mean, that we should act with prudence in sending him, not to any who profess not the art of healing, but to those who make it their profession; and who, besides, are paid for teaching² it to others; and thus, by this very acceptance of pay, take upon themselves to teach any one who is willing to come and

increase of his private fortune, the inheritance of Orontes, left to him probably by the last of Orontes's descendants. That piece of address, however, as related by Plutarch in his *Life of Artaxerxes*, and more fully by Ælian in his various histories, was no other than such as would have recommended him to our King James the First. Not that we call in question the personal merit of Ismenias; for we suppose it to be with regard to this very merit, as well as to the reward it met with, that he is here set in contrast with Anthemion.—S.

¹ A reflection this on the education of Anytus, slyly hinting that he was fit for nothing else. Plato, in this part of the dialogue, indulges a little his satirical genius, out of revenge for the death of Socrates, contrived and compassed by this Anytus.—S.

² It appears from this passage, that there were, in those days, professors of physic at Athens, such as there are in modern universities.—S.

learn?

learn; I ask you whether it is not from these considerations that we should do well in sending him to the physicians?

ANY. I answer, yes.

SOC. In the learning music too, and every other art, are not the same considerations just? Surely it is great want of understanding in us, if we are desirous of having some person taught music, not to choose for his masters such as profess the teaching of the art, and the taking of money too for their teaching; but, instead of this, to give trouble to other people, expecting him to learn from those who do not pretend to be teachers, and have not one scholar in that learning in which we expect our student should be by them instructed. Think you not that such an expectation would be very unreasonable?

ANY. I do, by Jupiter; and a great sign of ignorance too, besides.

SOC. You say well. Now then you have an opportunity of considering together with me, and giving your advice about this guest of yours, Meno here. For he has often told me long ago¹, Anytus, that he wished to acquire that wisdom and virtue², through which men govern well both their families and the commonwealth; through which also they behave respectfully to their parents; and know how to entertain both their countrymen and foreigners, and what presents to make them at their departure, in such a manner as becomes a good man. Were we then to recommend to him any persons³ from whom he might learn this virtue, consider whom we should do right in recommending. Is it not clear that, agreeably to what we have just now said in other cases, they would be those persons who profess to be teachers of virtue, and publicly through all Greece offer themselves to teach it to any one who desires to learn; fixing the price of this their teaching, and demanding it as their just fee?

¹ This was probably in some former trip which Meno had made to Athens when a youth.—S.

² Here we have an account of the principal topics of praise and admiration in those ancient days.—S.

³ In the Greek of this passage it is evident there is some word omitted. Stephens saw this, and in the margin of his edition conjectures the word *δια* to be wanting in the beginning of the sentence. But as this conjecture is not satisfactory to us, we beg leave to offer to the future editors of Plato one or two of our own; viz. to read either *διδασκοντας*, or *μαθησκουμενους*, after *αρετης*, in the middle of the sentence, or the latter of those two words at the end of it.—S.

ANY. And what persons, Socrates, do you mean?

SOC. You cannot be ignorant that I speak of those who are called sophists¹.

ANY. O Hercules! speak not so shamefully, Socrates. May none of my relations, friends, or acquaintance, fellow-citizens, or foreign guests, ever be seized with such a madness as to go and be spoiled by those men. For the bane and corruption those men are of all who follow them.

SOC. How say you, Anytus? Are these the only men among those who profess the knowledge of something beneficial to human kind, so widely different from all the rest, as not only not to improve and make better what is put into their hands as the others do, but on the contrary to corrupt and spoil it? and do they think fit openly to demand fees to be paid them for so doing? I cannot tell how I should give credit to this account of yours. For I know one man in particular, Protagoras, to have acquired singly more riches from having this wisdom, than Phidias has from his works so celebrated for their beauty, together with any ten other statuarys besides. It is a prodigy what you tell me; when the menders of old shoes and of old clothes could not escape a month from being publicly known, if they returned the clothes or shoes in a worse condition than they received them; but doing so would be soon reduced to starving; yet, that Protagoras should corrupt and spoil his followers, and send them home worse men than when they first came to him, without being discovered by all Greece, and this for above forty years. For I think he was near seventy years of age when he died, after having spent forty of them in the practice of his profession. And during all that time he maintained a high reputation, which continues even to this day. And not only Protagoras met with this success, but very many others: some of whom were prior to him in time, and some flourish at present. Now shall we suppose that they deceived and corrupted the youth, as you say they did, knowingly? or shall we suppose they did so unconscious of it to themselves? Shall we deem them to be so much out of their senses, such men, who are said by some to be the wisest of mankind?

¹ That Socrates in this speaks ironically and in jest, the readers of Plato will of themselves observe. But let them be pleased to observe further, how little Anytus could know of Socrates, of his way of thinking, or his common conversation, in taking him as he does to be here in earnest.—S.

ANY.

ANY. They are far from being out of their senses, Socrates : rather so are those of the youth, who give them money for corrupting them ; and still more so than these youths are their relations in committing them to the guidance of such men ; but most of all so are those cities which suffer such men to come in amongst them, and drive not away and banish every man, whether foreigner or citizen, who sets up in any such profession.

Soc. Has any of the sophists done you any injury, Anytus ? or why else are you so angry with them ?

ANY. I have never, by Jupiter, conversed with one of them myself ; nor would I suffer so to do any person who belonged to me.

Soc. You have no experience at all then of those men.

ANY. And never desire to have any.

Soc. How then should you know if there is any good or any harm in their teaching, when you have no experience of it at all ?

ANY. Easily enough. For I know what sort of fellows they are, whether I have had any experience or not of them and of their teaching.

Soc. You have the gift of divination perhaps, Anytus. For how otherwise you could know what they are, according to your own account, I should much wonder. But we were not inquiring to what persons Meno might go, and be made a bad man. As to these, if you will, let them be the sophists. But now tell us of those others : and do an act of kindness to this hereditary friend of yours, in directing him to what persons in this great city he may go and be made eminent in that virtue which I gave you a description of just now.

ANY. But why did not you direct him to such persons yourself ?

Soc. What persons I had imagined were the teachers of these duties I have told you. But I happen to have said nothing to the purpose, as you inform me.

ANY. There is some truth however in that perhaps.

Soc. Now, therefore, do you in your turn tell him to whom of the Athenians he should go. Name any one you choose.

ANY. What occasion has he to hear any one man's name ? For of the men of honour and virtue among the Athenians, there is not one, the first he meets with, who would not make him a better man than the sophists would, if he will but hearken and be observant.

Soc. But did these men of honour and virtue become such spontaneously, and without having learnt from any man to be what they are? and are they able to teach others what they were never taught themselves?

Any. They, I presume, learnt from those who went before them, men of like honour and virtue. Or think you not that our city has produced many excellent men?

Soc. I think, Anytus, that in this city there are men excellent in political affairs, and that there have been others no less excellent before them. But were they good teachers of that political excellence? For it is this which happens to be the subject of our present debate: not whether men of honour and virtue are to be found at present in this city or not; nor whether such were to be found here formerly: but whether virtue is to be taught or not. This we have been of a long time considering and inquiring; and in prosecuting the inquiry, we are fallen upon this question, whether those excellent men, either of these or of former days, knew how to impart, or to deliver down to others, that virtue in which they themselves are so excellent; or whether it be impossible for man to deliver down or to impart virtue, and for men to receive it one from another. This it is which we have been long examining, I and Meno. Consider the question now in this manner, on the footing of your own argument. Would you not say that Themistocles¹ was a man of virtue?

Any. I would; and that he was so the most of all men too.

Soc. And would you not then say, that if ever any man could teach his own virtue to another, Themistocles was a good teacher?

Any. I suppose he was, had he had a mind to teach.

Soc. But do you suppose that he had no mind to have some others made men of honour and virtue, and especially his own son? or do you imagine that he maliciously and designedly withheld from him that virtue in which he himself was excellent? Did you never hear that Themistocles taught² his

¹ For the character of this excellent general and statesman see Plutarch, who has written his life.—S.

² Plutarch had in view this passage of Plato, where, in reckoning up the children of Themistocles, and coming to Cleophantus, he says, *οὐ καὶ πλάτων ὁ φιλοσοφὸς ὡς ἱππεὺς ἀρίστου, τὰλλα δ' οὐδενὸς ἀξίου γενομένου, μνημονεύει*, *that he is mentioned also by Plato the Philosopher, as an excellent horseman, but in other respects worthless*.—S.

son Cleophantus¹ to be an excellent horseman? and that his son attained to such a pitch of excellence, that he would keep himself for a long time standing upright upon horses in full speed, and in this situation would throw his javelin; and performed many other surprising feats² of horsemanship, in which his father had him instructed; and that he made him skilled in all other accomplishments, such as depend on having had good masters? Have you heard all this from elderly people who remember it?

ANY. I have.

Soc. The disposition of his son therefore is not to be found fault with as untowardly and unteachable.

ANY. Perhaps it is not.

Soc. But what say you to this? That Cleophantus the son of Themistocles was a skilful and an excellent man in the same way as his father was, have you ever heard this from any man, either young or old?

ANY. No, truly.

Soc. Do we imagine then that he chose to breed him up in such studies and exercises as he did; and yet, in that wisdom and skill in which he himself excelled, to make him, his own son, not at all a better man than his neighbours, if virtue could be taught?

ANY. That indeed is, perhaps, not to be supposed.

Soc. Such a teacher of virtue now is this teacher of yours, a man whom you yourself acknowledge to have been one of the best men of the last age. And now let us consider another, Aristides³, the son of Lyfimachus. Do you not agree that he was a man of virtue?

ANY. I do entirely.

¹ In the Greek of this sentence the word *εἶναι* is plainly dropped, and ought to be restored in all future editions of Plato. In the Dialogue *περί ἀρετῆς*, attributed by some to Æschines the Socratic, but which is almost copied from this part of the Meno, the necessary word *εἶναι* is not omitted. It is strange that neither Cornaro nor Stephens observed so gross an omission in the manuscripts of Plato.—S.

² It is observable that Plato here uses the plural number: from whence we may conclude that the same wonderful performances in horsemanship were then taught at Athens which have lately been exhibited in our own country, such as the stepping or skipping upright from horse to horse in full gallop, &c.—S.

³ How great and how good a statesman Aristides was appears in Plutarch's Life of him.—S.

Soc. And did he not give his son Lyfmachus ¹ the best education to be had at Athens, so far as depended on masters and teachers? and do you think he has made him a better man than common? You have had some acquaintance with him, and you see what sort of a man he is ². Let another instance, if you please, be Pericles ³, a man so magnanimously wise ⁴. You know that he bred up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus ⁵.

ANY. I do.

Soc. These, as you know also, he taught horsemanship so as to make them equal in that skill to any of the Athenians. In music too, and gymnastic, and all other accomplishments which depend on art, he instructed them so well that none excelled them. But had he no mind to make them good men? I believe he wanted not inclination so to do ⁶; but I suspect it to be impossible to teach virtue. And that you may not imagine that I speak only of a few, and those of the meanest birth ⁷ among the Athenians, and such as

¹ It was common amongst the Athenians to give the eldest son the name of his grandfather; so that two names were continued alternately in the same family.—S.

² We find nothing more of this Lyfmachus, than what we read in Plutarch, that the Athenians, out of respect to the memory of his father, who died poor, gave him a little landed estate, a sum of money in hand, and a small pension; probably finding him unfit for any office in the state. He is one of the speakers, however, in Plato's Dialogue called Laches: in which he complains that his father, Aristides, had too much indulged him in leading an idle and luxurious life, and, giving himself up wholly to state affairs, had neglected to cultivate his son's mind and to form his manners.—S.

³ Plutarch has written the life of this consummate politician, this truly great man.—S.

⁴ In the Greek *πρω μεγαλοπρεπως σοφον*. With what propriety this epithet is bestowed on him may be seen in Plutarch.—S.

⁵ Concerning Paralus, nothing is recorded by Plutarch to his disadvantage. Indeed he only mentions his name, and that he, as well as his brother and sisters, died of the plague, that great plague described in so lively a manner by Thucydides the historian. But as to Xanthippus, we learn from the great biographer, how unworthy he was of such a father as Pericles, and how disrespectful and undutiful to him was his conduct.—S.

⁶ This instance of Pericles is produced for the same purpose as it is here, by Plato in his Protagoras.—S.

⁷ It is here plainly intimated, that the three great men, whom he had just before celebrated, were of mean extraction. Of Themistocles this is expressly confirmed by Plutarch, who says that he was of an obscure family. Of Aristides it is probable, from the great poverty under which he laboured all his life-time. But of Pericles, Plutarch reports, on the contrary, that his mother was of a considerable family, and his father a man of great personal merit.—S.

wanted

wanted abilities for such an affair, consider that Thucydides ¹ also bred up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus ², giving them a good education in all other respects, and particularly in the exercise of wrestling, in which they excelled all their countrymen. For he had one of his sons instructed by Xanthius, the other by Eudorus ³; and these two masters, in the art of wrestling, were thought to be the best of the age. Do you not remember this?

ANY. I remember that I have heard so.

SOC. Is it not evident then, that he would never have taught his children those things, the teaching of which must have put him to expense, and, at the same time, have neglected what would have cost him nothing, the teaching them to be good men, if such a thing was possible to be taught? But Thucydides, perhaps it may be imagined, was a mean inconsiderable person, who had but few friends among the Athenians or their allies. It was not so. For he was of a noble house ⁴, and had great power in Athens, and much weight in the other Grecian states ⁵. So that, if his sons could have made good

¹ Thucydides, here mentioned by Plato, was a different person from the historian of the same name. Plutarch tells us, and it is confirmed by Marcellinus, that he was a great politician and haranguer in the forum, and was set up by the aristocratical party in the commonwealth to oppose Pericles, who favoured the other side, the democratic. It is highly probable that he was the same Thucydides who, as we are told by the celebrated writer of the History of the Peloponnesian War, was one of the commanders of the Athenian fleet sent to Samos, to second that which had been sent thither before, under the command of Pericles; for the son of Melesias seems to have been a proper person to counterpoise the excessive weight of the power of Pericles, and to please and conciliate to the Athenians the aristocratic party among the Samians.—S.

² This Melesias is introduced by Plato in his Laches, as joining Lyfmachus in lamenting his want of the better parts of education, and in complaining of his father Thucydides's too great indulgence to him.—S.

³ In all the editions of Plato he is called Euodorus; a name, we believe, not to be met with elsewhere. We have therefore not scrupled to follow the translation of Cornarius, who, we presume, read in his manuscript Eudorus, a name to be found in Homer.—S.

⁴ Of the greatness of his family, we know not of any thing appearing on record expressly to confirm this passage. But his alliance with Cimon, the son of Miltiades, makes it probable: for it is not usual for either men or women, of noble ancestry, to intermarry with the base-born. Now Plutarch says of this Thucydides, that he was *κηδεστis Κιμωνος*, a near relation of Cimon's by marriage.—S.

⁵ This is very probable, if he was, as Plutarch relates, *εις των καλων καταδων ανδρων*, one of the men of honour and virtue in that age. Plutarch, in another place, calls him *ανδρα σωφρονα*, a man of sound understanding. Stesimbrotus the Thracian, also wrote a treatise, as we are informed

good men by teaching, he might easily have found out some person to make them so, either one of his own countrymen, or a foreigner, if he himself wanted leisure, on account of his public employments and his administration of the state. But I fear, friend Anytus, that virtue is a thing impossible to be taught¹.

ANY. You seem to me, Socrates, to be ready at abuse, and to speak ill of others with great facility. But I would advise you, if you choose to hearken to me, to be more cautious, and to take care of yourself. For that, in other cities too, it is perhaps an easy matter to do a man a mischief, as well as a piece of service; but here, at Athens, it is so more especially²; and, if I mistake not, you are³ sensible of it yourself⁴.

by Athenæus, p. 589, concerning Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles. From the company, therefore, in which he is placed, both by Plato and Stefimbrotus, it appears how very considerable a person he was accounted.—We have written these last notes to prevent its being thought that Socrates speaks here of Thucydides ironically, and really meaning to disparage him. But we cannot conceive what, beside malice, could darken the understanding of Athenæus to such a degree, as to make him imagine that Plato in this dialogue speaks ill of and vilifies Pericles and Themistocles, those greatest of the Grecians, says that writer, p. 506. Anytus, however, as we shall presently see, was smitten with the same blindness, and perhaps from the same cause, the malignity of his own temper.—S.

¹ Meaning that it is impossible for those to learn it who want the *εὐφυΐα*, a truly good natural disposition; and impossible also for those to teach it who cannot teach it scientifically, for want of the principles of wisdom, that is, impossible for any but true philosophers. For this is what Plato would insinuate in all this latter part of the dialogue.—S.

² Because of the power of the populace, who were easily led away by some favourite demagogue. On which account Socrates, as Ælian reports in his *Various Histories*, b. iii. ch. xvii. likened the Athenian democracy to a tyranny, the arbitrary government of one man; or to a monarchy (absolute), where the legislative power is in the hands of one: so far was it from an equal republic or commonwealth, which secures the rights, both natural and acquired, of every citizen; and is equitable alike to all.—Within three years before the death of Socrates, an oligarchy was forced upon the Athenians by their Lacedæmonian conquerors. Then was that great Leviathan, with the demagogic head, thrown to the ground, and a monster with thirty heads tyrannized in his room, slaughtered thousands without even pretence of law, and favoured only its own abettors.—The time of this dialogue seems to be, either towards the end of the oligarchic tyranny, or soon after the restoration of the democracy: what Anytus here says is equally applicable to both.—S.

³ Hinting at the dangers which Socrates had incurred under both governments, by a manly opposition to the acts of tyranny committed in each, and by a strict adherence to the ancient laws of his country, as interpreted and explained by the eternal laws of justice and equity.—S.

⁴ Anytus, having finished his menacing speech, appears to have turned himself away from Socrates

Soc. Anytus seems to me to be angry, Meno. And I am not at all surprised at it. For, in the first place, he supposes that I spoke ill of those persons I mentioned: and then he takes himself¹ to be such another as they were. Now if this man should ever come to know what it is to speak ill of others, he will cease to be angry: but at present he is ignorant of it. Do you therefore answer now, and tell me; are there not amongst us men of honour and virtue?

MENO. Certainly there are.

Soc. But are these men willing to offer themselves to the youth to teach them virtue? do they profess the teaching of it? or do they agree that virtue is a thing which can be taught?

MENO. No, by Jupiter, Socrates, they do not. For you may hear them sometimes maintaining that it may be taught, at other times that it cannot be taught.

Soc. Shall we say then that these men are teachers of virtue, when they have not settled so much as this point, whether virtue can be taught or not?

MENO. I think we should not, Socrates.

Soc. Well; but what say you of those sophists, the only persons who profess to teach virtue, think you that they are the teachers?

MENO. It is for this, O Socrates, that I especially admire Gorgias; for that one shall never hear him making any such professions, or taking upon himself an office of that kind. On the contrary, he laughs at those others whenever he hears them engaging to teach men to be virtuous; and thinks it the office of a sophist only to make men great orators and powerful in speaking.

Soc. You do not think then that the sophists neither are the teachers of virtue?

MENO. I know not what to say, Socrates, to this point. They have the same effect on me as they have on most other people; sometimes I think they are, and sometimes that they are not.

Socrates, but not to have withdrawn from the scene of conversation, which is continued on between Socrates and Meno to the end of the dialogue.—S.

¹ That is, he takes himself to be a great man like them; *μεγαλοφρονων εφ' εαυτου*, *thinking bigly of himself*, says Laertius, in his Life of Socrates, referring to the Meno; meaning undoubtedly this passage, and rightly explaining it.—S.

Soc. Do you know, that not only yourself and those others, who are versed in civil affairs, sometimes think that virtue is acquired through teaching, and sometimes that it is not; do you know that Theognis the poet is of the same mind, and speaks exactly in the same manner?

MENO. In what verses of his?

Soc. In his Elegiacs¹; where he says,

Mix evermore with men, through virtue, great;
And near to theirs be placed thy happy seat:
Still be companion of their board and bowl,
And still to what delights them bend thy soul.
For good through sweet contagion shall be caught,
And virtue be by living manners taught.
But converse of bad men is folly's school;
Where sense, taught backward, sinks into a fool.

Do you perceive, that in these verses he speaks of virtue as if it might be acquired through teaching?

MENO. It appears so to me.

Soc. And yet in other verses² a little farther on he says,

To fools their wisdom could the wise impart;
Could understanding be infus'd by art;
Or could right thought into the mind be driv'n;
For this how oft would great rewards be giv'n?

That is, to those men who were complete masters in this skill. And again, he says,

¹ An elegiac verse, properly speaking, is a pentameter, a verse consisting of four feet and two half feet, equally divided; two feet and a half constituting the former part of the verse, and two feet and a half the latter. But very few poems were ever written purely in this metre. Those verses were commonly called elegiac, where hexameter and pentameter verses were used alternately; such as the verses cited here by Plato. They are found in that collection of the verses of Theognis, extant at this day, under the title of *Γρῦμαι ἐλεγιακαί*, beginning at verse 33. One would imagine, from the last question of Meno and this answer of Socrates, that Theognis wrote some other poems in a different metre. Fabricius accordingly says, that *Γρῦμαι* were written by Theognis in 2800 verses of heroic measure: and cites Suidas as his authority for this. We presume that he read thus in some manuscript or old edition of Suidas: but in Kufter's edition we read elegiac and not heroic.—S.

² The verses here cited, and those which follow, begin at line 434 of Theognis.—S.

Ne'er

Ne'er did bad son from virtuous father rise,
 If duly nurtur'd by his precepts wife.
 But whate'er culture careful we bestow,
 Ne'er in bad soil can seed of virtue grow.

Do you observe, that in speaking again upon the same subject, he contradicts himself, and says the very reverse of what he had said before?

MENO. So it appears.

SOC. Can you tell me now of any other thing, where they who profess to be teachers are held by all men to be so far from teaching it to others, as to be ignorant of it themselves, and to have no merit in that very thing which they pretend to teach; and where those who are by all men allowed to be excellent themselves, sometimes say it may be taught, and sometimes that it cannot? Those who are so unsettled and perplexed about any subject whatever, would you say that they are the proper masters and teachers of it?

MENO. By Jupiter, not I.

SOC. If then neither the sophists, nor those who are themselves excellent men, are teachers of virtue, it is plain there can be no others beside.

MENO. I think there can be none.

SOC. And if no teachers, then no scholars neither.

MENO. I think what you say is true.

SOC. But we agreed before, that a thing in which neither teachers of it nor scholars are to be found, is not the subject of teaching, and cannot be taught.

MENO. We were agreed in this.

SOC. Of virtue now there appear no where any teachers.

MENO. Very true.

SOC. And if no teachers of it, then no scholars in it neither.

MENO. It appears so.

SOC. Virtue therefore must be a thing which cannot be taught.

MENO. It seems so, if we have considered the matter rightly. And hence, Socrates, I am led to wonder, whether any men really good are ever to be found or not; and if there are, by what means they became such.

SOC. We are in danger, O Meno! of being found, you and I, both of us, very insufficient reasoners on the point in question; and you not to have been fully instructed by Gorgias, nor I by Prodicus. Above all things

therefore ought we to apply our minds to ourselves ; and to search out a person who by some certain means would make us better men. I say this with regard to the inquiry now before us ; in which we have been so foolish as not to consider, that it is not under the conduct of science that the affairs of men are administered rightly and well ; or, if we should not choose to grant that, at least that it is not under the conduct of science only, but of some other thing also which is different from science ; and perhaps the knowledge of the means by which men become good hath escaped us.

MENO. How so, Socrates ?

SOC. I will tell you how. That those men who are good and virtuous must also be advantageous to us we have agreed rightly ; and that it is impossible it should be otherwise. Is not this true ?

MENO. Certainly.

SOC. And that they are advantageous to us on this account, because they conduct our affairs rightly, should we not do well in admitting this ?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. But we seem not to have done well in granting, that unless a man be prudent, it is not possible for him to conduct affairs rightly.

MENO. What mean you now by the word rightly ?

SOC. I will tell you what I mean. If a man who knew the way to Larissa¹, or wherever else you please, were to walk at the head of others whom he had undertaken to conduct thither, would he not conduct them well and rightly ?

MENO. Without doubt.

SOC. And how would it be were a man to undertake this who had only a right opinion about the way, but had never gone thither himself, nor had any certain knowledge of the way, would not he also conduct them rightly ?

MENO. To be sure.

SOC. And so long as he had any how a right opinion of the way, which the other man knew with certainty, he would not in the least be a worse guide, though only surmising justly, and not knowing clearly, than the other with all his perfect knowledge ?

¹ The road to Larissa is made the instance, because most familiar to Meno, who was of Pharfalus, a city of Thessaly, near to Larissa, the chief city of all that part of the country, and with which Meno was particularly well acquainted.—S.

MENO. Not at all worse.

SOC. Right opinion, therefore, with regard to right action, is not at all a worse guide than science or perfect knowledge. And this it is which we omitted just now in considering the nature of virtue; when we said that prudence only or knowledge led to right action; it is this, right opinion.

MENO. It seems so.

SOC. Right opinion therefore is not at all of less advantage to man than certain knowledge.

MENO. In this respect, however, Socrates, it is; in that he who has a perfect knowledge of his end, would always attain to it; but the man who had only a right opinion of it, sometimes would attain to it, and sometimes would not.

SOC. How say you? would not the man, who had a right opinion of it, always attain to it, so long as he entertained that right opinion?

MENO. It appears to me that he must. And therefore I wonder, Socrates, this being the case, on what account it is that science is so much more valuable than right opinion; and indeed in what respect it is that they differ at all one from the other.

SOC. Do you know now why you wonder? or shall I tell you?

MENO. By all means tell me.

SOC. It is because you never considered attentively those images^a made by Dædalus. But perhaps you have none of them in your country.

MENO. With what view is it now that you speak of these images?

SOC. Because these, if they are not fastened, run away from us, and become fugitives: but if they are fastened, they abide by us.

MENO. Well; and what then?

SOC. To have in one's possession any of these works of his loose and unfastened, is like to the being master of a runaway slave, a matter of little value, because not permanent: but when fastened and secured, they are things of great value; for indeed they are works of great beauty. But you ask, with what view it is that I speak of these images. I answer,—It is with a view to true opinions. For true opinions also, so long as they abide

^a These were small figures of the gods, reported to have in them the power of self motion.—S.

by us, are valuable goods, and procure for us all good things : but they are not disposed to abide with us a long time ; for they soon slip away out of our souls, and become fugitives. Hence are they of small value to a man, until he has fastened and bound them down, by deducing them rationally from their cause ¹. And this, my friend Meno, is reminiscence, as we before agreed. But when they are thus bound and fastened, in the first place they become truly known, and in consequence of this they become stable and abide with us. Now it is on this very account that science is a thing more valuable than right opinion ; and in this respect it is they differ, in that the parts of science only are fastened one to another, and bound down together.

MENO. By Jupiter, Socrates, they are similar to some such things as those to which you resemble them.

SOC. Nay, for my part, I speak thus not from knowledge ; but only from conjecture. But that right opinion and science are two different things, this, as it appears to me, I do not merely imagine or conjecture. For if I were to profess the knowledge of any things whatever (and there are but

¹ In the Greek, *αιτίας λογισμῷ*, by a rational account of the cause ; or by proving, how and from what cause it is that they are true. The cause of every truth is some other truth, higher and more general, in which it is included. To those who have considered the method, naturally used by the mind in reasoning, commonly but improperly called the art of reasoning, this will appear from hence ;—A proposition is an opinion of the mind expressed in words, which affirm or deny some one thing to belong to some other. If the proposition, that is, if the opinion be true, it admits of a rational proof. And all rational proof consists in showing or exhibiting of some general truth, or true proposition, in which is virtually included the proposition to be proved. In syllogistical reasoning (the only way of reasoning upwards, or tracing any truths from their causes) that truth, or true proposition, which is more general than the proposition to be proved, is called the major proposition on that very account, because it is of larger extent, or more general than the proposition to be proved, the conclusion ; containing in it the truth of that conclusion, together with many other truths, collateral to one another, and all of them subordinate to, or less general than, the major proposition itself. In the same manner, the truth of this major and more general proposition is to be traced out and deduced from another proposition still more general ; and so on till we arrive at some truth self-evident, apparently the cause from which is deduced the truth of those other propositions less general, which gradually and in order lead the mind up to it ; the cause why they are true. If many subordinate truths arise out of one and the same general truth, as they all equally depend from this, so by means of this too they are all connected together, like the collateral chains, mentioned in the way of similitude (though to another subject) by Plato in his *Io*, depending all from the iron ring at top fastened to the magnet.—S.

a few things which I could profess to know), this I would set down for one of them ¹.

MENO. You are entirely right, Socrates ².

Soc. Well; and am I not right in this also, that true opinion, having the conduct of any work or action whatever, executes her office full as well as science?

MENO. In this too I think you are in the right.

Soc. Right opinion, therefore, is a thing not at all inferior to science, nor less beneficial with regard to the execution of any work ³, or the performance of any action: nor is the man, who has right opinions, inferior (in this respect) to the man of science.

MENO. Very true.

Soc. And we agreed before, that a good man was beneficial or advantageous to others.

MENO. We did.

Soc. Since, therefore, it is not through science only that men have been good and beneficial to their country (if any such men there may have been),

¹ This sentence, together with that which immediately precedes it, seems to us the right key to open that part of the conversation of Socrates with his friends, in which he was generally supposed to dissemble his great knowledge. We find him here disclaiming the knowledge of those things which are not the proper objects of knowledge, but of imagination and opinion only; and such are almost all the subjects even of philosophical conversation: and we find him at the same time openly avowing, not with irony, but with much seriousness, that he knew the different nature of those two judgments of the soul, science and opinion; one of which is from mind, the other from sense. Now if all science depends on knowing the principle of science, if this principle is mind, and if the human soul partakes of mind, it follows, that the human mind knowing herself, knows in what she differs from the lower faculties of the soul, and how her own judgment of things, which is science, differs from theirs, which amounts to no more than mere opinion: it follows, that she knows what science is, and consequently knows what falls short of it: it follows also, that she knows what the objects are of science, and what those of opinion; having and contemplating the former sort in herself; but rejecting and disclaiming the latter, as not belonging to her province. Accordingly we shall find that Socrates, who knew himself, his true self, his mind, on the one hand never pretended, as ignorant men are apt to do, to know things which cannot be known; nor on the other hand, affected not to know the nature of the human mind, the principles of it, or any of its objects, so far as they are communicated to particular minds from and by mind universal.—S.

² That is, in distinguishing science from right opinion.—S.

³ This is because right opinion principally verges to sensibles; but science to intelligibles.—T.

but

but also by means of right opinion ; and since neither of these is with men by nature, neither science nor right opinion ; or ¹ do you think that either of them comes by nature ?

MENO. Not I.

Soc. Since then, they are not by nature, by nature neither is it that men could have been good and virtuous.

MENO. Certainly not.

Soc. Seeing now, that virtue comes not by nature, we should, in the next place, after this consider if it comes through teaching.

MENO. To be sure we should.

Soc. Did it not appear to us both, that if virtue was wisdom, then it came through teaching ?

MENO. It did.

Soc. And that if virtue came through teaching, then virtue would be wisdom ?

MENO. Very true.

Soc. And that if there were any teachers of virtue, virtue would in that case be a thing that came through teaching ; otherwise not ?

MENO. Just so.

Soc. But we have agreed that there were no teachers of it.

¹ Just here, in all the editions of the Greek, are added these two words, *οὐτ ἐπικτήτα*, *neither are they acquired*. Which part of the sentence is apparently false : for science and right opinion are both of them acquired ; science through teaching ; and right opinion through other adventitious means : but supposing it ever so true with regard to right opinion ; and supposing also, that the word *ἐπικτήτα* means in this place *acquired through teaching* ; it would be impertinent to this part of the argumentation, and premature : for Socrates is here proving only this, that virtue comes not by nature : and this he proves by showing that all men who act rightly and well, act thus either from science or from right opinion ; neither of which principles of action men have from nature. It is not till afterwards, in the next place, that he proves virtue not to be acquired through teaching. With great judgment, therefore, did Cornarius, in his translation, take no notice of those two words ; and, in his *Eclogæ*, has with great probability supposed the words *ἀλλ' ἐπικτήτα* to have been an ancient scholium written in the margin, and by subsequent transcribers, as happened frequently, assumed into the text ; and afterwards the word *ἀλλ'* to have been changed into *οὐτ* by some later copyist, not attending to the course of the argumentation, but to the conclusion only. The necessity of the omission is so clear, that we wonder not so much at the acuteness of Cornarius in seeing it, as at the blindness of Stephens in not seeing but expressly denying it.—S.

MENO. True.

Soc. We are agreed, therefore, that virtue comes not through teaching ; and that virtue is not wisdom.

MENO. Certainly so.

Soc. But we agreed besides, that virtue was something good.

MENO. True.

Soc. And that whatever conducted affairs rightly was a thing good and serviceable to us.

MENO. We did clearly.

Soc. And that affairs are conducted rightly by these two things only, true opinion and science ; possessed of either of which two, a man makes a good leader and guide. Whatever comes from fortune is not the effect of human conduct. But so far as man has to do in conducting rightly, it is only through one of these means, true opinion and science.

MENO. I think so.

Soc. Now since virtue comes not through teaching, it is not the effect of science.

MENO. It appears that it is not.

Soc. Of the two only things then, which are good and serviceable to man's right conduct, we have thrown one out of the question ; having agreed that science is not the thing through which civil affairs are administered and conducted rightly.

MENO. I think it is not.

Soc. Not therefore through any wisdom, nor as being wise, did such men govern in the state ; such as Themistocles, and the rest, whom Anytus here just now recounted. And for this very reason they were not capable of making others to be such men as themselves ; because it was not science that made them what they were.

MENO. The case, O Socrates, seems to be as you represent it.

Soc. If then it is not science, it follows that it must be the other thing which remains of the two, namely, right opinion, through which public affairs are administered rightly by our statesmen and politicians ; men who, in point of wisdom, are not at all superior to the oracle fingers and divine prophets. For these also utter many true sayings, but have no real knowledge of any one thing they utter.

MENO. I suspect this to be the case.

SOC. Now do not those men, O Meno, deserve the character of divine men, who either speak or act aright in many things of great importance, without any intellectual knowledge of the subjects concerning which they speak or act?

MENO. By all means do they.

SOC. Rightly then should we call those men divine, whom we just now mentioned, the oracle fingers and the prophets, and all who are inspired by the Muses. Nor at all less divine men than these should we say that the politicians are, no less enthusiasts, inspired divinely, and possessed by the Divinity, when in their speeches they direct aright many and great affairs, without any real knowledge of the subjects they are speaking of.

MENO. Certainly we should.

SOC. And accordingly the women, you know, Meno, call men of virtue by the name of divine men. And the Lacedæmonians, when they celebrate with encomiums any man of virtue, are used to say of him that he is a divine man.

MENO. And they appear, O Socrates, to speak justly too. And yet, perhaps, Anytus here is offended at what you say.

SOC. I give myself no manner of concern about it. With him, Meno, we shall have some discourse at another time. But if we, at this time, during all this conversation, have pursued our inquiries and reasonings aright, virtue can neither come by nature, nor yet through teaching; but to those with whom it is, it must come by a divine portion or allotment, without the intelligence or true knowledge of it; unless amongst the politicians there should be found some person capable of making another man a good politician. But if there should, he might almost be said to be such a one amongst the living, as Homer tells us that Tiresias is amongst the dead; where, speaking of him and of the rest who are in Hades, he says ¹,

Fill'd is he only with discerning mind;
The rest flit, empty shadows, dark and blind.

Exactly the same pre-eminence hath such a man; being as it were the

¹ In his *Odyssey*, lib. x. ver. 495.

truth and substance of things, compared with shadows †, in respect of virtue.

MENO. What you say, O Socrates, seems to me to be in the highest degree just.

SOC. From this reasoning then, Meno, it appears to us, that such as are possessed of virtue, have it as a divine portion or allotment to them. But on this point we shall then arrive at certainty, when, previous to our inquiries by what means it is that virtue comes to men, we set about searching first, what the essence is of virtue.—But it is now time for me to go somewhere else. And do you, since you are persuaded yourself of the truth of those conclusions, the result of our inquiries, persuade your friend Anytus to believe them also. For he may thus be softened and become milder; and you, by thus persuading him, may possibly do a piece of service to your country.

† It is obvious to be seen, that this is a metaphor taken from the simile here used, of Tiresias and the rest of the ghosts in Hades; or an application of the simile to that which it is brought to illustrate in terms used properly in the simile, but metaphorically in the application. For the application of the simile is this:—As all the other ghosts in Hades are to Tiresias, so are men of right opinion only, void of scientific principles, to men of true science, men who are knowing in those principles. In the simile, the common herd of ghosts are unreal, unsubstantial shades, or shadows, compared with Tiresias, who therefore, with respect to them, is real substance. In the subject, resembled to this simile, men of right opinion are as shadows when compared with men of real science.—The justness of the similitude depends on these doctrines of Plato: that matters of opinion are objects of the imagination, and matters of science are objects of the mind or intellect; that all objects of the imagination are only images of the objects of sense, or things sensible; and that these objects of sense, or things sensible, are but the shadows of things intelligible, the objects of intellect.—S.

THE PROTAGORAS:

OR,

THE SOPHISTS.

THE PROTAGORAS

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

An ASSOCIATE,		ALCIBIADES,
SOCRATES,		CALLIAS,
HIPPOCRATES,		CRITIAS,
PROTAGORAS,		PRODICUS ¹ ,

And HIPPIAS.

ASSOCIATE.

WHENCE come you, Socrates? or is it not evident that you come from hunting about the beauty of Alcibiades? For to me, as I lately beheld him, the man appeared to be beautiful. I say the man: for between ourselves, Socrates, he may be called so, since his beard begins now to make its appearance.

Soc. But what then? Do you not indeed praise Homer², who says, that the age of a young man when he begins to have a beard is most agreeable? And this is now the age of Alcibiades.

¹ As the same question is discussed in this Dialogue, though not so fully as in the *Meno*, viz. Whether virtue can be taught, an introduction to it is unnecessary. I shall therefore only observe, that the liveliness and variety of the characters in it; the mirth and pleasantry of Socrates; the simplicity and nobleness of the narratives; and the knowledge of antiquities it displays, are beauties no less obvious than inimitable. For an account of Protagoras, that prince of sophists, see the *Theætetus*.

² This sophist was of Cos, and flourished about 396 years before Christ. Among his pupils were Euripides, Socrates, Theramenes, and Isocrates. He made his auditors pay to hear him harangue, which has given occasion to some of the antients to speak of the orations of Prodicus, for 50 drachms. Among his numerous writings, he composed that beautiful epifode in which virtue and pleasure are introduced attempting to make Hercules one of their votaries.

³ See the 10th Book of the *Odyssey*, where Homer represents Mercury as assuming the shape of a young man that begins to have a beard.

Assoc. But do you not at present come from him? And how is the young man disposed towards you?

Soc. He appears to be well affected towards me, and especially so to-day; for he said many things in defence of me; and I am just now come from him. However, I wish to tell you something very strange: though he was present I did not attend to him, and even forgot to look at him.

Assoc. What great affair then happened to both of you? for you could not meet with any other beautiful person in this city.

Soc. I did, however, and with one far more beautiful.

Assoc. What do you say? Was he a citizen or a stranger?

Soc. A stranger.

Assoc. Whence came he.

Soc. From Abdera.

Assoc. And did this stranger appear to you so beautiful as to surpass in beauty the son of Clinias?

Soc. How can it be otherwise, O blessed man, but that the wisest must appear to be the more beautiful person?

Assoc. Do you come to us then, Socrates, from a certain wise man?

Soc. I do, and from the wisest indeed of those that exist at present; if Protagoras appears to you to be most wise.

Assoc. What do you say? Is Protagoras arrived hither?

Soc. He has been here these three days.

Assoc. And have you then just now been with him?

Soc. I have; and I have also both spoken and heard many things.

Assoc. Will you not therefore relate this conversation to us? For if nothing hinders, you may sit here, since this boy will give you his place.

Soc. I will certainly relate it to you: and I shall also thank you for attending to it.

Assoc. And we shall thank you for the narration.

Soc. There will then be reciprocal thanks. Hear therefore:—This morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phaedon, knocked very hard at my gate with his stick, and as soon as it was opened he hastily came to my bedchamber, crying with a loud voice, Socrates, are you asleep?—And I knowing his voice said, This is Hippocrates, do you bring any news?—None, he replied, but what is good.—You

speak well, said I, but what is it? and what brought you hither?—Protagoras, said he, is come, and dwells near me.—He has been here, I replied, for some time; and have you only just heard it?—I only heard it, by the gods, said he, this evening; and at the same time, taking a couch, he sat down at my feet, and said, I returned last night very late from the village of Oinoë; for my boy Satyrus had made his escape from me, and being desirous to tell you that I should pursue him, something else occurring, I forgot it. But after I had returned, supped, and was going to bed, then my brother told me Protagoras was come. On hearing this, I immediately attempted to go to you; but afterwards it appeared to me that the night was already far advanced. Soon therefore falling asleep from weariness, when I awoke, I came hither.—And I knowing the fortitude of Hippocrates, and seeing his astonishment, said, What is this to you? Has Protagoras injured you in any respect?—By the gods, said he laughing, he has, because he alone is wise, and has not made me to be so.—But, by Jupiter, said I, if you had given him money, and had persuaded him, he would have made you also wise.—O Jupiter, and the other gods, he replied, I should neither spare my own property, nor that of my friends, to accomplish this, and I now come to you, that you may speak to him in my behalf. For I am younger than you, and at the same time I never either saw or heard Protagoras; for I was a boy when he first came to this place. However, Socrates, all men praise him, and say that his discourses are most wise. But why do we not go to him that we may find him within? And he resides, as I have heard, with Callias¹ the son of Hipponicus. Let us then go.—To this I replied, We will not yet go thither, O good man, for it is too early; but let us go into our court, where we will walk and converse till it is light; and afterwards we will pay a visit to Protagoras. For, as he stays very much at home, we shall most probably find him within.—After this we rose and went into the court, and I, in order to try the strength of Hippocrates, looked at him attentively, and said, Tell me, O Hippocrates, do you now endeavour to go to Protagoras, that by giving him money he may teach you something? What kind of man do you suppose him to be? and what kind of a man would you wish him to make you? Just as if you

¹ This Callias was one of the first citizens of Athens, and his father Hipponicus had been general of the Athenians, together with Nicias, at the battle of Tanagre.

should go to your namesake, Hippocrates of Cos, who is a descendant of Esculapius, and should offer him money on your own account, if any one should ask you, O Hippocrates, to what kind of man do you give money, and on what account? what would you answer?—I should say, he replied, that I give it as to a physician.—And with what view would you give it?—That I might become a physician, said he.—But if you went to the Argive Polycletus, or the Athenian Phidias, and gave them a reward on your own account, should any one ask you to what kind of men, and for what purpose, you offered money to Polycletus and Phidias, what would you answer?—I should answer, said he, that I gave it as to statuary, and in order that I myself might become a statuary.—Be it so, I replied. But we are now going, I and you, to Protagoras, and we are prepared to give him money on your account, if we have sufficient for this purpose, and can persuade him by this mean; but if it be not sufficient, we must borrow from our friends. If therefore some one, on perceiving our great eagerness about these particulars, should say, Tell me, O Socrates and Hippocrates, to what kind of man, and for what purpose do you intend to give money in offering it to Protagoras? what answer should we give him? What other appellation have we heard respecting Protagoras, as with respect to Phidias we have heard him called a statuary, and with respect to Homer, a poet? What thing of this kind have we heard concerning Protagoras?—They call this man, said he, a sophist, Socrates.—Shall we go therefore, and offer money as to a sophist?—Certainly.—If then some one should ask you what do you design to become by going to Protagoras?—He replied, blushing (for there was now day-light sufficient for me to see him), from what we have already admitted, it is evident that my design is to become a sophist.—But, by the gods, said I, will you not be ashamed to proclaim yourself a sophist among the Greeks?—I shall, by Jupiter, if it is requisite to speak what I think.—Your design then, Hippocrates, in acquiring the discipline of Protagoras, is not to become a sophist, but you have the same intention as when you went to the school of a grammarian, or that of a musician, or of a master of gymnastic: for you went not to those masters to learn their art, that you might become a professor yourself, but for the sake of acquiring such instruction as becomes a private and a free man.—The discipline which I shall receive from Protagoras, said he, perfectly appears to me to be rather a thing of this kind.—Do you know therefore, I replied,

what you now intend to do? or is it concealed from you?—About what?—That you are about to commit your soul to the care of a man, who, as you say, is a sophist; and yet I should wonder if you know what a sophist is. Though if you are ignorant of this, neither do you know to whom you deliver your soul, nor if to a good or a bad thing.—But I think, said he, that I know.—Tell me then what you think a sophist is?—I think, said he, as the name implies, that he is one knowing in things pertaining to wisdom.—But, I replied, the same thing may also be said of painters and architects, that they also are knowing in things pertaining to wisdom. And if any one should ask us in what wise particulars painters are knowing, we should answer him, that their wisdom consisted in the production of images; and we should reply in a similar manner with respect to the rest. But if some one should ask in what particulars is a sophist wise; what should we answer? Of what art is he the master?—He is master, Socrates, of the art which enables men to speak eloquently.—Perhaps, said I, we speak the truth, yet we do not speak sufficiently. For this answer demands from us another interrogation, viz. in what a sophist renders men eloquent. For does not a harper also enable those that are instructed by him, to speak about that in which he is knowing, viz. the playing on the harp? Is it not so?—It is.—Be it so then. But about what does a sophist render men eloquent? For it is evident, that it must be about things of which he has a knowledge.—It is likely.—What then is that thing about which the sophist is knowing, and which he teaches to others?—By Jupiter, he replied, I can no longer tell you.—And I said after this, Do you know therefore to what danger you are going to expose your soul? or if you were going to subject your body to the hazard of becoming in a good or a bad condition, would you not diligently consider whether you should expose it to this danger or not? Would you not call your friends and relations to consult with them? And would you not take more than one day to deliberate on the affair? But though you esteem your soul far more than your body, and upon it depends your happiness or unhappiness, according as it is well or ill disposed, yet, concerning this, you neither ask advice of your father nor brother, nor of any one of us your associates, whether you should commit your soul to this stranger. But having heard of his arrival yesterday evening, you come next morning before break of day, without considering whether it is proper to commit yourself to him or not, and are

prepared to employ not only all your own riches for that purpose, but also those of your friends, as if you already knew that you must by all means associate with Protagoras, whom, as you say, you neither know nor have ever spoken to. But you call him a sophist, though what a sophist is, to which you are about to deliver yourself, you are evidently ignorant.—And he having heard me, replied, What you say, Socrates, appears to be the truth.—Whether or not, therefore, O Hippocrates, is a sophist a certain merchant and retailer of things by which the soul is nourished?—He appears to me, Socrates, to be a character of this kind; but with what is the soul nourished?—By disciplines, I replied. But we must take care, my friend, lest the sophist, while he praises what he sells, deceive us, just as those merchants and retailers do respecting the food of the body. For they are ignorant whether the articles of their traffic are salubrious or noxious to the body, but at the same time they praise all that they sell. Those also that buy these articles are alike ignorant in this respect, unless the purchaser should happen to be a master of gymnastic, or a physician. In like manner, those who carry about disciplines in cities, and who hawk and sell them to those that desire to buy them, praise indeed all that they sell, though perhaps some of these also, O most excellent youth, may be ignorant whether what they sell is beneficial or noxious to the soul. And this also may be the case with those that buy of them, unless the purchaser should happen to be a physician of the soul. If therefore you scientifically know what among these is good or bad, you may securely buy disciplines from Protagoras, or any other; but if not, see, O blessed youth, whether you will not be in extreme danger with respect to your dearest concerns. For there is much greater danger in the buying of disciplines than in that of food; since he who buys meats and drinks of a victualler or merchant may take them away in other vessels, and, before he receives them into his body, may place them in his house, and calling in some person skilled in these things, may consult what should be eaten and drank, and what should not, and how much and when it is proper to eat and drink; so that there is no great danger in buying provisions. Disciplines, however, cannot be taken away in another vessel; but it is necessary that he who buys a discipline, receiving and learning it in his soul, should depart either injured or benefited. Let us therefore consider these things with those that are older than we are: for we are too young to discuss an affair of such great importance. Let us
now,

now, however, go whither we intended, and hear the man ; and after we have heard him, let us also communicate with others. For not only Protagoras is there, but Hippias the Elean, and Prodicus too, I think, and many other wise men.

This being agreed upon by us, we go on ; but when we entered the porch, we stopt to discuss something which had occurred to us in the way. That it might not therefore be unfinished, but that being terminated we might thus enter the house, we stood discoursing in the porch, until we agreed with each other. It appears therefore to me that the porter, who was a eunuch, heard us ; and that on account of the multitude of the sophists he was enraged with those that came to the house. When therefore we had knocked at the gate he opened it, and seeing us, Ha, ha, said he, certain sophists. He is not at leisure. And at the same time taking the gate with both his hands, he shut it with all his force. We then knocked again, and he, without opening the gate, said, Did not you hear me tell you that he is not at leisure ?—But, my good man, said I, we are not come to Callias, nor are we sophists. Take courage, therefore, for we come requesting to see Protagoras. Announce this to him. Notwithstanding this the man would scarcely open the gate to us. However, he opened it at length, and when we entered, we met with Protagoras walking in the vestibule of the porch. Many followed him ; on one side Callias the son of Hipponicus, and his brother by the mother ; Paralus the son of Pericles ; and Charmides the son of Glauco. On the other side of him were Xanthippus the other son of Pericles, and Philippides the son of Philomelus, and Antimocrus the Mendæan, who was the most illustrious of all the disciples of Protagoras, and who is instructed in his art that he may become a sophist. Of those behind these, who followed them listening to what was said, the greater part appeared to be strangers, whom Protagoras brings with him from the several cities through which he passes, and whom he charms by his voice like another Orpheus : and they, allured by voice, follow him. Some of our countrymen also were in the choir. On seeing this choir I was very much delighted in observing how well they took care not to be an impediment to Protagoras in walking before him ; but when he turned, and his company with him, these his auditors that followed him opened to the right and left in a becoming and orderly manner, and always beautifully ranged themselves behind him. After Protagoras,

goras, as Homer¹ says, I saw Hippias the Elean seated on a throne in the opposite vestibule of the porch, and round him on benches sat Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, Phædrus the Myrrhinusian, Andron the son of Androton, and some others, partly strangers and partly his fellow citizens. They appeared, too, to be interrogating Hippias concerning the sublime parts of nature, and certain astronomical particulars; but he, sitting on a throne, considered and resolved their questions. I likewise saw Tantalus: for Prodicus the Cean was there; but he was in a certain building which Hipponicus had before used for an office, but which Callias, on account of the multitude that came to his house, had given to the strangers, after having prepared it for their reception. Prodicus therefore was still in bed wrapt up in skins and coverings, and Pausanias of Ceramis was seated by his bedside; and with Pausanias there was a youth, who appeared to me to be of a beautiful and excellent disposition. His form indeed was perfectly beautiful; and his name, as I have heard, was Agatho. Nor did I wonder that he was beloved by Pausanias. There were also the two Adimantes, the one the son of Cephis, and the other the son of Leucolophides, and many others. But as I was without, I was not able to learn what was the subject of their discourse, though I very much desired to hear Prodicus: for he appears to me to be a man perfectly wise and divine. But a certain humming sound being produced in the chamber through the grave tone of his voice, prevented me from hearing distinctly what he said. Just as we had entered, Alcibiades, the beautiful as you say, and as I am persuaded he is, and Critias the son of Calliarchus, came after us.

After we had entered therefore, and had discussed certain trifling particulars, and considered what passed, we went to Protagoras; and I said, O Protagoras, I and Hippocrates are come to see you.—Would you wish, said he, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of others?—It makes no difference, I replied, to us; but when you hear on what account we come, you yourself shall determine this.—What is it then, said he, that hath brought you?—Hippocrates here is our countryman, the son of Apollodorus, and is of a great

¹ See the 11th Book of the *Odyssey*, where Ulysses is represented conversing with the shades of the dead in Hades. Plato, by alluding to this part of the *Odyssey*, doubtless intended to insinuate, as Dacier well observes, that these sophists are not real men, but only the phantoms and shadows of men.

and

and happy family, and seems to contend with his equals in age for natural endowments. But he desires to become illustrious in the city; and he thinks that he shall especially effect this if he associates with you. Consider, therefore, whether it is proper for him to converse alone with you about these particulars, or in conjunction with others.—Your forethought, said he, Socrates, with respect to me is right. For a stranger who goes to great cities, and persuades young people of the greatest quality to leave the associations both of their kindred and others, both the young and the old, and adhere to him alone, that they may become better men by his conversation, ought in doing this to be cautious. For things of this kind are attended with no small envy, together with much malevolence and many stratagems. I say indeed that the sophistic art is antient, but that those men who first professed it, fearing the hatred to which it would be exposed, sought to conceal it, some with the veil of poetry, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, and others with that of the mysteries and prophecy, as Orpheus and Musæus, and their followers. I perceive also, that some have called this art gymnastic, as Iccus of Tarentum, and as a sophist at present does who is inferior to none, viz. Herodicus the Selymbrianian, who was originally of Megara. But your Agathocles, who was a great sophist, Pythocles of Ceos, and many others, concealed it under the veil of music. All these, as I said, being afraid of envy, employed these arts as veils. I however, in this particular, do not accord with all these: for I think they did not effect any thing which they wished to accomplish; since these concealments are understood by men of great authority in cities. The vulgar indeed do not perceive them; but praise certain things which they hear from the sophists. This subterfuge therefore, not being attended with any effect, but becoming apparent, necessarily shows the great folly of him that attempts it, and makes men much more inimical: for they think that a man of this kind is crafty in every thing. I therefore have taken an opposite path: for I acknowledge myself to be a sophist, and a teacher of men: and I think that by this ingenuous confession I avoid envy more safely than by dissimulation. I also direct my attention to other things besides this; so that, as I may say, with the assistance of Divinity, I have suffered nothing dire through confessing that I am a sophist; though I have exercised this art many years: for my age is very great, and I am old enough to be the father of any one of you. So that it will be by far the most pleasant

fant to me, if you discourse with me concerning these particulars in the presence of all those that are in the house.

I then, suspecting that he wished to exhibit himself to Prodicus and Hippias, and to boast that we came to him as being enamoured of his wisdom, said, Why may not Prodicus and Hippias be called, and those that are with him, that they may hear us?—By all means, said Protagoras, let them be called.—Callias therefore said, Shall we prepare seats for you, that you may discourse sitting?—It was agreed to be proper so to do. And at the same time all of us being pleased, as those that were to hear wise men converse, took hold of the benches and couches, and disposed them near to Hippias; for the benches had been there previously placed. In the interim came Callias and Alcibiades, bringing with them Prodicus, who had then risen from his bed, and those that were with him. When therefore we were all seated, Now, Socrates, said Protagoras, you may tell me before all this company what you a little before mentioned to me about this youth. And I said, My exordium, O Protagoras, is that which I employed before, viz. with what design we came to you. Hippocrates then, here, is desirous of your converse; and says he shall gladly hear what advantage he shall derive from associating with you. This is all we have to say to you.—Protagoras then said in reply, O young man, the advantage which you will derive from associating with me is this, that on the day in which you come to me you will go home better than you was before; you will also be more improved on the second than on the first day, and you will always find that you have every day advanced in improvement.—And I, hearing him, said, O Protagoras, this is by no means wonderful, but it is fit that it should be so; since you also, though so old and so wise, would become better, if any one should teach you what you do not know. But that is not what we require. But just as if Hippocrates here should immediately change his mind, and should desire to associate with the youth lately arrived at this place, Zeuxippus the son of Heracleus, and coming to him in the same manner as he is now come to you, should hear from him the same things as he has heard from you, that every day by associating with him he would become better, and advance in improvement; if he should ask him, In what do you say I shall become better, and advance in proficiency, Zeuxippus would answer him, In the art of painting. And if he were to associate with the Theban Orthagoras, and should hear from him the same things

things as he has heard from you, and should ask him in what he would daily become better by associating with him, he would reply, In the art of playing on the pipe. In like manner do you also reply to the youth, and to me asking for him: for you say that Hippocrates here, by associating with Protagoras, will daily become better and advance in improvement; tell us then, O Protagoras, in what he will make this proficiency?—Protagoras, on hearing me thus speak, said, You interrogate well, Socrates, and I rejoice to answer those who ask in a becoming manner. For Hippocrates, if he comes to me, will not suffer that which he would suffer by associating with any other of the sophists. Other sophists indeed injure youth: for they force them to apply to arts which they are unwilling to learn, by teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music. And at the same time looking at Hippias¹, he added, But he who comes to me, will not learn any thing else than that for the sake of which he came. The discipline too which he acquires from me is the ability of consulting well about his domestic affairs, so that he may govern his house in the best manner, and so that he may be capable of saying and doing all that is advantageous for his country.—I understand you, I replied: for you appear to me to speak of the political art, and to profess to make men good citizens.—This, said he, is the profession which I announce.—What a beautiful artifice, said I, you possess! if you do possess it. For nothing else is to be said to you than that which I conceive. For I, O Protagoras, do not think that this can be taught, and yet I cannot disbelieve what you say. It is just, however, that I should inform you whence I think it cannot be taught, nor by men be procured for men. For I, as well as the other Greeks, say that the Athenians are wise. I see, therefore, when we are collected in the assembly, and when it is necessary to do something respecting the building of houses, that the architects being sent for, are consulted about the business; but that when something is to be done concerning the building of ships, shipwrights are consulted; and in a similar manner with respect to other things which they think may be taught and learnt. But if any other person whom they do not think to be an artist attempts to give them advice in these particulars, though he may be very fine and rich and noble, they pay no more attention to him on this account, but

¹ Protagoras says this, because Hippias professed to be very skilful in these sciences.

laugh and make a noise, until he either desists from speaking through the disturbance, or till the archers, by order of the magistrates, lead or carry him out. In this manner therefore they act respecting things which pertain to art. But when it is requisite to consult about any thing which relates to the government of the city, then the builder, the brazier, the shoemaker, the merchant, and the sailor, the rich and the poor, the noble and the ignoble, rise, and similarly give their advice, and no one disturbs them, as was the case with the others, as persons who, though they have never learnt nor have had a preceptor, yet attempt to give advice. For it is evident that they do not think this can be taught. Nor does this take place only in public affairs, but in private concerns also; the wisest and best of the citizens are not able to impart to others the virtue which they possess. For Pericles, the father of these youths, has beautifully and well instructed them in those things which are taught by masters; but in those things in which he is wise, he has neither himself instructed them, nor has he sent them to another to be instructed; but they, feeding as it were without restraint, wander about, to see if they can casually meet with virtue. If you will too, this very same man Pericles, being the tutor of Clinias the younger brother of this Alcibiades, separated them, fearing the former should be corrupted by the latter, and sent Clinias to be educated by Ariphron. Before, however, six months had elapsed, Ariphron, not knowing what to do with him, returned him to Pericles. I could also mention many others to you, who being themselves good men, never made any other man better, neither of their kindred nor strangers. I therefore, O Protagoras, looking to these things, do not think that virtue can be taught. When, however, I hear you asserting these things, I waver, and am of opinion that you speak to the purpose, because I think that you are skilled in many things, and that you have learned many and discovered some things yourself. If, therefore, you can more clearly show us, that virtue may be taught, do not be envious, but demonstrate this to us.

Indeed, Socrates, said he, I shall not be envious. But whether shall I show you this by relating a fable, as an older to younger men, or shall I discuss it by argument? Many, therefore, of those that sat with him, left it to his choice. It appears, therefore, to me, said he, that it will be more agreeable to you to relate a fable.

"There was a time, then, when the gods were alone¹, but the mortal genera did not exist. But when the destined time of generation came to these, the gods fashioned them within the earth, by mixing earth and fire together; and such things as are mingled with these two elements. And when they were about to lead them into light, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus² to distribute to and adorn each with those powers which were adapted to their nature. But Epimetheus requested Prometheus that he might distribute these powers: And, said he, do you attend to my distribution. And having thus persuaded him, he distributed. But in his distributing, he gave to some strength without swiftness, and adorned with swiftness the more imbecile. Some he also armed; but giving to others an unarmed nature, he devised a certain other power for their security. For those whom he had invested with a small body, he either enabled to fly away through wings, or distributed them in a subterranean habitation; but those whom he had increased in magnitude he preserved by their bulk. And thus equalizing, he distributed other things, taking care that no genus should be deprived of the means of preservation.

"After, then, he had secured them from mutual destruction, he took care to defend them against the injuries of the air and seasons, by clothing them with thick hairs and solid skins, so that they might be sufficiently protected in the winter frosts and summer heats; and so that these very things might become appropriate and spontaneous beds to each when they went to rest. Under their feet, likewise, he partly added arms, and partly hairs and solid and bloodless skins. He also imparted to different animals different nutriment; to some, indeed, herbs from the earth, to others the fruits of trees, and to others roots. There were some also whom he permitted to feed on the flesh of other animals: and to some, indeed, he gave the power of generating but a few of their own species, but to those that are devoured by these he imparted fecundity, thus extending safety to the race. However, as Epi-

¹ By this nothing more is meant than that a divine is prior to a mortal nature, according to causal, but not according to temporal, priority. For, whatever Divinity produces, it produces continually; and hence every effect proceeding from a divine cause is consubstantial with that cause, in the same manner as shadow with its forming substance.

² Prometheus, as we have observed in the notes on the Gorgias, is the inspective guardian of the descent of the rational soul; and Epimetheus is the guardian of the irrational soul.

metheus was not very wise, he ignorantly bestowed all his powers on irrational animals; but the human race still remained unadorned by him. Prometheus, therefore, came to him while he was doubting, and considered the distribution which he had made. And he saw that other animals were well provided for, but that man was naked, without shoes, without a bed, and unarmed. But now the fatal day was arrived, in which it was necessary that man should emerge from the earth into light. Prometheus, therefore, being dubious what safety he could find for man, stole the artificial wisdom of Vulcan and Minerva¹, together with fire; since it was impossible that the possession of this wisdom could be useful without fire; and thus he imparted it to man. By these means, therefore, man possessed the wisdom pertaining to life. He had not, however, political wisdom. For this was with Jupiter; and Prometheus was no longer permitted to ascend to the citadel, the habitation of Jupiter². To which we may add, that the guards of Jupiter were terrible. Prometheus, therefore, secretly entered into the common habitation of Minerva and Vulcan, in which the arts were exercised; and stealing the fiery art from Vulcan, and the other from Minerva, he gave them to man: and from this arises the fertility of human life. But Prometheus afterwards, as it is said, through Epimetheus, was punished for his theft. Since, however, man became a partaker of a divine allotment, in the first place through this alliance with divinity, he alone of the other animals believed that there were gods, and endeavoured that the altars and statues of the gods should be established. In the next place he articulately distinguished by art, voice and

¹ In these two divinities the cause of all arts is primarily comprehended: the former of these first imparting the fabricative power which the arts possess; and the latter illuminating them with that which is gnostic and intellectual.

² Prometheus was not permitted to ascend to the citadel of Jupiter, with whom the political science first subsists, because the guards of Jupiter, i. e. the Curetes, who are of an unpolluted guardian characteristic, preserve him exempt from all partial causes, among which Prometheus ranks. Through these guardians also, being firmly established in himself, he pervades through all things without impediment, and being present to all his progeny, is expanded above wholes according to supreme transcendence. The citadel also of Jupiter (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 299), according to the rumours of theologists, is a symbol of intellectual circulation and of the highest summit of Olympus, which all the wise suspend from Jupiter's intellectual place of survey. To this place likewise (he adds) Jupiter extends all the mundane gods, thence imparting to them intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific illuminations.

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names, and invented houses and garments, shoes and beds, and nourishment from the earth. But men, being thus provided for in the beginning, lived dispersed; for cities were not: hence they were destroyed by wild beasts, through being every where more imbecile than them; and the fabricating art was indeed a sufficient aid to them for nutriment, but was inadequate to the war with wild beasts: for they had not yet the political art, of which the military is a part. They fought therefore to collect themselves together, and to save themselves, building for this purpose cities. When, however, they were thus collected in a body, they injured each other, as not possessing the political art; so that, again being dispersed, they were destroyed by the beasts. Jupiter, therefore, fearing for our race, lest it should entirely perish, sent Hermes, and ordered him to bring Shame and Justice to men, that these two might be the ornaments and the bonds of cities, and the conciliators of friendship. Hermes, therefore, asked after what manner he should give Shame and Justice to men. Whether, said he, as the arts are distributed, so also shall I distribute these? for they are distributed as follows:—One man who possesses the medicinal art is sufficient for many private persons; and in a similar manner other artificers. Shall I, therefore, thus insert Shame and Justice in men? or shall I distribute them to all?—To all, said Jupiter, and let all be partakers of them: for cities will not subsist, if a few only participate of these, as of the other arts. Publish also this law in my name, that he who is incapable of partaking of Shame and Justice shall be punished as the pest of the city.”

Thus, Socrates, and on this account, both others and the Athenians, when they discourse concerning building, or any other fabricative art, think that a few only should be consulted; and if any one unskilled in these affairs offers to give advice, they do not allow him, as you say; and it is reasonable, as I say, that they should not. But when they proceed to a consultation concerning political virtue, the whole of which consists from justice and temperance, they very properly permit every man to speak; because it is fit that every one should partake of this virtue, or there can be no cities. This, Socrates, is the cause of that which was doubted. And that you may not think I deceive you in asserting that all men in reality think that every man participates of justice, and of the rest of politic virtue, take this as an argument: in other arts, as you say, if any one asserts that he is a good piper, or skilled in any other

other art of which he is ignorant, those that hear him either laugh at, or are indignant with him, and his friends admonish him as one insane; but in justice and the other political virtue, though it be known that a certain person is unjust, yet if he asserts the truth of himself before the multitude, they think that he is insane, and that he should not unfold his iniquity; and they say that all men should acknowledge themselves to be just, whether they are or not; or that he who does not pretend that he is just must be mad; as if it were necessary that every one should, in a certain respect, partake of justice, or no longer be a man. I say these things, to show that every man is very properly permitted to give his advice concerning this virtue, because every one is thought to be a partaker of it. But that men do not think that it subsists from nature, nor from chance, but that it may be taught and obtained by study, this I will in the next place endeavour to show you. No one is enraged with another on account of those evils which he thinks arise either from nature or art; nor does he admonish, or teach, or punish the possessors of these evils in order to make them otherwise than they are; but, on the contrary, he pities them. Thus, for instance, who would be so mad as to reprehend the deformed, or the little, or the diseased? For I think they know that these things, viz. such as are beautiful and the contrary, happen to men from nature and fortune. On the contrary, when they think that any one possesses certain evils from study, custom, and learning, then they are indignant, admonish, and punish; among the number of which evils are injustice and impiety, and in short every thing which is contrary to political virtue. And as this species of virtue is obtained by study and discipline, they are on this account indignant with and admonish every one who neglects to acquire it. For if you are willing, O Socrates, to consider what the punishment of the unjust is able to effect, this very thing will teach you that men think virtue is to be acquired. For no one endued with intellect punishes him who has acted unjustly, merely because he has so acted; for he who acts in this manner punishes like a wild beast, irrationally. But he who endeavours to punish with reason, does not punish for the sake of past guilt (for that which has been done cannot be undone), but for the sake of future injustice, that neither this offender himself, nor any other who sees him punished, may again act unjustly. And he who has this conception must be persuaded that virtue may be taught: for punishment is inflicted for the
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fake of turning others from guilt. All, therefore, that punish, as well privately as publicly, have this opinion. And both other men, and especially the Athenians your fellow citizens, take vengeance on and punish those whom they think have acted unjustly ; so that, according to this reasoning, the Athenians also are among the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Very properly, therefore, do your fellow citizens admit the brazier and shoemaker to give advice in political concerns ; and, as it appears to me, Socrates, it has been sufficiently demonstrated to you that they consider virtue as a thing which may be taught and acquired.

There still, however, remains the doubt which you introduced concerning illustrious men, viz. on what account they teach their sons, and make them wise in things which may be obtained from preceptors, but do not render them better than others in the virtue for which they themselves are renowned. In order to remove this doubt, Socrates, I shall no longer employ a fable, but argument. For thus conceive : whether is there any one thing or not, of which it is necessary all the citizens should partake, or a city cannot subsist ? In this thing your doubt is solved, but by no means otherwise. For if there is this one thing, which is neither the art of the architect, nor of the brazier, nor potter, but is justice, and temperance, and holiness, and in short the virtue of man ; if this be the thing, of which it is necessary all should partake, and together with which every man should learn and perform whatever else he wishes to learn or do, but by no means without this ; or if he does not partake of it, that he should be taught and punished, whether boy, or man, or woman, till through punishment he becomes better ; and he who is not obedient, when punished or taught, is banished from the city, or put to death as one incurable ; if this then be the case, and those illustrious men teach their children other things, but not this, consider in how wonderful a manner they become excellent men : for we have shown that they think virtue may be taught both privately and publicly. But since it may be taught, do you think that fathers teach their children other things, the ignorance of which is neither attended with death nor a penalty ; but that in other things in which a penalty, death, and exile are the punishments attendant on their children, when they are not instructed nor exercised in virtue, and besides death, the confiscation of their goods, and in short the ruin of their families, they neither teach them these things,
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nor use their utmost endeavours that they may acquire them? It is necessary to think, Socrates, that fathers, beginning with their children when they are very young, will teach and admonish them as long as they live. For as soon as a boy understands what is said to him, his nurse, mother, pedagogue, and the father himself, strive to the utmost that the boy may become a most excellent character; teaching and pointing out to him, in every word and deed, that this is just, and that unjust; that this is beautiful and that base; and that this is holy, and that unholy: likewise that he should do these things, and not those. And if the boy is willingly persuaded, they think they have done well; but if not, they form him to rectitude by threats and blows, as if he were a distorted and bent piece of wood. In the next place they send him to masters, and these they much more enjoin to pay attention to the morals of the boys, than to the teaching them to read and play on the harp. The preceptors likewise take care of the children; and when the boys have learnt their letters, and their attention is directed to the meaning of what they read, instead of oral precepts, the masters give them the compositions of the best poets to read, and compel them to commit them to memory; because in these there are many admonitions, and many transactions, and praises, and encomiums, of antient illustrious men, that the boy may be zealous to imitate them, and may desire to become a similar character. The masters of the harp also do other things of a like kind; for they pay attention to temperance, and take care that the boys do not commit any vice. Besides this too, when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach them the compositions of other good lyric poets, singing them to the harp; and they compel rhythms and harmonies to become familiar to the souls of the boys, that becoming milder, more orderly, and more harmonious, they may be more able both to speak and act: for every life of man requires rhythm and harmony. Further still, besides these things, they send them to masters of exercise, that their bodies being rendered better, may be usefully subservient to the rational part of the soul, and that they may not be compelled to cowardice, through the depravity of their bodies, in war and other actions. And these things are done by those who are most able to do them: but the most able are the most wealthy; and the sons of these begin their exercises the earliest, and continue them the longest. But when they leave their masters, the city compels them to learn the laws, and to live according to the paradigm of these, that they may not

act casually from themselves ; but in reality, just as writing masters give their scholars, who have not yet learnt to write well, letters to be traced over by them which they have written, and thus compel them to write conformably to their copy ; so the city prescribing laws which were the inventions of illustrious and antient legislators, compels them to govern and to be governed according to these. But it punishes him who transgresses these ; and the name which is given to this punishment, both by you, and in many other places, is *ἐπιτιμῆς*, *corrections*, as if it were justice *correcting* depravity.

As so much attention therefore is paid, both privately and publicly, to virtue, can you still wonder and doubt, O Socrates, whether virtue may be taught ? It is not, however, proper to wonder that it can be taught, but it would be much more wonderful if this were not the case. But why then are unworthy sons frequently the offspring of worthy fathers ? Learn again the reason of this. For this is not wonderful, if what I have before said is true, that this thing virtue ought not to be peculiar to any one person, in order to the existence of a city. For if this be the case, as I say (and it is so the most of all things), consider and select any other study and discipline whatever. Thus, for instance, suppose that this city could not subsist unless we were all of us players on the pipe, should we not all apply ourselves to this instrument ? and would not every one teach every one, both privately and publicly, to play on it ? and would he not reprove him who played unskilfully, and this without any envy ? Just as now, no one envies or conceals things just and legal, as is the case in other arts. For mutual justice and virtue are, I think, advantageous to us : and on this account every one most willingly discourses about and teaches things just and legal. If then in playing on the pipe we are thus disposed, with all alacrity and without reserve, to teach each other, do you think, Socrates, said he, that the sons of the most excellent players on the pipe would become good pipers, rather than the sons of bad players on this instrument ? I indeed think not ; but the boy most happily born for that art would be found to be him who made the greatest proficiency ; and he who was not naturally adapted for it would pursue it without glory. And the son of an excellent piper would often be unskilled in that art ; and again, a good piper would frequently be the offspring of a bad one. However, they would be all sufficiently excellent, if compared with the unskilful, and with those who know nothing of the piper's art. In like manner think that the man

who appears to you to be the most unjust of those who are nurtured by the laws, and among men, is just and the artificer of this thing (justice), if he is compared with men, who have neither discipline, nor courts of justice, nor laws, nor any necessity which compels them to pay every attention to virtue, but are mere savages, such as those which Pherecrates the poet caused to be acted last year, during the festivals of Bacchus. And if you should chance to be among such men as the misanthropes in that play, you would rejoice if you met with Eurybates and Phrynendas¹, and deploring your fortune, you would desire the depravity of our men. But now you are delicate, Socrates, because all men are teachers of virtue to the utmost of their abilities, though no one appears to you to be so. For if you should search for the man who taught us to speak the Greek tongue, he would be no where to be found: nor, if you were to inquire who it is that can teach the sons of manual artificers this very art which they have learnt from their father, and which both the father and the fellow artists his friends exercise, you would not, I think, O Socrates, easily find the preceptor of these; but it is every where easy to find teachers of the ignorant. And thus it is also with respect to virtue and every thing else. We should likewise rejoice, if he who surpasses us causes us to advance in virtue, though but in a small degree, among the number of which I think I am one, and that I know in a manner, superior to other men, what will contribute to the beautiful and the good, and that I am worthy of the reward which I receive for my instruction, and indeed of more than I receive, as is also the opinion of my disciples. Hence this is the bargain which I usually make: when any one has learnt from me, if he is willing, he pays me the sum of money which I require; but if not, going to a temple and swearing how much the disciplines which I teach are worth, he deposits the sum which he is to pay me. And thus much, said he, O Socrates, I, and the fable, and argument have asserted, to prove that virtue may be taught; and the Athenians also are of the same opinion. We have likewise shown that it is not in any respect wonderful that depraved sons should be the offspring of excellent fathers, since the sons of Polycletus, who are of the same age with Paralus and Xanthippus, are nothing when compared with their father;

¹ These were two notorious profligates, who had given occasion for the proverbs, "An action of Eurybates: it is another Phrynendas."

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and in like manner with respect to the sons of other artists. These, however, are not yet to be condemned ; for they are young, and hope may be yet entertained of their making a proficiency. •

Protagoras therefore, having pointed out these and similar things, ceased to speak ; and I having been for a long time charmed, looked still at him, as desiring to hear him still speak. But when I perceived that he had in reality finished his discourse, and when I had with difficulty collected myself, looking to Hippocrates I said, O son of Apollodorus, how much do I thank you for having brought me hither ! For I make much of what I have heard from Protagoras ; since before this, I thought that it was not human care by which worthy men become worthy, but now I am persuaded that it is. There is however a small impediment to my belief, which Protagoras will doubtless easily remove, since he has unfolded so much. For if some one should discourse with any one of the popular orators, perhaps he would hear arguments of this kind, such as Pericles delivered, or some other eloquent man ; but if some one should ask them concerning any thing, they like a book would have nothing to reply, nor any thing to say. And if a man should ask them any trifling particular respecting what was said, they would resemble brass when struck, which keeps and extends its sound for a long time, unless some one lays hold of it. For thus rhetoricians, when asked some trifling thing, reply in an extended speech. But Protagoras here is sufficient to deliver both long and beautiful discourses, as he has just now made it appear ; and he is also sufficient, when interrogated, to answer with brevity, and interrogating, to wait for and receive an answer ; which can be asserted but of a few. Now then, O Protagoras, I am in want of a certain trifling particular, and if you answer me this, I shall have all that I want. You say that virtue may be taught ; and I, if I could be persuaded by any man, should be persuaded by you. But I beseech you to remove the wonder which you excited in my mind while you were speaking. For you say that Jupiter sent justice and shame to men ; and afterwards, in many parts of your discourse, you speak of justice, temperance, and sanctity, and of all these collectively, as if virtue were but one thing. Accurately explain to me, therefore, this very thing, whether virtue is one certain thing, but the parts of it are justice, temperance, and sanctity ; or whether all these which I have just now mentioned are names of one and the same thing. This it is

which I still desire to know.—But it is easy, said he, Socrates, to answer this question, that virtue being one thing, the particulars which you have adduced are the parts of it.—But whether, said I, are they parts, in the same manner as the mouth, nostrils, eyes and ears are parts of the face? or are they parts like the parts of gold, which do not differ from each other and the whole, except in magnitude and parvitude?—It appears to me, Socrates, that the parts of virtue have the same relation to the whole, as the parts of the face to the whole face.—Whether then, said I, do different men receive a different part of virtue? or is it necessary that he who receives one part should possess all the parts of virtue?—By no means, said he; since many men are brave, but unjust; and others again are just, but not wise.—But, said I, are these parts of virtue, viz. wisdom and fortitude?—Certainly, the most of all things, he replied; and the greatest of all the parts, is wisdom.—But, said I, of these parts, is this one thing, and that another?—Yes.—Has each of them also its proper power, in the same manner as each of the parts of the face? As for instance, the eye is not similar to the ears, nor is the power of it the same; nor do any of the other parts resemble each other, nor are their powers the same, nor are they mutually similar in any other respect. Is it therefore thus also with the parts of virtue, so that the one does not resemble the other, neither in itself, nor in its power? Or is it not evident that it is so, since it is similar to the paradigm which we have introduced?—But it does thus subsist, Socrates, said he.—And I replied, no other part of virtue therefore, is such as science, nor such as justice, nor such as fortitude, nor such as temperance, nor such as sanctity.—It is not, said he.

But come, said I, let us consider in common what kind of a thing each of these is. And, in the first place, is justice a certain thing, or is it nothing? For to me it appears to be something. But what does it appear to you to be?—That it is also something.—What then? If some one should ask you and me, O Protagoras and Socrates, tell me with respect to this very thing which you have just now named justice, whether it is just or unjust? I indeed should answer him that it is just. But what would you say? would your answer be the same with mine or not?—The same, said he.—I therefore should say that justice is a thing similar to the being just, in reply to the interrogator. And would not you also assert the same?—Yes, said he.—If then, after this, he should ask us, Do you also say that sanctity is something?

something? we should reply, I think, that we do.—We should, said he.—But whether do you say that this very thing sanctity is actually adapted to be unholy, or to be holy? For my part, I should be indignant with this question, and should say, Predict better things, O man: for by no means will any thing else be holy unless holiness itself be holy. But what do you say? would not you thus answer?—Entirely so, said he.—If then, after this he should say, asking us, How then have ye spoken a little before? Or have I not rightly understood you? For you appear to me to assert that the parts of virtue subsisted in such a manner with respect to each other, that one of them does not resemble the other; I should reply, that as to other things, you have understood rightly, but you are mistaken in thinking that I also have said this: for Protagoras gave this answer, but I interrogated him. If then he should say, he speaks the truth, Protagoras: for you say that one part of virtue does not resemble another. This is your assertion. What would be your answer to him?—It is necessary, said he, Socrates, to acknowledge it.—What then, O Protagoras, assenting to these things, shall we answer him, if he should add, holiness therefore is not of such a nature as to be a just thing, nor is justice such as a holy thing, but such as that which is not holy; and holiness is such as that which is not just. So that what is just is unholy. What shall we say to him in reply? For I, for my own part, should say that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. And for you, if you will permit me, I should reply this very thing, that either justice is the same with holiness, or that it is most similar to it; and that the most of all things, justice is such as holiness, and holiness such as justice. But see whether you hinder me from giving this answer; or does this also appear to you to be the case?—It does not entirely, said he, Socrates, appear to me to be simply thus, so as to grant that justice is holy, and holiness just; but there appears to me to be a certain difference between them. However, of what consequence is this? For, if you will, let justice be holy, and let holiness be just.—I have nothing to do, said I, with *I will*; and if it is agreeable to you, let it be reprobated. And let us also be persuaded that the subject of our conversation will be discussed in the best manner, when the particle *if* is removed from it.—But indeed, he replied, justice has something similar to holiness. For one thing always resembles another in a certain respect, contraries alone excepted: for white has no similitude to black, nor hard to soft; and so with respect to

to other things which appear to be most contrary to each other, and which, as we before observed, possess another power, and of which one does not resemble the other. But there are other things, such as the parts of the face, in which the one is similar to the other. So that although you should confute these things after this manner, if you are of opinion that all things are similar to each other, yet it is not just to call those things similar which possess a certain similitude to each other; as neither is it just to call those things which possess a certain dissimilitude, dissimilar, though they have but very little of the similar.—And I wondering, said to him, do the just and the holy appear to you to be so mutually related, as to possess but a small degree of similitude to each other?—Not entirely so, said he; nor yet again, do I consider them in the same way as you appear to me to consider them.—But I replied, Since these things do not seem to be agreeable to you, we will dismiss them, and consider this other thing which you say. What do you call folly? Do you not say that wisdom is perfectly contrary to it?—To me it appears to be so, said he.—But when men act rightly and profitably, do they then appear to you to act temperately; or when they act in a contrary manner?—They appear to me, said he, to act temperately, when they act rightly and profitably.—And do they not act temperately by temperance?—It is necessary.—Do not therefore those that act wrongly, act foolishly, and thus acting, not act by temperance?—I agree with you, said he, that they do.—The acting foolishly, therefore, is the contrary to acting temperately.—He said it was.—Are not, therefore, things which are done foolishly, so done by folly, but by temperance things which are done temperately?—He granted it.—If then any thing is done by strength, is it not done strongly, and if by weakness, weakly.—So it appears.—And if any thing is done with swiftness, is it not done swiftly, and if with slowness, slowly?—He said it was.—And if any thing is done after the same manner, is it not done by the same, and if in a contrary manner by the contrary?—He granted it.—Come then, I replied, is there something beautiful?—He admitted there was.—And is any thing contrary to this except the base?—There is not.—But what? Is there something good? And is any thing contrary to this except evil?—There is not.—Is there also something acute in voice?—He said there is.—And is any thing contrary to this except the grave?—There is not, said he.—To every one of contraries therefore, I replied, there is only one contrary, and not many.

many.—He granted it.—Let us then, said I, repeat the particulars to which we have assented. We have acknowledged that there is only one contrary to one thing, but not more than one.—We have.—But that which is done contrarily is done by things contrary.—He admitted it.—We also granted that what is done foolishly is done in a manner contrary to that which is done temperately.—He said we did.—But that which is done temperately is done by temperance, and that which is done foolishly, by folly.—He granted it.—But if a thing is done contrarily, is it not done by a contrary?—Yes.—And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly.—Yes.—And are they not done contrarily?—Entirely so.—Are they not therefore done by contraries?—Yes.—Folly therefore is contrary to temperance.—So it appears.—Do you remember, then, that it was before acknowledged by us, that folly is contrary to wisdom?—He agreed that it was.—And did we not also say, that there is only one contrary to one thing.—We did.—Which therefore of these positions, O Protagoras, shall we reject? That which says there is only one contrary to one thing, or that in which it is asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance? but that each is a part of virtue? And that besides being different, both they and their powers are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which therefore of these shall we reject? for both of them are not very musically asserted; since they do not accord, nor coharmonize with each other. For how can they accord, if it be necessary that there should only be one contrary to one thing, but not to more than one? But to folly, which is one thing, wisdom and temperance have appeared to be contrary. Is it so, said I, O Protagoras, or not?—He acknowledged that it was so, but very unwillingly.—Will not, therefore, temperance and wisdom be one thing? And again, prior to this, it appeared to us that justice and sanctity were nearly the same thing. But come, said I, Protagoras, let us not be weary, but consider what remains. Does it then appear to you that a man who acts unjustly is wise, because he acts unjustly?—I, said he, Socrates, should be ashamed to acknowledge this, though it is asserted by many men.—Whether then shall we address ourselves to them, or to you?—If you are willing, said he, speak first to this assertion of the many.—But it makes no difference to me, if you only answer, whether these things appear to you or not; for I especially direct my attention to the assertion. It may, however, perhaps happen, that I shall both explore myself interrogating, and him who answers.

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At first, therefore, Protagoras began to assume some consequence (for he was averse to discuss this affair, and said it was difficult); but afterwards he submitted to answer.—Come then, said I, answer me from the beginning: Do certain persons who act unjustly, appear to you to be wise?—Let them be so, said he.—And does not the being wise consist in consulting well, even when they act unjustly?—Be it so, said he.—But whether, I replied, does this take place if they do well, acting unjustly, or if they do ill?—If they do well.—Do you then say that certain things are good?—I do.—Whether, therefore, said I, are those things good which are advantageous to men?—By Jupiter, said he, they are; and I also call some things good, though they are not advantageous to men. And Protagoras, when he said this, appeared to me to be ruffled, afraid, and averse to answer. Seeing him, therefore, in this condition, I cautiously and gradually interrogated him; and I said, Whether, O Protagoras, do you speak of things which are advantageous to no man, or of those which are in *no respect* advantageous? And do you call such things as these good?—By no means, said he; but I know many things which are useless to men, meats and drinks, and medical potions, and ten thousand other things; and I also know some things which are advantageous to them. There are likewise some things which are by no means profitable to men, but are beneficial to horses; some which are advantageous to oxen only; and others to dogs: others again which are beneficial to no one of these, but to trees; and others which are good to the roots of trees, but pernicious to their blossoms. Thus, for instance, dung is beneficial to the roots of all trees when thrown upon them; but if you were to throw it on their branches and shoots, you would destroy them all. Thus too, oil is a very excellent thing for all plants: but is most hostile to the hairs of all animals except man. For it is beneficial to the hairs of man, and to the rest of his body. And so diversified and all-various a thing is good, that this very thing, oil, is good to the external parts of the body of man, but is most pernicious to his inward parts. And on this account all physicians forbid the diseased the use of oil; or at least only permit them to use it in a very small degree, and just sufficient to correct the bad smell of the food which they take.

Protagoras having thus spoken, those that were present loudly applauded him as one that had made a good speech. And I said, O Protagoras, I am a man naturally forgetful, and if any one makes a long discourse to me, I forget
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what was the subject of his discourse. As, therefore, if I were deaf, and you intended to discourse with me, it would be necessary for you to speak a little louder to me than to others; so now, since you happen to have met with a forgetful man, cut your answers for me, and make them shorter, if you wish that I should follow you.—How would you have me shorten my answers? Must I answer you, said he, shorter than is necessary?—By no means, I replied.—But as much as is proper, said he?—Yes, said I.—Whether, therefore, must my reply be such as appears to me to be necessary, or such as appears to be so to you?—I have heard, I replied, that you can both speak with prolixity yourself about the same things, and teach another to do the same, so as never to be in want of words; and again, that you can speak with brevity, so that no one can deliver himself in fewer words than you. If, therefore, you intend to discourse with me, use the other method, that of speaking with brevity.—O Socrates, said he, I have had verbal contests with many men, and if I had done this which you urge me to do, viz. if I had spoken as my antagonist ordered me to speak, I should not have appeared to excel any one; nor would the name of Protagoras have been celebrated in Greece.—And I (for I knew that the former answers did not please him, and that he would not be willing to answer my interrogations) thought that I had no longer any business in the conference. I therefore said, O Protagoras, I do not desire you to discourse with me contrary to your will; but if you are disposed to converse so that I can follow you, then I will discourse with you. For you, according to report, and as you yourself say, are able to speak both with prolixity and brevity: for you are wise. But I am unable to make these long speeches; though I wish that I had the ability. It is fit, however, that you, who are capable of doing both, should yield to my inability, in order that conversation may take place. But now, as you are not willing to do this, and a certain business prevents me from staying to hear your long speeches, I must depart whither it is requisite I should go; though perhaps it would not be unpleasant to me to hear these things from you.—And at the same time having thus spoken, I rose in order to go. But as I was rising, Callias taking hold of me with his right hand, and of my cloak with his left, said, We shall not dismiss you, Socrates: for if you depart, our conversation will be at an end. I beseech you, therefore, stay with us: for there is not any one thing which I would more willingly hear than you and Protagoras discoursing

VOL. V. s together.

together. Gratify all of us therefore.—And I said (for I was now standing as being ready to go), O son of Hipponicus, I have always admired your philosophy; but I now both praise and love it; so that I should wish to gratify you, if you request of me possibilities. But at present, it is just as if you should desire me to run a race with Criso the Himeræan, who is now in the vigour of youth, or with one of those who run and accomplish the longest course, or with some diurnal courier; I should say to you, that I wish much more than you do that I could keep pace with these runners, but that I cannot. If, therefore, you would see me and Criso running a race together, you must request him to keep pace with me: for I am not able to run swiftly, but he is able to run slowly. In like manner, if you desire to hear me and Protagoras, you must request him, that as he at first answered me with brevity the questions that were asked, he will now also answer me in the same manner: for if he does not, what will be the mode of our discourse? I indeed thought that it is one thing to converse together, and another to harangue.—But you see Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras appears to speak justly, when he says that he ought to be permitted to speak as he pleases, and you as you please. Alcibiades, therefore, taking up the discourse, said, You do not speak well Callias: for Socrates here acknowledges that he cannot make a long speech, and in this yields to Protagoras. But in the ability of discoursing, and knowing how to question and answer, I should wonder if he yielded to any man. If, therefore, Protagoras confesses that he is inferior to Socrates in disputation, it is sufficient for Socrates; but if he denies it, let him dispute, both by questioning and answering, without making a long speech to every interrogation, and without deviating from the subject so as to prevent another from speaking, and lengthening his discourse till the greater part of the auditors forget what was the subject of investigation. For as for Socrates, I will be security for him that he will not forget any thing: since he only jests when he says he is forgetful. To me, therefore, Socrates appears to be more reasonable in what he demands: for it is fit that every one should declare his own opinion. But after Alcibiades, it was Critias, I think, who said, O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias indeed appears to me to be very much for Protagoras; but Alcibiades is always fond of contention in every thing to which he applies himself. We, however, ought not to contend with each other, either for Socrates or Protagoras, but we should request both of them

in common not to dissolve the conference in the middle. But he having thus spoken, Prodicus said, You appear to me, Critias, to speak well : for it is requisite that those who are present at these conferences should be the common, but by no means equal auditors of both speakers. For these two are not the same : for it is requisite to hear both in common, but not to distribute equally to either ; but to the wiser more, and to the more unlearned less. I indeed, O Protagoras and Socrates, think that you ought to concede something to each other, and to contend together, but not to quarrel : for friends contend with friends through benevolence ; but adversaries and enemies quarrel with each other. And thus this conference will be conducted in the most beautiful manner. For you, the speakers, will be especially approved, I do not say praised, by us the hearers : for auditors approve from their soul without deception ; but praise is frequently bestowed in words, falsely, contrary to the real opinion. And thus again, we, the hearers, shall be especially delighted, but not pleasurably affected : for he is delighted who learns any thing and participates of wisdom in his dianoëtic part ; but he is pleasurably affected who eats something, or is passive to some other pleasant sensation in his body.

Prodicus having thus spoken, many of those that were present approved what he said. But after Prodicus, Hippias the wise thus addressed them :— I consider all ye that are present as kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by nature, and not by law : for the similar is naturally allied to the similar. But law being the tyrant of men, compels many things to be done contrary to nature. It would be disgraceful, therefore, if we who know the nature of things, who are the wisest of the Greeks, and who are now come for the purpose of displaying our knowledge into the very prytaneum itself of wisdom, and into this house, which is the greatest and most fortunate in the city, should exhibit nothing worthy of this dignity, but disagree with each other like the vilest of men. I therefore both request and advise you, O Protagoras and Socrates, to submit yourselves to us, as if we were arbitrators assembled for the purpose of bringing you to an agreement. Nor do you, Socrates, pursue this accurate form of dialogue, which is so very concise, unless it is agreeable to Protagoras ; but give up the reins to discourse, that it may appear to us to be more magnificent and elegant. Nor do you, Protagoras, extending all your ropes, fly with swelling sails into the wide sea of discourse,

discourse, and lose sight of shore : but let both endeavour to preserve a middle course. Be persuaded also by me, and let some moderator and president be chosen, who shall oblige each of you to keep within bounds.—This expedient pleased those that were present, and all of them praised it. And Callias said, that he would not suffer me to go, and required me to choose a moderator. I therefore said, that it would be disgraceful to select a judge of our discourses : for if he be our inferior, it will not be right that the subordinate should preside over the more excellent ; and if he be our equal, neither thus will it be right. For he who is just such a one as we are, will act similarly to us ; so that the choice will be vain. But to choose one better than we are, is, I think, in reality impossible : since one wiser than Protagoras here, cannot be chosen. And if you should choose a man in no respect more able, but whom you assert however to be so, this also will be disgraceful to Protagoras, by subjecting him to a president, as if he were some contemptible person : for it makes no difference as to myself. I am willing, therefore, to act as follows, that conversation and dialogue may take place between us, which are the objects of your desire : If Protagoras is not willing to answer, let him interrogate, and I will answer ; and at the same time I will endeavour to show him in what manner I say he who is interrogated ought to answer. But when I reply to that which he may be willing to ask, he again in a similar manner shall reply to me. If, therefore, he shall appear not to be cheerfully disposed to answer the interrogation, both you and I in common must demand of him, that which you now demand of me, not to dissolve the conversation. Nor for the sake of this is there any occasion to appoint a president : for all of you will be presidents in common.—It appeared to all that this was what ought to be done. And Protagoras, indeed, was not very willing to comply ; but at the same time he was compelled to consent to interrogate ; and that when he had sufficiently interrogated, he would in his turn answer with brevity. He began therefore as follows :

I think, said he, O Socrates, that the greatest part of a man's erudition consists in being skilled in poetical compositions. But this is the ability of knowing what is well or ill said by the poets, so as to be capable of assigning a reason when interrogated concerning their poems. And now indeed let the question be respecting virtue, the subject of our present discourse ; differing only in this, that the disquisition is transferred to poetry. Simonides then
says

says to Scopas, the son of Creon the Theſſalonian, "That it is difficult to become a truly good man, ſo as in hands, feet, and intellect, to be faſhioned a blameleſs ſquare." Do you know the verſe, or ſhall I repeat the whole paſſage to you?—And I ſaid, there is no neceſſity for this; for I know, and have paid great attention to the verſe.—You ſpeak well, ſaid he. Whether, therefore, does Simonides appear to you to have done well and rightly, or not?—Very well, ſaid I, and rightly.—But does the poet appear to you to have done well if he contradicts himſelf?—By no means, I replied.—Conſider more attentively, ſaid he.—But, my good man, I have ſufficiently conſidered it.—You know therefore, ſaid he, that in the courſe of the poem he ſays, "The aſſertion of Pittacus does not pleaſe me, though it was delivered by a wiſe man, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man." Do you underſtand that the ſame perſon made this and the former aſſertion?—I do, I replied.—Does it therefore, ſaid he, appear to you that theſe things accord with thoſe?—To me they do appear to accord. And at the ſame time fearing leſt he ſhould ſay any thing in addition, I ſaid, But do they not appear to do ſo to you?—How, he replied; can he who made both theſe aſſertions accord with himſelf, when he firſt ſays, that it is difficult to become a truly good man, and a little after, forgetting what he had aſſerted, he blames Pittacus for ſaying the ſame thing that he had ſaid, viz. that it is difficult to continue to be a good man, though it is evident that in blaming him who ſaid this, he alſo blames himſelf? So that either the former or the latter aſſertion is not right.—Protagoras having thus ſpoken, many of the auditors made a noiſe, and applauded him. And I indeed at firſt, as if I had been ſtruck by a ſkilful pugiliſt, was incapable of ſeeing, and became giddy, on his ſaying theſe things, and the reſt making a tumult; but afterwards (to tell you the truth), that I might have time to conſider what the poet ſaid, I turned myſelf to Prodicus, and calling him, I ſaid, Simonides, O Prodicus, was your fellow-citizen, and it is juſt that you ſhould aſſiſt the man. I appear therefore to myſelf to call upon you, in the ſame manner as Homer¹ ſays Scamander called upon Simois when beſieged by Achilles, "Dear brother, let us both join to repel the prowels of this man." For I ſay the ſame to you, let us take care that Simonides be not ſubdued by Protagoras. For in order to aſſiſt Simonides, that elegant device of yours is requiſite, by which you diſtinguiſh between *to will*

¹ Iliad xxi. v. 308.

and to *desire*, as not being the same, and by which you have just now said many and beautiful things. And now consider whether the same thing appears to you as to me : for I do not think that Simonides contradicts himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that *to become* is the same as *to be*, or that it is something different ?—Something different, by Jupiter, said Prodicus.—Does not Simonides then, said I, in the first assertion, declare his own opinion, that it is difficult to *become* a truly good man ?—You speak the truth, said Prodicus.—But he blames Pittacus, I replied, not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but for asserting something different from it. For Pittacus does not say this, that it is difficult to *become* a good man, as Simonides does, but that it is difficult to *continue to be* so. But as Prodicus says, *to be* is not the same as *to become*. And if this be the case, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod¹, “ It is difficult to become good : for the gods have placed sweat before virtue. But he who has arrived at the summit will find that to be easy, which it was difficult to acquire.” Prodicus therefore having heard these things, praised me ; but Protagoras said, your emendation, Socrates, is more erroneous than that which you correct.—And I said, Then I have done ill, as it seems, O Protagoras, and I am a ridiculous physician ; since by attempting to cure, I increase the disease.—Thus however it is, said he.—But how ? I replied.—The poet, said he, would have been very ignorant, if he had asserted that virtue is so vile a thing that it may be easily acquired, though, as it appears to all men, its possession is the most difficult of all things.—And I said, by Jupiter, Prodicus, here, is opportunely present at our conference. For the wisdom of Prodicus appears, O Protagoras, to be of great antiquity, whether it originated from Simonides, or from a source still more antient. But you, who are skilled in many other things, appear to be unskilled in this, and not skilled in it as I am, in consequence of being the disciple of this Prodicus. And now you appear to me not to understand that this thing which is said to be difficult, was not perhaps so apprehended by Simonides, as you apprehend it ; but it is with that as with the word *δεινός*, *deinos*, concerning which Prodicus continually admonishes me, when in praising you, or any other, I say, that

¹ Op. et Dier.

Protagoras is a wise and *skilful* (*δεῖνος*) man, by asking me if I am not ashamed to call things excellent *dreadful* (*δεινός*). For το δεινόν, says he, signifies something bad. Hence no one says *dreadful* riches, nor *dreadful* peace, nor *dreadful* health; but every one says *dreadful* disease, and *dreadful* war, and *dreadful* poverty, as if that which is (*δενον*) *deimon*, is *bad*. Perhaps, therefore, the inhabitants of Ceos and Simonides apprehended by the word *difficult* (*χρῆστον*) either that which is bad, or something different from what you conceive it to mean. Let us therefore inquire of Prodicus (for it is just to ask him the signification of words employed by Simonides); What, O Prodicus, does Simonides mean by the word *difficult*?—He meant, said he, *bad*.—On this account, therefore, I replied, he blames Pittacus for saying that it is *difficult* to continue to be good, just as if he had heard him saying, that it is *bad* to continue to be good.—But what else, Socrates, said he, do you think Simonides intended, than to blame Pittacus because he did not know how to distinguish terms rightly, as being a Lesbian, and educated in a barbarous language?—Do you hear Prodicus, said I, O Protagoras? And have you any thing to say to these things?—This is very far, O Prodicus, said Protagoras, from being the case; for I well know that Simonides meant by the word *difficult*, not that which is *bad*, but that which we and others mean by it, viz. a thing which is not easy, but is accomplished through many labours.—But I also think, I replied, that Simonides meant this, and that Prodicus knows that he did; but he jests, and is willing to try whether you can defend your assertion. For that Simonides did not by the word *difficult* mean any thing *bad*, is very much confirmed by what he adds immediately after: for he says, that Divinity alone possesses this honourable gift. He does not indeed say, that it is bad to continue to be good, and afterwards add that Divinity alone possesses this, and attribute this honour to Divinity alone: for if this were the case, Prodicus should have called Simonides a *profligate*, and not a divine man¹. But I wish to tell you what Simonides appears to me to have understood in this verse, if you think proper to make trial of my poetical skill. Or, if it is agreeable to you, I will hear you.—Protagoras, therefore, hearing me thus speak, said, Do so, if you please, Socrates: but Prodicus, Hippias, and the rest, very much urged

¹ Instead of *οὐδανως κριθεῖς*, as in the printed text, it is necessary to read, as in our version, *οὐδανως θεωρῶν*; as Dacier also well observes.

me to do it.—I will endeavour then, said I, to explain to you my conceptions respecting this verse.

Philosophy is very antient among the Greeks, and particularly in Crete and Lacedæmon; and there are more sophists there than in any other country. They dissemble, however, and pretend that they are unlearned, in order that it may not be manifest that they surpass the rest of the Greeks in wisdom (just as Protagoras has said respecting the sophists); but that they may appear to excel in military skill and fortitude; thinking if their real character were known, that all men would engage in the same pursuit. But now, concealing this, they deceive those who laconize in other cities. For there are some that in imitation of them cut their ears, have a cord for their girdle, are lovers of severe exercise, and use short garments, as if the Lacedæmonians surpassed in these things the other Greeks. But the Lacedæmonians, when they wish to speak freely with their own sophists, and are weary of conversing with them privately, expel these laconic imitators, and then discourse with their sophists, without admitting any strangers to be present at their conversations. Neither do they suffer any of their young men to travel into other cities, as neither do the Cretans, lest they should unlearn what they have learnt. But in these cities, there are not only men of profound erudition, but women also. And that I assert these things with truth, and that the Lacedæmonians are disciplined in the best manner in philosophy and discourse, you may know from the following circumstance: For if any one wishes to converse with the meanest of the Lacedæmonians, he will at first find him, for the most part apparently despicable in conversation, but afterwards, when a proper opportunity presents itself, this same mean person, like a skilful jaculator, will hurl a sentence worthy of attention, short, and contorted; so that he who converses with him will appear to be in no respect superior to a boy. That to laconize, therefore, consists much more in philosophizing, than in the love of exercise, is understood by some of the present age, and was known to the antients; they being persuaded that the ability of uttering such sentences as these is the province of a man perfectly learned. Among the number of those who were thus persuaded, were Thales the Milesian, Pittacus the Mitylenæan, Bias the Prienean, our Solon, Cleobulus the Lindian, Miso the Chenean, and the seventh of these is said to be the Lacedæmonian Chilo. All these were emu-
lators,

lators, lovers, and disciples of the Lacedæmonian erudition. And any one may learn that their wisdom was a thing of this kind, viz. short sentences uttered by each and worthy to be remembered. These men also assembling together, consecrated to Apollo the first fruits of their wisdom, writing in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi those sentences which are celebrated by all men, viz. "Know thyself," and "Nothing too much." But on what account do I mention these things? To show that the mode of philosophy among the ancients was a certain laconic brevity of diction. But the sentence which is ascribed to Pittacus in particular, and which is celebrated by the wise, is this: "It is difficult to continue to be good." Simonides, therefore, as being ambitious of wisdom, knew that if he could overthrow this sentence, and triumph over it like a renowned athletic, he himself would be celebrated by the men of his own time. In opposition to this sentence, therefore, and with a view to renown, he composed the whole of this poem, as it appears to me. Let all of us, however, in common, consider whether what I assert is true.

In the first place, then, the very beginning of the poem would indicate that its author was insane, if he, wishing to say that it is difficult to become a good man, had afterwards inserted the particle ($\mu\alpha$) *indeed*. For this would appear to have been inserted for no purpose. Unless it should be said, that Simonides in what he says contends as it were against the sentence of Pittacus: and that Pittacus, having asserted that it is difficult to continue to be good, Simonides disputing this, says it is not difficult; but it is difficult *indeed*, O Pittacus, to become a good man, and to be *truly* good. For he does not use the word *truly*, as if there were some men that are *truly* good, and others that are good indeed, but not truly so (for this would have been stupid and unworthy of Simonides); but it is necessary to consider the word *truly* as an hyperbaton¹ in the verse; and we must suppose Pittacus speaking, as if there was a dialogue between him and Simonides, and saying, O men, it is difficult to continue to be good; but Simonides answering, O Pittacus, your assertion is not true: for it is not difficult to *be* truly good, but to *become* so, in hands and feet, and intellect, being fashioned a blameless square.

¹ An hyperbaton is a rhetorical figure, and signifies the transposition of words from their plain grammatical order.

And thus it appears that the particle *indeed* is introduced with reason, and that the word *truly* is rightly added in the last place. All that follows likewise testifies that this is the meaning of the passage. There are also many sentences in this poem, each of which might be proved to be well written; for it is very elegantly and accurately composed. To evince this, however, would take up too much time; but let us summarily consider the whole form and intention of the poem, that we may show that the design of it throughout is more than any thing to confute that sentence of Pittacus. For a little after he says, as follows: "It is indeed truly difficult to *become* a good man; yet for a certain time it is possible to *be* so. But *having become* a good man, to continue in this habit, and to *be* a good man, (as you say¹, O Pittacus,) is impossible. For this is not human, but Divinity alone possesses this honourable gift. For man, who may be overwhelmed by unexpected calamity, cannot continue free from vice.

Whom, then, does an unexpected calamity overwhelm in the government of a ship? Evidently not an idiot; for the idiot is always overwhelmed. As therefore no one throws to the ground him who is lying on it, but sometimes he who stands upright is thrown down, so as to be prostrate; but this is never the case with him who is already prostrate; so an unexpected calamity may sometimes overwhelm a skilful man, but never him who is always unskilful. And a mighty storm bursting on the head of the pilot may render him unskilful; bad seasons may confound the husbandman; and things similar to these may be applied to the physician: for a good may indeed become a bad man. And this is also testified by another poet, who says, "A good man is sometimes bad, and sometimes worthy." But it is not possible for a bad man to become bad, but it is always necessary that he should be so. So that when an unexpected calamity overwhelms a skilful, wife, and good man, it is not possible for him not to be wicked. But you, O Pittacus, say, that it is difficult to continue to be good. The truth however is this, that it is difficult indeed, but possible, to *become* good; but impossible to *continue* to be good. For every man who acts well is good; but bad if he acts ill. What then is a good action with respect to literature? and what makes a man excellent in literature? Evidently the being disciplined in it. What

Meaning that it is impossible for man in the present life to continue invariably good.

good

good action likewise makes a good physician? Evidently the learning the art of curing the sick. For a good physician cures properly¹, but a bad one improperly. Who is it then that becomes a bad physician? Evidently the man to whom it belongs in the first place to be a physician, and in the next place to be a good physician; for he may become a bad physician. But we who are ignorant of the medicinal art, can never by acting ill become bad physicians; nor being ignorant of architecture can we become bad architects, or any thing else of this kind. But whoever does not become a physician by acting ill, it is evident that neither is he a bad physician. Thus also a good man may sometimes become a bad man, either from time, or labour, or disease, or from some other circumstance (for this alone is a bad action to be deprived of science); but a bad man can never become bad (for he is always so); but if he is to become bad, it is necessary that prior to this he should have been good. So that to this also the verses of Simonides tend, that it is not possible to be a good man, so as to be perseveringly good; but that it is possible to become a good man, and for this same good to become a bad man. And also that for the most part, those are the best men whom the gods love. All these things therefore are said against Pittacus, which the verses following these still more clearly evince. For he says, "Wherefore I shall not explore in vain and hope for that which cannot be found, viz. a man nourished by the fruits of the earth, who lives a blameless life and is perpetually good." Afterwards he adds, "I will tell you when I have found him." So vehemently, and through the whole of the poem, does he attack the saying of Pittacus. He also adds, "I willingly praise and love the man, who does nothing base; and the gods themselves are not able to contend with necessity." And this likewise is said in opposition to Pittacus. For Simonides was not so unlearned as to say that he praised him who willingly did nothing bad, as if there were some who committed base actions willingly. For I nearly think this, that no wise man considers any man as erring voluntarily, and as acting basely and wickedly with the concurrence of his will; but he well knows that all those who act basely and wickedly, do so involuntarily. But

¹ In the original here there is nothing more than κακός δε κακῶς; but from the version of Ficinus, it appears that the words ἀγαθός γὰρ ἰατρός θεραπεύει καλῶς must be supplied as in our translation. The sense indeed evidently requires this addition.

Simonides does not speak as if he said, that he praises the man who does not willingly do wrong, but he says this word *willingly* of himself. For he thought that a worthy and good man is frequently compelled to love and praise a certain person. Thus, for instance, it often happens that a man has a monstrous father, or mother, or country, or something else of this kind. Depraved characters, therefore, when any thing of this nature happens to them, are in the first place glad to see it, and in the next place blame and every where divulge the depravity of their parents or country, that they may not be accused of having neglected these, nor fall into disgrace for their neglect. Hence they blame their parents or country in a still greater degree, and add voluntary to necessary enmity. But the worthy man conceals the faults of his parents or country, and if any unjust conduct has led him to be enraged with them, he is their mediator to himself, and compels them to love and praise their own offspring. I also think that Simonides himself frequently praised and was the encomiast of a tyrant, or some other character of this kind; and this not willingly, but by compulsion. This, then, is what he says to Pittacus; "I, O Pittacus, do not blame you, from being myself one who loves to blame: for I am satisfied if a man is not wicked, nor very indolent, as knowing that a sane man benefits his country. Nor will I find fault; since I am not a lover of detraction. For the race of fools is infinite; so that he who delights in blaming will be satiated with it. All things, indeed, are beautiful with which such as are base are not mingled." His meaning however in this, is not as if he had said, all things are white with which black is not mingled (for this would be very ridiculous), but he intends to signify that he admits mediocrity, so as not to blame it. "And I do not seek," says he, "a man perfectly blameless, or expect to find him among such as gather the fruits of the wide-bosomed earth: for I will tell you when I find such a one. So that on this account I shall praise no one as perfect. But I am satisfied with a man of moderate excellence, and who does no ill: and all such as these I both love and praise." Here too he uses the language of the Mitylenæans as speaking to Pittacus, and saying, "I willingly praise and love all these." But here it is necessary to consider the word *willingly* as connected with the words "Who does nothing base," and to separate it from the verse in which he says, "There are also those whom I unwillingly praise and love. You therefore, O Pittacus, I should never have
blamed,

blamed, if you had spoken of that equitable and true mediocrity ; but now, though you are very much mistaken about things of the greatest moment, yet you *appear* to speak the truth, and on this account I blame you.”—It appears to me, said I, O Prodicus and Protagoras, that Simonides composed this poem in consequence of these conceptions.

Then Hippias answering said, You seem to me, Socrates, to have well explained these verses : and I also have something pertinent to say concerning them, which, if you please, I will point out to you.—Do so, O Hippias, said Alcibiades, but let it be at another time ; for now it is just to attend to the coincidence in opinion of Protagoras and Socrates with each other. And indeed, if Protagoras wishes still to interrogate, Socrates should answer ; but if he wishes to reply to Socrates, then Socrates should interrogate.—And I said, I leave it to Protagoras to do whichever of the two is more agreeable to him : but if he is willing, let us dismiss any further consideration about the verses. And I would gladly, O Protagoras, complete with you the discussion of those things, concerning which I at first interrogated you. For it appears to me, that a discourse about poetry is most similar to the banquets of vile and rustic men ; since these, not being able, through the want of education, to converse with each other while they are drinking, in their own language, and with their own words, introduce the players on the flute as honourable persons, hire at a great expense a foreign voice, viz. that of flutes, and through the sound of these associate with each other. But when worthy, good, and well-educated men feast together, you will see neither pipers, nor dancers, nor singers, but they being sufficient to converse with themselves, without these trifles and sportive amusements, speak in their own language, and in a becoming manner reciprocally hear each other, even though they have drank a considerable quantity of wine. In like manner, such conversations as the present, when they are between men such as most of us assert ourselves to be, require no foreign voice, nor poets, of whom it is impossible to ask the meaning of what they say, and to whom most of those by whom they are cited attribute different conceptions, without being able to explain their real meaning. Wise men, therefore, bid farewell to such conferences as these, but converse with each other through themselves, and in their discourses make trial of each other's skill. It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate conferences

conferences of this kind, laying aside the poets, and discoursing with each other through ourselves, make trial of the truth of ourselves. And if you wish still to interrogate, I am prepared to answer you; but if you do not wish it, impart yourself to me, and assist me in giving completion to those things, the discussion of which we left unfinished.—When I had said these and other such like things, Protagoras did not clearly signify what part he would take. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, said, Does Protagoras, O Callias, appear to you to do well, in not now being willing to say clearly, whether he will answer or not? For to me he does not; but let him say, whether he is willing or not willing to converse, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converse with some other person, or that some one of the company who is so disposed may discourse with some other.—And Protagoras, as it seemed to me, being ashamed in consequence of Alcibiades thus speaking, and Callias, and nearly all those that were present, soliciting him, scarcely at length agreed to dispute, and desired me to interrogate him that he might answer.

I then said to him, O Protagoras, do not think that I shall converse with you with any other design, than that those things may be discussed of which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer speaks very much to the purpose, when he says, “When two come together, the one apprehends prior to the other.” For with respect to us men, we are all of us more prompt in every deed, and word, and conception, when collected together. But he who thinks of any thing by himself alone, immediately searches for some one to whom he may communicate it, and from whom he may derive stability till he meets with the object of his search. Just as I, also, for the sake of this, more willingly converse with you than with any other, thinking that you discriminate the best of all men, both about other things which it is likely a worthy man would make the object of his consideration, and also concerning virtue. For what other person can do this besides you? Since you not only think yourself to be a worthy and good man, as some others also are indeed themselves worthy, but are not able to make others so; but you are both worthy yourself, and are able to make others good. And you have such confidence in yourself, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks to be a sophist, declare that you are a master of erudition and virtue, and you are the first that has thought

fit to set a price on his instructions. Is it not proper, therefore, to call upon you to the consideration of these things, and to interrogate and communicate with you concerning them?—There is no reason why this should not be done.—And now, with respect to those things which were the subject of my former interrogations, I again desire from the beginning, partly to be reminded of them by you, and partly to consider them in conjunction with you. But the question, I think, was this, whether wisdom, temperance, fortitude, justice, and sanctity, which are five names, belong to one thing, or whether a certain proper essence pertains to each of these names, so that each is a thing having a power of its own, and no one of them possesses a quality similar to the other. You said, therefore, that these were not names belonging to one thing, but that each of these names pertained to a proper thing. You likewise observed, that all these are parts of virtue, not in the same manner as the parts of gold are similar to each other, and to the whole of which they are parts, but just as the parts of the face are dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts, and to each other, and each possesses a proper power of its own. Inform me if these things still appear to you as they did then; or if you think otherwise concerning them. For I shall not accuse you, if you now speak differently; since I should not wonder if you said these things for the purpose of trying me.—But, Socrates, he replied, I say that all these are parts of virtue; and that four of them may justly be considered as similar to each other, but that fortitude very much differs from all these. By the following circumstance you may know that I speak the truth. You will find men who are most unjust, most unholy, most intemperate, and most unlearned, who are notwithstanding remarkably brave.—Stop, said I; for what you say deserves to be considered. Whether do you call brave men, daring men, or any thing else?—I do, he replied, and I likewise say that they rush headlong on things, which the multitude are afraid to approach.—Come then; Do you say, that virtue is something beautiful; and that you are a teacher of it, as of a thing beautiful?—Yes, said he, and a thing most beautiful, unless I am insane.—Whether then, said I, is one thing belonging to it base, and another beautiful? Or, is the whole beautiful?—The whole is as much as possible beautiful.—Do you not know, then, that there are some who boldly merge themselves in wells?—I know that divers do.—Whether do they do this in consequence of possessing knowledge, or on account of some-
 thing

thing else?—In consequence of possessing knowledge.—But who are they that fight boldly on horseback? Are they horsemen, or those that are unskilled in horsemanship?—They are horsemen.—And who are they that fight boldly with short shields? Are they those that are skilled in the use of such shields, or those that are not skilled?—Those that are skilled. And in every thing else, said he, you will find that those who possess knowledge, are bolder than the ignorant; and the same men after they have been disciplined are bolder than they were before.—But did you ever see any, I said, who being ignorant of all these things, were yet daring with respect to each of these?—I have, he replied, and such as were very daring.—Are, therefore, those daring persons brave also?—If they were, said he, fortitude would be a base thing, since these men are insane.—What then, said I, have you asserted of the brave? Is it not that they are bold?—I have, said he, and now also I assert the same.—But, I replied, do not those who are thus bold appear, not to be brave, but insane? And again, did not the most wise appear to us to be also the most daring? And being most daring, were they not also most brave? And according to this reasoning, will not wisdom be fortitude?—You do not well remember, Socrates, said he, what I said, and what was my answer to you? For being asked by you if the brave were bold, I acknowledged that they were; but you did not also ask me if the bold were brave. For if you had asked me this, I should have said that all the bold were not brave. But you have by no means shown that I was not right in granting that the brave are bold. In the next place, you show that men, when they possess knowledge, are bolder than when they were ignorant, and than others who are ignorant; and in consequence of this, you think that fortitude and wisdom are the same. But from this mode of reasoning, you may also think that strength is wisdom. For in the first place, if you should in like manner inquire of me, if the strong are powerful, I should say that they are; and in the next place, if you should ask me, if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not possess this knowledge, and if they are more powerful after they have learnt than before, I should say that they are. But from my acknowledging these things, it will be possible for you, by using the same arguments, to say that, by my own confession, wisdom is strength. I, however, shall by no means here acknowledge that the powerful are strong; but I shall admit,
indeed,

indeed, that the strong are powerful ; since power and strength are not the same. For, indeed, power may be produced from insanity, and from anger ; but strength derives its subsistence from nature, and the proper nutrition of bodies. In like manner, boldness and fortitude are not the same ; so that it will happen, that the brave are bold, but not that all the bold are brave. For boldness is produced in men from anger, and from insanity, in the same manner as we observed of power ; but fortitude arises from nature, and the proper nutrition of souls.—But do you say, O Protagoras, that some men live well, and others ill ?—I do, said he.—Does, therefore, a man appear to you to live well, if he lives in molestation and sorrow ?—He does not, said he.—But what, if he has lived pleasantly to the end of life, will he not thus appear to you to have lived well ?—To me he will, said he.—To live pleasantly, therefore, is a good, but unpleasantly a bad thing.—If, said he, he has lived delighted with worthy things.—But what, O Protagoras, Do you, like the multitude, call certain things that are pleasant bad, and some things that are disagreeable good ?—I do.—How do you say ?—So far as they are agreeable, are these things according to this not good, unless something else happens from them ?—And again, is this also the case with things disagreeable ?—It is.—Are they not then bad so far as they are disagreeable ?—I do not know, Socrates, said he, whether I should simply answer as you ask me, that all pleasant things are good, and all disagreeable things evil ; but it appears to me to be more safe to answer, not only to the present question, but also to every other during the rest of my life, that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and again, that there are some disagreeable things which are not evil ; and that there are also a third sort, which are neither good nor evil.—But do you not call, I said, those things pleasant, which either participate of pleasure, or produce pleasure ?—Entirely so, said he.—I ask, therefore, whether they are not good, so far as they are pleasant ; asking with respect to pleasure itself, if it is not good ?—Just as you continually say, Socrates, he replied, we must examine it, and if it shall seem to be conformable to reason, and the same thing shall appear to be pleasant and good, we must acquiesce in it ; but if not, we must controvert it.—Whether, therefore, said I, are you willing to be the leader of the inquiry ? or shall I lead ?—It is just, said he, that you should lead : for you began the conference.—Perhaps then, said I, that which we investigate will become

manifest after the following manner : for just as if any one, directing his attention to the form or health of a man, or any other of the works of his body, on beholding his countenance and his hands, should say, Come, strip yourself, and show me your breast and back, that I may see more clearly ; I also desire something of this kind in the present inquiry, perceiving that you being so affected as you say you are, with respect to the good and the pleasant, it is requisite I should say to you some such thing as this, Come, Protagoras, lay your mind open to me, and inform me what are your conceptions with respect to science. Does the same thing appear to you concerning it as to other men, or not ? But a thing of this kind appears to the many concerning science ; that it is not strong, and that it neither possesses a leading nor a governing power ; nor is it conceived to be a thing of this kind : but science being frequently inherent in man, they are of opinion, that it is not science that governs him, but something else ; at one time anger, at another pleasure, and at another pain : and that he is sometimes governed by love, and frequently by fear. And, in short, their conceptions of science are, as if it were a slave dragged about by every thing else. Does, therefore, a thing of this kind appear to you also respecting it ? Or, do you think that science is something beautiful, and as it were the governor of man ? And, that he who knows good and evil, will never be subdued by any thing, so as to act contrary to the mandates of science, but that intellectual prudence will be a sufficient aid to such a man ?—It appears to me also, he replied, Socrates, as you say : and it would be base in me, if it ever were so in any man, not to assert that wisdom and science are the most powerful of all human affairs.—You speak well, and with truth, I said.—You know, therefore, that the multitude of men are not persuaded by you and me, but say that many who know what is best, are unwilling to do it, when they have the power of acting in the best manner, but do other things. And such as I have asked what is the cause of this, have replied, that being vanquished by pleasure or pain, or some one of the things which I have just now mentioned, they have acted in this manner. For I think, said he, Socrates, that men assert many other things erroneously.

Come then, said I, endeavour with me to persuade and teach men what this passion is, which they call the being vanquished by pleasures, and through which they do not perform the most excellent things, though they have a
knowledge

knowledge of them. For, perhaps, if we should say, you speak erroneously, O men, and are deceived, they would ask us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not the being vanquished by pleasure, but something else, tell us what you say it is?—But, why is it necessary, Socrates, that we should consider the opinion of the multitude, who speak that which casually presents itself?—But I think, I replied, that this will contribute to our discovering how fortitude is related to the other parts of virtue. If, therefore, you are willing to abide by that which was just now agreed upon by us, that I should be the leader, follow me in that in which I think this thing will become most beautifully apparent; but if you are not willing, dismiss it, if you think fit.—You speak well, said he; but proceed as you begun.—Again, therefore, said I, if the multitude should ask us, What then do you assert this thing to be, which we call the being vanquished by pleasures? I should answer them as follows: Hear then, for I and Protagoras shall endeavour to tell you, Do you, O men, say that any thing else happens to you in this case, than that which often happens to those who are subdued by meats and drinks, and venereal pleasures; who, though they know that these things are baneful, yet at the same time they do them because they are pleasant? They will say, that nothing else happens. You and I, therefore, will again ask them, Do you say that these things are baneful? Whether, therefore, is it because they immediately impart pleasure, and each of them is pleasant? Or is it because that in some future time they produce diseases and poverty, and procure many other things of this kind? Or, though they should be followed by nothing of this kind, are they bad in consequence of causing men to rejoice? Shall we think, O Protagoras, that they will answer any thing else than that they are not evil from the immediate pleasure which they produce, but from the diseases and other things with which they are followed?—I indeed think, said Protagoras, that the multitude would thus answer. If they cause diseases, therefore, and poverty, do they not also cause sorrow?—I think they would acknowledge that they did.—Protagoras assented.—It appears, therefore, O men, as I and Protagoras say, that these things are bad, for no other reason than because they end in sorrow, and deprive their votaries of other pleasures.—It appeared to both of us, that they would acknowledge this to be the case.—Again, therefore, if, taking the contrary side, we should ask them, O men! ye who say that disagreeable things are good, do you not speak of such things

things as gymnastic exercises, military labours, and things which are effected through burnings, and incisions, and medicines, and fasting? And do you not say, that these things are indeed good, but disagreeable? They would say so.—It also appeared to Protagoras, that they would.—Whether, therefore, do you call these things good, because they immediately impart extreme pain and torment; or because they are followed by health, and a good habit of body, together with the safety of cities, dominion and wealth? They would say, because of the latter consequence.—And to this also Protagoras assented.—But are these things good through any thing else, than because they end in pleasures, and liberations from pain? Or can you mention any other end than pleasures and pains to which looking they call these things good? They will say, I think, that they cannot.—So, likewise, it appears to me, said Protagoras.—Do you, therefore, pursue pleasure as being good, and avoid pain as an evil? They will say, that they do.—And to this also Protagoras assented.—You, therefore, are of opinion, that this thing is evil, viz. pain, and that pleasure is good; since delight also is then said to be evil, when it deprives us of greater pleasures than it possesses, or when it procures pains greater than the pleasures which it contains. For if you call delight an evil on any other account, and look to any other end, you would also be able to inform us; but you cannot.—Nor do they appear to me, said Protagoras, to regard any other end.—Again, therefore, after the same manner with respect to pain, do you not then call the being in pain a good, when it liberates from pains greater than those which it contains, or when it procures pleasures greater than the pains? For if you looked to any other end, when you call the being in pain a good, than that which I have mentioned, you would be able to inform us; but you cannot.—You speak the truth, said Protagoras.—Again, therefore, said I, if you should ask me, O men, on what account I speak so much and so frequently about this, I should say, Pardon me. For, in the first place, it is not easy to show what this thing is which you call the being subdued by pleasures; and, in the next place, all demonstrations are contained in this. But now, also, you are at liberty to inform me, if you have any thing else which you assert to be good besides pleasure, or any thing else besides pain, which you call evil. Or are you satisfied with passing your life pleasantly without pain? For if you are satisfied with this, and if you cannot mention any good or evil which
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does not end in these things, hear what follows: I say, then, that, if this be the case, the assertion is ridiculous when you say that frequently, though a man knows that evil things are evil, he at the same time does them (though he has the power of not doing them), in consequence of being led and astonished by pleasure: and again, when you say that a man, knowing what is good, is not willing to do it, in consequence of being vanquished by immediate pleasure. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous, unless we employ a multitude of names; such as *pleasant* and *disagreeable*, *good* and *evil*. But since it appears that there are these two things, we must also call them by two names; in the first place by *good* and *evil*, and in the next place by *pleasant* and *disagreeable*. These things, therefore, being admitted, we will say that a man, knowing things evil to be evil, at the same time does them. If, then, some one should ask us why he does them, we must say, because he is vanquished. By what? he will say to us. But we are no longer permitted to say, by pleasure; for it assumes another name in the place of pleasure, viz. good. We must, however, answer him, and say that he does it because he is vanquished. By what? he will say. By good, we must say, by Jupiter. If it should happen, therefore, that he who interrogates us is an insolent man, he will laugh and say, You speak of a ridiculous thing when you assert that any one does evil, knowing that it is evil (and it is not proper to do it), in consequence of being vanquished by good. For he will say, Is such a one vanquished because the good in him is not worthy to vanquish the evil? Or is it because it is worthy? We shall evidently say in reply, that it is because it is not worthy. For otherwise he would not err whom we say is subdued by pleasure. But perhaps he will say, Why is the good in such a one unworthy to vanquish the evil? Or the evil to vanquish the good? Is it for any other reason than because the one is greater, and the other lesser? or because the one is more, and the other fewer in number? Have we any other cause to assign than this? It is evident, therefore, he will say, that this thing which is called the being vanquished, is to receive greater evils instead of lesser goods. And thus much for these particulars.

Let us then again change the names, and introduce in these very same things the pleasant and disagreeable, as follows: We formerly said that a man does evil; let us now say that he does things disagreeable, knowing that
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they are disagreeable, in consequence of being vanquished by pleasures, viz. by such as are unworthy to conquer. And what other unworthiness is there in pleasure with respect to pain, than the excess and defect of each other; that is, when they become greater and lesser, more or less numerous? For if any one should say, Immediate pleasure, O Socrates, very much differs from future pleasure and pain, I indeed should reply by asking, Whether it differs in any thing else than in pleasure and pain? For it cannot differ in any thing else. But it is just as if a man who is skilful in weighing, having collected together things pleasant and painful, and placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the balance, should say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous must always be chosen; but, if you weigh pains with pains, the fewer and the smaller must be selected. If likewise you weigh pleasures with pains, if the disagreeables are surpassed by the pleasures, those that are near by those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, we must yield to the more weighty; but if the pleasures are surpassed by the disagreeables, this conduct must not be adopted. Is it not so, O men, with respect to these things? I know that they will not be able to say otherwise. It also appeared to Protagoras that they would not. Since, therefore, this is the case, I will thus interrogate them, Do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say, that they do. And is not this the case also with things bulky, and with things numerous? And are not equal voices greater when near, but lesser when at a distance? They will say that they are. If therefore our acting well consisted in this, viz. in making and receiving great masses, but rejecting and not making such as are small, what would appear to be the safety of our life? Would it be the art of measuring, or the power of sight which judges of that which is apparent? Or rather would not the latter deceive us, and involving us in error, often compel us to judge differently at different times of the same thing, and change our opinion in the actions and elections of things great and small? But the art of measuring would make this phantasm void, and manifesting the truth, would cause the soul, by abiding in reality, to be at rest, and would preserve our life. Would the men assent to these things, and acknowledge that the art of measuring preserves us, or that this is effected by any other art? They would acknowledge that we should be preserved

served by the measuring art. But what, if the safety of our life consisted in choosing the even and the odd, so as to know when more ought to be rightly chosen, and when less, either one of these with respect to itself, or one with respect to the other, whether they be near or at a distance, what is it that in this case would preserve our life? Is it not science? For it would no longer be the art of measuring, since this is the art of excess and defect. But since that of which we are speaking is the art of the even and the odd, is it any thing else than arithmetic? The men would acknowledge that it is nothing else: or would they not? It appeared also to Protagoras that they would. Be it so, O men; but since the safety of our life has appeared to consist in the right choice of pleasure and pain, and in the choice of the more and the less, of the greater and the smaller, of the more distant and the nearer; of these, in the first place, does not the art of measuring appear to be the consideration of the excess and defect, and also of the equality of these to each other? Necessarily so. But since it is conversant with measuring, it is necessary that it should be both an art and a science. They will agree to this. What then this art and science may be, we will consider hereafter; but that it is a science is sufficient to the demonstration which it is necessary that Protagoras and I should give to your question. And, if you remember, when we mutually agreed that nothing is superior to science, but that this always governs, wherever it may be, both pleasure and every thing else, then you said that pleasure frequently subdues a man, even though he possesses science. But as we did not agree with you, after this you asked us, O Protagoras and Socrates, if this passion is not to be vanquished by pleasure, tell us what it is, and what you assert it to be? If, therefore, we then had immediately said to you that it is ignorance, you would have derided us. For ye have acknowledged that those that err in the choice of pleasures and pains (and these are things good and evil) err through the want of science; and not only through the want of science, but, ye have also added, of the science of measuring. But an erroneous action without science, is, as ye also know, performed through ignorance. So that to be vanquished by pleasure is the greatest ignorance; of which Protagoras here, Prodicus and Hippias, say they are the physician. But ye, because ye think this is something else than ignorance, neither go yourselves, nor send your children to the sophists, the teachers of these things, as if this science of measuring could
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not be taught : and by saving your money, and not giving it to these men, ye get badly both in private and public. And in this manner we should answer the multitude.

Together with Protagoras, however, I ask you, O Hippias, and you, O Prodicus (for let my discourse be in common to you), whether I appear to speak the truth, or that which is false?—It appeared to all that what had been said was transcendently true.—You confess, therefore, I said, that the pleasant is good, but the disagreeable evil. But I request Prodicus to excuse my adopting his division of names. For whether you call it pleasant, or delightful, or joyful, or in whatever way you may think fit to denominate things of this kind, O most excellent Prodicus, only answer what I wish to ask you.—Prodicus therefore laughing assented, and so likewise did the rest.—I then said, But what, my friends, as to this particular, are not all actions which contribute to the living well and pleasantly, beautiful and profitable? And is not a beautiful deed good and profitable?—They granted this.—If, therefore, I said, the pleasant is good, no one either knowing or thinking that other things are better than those which he does, and is able to do, will afterwards do these things, when he has the power of doing those that are better. Nor when a man is inferior to himself, is it any thing else than ignorance; nor, when he is superior to himself, is it any thing else than wisdom.—To this all of them assented.—But what? Do you say that ignorance is a thing of this kind, viz. to have a false opinion, and to be deceived about things of great importance?—And to this, likewise, all of them assented.—Does it not then follow, said I, that no one willingly betakes himself to things evil, or to those things which he thinks are evil? For, as it appears, it is not in the nature of man to betake himself to things which he considers as evil, instead of applying himself to such as are good. And when it is necessary to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater if he has it in his power to choose the lesser.—All these things were assented to by all of us.—What then, said I, do you call dread and fear? Is it that which I say it is to you, O Prodicus, viz. a certain expectation of evil, whether you call it fear or dread?—It appeared to Protagoras and Hippias that dread and fear were this; but to Prodicus it appeared that dread was this, but not fear.—It is, however, said I, O Prodicus, of no consequence; but this is of importance, whether what has been formerly asserted is true. Is, therefore, any man

willing to betake himself to those things which he dreads, when he has the power of betaking himself to things which he does not dread? Or is not this impossible from what we have granted? For we have granted that he thinks those things to be evil which he dreads; and that no one betakes himself to, or willingly receives things which he considers as evil.—These things, likewise, were assented to by all of them.—This, then, being admitted, said I, O Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras, here, defend to us the rectitude of his first answer. For then, there being five parts of virtue, he said that no one of them resembled the other, but that each had a peculiar power of its own. I do not, however, urge this at present, but I speak of that which he afterwards said, viz. that four of the parts might justly be considered as similar to each other, but that one of them, fortitude, very much differed from the rest. He also said that this might be known from the following circumstance. You will find, said he, Socrates, men that are most unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most undisciplined, but who are, at the same time, most brave; by which you may know that fortitude very much differs from the other parts of virtue. And I indeed, at that time, immediately very much wondered at the answer, and my surprise has been greatly increased since I have discussed these things with you. I therefore asked him this, If he called brave men bold men? He said he did, and likewise impetuous. Do you remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer?—I do, said he.—Tell us, then, said I, in what, according to you, the brave are impetuous? Is it in things which the timid attempt?—It is not, said he.—In other things, therefore.—Yes.—But whether do the timid engage in bold attempts, but the brave in such as are dreadful?—It is so said, Socrates, by the multitude.—You speak the truth, I replied. I do not, however, ask this: but in what do you say the brave are impetuous? Is it in dreadful things, thinking that they are dreadful, or in things that are not dreadful?—But, said he, this, in what you just now said, has been shown to be impossible.—And in this, also, I replied, you speak the truth. So that if this is rightly demonstrated, no one betakes himself to things which he thinks are dreadful, since it has been found that it is ignorance for a man to be inferior to himself.—He acknowledged it.—All men, however, both the timid and the brave, engage in things in which they boldly confide; and, in consequence of this, both the timid and the brave engage in the same things.—But indeed, Socrates, said

he, the things in which the timid and the brave engage are perfectly contrary to each other; for the latter wish, but the former are unwilling to engage in war.—But whether, said I, is it a beautiful, or a base thing to engage in war?—A beautiful thing, said he.—If, therefore, it is a beautiful thing, we have above agreed that it is a good thing. For we have acknowledged that all beautiful are good actions.—You speak the truth, and to me this has always appeared to be the case.—Right, said I. But which of the two do you say is unwilling to engage in war, though it is a beautiful and good thing.—The timid, he replied.—If, therefore, said I, it be beautiful and good, is it not also pleasant?—It is granted, said he.—Are the timid, therefore, unwilling to proceed to that which is beautiful, better, and more pleasant, knowing it to be such?—But, said he, if we assented to this, we should destroy what we have before acknowledged.—But what with respect to the brave man? Does he not engage in that which is more beautiful, more excellent, and more pleasant?—It is necessary, said he, to acknowledge that he does.—Hence, in short, the brave have not any base fears when they are afraid; nor when they are bold, are they basely daring.—True, said he.—But if they are not basely, does it not follow that they are beautifully daring?—He assented.—And if their boldness is beautiful, is it not also good?—Yes.—Are not, therefore, the timid, and the rash, and the insane, on the contrary, basely afraid, and basely bold?—He agreed they were.—But are they basely and wickedly bold, through any thing else than ignorance and the want of discipline?—It is so, said he.—What then? Do you then call this thing, through which the timid are timid, timidity or fortitude?—Timidity, said he.—But have not the timid appeared to be what they are, through the ignorance of things dreadful?—Entirely so, said he.—They are timid, therefore, through this ignorance.—He acknowledged it.—But that through which they are timid, you have granted to be timidity.—He said, he had.—Will not, therefore, the ignorance of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be timidity?—He assented.—But, said I, fortitude is contrary to timidity.—It is.—Will not then the wisdom of things dreadful, and not dreadful, be contrary to the ignorance of these things?—To this also he assented.—But is not the ignorance of these things timidity?—He, with great difficulty, assented to his.—The wisdom, therefore, of things dreadful, and not dreadful, is fortitude, being contrary to the ignorance of these.—Here, however, he was no

longer willing to assent, but was silent.—And I said, Why, O Protagoras, do you neither assent to, nor deny what I say?—Come to a conclusion, said he.—Immediately, said I; let me only first ask you, if it still appears to you as it did before, that there are certain men who are most ignorant, and yet most brave?—You still, Socrates, seem to be very anxious that I should answer you. I will therefore gratify you; and I say, that from what has been granted, it appears to me impossible that this should be the case.—But, said I, I do not ask you all these particulars on any other account, than because I wish to consider how the things pertaining to virtue subsist, and what virtue itself is. For I know that this becoming apparent, that which has been the subject of a long discussion to you and me will be made manifest; I indeed, asserting, that virtue cannot be taught, but you that it can. And it seems to me, that the conclusion of our arguments, as if it were a man, reviles and derides us; and that if it had a voice, it would thus address us:—You are absurd, O Socrates, and Protagoras; you indeed, in asserting in the former part of your discourse, that virtue cannot be taught, and now, being anxious to contradict yourself, by endeavouring to show that all these things, viz. justice, temperance, and fortitude, are science; by which mode of proceeding virtue will especially appear to be a thing which may be taught. For if virtue were any thing else than science¹, as Protagoras endeavours to evince it is, it clearly could not be taught; but now, if it should appear that it is science, as you, Socrates, are anxious to infer, it will be wonderful if it cannot be taught. Again, Protagoras at first admitted that it could be taught, but now, on the contrary, he seems earnestly to endeavour that virtue may appear to be any thing else rather than science; and thus it will be a thing in the smallest degree capable of being taught. I therefore, O Protagoras, seeing all these things agitated upwards and downwards with such dire confusion, am in the highest degree anxious that they may become apparent. And I could wish that we, in consequence of discussing these things, might discover what virtue is: and again, that we might speculate concerning it, whether it can be taught, or whether it can-

¹ Instead of *εἰ γὰρ ἄλλο τι πν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετὴ*, as in the printed text, the sense requires we should read *εἰ γὰρ ἄλλο τι πν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετὴ*. Ficinus in his version has adopted the error of the original; for he renders this passage, “Si enim aliud quiddam esset scientia quam virtus.”

not. For I fear that your Epimetheus has frequently deceived us in our inquiry, just as you say he neglected us in the distribution which he made. I am more pleased, therefore, with Prometheus in the fable, than with Epimetheus. Hence, following his example, and paying a *providential attention* to the whole of my life, I diligently consider all these things. And if you are willing, as I said at the beginning, I would most gladly examine these particulars with you.—To this Protagoras said—I, O Socrates, praise your alacrity, and the evolution of your discourse. For I am not, in other respects, I think, a bad man, and I am envious the least of all men : indeed I have often said respecting you to many, that I admire you by far the most of those with whom I associate, and consider you as greatly surpassing your equals in age. And I say, that I shall not wonder if you rank among the men renowned for wisdom. And, with respect to these things, we will again discuss them when you please ; but it is now time for me to betake myself to something else.—But, I replied, it is requisite so to do, if it seems fit to you. For I ought to have gone elsewhere some time ago ; but I staid in order to gratify the beautiful Callias.—Having spoken and heard these things, we departed.

THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS.

THE THE AGES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

POLITICAL WISDOM.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE THE AGES.

IN order to understand the design of this Dialogue, it is necessary to observe that wisdom is two-fold, the one absolute, the other conditional. The absolute is that which is denominated wisdom simply, and without any addition; but the conditional is that which is not simply called wisdom, but a certain wisdom. The former of these is defined to be the knowledge of those things which are the objects of science, and the objects of science are things which possess a necessary eternal and invariable subsistence, such as are those luminous causes and principles of things resident in a divine intellect, which Plato denominates ideas, and Aristotle ¹ things most honourable by nature. But conditional wisdom is common to all arts: for the summit or perfection of every art is called a certain wisdom. Of all those arts however, which possess conditional wisdom, the principal is political wisdom, to which the rest are ministrant. This is called as well the political as the royal discipline; of which the subject is a city, the end the common good, and its servants all the arts.

As this political wisdom, the subject of this Dialogue, forms an important part of virtue considered as a whole, Socrates, conformably to what he had delivered in the Meno, indicates that it can only be obtained by a *divine delirium*

¹ Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, defines wisdom absolutely considered to be "Science, and the intellect of things most honourable by nature, and the intellect of principles." Η σοφία ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων τῇ φύσει, καὶ νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν.

(*Θείη μοιρα*), without which all the endeavours of the most consummate masters are useless; and this he confirms by various examples.

This conversation, according to Dacier, passed that year in which the Athenians were vanquished at Ephesus by Tisaphernus; which was the 4th year of the 92d Olympiad, and 470 years before the birth of Christ. Plato being twenty years of age, was then the disciple of Socrates.

THE THEAGES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

DEMODOCUS, SOCRATES, THEAGES.

DEMODOCUS.

I WANT, Socrates, to speak with you in private about certain things, if you are at leisure; and if you are not, unless your business is of great importance, make leisure for my sake.

SOC. But I am indeed at leisure, and very much at your service. You have my permission therefore to speak, if you wish to say any thing.

DEM. Are you willing therefore that we should retire from this place into the porch of Jupiter Eleutherius, which is very near?

SOC. If you please.

DEM. Let us go then, Socrates. All plants, whatever is produced from the earth, other animals, and man, appear to subsist after the same manner. For in plants this thing is easy to such of us as cultivate the earth, viz. to prepare every thing prior to planting, and the planting itself; but when that which is planted lives, then the attention which the plant requires is great and very difficult. The same thing also appears to take place respecting men. For I form a conjecture of other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, the planting, or the procreating, or whatever else it may be requisite to call it, is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and occasions one to be in continual fear about him. With respect to other things, therefore, much might be said; but the desire which he now possesses very much terrifies me. It is not indeed ignoble, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. And as it appears to me, certain plebeians of the same age with him, coming to this city, and re-

peating certain discourses which they have heard, have very much disturbed him. Of these he is emulous, and some time ago was troublesome to me, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and give a sum of money to some one of the sophists, who might make him a wise man. I am not indeed much concerned about the expense; but I think that the object of his pursuit will lead him into no small danger. Hitherto, therefore, I have restrained by soothing him; but as I am no longer able to effect this, I have thought it best to comply with his wishes, lest by frequently associating with others without me he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those who appear to be sophists. Our meeting with you, therefore, is a fortunate circumstance: for as I am going to engage in affairs of this kind, I wish very much to consult you about them. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and proper for you to give it.

Soc. Counsel, however, O Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing. If therefore any other thing whatever is sacred, this will be so which is now the object of your consultation: for it is not possible for man to consult about any thing more divine than about the erudition of himself and of those that belong to him. In the first place, therefore, you and I should mutually agree, what we think this thing to be about which we consult; lest I should frequently apprehend it to be one thing, and you another, and afterwards very much dissenting from each other in our conference, we should perceive ourselves to be ridiculous: I who give, and you who request, advice not agreeing in any one thing.

DEM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak rightly, and it is proper so to do.

Soc. I do say right, and yet not entirely, since I make an alteration in a certain trifling particular: for I am thinking that perhaps this youth may not desire that which we think he desires, but something else. And if something else is the object of his wishes, we shall act absurdly in consulting about that which is different from them. It appears therefore to me to be most right to begin by inquiring of him what it is which he desires.

DEM. It appears indeed, as you say, to be best to do so.

Soc. But tell me what the name is of this fine youth: what must we call him?

DEM.

DEM. His name, Socrates, is Theages.

SOC. You have given to your son, O Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred name. But tell us, O Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wife man, and do you think it is fit that this your father should find out a man, who by associating with you may make you wife.

THEA. I do.

SOC. But whether do you call those men wife, who are scientifically knowing, whatever that may be about which they possess this knowledge; or do you call those wife who do not possess scientific knowledge?

THEA. I call the scientific wife.

SOC. What then? Has not your father taught and instructed you in those things, in which others here are instructed who are the sons of respectable fathers; viz. letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

THEA. He has.

SOC. Do you think, then, that there is still a certain science wanting, which it is proper your father should pay attention to for your sake?

THEA. I do.

SOC. What is it? Tell us also, that we may gratify you.

THEA. My father also knows what it is, Socrates: for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says these things to you, as if he did not know what I desire: for in other things also he similarly opposes me, and is not willing to place me with any one.

SOC. But all that you have hitherto said to him has been said without witnesses: now therefore make me a witness, and before me say what the wisdom is which you desire: for come now, if you should desire that wisdom by which men steer ships, and I should ask you, O Theages, what is the wisdom, of which being in want, you blame your father as unwilling to place you with a man through whom you might become wife? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not that of piloting?

THEA. Yes.

SOC. But if you desired to be wife according to that wisdom by which they drive chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteering art?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But with respect to the wisdom which you now desire, whether is it without a name, or has it a name?

THEA. I think it has a name.

Soc. Whether therefore do you know the thing itself, but not its name? Or do you also know its name?

THEA. I also know its name.

Soc. Say, therefore, what it is.

THEA. What other name, Socrates, can any one say it has than that of wisdom?

Soc. Is not then the charioteering art also wisdom? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

THEA. It does not.

Soc. But wisdom?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. What is the use of it? Is it not that we may know how to manage horses when yoked to a chariot?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is not therefore the piloting art also wisdom?

THEA. To me it appears to be so.

Soc. Is it not that by which we know how to manage ships?

THEA. It is.

Soc. But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? Or, what is that which, when we obtain it, we shall know how to govern?

THEA. To me it appears to be that by which we know how to govern men.

Soc. What, sick men?

THEA. No.

Soc. For that wisdom is the medicinal art. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Is it that, then, by which we know how to regulate fingers in choirs?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is music.

THEA. Certainly.

Soc.

Soc. But is it that by which we know how to govern those that engage in gymnastic exercises?

THEA. It is not.

Soc. For this is gymnastic.

THEA. It is.

Soc. Is it the wisdom by which those who do something effect their purpose? Endeavour to tell me, in the same manner as I have told you above.

THEA. It appears to me to be that wisdom by which we know how to govern those in a city.

Soc. Are there not, therefore, in a city also those that are sick?

THEA. Yes: but I do not speak of these only, but also of others in the city.

Soc. I understand then the art of which you speak. For you appear to me not to say, that it is that art by which we know how to govern mowers, vine-dressers, ploughmen, sowers, and threshers: for that by which we know how to govern these is agriculture. Is it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. Nor is it that by which we know how to govern those that handle the saw, the plane, and the lathe; for this belongs to the carpenter's art. Does it not?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But perhaps you speak of that wisdom by which we govern all these, viz. husbandmen, carpenters, all artificers, and private persons, both men and women.

THEA. It is this wisdom, Socrates, of which I wished to speak some time ago.

Soc. Are you, therefore, disposed to say that Ægisthus, who slew Agamemnon in Argos, had dominion over these things of which you speak, viz. all artificers and private persons, both men and women, or over certain other things?

THEA. He only had dominion over such as these.

Soc. But what? Did not Peleus, the son of Acacus, have dominion over these very things in Phthia?

THEA. Yes.

Soc.

Soc. And have you not heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, governed Corinth.

THEA. I have.

Soc. And did he not rule over these very same things in his city?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But what? Do you not think that Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who lately governed ¹ in Macedonia, had dominion over these very things?

THEA. I do.

Soc. But over what things do you think Hippias ², the son of Pisistratus, who rules in this city, has dominion? Is it not over these things?

THEA. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Can you tell me, then, what Bacis ³ and the Sibyl, and our Amphilytus, are called?

THEA. What else, Socrates, than diviners?

Soc. You speak rightly. Endeavour, therefore, also to tell me what name you give to Hippias and Periander through the same dominion?

THEA. I think they are tyrants: for what else can they be called?

Soc. Whoever, therefore, desires to have dominion over all the men in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

THEA. So it appears.

Soc. Do you therefore say that you desire this dominion?

THEA. It seems so from what I have said.

Soc. O you wicked one! Do you desire to tyrannise over us? And did you some time ago blame your father because he did not send you to some tyrannic preceptor? And are not you, O Demodocus, ashamed; who, having for some time known what your son desires, and having likewise the

¹ It was five or six years before. He was killed at the end of this very year.—Dacier.

² Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, was tyrant of Athens four years. According to Thucydides he succeeded his father, and not Hipparchus. After he had reigned four years he was banished; and twenty years after his exile was slain at the battle of Marathon, where he bore arms for the Persians.—Dacier.

³ Bacis was a prophet, who, long before Xerxes made a descent into Greece, predicted to the people all that would befall them. Herodotus relates some of his prophecies in his 8th book, and considers them to be so formal and plain, since their accomplishment, that he says he neither dares accuse those oracles of falsehood himself, nor suffer others to do so, or to refuse to give credit to them. Aristophanes speaks of this prophet in his comedy of Peace.—Dacier.

ability of sending him to be made that artist in wisdom which he aspires to be, have, notwithstanding, envied him this object of his wishes, and have not been willing to send him to obtain it? Now, however, since he accuses you before me, let us consult in common, you and I, whither we should send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

DEM. Let us indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates, consult: for it appears to me that no despicable counsel is requisite about this affair.

SOC. Permit us first, O good man, to make inquiry of him sufficiently.

DEM. Interrogate him.

SOC. What then, O Theages, if we should make use of Euripides? For he somewhere says,

Tyrants are wise that with the wise converse.

If, therefore, some one should ask Euripides, In what, O Euripides, do you say tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said,

Farmers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what are they rendered wise? What answer would he give us? Would he reply that they are rendered wise in any thing else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

THEA. He would not.

SOC. But what? If he had said,

Wise are the cooks that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they become wise? What do you think he would answer? Would it not be, that they become wise in things pertaining to cooking?

THEA. Yes.

SOC. Again, if he had said,

Wrestlers are wise that with the wise converse:

and we should ask him, In what they are rendered wise? Would he not say in things pertaining to wrestling?

THEA. Yes.

Soc. But since he says,

Tyrants are wife that with the wife converse:

if we should ask him, In what do you say they become wife, O Euripides? What would be his answer?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

Soc. Are you willing, then, I should tell you?

THEA. If you please.

Soc. These are the things which Anacreon, says Callicrete¹, knew. Or are you not acquainted with the verse?

THEA. I am.

Soc. What then? Do you also desire to associate with a man of this kind, who possesses the same art with Callicrete the daughter of Cyane, and who knows tyrannic concerns, in the same manner as the poet says she did; and this, that you may become a tyrant to us and the city?

THEA. You have for some time, Socrates, derided and jested with me.

Soc. But what? Do you not say that you desire this wisdom, by which you may have dominion over all the citizens? And doing this, will you be any thing else than a tyrant?

THEA. I think, indeed, that I should pray to become the tyrant of all men, or, if not of all, of the greater part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same. Or, perhaps, *you* would rather pray that you might become a god². But I did not say that *I* desired this.

Soc. But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to govern the citizens?

THEA. Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to govern the willing, in the same manner as other excellent men in the city.

Soc. Do you speak of such men as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skilful in political affairs?

¹ This was a virgin who employed herself in teaching politics, as Aspasia, Diotima, and some others, did after her. The verses which Anacreon made on her are lost.—Dacier.

² Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to say, that men should endeavour to become similar to divinity.

THEA.

THEA. By Jupiter, I speak of these.

Soc. What then, if you desired to become wise in equestrian affairs, would you obtain the object of your wish, by going to any other than those who are skilled in the management of horses?

THEA. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. But you would go to these very men who are skilled in these things, who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

THEA. Certainly.

Soc. But what! If you desired to become wise in things pertaining to the throwing of darts, would you not go to those who are skilled in these affairs, and who continually use many darts, both those belonging to others and their own?

THEA. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in political affairs, do you think you will become wise by going to any others than these politicians, who are skilful in political affairs, who continually use their own city, and many others, and who are conversant both with Grecian and Barbarian cities? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons you will become wise in those things in which they are wise, but not in these very things?

THEA. I have heard assertions, which they say are yours; that the sons of these political men are in no respect better than the sons of shoe-makers; and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be stupid, therefore, if I should think that any one of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he cannot in any respect benefit his own son; or if I should suppose that he could in these things benefit any other man.

Soc. What then would you do, O best of men, if you had a son who caused you molestation of this kind; and who should say that he desired to become a good painter; and should blame you, his father, because you are not willing to be at any expense for the sake of these things; while he, on the other hand, despised those artists, the painters, and was unwilling to learn from them; or, if he acted in this manner towards pipers or harpers, being at the same time desirous to become a piper or harper? What would

you do with him, and where would you send him, being thus unwilling to learn from these persons ?

THEA. By Jupiter, I do not know.

SOC. Now, therefore, doing these very things to your father, can you wonder at and blame him, if he is dubious what he should do with you, and where he should send you ? For, if you are willing, he will immediately place you with those Athenians that are most skilled in political affairs : and with these you will not be at any expense, and at the same time will be much more generally renowned than by associating with any others.

THEA. What then, Socrates ; are not you among the number of excellent and worthy men ? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I shall seek for no other.

SOC. Why do you say this, Theages ?

DEM. O Socrates, he does not speak badly ; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. For there is not any thing which I should consider to be a greater gain, than for my son to be pleased with your conversation ; and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish this to take place. I therefore entreat both of you ; you, Socrates, that you will be willing to associate with him ; and you, my son, that you do not seek to associate with any other than Socrates ; and you will thus liberate me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear lest my son should meet with some other person who may corrupt him.

THEA. You need not fear any longer, O father, for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

DEM. You speak very well. And after this, all the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, in short, to give up myself to you, and whatever is most dear to me that you may require, if you will love this my Theages, and benefit him to the utmost of your ability.

SOC. O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially benefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he who is endued with intellect ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to assist your son in becoming a
good

good citizen, than you yourself, and whence you have thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For you, in the first place, are older than I am; and in the next place, you have exercised the principal offices among the Athenians; nor is any one more honoured than you by the Anagyrusian populace and the rest of the city. But neither of you fees any one of these things in me. If herefore Theages, here, despises the associating with political men, and seeks after certain others who profess to give instruction, there and here, Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias the Leontine, Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that going into cities they persuade the noblest and most wealthy of the youth, who are permitted to associate gratis with any one of the citizens they please,—they persuade these, I say, to renounce those of their own city, and adhere to them, though the youth give them a considerable sum of money, and thanks besides, for their instruction. It is fit, therefore, that you and your son should choose some one of these; but it is not fit that you should choose me: for I know none of these blessed and beautiful disciplines; though I wish I did; but I always profess to know nothing, as I may say, except a certain small discipline of amatory affairs. In this discipline, I acknowledge myself to be more skilful than any one of the past or present age.

THEA. Do you not see, O father, that Socrates does not appear to be very willing to associate with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing; but he says these things in jest to us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and others who are a little older, who before they were familiar with him were of no worth, but when they associated with him, in a very little time appeared to be the best of all men, and surpassed those to whom they were before inferior.

Soc. Do you know, therefore, O son of Demodocus, how this comes to pass?

THEA. Yes, by Jupiter, I do; and if you were willing, I also should become such as they were.

Soc. Not so, O excellent youth; but you are ignorant in what manner this takes place. However, I will tell you how it happens:—There is a certain dæmoniack power¹ which has followed me by a divine allotment from childhood.

¹ This passage incontestably proves that the dæmon of Socrates was not the intellect of that philosopher.

childhood. This is a voice, which when it takes place always signifies to me that I should abandon what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and I hear the voice, it dissuades me from this thing, and does not suffer me to do it. Of these things I will adduce to you witnesses: You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco; he once came to me, in order to communicate to me his intention of contending in the Nemean games¹; and immediately, on his beginning to tell me that he meant to contend, I heard the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you was speaking to me, I heard the voice of the dæmoniackal power; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet by exercising myself at this time I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him what happened to him from contending in these games. If you are willing also, ask Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus², what Timarchus said to him when he was about to die, for having despised the admonition of the dæmonical power. For he and Euathlus, who was famous for running races, and who received Timarchus when he fled, will tell you what he then said.

THEA. What did he say?

Soc. O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates. But why Timarchus said this I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, in order to kill Nicias the son of Herofcomander, for none but they two were in the conspiracy,—Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say, Socrates? Do you indeed continue drinking; but it is necessary that I should depart. I will, however, return shortly, if I can. I then heard the voice, and I said to him, By no means should

philosopher, nor any part of his soul, as has been rashly asserted by some moderns unskilled in the writings and philosophy of Plato. For a full account of this dæmon see the note at the beginning of the first Alcibiades.

¹ One of the four famous games of Greece, which were celebrated once in three years.

² I suppose this is Timarchus of Cheronea, who desired to be interred near one of the sons of Socrates, who died a little before. I could never find any footsteps of this history elsewhere.—Dacier.

you

you leave us; for I have heard the accustomed dæmoniacal signal. Upon this he stayed; and having remained with us for a time, he again rose up to depart, and said, Socrates, I am going: and again I heard the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose without saying any thing to me, when my attention was otherwise engaged, and thus departing he did that which was the cause of his death. Whence he said this to his brother, which I have now told you, viz. that he was going to die, because he would not believe me. Further still, you may also learn from many in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army. And with respect to things that are past, you may hear them from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the dæmoniacal signal, if it says any thing to the purpose. For Sannion, the son of Calus, is gone to the army; and on his going, I heard the dæmonical signal. But he is now gone with Thraſyllus¹, in order to wage war immediately with Ephesus and Ionia; and I think that he will either die, or that some misfortune will befall him. And I very much fear² for the rest of the enterprise. I have said all these things to you, because this power of the dæmon is able to effect every thing with respect to the conversations of those that associate with me. For it is adverse to many, nor can those be benefited by associating with me whom the dæmon opposes: so that it is not possible for me to live with these. With many, however, he does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not all benefited by associating with me. But those whose conversation with me is favoured by the power of the dæmon, these are they whom you have noticed: for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of these, some possess this advantage with firmness and stability; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner, but when they leave me, they again differ in no respect from other men. This Aristides, the son of Lyſimachus and grandson of Aristides, once experienced: for, associating with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short

¹ Thraſyllus was chosen general with Thraſybulus, the fourth year of the ninety-second Olympiad.—Dacier.

² Indeed the Athenians were vanquished at Ephesus. Xenoph. lib. i. Hence Plutarch says, in the life of Alcibiades, that the army of Thraſyllus was terribly galled under the walls of Ephesus; and that in memory of this defeat the Ephesians erected a trophy of brass, to the shame of the Athenians.—Dacier.

time; but afterwards he failed from hence, in order to engage in some military expedition. When he returned, he found Thucydides, the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides¹, associating with me. But this Thucydides, the day before, had quarrelled with me in a certain conference. Aristides, therefore, seeing me, after he had saluted me, and some conversation had passed between us, said,—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, with respect to some things, and is angry with you, as if he were an extraordinary person. It is so, said I. But what? said he, does he not know what a slave he was before he associated with you? It does not seem that he does, said I, by the gods. But a ridiculous circumstance, said he, has happened to me, Socrates. What is it, said I. It is this, said he, that before I went to the army, I was able to converse with any man whoever he might be, nor did I appear to be inferior to any one in argument, so that I sought after the company of the most elegant men; but now, on the contrary, I shun any one whom I perceive to be learned, so ashamed am I of my own vileness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly, or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you were learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true: for I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know, but I made a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house that you were, though not in the same room; but my proficiency was greater when I was in the same room with you. I also appeared to myself to improve much more when, being in the same room with you, I looked at you when you spoke, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency when I sat near you and touched you. Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely fled. Such, therefore, O Theages, is the association with me: for if it pleases divinity, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but you will not, if he does not please. See then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those who have power over the benefit which they impart to men, than by me who benefit, or not, just as it may happen.

¹ This grandson of Thucydides rivalled Pericles in the government.

THEA. It appears to me, therefore, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, viz. that we should make trial of this dæmoniacal power by associating together. And, if he is favourable to us, the best consequences will ensue; but if he is not, then let us immediately consult what is to be done, whether we should associate with some other, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other means which our diviners teach.

DEM. Do not oppose the lad any longer, Socrates, in these things: for Theages speaks well.

Soc. If it appears proper thus to act, let us do so.

THE END OF THE THEAGES.

THE LACHES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

FORTITUDE.

THE LACHES¹.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS²,
MELESIAS,

|| NICIAS³,
LACHES⁴,

The Sons of LYSIMACHUS and MELESIAS, and SOCRATES.

¹ We have already observed, in the introduction to the *Parmenides*, that the dialectic energy is triple; either subsisting through opposite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood. As the design of the present dialogue, therefore, is to confute the false opinions of Laches and Nicias concerning fortitude, and thus to liberate them from two-fold ignorance, the reader must not expect to find in it an accurate definition of fortitude. As, however, he will doubtless be anxious to obtain this definition, I shall present him with the luminous conceptions of the divine Jamblichus on this subject.

Fortitude, considered according to its most principal subsistence, is an immutable intellectual power, and a most vigorous intellectual energy; or, in other words, it is a sameness and stable habit of intellect in itself. And of this kind will the species of fortitude be, which are beheld about life, whether they are considered as subsisting by themselves, or as imparting their strength to the firm stability of reasoning. But from these, those species of fortitude proceed, which are seen in the passions, about things dreadful and the contrary, and in fear and boldness; which generously resist pleasure and pain, and always preserve the same right opinions, and commensurate and moderate manners. In common with these, manifold species of fortitude arise from passion, reason, and free deliberation, through which human life derives a strenuousness of action, incapable of being subdued. This strenuous energy likewise voluntarily performs whatever is beautiful, and to be chosen for its own sake; and for the sake of good, endures all labours and dangers. It also cheerfully and readily gives itself to things which appear to be difficult; boldly encounters and meditates on death; and easily bears pain and calamity of every kind.

This Dialogue is supposed to have been written soon after the defeat of the Athenians at Delium, which happened in the first year of the 89th Olympiad.

² The son of Aristides the Just.

³ The general of the Athenians.

⁴ Another Athenian general.

LYSIMACHUS.

YOU have seen, O Nicias and Laches, this man fighting in armour¹: and indeed we did not then tell you on what account I and Melesias here called you to see him; but now we will tell you; for we think it is proper to speak freely to you. There are, indeed, some who laugh at things of this kind; and if any one consults them, they will not tell you what they think; but conjecturing the thing about which their advice is asked, they speak contrary to their own opinion. Thinking, however, that you are sufficiently qualified to know, and that knowing you will in short say what you think, we have made you our associates in the subject of our deliberation. The thing, therefore, about which I have for a long time prefaced so much is this:—These are our sons. That youth, the son of Melesias, is called Thucydides, by his grandfather's name; and this which is mine, is called Aristides, after my father. It has appeared therefore to us, that we should pay all the attention to them in our power, and that we should not act in the same manner as many do, who, when their children become lads², suffer them to do as they please, but we now begin to take all the care of them we are able. Seeing, therefore, that you also have children, we thought that you especially must have considered how they may be educated so as to become the best of men. If, however, you have not frequently paid much attention to this thing, we now remind you that it is not proper to be negligent of it, and we call upon you to deliberate, in common with us, concerning the education of children. But whence we have been led to think in this manner, O Nicias and Laches, it is proper you should hear, though the narration may be somewhat prolix.

I and Melesias, here, have but one table, and these lads eat with us. As I told you therefore at first, we shall speak freely to you. For both of us are able to relate to the youths many beautiful deeds of our fathers, both in war and peace, during the time that they managed the affairs of their allies

¹ It is well observed by Dacier, that this fighting in armour appears to have been similar to the exercise which is at present taught in fencing schools.

² In the original *μερανια*, which seems to correspond to our English word *lads*. For according to the anonymous Greek interpreter of Ptolemy's books *De Judiciis*, p. 166, the seven ages of man are *βρεφος*, *παις*, *μερανιος*, *νεος*, *ανηρ*, *πρεσβυτης*, *γερον*. i. e. an infant, a boy, a lad, a youth, a man, an elderly man, an old man.

and

and of the city; but we cannot relate to them any deeds of our own. This covers us with shame, and we accuse our fathers for suffering us to live delicately when we became lads, while they in the mean time were busily employed about the affairs of others. These very things we point out to these youths, telling them that if they neglect themselves, and are not persuaded by us, they will become ignoble; but that, if they pay attention to themselves, they may quickly become worthy of the name which they bear. They therefore say that they will obey us; but we consider what that is through which they by learning or studying may become the best of men. Hence, a certain person recommended to us, that the young men should learn to fight in armour, and said that this was a beautiful discipline. He also praised him, whom you have just now beheld exhibiting, and advised us likewise to see him. It appeared to us, therefore, proper to come and take you along with us, that you might not only be spectators together with us, but might also assist us with your advice, if you were willing, concerning the attention which should be paid to children. These are the things which we wish to consider in common with you. It is now, therefore, your part to consult about this discipline, whether it appears proper to learn it or not; and with respect to other things, whether you have any discipline or study for the youths worthy of praise; and in short to tell us, what mode of conduct you intend to adopt for your own children.

NIC. I indeed, O Lysimachus and Melesias, praise your conception, and am prepared to join with you in this deliberation, and I think that Laches here is prepared for the same purpose also.

LAC. You think with truth, O Nicias. And what Lysimachus just now said about his father, and the father of Melesias, appears to me to have been very well said, both against them and us, and all such as engage in political affairs: for those things nearly happen to them which he said, both with respect to children and other domestic concerns, viz. that they are neglected and despised by them. These things, therefore, O Lysimachus, you have well said. But I am surprised that you should call us to join with you in consulting about the education of youth, and should not call Socrates here: for, in the first place, he is our fellow-citizen; and in the next place, he is always busily employed in considering that which is the object of your investigation, viz. what discipline or pursuit is proper for youth.

Lys.

LYS. How do you say, O Laches? Does Socrates here pay attention to any thing of this kind?

LAC. Entirely so, Lyfimachus.

NIC. I also can assert this with no less confidence than Laches. For he lately introduced as a stranger to me, for the sake of instructing my son in music, Damon the disciple of Agathocles, a man most acceptable not only for his skill in music, but also for other things which qualify a man to associate with such youths as these.

LYS. Indeed, O Socrates, Nicias, and Laches, I, and such as are my equals in age, have no longer any acquaintance with younger persons, because we for the most part keep within doors on account of our age. But, O son of Sophroniscus, if you have any thing to advise for the good of this your fellow-citizen, it is proper that you should communicate it: for it is just that you should; since you are a paternal friend to us; for I and your father were always associates and friends; and our friendship lasted till his death without interruption. At present I have some recollection of the name of Socrates: for these lads, when discoursing with each other at home, frequently make mention of Socrates, and very much praise him; but I never have yet asked them whether they spoke of Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Tell me, however, O boys, whether this is that Socrates of whom you so often make mention?

Sons of MEL. and LYS. Yes, O Father, it is the same.

LYS. It is well, by Juno, Socrates, that you do credit to your father, who was the best of men; and henceforward your interests shall be mine, and mine yours.

LAC. And, indeed, O Lyfimachus, you must not let this man go: for I have elsewhere seen him, not only doing credit to his father, but also to his country. For, at the defeat at Delium¹, he retired along with me; and I can assure you, that if the rest had conducted themselves as he did, our city would have stood firm, and would not then have suffered such a ruin.

LYS. O Socrates, this indeed is a beautiful praise, which is now given

¹ In this battle Socrates saved the life to Xenophon, who fell in consequence of his horse being killed under him; and Socrates being on foot, took him on his back, and carried him several miles.

to you by men who are worthy to be believed, and who deserve to be celebrated for the same things for which they praise you. Be well assured, therefore, that I, hearing these things, rejoice that you are renowned; and think that I am among the number of those who are most benevolently disposed towards you. Hence it is requisite that you should first come to us, and believe that we are your familiars, as it is just you should. Now, therefore, from this very day, since we have recognized each other, you should not do otherwise; but be familiar with us and these youths, that mutual friendship may be preserved between us. Do you therefore do these things, and we will again recall them to your memory. But with respect to the things which we began to inquire into, what do you say? Does it appear to you that this discipline is adapted to lads, or not; I mean the learning to fight in armour?

Soc. Concerning these things, O Lyfmachus, I will endeavour to give you what advice I am able; and again, to do all that you request. It appears indeed to me to be most just, that I being the younger, and less experienced in these things, should first hear what these persons say, and learn from them. And if I should have any thing to say different from their opinion, then I will declare my sentiments, and endeavour to persuade you and them of their truth. But, O Nicias, why do not you speak the first?

Nic. Nothing hinders, Socrates; for it appears to me that the knowledge of this discipline is very generally useful to youth. For it is well not to be busily employed about those things with which young men love to be conversant when they are at leisure, but to engage in this whence the body necessarily acquires a better condition. For it is not inferior to any of the exercises, nor has it less labour; and at the same time this exercise and equestrian skill are especially proper for a liberal man. Indeed, in the contest in which we are athletæ, and in those exercises in which a contest is proposed to us, those alone contend who are exercised in these warlike instruments. In the next place, this discipline is of advantage in battle itself, when it is necessary to fight in rank with many others. But it is most beneficial when the ranks are broken, and when it is necessary, in single combat, either to pursue one resisting, or in flight to repel one attacking. For he who is skilled in this art, will not be vanquished by one, nor perhaps by many

many enemies, but will every where through this be superior to his opponent. Further still, a thing of this kind incites a desire of another beautiful discipline. For every one who has learnt to fight in armour, will also desire the discipline consequent to this, viz. that concerning the ranks of an army; and having received these disciplines, and being ambitious of excelling in them, he will be impelled to every thing which concerns the command of an army. And this being the case, it is evident that he will apply himself to those beautiful disciplines and studies consequent to these, which it is well worth while for a man to learn and study, and of which this discipline is the leader. We may also add to it this, which is no trifling addition, that this science will make every man in no small degree more daring and brave in battle than he was before. Nor is this also to be passed over in silence (though it may appear to be very trifling), that it gives a man a graceful carriage, in those places where it is proper he should appear to possess it; and where also through this gracefulness of carriage he will at the same time appear more terrible to his enemies. To me therefore, O Lysimachus, as I have said, it appears to be necessary to teach young men these things, and for the reasons which I have assigned. But I shall be glad to hear if Laches has any thing to say in opposition to what I have advanced.

LAC. But it is difficult, O Nicias, to say with respect to any discipline, that it is not proper to learn it: for it appears to be good to know all things. And indeed, as to this art respecting arms, if it is a discipline, (as those say it is who teach it, and if it is such as Nicias asserts it to be,) it is necessary to learn it; but if it is not a discipline, and those deceive us who promise to teach it us as such, or if being a discipline, it is not of much worth, why is it necessary to learn it? But I say these things concerning it, looking to this circumstance, viz. that if it were of any value, I think it would not have been concealed from the Lacedæmonians, who are concerned for nothing else in life than to seek and study that by which they may surpass others in war. And if this art were concealed from them, yet it could not be concealed from the teachers of it, that the Lacedæmonians, the most of all the Greeks, pay attention to things of this kind, and that he who is renowned for these things, will accumulate much wealth both from them and from others, just as a tragic poet when he is renowned among us. For indeed, he who thinks that he can compose excellent tragedies, does not, wandering out of Attica,
make

make the circuit of other cities, in order to attract notice, but immediately comes hither, and very properly exhibits himself to our citizens. But I see that those who fight in armour consider Lacedæmon as an inaccessible temple, and do not enter into it even on tip-toe, but they wander round it, and rather exhibit themselves to others, and especially to those who acknowledge themselves to be inferior to many others in warlike concerns. In the next place, O Lyfimachus, I have been present with not a few of these men in the work itself, and I have seen what kind of men they are. But we may form a judgment of them from this circumstance, that no man who has applied himself to armorial concerns has ever become illustrious in war; though in all other things men have been celebrated for their skill in their respective professions. But these men, as it seems, are particularly unfortunate in this respect beyond others. For this very same Stefileus, whom you beheld together with me exhibiting himself in so great a crowd, I have seen truly displaying himself elsewhere, in a far better manner, though unwillingly. For when the ship he was in attacked a merchantman, he fought with a spear headed with a scythe that his arms might be as different as himself was from the rest of the combatants. Other particulars therefore respecting the man do not deserve to be related; but the success of this stratagem of heading a spear with a scythe must not be passed over in silence: for while he was fighting, his scythe became entangled in the tackling of the enemy's ship; Stefileus therefore pulled in order to disengage it, but was not able to effect his purpose; and the one ship passed by the other. In the mean time he followed the course of the ship holding his spear. But when the enemy's ship steered off, and was drawing him in, as he was still holding his spear, he suffered it to slip through his hands, till he had only hold of it by the small end. The crew of the merchantman laughed and shouted at this circumstance of his being drawn by his spear, and at the figure which he made. At length some one having thrown a stone that fell just at his feet, on one of the rowers' seats, he quitted his spear. Then, indeed, those that were in the three-banked galley were no longer able to restrain their laughter on seeing that spear headed with a scythe hanging from the ship. Perhaps therefore, this art may be of some use, as Nicias says; such however are the particulars of which I was a spectator. Hence, as I said at first, if it be a discipline, it possesses but little utility; and if it be not, but they dissemble who say it is, it is not worth while

to endeavour to learn it. For it appears to me, that if any coward should think he ought to learn this art, acquiring confidence through it, his cowardice would become more apparent; but that if a brave man should learn it, in consequence of being observed by every one, if he erred but in a small degree he must endure great calumnies. For the profession of this science is attended with envy; so that unless he surpasses others in virtue in a wonderful degree, he who acknowledges that he possesses this science cannot avoid becoming ridiculous. Such, O Lysimachus, does the pursuit of this discipline appear to me. But it is requisite, as I said at first, not to dismiss this Socrates, but to request him to give his opinion on this subject.

LYS. But I indeed request, O Socrates, that you will do so: for it appears to me that we want an umpire to decide the difference. Had these indeed agreed in opinion, a thing of this kind would have been less necessary. But now (for you see that Laches dissents from Nicias) it will be well to hear from you to which of the men you give your suffrage.

SOC. But what, O Lysimachus? If many praise us, will you make use of them?

LYS. What else can any one do, O Socrates?

SOC. And will you also, O Melesias, act in this manner? And if it were necessary for you to consult about exercise for your son, would you rather be persuaded by the many, than by one who had learned under a skilful master, and who had exercised himself?

MEL. It is fit, Socrates, I should be persuaded by the latter.

SOC. You would rather, therefore, be persuaded by him than by us four?

MEL. Perhaps so.

SOC. For it is necessary, I think, to judge by science, and not by multitude, if a man intends to judge well.

MEL. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Now, therefore, it is necessary to consider this very thing in the first place, viz. whether any one of us is an artist, in the thing about which we consult, or not. And if any of us is, we should be persuaded by him being one, dismissing the rest. But if no one of us is an artist in this particular, we must seek after some other person. Or, do you and Lysimachus think that this is an affair of small consequence, and that it is not concerning

cerning that which is the greatest of all your possessions? For the government of the whole paternal house will be according as the children are worthy, or the contrary.

MEL. You speak the truth.

Soc. It is necessary, therefore, to pay much attention to this subject.

MEL. Certainly.

Soc. How then should we consider that which I just now mentioned, if we wished to find which of us is most expert in contest? Should we not consult him who had learned and studied this art of contending, and who had been instructed in it by good masters?

MEL. To me it appears that we should.

Soc. Should we not, therefore, prior to this, consider what this thing is in which we seek for masters?

MEL. How do you say?

Soc. Thus, perhaps, what I say will be more manifest. It does not appear to me, to have been acknowledged by us at first what that is about which we consult and speculate, in order to know which of us is most skilled in it, and has had masters for the sake of this, and which of us is not.

NIC. Did we not, O Socrates, consider about fighting in armour, whether it was proper lads should learn it or not?

Soc. Entirely so, O Nicias: but when any one considers about a remedy for the eyes, whether it is proper to apply it or not, whether do you think the consultation should then be about the remedy, or about the eyes?

NIC. About the eyes.

Soc. Hence also, when any one considers about a bridle for a horse, whether it should be used or not, and when it should be used, he will then consult about the horse, and not about the bridle.

NIC. True.

Soc. In one word, therefore, when any one considers a certain thing for the sake of something, his consultation will be about that thing for the sake of which he speculates, and not about that which he seeks for the sake of something else¹.

¹ Thus, in the above instance of the bridle and the horse, the horse is that for the sake of which a man considers about a bridle; but the bridle is that which is sought for the sake of the horse.

NIC. Necessarily so:

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether the person whose advice we ask is skilled in that thing for the sake of which we engage in the present inquiry.

MEL. Certainly.

SOC. Do we not therefore say, that we now inquire concerning discipline for the sake of the soul of youth?

NIC. Yes.

SOC. Whether, therefore, any one of us is skilled in the art of taking care of the soul, and is able to accomplish this employment well, and has had good masters in this art himself, must be considered.

LAC. But what, O Socrates, have you never yet seen some persons become more skilful in a certain thing without than with masters?

SOC. I have, O Laches; whom, however, you would not be willing to believe, if they said that they were good artists, unless they could show you some excellent production of their art, and not only one but many.

NIC. What you say is true.

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, O Laches and Nicias, since Lysimachus and Melesias have called upon us to consult with them concerning their sons, in consequence of being anxious that their souls may become most excellent,—I say, it is necessary that we, if we acknowledge that we have had masters, should show who they were, they in the first place being good masters, and having cultivated the souls of many youths; and in the next place, who shall appear to have also instructed us. Or, if any one of us shall say that he has had no master, he ought to be able to speak of the works which he has performed, and to show what Athenians or foreigners, what slaves or freemen, have acknowledged themselves to have been benefited by him. But if we can do neither of these, we must order them to seek for advice from others, and not subject ourselves to the danger of corrupting the sons of other men, and thus be exposed to the greatest reproach from those with whom we are most familiar. I therefore, O Lysimachus and Melesias, in the first place, say concerning myself, that I have had no preceptor of this thing, though my desire has always tended to it from my youth. But I am not able to give a reward to the sophists, who alone profess themselves to be capable of making me a worthy man; and even now I am unable to discover
this

this art myself. If, however, Nicias or Laches shall have either discovered or learned it, I shall not wonder : for they are richer than I am, so that they might learn it from others ; and they are at the same time older, so that they may now have discovered it. But they appear to me to be able to instruct a man : for they never would so intrepidly have decided concerning worthy and base pursuits, unless they had believed that they had a sufficient knowledge of them. I believe them, therefore, as to other things ; but I wonder that they differ from each other. Hence, as Laches just now ordered that you should not dismiss but interrogate me ; in like manner I now call upon you not to dismiss Laches and Nicias, but to interrogate them ; at the same time telling them, that Socrates says he has no knowledge of the thing, and is not qualified to judge which of you speaks the truth ; for he is neither the inventor nor the disciple of any one about things of this kind. But do you, O Laches and Nicias, tell us what man you have met with most skilled in the education of youth ; and whether you know these things in consequence of having learnt them from some one, or from having discovered them yourselves. And, if you have learnt them, tell us who was your master, and who those are that are similar artists ; that if the affairs of the city should not afford you leisure sufficient to attend to us, we may go to those masters, and may persuade them, either by gifts or caresses, or both, to take care of our children and yours, that they may not, through becoming depraved characters, be a disgrace to their ancestors. But if you yourselves discovered this art, give us instances of those who by your care have, from being depraved, become worthy characters. For if you now begin to give instruction for the first time, it is requisite to consider that you will be exposed to the danger, not of making trial in Car¹, but upon your sons, and the sons of your friends, and, in short, according to the proverb, that you will teach a potter² in a tub. Tell us, then, what you can do, and what not. Inquire these things of them, O Lysimachus, and do not dismiss the men till they have answered.

Lys. Socrates, my friends, appears to me to speak well ; wherefore, O Nicias and Laches, consider whether it will be agreeable to you to be interro-

¹ This is said of those that engage in perilous concerns, and in the affairs of others, when they are attended with danger.

² See this explained in a note on the Gorgias.

gated about, and reply to such like particulars. For to me and Melesias here, it will certainly be very agreeable, if you are willing to discuss all that Socrates may ask. For I said from the first, that we called upon you for advice, because we thought that you would pay attention to these things in a becoming manner, and because your sons, as well as ours, are now nearly arrived at that age in which they ought to be instructed. If, therefore, it makes no difference to you, speak, and consider the affair in common with Socrates, giving and receiving arguments from each other: for this was well said by him, that we are now consulting about the most important of our concerns. See, therefore, whether it appears to you that this ought to be done.

NIC. O Lysimachus, you seem to me to know Socrates only from his father, and not to have associated with him; unless, perhaps, when he was a boy, you may have met with him in public assemblies following his father, or in a temple, or some other convention of the people; but it is evident that you never had any correspondence with him since he came to be a man.

LYS. Why do you say this, O Nicias?

NIC. You seem to me not to know that whoever draws near to Socrates by discourse, as if by family alliance, and converses with him, although he may begin to discourse about something else, will not cease to be led about by his arguments, till he falls on the necessity of giving an account of his present mode of life, and the manner in which his past life has been spent. And when he has fallen on this necessity, Socrates will not dismiss him till he has well and properly examined all these particulars. But I am accustomed to his manner, and I know that it is necessary to suffer these things from him; and I also well know that I must suffer them now: for I rejoice, O Lysimachus, to draw near to the man; and I think it is no bad thing to be reminded that we have acted or shall act in an improper manner. But, indeed, he who is not averse to this must necessarily be more cautious in future, being willing and thinking it worth while, according to the saying of Solon, to learn as long as he lives, and not expecting that age, when it comes, will bring intellect along with it. To me, therefore, it is neither unusual nor unpleasant to be examined by Socrates; but, indeed, I have nearly for some time perceived that our discourse, as Socrates is present, would not be about the lads, but about ourselves. As I said, therefore, as to myself nothing hinders

ders me from discoursing with Socrates in whatever manner he pleases. But see how Laches here is disposed about a thing of this kind.

LAC. The manner in which I am affected, O Nicias, with respect to discourse, is simple, or, if you will, is not simple, but double: for to some one I may appear to be a philologist, and not a misologist. For when I hear a man discoursing concerning virtue, or concerning a certain wisdom, he being one who is truly a man, and worthy the arguments which he uses, I rejoice transcendently, contemplating at the same time him who speaks and what is said, how they fit and harmonize with each other. And, indeed, such a man appears to me to be a musician, and one who produces the most beautiful harmony; not that he is harmonized according to the melody of the lyre, or instruments of sport; but in reality he attunes his life. Such a one too lives in concord with himself both in words and deeds, not indeed according to the Ionic¹, or Phrygian, or Lydian harmony, but according to the Dorian, which is alone the Grecian harmony. Such a man, therefore, when he speaks, causes me to rejoice, and to seem to be a lover of words, with such avidity do I receive what he says. But he who acts in a manner contrary to this man pains me, and by how much the better he appears to speak, by so much the more does he make me seem to be a hater of words. I have not yet, indeed, had any experience of the words of Socrates; but of his works, as it seems, I formerly have; and there I found him a man worthy of beautiful assertions and of all liberty of speech. If, therefore, he is such a man, I will consult him, and most willingly shall I be interrogated by, and not be averse to learn from him. I also assent to the saying of Solon, with the addition only of one thing: for I wish to learn as I grow old, but from the worthy alone. Let this then be granted to me that he is a worthy preceptor, lest while I learn unpleasantly, I should appear to be indocile. For it is with me a thing of no consequence, if he who teaches me should be younger than I am, or should not yet be renowned, and the like. I announce to you, therefore, O Socrates, that you may confute and teach me whatever you please: for I am favourably disposed towards you from that day,

¹ The Ionic harmony was effeminate and soft; the Lydian was doleful and adapted to lamentation; the Phrygian vehement, and capable of producing ecstasy, and on this account Proclus informs us that it was used in the mysteries; and the Dorian was grave and masculine, and on this account was preferred by Plato to all the rest. See the third book of the Republic.

in which you was my companion in danger, and in which you gave such a specimen of your virtue, as it became a just man to give. Say therefore whatever you please, and pay no attention to our age.

Soc. We cannot then accuse you, as it seems, that you are not ready jointly to consult and investigate with us.

Lys. This is our business, Socrates; for I regard you as one of us. Consider, therefore, instead of me, for the sake of the youths, what we ought to inquire of them, and consult by conversing with them. For I have forgotten many things, through my age, which I had intended to ask them; and again, I do not very well remember what I hear, if any other conversation intervenes. Do you therefore speak about, and discuss among yourselves, the things which we have proposed to be investigated; and when I have heard what you have to say, I will do, together with Melesias here, whatever shall appear to you proper to be done.

Soc. O Nicias and Laches, we must obey Lysimachus and Melesias. The things then which we just now endeavoured to consider, viz. who were our masters in a discipline of this kind, or what other persons we had made better, it will not perhaps be improper to investigate among ourselves. But I think that such a consideration as this tends to the same thing; or nearly it will be something which rather flows as from a principle. For if we have a scientific knowledge of any thing, which when communicated to another renders him better, and if we are also able to communicate it to another, it is evident that we know the thing itself, and also how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. Perhaps you do not understand what I say, but thus you will easily comprehend my meaning. If we know that sight, when present to the eyes, makes those eyes to which it is present better, and if besides this we have the power of making it present to the eyes, it is evident that we know what the sight is, and can inform him who consults us for this purpose how it may be acquired in the easiest and best manner. For if we have no knowledge of this very thing, what the sight is, or what the hearing is, we cannot be counsellors or physicians worthy of any regard, either about the eyes or the ears, with respect to the manner in which either the hearing or the sight may be most beautifully obtained.

Lys. You speak the truth, O Socrates.

Soc. Do not therefore these persons, O Laches, now call upon us to consult with

with them after what manner virtue, being present to the souls of their sons, may render them better?

LAC. Entirely so.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, essentially necessary to know this, what virtue is? For if we are entirely ignorant what virtue is, how can we become advisers to any one, so as that he may be able to acquire it in the most beautiful manner?

LAC. By no means can we, as it appears to me, Socrates.

SOC. Shall we say then, O Laches, that we know what virtue is?

LAC. We shall certainly say so.

SOC. If, therefore, we know, cannot we also tell what it is?

LAC. Undoubtedly.

SOC. We will not, therefore, O best of men, immediately speculate concerning the whole of virtue (for that perhaps would be a very laborious work); but let us first see with respect to a certain part of it, if we are sufficiently able to know it, and thus, as it is probable, the speculation will be easy to us.

LAC. Let us do so, Socrates, since it is agreeable to you.

SOC. Which of the parts of virtue then shall we select? Is it not evident that it must be this, to which the discipline of arms appears to tend? But it appears to the many to tend to fortitude. Or does it not?

LAC. And very much does it appear so.

SOC. In the first place, therefore, O Laches, let us endeavour to say what fortitude is; and in the next place let us after this consider how it may be acquired by youth, so far as it is possible for it to be acquired by studies and disciplines. But endeavour to say what fortitude is.

LAC. By Jupiter, Socrates, it is not difficult to say what it is. For if any one is willing, keeping in his rank, to oppose the enemy, and does not fly, I well know that he will be a brave man.

SOC. You speak well, O Laches; but perhaps I, from not speaking clearly, am the cause of my perceiving that you do not answer that which I asked, but something else.

LAC. Why do you say this, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you, if I am able. A brave man, as you say, is one who, keeping in his rank, fights the enemy.

LAC. So I say.

Soc. And I also. But is not he likewise a brave man, who flying and not keeping in his rank fights the enemy?

LAC. How flying?

Soc. Just as the Scythians are said to fight no less flying than pursuing. And Homer, praising the horses of Æneas, says,

Swiftly they every where pursue and fly.

And for this very thing he praises Æneas himself, viz. for his being skilled in flying, and says, that he was expert in retreating.

LAC. And very properly, Socrates: for he there speaks concerning chariots; but you speak concerning the horse of the Scythians. For their cavalry fight in this manner; but the infantry of Greece fight as I said.

Soc. Except perhaps the Lacedæmonians, O Laches. For they say that the Lacedæmonians, in the battle of Platæa, when they were engaged with the *Gerropbori*¹, were not willing to fight standing their ground against them, but fled; but that after the ranks of the Persians were broken, they rallied and fought like cavalry, and thus became conquerors in that battle.

LAC. You speak the truth.

Soc. On this account, therefore, I said that I was the cause that you did not answer well, because I did not interrogate you well. For I wished to ask you not only concerning those who are brave in the infantry, but also concerning those who are brave in the cavalry, and in all the forms of war; and not only concerning those that are brave in battle, but also concerning those that are brave in dangers on the sea,—in diseases,—in poverty,—and in political affairs: and again, not only concerning those who are brave in pains or fears, but also concerning those who are powerful in contending against desires or pleasures, both by standing their attacks, or retreating from them: for some men, O Laches, are also brave in things of this kind.

LAC. And very much so, O Socrates.

Soc. All these, therefore, are brave; but some of them possess fortitude in pleasures, others in pains, others in desires, and others in fears; and others, I think, possess timidity in these very same things.

¹ These were Persian troops armed with bucklers of willows.

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. What then each of these is, this is the thing which I ask. Again, therefore, endeavour to tell me, in the first place, what fortitude is which is the same in all these. Or do you not yet understand what I say?

LAC. Not very much.

Soc. But I say, just as if I should ask what swiftnes is, which is present with us in running, in playing on the harp, in speaking, in learning, and in many other things. For we nearly possess it in such things as the following, which it is worth while to mention, viz. either in the actions of the hands or feet, or mouth and voice, or in those of the dianoëtic part. Or do not you also say so?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, any one should ask me, O Socrates, What do you call this thing which you denominate swiftnes in all things? I should say to him, that I call that power swiftnes which accomplishes many things in a short time, about the voice, and about the course, and about all other things.

LAC. And you would say rightly.

Soc. Do you also endeavour, O Laches, thus to define fortitude, and tell us what that power is which is the same in pleasure and in pain, and in all the above-mentioned cases, and which in all these is called fortitude.

LAC. It appears, therefore, to me to be a certain endurance of the soul, if it is necessary to speak of that which accords with fortitude in all things.

Soc. But this indeed is necessary, if we are to reply to the question that was asked us. This therefore appears to me, that you do not consider every kind of endurance to be fortitude. But I infer this from hence: for I nearly know, O Laches, that you think fortitude to be among the number of things which are very beautiful.

LAC. I do indeed, and I also think that it ranks among things the most beautiful.

Soc. Is not, therefore, that endurance which subsists in conjunction with prudence beautiful and good?

LAC. Entirely so. But what of that endurance which subsists with folly? Is it not on the contrary bad and pernicious?

LAC. Yes.

Soc. Do you then say that a thing of this kind is beautiful, though it is bad and pernicious?

LAC. This would not be just, O Socrates.

Soc. You do not, therefore, acknowledge such an endurance as this to be fortitude, since it is not beautiful; but fortitude is beautiful.

LAC. That is true.

Soc. Prudent endurance, therefore, according to your assertion, will be fortitude.

LAC. So it seems.

Soc. Let us see then in what this endurance is prudent; or whether it is prudent in all things both great and small. Thus, for instance, if some one endures to spend his money prudently, knowing that he shall be enriched by thus spending it, would you call him a brave man?

LAC. By Jupiter, not I.

Soc. And if some one, being a physician, had a son or some other patient ill with an inflammation in his breast, and this patient should request him to give him something to eat or drink, but the physician should inflexibly persist in denying his request, would you call this endurance fortitude?

LAC. I should not.

Soc. But in war; here is a man of endurance who is willing to fight; and he prudently reasons with himself, that others will give him assistance, and that he fights against those who are fewer and more despicable than those of his own party, and still further that he has the advantage of the ground: will you say that this man, enduring with such like prudence and advantage, is braver than him in the contrary army who is willing to stand his ground and endure?

LAC. The man in the contrary army, O Socrates, appears to me to be the braver.

Soc. And yet the endurance of the one is more imprudent than that of the other.

LAC. That is true.

Soc. Will you, therefore, say that a man who endures in an equestrian contest with equestrian science, is less brave than him who endures without science?

LAC. To me it appears that he is.

Soc. And will you also say the same of a slinger, or an archer, or of any other who endures in any other art?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. And with respect to such as are willing to descend into a well, and there to endure swimming in it, though they are not skilled in this employment, or in any thing else of this kind,—will you say that such men are braver than those that are skilled in these things?

LAC. What else can one say, O Socrates?

Soc. Nothing, if he thinks so.

LAC. But I, indeed, do think so.

Soc. And yet, O Laches, such men encounter danger, and endure more imprudently than those who do this in conjunction with art.

LAC. So it appears.

Soc. Did not, therefore, base and imprudent boldness and endurance appear to us to be noxious in our former conclusions?

LAC. Entirely so.

Soc. But fortitude was acknowledged by us to be something beautiful.

LAC. It was acknowledged.

Soc. But now again we say that that base and imprudent endurance is fortitude.

LAC. So it appears.

Soc. Do we therefore appear to you to speak well?

LAC. By Jupiter, Socrates, to me we do not.

Soc. In your own language, therefore, O Laches, you and I are not Dorically harmonized: for our works do not accord with our words. For some one, as it seems, may say that we participate of fortitude in our deeds; but not, as I think, in our words, if he should hear us now discoursing.

LAC. You speak most truly.

Soc. What then? Does it appear to you to be beautiful that we should be in this condition?

LAC. By no means.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we should yield our assent to what we said?

LAC. To what assertion of ours do you allude?

Soc.

Soc. To that which ordered us to endure. If you are willing, therefore, let us persevere in our inquiry, and endure, lest fortitude itself should deride us for not bravely investigating what it is; if, indeed, endurance itself is often fortitude.

LAC. I, indeed, O Socrates, am ready to stand my ground, though I am unaccustomed to such like conferences. But a certain pertinacity instigates me against what has been said, and I am in reality indignant that I am so incapable of telling my conceptions. For I seem to myself to know what fortitude is; but I know not how it just now fled from me, so that I cannot comprehend in words and say what it is.

Soc. But a good huntsman, my friend, ought to run after the beast he hunts, and not remit his pursuit.

LAC. By all means he ought.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, that we call Nicias also to this hunting, that we may try if he is in any respect more sagacious than us?

LAC. I am willing: for why should I not?

Soc. Come then, O Nicias, gratify your friends, and assist them in their doubts in this conference, if you possess any power; for you see how we are embarrassed. Do you, therefore, tell us what you think fortitude is, free us from this doubt, and confirm by argument what you conceive it to be.

NIC. You have appeared to me, for some time past, Socrates, not to have well defined fortitude; for you make no use of that which I have heard you so well assert.

Soc. What is that, O Nicias?

NIC. I have often heard you assert that every one of us is good with respect to those things in which he is wise, but bad with respect to those of which he is ignorant.

Soc. By Jupiter, what you say is true, O Nicias.

NIC. If, therefore, a brave is a good man, he is clearly a wise man.

Soc. Do you hear, O Laches?

LAC. I do, but I do not very much understand what he says.

Soc. But I seem to understand him, and he appears to me to call fortitude a certain wisdom.

LAC. What kind of wisdom, O Socrates?

Soc. Will you not therefore inquire this of him?

LAC,

LAC. I will.

Soc. Come then, O Nicias, tell him what kind of wisdom fortitude will be according to you : for it is not that which belongs to the pipe.

NIC. By no means.

Soc. Nor yet that which belongs to the harp.

NIC. It is not.

Soc. But what is it then, or of what is it the science?

LAC. You very rightly interrogate him, Socrates ; and let him tell us what wisdom it is.

NIC. I say then, O Laches, that it is the science of things dreadful and daring, both in war and in all other things.

LAC. How absurdly he speaks, Socrates !

Soc. Looking to what do you say this, O Laches ?

LAC. To what ? Why wisdom is separate from fortitude.

Soc. Nicias does not say so.

LAC. He does not, by Jupiter ; and therefore he raves.

Soc. Let us therefore teach and not revile him.

NIC. He does not revile me ; but it seems to me, O Socrates, that Laches is desirous that I also may appear to say nothing, because this was just now the case with him.

LAC. Entirely so, O Nicias ; and I will endeavour to evince this : for you say nothing. Without going any further, in diseases do not physicians know things that are dreadful ? Or do brave men appear to you to know this ? Or do you call physicians brave men ?

NIC. By no means.

LAC. Neither do you give that name, I think, to husbandmen, though they know things that are dreadful in agriculture ; and all other artificers know things that are dreadful and daring in their own arts, and yet they are not in any respect the more brave for this.

Soc. What does Laches, O Nicias, appear to you to say ? for he certainly appears to say something.

NIC. He does indeed say something, and yet not what is true.

Soc. How so ?

NIC. Because he thinks that physicians know something more about the sick than the being able to say that a thing is healthful or unhealthful ; but
they,

they alone know this. But whether to be well is a thing dreadful to any one rather than to be ill; do you think, O Laches, that physicians have any knowledge of this? Or do you not think that it is better to many for them not to recover from disease than to recover? For tell me this: Do you say that it is better to all men to live, and that it is not more advantageous to many to die?

LAC. I do say this.

NIC. To those, therefore, to whom it is advantageous to die, do you think the same things are dreadful, as to those to whom it is better to live?

LAC. Not I.

NIC. But do you allow that physicians know this, or that it is known by any other artificer than the man who is skilled in things dreadful, and whom I call a brave man?

SOC. Do you understand, O Laches, what he says?

LAC. I do; and I perceive that he calls prophets brave men: for whom else knows to whom it is better to live than to die? And I ask you, O Nicias, whether you acknowledge yourself to be a prophet, or to be neither a prophet nor a brave man?

NIC. But what? Do you think it belongs to a prophet to know things dreadful and daring?

LAC. I do; for to whom else does it belong?

NIC. Much more, O best of men, to him of whom I speak; since it is necessary that a prophet should only know the signs of future events, whether they portend death to any one, or disease, or the loss of riches, or victory, or the being vanquished in battle or in any other contest. But, why does it rather belong to a prophet, than any other, to judge for whom it is better to suffer or not suffer any one of these things?

LAC. I do not understand, Socrates, what he means to say: for he does not render it manifest that it is either a prophet, or a physician, or any other person, whom he calls brave, unless he says that this brave person is a certain god. Nicias, therefore, appears to me to be unwilling ingenuously to confess that he says nothing, but he is rolled upwards and downwards, concealing his perplexity; though you and I might have been similarly rolled, if we had wished not to appear to contradict ourselves. If, indeed, we were
pleading

pleading in a court of justice, it might be reasonable to act in this manner; but now in such a conference as this, why should any one vainly adorn himself with empty words?

Soc. For no reason, as it appears to me, O Laches. But let us see; perhaps Nicias thinks that he says something to the purpose, and does not assert these things merely for the sake of speaking. Let us, therefore, inquire of him more clearly what he means; and if it shall appear that he says any thing pertinent, let us assent to him; if not, we will teach him better.

Lac. Do you, therefore, O Socrates, if you will, ask him; for I have interrogated him sufficiently.

Soc. Nothing will hinder me: for the interrogation will be in common to me and you.

Lac. Entirely so.

Soc. Tell me then, O Nicias, (for I and Laches unite in this question,) Do you say that fortitude is rather the science of things dreadful and daring, than of any thing else?

Nic. I do.

Soc. But it is not the province of every man to know this, since neither a physician nor a prophet possesses this knowledge; nor will a man be brave, unless he acquires this science. Do you not say so?

Nic. I do.

Soc. According to the proverb, therefore, in reality, every hog does not know this, nor will every hog be valiant.

Nic. It does not appear to me that it will.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, O Nicias, that neither do you believe that the Crommyonian sow was brave. But I do not say this in jest: for I think it is necessary that he who asserts these things should admit that no brute is brave; nor ought he to grant that any wild beast is so wise, that what few men know through the difficulty of acquiring knowledge, *that* a lion, or a leopard, or a certain boar knows. But he who defines fortitude, as you have done, must necessarily say that a lion and a stag, a bull and an ape, are similarly formed by nature with respect to fortitude.

Lac. By the gods, Socrates, you speak well: and in reality inform us, O Nicias, whether you say that these wild beasts, which we all of us acknow-

ledge to be brave, are wiser than we are, or, contrary to the opinion of all men, will you dare to deny that they are brave ?

NIC. Indeed, Laches, I do not call either a wild beast, or any thing else brave, which through ignorance is not terrified at things dreadful, but is fearless and stupid. Or, do you think, that I call all boys brave, who through ignorance fear nothing? But I am of opinion, that *the fearless* is not the same with *the brave*. For, I think, that fortitude and forethought are to be found in very few; but that confidence and boldness, and a privation of fear, together with the want of forethought, may be seen in very many men and women, boys and wild beasts. That, therefore, which you and the many call fortitude, I call rashness; but I call the brave, the prudent and the wise, about whom I now speak.

LAC. You see, Socrates, how well this man decorates himself, as he thinks, with words; but those whom all men acknowledge to be brave he endeavours to deprive of this honour.

NIC. Not I indeed, Laches; but take courage. For I say that you and Lammachus¹ are wise, if you are brave; and that this is also true of many others of the Athenians.

LAC. I say nothing against these things, though I could reply to them, lest you should say that I am in reality a slanderer.

SOC. Nor should you speak against them, O Laches; for you appear to me not to have perceived that Nicias here received this wisdom from our associate Damon; and Damon is very intimate with Prodicus, who appears to distinguish appellations of this kind in a manner superior to the other sophists.

LAC. For it rather becomes a sophist, O Socrates, to think highly of himself on account of things of this kind, than a man whom the city thinks worthy to be its governor.

SOC. It becomes indeed him, O blessed man, who presides over things of the greatest consequence, to participate of the greatest wisdom. But it appears to me to be worth while to consider with a view to what Nicias thus defines fortitude.

¹ This Lammachus was general of the Athenians, with Nicias and Alcibiades, in the expedition of Sicily, where he was killed.

LAC. Consider this then, Socrates, yourself.

Soc. I shall do this, O best of men. Do not, however, think that you are to be excluded from this conference, but attend and consider what is said.

LAC. Let these things be so if it appears to be proper.

Soc. But it does appear to be so. And do you, Nicias, tell us again from the beginning; for you know that at the beginning of our conference we considered fortitude as a part of virtue.

NIC. Entirely so.

Soc. Did not you, therefore, also answer, that it was a part of virtue, there being likewise other parts, all which are called virtue?

NIC. For how is it possible I should not?

Soc. Do you, therefore, call the same things the parts of virtue as I do? For I, besides fortitude, call temperance and justice, and certain other such like things, parts of virtue. And do not you also?

NIC. Entirely so.

Soc. Attend then: for these things are granted by us. But let us consider concerning things terrible and daring, lest you should form one opinion of them, and we another. For we will tell you what we think concerning them; and do you, if you do not accord with us, teach us better. We then think those things to be dreadful which occasion fear, and that those things are daring, or may be dared, which do not occasion fear. Neither, however, past nor present evils occasion fear, but those which are expected: for fear is the expectation of a future evil. Or does it not likewise appear so to you, O Laches?

LAC. Very much so, Socrates.

Soc. Do you, therefore, O Nicias, hear our assertions, that things dreadful are future evils; but that things which may be dared are future goods, or at least are not evils. Do you say this, or something else about these things?

NIC. I say this.

Soc. But do you call the science of these things fortitude?

NIC. I do.

Soc. Let us then still further consider whether a third thing appears the same to you as to us.

NIC. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you. For it appears to me and Laches, that of whatever things there is science, there is not one science of a thing which is past, by which we know that it was made, another concerning things present, by which we know that they are made, and another concerning that which is not yet made, by which we know that it may and will be made in the most beautiful manner; but to know all these is the province of the same science. Thus, for instance, with respect to that which is salubrious at all times, there is no other science than medicine, which being one and the same, sees what has been, what is, and what will be salubrious. And agriculture subsists in a similar manner with respect to things which grow out of the earth. Thus too, in warlike concerns, you yourselves can testify that the science of commanding an army, provides in the most beautiful manner for other things and for what will happen in future. For this art does not think it fit that it should be subservient to divination, but preside over it, as better knowing things which do and will take place about wars. And the law also orders this, not that the diviner shall command the general, but that the general shall command the diviner. Shall we assert these things, O Laches?

LAC. We must assert them.

Soc. But what? Do you agree with us, O Nicias, that it is the province of the same science to possess a knowledge of the same things, whether they be considered as past, or as present, or as future?

NIC. I do: for thus it appears to me, O Socrates.

Soc. Is not, therefore, O best of men, fortitude, as you say, the science of things dreadful and daring?

NIC. It is.

Soc. But it has been acknowledged that things dreadful are future evils, and things daring future goods.

NIC. Entirely so.

Soc. But the same science has a knowledge of things past, present, and future.

NIC. It has.

Soc. Fortitude, therefore, is not only the science of things dreadful and daring: for it not only has a knowledge of future goods and evils, but also of such as are past and present and in short it surveys all things like the other sciences.

NIC.

NIC. So it seems.

SOC. You have, therefore, O Nicias, only defined to us in your answer the third part of fortitude, though we asked you what the whole of fortitude is. And now, as it seems, according to your assertion, fortitude is not only the science of things dreadful and daring, but nearly of all good and evil, and in short of all things, from your argument, in whatever manner they may subsist. Do you thus determine, or how do you say, O Nicias?

NIC. To me it appears to be so, O Socrates.

SOC. Does then such a virtue as this appear to you, O blessed man, to be deficient in any respect, if it knows all goods, and in what manner they have been, are, and will be produced, and in the same manner as to evils? And do you think that he is indigent of temperance, or justice, or piety, to whom alone it belongs to be cautious with respect to such things as are dreadful and such as are not, both concerning gods and men; who also knows how to obtain what is good, and to associate in a proper manner with others?

NIC. You appear to me, O Socrates, to say something.

SOC. That therefore, O Nicias, which is now adduced by you, will not be a part of virtue, but all virtue.

NIC. So it seems.

SOC. Nevertheless we said that fortitude is one of the parts of virtue.

NIC. We did say so.

SOC. But that which is now said does not appear to be a part of virtue.

NIC. It does not.

SOC. We have not, therefore, O Nicias, discovered what fortitude is.

NIC. It does not appear that we have.

LAC. And yet I should have thought, my dear Nicias, that you would have discovered it, by your contempt of me when I answered Socrates. And therefore I had very great hope that you would have discovered it from the wisdom of Damon.

NIC. Excellent indeed, O Laches, that you should think it a thing of no consequence, that you just now appeared to know nothing about fortitude; but should be alone concerned that I also may appear to be as ignorant as yourself: and as it seems you are satisfied, if I as well as you am ignorant of things, of which it becomes him to have a knowledge who wishes to be a man of any consequence. You therefore appear to me to act in reality
after

after the manner of men, because you do not at all look to yourself but to others. I think, however, that I have spoken tolerably well on this subject; and if any thing that I have asserted is defective, I shall afterwards correct it, and this with the assistance of Damon, whom you think proper to deride, though you have never seen him. I shall also do this by calling in the aid of others: and when I have obtained a firm conviction of these things, I will likewise instruct you without envy; for you appear to me to be in very great want of instruction.

LAC. You are indeed wise, O Nicias: but, at the same time, I advise Lysimachus here and Melesias to bid farewell to you and me concerning the education of youth; but not to dismiss this Socrates, as I said from the first: for I would thus act, if my children were of a proper age.

NIC. I also grant you, that if Socrates is willing to take the lads under his care, no other person should be sought after. Indeed, I should most gladly send Niceratus to him, if he were willing; but when I say any thing to him on this subject, he recommends others to me, and is unwilling to undertake this office himself. But see, O Lysimachus, whether Socrates will more willingly comply with your request.

LYS. It is just, O Nicias, since I also am willing to do many things for him, which I should not be very willing to do for many others. What then do you say, O Socrates? Will you comply with our request, and will you take charge of these lads, so that they may become most excellent characters?

SOC. It would certainly be a dreadful thing, O Lysimachus, not to be willing to endeavour that they may become most worthy. If, therefore, in the preceding conference, I have appeared to be skilful, but the other persons of the dialogue not, it will be just to call me especially to this employment; but now, since we are all similarly involved in doubt, which of us ought to be preferred? To me indeed it seems that no one of us should have the preference. And since this is the case, consider whether I appear to advise you rightly: for I say it is requisite, O men, (since our conference is only among ourselves,) that we should all of us in common inquire, in the first place, after the best master for ourselves, for we stand in need of one; and in the next place for these lads, sparing neither money nor any thing else; but I shall not advise our continuing in the condition in which we now are. And
if

if any one should deride us for applying to teachers at these years, it appears to me that it will be proper to adduce Homer^{*}, who says,

“Shame ill-accompanies a man in need.”

We therefore, bidding farewell to reproach, will pay attention in common to ourselves and the lads.

Lys. What you say, Socrates, pleases me ; and by how much the older I am, by so much the more readily shall I desire to learn together with the youths. Do then as you have said : come to-morrow morning early to my house without fail, that we may consult about these very things : for it is now time that we should dissolve this conference.

Soc. I will do these things, O Lysimachus ; and, if it please God, I will be with you to-morrow morning.

* In the 17th book of the *Odyssey*.

THE LYSIS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

FRIENDSHIP.

INTRODUCTION

19

THE LYSIS.

WHEN Socrates, says Ficinus, disputes with the sophists and their followers, he confutes false opinions, and signifies, rather than teaches, such as are true. This is evident from the Euthydemus, Protagoras, Meno, Hippias, Euthyphro, and Lysis. But where he discourses with his disciples, and those who were anxious to be instructed, he unfolds and teaches, as is evident from many of the preceding dialogues. In this Dialogue, therefore, in which he disputes concerning friendship among the disciples of the sophists, he is rather studious of confuting false opinions than of demonstrating such as are true.

But, that we may take a cursory view of the contents of the Lysis, in the first place, Socrates reproves those who pervert the power of love, and, under the pretext of friendship, are subservient to base lust. In the second place, he admonishes those who, looking no higher than corporeal beauty, think themselves worthy to be beloved for this alone. And, in the last place, he indicates to the sagacious a certain path by which friendship may be investigated and discovered. Again, while Socrates ironically derides Hippothales and Ctesippus, he signifies that they were captivated by base love. And, while in their presence he prepares youth for moral discipline, he admonishes lovers how they should live together, and what kind of attachment they should entertain for each other. Having instructed lovers in the second part of the Dialogue, he instructs those that are the objects of love;

and, by a long series of induction, teaches that wisdom and prudence ought to be explored by friends, which compose the true beauty of the soul, and not the shadowy form of this fleeting body. In the third place, he confutes, and first the opinion of Solon, who said that those who are beloved are friends; for these often hate their lovers. He adds, that neither are lovers only fi ends, because these are frequently the objects of hatred. And here he concludes that reciprocal benevolence should be called friendship. In the next place, he reproves Empedocles, who was of opinion that any kind of similitude is sufficient to produce friendship. This, however, the similitude of many arts shows to be false, which more frequently generates envy and hatred than friendship. In the last place, the assertion of Hesiod and Heraclitus is adduced, that dissimilars are friendly to each other.—That they are not, however, appears from this, that hatred and love, since they are dissimilars, will not be friendly, nor will a just and an unjust man; and of others in a similar manner. And, if it should be said that sometimes a thing desires that which is dissimilar to itself, as that which is dry, moisture, or that which is hot, the cold, the answer is, that it does not in this case love its contrary, but seeks after a restitution of itself from a contrary. For that which is preternaturally hot is reduced through cold to its proper temperament; so that it does not love cold, but through it desires a temperament accommodated to its nature.

Having confuted these assertions, Socrates, as if prophesying, introduces a certain opinion as his own, and says that there appear to him to be three genera of things, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. But the evil, on account of diversity, cannot be a friend to the good, and the evil, through injustice, are injured by the evil. These, therefore, cannot be mutually friends. It is likewise impossible for him who is neither good nor evil to love the evil; for evil, since it is noxious, is always attended with hatred. It remains, therefore, that friendship must subsist between the good and the good, and between that which is neither, and the good. But here certain objections arise which Socrates openly introduces, but the solutions of which he occultly indicates. In the first place, the good is similar to the good; but it was said, in opposition to the opinion of Empedocles, that similars are not friendly to each other. It must, however, be observed, that it was not asserted that similars are by no means friendly; but it was denied that every kind

kind of similitude is sufficient to the production of friendship. Again, when, in the second place, it is objected that the good man is sufficient to himself, that on this account he does not desire another, is without love, and therefore is not the friend of the good;—it must be observed that this absurdity does not follow from the doctrine of Plato, but from the assertions of Empedocles and Heraclitus superficially considered, in which the desire of love is not apparently distinguished from friendship. And as desire is a want, for it always tends to something unpossessed, it follows, from this doctrine, that friendship is always attended with desire. To admit this, however, would be to confound friendship with love. But, according to Plato, they are different, because they are directed to different ends: for friendship tends to the good, and love to the beautiful.

In short, friendship, considered with relation to man, is a union among worthy characters, arising from a similitude of disposition and pursuits. Love also is a union between the lover and the beloved; but it differs from the union of friendship in this, that the former is inseparable from indigence, from which likewise it originates; while, on the other hand, the latter arises from plenitude, with which it is constantly attended in proportion to the perfection which it possesses. In the friendships, indeed, of the most worthy men, this union is not without desire, and is consequently accompanied with want; but this is because the object of friendship is not in this case the highest good. Hence friendship with divinity is the only union in which a perfect plenitude is produced, desire dies, and indigence is unknown.

The character of this Dialogue, like that of the *Theætetus*, is *maieutic*, and the conceptions here, of which Socrates is the midwife, as well as there, are abortive.

THE LYSIS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, || CTESIPPUS*,
HIPPOTHALES, || MENEXENUS,
And LYSIS.

ON going from the Academy, in a straight line to the Lyceum, which is indeed out of the walls, but close to them, when I arrived at the gate, where there is the fountain Panopis, I met with Hippothales the son of Hicronymus, and Ctesippus Pæanæus, and other young men who were assembled together with these. And Hippothales, on seeing me approaching, O Socrates, says he, whither are you going, and whence do you come?—I replied, I came from the Academy, and am going in a direct road to the Lyceum.—But will you not come to us, says he? For it is worth while.—I replied, Whither do you wish me to go, and to whom among you?—Hither, says he, showing me a certain enclosure, and an open gate, opposite to the wall. Here we, and many other very worthy persons, pass away our time.—I then asked him, What is this place, and what do you employ yourselves about?—It is a Palæstra, says he, newly built: but we spend our time for the most part in discourse, which we shall gladly communicate to you.—You do well, said I. But who is the preceptor in that place?—Your associate and encomiast, says he, Miccus.—By Jupiter, said I, he is not a vulgar man, but a sufficiently great sophist.—Are you willing therefore, says he, to follow me, that you may see those that are assembled in that place?—But I should first of all gladly hear

* Ctesippus was a son of Chabrias the Athenian general. After his father's death he was received into the house of Phocion, the friend of Chabrias. Phocion in vain attempted to correct his natural foibles and extravagancies.—Plut. in Phoc.

for what purpose I am to enter, and who that beautiful person is.—To some of us, says he, Socrates, he does not appear to be beautiful.—But what does he appear to you to be, O Hippothales? Tell me this.—But he being thus interrogated, blushed.—And I said, O Hippothales, son of Hieronymus, you need no longer inform me whether you love or not: for I know that you not only love, but that you are far advanced in love. For, with respect to other things, I am vile and useless, but divinity has given me the ability of very rapidly knowing a lover, and the person beloved.—And on hearing this, he blushed in a still greater degree than before. Ctesippus therefore said, You are polite, Hippothales, because you blush, and refuse to tell Socrates the name of your beloved. But you will do nothing but commend him, if Socrates stays only a short time with you. As to our ears, Socrates, they are perfectly filled and rendered deaf with the name of Lysis: and when Hippothales has drunk largely, it is easy for us to think, when we are roused from sleep, that we hear the name of Lysis. And the things which he relates concerning him in prose, though dire, are not altogether so, except when he robs us of our poems, and other writings; and what is still more dire, when he sings his loves with a wonderful voice, which we are under the necessity of enduring to hear. But now being asked by you, he blushes.—This youth then, it seems, I said, is Lysis. But I conjecture this; for I do not know it, from having heard his name.—They very seldom, says he, call him by his own name, but he is yet called by the name of his father, because he is a man very much known. But I well know, that you are far from being unacquainted with the form of the youth: for he may be sufficiently known from this alone.—I then said, Tell me whose son he is?—He is the son of Democrates, says he, who is the eldest son of Exoneus.—Be it so then, said I, O Hippothales, that you have found this generous and juvenile love. But come, evince to me the things which you have shown to these persons, that I may see whether you know what a lover ought to say respecting the objects of his love, either to himself or to others.—Do you examine, says he, Socrates, any thing that he asserts? But do you deny that you love him, as he says?—I do not, said he. But I affirm that I do not compose any thing, either in prose or verse, with a view to my amours.—He is not, well, says Ctesippus, but is delirious and insane.—Upon this, I said, O Hippothales, I neither request to hear any verses, nor any song, which you may
have

have composed on the young man, but I desire to become acquainted with your thoughts, that I may know in what manner you conduct yourself in your amours.—Ctesippus here, says he, will tell you: for he accurately knows and remembers; since, as he says, he has heard me continually talking about him.—Entirely so, by the gods, says Ctesippus. Though indeed it is very ridiculous that he being a lover, and paying far more attention to the youth than others, should have nothing of his own to say. Would not even a boy say that this is ridiculous? For what the whole city proclaims about Democrates, and Lysis the grandfather of the youth, and about all his ancestors, his wealth, his store of horses, his victories in the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, and his contests with four horses, and with one horse, these are the very things which he celebrates. And besides these, he speaks of things still more common: for he lately related to us, in a certain poem, the reception of Hercules as a guest, viz. how an ancestor of Democrates and Lysis entertained Hercules on account of his alliance to him, through being also the offspring of Jupiter and the daughter of the prince of the people;—a circumstance, indeed, which even old women sing. He likewise celebrates, Socrates, many other such like particulars. And these are the things which he compels us to hear him relating and singing.—Upon hearing this, I said, O ridiculous Hippothales, before you have vanquished you make and sing an encomium on yourself.—But I neither make nor sing these things for myself, Socrates, says he.—I replied, You do not think that you do.—How do you mean?—These odes, I said, tend to you the most of all things. For if you should find a beloved person of this kind, your assertions and songs will be an ornament to you, and an encomium on yourself as a conqueror, for having made such an acquisition. But if you are deceived in this respect, by how much greater the encomiums are which you make on your beloved, by so much the more you will appear to be deprived of things beautiful and good, and become ridiculous. Whoever therefore, my friend, is wise in amatory affairs, will not praise his beloved till he is well acquainted with him, in consequence of being fearful of the event. For at the same time it must be observed, that such as are beautiful are filled with pride and ostentation when any one praises and extols them. Or do you not think this is the case?—He replied, I do.—Does it not therefore follow, that by how much the more
insolent

insolent they are, by so much the more difficult it is to catch them?—It is likely.—What kind of a hunter, therefore, would he appear to you to be, who should drive wild beasts out of their lurking places, and increase the difficulty of taking them?—Doubtless, a vile one.—And is it not a mark of great unskillfulness, to exasperate men, instead of alluring them by discourse and songs?—To me it appears to be so.—But consider, O Hippothales, whether you do not render yourself obnoxious to all these things through your poetry. Indeed, I think you are not willing to acknowledge that a man who injures himself in his poems can be a good poet.—I am not, by Jupiter, says he: for this would be very absurd. But on account of these things, Socrates, I communicate my thoughts to you. And consult with yourself, whether you have any thing else to offer, by which it may appear how a man by speaking and acting may become acceptable to the objects of his love.—This, I replied, is not easy to relate: but if you are willing to make Lysis join us in discourse, perhaps I may be able to show you what ought to be said to him, instead of those things which they say you have asserted and sung.—He replied, there is nothing difficult in this. For if you enter this place together with Ctesippus, and sitting down discourse, I think that he will join us: for he is remarkably fond, Socrates, of hearing others converse. Observe too, that both young men and boys are mingled together in this place, as being engaged in Mercurial contests. He will therefore come to you: and if he does not, since he is familiar with Ctesippus, through Menexenus the cousin of Ctesippus, (for he is in the highest degree of intimacy with Menexenus,) let him call him, if he does not join us of his own accord.—I replied, it is proper to act in this manner: and at the same time, laying hold of Ctesippus, I entered the Palæstra, and the others came after us. But on entering, we found that the boys were sacrificing, and that the particulars pertaining to the victims were nearly finished: but all of them were playing at dice, and properly dressed. Many of them, therefore, were playing out of the Palæstra in the porch; but some of them in a corner of the place, where they put off their clothes, were playing with a great multitude of dice, and selecting them from certain little baskets. But others stood round these, beholding them; among whom was Lysis, who was standing crowned, among the boys and young men, and transcending all of them in the beauty of his person. Nor did he alone deserve to be heard for his beauty, but because he was worthy

and good. But we, withdrawing from the crowd, seated ourselves opposite to him: for the place where we sat was quiet; and we there entered into conversation with each other. Lyfis, therefore, turning round, often looked at us; and it was evident that he desired to join us; but, in the mean time, he hesitated, and was averse to come to us alone. Afterwards Menexenus came from the porch, in the midst of the games, and as soon as he saw me and Ctesippus, came and seated himself by us. Lyfis, therefore, seeing him, followed, and sat down with Menexenus. Others likewise came; but Hippothales, after he saw that many were assembled in this place, desiring to be concealed, betook himself to a part where he thought he should not be seen by Lyfis, fearing lest he should be offended with him; and, standing in this manner, he heard the discourse. And I, beholding Menexenus, said, O son of Demophon, which of you is the elder?—He replied, we are not certain.—I then said, Do you therefore contend which of you is the more generous?—Entirely so, said he.—And in a similar manner, likewise, which of you is the more beautiful?—At this question both of them laughed.—But I said, I do not also ask you which of you is the more rich, for you are friends: are you not? They replied, entirely so.—The possessions of friends, therefore, are said to be common; so that about this you will not, in any respect, disagree, if this assertion about friendship is true.—To this they assented.—But after this, as I was endeavouring to ask, which of them was the more just and wise, a certain person interrupted us, by telling Menexenus that he was called by the master of the Gymnasium. But it appeared to me that he was called by the sacrificer. Menexenus therefore left us; and I thus interrogated Lyfis:

Inform me, O Lyfis, if your father and your mother very much love you?—He replied, entirely so.—Do they not, therefore, wish you to be most happy?—Undoubtedly they do.—Does that man appear to you to be happy who is in a state of subjection, and who is not permitted to do any thing which he desires to do?—By Jupiter, says he, to me he does not.—If, therefore, your father and your mother love you, and wish that you may be happy, they will certainly, by every possible means, endeavour that you may become so.—How is it possible they should not, said he.—Do they, therefore, permit you to do what you please, and in no respect oppose your desires?—By Jupiter, says he, Socrates, they oppose me in very many things.—How do you say? I replied.

plied.—At the same time that they wish you to be blessed, do they prevent you from acting as you please? But answer me this question; If you should desire to ride in some one of your father's chariots, and for this purpose should take the reins, when he is going to contend in the games, would he not suffer you? or would he prevent you?—By Jupiter, says he, he would not suffer me.—But would he not permit some one to do this?—There is a certain charioteer who is hired for this purpose by my father.—How do you say? Would your father rather suffer a mercenary to do what he pleases to the horses than you, and, besides this, pay him for so doing?—But what then? says he.—But I think he would permit you to drive the yoked mules, and, if you were willing, to take the whip and strike them.—Why should he permit me to do this? says he.—Why not? said I. Is no one permitted to strike them?—Yes, said he, the mulâteer, very much so.—Is he a slave, or free-born?—A slave.—It seems, therefore, that your parents think more highly of a slave than of you who are their son, and commit their affairs to him rather than to you, and that they permit him to do what he pleases, but do not give this liberty to you. And farther still, answer me this question, Do they suffer you to govern yourself? or neither do they permit you to do this?—For how, says he, should they permit me? Who then governs you?—The pædagogus, says he.—Does he do this, being a slave?—But what then? he is our slave, says he.—But I replied, Is it not a dire thing for one who is free-born to be governed by a slave? And what does this pædagogus when he governs you do?—He leads me, says he, to my master.—And do not these masters also govern you?—Certainly, entirely so.—Your father, therefore, voluntarily places over you many despots and governors. But when you return home to your mother, does she suffer you to do what you please, that you may be blessed, either about the wool or the web, when she weaves? For she doubtless does not prevent you from touching the two-handed sword, or the shuttle, or any other instrument subservient to the working of wool.—But he laughing replied, By Jupiter, Socrates, she not only prevents me, but beats me if I touch them.—By Hercules, said I, have you in any respect injured your father or your mother?—Not I, by Jupiter, said he.—On what account then do they in so dire a manner prevent you from being happy, and from doing what you please? And why every day do they educate you so as to be in subjection to some one, and, in one word, do not in the least suffer you to gratify

gratify your desires? So that, as it seems, neither are such great riches of any advantage to you (since every one has dominion over them rather than you), nor even your body, though it is so noble, but this also is sed and taken care of by another. But you, O Lyfis, have no authority over any one, nor do you do any thing that you desire to do.—For I am not yet old enough, Socrates, says he.—But see whether it is not this which prevents you, O son of Democrates. For thus much I think both your father and mother will concede to you, and will not wait till you are more advanced in years. I mean, when they wish any thing to be read to or written for them, they will, I think, order you to do this the first in the house, or will they not?—Entirely so, says he.—Are you therefore allowed, in this case, to write which of the letters you please first, and which second? And are you allowed to read in the same manner? And again, when you take up a lyre, does neither your father nor your mother prevent you from stretching and relaxing the chords as much as you please, and from gently touching and striking them with the plectrum? or do they prevent you?—They certainly do not.—What then is the cause, Lyfis, that they do not prevent you in these things, but prevent you in those which we just now mentioned?—Because, I think, says he, I know the one, but am ignorant of the other.—Be it so, I replied, O most excellent youth. Your father, therefore, does not wait for age, to give you permission to do as you please in all things; but on whatever day it shall appear to him that you are become more prudent, on this day he will permit you to govern yourself, and your own affairs.—I think he will, said he.—Be it so, I replied.—But what? Will not a neighbour conduct himself towards you in the same manner as your father? Whether do you think he will commit to you the government of his family, when he is of opinion that you are more skilled in œconomics than himself, or in this case govern it himself?—I think he will commit the government of it to me.—But what with respect to the Athenians? Do you not think that they will commit to you the management of their affairs, when they perceive that you are sufficiently wise?—I do.—But what with respect to the great king? Would he suffer his eldest son, who will succeed to the government of all Asia, to throw into broth whatever he pleases, rather than us, if going to him we should convince him that we were more skilled in the preparation of a banquet than his son?—He replied, It is evident he would rather suffer us.—Is it not also clear that he would not permit

permit his son to throw any thing, however trifling, into the broth, but that he would permit us, if we wished to throw in a quantity of salt, to do so?—Undoubtedly.—But what if his son should be diseased in his eyes? Would he therefore suffer him to meddle with his own eyes, at the same time that he thinks he is not a physician, or would he prohibit him?—He would prohibit him.—But if he considered us as good physicians, I think he would not prevent us, even though we should wish to open his eye-lids and scatter ashes on his eyes.—True.—Would he not, therefore, rather commit to us than to himself or his son every thing else in which we appeared to be more wise than either of them?—He replied, it is necessary, Socrates.—This then, I said, is the case, friend Lysis, that all persons, both Greeks and Barbarians, men and women, will permit us to act as we please with respect to things in which we are skilled, nor will any one voluntarily hinder us from so acting; but in these particulars we shall be free, and the governors of others. And these things will be ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But no one will permit us to act as we please respecting things of which we are ignorant; but all men will hinder us as much as they are able, not only strangers, but our parents, and whatever else may be more allied to us than these. And in these we shall become the servants of others, and they will be things foreign to us, for we shall derive no benefit from them. Do you agree that this will be the case?—I do.—Shall we, therefore, be friends to any one, and will any one love us in those things in which we are useless?—By no means, said he.—Now, therefore, neither your father nor any other person will ever love you, so far as you are useless.—It does not appear he will, said he.—If then you become wise, O boy, all men will be your friends, and will be familiar with you; for in this case you will be useful and good. But if you do not, neither will any other person, nor your father nor mother, nor any of your kindred, be your friend, or be familiar with you. Is it possible, therefore, that any one can think highly of himself with respect to things in which he has not yet acquired any skill?—How can he? said he.—If, therefore, you require a master, you are not yet wise.—True.—And hence you are not magnanimous, if you are yet unwise.—By Jupiter, says he, Socrates, I do not appear to myself to be so.

Upon hearing him say this, I looked at Hippothales, and was very near committing an error; for it occurred to me to say, after this manner, O Hippothales,

pothales, it is requisite to discourse with those of a puerile age, viz. humbling and repressing them, and not, as you do, flattering and rendering them effeminate. But perceiving him anxious and disturbed, on account of what had been said, I recollected that, a little while since, he wished to conceal himself from Lysis; I therefore recovered myself, and was silent. In the mean time Menexenus came again, and seated himself near Lysis, in the place whence he rose before. Lysis, therefore, in a very playful and friendly manner, but without Menexenus observing him, said to me, O Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have told me.—And I replied, You should relate these things yourself to Menexenus, for you have heard me with very great attention.—Entirely so, says he.—Endeavour, therefore, I replied, to recollect these particulars as much as possible, that you may clearly tell him the whole. But if you should happen to forget any one of them, you may again inquire of me the first time that you meet with me.—I will by all means do so, said he, Socrates; of this you may be well assured. But you should say something else to him, that I also may hear, till it is time to return home.—I replied, this must be done, since you command: but see how you will be able to defend me, if Menexenus should endeavour to confute me. Or do you not know that he is contentious?—Very much so, says he, by Jupiter; and on this account I wish to hear you discourse with him.—I replied, Do you desire this, in order that I may become ridiculous?—By Jupiter I do not, said he, but in order that you may punish him.—I replied, This is a thing not easy to accomplish: for he is a skilful man, and the disciple of Ctesippus. And besides, do not you see Ctesippus himself is present?—Be not at all concerned at this, Socrates, said he; but come, discourse with him.—I replied, We will discourse.—As, therefore, we were thus speaking to each other, Ctesippus said, Why are you thus feasting alone, and do not impart your discourse to us?—But indeed, I replied, we shall impart it; for Lysis here does not understand something which I have said, but thinks that Menexenus will understand it, and therefore orders me to interrogate him.—Why then, said he, do you not interrogate him?—I replied, But I will.—Give me an answer, then, Menexenus, to that which I shall ask you; for from my childhood I have had a desire of a certain possession, just as another person may have had of a different thing; for one man desires to possess horses, another dogs, another gold, and another honours; but I was indifferent with respect to these things,

but

but was affected in a very amatory manner with respect to the possession of friends. Hence I was more desirous of finding a good friend than the most excellent quail or cock; and, by Jupiter, I preferred this to the best horse or dog. I likewise think, by the dog, that I should prefer the possession of an associate far beyond the wealth of Darius, or even Darius himself: such a lover of an associate am I. Perceiving, therefore, you and Lysis, I was immediately struck, and proclaimed you happy, because, young as you are, you have so rapidly and easily acquired this possession; you with such celerity having made him so much your friend, and he you. But I am so far from this possession, that I do not even know after what manner one man becomes the friend of another. But in this I wish to be informed by you, who are a skilful person: Tell me, therefore, when any one loves another, which of the two becomes the friend of the other? Whether the lover becomes the friend of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover? Or is there in this case no difference?—It does not appear to me, said he, that there is any difference.—To this I replied, How do you say? Do both therefore become friends of each other, if one alone loves the other?—It appears so to me, said he.—But what? May there not be a lover who is not in his turn beloved by the object of his love?—There may.—Is it not possible, therefore, that a lover may be hated? which lovers sometimes appear to suffer from the objects of their love: for though they most ardently love, they are not beloved in return, but, on the contrary, are sometimes hated. Or does not this appear to you to be true?—Very much so, said he.—In a case of this kind, therefore, I replied, does not the one love, and is not the other beloved?—Yes.—Which, then of these is the friend of the other? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he is loved in return, or hated, or the beloved of the lover? Or in this case, is neither the friend of neither, since a mutual love does not subsist between them?—It appears so.—Now, therefore, the case appears to us to be otherwise than what it appeared to us before. For then it seemed, that if one alone loved, both were friends; but now, that neither is a friend, unless both mutually love.—This appears to be the case.—No one, therefore, is a friend to the object of his love, unless he is beloved in return.—It does not appear that any one is.—Neither, therefore, are those the friends of horses, whom horses do not love in return; nor are those the friends of quails and dogs, of wine and gymnastic, who are not mutually beloved by these; nor are those friends of wisdom, whom wisdom does not love in return:

return: for each of these is a lover without being a friend. The poet therefore speaks falsely who says, "Happy the man that possesses beautiful boys, horses with solid hoofs, hunting dogs, and a foreign guest." Does he appear to you to speak the truth?—Yes.—The beloved, therefore, is the friend of the lover, as it seems, O Menexenus, whether he loves or whether he hates; just as children recently born, partly do not yet love, and partly hate when they are chastized by their mother or father; and at the very time in which they hate, they are in the highest degree beloved by their parents.—It appears to me, said he, that this is the case.—The lover, therefore, from this reasoning, will not be the friend, but the beloved.—It appears so.—Hence too, he who is hated is an enemy, but not he who hates.—So it appears.—Many, therefore, are beloved by their enemies and hated by their friends; and are friends to their enemies, but enemies to their friends; if the beloved is a friend, and not the lover. Though it is very absurd, my friend, or rather, I think, impossible, to be an enemy to a friend, and a friend to an enemy.—You seem, said he, to speak the truth, Socrates.—If, therefore, this is impossible, the lover will be the friend of the beloved.—So it appears.—Again, therefore, he who hates will be the enemy of him who is hated.—It is necessary.—It happens, therefore, that it is necessary for us to acknowledge the same things as we assented to before, that a man is often the friend of one who is not his friend, and that he is often the friend of his enemy, when either he loves and is not beloved, or loves one by whom he is hated. It likewise often happens that a man is an enemy to one who is not his enemy, or even to one who is his friend; when any one loves him by whom he is hated, or hates him by whom he is loved.—So it appears, said he.—I replied, What then shall we say, if neither lovers, nor those that are beloved, are friends, nor yet lovers and the beloved? Shall we say that certain others besides these become friends to each other?—By Jupiter, said he, Socrates, I do not well know what to reply.—Consider, therefore, Menexenus, whether our investigation has been perfectly right.—Lysis replied, To me it appears so, Socrates; and at the same time that he said this he blushed: for he appeared to me unwilling to avoid what was said, through the very great attention which he paid to the discourse. I, therefore, being willing that Menexenus should cease from speaking, and being delighted with his philosophy, thus transferred my discourse to Lysis,

Lyfis, and said, O Lyfis, what you have asserted appears to me to be true; I mean that if we have rightly considered, we shall not in any respect have wandered from the truth. But we will proceed no further in this way: for that consideration appears to me to be difficult like a rough road. But it seems to me requisite to proceed in the path in which we have now entered, speculating the assertions of the poets: for these are, with respect to us, as the fathers and leaders of wisdom. They say, therefore, not badly, with reference to such as are friends, that divinity makes them to be friends, by conducting them to each other. But I think they thus speak:

Likeness to likeness, God for ever leads,
And makes it known.

Or have you not met with these verses?—I have, said he.—Have you, therefore, likewise met with the writings of the wisest of men, in which it is said, that the similar is always necessarily a friend to the similar? But these men are those that discourse and write about nature and the universe.—He replied, What you say is true.—Whether or no, therefore, do they speak well?—Perhaps so, said he.—I replied, Perhaps the half of this is true, and perhaps also the whole. But we do not understand them: for it seems to us, that by how much nearer a depraved man approaches to one depraved, and by how much the more frequently he converses with him, by so much the more inimical will he become: for he will act unjustly. But it is impossible that those can be friends who injure, and are injured. Is it not so?—He replied, It is.—On this account, the half of this saying will not be true, since the depraved are similar to each other.—True.—But they appear to me to say, that the good are similar and friends to each other; but that the wicked, (as it is said concerning them,) are never similar, not even to themselves, but are stupid and unstable. But he who is dissimilar to, and differs from himself, can never be similar to, or become the friend of another. Or does it not appear so to you?—To me it does, he said.—It seems to me, therefore, my friend, that those who say the similar is a friend to the similar, obscurely signify this, that he alone who is good, is a friend to the good, but that he who is wicked can never arrive at true friendship, either with the good or

the wicked. Does this also appear to you to be the case?—It does.—We now, therefore, have those that are friends: for our discourse now signifies to us, that those are friends that are worthy.—It appears entirely so to me, said he.—And to me also, I replied. But, notwithstanding this, there is something difficult in the affair. Come then, by Jupiter, and see what I suspect to be the case. He who is similar, so far as he is similar, is a friend to the similar, and such a one is useful to such a one. Or rather thus: Is any kind of the similar, of any advantage to any kind of the similar? Or is it able to do any injury to the similar, which it does not do to itself? Or to suffer any thing which it does not also suffer from itself? But how can such things as these, which are not able to afford any assistance to each other, be loved by each other?—They cannot.—But how can he who does not love be a friend?—By no means.—But perhaps the similar is not a friend to the similar; but the good is a friend to the good, so far as he is good, and not so far as he is similar.—Perhaps so.—But what? Is not he who is good, so far as he is good, sufficient to himself?—Yes.—But he who is sufficient to himself, is not indigent of any thing, so far as he possesses sufficiency.—Undoubtedly.—And he who is not indigent of any thing, will not love any thing.—He will not.—But he who does not love, will not be a friend.—Certainly not.—How then will the good be friends to the good, who neither when absent desire each other (for they are sufficient to themselves when apart), nor when present are indigent of each other? By what artifice can these possess a great esteem for each other?—By none, said he.—But those will not be friends who do not very much esteem each other.—True.—Consider then, O Lysis, in what respect we are deceived. Are we therefore deceived in a certain whole?—But how? said he.—I once heard a person assert, and I now very well remember it, that the similar was hostile to the similar, and the good to the good. And he who asserted this, produced Hesiod¹ as a witness, who says, “The potter is hostile to the potter, the singer to the singer, and the mendicant to the mendicant.” And it appeared to him that all other things necessarily subsist in this manner; and that things most similar to each other, were in the highest degree filled with envy, emulation, and hatred; but such as are most dissimilar with friendship. For he

¹ Op. et Di. v. 25.

was of opinion that the poor man was necessarily a friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of help: that in like manner the sick man was a friend to the physician; and that every one who was ignorant, loved and was a friend to the man endued with knowledge. He likewise added something still more magnificent, that the similar is so far from being a friend to the similar, that the very contrary to this takes place. For that which is most contrary, is especially a friend to that which is most contrary. For every thing desires a nature of this kind, but not that which is similar. Thus the dry desires the moist; the cold, the hot; the bitter, the sweet; the acute, the obtuse; the void, the full; and the full, the void; and the like takes place in other things. For the contrary is aliment to the contrary, but the similar does not in any respect enjoy the similar. And indeed, my friend, he who asserted these things appeared to be an elegant man: for he spoke well. But how does he appear to us to have spoken?—Well, Menexenus replied, as it seems on the first view.—Shall we say, therefore, that the contrary is especially a friend to the contrary?—Entirely so.—Be it so, I replied, O Menexenus: but is not this prodigious? And will not those all-wise men, who are skilled in contradicting, gladly rise up against us immediately, and ask, if friendship is not most contrary to hatred? What shall we say, in answer to them? Is it not necessary to acknowledge that their assertion is true?—It is necessary.—Will they therefore say, that an enemy is a friend to a friend, or that a friend is a friend to an enemy?—He replied, they will say neither of these things.—But is the just a friend to the unjust, or the temperate to the intemperate, or the good to the bad?—It does not appear to me that this is the case.—But, I replied, if any one is a friend to any one, according to contrariety, it is necessary that these also should be friends.—It is necessary.—Neither, therefore, is the similar a friend to the similar, nor that which is contrary to that which is contrary.—It does not appear that it is.—Further still, let us also consider this, lest we should be still more deceived; I mean that a friend in reality is none of these, but that what is neither good nor evil may sometimes become the friend of the good.—How do you say? he replied.—By Jupiter, said I, I do not know; for I am in reality staggered by the ambiguity of the discourse. And it appears, according to the ancient proverb, that a friend is a beautiful thing. It

resembles,

resemble, however, something soft, smooth, and fat; on which account perhaps it easily eludes us, and glides away, as being a thing of this kind. For I say that the good is beautiful. Do you not think so?—I do.—I say therefore, prophesying, that that which is neither good nor evil, is the friend of the beautiful and the good. But hear what it is that induces me thus to prophesy. There appear to me to be three certain genera of things, the good, the evil, and that which is neither good nor evil. But how does it appear to you?—The same, said he; and that neither the good is a friend to the good, nor the evil to the evil, nor the good to the evil; as neither did our former discourse suffer us to say.—It remains, therefore, if any thing is a friend to another, that that which is neither good nor evil, must be a friend either to the good, or to something which resembles itself. For nothing can become a friend to the evil.—True.—And we just now said, that neither is the similar a friend to the similar. Did we not?—Yes.—Hence to that which is neither good nor evil, that will not be a friend, which is itself neither good nor evil.—It does not appear that it will.—That which is neither good nor evil, therefore, alone happens to become a friend to the good alone.—It is necessary, as it seems.—Is therefore that which we have now said, I replied, O boys, well explained? If then we wish to understand, a healthy body has not any occasion for the medicinal art, nor does it require any assistance: for it possesses sufficiency. So that no healthy person is a friend to the physician through health. Or is he?—No one.—But the diseased, I think, is a friend to the physician through disease.—Undoubtedly.—But disease is an evil; and the medicinal art is useful and good.—It is.—But the body, so far as body, is neither good nor bad.—True.—But through disease, the body is compelled to embrace and love the medicinal art.—It appears so to me.—That, therefore, which is neither evil nor good, becomes a friend to the good, through the presence of evil.—So it seems.—But it is evident that it becomes a friend to the good, prior to its becoming evil through the evil which it possesses. For it does not become evil, instead of the good which it desires, and of which it is the friend. For we have said it is impossible, that the evil can be a friend to the good.—It is impossible.—But consider what I say. For I say that some things are such as that which is present to them; but that this is not the case with other things. Thus, if any one wishes to
be

be anointed with a certain colour, the inunction is after a manner present to him who is anointed.—Entirely so.—Whether therefore, after being anointed with the colour, does he remain the same as he was before?—He replied, I do not understand you.—Consider thus, then I said. If any one should besmear your hairs which are yellow with white lead, would they then be white, or only appear to be so?—He replied, They would only appear to be so.—But whiteness would be present with them.—It would.—And yet at the same time your hairs would not be in any respect more white than they were before; but though whiteness is present, they will neither be white nor black.—True.—But when, my friend, old age causes them to be of this colour, then they will become such as the colour which is present to them, viz. white through the presence of whiteness.—Undoubtedly.—This then is what I now ask, Whether that to which any thing is present, is, by possession, such as the thing which is present? Or whether this is the case, if the thing is present after a certain manner, but otherwise not?—Thus, rather, he replied.—In like manner, that which is neither evil nor good, sometimes when evil is present, is not yet evil; but there is a time when it becomes so.—Entirely so.—When, therefore, it is not yet evil, though evil is present, this very presence of evil causes it to desire good; but this presence which causes it to be evil, deprives it of the desire, and at the same time friendship of good. For it is now no longer neither evil nor good, but is evil. But it was shown that the good is not a friend to the evil.—It is not.—Hence we must say, that those who are wise must no longer philosophize¹, whether they are gods or men; nor again, those who are so ignorant, that they are vicious. For no one who is vicious and void of discipline can philosophize. Those therefore remain, who possess indeed this evil, ignorance, but are not yet stupid and void of all discipline, but who yet think they do not know those things of which they are ignorant. On which account, in a certain respect, those that are neither good, nor bad, philosophize: for such as are bad do not philosophize, nor such as are good. For it has appeared to us, that neither is the contrary a friend to the contrary, nor the similar to the similar. Or do you not remember that this

¹ For philosophy, as is shown in the speech of Diotima in the Banquet, is a medium between wisdom and ignorance.

was asserted by us above?—He replied, I perfectly remember.—Have we not therefore, O Lysis and Menexenus, more than any thing discovered what is a friend, and what is not? For we have said, that both according to the soul, and according to the body, and every where, that which is neither evil nor good, is a friend to the good through the presence of evil.—They in every respect admitted that these things were so. And I indeed was very glad, like a hunter having gladly obtained that of which I was in search. But afterwards, I know not how, a most absurd suspicion came into my mind, that the things which we had asserted to were not true. And being immediately uneasy on this account, I said, It is strange, Lysis and Menexenus, but we seem to be enriched with a dream.—Why so? said Menexenus.—I am afraid, I replied, lest we have met with false assertions, as with arrogant men, in our inquiry about friendship.—How? he replied.—To which I answered, let us consider thus. Is he who is a friend, a friend to any one or not?—Necessarily so, said he.—Whether, therefore, is he a friend for the sake of nothing, and through nothing, or for the sake of something, and through something?—The latter.—Is that thing then a friend, for the sake of which a friend is a friend to a friend, or is it neither a friend nor an enemy?—He replied, I do not perfectly apprehend you.—It is likely, I said. But thus perhaps you will follow me; and I think that I also shall better understand what I say. We have just now said that the sick is a friend to the physician. Did we not?—Yes.—Is he not therefore through disease, and for the sake of health, a friend to the physician?—Yes.—And is not disease an evil?—Undoubtedly.—But what of health? I replied. Is it good or evil, or neither?—It is good, said he.—We have therefore said, as it seems, that the body is neither good, nor bad, through disease; but that through disease it is a friend to the medicinal art. We have likewise asserted that the medicinal art is good; but that it obtains friendship for the sake of health: and that health is good. Is it not?—Yes.—But is health a friend, or not a friend?—A friend.—And is not disease an enemy?—Entirely so.—Hence that which is neither evil nor good, through evil and an enemy, is the friend of good, for the sake of good and a friend.—It appears so.—A friend therefore is a friend for the sake of a friend, through an enemy.—So it seems.—Be it so, I replied. But since, O boys, we have arrived thus far, let us diligently attend

attend lest we should be deceived. For we shall bid farewell to the assertion, that a friend becomes the friend of a friend, and that the similar is a friend to the similar; for this we have said is impossible. But at the same time, let us consider as follows, lest what is now asserted should deceive us. Do we not say, that the medicinal art is a friend for the sake of health?—Yes.—And therefore that health is a friend?—Entirely so.—If then it is a friend, it is for the sake of something.—It is.—But it is the friend of something, from what we have asserted to before.—Entirely so.—Will not therefore that again be a friend, for the sake of a friend?—Yes.—Is it not therefore necessary that thus proceeding, we should reject what we have said, and arrive at a certain principle, which is not referred to another friend, but brings us to that which is the first friend, and for the sake of which we say all other things are friends?—It is necessary.—This then is what I say, that we should be cautious lest we are deceived by all those other particulars which we assert to be friends for the sake of the first friend, and which are as it were certain images of it; while, in the mean time, this first friend is truly a friend. For we should thus consider: That which any one very much esteems, (as, for instance, a father sometimes his son,) he honours before all other things. But a man of this kind, on account of thus highly esteeming his son, will also, on his account, highly esteem something else. Thus, for instance, if he perceives that he drinks hemlock, he will very much esteem wine, because he thinks that this will save his son. Or will he not?—Undoubtedly, he replied.—Will he not therefore also highly value the vessel which contains the wine?—Entirely so.—But will he then no less esteem the earthen cup, or three cups of wine, than his son? Or is the case thus? The whole of the endeavour, in an affair of this kind, does not regard those things which are procured for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which all such things are procured. Nor is the assertion which we frequently make true, that we very much esteem gold and silver; but in this case, that which we highly esteem, is that for the sake of which gold, and all other preparatives, are procured. Shall we not say so?—By all means.—The same thing therefore may be said respecting a friend: for such things as we say are friends to us, when they subsist for the sake of a friend, we improperly denominate. But that appears to be a friend in reality,

reality, in which all those that are called friendships end.—This, said he, seems to be the case.—Hence that which is in reality a friend, is not a friend, for the sake of a certain friend.—True.—The assertion therefore is to be rejected, that a friend is a friend, for the sake of a certain friend. But is a friend, therefore, a good thing?—It appears so to me.—Is the good then beloved though evil? And is the case thus? Since the things of which we now speak are three, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, if two of these are received, but evil entirely departs, and has not any connection either with body, or soul, or any thing else, which we say is in itself neither good nor evil, in this case will good be perfectly useless to us? For if nothing any longer injures us, we shall not be indigent of any assistance whatever. And thus it will then become manifest that we have sought after, and loved good on account of evil; good being the medicine of evil; but evil being a disease. But when there is no disease, there will be no occasion for medicine. Does good thus naturally subsist, and is it thus beloved, on account of evil, by us who are situated between evil and good? And is it of no use itself, for its own sake?—He replied, It seems to subsist in this manner.—That friend, therefore, in which all other things end, which we say are friends for the sake of another friend, is not in any respect similar to these. For these are called friends for the sake of a friend; but that which is in reality a friend, appears to be naturally in every respect contrary to this: for we have seen that this is a friend for the sake of an enemy. But if an enemy should be present, it would no longer as it seems be a friend to us.—He replied, It does not appear to me that it would, as it is now said.—But, by Jupiter, said I, if evil should be extirpated, would there no longer be any hunger or thirst, or any thing else of the like kind? Or would there be hunger, but yet not noxious, since there would be men and other animals? and thirst, and other appetites, but without being evil, in consequence of evil being abolished? Or shall we say that the inquiry is ridiculous, what would then be, or would not be? For who knows? This however we know, that at present it is possible to be injured by being hungry, and it is also possible to be benefited. Or is it not?—Entirely so.—Does it not therefore follow, that when we are hungry, or desire the gratification of any other appetite, our desire may be sometimes beneficial, and sometimes noxious, and sometimes

times

times neither?—Very much so.—If, therefore, evils were destroyed, what would be the advantage, if things which are not evil, were destroyed together with such as are evil?—There would be none.—There would be appetites, therefore, which are neither good nor evil, even if evils were destroyed.—It appears so.—Is it therefore possible, that he who desires and loves any thing, should not be the friend of that which he desires and loves?—It does not appear to me that it is.—When evils therefore are destroyed, certain friendly persons, as it seems, will still remain.—They will.—But if evil were the cause of friendship, no one would be a friend to another, when evil is destroyed. For the cause being taken away, that of which it was the cause can no longer have an existence.—Right.—Was it not therefore acknowledged by us, that a friend loved something, and on account of something? And did we not then think, that through evil, that which is neither good nor evil loves good?—True.—But now, as it seems, something else appears to be the cause of loving and being beloved.—So it seems.—Is then, in reality, desire, as we said, the cause of friendship? And is that which desires, the friend of that which it desires, and then, when it desires? And is he whom we before asserted to be a friend, a mere trifle, like a very prolix poem?—It appears so, said he.—But, I replied, he who desires, desires that of which he is indigent. Or does he not?—Yes.—Is not then that which is indigent, the friend of that of which it is indigent?—It appears so to me.—But every one becomes indigent of that of which he is deprived.—Undoubtedly.—Hence, as it seems, love, friendship, and desire, respect that which is domestic and allied to them. This appears to be the case, O Menexenus and Lysis.—They admitted it was so.—You, therefore, if you were friends to each other, would be naturally mutually allied. They replied, And very much so.—And hence, I said, if any one person desires or loves another, O boys, he can never either desire, or love, or be a friend, unless he is allied to the object of his love, either according to his soul, or a certain custom of his soul, or according to manners, or according to species.—Menexenus said, Entirely so; but Lysis was silent.—But I replied, It appears to be necessary for us, to love that which is naturally allied to us.—It seems so, he said.—It is necessary therefore, that he who is a genuine, and not a pretended

pretended lover, should be beloved by the objects of his love.—To this Lysis and Menexenus scarcely assented: but Hippothales, through the pleasure which he experienced, exhibited all-various colours. And I being willing to consider the assertion, said, If that which is domestic and allied differs from that which is similar, we have declared, as it appears to me, O Lysis and Menexenus, what a friend is: but if the similar and the allied are the same, it is not easy to reject the former assertion, that the similar is not useless to the similar, according to similitude; but to acknowledge that a friend is useless, is inelegant. Are you willing therefore, I added, since we are as it were intoxicated by discourse, that we should grant and say that the allied is something different from the similar?—Entirely so.—Whether, therefore, shall we admit that good is allied, but evil foreign to every one? Or shall we say that evil is allied to evil, but good to good? and that a thing which is neither good nor evil, is allied to that which is neither good nor evil?—Each of these appeared to us to be allied to each.—Again therefore I said, O boys, we have fallen upon those assertions which we first made respecting friendship. For an unjust man will be no less a friend to the unjust, and the vicious to the vicious, than the good to the good.—So it seems, he said.—But what? if we should say the good and the allied are the same, will any thing else follow, than that the good alone is a friend to the good?—Nothing else.—But this assertion also we thought was confuted by us. Or do you not remember?—We do remember.—What further then can we employ in our discourse?—It is evident nothing further.—Like wise men, therefore, in courts of justice, we ought to repeat all that has been said: for if neither those that are beloved, nor lovers, nor the similar, nor the dissimilar, nor the good, nor the allied, nor any other such particulars as we have discussed, (for I do not remember any further, on account of their multitude),—if then no one of these is a friend, I have not any thing more to say. When I had thus said, intending afterwards to excite some one who was more advanced in years, the pædagogues of Lysis and Menexenus approaching like certain demons, together with the brothers of these two, called to them, and ordered them to return home: for it was then late. At first, therefore, both we, and those that surrounded us, drove them away: but they paid no attention to us,

but

but speaking in a barbaric manner were indignant and continued no less calling to the boys. Being vanquished therefore by their importunity, and it appearing to us, that as they had been subdued in the Mercurial feast, they would not have any thing else to offer, we dissolved the conference. At the same time, after they had departed, I said to Lyfis and Menexenus, We are become ridiculous, I who am an old man, and you who are boys. For they, now they have left us, will say, that we think ourselves to be friends to each other (for I rank myself among you), though at the same time we have not yet been able to find what a friend is.

THE END OF THE LYSIS.

THE CHARMIDES:

A DIALOGUE

ON

TEMPERANCE.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CHARMIDES.

TWO things are to be noted in the exordium of this Dialogue, which transfer love from corporeal to incorporeal form. First, the assertion of Socrates, that nearly all young men appear to him to be beautiful; which is as if he had said that he did not stop at the form of one body, but ascended to the common beauty of the whole species. As therefore we ascend from the beauty of an individual, to that which is common to the species, and from this to that beauty which is uncoordinated with the many, and is an incorporeal form subsisting by itself; so by what is here said we are admonished to pass from the love of an individual form, to the love of that which is common, and from this to the love of ideal form, subsisting in intellect as its native seat. The second thing which deserves to be noted is, that Socrates orders the soul of Charmides to be exposed naked to the view, and that neglecting the form of the body we should behold the natural beauty of the soul, and diligently endeavour to obtain it when it is found to be wanting. Nor is it without reason that the exhortation to temperance begins from the beauty of body: for this is nothing more than a symphony and consent of the organical parts, which corresponds to temperance in the soul.

Plato in the Cratylus explains the name of temperance, as signifying a certain safety and preservation of prudence. For he considered all truth as naturally inherent in the soul; and that, in consequence of this, the soul by profoundly looking into herself will discover every truth. She is however impeded from this conversion to herself, by an immoderate love of body and corporeal natures. Hence temperance is in the first place necessary, by which the darkness of perturbations being expelled, the intellect becomes more serene, and is abundantly irradiated with the splendors of divinity.

But

But as Socrates intends to discourse about temperance, he admonishes Charmides to look into himself. For a conversion of the soul into herself is the business of this virtue. And it is said in the *Timæus* that all our affairs become prosperous, from the soul being in harmony with herself, and in *concord with respect to the body*. The Pythagoreans also assert, that if the soul prudently governs not only her own motions, but those of the body, length of life will be the portion of the latter, and perpetual health of both. To this Socrates adds, as still more wonderful, that the Magi promise by their verses immortality to bodies: and we learn from Plato, in the first Alcibiades, that the magic of Zoroaster was nothing else than the worship of divinity. Socrates however observes, that the soul and body are not only preserved from death by magical verses, but likewise by philosophic reasonings and temperance. Again, as that discourse, which is calculated to persuade its auditors to temperance, requires power imparted by divinity, and reasonings produced by philosophy, Plato calls such a discourse a magical incantation.

In the next place, Socrates often inquires what temperance is, which, neither Charmides nor Critias accurately defines. For the one adduces, that which is not properly temperance, but its attendant, and the other, that which rather belongs to prudence. Hence the latter defines temperance to be a certain science, which both knows itself and all other sciences, but is ignorant of the things themselves which are the objects of science. This however is false, because the truth of science consists in a certain congruity and contact of that, which knows with that which is known. Besides, science cannot be perfectly known, unless it is perceived what science is, and this cannot be obtained without a knowledge of its object. But as Critias brings the discourse on temperance to prudence, Socrates asserts that prudence, or the science of good and evil, obtains the highest authority with respect to beatitude, as well because it demonstrates the most excellent end, and the media which lead to it, as because all arts and pursuits, so far as they are governed by it, contribute to our advantage, but end in our detriment when it is neglected. In the last place, Socrates teaches us that nothing can with more difficulty be defined, or procured, than temperance. It is most difficult to define, because it is so intimately combined with the other virtues, of which it is a certain consonance; and it cannot be obtained
without

without great difficulty, because from our union with body we are prone to intemperance, and from our infancy drink deep of the envenomed cup of pleasure.

For the benefit of the Platonic reader, as this Dialogue is pirastic, I shall conclude this Introduction with the following admirable observations from Jamblichus¹, in which the nature of temperance is beautifully unfolded. "Every virtue despises that which is mortal, and embraces that which is immortal; but this in a very remarkable degree is the endeavour of temperance, as despising those pleasures which fasten the soul to the body as by a nail, and establishing itself, as Plato says, on holy foundations. For how is it possible that temperance should not make us perfect, since it exterminates from us the imperfect and the passive? But you may know that this is the case by attending to the fable of Bellerophon, who, contending in conjunction with *moderation*, destroyed Chimæra, and every beastly, wild, and savage tribe. For, in short, the immoderate dominion of the passions does not suffer men to be men, but draws them down to that which is irrational, beastly, and disordered. But that excellent order, which confines the pleasures within definite measures, preserves families, and preserves cities according to the assertion of Crates: and further still, it also in a certain respect approximates to the form of the gods. Perseus therefore, riding to the highest good of temperance, with Minerva for his leader, cut off the head of Gorgon, which appears to me to be desire drawing men down to matter, and turning them into stone, through a repletion of stupid passions. Continence of pleasure therefore, as Socrates says, is the foundation of virtue; and temperance appears to be the ornament of all the virtues, as Plato also asserts. And, as I say, this virtue is the fortification of the most beautiful habits. Hence, I shall with confidence strenuously assert, as a thing truly acknowledged, that the beauty of temperance extends through all the virtues, that it coharmonizes them according to one harmony, and that it inserts in them symmetry and mixture with each other. Such then being the nature of temperance, it affords an opportunity to the implanting of the other virtues, and when they are implanted, imparts to them stable security."

¹ Stobæi Eclog. p. 68.

THE CHARMIDES.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES,
CHÆREPHO,

||

CRITIAS, and
CHARMIDES,

YESTERDAY, when I came in the evening from the army, I gladly returned to my accustomed exercise, in consequence of having been for some time absent from it; and entered into the Palæstra of Taurean Neptune, which is opposite to the royal temple. Here I met with very many persons, some of whom were unknown to me, but the greater part of them I knew. And as soon as I was seen entering thus unexpectedly, some from all quarters immediately congratulated me at a distance. But Chærepho, as if he had been insane, leaping from the midst of them, ran towards me, and taking me by the hand, O Socrates, says he, how were you saved in the engagement? For a short time before we came away there was a battle at Potidæa, of which those that are here just now heard.—And I answering them, said, It is as you see.—Indeed, said he, a report was spread here, that a very sharp engagement had taken place, and that many of those that we know had perished in it.—I replied, You were told the truth.—But, said he, was you in the engagement?—I was.—Sit down here, said he, and relate the affair to us; for we have not yet clearly heard the whole. And at the same time leading me along, he seated me near Critias the son of Callæschrus. Being therefore seated, I saluted Critias, and the rest, and according as any one asked me, related the affairs of the army. But some asked me one thing, and others another. And when we had had enough of things of this kind, I again asked them respecting philosophy, how it was circumstanced
at

at present ; and whether there were any young men who were remarkable for wisdom, or beauty, or both. Critias then, looking towards the gate, and perceiving certain young men entering and reviling each other, and another crowd following behind them, said, It appears to me, Socrates, that you will immediately have an answer to your question respecting beautiful youths. For those that are now entering, are forerunners and lovers of one who seems to be the most beautiful of all of the present time. And it appears to me that he is now nearly entering.—But who is he ? I replied ; and of whom is he the son ?—Perhaps you know, said he, (but he was very young when you left this place ;) I say, perhaps you know Charmides, the son of our uncle Glauco, but my cousin.—I know him indeed, by Jupiter, I replied, for he was not then to be despised, though he was but a boy, but now I think he must be almost a young man.—You will immediately know, said he, both his age, and the qualities which he has acquired. And at the same time that he was thus speaking, Charmides entered.—No consideration therefore, my friend, is to be paid to me. For I am indeed a *white rule*¹ with respect to those that are beautiful ; since nearly all young men appear to me to be beautiful. But he then appeared to me to be wonderful, both on account of the magnitude and the beauty of his body : and all the rest seemed to me to be in love with him ; so astonished and so disturbed were they, when he entered. Many other lovers also followed among those that were behind him. And as to the men indeed, this was less wonderful : but I also paid attention to the boys, and saw that none of these beheld any one else than him, not even the smallest among them, but the eyes of all were fixed on him, as on a statue. And Chærepho calling me, said, What do you think of the youth, Socrates ? Is he not a beautiful person ?—I replied, transcendently so.—But, said he, if he were willing to show himself naked, he would appear to you to have a deformed face, his form is so very beautiful. And this assertion of Chærepho was confirmed by all the rest.—I then said, By Hercules, you speak of an unconquerable man, if only one small thing further belongs to

¹ The expression a *white rule*, says the Greek Scholiast on Plato, is applied to those who signify things immanifest, by such as are immanifest, and in so doing indicate nothing. For a white rule can indicate nothing in white stones (*with respect to whiteness*), as a rule can which is of a red colour.

him.—What is that? said Critias.—I replied, If his soul is naturally in a good condition. It is however proper, Critias, that it should be so, as being one of your family.—But, he replied, he is also very beautiful and good in this respect.—Why then, I said, do we not expose *this* naked to the view, and contemplate it prior to his form? For since he is thus inwardly beautiful, he will in every respect be willing to discourse.—Very much so, said Critias; since he is a philosopher, and (as it appears both to others and himself) very poetic.—I replied, This beauty, friend Critias, descends to you remotely, through your alliance to Solon. But why do you not call the youth hither, and present him to me? For it would not disgrace us to discourse with him, even if he were younger than he is, while you are present, who are his cousin and tutor.—You speak well, said he; and we will call him. And at the same time turning to the person that followed him; Call, says he, Charmides, and tell him that I wish to commit him to the care of a physician, on account of the infirmity of which he has lately complained.—Critias therefore said to me, Charmides lately has complained of a heaviness in his head when he rose in the morning. What then should hinder you from pretending to him, that you know a remedy for this disorder of the head?—Nothing, I replied; let him only come.—But he does come, said he. Which was indeed the case: for he came, and caused much laughter. For each of us that were seated together, through eagerness to sit near Charmides, pushed his neighbour; till of those that were seated last of all, some we forced to rise up, and others to fall on the ground. But he came and sat between me and Critias. And I then said, My friend, I am now perplexed, and the confidence which I before had, that I should easily discourse with Charmides, fails me. But when Critias had told him, that I was the person who knew a remedy for his disease, he fixed his eyes upon me as something prodigious, and drew near as if he meant to ask me a question. Then all that were in the Palæstra immediately gathered round us; and when, O generous man, I saw the beauty of his form within his garments, I was inflamed with the view, and was no longer myself. I likewise thought that Critias was most wise in amatory affairs, who said, when speaking of a beautiful boy, but employing the similitude of something else, that I should be cautious lest a fawn coming opposite to the lion, a portion of the flesh should be
taken

taken away: for he appeared to me to have been captured by an animal of this kind. But at the same time, when Charmides asked me, if I knew a remedy for the head, I scarcely knew what to answer. What is it? said he.—I replied that it was a certain leaf, but that a certain incantation must be added to the medicine, which if any one employed together with the leaf, the medicine could perfectly restore him to health; but that the leaf would be of no use without the incantation.—He then said, I will write down this incantation from you.—I replied, Will you do this, whether you are persuaded by me or not?—Upon this, he said laughing, I will, if I am persuaded by you, Socrates.—Be it so, I replied. And do you also accurately know my name?—I do, unless I am unjust, said he. For there is no small talk about you, among those of my age: and I can remember that you associated with Critias when I was a boy.—You say well, I replied. For I shall now tell you, with greater freedom of speech, what the incantation is. But, just now, I was doubtful, after what manner I should show you its power. For this incantation is such, O Charmides, that it is not able to make the head alone well; just perhaps as you have often heard good physicians assert, when any one comes to them with diseased eyes: for then they say, that they must not attempt to cure the eyes alone, but that it is necessary for them at the same time to cure the head¹, if they design to render the eyes in a good condition. And again, that it would be very stupid to think to cure the head itself without the whole body. In consequence of this reasoning, they turn their attention to the regimen of the whole body, and endeavour to cure the part in conjunction with the whole. Or have you not heard that they thus speak, and that this is the case?—Entirely so, he replied.—Does it therefore appear to you that they speak well; and do you admit this doctrine?—The most of all things, said he.—And I, on hearing him praise this method of cure, took courage, and my confidence again was a little excited and revived: and I said, Such, therefore, O Charmides, is the power of this incantation. But I learnt it there, in the army, from one of the Thracian physicians of Zamolxis², who are said to render men immortal. This Thracian

¹ Viz. Not only the head, but the whole body must be cured, when the eyes are diseased from an internal cause.

² A slave and disciple of Pythagoras,

too said, "The Grecian physicians beautifully assert the same things as I now assert. But Zamolxis, said he, our king, being a god, says, that as it is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body, so neither is it proper to cure the body without the soul: and that the reason why many diseases are unknown to the Grecian physicians is, because they are ignorant of the whole, to which attention ought to be paid. For when this is not well disposed, it is impossible that a part should be well affected. For all things, said he, originate from the soul, both such as are good and such as are evil, and emanate from thence into the body, and the whole man, just as things flow from the head to the eyes. It is requisite therefore that the maladies of this should in the first place and especially be healed, in order that the head and the whole body may be well affected." But he said, O blessed youth, "that the soul was cured of its maladies by certain incantations; and that these incantations were beautiful reasons, from which temperance was generated in souls." He further added, "that when this was inserted and present, it was easy to impart health, both to the head and the rest of the body." Having therefore taught me the medicine, and the incantations, "Let none, said he, persuade you to cure the head of any one with this medicine, who has not first presented his soul to be cured by you with the incantation. For the fault, said he, of the present time, respecting men, is this, that certain persons endeavour to become physicians without a knowledge of temperance and health." And he very earnestly ordered me to take care, that neither any rich, or noble, or beautiful person, ever persuaded me to do otherwise. I therefore declared to him, with an oath, that I would not; and hence it is necessary I should obey him, which I am determined to do. And indeed, if you are willing, according to the mandate of the stranger, to present your soul first of all to be enchanted by the incantations of the Thracian, I will administer the medicine to your head; but if not, I cannot in any respect benefit you, O friend Charmides.--Critias therefore hearing me thus speak, said, This heaviness of the head, O Socrates, will be gain to the youth, if he should be compelled to become better in his dianoëtic part through his head. I can indeed assure you, that Charmides not only surpasses all his equals in the form of his
body

body, but in this very thing for which you say you have an incantation. But you say this is temperance. Or do you not?—Entirely so, I replied.—Know then, said he, that Charmides appears to be by far the most temperate of those that exist at present; and that, as far as his age permits, he is not inferior to any one in every thing else.—And I replied, It is but just, O Charmides, that you should excel all others in all such things as these. For I do not think that any one now present can easily show two families among the Athenians, from a conjunction between which by marriage, a beautiful and excellent offspring is so likely to be produced, as from those that were your progenitors. For the paternal family of Critias, here, the son of Diopis, is celebrated by Anacreon, and Solon, and many other poets, as excelling in beauty, virtue, and the rest of what is called felicity. And again, there is the same renown on his mother's side: for no one of those that dwell on the continent is said to surpass in beauty and grandeur your uncle Pyrilampes, as often as he goes in the character of ambassador to the great king, or to some other inhabitant of the continent. But the whole of his family is in nothing inferior to any other. It is likely, therefore, that, being the offspring of such characters, you should be the first in all things. Hence, O beloved son of Glauco, with respect to your visible form, you appear to me to disgrace no one of your progenitors: and, if you are naturally endued with all that is sufficient to the possession of temperance, and the other virtues, according to the assertion of Critias here, your mother, O dear Charmides, brought you forth blessed. The case, then, is this: If temperance is present with you, as Critias says it is, and if you are sufficiently temperate, you will no longer require the incantations, either of Zamolxis, or the Hyperborean Abaris¹, but the medicine for the head should be immediately administered you. But if you are in any respect indigent of this, the incantation must precede the medicine. Inform me therefore, whether you assent to Critias, and affirm that you sufficiently participate of temperance, or whether you are deficient in this respect.—Charmides therefore blushing, in the first place appeared to be still more beautiful (for bashfulness becomes his age); and in the next place he

¹ A Scythian in the time of the Trojan war, who is fabled to have received a flying arrow from Apollo, with which he gave oracles, and transported himself wherever he pleased.

answered:

answered me not ignobly. For he said, It is not easy either to admit or reject the subjects of the present investigation: for, said he, if I should affirm that I am not temperate, it would be absurd that I should assert such a thing of myself, and at the same time I should evince that Critias has spoken falsely, and many others to whom I appear to be temperate. But again, if I should affirm that I am temperate, by thus praising myself, I shall perhaps give offence: so that I do not know how to answer you.—To this I replied, You appear to me, O Charmides, to speak well: and I think we should consider in common whether you possess that which I inquire after, or not; that you may neither be compelled to speak contrary to your will, nor I may again inconsiderately turn myself to the medicinal art. If, therefore, it is agreeable to you, I wish to consider this affair together with you; but if it is not, to dismiss it.—But it is, said he, the most agreeable to me of all things. Pursue therefore the inquiry, in whatever manner appears to you to be best.—This, I replied, seems to me to be the best mode of considering the subject: for it is evident, if temperance is present with you, that you have some opinion about it; for it is necessary, if it is really inherent in you, that it must produce some sensation of itself, from which you will possess an opinion respecting it, what it is, and what are the qualities with which it is endued. Or do you not think so?—He replied, I do think so.—And do you not also, I said, think this, since you know how to speak the Greek tongue, that you can likewise inform me what temperance appears to you to be?—Perhaps so, said he.—That we may therefore conjecture whether it is inherent in you or not, tell me, I said, what temperance is, according to your opinion? And at first, indeed, he was tardy, and was not altogether willing to answer; but afterwards he said, that temperance appeared to consist in doing all things in an orderly manner, in walking and discoursing quietly in the public ways, and acting similarly in every thing else. And, in short, said he, that which is the object of your inquiry appears to me to be a certain quietness¹.—I replied, You speak well; for they say, O Charmides, that quiet are temperate persons. But let us see if they say any thing to the purpose: for, tell me, is not temperance something beautiful?—He replied, Entirely so.—Whether, therefore, in

¹ *ἡσυχία*, *quietness*, signifies, in this place, a leisurely mode of acting in every thing.

the grammatic art, is it most beautiful to write similar letters swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—But what with respect to reading? Is it most beautiful to read swiftly or slowly?—Swiftly.—And is it also by far more beautiful to play on the harp rapidly, and to wrestle with celerity, than quietly and slowly?—Yes.—And does not the like take place in pugilistic and pancratiatic contests?—Entirely so.—And with respect to running and leaping, and all other works of the body, are they not beautiful when performed with vigour and rapidity; but when performed slowly, with difficulty, and quietly, are they not base?—It appears so.—It appears to us, therefore, I replied, that with respect to the body, not the quiet, but the most rapid, and the most vigorous, are the most beautiful. Is it not so?—Entirely so.—But did we not say that temperance is something beautiful?—Yes.—Not quietness, therefore, but celerity will be the more temperate with respect to the body; since temperance is beautiful.—It seems so, said he.—What then, I replied, is docility more beautiful than dulness?—It is.—But docility, I said, is to learn swiftly; and dulness to learn quietly and slowly.—It is.—And is it not more beautiful to teach another swiftly and vehemently, than quietly and slowly.—Yes.—And which is the more beautiful to recollect and commit things to memory quietly and slowly, or vehemently and rapidly?—He replied, Vehemently and rapidly.—And with respect to sagacity, is it not a certain acute energy, and not a quietness of the soul?—True.—Does it not therefore follow, that it is most beautiful in the grammatic art, in the art of playing on the harp, and in every thing else, to understand what is said, in the most rapid, and not in the most quiet manner?—Yes.—And again, in the investigations and consultations of the soul, it does not appear to me that he who consults and discovers in the most quiet manner, and with difficulty, is worthy of praise, but he who does this easily and rapidly.—To this also he assented.—Hence, I replied, in all things, both pertaining to the soul and the body, such as are performed with celerity and vigour appear to be more beautiful than such as are performed slowly and quietly.—It appears so, said he.—Temperance, therefore, will not be quietness, nor will a temperate be a quiet life, from this reasoning: since that which is temperate ought to be beautiful: for one of two things must take place, viz. quiet actions in life must either never, or very rarely, appear to be more beautiful than such as are swift and strenuous. If then, my friend, it were even found that not fewer quiet actions are beautiful than such as are vehement and rapid,

neither would it follow from hence that temperance consisted rather in acting quietly, than in vehement and rapid energy, either in walking or in reading, or any thing else; nor would a quiet and orderly life be more temperate than one which is not orderly, since it has been admitted in our discourse, that temperance is something beautiful. But things swift have appeared to be no less beautiful than such as are quiet.—What you have said, Socrates, he replied, appears to me to be right.—Again, therefore, said I, O Charmides, be still more attentive, and looking to yourself, consider what kind of a person temperance, when present, causes you to be, and what sort of a thing it is itself while it accomplishes this: reasoning, therefore, on all these particulars, inform me well, and in a virile manner, what appears to you to be the truth.—But then Charmides, collecting and looking into himself, in a very manly manner said, Temperance seems to me to make a man blush and be ashamed; and I, therefore, conclude that temperance is shame.—Be it so, I replied: but did we not just now acknowledge that temperance is something beautiful?—Entirely so, said he.—Are not therefore temperate, good men?—Yes.—Will therefore that be good, which does not render men good?—It will not.—Temperance, therefore, is not only beautiful but good.—It appears so to me.—What then, I replied, will you not believe that Homer¹ speaks well, when he says,

“Shame ill accompanies a man in need?”

I do, he replied.—Shame, therefore, as it seems, is both not good, and good.—It appears so.—But temperance is good; since it makes those good, to whom it is present, but by no means evil.—The case appears to me to be as you say.—Temperance, therefore, will not be shame; since temperance is good, but shame is not in any respect more good than evil.—It appears to me, Socrates, said he, that this is rightly asserted. But attend to what I shall adduce respecting temperance. For just now I recollected what I had heard a certain person assert, viz. that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Consider, therefore, whether what I say appears to you to be well said.—I replied, O vile youth! you have heard this from Critias, or from some other of the wise.—It seems, said Critias, he must have heard it from some other person, for he did not hear it from me.—But of what

¹ Odyss. lib. 17.

consequence is it, Socrates, Charmides replied, from whom I heard it?—None at all, said I. For we are not to consider who said it, but whether he has spoken the truth or not.—Now you speak as you ought, he replied.—By Jupiter, I do, said I. But if we discover how this thing subsists, I shall wonder: for it is similar to a certain enigma.—On what account, said he.—Because, I replied, his meaning is not such as the words seem to imply, when he says that temperance is to manage our own affairs. Or do you think that a grammarian does nothing when he writes or reads?—I think he does something, said he.—Does a grammarian, therefore, appear to you to write and read his own name only, or to instruct you boys? And do you in consequence of his instructions no less write the names of your enemies than the names of your friends?—No less, said he.—When, therefore, you do this, are you too busily employed, and intemperate?—By no means.—And besides this, you do not perform things pertaining to yourself, if to write, and also to read, is to do something. But it certainly is. And besides, my friend, to be healed, to build, to weave, and to accomplish the work of any art, is certainly to do something. Is it not?—Entirely so.—What then, I replied, does that city appear to you to be well instituted in which there is a law commanding every one to weave and wash his own garment, to make his own shoes, oil-cruise, curry-comb, and every other necessary article, but not to touch things belonging to others, but to attend to his own affairs?—He replied, It does not appear to me that such a city is well instituted.—But, said I, if a city is temperately, it is well instituted.—Undoubtedly, he replied.—For a man, therefore, to do such things as these, and to manage his own affairs, will not be temperance.—It does not appear that it will.—He, therefore, who said, that for a man to do things pertaining to himself is temperance, spoke, as I just now observed, obscurely: for he was not so stupid, as to mean that his words should be taken in the literal sense. Or did you hear some stupid person assert this, O Charmides?—By no means, said he; since to me he appeared to be very wise.—More than any thing, therefore, as it seems to me, he proposed this enigma, because it is difficult to know what it is for a man to transact his own affairs.—Perhaps so, said he.—Can you therefore tell me what it is to transact one's own affairs?—He replied, by Jupiter, I do not know. But perhaps nothing hinders, but that he who said this did not know the meaning

of the assertion. And at the same time that he thus spoke, he laughed, and looked at Critias. But it was evident that Critias, who had formerly contended with, and was stimulated by ambition against Charmides, and those that were present, and who could then scarcely contain himself, was now no longer able to do so. And it appeared to me that my former suspicion was more than any thing true, that Charmides had heard this definition of temperance from Critias. Charmides, therefore, not being willing to support the definition himself, but being desirous that this province should fall to the lot of Critias, shewed as if he thought him confuted. This Critias could not endure, but appeared to me to be as much enraged with Charmides, as a poet with a player who acts his poems badly. So that, looking at him, he said, Do you therefore think, O Charmides, that if you do not understand his meaning who said, that temperance is for a man to transact his own affairs, neither does he know what he asserted?—But, I replied, O Critias, best of men, it is nothing wonderful that Charmides, who is but a youth, should not understand this assertion; but it is fit that you should understand it, both on account of your age and employment. If therefore you affirm that this is a true definition of temperance, I shall very gladly consider with you, whether it is so or not.—But I entirely assent to it, said he.—You do well then, I replied. But inform me whether you admit what I just now asked: I mean, if all artists do something?—I do.—Do they therefore appear to you to do things belonging to themselves only, or things also belonging to others?—Things also belonging to others.—Do they act temperately, therefore, who only do things belonging to themselves?—What should hinder? said he.—Nothing, so far as respects myself, I replied; but see whether there may not be a hindrance with respect to him who, defining temperance to be the transacting one's own affairs, afterwards says that nothing hinders but that those who transact the affairs of others may also be temperate.—I indeed, he replied, have confessed that those that *transact* the affairs of others may be temperate. But have I also acknowledged that this is the case with respect to those that *make* things pertaining to others?—But inform me, said I, do you not affirm that to *make* a thing is the same as to do it?—I do not indeed, said he. Nor do I say that to *operate* is the same as to *make*. For I have learned to make this distinction from Hesiod¹,

¹ In his Works and Days.

who

who says, "No *work* is a disgrace." Do you therefore think that if he had called by the names of *to operate* and *to do*, such works as you now speak of, he would have said that no work is a disgrace, whether it is that of the shoemaker, or of a falter of fish, or of one who sits in a shop?—It is not proper to think he would, Socrates: but I think that he considered making as something different from action and operation; and that a thing made sometimes becomes a disgrace, when it is not produced in conjunction with the beautiful; but that no work is ever a disgrace. For things which are made beautifully and with utility he calls works, and denominates operations and actions certain makings of this kind. It is likewise proper to assert that he considered such things as these, as alone domestic and allied, but every thing noxious as foreign. Hence, it is requisite to think that Hesiod, and every other prudent person, calls him who transacts his own affairs temperate.—O Critias, I replied, as soon as you began to speak, I almost immediately perceived, that you called things allied to a man, and which are his own good, and that you denominates the making of things good, actions. For I have ten thousand times heard Prodicus dividing names: and I will allow you to use every name as you please, if you only evince what you mean to signify by any particular name. Now therefore again, from the beginning, define more clearly, whether you say that temperance is the doing, or the making, (or in whatever manner you may wish to denominate it,) of good things.—I do, said he.—He therefore is not temperate who acts badly, but he who acts well.—He replied, Does it not, O best of men, appear so to you?—Dismiss this question, I said: for we do not consider what appears to me to be the case, but what you now say.—But indeed, said he, I do not assert that he is temperate, who does not do good but evil. For I clearly define to you, that temperance is the practice of things good. And perhaps nothing hinders but that you speak the truth. But nevertheless I should wonder if you thought that men who conduct themselves temperately were ignorant that they are temperate.—But I do not think so, said he.—To this I replied, Did you not say a little before, that nothing hindered but that artists who made things pertaining to others might be temperate?—It was asserted by me, said he. But what then?—Nothing. But inform me whether he appears to you to be a physician, who, in making any one well, does that which is advantageous both to himself, and to him whom he cures?—To me he does.—Does not he, therefore, who acts in this manner,

manner, act well?—Yes.—And is not he temperate who acts well?—He is temperate.—Is it not therefore necessary that a physician should know when he cures with advantage, and when not? And likewise that every artist should know when he will be benefited by the work which he does, and when not?—Perhaps not, said he.—Sometimes, therefore, I replied, when a physician acts profitably, or noxiously, he will not know that he acts in this manner; though, according to your doctrine, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately. Or do you not say so?—I do.—Does it not therefore seem, I replied, that sometimes, when he acts profitably, he acts temperately, and is temperate, but is himself ignorant that he is temperate? But this, said he, Socrates, can never take place. If you think that this necessarily follows from what I have admitted above, I will readily grant it you. For I shall not be ashamed to confess, that something has been improperly asserted, rather than admit that the man who is ignorant of himself is temperate. For I nearly say, that to know ourselves, is temperance; and I agree with him who inscribed this precept in the temple of Apollo at Delphi. For this precept appears to me to have been inscribed as a salutation of Divinity, to be used by those that enter the temple, instead of *hail*! So that this inscription does not directly signify joy, or imply that we should exhort each other to rejoice, but rather, to be temperate. For thus the God speaks to those that enter the temple; and addresses us otherwise than men are wont to do, as he also conceived, in my opinion, who placed this inscription. It likewise says nothing else to those that enter, than that they should live temperately. But as speaking prophetically, it says this in a more enigmatic manner. For “Know thyself,” is the same as “Be temperate,” as both the writings and I assert. But perhaps some one may think it has a different meaning, which appears to me to have been the case with those who placed those posterior inscriptions, “Nothing too much¹,” and “A surety is near to sorrow².” For they thought that “Know thyself,” was advice, and not an address of the Divinity to those that enter the temple. Afterwards, that they might suspend advice in no respect inferior to this, they placed these inscriptions. Hence, Socrates, that for the sake of which I assert all these things is this, that I may grant you all that has been said above. For perhaps you may have said something more right respecting them, and perhaps this may be the

¹ The saying of Solon.

² The saying of Pittacus.

case with myself; but we have not advanced any thing clear. However, I now wish to give you the reason of this, if you do not grant that temperance is to know one's self. But, I replied, O Critias, you act by me as if I acknowledged that I knew that which is the subject of your inquiry. But this is not the case. For I always inquire in conjunction with you, respecting that which is proposed to be considered, in consequence of being myself ignorant. I am considering, therefore, whether I shall assent or not. But stop till I have considered.—Consider then, he replied.—I answered, I do. For if to know a certain thing is temperance, it is evident that temperance will be a certain science, and a science of something. Or will it not?—It is, he replied, and of itself.—Is not therefore, I said, medicine the science of that which is healthy?—Entirely so.—If then, I said, you should ask, since medicine is the science of that which is healthy, of what advantage it is to us, and what it accomplishes, I should reply that it is of no small advantage, because it procures us health, the effecting of which is beautiful; if you admit this.—I do admit it.—If therefore you should again ask me, what architecture effects, which is the science of building, I should say, houses; and I should reply in a similar manner with respect to other arts: it is requisite therefore, Critias, since you say that temperance is the science of itself, that you should be able to answer him who asks you, what beautiful work temperance effects, and which deserves to be named. Tell me therefore what it is?—But Socrates, said he, you do not interrogate rightly. For temperance is not naturally similar to other sciences, nor are other sciences similar to other. But you make your inquiry as if they were similar. For tell me, said he, what work is there in the logistic¹, or geometric art, which is of the like nature with a house, the work of the architectural art, or with that of a garment, which is the work of the weaving art; and so in many other such particulars belonging to the several arts. Can you in these exhibit to me any such work? But you cannot.—I replied, You speak the truth. But this I can show you, of what each of these sciences is the science, and which is something different from that science. Thus, for in-

¹ Logistic is the contemplation of things numbered, but is not conversant with pure numbers. Hence it considers any one sensible *particular* as the monad, and that which is *numbered* as *number*; as for instance three things as the triad, and ten things as the decad. It is nothing else than vulgar practical arithmetic.

stance, the logistic science is the science of even and odd multitude, how they subsist with respect to themselves and to each other. Is it not?—Entirely so, he replied.—Are not, therefore, the even and the odd different from the logistic science?—Undoubtedly.—Statics also is the science of the weight of a heavier and lighter body. And the heavy and the light are different from statics itself. Do you admit this?—I do.—Tell me then, what that is of which temperance is the science, and which is different from temperance itself?—This very thing, Socrates, said he, which you are now seeking, is that by which temperance differs from all other sciences: but you inquire after a certain similitude of it to other sciences. This however is not the case: for all other sciences are sciences of something different from themselves; but this alone is both the science of other sciences and of itself. And of these things you ought by no means to be ignorant. But I think that you do the very thing which you just now *denied* that you did: for you attempt to confute me, and dismiss that which is the subject of our discourse.—What are you doing, I replied? Do you think that if I should endeavour to confute you, I should do it on any other account, than that I might discover the meaning of what I assert, as I am fearful, lest whilst I think myself knowing, when at the same time I *am* not, I should be unconscious of my ignorance? And now I say that I do this, viz. consider the discourse, principally indeed for my own sake, but, perhaps also for the sake of my other friends. Or do you not think *it* is a common good, for the condition of every thing to become apparent *early* to all men?—Very much so, he replied, Socrates.—Boldly therefore, said I, O blessed man, give your opinion in answer to the question, dismissing the consideration whether it is Critias or Socrates who is confuted; but attend to the discourse itself, considering what will be the consequence when either of us is confuted.—I shall do so, he replied; for you appear to me to speak well.—Inform me therefore, said I, what you say respecting temperance.—I say then, he replied, that this alone, of all other sciences, is both the science of itself and of other sciences. Will it therefore, said I, be the science of ignorance¹, since it is of science?—Entirely so.—The temperate man therefore alone

¹ Socrates asks this, because there is one and the same science of contraries. Thus the medicinal science, which knows health, knows also disease.

will know himself, and will be able to explore what it is he knows, and what it is he does not know. In a similar manner likewise he will be able to consider respecting others, what it is which any one knows, and thinks he knows; and what it is which he himself thinks he knows, but does not know. But no other person will be able to accomplish this. Likewise this is to be temperate, and is temperance, and the knowledge of ourselves, to know what we know, and what we do not know. Are these the things which you assert?—They are, he replied.—Again therefore, said I, the third¹ to the Saviour, let us consider as it were from the beginning. In the first place, whether this is possible or not, that with respect to what a man knows, and does not know, he may know that he knows and does not know. And, in the next place, if this is possible, what will be the utility of it to us who know it.—It is requisite, said he, to consider this.—Come then, said I, Critias, consider whether you have any clear conceptions respecting these things. For I am dubious, and I will tell you in what.—By all means, said he.—The following consequence then, I replied, will ensue (if that is true which you just now asserted), that there is one science which is not the science of any thing else than of itself and other sciences, and of ignorance. Will not this be the case?—Entirely so.—See then, my friend, how absurdly we have endeavoured to speak. For if you consider this same thing in other things, it will, I think, appear to you to be impossible.—How and where?—In the following particulars. For consider, whether it appears to you that there is a certain sight, which is not the vision of those things which are the objects of other visions, but is the vision of itself and other visions, and is likewise the vision of that which is not vision: and again, in a similar manner, which does not see any colour, though it is sight, but sees itself and other visions. Does it appear to you that there is such a sight as this?—By Jupiter, it does not.—What then? Can there be an auditory sense, which does not hear any sound, but hears itself, and other hearings, together with a privation of hearing?—Nor yet this.—In short, therefore, consider with respect to all the senses, whether it appears to you that there is any sense, which perceives other senses and itself, but perceives none of those things which are the objects of the other senses.—This does not appear to me to

¹ See this explained in the Notes on the Philebus.

be the case.—But does it appear to you that there is any desire, which is the desire of no pleasure, but is the desire of itself and of other desires?—It does not.—Nor, as I think, is there any will which wills no good, but alone wills itself and other wills.—There is not.—But will you say that there is a love of such a kind, as to be the love of nothing beautiful, but which is the love of itself and other loves?—Not I, said he.—Do you conceive then, that there is any fear which fears itself and other fears, but fears nothing dreadful?—I do not, said he.—But is there any opinion which opines opinions and itself, but which forms no opinion respecting those things which are the subjects of other opinions?—By no means.—But we say, as it seems, that there is a science of such a kind, as to be the science of no discipline, but which is the science of itself and of other sciences.—We do say so.—Must it not therefore be wonderful if there is such a science? For we do not as yet strenuously contend that there is not, but consider if there is.—Right.—Come then, is this science the science of something? And does it possess a certain power, by which it is enabled to be the science of something?—Entirely so.—And must we not also say that the greater possesses a certain power, by which it is greater than something?—We must.—Must it not therefore be greater than something lesser, if it is greater?—It is necessary.—If therefore we should find something greater, which is greater than things greater, and than itself, but which is not greater than any of those things than which other things are greater, would it not follow that a thing of this kind, since it is greater than itself, is also less than itself?—This is perfectly necessary, Socrates, said he.—If therefore there is any thing which is double of other doubles, and of itself, it will be double of other doubles, and of itself, in consequence of being half. For nothing can be double of any thing else than of half.—True.—But being more than itself, will it not also be less than itself? And will not a thing which is heavier than, be also lighter than, itself? And that which is older than, be also younger than, itself? And in every thing else, in a familiar manner, will it not follow, that whatever has a power of its own with respect to itself, will also possess that essence to which this power is related? But my meaning is this: Do we not say, that hearing is nothing else than a hearing of sound?—We do?—If therefore it could hear
itself,

itself, would it not hear in consequence of itself possessing a voice? For otherwise it would not hear.—It is perfectly necessary this should be the case.—Sight likewise, O best of men, if it could itself see itself, must necessarily possess a certain colour. For without colour, sight would never be able to perceive any thing.—It would not.—You see therefore, O Critias, that the particulars which we have discussed, appear to us to be partly altogether impossible, and partly dubious in the extreme, whether they possess a power of their own with respect to themselves. For it is perfectly impossible that this can be the case with magnitude, multitude, and other things of this kind. Or is it not?—Entirely so.—Again, that hearing hears itself, and sight sees itself, and that motion moves itself, and heat burns itself, and all other such like assertions, may be not credited by some, but may perhaps be believed by others. But there is occasion, my friend, for some great man, who may be able to show sufficiently, by a division through all things, whether nothing except science naturally possesses a power of its own with respect to itself, and not a power only over something else; or whether this is the case with some things, and not with others: and again, if there are certain things which possess a power with respect to themselves, whether the science which we say is temperance, ranks in the number of these. For I do not believe myself sufficient for the discussion of these particulars: on which account I am not able strenuously to affirm, whether it is possible there can be a science of science. Nor if there is, could I admit that temperance is this science, till I had considered whether, being such, it would be of any advantage to us, or not. For I prophesy that temperance is something advantageous and good. Do you therefore, O son of Callæsebrus, (since you assert that temperance is this science of science, and likewise of ignorance,) in the first place evince this, that it is possible for you to prove that which I have just now mentioned; and in the next place, in addition to its being possible, show that it is profitable: and thus perhaps you will satisfy me that what you have said respecting temperance is right.—But, Critias, when he had heard these things, and saw that I was dubious, in the same manner as those that look directly at others who are gaping, gape themselves, so he appeared to me to be involved in doubt, in consequence of my doubting. However, being very much celebrated,

celebrated, he was ashamed of those that were present; and was neither willing to grant me that he was incapable of deciding the question which I proposed to him, nor yet did he assert any thing perspicuous, but concealed his perplexity. But I, that the discourse might proceed, said, If it is agreeable to you, Critias, we will now grant this, that it is possible there may be a science of science. But again, let us consider whether it is so or not. If therefore this is in the highest degree possible, why is it more possible to know what any one knows, and what he does not know? For we say that this is for a man to know himself, and to be temperate. Or do we not?—Entirely so, he replied, and this happens in a certain respect to be the case, Socrates. For if any one possesses that science which knows itself, he will be such as that is which he possesses. Just as when any one possesses swiftness, he is swift; when he possesses beauty, is beautiful; and when knowledge, is knowing. But when any one possesses a knowledge of himself, he will then become himself knowing himself.—To this I replied, I was not dubious, that when any one possesses the knowledge of himself, he then knows himself; but I was doubtful, what necessity compels the man who possesses this knowledge to know what he knows, and what he does not know.—Because, Socrates, this is the same with that.—Perhaps so, I replied; but I seem to be always similarly affected. For again, I do not understand how it is the same thing for a man to know what he knows, and to know what he does not know.—How do you mean? said he.—Thus, I replied. Since there is a science of science, will this science be able to divide any further than this, that of these things this is science, and that is ignorance?—It will not; but thus far alone.—Is the science therefore, and ignorance of that which is healthful, the same with the science and ignorance of the just?—By no means.—But I think that the one is a medicinal, and the other a political science; and that the science of science is nothing else than science.—Undoubtedly.—He therefore who has not a scientific knowledge of the healthy and the just, but alone knows science, as alone possessing science of this, such a one will know that he knows, and that he possesses a certain science, both with respect to himself and other things. Or will he not?—Yes.—But how will he know that he knows through this science? For he knows the healthful through the medicinal science, and not through temperance; the
harmonic

harmonic through the musical science, and not through temperance; and that which pertains to building through the architectural science, and not through temperance; and so in every thing else. Is it not so?—So it appears.—But how can temperance, if it is the science of sciences, know that it knows the salubrious, or that which pertains to building?—It cannot by any means.—Being therefore ignorant of this, it will not know that which it knows, but will alone know that it knows.—So it seems.—To know therefore that which we know, and that of which we are ignorant, will not be to be temperate, nor yet will be temperance, but as it seems this will consist alone in knowing that we know, and that we do not know.—It appears so.—Hence, he who possesses this science of sciences, will not be able to examine another, who professes to have a scientific knowledge, whether he knows scientifically or not that which he says he knows; but as it seems he will alone know this, that he possesses a certain science, but temperance will not enable him to know the object of this science.—It does not appear that it will.—Neither therefore will he be able to distinguish one who pretends to be a physician, but is not, from one who is a true physician, nor any other who is from one who is not endued with scientific knowledge. But let us thus consider; if a temperate man, or any other person, intends to discover a true and a false physician, will he not act as follows? He will not discourse with him respecting the medicinal science: for, as we have said, a physician attends to nothing else than the healthy and the diseased, the salubrious and the noxious. Is it not so?—It is.—But he knows nothing respecting science; for this we have attributed to temperance alone.—We have.—The physician therefore will not know any thing about medicine, since medicine is a science.—True.—And the temperate man will know that he possesses a certain science; but it is necessary that of this science the physician should make trial; and to know what this science is must be the province of some other person. Or is not every science defined by this, not only that it is a science, but by ascertaining what science it is, and what are its objects?—Yes.—The medicinal science, therefore, is defined to be different from other sciences in this, that it is the science of the salubrious and the noxious.—It is.—Is it not therefore necessary, that he who wishes to consider the medicinal science, should consider the subjects with which it is con-
versant?

verfant? For it is not proper to contemplate it in things external, with which it is not converfant.—Certainly not.—He therefore who contemplates rightly, will contemplate a physician, so far as he is a physician, in things falubrious and noxious.—So it seems.—In words and actions therefore, will not such a one consider whether what is asserted is true, and whether what is done is done rightly?—It is necessary.—But can any one accomplish this without the medicinal science?—Certainly not.—Nor yet can any other, as it seems, except the physician; nor can this be accomplished by the temperate man. For, besides being temperate, he would be a physician.—True.—More than any thing therefore will it follow, if temperance is alone the science of science, and the science of ignorance, that neither can he who knows the medical art, nor he who does not, be able to distinguish the real or pretended physician, or one who thinks he is a physician, nor can any other person who is knowing in any thing whatever, be able to accomplish this, except him who professes the same art, as is the case with other artists.—It appears so, said he.—What further utility then, Critias, shall we derive from temperance, if it is such as we have asserted it to be? For if, as we supposed in the beginning, the temperate man knows that which he knows, and that of which he is ignorant, knowing with respect to the former *that* he knows, and with respect to the latter that he does not know, and is able to contemplate another person who is affected in the very same manner,—if this be the case, we must say that we derive a great advantage from being temperate. For both we who possess temperance, and all such as are governed by us, shall pass through life without guilt; since we shall neither ourselves endeavour to do any thing which we do not know, but finding out skilful persons, commit it to their care, nor shall we allow those that are in subjection to us to do any thing else than what they will do well, but this will be that of which they possess a scientific knowledge. And thus through temperance we shall govern our families in a proper manner, well administer the affairs of cities, and every thing else which is under the dominion of temperance. For erroneous conduct being taken away, and rectitude being the leader in every action, it is necessary that men with these qualifications should act beautifully and well; and that those that act well should be happy. Should we not, O Critias, speak in this manner respecting temperance;

temperance ; asserting, how great a good it is to know what any one knows, and what he does not know ?—Entirely so, he replied.—But now, said I, you see that no such science has appeared to us any where.—I do see it, he replied.—Has not therefore, said I, temperance, which we have now found to be that which knows both science and the privation of science, this good, that he who possesses it will easily learn whatever else he may attempt to learn, and all things will appear to him in a clearer point of view ? Will not this likewise follow from his looking to science in whatever he learns ? And will he not examine others better, respecting things which he has learned ? And must not those who examine others without this, do it in a more imbecile and unbecoming manner ? Are these the privileges, my friend, which we enjoy through the possession of temperance ? But at the same time, do we look to something greater, and require temperance to be greater than it really is ?—Perhaps, said he, this is the case.—Perhaps so, I replied. And perhaps too we have investigated nothing profitable. But I conjecture this from hence, that certain absurd consequences appear to me to ensue respecting temperance, if it is such as we have defined it to be. For let us see, if you please admitting that it is possible to have a scientific knowledge of science ; and let us not deprive temperance of the power of knowing what it knows, and what it does not know, which we ascribed to it at first, but let us confer upon it this power. And, admitting all these particulars, let us still more diligently consider, if being such it will benefit us at present. For what we just now said, I mean that temperance would be a great good, if it were of such a nature as to govern families and cities, does not appear to me, O Critias, to have been properly granted.—How so, he replied.—Because, said I, we easily admitted, that it would be a great good to mankind, if each of us performed those things which we knew, and committed to others endued with knowledge the management of things of which we are ignorant.—Did we not then, said he, do right in assenting to these things ?—It appears to me, I replied, that we did not.—You really speak absurdly, said he, Socrates.—By the dog, said I, thus it appears to me. And just now looking at these things, I said, that they seemed to me to be absurd, and that I was afraid we had not rightly considered them. For in reality, if temperance is such as we have described it, it does not appear evident to me

me, what good it will produce for us.—Inform me, said he, how this is, that we also may know what you say.—I think, I replied, that I am trifling; but at the same time, it is necessary to consider that which presents itself to our view, and not rashly omit it, if any one pays to it the smallest degree of attention.—You speak well, said he.—Hear then, I replied, my dream, whether it has passed through the gate of horn¹, or through that of ivory. For if temperance should govern us, being such as we have now defined it to be, it would indeed act scientifically; nor would he who asserts himself to be a pilot, when he is not, deceive us; nor would a physician, nor a general of an army, nor any other who pretends to know that which he does not know, elude our penetration. But from these things thus subsisting, something else would happen to us; for our bodies would be more healthful than they are at present, and we should be preserved in the perils of the sea and war. We should likewise possess all our vessels and instruments, together with our garments, shoes, and all the conveniences and necessities of life, more artificially constructed than at present, because we should employ true artists. If also you are willing we should grant that prophecy is the science of that which is future, and that temperance presiding over it, avoids arrogant diviners, but chooses true prophets for the prediction of future events, I should affirm that the human race, furnished with this, would act and live scientifically. For temperance being our guard, it will not suffer ignorance interfering to cooperate with us. But that we shall act well and be happy, in consequence of acting scientifically, this, friend Critias, I am not yet able to understand.—But indeed, he replied, you will not easily find any other end of acting well, if you despise acting scientifically.—In-

¹ Socrates here alludes to Homer's well-known description of the two gates of dreams, of which the following explanation is given by Porphyry, as preserved by Macrobius in *Somn. Scip.* cap. 3. "All truth, says he, is latent; but this the soul sometimes beholds, when she is a little liberated by sleep from the employments of the body. And sometimes she extends her sight, but never perfectly reaches the object of her vision. Hence when she beholds, she does not see it with a free and direct light, but through an intervening veil, which the folds of darkening nature draw over her eye. This veil, when in sleep it admits the sight to extend as far as to truth, is said to be of horn, whose nature is such, from its tenuity, that it is pervious to the sight. But when it dulls the sight and repels it from the vision of truth, it is said to be of ivory, which is a body so naturally dense, that, however thin it may be scraped, it cannot be penetrated by the visual rays."

struck me therefore more particularly, I said, what kind of scientific action you mean. Is it that of cutting leather?—It is not, by Jupiter.—Is it that of a brazier?—By no means.—Is it that of a wool-worker, or a turner, or any such like artists?—It is not.—We must therefore, I replied, no longer persist in the assertion, that he is happy who lives scientifically. For these artists, though they live scientifically, are not acknowledged by you to be happy; but it appears to me that the happy man should be ranked among *certain* persons that live scientifically. And perhaps you will assert the happy man to be him whom I just now mentioned, I mean the diviner, who knows all future events. Do you speak of this, or of any other character?—Of this, said he, and another.—What other? I replied. Do you speak of the man who, besides knowing future events, knows every thing past and present, and is not ignorant of any thing? For let us admit that there is such a man: for I think you will not say that any one lives more scientifically than this man.—Certainly not.—But this also should be added, Which of the sciences makes him happy? Or do all the sciences similarly produce this effect?—By no means, said he.—But which most eminently accomplishes this? Is it that by which a man knows things past, present, and to come? And will it therefore be the science of chefs?—But why of chefs? he replied.—Will it then be the logistic science?—By no means.—Shall we say it is the science by which health is procured.—Rather so, said he.—But is it, I replied, especially that science by which we know some particular thing?—It is that, said he, by which we know good and evil.—O vile man, I replied, some time since you drew me round in a circle, concealing from me that to act well, and be happy, did not consist in living scientifically, and were not produced by the possession of all the other sciences, but are effected by one science alone, which enables us to know good and evil. And if, O Critias, you were willing to take away this science from the other sciences, would the medicinal science no less produce health, that of the leather-worker shoes, that of the weaver garments? And would the pilot's art no less prevent us from perishing in the sea, and the military science from being killed in battle?—No less, said he.—But, friend Critias, this science, by which we know good and evil, being taken away, each of these other sciences will no longer operate beneficially.—True.—But this science, as it seems, is not temperance, but that, the employment of which is to benefit us: for it is not

the science of sciences, and their privations, but it is the science of good and evil. So that if temperance is beneficial, it will be useful to us in some other respect.—But, he replied, is not temperance then beneficial? For if temperance is the science of sciences, and presides over other sciences, it will also benefit us by ruling over this science which is conversant with the good.—But will temperance, I replied, give us health, and not the medicinal science? And will this effect all that the other arts effect, so that each of these will no longer accomplish its proper work? Or did we not some time since testify that temperance is the science of science, and ignorance alone, but of nothing else? Is it not so?—So it appears.—It is not therefore the artificer of health.—Clearly not.—For health is the production of another art. Is it not?—It is.—Hence, my friend, temperance is not the artificer of utility: for we attributed this effect to another art. Did we not?—Entirely so.—How therefore will temperance be beneficial, since it is the artificer of no utility.—By no means, Socrates, as it seems.—Do you not see, therefore, Critias, that I was very properly afraid some time since, and that I justly accused myself, because I beheld nothing useful respecting temperance? For that which is acknowledged to be the most beautiful of all things, would not have appeared to us to be useless, if I were myself in any respect useful for the purpose of proper investigation. But now we are every way vanquished, and by no means able to discover with what design the legislator instituted this name temperance; although we have granted many things which by no means followed from our discourse. For we admitted, that there is a science of science, though our discourse neither suffers nor affirms this. We likewise granted that the works of other sciences were known by this science, though neither did our discourse suffer this, in order that we might define a temperate man to be one who knows that he knows the things which he knows, and who likewise knows that he does not know the things of which he is ignorant. This indeed we granted in a manner perfectly magnificent, not considering that it is impossible, after a manner, for a man to know that which he in no respect knows. For we agreed that he who is ignorant of any thing may know¹ that he is ignorant of that thing,

¹ He who is passing from twofold ignorance, or the being ignorant that he is ignorant, to knowledge, subsists in a middle condition between ignorance and knowledge. Accurately speaking,

thing, though in my opinion there is nothing which appears more irrational than this assertion. But at the same time, so silly were we, though not obstinate in the pursuit of this inquiry, that we were not rendered in any respect more able to discover the truth. Indeed, so ridiculous was our investigation, that what we had formerly acknowledged, and mutually devised to be temperance, this in a very insolent manner has appeared to us to be useless. On my own account, therefore, I am less indignant; but for your sake I replied, O Charmides, I am very indignant, if you who are so beautiful in your body, and most temperate with respect to your soul, derive no advantage from this temperance, and are not in any respect benefited in life by its presence. But I am still more indignant for the sake of the incantation, which I learned from a Thracian, if being a thing of no worth, I have bestowed so much labour in learning it to no purpose. I do not, therefore, by any means think that this is the case, but I am of opinion that I am a bad investigator. For I consider temperance as a certain mighty good; and I am persuaded, that if you possess it, you are *blest*. But see if you do possess it, and do not in any respect require the incantation. For if you possess it, I shall rather advise you to consider me as a trifler, and one who is incapable of investigating by discourse; but I shall advise you to consider yourself happy in proportion to the degree of temperance which you possess. And, O Charmides—— But, by Jupiter, Socrates, said he, I do not know whether I possess it, or not. For how can I know that, the nature of which you, as you say, are unable to discover? I, indeed, am not very much persuaded by you, and I consider myself, Socrates, to be greatly in want of the incantation. I likewise am of opinion, so far as pertains to myself, that nothing hinders me from being daily enchanted by you, as long as you shall think it necessary.— Be it so, said Critias: but, O Charmides, if you act in this manner, it will be to me as an argument that you are temperate, because you will present yourself to Socrates to be enchanted, and will not desert him for any occasion, whether great or small.—I shall follow, said he, and not desert him. For I should act in a dire manner, if I were not persuaded by you who are my tutor,

ing, therefore, he does not *know* that he is ignorant, but may be said to have a confused consciousness, or a dreaming perception, that he is so. This is the key to the profound meaning of Socrates when he said that he *knew* that he knew nothing, which I have explained in a note on the Apology, and elsewhere.

and did not do what you order.—But, said Critias, I do order you.—I shall, therefore, act in this manner, Charmides replied, beginning from this very day.—But what are these, I replied, deliberating about?—Nothing, said Charmides: but we have determined to act in this manner.—You have employed violence, therefore, said I, and do not permit me to interrogate.—Consider me as having used force, said he, since Critias commands me to adopt this mode of conduct. Besides this, do you also consult what you are to do.—But, I replied, there is no place left for consultation: for no man is able to oppose you, when you are endeavouring and compelling to do any thing.—Do not you, therefore, resist, said he.—I shall not indeed, said I, oppose you.

THE END OF THE CHARMIDES.

THE

THE
LESSER HIPPIAS:
A DIALOGUE
CONCERNING
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ERROR.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

IN this Dialogue Hippias the sophist bears the highest of the two subordinate parts or characters: from him therefore it derives its name¹; and the brevity of it, in comparison with the other between Socrates and the same sophist, has occasioned it to be called The Lesser Hippias.—The title prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato, which is this, *περὶ ψευδους*, Concerning Lying, or untruth, is apparently defective; because it expresses only part of the subject: unless the word lying be there taken in the sense put upon it by a late writer², so as to relate to every part of human conduct. But this being not the proper sense of the word, we have ventured to change the title; and to assign such a one as, we think, comprehends the whole of the subject; and, in as few words as are requisite to some degree of clearness, shows the nature of it. For in this Dialogue is argued a point which has been long

¹ See the latter part of the Prologue.—S.

² Mr. Wollaston in his Religion of Nature delineated: where that very ingenious and learned man makes error, or deviation from rectitude in moral actions, to consist in acting a lie; that is, in acting as if the nature of that person or thing, whom or which our action concerns, were different from what it is: which in plain English, and agreeably to the language of the Platonists, is the same thing as acting with incongruity and impropriety; or, as the Stoics love to express themselves, acting contrary to nature, our own, and that of other things.—S.

the

the subject of much controversy, "whether error in the will depends on error in judgment." Socrates takes the affirmative side of the question: and his end in so doing is to prove the necessity of informing the understanding in moral truths, that is, of acquiring moral science; together with the necessity of maintaining the governing part within us in full power over that which is inferior, that is, of acquiring habits of virtue: through want of which science, and of which power or virtue, the philosopher insinuates, that man is either led blindly or impelled inevitably into evil. This design is executed in three parts. The first is concerning words: in which it appears, from inductive reasoning, that all untruth is owing either to some ignorance in the mind, that is, want of knowledge in those things which are the subjects of our affirmation or negation, or to some passion of the soul, desire of glory, for instance, prompting us to speak either deliberately and with design, like Hippias, or inadvertently and rashly, like Achilles, untruths or lies. The second part is concerning actions; and proceeds in the same way of reasoning by induction, to prove that all error in acting arises either from ignorance or weakness: seeing that in every action, merely corporeal, and also in the energies or works of every art, when faults are committed, such as are blamable, the cause of this is either defect of skill to design well, or defect of ability to execute. In the last part, by much the shortest, but for which the other two are intended by Plato, according to his usual manner, merely to prepare us, the reasoning is analytical; and proves, that in dishonest or bad men the understanding is either unenlightened by science, or overpowered and blinded by passion, or else suffers in both ways; and therefore that, with the ignorance or impotence of mind under which they labour, they labour at the same time under a necessity of doing ill: from which necessity they can be freed only by inward light and strength, that is, by science and virtue. Here we find the *Sapiens sibi que Imperiosus* of Horace, in a beautiful passage of his seventh Satire, the second book: so much of which as relates immediately to our purpose we have thus paraphrased;

Thy master does, himself, some master serve;
 Some impulse sets in action every nerve.
 Think not the puppet in his own command;
 His strings are guided by another's hand.

Who

Who then is free?—who not by passion fool'd,
 In every motion is by reason rul'd.
 To all but reason he, superior, still
 Moves but as bids him his own better will.

Agreeably to this is that doctrine of the Stoics, derived immediately, it should seem, from this dialogue of Plato, “that only the wise man is free¹,” upon which maxim the fifth Satire of Persius is a lively comment. But this being a philosophical paradox, Plato employs great address, in the insinuating into the mind a truth which our own consciousness seems to contradict: for who is there, not under outward restraint, and only influenced by inward motives, who does not think himself free? Our subtle philosopher therefore argues upon the supposition of the freedom of will in bad men; and by thus arguing, proves an absurdity, “that such as do evil wilfully are better men than those who do evil without intending it.” The consequence of which is this, that the argument proceeded upon a false supposition; for that none do evil with a clear-sighted and distinct view, and that in bad men the will is not free. Thus much only seems necessary for opening the concealed manner, design, and method of this dialogue. A more explicit and

¹ Plotinus also, the most antient Platonist of any whose writings are now remaining, proves that only mind or intellect is truly free; and that, therefore, liberty of will in man, or his having his actions in his own power, *το αὐτεξουσιν*, resides only in a soul whose inward operations follow the leading of intellect or mind, *εν ψυχῇ κατὰ νοῦν ενεργουση*. And at the end of his argument he thus concludes, The soul, therefore, becomes free through the government of the mind; pursuing thus, without impediment or hindrance, her way to good: *Γίνεται οὖν ψυχὴ ἐλευθερά διὰ νοῦ, πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν σπευδούσα ἀνεμπόδιστως*. Plotin. Enn. vi. l. viii. c. 5, 6, and 7. Alexander Aphrodis. also, the oldest interpreter of Aristotle extant, makes the essence of man's freedom to consist in his being governed *κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρίσιν*, by the judgment of his own reason; and in acting *κατὰ λογικὴν ὁρμήν*, from rational motives, or as he is prompted and excited by reason. See his treatise *Περὶ ἐμπερισταμένων*, §. 14, and 23. ed. Lond. and Aristotle himself, *Metaphysic.* l. ix. c. 5. Epicurus seems to have been the first who imagined human liberty to consist in acting without any motives at all, or at least independently of any. To account for which wild way of acting, he supposes that uncertain and unaccountable declination of atoms, or their deviation from the ordinary course of nature, for which he is justly reprehended by Cicero in many parts of his philosophical works. Yet this notion, or fancy, of Epicurus, concerning the liberty of the will, absurd as it is, hath been espoused by some modern writers of great name; though without his, or indeed any other ingenious contrivance to obviate the absurdity.—S.

particular account of them will appear in the process of our notes. The Introduction is too natural and easy to want any explication. The outward form of the Dialogue is simply dramatic: and as to its genius, it may perhaps not improperly be said to be of the confuting kind; for we would not, unless obliged by the necessity of reason, choose to differ from other writers, or depart from antient authority, by which it is pronounced anatreptic. What ground there is, however, for referring it to some other kind, will easily appear to the readers of our synopsis.—S.

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

* SCENE.—*The SCHOOL of PHIDOSTRATUS.*

EUDICUS.

WHENCE comes it, Socrates, that you are so silent; when Hippias here has been exhibiting so finely and so copiously? Why do you not join the rest of the audience in praising his dissertation; or, at least, make some objections to it, if there was any thing in it which you disapproved?—All the company too are now departed, and we left by ourselves; we, who would claim an especial right to share in all philosophic exercises.

Soc. It would give me pleasure, Eudicus, I assure you, to ask Hippias a question

* The conversation, here related, was held presently after Hippias had finished the exhibiting or public reading of that dissertation of his, so highly celebrated by himself in the larger Dialogue of his name, and upon the same spot of ground, which had been the scene of his lecture. This is evident from many circumstances. In the first place, Eudicus, who is there mentioned as the patron of Hippias, and promoter of that exhibition in particular, sustains the same character in this Dialogue. He opens it with an air of triumph upon the success of Hippias, which appeared in the applause paid him by his audience: and whenever he speaks afterwards, he takes the air and style of a patron, one of that kind who are humble and ignorant admirers.—It is probable that he stayed behind, one of the last of the assembly, on purpose to have an opportunity of inviting and leading the orator to his house; to feast there together, upon his coming off so triumphantly; as the custom is in modern times upon similar occasions.—Further, it appears from that passage of the Greater Hippias before cited, that Socrates, with such of his philosophic friends as himself should choose, was, at the particular request of Hippias, to make part of the audience at his intended exhibition. It is reasonable therefore to suppose them to be admitted without paying their quota of the contribution money. Now this circumstance exactly tallies with what we

question or two, relating to a subject, which he has just now been treating of, taken out of Homer. For I have heard your father Apemantus say, that the Iliad of Homer was a finer poem than his Odyssey; and as far surpassed it in excellence, as the virtue of Achilles surpassed the virtue of Ulysses. For those two poems, he said, were purposely composed in honour of those two heroes: the Odyssey, to shew the virtues of Ulysses; the Iliad, those of Achilles. Concerning this very point then, I should be glad, if it pleases Hippias, to ask his opinion; what he thinks of those two persons, and whether of them in his judgment was the better man. For his exhibition, besides containing a great variety of other matters, displayed much learning in the poets, and particularly in Homer.

EUD. There is no doubt but Hippias, if you propose a question to him, will condescend to give an answer.—Will you not, Hippias, answer to any question which Socrates shall propose to you? or what other course will you take in the affair?

HIP. ¹ I should take a shameful course indeed, Eudicus, should I decline

find in this Dialogue. For, not to insist on the improbability that Socrates should have been present without such special invitation; it accounts for the tarrying behind of Socrates and his friends, out of civility to Hippias, who probably had conducted and introduced them to the place appointed for the exhibition.—That Socrates was at this time accompanied by some of his followers in philosophy, is plain from the first speech of Eudicus; at the conclusion of which he addresses Socrates in the plural number, meaning him and his friends.—One argument more, to prove that the exhibition of Hippias, which gave occasion to this Dialogue, was the same with that promised in the Greater Hippias, arises from the nature of the dissertation itself. For the characters of the heroes in Homer's Iliad were drawn in this which he had been exhibiting, as we learn from the following Dialogue; and it appears from the subject, the title, and introduction of the dissertation promised, that a description of those very characters made a considerable part of it.—Remarkable instances, all these, of Plato's exact fidelity in the dramatic circumstances of his Dialogues, if true; or of his accuracy and exquisite judgment in adapting them one to another and to probability, if they are feigned.—S.

¹ The usual manner of Plato, in his Dialogues, is to open the character of each person, in the beginning or first speeches of his part; a manner worthy the imitation of all dramatic poets. The most striking feature in the character of Hippias is vanity, or the desire of false and vain applause: accordingly, it is here, in the very outset of the Dialogue, shown in a strong light. But there is, besides, a peculiar reason for displaying it in the beginning of this particular Dialogue, because the display of Hippias's vanity, and of the influence that vanity had upon his conduct, makes a material part of the subject and design.—S.

answering

answering to any question put by Socrates ; I, who never fail my attendance at the Olympic games ; and, quitting the privacy of home, constantly present myself in the temple there, to dissert, before the general assembly of the Grecians, upon any of the subjects which I have then ready for exhibition, such as shall be chosen by the audience ; and to answer to any question which any man shall think fit to ask.

Soc. Happy is the situation of your mind, Hippias, that, as often as the Olympic festival returns, you can ¹ proceed to the temple with a soul so full of alacrity and hope, through consciousness of wisdom. I should much wonder, if any one of the athletic combatants, on that occasion, marched to the engagement with half that security and confidence in the powers of his body, which you, according to your own account, have in the abilities of your mind.

Hip. I have reason, Socrates, to entertain such confidence. For, since the time when I first contended for a prize in the trials of skill at the Olympics, I have never met with a man my superior in any which I engaged in.

Soc. The reputation of your wisdom, Hippias, will be a fair monument of glory to your family and country.—But what say you to our question concerning Achilles and Ulysses ? Whether of the two, think you, was the better man ; and in what respects ? For, amidst the multitude of people, who were within, thronging about you at your exhibition, I missed hearing some part of what you said ; and, though desirous of asking you to repeat it over again, I suppressed that desire, on account of the greatness of the crowd, and because I would not interrupt your dissertation. But since we are reduced

¹ That is, when he was going to engage in those voluntary combats or contentions between the sophists, to prove which of them could make the finest exhibition. The decision of these seems to have been left to that judicious audience of theirs, the multitude ; who promulgated their sentence, we presume, in their usual way, by bestowing a more or less loud roar of applause, in proportion as they were more or less pleased with each of the combatants in these bye-battles. For, as it is certain that these made no part of those solemn combats or competitions at the Olympic festival, according to its original institution ; so neither do we suppose them in the number of those added afterwards, those in the liberal arts and sciences. It is more probable that the sophists, with a view of spreading their fame wider, exhibited on these occasions, gratis, to the public, the most approved of their dissertations made for private exhibition.—S.

to so small a number, and since Eudicus here encourages me to ask you, give me a precise and clear account of what you then said of those two heroes, and what distinction you made between their characters.

HIP. Well, Socrates; I am willing to inform you, more precisely and distinctly than I did in my exhibition, what my sentiments are concerning those heroes, and others beside,—I say then, that Homer has made Achilles superior in virtue to all the Grecians who were at the siege of Troy, Nestor superior in wisdom, and Ulysses in cunning.

SOC. Ah, Hippias! Will you grant me one favour more? and that is, not to laugh at me, if I am slow in apprehending what you say, and importune you with frequent and repeated questions. Will you endeavour, on the contrary, to give me mild and gentle answers?

HIP. Since I profess the instructing others in the knowledge of those very things which are the subjects of your inquiry, and think that knowledge so rare, as to deserve the being well paid for, it would be unfair and dishonourable in me, Socrates, not to pardon your ignorance, and give a mild answer to your questions.

SOC. Very fairly and honourably spoken.—You must know then, that when you said Achilles was made by Homer superior in virtue, I seemed to apprehend your meaning: as I also did, when you told me that his Nestor was made superior in wisdom. But when you further said, that the poet had made Ulysses superior in cunning, what you mean by this, to confess to you the truth, I am entirely ignorant of.—Possibly I may apprehend your meaning better by your answer to this question: Is not cunning part of the character of Achilles, as drawn by Homer?

HIP. Nothing like it; but the height of simplicity. For in the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles and Ulysses are introduced in conversation together, Achilles, addressing himself to Ulysses, speaks thus:

Son of Laertes, progeny of Jove!
Subtle thy wit, Ulysses, and thy brain

¹ It must be remembered, that we have professed to translate the passages, taken out of Homer, not immediately from the poet, but from Plato. Now in these verses, as here cited, besides other various readings, there is one whole line omitted; which, though of importance in the poem, is insignificant to the design of Hippias in citing the passage.—S.

Full

Full of devices various : but to me
 Plain speech belongs ; and bluntly to declare
 My mind, my meaning, and my fix'd resolve.
 Not the black gates of hades are to me
 More hostile or more hateful, than the man
 Whose tongue holds no communion with his heart.
 Thus then the secret purpose of my soul
 I tell thee—in no fruitless words ; the deed
 Shall follow.—

In these verses we see the character of each of those heroes : we see Achilles sincere and simple, Ulysses false and cunning. For Achilles is made the speaker of these verses, and to Ulysses are they spoken.

Soc. Now, Hippias, I am in some hopes of understanding what you mean. False you call cunning, it seems ; and a cunning man, with you, I find, is a man of falsehood.

HIP. Exactly so, Socrates. And Homer accordingly has made Ulysses a man of that very character, in many places both of the Iliad and of the Odyssey.

Soc. Homer then, it seems, was of opinion, that the man of truth was a man of different character from the man of falsehood.

HIP. Certainly, Socrates. How should it be otherwise ?

Soc. And are you of the same opinion then yourself, Hippias ?

HIP. Most certainly. For it would be of sad consequence to have those two opposite characters confounded.

Soc. Homer then let us leave out of the question : it being impossible for us to ask him, what he had in his mind when he wrote those verses. But, since you appear to second and support his cause, and to entertain the same sentiments with those which you attribute to him, do you answer at the same time for both, for the poet and yourself.

HIP. So it shall be. Ask any question then, whatever you think fit ;— only let it be brief.

Soc. ¹ By men of falsehood, do you mean men who are under some such kind

¹ Plato, in this and the questions which follow, informs us what are the sources of vice and moral

kind of inability to certain actions, as men who are sick labour under ? or do you mean men of abilities and powers for some or other performance ?

HIP. I mean men, who have powers, and those very strong ones too, for many purposes, but particularly to deceive others.

SOC. The cunning then, it seems, according to your account, are men of strong powers and abilities. Are they not ?

HIP. They are.

SOC. Is it through folly, and want of understanding, that they are cunning and deceitful ? or is it through artfulness and understanding—of a certain kind ?

HIP. Through artfulness in the highest degree, and depth of understanding.

SOC. They are men of good understanding then, it seems.

HIP. They are in no want of understanding, by Jupiter.

SOC. Since they have understanding then, are they ignorant of what they are about ? or do they know it ?

HIP. They know well enough what they do. And through this very knowledge it is that they are so wicked.

SOC. With this knowledge then, which they are masters of, can they want discipline or skill ? or do they abound in it ?

HIP. They have discipline and skill very sufficient for their purpose, that is, to deceive.

SOC. Hold now : let me recollect all that you have said. You assert, that men of falsehood are men of abilities, understanding, knowledge, and skill ;—that is, in those subjects, in which they deceive.

HIP. I do.

SOC. And that men of sincerity and men of falsehood are different kinds of men, and of quite opposite characters one to the other.

HIP. I own this assertion also.

moral evil. The first is some disorder in the body, obscuring the light of the mind, or obstructing the operation of its faculties. . Another is some defect in the natural powers of the understanding. A third is want of science : and the fourth, want of virtuous habit and practice.—S.

SOC.

Soc. Well then; amongst the men of abilities and skill, some, it seems, are men of falsehood, according to your account.

HIP. Most true.

Soc. When you say now, that men of falsehood are men of abilities and skill in certain respects, do you mean that they are able to deceive, if they are willing so to do? or think you that they want abilities for the purpose of deceiving?

HIP. I think they have abilities for that purpose.

Soc. To sum up the whole then; men of falsehood are men who have skill and ability to deceive.

HIP. Right.

Soc. The man therefore, who has no ability or skill to deceive, cannot be a man of falsehood, or a deceiver.

HIP. Very right.

Soc. ¹ Whether is that man able to do what he wills, who can exercise his ability at whatever time he chooses? that is, supposing him not hindered by some disease or ² other thing of that kind: but in the same manner, I mean, as you are able, whenever you choose it, to write my name. Say you not, that every such man is able, who has the like power in other cases?

HIP. I do.

Soc. Tell me now, Hippias; are not you well versed in numbers and accounts?

HIP. Perfectly well, Socrates.

Soc. Were a man to ask you then, "How many are thrice seven hundred," would you not answer that question, if you chose so to do, perfectly well, and with the utmost readiness?

HIP. I certainly should.

Soc. And that, because your ability and skill are excellent in subjects of that kind.

HIP. True.

¹ This sentence is evidently intended by Plato as a question, not as a positive consequence from any thing before said. Yet all the editors have given it this wrong turn, by falsely printing ἀγα instead of ἀρα. And all the translators were in this, as in most other places, misled by the erroneous printing of the Greek text.—S.

² That is, any outward impediment. In the vulgar use of the words, power and liberty, the absence of outward obstacles and impediments only is considered.—S.

Soc. Do you excel in ability and skill only? or is your virtue¹ equal to your ability and skill—with respect to the same subject; that is, numbers and accounts?

HIP. It is, Socrates.

Soc. You are perfectly well able, then, upon these subjects, to speak the truth: are you not?

HIP. So I imagine.

Soc. But what; are you not equally able to speak untruths upon the same subject? Answer me now, Hippias, as you did before, with a generous freedom and openness. Were a man to ask you, then, "How many are thrice seven hundred?" would not you be the best able to impose on others, and always to give answers alike untrue upon that subject, if you had a constant inclination to impose falsehood for truth, and never at any time to give a right answer? Or would the unskilled in computations be better able to deceive than you are, if they were so inclined? Might² not the ignorant, however desirous of persisting in false answers, frequently happen to stumble on such as were true, out of mere ignorance? But you, who have skill, should you also have an inclination to deceive, would you not always invariably answer wrong?

HIP. Certainly; the case is as you represent it.

Soc. Now the man of thorough falsehood, is he a deceiver in other cases only, but not so in numbering and computing?—Would he not deceive others, when numbers and computations were the points in question?

HIP. By Jupiter, would he³.

Soc. Let us suppose, then, Hippias, some certain person to be a false man, or a deceiver, upon the subject of numbers and computations.

HIP. Well.

Soc. What kind of person must he be? In order to be a deceiver, must he not, as you yourself just now acknowledged, have abilities to deceive?—

¹ Socrates here means justice, particularly that part of it which is called veracity.—S.

² In the original here we certainly ought to read *ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθής*, and not *ἢ* (or) as it has been hitherto printed, and accordingly translated.—S.

³ Numbers and accounts being the chief articles in which bad men are guilty of fraud and falsehood.—S.

for,

for, as to any other man, who wanted those abilities, you admitted, if you remember, that such a one would never be a good deceiver.

HIP. I remember, we agreed in this.

SOC. Was it not proved just now, that you yourself was in the highest degree capable of deceiving others, by false information, upon the subject of numbers and accounts?

HIP. In this too we agreed.

SOC. And are you not in the highest degree capable of giving true information upon the same subject?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. One and the same person therefore has abilities beyond other men to give either false or true information upon the subject of numbers and accounts: and a good arithmetician is this person.

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. Who appears, then, Hippias, to be the man of falsehood¹, and the deceiver, with regard to numbers and accounts? Is it any other than the good arithmetician? for he it is who is the most able. And the same man is also the true accountant.

HIP. So it appears.

SOC.² You see then that it belongs to the same man to be a man of falsehood

¹ Both members of this sentence, in the original, are by all the editors erroneously, as we apprehend, made interrogative; and are so translated by Serranus and Bembo. The other versions, in this place, concur with ours.—S.

² Aristotle observes, that Plato here makes use of a paralogism, or sophistical way of arguing: for by ψευδης, or, a man of falsehood, Plato, says he, means a man δυναμενος ψευδισθαι, capable of speaking untruths; whereas the word properly signifies a man ευχερης και προαιρετικος των τοιoutων [sc. ψευδων] λογων, μη δι' ετερον τι, αλλα δι' αυτο, και ο αλλοις εμποητικός των τοιoutων λογων, apt to speak falsities through choice, and with intention to deceive, and to beget in others false notions of things. Aristot. Metaphysic. l. v. c. 29. And such a man, it is true, is the subject of the present dispute between Socrates and Hippias; but it is an innocent piece of sophistry; since it is not employed for the purpose of deceiving any, but for that only of discovering truth; and turns into just reasoning, when the inference comes afterwards to be drawn from all the instances enumerated. Aristotle does not condemn Plato as guilty of arguing unfairly, or of putting off one sense of the word for another; but as he treats, in that chapter of his Metaphysics, concerning the various meanings of the words false and falsity, he produces from this passage of Plato a singular instance of an improper use of the term ψευδης, false, when applied to man.—S.

³ In this sentence Socrates makes the application of his first instance, to prove the truth of his general

falsehood and a man of truth on such subjects ; and that the man of truth is not a better man in this respect, than the man of falsehood : for indeed he is the same person ; so far is he from being one of opposite character, as you just now imagined.

HIP. It appears so in this case, I own.

Soc. Shall we try how it appears in other cases ?

HIP. With all my heart ; if you choose to go on to others.

Soc. Have not you great skill in geometry ?

HIP. I have.

Soc. Well then ; is it not so in geometry ? Is not one and the same person capable of giving either true or false information concerning diagrams ?

HIP. I admit he is.

Soc. Is any other person beside good at diagrams ?

HIP. No other.

Soc. A good and skilful geometrician, then, is equally capable, in either way, above other persons : and, if there be any excellent deceiver upon the subject of diagrams, it must be such a man : for he has abilities to deceive ; whereas the bad geometrician is wanting in those abilities : so that neither in this case can the man who has no abilities to deceive ever be a deceiver or man of falsehood, as you before admitted.

HIP. You are right.

Soc. Further now, let us consider a third case, that of astronomy ; in which science you have a still deeper knowledge than you have in those mentioned before. Is it not true, Hippias ?

HIP. It is.

Soc. Does not the same thing then hold good in astronomy ?

HIP. It is probable that it does, Socrates.

Soc. In this case, therefore, it is the good astronomer who is, above all others, the man of falsehood ; he who is able and well qualified to deceive : for it cannot be the man who is ignorant in astronomy ; because such a one is unable and unqualified for that purpose.

general position : we have, therefore, with all the translators, except Serranus, given it the air of an absolute assertion ; contrary to the printed editions of the Greek, in which it is turned into a question.—S.

HIP.

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. One and the same man therefore, in astronomy also, is the man of truth and the man of falsehood.

HIP. So it seems to be, I confess.

SOC. Now, Hippias, let us proceed to consider, in general and at large, through all the arts and sciences, if there be any case in which that position fails of being true. You must be a competent judge of this, because your knowledge is universal, and you are master of more arts than any man living : ¹ as I have heard you yourself declare, at some of the tables in the assembly-

¹ Whenever Plato brings instances from the mathematical sciences, in order to prove or to illustrate any truth running through them all, he does it always with a view of leading the mind upward from them to that master-science*, that from which they receive their principles, the science of mind ; or at least to its immediate and noblest offspring, that of morals. See particularly his Theætetus, Republic, and Epinomis. We make this observation here, to show the scope of the argument now used by Socrates. The small company about him, all of them, except Hippias and Eudicus, were his own disciples, and of his intimate acquaintance : consequently they were used to this method of reasoning in the discourses of their master. It was easy for them therefore to apply the instances, which he brought from the lower sciences, agreeably to his intention ; and to infer from thence, that, if his present argument were just, it would hold good in those higher sciences. But the absurdity of this must have been clearly apparent to them : for they knew that the truly wise and good man was, with a full and free choice, attached to truth ; and consequently, where veracity was concerned, was indeed *μη διαίμενος ψευδισθαι*, incapable of uttering falsities, or untruths, in a moral sense ; and that in such cases, *ψευδης*, a man of falsehood, in Plato's sense of the word, was the same with *ψευδης* in Aristotle's sense of it, or *ψευδολος*, a man given to speak falsities, and was the reverse therefore of the man of truth. Hence they saw, it followed, that, contrary to the account given by Hippias, the false man, or deceiver in words, was under some natural inability either of body or of mind, or was ignorant and void of the best science, or wanted skill and experience in the art of human life, that is, practical virtue. Aristotle rightly observes, that Plato produces these instances of falsehood, in the way of induction, to prove the same thing universally to be true of all moral evil. The inference, therefore, is, that no man is a wicked or bad man *ικων*, with a clear-sighted and free choice, but *ακων*, through the power of some evil necessity.—S.

* Socrates, to put his meaning beyond all doubt with the intelligent part of his audience, presents to their view next, in a very strong light, the character of Hippias himself, as full of false boasting and vain pretensions, which in him were clearly the effects of a total ignorance in moral science. He had been, it seems, though probably but for a short time, a disciple of Hegesidamus, or, as he is called by Jamblichus, (in Vit. Pythag. cap. ult.) Agesidamus, a Pythagorean philosopher of Metapontum in Lucania ; who taught, that the perfection, end, and happiness of man

* This master-science is by Plato called *dialectic*, and by Aristotle metaphysics. For an account of which see the Introduction to the Parmenides.—T.

assembly-hall¹; where you were setting forth in ample detail, and glorying in, the variety of your valuable and rare knowledge. You there told us that you went once to the Olympic festival, with your attire, and every thing which you had about you; all the making of your own hands: in the first place, that the seal-ring which you wore on your finger, for you began with that, was your own work, proving thus your skill in cutting intaglios. Beside that,

consisted in *αὐτάρκεια*, self-sufficiency: but Hippias was so blind, it seems, to the true meaning of that sublime doctrine, and so stupid with regard to truth, whether metaphysical or moral, as to imagine, that the being able to furnish himself from himself with all the conveniences and even ornaments of life, and not to be indebted to any other artists for such as their respective arts afford, was the self-sufficiency recommended by the philosopher. See Quintilian. *Inst. Orat.* l. xii. c. 11. where that most judicious writer seems to have accounted for the conduct of Hippias from this ridiculous error of his: for, in order to attain self-sufficiency, Hippias aimed at acquiring skill in all the several arts requisite for that purpose; and, falling far short of an acquisition which is beyond the powers of any one man, he yet arrogantly pretended to it, through a desire of being admired by the multitude, and for want of that true self-sufficiency taught by Hegesidamus: to understand which it may be necessary in this place to observe, that in the days of Thales the Ionian arose Pythagoras; who in the southern parts of Italy, where Grecian colonies had settled, founded a sect of philosophers, from their country called Italic. The chief object of their philosophy was the knowledge of mind; which they considered as the first-moving principle in nature, and the fountain of all action; moving the soul to act with a view always to some end, which end always is some good. They held, that, as the universe was perfect and complete, actuated by soul under the direction of mind, this universal mind was *αὐτοτελής*, that is, had in himself his own end, the possession of all good, and was sufficient to his own perfect happiness: the universal soul, therefore, acted only for the sake of producing good to particular beings, as many as was possible, and of communicating to particular minds the happiness of its own. Now this arising from its self-sufficiency, independence, and the contemplation of all being and beauty within itself, the great points of the Pythagorean moral were to free man from his dependance on things out of himself, to purge his soul from those passions by which he is attached to them, and to remove his life from those incumbering pursuits which hinder the contemplation of truth, and hide the view of archetypal and true beauty. Accordingly these philosophers taught, that the end of man was *ὁμοιωσις τῷ Θεῷ*, a resembling of God: which Hegesidamus explained by *αὐτάρκεια*, self-sufficiency: and his explication is confirmed by what Socrates in Xenophon teaches, (*Mem.* l. i. p. 79. ed. Simpfon.) that “to want nothing is peculiar to the divine nature; and to have the fewest wants is approaching to it the nearest.” This self-sufficiency, by which a man becomes independent; and is free, like God himself, to do good to all; is the same thing also with that freedom of the soul, the desire of which to raise in his disciples is the ultimate end of Plato in this Dialogue.—S.

¹ The *αγορά*, or place where the people met, and voted in their general assemblies, was the place likewise of exchange: for at certain hours of the day mercantile business was here transacted: and at certain other hours the shops within it all around were opened, and tables were brought out, on which

that, you had another seal of your own engraving : a strigil too^r, and an unguent-box, of your own workmanship. Your father said, that the slippers, which you then had on your feet, were of your own cutting out and making ; and that the garments which you then wore, the upper and the under both, were of your own weaving. But, what seemed the strangest thing of all, and a proof of your ingenuity and skill the most surprising, you told us, that the belt or girdle, which you wore round your vest, (and it was of that rare and costly sort, such as they make in Persia,) was entirely your own manufacture. Beside all this, you carried with you thither, on that occasion, poems, you said, of your own composing, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic ; together with a great number of your compositions in prose upon various subjects. You assured us, that in the sciences, those we have just now been speaking of, you was superior to every person then at the Olympics ; as you also was in the science of rhythm and harmony, and that of grammar. You enumerated, as well as I remember, a multitude of other branches of knowledge which you excelled in. But, I think, I had like to have forgotten your art of memory, for which you are so famous. Many other arts I presume you have, which I cannot recollect at present. But what I mean is this ; to put you upon considering those arts and sciences, which you are master of, (and I have mentioned a sufficient number of them,) and all those beside, which are severally professed by others ; and then to ask you, if you can think of any, where the man of truth and the

which all kinds of shop-commodities were exposed to sale, each kind severally in a peculiar part of this vast edifice ; that every person who came to purchase might know where to meet directly with what he wanted. At some of these shops and tables much time was spent by the talkative, the inquisitive, and the idle.—S.

^r This was an instrument used by the old Greeks and Romans to clean the skin ; and serving them, besides, for the same purposes with our flesh-brush : for the antient politer nations took a much better care of their persons than is customary amongst the modern Europeans. Whenever their bodies were fouled, as after travelling, or walking in dusty roads, after wrestling, or other exercises, which they used almost naked in rooms strewed deep with a soft sand, (to procure them, when they fell, an easy fall,) they rubbed themselves gently with these strigils ; bathing at the same time in warm baths, which were very numerous, and to be met with in all great towns and cities. At other times a more vehement rubbing served in the room of exercise itself. After using the strigil, they anointed themselves all over, especially about their joints, with some perfumed oil or unguent. Thus the skin was cleansed, the blood was equally circulated, the muscles were strengthened, and the joints made supple and pliant.—S.

man

man of falsehood, as we have described them, are distinct persons; and where the same man is not equally fitted for speaking truth and falsehood. Consider the matter in any art you please, in any kind of wisdom, skill, or cunning, or whatever else you choose to name it, and you will never find it so to be; since it is not there to be found. For if you know any, which affords such an instance, tell me what it is.

HIP. I am not able, Socrates, thus on the sudden.

SOC. Nor ever, as I imagine, will you be able. If I am in the right then, remember, Hippias, what conclusion follows from my reasoning.

HIP. It does not readily occur to me, Socrates, what conclusion it is you mean.

SOC. You do not perhaps at present exercise your art of memory. No doubt, you think there is at present no occasion for it. I will assist you therefore in recollecting. Do you not remember that you said, Achilles was a man of truth, and Ulysses a man of cunning and falsehood?

HIP. I do.

SOC. But now you perceive, that the man of truth and the man of falsehood have proved to be the same person. So that, if Ulysses was a man of falsehood, it appears that he was no less a man of truth; and if Achilles was a man of truth, we find he must also have been a man of falsehood. These two characters then are not heterogeneous, one from the other; much less are they opposite, as you imagined; but are similar, and meet in the same man.

HIP. Socrates, you are always twisting and winding arguments in this sort of way. In every matter of debate, you always pick out that point in which most difficulty lies; you stick close to that, and handle it with a most minute exactness: but you never meddle with the ¹ whole of the subject, considered in one view. For I can produce you now a multitude of proofs,

¹ Hippias himself is here made to expose his own loose, vague, and declamatory way of talking; so opposite to that close, precise, and truly logical manner of Socrates in his discourses, by which alone truth can be discovered, and the disputes arising in conversation be brought to any rational or fair conclusion. But this not being now or ever the intention of Hippias, he expresses in this speech his uneasiness at the present method of managing the debate, and his desire of returning to his usual long harangues; showing himself in this respect also the *ψευδης*, or man of falsehood; according to the old maxim, "*Dolus versatur in generalibus*," The man, who means to deceive, deals only in generals, and avoids coming to particulars.—S.

if you are disposed to hear them, sufficient to convince you, that Homer has made Achilles a man of sincerity, and of greater virtue than Ulysses ; whom he has made crafty, false, and deceitful, in fine, a worse man than Achilles. And to oppose my proofs, do you, if you have a mind to it, bring others on your side of the question, to prove Ulysses the better man : by which means our little audience here may be the better enabled to judge which of us speaks the best.

Soc. ' I have no doubt, Hippias, but that your wisdom is superior to mine. But it is a constant rule with me, at the time when any man is speaking, to give him my attention ; especially, if I think him a wise man : and, as I am desirous of comprehending perfectly all he means, afterwards I interrogate, and sift him thoroughly concerning all he has said ; I consider it over again, and compare it with the account he gives me in his answers, in order to my own better information. But if I think the speaker insignificant, and not worth regarding, after he has done speaking, I ask him no questions, nor give myself any trouble about what he has been talking of. You may know by this, what persons I account wise. You may also find, that I am studious and solicitous about the sayings of ² such a man ; that I am busy and restless in putting questions to him, with a view of being improved by the acquisition of some piece of knowledge. Accordingly, I took particular notice, in my own mind, of something ³ which seemed to me very strange in that passage of Homer, if your interpretation of it be true, that which you repeated just now, to prove that Achilles treated Ulysses as a deceiver. This to me, I say, seemed strange ; because Ulysses, your cunning Ulysses, no where appears to have spoken untruths : but it is Achilles, whom we find cunning, according to your account, as being a teller of falsties and deceiving others. For having premised that fair profession, which you just now repeated,

² Socrates here intimates, that the source of that habit, which Hippias had, of lying and deceiving, was a fondness for unmerited or false praise, with an affectation of being thought wise.

³ The word in the original here is printed *ταυτα*, but we presume ought to be either *ταυτων*, agreeably to the translations of Ficinus and Gryneus, or as we have supposed it in ours, *τοιυτου*.—S.

³ From the sense it is evident, that we ought here to read in the Greek *δ*, *τι—ατομων*, κ. τ. λ. not *ατι δ* [*ivot*,] an error frequent throughout the printed text. Stephens has frequently indeed corrected it ; but has passed it over in this and many other places.—S.

Not the black gates of hades are to me
 More hostile or more hateful, than the man
 Whose tongue holds no communion with his heart.

A little afterwards he declares, that he would not be dissuaded from his purpose, not by Ulysses and Agamemnon together; nor would he be by any means prevailed on to stay in the Trojan territories; but, says he,

¹ To-morrow, after sacrifice to Jove
 And all that next in nature is divine,
 My well-mann'd galleys launch I from the shore
 Into the briny waves: and thou shalt see,
 (If curious of the sight, or thy concern
 Thou mak'st it,) with the dawning hour of day,
 My fleet spread o'er the fishy Hellespont;
 With many an eager stroke of the brisk oars
 Short'ning the passage: and if Neptune grant
 Prosperous voyage, the third returning light
 Shall view me on rich Pthia's fertile plains.

Besides, long before this, with an air of insult he had said thus to Agamemnon,

² And now with my full galleys I depart,
 Steering my course for Pthia:—my best course
 Is homeward,—here dishonour'd.—Nor shalt thou
 Meet better fare, I ween:—no more expect
 Spoils and rich plunder shall attend thine arms.

Now though he had made this declaration, first in the face of the whole army, and afterwards to such as were intimate with him, it no where appears, that he made any preparations for his voyage, or any attempts toward the launching of his ships, in order to his departure homeward; but, on the contrary,

¹ We meet with this passage in the ninth book of the Iliad, v. 357, &c. a little after the former; and both of them exactly as they are cited by Plato.—S.

² The verses, here cited, occur in the first book of the Iliad, with a difference only in one word. For instead of *αἰών*, which we read in Plato, we find in Homer *εἰς αἰῶνα*: a difference not taken notice of by Barnes in his Var. Lect. Perhaps he thought it not of importance enough to mention. But, in editions of the finest writers of antiquity, too minute an accuracy, we think, never can be used.—S.

with a noble indifference, he disregarded the keeping of his word and the speaking truth. It was for this reason, Hippias, that I proposed my first question to you; because I was at a loss to know, which of those two heroes the poet had made the better man: but I presumed that both were excellent; and that it was difficult to determine whether was the superior, as well with respect to speaking truth and¹ falsehood, as every other kind of virtue; for in that point, no less than in others, they seemed nearly on a par.

HIP. You view not the matter in its true light, Socrates. For, though Achilles breaks his word, it is plain that he had no intention to deceive, nor any dissembled meaning: but, against his inclination, he is obliged, by the distresses of the army, to stay and give them his assistance. But when Ulysses speaks falsely, it is with design, and his falsehood is voluntary.

SOC. My dear friend Hippias, you deceive me; and are guilty, yourself, of doing as you say Ulysses did.

HIP. Far from it, Socrates. How mean you? and in what respect?

SOC. By telling me, that Achilles had no intention to deceive, nor any dissembled meaning: whereas Achilles, in saying through arrogance what he had no serious intention of doing, was so² artful an impostor, as Homer has represented him, that he appears confident of outwitting Ulysses, and concealing from him the emptiness of his arrogance; nay, to that degree confident, as to dare in his presence to contradict himself. Accordingly we find Ulysses actually imposed upon: for, as we see from his silence on that head, he discovered not that Achilles had told him any untruth.

HIP. Where is all this to be found, Socrates?

¹ Socrates here mentions falsehood as well as truth, in order to preserve consistence in his argumentation; having proved to Hippias, that the speaking falsehood well was the effect of some kind of knowledge and virtue.—S.

² In the Greek, *Γῶς*, or cunning juggler. By Achilles here, we suppose, is meant that very passion of arrogance in him, which is the most distinguished part of his character. For all the great actions and events of Homer's *Iliad* turn upon the desire of Achilles to show to the Grecians the importance of his presence and his aid. By the same name, *Γῶς*, is the passion of love called in Plato's *Banquet*, and in the same metaphorical sense; because both these passions impose upon a man's own understanding, and force him to say and do things, to which his reason is by no means privy; putting him, as in this case of Achilles, upon contradictory promises and assertions; and by their bold assurance, making him believe them all, by turns, himself.—S.

SOC. Do you not remember, that ¹ after he had declared (as he did to Ulysses), that he would set sail early the next day ; to Ajax on the other hand he says no such thing, but tells him a quite different story.

HIP. In what passage ?

Soc. In this,

* No more in bloody field shall I engage,
I nor my forces ; till great Ilium's son,
The godlike Hector, worthy of his fire,
Through heaps of slaughter'd Greeks, victorious reach
My myrmidons ; or till his hostile flames,
Spreading from ship to ship, approach my own.
Then,—near my vessel, or my tent, I trust,
Shall Hector's fury, though impetuous, meet
A bound impassable.——

Now can you imagine, Hippias, that he was so forgetful, this son of the goddess Thetis, this pupil of the sage Chiron, as that, after throwing out the bitterest reproaches upon such as speak what they mean not, he should first tell Ulysses that he would sail away, and then, through forgetfulness, assure Ajax that he would continue where he was ? Do you not think that he must have talked in this manner with design, and from a supposal that Ulysses was a plain simple man, and that he should get the better of him that very way, by artifice and lying ?

¹ In the Greek this passage is read thus ; *Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι λεγὼν, ὑστερον, ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεῦ εἶπεν ἅμα τῇ ἡοι ἀποπλεῖ σείσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* Stephens saw, that this was a corrupt reading ; but an emendation of it not readily occurring to his mind, he supposed that many words were wanting. A slight alteration only will, as we imagine, correct the sentence thus ; *Οὐκ οἶσθ', ὅτι λεγὼν, τῇ ὑστεραία (ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεῦ εἶπεν) ἅμα τῇ ἡοι ἀποπλεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ.* agreeably to which we have made our translation.—S.

² Achilles speaks of Hector thus highly on this occasion, purposely to raise the higher, in those who heard him, the idea of his own valour ; none but himself, he tells them, being able to stop the progress of so mighty and formidable an enemy. Mr. Pope therefore, in omitting those high terms in which Achilles here mentions Hector, has omitted an essential beauty in this passage, and particularly material to that purpose, for which it is cited by Socrates,—to show, that the inconsistent fables, uttered by Achilles, were owing to his arrogance and his thirst of glory. See the Introduction to this Dialogue. The verses are taken from the ninth book of the Iliad, v. 646, &c. But there is evidently a false reading in them, as cited by Plato, *μῆθοσμαι* instead of *μεδῆσμαι*, observed by Barnes, in his notes on Homer.—S.

HIP.

HIP. I think quite otherwise, Socrates: I think that he was imposed upon, himself, by his own simplicity and undefining heart: and that want of reflection made him talk to Ajax in a strain different from that in which he had been talking to Ulysses. But Ulysses, whenever he speaks truth, has always an intention to deceive, no less than when he speaks a falsehood.

SOC. Ulysses then is a better man, it seems, than Achilles.

HIP. By no means, Socrates, clearly.

SOC. Why, was it not proved just now, that the speakers of falsehoods, knowing them so to be, and with intention to deceive, were ¹ better men than those, who spoke what was false merely through ignorance, and against their intention?

HIP. But how is it possible, Socrates, that such as are guilty of injustice knowingly, such as are deceitful, and insidious, and wilfully do mischief, should be better men than those, who, not knowing what they do, lead others into mischiefs or mistakes? To such is due free pardon, should any injustice be done by their means, or if any man be deceived by them, or suffer injury. The laws ² accordingly are more severe to designing cheats, and to the wilfully injurious, than to such as deceive or injure without intention of so doing.

SOC. You see, Hippias, that I spoke truth, when I told you, how busy

¹ This is another instance, similar to that, taken notice of by Aristotle, which we mentioned before, of a sophistical way of arguing used by Plato against the sophists. For the truth of the position, contended for, has indeed been proved; and is apparent enough, in every inferior art or science; but Plato applies it in this place to morals, of which it has not been proved, but the direct contrary insinuated. There is the same ambiguity of expression in our own language; for we use the term, good man, with reference not only to moral goodness, but even ability or skill in any way whatever. Such a one, we say, is a good man, when we only mean, as to some particular kind of work or action which he performs well.—S.

² Demosthenes in *Orat. c. Midiam*, § 11. p. 35 and 36 of Dr. Taylor's edition in 8vo. gives an account of these laws somewhat more at large, too long to be here inserted, but so like this of Plato's, and so much in the same words, that it seems highly probable he had an eye towards it when he composed that part of his oration. For that incomparable orator was always a great admirer of Plato, and had been one of his favourite disciples; as we are told by the writer of the lives of the ten orators, vulgarly ascribed to Plutarch.—S.

and restless I was in putting questions to the wife ¹. I fear, indeed, that I have no other valuable quality belonging to me ; the rest which I have being inconsiderable and mean. For I am apt to be mistaken in the natures of things, and ignorant of what they truly are. A sufficient evidence of which appears, whenever I am in company with any of you celebrated wise men, whose wisdom is acknowledged by the united voices of all the Grecians. It then appears that I know nothing : for scarcely in any point am I of the same opinion with you. And what greater evidence can there be of a man's want of knowledge, than his differing in opinion from the wife. I have this one admirable quality, however, which saves me from the fatal consequences of ignorance and error ; this, that I am not ashamed to learn ; but am given to inquiry, and to asking questions. I am very thankful also to the person who vouchsafes me an answer : nor ever neglected I to pay him my due acknowledgments. For whenever I had acquired a piece of knowledge, I never denied my having learnt it ; nor ever pretended, that it was of my own finding out. On the contrary, I celebrate the wisdom of my teacher, whenever I produce the doctrine which he taught me. Thus at present, for instance, I agree not with you in that position, which you have laid down for truth ; but am strongly of a different opinion. And this, I am convinced, arises from something in me, and must be attributed to my being such a one as I am ; to avoid using any term or epithet too high in speaking of myself. To me, Hippias, the truth appears directly contrary to what you say. I think, that those who injure others, who are guilty of injustice, who vent falsehoods, and deceive, or commit any other fault, knowingly and wilfully, are better men than such as do the same evils ignorantly and without free choice. Sometimes, however, I am in the opposite way of thinking. In short, my sentiments are ever varying upon this subject, and driven backward and forward continually : the cause of which unsteadiness is clearly want of knowledge. But I now find in myself a fresh accession of my old malady : for the opinion, which prevails in me at present, is

¹ This and such other sayings, frequent in the mouth of Socrates, passed with the people even of his own time for mere ironies. Whence he was commonly called *ὁ ἀγαν*, the dissemler of his knowledge, or pretender to ignorance.—S.

this ;

this;—that such as commit wilful errors in any action whatever, are better men, with respect to actions in that way, than those who err in the same way against their will or intention. This present turn of mind in me is owing, as I imagine, to the preceding part of our conversation: for our reasoning upon the point, then debated, will, in all appearance at present, hold good through all things; and will prove, that the involuntary actors of ill, in any of those instances we have mentioned, are more wicked than those who are guilty of the same bad actions wilfully. Be so good therefore as to set my mind right: for in healing the disease of this, and freeing it from ignorance, you will do me a much greater piece of service, than you would in healing any distemper incident to my body. But now, should you have any intention to go through a long harangue, I can assure you beforehand, that you will never that way succeed in the affair: for my thoughts never will be able to keep even pace with you. But if you are disposed to answer to my questions, as you did before, you will highly^r profit and improve me; and, I presume, receive no detriment yourself. I have a right, Eudicus, to beg your interest with Hippias on this occasion; for you it was who engaged me in this dispute with him. If he therefore is averse to continuing the conversation in the way which I desire, do you intercede with him to favour my request.

EUD. There will be no occasion, Socrates, I imagine, for my intercession. That is made unnecessary by what Hippias himself said at first,—that he never declined answering to any man's questions. Did you not say so, Hippias?

HIP. I own it, Eudicus. But Socrates is always entangling the argument with cunning fallacies; and behaves like a fly deceiver.

SOC. My good Hippias! I do it not wilfully, I assure you, nor with any intention to deceive: for, if that were the case, I should be a man of great wisdom and abilities, according to your account. But, if I have that fault which you accuse me of, it is wholly involuntary in me. I pray you therefore pardon me: for pardon, you say, is due to involuntary and ignorant deceivers.

^r See the last sentence but one in the Greater Hippias.—S.

EUD.

EUD. Do so, Hippias; forgive Socrates; and be not angry with him: but for my sake, and out of regard to your own word, answer to whatever questions he shall propose to you.

HIP. Well, at your entreaty, I will answer to his questions.—Come then; propose any, which you desire to have an answer to.

SOC. Truly, Hippias, I am greatly desirous to have a thorough discussion of that very point just now mentioned;—Which are the better sort of men; those who commit errors knowingly, wilfully, and purposely; or those others, who are guilty of the very same without knowing what they do, and without any will or purpose to err¹. Now the best way we can take, to have this point well examined, is, in my opinion, by setting out thus;—but observe, and make your answers duly²;—Are there not men, who are good at a foot-race?

¹ Every universal truth will hold good in all particular cases, to which it is applicable. In the way of reasoning therefore by induction, the enumerating of many particulars, however chosen, in which the hypothesis to be proved is found true, serves to induce a probability at least of its being true universally. And if the hypothesis fails in no instance that can be thought of, the certainty of it is then sufficiently established.—It should seem, therefore, that Plato might have been indifferent what instances he produced to prove a doctrine which, if true, might fairly be inferred from a multitude of any pitched upon at random. And indeed, had this been all he had in view, indifferent he would certainly have been to which he gave the preference. But his design, in selecting from all the several kinds of action the particular instances that follow, to the end of this second part of the Dialogue, is to show, what weaknesses or disorders in the human frame are the natural causes of ignorance and vice; and what natural disposition of body and mind is favourable to knowledge and virtue. In the choice and arrangement of these instances will appear admirable art and contrivance: for the discovery of which he prepares us in this sentence, by professing to take a certain method and way of beginning, such as is the most proper.—S.

² Plato begins, and takes his four first instances from such actions as fundamentally depend on the structure of the body and the conformation of its parts; in particular, running, wrestling, dancing, and singing. For the well-performing of these exercises, so far as the body is concerned, severally depends on agility, strength, gracefulness, and a musical voice: and these severally arise from elasticity of the fibres, firmness in the fabric of the bones, pliancy in the joints, and a perfect power of dilatation and contraction in the lungs and larynx. When all these concur, the natural consequences will be an animated, free, and easy flow of the blood and humours, sprightliness and vigour in the soul, and at the same time (if no obstacle hinder) firmness in the mind.—S.

HIP.

HIP. There are.

Soc. And others in the same exercise who are bad?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. Are not the good, those who run well? and the bad, those who run ill?

HIP. They are.

Soc. Do not the slow runners run ill? the swift runners, well?

HIP. They do.

Soc. In the race therefore, and in running, swiftness is a good thing; slowness, a bad thing.

HIP. Without dispute.

Soc. Whether of these two then is the better man in the race? One, who runs slow wilfully and on purpose; or one, whose slowness in running is involuntary and undesigned?

HIP. The first; he, who runs slow on purpose.

Soc. Is not running the doing something?

HIP. It is.

Soc. And if so, is not some action performed in running?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. The man, therefore, who runs ill, performs an action which is bad and unseemly in the race.

HIP. Undoubtedly so.

Soc. And the man runs ill, you say, who runs slowly.

HIP. True.

Soc. He therefore is the good man in the race, who wilfully and purposely commits this bad and unseemly action: and he is the bad man, who does it against his will and his intention.

HIP. So it seems to be.

Soc. In the race therefore, the man, who is guilty of bad actions against his will and his intention, is a worse man than the other, in whom those bad actions are voluntary and intended.

HIP. In the race, I grant you, that it is so.

Soc. And how is it in wrestling? Whether of the two is the better wrestler? the man who, when he falls, falls designedly, or the man whose falls are involuntary and undesigned?

HIP. Probably, the man who falls designedly.

SOC. And which is the worse and more unseemly action in wrestling? for a man to fall himself, or to give his antagonist a fall?

HIP. To fall himself.

SOC. In wrestling then also, the man, who is guilty of bad and unseemly actions with design, is a better man than the other, who is guilty of the same without designing them.

HIP. It is probable that he is.

SOC. And how does the rule hold with respect to all other actions of the body? Is not the man, whose body is well-framed and fitly disposed, equally able for actions either strong or weak, either seemly and becoming, or unbecoming and awkward? So that the man who has a better habit of body, when he performs any bodily exercise or action ill, does it out of choice; but the man, whose body is in a worse state, performs ill against his inclination.

HIP. In actions which depend on strength of body, I admit the truth of your hypothesis.

SOC. And what say you as to those, which depend on gracefulness of the body, Hippias? Does it not belong to that body, which is well formed and well habituated, to exhibit unseemly and bad motions, gestures, and attitudes, only when the mind so wills and directs; but to a body of worse make and worse habits, to behave, move, and carry itself awkwardly without such will and direction? or how think you?

HIP. That it is, as you say.

SOC. Ungracefulness therefore also, when voluntary, belongs to the body in its better plight; when involuntary, is owing to an ill or depraved state of body.

HIP. So indeed it appears.

SOC. And how think you as to the voice? Which voice do you suppose the better and more excellent? That which sings out of tune wilfully and designedly; or that which does so because it cannot do otherwise?

HIP. That which does so designedly.

SOC. And that you call a viler voice, which errs from the harmony, and cannot help it.

HIP.

HIP. I do.

Soc. Further¹;—the things which are yours, whether would you choose to have them in good condition and order, or to have them bad, depraved, and out of order?

HIP. To have them good, and such as they ought to be.

Soc. Whether then would you choose to have your feet go lame at your own pleasure, or to have them limp and stumble against your will?

HIP. To go lame at my own pleasure.

Soc. Is not lameness in the feet a depravity of the feet; and the going lame an ungraceful way of walking?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. And is not squinting a depravity of the eyes?

HIP. It is.

Soc. Which sort of eyes now would you choose to have, and to see with? Such as would look askint only when you pleased, or such as could not avoid squinting?

HIP. Such as squinted only when I pleased.

Soc. Of the things then which are your own, you deem those, whose wrong and depraved actions are voluntary, better than those, the pravity of whose actions is involuntary.

HIP. In things of that kind, I admit it to be true.

Soc. All such therefore, ears, and nose, and mouth, and all other parts administering to sensation, are to be comprehended in the following general

¹ His five next instances he takes from those parts of the body which are the more immediate servants of the mind: 1. The outward instruments of motion (particularizing in the feet), by which the will of the mind is executed: 2. The outward organs of sensation (enumerating them all), through which the mind perceives outward things: 3. That immediate source of motion and sensation, the brain; to signify which he uses the metaphor of a rudder, steering the body as the mind pleases: 4. Those inward instruments of motion, and vehicles of sensation, the nerves; which he compares to the strings of musical instruments, braced up or relaxed by the different passions of the soul, and vibrating just as they are touched from without, or played on by the musician's hand within: 5. and lastly, The organs of speech, signified by wind-instruments of music, through which the mind expresses her meaning, or declares her will. How much the acquisition of knowledge, the state of the soul, and power of the mind to do what she wills, depend on having all these organs in perfection, is by no means difficult to conceive.—S.

rule ;—those, in which the bad performance of their functions is involuntary, a man would be glad not to have, feeling that such are evil ; but those, whose wrong action or operation is wilful, and according to the intention, are desirable, such being good.

HIP. I agree.

SOC. Well ; and what sort of instruments is it best to have to do with ? those, with which a man may execute his work ill through choice and design ; or those, with which he cannot work otherwise than ill ? For instance : Whether of the two is the best rudder ; that, with which the steering ill is unavoidable ; or that, with which the pilot, if he steers ill, does it wilfully and on purpose ?

HIP. The latter sort.

SOC. Is it not so with the bow and lyre ; so with the flute ¹ ; so with every other kind of tools and instruments ?

HIP. It is true.

SOC. Well ² ; and of which horse is it best to be the owner ? Whether of a horse with such a kind of temper and spirit, as may serve his rider in riding

¹ To the instances already given, which are of more especial moment, the other parts and members of the body are subjoined, in general ; the regular frame and sound condition of them all being, in the opinion of Plato, of some importance to the soul, to its affections and passions ; more or less, in proportion to the more immediate or more remote action, or influence, of the one upon the other. This will open much of Plato's secret meaning in the latter part of his *Timæus*.—S.

² From the just frame of the body, and the right formation of every member of it, the philosopher proceeds, in the same metaphorical manner, to describe the other part of that *εὐφροία*, or good natural disposition, which he holds to be the necessary foundation of virtue. This other part is the right frame or constitution of the soul herself. He begins with the passions ; agreeably to that climax which he uses through all these instances. The passions are, in the Platonic system, all comprehended under two kinds, *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, the emotions of desire and anger. The first of these kinds is characterized under the emblem of a horse, the latter under that of a dog ; and both with great propriety. For one of these animals is remarkably subject to vehement emotions of the former kind in pursuit of glory or pleasure ; the other to emotions of the latter kind no less violent, when the seizing of his prey or the destruction of an enemy is the end in view. Now both these animals, though irrational, are by nature formed to be manageable by man ; and are highly servicable to him, when their passions are directed to their proper objects, and restrained within due bounds.—S.

ill purposely and through choice only; or of a horse ¹, upon which his rider must of necessity ride ill?

HIP. Of the horse, upon which a man may ride ill only through choice.

Soc. This horse then is of a better spirit and temper than the other.

HIP. True.

Soc. With this better-tempered horse then a man may ², if he has an evil intention, perform such mischievous and evil tricks as this animal is capable of; but with the bad-tempered horse he cannot avoid doing mischief.

HIP. Perfectly true.

Soc. And is it not equally true with respect to the spirit and temper of a dog? and so of every other species of animals?

HIP. I admit it to hold true in the case of every brute animal.

Soc. Well now; and how is it in our own species, and with respect to the human soul? Whether is it better to have in our service a bowman, who, if he ever misses the mark, misses wilfully ³; or one who is apt to do, contrary to his intention and his aim?

HIP. One who misses wilfully.

Soc. Such a one then is a better man at shooting.

HIP. Right.

¹ The emendation of this sentence must be attributed to Cornarius: for he has been beforehand with us, in reading *αμεινον, η η ακων*, instead of *αμεινων η ακων*, as in all the editions of the Greek it is printed.—S.

² Thus in the Greek; *Τη αμεινον αρα ψυχη ιππου τα της ψυχης εργα ταυτης τα πονηρα εκουσιως αν ποιοι, τα δε της πανηρις, ακουσιως*. It is evident, that this reading is faulty. We have always imagined, that the fault lay in the transposition of some of the words, with the corruption of only one in consequence of that transposition; and that the right reading was this; *Τ. α. α. ψ. ι. τ. τ. ψ. ε. τ. τα της πονηρις, εκουσιως αν ποιοι, τη δε πονηρα, ακουσιως*. But Cornarius is of opinion, that the sentence may be amended by altering only *τα δε της πονηρις* into *τη δε τ. π.* which he is pleased to say, signifies the same with *τη δε πονηροτερα*.—S.

³ In the editions of the Greek text, the sentence stands thus; *Τι δε δη; ανθρωπη ψυχην κεντησθαι τοσοτη αμεινους ειν, ητις εκουσιως αμαρτανει τω σκοπη, η ητις ακουσιως*; but we should be glad to read it as follows; *Τι δε δη ανθρωπη; ψυχην κεντησθαι τοσοτη αμεινον ειν, κ. τ. λ.* transferring the first point of interrogation to the word *ανθρωπη*, and altering the word *αμεινους* into *αμεινον*, which latter emendation was made before us by Cornarius. Both together will render this sentence much more agreeable to the turn of those which precede, than the alteration of it proposed by Stephens.—S.

Soc.

Soc. In our own species therefore, and with respect to the human soul^f, the man, who misses aim or errs without intending so to do, is a worse man than the other, whose missing of the mark is undesigned, or whose error is involuntary.

Hip. In the bowman's art I grant you that it is so.

Soc. And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not he the better physician, who, if he hurts or brings any disorder on the bodily frame, does it knowingly and purposely?

Hip. He is.

Soc. In this art also then, such a one is a better man than one who hurts when he would heal.

Hip. True.

Soc. And how is it in music, whether of the string or of the wind-kind? how, in all other arts and sciences? Is not he the better man, who purposely performs ill, and commits voluntary errors? and is not he the bad man, who blunders and errs, without designing it?

Hip. Probably so.

Soc. And we certainly should choose to have under our command such slaves as committed voluntary faults, and were guilty of bad actions purposely, rather than such as could not help blundering, doing wrong, and acting perversely; the former sort being better for our service.

Hip. In that also we agree.

Soc. Well then; do we not wish to be as good and excellent as possible ourselves?

Hip. To be sure.

Soc. Would not our own mind, spirit, and temper, be better, if we did evil and committed faults wilfully and freely, than if we could not avoid those faults and evil actions?

Hip. It would be a strange thing, Socrates, if the wilfully unjust and dishonest were better men than those who unwittingly or unwillingly did a base action.

^f The original, as printed, runs thus; *Και ψυχή ἀρὰ ἀκρίτως ἀμαρτανύσα, κ. τ. λ.* But the reasoning requires the word *ἀνθρώπου* to be inserted after the word *ἀρὰ*. It was easily dropped in transcribing some manuscript, on account of the similitude of the letters which follow it: the ancient manner of writing it being this; *Και ψυχή ἀρὰ ἀν ἀκρίτως, κ. τ. λ.*—S.

Soc.

Soc. And yet this appears to be the just conclusion from those premises ¹, in which we are agreed.

Hip. It appears not so to me.

Soc. To you yourself, I imagined, it must so appear. Let me put to you then a question or two more.—Is not honesty either some certain power in the mind, or some certain knowledge, or both together? Is it not necessary that true inward honesty should be one or other of these?

Hip. It is.

Soc. If honesty then be some power in the mind, does not honesty inhabit that mind most which is possessed of the most power? And this corresponds with what appeared true to us before, if you remember,—that the man who had the most abilities and powers within him was the best man in every case that we considered.

Hip. It did so appear.

Soc. And if honesty be some knowledge in the mind, does not honesty reside most in that mind, which hath the most knowledge, and is the wisest? and is not, in such case, that mind the most dishonest which is the most undisciplined and ignorant?—But if honesty should arise from knowledge and power, meeting both together in the same mind, is not that mind which is the best furnished with both, with knowledge and power, the most filled with honesty? and are not the greatest degrees of ignorance ² and impotence

¹ That is, upon the absurd supposition, that there are any such men. But if still the question should be asked, Whence is it, that a man may err wilfully in executing any work or energy of art, or in performing any action merely natural (for so is it with great truth supposed throughout the Dialogue), and that power and will may in all such cases be separated; yet that it is otherwise with respect to moral actions; that no error here is truly voluntary, and no bad man is free? The reason is this; that in all other cases the workman, or performer, may aim at some other end than the excellence of his work, or the rectitude of his performance: but that in every action, where morality is concerned, that is, in every action morally good or evil, the attainment of what a man thinks his good is the only end for which he acts: and that no man can possibly pursue, will, or aim at his own evil, fully and clearly knowing it to be what it is; nor help aiming at, willing, and pursuing what upon the whole he determines to be for himself the best. The will therefore in all these cases must of necessity follow, or rather accompany, the judgment.—S.

² That, in the Greek text, after the words *ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεύτερα*, the words *καὶ ἀδυνάτετερα* ought to be inserted, will be evident to every one who knows how to reason, and in what part an argument is defective.—S.

in the mind parents of the greatest villany?—Must not these things through necessity be so?

HIP. So indeed they appear.

SOC. Did it not appear before, that a man of the most knowledge and wisdom, as well as of the most abilities and powers, was the best man, and the most capable of performing either well or ill, at his own pleasure, in every operation?

HIP. It did.

SOC. Such a man therefore, whenever he performs any thing ill, does it with design; does it through his powers and his knowledge. Now it is evident, that on these honesty depends, either on both of them, or at least on one or other.

HIP. Probably it does.

SOC. It is further evident, that acting dishonestly is doing ill; and that acting honestly is doing well.

HIP. Clearly so.

SOC. Will not that man then, whose mind is the most filled with honesty and virtue, whenever he shall do any dishonest or base action, do it through choice and with design? but the man whose mind is evil and dishonest, will no he be guilty of villanous and base actions through unavoidable necessity?

HIP. So it appears.

SOC. Is not a good man, one whose mind is good and honest? and is not he a bad man, whose mind is evil and dishonest?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. It belongs to the good man, therefore, to act dishonestly through free choice; to the bad man without free choice, and through unavoidable necessity; if it be true that the mind of a good man is good.

HIP. And that certainly is true.

SOC. The man, therefore, who does wrong, and is guilty of villanous and base actions wilfully and out of free choice, if such a man there be¹, Hippias, he can be no other than the good man.

HIP.

¹ Meaning, that the supposition was absurd. See the Introduction. Plato here presents us with a key to this Dialogue, opening it so easily, and letting us into the secret of it so freely, that every unprejudiced mind may well wonder how it came to be so greatly misunderstood, as it will appear to have generally been, if any of our readers will take the pains to examine the annotations and comments on it, written by the moderns. But the wonder will cease, on reflecting what

HIP. I know not, Socrates, how I can grant you this.

SOC. Nor can I easily grant it to myself, Hippias. It must however, of necessity, appear true to us both at present, having been proved by the force of our present argument. But, as I said before, with regard to this point¹,
my

what unphilosophical and vulgar notions concerning the freedom of the will have generally prevailed in Europe ever since the extinction of those ancient schools of philosophy which once enlightened it. Hence it has come to pass, that learned men, involved in the common prejudices, have understood all the passages of ancient authors, relating to this point, in a sense favourable to their own notions. For error, that disease of the mind, resembles in this respect certain diseases in the humours of the body; it imparts somewhat of its own flavour, and gives a tinge of its own colour, to every object of the taste or sight which is so diseased. Those prejudices on the point in question, and the consequences of them, here complained of, are evidently seen in the late Mr. Jackson's Defence, as he is pleased to term it, of Human Liberty. For that learned man appears to have had a heart purer and clearer than his head; and therefore cannot be supposed to have misrepresented the sense of those ancient authors, whom he cites, knowingly and wilfully. The truth seems to be, that over much zeal, though in a good cause, that of theism, so far blinded him, as well as some greater men before him, that he thought he saw a similitude between two hypotheses, quite different and even opposite; the one, that of a material or mechanical necessity, maintained by Mr. Hobbes and by the author of Cato's letters, an hypothesis utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of an all-directing mind in nature; the other, that of a rational or moral necessity, no less inconsistent with atheism, and necessarily connected with the idea of a governor of the universe, ruling as well the rational part of it, as the rest, not by mere will, but wisdom. For if the appearances of good are not cogent to man, and he is not of necessity obliged to follow those only rational motives, but is by nature referred afterwards to some other power within him called will, distinct from reason, and able to control it, then is mere will in man, and, for aught we can tell, in nature too, a principle higher and more divine than intellect.—S.

¹ Should there be any man now, after all, who is inclined to think that Socrates, through this whole conversation, was but in jest, and meant nothing serious; or that, like the sophists, he used fallacious arguments, with a villanous intent to impose on the understandings of the company, by confounding truth and falsehood, right and wrong; or should any imagine, with Serranus, that the philosopher had no other end in view than merely to confuse or puzzle Hippias, and expose him to ridicule; or should there possibly be some other who follows Ficinus in fancying, that his secret meaning was the very reverse of that which we have represented it to be in the Introduction, and contended for in the notes; for that the will was independent of the judgment or understanding; and vice was owing neither to impotence, nor ignorance, nor both together, but to malice only or perverseness in the will; and that Socrates himself embraced, as truly philosophical, this distinction of the forum, received in after-ages by the pretended followers of Aristotle; but that he left it forsooth for Hippias to distinguish thus nicely, on purpose to show the ignorance of that sophist if he did it not; should any of our readers be apt to entertain any of these notions, on account of the strangeness of the paradox advanced or insinuated in this Dialogue, we shall content ourselves with observing that, strange as it may seem, it is entirely

my mind is driven backward and forward continually, and never remains long in the same opinion. Indeed, there is nothing wonderful in the case that I should wander in uncertainty; or that any other man should, who is only one of the multitude. But if you wise men should run in the same perplexed mazes, this must be to us a heavy misfortune; since we could never in this case, even though we applied to you, be freed from our perplexities.

consonant with the doctrine of Socrates, as delivered to us by Plato in many other of his writings. This was so notorious to the ancients, that Arrian, in his *Dissertations* of Epictetus, l. i. c. 28. and l. ii. c. 22. and Marcus Antoninus, l. vii. § 63. cite the authority of Plato to confirm the truth of this doctrine. The principal passages in our author, where he inculcates it expressly and openly, have been collected by Gataker in his *Annotations* on Antoninus, p. 286 and 399. and by our late learned friend Mr. Upton, in his *Notes* on Arrian, p. 91. Above all, see Alcinous, *Introduct.* c. 23. where his account of the Platonic doctrine upon this subject seems to be chiefly extracted from this Dialogue, and shows that he understood it exactly in the same sense with us.—S.

THE END OF THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THE EUTHYDEMUS:

A DIALOGUE

EXPOSING

THE VAIN TRIFLING OF THE SOPHISTS.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

PLATO, in the following Dialogue, has given an illustrious specimen of that philanthropy, which he often displays in his other dialogues. For he here studies to avert the reader from the vain trifles of the sophists, by showing that these men, even when they discuss the most weighty subjects, jest and delude the expectation of the hearers. Both in this Dialogue, however, and elsewhere, he describes these men to be curious and vain disputants in verbal altercation, and prompt to refute whatever may be said, whether it be true or false. And, in the first place, indeed, he shows how avaricious the genius of the sophists is, since the brother sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, are prepared to teach for money the military art, in which they boast, and which no one ever sold. In the next place, how ambitious, since they at the same time profess judicial together with military skill, and together with both the sophistic art, though all these widely differ from each other. In the third place, how vain; since, though now old men, they betake themselves from things to words, and from the study of truth to falsehood. And, in the fourth place, how despicable; since, in a short time, any one may become a proficient in this cavilling art.

In the course of this Dialogue, Socrates, with a most facetious irony, beseeches the sophists, that after jesting they would come to serious concerns; and he proposes a certain formula, conformable to which, as a pattern, he hopes to receive from them an exhortation to philosophy. In this formula he first defines felicity, by a common conception, to be *living well*. Afterwards

wards he proves that this living well consists either in obtaining things agreeable to the will, or in the right use of the things themselves. And he concludes that wisdom alone renders its possessors blessed, since it alone obtains what is agreeable to the will, and rightly uses what it obtains. In the course of the argument an illustrious dogma presents itself to the view, and which afterwards became the foundation of the Stoic philosophy, viz. that things external and corporeal ought rather to be called indifferent and common, than good or evil; and that wisdom is properly good, and folly properly evil: since through the former we partake of every good, and through the latter of every evil. But that all the power of felicity consists in wisdom, the three appellations of felicity, instituted by the antient authors of the Greek language, sufficiently evince, viz. *ευδαιμονια, ευτυχια, ευπραγια*, *eudaimonia, eutuchia, eupragia*. For the first of these appellations signifies the knowledge of good; the second, the attainment of it; and the third, the use of it; all which are accomplished for us by wisdom.

Near the conclusion of this Dialogue, the artificial, polite, facetious, and elegant irony of Socrates collects the reprehension of sophistic cavilling into three heads. First, that the most worthy men despise trifles of this kind. Secondly, that the sophisms confute themselves. And thirdly, that even boys might acquire this most trifling artifice in the space of two days. Soon after this, he descends from the sophist to the rhetorician, for each of these falsely professes political virtue, as we learn from the *Gorgias*. And he shows that rhetoricians, while they profess themselves to be both politicians and philosophers, are perfectly useless for the purposes of either.

I only add, that this Dialogue appears to have been justly ranked by the antients among those of the *anatreptic*, or *subversive* character, and that it belongs to that energy of Plato's dialectic, which, as we have already observed in the Introduction to the *Parmenides*, consists in confuting false opinions.

THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITO,		DIONYSODORUS,
SOCRATES,		CLINIAS,
[EUTHYDEMUS,		CTESIPPUS ¹ .]

CRITO.

WITH whom, Socrates, did you yesterday converse in the Lyceum? For you were surrounded with so great a crowd, that though I approached, desirous to hear, yet I could not hear any thing clearly. I raised myself indeed on my feet that I might see more distinctly, and it appeared to me that it was a certain stranger with whom you were conversing. Who was this stranger?

Soc. You must ask, Crito, which of them it was; for not one only, but two were present.

CRITO. He, of whom I speak, sat the third from your right hand; but in the middle of you was a lad², the son of Axiochus, who appeared to me, Socrates, to have made a great proficiency in learning, and who does not

¹ I have followed Dr. Routh, in his excellent edition of this Dialogue, in including the names of Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Clinias, and Ctesippus, in brackets, because, as he justly observes, these persons do not speak, but the disputation is delivered, as if the thing were narrated, and not acted.

² The name of this youth was Clinias, at whose request Socrates, together with Axiochus, in a dialogue of that name, which is generally ascribed to Æschines, disputes against the fear of death.

much

much differ in age from our Critobulus¹; though he indeed is very slender; but this lad looks older than he is, and is of a fair and engaging aspect.

Soc. It is Euthydemus, Socrates, of whom you inquire; but he who sat with me, on my left hand, was his brother Dionysodorus, who also partook of the discourse.

CRITO. I know neither of them, Socrates.

Soc. They are recent sophists, as it appears.

CRITO. Whence do they come; and what is the wisdom which they profess?

Soc. They are, I think, natives of Chius, but they migrated to the Thurians², and flying³ from thence, dwelt for many years about these places. But in answer to your inquiry respecting their wisdom, they are indeed very wise, Crito; but I have been hitherto ignorant that they were pancratiasts: for they are skilled in every kind of contest, not after the manner of those brother pancratiasts of Acarnania; since they are only able to contend with the body; but these, in the first place, are most powerful in body, and excel in that contest which consists in vanquishing all men⁴. For they are very skilful in contending with arms, and they know how to impart this skill to another who gives them a reward for it. In the next place, they are most powerful in judicial contests, and are able both to contend themselves, and instruct others, to deliver and compose forensic orations. At first, therefore, they were only skilled in these things, but now they have carried the pancratiastic art to its utmost perfection: for they are now so skilled in that kind of contest, which it remained for them to acquire; that no one is able to resist them; so skilful are they become in verbal contention, and in always confuting whatever is said, whether it be true or false. I therefore, Crito,

¹ Xenophon often makes mention of this person, and sometimes Plato. He was the friend of Clinias, and was a youth of admirable beauty. Vid. Xen. Sympof. p. 882. ed. Leunclav. See also more concerning this son of Crito near the end of the Dialogue.

² Thuri, or Thurium, was a town of Magna Græcia, situated between the rivers Sybaris and Crathis.

³ Others of the antient sophists also were banished from Grecian cities, as we learn from Philostratus and others who have written their lives.

⁴ These sophists were not in reality skilled in the *pancratium*; but Socrates says this ironically of them, because they pretended to possess *universal skill in confutation*.

intend to deliver myself to these men: for they say that, in a short time, they can render another person skilled in the same things.

CRITO. But are you not afraid, Socrates, that you are too old for this purpose?

SOC. By no means, Crito, as I have a sufficient argument and remedy against fear: for these very men, as I may say, who are now old, have entered on the study of this wisdom, which I desire, viz. the art of contending. For last year, or the year before last, they were not in the least skilled in this art. But I am only afraid of one thing, lest I should be a disgrace to these strangers, in the same manner as I am to Connus the harper, the son of Metrobius, who even now teaches me to play on the harp. The boys, therefore, who are my fellow disciples, on seeing me, laugh, and call Connus the preceptor of old men. Lest therefore some one should reproach these strangers with the same thing, and they dreading this should be unwilling to receive me, I have, Crito, persuaded other elderly men to attend me thither as my fellow disciples, and here also I am persuading others to accompany me. Do you also join us. Perhaps too, as an allurements, we may bring your sons to them: for, in consequence of desiring to have them as their pupils, I know that they will also instruct us.

CRITO. Nothing hinders, Socrates, if you are so disposed. But, in the first place, tell me what this wisdom of these men is, that I may also know what it is which we shall learn.

SOC. You will be disappointed, if you think that I am not able to tell you as if I did not attend to them. For I paid great attention, and very well remember what they said: and I will endeavour to relate the whole to you from the beginning. For, by a certain divine allotment, I had seated myself where you saw me, alone, in the Apodyterium¹: and I then intended to have risen; but as I was about to rise, the dæmon gave me the accustomed signal. I again therefore sat down, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus entered, and, together with these, many others, who appeared to me to be their disciples; and having entered, they walked in the covered porch² of the Gymnasium. But they had not yet walked twice or thrice round this place, when Clinias entered, who you say has made a great proficiency, and

¹ That part of the Gymnasium, in which those who washed or exercised put off their clothes.

² In this place the *athletæ* were exercised in the winter.

in so saying you speak the truth. Behind him there were many lovers and others, and besides these Ctesippus², a Pæanean youth, very beautiful and naturally very worthy, but wanton in consequence of his youth. Clinias, therefore, as soon as he entered, seeing me sitting alone, came towards me, and sat down on my right hand, as you say. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus perceiving him, at first stopped and conversed with each other, occasionally looking at us: for I beheld them very attentively. Afterwards approaching nearer, they sat down, Euthydemus indeed by the lad, but Dionysodorus by me, on my left hand. The rest seated themselves just as it happened. These therefore I saluted, because I had not seen them for some time. After this, I said to Clinias, These men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, O Clinias, are not wise in small, but in great things. For they are skilled in every thing pertaining to war, in all that a good general ought to know, and in the arrangement and management of an army. They likewise know how to render a man able to defend himself in courts of justice, when he is injured by any one. For thus speaking however they despised me, and both of them laughed, looking at each other. And Euthydemus indeed said, We no longer engage in these matters seriously, Socrates, but incidentally. And I being surprised said, Your pursuit must indeed be beautiful, if such great affairs are with you incidental. And, by the gods, inform me, what this beautiful study is.—We are of opinion, said he, Socrates, that we are able to teach virtue in the best manner, and with the greatest celerity of all men.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a mighty thing do you announce. Whence was this gain derived? I indeed had hitherto conceived respecting you, as I just now said, that you were very skilful in military contests; and this I had asserted to others. For when you first came hither, I remember that you announced this. But now, if in reality you possess this science, be propitious. For indeed I invoke you, as if you were gods, entreating you to pardon what I have before said. But see, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, if you have spoken the truth: for it is by no means wonderful if the magnitude of the promise should occasion disbelief.—Be assured, Socrates, that it is so, was the answer.—I therefore consider you as much more blessed through this possession, than the great king through his dominion. Thus

² He was one of those that were present at the death of Socrates. See the *Phædo*.

much however inform me, whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom, or how have you determined to act.—We came hither, Socrates, for this very purpose, to demonstrate and to teach, if any one is willing to learn.—But that all men who do not possess wisdom are willing to learn, I readily admit : for, in the first place, I myself am willing, and, in the next place, Clinias here ; and besides these Ctesippus, and all the rest that you see, pointing out to him the lovers of Clinias, by whom we were then surrounded : for Ctesippus at that time happened to be sitting at a considerable distance from Clinias. And as it appeared to me, Euthydemus, while he was discoursing with me, prevented, by the inclination of his body, Ctesippus from seeing Clinias, who was seated in the middle of us. Ctesippus therefore wishing to see his familiars, and at the same time being anxious to hear what was said, was the first that rose, and stood opposite to me. Afterwards the rest seeing him, stood round us, viz. the lovers of Clinias, and the companions of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. I therefore introducing these to Euthydemus, informed him that they were all ready to learn. And Ctesippus indeed, and the rest, very readily assented ; and all of them in common exhorted him to exhibit the power of his wisdom. I therefore said, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, these persons must by all means be gratified, and you must exhibit your wisdom to them for my sake. And it is evident indeed, that to demonstrate most things pertaining to this subject will be no small labour ; but inform me whether you are able to make him alone a good man, who is already persuaded that he ought to be instructed by you, or him also, who is not yet persuaded in consequence of not believing that virtue is a thing to be taught, or that you are the teachers of it : for, it is the business of the same art, to persuade a man thus affected, that virtue may be taught, and that you are capable of teaching it in the best manner. Or is it not?—It is the business, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, of the same art.—You therefore, I replied, O Dionysodorus, can in the best manner, of all the men that now exist, exhort to philosophy and the study of virtue. Is it not so?—We think we can, Socrates.—Of other things, therefore, I said, you will afterwards give us the demonstration, but of this now : and you will persuade this youth that he ought to philosophize, and study virtue ; and in so doing you will oblige me, and all that are present : for it so happens that both I, and all these, are desirous that this lad may become the best of men. He is the son

of Axiochus, who descended from the antient Alcibiades, and the cousin of the now-existing Alcibiades; and his name is Clinias. But he is young, and we are fearful, as it is likely we should be concerning one of his age, lest some one previous to our endeavours should turn his dianoëtic part to another study, and thus corrupt it. You therefore are very opportunely come: and if it is the same thing to you, make trial of the lad, and discourse with him before us.—When I had thus nearly said these things, Euthydemus boldly, and at the same time confidently, replied, It makes no difference, Socrates, if the lad is but willing to answer.—But indeed, I replied, he is accustomed to do this. For these frequently meeting together ask many questions, and discourse much with each other; so that it is likely that he will answer with confidence.

But how, O Crito, shall I disclose to you, in a proper manner, what follows? For it is no trifling labour to narrate such immense wisdom. So that I, after the manner of the poets, in beginning this narration, find it necessary to invoke the Muses and Mnemosyne. Euthydemus, therefore, as I think, began after this manner.—Whether, O Clinias, are those men that learn, wise or unwise?—And the lad through the magnitude of the question blushed, and being dubious, looked at me. But I, perceiving his perturbation, said, Be confident, Clinias, and boldly answer what appears to you to be the truth: for perhaps the greatest advantage will thence ensue. Upon this Dionysodorus whispering in my ear, and smiling, Indeed, Socrates, said he, I predict that in whatever manner the lad may answer he will be confuted. However, while he was thus speaking, Clinias happened to answer, so that it was not possible for me to admonish the lad any further. But he answered, that those that learnt were wise men. Euthydemus, therefore, said, Do you admit that there are certain teachers, or not?—He admitted that there are.—Are not therefore preceptors the preceptors of those that learn? As, for instance, a harper and a grammarian, were the preceptors of you and other boys, but you were their disciples.—He assented to this.—When you learned, therefore, were you not ignorant of these things which you learned?—Yes.—Were you, therefore, wise, when you were ignorant of these things?—By no means.—If, therefore, you were not wise, were you not ignorant?—Entirely so.—You therefore, when learning things of which you had no knowledge, learned them being ignorant?—The lad assented

assented to this.—The ignorant therefore learn, O Clinias, and not the wife, as you thought.—On his speaking in this manner, just like a choir, on a signal given by the master, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus loudly applauded what was said and laughed. And before the lad could well take breath, Dionysodorus said to him, But what, Clinias, when the grammarian recites, whether are the boys who learn what he recites, wife, or unwise?—They are wise, said Clinias.—The wise therefore learn, and not the ignorant; and consequently you did not rightly just now answer Euthydemus.—But on this, the lovers of these men more loudly laughed and applauded, admiring the wisdom of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus; but the rest of us being astonished were silent. Euthydemus, therefore, perceiving our astonishment, that we might yet still more admire him, did not dismiss the lad, but further interrogated him; and, after the manner of skilful dancers, turned twofold inquiries about the same thing. For, said he, whether do those who learn, learn the things which they know, or things which they do not know? And again Dionysodorus said to me whispering, This also, Socrates, is just such another question as the former.—By Jupiter, said I, the former question appeared to me to be beautiful.—We always ask, said he, Socrates, such like inevitable questions.—You appear therefore to me, said I, to possess a great reputation among your disciples. In the mean time Clinias answered Euthydemus, that those who learn, learn that of which they are ignorant. And Euthydemus interrogated him as before—Do you not, said he, know your letters?—I do.—Do you not, therefore, know all of them?—He acknowledged that he did.—When therefore any one recites, does he not recite letters?—He confessed it.—Hence, said he, he recites things which you know, since you know all the letters.—This also he acknowledged.—What then? he replied, Do you not learn that which some one recites?—Yes.—But do you learn, not knowing your letters?—I do not, he replied, but I learn in consequence of knowing them.—Do you not therefore learn the things which you know, since you know all the letters?—He acknowledged that he did.—Hence, said he, you have not answered rightly.—Euthydemus had scarcely thus spoken, when Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse as if it had been a ball, again aimed at the lad as a mark, and said, Euthydemus deceives you, O Clinias. For tell me, is not to learn, to receive the science of that which any one learns?—Clinias assented.—But, he replied, is to know.

know scientifically any thing else than to possess science when thus knowing?—He granted it was nothing else.—Not to know scientifically, therefore, is not yet to possess science.—He assented to this.—Whether, therefore, are those that receive any thing, those who now possess it, or those who do not possess it?—Those who do not possess it.—Have you not then confessed that those who have not scientific knowledge, are among the number of those who do not possess?—He acknowledged that he had.—Those that learn, therefore, belong to those that receive, and not to those that possess.—He granted it.—Those therefore, said he, Clinias, learn who have not a scientific knowledge, and not those who have. After this, again wrestling as it were the third time, Euthydemus attacked the youth. But I, seeing the merged condition of the lad, and wishing to give him some respite, lest he should be afraid of us, said, in order to console him, Do not wonder, Clinias, if these discourses appear to you to be unusual; for perhaps you do not perceive the intention of these strangers. They act however in the same manner as those in the mysteries of the Corybantes, when they place him whom they are about to initiate on a throne¹: for there also there are dancing and sports, as you know, if you have been initiated in these mysteries. And now they do nothing else than dance, and as it were sportively leap round, as if after this they would initiate you. Now therefore think that you have heard the first part of sophistical sacred rites. For, in the first place, as Prodicus says, it is necessary to learn the proper signification of names; which these strangers also have indicated to you, because you have not perceived that men employ the verb *to learn* in a thing of this kind, when any one, at first possessing no science concerning a certain thing, afterwards receives the science of that thing. They also employ this verb, when any one now possessing science, considers this very thing by this same science, either while the thing is effected or while it is enunciated. Or they rather call this *to apprehend* than *to learn*,

¹ The *Curetes* are gods of an unpolluted guardian characteristic, and first subsist in that order of gods which is called by the Chaldaean theologists *nopeos*, intellectual. The *Corybantes*, who form the guardian triad of *supermundane* gods, are analogous to these. Those that were initiated in the mysteries of the Corybantes were *insanely* and *enthusiastically moved*, as we learn from the *Lexicon* of Timæus. When he who was about to be initiated in the mysteries of these, or any other gods, was invested with a sacred and mystic dress, he was placed in a solemn manner on a throne, while in the mean time the other mystics danced round him. This ceremony was called *θρονισμος*.

though

though sometimes they call it *to learn*. But of this, as they indicate, you are ignorant, viz. that the same name pertains to men affected in a contrary manner, viz. with respect to him who knows, and him who is ignorant. Similar to this is that which took place in the second question, in which they asked you, whether men learn things which they know, or things of which they are ignorant. These indeed are the sports of disciplines: on which account I say that these men play with you. But I use the word *play* on this account, because, though some one should learn many, or all such particulars as these, yet he would not be in any respect wiser with respect to the manner in which things subsist. However, he may sport with men, by supplanting and subverting what they assert, through the difference of names; just as they who draw away the seats from those that are going to sit down rejoice and laugh when they see him whom they have overturned supine. Consider therefore what has happened to you from these men as sport; but what follows will be exhibited to you by them as serious concerns: and I will show them the way that they may fulfil their promise to me. For they promise to exhibit their exhortatory wisdom: but now, as it appears to me, they have thought it was requisite first to sport with you.

Thus far therefore, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, you have sported, and perhaps sufficiently: but in the next place show, exhorting the lad, in what manner it is requisite to pay attention to wisdom and virtue. First of all, however, I will indicate to you my conceptions on this affair, and what I desire to hear concerning it. If, therefore, I shall appear to you to do this, in a foolish and ridiculous manner, do not deride me: for, through a desire of hearing your wisdom, I will venture for a time to speak before you. Endure therefore to hear me, both you and your disciples, without laughing: but do you, O son of Axiochus, answer me.—Do we not all then wish to do well? Or is this question, of which we were just now afraid, one among those that are ridiculous? For indeed, it is stupid to ask questions of this kind. For who is there that does not wish to do well?—No one, said Clinias.—Be it so, said I.—But in the next place, since we wish to do well, in what manner shall we be able to accomplish this? Shall we say, by having many good things? Or is this answer still more stupid than the former? For it is evident that this also must be the case.—He assented.—But come, what are the things which are good to us? Or does it appear to
be

be a thing neither difficult, nor the province of a venerable man, to discover this? For every one will tell us that it is good to be rich. Will they not?—Certainly, said he.—And is it not also good to be in health, to be beautiful, and to be sufficiently furnished with other things pertaining to the body?—So it appeared to him.—But nobility also, power, and honours, in one's own city, are also good.—He granted that they were.—What then, said I, yet remains for us among things good? What is it to be temperate, just, and brave? Whether, by Jupiter, Clinias, do you think that, if we consider these things as good, we shall consider them properly? Or that this will be the case if we consider them not as good? For perhaps this may be disputed by some one. But how does it appear to you?—That these things are good, said Clinias.—Be it so, said I; but in what choir shall we place wisdom? Among things good? Or how do you say?—Among things good.—But consider, lest among things good, we should omit any one which is worthy to be related.—But, said Clinias, it appears to me that we have not omitted any one.—However, I then recollecting, said, But, by Jupiter, we appear to have omitted the greatest of goods.—What is that? said he.—Felicity, O Clinias, which all men, and even those that are perfectly depraved, assert to be the greatest of goods.—What you say is true, said he.—And I again, correcting myself, said, We have nearly, O son of Axiochus, rendered ourselves ridiculous to these strangers.—Why so? said he.—Because, having placed felicity in the things which we before enumerated, we now again speak concerning it.—But why is this improper?—Because it is certainly ridiculous again to adduce that which was formerly proposed, and to say the same things twice.—How do you mean? said he.—Wisdom, I replied, is certainly felicity: this even a boy knows.—He indeed wondered, so young and simple was he. And I perceiving his admiration, said, Do you not know, Clinias, that in performing well on the pipe, pipers¹ are most happy?—He granted that they were.—Are not therefore, said I, grammarians also most happy in the writing and reading of letters?—Entirely so.—But what? In dangers of the sea, do you think that any in short are more happy than wise pilots?—Certainly not.—Again: In battle,

¹ Felicity is the *proper perfection* of a vital being. An artist therefore is happy, so far as pertains to his being an artist, when he arrives at *perfection* in his art.

with

with which will you more pleasantly partake of danger and fortune? with a wife, or with an ignorant general?—With a wife general.—And when you are dangerously ill, with which will you be more pleasantly circumstanced? with a wife, or with an ignorant physician?—With a wife physician.—Is it not therefore, said I, because you think that you will act more prosperously, by acting with one wife, than with one unwife?—He granted it.—Wisdom, therefore, every where, renders men happy. For certainly no one can ever err through wisdom; but it is necessary that through this he should act rightly, and obtain his end: for otherwise it would not be wisdom.—At length, but I do not know how, we summarily agreed that this was the case; viz. that when wisdom is present, nothing of felicity is wanting.

After we had agreed in this particular, I again asked him how we should be affected with relation to the things which we had formerly granted. For, said I, we granted that if many good things were present with us we should be happy, and act well.—He assented to this.—Whether, therefore, should we be happy through present good, if it were of no advantage to us, or if it benefited us?—If it benefited us, said he.—Would then any thing benefit us, if we alone possessed it, but did not use it? As, for instance, if we possessed much food, but did not eat it, or drink, but did not drink it, should we in any respect be benefited by this?—Certainly not, said he.—But what? If all artificers had every thing requisite prepared for them, each for his own work, but did not use them when thus procured, would they act well through the possession of these, viz. merely because they possessed every thing which an artificer ought to possess? Thus, for instance, if a carpenter had all kinds of instruments and wood prepared for him sufficient for his purpose, but yet should fashion nothing, would he derive any advantage from this possession?—By no means, said he.—But what? If any one should possess riches, and all such things as we now denominate good, but should not use them, would he be happy through the possession of these goods?—He certainly would not, Socrates.—It is necessary therefore, said I, as it seems, that he who intends to be happy should not only possess good things of this kind, but should likewise use them.—What you say is true.—Is not therefore, O Clinias, the possession and the use of good, sufficient to make any one happy?—It appears so to me.—Whether, I replied, if any one uses good things properly, or if he does not?—If he uses them properly.—You speak

well, said I. For I think that the improper use of a thing is worse than the neglect of it. For the former is vicious, but the latter is neither good nor bad. Or do we not say so?—He assented.—What then? In the operation and use pertaining to wood, is there any thing else which produces a right use than the tectonic science?—Certainly not, said he.—Perhaps also, in producing proper apparatus, it is science which produces with rectitude.—He granted that it was.—Whether therefore, said I, with respect to the use of those goods which we first mentioned, viz. riches, health, and beauty, is it science, leading and properly directing the practice, which enables us to use every thing of this kind properly, or is it any thing else?—It is science, said he.—Science, therefore, imparts to men in every possession and action, not only felicity, as it seems, but likewise success.—He confessed that it was so.

Is there then, said I, by Jupiter, any advantage to be derived from other possessions, without prudence and wisdom? Or will a man be benefited who possesses many things, and performs many actions, but without intellect? Or rather will not this be the case, if he possesses and performs but a few things, but is endued with intellect? However, consider thus. Will he not by doing less, err less? And erring less, will he not act less improperly? And acting less improperly, will he not be less miserable?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether, therefore, will he rather perform fewer things being poor, than being rich?—Being poor, said he.—But whether if he is weak or strong?—If he is weak.—Whether also, if he is honoured, or dishonoured?—If dishonoured.—But whether, if he is brave and temperate, will he do less, or if he is timid?—If he is timid.—Will not this then also be the case, if he is indolent rather than if he is active?—He granted that it would.—And if he is slow rather than if he is quick? And if his sight and hearing are blunt rather than if they are sharp?—In every thing of this kind we agreed with each other.—But in short, said I, O Clinias, it appears that, with respect to all those things which we first asserted to be good, the discourse about them is not that they are naturally essentially good, but, as it seems, that they subsist in the following manner; viz. that if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their contraries, by how much the more capable they are of becoming subservient to that evil leader; but that if they are led by prudence and wisdom, they are greater goods; but that neither of them, when they are considered by themselves, is of any worth.—It appears, said he,

to

to be as you say.—What then happens to us, from what has been said? Is it any thing else than this, that no one of other things is either good or evil? But these being two, that wisdom is good, and ignorance evil?—He assented.

Further still then, said I, let us consider what remains. Since we all of us strive to be happy, and we appear to become such from using things, and from using them rightly, but science affords rectitude and success, it is requisite, as it seems, that every man should by all possible means endeavour to become most wise. Is it not so?—It is, said he.—And he should think that he ought to receive this from his father, his tutors, his friends, and from others who profess themselves to be his lovers, much more than wealth, and should request and suppliantly implore strangers and his fellow citizens to impart wisdom. Nor is it in any respect base or reprehensible, O Clinias, for the sake of this, to be obsequious and subservient both to a lover and to every man, willingly obeying him in worthy services, through an ardent desire of becoming wise. Or does it not appear so to you? said I.—You entirely, said he, appear to me to speak well.—If, said I, Clinias, wisdom can but be taught, and does not casually subsist among men. For this is yet to be considered by us, and has not yet been assented to by me and you.—But to me, said he, Socrates, it appears that it can be taught.—And I, being delighted, said, You speak beautifully, O best of men, and you have done well in liberating me from a long speculation about this very thing, whether wisdom can, or cannot be taught. Now, therefore, since it appears to you that it can be taught, and that it is the only thing which can make a man happy and prosperous, do you say any thing else than that it is necessary to philosophize? And is it your intention to do this?—Entirely so, said he, Socrates, as much as possible.—And I, rejoicing to hear these things, said, My example, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of exhortatory discourses, such as I desired it to be, is of this kind; vulgar perhaps and scarcely unfolded by a multitude of words: but let whichever of you is willing, considering this very thing according to art, render it apparent to us. But if you are unwilling to do this, point out to the lad what follows, from that part in which my discourse ended, viz. whether he ought to procure for himself every science, or whether there is one particular science which, when he receives, he will necessarily be happy and a good man; and what that science is. For, as I said

in the beginning, it is of great consequence to us that this youth should become wife and good.

I therefore, Crito, said these things; but I paid very great attention to what followed, and considered after what manner they would discourse, and whence they would begin, while they were exhorting the youth to the study of wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus then, who was the elder of them, first began the conference. And all of us beheld him, as those who were immediately to hear certain very wonderful discourses; which indeed was the case. For the man, O Crito, began a certain admirable discourse, which it is proper you should hear, because it exhorted to virtue.—Tell me, Socrates, said he, and the rest of you who express a desire that this youth should become wife, whether you are jesting when you make this assertion, or truly and seriously desire this?—Then I perceived that they were of opinion that we had, prior to this, been jesting, when we exhorted them to converse with the youth, and that on this account they also jested and had not discoursed seriously with him. Perceiving this therefore to be the case, I further said, that we were serious in a wonderful degree. And Dionysodorus said, See, Socrates, that you do not hereafter deny what you now assert.—I have considered this, said I: for I shall never deny what I have asserted.—What is it then, said he, that you assert? Do you wish that he should become wife?—Entirely so.—But now, said he, whether is Clinias wife or not?—Not yet, according to his own confession: and he does not, said I, speak idly.—But do you, said he, wish that he should become wife, and not be unlearned?—We acknowledged that we did.—Do you not therefore wish him to become that which he is not; and no longer to be that which he now is?—And I, on hearing this, was disturbed. But he, taking advantage of my perturbation, Since, said he, you wish him to be no longer that which he now is, you wish, as it seems, that he may perish; though those friends and lovers would certainly be but of little worth, who should be desirous above all things that the objects of their love may be destroyed. Ctesippus on hearing this was indignant, on account of his attachment to the youth, and said, O Thurian stranger, if it were not more rustic than is becoming, I should call you to an account for this assertion, and should ask you why you falsely ascribe to me and the rest a thing of this kind, which I think it is not holy to assert, viz. that I should wish that this youth might perish.

But

But what? O Ctesippus, said Euthydemus, does it appear to you, that it is possible to speak falsely?—By Jupiter, said he, it does, unless I were insane.—But whether will this be the case, when asserting a thing which is the subject of discourse, or when not asserting it.—When asserting it.—When, therefore, he asserts that thing, is it not true, that he does not speak of any thing else than that which he asserts?—For how should he do otherwise, said Ctesippus?—But that is one of the things which exist, of which he speaks, separate from others.—Entirely so.—Does he not therefore, when he speaks of that thing, speak of that which has a being?—Yes.—But he who speaks of that which is, and of beings, speaks of things which are true. So that if Dionysodorus speaks of beings, he speaks of things which are true, and according to you utters nothing false.—He does so, said he.—But he who says these things, said Ctesippus, does not speak, O Euthydemus, of beings.—To this Euthydemus replied, Are non-beings any thing else than things which are not?—They are not.—By no means, therefore, are non-beings, beings.—By no means.—Can therefore any one perform any action about these non-beings, so as to make things which in no respect are?—It does not appear to me, said Ctesippus, that he can.—What then? Do rhetoricians, when they speak to the people, perform nothing?—They do something, he replied.—If, therefore, they do something, do they not also make something? To speak then is to do and to make.—He assented.—No one therefore, said he, speaks of non-entities: for if he did, he would make something. But you acknowledge that no one can make non-entities. So that, according to you, no one can assert things which are false; but if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks things which are true, and he speaks of beings.—By Jupiter, said Ctesippus, it is so, Euthydemus: yet he speaks of beings after a certain manner, though not as they subsist.—How do you say, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus? Are there some who speak of things as they are?—There are indeed, said he; and these are men worthy and good, and who assert things which are true.—What then? said he. Are not things good, well, and things evil, ill-conditioned?—He granted that they were.—And do you not acknowledge that the worthy and the good speak of things as they are?—I do.—The good therefore, said he, O Ctesippus, speak of evil things evilly, if they speak of them as they are.—Truly, said he, by Jupiter, they do very much so of bad men, among which, if you are persuaded

persuaded by me, you will be careful that you may not be numbered, lest the good should speak evilly of you; because you well know that the good speak evilly of the bad.—Do they not also, said Euthydemus, speak magnificently of great men, and warmly of those that are fervent?—Very much so indeed, said Ctesippus.—Of cold men, therefore, they speak coldly, and assert that they speak frigidly.—You revile, O Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you revile.—Not I, by Jupiter, said he, Dionysodorus, for I love you; but I admonish you as my companion, and I endeavour to persuade you, that you should never in my presence make such a rustic assertion, as that I wish the destruction of those whom I very much esteem.

I therefore, as they appeared to me to conduct themselves in a rustic manner towards each other, jested with Ctesippus, and said, it appears to me, Ctesippus, that we ought to receive what is asserted by the strangers, if we wish to impart it to others, and not contend about words. For if they know how to destroy men in such a manner as to make them, from being depraved and unwife, worthy and wise, whether they have discovered this themselves, or have learnt from some other, a corruption and destruction of this kind, so that having destroyed him who is depraved, they afterwards render him worthy; if they know how to effect this (but it is evident that they do possess this knowledge; for they affirm that the art of making men worthy that were depraved, is an art which they have recently invented;) we must therefore permit them to destroy the lad, and to make him and all the rest of us wise. But if you young men are afraid of me, make trial of me, as if, according to the proverb, in Car¹, since, though an elderly man, I am prepared for danger: and I deliver myself to this Dionysodorus, as to Medea the Colchian. Let him destroy me, and, if he will, boil me, or do whatever else he pleases with me, if he does but render me worthy. And Ctesippus said, I also, Socrates, am prepared to deliver myself to these strangers, though they should be willing to excoriate more than they do at present, provided my skin does not end in a bladder like that of Marsyas, but in virtue. Indeed Dionysodorus, here, thinks that I am angry with him: I am not however angry, but I contradict those things which, in my opinion, he has not well advanced

¹ That is to say, make trial of me as if I were some vile man or thing, in which, if the event is not fortunate, not much loss will be sustained. See Erasmus in *Chiliad*. p. 227.

against me. But do not, said he, O Dionysodorus, call contradiction reviling ; for reviling is a different thing.

To this Dionysodorus replied, Do not you, Ctesippus, discourse as if you contradicted ?—Entirely, and very much so, said he.—Or do not you think that I speak as if I contradicted ? You cannot therefore at any time demonstrate that, if you have heard no one contradicting another.—True, said he : but let us now hear whether I can demonstrate to you that Ctesippus contradicts Dionysodorus. Or can you bear a discourse of this kind ?—By all means, said he.—What then ? he replied ; are there definitions of every thing which exists ?—Entirely so, said he.—Whether, therefore, is there a definition of every thing, as it is, or as it is not ?—As it is. For if you remember, said Ctesippus, we have just now shown that no one speaks of a thing as it is not. For no one appears to speak of that which is not. But why this ? said Ctesippus. Shall you and I, on this account, contradict the less ?—Whether therefore, he replied, shall we contradict, if we both of us know the definition of the same thing, or shall we indeed thus say the same things ?—He granted that we should.—But, said he, when neither of us gives the definition of that thing, shall we not then contradict ? Or, indeed, will it not follow, that thus no mention whatever of that thing will be made by either of us ?—He granted this also.—When therefore, said he, I give the definition of that thing, but you of something else, do we then contradict each other ? Or do I then speak of that thing, but you do not speak of it in any respect whatever ? But how can he who does not speak of a thing contradict him who does ?

Ctesippus indeed was then silent ; but I, wondering at the discourse, said, How do you say, Dionysodorus ? For, though I have heard this assertion often, and from many, yet I always wondered at it. For it was much used by Protagoras and his followers, and by others more antient than these ; but to me he always appears to be a wonderful person, who both subverts others and himself. I think, however, that I shall especially learn the truth of this assertion from you. Is the assertion then any other than this, that it is not possible to assert things which are false ? For this is the force of the argument. Is it not ? And that he who speaks, asserts things which are true, or otherwise does not speak ?—He granted that it was so.—Whether, therefore, is it not possible to assert things which are false, but to form an opinion
of

of them is possible?—It is not even possible, said he, to form an opinion of them.—Neither therefore, said I, is there any such thing as false opinion.—There is not, said he.—Neither therefore is there ignorance, nor are there unlearned men. Or would not this be ignorance, if there were any such thing, viz. to speak falsely of things?—Entirely so, said he.—But, I replied, this is not possible.—It is not, said he.—Do you make this assertion, O Dionysodorus, for the sake of discourse, that you may speak that which is wonderful; or does it truly appear to you that no man is unlearned?—Confute, said he, the assertion. Or, according to your assertion, can confutation take place, while no one speaks falsely?—It cannot, said Euthydemus.—Neither therefore do I, said Dionysodorus, order you to confute. For how can any one order that to be done which is not?—O Euthydemus, said I, I do not well understand these wise and excellent assertions, but I hastily as it were conceive them. Perhaps, therefore, I shall ask something which will be troublesome; but you will pardon me. See then. For if it is neither possible to speak falsely, nor to entertain false opinions, nor to be unlearned, neither is it possible for any one to err when he does any thing. For he who acts cannot err in that which he does. Do you not say so?—Entirely so, said he.—This, said I, is the troublesome question which I just now mentioned. For if we do not err, neither acting nor speaking, nor thinking, if this be the case, of what, by Jupiter, do you come as the teachers? Or did you not just now say, that you could teach him virtue who was willing to learn it, the best of all men?—Are you so dull, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, taking up the discourse, as that you now remember what we first said, and would even now remember any thing which I may have said last year, yet do not know how to use what has been said at present?—I replied, The things which have been now asserted are difficult: and this very properly; for they have been asserted by wise men. And likewise this last thing which you said cannot be used without extreme difficulty: for what will you say, Dionysodorus, is the meaning of this assertion, There is something which I do not know how to use? Does it not mean this, that I do not know how to confute it? Or tell me, what other conception you form of these words, I do not know how to use these assertions?—Do you affirm, said he, that they mean any thing else than this, that it is very difficult to use them? Answer me.—Before you have answered, said I, Dionysodorus?

dorus?—Will you not answer, said he.—Is it just that I should?—It is certainly just, said he.—After what manner? I replied. Is it because you, being a person very wise, have now entered into a discussion with us respecting discourse, and because you know when it is proper to answer, and when not; and now will not give any answer, because you know that it is not requisite?—You babble, said he, neglecting when it is proper to answer, and when not. But, good man, be obedient and answer; since you acknowledge that I am a wise man.

We must obey, said I, and as it seems it is necessary: for you are the ruler. Ask, then.—Whether therefore do those that understand, understand having a soul? or do inanimate natures also understand?—They understand having a soul.—Do you know, therefore, said he, any assertion which has a soul?—Not I, by Jupiter.—Why, then, did you just now ask me what was the meaning of my assertion?—For what other reason, I replied, than that I have erred through indolence: or shall I say, that I have not erred, but that I have also said this rightly, when I asserted that my words understood? Whether will you say that I erred, or not? For if I have not erred, neither do you confute though you are a wise man, nor have you any thing to reply to my assertion: but if I have erred, neither thus do you speak rightly, in saying that it is not possible to err. And I say these things, not in opposition to what you have asserted last year. But this discourse, said I, O Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, seems to remain in the same condition, and even now as formerly, having thrown down others, to fall itself; nor has your art discovered a method of preventing this, though it is so wonderful with respect to accuracy of arguments.—Ctesippus then said, You certainly speak wonderful things, O Thurian or Chian men, or by whatever other name it may delight you to be called, as you are not in the least concerned whether you are delirious or not.—And I, fearing lest defamation should take place, again appeased Ctesippus, and said, O Ctesippus; and now indeed, O Ctesippus, what I have said to Clinias, I also say to you, that you do not know that the wisdom of these strangers is admirable. They

¹ In the original δ , τι μοι νοει το φημι, which is literally "what my assertion *understands* for me." The words of Socrates, therefore, are perverted by the sophist from their natural meaning, in order that he might play on the word *understand*.

are however, unwilling to exhibit it to us seriously, but imitate Proteus the Egyptian sophist, and deceive us by enchantments. Let us, therefore, imitate Menelaus, and not suffer the men to leave us, till they have unfolded to us what it is in which they are serious: for I think that something pertaining to them very beautiful will appear, when they begin to act seriously; but we request, we exhort, and we beseech them to unfold themselves.

I therefore again appear to myself to be about to relate in what manner I beseech them to unfold themselves to me: for I will endeavour to the best of my ability to discuss what I formerly left unfinished, if I can in a certain respect allure them, and induce them to pity and commiserate me thus strenuously and seriously acting, and to act seriously themselves. But do you, Clinias, said I, enable me to recollect whence we at that time discontinued our discourse: for I think we ended there, whence we acknowledged we should philosophize: did we not?—We did, he replied.—But philosophy is the possession of science: is it not so? said I.—It is, said he.—By the possession therefore, of what science shall we rightly possess? is not this indeed obvious, that it must be by the possession of that science which will benefit us?—Entirely so, said he.—Should we therefore be in any respect benefited, if we scientifically knew, while travelling, in what part of the earth much gold is buried?—Perhaps so, said he.—But formerly, I replied, this was our decision, that we should gain nothing, even though without labour, and without digging the earth, all the gold that exists should be ours. So that neither if we knew how to make golden stones would this science be of any worth: for if we knew not how to use gold, no advantage would be apparent from the possession of it. Or do you not remember? said I.—I do very well remember it, he replied.—Nor, as it seems, will any advantage be derived from any other science, neither from that which is employed in the negotiation of money, nor from the medicinal science, nor from any other, which knows how to make any thing, but does not know how to use that which it makes. Is it not so?—He granted that it was.—Nor even, if there were a science by which men could be made immortal, but without knowing how to use immortality, neither from this does it appear that there would be any advantage, if it is proper to argue from what has been previously granted.—To all these particulars we mutually assented.

A certain science, therefore, is requisite for us, O beautiful boy, of such a kind,

kind, in which both to make, and to know how to use that which is made, may concur.—It appears so, said he.—It is of much consequence therefore, as it seems, whether we are skilful makers of the lyre, or in possession of a certain science of that kind: for here the art which makes is separated from the art which uses, about the same thing. For the lyre-making and the harp-making arts differ very much from each other. Is it not so?—He granted that it was.—Nor shall we indeed require the pipe-making art: for this is another such-like art.—He granted that it was.—But, by the gods, said I, if we should learn the art of composing orations, is this the art from the possession of which we should be happy?—I do not think it is, said Clinias.—What argument, said I, do you employ in thinking thus?—I see, he replied, certain framers of orations, who do not know how to use the very orations which they themselves have composed: just as the makers of lyres are unskilled in the use of the lyre; but here others are able to use the orations which these have framed, though they are incapable of framing orations themselves. It is evident, therefore, with respect to orations, that the art of making is separate from the art of using them.—You appear to me, said I, to adduce a sufficient argument that the art of composing orations is not that art by the acquisition of which any one will be happy; though I thought that here that science would be apparent which we some time since investigated: for to me those very men who compose orations appear, O Clinias, to be transcendently wise, when I am conversant with them; and this very art of theirs also appears to be something divine and elevated. This indeed is by no means wonderful: for it is a portion of the art of enchantments, to which it is but a little inferior; for the art of enchantments is that art by which vipers, spiders called phalangii, and scorpions, are allured; but this allures and soothes judges, those that frequent assemblies, and other tumultuous associations. Or are you of a different opinion?—I am not, said he; but it appears to me as you say.—Where then shall we yet further turn ourselves? and to what art?—I do not well know, said he.—But I think, said I, that I have discovered this art.—What is it? said Clinias.—The art of commanding an army, said I, appears to me, more than any other art, to be that which will confer felicity on its possessor.—It does not appear so to me.—Why not? said I.—This is certainly an art of hunting men.—What

then? said I.—No part, said he, of the hunting art extends beyond hunting and subjugating; but when they have subjugated that which they have hunted, they are not able to use it. But hunters and fishermen assign this to cocks; while, on the contrary, geometricians, astronomers, and those skilled in the logistic art (for these also are hunters) do not make diagrams, but investigate things themselves. As therefore they do not know how to use these, but are alone skilled in hunting, they deliver their inventions to be used by those who are expert in dialectic; I mean that this is done by such among these as are not entirely stupid.—Be it so, I replied, O most beautiful and wife Clinias.—After the same manner, said he, the commanders of armies also, when they have hunted any city or camp, deliver it to the care of politicians; for they know not how to use those things which they have hunted: just, I think, as the hunters of quails deliver them to those by whom quails are nurtured. If, therefore, he replied, we are in want of that art which its possessor, whether he makes or hunts it, will know how to use, and an art of this kind will render us blessed, some other art, said he, must be investigated instead of that of commanding an army.

CRITO. What do you say, Socrates? Did that lad assert things of this kind?

Soc. Do you not think he did, Crito?

CRITO. By Jupiter, I do not indeed. For I think if he had said these things, that he would not have required the assistance either of Euthydemus, or any other man, with respect to erudition.

Soc. But, by Jupiter, was it Ctesippus then that said these things? for I do not remember.

CRITO. What, Ctesippus?

Soc. This, indeed, I well know, that neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus said these things. But, O divine Crito, was it not some one of the beings more excellent than man, who being present said these things? For I well know that I heard them.

CRITO. It is so, by Jupiter, Socrates; and it appears to me, and indeed very much so, to have been some one of the more excellent order of beings. But after this, what art have you still investigated? And have you discovered that art for the sake of which you engaged in this investigation?

Soc. Whence, blessed man, should we have discovered it? But we were perfectly

perfectly ridiculous, just like boys that pursue larks; for we continually thought that we should immediately apprehend each of the sciences, but they always fled from our view. Why therefore should I speak to you concerning many sciences? But when we came to the royal art, and considered whether it is that art which imparts and produces felicity, here falling as it were into a labyrinth, when we thought that we had now arrived at the end, we again proceeded in a winding course, as if we appeared to be in the beginning of our inquiry, and were as much distant from the object of our search as when we began the investigation.

CRITO. But how has this happened to you, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you. For the political and the royal art appear to us to be the same.

CRITO. But what then?

SOC. The art of commanding an army, and the other arts, appear to impart dominion over those works of which they are the artificers, as alone knowing how to use them. Hence it clearly appeared to us to be the art which we were investigating, and the cause of good conduct in a city, and, in short, according to the Iambic of Æschylus, that it alone is seated in the stern of the city, governing and ruling over all things, and rendering all things useful.

CRITO. Does not this therefore appear to you to be well said respecting this art?

SOC. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what after these things will happen to us. For again, let us nearly consider as follows. What work will that royal art which rules over all things produce for us? Shall we say none? But we have said to each other that it certainly will produce some work. For did not you assert this, Crito?

CRITO. I did.

SOC. What then will you say is the work of it? Just as if I should ask you what work the medicinal art produces in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say it is health?

CRITO. I should.

SOC. But what? With respect to your art, agriculture, what does it effect in all those things over which it rules? Would you not say that it affords us food from the earth?

CRITO.

CRITO. I should.

SOC. But what does the royal art effect while it governs every thing over which it has dominion? Perhaps you do not clearly perceive this.

CRITO. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates.

SOC. Nor do we, Crito. But thus much indeed you know, that if it is that art which we investigate, it ought to be useful.

CRITO. Entirely so.

SOC. Ought it not, therefore, to impart to us a certain good?

CRITO. Necessarily so, Socrates.

SOC. But we have acknowledged to each other, I and Clinias, that good is nothing else than a certain science.

CRITO. You did indeed say so.

SOC. Do not therefore other works, which may be said to belong to the political art, (but these will be many, such as to render the citizens rich, free, and without sedition,) do not all these appear to be neither evil nor good? But it is necessary that this art should make men wise, and impart wisdom, if it is to be that art which will benefit and render men happy.

CRITO. It is so: and thus you accord with each other conformably to your narration.

SOC. Does therefore the royal art make men wise and good?

CRITO. What should hinder, Socrates?

SOC. Does it therefore make all men to be so, and to be entirely good? And is it that art which imparts every science, that of the shoemaker, of the smith, and of all other artificers?

CRITO. I do not think it is, Socrates.

SOC. But what science is it? Or to what purpose do we employ it? For it is requisite that it should not be the artificer of any work which is neither good nor evil, and that it should impart no other science than itself. Let us therefore say what it is, or to what purpose we should use it. Are you willing, Crito, we should say it is that by which we make others good?

CRITO. Entirely so.

SOC. But in what will these be good, and to what purpose will they be useful? Or shall we also say that they will make others good, and that those others will make others to be so? However, it will no where appear to us in what they are good, because we have rejected the works which are said

to

to belong to the political science. But in reality, according to the proverb¹, Corinthian Jupiter is present; and as I have said, we are still equally, or more than equally, remote from knowing what that science is which will make us happy.

CRITO. By Jupiter, Socrates, you have arrived as it seems at abundant doubting.

SOC. I myself, therefore, Crito, since I was fallen into this doubt, with every possible exertion of voice entreated the strangers, and called upon them as if they had been the Dioscuri² to save us, viz. me and the lad from the overwhelming billows of this discourse, to be by all means serious, and seriously to show us what that science is, by the possession of which we may pass through life in a becoming manner.

CRITO. What then? was Euthydemus willing to unfold any thing to you?

SOC. How could he do otherwise? And he began, my friend, the discourse very magnificently thus: Whether, said he, Socrates, shall I teach you this science about which you formerly doubted, or evince that you possess it?—O blessed man, I replied, are you able to effect this?—Entirely so, said he.—Show me, therefore, by Jupiter, said I, that I possess it: for this will be much easier than to instruct a man so far advanced in years.—Come then, said he, answer me. Is there any thing which you know?—Certainly, said I, there are many things which I know, and these of small importance.—It is sufficient, said he. Does it therefore appear to you to be possible, that any thing which exists should not be that thing which it is?—It does not, by Jupiter.—Do you not therefore, said he, know something?—I do.—Are you not therefore knowing, if you know?—Entirely so, in this very thing which I know.—It is of no consequence. Is it not then necessary that you should know all things, in consequence of possessing knowledge?—It is not, by Jupiter, said I, since there are many things which I do not know.—Will it not therefore follow, if there is any thing which you do not know, that you are not knowing?—

¹ A weariness from words repeated in vain, is signified by this adage. Concerning the origin of this proverb, which is obscure, see the Greek Scholia on Plato, p. 96. and Erasmus in *Chiliad*. p. 678.

² The Dioscuri are Castor and Pollux, the sons of Jupiter from Leda. These brother deities were invoked by sailors when in danger of shipwreck.

It will follow that I am not knowing in that thing, my friend, I replied.—Will you then, said he, be less destitute of knowledge? For you just now said, that you were knowing: and thus you will be the same person, and again not the same person, according to the same, and at the same time.—Be it so, I replied, Euthydemus: for, according to the proverb, you say all things well. How then do I know that science which we investigate? Since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be: if knowing one thing, I know all things. For I cannot possess, and at the same time be destitute of knowledge. But if I know all things, I also possess that knowledge. Is this then what you say? And is this that wise thing?—You yourself, said he, Socrates, confute yourself.

But what? said I, O Euthydemus, does not the very same thing happen to you? For I, whatever I may suffer with you and this Dionysodorus, the beloved head, shall not be very indignant. Tell me, do you not know some things, and are you not ignorant of others?—By no means, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.—How do you say? I replied. Do you therefore know nothing?—Very far from it, said he.—Do you then know all things, said I, since you also know any thing?—All things, he replied. And you likewise, if you know one thing, know all things.—O Jupiter! I replied, what a wonderful thing you speak of: and a mighty good becomes apparent. But do all other men likewise know all things, or nothing?—They certainly, said he, do not know some things, but are ignorant of others; and are not at the same time scientifically knowing, and deprived of science.—But how is this? said I.—All men, he replied, know all things, if they know one thing.—O, by the gods! said I, Dionysodorus, (for it is now manifest to me that you are serious, though I with difficulty incited you to be so,) do you in reality know all things, such as the carpenter's and the shoemaker's art?—Entirely so, said he.—And are you also able to sew shoes, in the same manner as shoemakers?—I am, by Jupiter, said he, and also to mend them.—Do you also know such things as these, viz. the number of the stars and the sands?—Perfectly so, he replied. Do you not think, we should confess that we do?—And Ctesippus then taking up the discourse, By Jupiter, said he, O Dionysodorus, exhibit to me such a proof of these things, that I may know that you speak the truth.—What shall I exhibit, said he.—Do you know how many teeth Euthydemus has, and does Euthydemus know how many you have?

have?—Is it not sufficient for you, said he, to have heard that we know all things?—By no means, said he; but only tell us this one thing more, and show that you speak the truth. And if you tell how many teeth each of you have, and you shall appear to know this on our counting them, we shall then also believe you in other things. Conceiving, therefore, that they were derided, they were unwilling to comply, but they acknowledged that they knew all things, while they were severally interrogated by Ctesippus. For there was not any thing at length, which Ctesippus did not ask them without any hesitation, and even asked them, if they knew the most indecent things. They however most bravely advanced to the interrogations, confessing that they knew, like wild boars rushing on the blow; so that I also myself, Crito, was at length compelled, through my incredulity, to ask Euthydemus, whether Dionysodorus knew also how to dance? But he replied, Perfectly so.—However, said I, he certainly does not know how to precipitate himself upon swords, and to be whirled on a wheel, being so much advanced in years as he is. Or is he master of this piece of wisdom also?—There is nothing, said he, which he does not know.—But whether, said I, do you now only know all things, or has this always been the case?—Always, said he.—And when you were boys, and as soon as you were born, did you know all things?—All things, said both of them together.—And to us, indeed, the thing appeared to be incredible. But Euthydemus said, You do not believe, Socrates.—Except this one thing, I replied, that it is likely you are wise men.—But, said he, if you are willing to answer me, I will also show you, giving your assent to these wonderful things.—I replied, I shall most gladly be confuted in these things. For if it is concealed from me that I am wise, and you demonstrate that I know all things, and that I have always possessed this knowledge, what greater gain than this shall I be able to discover through the whole of life?—Answer then, said he.—Ask me as one that will answer.

Whether, therefore, Socrates, said he, do you know any thing or not?—I do.—Do you then know by that thing through which you are knowing, or by any thing else?—By that by which I am knowing: for I think that you speak of the soul. Or do you not speak of this?—Are you not ashamed, said he, Socrates, to interrogate when you are interrogated?—Be it so, said I; but what shall I do? Shall I do as you bid me, when I know not what it

is you ask me, though at the same time you order me to answer and not to interrogate?—You, doubtless, said he, apprehend what I say.—I do, I replied.—Now therefore answer to that which you apprehend.—What then? said I, if you indeed ask conceiving one thing, but I apprehend another, and afterwards I should answer to this, would it be sufficient for you if I answered nothing to the purpose?—To me it would, he replied, but not to you, as I think.—I will not therefore, by Jupiter, said I, answer, till I understand.—You will not answer, said he, to the things which you always apprehend, because you trifle, and are more simple than is becoming.—And I perceived that he was indignant with me for disputing what was said, he being desirous to catch me by enclosing me with words. I recollected, therefore, that Connus was always indignant with me, when I did not yield to him, and that afterwards he paid less attention to me, as one that was ignorant. As, therefore, I had formed the design of becoming instructed by these men, I thought it was necessary to submit to them, lest, considering me as an illiterate person, they should reject me. Hence I said, If you are disposed to act in this manner, Euthydemus, let it be done: for you, in every respect, better know how to discourse than I do, you who possess art, than I who am a rude unlettered man. Again, therefore, interrogate from the beginning.—Answer then again, said he, whether you know those things which you know, by something or not.—I do, said I; for I know them, by my soul.—Again, said he, in his answer, he adds to what he is asked. For I did not ask by what you know, but if you know by any thing.—Again, said I, I have answered more than is sufficient, through my want of erudition; but pardon me. For I will now answer simply that I always know by a certain thing what I know.—But whether, said he, do you always know by this very same thing? Or do you at one time know by this, and at another by something else?—Always by this, said I, when I know.—Again, said he, you will not cease to speak superfluously.—But I am afraid lest this certain something always should deceive us.—It will not deceive us, said he; but if at all, it will deceive you. Answer me, however, whether you always know by this.—Always, I replied; since it is necessary to take away the when.—Do you therefore always know by this? And always knowing, whether do you know some things by this by which you know, but other things by something else? Or do you know all things by this?—All things by this, said I, which I do know.—This latter part of your answer,

answer, said he, is again superfluous.—But I take away, said I, the words which I do know.—You should not, however, said he, take away even one word; for I want none of your assistance. But answer me; would you be able to know all things unless you could know all things?—This would be a prodigy, I replied.—And he said, Add now whatever you please: for you confess that you know all things.—I appear to have done so, said I, since the words, the things which I know, possess no power whatever; but I know all things.—Have you not therefore also confessed that you always know by this thing by which you know? whether it be when you know, or in whatever way you please: for you have acknowledged that you always know, and at the same time, that you know all things. It is evident therefore that you knew when you was a boy, and when you was begot, and when you was born. Hence, before you was born, and before heaven and earth were produced, you knew all things, if you always possessed knowledge. And by Jupiter, said he, you always will know, and will always know all things, if I am willing that you should.—But be willing, I replied, O much-honoured Euthydemus, if you speak the truth in reality. But I cannot entirely believe that you are sufficient to accomplish this, unless this your brother Dionysodorus assists you with his counsel: and thus perhaps what you say may be accomplished.

But tell me, I said; for in other things I cannot contend with you, who are endued with such portentous wisdom, nor deny that I know all things, since you say that I do;—how shall I say that I know such things as the following, O Euthydemus, viz. that good men are unjust? Come, inform me, do I know this, or do I not know it?—You certainly know it, said he.—What, I replied, do I know?—That good men are not unjust.—This, said I, I perfectly knew a long time ago. But I do not ask this; but where did I learn that good men are unjust?—No where, said Dionysodorus.—I do not therefore, said I, know this.—Euthydemus then said to Dionysodorus, You destroy the conversation; and he will appear to be not knowing, and to possess, and at the same time to be deprived of knowledge. And Dionysodorus blushed. But you, Euthydemus, said I, how do you say? Does not your brother appear to you to speak rightly, who knows all things?—But am I the brother of Euthydemus? said Dionysodorus, hastily replying.—And I said, Excuse me from answering you, O good man, till Euthydemus has taught me

that I know that good men are unjust, and do not envy me the discipline.—You fly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and are not willing to answer.—It is reasonable that I should, said I: for I am inferior to either of you, so that there is an abundant necessity that I should fly from two. For I am much more imbecile than Hercules, who was not able to contend with the hydra (a sophist who, by her wisdom, if one head of the discourse was cut off, presented many instead of one), and at the same time with the crab, a certain other sophist, who, as it appears to me, recently drove on shore from the sea); and when Hercules had in a similar manner tormented the crab) by speaking to and biting him on the left-hand side, he called upon Iolaus, the son of his brother, to assist him: and he gave him sufficient aid. But my Iolaus Patrocles, if he should come, would rather effect the very contrary.

Answer then, said Dionysodorus, since these things are celebrated by you, whether Iolaus was more the nephew of Hercules than of you.—It is therefore best for me, O Dionysodorus, said I, to answer you. For you will not desist from interrogating, nearly envying (for this I well know), and hindering Euthydemus from teaching me that wise thing.—Answer, however, said he.—But I will answer, I said, that Iolaus was the son of the brother of Hercules, but, as it appears to me, is by no means my nephew. For Patrocles, who is my brother, was not his father; but Iphicles, who resembles him in name, was the brother of Hercules.—But is Patrocles, said he, your brother?—Certainly, said I; for he had the same mother, though not the same father with me.—He is your brother therefore, and not your brother.—I said, He was not from the same father, O best of men: for his father was Chæredemus, but mine Sophroniscus.—But the father, said he, was Sophroniscus and Chæredemus. Was he not?—Certainly, said I; the former was my, and the latter his father.—Was not therefore, said he, Chæredemus different from the father?—From my father, said I.—Was he therefore a father, being different from a father? Or are you the same thing as a stone?—I am afraid, said I, lest through you I should appear to be the same; but I do not appear to myself to be the same.—Are you not therefore, said he, different from a stone?—Different certainly.—Being different from a stone, therefore, you are something else, and not a stone: and being different from gold, you are not gold.—Granted.—Will not Chæredemus therefore, since he is different from father, not be a father?—It seems, said I, he is not a father.—For certainly,

said

said Euthydemus, taking up the discourse, if Chæredemus is a father, again Sophroniscus, on the contrary, being different from father, is not a father; so that you, O Socrates, are without a father.—And then Ctesippus, taking up the discourse, said, Does not your father suffer these very same things? for he is different from my father.—Very far from it, said Euthydemus.—Is he then the same? he replied.—The same, indeed.—I should not consent to this. But whether, O Euthydemus, is he alone my father, or is he the father also of other men?—Of other men also, said he.—Or do you think that the same person being father, is not father?—I should indeed think so, said Ctesippus.—But what? said he. A thing being gold, is it not gold? Or being man, is it not man?—You do not, said Ctesippus, according to the proverb, connect, O Euthydemus, thread with thread¹. For you speak of a dire thing, if your father is the father of all men.—But he is, said he.—Whether is he the father of men, said Ctesippus, or also of horses? Or likewise of all other animals?—Of all others animals, said he.—Is a mother also the mother of all animals?—And a mother likewise.—Your mother therefore, said he, is also the mother of marine hedge-hogs.—And yours too, said he.—Hence then you are the brother of gudgeons, whelps, and pigs.—For you also are, said he.—And besides this, your father also is a dog.—For your father is likewise, said he.—But, said Dionysodorus, if you answer me, you will in a short time acknowledge these things. For tell me, have you a dog?—And a very bad one, said Ctesippus.—Has he therefore whelps?—He has indeed, said he, others very much like himself.—Is not the dog then the father of them?—I, said he, saw him having connection with a bitch.—What then? Is he not your dog?—Certainly, said he.—Being a father therefore, is he not yours? So that the dog becomes your father, and you are the brother of whelps.—And again, Dionysodorus hastily took up the discourse, that Ctesippus might not say any thing in reply prior to him; and still further, said he, answer me a trifling particular. Do you strike this dog?—And Ctesippus laughing, By the gods, said he, I do; for I cannot strike you.—Do you not therefore, said he, strike your father?—I should much more

¹ This proverb, according to the Greek Scholiast on Plato, is applied to those who say or do the same things through the same, or who connect similars into friendship. This proverb is also mentioned by Aristotle in the third book of his *Physics*.

justly,

justly, said he, strike your father, and ask him what he meant, by begetting such wise sons. But certainly, O Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, your father and the father of the whelps has obtained the possession of many good things from this your wisdom.

But he is not in want of many good things, O Ctesippus, neither he, nor you.—Nor are you, O Euthydemus, said he, in want of them.—Neither I nor any other man am in want of them. For tell me, O Ctesippus, whether you think it good for a sick man to drink a medicine, or does it appear to you to be not good, when it is requisite he should drink it; or when any one is going to a battle, ought he rather to go armed, or without arms?—To me, said he, it appears to be better to do the former of these; though I think that you are about to say something beautiful.—You understand most excellently, said he; but answer me. For since you acknowledge that it is good for a man to drink a medicine when it is requisite, it is also necessary to drink abundantly of this good, and it will in this case be well, if some one bruising it, should mingle with it a cart load of hellebore.—And Ctesippus said, This would be very proper indeed, O Euthydemus, if he who drank it were as large as the statue in Delphi.—As therefore, said he, it is also good to have arms in battle, is it not necessary to have a great number of shields and spears, since it is a good thing?—Very much so, said Ctesippus. But you are not of this opinion, O Euthydemus; for you think that one shield and one spear are sufficient. Or do you not?—I do.—Would you also, said he, arm Gorgon and Briareus after this manner? But I think that you are more skilful than to act in this manner, as being one who fights with military weapons, as is also the case with this your associate.—And Euthydemus indeed was silent; but Dionysodorus said, in reply to those things which had been before answered by Ctesippus, Does it not therefore also appear to you to be good to possess gold?—Certainly, said Ctesippus, and also to have a great quantity of it.—What then? Does it not appear to you to be a good thing always to possess riches, and every where?—Very much so, said he.—Do you not therefore also acknowledge gold to be a good thing?—We have acknowledged it, said he.—Is it not then necessary always to possess it, and every where, and especially in one's self? And would not a man be most happy, if he had three talents of gold in his belly, a talent in his skull, and a stater of gold in each of his eyes?—They say indeed, O Euthydemus, said

Ctesippus, that those among the Scythians are the most happy and the best men, who have much gold in their skulls, just as you lately said, that a dog was your father : and, what is still more wonderful, they say, that they drink out of their own golden skulls, and view the gold within them, having their own head in their hands.

But whether, said Euthydemus, do the Scythians and other men see things which may be seen, or things which cannot be seen ?—Things which can be seen, certainly.—Is this, therefore, also the case with you ? said he.—It is.—Do you therefore see our garments ?—Yes.—Are these then things which may be seen ?—Transcendently so, said Ctesippus.—But what ? said he.—Nothing. But you perhaps do not think that they are seen ; so pleasant are you. To me however, Euthydemus, you appear, not sleeping to be asleep, and if it were possible for a man when speaking to say nothing, that you also do this.—Is it not therefore possible, said Dionysodorus, for him who is silent to speak ?—By no means, said Ctesippus.—Is it also impossible for him who speaks to be silent ?—This is still less possible, said he.—When therefore you speak of stones, and pieces of wood and iron, do you not speak of things silent ?—I do not, said he, if I walk in braziers' shops ; but the pieces of iron are called things which sound, and make the greatest noise, if any one meddles with them. So that in this particular, it is concealed from you through your wisdom, that you have said nothing. But further still, explain to me the other assertion, how it is possible for one who speaks to be silent.—And Ctesippus appeared to me to contend in a transcendent manner, on account of the youth, the object of his love.—When you are silent, said Euthydemus, are you not silent as to all things ?—I am, said he.—Are you not therefore silent, as to things which are said, if things which are said are among the number of all things ?—But what ? said Ctesippus, are not all things silent ?—Certainly not, said Euthydemus.—Do therefore, O best of men, all things speak ?—Those things certainly do, which do speak.—But, said he, I do not ask this ; but I ask whether all things are silent, or speak ?—They do neither, and they do both, said Dionysodorus, hastily taking up the discourse. For I well know that you have not any thing to say to this answer.—And Ctesippus, as was usual with him, laughing very loudly, O Euthydemus, said he, your brother has lost his position in both cases, and his assertion perishes and is vanquished. And Clinias was very much delighted and
laughed ;

laughed; so that Ctesippus became ten times greater than he was. But Ctesippus, as being very crafty, appeared to me to have stolen these things from these very men. For a wisdom of this kind is not now possessed by any other persons.

And I said, Why do you laugh, O Clinias, at things so serious and beautiful?—Why have you now, Socrates, ever seen a beautiful thing? said Dionysodorus.—I have, said I, and many such, O Dionysodorus.—Were they therefore, said he, things different from the beautiful, or the same with the beautiful?—And I then became perfectly involved in doubt, and thought I had suffered justly for having granted. At the same time, however, I replied, They are different from the beautiful; but a certain beauty is present to each of them.—If, therefore, said he, an ox is present with you, you are an ox; and because I now am present with you, you are Dionysodorus.—Predict better things, said I.—But after what manner, said he; when one thing is present with another, will that which is different be different?—Are you then, said I, dubious respecting this? But I will now endeavour to imitate the wisdom of men, as being one who is desirous of it.—How should I not doubt, said he, both I and all other men, respecting that which is not?—What do you say? said I, O Dionysodorus. Is not the beautiful, beautiful, and the base, base?—If, said he, it appears to be so to me.—Does it not therefore appear to be so to you?—Entirely so, said he.—Is not therefore also the same, same? and is not the different, different? For certainly the different is not the same. But I should not think that even a boy would doubt this, that the different is not different. But, O Dionysodorus, this indeed you willingly pass by; since in other things you appear to me to resemble artists on whom it is incumbent to accomplish certain particulars; for it is proper that you should accomplish the business of discourse in an all-beautiful manner.—Do you know therefore, said he, what is proper to each of the artists? And, in the first place, do you know to whom it belongs to work in brass?—I know that this belongs to copper-smiths.—But to whom does it belong to fashion things from clay?—To a potter.—And whose business is it to cut throats, to excoriate, and cutting off small pieces of flesh to boil and roast them?—It is the business of a cook, said I.—If then, said he, a man does things which are proper, does he not act rightly?—Especially so.—But it is proper, as you say, that a cook should cut and excoriate. Have you

you assented to these things or not?—I have assented, I said; but pardon me.—It is evident, therefore, said he, that if any one, cutting the throat of a cook and chopping him into small pieces, should boil and roast him, he would do what is proper; and that if any one should work on a copper-smith himself after the manner of braziers, and on a potter after the manner of potters, he also would do what is proper.—O Neptune, said I, now you place a summit¹ on your wisdom. Will it therefore ever be present with me, so as to become familiar to me?—You will know it, Socrates, said he, when it becomes familiar to you.—That is to say, said I, if you are willing that it should.

But what? said he, Do you think you know the things pertaining to yourself?—Unless you say any thing to the contrary. For it is necessary to begin from you, but to end in Euthydemus here.—Whether therefore, said he, do you think these things to be yours, over which you have dominion, and which you can use as you please? As, for instance, with respect to oxen and sheep, do you think that such among these are yours as it is lawful for you to sell and give, and sacrifice to whatever god you please? And that those of them over which you have not this power, are not yours?—And I (for I knew that from those questions something beautiful would emerge, and at the same time being desirous to hear very quickly) said, it is perfectly so: things of this kind are alone mine.—But what? said he. Do you not call these things animals, which possess a soul?—Yes, I said.—Do you acknowledge then, that these alone among animals are yours respecting which you have the liberty of doing all these things which I have just now mentioned?—I acknowledge it.—And he pausing, very ironically, as if considering something of great consequence, Tell me, said he, Socrates, is Jupiter with you *Patrius*?—And I, suspecting that the discourse would come to that place, in which it would end, fled with a certain ambiguous craftiness, and now turned myself as if I had been caught in a net. And I said, He is not, O Dionysodorus.—You therefore are a miserable man; nor are you an Athenian, since you have neither gods called *Patrii*, nor sacred rights, nor any thing else beautiful and good.—Spare me, said I, O Dionysodorus, predict better things, and do not instruct me with severity. For

¹ This was usually said when the last hand was put to any thing, or when that was added without which a business could not be finished. See Erasmus in *Chiliad*, p. 570.

I have altars, and domestic sacred concerns, and such as belong to my country, and whatever other things of this kind are possessed by the rest of the Athenians.—In the next place, said he, is not Jupiter Patrius to the rest of the Athenians?—That appellation, said I, does not belong to any one of the Ionians, nor to such as are colonized from this city, nor to us. But Apollo is Patrius ¹, through the nativity of Ion. Jupiter, however, is not called by us Patrius, but Herceus ² and Phratrius; and Minerva also is called Phratia. —This is sufficient, said Dionysodorus; for you have, as it seems, Apollo, Jupiter, and Minerva.—Entirely so, said I.—Will not these therefore, said he, be your gods?—My progenitors, said I, and masters.—They will be so then to you, said he. Or have you not confessed that they are yours?—I have confessed it, said I. For what can I do?—Are not therefore, said he, those gods also animals? For you have acknowledged that such things as have a soul are animals. Or have not those gods a soul?—They have ³, said I.—Are they not therefore also animals?—Animals, said I.—But of animals, said he, you have acknowledged these to be yours, which you can give and sell, and sacrifice to any god you please.—I have acknowledged it, said I. For I do not recant, O Euthydemus.—Come then, said he, tell me immediately, since you acknowledge that Jupiter is yours and the other gods, are you therefore permitted to sell them, or give them, or to use them in any other way you please, in the same manner as other animals?—I therefore, O Crito, as if struck by what he said, lay speechless; but Ctesippus coming as it were to my assistance, Pypax ⁴, O Herules, said he, a beautiful discourse!—And then Dionysodorus, Whether, said he, is Hercules Pypax, or Pypax Hercules?—And Ctesippus, O Neptune, said he, what weighty questions! I yield; the men are unconquerable.

¹ Some, says the Greek scholiast on Plato, p. 98, say that the Greeks were indigenous, and that their parents were the earth and the sun who is the same with Apollo. But others assert that Apollo having connexion with Creusa, the daughter of Erechtheus, begot Ion, from whom the Athenians were at one time called Ionians, and that on this account they have Apollo Patrius.

² The Athenians called houses *ερα* *erke*; and hence Jupiter is with them Herceus, whom they establish in them for the sake of a guard. But Phratia is the third part of every tribe; and Minerva Phratia is the inspective guardian of these. Schol. in Plat. p. 98.

³ This passage, among numberless others that might be adduced, must convince the most careless reader that the gods of the ancients were not considered by those that worshipped them to be nothing but flocks and fables, as some have stupidly pretended they were.

⁴ The Greek Scholiast on Plato informs us, that this word expresses both indignation and pride.

Here indeed, my dear Crito, there was not any one present, who did not in the highest degree praise what was said; and the men were almost ready to die with laughing, applauding, and exulting. For before this, the lovers alone of Euthydemus applauded every thing that was said in a very beautiful manner; but here, not far from the pillars in the Lyceum, they applauded the men, and were delighted with what they said. As to myself, my feelings were such, that I was forced to acknowledge that I had never at any time seen men so wise; and being perfectly enslaved by their wisdom, I applied myself to the praising and passing encomiums on them; and I said, O blessed ye for your admirable genius, who have so rapidly, and in a short time, accomplished a thing of such magnitude! Your arguments indeed, O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, contain many other beautiful things; but this is the most magnificent thing in them, that you pay no attention to the multitude of mankind, nor to things venerable, and which appear to be of some consequence, but only to those who are like yourselves. For I well know, that very few men, and those such as are similar to you, delight in these arguments; but others are so ignorant of them, that I well know, they would be more ashamed to confute others with such like arguments, than to be themselves confuted. This too again is another popular and mild thing in your arguments, that when you say there is nothing either beautiful, or good, or white, or any thing else of this kind, and, in short, that one thing is not different from another, you in reality sew up the mouths of men, as you also acknowledge that you do; but that you not only sew up the mouths of others, but appear also to sew up your own, this is very polite, and removes that which is oppressive in your arguments. The greatest thing however is, that these arguments subsist in such a manner, and are so artificially invented by you, that any one may learn them in a very short time. This I have perceived, and I have noticed how rapidly, and indeed immediately, Ctesippus has been able to imitate you. This wisdom therefore of yours, with respect to its being rapidly imparted to another, is beautiful, but is not adapted to be discussed before men. But if you will be persuaded by me, be careful that you do not speak before many, lest rapidly learning, they should not thank you for your instruction. But especially discourse together by yourselves alone: if not, if you discourse before another, let it be before him alone, who gives you silver for what you say. These same things too if you are wise you will also admire.

nish your disciples, viz. That they never discourse with any man, unless with you and themselves. For that which is rare, O Euthydemus, is honourable; but water may be bought for a vile price, being the best of things, as Pindar says. But come, said I, make Clinias and me partakers of your discipline.

Having said these things, O Crito, and a few others, we departed. Consider therefore now, how you will accompany me to these men. For they say that they are able to teach any one who is willing to give them money; and that they do not exclude any genius or age. They likewise assert that which it is especially proper for you to hear, that an attention to gain does not hinder any one from easily receiving their wisdom.

CRITO. And indeed, Socrates, I am desirous of hearing them, and would willingly learn something from them; though indeed I also appear to be among the number of those who do not resemble Euthydemus, but those whom, as you said, would more willingly be confuted by such like arguments, than confute them. It seems however to me to be ridiculous to admonish you, at the same time I wish to relate to you what I have heard. Do you not know, that among those that left you, a certain person came to me as I was walking, a man who thought himself to be very wise, and one of those who are skilful in forensic harangues, and that he said to me, O Crito, have you heard nothing of these wise men?—By Jupiter, I have, not said I. For I could not stand before others, so as to hear, on account of the crowd.—But, said he, it was worth while to have heard them.—Why? said I.—Because you would have heard men discoursing, who are the wisest of all those who at present engage in such like arguments.—And I said, What then do you think of their arguments?—What else, said he, than that they are such as you will always hear from such like triflers, who bestow vile attention on things of no worth. For these were his very words.—And I said, But certainly philosophy is an elegant thing.—How, elegant, said he, O blessed man! It is indeed a thing of no worth. But if you had been present just now, I think that you would have been very much ashamed on account of your associate, who was so absurd as willingly to put himself in the power of men, who pay no attention to what they say, but adhere to every word. And these men, as I just now said, are among the best of those that exist at present. But indeed, Crito, said he, both the thing itself, and the men who are conversant with it, are very vile and ridiculous.—But to me, Socrates,

tes, neither he appears rightly to blame the thing, nor any other who blames it. To be willing, however, to discourse with these men before many appears to me to be rightly blamed.

SOC. O Crito, men of this kind are wonderful. But I do not yet know what I am about to say. To what class of men did he belong who came to you, and blamed philosophy? Was he among the number of those who are skilful in contending in courts of justice, a certain orator; or was he one of those who introduce men of this description, a composer of the orations with which orators contend?

CRITO. The least of all, by Jupiter, was he an orator; nor do I think that he ever went into a court of justice; but they say that he is knowing in the thing itself, by Jupiter, and likewise that he is skilful, and that he composes skilful orations.

SOC. I now understand: for I myself was just now about to speak concerning these men. For these are they, O Crito, whom Prodicus says exist in the confines of a philosopher and politician. But they think themselves to be the wisest of men; and besides being such *in their own opinion*, they also entirely appear to be so among the many. Hence, as they are celebrated by all men, no others are an impediment to them, than those who are conversant with philosophy. They think therefore, if they can establish an opinion, that philosophers are of no worth, they shall obtain the palm of wisdom without contention in the opinion of all men. For they consider themselves to be in reality most wise; but think that their authority is lessened by the followers of Euthydemus, when they are intercepted in their private discourses. But they are very reasonably thought to be wise men: for moderately to possess philosophy, and moderately to engage in political concerns, is very convenient; since this is to partake of both, as much as is requisite, and to enjoy the fruits of wisdom, secure from dangers and contests.

CRITO. What then? Do they appear to you, O Socrates, to say any thing of consequence?

SOC. They do not, indeed.

CRITO. But the discourse of the men possesses a certain gracefulness.

SOC. For it has in reality, O Crito, gracefulness rather than truth. For it is not easy to persuade them, that men and all other things which subsist
between

between two certain things, and participate of both, viz. such particulars as consist from good and evil, become better than the one, and worse than the other; but that such things as consist from two goods, not tending to the same, are worse than both with respect to that for which each of the things is useful from which they are composed; and that such things as are composed from two evils, not tending to the same, and which are in the middle, are alone better than each of those things, a part of both of which they participate. If, therefore, philosophy and political action are good, but each tends to that which is different, and these men, while they participate of both, are situated in the middle, they say nothing to the purpose; for they are viler than both. But if philosophy and political action are both good and bad, these men are better than some and worse than others. And if both are bad, thus they will assert something which is true, but by no means otherwise. I do not therefore think they will acknowledge, either that both these are bad, or that the one is bad, and the other good; but they in reality partaking of both, are inferior to both with respect to the performing of either, with a view to which both the political science and philosophy are worthy of regard; and though in reality they rank as the third, they endeavour to appear to be the first. It is requisite, therefore, to pardon their desire, and not to be indignant with them. We should however consider them to be such as they are: for it is requisite to embrace every man who says any thing which adheres to intellect, and who valiantly labours in endeavouring to do so.

CRITO. And indeed, Socrates, I also (as I always say to you) am dubious with respect to the management of my own children. For the youngest is yet but a little one; but Critobulus is now an adult, and requires the assistance of some one. I therefore, when I converse with you, am led to think that it is madness to be so much concerned about other things for the sake of children, such as about marriage, that they may be born from the most generous mother, and about riches, that they may become most wealthy, and yet neglect their education. But when I look at any one of those who profess to instruct men, I am struck with astonishment; and, to tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me to be unfit for the purpose; so that I cannot exhort the lad to philosophy.

Soc. O, my dear Crito, do you not know that in every pursuit, the many are vile, and of no worth, and that the few are worthy of all regard? For
do

do not the gymnastic art, the art of acquiring money, rhetoric, and the art of commanding an army, appear to you to be beautiful?

CRITO. To me they certainly do, in every respect.

Soc. What then? In each of these do you not see that the multitude are ridiculous with respect to the several employments of these arts?

CRITO. Yes, by Jupiter; and you speak most truly.

Soc. Would you, therefore, on this account avoid all pursuits, and not suffer your son to engage in them?

CRITO. This indeed, Socrates, would not be just.

Soc. You must not, therefore, O Crito, do that which ought not to be done; but bidding farewell to those who study philosophy, whether they are good or bad, explore the thing itself, well and properly; and if it should then appear to you to be a vile thing, dissuade every man from it, and not your sons only; but if it should appear to you such as I think it is, confidently pursue and cultivate it, as it is said, both you and your children.

THE END OF THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE

THE HIPPARCHUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

THE LOVE OF GAIN.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE design of the Hipparchus is to show that all men naturally desire good, since even those who wander from it through avarice, wander through a desire of obtaining it; but they err in consequence of mistaking good, which is a mean, for ultimate good. For good is two-fold, one being the end, the other subsisting for the sake of the end. Hence the possession of the former is called *beatitude*, and of the latter *gain*. Hence too, gain is the acquisition of that good, which contributes to the possession of ultimate good. But that which does not contribute to this, is neither useful, nor is the acquisition of it gain. The desire therefore of gain thus defined, and which is naturally inherent in all men, is laudable; but the false opinion is to be reprobated, which, while it is ignorant of the truly useful and lucrative, distorts to things adverse the natural appetite of man. Plato latently teaches this, while he confutes the false definitions which are introduced in this Dialogue, concerning the desire of gain. But he employs this proposition, *that all men desire good* as manifest, in order to conclude that all men naturally desire gain, and that this *natural* desire is laudable. And this is the conclusion which Socrates after a manner directly introduces by three modes of arguing, viz. by example, by induction, and by reasoning. But from the whole Dialogue we collect, that all men desire good; and this is its ultimate end. For its first end is to show that all men are desirous of gain, and that

this desire is not to be blamed when directed to gain according to its true definition.

It appears from Ælian (Var. Hist. viii. 2.) that it was dubious with some of the ancients, whether this Dialogue was in reality composed by Plato. If I may be allowed to give my own opinion, I do not find any thing, either in its manner or matter, for which its authenticity deserves to be called in question.

THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPARCHUS.

SOCRATES.

WHAT is the love, and who are the lovers of gain?

HIP. It appears to me that those are lovers of gain, who think it worth while to acquire wealth from things of no worth.

SOC. Whether therefore do they appear to you to do this in consequence of knowing, or being ignorant that these are things of no worth? For if they do this through ignorance, you call the lovers of gain stupid.

HIP. But I do not call them stupid, but perfectly crafty and base; men who are vanquished by gain, who know that the things from which they have the boldness to acquire wealth, are of no worth, and yet at the same time, through their impudence, dare to love gain.

SOC. Do you, therefore, call a character of the following kind a lover of gain? I mean, as if a husbandman, planting a tree or herb, and knowing that it is of no worth, should nevertheless think it worth while to enrich himself from the cultivation of such a plant? Do you call such a one as this a lover of gain?

HIP. A lover of gain, Socrates, thinks he ought to enrich himself from every thing.

SOC. Do not thus rashly answer me, like a man who has been injured by some one; but, attending to what I say, answer me as if I should again interrogate you from the beginning. Do you agree with me, that a lover of
gain

gain knows the value of that thing whence he thinks it worth while to enrich himself?

HIP. I do.

SOC. Who then is he that has a knowledge of the worth of plants, and who likewise knows in what region, and at what time of the year it is worth while to plant them? that we also may adopt something from those words of the wife, which lawyers employ for the sake of elegance.

HIP. A husbandman, I think.

SOC. Do you, therefore, say that the term, It is worth while to acquire wealth, is any thing else than to think that it is requisite to acquire wealth?

HIP. I say it is this very thing.

SOC. Do not therefore you, who are so young, endeavour to deceive me, who am now an elderly man, by answering, as you do at present, what you by no means think; but answer me truly, whether you think that the man who is a husbandman, and who knows that it is not worth while to set a certain plant, will yet expect to be enriched by such a plant?

HIP. By Jupiter, not I.

SOC. What then? Will a jockey who knows that the food which he gives a horse is of no worth, be ignorant that by such food he will destroy the horse?

HIP. I do not think he will.

SOC. He will not, therefore, think that from such aliment as this, which is of no worth, he shall be enriched.

HIP. He will not.

SOC. What then? Do you think that a pilot who furnishes a ship with a rudder and sails, which are of no value, can be ignorant that he shall sustain an injury, be himself in danger of perishing, and both destroy the ship and all it contains?

HIP. I do not.

SOC. He will not therefore think that he shall be enriched by furniture of no value.

HIP. He will not.

SOC. Will the general of an army, likewise, when he knows that his soldiers have arms which are of no value, think that he shall acquire wealth, or that it is worth while to be enriched by these?

HIP. By no means.

SOC. In like manner, if a piper possesses a pipe of no value, a lyrist a lyre, an archer a bow, or in short if any other artist or skilful person possesses instruments, or any other apparatus of no value, will he think that he shall be enriched by these?

HIP. It appears he will not.

SOC. Who then do you call lovers of gain? For they are certainly not those whom we have already mentioned, who expect to be enriched from things which they know are of no value. And thus, O wonderful man, according to what you say, no one is a lover of gain.

HIP. But I, Socrates, wish to say, that those are lovers of gain, who, through insatiable avidity, transcendently aspire after things very small and trifling, and which are of no value, and this for the sake of gain.

SOC. But certainly, O best of men, they do not act in this manner, knowing that they are things of no worth; for we have granted that this is impossible.

HIP. So it appears to me.

SOC. If, therefore, they do not act in this manner knowingly, it is evident that their conduct must be the effect of ignorance; the consequence of thinking that things which are of no worth are highly valuable.

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. Do the lovers of gain, love any thing else than gain?

HIP. Nothing else.

SOC. But do you say that gain is contrary to loss?

HIP. I do.

SOC. Is it therefore good to any one to suffer a loss?

HIP. To no one.

SOC. Is it then an evil?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. Are men, therefore, injured by loss?

HIP. They are injured.

SOC. Is then loss an evil?

HIP. It is.

SOC. And is gain contrary to loss?

HIP. Contrary.

Soc.

Soc. Is gain therefore good?

Hip. It is.

Soc. Do you, therefore, call those that love good, lovers of gain?

Hip. So it seems.

Soc. You do not then, my friend, call the lovers of gain insane persons. But with respect to yourself, whether do you love that which is good, or do not love it?

Hip. I love it.

Soc. Is there a certain good which you do not love, but a certain evil which you do?

Hip. By Jupiter, there is not.

Soc. But you love all good things equally.

Hip. I do.

Soc. Ask me, if I also do not. For I also shall acknowledge to you, that I love things good. But besides I and you, do not all other men appear to you to love things good, and hate such as are evil?

Hip. To me it appears so.

Soc. But have we not acknowledged that gain is good?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. After this manner, therefore, all lovers of gain appear; but according to that mode which we before mentioned, no one was a lover of gain. By employing which of these two, then, shall we not err?

Hip. If any one, Socrates, rightly apprehends what a lover of gain is, I think he will rightly consider him to be a character of this kind, who earnestly applies himself to the acquisition of wealth, and thinks it worth while to enrich himself from those things from which good men never dare to enrich themselves.

Soc. But do you not see, O sweetest of men, that we just now acknowledged that to be enriched is to be benefited?

Hip. But what then?

Soc. Because this also we previously admitted, that all men always aspired after things good.

Hip. We did.

Soc. Will not, therefore, good men wish to possess every thing lucrative, since every thing lucrative is good?

HIP

HIP. But they will not, Socrates, desire things lucrative, by which they may be injured.

Soc. Do you say that to be injured, is to suffer a loss, or that it is something else?

HIP. I say it is no other than to suffer a loss.

Soc. Do men, therefore, suffer a loss through gain, or through loss?

HIP. Through both. For they suffer a loss through loss, and through base gain.

Soc. Does it therefore appear to you that any thing useful and good is base?

HIP. It does not.

Soc. Did we not then, a little before this, acknowledge that gain is contrary to loss, which is an evil?

HIP. We did.

Soc. And that being contrary to evil, it is good?

HIP. We granted this.

Soc. You see therefore that you endeavour to deceive me, and that you designedly assert the contrary to that which we just now granted.

HIP. I do not, by Jupiter, Socrates: but, on the contrary, you deceive me; and I do not know how it is, but in your discourse you turn all things upwards and downwards.

Soc. Good words, I beseech you. For indeed I should not act well, if I were not persuaded by a good and wise man.

HIP. Who is he? and to what purpose is this?

Soc. My fellow citizen, and likewise yours, Hipparchus the son of the Philædonic Pisistratus, and the eldest and wisest of the sons of Pisistratus. This man, besides exhibiting many other illustrious works of wisdom, was the first that introduced into this land the writings of Homer, and compelled the rhapsodists to recite them in the Panathenaia, alternately, and in order, just as you know they do at present. He likewise brought back Anacreon, who was sent to Teium, in a ship of fifty oars: and always had about him Simonides of Chius; persuading him to reside with him, by great rewards and gifts. He did these things, wishing to persuade his citizens, that thus he might rule over the best of men; thinking, that it was not proper to

envy any man the possession of wisdom, and this because he himself was a worthy and good man. As, therefore, his fellow citizens were well educated men, and admired him for his wisdom, he likewise endeavoured to instruct the husbandmen, and in order to this, placed Hermæ for them in the roads, in the middle of the city, and in each of the towns. Afterwards, from this wisdom of his, which he partly learned, and partly himself discovered, selecting such things as he thought were the wisest, he inserted them in an elegy, and inscribed this work, HIS POEMS, and SPECIMENS OF WISDOM. This he did, in the first place, that his citizens might not admire those wise inscriptions in the temple of Delphi, "Know thyself," "Nothing too much," and the rest of this kind, but that they might think the words of Hipparchus were to be preferred for wisdom to these: and, in the next place, that by every where reading and receiving a taste of his wisdom, they might come from the fields, and be instructed in the other branches of learning. But there are two epigrams, one on the left hand part of each of the Hermæ, in which, according to the inscription, Hermes says, that the column should stand in the middle of the city, and the people; and the other on the right hand part; which was thus inscribed: "This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Persist in paying attention to justice." There are also many other beautiful inscriptions, on other Hermæ; and the following is to be seen in the Stiriæ road: "This monument was raised by Hipparchus—Do not deceive your friend." I therefore, being your friend, dare not deceive you, and oppose the mandate of so great a man; after whose death, the Athenians were under tyrannic subjection to his brother Hippias. And you must have heard from all old men, that there never was a tyranny in Athens till these three years past, and that during every other time, the Athenians lived somewhat nearly after the same manner, as when Saturn reigned. But it is said by more elegant men, that he did not die in the way which the multitude report, viz. through the ignominy of his sister Canephoria; (for it is absurd to suppose that this was the case;) but that Harmodius was beloved and instructed by Aristogiton, who valued himself very highly on this account, and thought that Hipparchus would be his antagonist. But at that time it happened that Harmodius was the lover of a certain noble and beautiful youth, whose name I have heard, but do not at present remember. This
young

young man then at first admired Harmodius and Aristogiton, as wise men, but afterwards associating with Hipparchus, he despised them; and they being very much afflicted with the disgrace, slew Hipparchus.

HIP. You appear, therefore, Socrates, either not to consider me as a friend; or, if you do think me a friend, not to be persuaded by Hipparchus: for I do not know how to persuade myself that you have not deceived me in the preceding discourse.

SOC. But indeed, just as in the game of chess, I am willing to retract whatever you please, that you may not think I have deceived you. Whether therefore shall I retract this assertion for you, that all men desire good?

HIP. Not for me.

SOC. Shall I retract this then, that neither to sustain a loss, nor a loss itself, is an evil?

HIP. Not for me.

SOC. Shall it be this then, that gain, and to acquire gain, are contrary to loss, and to suffer a loss?

HIP. Nor this neither.

SOC. Shall I retract this assertion, that to acquire gain, as being contrary to evil, is good?

HIP. You shall not retract any thing of this.

SOC. It appears to you, therefore, as it seems, that of gain one part is good, and another part evil.

HIP. To me it does appear so.

SOC. I will therefore retract this for you. For let it be that one kind of gain is good, and another kind evil: but gain itself is not more good than evil. For is it?

HIP. Why do you ask me?

SOC. I will tell you. Is there good, and is there likewise bad, food?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. Is therefore one of them more food than the other? or are both of them similarly food? and does the one in no respect differ from the other, so far as each is food, but so far as one is good, and the other bad?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. And does it not likewise follow with respect to drink, and all other things which participate of the good and the bad, that they differ in no

respect from each other, in that in which they are the same? Just as with respect to our own species, one man is good, and another bad.

HIP. Yes.

SOC. But with respect to men, I think that one man is neither more nor less a man than another, neither the good than the bad, nor the bad than the good.

HIP. True.

SOC. Must we not therefore think in the same manner respecting gain, that both the good and the bad are similarly gain?

HIP. It is necessary.

SOC. He, therefore, who possesses good gain, is not in any respect more enriched than he who possesses bad gain: for we have granted that neither of these appears to be more gain than the other.

HIP. True.

SOC. For neither the more nor the less is present to either of these.

HIP. It is not.

SOC. But how can any one do, or suffer, more or less with respect to a thing to which neither of these pertains?

HIP. It is impossible.

SOC. Since, therefore, both are similarly gain and lucrative, it is requisite that we should still further consider this; on what account you call both of them gain, and what it is that you discover to be in both the same. Just as if you should ask me why I just now called both good and bad food similarly food, I should say, It is because each is a dry aliment of the body. And this you will also grant. Or will you not?

HIP. Yes.

SOC. And there will be the same mode of answering respecting drink, that we give this appellation to the moist aliment of the body, whether it is good or bad: and the reply in other things will be similar. Do you, therefore, endeavour to imitate me, by answering as follows. You say with respect to good and bad gain, that each of them is gain. What same thing is it then which, perceiving in these, you denominate gain? But if you are not able to answer me this question, attend to what I am now going to say. Do you then call every possession which any one obtains gain, when he either spends nothing, or receives more than he spends?

HIP.

HIP. It appears to me that this should be called gain.

SOC. Do you, therefore, thus denominate such things as follow: If any one at a feast should spend nothing, but when satiated should become diseased?

HIP. Not I, by Jupiter.

SOC. But if he should obtain health from feasting, would he acquire gain, or suffer a loss?

HIP. He would acquire gain.

SOC. This, therefore, is not gain, to acquire any kind of possession whatever.

HIP. It is not.

SOC. Does it therefore follow that gain is not to be acquired from every kind of possession, whether it be good or bad?

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. And does it likewise follow that loss will not be sustained from every thing, whether it be good or bad?

HIP. To me it appears so.

SOC. Do you, therefore, perceive how you again revolve to the same thing? For gain appears to be good, but loss evil.

HIP. I am dubious what to say.

SOC. And this not unjustly. But still further, answer me this: If any one obtains more than he spends, do you say that this is gain?

HIP. I do, if his gain is not base, but he receives more than he spends, either of gold or silver.

SOC. And I shall also ask you this: If any one, spending half a pound of gold, should receive double this weight of silver, would he be a gainer, or a loser?

HIP. A loser, certainly, Socrates: for he would only receive half the value of what he spent.

SOC. But yet he would receive more. Or is not double more than half?

HIP. But silver is not of the same value as gold.

SOC. It is requisite therefore, as it seems, to add value to gain: for in this case, though the silver is more than the gold, yet you say it is not of equal value.

HIP.

HIP. And very much so : for thus it is.

SOC. Value, therefore, is lucrative, whether it is small or great : but that which is without value is without gain.

HIP. It is.

SOC. Do you say that value is any other value than that which deserves to be acquired ?

HIP. I do not.

SOC. But what do you call that which deserves to be acquired ? The useless, or the useful.

HIP. The useful, certainly.

SOC. The useful, therefore, is good.

HIP. Yes.

SOC. Hence, O most virile of all men, have we not a third or a fourth time granted that the lucrative is good ?

HIP. So it seems.

SOC. Do you remember, therefore, whence this discourse of ours originated ?

HIP. I think I do.

SOC. If you do not, I will remind you. It originated from your denying that good men would be willing to acquire every kind of gain, but that they would wish to possess good, and not base gain.

HIP. It did originate from this.

SOC. But did not our discourse compel us to acknowledge, that all kinds of gain, both small and great, are good ?

HIP. It did compel, Socrates, rather than persuade me.

SOC. But perhaps, after this, it will also persuade you. Now, however, whether you are persuaded, or in whatever manner you may be affected, do you agree with us, that all gain is good, both small and great ?

HIP. I do.

SOC. And do you agree with me, or not, that all good men aspire after all things that are good ?

HIP. I do.

SOC. But you said that bad men love gain of every kind, both small and great.

HIP.

HIP. I did say so.

SOC. According to your assertion, therefore, all men will be lovers of gain, both good and bad men.

HIP. It appears so.

SOC. No one, therefore, who blames the love of gain will blame rightly, since he who does so is himself also a lover of gain.

THE END OF THE HIPPARCHUS.

THE RIVALS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE RIVALS.

THE general subject of this short Dialogue is so evident, that it is no wonder all the copies agree in the entitling it “Concerning Philosophy.” But in the naming it there is some difference. For this is one of those few Dialogues of Plato, which take not their names from any one of the speakers: the reason of which in this is much the same with that in *The Banquet*; it is because the two subordinate speakers are placed on an equal footing of importance in the Dialogue; where we see their characters contrasted, one to the other. They are presented to our view, at their first appearance, contending together for the honour of their respective studies or ways of life, which are of quite opposite kinds, and jealous of each other in the gaining of partisans or followers. It was necessary, therefore, that the Dialogue should have such a name, as might comprise both these persons. The name, usually prefixed to the copies of it, and confirmed by Olympiodorus, is *Ερωται*, signifying all those persons, mentioned in the beginning of the Dialogue, an account of whom is given in note 4. The other name, found in some copies, and authorized by Diogenes Laertius and Proclus, is *Αντιστοιχει*. We have given the preference to this latter; which, we think, will appear to be the genuine name, and the former to be spurious, from the following observations. In the first place, the former name is too general, and ¹ comprehends many other persons present at the conversation,

¹ Much the same reason with this our first is assigned by Dr. Forster in the notes to his edition, for the preference which he also gives to this name of the Dialogue.—S.

who are mute, and merely auditors: whereas the latter peculiarly characterizes the two subordinate speakers, exclusive of the rest of the company. Another reason, which alone seems sufficient to prove the authenticity of the name we have chosen, is this, that the contention or rivalry between these two, besides forming the most entertaining part of the Introduction, gives occasion to the subject of the Dialogue, and is the very foundation on which the structure of it is built. Our last reason is, that where the Man of Learning makes his first appearance, he is ¹ by Plato himself called Rival to the Man of Exercise; a name, which could not properly be attributed to either, till they were both brought upon the stage: however, it is soon afterwards repeated, and applied to the Man of Exercise; which needed not to have been done, but for the sake of marking them the more strongly with this name, common to them both; because terms of reciprocal relation, as well as other correlatives, always suppose and imply one another. In other parts of the Dialogue they are denoted, each by his proper and peculiar epithets; ἐξέρωμενος, αμαθής, σοφώτερος, σοφός ². Thus much concerning the name of the Dialogue, the Introduction to it, and the general subject which gives the title.—The particular subject is the peculiar nature and essence of true philosophy. That by which it is distinguished from all those other kinds of knowledge, that falsely assumes its name, the study of which has in all ages pretended to be, and been set up for, the study of wisdom, or philosophy. For the design of this Dialogue is to show³, that the completely just and good man, who is such upon the principles of science, is alone the wise man or true philosopher. In order to this end, first is detected and exposed that appearance or show of wisdom, which consists in polymathy⁴ in gene-

¹ Part of this third reason is agreeable likewise to an observation of Menage in favour of the name *Αντιρροπται*. See Menagii Observat. in Laertium, p. 137.—S.

² Besides Menage and Forster, Stanley also and Fabricius approve of the name *Αντιρροπται*. It is probable, that the *wrong* name owed its origin merely to an accidental omission of the first syllable in the *right* name, and prevailed with the after-copiers the more easily, as they were so much used to the word *ερασται* in transcribing other Dialogues of Plato; and especially as it occurred in the very first sentence of this.—S.

³ From considering, as it seems, this design of the Dialogue, the antients agree in referring it to the ethic kind.—S.

⁴ It was beautifully said therefore, by Heraclitus, that “*polymathy does not teach intellect*!” πολυμαθὴ ἢ κεν οὐ διδάσκει.—T.

ral, or much learning and knowledge of various kinds. Next, are disproved and disallowed those pretensions, claimed by the mathematical sciences or by any of the liberal arts, which in the Platonic discipline do but smooth and pave the way to true philosophy. The false species being thus rejected, lastly is exhibited this wisdom in her genuine form, as the knowledge of ourselves; the science of that divine principle in man, his mind; the science of justice and goodness, therein included; and the science of government thence immediately derived.—This short bill of fare presents to our readers all they are to expect in the following repast; small in quantity; but great in value, as being a just sample of those rich and plentiful entertainments provided for them by Plato in his longer Dialogues.—The outward form of this piece is purely narrative. But the conversation, recited in it, is peculiarly dramatic. For, besides the other excellencies of the drama, common to it with the rest of Plato's Dialogues, it has this singular beauty, that the figures of the two Rivals are described in as exact and lively a manner, as painting itself could draw them: a circumstance that well may recommend the scene to some ingenious professor of that art, to design after and delineate.—The inward form or genius of the Dialogue corresponds to what has been before said of the conduct of it: for it is partly disputative, of that species where the adverse party is confuted; and partly, to do particular honour to an adversary far superior to the sophists, it is demonstrative, of that species where the proof is by induction.—S.

THE RIVALS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, ¹ MAN OF LEARNING, MAN OF EXERCISE.

SCENE.—*The SCHOOL of DIONYSIUS.*

SOCRATES.

I WENT into the School of Dionysius ² the grammarian; and I there saw the comeliest and finest of our young gentry, accompanied by such
as

¹ Proclus, if that passage, cited from him in note 1, p. 376, be not corrupted, must have supposed this Man of Learning to be Theodorus of Cyrene, the mathematician. It must be confessed, that the character of Theodorus the Cyrenean, given us by Plato in his Theætetus, tallies well enough with that of the Man of Learning, or universal scholar, in this Dialogue. But we presume, the note referred to makes it appear highly probable, at least, that the passage there cited is grossly corrupt; and that Proclus could not entertain any such supposition. We therefore embrace the opinion of Thrasyllus, who, as Diogenes Laertius informs us, pronounced him to be Democritus. To this opinion Laertius himself subscribes, and Dr. Forster seems to agree with them. The reasons, by which it may be supported, together with answers to some objections, to which it may be liable, will be given in our notes to the Dialogue.—S.

² The narration is made in the person of Socrates: who is here feigned by Plato to relate to some of his friends a certain conversation, in which he had been engaged; but how long before this narration is left undetermined.—Now we know, it is usual and natural for all men to begin their relation of any thing past, whether it consisted of facts or words, with an account of the time when those facts happened or those words were spoken; unless the relation immediately succeeds the thing related.—Accordingly Plato, in every one of his narrative Dialogues, points out the precise time of the conversation there related, except in this, and in The Lyfis: but the words, with which he begins The Lyfis, manifestly, we think, imply the time to have been the morning of the same day. The Rivals therefore, remaining a single exception to the general rule, it seems
necessary

as courted their esteem and friendship ⁴. Two of these youths happened at that time to be disputing: but what was the subject of their dispute I did

necessary to suppose, that Plato in this Dialogue, agreeably to the usage of all men, dictated to them by nature and common sense, and agreeably to his usual dramatic manner, intended to represent Socrates, immediately on his quitting the school of Dionysius, meeting with some of his friends, who happened not to have attended him thither, and relating to them a conversation, to which they had not been witnesses. For Socrates appears never to have used the didactic manner, in the instructing his disciples: but to have taught them his divine doctrine in the more engaging way of familiar conversation. If then he be supposed to have made them this narration in answer to these questions of theirs,—Where have you been, and what have you been doing since you left us?—the time, Just now, is evidently implied in the very first sentence. Or if he be supposed to have given them the recital from his own motion, as being yet warm from the discourse recited, and having his head still full of the argument,—in this case, the abrupt manner of beginning, without mention of the time, is more animated, and shows the mind pregnant with the matter to be delivered.—Dacier, in his translation of this Dialogue, has here thrust in, without any warrant from the original, the words “*l'autre jour*,” which give an air of coldness to the whole narration. But it must be observed, that he is every where more attentive to make his translation of Plato agreeable to modern readers, than to preserve those seemingly slight and trivial dramatic circumstances, which would have cost him the trouble of many a note to illustrate and explain.—S.

³ Γραμματικου. Thus all the editions of Plato, and consequently those manuscript copies, from which the four first were printed. But Dr. Forster, in his late excellent edition of this and other Dialogues of Plato, prefers the reading of Γραμματιστου, that is, *teacher of the elements of grammar*, which has the authority of only one manuscript to support it. It appears indeed, from the very passage now before us, that teaching the elements of grammar was the profession of this Dionysius; and we learn, from several ancient writers, that he had taught Plato. But if it be true, what Olympiodorus supposes, and the supposition seems very natural and just, that Plato introduces the mention of his master in this passage, on purpose to record his memory, and to give his name what place he could in his writings, it is probable that, in pursuance of the same solicitude for his master's honour, he would mention him in the most respectful manner, and though Dionysius was Γραμματιστης, a grammar-schoolmaster by profession, yet that his grateful scholar would give him here the more honourable title of Γραμματικο;—. It is further to be observed, that Olympiodorus, when he calls him Γραμματιστης, speaks of him historically, and not citing the words of Plato in this passage, as Dr. Windet in his notes on Olympiodorus, and Dr. Forster after him, erroneously seem to think.—S.

⁴ There was a law or custom in Sparta, instituted by Lycurgus, that young gentlemen, who had gone through the whole course of their studies, and were become perfect in the practice of those virtues they had learnt, should take under their own immediate eye the younger sort, who were then training up in the same discipline. The intention of which law was this; that the continual presence and example of those adepts might animate the learners, and fire them with emulation and an ardour to arrive at the same excellence. To further this end, particular friendships

were

did not perfectly apprehend. There was reason however to suppose it related either to Anaxagoras or to Oenopides¹: for they appeared to be describing

were highly encouraged, and grew into great fashion, between two such persons. They were contracted in this manner: the elder chose out from among the youth one, whose genius he thought similar to his own, and whom he had conceived the best hopes of being able to improve; attached himself to him, and accompanied him in all his studies, his performances in music, and his gymnastic exercises, the two principal parts of a Spartan education; encouraging and applauding him, endeavouring to acquire his confidence, and engage him to a reciprocal esteem and friendship. In imitation of this custom amongst the Spartans, Solon either introduced or authorized friendships of this kind amongst the Athenians; laying them under the same restrictions as in Sparta; and prohibiting slaves, though frequently employed as schoolmasters and pedagogues to their youth, from aspiring to be their private tutors, guides, and constant companions, in this way of intimacy and friendship. This was all the caution deemed requisite, in those antient and virtuous times, to preserve their youth from the contagion of base sentiments and bad manners. But when afterwards the riches of Asia flowed into Athens, and thence into the rest of Greece, through the channels of trade and commerce; and when luxury and effeminacy, which always come with the tide of riches, had corrupted the Grecians, and debauched their manners; friendship, which only can subsist amongst the virtuous, no longer flourished in its purity, but degenerated into a commerce of lewdness; entered into and managed, at first, under the mask of friendship, and those laudable motives before mentioned; but at length, especially amongst the rich and great, carried on more openly, and with little or no disguise. Instances in both ways we meet with frequently in Plato; in the way of virtuous friendship, Socrates in particular, every where seeking out the best disposed amongst the youth, attracting their regards and cultivating their esteem, with a view to communicate to them his wisdom, to avert them from the parties of bad men, and to engage them on his own side, the side of virtue. The Man of Learning in this Dialogue is plainly enough, from his whole description, another instance of like kind. Of which sort were the other persons, mentioned in the passage here before us, is uncertain: and examples of the vicious kinds in some other Dialogues need not to be pointed out. The speech of Alcibiades in The Banquet is too flagrant a proof, that the profligacy of that young nobleman was no very astonishing or singular thing at Athens. When any other such passages occur in Plato, it will be sufficient to refer our readers to this note.—S.

¹ Proclus, in giving a short history of the rise and progress of geometry, refers to this place in the following words: *Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένηος πολλὰν ἐρεψατο κατὰ γεωμετρίαν, καὶ Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος, ὁ τοῦ του μνησίου τετραγωνισμὸν εὗρεν, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, ὁλίγον πεντέρος ἀνὰ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου· ὃν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρετικῶν ἐκχρησίσταται, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθηματικῇ διδασκαλῶντων.* “Anaxagoras the Clazomenian touched on many points in geometry; as also did Oenopides the Chian, he who found out the squaring of the Meniscus; and Theodorus the Cyrenean, somewhat junior to Anaxagoras; who are recorded by Plato in The Rivals, as men of reputation for mathematical science.” Procl. Comment. in Euclid. l. ii. p. 19. But we find no where in this Dialogue any mention made of Theodorus by name. It should seem, therefore, that Proclus imagined, one of the two nameless

describing circles; and by holding their hands in an inclining and oblique position, seemed to be representing, not in play, but with much seriousness, certain inclinations of the pole. Upon which, as I had seated myself next to an admirer of one of the young disputants, I moved him with my elbow to turn his face to me, and then asked him what point it was which engaged

nameless Rivals, the Man of Learning, to be this very Theodorus. But indeed the sentence, here cited from Proclus, appears to us erroneously copied by some old transcriber. For it is immediately followed by this other sentence; *ἐφ' οἷς Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χίος, ὁ τὸν τοῦ μηνίσκου τετραγωνισμὸν εὑρων, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, ἐγένοντο περὶ γεωμετρίας ἐπιφανεῖς.* "After whom Hippocrates the Chian, he who found out the squaring of the Meniscus, and Theodorus the Cyrenean, became illustrious for their skill in geometry." Now these two sentences, taken together, evidently contain two egregious blunders; one is, that the [first] discovery of squaring the Meniscus, is attributed to two different persons; the other is, that one and the same person, Theodorus, is introduced as posterior in point of time to himself. We have therefore no doubt but that the whole passage in Proclus ought to be read as follows: *Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομενίος πολλὰν ἐφηψάτο κατὰ γεωμετρίας, καὶ Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος, ὃν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς ἀντεράσταις ἐμνημονεύσεν, ὥς ἐπὶ τοῖς μαθημασί διέξαν λαβόντων. ἐφ' οἷς Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χίος, ὁ τὸν τοῦ μηνίσκου τετραγωνισμὸν εὑρων, καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, οὐκ ὡς νεώτερος ὢν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου, ἐγένοντο περὶ γεωμετρίας ἐπιφανεῖς.* "Anaxagoras the Clazomenian touched on many points in geometry; as also did Oenopides the Chian; who are [both of them] recorded by Plato in The Rivals, as men of reputation for mathematical science. After whom, Hippocrates the Chian, he who found out the squaring of the Meniscus, and Theodorus the Cyrenean, who was somewhat junior to Anaxagoras, became illustrious for their skill in geometry." The mistake of the transcriber of this passage is easy to be accounted for by such as are used to ancient manuscripts, in the following manner. The transcriber, we presume, had no other person to read to him; as those had, who copied books, for which there was always a great demand, such as Homer, for instance; in which case there was one reader to many scribes. But the writings of Proclus were the purchase only of a few. The transcriber, therefore, being alone, his eye must have been often changing from his own writing to that which he wrote after. We suppose, that the words *Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χίος* occurred in the next line to, and immediately under, the words *Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος*. We suppose that the transcriber having written so far as *Οἰνοπίδης ὁ Χίος*, and looking into his original, had his eye caught by *ὁ Χίος* in the next line; from which words there he went on transcribing, with the omission of a whole line: and that afterwards on a review finding his mistake, transcribed in the margin the words omitted (a large margin being always left for such purposes); and added a few words which followed, to point out where the omission was made. But when this very transcript came afterwards to be copied, we suppose that the latter transcriber inserted the marginal words into the body of his copy, in a wrong place, after the words *τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου*. But the matter is put out of dispute by Simplicius, who, in his learned Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, fol. 12. has shown us mathematically how to square the Meniscus; the invention, as he expressly tells us, of Hippocrates the Chian, as a step to the discovery of squaring the Circle.—S.

those two youths so earnestly in debate ; adding, It must certainly be something of great importance, and a matter of fine speculation, that, on which they bestowed so serious an attention.—What call you great and fine? said he. They are² prating³ about things up in the sky, and trifle away their time

¹ The Greek is thus printed ; 'Ο δ' εἶπε, Ποιον, εἶη, μέγα καὶ καλόν : “ And he replied, What mean you, said he, by great and fine?” If this reading be right, Dr. Forster rightly says, there is a pleonasm here in the words εἶπε and εἶη. But, perhaps, instead of εἶη, we should read φησ. Grammarians, in explaining ancient authors, love all opportunities of having recourse to figures of speech ; and verbal critics take as much delight in all occasions to amend the text. But as this makes only a small part of the office we have undertaken, we hope we are moderate in the execution of it. We therefore contend not in this place, but leave it to the determination of our learned readers.—S.

² In the Greek, ἀδολοσχόνσι περὶ τῶν μετεώρων. Ἀδολοσχεῖν is to talk idly and impertinently, and in the Phædo is opposed to περὶ προσήκοντων λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, “ the speaking about what concerns a man.” But by the multitude, by the men of business, and all other the enemies of philosophy, it was specially used to signify those who held much conversation together on philosophical subjects. Thus Strepsiades in Aristophanes at first calls the house, where men addicted to such studies used to assemble, ψυχῶν σοφῶν φροντιστήριον, “ the considering place of wise souls :” and when afterwards he is made to change his mind, he calls it τὴν οἰκίαν τῶν ἀδολετχῶν, “ the house of the philosophic praters.” The sense of this passage is expressed in The Phædrus by one word, μετεωρολετχεῖν.—S.

³ Περὶ τοῦ μετεώρου. Aristotle restrained the meaning of the word μετεώρα to signify the phenomena in the air or lower sky, with their influences on the water ; and those only in the upper sky which seem mutable or transient, such as comets ; or indistinct, as the milky way ; exclusively of those which appear distinct in their forms, and are constant and invariable in their motions, called the heavenly bodies. But Plato by the word μετεώρα always means principally, if not solely, these last, as the word commonly signified. Thus in The Clouds of Aristophanes, where Socrates is called one of the μετεωροσφιστῆται, he is made to say, Αἰροῦμαι, καὶ περισκοπῶ τὸν ἥλιον ; “ I walk in air, and contemplate the sun.” And presently after,

— — — — — Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε
Ἐξευρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετεώρα πραγμάτων,
Εἰ μὴ, κ. τ. λ.

For the real nature of these things on high
Ne'er had I found out rightly, if, &c.—

And near the end of the comedy, where Strepsiades, in mimicry, repeats the former of these two passages, Αἰροῦμαι, κ. τ. λ. he adds, speaking to Socrates in scoff,

Καὶ τῆς σελήνης εὐσκοπεῖσθε τὴν ἰδραί ;

The dwellings of the moon too have ye spy'd?

ridiculing

in philosophizing.—This answer of his seemed to me a strange one; and I said, Young man, do you then think it mean and dishonourable for a man to philosophize? or for what other reason do you speak so harshly of what they are employed about?—On my putting this question to him, another person¹, who happened to be a rival of his for the esteem of the youths I mentioned,

ridiculing in this the doctrine of Anaxagoras and his followers, that the moon was inhabited, like the earth, which the poets called

———ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰετ.

———the firm and ever-fix'd abode
Of gods and mortals.

¹ It will soon appear probable, that Socrates knew who this person was; for he tells us what kind of life he led; which resembled rather that of a philosopher than that of a sophist. It is probable that he was a stranger at Athens, and chose to be concealed. It was polite, therefore, in Socrates to suppress the mention of his name. Had he been an Athenian, it would have been natural for Socrates to speak of him by name, as he was speaking to his fellow-citizens. And had he been a sophist, we could not fail to have been told his name, because Socrates never spared the sophists. He appears then to have been some foreign philosopher, whom Socrates had discovered notwithstanding his affected privacy. Now none of the philosophers of that age lived a life so retired, or so obscure, as did Democritus. He sought not fame: speculative knowledge for its own sake seemed to be his only end. For he despised, not only the multitude, but all men. He concerned not himself with any human affairs; but laughed at all human pursuits, and even at all social engagements. Quite opposite in this respect was the character of Socrates. For he always lived the most social life, in the midst of the most populous city at that time in the known world. He conversed familiarly with all sorts of men, with a simple and constant view to make them better men in private life, and better citizens, whether as governors or as subjects. His peculiar philosophy was wholly of the practical kind. He was indeed the first who investigated the principles of morals and of politics, and thus raised them into sciences: whereas before his time political and even moral precepts lay unconnected, loose, and scattered; and were consequently vague and uncertain. He first discovered them to be founded in the stable and eternal essence of mind, and in the government of mind, by nature, over all things inferior to itself. Thus the philosophy of Socrates is like the ladder in the patriarch Jacob's dream: his metaphysics ascend gradually up to the first cause of things; from which depend, and from whence come down to earth, the sciences of ethics and of politics, to bless mankind. Such being the sum of the Socratic doctrine; and the drift of this Dialogue in particular being to show, that no other doctrine than this deserves the name of philosophy; none of the philosophers, so called, was so proper to be opposed here to Socrates, as Democritus; not only for the reasons already given, but because also, like most modern philosophers, he was merely a naturalist; making body the sole subject of his philosophical researches; attributing to body a natural and necessary motion; and in the nature

mentioned, and was therefore seated near us, having heard my questions, with his answers to them, interposed, and said to me, It is unworthy of you, Socrates, to ask the opinion of this man, whether he thinks it mean and dishonourable to philosophize. Know you not him, that he has spent all his time in wrestling, cramming himself, and sleeping? What other answer then can you expect from him than this, that the study of philosophy is dishonourable and base.—Now the person, who thus spake to me, ye are to understand, employed his whole time in the improvement of his mind, and in the study of the arts^a and sciences: the other, whom he had vilified,

of body seeking for the cause of all things. There seems to be another propriety too in introducing Democritus in this Dialogue, as attentive to the astronomical dispute between the two youths. For we have some reason to think, that he favoured the Pythagorean, or at least the Semi-Tychonic, system of the world. His master in natural philosophy we know was Leucippus: and by all writers of philosophic history he is accounted of the same sect, the Eleatic. Now Leucippus, as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius, held *την γην οχεσθαι περί το μέσον διουμένην*, “that the earth was carried wheeling round the middle.” If the middle here means a central body at some distance from the earth, (and it is certain, that *οχεσθαι* every where else signifies to ride, or to be carried aloft,) it follows, that Leucippus held the Pythagorean system of the world. But if it means only the axis of the earth’s motion, then the doctrine of Leucippus is agreeable to that hypothesis, since called the Semi-Tychonic.—S.

^a In the Greek, *τραχηλιζόμενος*. Most of the interpreters agree in the general meaning of the word in this place, that it relates to wrestling. But as they all differ in the manner how, we beg leave to differ from them all, and to suppose it means, “held by the neck,” as is usual in the action of wrestling. The word, thus understood, presents to the imagination the most ridiculous image, and is therefore the most proper in a description intended to be ridiculous. Agreeably to this, Lucian, in several places of his *Anacharxis*, represents these wrestlers as throttling and half strangling each other. As to the rest of the description, it agrees with the account, given us by Plutarch, of the life of the athletics, *ὕπνῳ τε πολλῷ, καὶ πλησμοναῖς ἐνδελχεῖσι, καὶ κινήσει τεταγμέναις καὶ ἡσυχαιῖς, αὐξάντων τε καὶ διαφυλαττόντων τὴν ἑξίν*. “By much sleep and continual full feeding, by regulated motions, and stated times of rest, improving and preserving in its improvement the habit of their bodies.” Plutarch, in his *Life of Philopœmen*.—The main of the description is justly applicable to the life of every man, who makes the exercise of his body in general his sole business, or is addicted to the violent exercise of it in any one way. Galen, with this very description apparently in his mind, has improved and heightened the colouring of it, in a passage cited by Dr. Forster, to which we refer our learned readers.—S.

^a In the Greek, *περί μουσικῆν*. See Dr. Forster’s note on this place, to which nothing needs to be here added.—S.

spent

spent his in the care and improvement of his body by the gymn¹ exercises. I therefore thought it proper to desist from putting my questions to him, ²this robust body of a man; seeing that he professed not to be well-practised in the arts of reasoning and discoursing, but in feats only of activity and strength: and I chose rather to interrogate and sift the other, who pretended to be the wiser man; ³in hopes that, if it were possible for me, I might receive from him some improvement in knowledge. Addressing myself therefore to him, I told him that I had proposed my question before all who heard me; ⁴and if you think yourself, said

¹ These exercises were, running, leaping, casting of quoits, throwing of javelins, wrestling, and boxing: but wrestling was the principal. They were called *γυμνικοί*, gymn^{ic}, because they were all of them usually, and wrestling was always, performed with the limbs and the upper part of the body quite naked. They were taught according to rules of art: masters were appointed to teach them; and schools were built, and places set apart, proper for the exercise of them. Skill in them, particularly in wrestling, and the exercise according to art, was called *γυμναστική*, the word here used by Plato.—S.

² In all editions of the Greek we read, *τον ερμηνον*, a word justly suspected by every learned and careful reader not to have been written in this place by Plato. Dr. Forster, in his edition of this Dialogue, proposes an emendation, made by a very ingenious and learned man, Mr. Mudge, formerly of Exeter College in Oxford; it is *τον ερρωμενον*: in favour of which we heartily resign two former conjectures of our own;—one was *τον εραμενον*, in the same sense, in which Plato had just before said *ουτος τον ερσταν*:—the other was *τον εραμενον*, a word which we imagined might distinguish this man's regard for the youth from that of the other, the *μουσικος*. We embrace Mr. Mudge's emendation the more readily, because the description, given of the Man of Exercise in the word *ερρωμενον*, is well opposed to the description of the Man of Learning, given us by Plato presently afterwards.—S.

³ One of the most striking features in the character of Socrates was the ironical manner which he used in conversing with the sophists, complimenting them on their pretended wisdom, and dissembling his own real knowledge. For before them he affected ignorance even in those subjects, which he had studied the most and knew the best of any man; and was always asking them questions on those very points, seemingly for the sake of information. By this conduct he engaged them to expose their own ignorance, and by that means undeceived their followers and admirers, who by them were misled and had their minds corrupted. But the sentence now before us, where Socrates is speaking, not to the Man of Learning himself, but of him to his own friends and disciples, we presume, cannot be ironical: it is one of those many passages in Plato, where appears another, equally strong, but more amiable feature, in the character of that wise and good man; his unassuming modesty, and truly polite regard to others, according to their rank or merit.—S.

⁴ In the original here is a transition from the narrative or historical style to the dramatic or that

said I, capable of giving me a better answer than that man, I repeat the same question to you, Whether you think it honourable, or not, to philosophize?—About the time we had proceeded thus far in our conversation, the two youths, overhearing what we said, became silent; and breaking off the dispute between themselves, gave their attention to us. Now, what were the sentiments of their professed friends and admirers on this occasion I know not; but, for my own part, I was struck with admiration at the scene; as I always am, when I see such a disposition in the young and handsome. One of them, however, the person to whom I had proposed my question last, seemed to me no less charmed with it than myself: not but that he answered with a free and open air, as if ambitious only of having the preference and the praise given to his own studies.—¹ Should I ever, Socrates, said he, come to think meanly of philosophy, I should no longer deem myself a human being; as I deem not any person, who entertains such a sentiment worthy of that character;—hinting at his Rival, and raising his voice, that he might be heard by the youths, of whose esteem both of them were emulous.—You then, said I, think highly of philosophy.—Most highly, replied he.—But what? said I: do you suppose it possible for a man to know the true dignity of any thing, to know whether it be base or honourable, unless he first knows what the nature of that thing is?—

that of dialogue. But as we use no such figure or mode of speech in our language, the translator has inserted the words, “said I,” to make his sentence good English.—S.

¹ Those, called sophists, were not only proud of this very title, which signifies men who knew things wise, that is, things above the knowledge of the vulgar, but they also affected to be thought and called σοφοί, wise men. The Pythagoreans, after their master, only assumed the title of philosophers, lovers of wisdom, or students in it. Thus, in the beginning of this Dialogue, philosophizing means, applying the mind to the study of wisdom. We are told by Laertius, that Democritus admired Pythagoras, and emulated the Pythagoreans. Now it is certain, that he was no follower of their doctrines, or way of teaching; it must be meant therefore of their manners, their modesty, and their other virtues. We find our Man of Learning here professing nothing more than a high esteem for philosophy. The sentiment, here attributed to him, is the very same with that of Democritus, in Stobæus, Sermon. I. Ἄνθρωποις ἀνθρώπων, ψυχῆς πολλῶν ἢ σώματος ποιεῖσθαι λόγον. “It is a thing befitting human beings, to make more account of the soul, than of the body. For the soul, improved in the highest degree, rectifies what is amiss in its tabernacle,” meaning the body; “whereas strength of this, without the exercise of reason, betters not a whit the condition of the soul.” Ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ τελεωτάτη σκηνὴς μοχθηρίαν ἐξέβη· σκηνὴς γὰρ ἰσχυρὰ ἀνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχὴν οὐδὲν τι ἀμείνω τίθησι.—S.

I do

I do not, answered he.—Know you then, said I, what it is to philosophize?—Perfectly well, said he.—What is it then? said I.—What other thing, answered he, than that described by Solon¹ in these verses,

To various knowledge, I had gain'd before,
I add each year variety of more;
And thus old age increases still my store.

Agreeably to this is my opinion, said he, that the man, who would philosophize, ought to be always, in his old age as well as in his youth, still adding to his stock of knowledge by some new acquisition; making use of life to learn as many things as possible.—Now this account of his² seemed to me,
at

¹ Γηρασκω δ', αiei πολλὰ διδασκομενος. In these words is this celebrated verse of Solon's cited here by Plato. And we have given a paraphrase of it according to this reading, and answering the purpose for which it is introduced. A more literal translation would be this: "Old as I grow, I still learn many things." But the verse, as cited by other ancient writers, is this,

Αiei γηρασκω, πολλὰ μαθησκομενος.

to be translated thus:

Older and older every day I grow,
Yet have to learn much more than yet I know.

Or, if the word *μαθησκομενος*, in the future tense, has here the force of a verb desiderative or meditative, and signifies resolved, or ready, or about to learn, it may then be thus translated:

I still grow older; yet I still aspire
In many things more knowledge to acquire.

The verse, we see, whichever be the true reading, and whichever the precise sense of it, is evidently in praise of polymathy; and consequently is agreeable to the mind and taste of our Man of Learning: but the meaning of it, last given, seems to be so the most; the second has indeed a greater appearance of modesty; and the first perhaps favours too much of vanity and ostentation.—S.

² For indeed at first sight it looks very like to that, which Socrates in Xenophon gives of himself and his own studies, where he says; *εξ ουτου περ ξυνιεναι τα λεγομενα ηξεαμι, ου πωποτε διελιπον και ζητων και μαθανων ο τι εδυναμην αγαθον*. Xen. in Soc. Apolog. "Ever since I began to understand the subjects of discourse, I have never ceased inquiring into and learning every GOOD thing I was able." But on nearer inspection, the same difference will be found between them, that appears in this Dialogue between philosophy, as described at first by the Man of Learning, and that which at the conclusion proves to be genuine philosophy, that knowledge which is eminently good and useful

at first appearance, to have some weight in it : but after reviewing it a little within myself, I asked him, whether philosophy in his judgment consisted in multiplicity of knowledge.—That, replied he, is entirely my opinion.—And is it your opinion too, said I, that philosophy is only a becoming and an honourable study? or do you deem it also good and beneficial?—Good and beneficial, replied he, in the highest degree.—Does this appear to you the peculiar property of philosophy? or think you that other studies partake of the same advantage? For instance, love of the gymnastic exercises, do you deem it not only honourable and becoming a man, but good for him also? or think you otherwise?—To this question, he facetiously replied, I have two answers to give. To this man here I would say, It is neither : but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both, to be good for a man, as well as becoming him.—Then I asked him, whether in these exercises he thought the undergoing much toil to be the same thing with love of exercise.—By all means, said he ; just as in philosophizing, I take the acquisition of much knowledge to be the same thing with philosophy.—Do you think then, said I, that the lovers of those exercises have any other view than to acquire a good habit of body?—No other, replied he.—Is a good habit of body then, said I, acquired by using much exercise, and under-

useful to man, that which our elegant philosophic poet terms, the only science of mankind.—One cannot but wonder, that Wower, in his treatise de Polymathia, c. ii. § 7. could so much mistake Plato's meaning, as to cite him asserting in this very Dialogue that philosophy is polymathy. We cannot suppose Wower to have meant, that such an account of philosophy was given us somewhere in this Dialogue, that is, by the Man of Learning : for to confirm what he tell us as the opinion of Plato himself, he immediately adds the following quotation, as out of Plato's Republic, *τογε πολυμαθες και φιλοσοφον ταυτον*. Unhappily for his argument, the word in this last passage is not *πολυμαθες*, but *φιλομαθες*, and means a love of that knowledge which by nature is familiar to the mind of man ; which is indeed the same thing with the love of wisdom, or philosophy. It is not at all surprising, that Wower should elevate above measure the charms of his own mistress ; for such sentiments inseparably attend the passion of love : but to imagine that every other man must see her in the same light, can proceed only from being in love to a degree of madness. Besides ; men, who aspire to the fame of vast erudition, are apt to read in too hasty and cursory a manner.—S.

Την πολυμθειαν.—Agreeably to this, Clemens of Alexandria, citing a passage out of Democritus, where this philosopher boasts of his much travelling through various countries, of the accurate researches which he made in them all, of his long abode in Egypt, and of his skill superior to that of all men every where in geometrical demonstrations, observes, that the philosopher wrote thus, *επι τη πολυμαθια σεμνυνόμενος*, “glorying in his polymathy.” *Stromat.* l. i.—S.

going

going much toil and labour in it?—Certainly, said he: for how should a man, who labours little, or uses little exercise, acquire a good habit of body. —Here I thought it most advisable to call in to my assistance our champion for the gymnastic art, on account of his experience. I therefore said to him, How can you sit silent, my friend, and hear this man talk so strangely? Are you of opinion too, that a good habit of body is acquired through great toil, labour, and exercise, and not rather by means of such as are moderate?—For my part, Socrates, said he, I was thinking that I had an evident proof before my eyes, at this very time, to confirm the truth of that well-known saying, that moderate labour is best for the body.—How so? said I.—Do I not see ¹ him there, said he, in want of sleep and good nourishment, ² scarce able to turn his head, and worn away to a shadow with much study and hard labour of the brain?—At this sarcasm, the youths, who heard him, were pleased, and could not refrain from laughing; a circumstance which put our great student a little out of countenance.—I then said to him, Well; do you now agree with us, that a good habit of body is procured neither by much nor by little labour, but by that only which is moderate? or will you dispute the point with us, one against two?—Against him, replied he, I would enter the lists with much pleasure, well assured that I should be able to support my side of the argument, ³ even though it were worse and weaker than it is: for in such combats, he is a mere nothing. But against you, Socrates, I would not choose to contend for

¹ This description of our Man of Learning, in his person and appearance, agrees exactly with the description given of Democritus by Hippocrates, in that epistle of his cited before;—that he was *μικρικῶς πανυ καὶ λειποσαρκός*, “extremely pale in his visage and wasted in his flesh;”—that he found him with a book,” *βιβλίον ἐπὶ τοῖν γονατοῖν*, “which lay [open] on his knees;” *ἑτέρα δὲ τινα εἰς ἀμφοῖν τοῖν μεροῖν αὐτοῦ περιβέβλητο*, “and that other books lay by him, some on each side;”—*ὅτε μὲν συντόμως ἐγχαρὲν ἐγκειμενός*, that “by turns he wrote, poring over his writing with earnest attention;” *ὅτε δὲ ᾗρειμει, πᾶμπόλυ—ἐν αὐτῷ μερμηρίζων*, “and by turns rested, pondering very much within himself.”—S.

² This must ever be the case of such a man as Democritus, who was always poring on his books, his experiments, and his dissections. From hence it was, and from extreme attention to his studies, that he did not at first, as Laetius relates, know his own father, when he came to visit him.—S.

³ These athletic gentlemen were remarkable for their slowness, heaviness, and want of adroitness, in all exercises of the mind. See the third book of the Republic.—S.

any kind of paradox : and therefore I admit, that 'not violent but moderate exercise procures men a good habit of body.—And how is it with respect to food ? said I. Is it much or moderate, which contributes to the same end ?—¹ With respect to food also he acknowledged moderation to be best. And thus I led him on through all other things which had relation to the body ; urging him to own, that it was best to be moderate in the use of them all, and neither to exceed, nor to be deficient : and all this he granted me.—Well ; and how is it with respect to the soul ? said I. Is this benefited most by a moderate or by an immoderate quantity of those things which it receives ?—By a moderate quantity, said he.—Is not learning one of the things administered to the soul ?—It was admitted.—Most beneficial therefore to the soul is moderate learning, and not an immense heap.—He granted it.—Who now is the proper person for us to advise with concerning the body ; would we know, what kinds and degrees of exercise are moderate, and what is a moderate quantity of food ? We must all three of us agree, that it is either a physician or ²a master of exercise. And concerning corn,

what

¹ We understand the following passage of Xenophon, as having a view to the vehement lovers of bodily exercise, a character common amongst the young men of that age : το μεν ουν υπερειθιοντα υπερπονειν αποδοκιμαζει (c. Σωκρατης,) το δε οσα ηδως η ψυχη δεχεται, ταυτα ικανως εκπονειν εδοκιμαζει. Memorab. l. i. c. ii. § 4.—S.

² In the Greek, Και τα σιτια ωμολογει. In this sentence the word ομοιος, or ωσαυτως, or other word of like import, seems wanting, and must be understood. But we suspect that, instead of τα σιτια, we should read τα μετ ια. This concession of the Man of Learning thus agrees exactly, and in the same terms, with his two subsequent concessions on the same point. We have, however, given such a turn to our translation of this sentence, as to adapt it to either way of reading it.—See a passage, parallel to this, in Aristotle's Nicomach. Ethics. l. ii. c. ii.—S.

³ παιδοτριβην. This properly signifies the master, appointed to teach the youth their exercises, and direct every motion to be used in them. But Plato here, and in other places, uses the word to signify a person whose knowledge was of the same kind with that of the γυμναστης, or gymnastic physician ; to know the power of each particular exercise in the cure of each particular disease ; and how much of it was to be used in each particular case ; a science, which has for many ages been too much neglected. Perhaps, from the time of Herodicus, (who as Plato tells us in his 3d book de Republicâ, παιδοτριβης αν ειμιε γυμναστικην ιατρικην,) for a few ages, the offices of παιδοτριβης and γυμναστης belonged to men versed in the same kinds of knowledge ; though in process of time they came to be very different, and were assigned to men of very different abilities. It is certain, that in the time of Galen, the παιδοτρικης, "the master of the exercises," was subordinate to the γυμναστης, "the physician" who prescribed the proper exercise ; and that he was under his direction. Such an

alteration

what is a moderate and due quantity for sowing, we must agree, that the husbandman is the fittest person to be consulted. But concerning the soul, and the discipline or learning to be there sown and planted, of whom ought we to inquire, what measure and what share is to be accounted moderate?—We were here all of us at a stand. Upon which, in a jocular way, I said, Since we are at a loss, ourselves, what to answer, will you consent to ask the opinion of these youths here on the point in question? But perhaps we are above that; ¹ like the wooers of Penelope, of whom Homer says, that they

alteration in the practice was very natural: for when any art is considerably improved, and the principles of it come to be established on science, the inferior branches of it, those which require manual operations, or any labour of the body, of course devolve to inferior persons.—What confirms our supposition is, that Æschines the Socratic, Plato's fellow-disciple, in his Dialogue *περι αρετης, η διδακτων*, attributes to the *παιδοτριβαι* knowledge and judgment in the constitution and habit of men's bodies. The same writer, in his Dialogue named *Axiochus*, mentions the *παιδοτριβαι* and *γυμνασται* together, as persons equal in authority over the youth committed to their care and teaching. Neither Mercurialis nor Peter Faber cite these last-mentioned Dialogues: they seem indeed to have overlooked them, as being in their days numbered amongst the supposititious Dialogues of Plato; for otherwise they would not so hastily have concluded, nor so rashly have asserted, that by *παιδοτριβης* Plato means *γυμναστης*. See the former of these writers in his treatise *de Arte Gymnasticâ*, lib. i. c. xii. and the latter, in *Agonisticôn*, lib. ii. c. vi.—In the next age after that of Plato, very little alteration seems to have been made. For Aristotle, in the beginning of the 4th book of his *Politics*, having mentioned this kind of general knowledge, the knowing what sort of exercise is agreeable to each particular habit of body, attributes this knowledge to the *παιδοτριβης*, as well as to the *γυμναστης*, which last word we beg leave to read in that passage, instead of *γυμναστικος*; for we know of no master or teacher of the exercises, or any subordinate officer or minister in the teaching them, who was ever called by the name of *γυμναστικος*. The corruption of the text of Aristotle in this passage arose perhaps from comparing it with another passage in the same work, at the end of the 3d chapter of the 8th book, where the arts *γυμναστικη και παιδοτριβικη* are mentioned together; and where (by the way) the exact distinction is made between them, as they were practised at that time; and the latter, the art of the *παιδοτριβης*, is shown to be instrumental to the former, the art of the *γυμναστης*, though knowledge of the same kind still belonged to both.—S.

¹ Socrates speaks here jocosely, as if he thought the Man of Learning might possibly be affronted, and piqued in point of honour, if the question were referred to the two youths, persons who seemed so much less able to answer it: in like manner as the wooers of Penelope pretended, that the offer of the seeming beggar to try his strength with them was an affront to their superior rank. Monf. Dacier, in his note on this passage, seems to insinuate, that Plato has given a turn to the passage in Homer here alluded to, different from the intention of the poet. For he says that Penelope's wooers openly avowed their fear of the superior strength of the concealed Ulysses, and

they disdained to suffer any to draw the bow beside themselves.—¹ When they now seemed to be giving up the argument, in despair of coming to a conclusion; I bethought myself how to put the inquiry on another footing. And accordingly I proposed this question, What sorts of learning, to the best of our conjecture, does it become a philosopher to acquire principally? since

their apprehensions of his doing that to which they found themselves unequal. But this criticism of his shows that he entered not thoroughly into the sense either of Plato or of Homer in this place: for, in the lines to which he refers us, Homer says, that when Ulysses had offered to try his strength in drawing the bow, they (his rivals) were beyond measure offended, and overflowed with indignation and resentment; being afraid lest Ulysses should succeed in the attempt, if they permitted it; that is, they were at the same time secretly afraid of his success: for we are to observe, that Homer writes this as inspired by the Muse, who was supposed not only cognizant of all the past actions and speeches of those who were the subjects of his poem, but also privy to the secret motives of the actors, and to the minds of the speakers. But the avowed motives of Antinous and Eurymachus, in rejecting the offer made by Ulysses, were indignation at his presumption, and a sense of honour, not suffering them to enter the lists with an antagonist deemed so much their inferior. In refusing therefore to admit of his proposal, they pleaded, not the danger they were in of his prevailing, but the shame that would arise to them in case he should happen to prevail. Thus, under the pretence of the superiority of their rank to his, they concealed the sense they had of their own deficiency, and their opinion of his real superior excellence. Affecting haughtiness and contemptuousness is the usual mask of conscious meanness. In this light Plato saw the behaviour of Antinous and his assuming companions, described in the twenty-first book of the *Odyssey*; and in that slyly jocular manner, which he every where attributes to Socrates, he insinuates that his Man of Learning on the present occasion might naturally have his mind possessed with the same sentiments. When Socrates proposed a reference to the two youths, it should seem, from what he immediately adds, that a smile of disdain appeared in the countenance of the professed philosopher. But the likening his case to that of Penelope's suitors contains a hint that he was under secret apprehensions of having his ignorance exposed. The proper answer to the question of Socrates he knew was obvious; but his very profession of philosophy would not admit him to speak it openly himself: he was conscious of not possessing any such science as that of mind, and of not having studied any such art as that of medicine for the soul. Therefore, though Socrates at the end of their conversation drives him to shame, and exposes his ignorance in the nature and ends of philosophy, he endeavoured to conceal this ignorance as long as he could, and was unwilling to have the answer given by any. At the same time it is suggested to our thoughts by Plato, that nothing more than common sense and a candid mind, chiefly to be found in youths of good dispositions, was requisite to make that answer; and that fair reasoning, joined to these, was sufficient to lead a man to true philosophy.—S.

¹ This knot, or rather break, in the thread of the argument, forewarns us of new matter to be now brought upon the carpet. But there is, besides, a peculiar reason for the pause in this place; and therefore

since we have already found, that it is not all sorts, nor even many.—To this my learned companion answered, That the finest sorts of learning, and the most becoming to the philosophic character, were those which give a man the highest reputation as a philosopher: and this reputation, said he, that man would gain, who should appear conversant ¹ in all the arts and sciences, at least in as many as possible, especially in those which are held in esteem the most, and are the most deserving of it;—the man, who having studied these arts, as far as is requisite to a liberal education, hath acquired so much knowledge in them, as depends on taste and judgment, not on the mechanical exercise of any, or on the labour of the hands.—Do you mean in the same way, said I, as it is in building? For in that affair, if you have occasion for artificers and artists, a bricklayer or a carpenter you may hire for five or six minas ²,

therefore it has here a peculiar beauty. It seems to be contrived on purpose to give every reader an opportunity of consulting his own mind, and of finding there the proper answer to the last question put by Socrates: it prepares him, therefore, for what is to follow, where he will see his inward conjecture explicitly confirmed, and the conceptions of his own mind from the precedent part of the argument produced to light, in a plain and full description of what is justly to be called the study of wisdom or philosophy.—S.

¹ Dr. Forster very justly observes that the character which the Man of Learning here gives of a philosopher exactly agrees with the character of Democritus himself, as given us by Diogenes Laertius; that, besides his being a great naturalist and moralist, besides his being versed in mathematical learning, and in all the popular erudition, he had a thorough experience in the arts, *περι τεχνων πάντων εἶχεν ἐμπειρίαν*. If the right reading of this sentence in Laertius be, as we suspect, *παντός* or *πασῶν*, instead of *πάντων*, the agreement with the words of Plato in this place is still more exact. However, though Laertius in this passage plainly uses the word *τεχνων* in the philosophical and proper sense, to signify arts as distinct from sciences; yet Plato, in the passage to which this annotation belongs, seems to include in the word *τεχνων* all the particular sciences: and if it be so, then the whole account which Laertius gives of the knowledge of Democritus, answers in every part to the philosophic character, as here drawn by our Man of Learning. It is certain, that every particular science has some art immediately derived from it, and particularly dependent on it. In mathematics, the art of numbering and computing depends on the science of arithmetic; the art of measuring on the science of geometry; the art of music on the science of the same name; and the art of calculating eclipses, &c. on the science of astronomy. In the arts and sciences of higher order it is the same: the art of government thus immediately depends on the science of mankind; the art of leading a good and happy life, on the knowledge of ourselves; and the art of reasoning, on the science of mind. We the rather produce these latter instances, for that they have a near relation to, and serve to illustrate, the last part of this Dialogue.—S.

² Less than twenty pounds of our money. For the attic *μνα* was equal to 3l. 4s. 7d. English.—S.

but

but an architect will cost you above ten thousand drachmas ¹, so few of these are to be found in all Greece. Do you mean to distinguish in some such way as this?—He admitted such to be his meaning.—On this, I asked him, if it was not impossible for one man to be a perfect master of any two arts, much more to attain a mastership in any considerable number, especially of such as are great and excellent.—Do not imagine, Socrates, said he, that I mean, it is requisite for a philosopher to have so thorough a knowledge of any art, as the man who makes it his profession; but to be able, as becomes a gentleman of a liberal education, to understand what the artist says, when he is speaking of his work, better than any of the bystanders; and to interpose judiciously his own advice about the workmanship: so as always to appear, in every conversation relating to the arts, and in criticising on every performance of the artists, to have a finer taste, and more knowledge, than any other person present.—Then I, for I was not yet quite certain what he meant, said to him thus; Do I conceive rightly, what kind of man you call a philosopher? You seem to me to have described such a man, as the ² general combatants are in the Olympic games, compared with the racers ³ or

¹ Equal to 322l. 18s. 4d. The *μυρ* was worth 100 *δραχμαί*. Plato therefore, in this place, might have said one hundred minas instead of ten thousand drachmas: but he chose to express the sum according to its value in the smaller coin, to give it at first sight the greater appearance: as the French choose to compute by livres rather than by pounds sterling.—Architect seems here to mean no other artist than the master-builder.—S.

² The particular combatants in these games were such as had devoted themselves wholly to one particular sort of exercise, and therefore had attained to excel in it beyond all other men. The general combatants were such as had divided their studies, and had been exercised in them all, and consequently could not be supposed equal in any one to those who had made it their peculiar study. They engaged in all the combats at these games, but contended only with such as themselves. They were called *πενταθλοι*, the term here used by Plato, Combatants in the five Exercises, because the sixth, that is, boxing, or fighting with fists, was not introduced till the 23d Olympic, having been thought till then too mean and ignoble. And after it was introduced, the general combatants still retained the name of *πενταθλοι*. All the learning on this subject has been collected by Peter Faber in his *Agonistica*. But an English reader, curious to be further informed, may find full satisfaction in an excellent dissertation, written by Mr. West.

³ By an unaccountable error, all the editions of Plato read here *πείλαστας*. But according to a most certain emendation of Mr. Le Clerc's, with which Dr. Forster is highly pleased, we ought to read *παλαιστας*. Which reading we have not scrupled to follow in our translation; as Dacier has had the judgment to do in his.—S.

the wrestlers. For in each kind of competition, those universalists fall short of the respective excellencies of the particular professors, and are but the next best men to them in their own way, but at the same time are superior to the professors of the other kind, and easily get the better of these, whose excellence lies only in the other way. Such a degree of skill as this, you may perhaps mean, that the study of philosophy begets in those who are addicted to it; a degree, by which they fail of supreme excellence in knowledge of the arts, but attaining an excellence which is next to the supreme, they excel all men except the artists: so that he, who has studied philosophy, is, in every employment or business of life, a second-rate man, and below the pitch of perfection. Some such man, I think, as this you point out to us for a philosopher.—You seem, Socrates, replied he, to have a just conception of what belongs to a philosopher, in likening him to ¹ a general combatant in the public games. For he is absolutely such a man, as not to be a slave to any thing; nor has he studied any branch of knowledge so accurately and minutely, as, through entire attention to that one, to be deficient in all the rest, like vulgar artists, and the professors of one only science; but he has bestowed a competent measure of application on them all.—After he had made me this answer, I, desirous he should explain himself more fully and clearly, asked him, whether he thought the good, in any way of life, to be useful men, or useless.—Useful, without doubt, Socrates, said he.—If then the good are useful, are not the bad useless?—He agreed.—Well then, said I; do

¹ The whole passage of Laertius, referred to in note 1 to p. 319, and also in note to persons of the Dialogue, is this, as amended;—ἐπεὶ οἱ Ἀνταρταὶ Πλάτωνος εἰσι, φησι Θρασύλλος, οὗτος ἀν εἰν ὁ παραγινόμενος ἀνωνυμος, τῶν περὶ Οἰνοπίδην καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ἑταίρος, ὅς [instead of ἑτερος, as it is printed] ἐν τῇ πρὸς Σωκράτην ὁμιλίᾳ διαλεγόμενος περὶ φιλοσοφίας [here we omit the ὅς] φησιν, ὡς πεντάθλῳ εοικεν ὁ φιλοσοφός· καὶ ἡν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πεντάθλος. Τα γὰρ φυσικὰ ἡσκητο [as If. Casaubon rightly reads from Suidas] καὶ τὰ ἠθικά, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, καὶ τοὺς ἐγκυκλίους λόγους, καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν πᾶσιν [instead of πᾶσαν] εἶχεν ἐμπειρίαν. D. Laert. l. ix. §. 37. “If the Rivals be a dialogue of Plato’s, says Thrasyllus, the anonymous person there introduced, as the friend of those who were disputing about Oenopides and Anaxagoras, must be this Democritus; who in the conversation he had with Socrates concerning philosophy, there related, says, that a philosopher is like a general combatant in the games. And he himself was in fact a general combatant in philosophy. For he had cultivated physics, and ethics; moreover, mathematics, and all the common learning of those times: and in all the arts he was experienced.”—S.

you take philosophers to be useful men, or not?—He acknowledged they were useful : and not only so, said he, but I account them the most useful of all men.—Come now, said I ; let us examine whether this be true. How can they be even of any use at all, these second-rate men ? For it is plain, that your philosopher is inferior in every art or science to the man who is a perfect master of it.—This he acknowledged.—Well ; suppose now, said I, that you yourself, or any friend of yours, for whom you have a great regard, should happen to fall sick, I ask you, whether, with a view to the recovery of health, you would send for that second-rate man, the philosopher ; or whether you would send for a physician.—For both of them, said he.—I ask you not that, said I ; but which of the two you would send for in the first place, or in preference to the other.—No man, said he, would doubt, in such a case, to give the preference to the physician.—And how in the case of a storm at sea, said I ? to whom rather would you choose to intrust yourself and your concerns ; to a pilot, or to a philosopher ?—To a pilot, said he, I for my part.—And thus it is in every other affair, said I ; so long as a man, professing skill in it, is to be found, a philosopher is of no use.—Thus it appears, said he.—A philosopher therefore, said I, we have discovered to be a man entirely useless ; since it is clear, that in every affair of life, men, who profess skill therein, are to be found. And we agreed before, that the good in any way were the useful men, and the bad were the useless.—He was forced to own it.—But now, said I, that we have carried our reasoning to this length, may I go on with my questions ? or would it not be rather unpolite and rude to push the point further ?—Ask any questions that you please, said he.—Nay, said I ; I desire nothing else, than to recapitulate what has been already said. The present state of the argument then is this : We acknowledged, that philosophy was an honourable study, and professed to be philosophers ourselves : we acknowledged that philosophers were, in their way, good as well as honourable ; that the good, in any way, were useful men, and the bad useless. On the other hand, we acknowledged that philosophers were useless, whenever we could find good workmen and men of skill of every kind ; and that good workmen of every kind, professors of the several sciences, and practisers of the several arts, were always to be found. For was not all this granted ?—It was, said he.—We grant therefore, agreeably
to

to those our own concessions, that, if philosophy be, what you say it is, knowledge in the arts and sciences, the spending our time in philosophizing is then a bad and useless way of life, and philosophers are useless men, and good for nothing. But what, my friend, if their case be otherwise? what, if the philosophic life consist not in studying the arts; nor in busying a man's self about a multitude of experiments, and continually poring over them; nor in acquiring a multiplicity of knowledge; but in something else? For I thought, that such employments were accounted dishonourable and base, and that those who followed them were called, by way of reproach, dirty mechanics and bellows-blowers². Whether my suspicions are just or

¹ Πολυπραγμονουντα. Concerning this kind of πολυπραγμοσυνη, our learned readers may consult Wower de Polymathia, cap. ii. §. 3. or Suidas in voce Ασκληπιοδοτος. Democritus not only took the pains to dissect the bodies of animals, in order to investigate the animal œconomy, but also expressed the juices of every plant and herb he met with, to make experiments of their several virtues. *Omnium herbarum succos Democritus expressit*, says Petronius; *et ne lapidum virgultorumque vis lateret, atatem inter experimenta consumpsit*. We have some instances of his knowledge of this kind recorded in Pliny's Natural History.—S.

² In the greek, βαναυσους. By this name were called all artists, who operated by means of fire; but properly speaking, they were such only as used furnaces in their operations. For so Hefychius,—Βαναυσια, πασα τεχνη δια πυρος, κυριως δε η περι τας καμινους. In using this word, Plato seems to allude to the metallurgic and the chymical experiments of Democritus. Concerning this very fact indeed, whether Democritus made any such experiments, or not, much controversy has arisen, particularly between Olaus Borrichius and Conringius, in contending, the first of them for the high antiquity of chymistry, the other for the novel invention of that useful art. Each of them perhaps has pushed his point further than the truth will bear him out. The treatise which Democritus wrote περι της λιθου, was certainly not concerning the philosopher's stone, as Borrichius and the alchymists pretend; but concerning the magnet, or loadstone, which, perhaps, for its peculiar and celebrated virtues, was by the antients eminently styled *the stone*. Yet we do not see how it can with reason be denied, that the great man in question was *philosophus per ignem*; because he could not, but through fusion by fire, have done what ancient writers agree he did, converted common stones into precious; nor could he well have found out the virtues of herbs and plants without the help of chymical experiments. However, we would not lay too much stress on the interpretation of the word βαναυσια, given by Hefychius, though it agrees with the etymology. It seems too confined. The word, as used by many of the antients, particularly by Aristotle in the 8th book of his Politics, and by Plutarch in many places, seems to comprise all those arts we call mechanical: Plato's argumentation requires that we should understand it to be used here with the same latitude; and this larger meaning best confirms the supposition, that our Man of Learning and Knowledge in this Dialogue was Democritus. To express therefore the whole meaning of Plato in this place, we have used in our translation both those terms of contempt, which may answer to the full sense of the word βαναυσος.—S.

not, will evidently appear, if you but answer ¹ to the following questions—
What ² men are those who understand how to give proper chastisement to
vicious

¹ We are now come to the third and last part of the Dialogue. In the two former we have seen what philosophy, truly so called, is not; in this latter, Plato will show us what it is; for which he here briefly prepares his readers, by informing them, that Socrates will now open a new scene, and begin a new series of questions.—S.

² Plato lays the foundation of true philosophy in the knowledge of ourselves, that is, of our own souls. He begins with the inferior part of the soul; the seat of the passions and animal affections. These he characterizes, as is usual with him, under the allegorical names of brute animals, horse and dog; to which soon afterwards he adds that of ox. The horse is a proper emblem of the love of glory; because of all brute animals the horse is the only one which appears to be delighted with fine trappings, to be ostentatious, to be emulous of glory, and fond of proving his superiority over his rivals. No less properly does the dog represent the passion of anger; because of all animals he is the most subject to it, has it roused in him on the slightest occasions, entertains it the longest, and is the most vindictive. And the ox is the fittest representative of sensuality, because that animal, when not employed by man in laborious offices, is always either eating or chewing the cud, that is, eating over again what he had eat before: as sensual men, after they have feasted, are apt to feast it over again in reflection; as well as before they feast, to feast in imagination. Plato makes a distinction at the same time between the good, and the bad or vicious, amongst these animals. Of the latter sort are the perverse and refractory; horses, that are almost unmanageable by their riders; dogs, that hardly can be broken, or made to obey their master's will; oxen, that are stubborn, that refuse to quit the stall, and to labour. These are the emblems of bad men; whose passions, such as correspond to the tempers of those several animals, are immoderate or inordinate, and not to be governed, or restrained within their due bounds, without much difficulty. Good horses, dogs, and oxen, he calls those, whose natural temper is gentle, and pliant, and easily made obedient. And by such he signifies to us men naturally good, that is, men, whose brutal passions of each kind are by nature moderate, and easily obey the government of reason, that superior part of the soul, whose whole office and government he delineates or sketches out in the following manner.—If any of our passions are wild and irregular, if our horse, for instance, would throw off and trample on his rider, if our dog barks at his master or his master's friends, or if our ox knows not his owner and his feeder, they are to be chastised and reduced to order. If our passions are all tame and gentle, it is the business of reason to employ them in her own service, to apply them each to its proper use, and thus to make them highly beneficial to the whole man. But neither of these offices can be well performed, unless it be known what is moderate and regular in the passions, and what the contrary; that is, unless the boundaries between good and evil be well settled, so that the one may be distinguished from the other. The making this distinction, therefore, is the inward operation of knowledge in the mind; as the application of it to practice, in the discharge of those offices, is an exertion of the mind's power over the inferior man. The former is the theory of morals; the latter is practice virtue. This properly is art; that, science. But Plato in this place

vicious horses? are they those very men who can give a horse all the improvement he is capable of; or are they a different sort of men?—The very same men, he answered.—And those, said I, who are able to improve the useful qualities of a dog, do not the same men know how properly to chastise dogs which are vicious?—They do, said he.—By one and the same art then, said I, are those animals improved and properly chastised.—I agree, said he.—Well; but, said I, is it also the same art, through which a man distinguishes amongst those animals the good from the vicious? or is this an art different from that, through which they receive improvement and due correction?—It is still, said he, the same art.—Will you admit then, said I, that this holds true with regard to the human species in like manner; that the art, whatever it be, by which men are made to excel in virtue, is the same art with that through which bad men are properly chastised, and the same also with that through which the good and the bad are known and distinguished one sort from the other?—By all means, said he.—¹ Now the art, which

uses the term art to express both; as he frequently does elsewhere, when he means any art which is founded on science, and without science cannot be exercised. For this note thus much suffices.—S.

¹ Plato proceeds in the next place to the knowledge of mankind; that is, to the knowledge of the same passions and affections in the souls of other men that we feel in our own. He shows it to be consequently one and the same kind of knowledge with the knowledge of ourselves, differing only in the objects of it; as it is applied either to many men, or to a single one; for of men every one is a man. He therefore, who thoroughly knows himself, who knows what is right and good in his own soul, and what is there wrong and evil, must know at the same time all men in general, must know what is good and what is evil in the whole human nature: and he who thus knows others, must also thus know himself. The subject of all this knowledge is the superior part of the soul of man, mind and reason: the object is itself, and also that part which is inferior, with the passions and animal affections there seated. The knowledge of itself implies the knowledge of its power over the inferior part. Now as no man can help following known good, nor can help avoiding known evil; the true knowledge of good and evil must be attended with an exercise of that power over the inferior part, improving what is there found right and good, and rectifying what is wrong and evil. And since all men partake of the same nature, the same knowledge, through which a man manages himself rightly, betters what in himself is good, and corrects what in himself is evil, must qualify him as well to dispense justice to other men, to encourage the good and to correct the bad. Now this is the office of the judge and of the magistrate; and the science, which enables him to execute his office well is the judicial science, which is no other than the science of justice. It follows, therefore, that the wise and good man, he who is master of this science, and employs it in the proper management of himself, is qualified for the office of a judge and of a magistrate.—S.

gives this power and this knowledge with respect to one man, has it the same efficacy with respect to many men? And the art of thus managing and judging of many, has it the same abilities with respect to one?—Certainly, said he.—Is it so in the case of horses too, said I, and in all other cases after the same manner?—Beyond a doubt, said he.—Now what science, said I, is that, through which proper chastisement is given to the licentious and the lawless in civil states? Is it not the judicial science, that of judges and other magistrates?—It is, said he.—Is the science of justice, said I, any other than this science?—No other, answered he.—And is it not through the same science that the good and the bad are both known?—He replied, it was through the same science.—And the science, said I, through which one man is known, will give equal skill to know many men.—True, said he.—And whoever, said I, through want of this science, hath not the skill to know many, will be equally deficient in the knowledge of one.—Right, said he.—If a horse therefore, said I, as being but a horse, be incapable of knowing and distinguishing between good and bad horses, must he not be ignorant of which sort he himself is?—Certainly, said he.—And if an ox, said I, being but an ox, knows not how to distinguish and judge of good and bad oxen, is it possible that he can know of which sort he is himself?—Certainly not, said he.—And is not the same thing certain, said I, with respect to the ignorance of dogs?—It is, said he.—And how is it in the case of men? said I. When a man knows not who are the good men and who the bad, is he not at the same time ignorant of himself, and unable to tell whether he is good or bad, in as much as he also is a man?—He allowed it to be true.—Now to be ignorant of oneself, said I, is it ¹ to be sound of mind, or to be insane?—To be insane, he replied.—To know oneself therefore, said I, is to be sound of mind.—I agree, said he.—This then, said

¹ Σωφροειν, ἢ οὐ σωφροειν. No words have more puzzled us, in the translating of Plato than the words σωφροειν, σωφρον, and σωφροσυνη. The difficulty arises from this,—that in different places they are used in different senses; and we could find no words in the English language answering to them every where. At length, therefore, we found ourselves obliged, if we would every where express their precise meaning, to use different words in different places. Our labours, however, on this point have enabled us to give a kind of history of those words, and of the several alterations they have undergone in their meaning. Homer, the most antient Greek writer extant, by the word σωφροσυνη evidently means prudence, or discretion. See his *Odyssey*,

said I, should seem to be the precept contained in the *Delphic inscription; it is to exercise wisdom and justice.—It should seem so, replied he.—And through the same science we know how to correct others duly and rightly.—
True,

Odyssey, book xxiii. ver. 30. from which we conclude, that the true etymology of the word is from *συνα φρον*, a sound mind. To which agrees this of Porphyry,—*και γαρ σωφροσυνη σωφροσυνη τις*. Apud Stobæum, Serm. 19.—In the time of Homer, and for a long time after, the doctrine of morals was far from being improved to such a degree of perfection as to become a science. It was delivered in loose and unconnected precepts, agreeing to the experience of wise men, without any known principles for their foundation. The first, who attempted to raise it into a science, and to treat of it with order and method, were the Pythagoreans. These philosophers, having considered that the soul of man was the subject of virtue and of vice, considered next the constitution and œconomy of this soul: they saw it distinguishable into two parts, the rational and the irrational, and the irrational part again into irascible and concupiscible. Now as every thing in nature has a peculiar virtue of its own belonging to it, the defect of which is its imperfection, and the contrary quality its vice, the Pythagoreans made their primary distinction of the virtues of man, according to their distinction of the parts of his soul. The virtue of the rational part they termed *φρονησις*, *prudence*; the virtue of the irascible part, *ανδρεια*, *fortitude*; that of the concupiscible, *σωφροσυνη*, *temperance*; and the virtue of the whole soul, or the habit produced therein by the harmony of all its parts, they called *δικαιοσυνη*, *justice*.—Thus far did these philosophers advance in the science of morals; deducing all the other, the particular virtues, which are exercised but occasionally, from these four, which in every good man are in constant practice: but they ascended no higher. It was left for a Socrates and a Plato to put a head to this beautiful body of moral philosophy, to trace all the virtues up to one principle, and thus represent them to our view united. Yet thus only can the doctrine of morals be properly termed a science. This principle is mind; for mind, being measure itself, and being also the governor of all things, contains the measures of rectitude in all things, and governs all things aright and for the best. The principle of virtue therefore being mind, on the soundness of mind is all sincere and uncorrupt virtue established; for the soundness of every thing depends on the soundness of its principle. And thus also, as morals are founded on mind, and as no true science of any thing, according to Plato, can be without the science of its principle, the science of morals either is the same thing with the science of mind, or is immediately thereon dependent. Accordingly, Plato, in the *Charmides*, uses the word *σωφροσυνη* in its original signification, as it means soundness of mind. In the same sense is the word *σωφροσυνη* used by Xenophon, in *Απομνημ.* l. i. c. i. § 16: where it is opposed to *μανια*. See Dr. Simpson's annotation to that passage. So it is again used by Plato, and opposed to *μανια*, in his first book de Republicâ, p. 16. ed. Cantab. Most commonly, however, Plato used this word in the Pythagorean sense, to signify one of the four cardinal virtues: in which sense it is used by Aristotle in all his moral treatises. Yet even in this particular sense, the peculiar relation which it has to prudence, the proper virtue of the rational part of the soul, is well observed by the very learned author of *Hermes*, in his notes (for his they are) to Aristotle's treatise, *περι Αρετων και Κακων*, lately published by Mr. Fawconer, p. 116. Zeno like-
wise,

True, said he.—Now that, through which we have this knowledge, is the science of justice; and that, through which a man has the knowledge of himself, and of other men, is soundness of mind, or wisdom.—It appears so to be, said he.—The science therefore of justice, said I, and the science belonging to every sound mind, wisdom, are one and the same science.—It appears, said he, to be so proved.—³ Again, said I, by the same means are civil states well governed; that is, when the doers of injustice are duly punished.

wife, who followed the same distinction of the cardinal virtues, defined every one of them by science of one kind or other; as appears from Stobæus, *Eclog.* l. ii. p. 167. And one science, the science of mind, includes them all.—S.

² The inscription here meant, is that most antient one, in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ, KNOW THYSELF. This was generally supposed to be the dictate or response of the Pythian oracle to the question asked of it;—What was man's greatest good. See Menag. Annotat. in Laertium, p. 22 and 23, and Dr. Simpson's note on Xenophon's Memorab. l. iv. c. ii. §. 24. In what sense Plato understood this truly divine precept, is evident from his brief definition of it in this sentence, as explained by the preceding argumentation. From which it appears, that by the knowledge of one's self he means the knowledge of the whole soul, or the knowledge of what is good and what is evil. For the superior part of the soul contains in itself the seeds of all moral good; the inferior, the seeds of all moral evil. But the subject of all this knowledge, of both kinds, is only the superior part of the soul, the rational. For, as the Stoics well express themselves on this point, no other faculty in man contemplates and knows itself, besides the faculty of reason. This alone also knows and judges of all other things, whether without or within the soul: for in itself it hath the rule and standard of right, according to which it judges, and distinguishes between right and wrong; approving the one, which is agreeable to its own nature, and disapproving the other, which is disagreeable and contrary to it. Truly and properly speaking, mind itself is rule and measure, being the measure and the rule of all things. The science of mind, therefore, which is wisdom, is the science of right and wrong, gives the discernment of good and evil in ourselves, and enables us at the same time to distinguish rightly between good and bad men; and thus is it the science of justice, and the judicial science, belonging to the magistrate and to the judge. After what has been said, we presume it needless to make any apology, or to give any further reason for translating *σωφροσυνή* in this place *wisdom*.—But concerning this wisdom, or knowledge of self, see more at large in Plato's First Alcibiades, where it makes the principal subject.—S.

³ From the science of ethics, and that of law, truly so called, (for, in a philosophical sense, right only is law, law eternal and divine,) Plato makes a short and easy step to the science of politics and the art of government. The art of government is founded on knowledge of the different tempers and humours, minds and characters of men. For none can have the skill to manage them, but those who know them, and who know by what methods to lead the good and gentle to obedience, and to prevent the disobedience of the perverse and evil. This knowledge of man-kind

punished.—Right, said he.—The same science therefore, said I, is the science of politics.—He assented.—And when a civil state is thus well governed by one man, is not that man called ¹ either a tyrant ², or a king?—He is, said he.

kind supposes the knowledge of who are the good and who the evil; which supposes also the knowledge of what is good and what is evil; the same, which is the knowledge of ourselves.—S.

¹ In the Greek, *τυραννος τε και βασιλευς*, translated literally, “both a tyrant and a king.” But Plato does not mean, that tyrant and king are synonymous terms: so far from that is his meaning, that in his Dialogue called *Πολιτικός*, “The Politician,” he says, that “a tyrant and a king are *απομισητατοι*, most unlike one to the other:” and in his 9th book de Republica, that “the best of all governments is the kingly, and that the worst of all is the tyrannic.” What he means by a king, and what by a tyrant, will be explained in the very next note. But in this they agree, that government by a king and government by a tyrant are both of them governments by one man: which is the whole of his meaning in the place now before us. However, to prevent his meaning from being misunderstood, we have taken the liberty of using the conjunctions disjunctive in translating this sentence. Monf. Dacier, as well here as in what follows, has entirely omitted the words tyrant and tyrannic, through excessive caution we imagine: but for such caution in England we have no occasion. A king of England, while the English constitution lasts, and the fundamental laws of English government subsist, can never be suspected of being, what it is impossible for him to be, a tyrant.—S.

² The word in the original here is *τυραννος*. The meaning of which word, as it is always used by Plato, and fully explained by Aristotle in Politic. l. iii. answers to our idea of an arbitrary monarch, governing his people, not according to established laws, but according to his own will and pleasure; whether such his will and pleasure be agreeable to natural law, to justice and equity, or not. On the other hand, by the word *βασιλευς*, or king, was understood a person who made the laws established in his country, whether written or customary, the rules of his government. The regal office was to put these laws into execution, and to administer the government; which, properly speaking, was a government of the laws. Such were the most antient kings in Greece, where kingly government at first universally prevailed, long before any laws were written for the rule of conduct both to prince and people. And, whatever some men pretend concerning the high antiquity of arbitrary or despotic governments; or others fancy concerning governments originally vested in the people; the most antient records of history in all nations prove, that kingly government took place the first every where upon earth. It is natural to suppose that general customs in all countries were founded originally on reason, one universal reason adapting itself to the genius of each country, that is, to the peculiar situation and other relative circumstances of each, and to the peculiar temper of the inhabitants naturally thence arising: so that, although in some instances, what was reasonable and right to practise in one country was unreasonable and wrong in another, yet one universal reason, the natural law of all men, was the dictator and legislator to them all. And, whereas all true authority is founded in the opinion of superior wisdom, it is natural also to suppose, that in the infancy of every state, the little multitude should look up to a person deemed the wisest amongst them; that they should hear,
attend

he.—Does he not thus govern, said I, through the kingly art, or the tyrannic?
 —He does, said he.—These arts therefore, said I, the kingly and the tyrannic,

attend to, and obey him, as the best conservator and guardian of their unwritten laws or general customs, acknowledged by them all to be right. It is further, as natural to suppose that these petty princes, having established their authority with the people by wisdom and good government, should derive a particular regard in that people towards their families; and that their sons, trained up in obedience to the laws, and being presumed to have learnt, from the examples and private instructions of their fathers, the art of government, should easily, by the tacit consent of all the people, succeed to their fathers in their authority and dignity; unless they were apparently unfit, through nonage, known want of understanding or of prudence, or other incapacity for government. The first regal families, being thus for many generations well settled in the throne or seat of royalty, claimed a kind of legal right, the right of custom, to their kingly thrones: and in that claim the people acquiesced for the sake of peace and order. And thus arose hereditary kingdoms. In process of time, as the people increased in number, and many private persons increased in riches, and in power thence arising, neither the rich nor the poor were any longer to be governed by the mere authority of one man: the multitude grew seditious, and the powerful grew factious. It became necessary to rule by force and compulsion, if the regal establishment was still to be preserved. The person of the king was to be defended by a guard, and the people were to be kept in awe and obedience by a standing army. Then was the king possessed of power to change the laws and customs of his country at his own pleasure, and to make all his people submissive to his will. Such was the origin and rise of tyranny, the natural degeneracy of kingly government in a great and powerful kingdom. Now it is well known that unlimited power in man is every moment liable to be abused. To wise men indeed right reason is law; and in the government of themselves and of others they follow the dictates of wisdom. But men unwise are in the principal part of their conduct, in that which is the most important to themselves and others, governed by their passions: and the evil consequences of human passions under no restraint, either from within the soul or from without, are infinite. Few men, therefore, being wise, what evil is not to be expected from tyrants, that is, arbitrary monarchs? In fact, the tyrants of old were, most of them, guilty of numberless and flagrant acts of injustice, in open violation of the ancient unwritten laws. But things could not remain long in this situation, wherever common sense remained in men, a sense of their natural and just rights. Among such people then were found patriots, men of true fortitude, despising all danger in the public cause; and these undertook to free their country from so insupportable a yoke. Their undertakings were successful. The tyrants and their families were either expelled or murdered. New civil establishments were formed; but not on the ancient plan: that was the work of nature; and began naturally in the infant state of civil societies. Government was now to be the work of art and reason. And what proved very favourable to this work, was the cultivation of true philosophy about the same time, and the great advances consequently made in moral and political science. Accordingly it is to be observed, to the honour of philosophy, that wherever this favourable conjuncture happened not, in all countries whither philosophy never travelled, when the people could no longer bear their tyrants,

tyrannic, are the same with that art and science just before mentioned.—So they appear, said he.—Well, said I, and when a family¹ is in like manner well governed by one man, what is this man called? Either the steward² of the household, or else the master³ of the family; is he not?—He is, said

tyrants, they only changed them for others; the tyranny still continued. For wisdom was wanting to frame good constitutions of government: so that, if ever they had the spirit to emerge from slavery, and rise to freedom, immediately they sunk again. But wherever true philosophers were found, they undertook on such occasions the office of legislators. New laws were made, written and promulged, obligatory alike to all. By these laws was the power of princes and of magistrates limited and ascertained; and by their known functions the general obedience of the people was secured. And thus were legal governments first established, of different forms in different countries, monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, or mixed governments, as best suited the numbers and the genius of each people. The antient kingly governments, however, still remained in some places in the time of Plato; and the few tyrants, subsisting amongst a people enlightened by philosophy, now ruled with some degree of equity and mildness, through fear of their intelligent subjects, ready to be succoured and protected, on occasion, by their free and therefore brave neighbours. This short history of civil governments, from their beginning down to the age when Plato lived, we thought necessary to show the distinction then made between the kingly and the tyrannic; giving an account of the rise of each; of the former built upon authority and esteem, and by them alone supported; of the latter, acquired often by false pretences, and intriguing practices at home, and sometimes by conquests from abroad made in war; but always maintained by military force. A tyrant, therefore, according to the foregoing explanation of the word, may, as well as a king, be a wise and good governor, if he has wisdom and the science of justice; though the ways and means, by which he governs, must be very different from those of a king.—S.

¹ We are now arrived at the science of œconomics. This indeed in the order of things precedes the science of politics. For a civil state is composed of many families; and arises from the agreement of their minds, in perceiving the necessity of civil or kingly government for their common good. But Plato here speaks of it the last, probably for this reason, that the government of a family is *βασιλική τε και τυραννική*, partly authoritative and kingly, partly compulsive and tyrannical: the paternal part of it is kingly; and thus a king is as the father of all his people, and governs them as through paternal authority and filial awe: the despotic part is tyrannical; and thus a tyrant is the lord and master of the whole people, ruling them by compulsion, as a master rules his slaves, and such were all domestic servants in the age and country of Plato.—S.

² *Οικονομος*. It was usual in antient times, as well as it is in modern, for princes, and other rich and great men, who kept a multitude of domestics, to depute the care and management of them all, and the dispensation of justice among them, to one man, whom they called *οικονομος*, and we call major-domo, maitre d'hôtel, or, in the English term we choose to make use of in an English translation, steward of the household.—S.

³ *Δεσποτής*, that is, the lord and master himself, governing in his own right, with authority and power undivided.—S.

he.—Whether is it the science of justice now, said I, which enables this man also to govern well his family? or is it any other art or science?—The science of justice only, said he.—The same kind of person, it seems then, said I, is a king, a tyrant, a politician¹ a steward of a household, a lord and master of a family, a man of wisdom, and a just and good man. And one and the same art is the kingly, the tyrannic, the political, the despotic, and the œconomical, the same with the science of justice, and the same with wisdom.—So, said he, it appears.—Well then, said I: is it a shame for a philosopher not to understand what the physician says, when speaking of his patient's malady; nor to be able to give a judicious opinion, himself, upon the case? and so with regard to other artists and their arts, is it a shame for him to be ignorant? and yet, when a magistrate, or a king, or any of the others, just now enumerated, is speaking of the affairs or functions of his office, is it not shameful in a philosopher not to understand perfectly what any of these persons say, nor to be able to give good counsel himself in such cases?—How, Socrates, said he, can it be otherwise than shameful to him, to have nothing pertinent to say on subjects so important?—Are we of opinion then, said I, that in these cases it becomes a philosopher to be like a general combatant, a second-rate man, to come next behind all who have these offices, and to be useless, so long as any such are to be found? or do we hold quite the contrary, that he ought, in the first place, not to commit the management of his domestic affairs to another man, nor to come next behind some other in his own house; but that he ought himself to be the ruler, corrector, and impartial judge, if he would have right order and good government at home?—This he granted me.—And besides this, said I, if his friends should submit their differences to his arbitration, or if the state should refer to his judgment the decision of any controverted point, is it not a shame that he should appear in such cases

¹ Πολιτικός. This word, as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics, is of a very large and extensive import, including all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto belonging: and such are here particularly meant by Plato. Agreeably to this passage, he tells us in his Politicus, that the science of a politician differs only in name from the kingly science. For the proof of which position we refer our readers to that Dialogue, where the nature of the kingly office is so admirably well elucidated and explained.—S.

to be but a second or a third rate man, and not to have the lead?—I must own myself of that opinion, said he¹.—Philosophizing, therefore, my friend, is a thing quite different, we find, from the acquiring a multiplicity of various knowledge, or the being buſied in the circle of arts and ſciences.—When I had ſaid this, the Man of Learning, aſhamed of what he had before aſſerted, was ſilent: the man without learning ſaid, I had made it a clear caſe: and the reſt of our audience gave their aſſent and approbation.

¹ It equally follows from the foregoing reaſoning, that a king ought himſelf, in the firſt place, truly to philoſophize: in the next place, that he ought to chooſe a true philoſopher, *if ſuch a man can be found*, to be of his council: and laſtly, it follows that a true philoſopher, when duty to his prince or to his country, or other good occaſion, ſent to him from above, calls him forth to light, and places him in his proper ſphere of action, muſt always be found adequate to any part of the kingly office. Theſe concluſions may ſeem to favour a little of what is called philoſophic arrogance; and for this very reaſon perhaps it is, that Plato has declined the making them, eſpecially as from the mouth of his great maſter, a man ſo remarkable for his rare modeſty.—S.

THE END OF THE RIVALS.

THE MENEXENUS:

OR,

AN ORATION

IN PRAISE OF THOSE ATHENIANS WHO DIED IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR
COUNTRY.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE MENEXENUS'.

THIS piece of Plato, though entitled a Dialogue, consists chiefly of an Oration, to which the Dialogue was intended to serve only for an introduction or vehicle ; and is accordingly very short. The subject of this Oration is the commemoration of all those Athenians, who, from the beginning of the commonwealth to the time of Plato, had died in the service of their country ; a subject that takes in so considerable a portion of the history of Athens, that I rather choose to refer the reader to those authors who have treated at large of the transactions of that state, than to set down the several events here alluded to in notes, which would soon swell to a bulk much larger than the Oration itself. It may not, however, be improper to premise a short account of the custom, which gave birth to this and many other orations, spoken by some of the greatest orators of Athens ; as such an account may tend to put the reader into a proper situation of mind to judge of the beauties of this famous panegyric, by leading him as it were to Athens, and making him one of the audience. Take it, therefore, in the words of Thucydides, thus translated.

“ In the same winter (namely, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war) the Athenians, in obedience to the laws of their country, performed, at the public expense, the obsequies of those citizens who first lost their lives in

’ This Introduction is extracted from the Argument of Mr. West to this Dialogue, by whom also it was translated into English. I have adopted his version of it wherever I found it to be sufficiently faithful, and given my own translation where it was otherwise.—T.

this

this war: the manner of which is as follows. Three days before that appointed for the funeral, they erect a pavilion, underneath which they lay out the bones of the deceased, allowing to their respective friends and relations the liberty of bringing whatever they judge proper to add, by way of showing their particular concern or regard for those who belonged to them. On the day of the interment there are brought in waggons (or hearses) so many chests (or coffins) made of cypress, one for every tribe, in which are put the bones of the deceased, each man according to his tribe. Besides these there is an empty bier, properly covered in honour of those whose bodies could not be found and brought away in order for their interment. In the funeral procession, whoever is disposed, whether he be a citizen or foreigner, has leave to march, together with the female kindred of the deceased, who assist at the sepulchre, making great lamentations. After this they deposite the bones in the public cœmety, which is situated in the most beautiful suburb of the city; and here they have always been accustomed to bury all who fall in battle, those only excepted who were slain at Marathon, to whom, as to men of distinguished and uncommon virtue, they performed their obsequies in the very place where they lost their lives. As soon as the remains are buried in the ground, some Athenian, eminent as well for his wisdom as his dignity, is appointed by the state to pronounce a suitable oration in honour of the dead: after which the whole company depart. This is the manner in which the Athenians perform the funerals of those who are slain in battle, and this custom they constantly observe in every war, as often as the case happens, in conformity to a law enacted for that purpose."

From this account, and some other particulars mentioned in the ensuing Oration, it is evident that these public funerals were performed with great pomp and solemnity by the whole body of the Athenian people; to whom therefore, considered upon this occasion under two heads, namely, as citizens of Athens and as relations and friends of the deceased, the orator was in reason obliged to accommodate his discourse: which from hence he was under a necessity of dividing likewise into two heads. Under the first he was to apply himself to the citizens of Athens in general; under the second, to the parents, children, and kindred of the deceased in particular. For the topics proper to be insisted upon under these two heads, he was left at liberty to

to select such as he judged most suitable to the occasion on which he was to speak. The occasion was solemn and mournful. Consolatories, therefore, were to be administered as well to the public as to individuals, who were there come together to perform the last offices to their fellow-citizens and relations. To the public, no topic of consolation could be so effectual as that which, by setting before them the glory and advantages accruing to the commonwealth from the actions of those brave citizens who had lost their lives in the service of their country, tended to call off their attention from the calamity which they were then assembled to commemorate. And this topic was very naturally suggested to the orator by the many public monuments erected in honour of those who had fallen in battle, and scattered up and down the place where he was to pronounce his oration. Plato accordingly made choice of this topic; and hath dwelt upon it with equal judgment and eloquence through the greater part of the following panegyric.

The remaining part of this first division contains an artful and noble panegyric in honour of the state and people of Athens; which evidently proves, what indeed will appear to any one who attentively examines the Grecian history, that the Athenians were unquestionably the first and greatest people of Greece.

The second part, in which the orator addresses himself to the relations of the deceased, is as beautiful a piece of oratory as is to be met with in all antiquity. I shall not here forestall the reader's judgment or pleasure, by pointing out the particular passages worthy of admiration. They are so striking that he cannot fail taking notice of them; and the more they surprise, the more they will please.

THE MENEXENUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND MENEXENUS.

SOCRATES.

FROM the Forum, Menexenus? Or whence come you?

MEN. From the Forum, Socrates, and from the Senate-house.

Soc. What particular business called you to the Senate-house? Is it that you think yourself, O wonderful young man, arrived at the summit of learning and philosophy, and as being every way sufficiently qualified, you are purposing to turn yourself to affairs of greater importance; and that we may never want a supply of magistrates out of your family, you yourself are thinking, young as you are, of governing us old fellows.

MEN. Indeed, Socrates, I should most readily entertain such an ambition, encouraged by your permission and advice; but otherwise, I would by no means think of it. The occasion of my going to the Senate-house to-day was the having heard that they intended to make choice of the orator who is to speak the funeral oration in praise of the dead. For you know they are now preparing to celebrate their obsequies.

Soc. Entirely so. But whom have they chosen?

MEN. No one as yet. They have deferred that consideration till to-morrow: but I think that either Dion or Archinus will be appointed.

Soc. Sure, Menexenus, it must needs be a fine thing for a man to die in battle; for he he ever so poor and inconsiderable, he will have the good fortune at least to be buried with splendour and magnificence, and to have his praises set forth by wise and ingenious men; not in crude and extempore

rary

rary panegyrics, but in discourses well considered and prepared for a long time before. And indeed so magnificent, so copious, and even exuberant upon every topic, and so beautifully variegated with fine names and words are the panegyrics which our orators give us upon these occasions, that they as it were bewitch our souls; and what with the encomiums which they so plentifully pour out upon the city, upon those who have at any time died in battle, upon the whole series of our ancestors, even to the remotest ages, and what with those which they bestow upon the audience, I myself, Menexenus, have often been very generously disposed; and, listening to their panegyrics, have for the time been charmed into an opinion that I was grown greater, more noble, and more illustrious, and have fancied that not only I myself appeared more considerable in the eyes of those strangers, who at any time accompanied me upon those occasions, but that they also were affected in the same manner, and persuaded by the orator to look upon me and Athens with more admiration than before. And this veneration of myself has often remained upon me for more than three days. Nay, with so powerful a charm has the discourse and even the voice of the speaker sunk into my ears, that for four or five days I have scarcely been able to recollect myself, or perceive in what part of the earth I was; but imagined myself sometimes an inhabitant of the Fortunate Islands. So dexterous are our orators!

MEN. You are always, Socrates, rallying the orators. However, I am afraid the person they shall now appoint will not perform his part very well; for, as he will be chosen on a sudden, he will be obliged to speak without any preparation.

SOC. How so, my good friend? Each of these has orations ready prepared. Besides, it is no difficult matter to speak extempore upon such topics. For if it were requisite to celebrate the praises of the Athenians, in an assembly of Peloponnesians, or of the Peloponnesians in an assembly of Athenians, a man must be an excellent orator indeed to gain the assent and approbation of his auditory. But when a man is to perform before an audience, whose praises are the subject of his discourse, it seems to be no great affair to make a good speech.

MEN. Is that your opinion, Socrates?

SOC. It is, by Jupiter.

MEN. Do you think that you should be able to make a speech if it were requisite, and the senate should appoint you?

Soc. If I should, O Menexenus, it would not be wonderful, considering I have been instructed by a mistress, who is by no means contemptible in rhetoric, but who has made many good orators, one in particular who excelled all the Greeks, Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

MEN. Who is she? I suppose you mean Aspasia¹.

Soc. I mean her, and Connus, the son of Metrobius, also. For these
two

¹Aspasia, the lady to whom Socrates gives the honour of the ensuing Oration, as well as of that spoken formerly by Pericles on the like occasion, was born at Miletus, and was indeed in great favour with Pericles, as may be seen in Plutarch. What is here said of her having instructed Pericles, and many other good orators besides Socrates, in rhetoric, whether strictly true or not, shows at least that she had as great a reputation for wit as for beauty. But it appears from this passage that rhetoric, which is the art of composition, was not, in the opinion of the Athenians, alone sufficient to make a complete orator: music, which, as far as it relates to oratory, and whenever it is put in contradistinction to rhetoric (as in this passage) can only mean an harmonious pronunciation, or a melodious modulation of the voice; music, I say, in the sense now mentioned, was likewise deemed a science necessary to be learnt by all who intended to speak in public. And hence I am confirmed in an opinion, which I have entertained many years, and in which I find I am not single, viz. that accents were originally musical notes set over words to direct the several tones and inflections of the voice requisite to give the whole sentence its proper harmony and cadence. The names of the Greek accents, *ὀξύς*, *βαρύς*, *περισπωμενός*, *acute*, *grave*, and *circumflex*, speak their musical origin, and correspond exactly to three terms made use of in our modern music, namely, *sharp*, *flat*, and a *grave*, called the *turn*, consisting, like the *circumflex*, of a *sharp* and a *flat* note. I shall not here enter into the question concerning the antiquity of accents, which many learned men take to be of modern invention; though if they were used for musical marks, as I am persuaded they were, they were probably as antient as the application of that science, from whence they were borrowed to form a right pronunciation and harmonious cadence, which was as antient at least as the time of Plato. It is no wonder, however, that many old manuscripts and inscriptions are found without accents: as they were intended solely for the instruction of those who were desirous of reading and speaking properly, they were in all likelihood made use of only by masters of music in the lessons which they gave their scholars upon pronunciation. Neither is it surprising that the antient Greeks should descend to such minute niceties in forming their orators, when it is considered that oratory, from its great use and importance in their public assemblies, was in the highest esteem among them, and carried by them to its utmost perfection.

From what has been said I am induced to beg leave to observe, that from not understanding, or not attending to the original and right use of accents in the Greek, however transmitted down to these times, has arisen one of the grossest perversions and abuses that ignorance or barbarism itself could possibly have introduced into any language; and that is, reading by accent, as it is called, and practised in most of the schools (Eton excepted), and in the universities of this kingdom, not to
say

two are my masters: he in music, she in rhetoric. That a man thus educated should be a skilful speaker is nothing wonderful, since, even one who has been worse educated than I have, and who has indeed learnt music from Lamprius, but rhetoric from Antiphon the Rhamnusian;—I say, it is not impossible even for such a one to gain the good opinion of the Athenians when he makes their praises the theme of his oration.

MEN. And what would you have to say were you to speak?

Soc. From myself perhaps nothing. But yesterday I heard Aspasia pronounce a funeral oration concerning these very persons; for she had heard what you tell me, that the Athenians were going to choose an orator for the occasion: upon which she immediately ran over to me such things as it would be proper to say; and what she had formerly made use of, when

say of all Europe. For by this method of reading, in which no regard is paid to the long or short vowels or diphthongs, the natural quantity of the words is overturned; and the poets, who never wrote, and indeed are never read, and can never be read by accent, must be supposed to have measured the language by a rule different from that followed by the writers and speakers in prose, that is, all the rest of their countrymen; which indeed is an absurdity too great to be supposed; and therefore I imagine it will not be pretended that the antient Greeks spoke by accent. If this therefore be an absurdity too great to be charged upon the antient Greeks, why should it be imposed upon those who now study that language, and who, by this method, are obliged, when they read poetry, to neglect the accent, and when they read prose to disregard the quantity; which is to make two languages of one? Much more might be said against this preposterous usage of accents, which seems to me to have arisen at first from the ignorance and idleness of school-masters, who not knowing the true quantity of the words, and not caring to acquaint themselves with it, took the short and easy way of directing themselves and their scholars by those marks which they saw placed over certain syllables. These they took for their guides in reading prose, though in poetry, as has been said, they were necessitated to observe a different rule, viz. the measure of the verse where known, as that of hexameters, iambics, anapæsts, &c.; but in the great variety of measures made use of by Pindar, and the dramatic writers, they were still at a loss, and therefore in reading those odes, were obliged to have recourse to accents, to the utter subversion of all quantity and harmony. If it should be thought worth the while to correct this illiterate abuse in our schools and seminaries of learning, it may be proper either to print such books as are put into the hands of young beginners without accents, or to substitute in their stead such marks as may serve to show the quantity of the several syllables: to which end I would recommend to all future compilers of lexicons and grammars, to mark, after the example of many Latin lexicographers, the quantities of all the syllables: many of which are reducible to general rules, and others may be discovered and ascertained by carefully comparing the correspondent measures of the strophé, antistrophé, epode, &c. in the Greek ode.—W.

she

she composed the funeral oration spoken by Pericles; out of the scraps of which she patched up this discourse.

MEN. Can you remember what she said?

Soc. Else I should be unjust; for I learnt it from her, and there wanted but little of my being beaten for forgetfulness.

MEN. Why then do you not repeat it?

Soc. My mistress may be offended, if I make her discourses public.

MEN. By no means, Socrates: however, speak and oblige me; whether you are willing to speak what Aspasia said, or any thing else, it is of no consequence if you will but speak.

Soc. But you will perhaps laugh at me, if I, being an elderly man, should appear to you still to jest.

MEN. Not at all, Socrates: speak, I entreat you, by all means.

Soc. Well, I find I must gratify you, though you should even order me to fall a dancing. Besides, we are alone. Attend then. She began her oration, I think, with mentioning the deceased in the following manner:

Whatever was requisite to be done for these brave men, has been performed on our part. They have received their dues, and are now proceeding on their fated journey, dismissed with these public honours, paid them as well by the whole state as by their own families and friends. But to make these honours complete, something remains to be said; which not only the laws require to be rendered to them, but reason also. For an eloquent and well-spoken oration impresses on the mind of the audience a lasting admiration of great and virtuous actions. But the present occasion demands an oration of a particular kind; an oration that may at one and the same time do justice to the dead; benevolently admonish the living; excite the children and brethren of the deceased to an imitation of their virtues; and administer comfort to the fathers and the mothers, and whoever of their remoter ancestors are yet alive. Where then shall we find such an oration as this? Or whence shall we rightly begin the praises of those brave men, who when living made their friends happy by their virtues, and by their deaths procured the safety of those who survive.

As they were naturally good, it is in my opinion necessary to begin their panegyric with an account of their original: for that they were virtuous was
owing

owing to their being descended from virtuous ancestors. Let us then celebrate, in the first place, their noble birth; in the second, their nurture and education; and afterwards, by exhibiting their actions to view, make it appear that *these* also were virtuous, and such as corresponded to all those advantages. First, then, as to the nobility of their descent: they are sprung from a race of ancestors, not adventitious, not transplanted from I know not where, but natives of the *soil*, dwelling and living really and properly in their own country; nursed, not like other nations, by a step-mother, but a parent, the very land which they inhabited, in which they now lie buried; the soil which bred, which nursed them, and which, as her own, has again received them into her bosom. It is most just, therefore, to bestow some encomiums, in the first place, on this mother; for thus the nobility of these her children will at the same time be adorned. This country, indeed, deserves to be celebrated by all mankind, not only by us, and that upon many accounts; but principally because she is dear to divinity, of which the strife of the gods, who contended for her, and the decision that followed thereupon, is a clear evidence. And how is it possible that it should not be just for all men to celebrate that which the gods have praised? Another topic of deserved praise is this, that at the very time when the earth bred and produced animals of all kinds, both wild and tame, this country of ours preserved her purity; was unprolific of savage beasts; and among all animals chose to produce man only, who surpasses the rest in understanding, and who alone legally cultivates justice and the gods. As a great argument in confirmation of what I here advance, that this earth is the genuine parent of our forefathers, I must observe that every thing that brings forth is provided with nourishment adapted to what it has produced; and that a woman is proved to be really and in fact a mother, from her being supplied with native fountains of nourishment for the sustenance of the child. In like manner our country and mother affords a sufficient argument of her having procreated men; for she alone at that time and first produced the grain of wheat and barley, the proper and the best food of man; as being in reality the parent of this species of animals; and to her these proofs apply more strongly than to a woman. For the earth did not in breeding and producing imitate woman, but woman imitated earth: neither did she enviously withhold these her fruits, but distributed them to others. For her
offspring,

offspring, in the next place, she produced the olive, the support of toil; and after she had thus nourished and reared them up to manhood, she introduced to them gods for their governors and instructors, whose names it is unnecessary to mention in this place. We all know who furnished us with the necessaries and securities of life; who instructed us in the arts requisite for our daily support; who gave us and who taught us the use of arms for the defence of our country. Our ancestors, thus born, and thus brought up, framed a polity of which it may not be improper to speak a few words. For a polity is the nurse of men; a good one of virtuous men, a bad one of wicked men. That those who went before us, therefore, were educated under a good polity, it is necessary to show; for indeed it was owing to this that both they and their descendants, the fathers of the deceased, became virtuous. The polity then was, as it now is, an aristocracy. Under this form of government we still live, and for the most part have done so from that time to this. Let others call it a democracy, or by what name they please: it is in truth an aristocracy accompanied with renown. We have always had magistrates invested with kingly power, some of whom were hereditary, others elective: but the people were generally the most powerful; and they always bestowed the authority and power of the state upon those whom they judged most worthy. No man was excluded for the meanness, the obscurity, or the poverty of his family; nor advanced for the contrary qualifications of his ancestors, as is practised in other cities. Their choice was confined by one boundary. Whoever was esteemed to be wise and good, he had the authority, and he the power. The cause of this our polity was the equality of our original. For other states are composed of men of every country, and of different extractions; whence their governments are unequal, tyrannies, or oligarchies; in which one part of the people consider the other as their slaves, and those who are considered as slaves look upon the other part as their masters. But we, who are all brethren, born of one mother, do not think it fit that we should be the slaves or the lords of one another. On the contrary, the natural equality of our births compelled us to seek after a legal equality in our government; and forbade us to yield subjection to any thing, except to the opinion of virtue and wisdom. Hence it came to pass that all our ancestors, the fathers of the deceased, and they themselves, being thus excellently born, thus nurtured

tured in all liberty, exhibited to all men many and beautiful deeds, both privately and publicly, thinking it their duty as well to protect Grecians against Grecians, as to maintain the general liberty of Greece against the Barbarians. How they repelled the invasions of Eumolpus, of the Amazons, and of other enemies before them, and in what manner they defended the Argives against the Thebans, and the Heracleide against the Argives, the time will not permit me fully to relate: besides, their virtues having been finely celebrated by the poets in their melodious songs, they have been made public to all men; so that we should but disgrace ourselves in attempting the same subject in simple prose. For these reasons, therefore, I think proper to pass over these matters. Justice has been done to their merits. But I think myself obliged to recall the memory of those exploits which, worthy as they were, the poets have not thought worthy of their notice, and which are now almost buried in oblivion; that by setting forth the praises of the great men who performed them, I may woo the poets to admit them into their songs and verses. The chief of these are the actions of our forefathers, the progeny of this soil, who held the hands of those lords of Asia, the Persians, when they attempted to enslave Europe; whose virtue, therefore, in the first place deserves to be commemorated and to be praised. To praise them as they deserve, we ought to take a view of it in that period of time, when all Asia was in subjection to the third king of the Persian race. The first of these was Cyrus, who by his own great abilities freed his countrymen the Persians, enslaved the Medes his masters, and brought under his dominion the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt. His son subdued Egypt, and as much of Lybia as was accessible, by his arms. Darius, the third king, extended the limits of his empire by his land forces as far as Scythia, and by his fleets made himself master of the sea and of the islands; so that no one durst oppose him. The very opinions of all mankind seem to have been subdued: so many, so powerful, and so warlike were the nations which the government of the Persians involved. This Darius accusing us and the Eretrians of an attempt upon Sardis, made that a pretence for sending an army of five hundred thousand men on board his ships and transports, and a fleet of three hundred sail, over which he appointed Datis to be general, ordering him, under the forfeiture of his head, to bring back the Eretrians and Athenians captive. Datis failing to Eretria, against a nation

which of all the Greeks had at that time the greatest reputation for valour, and was moreover very numerous, subdued them in three days; and that none of them might escape, he took this method of searching the whole island. Causing his troops to march to the utmost limits of the Eretrians, and extend themselves from sea to sea, he ordered them to join their hands, and sweep the country, that he might be able to assure the king that not a man had escaped him. With the like design he passed from Eretria to Marathon, imagining he had nothing to do but to place the same inevitable yoke upon the neck of the Athenians, and carry them off as he had done the Eretrians. During these transactions, part of which were accomplished and part attempted, no nation of the Greeks came to the assistance either of the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedæmonians, and they did not join us till the day after the battle. The rest, struck with terror, and preferring their present safety, kept quiet at home. By this a judgment may be formed of the bravery of those men who received the attack of the Barbarians at Marathon, chastised the arrogance of all Asia, and were the first who erected trophies for their victory over a barbarous enemy; by their example instructing others that the power of Persia was not invincible, and that wealth and numbers must yield to virtue. I call these men, therefore, not only the fathers of our bodies, but also of our liberty, and of the liberty of all Europe. For the Grecians, surveying this day's work, were taught by their Marathonian masters to hazard new battles in the defence of their country. Upon these, therefore, ought we in reason to bestow the first palm, and give the second to them who afterwards fought and conquered in the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium. He who would discuss the several actions of these brave men, enumerate the many difficulties they had to encounter both by sea and land, and tell how they surmounted them, would have much to say. But I shall only mention what appears to me to be the greatest exploit after that of Marathon: for by that victory the Greeks had been only taught, that upon land it was possible for a small number of Grecians to overcome a multitude of Barbarians; but that at sea they were able to effect the same thing was not yet evident. The Persians had the reputation of being invincible at sea, by the superiority of their numbers, their riches, their naval skill, and strength. Now what is most praise-worthy in those brave men, who signalized themselves at sea, is, that they

they did thereby, as it were, loosen those bands of terror, what had held the Grecians so fast bound, and caused them no longer to stand in awe of numbers, whether of ships or men. From these two actions, this of Salamis, and that of Marathon, all Greece was instructed and accustomed not to be afraid of the Barbarians, either by land or sea. The third great exploit for the deliverance of Greece, as well in order as in degree, is the action of Platæa; in the glory of which the Lacedæmonians and Athenians had an equal part. This great, this arduous enterprise was achieved, I say, by these two nations; and for this their merit are they now celebrated by us, and will be by our posterity to the latest times. After this, many states of Greece still sided with the Barbarian, and the king himself was reported to have a design of invading Greece once more. It would then be highly unjust not to take notice of those also, who completed the work of their forefathers, and put the finishing hand to our deliverance, by scouring and expelling from the sea every thing that had the name of Barbarian. These were they, who were engaged in the naval fight at Eurymedon, in the expeditions to Cyrus, to Egypt, and many other places. These ought we therefore, to commemorate, and to acknowledge our obligations to them, for having taught the *great king* to fear; to attend to his own safety, and not to be plotting the overthrow of Greece. This war against the Barbarians did our commonwealth, with her own forces only, draw out to the very dregs, for her own security, and that of her allies. Peace being made, and the city honoured, there came upon her that which usually falls on each that are successful, first emulation, and from emulation envy, which drew this city, though unwilling, into a war against the Grecians: upon the breaking out of which war the Athenians fought a battle with the Lacedæmonians at Tanagra, for the liberties of Bœotia. Though the issue of this battle was doubtful, yet the following action proved decisive: for some of the allies of the Bœotians having deserted those, to whose assistance they came, our countrymen having on the third day after obtained a victory, we recovered to a sense of their duty those who, without reason, had fallen off from it. These brave men having fought against Grecians for the liberties of Grecians, and delivered those whose cause they had undertaken to defend, were the first, after the Persian war, upon whom the commonwealth conferred the honour of being buried in this public cœmety. After this the war became more general; all Greece

attacked us at once, and ravaged our country, ill requiring the favours they had received from this city. But the Athenians, having defeated their enemies in a sea-fight, and taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria their leaders the Lacedæmonians, when it was in their power to have put them to death, spared their lives, forgave them, and made peace with them; thinking, that although in a war against Barbarians nothing less than their utter ruin should be aimed at, yet that in a war between Grecians and Grecians the contest should be carried on as far as victory indeed, but that the common interest of Greece ought not to be sacrificed to any particular resentment. Are not these brave men, therefore, worthy to be praised, who were engaged in that war, and who now lie buried here? They who made it appear, if indeed it was a question, whether in the first Persian war another nation was not at least equal to the Athenians: they, I say, who made it appear that such a question was entirely groundless. These men made the superiority of the Athenians sufficiently evident, by being victorious in that war, in which all Greece took part against them, and vanquishing in battle, with the forces of Athens only, those who had set themselves up for the chiefs of Greece, though they could pretend to no more than an equal share with the Athenians in their victories gained over the Barbarians. After the peace, arose a third dreadful and unexpected war, in which many brave men fell, who here lie buried. Some of these erected many trophies in Sicily; to which country they had sailed in order to protect the Leóntines in their liberties, whom we were by oath bound to assist. But before they could arrive, the passage being long, the Leontines were reduced to extremities, and disabled from yielding them any assistance; for which reason they gave over the attempt, and were unfortunate; though it must be owned, their enemies, those against whom they came to fight, behaved with such virtue and moderation, that they deserved far greater praise than some who were only confederates in that war. Others signa-
 lized themselves in the Hellespont, by taking all the ships of the enemy in one day, and by several other victories. I called this a dreadful and unexpected war, because some of the states of Greece carried their enmity to this city so far, as to presume to send an embassy to the king of Persia, *their* and *our* most inveterate enemy, to invite, upon their own particular views, that barbarian into Greece, whom, for the common cause, they had formerly joined
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with us to drive out of Europe; thus uniting in a league against Athens all the Greeks and Barbarians. Upon which occasion the strength and valour of this state became most conspicuous. For our enemies considering Athens as already vanquished, and having seized some of our ships at Mitylene, these gallant men (for so they confessedly were) whom we now commemorate, went to their relief with sixty sail, and boarding the enemy's ships, gained a victory over them, and delivered their own allies, but met with a lot unworthy of their valour; for their bodies were not, as they ought to have been, taken up out of the sea, but had their burial there. And surely they deserve to be remembered ever with praise and honour. For by their valour we became victorious, not in that engagement only, but throughout the whole war; and through their bravery was it that our city gained the reputation of being invincible, though attacked by the united forces of all mankind. Neither has this reputation been falsified in fact. For we were conquered; not by our enemies, but by our own dissensions. As to them, we remain invincible even to this day. But we have vanquished, have subdued ourselves. After these transactions a calm ensuing, and a peace between us and all other nations, a civil war broke out, which was carried on in such a manner, that if, by the decrees of fate, dissensions must necessarily arise, a man would pray that his country might be so and no otherwise distempered. For how benevolently and familiarly did the people of the Piræus, and those of the city, mingle with each other! And with how much moderation did they lay aside their hostility against those of Eleusis, contrary to the expectations of all Greece! All which is to be ascribed to no other cause than their real consanguinity, which imparts firm friendship not in words but in deeds. We ought not, therefore, to pass over in silence even those, who in this war were slain on either side, but as far as in us lies endeavour to reconcile them to each other; praying and sacrificing upon these occasions to those powers who have the command and direction over them, in as much as we ourselves are reconciled. For they did not attack each other out of hatred and malice, but from the malignity of their fortune. Of this we ourselves are living evidences; who, being of the same common original with them, have forgiven each other, both what we did and what we suffered. After this the city had rest, and enjoyed a profound peace, easily pardoning the Barbarians, who having been ill enough treated
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by this state, returned it but as they ought. But she was indignant with the Greeks, when she called to mind the benefits they had received, and the retribution they made, by uniting with the Barbarians, depriving us of our ships, to which they formerly owed their own deliverance, and pulling down our walls, in return for our having saved theirs from ruin. The city then having taken the resolution not to give for the future any assistance to the Greeks, whether oppressed by Grecians or Barbarians, remained quiet : upon which the Lacedæmonians, imagining that Athens, the patroness of liberty, was fallen, and that now was the time for them to pursue their proper business, the enslaving of others, set immediately about it. I need not enlarge upon what followed. Those transactions are neither of an antient date, nor perplexed by the variety of actors. We all know in what a consternation the chief states of Greece, the Argives, the Bœotians, the Corinthians, applied to this city for succour ; and what was the most divine of all, that the king of Persia himself was reduced to such a strait, as to have no hopes of safety from any other quarter than from this very city, whose destruction he had so eagerly pursued. And, indeed, if Athens can be justly accused of any thing, it is of having been always too compassionate, too much inclined to heal the wounds of the fallen. For at this very time she was not able to persevere, and to keep to her resolution, of not assisting those in the preservation of their liberties, who had maliciously and designedly injured her. She yielded, she assisted them, and by that assistance rescued them from slavery, and gave them their liberty, till they should think fit to enslave themselves again. She had not indeed the assurance to act so preposterous a part as to send the king of Persia any succours ; she bore too great a reverence to the trophies of Marathon, of Salamis, and Plataea : yet, by conniving at the assistance given him by fugitives, and such as voluntarily entered into his service, she was confessedly the cause of his preservation. At this time she repaired her fortifications and her fleets, and prepared again for war ; finding herself under the necessity of entering into one with the Lacedæmonians for the protection of the Parians. The king of Persia, on his part, as he saw the Lacedæmonians had given over all thoughts of carrying on a war by sea, took umbrage at the Athenians, and resolving to break the peace, demanded those Grecian states which were upon the continent of Asia to be delivered up to him (those very states which the Lacedæmonians had formerly

merly consented to give up) as the condition of his continuing his amity with us and our allies. This demand he did not imagine would be complied with, and he made it only that he might, upon its being rejected, have a fair pretence for breaking the treaty. But he was mistaken as to some of his allies; for the Corinthians, the Argives, and the Bœotians, determined to comply with his demand, and even entered into a treaty with him, which they confirmed by oath, to give up the Greeks upon the continent of Asia, provided he would furnish them with money. But we, and we alone, had not the assurance to abandon those states, much less to swear to such a treaty. That the city of Athens is so generous, free, and firm, that she is so sound, and as it were by nature so averse to the Barbarian, must be ascribed to her being wholly *Greek*, and unmingled with Barbarians. For none of your foreign heroes, Pelops, Cadmus, Ægyptus, Danaus, and many others, who, though living under Grecian laws, were Barbarians by extraction; none of these, I say, are of the number of our citizens. We are genuine Greeks, no half-barbarians. Hence proceeds the genuine and unadulterated enmity of Athens to all Barbarians. Wherefore we were once more left alone, for refusing to do an action so infamous, and so impious as that of delivering up Grecians into the hands of Persians. But being restored to what we had been deprived of in the former war, by the assistance of divinity, we prosecuted this with more success. For, becoming once again masters of a fleet, having rebuilt our walls, and recovered our colonies, we were soon freed from a war, from which our enemies were very glad to be liberated. In this war we lost indeed many gallant men, some at Corinth, by the disadvantage of their situation, others at Lechæum by treachery. Nor were they less gallant, who saved the king of Persia, and drove the Lacedæmonians out of the seas. These are the men I would recall to your remembrance, and in honouring and praising such as these it becomes all of you to join.

Such were the exploits of those brave men who here lie buried; such were the exploits of those others also who, though unhappily deprived of burial, died like them in the service of their country; exploits many and great indeed, as has been related: but more and still greater yet remain untold; to enumerate all which many whole days and nights would scarce suffice. It is the duty, therefore, of all and of every particular man to bear these things in mind, and as in battle to exhort the children of such fathers

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not to quit the rank, in which their ancestors have placed them, by a base and cowardly retreat. Accordingly, I myself, O ye sons of virtuous men, do now exhort you, and as long as I shall remain among you will never cease reminding and exhorting you, to use your utmost endeavours to become the best of men. But upon this occasion it is my duty to tell you what your fathers, when they were going to expose their lives for their country, commanded us to say to those whom they left behind, in case any accident should befall themselves. I will repeat to you what I heard from their own mouths, and what, if I may judge from the discourse they then held, they would now gladly say to you themselves, were it in their power. Imagine, therefore, you hear them speaking what I shall now relate. These were their words: O children! that ye are the sons of virtuous fathers is evident from our present circumstances. For having it in our option to live with dishonour, we have generously made it our choice to die, rather than bring ourselves and our posterity into disgrace, and reflect infamy back upon our parents and forefathers; persuaded as we were, that the life of one who dishonours his family is not worth living, and that such a man can have no friend either here upon earth among mankind, or among the gods hereafter in the realms beneath. It behoves you, therefore, to bear these our words in remembrance, to the end that all your undertakings may be accompanied with virtue; assuring yourselves that without virtue every acquisition, every pursuit, is base and infamous. For wealth can add no splendour to an unmanly mind. The riches of such an one are for others, not for himself. Neither are beauty, and strength of body, when joined with baseness and cowardice, to be deemed ornamental, but disgraceful: since if they make a man more conspicuous, they at the same time make the baseness of his soul conspicuous also. Science too, when separated from justice and the rest of the virtues, is not wisdom but cunning. Wherefore, in the first place, and in the last, and throughout the whole course of your lives, it is incumbent upon you to labour with all your faculties to surpass us and your progenitors in glory. Otherwise be assured that, in this contest of virtue, if we remain victorious, the victory will cover us with confusion, which, on the contrary, if obtained by you, will make us happy. The most effectual way for you to surpass us, and obtain this victory, is so to order your conduct, as neither to abuse nor waste the glory left you by your ancestors. For can any thing be more ignominious

nious for a man, who would be thought something, than to receive honour, not from his own merit, but from the reputation of his forefathers. Hereditary honour is indeed a beautiful and magnificent treasury. But to enjoy a treasury of riches and honours, and, for want of a proper supply of wealth and glory of your own, not to be able to transmit it to your posterity, is infamous and unmanly. If you endeavour after these things, you will be welcome to us and we to you, whenever your respective fates shall conduct you to us in the world below: but if you disregard them and become profligate, not one of us shall be willing to receive you. Thus much be spoken to our children: but to our fathers and mothers, if any of them should survive us, and it should be thought necessary to administer comfort to them, say, that it is their duty patiently to bear misfortunes, whenever they happen, and not give themselves up to grief: otherwise they will never be without sorrow; for the ordinary occurrences of life will afford sufficient matter for affliction. They should seek to heal and mitigate their troubles in the remembrance, that as to the most considerable point the gods have heard their prayers. For they did not pray that their children might be immortal, but virtuous and renowned. And this, the greatest of all blessings, they have obtained. It is not easy for mortal man to have every thing happen according to his wishes in this life. Besides, by bearing their misfortunes with resolution and fortitude, they will gain the opinion of being the genuine parents of magnanimous children, and of being themselves men of courage and magnanimity; whereas by sinking under their sorrows, they will raise a suspicion of their not being our fathers, or those who shall praise us will be thought to have spoken falsely; neither of which things ought to come to pass. They themselves rather should bear chief testimony to our praise, showing by their actions that they are indeed men and the fathers of men. The old proverb, "Not too much of any thing," seems to be well said, and in fact it is so. For he who has within himself all that is necessary to happiness, or nearly so, and who does not so depend upon other men, as to have himself and his affairs in a perpetual fluctuation, according to their good or ill conduct, he, I say, is best provided for this life; he is moderate, he is prudent, he is brave; and he, upon all occasions, whether he obtains or loses an estate or children, will pay the greatest regard to this proverb: for placing all his confidence in himself, he will neither be

too much elevated with joy, nor depressed with sorrow. Such men we should think worthy to be our fathers; such we wish them to be, and such we affirm they are; such likewise are we now proved to be, by neither murmuring nor trembling at death, though we were to meet it this instant. And this same state of mind do we recommend to our fathers and our mothers; entreating them to make use of such sentiments as these through the remaining part of their lives; and to be persuaded that they will do us the greatest pleasure by not weeping and lamenting for us; that if the dead have any knowledge of what passes among the living, their afflicting themselves, and bearing their misfortunes heavily, will be very unacceptable to us; whereas, on the contrary, by bearing their afflictions lightly, and with moderation, they will be most pleasing to us. Our lives and actions are now going to have an end; but such an end as among men is deemed most glorious, and which therefore ought rather to be graced with honour than sullied with lamentations. By taking care of our wives and children; by educating the latter, and turning themselves and their minds wholly to such-like employments, they will the more readily forget their misfortunes, and lead a life more exemplary, more agreeable to reason, and more acceptable to us. Let this suffice to be spoken on our part to our relations and friends. To the commonwealth we recommend the care of our parents and children; beseeching her to give these an honourable education, and to cherish those in their old age, in a manner worthy of them: but we are sensible that without this recommendation, all proper care will be taken of both."

These things, O ye children, and ye parents of the deceased, have they given me in charge to say to you on their part; and I have most willingly, and to the best of my power, executed their commands. On my own part and for their sakes I beseech you, ye sons! to imitate your fathers: you fathers, to take comfort for the loss of these your sons; assuring yourselves, that both in our public and private capacities, we will take care of you, and cherish your old age, as the respective duties and relations of every one of us may require. You yourselves well know what provisions the commonwealth has made; that by express laws she has ordered care to be taken of the children and parents of those who die in battle; and has given it in charge to the chief magistrate, to take them, above all others, into his particular protection; that the latter may be guarded from all injuries, and the former

former not be sensible of their orphan state, nor feel the want of a father; whose place the commonwealth supplies, by assisting in the care of their education while they are children, and when they are grown up to manhood, dismissing them to their several vocations with an honourable present of a complete suit of armour. And this she does, not only with a view of intimating to them, and reminding them of the occupations of their fathers, by presenting them with those implements of valour which their fathers had so gloriously employed; but also that being arrived to the full strength, and furnished with the armour of a man, when they first go to take possession of their household gods, they may set out with a good omen. Moreover, she fails not from time to time to pay these anniversary honours to the deceased; taking upon her to perform in general, with regard to them, whatever is due to each from their respective relations; and to complete all, by exhibiting games of different kinds, equestrian and gymnastic, musical and poetical, she effectually supplies the office of sons and heirs to fathers; of fathers to sons; and that of guardians and protectors to their parents and kindred: discharging at all times all and every part of the duties that belong to all. Learn, therefore, by reflecting upon these things, to bear your afflictions with more patience; for by so doing you will act the most friendly part as well to the dead as to the living, and be better able to give and receive comfort, to cherish and assist each other. And now, having jointly paid the tribute of your sorrow to the deceased, as the law directs, you may all depart.

This, Menexenus, is the speech¹ of Aspasia the Milesian.

¹ This Oration, which Plato (either from undervaluing his own performance, or with a view of abating the too great esteem which the Athenians entertained for their orators, whom he rallies very finely in the beginning of the dialogue) hath here given to Aspasia the Milesian, was however held in such estimation at Athens, that, as Tully informs us, it was ordered to be repeated every year, on the day appointed for the commemoration of those who had been slain in battle: a plain evidence of the preference which the Athenians gave to this Oration of Plato before all others spoken on the same occasion, though some of them were composed by their greatest orators, as Pericles, Lyfias, Hyperides, and Demosthenes. Those of Hyperides and Demosthenes are not now extant. That ascribed to Pericles by Thucydides, and preserved in his History, was most probably written by that historian. Lyfias's Oration is yet remaining. We have therefore but one genuine oration of any of these orators, upon this subject, with which we can compare this Oration of Plato; to whom I shall not scruple to give the advantage upon the comparison. For the rest, we have the decision of the Athenians, who were acquainted with all the others, in favour of Plato; and in their judgment, I think, we may safely acquiesce.—W.

MEN. By Jupiter, Socrates, you say that Aspasia is blessed, if being a woman she can make such speeches as these.

Soc. If you doubt it, come along with me, and you shall hear her herself.

MEN. I have often been in her company, and know what she is.

Soc. Well then, do you not admire her, and are you not obliged to her for this Oration?

MEN. I am greatly obliged, Socrates, either to her or to him, whoever was the author of it, but more particularly to you, who have repeated it to me.

Soc. Very well: but remember not to speak of it, that I may hereafter be at liberty to communicate to you some more of her fine political discourses.

MEN. You may depend upon my not betraying you. Do you only relate them.

Soc. I will not fail.

THE END OF THE MENEXENUS.

THE CLITOPHO:

AN

EXHORTATORY DIALOGUE.

THE CLITOPHO

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND CLITOPHO.

SOCRATES.

A CERTAIN person lately informed me that Clitopho, the son of Aristonymus, conversing with Lyfias, blamed the pursuits of Socrates, but praised immoderately the conversation of Thrasymachus.

CL. Whoever he was, Socrates, he has not accurately related to you my discourse with Lyfias about you. For in some things I did not praise you, but in others I did. But since you evidently blame me, though you pretend to care nothing about this report, I will most willingly relate to you my conversation with Lyfias, especially since we happen to be alone, that you may see I am not so ill disposed towards you as you might be induced to suppose. For now perhaps you have not rightly heard, and on that account are more exasperated with me than is proper. But if you will permit me to speak freely, I shall most cheerfully relate the affair to you.

Soc. But it would be shameful, when you are willing to benefit me, that I should not suffer you. For it is evident that when I know in what

¹ In this Dialogue, Clitopho, the son of Aristonymus, being asked by Socrates why he preferred Thrasymachus, answers, that though he had often heard excellent exhortations to virtue from Socrates, yet hitherto he had not been able to perceive in what virtue itself consisted, and in what manner he should happily proceed in the study it. Hence, he adds, if Socrates either is ignorant of this, or is unwilling to teach it him, he may with great propriety betake himself to Thrasymachus, or to any other, for the sake of obtaining this knowledge. As the answer of Socrates to this complaint is not added, there is every reason to believe that this Dialogue is imperfect.

respect I am better and worse, I shall pursue some things, and avoid others, to the utmost of my power.

CLI. Hear then. For when I am with you, Socrates, I am often astonished on hearing you discourse, and you appear to me, compared with other men, to speak most beautifully, when reproving men, you exclaim like a god from a tragic machine, "Whither are you borne along? Of this you are ignorant, and your conduct is in no respect becoming. For all your attention is employed in the acquisition of wealth; but you neglect the children to whom you are to leave it, and are not at all anxious that they may know how to use it justly; nor that they may acquire this knowledge, do you procure for them teachers of justice, if justice can be taught, and who may sufficiently exercise them in it, if it is to be obtained by meditation and exercise. Nor yet, prior to this, do you thus cultivate your own minds: but perceiving that you and your children have sufficiently learnt grammar, music, and gymnastic (which you consider as the perfect discipline of virtue), though afterwards you are no less depraved with respect to riches than before, yet you do not despise the present mode of education, nor inquire after those who might liberate you from this unskilful and inelegant condition of life. Though through this confusion and indolence, and not through the discordant motion of the foot to the lyre, brother rises against brother, and city against city, immoderately and unharmoniously; and warring on each other, both do and suffer all that is lawless and dire. But you say, that those who are unjust, are unjust voluntarily, and not through want of discipline, nor through ignorance; and again, you dare to assert that injustice is base, and odious to divinity. How then can any one voluntarily choose this which is so great an evil. It is chosen by him, you say, who is vanquished by pleasure. Is not this therefore involuntary, since to vanquish is voluntary? So that reason perfectly convinces us, that to act unjustly is involuntary. Every man, therefore, privately, and all cities publicly, ought to pay more attention to justice than at present."

When therefore, Socrates, I hear you perpetually asserting these things, I am very much delighted, and praise you in a wonderful manner. This is likewise the case with me, when you say as follows: That those who cultivate their bodies, but neglect their soul, pay attention to that which is naturally in a state of subjection, but neglect that which governs. Likewise,
when

when you assert that it is better for him who does not know how to use a thing to dismiss the consideration of its utility. And that for him who does not know how to use his eyes, ears, and his whole body, it is better neither to hear, nor see, nor to use his body in any respect, than to use it. In a similar manner too, with respect to art. For it is evident, as you say, that he who does not know how to use his own lyre, will not know how to use that of his neighbour. Nor will he who is ignorant of the use of any other instrument or possession belonging to another, know how to use that which belongs to himself. And, in the last place, you beautifully add, that for him who does not know how to use his soul, it is better to be at rest with respect to his soul, and not to live, than to live and act from himself. But if there is any necessity for such a one to live, that it is better for him to lead the life of a slave, than of one free born. This however is to deliver the helm of the dianoëtic part as of a ship to another, who has learnt how to govern men; viz. who has learnt what you, Socrates, have often called the political science; and which is likewise judicial and justice. To these, and many other all-beautiful sentences, in which you assert that virtue¹ can be taught, and that a man ought above all things to pay attention to himself, I have never at any time been adverse, nor do I think that I ever shall be. For I think that these assertions are most exhortatory and useful, and vehemently excite us, as if we were asleep. I have attended, therefore, as one who is to hear what follows, and I have asked, not you, in the first place, Socrates, but your equals in age, those who have the same desires with you, or your companions, or in whatever manner it may be proper to call those that are thus disposed towards you. For among these I have first of all asked those that are most esteemed by you, what will be the discourse after this, and proposing to them to dispute after your manner, I have said to them, O best of men, how are we to receive the present exhortation of Socrates to virtue? Are we to receive it as nothing more than an exhortation, and not apply it to practice? But this will be our employment through the whole of life, to exhort those who are not yet incited. Or is it requisite, after this, that we should ask Socrates and each other, since we confess this conduct should be adopted, what is next to be done? How ought we to

See the Meno, for the manner in which this is to be understood.

begin respecting the discipline of justice? For just as if some one should exhort *us* to pay attention to the body, who like boys do not in any respect perceive that the care of the body is gymnastic and medicinal, and should afterwards reproach us by saying, that we paid every attention to wheat and barley, and such other things as we labour to obtain for the sake of the body, but that we search after no art nor device, by which the body may be rendered in the best condition, though there is such an art,—should any one thus reproach us, might not we ask him, Do you say there are such arts as these? perhaps he would say that there are, and that these are the gymnastic and medicinal arts. After the same manner, let some one now inform us what that art is which we consider as conversant with the virtue of the soul. But he who appears to be most robust in answering such questions as these, will say, This art which you have heard Socrates mention, is no other than justice. To this I reply, You should not only tell me the name of the art, but thus explain the art itself. Medicine is said to be a certain art. But by this, two things are effected: for physicians are always formed by physicians; and health is produced by medicine. But one of these is no longer art, but the work of the medical art teaching and acquired; and this work we denominate health. After a similar manner, two things are effected by the tectonic art, viz. an edifice, and the tectonic art, one of which is a work, and the other a document. Thus too, with respect to justice, one of its effects is to make men just, in the same manner as each of the above-mentioned arts makes artists; but what shall we say the other is, which a just man is able to accomplish for us? One person will, I think, answer us, that it is the profitable; another, that it is the becoming; another, that it is the useful; and another, that it is the convenient. But I in answering to this have objected, that these very names are to be found in each of the arts, viz. to act rightly, conveniently, profitably, and the like. But that to which all these tend, is the peculiarity of each art. Thus, in the tectonic art, the right, the beautiful, and the becoming, tend to this, that wooden furniture may be aptly made, which is not art, but the work of art. In like manner, let some one answer me, respecting the work of justice. Lastly, one of your associates, Socrates, who appeared to speak most elegantly, answered me that the peculiar work of justice is this, which is not effected by any other science, viz. to produce
friendship

friendship in cities. But he being again interrogated, replied, that friendship was a thing good, and by no means evil: and being asked respecting the friendships of boys and wild beasts, as we denominate the attachments of these, he would not admit that such attachments should be called friendships, because they more frequently happen to be noxious than good. He likewise said, that they were falsely called friendships, but that real and true friendship was most clearly concord. But being asked whether he called concord agreement in opinion, or science, he despised the former, because there is a necessity that there should be many and noxious agreements in opinion among men; but he had granted that friendship was a thing perfectly good, and the work of justice. So that he said, concord was the same with science, and not with opinion. But when we were at this part of our discourse, those who were present, doubting the truth of these assertions, called to him, and said, that the discourse revolved to what was at first advanced. They likewise affirmed that the medicinal art is a certain concord; that this is the case with all the other arts; and that they are able to declare what the subject is with which they are conversant. But with respect to that which is called by you justice, or concord, we know not whither it tends, and it is not manifest what is its work.

Concerning these things, Socrates, I have at length asked you; and you tell me that the work of justice is to injure our enemies, and benefit our friends. But afterwards it appeared to you, that the just man will never injure any one, but will act to the advantage of every one in all things. These things have been the subject of discussion, not once, nor twice only; but having assiduously attended you, Socrates, for a long time, I became at length weary; thinking, indeed, that you, in the most excellent manner of all men, exhorted to the study of virtue, but that one of these two things must take place, either that you are able to effect thus much alone, but nothing further, which may happen to be the case respecting any other art; as for instance, he who is not a pilot may endeavour to praise the pilot's art, as a thing most worthy the attention of mankind; and in a similar manner with respect to the other arts. This may perhaps apply to you concerning justice, viz. that you have not a greater knowledge than others of its nature, because you praise it in a beautiful manner. However, I do not think that this is the case. But as I said, one of these two things must take place, either that you

do not know what justice is, or that you are unwilling to impart this knowledge to me. On this account, I think I shall betake myself to Thrasymachus, and wherever else I am able, in order that I may be liberated from my doubts. Not indeed, that I should apply to any one else, if you were willing to finish your exhortatory discourses to me. I mean, if, as you have exhorted me to that care of the body which belongs to gymnastic, and which it is not proper to neglect, you would unfold to me, after an exhortation of this kind, what the nature is of my body, and what the attention which it requires. Let this be done at present. Take it for granted, that Clitopho acknowledges it to be ridiculous, to pay attention to other things, and in the mean time neglect the soul, for the sake of which we labour in other things; and suppose me to admit every thing else which is consequent to this, and which we have now discussed. I request you not to act in any respect otherwise, that I may not be obliged hereafter, as at present, partly to praise and partly to blame you before Lysias and others. For I say, Socrates, that you are inestimably valuable to the man who is not yet exhorted; but that to him who has been exhorted, you are nearly an impediment; since you prevent him from becoming happy, by arriving at the end of virtue.

THE END OF THE CLITOPHO.

THE

T H E I O:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

P O E T R Y.

INTRODUCTION

TO

T H E I O.

THE general subject, says Mr. Sydenham, of this Dialogue, is Poetry; but various titles are found prefixed to the copies of it, assigned probably by the antients. Some style it a Dialogue “concerning the Iliad:” while others, aiming to open the subject more fully and distinctly, entitle it, “Of the Interpretation of the Poets:” and others again, with intention to express the design or scope of it in the title, have invented this, “Concerning the Mark or Characteristic of a Poet.” But none of these titles, or inscriptions, will be found adequate or proper. The ¹ first is too partial and deficient. For the Dialogue, now before us, concerns the Odyssæy as much as the Iliad, and many other poets no less than Homer. As to the next title, the Interpretation or Exposition of the Poets, is but an occasional or accessory subject, introduced only for the sake of some other, which is the principal. The last title is erroneous, and mistakes the main drift and end of this Dialogue,

¹ “Concerning the Iliad.” This however appears to be the most antient, being the only one found in Laertius; and the others being too precise and particular to be of an earlier date. For the titles of all the profane works of the antients, whether dialogues, dissertations, or methodical treatises, written before the age of Plutarch, were as general and as concise as possible, expressing the subject usually in one word. The title that we have chosen appears not indeed in any of the copies of this Dialogue; but perhaps may be supported by the authority of Clemens of Alexandria, a writer little later than Laertius. For citing a passage out of the *Io*, he has these words, *περι μεν ποιητικῆς Πλάτων—γραφει*. *Stromat.* l. vi. near the end. Though it must be owned not absolutely clear, whether he means it as the known title of the Dialogue, or as the subject only of the passage there quoted.—S.

which

which is by no means so slight or unimportant, as merely to show that enthusiasm¹, or the poetic fury, is the characteristic of a true poet; but makes a part of the grand design of Plato in all his writings, that is, the teaching true wisdom: in order to which, every kind of wisdom, falsely so called, commonly taught in the age when he lived, was to be unlearned. The teachers, or leaders of popular opinion among the Grecians of those days, were the sophists, the rhetoricians, and the poets; or rather, instead of these last, their ignorant and false interpreters. Men of liberal education were misled principally by the first of these: the second sort were the seducers of the populace, to whose passions the force of rhetoric chiefly is applied in commonwealths: but the minds of people² of all ranks received a bad impression

¹ Yet only in this light was the *Io* considered by Ficinus, as appears from his Commentary on this Dialogue. And his representations of it have been blindly followed by all who have since his time written concerning it, as Janus Cornarius in his seventh Eclogue, Serranus in his Argument of the *Io*, and Franciscus Patritius in his *Dissertation de Ordine Dialogorum*. Nor must we conceal from our readers the opposite opinion of a very ingenious friend, who supposes Plato to have no other view in this Dialogue, than to expose *Io* to ridicule, and to convince him of his own ignorance. Whatever, therefore, is said, on the subject of enthusiasm in poetry, appears to him wholly ironical, and Socrates to be absolutely in jest, throughout the Dialogue. To this conjecture we shall only say, in the words of Horace, which a reader of Plato ought always to have in mind,

——— *Ridentem dicere Verum*
Quid vetat ——?

What hinders, but that serious truth be spoke
In humour gay, with pleasantry and joke?

As to the other opinion, that which is generally received, we contend not that it has no foundation, nor even at all dispute the truth of it; but deny only the importance of that truth to the *Io*. For though the immediate and direct end of Plato, in this Dialogue, was to prove that the wisdom, which appears in the writings of the elder poets, especially in those of Homer, was not owing to science: yet another thing, which he had obliquely in his view, was the intimating to his readers, to what cause positively it was owing that so many profound truths were contained in those ancient poems. The cause assigned by the philosopher is some universal and divine principle, operating in various ways: partly acting only occasionally, in which respect he terms it, agreeably to the language of those days, the inspiration of the muse; and partly with a continual and constant energy, being a divine genius, but limited, and confined to certain subjects, operating differently in different persons; though in Homer, most of all men, exerting its full force, and the most according to its own nature, that is, universal and divine—S.

² As soon as boys had been taught letters, they were introduced to the reading of the poets; their minds were charged with the memory of shorter poems, and of many passages from the longer;

impression from those of the last-mentioned kind. To prevent the ill influence of these, is the immediate design of the Io; and the way which the philosopher takes to lessen the credit of their poems is not by calling in question the inspiration of the poet, or the divinity of the Muse. Far from attempting this, he establishes the received hypothesis, for the foundation of his argument against the authority of their doctrine: inferring, from their inability to write without the impulse of the Muse, that they had no real knowledge of what they taught: whereas the principles of science, as he tells us in the *Philebus*, descend into the mind of man immediately from heaven; or, as he expresses it in the *Epinomis*, from God himself, without the intervention of any lower divinity. The true philosopher, therefore, who attends to this higher inspiration, he alone possessing that divinest science, the science of those principles, is able to teach in a scientific way. But Plato, of all the polite writers among the ancients the most polite, makes not his attack upon the poets themselves directly: for, as the disaffected to any government, so long as they retain their respect for it, strike at the sovereigns only in the persons of their ministers; in the same respectful manner does the courtly Plato seem to spare those sacred persons, the anointed of the Muses, making free with the rhapsodists only, their interpreters. This he does in the person of Io, one of that number, who professed to interpret the sense of Homer; proving out of his own mouth, that he had no true knowledge of those matters, which he pretended to explain; and insinuating at the same time, that the poet no less wanted true knowledge in those very things, though the subjects of his own poem. For every thing that he says of the rhapsodists and of rhapsody, holds equally true of poets¹ and of poetry.

The

longer; and they had masters appointed to explain, criticise, and comment upon what they had learnt. From the poets consequently did the youth imbibe principles of manners, and general opinions of things: their odes were as commonly sung as ballads among us; and their verses were cited, not only to grace conversation, but even to add weight to grave discourses. Justly therefore does Aristides the orator call them *κοινους των Ελληνων τροφειας και διδασκαλους*, "the common tutors and teachers of all Greece." *Aristid.* tom. iii. p. 22. ed. Canter.—S.

¹This appears to have been so understood by the poets themselves of those days. For what other provocation Socrates could have given them than by some such talk as Plato in this *Dialogue* puts into his mouth is not easy to conceive. The enemies that Socrates had made himself by his free-

The pursuit of this argument naturally leads to a twofold inquiry: one head or article of which regards the sciences, the other concerns the arts. By this partition does Plato divide his *Io*; throwing, however, here, as he does every where else, a graceful veil over his art of composition, and the method with which he frames his dialogues; in order to give them the appearance of familiarity and ease, so becoming that kind of writing: in the same manner as he always takes care to conceal their scope or design; that, opening itself unexpectedly at last, it may strike the mind with greater efficacy. Upon the article of science, Plato represents the poets writing through the inspiration of the Muses, of all things, whether human or divine; of morals, politics, and military affairs; of history, and antiquities; of meteorology, and astronomy; in fine, of the whole universe; yet without any intimate acquaintance with the nature of those things, and without having had any other than a superficial view. Under the other article, that of art, Plato shows that the poets describe, and in description imitate, the operations and performances of many of the arts, though in the principles of those arts uninstructed and ignorant; as having skill in one art only, that, through which they so describe and imitate, the art of poetry: while every other artist hath skill in some one other, his own proper, art; and to the true philosopher, as he tells us in his Dialogue called the Politician, belongs the knowledge of that art, in which are comprehended the principles of all the rest. Hence it follows, that of such poetical subjects as have any relation to the arts, whether military or peaceful, whether imperatorial, liberal, or

dom of speech, as we are informed by himself in his *Apology*, reported to us by Plato, were of three sorts; the politicians, the rhetoricians, and the poets. That the former sort repented his exposing their conceited ignorance, and vain pretensions to political science, is told us by Laertius, b. ii. and is indeed abundantly evident from Plato's *Meno*. That Socrates treated the rhetoricians in the same manner, will appear very sufficiently in the *Gorgias*. Is it not then highly probable, that the repentment of the poets was raised against him by the same means; and that they well understood his attack upon the rhapsodists, a set of men too inconsiderable for any part of his principal notice to be intended against themselves? We should add to this argument the authority of Athenæus, were it of any weight in what regards Plato. For he gives this as one instance of Plato's envious and malignant spirit, which his own malignity against the divine philosopher attributes to him, that in his *Io* he vilifies and abuses the poets. See *Athen. Deipnosoph.* l. xi. p. 506.—S.

mechanical,

mechanical, the knowing in each art are respectively the only proper judges. Such is the design, and such the order of this Dialogue. As to its kind, it is numbered by the antients among the peirastic: but according to the scheme proposed in our synopsis, the outward form or character of it is purely dramatic: and the genius of it is seen in this, that the argumentation is only probable; and in this, also, that the conclusion leaves the rhapsodist Io perplexed and silenced, bringing off Socrates in modest triumph over the embarrassment of his half yielding adversary ¹.

¹ See what has been already observed concerning the Io, in the note at the beginning of the tenth book of the Republic, in which we have given, from Proclus, a copious and admirable account of the different species of poetry, and the nature of poetic fury.—T.

T H E I O.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND IO.

SCENE'.—ATHENS.

SOCRATES.

JOY be with Io^{*}. Whence come you now? what; do you come directly from home, from Ephesus?

Io.

^{*} The scene, though not precisely marked out to us by Plato, evidently lies within the city; and some circumstances make it probable to be the public streets; where Socrates, in passing along, casually met with Io. Not to insist on that of Io's recent arrival at Athens, nor on that other of the seeming haste of Socrates, expressed in his postponing Io's impertinent harangue, and his endeavouring to draw the conversation into a narrow compass, circumstances perhaps ambiguous: one more decisive is the restriction of the number of persons composing the Dialogue to those two. For whenever Plato lays his scene in some public place, frequented for the sake of company, exercise, or amusement; many persons are made parties, or witnesses at least, to the conversation; and this out of regard to probability; because a conversation-party, consisting of more than two persons, may naturally be supposed the most frequent in places, where few of the assembly could fail of meeting with many of their acquaintance. Another circumstance, contributing to determine where the scene lies, is the brevity of this Dialogue. For Plato, to his other dramatic excellencies, in which he well might be a pattern to all dramatic poets, adds this also, to adjust the length of the conversation to the place where it is held: a piece of decorum little regarded even by the best of our modern writers for the stage. Accordingly, the longest conversations, related or feigned by Plato, we may observe to be carried on always in some private house, or during a long walk into the country; unless some peculiar circumstance permits the discourse to be protracted in a place otherwise improper. For the same reason of propriety, the exchange, where much talk would be inconvenient; or the street, where people converse only as they pass along together, and sometimes, removed a little from the throng, standing still a while, is generally made the scene of the shortest dialogues. And in pursuance of the same rule, those of middling length

Io. ³ Not so, Socrates, I assure you; but from Epidaurus⁴, from the feasts of Æsculapius⁵.

Soc. The people of Epidaurus, I think, upon this occasion, propose a trial of skill among the rhapsodists⁶, in honour of the god. Do they not?

Io. They do; and a trial of skill in every other branch of the Muse's art?

Soc.

length have for their scene some public room, a gymnastic or a literary school, for instance, in which were seats fixed all round, for any of the assembly to sit and talk; but in a place of this kind the conversation must be abridged, because liable to interruption; besides that decency, and a regard to the presence of the whole assembly, regulate the bounds of private conversation in those detached and separate parties, into which usually a large company divides itself; appointing it to be confined within moderate compass. As this note regards all the dialogues of Plato, the length of it, we hope, wants no apology.—S.

² To wish joy, was the usual salutation of the antient Greeks, when they met or parted: as ours is, to hope or wish health; an expression of our courtesy, derived to us from the old Romans.—S.

³ As much as to say, "It is not so bad with me neither, as to be obliged ever to be at home." Plato makes him express himself in this manner, partly to shew the roving life of the rhapsodists, inconsistent with the attainment of any real science; but chiefly to open the character of Io, who prided himself with being at the head of his profession, and consequently in having much business abroad. The very first question therefore of Socrates, who knew him well, is on purpose to draw from him such an answer: as the questions that follow next are intended to put him upon boasting of his great performances. Nothing in the writings of Plato, not the minutest circumstance, is idle or insignificant. It would be endless to point out this in every instance. Scarce a line but would demand a comment of this sort. The specimen, however, here given, may suffice to show, with what attention so perfect a master of good writing ought to be read; and with such a degree of attention, as is due, the intelligent reader will of himself discern, in ordinary cases, the particular design of every circumstance, and also what relation it bears to the general design of the whole Dialogue.—S.

⁴ In this city was a temple of Æsculapius, much celebrated for his immediate presence. An annual festival was here likewise held in honour to that god.—S.

⁵ *Ἐκ τῶν Ἀσκληπειῶν*. Ficinus seems to think, this means the worshippers of Æsculapius. Bembo translates it "*da Figliuoli di Esculapio*," an appellation given only to physicians. Seranus interprets it in the same sense that we do, and that this is the true one, appears from Jul. Pollux, Onomast. i. l. c. 13.—S.

⁶ These were a set of people, whose profession somewhat resembled that of our strolling players. For they travelled from one populous city to another, wherever the Greek was the vulgar language, rehearsing, acting, and expounding the works of their antient poets, principally those of Homer. They resorted to the feasts and banquets of private persons, where such rehearsals made part of the
entertainment;

Soc. Well; you, I presume, were one of the competitors: What success had you?

Io. We came off, O Socrates, with the chief prize.

Soc. You say well: now then let us prepare to win the conquest in the Panathenæa¹.

Io. That we shall accomplish too, if fortune favour us.

Soc. Often have I envied you rhapsodists, Io, the great advantages of

entertainment; and in the public theatres performed before the multitude. Especially they failed not their attendance at the general assemblies of the people from all parts of Greece; nor at the religious festivals, celebrated by any particular state. For on these solemn occasions it was usual to have prizes proposed to be contended for, not only in all the manly exercises fashionable in those days, but in the liberal arts also; of which even the populace among the Grecians, then the politest people in the world, were no less fond. The principal of these was poetry: (see the second of Mr. Harris's three Treatises:) and poets themselves often contended for the prize of excellence in this art. But poets were rare in that age. Their places therefore on these occasions were supplied by the rhapsodists; who vied one with another for excellence in reciting. Whoever desires a more particular account of the rhapsodists, so often mentioned in this Dialogue, than can be given within the compass of these notes, may consult the commentary of Eustatius upon Homer, with the notes of the learned Salvini, v. i. p. 15, &c. as also a treatise of H. Stephens de Rhapsodis.—S.

¹ This was a festival kept at Athens yearly in honour of Minerva, who was believed by the Athenians to be the divine protectress of their city. Every fifth year it was celebrated with more festivity and pomp than ordinary; and was then called the Great Panathenæa, to distinguish it from those held in the intermediate years, termed accordingly the Less. We learn from Plato, in his Hipparchus, from whence Ælian almost transcribes it in his Various Hist. l. viii. c. 2. that there was a law at Athens, appointing the works of Homer to be recited by the rhapsodists during the solemnization of this festival: in order, says Isocrates in his Panegyric Oration, to raise in the Athenians an emulation of the virtues there celebrated. From a passage in the Oration of Lycurgus the Orator it appears, that this law regarded only the Panathenæa. On this very solemn occasion it is highly probable, that Io was come to Athens on purpose to show his abilities, and contend for the prize of victory. We cannot help observing by the way, that many writers, ancient as well as modern, express themselves as if they imagined the Greater and the Less Panathenæa to be two different festivals: see in particular Castellan. de Fest. Græc. p. 206, 7. whereas it is clear from the words of Lycurgus, that there was but one festival of that name, though held in a more splendid manner every fifth year. As they nearly concern the subject now before us, we present them to the learned reader at full length: οὗτοι γὰρ ὑπελάβον ἡμῶν οἱ πατέρες, ἐπὶ οὐδαμῶν εἶναι ποιητὴν (sc. τὸν Ὅμηρον) ὥστε νόμον ἐθέντο, καθ' ἑκάστην πενταετηρίδα τῶν Παναθηναίων, μόνου τῶν ἀλλῶν ποιητῶν ῥαψωδίσθαι τὰ ἐπη. P. 223. of Dr. Taylor's edition. "Your ancestors had so high an opinion of the excellence of Homer, as to make a law, that in every fifth year of the Panathenæa his poems, and his only, should be recited by the rhapsodists."—S.

your

your profession. For to be always well dressed¹, and to make the handsomest appearance possible, as becomes a man, no doubt, who speaks in public; to be conversant, besides, in the works of many excellent poets, especially in those of Homer, the best and most divine of them all; and to learn, not merely his verses, but his meaning, as it is necessary you should; these are advantages highly to be envied. For a man could never be a good rhapsodist unless he understood what he recited: because it is the business of a rhapsodist to explain to his audience the sense and meaning of the poet; but this it is impossible to perform well, without a ² knowledge of those things, concerning which the poet writes. Now all this certainly merits a high degree of admiration.

IO. You are in the right, Socrates. And the learning this I have made my principal business. It has given me indeed more trouble than any other branch of my profession. I presume therefore there is now no man living,

¹ The rhapsodists often used to recite in a theatrical manner, not only with proper gestures, but in a garb also suitable to their subject: and when they thus acted the *Odysses* of Homer, were dressed in a purple-coloured robe, *ἀλουργγῆς*, to represent the wanderings of Ulysses by sea: but when they acted the *Iliad*, they wore one of a scarlet colour, to signify the bloody battles described in that poem. Upon their heads they bore a crown of gold; and held in their hands a wand made of the laurel-tree, which was supposed to have the virtue of heightening poetic raptures; being, we may presume, found to have, like the laurel with us, though a different kind of tree, somewhat of an intoxicating quality. See Eustathius on Homer's *Iliad*, b. i. and the scholiast on Hesiod's *Theogony*, v. 30. This little piece of information, we imagine, will not be disagreeable to our readers: although in this passage, we must own, the common dress of the rhapsodists, when off the stage, seems rather to be intended; and the finery of Io, at that very time of his meeting with Socrates, resembling probably that of our itinerant quack-doctors, to be here ridiculed.—S.

² This whole speech of Socrates is ironical. For Xenophon, in whose writings Socrates is a graver character, with a less mixture of humour than in those of Plato, introduceth his great master expressly declaring, that no sort of people in the world were sillier, *πληθύτεροι*, than the rhapsodists: and Maximus Tyrius calls them a race of men utterly void of understanding, *τῶ των ἐκφυδῶν γενοῦ το ἀνοητότατον*. Diff. xxiii. We are to observe however, that notwithstanding this, and our comparison of their manners and way of life with those of mountebanks and strolling players, yet they held a much higher rank in common estimation, equal to that of the most judicious actors in the theatres of our metropolis, or the most ingenious professors of any of the polite arts: were fit company for persons even of the first rank, and guests not unbecoming their tables. We are not therefore to be surprised at seeing Socrates so highly compliment Io, and treat him with so much outward respect, as he does through the whole *Dialogus*.—S.

who differs upon Homer so well as myself: nay, that none of those ¹celebrated persons, ²Metrodorus of Lampfacus, ³Stefimbrotus the Thasian, Glauco ⁴, nor any other, whether antient or modern, was ever able to show in the verses of that poet so many and so fine ⁵sentiments as I can do.

Soc.

¹ The persons here mentioned were not rhapsodists, but critics, or as they were afterwards called grammarians; to whose profession antiently belonged the interpreting or explaining of their elder poets. See Dion. Chryf. Orat. liii. p. 553.—S.

² We are told by Diog. Laertius, in his life of Anaxagoras, that this Metrodorus was the first who applied himself to compose a work expressly concerning the philosophy of Homer; meaning without doubt, as appears from Tatian, *Λογ. προς Έλληνας*, that he explained Homer's theology from the various operations and phænomena of nature: and further, that he was intimate with Anaxagoras, and improved the moral explications of Homer, which had been given by that philosopher. If all this be true, Metrodorus must have been a great philosopher himself. For to have done this to the satisfaction of such a man as Anaxagoras, the master of Socrates, required certainly no mean degree of knowledge in the nature of man and of the universe. What is more probable is, that Metrodorus having been instructed by Anaxagoras in this knowledge, applied it to the giving a rational account of Homer's mythology, which was understood and received in a literal sense by the vulgar. The book which he composed on this subject, as we learn from Tatian, was entitled *περι Όμηρου*, "Concerning Homer."—S.

³ Stefimbrotus is mentioned with honour by Socrates himself in Xenophon's Symposium, as a master in explaining Homer: and his abilities of this kind are there set in contrast with the ignorance of the rhapsodists. As to the time when he lived, we learn from Plutarch, in his Life of Cimon, that he was exactly of the same age with that general. The work, for which he seems here to be celebrated, was entitled *περι της ποιησεως Όμηρου*, "Concerning the poetry of Homer," as appears, we think, from Tatian, § 48.—S.

⁴ We cannot find this Glauco mentioned by any of the antients, unless he be the same person cited as a grammarian, under the name of Glauco of Tarsus, by an old Greek scholiast upon Homer in the Medicean library, never published. See the passage to which we refer, in Luc. Holsten. de Vita et Scriptis Porphyrii, c. vii. But he appears, we think, from the specimen of his criticisms there given, to have been a grammarian of a much later age: we are inclined, therefore, to suspect a misnomer in this place, and instead of *Γλαυκων* would choose to read *Γλαυκος*, if any manuscript favoured us; believing that the person here mentioned is Glaucus of Rhegium, who flourished about this time, and wrote a treatise *περι ποιητων*, as we are informed by Plutarch, t. ii. ed. Par. p. 833. C. or as the title of it is elsewhere by the same author given us more at large, *περι των αρχαιων ποιητων τε και μουσικων*, t. ii. 1132. E. See Jonsius de Scriptor. Hist. Philof. l. ii. c. 4. § 4. But certainly much mistaken is J. Alb. Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. l. ii. c. 23. n. 37. in supposing the Glauco, here mentioned, to have been a rhapsodist. That very learned and worthy man was used to read too hastily; and did not therefore duly observe amongst what company Glauco is here introduced.—S.

⁵ We learn from Plato, in this Dialogue, that the rhapsodists not only recited the poems of Homer, but professed to intrepert hem too. For the multitude every where, having heard that profound secrets

Soc. I am glad, Io, to hear you say so: for I am persuaded you will not be so ill-natured as to refuse the exhibiting before me your abilities in this way.

Io. My illustrations of Homer are indeed, Socrates, well worth your attention. For they are such as, I think, entitle me to receive from the admirers¹ of that poet the ²crown of gold.

Soc. I shall find an opportunity of hearing you descant on this subject some other time. For the present, I desire only to be informed of this; whether you are so great a master in explaining Homer alone, or whether you shine no less in illustrating ³Hesiod and Archilochus.

Io.

secrets of wisdom lay concealed there, thought there was no reason why they should not be made as wise as their betters; and were eager to have those hidden mysteries opened and revealed to them. The philosophers, and those who had studied under them, knew the bulk of the people to be incapable of apprehending those things rightly; or of receiving any real benefit from such revelation; which they considered consequently as a profanation of the truth. The Athenians, therefore, being in a state of democracy, encouraged the rhapsodists to undertake the unfolding to them that secret wisdom, reported to be wrapped up in the fables and allegories of Homer. The rhapsodists accordingly indulged their curiosity; collecting, as well as they were able, every meaning which had been attributed to that poet by grammarians, critics, or philosophers. Thus the people became perplexed with a multiplicity of different opinions, infused into them by men who had never studied the nature of things. See also Mr. Pope's first or introductory note on Homer's Iliad.—S.

¹ Ὑπὸ Ὀρχηδόνων. This word in its original sense signified only those who were supposed to be descended from Homer, or from some of his kindred, and were the fathers or founders of that rhapsodical way of life before described. The title was afterwards extended to all their successors in that profession. See the scholiast on Pindar's second Nemæan Ode; and Athenæus, p. 620. H. Stephens seems to think these rhapsodists of Homer to be the persons chiefly intended in this passage. If so, it ought to be translated, or rather paraphrased, thus; "For all the interpreters of that poet ought, I think, to yield me the preference and the prize, consenting to crown me with the golden crown." But believing the word capable of being extended to that larger meaning given it by the old translators, we have ventured to follow them in it, as being a more rational one; the other sense making the arrogance of Io too extravagant and absurd.—S.

² This means not the crown, before mentioned, to have been worn by the rhapsodists at the time of their rehearsal: for so his boast would amount to no more than the pronouncing himself worthy of his profession; a speech too little arrogant for the character of Io: but it means the prize, bestowed on the most excellent performer on this occasion. For that this was a crown of gold, may be seen in Meursius's Panathenæa, c. xxv.—S.

³ These two poets are singled out from the rest of the poetic tribe, because their poetry, next to that of Homer, was the most frequently recited by the rhapsodists. This is fairly deducible from the words of Chamælion, cited by Athenæus. Not only, says he, were the poems of Homer

Io. By no means: for I own my powers confined to the illustrating Homer. To execute this well, is merit enough, I think, for one man.

Soc. But in the writings of Homer and of Hesiod are there no passages in which their sentiments and thoughts agree?

Io. There are, I believe, many passages of that kind.

Soc. In these cases now, are you better able to explain the words of Homer, than those of Hesiod?

Io. Equally well to be sure, Socrates, I can explain the words of both, where they agree.

Soc. But how is it with you, where, in writing on the same subject, they differ? For instance, Homer and Hesiod both write of things that relate to divination.

Io. True.

Soc. Well now; the passages in either of these poets, relating to divination; not only where he agrees with the other, but where he differs from him: who, think you, is capable of interpreting with most skill and judgment, yourself, or some able diviner?

Io. An able diviner, I must own.

Soc. But suppose you were a diviner, and were able to interpret rightly the similar places in both; would your abilities, do you imagine, fail you, when you came to interpret the places in either of them, where he differed from the other?

Io. I should certainly in that case have equal skill to explain both of them.

Soc. How comes it to pass then, that you interpret Homer in so masterly

ing by the rhapsodists, but those of Hesiod too, and of Archilochus; and further, (that is, sometimes,) the verses of Minnervus, and of Phocylides. *Ου μόνον τα Όμηρου, αλλά και τα Ήσιου και Αρχιλοχου. επι δ., Μινερμου και Φωκυλιδου.* Deipnosoph. I. xv. p. 620. The first of these two, Hesiod, is well known; and as he comes nearest to Homer in point of time, of all the poets, any of whose works are yet remaining entire; so is he confessedly the next to him in point of merit, among those who wrote in heroic measure. Archilochus was the first who composed poems of the Iambic kind, in which he is said to have been superior to all, who came after him. (See Athenæus's introduction to his Deipnosoph.) Upon which account Patereulus joins him with Homer; mentioning these two poets, as the only instances of such as advanced those arts, which they invented themselves, to the utmost pitch of perfection. Dion Chrysostom goes beyond this in the praises of Archilochus, putting him in the same rank with Homer, as a Poet; *δυσ γαρ ποιητων γε γοντων εξ απαντος του αιωνος, ος ουδενα των αλλων ζυμβαλειν αξιον, Όμηρου τε και Αρχιλοχου,* x. τ. λ. Dion Orat. xxiii. p. 397. "In all the course of time there have been but two poets, with whom no other is worthy of comparison, Homer and Archilochus."—S.

a manner,

a manner, yet not Hesiod, or any other of the poets? Are the subjects of Homer's writings any thing different from the subjects of other poems, taken all together? Are they not, in the first place, war and military affairs; then, the speeches and mutual discourse of all sorts of men, the good as well as the bad, whether they be private persons or public; the converse also of the gods one with another, and their intercourse with men; the celestial bodies, with the various phænomena of the sky and air; the state of souls departed, with the affairs of that lower world; the generation of the gods, with the descent and race of the heroes? Are not these the ¹ subjects of Homer's poetry?

Io. They are, Socrates, these very things.

Soc. Well; and do not the rest of the Poets write of these very things?

Io. They do, Socrates: but their poetry upon these subjects is nothing like the poetry of Homer.

Soc. What then, is it worse?

Io. Much worse.

Soc. The poetry of Homer, you say then, is better and more excellent than that of other poets.

Io. Better indeed it is, and much more excellent, by Jupiter.

Soc. Suppose now, my friend Io, out of several persons, all in their turns haranguing before an audience upon the nature of numbers, some one made a better speech than the rest; might not one of the auditors be capable of finding out that better speaker, and of giving him the preference due to him?

Io. There might be such a one.

Soc. Would not the same auditor, think you, be a judge of what was said by the worse speakers? or must he be a different person, who was a proper judge of these?

Io. The same person, certainly.

Soc. And would not a good arithmetician be such a person, thus equally able in both respects?

¹ As, in describing the shield of Achilles, Homer has presented us with a view of human life, and of the whole universe, in epitome; so Plato here finely sums up, in the concise manner possible, those very things, as the subjects of the Iliad and the Odyssey; giving us to behold in them a picture of all human affairs, whether in peace or war; of all nature, whether visible or invisible; of the divine causes of things; of the heroic virtues among men, and the greatness of families in antient days from thence arising. S.

Io. Without doubt.

Soc. To put another case to you : suppose among many persons, severally dissenting upon food, what sorts of it were wholesome, there should be one who spoke better than the rest ; would it belong, say you, to one of the hearers to distinguish accurately the better speaker, while it was necessary to look amongst the rest of the audience for a fit judge of the meaner speakers ? or would the speeches of them all be examined judiciously, and their different merits and demerits be estimated justly by the same person ?

Io. By the same person, beyond all doubt.

Soc. Of what character must this person be, who is thus qualified ? What do you call him ?

Io. A physician.

Soc. And do not you agree with me, that this holds true universally ; and that in every case, where several men made discourses upon the same subject, the nature both of the good and of the bad discourses would be discerned by the same person ? For if a man was no proper judge of the defects in the meaner performance, is it not evident that he would be incapable of comprehending the beauties of the more excellent ?

Io. You are in the right.

Soc. It belongs to the same person, therefore, to criticize with true judgment upon all of them.

Io. No doubt.

Soc. Did not you say that Homer, and the rest of the poets, for instance, Hesiod and Archilochus, write concerning the same things, though not in the same manner ? the compositions of the one being excellent, you say, while those of the others are comparatively mean.

Io. I said nothing more than what is true.

Soc. If then you can distinguish and know the compositions which excel, must not you necessarily know those which fall short of that excellence ?

Io. I own it appears probable, from your argument.

Soc. It follows therefore, my good friend, that in affirming Io to be equally capable of explaining Homer and every other poet, we should not miss the truth : since he acknowledges one and the same person to be an able judge of all such as write concerning the same things ; admitting at the same time the subjects of almost all poetical writings to be the same.

Io. What can possibly be then the reason, Socrates, that whenever I am
present

present at an harangue upon any other poet, I pay not the least regard to it ; nor am able to contribute to the entertainment, or to advance any thing upon the subject in my turn, worth the regard of others ; but grow downright dull, and fall asleep : yet that as soon as any mention is made of Homer, immediately I am roused, am all attention, and with great facility find enough to say upon this subject ?

Soc. It is not in the least difficult, my friend to guess the reason., For to every man it must be evident, that you are not capable of explaining Homer on the ¹ principles of art, or from real science. For if your ability was of this kind, depending upon your knowledge of any art, you would be as well able to explain every other poet : since the whole, of what they all write, is poetry ; is it not ?

Io. It is.

Soc. Well now ; when a man comprehends any other art, the whole of it, is not his way of considering and criticising all the ² professors of that art, one and the same ? and does not his judgment in every case depend on the same principles ? Would you have me explain myself upon this point, Io ? do you desire to know the meaning of my question ?

Io. By all means, Socrates. For I take great pleasure in hearing you wise men talk.

Soc. I should be glad, Io, could that appellation be justly applied to me ; but you are the wise men, you rhapsodists and the ³ players, together with the poets, whose verses you recite to us. For my part, I speak nothing but the
simple

¹ The Italian translator has strangely omitted this latter part of the sentence, though very material to the sense.

² In the Greek we read “ *περι ἅπασων τῶν τεχνῶν.*” But if Socrates does indeed, as he undertakes to do, explain the meaning of this sentence in what follows, his own explanation requires us to read “ *περι ἅπαντων τῶν τεχνῶν,*” or rather *τεχνικῶν*, this being the word always used by Plato to signify *artists*. The argument however would bear the reading with less alteration, “ *περι ἅπασων τῶν τεχνιστῶν,*” that is, all the performances in that art. Either way we are thus freed from the necessity, which Ficinus was under, from his retaining the common reading, to insert many words of his own, in order to preserve the justness of the reasoning, and make this passage agreeable to the sequel — S.

³ Plato in other places beside this, as hereafter in this Dialogue, in the 3d book of the Republic, and in the 2d book of the Laws, joins together the arts of rhapsody and of acting plays, as being

simple truth, as it becomes a mere private man to do. For the question, which I just now asked you, see how mean a matter it concerns, how common, and within the compass of every man's reach to know, that which I called ¹ one and the same way of criticising, when a man comprehends the whole of any art. To give an ² instance of such comprehensive skill; painting is an art, to be comprehended as one kind of skill, whole and entire; is it not?

Io. It is.

Soc. Is there not a difference, in degree of merit, between the several professors of that art, whether you consider the ancients or the moderns?

Io. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Now then, do you know any man who is an able critic in the

arts of near affinity. That affinity between them was greater than one would be apt to imagine, and appears in a strong light from what Eustathius says of the rhapsodists, that "frequently they used to act in a manner somewhat dramatic." Hence in the feast of Bacchus, principally celebrated with dramatic entertainments, the rhapsodists had antiently a share: and one of the festival days was called *εορτη των ραψωδων*. See Athenæus, l. v. p. 275. Hesychius therefore with great propriety explains the word *ραψωδοι* rhapsodists, by this description *υποκριται επων*, actors of epic poems.—S.

¹ Socrates here, in the way of irony, after his usual manner, insinuates some very important doctrines of his philosophy, leading us up even to the highest. For, observing that all the arts depend on certain uniform and stable principles, he would have us infer, in the first place, that every art, properly so called, or as it is distinguished from science on the one hand, on the other from mere habit and experience, is built on science; and that no person can be justly called an artist, or a master of the art which he professes, unless he has learnt the epistemonical or scientific principles of it: in the next place, that science is a thing stable, uniform, and general; guiding the judgment with unerring certainty, to know the rectitude and the pravity of every particular, cognisable from the rules of any art depending thus on science: further, that every science hath certain principles, peculiar to it, uniform and identical: and lastly, that all the sciences are branches of science general, arising from one root, which in like manner is uniform, and always the same.—S.

² *Λαβωμεν τω λογω*. Serranus very absurdly translates it thus, "*adhibita ratione comprehendere*." Ficinus imperfectly thus, "*exempli causa*," followed by the Italian, "*come per esempio*." So also Cornarius, "*veri bi causa*." True it is, that *λαβε* τω λογω, frequently signifies *take an instance*. But in this place, *λαβωμεν* refers to the word *λαβη*, *comprehend*, in the preceding sentence; and *λογω* is opposed to an actual comprehending of any art. Thus, to omit many passages in Plato's Republic; in the third book of his Laws, *λογω κατασκευειν την πολιν* is opposed to the actual founding of a city: and again in his Theætetus, *εα μη στήσωμεν αυτους τω λογω* is in opposition to an actual settling, or fixing. Euripides with the same meaning opposes *λογω* to *εργω* in this verse of his Cyclops, *Γενται εν, ω, αι μη λογω παινης μονον*.—S.

works

works of ¹ Polygnotus, the son of Aglaophon; and can show, with great judgment, which of his pieces he executed well, and which with less success; yet in the works of other painters hath no critical skill; and whenever their performances are brought upon the carpet to be examined and criticised, grows dull and falls asleep, or is unable to contribute his quota to the conversation: but as soon as occasion calls him to declare his judgment about Polygnotus, or any other particular painter whatever, immediately is roused, all attention, and finds enough to say upon this subject? Know you any such man?

Io. Really I do not.

Soc. Well now; in the statuary's art how is it? Did you ever see any man, who upon the works of ² Dædalus, the son of Metion, or Epeius, son to Panopeus, or Theodorus the Samian, or any other single statuary, was able to display great judgment in showing the excellent performances of so great a master; yet with regard to the works of other statuaries, was at a loss, grew dull, and fell asleep, because he had nothing to say?

Io. I confess I never saw such a man neither.

Soc. Nor is it otherwise, I imagine, with regard to ³ music, whether
we

¹ This excellent artist was, in the days of Socrates, the Homer of the painters; and is here for this reason singled out from the rest of his profession, as the most proper for the comparison; which was intended to show, that the same circumstance attended both the arts, of poetry and painting; this, that true critical skill, to judge of the performances of the best artist, inferred equal judgment with regard to all of inferior class. Polygnotus was the first painter, who gave an accurate and lively expression of the manners and passions, by proper attitudes, and every variety of countenance. He distinguished himself also by giving his portraits what we call a handsome likeness: and, besides many other improvements which he made to his art, invented the way of showing the skin through a transparent drapery. See Aristotle's *Politics*, b. viii. c. 5. and his *Poetics*, c. 2. and 6. Pliny's *Nat. Hist.* b. xxxv. c. 9. and *Ælian's Var. Hist.* b. iv. c. 3.—S.

² Plato here has purposely chosen for his instances three statuaries, famous for their excellence in three very different ways, to make his reasoning more just and less liable to exception; when he is proving, by induction, the sameness of the art of criticising upon all the poets, however different in their kinds. Dædalus then was particularly admirable for his wonderful automations, or self-moving machines, mentioned by Plato in his *Meno*. Epeius is well known to the readers of Homer's *Odyssey*, and Virgil's *Æneid*, for that vast work of his, the Trojan horse, of a size so stupendous. And the excellence of Theodorus consisted in the extreme minuteness and subtilty of his works. See Pliny's *Nat. Hist.* b. xxxiv. c. 8.—S.

³ In this word the ancients comprehended all those arts, which have any relation to the muses.

Every

we consider ¹ wind-instruments, or those of the string-kind; and these last, whether alone, or ² accompanied by the voice; so likewise in rhapsodical recitals; you never, I presume, saw a man, who was a great master

Every species of poetry, known at that time, is included in what follows. For *Αυλησις* includes dithyrambic poetry and satire. *Κιθαρσις*, joined with *αυλησις*, implies comedy and tragedy; because in these the *αυλος* and the *κιθαρα* were the instruments principally used: thus Maximus Tyrius; *αυληματα, η κιθαρσματα, η ει τις αλλη εν Διονυσου μουσα τραγικη τις και κομωδικη*. Dissert. vii. *Κιθαρωδια* means all Lyric poetry, or that, which the musician sung to his own instrument, the *κιθαρα*, or the *λυρα*. And *Ραψωδια* comprehends all poems, usually recited, whether composed in heroic, elegiac, or other measure. We see here then, in what arts were those *αγωνες*, or trials of skill, before mentioned, proposed at the feasts of Æsculapius. True it is, that Plato, in different parts of his writings, useth the word music in different senses. In some places he means by it not only all harmony, whether instrumental or vocal, but all rhythm, whether in sound or in motion: The following remarkable instance of this occurs in his First Alcibiades: *ΣΩΚ. Ειπε πρωτον, τις η τεχνη, ης το κιθαριζειν, και το αδειν, και το εμβαίνειν ορθως, συναπασα τις καλειται; ουπω δυνασαι ειπειν; ΑΛΚ. Ου δητα. ΣΩΚ. Αλλ' ουδε πειρω. τινες αι θεαι, ων η τεχνη; ΑΛΚ. Τας Μουσας, ω Σωκρατες, λεγεις; ΣΩΚ. Εγωγε. ορα δη' τινα απ' αυτων επωνυμιαν η τεχνη εχει; ΑΛΚ. Μουσικην μοι δοκεις λεγειν. ΣΩΚ. Λεγω γαρ.* In other places, he confines it to melody alone. Thus, for instance, in his Gorgias, music is defined to be an art conversant *περι την των μελων ποιησιν*. Sometimes he enlarges it, so as to take in profane eloquence; and sometimes so widely, as to comprehend all the liberal arts. There are passages where it is made to signify virtue; and a few, in which it is applied to the sublimer parts of philosophy. These last metaphorical uses of the word are sufficiently accounted for by Plato himself on proper occasions: the rest we shall take notice of, and vindicate, in their due places. But in the sentence now before us, that enumeration of the species of music fixes the meaning of the word, and limits it to the common acceptation. That *Μουσικη* has the same meaning in the beginning of this Dialogue, where we have translated it, "the Muse's art," is plain from the nature of the subject in that place. For every thing else, comprehended in the larger senses of the word, would there be foreign to the purpose; as being, if we except medicine, nothing to Æsculapius.—S.

¹ The Greek is *ουδε εν αυλησει γε, ουδε εν κιθαρισει*. *Αυλος* is known to be a general term for all wind-instruments. *Επιπνευσμενα οργανα, το μιν συμπαν. αυλοι και συριγγες*, says Jul. Pollux, Onomastic. l. iv. c. 9. And because the *Κιθαρα* stood at the head of all stringed instruments, it is sometimes taken for them all. Accordingly Maximus Tyrius expresses all instrumental music by these two kinds, *αυληματα και κιθαρισματα*. Dissert. xxxii. See likewise Aristotle's Poetics, ch. i. and Plato's Lesser Hippias, p. 375. ed. Steph. But these two being wholly distinct, the one from the other, we are not to imagine that ever they were either confounded together, and used promiscuously, the one for the other; or that both of them were sometimes signified by the word *αυλος*, as a common term for all instruments of either kind. We make this observation, to prevent the young scholar from being misled by Hesychius, who explains the word *Αυλος* thus, *κιθαρα η συριγξ*: for which egregious mistake his late learned editor has but lamely apologized.—S.

in critising on ³ Olympus, or on Thamyris, or on Orpheus, or on Phemius the rhapsodist of Ithaca ; but as to Io the Ephesian, was at a loss what to say about him, and unable to give any account of Io's good or bad performances.

Io. I have nothing to oppose to what you say upon this point, Socrates : but of this I am conscious to myself, that upon Homer I dissent the best of all men, and do it with great ease. Nor is this my own opinion only ; for all people agree, that my dissertations of this kind are excellent. But if the subject be any other of the poets, it is quite otherwise with me. Consider then what may be the meaning of this.

Soc. I do consider, Io ; and proceed to show you how it appears to me. That you are able to discourse well concerning Homer is not owing to any art of which you are master ; nor do you explain or illustrate him, as I said before, upon the principles or from the rules of art ; but from a divine power, acting upon you, and impelling you : a power resembling that which acts in the stone, called by Euripides the magnet, but known commonly by the name of ⁴ the loadstone. For this stone does not only attract iron rings, but

² The Greek here is *κithαρῖδα* : which word Eustathius, in his commentary on the Iliad, b. ii. v. 600. by a strange blunder, confounds with *κithαρισίς*, and makes them both to have the same meaning.—S.

³ These four persons severally excelled in the four arts just before mentioned, each of them in one, according to the order in which they are there ranked. For we learn from Plutarch *περὶ μουσικῆς*, and from Maximus Tyrius, Diff. xxiv. that Olympus's instrument was the *Αυλός*. How excellent a master he was of music we are told by Plato in his *Minos*, and by Aristotle in his *Politics*, b. viii. c. 5. who both agree, that the musical airs of his composing were most divine, and excited enthusiastic raptures in every audience. Thamyris is celebrated by Homer himself, who calls him *κithαριστός*, Iliad. l. ii. v. 600. Agreeably to which we are informed by Pliny, that Thamyris was the first who played on the cithara, without accompanying it with his voice. Hist. Nat. l. vii. c. 56. The fame of Orpheus is well known : and among many passages in the writings of the ancients, to prove that he was *κithαρῖδης*, or sung and played on his instrument together, this of Ovid is most express, "*Talia dicentem, nervosque ad verba moventem.*" Metamorph. l. x. v. 40—and this other in l. xi. v. 4. "*Orpbea percussis jocientem carmina nervis.*" And as to Phemius, that he recited (or sung in recitativo) poems of the epic kind, touching his lyre at the same time, appears from Homer's *Odyssey*, b. i. v. 153, &c. and b. xvii. v. 262.—S.

⁴ The Greek word here is *ἡρακλεία*, which Bembo translates *di Hercule*. But we are taught by Hesychius, that this name was given to the loadstone from the city Heraclea in Lydia, where probably they were found in greater number than elsewhere. Accordingly, the same stone was also called *λίθος Λυδῖκος*, the *Lydian stone*. The same Hesychius, however, says, that Plato is mistaken

But impart to those rings the power of doing that very thing which itself does, enabling them to attract other rings of iron: So that sometimes may be seen a very long series of iron rings; depending, as in a chain, one from another. But from that stone, at the head of them, is derived the virtue which operates in them all. In the same manner, the Muse, inspiring, moves men herself through her divine impulse. From these men, thus inspired, others¹, catching the sacred power, form a chain of divine enthusiasts. For the best epic poets, and all such as excel in the composing any kind of verses to be recited, frame not those their admirable poems from the rules

in supposing the magnet to be the same with this stone, referring, undoubtedly, to the passage now before us. But it is Hefychius who is mistaken, not Plato. For that the *μαγνῆτις* of the ancients was the same with our magnet, appears from these words of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, an earlier writer than Hefychius, *μαγνῆτις ἔλκει μὲν τὸν σίδηρον*. Com. in Aristot. Problem. fol. 1. and from these of Cicero long before, *Magnetem lapidem—qui ferrum ad se allicit et attrahat*. Cic. de Divinat. lib. i. Yet Hefychius is so fond of his mistake, as to repeat it in three different places; admitting the *ἡρακλεία* to attract iron, but denying that quality to the *μαγνῆτις*. See Hefych. in vocibus, *ἡρακλεία, λίθος Λυδικός, and μαγνῆτις*. *Λίθος Λυδικός* indeed frequently among the ancients signified the touchstone: but so did sometimes *μαγνῆτις*. Witness the following passage of Euripides himself, *τὰς βροτῶν ἰνῶμας σκοπῶν, [οἶδ'] ὥστε μαγνῆτις λίθος*. See also Theophrastus *περὶ λίθων*. The truth seems to be, that the names of these two stones, the touchstone and the loadstone, were not well distinguished, but vulgarly confounded, in the days of Plato. This accounts for that uncertainty and doubtfulness with which Plato here mentions the name of this stone; which in any other light would appear unnecessary and insipid. This, perhaps, also was the reason why no particular name of that stone was mentioned by Aristotle, speaking of it in this passage, *εἰκε δὲ καὶ Θάλης, εἰ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι, κινήτικον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαμβάνειν, εἴτερ τὸν λίθον εἴη ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ*. Aristot. de Animâ, lib. i. cap. 2.

¹ The contagion of this kind of enthusiasm is thus beautifully painted by a fine critic, who himself felt all the force of it: Πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίῳ θεοφοροῦνται πνεύματι, τὸν αὐτὸν τροπὸν, ὃν καὶ τὴν Ύδριαν λόγος ἔχει, τρεῖσιν πηκισάουσαν, εἶτα ῥήγμα ἐστὶ γῆς ἀναπνεῖν, ὡς φασιν, αἶμον ἐνδεῶν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐγκύματα τῆς δαιμονίου καθίσταμένην δύναμει, παρὰ τὰ κτλ. κατ' ἐπιπνοίαν οὕτως ἀπο τῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων μεγαλοφίας, εἰς τὰς τῶν ζήλουτων ἐκείνους ψυχὰς, ὡς ἀπὸ ἱερῶν στήσεων, ἀπορροιαὶ τινεὶ φερόνται, ὅφ' ὧν ἐπιπνέμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰν Φοῖβεσστικοὶ τῶ ἑτέρων συνέθεσσις μεγαλεῖ. “Many are possessed and actuated by a divine spirit, derived to them through others: in the same manner as it is reported of the Delphian priests, that when she approaches the sacred tripod, where a chasm in the earth, they say, respires some vapour, which fills her with enthusiasm, she is immediately by that more than human power made pregnant; and is there upon the spot delivered of oracles, such as the particular nature of the inspiration generates. So, from the great genius residing in the ancients, through them, as through some sacred opening, certain effluxes, issuing forth, pass into the souls of their admirers: by which many, who of themselves but little feel the force of Phœbus, swell with the expansive virtue of those great and exalted spirits.” Longin. de Sublim. § 11.—S.

of

of ¹ art; but possessed by the Muse, they write from divine inspiration. Nor is it otherwise with the best lyric poets, and all other fine writers of verses: to be sung. For as the priests of ² Cybele perform not their dances, while they have the free use of their intellect; so these melody poets pen those beautiful songs of theirs only when they are out of their sober minds. But as soon as they proceed to give voice and motion to those songs, adding to their words the harmony of music and the measure of dance, they are immediately transported; and, possessed by some divine power, are like the priestesses of ³ Bacchus, who, full of the god, no longer draw water, but honey

¹ In the Greek it is *οὐκ ἐν τέχνῃς*. Bembo's translation of which, *non con arte*, excludes art from having any share in the best poetical compositions. But Plato's words admit of art, as an attendant upon the Muse; though they make not her art, but her inspiration, to be the mistress and leading cause of all which is excellent in poetry. Serranus happily paraphrases it, *non artis auspiciis*. The following passage in the Phædrus puts the meaning of Plato, with regard to this point, out of dispute. 'Ὅς δ' ἀν ἀνεν μανίας Μοῦσων ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θυρὰς ἀφικηται, πειθεὶς ὡς ἀρα ἐν τέχνῃς ἱκανῶς ποιητὴς ἐσομένος, ἀτελεὶς αὐτὸς τε, καὶ ἡ ποιησις ὑπο τῆς τῶν μαινόμενων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονούντος ἡφαισθή. "Whoever went, with a mind sober and uninspired, to the gates of the Muses; and made his application to them, in order to be taught their art; persuaded, that the learning that was alone sufficient to qualify him for writing poetry; never attained to any perfection as a poet; and his poetry, as being that of a man cool and sober, is now obliterated all, having been darkened by the splendour of that of the inspired."—S.

² The rites of Cybele and of Bacchus, beyond those of any other deities, were performed in a spirit of enthusiasm: which exerted itself in extraordinary agitations of body. Accordingly, these two religious rites are sung of together, as equally enthusiastical, by the chorus between the first and second acts in the Bacchæ of Euripides.—S.

³ The following account of enthusiasm, and the causes of divine mania, extracted from the third section of Jamblichus de Myst., as it admirably illustrates this part of the Io, will, I doubt not, be gratefully received by every Platonic reader:

Enthusiasm is falsely believed to be an agitation of the dianoëtic part in conjunction with dæmoniacal inspiration; for the inspiration is from the gods. But neither is it simply an ecstasy, but a reduction and restitution of the soul to a more excellent nature; since inordinate motion and ecstasy indicate a regression to that which is worse. Further still, the advocate for ecstasy adduces that which happens to those that energize enthusiastically, but does not teach us the leading cause, which is this, that the inspired are wholly possessed by a divine power; which possession is afterwards followed by ecstasy. No one, therefore, can justly apprehend, that enthusiasm depends on the soul, or any one of its powers, or on intellect, or energies, or corporeal infirmity, or that it cannot be produced without this. For the work of divine afflation is not human, nor does it derive all its authority from human parts and energies; but these have the relation of subjects, and divinity uses them as instruments. Hence he accomplishes the whole business of prophecy

† honey and milk out of the springs and fountains ; though unable to do any thing like it when they are sober. And in fact there passes in the souls of these poets that very thing which they pretend to do. For they assure us, that out of certain gardens and flowery vales belonging to the Muses, from fountains

through himself, unmingled with and liberated from other things, and neither the soul nor body moving, energizes by himself. Hence too, prophecies, when they are conducted in this manner, are unattended with falsehood. But when the soul has been previously disturbed, or is moved during the inspiration, or is confounded by the body, and disturbs the divine harmony, then the prophecies become confused and fallacious, and the enthusiasm is no longer true or genuine.

With respect to the causes of divine mania, they are as follow : Illuminations proceeding from the gods ; spirits imparted by them ; and an all-perfect dominion from them, which comprehends all that we possess, and entirely exterminates our proper obsequency and motion. It also produces words which are not understood by those that utter them, but are delivered, as it is said, with an insane mouth ; the possessed being wholly subservient and obedient to the energy alone of the inspiring deity : such, in short, is enthusiasm, and from such like causes does it derive its perfection.

Again, with respect to its proper causes, it must not be said, that it arises from this, that nature leads every thing to its like : for the enthusiastic energy is not the work of nature. Nor is it produced because the temperature of the air, and of that which surrounds us, causes a difference of crasis in the body of the enthusiastic. For the works of the gods are not changed by corporeal powers or temperaments. Nor is it that the inspiration of the gods accords with passions and generated natures. For the gift to men of the proper energy of the gods is more excellent than all generation. But because the power of the Corybantes is of a guardian nature, and adapted to sacred mysteries, and because that of Sabazius pertains to the purification of souls, and a dissolution of antient anger, on this account the inspirations of these divinities are in every respect different.

In short, the spirits which from the divinities excite and agitate men with divine fury, expel all human and physical motion, nor are their operations to be compared with our accustomed energies ; but it is requisite to refer them to the gods, as their primary causes.

Thus we see that Jamblichus very properly suspends enthusiasm and divination from the divinities, and ascribes all the varieties of these to the different characteristic properties of the gods, as to their proper source.—T.

† This place receives great light from the two following passages in Euripides :

Ὅσαις δὲ λευκοῦ πνεύματος ποθεῖς παρῆν,
 Ἀκροῖσι δακτυλοῖσι διαμῶσαι χθονά,
 Γαλακτὸς εἰς ἡμῶς εἰχόν' ἐκ δὲ κισσίνων
 Θυρῶν γλυκεῖαι μέλιτος ἑσταζόν ῥοαί. Bacch. v. 707.

Ῥεῖ δὲ γαλακτὶ πιδόν,
 Ῥεῖ δ' οἶνω, ῤεῖ δὲ μέλισσαν
 Νεκταρί. Bacch. v. 142.

The

fountains flowing there with honey, gathering the ¹ sweetness of their songs, they bring it to us, like the bees; and in the same manner withal, flying. Nor do they tell us any untruth. For a poet is a thing light and volatile, and ² sacred; nor is he able to write poetry, till the Muse entering into him, he is transported out of himself, and has no longer the command of his intellect. But so long as a man continues in the possession of intellect, he is

The first of these is in one of the dialogue scenes of the tragedy, and part of a narration; in English thus,

Some, longing for the milder milky draught,
Green herbs or bladed grass of the blest ground
Cropp'd with light finger; and to them, behold,
Out gush'd the milky liquid: trickling down
To others, from their ivy-twined wands
Dropp'd the sweet honey.—

The other is sung in chorus by the Bacchæ themselves; which we have therefore thus paraphrased,

Streams of milk along the plain
Gently flow in many a vein:
Flows sweet nectar, such as bee
Sips from flow'r and flow'ring tree:
Flow the richer purple rills;
Bacchus' self their current fills.

From hence are to be explained the fabulous relations in Anton. Liberal. Met. lib. x. and Ælian. V. H. lib. iii. c. 42. There is likewise a passage, cited by Aristides the orator, from Æschines, one of the disciples of Socrates, so much like this of Plato, that the reader may, perhaps, have pleasure in comparing them together. Αἱ Βακχᾶι, ἐπειδὴν εὐθεοὶ γίνονται, ὅθεν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῶν φρενῶν οὐδὲ ὕδωρ δύνανται ὑδρεύεσθαι, ἐκίμαι μέλι καὶ γάλα ἀρύνονται. Aristid. Orat. vol. iii. p. 34. ed. Canter. "The priestesses of Bacchus, when they are become full of the god, extract honey and milk from those wells, out of which no common person is able so much as to draw water."—S.

¹ The Greek is only τὰ μέλι, and is by the old translators rendered simply *carmina*, and *i versis*. We are in doubt whether the true reading is not τὸ μέλι: for the preceding word is *δρεπομένοι*, and the metaphor the same with this of Horace, *Ego apis matinae more modoque, Grata carpentis thyma*, &c. If this alteration be not admitted, an allusion, however, to the word μέλι is certainly meant, in the similarity of sound, which μέλι bears to it. And there is then a necessity, besides, for inserting the word μέλι immediately afterwards, as Ficinus does in his translation; which is making a still greater change in the text of the original.—S.

² Bees were by the antients held sacred, because fabled to have yielded their honey for a nourishment to the Cretan Jupiter in his infancy; (see Virgil's fourth Georgic, v. 150.) and poets, because supposed to be under the influence of the Muse.—S.

unable

unable to sing either odes or oracles; to write any kind of poetry, or utter any sort of prophecy. Hence it is, that the poets say indeed many fine things, whatever their subject be; just as you do concerning Homer: but each is alone able to accomplish this through a divine destiny, on that subject to which he is impelled by the Muse; this poet in ¹ dithyrambic; that in panegyric; one in chorus songs, another in epic verse, another in iambic. In the other kinds every one of them is mean, and makes no figure: and this, because they write not what is taught them by art, but what is suggested to them by some divine power, on whose influence they depend. For if it was their knowledge of the art which enabled them to write good poems upon one subject, they would be able to write poems equally good upon all other subjects. But for this reason it is, that the god, depriving them of the use of their intellect, employs them as his ministers, his ² oracle fingers, and divine ³ prophets; that when we hear them, we may know, ⁴ it is not these men who deliver things so excellent; these, to whom intellect ⁵ is not present; but the god himself speaking, and through these men publishing

¹ The usual accuracy of Plato appears strongly in this passage. For the five species of poetry, here enumerated, were the most of any full of enthusiasm, of the *vis poetica*, and the *os magnafonans*; and appear ranked in their proper degrees of excellence in those respects; beginning with that, which was deemed, and indeed by its effects proved, to be the most highly rapturous.—S.

² Near the seat of the oracle were certain poets employed, as the oracular response was delivered, to put it into metre. And because, in order to execute their office well, they ought to enter into the sense and spirit of those responses, they were piously presumed to be themselves inspired by the oracle.—S.

³ Plato in other places calleth the poets by this name; particularly in the second book of his Republic, where his words are, *οι θεων παιδες ποινται, και προφηται των θεων γενομενοι*, poets, born the children of the gods, and made afterward their prophets. And in the Second Alcibiades he calls Homer, by way of eminence, *θεων προφητης*, the prophet of the gods.—S.

⁴ Thus Tully, who professedly imitated Plato; *Deus inclusus corpore humano jam, non Cassandra, loquitur*. Cic. de Divinat. lib. i.—S.

⁵ The soul, when resigning herself to the inspiring influence of divinity, in consequence of energizing divinely, is no longer governed by intellect; and it may therefore be said, that intellect is then no longer present to her nature. Mr. Sydenham, from not having penetrated the depths of antient theology, has unhappily given, by his translation, an air of ridicule to this passage; and I am sorry to add, that this is not the only instance in which he has done the same, both in this and other dialogues. The original is *οι νους μη παρεστιν*. The translation of Mr. Sydenham, *who are divested of common sense*.—T.

his

his mind to us. The greatest proof of that which I advance, is Tynnichus the Chalcidian; who never composed any other poem, worth the mention or remembrance, beside that ¹ Pæan, which every body sings, of almost all ² odes the most excellent, and as he himself tells us,

³ Wholly a present from the Muse's hands,
Some new invention of their own.

For in him does the god seem to give us a convincing evidence, so as to leave no room for doubt, that those beautiful poems are not human, nor the compositions of men; but divine, and the work of gods: and that poets are only interpreters of the ⁴ gods, inspired and possessed, each of them by that particular deity who corresponds to the peculiar nature of the poet. This, the better to demonstrate to us, did the god purposely choose out a poet of the meanest kind, through whom to sing a melody of the noblest. Do not you think, Io, that I say what is true?

Io. Indeed I do: for I ⁵ feel as it were in my very soul, Socrates, the truth of what you say. To me too such poets, as write finely, appear in their

¹ This was an ode or hymn in honour of Apollo, so called from one of the names or titles of that god: in the same manner, as the word *Dithyrambic* is derived from *Διθύραμκος*, one of the names of Bacchus.—S.

² *Μελων*. In *μελη* are included all poems, made to be sung; as *επη*, in the larger sense of that word, comprehends all those made for recital.—S.

³ The Greek is *ατεχνως εδρηματι μουσαν*. This is a verse in the Alcmanian measure. Whence it appears, that this incomparable ode of Tynnichus, unhappily lost, was of the lyric kind, and in the measure used by Aleman, approaching the nearest of any to the heroic. It is evident, that Plato, in citing this verse, as applicable to his present purpose, alludes to the other sense of the word *ατεχνως*, in which it signifies *inartificially*, or *without art*. It was impossible to preserve this double meaning in our language, unless the word simply may be thought tolerably expressive of it. Cornarius renders it in Latin, *sine arte*: but the rest of the translators, as if it were a word of no force or even meaning at all, have entirely omitted it in their translations. It is probable, however, that they were misled by the false pointing in Aldus's edition, which refers the word *ατεχνως* to the preceding sentence.—S.

⁴ Hence probably was this title given to Orpheus, *sacer, interpretsque deorum*, by Horace, Epist. ad Pison. v. 391.—S.

⁵ The words in the original are very strong and significant, *απη της ψυχης*, *you touch my soul*. Whoever is well versed in Plato's way of writing, and is no stranger to the Socratic way of thinking, will easily imagine, that Plato intends here to hint to us, by what means poetry operates so strongly

their writings to be ¹ interpreters of the gods, in proportion to the kind and degree of those divine powers, allotted severally to each poet.

Soc. Now you rhapsodists interpret in like manner the writings of the poets. Do you not?

Io. So far you still say what is true.

Soc. Do you not then become the interpreters of interpreters?

Io. Very true.

Soc. Mind now, Io, and tell me this; and think not to conceal any part of the truth, in answering to what I am going to ask. At those times, when you perform your rehearsals in the best manner, and strike your audience with uncommon force and efficacy; when you sing, for instance, of Ulysses, hastening to the entrance of his house, appearing in his own proper person to the wooers of his queen, and pouring out his arrows close before him, ready for spreading round him instant death; or represent Achilles rushing upon Hector; or when you rehearse, in a different strain, any of the melancholy mournful circumstances attending Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam; at such times whether have you the free use of your intellect? or are you not rather ² in a state of mental alienation? Does not your soul, in an ecstasy, imagine herself present to those very things and actions which you relate? as if you had been hurried away by some divine power to Ithaca, or Troy, or wherever else be laid the scene of action.

Io. How clear and convincing a proof, Socrates, of your argument is this which you have produced! For, without concealing any thing, I shall own the truth. When I am reciting any thing pitiable or mournful, my eyes

strongly upon the soul; that is, by touching some inward string the most ready to vibrate; awakening those sentiments, and stirring up those passions, to which the soul is most prompt: insinuating at the same time, that by means of the like aptitude and natural correspondence, truth touches the mind. Thus Io, in the present situation of his soul, reminded of his own past feelings, and made sensible to what cause they were owing, exemplifies and illustrates the truth of that doctrine just before laid down by Socrates.—S.

¹ In this sense it is, that the poets are a little before styled the ministers of the gods, as serving them in the conveying their mind and will to mortals. In the same sense the rhapsodists are called, in the second book of the Republic, *ποιητῶν ὑμνηταί, the ministers of the poets.*—S.

² Agreeably to this, Cicero introduceth his brother Quintus, observing of him, and of Æsop: the orator, *tantum ardorem vultuum atque motuum, ut cum vis quædam abstraxisset a sensu mentis videretur.* Cic. de Divinat. lib. i.—S.

are

are filled with tears ; when any thing dreadful or horrible is the subject, my hairs stand erect, and my heart beats quick, through terror and affright.

Soc. What shall we say then, Io? that a man has, at that time, the free use of his intellect, when, clad in a splendid garb, with a crown of gold upon his head, amidst a feast, or at a festival, he falls into tears, without having lost any part of his finery, or of the entertainment? or when he is affrighted and terrified, standing in the midst of twenty thousand men, all well-disposed and friendly to him, none offering to strip him of his ornaments, or do him the least injury?

Io. To confess the truth, Socrates, he is not, by Jupiter, entirely in the possession of intellect.

Soc. Do you know that you produce this very same effect upon many of your auditors?

Io. I am, indeed, fully sensible of it. For at every striking passage I look down from my ¹ pulpit round me, and see the people suitably affected by it : now weeping, then looking as if horror seized them ; such emotion and such astonishment are spread through all. And it is my business to observe them with strict attention, that if I see I have set them a weeping, I may be ready to receive their money, and to laugh ; but if I find them laughing, that I may prepare myself for a sorrowful exit, disappointed of my expected gain.

Soc. Know you not then, that this audience of yours is like the last of those rings, which one to another, as I said, impart their power, derived from that magnet at the top? The middle ring are ² you the rhapsodist,

¹ This was a place, raised on high above the area, like those two opposite gallery boxes in our magnificent theatre at Oxford ; from whence orators, rhapsodists, and other declaimers, harangued the people.—S.

² Learned men are divided in their opinions concerning Io the rhapsodist, whether he is the same person or not with Io the Chian, a considerable poet, who flourished in the same age. see Jonsius de Scriptor. Hist. Philos. l. ii. c. 13. n. 4. and Bentleii Epist. ad Millium, p. 50, &c. In the great want of good reasoning on either side of the question, it may be worth observing, that in this passage, as also in page 32, Io is contradistinguished from the poets. A negative argument too may be of some weight, from the silence of Plato upon this point. Indeed it is strange, had Io been a poet, and had won the prize of tragedy, which was the case of Io the Chian, that Plato should have made him take none of those many opportunities to glory in it, which offered themselves in this conversation.—S.

and so too is the player: the first ring being the poet himself. By means of all these does the god draw, wherever it pleases him, the souls of men, suspended each on other through attractive virtue. In the same manner too, as from that magnet, is formed a chain of many rows, where ¹ chorus-singers and dancers, masters and ² under-masters, hang, like the collateral rings, attracted and held together side ways, all depending from the Muse. But upon one Muse one of the poets, upon a different Muse another is suspended; ³ possessed we call him, that is held fast; because he is fast held by the Muse. From these first rings, the ⁴ poets hang their followers and admirers; some from one, others from another; inspired by them, and fastened on them, by means of the enthusiastic spirit issuing from

¹ Or rather chorus-fingers dancing; [*χορευταί*:] for they were not different persons: the dance being nothing else than a measured motion, accompanied with certain gestures of body, adapted to the tune, (which they called the harmony,) as that was to the words of the chorus-song, sung by the same persons who performed the dance.—S.

² The hindmost rows of the chorus sang an under part, and had peculiar masters of their own to teach it them, who were therefore called under-masters. At the head of each row was placed the master of it, to give the musical key, and to lead the dance to his proper row. The principal teacher of the whole choir, who also headed the whole, was called *Χορηγός*. See Jul. Pollux, *Onomastic*. l. iv. c. 15.—S.

³ This passage in all the editions of Plato is read thus; *ονομαζόμεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατεχεται. τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ παραπλησίον· εχεται γὰρ*. Which, being nonsense, is thus nonsensically rendered into Latin by Ficinus; "*Vocamus autem id nos occupari*, (altered by Grynæus into *mente capi*;) *quod quidem illi proximum est: tenetur enim*." And by Cornarius thus; "*Hoc verò corripitur nominamus, quod consimile est: caret enim*." In the steps of these translators Bembo thought it safest here to tread, as being wholly in the dark himself. For he thus translates it; *e cio chiamamo noi l'esser preso, il che è simile*: and then quite omits the *εχεται γὰρ*. Serranus, divining, as it seems, the true sense of the passage, (for the words show it not,) avoids the sinking into nonsense; but hobbles along very lamely. The emendation of the pointing, with omission only of the word *γὰρ*, would make the passage plain and clear, thus read, *ονομαζόμεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατεχεται, τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ παραπλησίον· εχεται*. But there is another way of amending this passage, that is, by a repetition of the word *εχεται*: and this way we prefer, and follow in our translation, reading it thus; *ονομαζόμεν δὲ αὐτὸ κατεχεται· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ, παραπλησίον· εχεται· εχεται γὰρ*. The omission of a word, where the same word immediately follows, is a common fault in manuscripts.—S.

⁴ The wrong pointing of this passage in the Greek has occasioned Serranus to translate it, as if it described the poets depending, that is, receiving their inspiration, one from another. But though this fact be true, it is not the primary intention of Plato in this place to describe it. To prevent the same mistake in the readers of any future edition of the original, this sentence ought to be printed with a comma after the word *ποιῶν*, as well as with one before it. Ficinus however and the rest translate it rightly.—S.

them;

them; some to Orpheus, others to Musæus; but the most numerous sort is of such, as are possessed by Homer, and held fast by him. Of this number, Io, are you, inspired as you are, and enthusiastically possessed by Homer. Hence it is, that when the verses of any other poet are sung or recited, you grow dull and fall asleep, for want of something to say: but that, as soon as you hear a strain of that poet poured forth, immediately you are roused, your soul recovers her sprightliness, and much to say presents itself to your mind: because, when you harangue upon Homer, you do it not from art or science, but from enthusiasm, of that particular kind which has possessed you by divine allotment. Just as those, who join in the rites of Cybele, have an acute perception of such music only as appertains to that deity by whom they are possessed; and are not wanting either in words or gestures, adapted to a melody of that kind; but have no regard to any other music, nor any feeling of its power. In the same manner you, Io, when any mention is made of Homer, feel a readiness and a facility of speaking; yet with regard to other poets find yourself wanting. That therefore which your question demands, whence you have within you such an ample fund of discourse, upon every thing relating to Homer; whilst it is quite otherwise with you, when the subject brought upon the carpet is any other of the poets: the cause is this, that not science, but enthusiasm, not art, but a divine destiny, has made you so mighty a panegyrist on Homer.

Io. You speak well, Socrates, I own. But I should wonder if, with all your fine talk, you could persuade me to think myself possessed, and insane, when I make my panegyrics on Homer. Nor would you, as I imagine, think so yourself, were you but to hear from me a dissertation upon that poet.

Soc. And willing am I indeed to hear you; but not till you have answered me this question in the first place, ¹ which of his subjects does Homer

¹ The Greek of this passage in all the editions runs thus; ὃν Ὅμηρος λέγει, περὶ τίνος εὐ λέγει; Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, very dogmatically alters the last word of this question into λέγεις. Afterwards H. Stephens, into whose hands had fallen a copy of Plato with conjectural emendations in Ficinus's own hand-writing on the margin, tell us in his notes, that the same alteration was there proposed by Ficinus. This, if admitted, will give a different turn, not only to this question,

Homer handle best? for certainly you will not say, that he excels in all things.

Io. Be assured, Socrates, there is nothing in which he excels not.

Soc. You certainly do not mean to include those things of which Homer writes, and of which you are ignorant.

Io. And what things may those be which Homer writes of, and which I am ignorant of?

Soc. Does not Homer frequently, and copiously too, treat of the arts; for instance, the art of ¹ chariot-driving? If I can remember the verses, I will repeat them to you.

Io. I will recite them rather to you, for I well remember them.

Soc. Recite me then what Nestor says to his son Antilochus, where he gives him a caution about the turning, in that chariot-race celebrated in honour of Patroclus.

Io. His words are these:

There to the left inclining, easy turn
The light-built chariot; mindful then to urge
With pungent whip, and animating voice,
The right-hand courser, and with hand remiss
The reins to yield him; hard upon the goal,
Mean time, his partner bearing; till the wheel
Skimming the stony lines of that old mark,
² Doubt if its nave with point projecting touch
Th' extremest margin: bat of those rough stones
Th' encounter rude be careful to decline.

Soc.

but to Io's answer, and to the observation of Socrates thence arising: but the philosopher's drift, in asking the question, and the series of the argument, will be very little affected by it. For the business is to show, that neither poets write, nor rhapsodists interpret, when their subject happens to be some point belonging to any one of the arts, from their real skill in such art. The only difference is, that in the common readings, the poets are concerned immediately; and according to the proposed alteration, the question is pointed at the rhapsodists, and reaches the poets but in consequence. In either way, however, as the argument proceeds, the direct proof equally lies against the rhapsodists. Now in such a case as this, we believe it to be an established rule of sound criticism to forbear altering the text.—S.

¹ What this art was in ancient times, and in what high estimation it was held, such of our readers, as are not conversant in the writings of the antients, may find in the entertaining notes to Mr. Pope's Homer.—S.

² It is great pity, that Mr. Pope, in his elegant version of Homer, has dropt this strong poetical

Soc. Enough. Now in these verses, Io whether Homer gives a right account of what ought to be done upon the occasion or not, who must be the ablest judge, a physician, or a charioteer?

Io. A charioteer, undoubtedly.

Soc. Whether is he thus able, from his having skill in his art, or by some other means?

Io. From his skill in his art only, and no other way.

Soc. ¹ Has not thus every one of the arts an ability, given it by God himself, to judge of certain performances? for the same things, in which we have good judgment from our skill in the art of piloting, by no means shall we be able to judge of well from any skill in the art of medicine.

Io. By no means, undoubtedly.

Soc. Nor the same things, in which our skill in the art of medicine has given us good judgment would the greatest skill in the art of building qualify us to judge of equally well.

Io. Certainly not.

Soc. ² Does it not then hold true alike in all the arts, that of whatever things we are good judges by means of our being possessed of one art, we can never judge well of those very things from our skill in any other art? But before you answer to this question, answer me to this other: Do not you admit a diversity between the arts, and call this some one art, and that some other?

Io. I admit such a diversity.

Soc. Do not you distinguish every art in the same way that I do, inferring

poetical stroke; by which not only the wheel is animated, but the exquisite nicety of turning the goal, in keeping close to the edge of it, without touching, is described by one word in the finest manner possible. This mistake happened to him, from his misunderstanding the word *δοασεται* to mean, doubling the goal; in which sense this part of the description would be flat, lifeless, and prosaic, altogether unworthy Homer. Had Mr. Pope thought fit to consult Eustathius, he would have set him right. The verses here cited are in the 23d book of the Iliad; where the word *αγ*, in the fifth line, is evidently the right reading, instead of *μν*, which we meet with in the copies of Plato.—S.

¹ In the Greek, as it is printed, this is made an absolute assertion of Socrates, contrary to his usual manner of conversing, and to the genius of this Dialogue in particular, where Socrates is represented as proving the ignorance of Io out of his own mouth.—S.

² This sentence in the original is likewise printed as if it was spoken positively; and is so translated by Bembo: whereas immediately afterwards Socrates himself calls it a question.—S.

a diversity

a diversity between them from the diversity of their subjects? When one art is attended with knowledge of one sort of things, another art by knowledge in things of a different nature, do you not from hence conclude, as I do, that this accordingly is one art, and that another?

Io. I do.

Soc. For if, in any two arts, there was the knowledge of the same things in both, why should we make a distinction, and call this some one art, and that some other different, when both of them were attended by skill in the same sort of things? as I know, for instance, these fingers of mine to be five in number; and you know it as well as I. Now were I to ask you, whether it was by the same art that we know this one and the same thing, by the art of arithmetic, you as well as I, or each of us by a several art; you would certainly answer, it was by the same art.

Io. Undoubtedly.

Soc. The question then, which I was about asking you before, answer me now; whether in all the arts, you think it alike necessary that the same things should be judged of by the same art; and that a different art must not pretend to judge of those very things; but that if in reality it be a different art, different things must of course fall under its cognizance?

Io. I do think so, Socrates.

Soc. No man therefore will be able to judge well of any thing said, or done, relating to any one of the arts in which he has no skill.

Io. You say right.

Soc. In those verses then, which you repeated, can you best tell whether Homer gives a right account of things or not; or is a charioteer the properest judge of this?

Io. A charioteer.

Soc. And that for this reason, because you are a rhapsodist and not a charioteer.

Io. True.

Soc. And because the art of a rhapsodist is different from that of a charioteer.

Io. Right.

Soc. If then it be a different art, it is attended by skill in a different sort of things.

Io. Very right.

Soc.

Soc. Well then; when Homer relates how Hecamede, a damsel of Nestor's, mingled a potion for Machaon to drink, after he had been wounded, giving us this description of it;

Into rough Pramnian carefully she scrapes,
With brazen scraper, acrid-tasted cheese,
Made of thin milk drawn from fallacious goat;
And sets beside the life-reviving bowl

¹ Strong stimulating onion.—

To form a true judgment in this case, whether Homer be in the right or not, does it belong to the art of medicine, or to that of rhapsody?

Io. To the art of medicine.

Soc. Well; and what, where Homer says thus;

Steep down to the low bottom of the main
Then plung'd the goddess; rushing, like the lead,
Pendant from horn of meadow-ranging bull,
Which falls impetuous, to devouring fish

² Bearing the deathful mischief.—

Whether shall we say it belongs to the art of fishing, or to that of rhapsody, to judge best whether this description be right or wrong?

Io. To the art of fishing, Socrates, without doubt.

¹ This latter circumstance is mentioned by Homer at some distance from the former, eight lines intervening. Plato brings them together, selecting them out from the other particulars of that description, as the two most singular and remarkable, the most blamed by the physicians, and ridiculed by the wits of those days. But in the 3d book of his Republic, he answers all their criticisms and cavils himself, in a just defence of the great poet, and of such a method of treating wounded persons, in the more simple, less luxuriant, and healthier ages. The verses of Homer, here cited, are to be found in the eleventh book of the Iliad.—S.

² Had we been to have translated this passage immediately from Homer, we should have made the last line thus: "Bearing their fates destructive"—the Greek word being *νερα* in the copies of Homer, instead of which we read *πνυα* in those of Plato. Upon this occasion, we beg leave, once for all, to advertise our readers, that in many passages of Homer, as cited by Plato, there are variations, and those sometimes material, from the received reading of the text of that poet; and that this was one of the reasons on which we grounded our undertaking to translate all those passages afresh; when Mr. Pope's version, so excellent upon the whole, might otherwise have well excused us from that trouble. The passage of Homer, now before us, occurs in the last book of the Iliad.—S.

Soc.

Soc. Consider now, suppose yourself had taken the part of questioner, and were to say to me thus ; Since then, Socrates, you have found what passages in Homer it belongs to ¹ each of those arts before mentioned, severally to discern and criticise with good judgment ; come, find me out, upon the subject of divination, what passages it is the business of a diviner critically to examine, and to tell us whether the poetical account be right or wrong : consider, how easily I should be able to give you a satisfactory and a proper answer. For Homer has many passages relating to this subject in his *Odyssey*, particularly one, where Theoclymenus the diviner, ² one of the race of Melampus, addresses the wooers of Penelope in this manner ;

Mark'd out by Heav'n for great events ! What ill
Is this attends ye ! what sad omens point
Prefageful ! round ye some dark vapour spreads
His dusky wings ; head, face, and lower limbs
In shades involving : thick through burden'd air
Roll hollow sounds lamenting : dropping tears
Stain of each mourning statue the wet cheeks :
Crowded the porch, and crowded is the hall
With spectres ; down to Pluto's shadowy reign
Ghosts seem they gliding : the sun's cheery light
Is lost from heaven : a gloom foreboding falls,
O'erhanging all things, sadd'ning every heart.

On the same subject he writes in many places of his *Iliad* ; as, for instance, where he describes that fight, which happened under the Grecian fortifications. For he there gives us this relation of it ;

While eager they prepar'd to pass the moat,
And force th' intrenchments ; o'er them came a bird

¹ It is observable, that Plato here takes his four instances from four different sorts of arts ; the first from one of the arts military ; the second from one of the liberal arts ; the third from one of the mechanical kind ; and the fourth from one of those arts relating to religion. His ends in thus multiplying and varying his instances are these ; one is, to show the universality of Homer's genius ; and another is, to make it appear the more plainly, what a variety of arts the poet must have been master of, had he wrote, not from a divine genius, but from real skill humanly acquired. With the same view he instances again a little further in the arts imperatorial, liberal, servile, and mechanical.—S.

² See the *Odyssey* of Homer, b. xv. v. 225, &c. But the fine descriptive speech following is taken out of the twentieth book of that poet.—S.

Tow'ring

Tow'ring, an eagle, from the ' left of heaven,
 Their enterprize forbidding: on he came,
 And in his talons bore a dragon, huge,
 Enormous, glist'ning horrid with red scales.
 Still liv'd the serpent; and though clofe with death
 He strove, and gasp'd, and panted; yet his rage
 And venom he forgot not; for half round
 Wreathing the pliant joints of his high crest,
 With backward stroke he pierc'd his griping foe:
 His breast he pierc'd, where clofe beneath the neck
 Soft to the stroke it yielded. Stung with smart,
 Loosen'd his gripe the foe, and to the ground
 Down dropp'd him. Mid the martial throng the beast
 Fell: while the bleeding bird with clangor shrill
 Strain'd onward his weak flight, where bore the winds.

These passages, and others of the same kind, shall I say, it belongs to the diviner to consider, and to criticise?

Io. So will you say what is true, Socrates.

Soc. You speak truth yourself, Io, in this. Come on then, and tell me, as I have selected out for you certain passages from the *Odyssey*, and from the *Iliad*, appertaining some of them to the diviner, some to the physician, and others to the fisherman; in return, do you pick out for me (since you are better versed in Homer than I am) such passages, Io, as appertain to the rhapsodist, and relate to the rhapsodical art: such as it becomes the rhapsodist to examine and to criticise, with a judgment and skill superior to that of other men.

Io. The whole of Homer I affirm it to be, Socrates.

¹ This circumstance is very important. For upon the principles of augury, one kind of divination, had the flight of the eagle over their heads been, on the contrary, from the right side of the heavens, that is, from the east, making toward the left, or west, it had been a presage of good success. Yet is this circumstance carelessly omitted by Mr. Pope. Now the passage being cited by Plato, expressly, as an instance to show that Homer treats of the art of divination, we could not, without an absurdity, pass over that part of it, which is the most material with regard to the scope of our author in this place. And as this often is the case, that where Plato cites Homer for some particular purpose, Mr. Pope's version happens there to be defective, we found ourselves obliged, for this further reason, to attempt setting those passages in their proper light by a new translation. This is cited from the *τευχμαχία*, or twelfth book of the *Iliad*.—S.

VOL. V.

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Soc.

Soc. You denied it, Io, but just now, to be the whole of Homer. ¹ What, are you so forgetful? It ill becomes, however, a man, who is a rhapsodist, to be forgetful.

Io. But what is it now that I have forgot?

Soc. Do you not remember, that you affirmed the art of rhapsody to be an art different from that of chariot-driving?

Io. I do remember it.

Soc. Did not you allow too, that being a different art, it was accompanied by skill and judgment in a different sort of things?

Io. I did allow it.

Soc. The art of rhapsody therefore, according to your own account, is not accompanied by skill and judgment in things of every sort: nor will the rhapsodist know all things.

Io. With an exception, perhaps, Socrates, of such sort of things.

Soc. By such sort of things, which you are pleased to except, you mean such things as belong to nearly all the other arts. But, since the rhapsodist knows not all things, pray what are those things which he does know?

Io. He knows, I presume, what is proper for a man to speak, and what for a woman; what for a slave, and what for a freeman; what for those who are under government or command, and what for the governor and the commander.

Soc. For the commander, do you mean who has the command of a ship at sea, amidst a tempest, what is proper for him to speak, that the rhapsodist will know better than the master of a ship?

Io. Not so; for this indeed the master of a ship will know best.

Soc. For the governor then, who has the government of the sick, what is proper for such a one to speak, will the rhapsodist know better than the physician?

Io. Not this neither.

Soc. But that which is proper for a slave, you say.

Io. I do.

¹ The Greek here is erroneously printed in all the editions, thus $\frac{1}{2}$ (instead of $\frac{3}{4}$) οὕτως ἐπυθησάμην αἱ; accordingly, Cornarius translates it, "*Aut ita oblitivius es?*" This error of the press, we hope, will be corrected in the next edition of Plato.—S.

Soc.

Soc. For instance now, a slave, whose office it is to keep the cattle, what is proper for him to speak, when the herd grows wild and madding, in order to pacify and tame them; do you say the rhapsodist will know this better than the cow-keeper?

Io. No, to be sure.

Soc. That, however, which is proper for a woman to speak; for a woman-weaver now, suppose, relating to the fabric of cloth.

Io. No, no.

Soc. But he will know what is proper for a man to speak, who has the command of an army, in order to animate his men.

Io. You have it; such sort of things the rhapsodist will know.

Soc. What is the art of rhapsody then the art of commanding armies?

Io. Truly I¹ should know what speech is proper for the commander of an army.

Soc. Because you have, perhaps, the art of generalship, Io. For suppose you were skilled in the arts of horsemanship and of music, both of them, you would be a good judge of what horses were well-managed, and would be able to distinguish them from such as were managed ill. Now, in that case, were I to ask you this question, by which of your arts, Io, do you know the well-managed horses? do you know them through your skill in horsemanship, or through your skill in music? what answer would you make me?

Io. Through my skill in horsemanship, I should answer.

Soc. Again; when you distinguished rightly the good performers in music, would not you own, that you distinguished them by your being skilled in music; and not say it was owing to your skill in horsemanship?

Io. Certainly.

Soc. But now that you understand what belongs to the² command of

¹ In the printed editions of the Greek we here read γινῶσκῃ σου ἀπ' ἑωῶ, whereas certainly we ought to read γινῶσκῃ σου αὐτὸν (or else ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) ἑωῶ.—S.

² This refers to an assertion of Io's a little before. It seems necessary, therefore, in this place to read στρατῶν ἡγεῖα, (as the sense also requires), and not στρατιωτικὰ, *military affairs*, as it is printed, and accordingly translated by Cornarius and Serranus. Ficinus, however, Grynæus, and Bembo, agree with us.—S.

armies, whether do you understand this by means of your skill in the art of generalship, or as you are an excellent rhapsodist?

Io. There appears to me no difference.

Soc. What mean you by no difference? Do you mean, that the art of rhapsody and the art of generalship are one and the same art? or do you admit them to be two different arts?

Io. I think they are one art only.

Soc. Whoever then happens to be a good rhapsodist, the same man must also be a good general.

Io. By all means, Socrates.

Soc. ¹ And whoever happens to be a good general, must he be a good rhapsodist too?

Io. This, I think, does not hold true.

Soc. ² But that other consequence, you think, will hold true, that whoever is a good rhapsodist is also a good general.

Io. Beyond all doubt.

Soc. Now are not you the most excellent of all the Grecian rhapsodists?

Io. Certainly so, Socrates.

Soc. Do you also then, Io, excel the rest of the Grecians in knowing how to command armies?

Io. ³ Be assured, Socrates, that I do; for I have acquired that knowledge from the works of Homer.

Soc. In the name of the gods then, Io, what can be the meaning that, excellent as you are above the rest of the Grecians, both as a general and as a rhapsodist, you choose to make your appearance only in this latter character; and travel about all over Greece, reciting and expounding, but take not the command of the Grecian armies? Is it because you think the Grecians

¹ We choose, here, to tread in the steps of Ficinus, deviating from the printed original, where the sentence is not interrogative, but affirmative.—S.

² By a strange perverseness in the editors or printers of the Greek text, this sentence is changed into a question; by which means the humorous turn of it is half lost.—S.

³ The words of Plato are *eu lothi*. This was an arrogant expression, frequent in the mouths of the sophists. See Plato's Symposium. In the same spirit he here very properly attributes it to Io. Yet Bembo renders it thus in Italian, *Tu il fai bene*; following the sense, or rather nonsense, given it by Cornarius and Serranus.—S.

are in great need of a rhapsodist, or of a man to repeat verses to them with a golden crown upon his head, but have no occasion at all for a general?

Io. The city, which I belong to, Socrates, is under the government of yours, and her forces are commanded by the Athenians: therefore she is in no want of a general. And as to your city, or that of the Lacedæmonians, neither of you would appoint me her general, because you have, both of you, a high opinion of your own sufficiency.

Soc. What, my friend Io, do you not know Apollodorus of Cyzicum?

Io. Which Apollodorus?

Soc. Him, whom the Athenians have often appointed to the command of their armies, though a foreigner. Then there is, besides, Phanosthenes the Andrian, and ¹ Heraclides of Clazomenæ; upon whom the city, notwithstanding that they are foreigners, yet because they have ² approved themselves considerable and worthy men, confers the chief command of her army, with other posts of power and government. And will not the city then bestow her honours on Io the Ephesian, and appoint him her general, should he

¹ This general is mentioned by Ælian in his *Various Histories*, b. xiv. c. 5. together with Apollodorus of Cyzicum, and both of them with high commendations; but in such a manner, it must be owned, as to induce a suspicion, that he had all his knowledge of them from this passage of the Io — S.

² Plato seems to take this opportunity of expressing the esteem he had for these three commanders; under whom, it is probable, that Socrates had served his country in some of those campaigns which he had made with so much glory. See Plato's *Banquet*. This whole passage, however, is understood in a very different sense by Athenæus, b. xi. p. 5:6 who takes this praise to be ironical: in consequence of which mistake he bestows ill language on Plato, for having here, as he pretends, vilified these commanders, and thrown a reflection upon the city for promoting them. According to the supposition, therefore, of Athenæus, they are introduced here, on purpose to depreciate them, and put them on a level with an ignorant rhapsodist. A strange interpretation! by which is weakened, if not entirely destroyed, as well the force of the argument here used by Socrates, as of that ridicule, with which he all along treats Io. For by setting him in comparison with commanders of real merit only, could Socrates, consistently with his own reasoning, invalidate the account given by Io, why he was not promoted, in that he was a foreigner. Since the argument would be very inconclusive, if this were supposed the meaning: "You see how the city chooses to prefer a pack of fellows, who have no merit, and are foreigners as well as yourself; if you then are truly an expert and able general, though a foreigner, you may reasonably expect a share in so injudicious a promotion." And as to the irony, Socrates is thus

he appear a man valuable, and worthy that regard? What, are not ¹ you Ephesians originally of Athens? and then, besides, does Ephesus yield the preference to any city in point of greatness? But the question is about your own character, Io; What shall we think of you? For if you speak truth, when you say that you are able to display the excellencies of Homer through your skill in any art or science, you are a man who does not act fairly. For after you had professed to know many fine things, from which you could illustrate the works of Homer, and had undertaken to give me a specimen of that knowledge of yours, you deceive and disappoint me: whilst you are so far from doing as you promised, and giving me such a specimen, that you will not so much as inform me what those things are in which you have so profound a skill; and this, notwithstanding I have long pressed you to tell me: but absolutely become, like Proteus, all various and multiform, changing backwards and forwards, till at last you escape me, by starting up a general; for fear, I suppose, you should be driven to discover how deep your wisdom is in the works of Homer. If then you really are an artist, and when you had promised to give me a specimen of your art and knowledge in Homer, wilfully disappoint me; you act, as I just now said, unfairly. If indeed you

made to go out of his way, and take off the ridicule from Io, whilst he turns it upon others. But the reasoning is just, and the ridicule on Io continued strong, upon the contrary supposition, expressed in other words thus: "Your being a foreigner can be no bar to your preferment; let not that deter you from so laudable an ambition: you see what regard the city pays to men of great abilities, though born in other countries. Let the success, therefore, of Apollodorus and the rest encourage you to offer yourself a candidate: for you on other accounts have still fairer pretensions." Were the point, now in debate, a matter to be decided by authority, to that of Athenæus we might oppose that of Ælian, who commends the compliment, made by Plato in this passage, not only to the three foreign generals, but to the city of Athens at the same time, for giving her first honours to superior virtue, wherever found, without regard to birth-place or to popular favour. See Ælian. Var. Hist. lib. xiv. c. 5.—S.

¹ Socrates, having now sufficiently derided the personal arrogance and ignorance of Io, before he quits him, bestows an ironical sarcasm or two upon the general vanity of Io's countrymen; who, while they were sunk in Asiatic luxury and effeminacy, valued themselves highly, in the first place, upon their descent from the Athenians, so illustrious for wisdom and valour, and next on account of their opulence and magnificence; circumstances, in truth, redounding only to their shame; yet the usual topics of boast, these two, high descent and outward greatness, whether in nations or private persons, degenerated from their ancestors, and void of those virtues which raised them to that greatness.—S.

are not an artist, but an enthusiast, one of those who from divine allotment are inspired by Homer ; and thus, without any real knowledge, are able to utter abundance of fine words about the writings of that poet, agreeably to the opinion which I had of you before ; in this case you are not guilty of any unfair dealing. Choose then, whether of these two opinions you would have me entertain of you ; whether this, that you are a man, who acts unfairly ; or this other, that you are a man under the influence of some divinity.

IO. Great is the difference, O Socrates : it is certainly much the better thing to be deemed under divine influence.

Soc. This better thing then, IO, is with you, to be deemed by us, in your encomiums upon Homer, an enthusiast, and not an artist.

THE END OF THE IO.

THE

THE CRATYLUS:

A DIALOGUE

ON

THE RECTITUDE OF NAMES.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE CRATYLUS.

THE ensuing Dialogue, which disputes whether names have been assigned to things from nature or position, and whether some at least are not derived from a more divine origin than that of human invention, has been highly censured by modern critics for its etymologies, which they contend are for the most part false. This censure originated from not perceiving that the intention of Plato in this Dialogue is to investigate names philosophically, and not grammatically, and that he despises the matter, but is especially attentive to the form of names; though this was obvious to the philologist Selden, as may be seen in his treatise on the Syrian gods:—and in the next place, Plato mingles, in his investigation, the serious with the jocose: so that in the first part of the Dialogue, when he investigates the names of the gods, he is perfectly in earnest, as is highly proper on such an occasion; and in the middle part he facetiously ridicules the followers of Heraclitus, who considered all things as perpetually flowing, without admitting any periods of repose. Hence, in order to explode this opinion, which is erroneous in the extreme, when extended to intelligible as well as sensible natures, he proves that, by an abuse of etymologies, all names may be shown to have been established, as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.

With respect to the subject matter of this logical Dialogue, which is the invention, and as it were generation of names, it is necessary to observe, that there were two opinions of the ancients on this particular; one of Heraclitus

and his followers, among whom Cratylus held a considerable rank ; the other of certain Parmenidæans, among whom Hermogenes was no ignoble advocate. Of the former of these, Cratylus, it is reported that Plato was an auditor ; and he is said to have been under the tuition of the latter in theological concerns. And the Heraclitics indeed asserted that names consist from nature alone, and that the consent of men contributes nothing to their formation or invention. But the Parmenidæans affirmed, that names were not the productions of nature, but received their conformation from the arbitrary decision of men, by whom they were assigned and imposed upon things. The more early Academics or disciples of Plato embraced the opinion of the Heraclitics ; and the more early Peripatetics that of Hermogenes : while in the mean time each sect endeavoured to bring over its leader to the doctrine which it embraced ; though, as we shall now shew from Ammonius[†], the sentiments of Plato and Aristotle on this subject differed only in words, and not in reality.

In order therefore to be convinced of this, it is necessary to observe, that the dogma of those who considered names as consisting from nature, and not from the will of men, received a two-fold distribution. Hence one part, as the Heraclitics, were of opinion that names were natural, because they are the productions and works of nature. For (say they) proper and peculiar names are prepared and assigned from the nature of things, no otherwise than proper or secret senses are attributed from the same cause to every thing. For that which is visible is judged to be different from that which is tangible, because it is perceived by a different sense. But names are similar to natural resemblances ; i. e. to such as are beheld in mirrors, or in water, and not to such as are the productions of art. And indeed those are to be considered as denominating things, who produce true and solid names of this kind ; but those who act in a different manner, do not properly denominate, but only emit a sound or voice. But it is the business of a prudent, learned, and truly philosophic man, always to investigate names, which are peculiarly constituted and assigned to each particular from the nature of things ; just as it is the province of one who possesses an acute sight, to know and judge rightly the proper similitudes of every visible object.

† In *Aristot. de Interpretatione*.

But

But the other class of those who defended this opinion, asserted that names consist from nature, because they correspond to the nature of the denominated particulars. For (say they) names ought to be illustrious and significant, that they may express things with perspicuity and precision. As if (for instance) any one should be born with a disposition admirably adapted to imperial command, such a one may with great propriety be called *Agésilas* or *Archidamus*. And that on this account such names are natural, because they significantly accord with the things which such names imply. For the person just adduced may be elegantly called *Archidamus*, because he is able to rule over the people; and *Agésilas*, because he is the leader of the people. They add besides, that names are indeed similar to images; but to those only which do not consist from nature, but which are the offspring of human art, such as pictures and statues, in which we evidently perceive that various similitudes of resemblances correspond to the various exemplars of things; and that these render more, but those less express effigies of things, according as the skill of the artificer, by employing the dexterity of art, is able to fashion them in a more or less convenient manner. But the truth of this (say they) may be clearly evinced from hence, that we often investigate the natures of things by an analysis of names; and, after a process of this kind, demonstrate that names are assigned adapted to the things which they express.

In like manner, the dogma of those who ascribed names to the consent of men received a two-fold division. And one part indeed defended such a position of names, as the *Parmenidæan* *Hermogenes* in the present Dialogue, viz. that names might be formed according to every one's arbitrary determination, though this should take place without any rational cause: so that if a man should call any thing by just whatever name he pleased, the name in this case would be proper, and accommodated to the things denominated. But the other part, such as the more antient *Peripatetics*, asserted that names ought not to be formed and assigned by men rashly, according to the opinion of *Hermogenes*, but with deliberation and design. And that the artificer of names ought to be a person endued with universal science, in order that he may be able to fabricate proper and becoming names for all the variety of things. Hence they assert that names consist from the determinations of men, and not from nature, because they are the inventions of the reasoning soul, and are properly accommodated from hence to things themselves. For
those

those antient founders of names did not rashly and without design denominate marshes of the female genus, but rivers of the male (not to mention the various tribes of animals), but they characterized the former by the feminine genus, because, like the soul, they are certain receptacles; and called the latter by a masculine appellation, on account of their entering into and mingling themselves with the former. In like manner they assigned the masculine genus to intellect, and marked soul with a feminine appellation; because intellect diffuses its light upon soul, which, in consequence of receiving it from thence in her inmost penetralia, is most truly said to be filled and illuminated by intellect. They likewise very properly employed an equal analogy in the sun and moon, on account of the abundant emanation of light from the former, and the reception of the prolific rays by the latter. But with respect to the neuter and common genus, as they judged that these were constituted and composed from the mixture or separation of the masculine and feminine genus, hence they significantly assigned them to certain things in a congruous proportion of nature.

Hence it appears that Aristotle and the Peripatetics differ only in words from Plato and the Academics: since the latter assert that names consist from nature, because they signify particulars in a manner accommodated to the nature of things; but the former contend that names are the offspring of human invention, because they have been sagaciously assigned by a most skilful architect as it were of speaking, and this according to the exigency of nature. But the present Dialogue sufficiently proves that this is a true interpretation of Plato's opinion on this interesting subject; since Socrates here establishes himself as a medium between Hermogenes and Cratylus, and remarkably reprehends each by a multitude of very conclusive reasons. For he plainly demonstrates that names cannot alone consist from the arbitrary determination of men, as Hermogenes seemed to assert, on account of the universal genera of things, and immutable and eternal natures to which a stable and right reason of names may be well ascribed, both because they are perpetual and constant, and known to all men from the beginning, and because they are allotted a nature definite and immovable. And again, he shows that neither can names consist from nature in the manner which the Heraclitics endeavour to support, on account of the gliding and fluxible nature of individuals,

dividuals, to which names can neither be conveniently assigned nor well adapted for any considerable period of time.

But that the reader may see the progression of names from their sources, which are the gods, let him attend to the following beautiful passage from Proclus on the Theology of Plato¹. "The first, most principal, and truly divine names must be considered as established in the gods themselves. But those of the second order, and which are the resemblances of these, subsisting in an intellectual manner, must be said to be of a dæmoniacal condition. And those in the third rank, emanating indeed from truth, but fashioned logically, and receiving the last representation of divine concerns, make their appearance from scientific men, who at one time energize according to a divine afflatus, and at another time intellectually, generating images in motion of the inward spectacles of their souls. For as the demiurgic intellect establishes about matter representations of the first forms subsisting in his essence, temporal resemblances of things eternal, divisible of such as are indivisible, and produces as it were shadowy images of true beings; in the same manner, as it appears to me, the science which we possess, fashioning an intellectual production, fabricates resemblances both of other things and of the gods themselves. Hence it assimilates through composition that which in the gods is incomposite; that which is simple in them through variety, and that which is united through multitude. And thus forming names, it manifests images of divine concerns, according to their last subsistence: for it generates each name as if it was a statue of the gods. And as the Theurgic art, through certain symbols, calls forth the unenvying goodness of the gods, into an illumination of the artificial statues; in the same manner, the intellectual science of divine concerns, through compositions and divisions of sounds, exhibits the occult essence of the gods. With great propriety therefore does Socrates in the Philebus assert—that he proceeds with the greatest dread in that which respects the names of the gods, on account of the caution which should be employed in their investigation. For it is necessary to venerate the last resounding echoes as it were of the gods; and in consequence of this reverence to establish them in their first exemplars²."

Thus

¹ Lib. i. cap. 29.

² Agreeably to this, likewise, Proclus, in the fourth book of his Commentary on the Parmenides, which is justly called by Damascius, *υπερσυνετα στήνησις*, a transcendent exposition, observes

Thus far the truly divine Proclus; from which admirable passage the Platonic reader will find all his doubts on this intricate subject fully solved, if he only bestows on it that attention which it so well deserves. I only add, that every ingenuous mind may be convinced, from the etymologies of divine names in this Dialogue, that the latter Platonists were not perverters of their master's theology, as is ignorantly asserted by verbal critics and modern theologists. This, indeed, will be so apparent from the ensuing notes, that no greater proof can be desired of the dreadful mental darkness in which such men are involved, notwithstanding the great acumen of the former, and the much-boasted but delusive light of the latter.

as follows: *πολλαι ταξεις ειναι και των ονοματων, ωσπερ δη και των γνωσεων και τα μεν αυτων θεια λεγεται, δι ων οι καταδεστεροι θεοι τους προ αυτων ονομαζουσι τα δε αγγελικα, δι ων οι αγγελοι εαυτους τε και τους θεους τα δε δαιμονια, τα δε ανθρωπινα. και τα μεν εστι ρητα και εμιν, τα δε αρητα. και ολως ωσπερ ημας ο Κρατυλος αναδιδασκει, και προ τουντου η ενθιος παραδοσις, και γνωσις, και ονομασια διαφορος εστι.—i. e.* “There are many orders of names, as well as of cognitions; and some of these are called divine, through which subordinate gods denominate such as are prior to them: but others are angelic, through which angels denominate themselves and the gods; and others are dæmoniacal, and others again human. And some are effable by us, but others are ineffable. And universally, as the Cratylus informs us, and prior to this, the divine tradition (*i. e.* the Zoroastrian oracles), there is a difference in nomination as well as in knowledge.”

THE CRATYLUS.

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS, SOCRATES.

HERMOGENES.

ARE you willing, then, that we should communicate this discourse to Socrates?

CRAT. If you think proper.

HERM. Cratylus here, Socrates, says, that there is a rectitude of name naturally subsisting in every thing; and that this is not a name which certain persons pronounce from custom, while they articulate a portion of their voice; but that there is a certain rectitude of names which is naturally the same both among Greeks and Barbarians. I ask him, therefore, whether Cratylus is his true name, or not. He confesses it is. I then inquire of him, what is the appellation belonging to Socrates? He replies, Socrates. In all other particulars, therefore, I say, is not that the name by which we call each? Yet, says he, your name is not Hermogenes, though all men should agree in calling you so. And upon my eagerly desiring to know the meaning of what he says, he does not declare any thing, but uses dissimulation towards me, feigning as if he was thinking about something on this subject, which if he should be willing to relate clearly, he would oblige me to agree with him in opinion, and to say the same as he does. If, therefore, you can by any means conjecture this divination of Cratylus, I shall very gladly hear you; or rather, if it is agreeable to you, I should much more gladly hear your opinion concerning the rectitude of names.

Soc. O Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, according to the antient proverb, beautiful things are difficult to be understood ; and the discipline respecting names is no small affair. If, therefore, I had heard that demonstration of Prodicus, valued at fifty drachmas, which instructed the hearer in this very particular, as he himself says, nothing would hinder but that you might immediately know the truth respecting the rectitude of names : but I never have heard it ; and am acquainted with nothing more than the circumstance about the drachmas. Hence I am unacquainted with the truth respecting these particulars ; but am nevertheless prepared to investigate this affair, along with you and Cratylus. But as to his telling you, that your name is not in reality Hermogenes, I suspect that in this he derides you : for he thinks, perhaps, that you are covetous of wealth, and at the same time have not obtained your desire. But, as I just now said, the knowledge of these matters is difficult. However, placing the arguments in common, it is proper to consider, whether the truth is on your side, or on that of Cratylus.

HERM. But indeed, Socrates, though I have frequently disputed with Cratylus and many others, yet I cannot persuade myself, that there is any other rectitude of nomination, than what custom and mutual consent have established. For to me it appears, that the name which any one assigns to a thing, is a proper name ; and that, if he should even change it for another, this name will be no less right than the first ; just as we are accustomed to change the names of our servants. For I am of opinion, that no name is naturally inherent in any thing, but subsists only from the law and habit of those by whom it is instituted and called. But, if the case is otherwise, I am prepared both to learn and hear, not only from Cratylus, but from any other person whatever.

Soc. Perhaps, Hermogenes, you say something to the purpose. Let us consider therefore. Is that by which any one calls any thing, the name of that thing ?

HERM. To me it appears so.

Soc. And this, whether a private person calls it, or a city ?

HERM. I think so.

Soc. What, then, if I should call any thing in such a manner, as to denominate that an horse which we now call a man, and that a man which we

now

now call a horse; would not the name man remain the same publicly, but the name horse privately; and again, privately the name man, and publicly the name horse? Would you not speak in this manner?

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. Tell me, then, do you call it any thing to speak true and false?

HERM. I do.

Soc. Therefore, one thing will be a true sentence, but another a false one. Will it not?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not that sentence, then, which speaks of things as they are, be a true sentence; but that which speaks of them different from what they are, a false one?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Is not this, therefore, to speak of things which are, and which are not, by discourse.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. But with respect to a sentence which is true, is the whole true, but the parts of it not true?

HERM. The parts, also, are no otherwise than true.

Soc. But whether are the large parts true, and the small ones not? or, are all the parts true?

HERM. I think that all the parts are true.

Soc. Is there any part of what you say, smaller than a name?

HERM. There is not. But this is the smallest of all.

Soc. And does not this name belong to a true sentence?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And this, you say, is true.

HERM. I do.

Soc. But is not the part of a false sentence false?

HERM. I say it is.

Soc. It is permitted us, therefore, to call a name true and false, since we can call a sentence so.

HERM. How should it not be so?

Soc. Is that, therefore, which each person says the name of a thing is, the name of that thing?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Will there be as many names belonging to a thing, as any person assigns it ; and at that time when he assigns them ?

HERM. I have no other rectitude of name, Socrates, than this ; that I may call a thing by one name, which I assign to it, and you by another, which you think proper to attribute to it. And after this manner, I see that in cities, the same things are assigned proper names, both among the Greeks with other Greeks, and among the Greeks with the Barbarians.

Soc. Let us see, Hermogenes, whether things appear to you to subsist in such a manner, with respect to the peculiar essence of each, as they did to Protagoras, who said that man was the measure of all things ; so that things are, with respect to me, such as they appear to me ; and that they are such to you, as they appear to you : or do some of these appear to you to possess a certain stability of essence ?

HERM. Sometimes, Socrates, through doubting, I have been led to this, which Protagoras asserts ; but yet this does not perfectly appear to me to be the case.

Soc. But what, was you never led to conclude that there is no such thing as a man perfectly evil ?

HERM. Never, by Jupiter ! But I have often been disposed to think, that there are some men profoundly wicked, and that the number of these is great.

Soc. But have you never yet seen men perfectly good ?

HERM. Very few, indeed.

Soc. You have seen such then ?

HERM. I have.

Soc. How, then, do you establish this ? Is it thus : That those who are completely good, are completely prudent ; and that the completely bad, are completely imprudent ?

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. If, therefore, Protagoras speaks the truth, and this is the truth itself, for every thing to be such as it appears to every one, can some of us be prudent, and some of us imprudent ?

HERM. By no means.

Soc. And this, as I think, appears perfectly evident to you, that, since there

there is such a thing as prudence and imprudence, Protagoras does not entirely speak the truth; for one person will not in reality be more prudent than another, if that which appears to every one, is to every one true.

HERM. It is so.

Soc. But neither do I think you will agree with Euthydemus, that all things subsist together with all, in a similar manner, and always; for thus things would not be good, and others evil, if virtue and vice were always, and in a similar manner, inherent in all things.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. If, therefore, neither all things subsist together similarly and always with all things, nor each thing is what it appears to each person, it is evident that there are certain things which possess a stability of essence, and this not from us, nor in consequence of being drawn upwards and downwards by us, through the power of imagination, but which subsist from themselves, according to the essence which naturally belongs to them.

HERM. This appears to me, Socrates, to be the case.

Soc. Will, therefore, the things themselves naturally subsist in this manner, but their actions not so? or are their actions, in like manner, one certain species of things?

HERM. They are perfectly so.

Soc. Actions therefore, also, are performed according to the nature which they possess, and not according to our opinion. As, for instance, if we should attempt to cut any thing, shall we say that each particular can be divided just as we please, and with what we please? or rather, shall we not say, that if we desire to cut any thing according to its natural capacity of receiving section, and likewise with that instrument which is natural for the purpose, we shall divide properly, effect something satisfactory, and act rightly? But that if we do this contrary to nature, we shall wander from the purpose, and perform nothing?

HERM. To me it appears so.

Soc. If therefore we should attempt to burn any thing, we ought not to burn it according to every opinion, but according to that which is right; and this is no other, than after that manner in which any thing is naturally adapted to burn and be burnt, and with those materials which are proper on the occasion.

HERM. It is so.

Soc.

SOC. Must we not, therefore, proceed with other things after the same manner?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not to speak, therefore, one particular operation?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Whether, therefore, does he speak rightly, who speaks just as he thinks fit; or he, who speaks in such a manner as the nature of things requires him to speak, and themselves to be spoken of; and who thinks, that if he speaks of a thing with that which is accommodated to its nature, he shall effect something by speaking; but that, if he acts otherwise, he shall wander from the truth, and accomplish nothing to the purpose?

HERM. It appears to me, it will be just as you say.

SOC. Is not, therefore, the nomination of a thing, a certain part of speaking? For those who denominate things, deliver after a manner sentences.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not the nomination of things, therefore, a certain action, since to speak is a certain action about things?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But it has appeared that actions do not subsist with respect to us, but that they have a certain proper nature of their own.

HERM. It has so.

SOC. It follows, therefore, that we must give names to things, in such a manner as their nature requires us to denominate, and them to be denominated, and by such means as are proper, and not just as we please, if we mean to assent to what we have before asserted. And thus we shall act and nominate in a satisfactory manner, but not by a contrary mode of conduct.

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. Come then, answer me. Must we not say, that a thing which ought to be cut, ought to be cut with something?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And that the thread, which ought to be separated in weaving, ought to be separated with something? And that the thing which ought to be perforated, ought to be perforated with something?

HERM.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And likewise that the thing which ought to be named, ought to be named with something?

HERM. It ought.

Soc. But with what are the threads separated in weaving?

HERM. With the shuttle.

Soc. And what is that with which a thing is denominated?

HERM. A name.

Soc. You speak well. And hence a name is a certain organ.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. If, therefore, I should inquire what sort of an instrument a shuttle is, would you not answer, that it is an instrument with which we separate the threads in weaving?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But what do we perform in weaving? Do we not separate the woof and the threads, which are confused together?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. Would you not answer in the same manner concerning perforating, and other particulars?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Can you in like manner declare concerning a name, what it is which we perform, whilst we denominate any thing with a name which is a certain instrument?

HERM. I cannot.

Soc. Do we teach one another any thing, and distinguish things according to their mode of subsistence?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. A name, therefore, is an instrument endued with a power of teaching, and distinguishing the essence of a thing, in the same manner as a shuttle with respect to the web.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But is not the shuttle textorial?

HERM. How should it not?

Soc. The weaver therefore uses the shuttle in a proper manner, so far as concerns

concerns the art of weaving ; but he who teaches employs a name beautifully, according to the proper method of teaching.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Through whose operation is it that the weaver acts properly when he uses the shuttle ?

HERM. The carpenter's.

SOC. But is every one a carpenter, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

SOC. And whose work does the piercer properly use, when he uses the auger ?

HERM. The blacksmith's.

SOC. Is every one therefore a blacksmith, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

SOC. But whose work does the teacher use when he employs a name ?

HERM. I cannot tell.

SOC. Nor can you tell who delivered to us the names which we use ?

HERM. I cannot.

SOC. Does it not appear to you that the law delivered these ?

HERM. It does.

SOC. He who teaches, therefore, uses the work of the legislator when he uses a name.

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. But does every man appear to you to be a legislator, or he only who possesses art ?

HERM. He who possesses art.

SOC. It is not the province, therefore, of every man, O Hermogenes, to establish a name, but of a certain artificer of names ; and this, as it appears, is a legislator, who is the most rare of artificers among men.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. But come, consider, what it is which the legislator beholds, when he establishes names ; and make your survey from the instances above adduced. What is it which the carpenter looks to, when he makes a shuttle ? Is it not to some such thing as is naturally adapted to the purposes of weaving ?

HERM.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But if the shuttle should break during its fabrication, do you think the carpenter would make another, taking pattern by the broken one? or rather would he not look to that form, agreeably to which he endeavoured to make the broken shuttle?

HERM. It appears to me that he would look to this in his fabrication.

SOC. Do we not, therefore, most justly call this form, the shuttle itself?

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. When, therefore, it is requisite to make shuttles, adapted for the purpose of weaving a slender garment, or one of a closer texture, or of thread or wool, or of any other kind whatever, it is necessary that all of them should possess the form of the shuttle; but that each should be applied to the work to which it is naturally accommodated, in the most becoming manner.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. And the same reasoning takes place with respect to other instruments. For an instrument must be found out which is naturally adapted to the nature of each particular, and a substance must be assigned to it, from which the artificer will not produce just what he pleases, but that which is natural to the instrument with which he operates. For it is necessary to know, as it appears, that an auger ought to be composed of iron, in order to operate in each particular naturally.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And that a shuttle should for this purpose be made of wood.

HERM. It is so.

SOC. For every shuttle, as it appears, is naturally adapted to every species of weaving; and other things in a similar manner.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, excellent man, that the legislator should know how to place a name naturally, with respect to sounds and syllables; and that, looking towards that particular of which this is the name, he should frame and establish all names, if he is desirous of becoming the proper founder of names. But if the founder of names does not compose every name from the same syllables, we ought to take notice, that neither does every blacksmith use the same iron, when he fabricates the same instrument for the sake of the same thing; but that the instrument is properly composed, so long as they fabricate it according to the same idea, though from different sorts of

iron, whether it is made here, or among the Barbarians. Is not this the case?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Will you not therefore be of opinion, that as long as a founder of names, both here and among the Barbarians, assigns a form of name accommodated to each, in any kind of syllables, that while this is the case, the founder of names here will not be worse than the founder in any other place?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Who therefore is likely to know whether a convenient form of the shuttle is situated in every kind of wood? Does this belong to the artificer of the shuttle, or to the weaver by whom it is used?

HERM. It is probable, Socrates, that he is more likely to know this, by whom the shuttle is used.

Soc. Who is it, then, that uses the work of the fabricator of the lyre? Is it not he who knows how to instruct the artificer of it in the best manner, and who is able to judge whether it is properly made or not?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. But who is this?

HERM. The lyrist.

Soc. And who is it that uses the work of the shipwright?

HERM. The pilot.

Soc. And who is he that knows whether the work of the founder of names is beautiful, or not; and who is able to judge concerning it when finished, both here and among the Barbarians? Must it not be the person who uses this work?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And is not this person, one who knows how to interrogate?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And likewise to answer?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. But would you call him, who knows how to interrogate and answer any thing else, than one who is skilled in dialectic?

HERM. I should not.

Soc. It is the business, therefore, of the shipwright to make a rudder, according to the directions of the pilot, if he means to produce a good rudder.

HERM.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. And the legislator, as it seems, ought, in the establishing of names, to consult a man skilled in dialectic, if he means to found them in a beautiful manner.

HERM. He ought.

SOC. It appears, therefore, O Hermogenes, that the imposition of names is no despicable affair, as you think it is, nor the business of depraved men, or of any that may occur. And Cratylus speaks truly, when he says that names belong to things from nature, and that every one is not the artificer of names, but he alone who looks to that name which is naturally accommodated to any thing, and who is able to insert this form of a name in letters and syllables.

HERM. I have nothing proper to urge, Socrates, in contradiction of what you say. And, perhaps, it is not easy to be thus suddenly persuaded. But I think that I should be more easily persuaded by you, if you could show me what that is which you call a certain rectitude of name according to nature.

SOC. As to myself, O blessed Hermogenes, I say nothing; but I even almost forget what I said a short time since, that I had no knowledge in this affair, but that I would investigate it in conjunction with you. But now, in consequence of our mutual survey, thus much appears to us, in addition to our former conviction, that a name possesses some natural rectitude; and that every man does not know how to accommodate names to things, in a becoming manner. Is not this the case?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. After this, therefore, it is necessary to inquire, what the rectitude of name is, if you desire to know this.

HERM. But I do desire to know it.

SOC. Consider then.

HERM. But in what manner is it proper to consider?

SOC. The most proper mode of inquiry, my friend, must be obtained from those endued with science, offering them money for this purpose, and loading them with thanks: and these are the sophists, through whom your brother Callias, in consequence of having given them a great quantity of money, appears to be a wise man. But, since you have no authority in paternal matters, it is proper to supplicate your brother, and entreat him to show you that rectitude about things of this kind, which he has learned from Protagoras.

HERM. But this request of mine, Socrates, would be absurd, if, notwithstanding my entirely rejecting the truth of Protagoras, I should be pleased with assertions resulting from this truth, as things of any worth.

Soc. But if this does not please you, it is proper to derive our information from Homer, and the other poets.

HERM. And what does Homer say, Socrates, concerning names; and where?

Soc. Every where. But those are the greatest and most beautiful passages, in which he distinguishes between the names which are assigned to the same things by men, and those which are employed by the gods. Or do you not think that he speaks something in these, great and wonderful, concerning the rectitude of names? For it is evident that the gods call things according to that rectitude which names naturally possess. Or do you not think so?

HERM. I well know, that if the gods denominate any thing, they properly denominate it. But what are the passages you speak of?

Soc. Do you not know, that speaking of the Trojan river, which contested in a singular manner with Vulcan, he says,

Xanthus its name with those of heav'nly birth,
But call'd *Scamander* by the sons of earth?¹

HERM. I do.

Soc. But what then, do you not think that this is something venerable, to know in what respect it is more proper to call that river *Xanthus*, than *Scamander*? Likewise, if you are so disposed, take notice that he says², the same bird is called *Chalcis* by the gods, but *Cymindis* by men. And do you think this is a despicable piece of learning, to know how much more proper it is to call the same bird *Chalcis* than *Cymindis*, or *Myrines* than *Batica*; and so in many other instances, which may be found both in this poet and others? But these things are, perhaps, beyond the ability of you and me to discover. But the names *Scamandrius* and *Astyanax* may, as it appears to me, be comprehended by human sagacity; and it may easily be seen, what kind of rectitude there is in these names, which, according to Homer, were given to the son of Hector. For you doubtless know the verses in which these names are contained.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Which therefore of these names do you think Homer considered as more properly adapted to the boy, *Astyanax* or *Scamandrius*?

¹ *Iliad* xx. v. 74.

² *Iliad* xiv. v. 291.

HERM. I cannot tell.

Soc. But consider the affair in this manner: if any one should ask you, which you thought would denominate things in the most proper manner, the more wife or the more unwise?

HERM. It is manifest that I should answer, the more wife.

Soc. Which therefore appears to you to be the more wife in cities, the women or the men, that I may speak of the whole genus?

HERM. The men.

Soc. Do you not therefore know that, according to Homer, the son of Hector was called by the men of Troy, Aftyanax, but by the women, Scamandrius?

HERM. It appears that it was so.

Soc. Do you not think that Homer considered the Trojan men as wiser than the Trojan women?

HERM. I think he did.

Soc. He therefore thought that the name Aftyanax was more proper for the boy than Scamandrius.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But let us consider the reason which he assigns for this denomination: for, says he,

Aftyanax the Trojans call'd the boy,
From his great father, the defence of Troy¹.

On this account, as it appears, it is proper to call the son of the saviour of his country Aftyanax, that is, the king of that city, which, as Homer says, his father preserved.

HERM. It appears so to me.

Soc. But why is this appellation more proper than that of Scamandrius? for I confess I am ignorant of the reason of this. Do you understand it?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

Soc. But, excellent man, Homer also gave to Hector his name.

HERM. But why?

Soc. Because it appears to me that this name is something similar to Aftyanax, and that these names were considered by the Greeks as having the

¹ Iliad vi. v. 402.

same meaning; for *king* and *Hector* nearly signify the same, since both these names are royal. For whoever is a *king*, is also doubtless a *Hector*; since such a one evidently *rules over*, *possesses*, and *has*, that of which he is the king. Or do I appear to you to say nothing to the purpose, but deceive myself, in thinking, as through certain vestiges, to touch upon the opinion of Homer respecting the rectitude of names?

HERM. By no means, by Jupiter, but perhaps you in some degree apprehend his meaning.

SOC. For it is just, as it appears to me, to call the offspring of a lion, a lion, and the offspring of a horse, a horse. I do not say, that this ought to be the case when something monstrous is produced from a horse, and which is different from a horse; but only when the offspring is a natural production. For if the natural progeny of an ox should generate a horse, the offspring ought not to be called a calf, but a colt. [And if a horse, contrary to nature, should generate a calf, the offspring ought not to be called a colt, but a calf¹.] And again, if from a man an offspring not human should be produced, the progeny, I think, ought not to be called a man. And the same reasoning must take place respecting trees, and all other producing natures. Or does it not appear so to you?

HERM. It does.

SOC. You speak well: for take care that I do not fraudulently deceive you. For the same reason, therefore, the offspring of a king ought to be called a king. But it is of no consequence, though the same thing should be

¹ A great part of this sentence within the crotchets is omitted in the Greek text of all the printed editions of Plato; and a great part likewise of the preceding sentence is wanting: though Ficinus, as is evident from his version, found the whole complete in the manuscript, from which he made his translation. In the Greek, there is nothing more than, *εαν βοος εκγονον φυσει ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκη μοσχων, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχων*. Instead of which we ought to read, *εαν βοος εκγονον φυσει ιππον τεκη ου μοσχων κλητεον, αλλα πωλον, και εαν ιππος παρα φυσιν τεκη μοσχων, ου πωλον κλητεον, αλλα μοσχων*. But though, without this emendation, the passage is perfect nonsense, yet this has not been discovered by any of the verbalists; a plain proof this, that they never read this Dialogue with a view to understand it. Or perhaps, they considered an emendation of this kind beneath their notice; for doubtless it is not to be compared with the remarks with which their works abound. Such as, for instance, the following observation in Fischer's edition of this Dialogue, p. 2. in which we are informed that instead of *αυτων*, "the Basil edition has *αυτων*, and this not badly:" "Ald. Baf. 1. 2. *αυτων*, non male." And this author's edition is replete with remarks no less curious, acute, and important.

expressed

expressed in different syllables, or a letter should be added or taken away, as long as the essence of the thing possesses dominion, and manifests itself in the name.

HERM. What is this which you say?

Soc. Nothing complex. But, as you well know, we pronounce the names of the elements, but not the elements themselves, four alone excepted, viz. ϵ & υ , and $\omicron$ & ω : and adding other letters, as well to the other vowels as to the non-vowels, we form names, which we afterwards enunciate. But, as long as we insert the apparent power of the element, it is proper to call the name that which is manifested to us by the element. As is evident, for instance, in the letter $\beta\eta\tau\omega$: for here you see that the addition of the η , and the τ , and the ω , does not hinder the nature of that element from being evinced by the whole name, agreeably to the intention of its founder; so well did he know how to give names to letters.

HERM. You appear to me to speak the truth.

Soc. Will not, therefore, the same reasoning take place respecting a king? For a king will be produced from a king, *good* from *good*, and *beauty* from *beauty*; and in the same manner with relation to every thing else, from every genus a progeny of the same kind will be produced, unless something monstrous is generated; and will be called by the same name. But it is possible to vary these names in such a manner by syllables, that, to ignorant men, the very same appellations will appear to be different from each other. Just as the medicines of physicians, when varied with colours or smells, appear to us to be different, though they are still the same; but to the physician, as one who considers the power of the medicines, they appear to be the same, nor is he at all astonished by the additions. In like manner, perhaps, he who is skilled in names speculates their power, and is not astonished, if at any time a letter should be added, or changed, or taken away; or that in other all-various letters, the same power of name should be found. As in the names *Astyanax* and *Hector*, which we have just spoken of, they do not possess any thing of the same letters, except the ι , and yet, at the same time, they signify the same thing. So likewise with respect to the name $\alpha\chi\epsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\varsigma$, or a *ruler of a city*, what communication has it in letters with the two preceding names? and yet it has the same signification. And there are many
other

ether words which signify nothing else than a king; many which signify nothing else than the leader of an army, as *αγης*, *πολεμαρχος*, *ευπολεμος*; and likewise many which imply a professor of medicine, as *ιατροκλης* and *αιεσιμβος*. And perhaps many other may be found, disagreeing indeed in syllables, and letters, but in power vocally emitting the same signification. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And that to things which subsist according to nature, the same names should be assigned?

HERM. Perfectly so.

SOC. But that, as often as generations take place contrary to nature, and by this means produce things in the form of monsters, as when from a good and pious man an impious man is generated, then the offspring ought not to be called by the name of his producer; just as we said before, that if a horse should generate the progeny of an ox, the offspring ought not to be called a horse, but an ox?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. When an impious man, therefore, is generated from one who is pious, the name of the genus to which he belongs must be assigned him.

HERM. It must so.

SOC. Such a son, therefore, ought not to be called either one who is a friend to divinity, or mindful of divinity, or any thing of this kind: but he should be called by that which signifies the contrary of all this, if names ought to possess any thing of rectitude.

HERM. This ought to be the case more than any thing, Socrates.

SOC. Just, Hermogenes, as the name Orestes appears to be properly invented; whether a certain fortune assigned him this name, or some poet, evincing by this appellation his rustic nature, correspondent to an inhabitant of mountains.

HERM. So it appears, Socrates.

SOC. It appears also, that the name of his father subsists according to nature.

HERM. It does so.

SOC. For it seems that Agamemnon was one who considered that he ought to labour and patiently endure hardships, and obtain the end of his designs

designs through virtue. But his stay before Troy, with so great an army, evinces his patient endurance. That this man, therefore, was wonderful, with respect to perseverance, is denoted by the name Agamemnon. Perhaps also Atreus is a proper denomination: for his slaughter of Chryseus, and the cruelty which he exercised towards Thyestes, evince that he was *pernicious* and *noxious*. His surname, therefore, suffers a small degree of declination, and conceals its meaning; so that the nature of the man is not evident to every one; but to those who are skilful in names, the signification of Atreus is sufficiently manifest. For his name properly subsists throughout, according to the *intrepid*, *inexorable*, and *noxious*. It appears also to me, that the name given to Pelops was very properly assigned: for this name signifies one who sees things near at hand, and that he is worthy of such a denomination.

HERM. But how?

SOC. Because it is reported of this man, that in the slaughter of Myrtilus, he neither provided for any thing, nor could perceive afar off how great a calamity his whole race would be subject to from this circumstance; but he only regarded that which was just before him, and which then subsisted, that is, what was *πelas*, or *near*; and this when he desired, by all possible means, to receive Hippodamia in marriage. So that his name was derived from *πelas* *near*, and *αἰς* *fight*. Every one also must think that the name given to Tantalus was properly and naturally assigned him, if what is related concerning him is true.

HERM. But what is that relation?

SOC. That, while he was yet living, many unfortunate and dire circumstances happened to him, and at last the whole of his country was subverted; and that, when he was dead, a stone was suspended over his head in Hades, these particulars, as it appears corresponding with his name in a wonderful and artless manner: for it is just as if any one should be willing to call him *ταλάντατος*, i. e. *most miserable*, but, at the same time, desirous to conceal this circumstance, should call him Tantalus instead of Talantatus. And it seems that the fortune of rumour caused him to receive this appellation. But it appears that the name of him who was called his father, is composed in an all-beautiful manner, though it is by no means easy to be understood: for in reality the name of Jupiter is, as it were, a sentence; but dividing it into

two parts, some of us use one part, and some another, for some call him *ζῆνα*, and some *δια*. And these parts collected into one, evince the nature of the god; which, as we have said, a name ought to effect: *For there is no one who is more the cause of living, both to us and every thing else, than he who is the ruler and king of all things*¹. It happens, therefore, that this god is rightly denominated, through whom life is present with all living beings; but the name, though one, is distributed, as I have said, into two parts, viz. into *δια* and *ζῆνα*. But he who suddenly hears that this god is the son of Saturn, may perhaps think it a reproachful assertion: for it is rational to believe that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain great dianoëtic power; for, when Saturn is called *ῥεφες*, it does not signify a boy, but the purity and incorruptible nature of his intellect². But, according to report, Saturn is

¹ It is evident from hence, that Jupiter, according to Plato, is the demiurgus, or artificer of the universe; for no one can be more the cause of living to all things, than he by whom the world was produced. But if this be the case, the artificer of the world is not, as we have before observed according to the Platonic theology, the first cause: for there are other gods superior to Jupiter, whose names Plato, as we shall shortly see, etymologizes agreeably to the Orphic theology. Indeed, his etymology of Jupiter is evidently derived from the following Orphic verses, which are cited by Joannes Diac. Allegor. ad Hesiodi Theog. p. 278.

Ἔστιν δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ Ζεὺς. Ζεὺς γὰρ ἔδωκε,
Ζωὰ τ' ἐγέννησεν καὶ Ζῆν αὐτὸν καλεῖσθαι,
Καὶ Δία τ' ὅδ', ὅτι δὴ διὰ τοῦτον ἀπαντὰ τεύχεται.
Εἰς δὲ πατὴρ ὅστις πάντων, θῆρων τε βροτῶν τε.

i. e. "Jupiter is the principle of all things. For Jupiter is the cause of the generation of animals and they call him Ζην, and Δία also, because all things were fabricated *through* him; and he is the one father of all things, of beasts and men." Here too you may observe that he is called *fabricator* and *father*, which are the very epithets given to the demiurgus of the world by Plato in the *Timæus*. In short, Jupiter, the artificer of the world, subsists at the extremity of that order of gods which is called *ῥεφες*, *intellectual*, as is copiously and beautifully proved by Proclus, in *Plat. Theol. lib. v.* And he is likewise celebrated by the Chaldaic theology, as we are informed by Damascius and Pselus under two names, *δις ἐπέκεινα*, *twice beyond*.

² Saturn, therefore, according to Plato, is *pure intellect*, viz. the first intellectual intellect: for the intellects of all the gods are pure in the most transcendent degree; and therefore purity here must be characteristic of supremacy. Hence Saturn subsists at the summit of the intellectual order of gods, from whence he is received into all the subsequent divine orders, and into every part of the world. But from this definition of Saturn we may see the extreme beauty of that divine fable, in which he is said to devour his children: for this signifies nothing more than the nature of an intellectual god, since every intellect returns into itself: and consequently its offspring, which are intellectual conceptions, are, as it were, absorbed in itself.

the

the son of Heaven: and sight directed to things above is called by this name, *οὐρανία*¹, from beholding things situated on high. From whence, O Hermogenes, those who discourse on sublime affairs, say that a pure intellect is present with him, and that he is very properly denominatèd Heaven. Indeed, if I did but remember the genealogy of the gods, according to Hesiod, and the yet superior progenitors of these which he speaks of, I should not desist from showing you the rectitude of their appellations, until I had made trial of this wisdom, whether it produces any thing of consequence, or not; and whether those explanations which I have just now so suddenly delivered, though I know not from whence, are defective or true.

HERM. Indeed, Socrates, you really appear to me to pour forth oracles on a sudden, like those who are agitated by some inspiring god.

Soc. And I think indeed, O Hermogenes, that this wisdom happened to me through the means of Euthyphro, the son of Pantius: for I was with him in the morning, and listened to him with great attention. It seems therefore, that, being divinely inspired, he has not only filled my ears with divine wisdom, but that he has also arrested my very soul. It appears therefore to me, that we ought to act in such a manner as to make use of this wisdom to-day, and contemplate what yet remains concerning the rectitude of names. But to-morrow, if it is agreeable to you, we will lay it aside, and purify ourselves from it, finding out for this purpose one who is skilled in expiating things of this kind, whether he is some one of the priests, or the sophists.

¹ Heaven, which is here characterized by sight, is the heaven which Plato so much celebrates in the Phædrus, and composes that order of gods which is called by the Chaldean oracles *νοητός καὶ νοερός*, i. e. *intelligible, and at the same time intellectual*. This will be evident from considering that Plato, in what follows, admits with Hesiod, that there are gods superior to heaven, such as night, chaos, &c: But as sight corresponds to intelligence, and this is the same with that which is both intelligible and intellectual, and as Saturn is the summit of the intellectual order, it is evident that heaven must compose the middle order of gods characterized by intelligence, and that the order above this must be entirely intelligible. In consequence of all this, what must we think of their system, who suppose Heaven, Saturn, and Jupiter, and indeed all the gods of the antients, to have been nothing more than dead men deified, notwithstanding the above-etymologies, and the express testimony of Plato to the contrary in the Timæus, who represents the demiurgus commanding the subordinate gods, after he had produced them, to fabricate men and other animals? For my own part, I know not which to admire most, the ignorance, the impudence, or the impiety of such assertions. All that can be said is, that such opinions are truly barbaric, modern and Galilæan.

HERM. I assent to this ; for I shall hear, with great pleasure, what remains of the discussion concerning names.

SOC. It is necessary to act in this manner. From whence then are you willing we should begin our speculation, since we have insisted upon a certain formula of operation ; that we may know whether names themselves will testify for us, that they were not entirely fabricated from chance, but contain a certain rectitude of construction ? The names, therefore, of heroes and men may perhaps deceive us : for many of these subsist according to the surnames of their ancestors, and sometimes have no correspondence with the persons, as we observed in the beginning of this disputation. But many are added, as tokens of renown, such as *the prosperous, the saviour, the friend of divinity*, and a variety of others of this kind. It appears to me, therefore, that we ought to neglect the discussion of these : but it is probable that we shall particularly find names properly fabricated, about eternal and natural beings ; for it is most becoming to study the position of names in these. But, perhaps, some of these are established by a power more divine than that of men.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak excellently well.

SOC. Will it not therefore be just, to begin from the gods, considering the reason why they are properly denominated gods ?

HERM. It will be proper.

SOC. I therefore conjecture as follows :—It appears to me that the most ancient of the Greeks, or the first inhabitants of Greece, considered those only as gods, which are esteemed such at present by many of the Barbarians ; I mean, the sun and the moon, the earth, the stars, and the heavens. As they therefore perceived all these *running* round in a perpetual course, from this nature of *running* they called them gods ; but afterwards, understanding that there were others besides these, they called all of them by the same name. Has what I say any similitude to truth, or not ?

HERM. It possesses a perfect similitude.

SOC. What then shall we consider after this ?

HERM. It is evident that we ought to speculate concerning dæmons, heroes, and men.

SOC. Concerning dæmons ? And truly, Hermogenes, this is the proper method of proceeding. What then are we to understand by the name dæmon ? See whether I say any thing to the purpose.

HERM.

HERM. Only relate what it is.

Soc. Do you not know who those dæmons are which Hesiod speaks of?

HERM. I do not.

Soc. And are you ignorant that he says, the golden race of men was first generated¹?

HERM. This I know.

Soc. He says, therefore, concerning this, "that after this race was concealed by Fate, it produced dæmons² denominated holy, terrestrial, good, expellers of evil, and guardians of mortal men."

HERM. But what then?

Soc.

¹ The different ages of men which are celebrated by Hesiod; in his Works and Days, are not to be understood literally, as if they once really subsisted, but only as signifying, in beautiful poetical images, the mutations of human lives from virtue to vice, and from vice to virtue. For earth was never peopled with men either wholly virtuous or vicious; since the good and the bad have always subsisted together on its surface, and always will subsist. However, in consequence of the different circulations of the heavens, there are periods of fertility and sterility, not only with respect to men but likewise to brutes and plants. Hence places naturally adapted to the nurture of the philosophical genius, such as Athens and Egypt, will, in periods productive of a fertility of souls, such as was formerly the case, abound with divine men: but in periods such as the present, in which there is every where a dreadful sterility of souls, through the general prevalence of a certain most irrational and gigantic impiety, *αλογιστος και γιγαντικη ανοσιουργια*, as Proclus elegantly calls the established religion of his time, in Plat. Polit. p. 369—at such periods as these, Athens and Egypt will no longer be the seminaries of divine souls, but will be filled with degraded and barbarous inhabitants. And such, according to the arcana of ancient philosophy, is the reason of the present general degradation of mankind. Not that formerly there were no such characters as now abound, for this would be absurd, since mankind always have been, and always will be, upon earth, a mixture of good and bad, in which the latter will predominate; but that during the fertile circulations of the heavens, in consequence of their being a greater number of men than when a contrary circulation takes place, men will abound who adorn human nature, and who indeed descend for the benevolent purpose of leading back apostate souls to the principles from which they fell. As the different ages therefore of Hesiod signify nothing more than the different lives which each individual of the human species passes through, hence an intellectual life is implied by the golden age. For such a life is pure, and free from sorrow and passion; and of this impassivity gold is an image, through its never being subject to rust or putrefaction. Such a life, too, is with great propriety said to be under Saturn, because Saturn, as we have a little before observed, is pure intellect. But for a larger account of this interesting particular, and of the allegorical meaning of the different ages celebrated by Hesiod, see Proclus upon Hesiod, p. 39, &c.

² By dæmons, here, must not be understood those who are essentially such, and perpetually subsist as mediums between gods and men, but those only who are such *κατα σchein*, or according

SOC. I think, indeed, that he calls it a golden race, not as naturally composed from gold, but as being beautiful and good: but I infer this, from his denominating our race an iron one.

HERM. You speak the truth.

SOC. Do you not therefore think, that if any one of the present times should appear to be good, Hesiod would say he belonged to the golden race?

HERM. It is probable he would.

SOC. But are the good any other than such as are prudent?

HERM. They are the prudent.

SOC. On this account therefore, as it appears to me, more than any other he calls them *dæmons*, because they were *prudent* and *learned* (*δαίμονες*). And, in our antient tongue, this very name is to be found. Hence both he, and many other poets, speak in a becoming manner, when they say that a good man after death will receive a mighty destiny and renown, and will become a *dæmon*, according to the surname of prudence. I therefore assert the same, that every good man is *learned* and *skillful*; that he is *dæmoni*acal, both while living and when dead; and that he is properly denominated a *dæmon*.

HERM. And I also, Socrates, seem to myself to agree with you perfectly in this particular. But what does the name *hero*¹ signify?

SOC.

to habitude; or, in other words, the souls of truly worthy men, after their departure from the present life: for such, till they descend again upon earth, are the benevolent guardians of mankind, in conjunction with those who are essentially *dæmons*.

¹ Heroes form the last order of souls which are the perpetual attendants of the gods, and are characterized by a venerable and elevated magnanimity; and as they are wholly of an anagogic nature, they are the progeny of love, through whom they revolve about the first beauty in harmonic measures, and with ineffable delight. Men likewise, who in the present life knew the particular deity from whom they descended, and who lived in a manner conformable to the idiom of their presiding and parent divinity, were called by the antients, *sons of the gods*, *demigods*, and *heroes*: i. e. they were *essentially* men, but *according to habitude*, *κατὰ ὄρεσιν*, *heroes*. But such as these were divided into two classes; into those who lived according to *intellectual*, and those who lived according to *practical* virtue: and the first sort were said to have a god for their father, and a woman for their mother; but the second sort, a goddess for their mother and a man for their father. Not that this was literally the case; but nothing more was meant by such an assertion, than that those who lived according to an intellectual life, descended from a deity of the male order, whose illuminations they copiously participated; and that those who lived according to practical virtue, descended from a female divinity, such a species of life being more imbecile and passive than

Soc. This is by no means difficult to understand ; for this name is very little different from its original, evincing that its generation is derived from love.

HERM. How is this ?

Soc. Do you not know that heroes are demigods ?

HERM. What then ?

Soc. All of them were doubtless generated either from the love of a god towards a mortal maid, or from the love of a man towards a goddess. If, therefore, you consider this matter according to the antient Attic tongue, you will more clearly understand the truth of this derivation : for it will be evident to you that the word hero is derived from love, with a trifling mutation for the sake of the name : or you may say, that this name is deduced from their being wife and rhetoricians, sagacious and skilled in dialectic, and sufficiently ready in interrogating ; for *εἰπεν* is the same as to speak. Hence, as we just now said in the Attic tongue, those who are called heroes will prove to be certain rhetoricians, interrogators, and lovers : so that the genus of rhetoricians and sophists is, in consequence of this, an heroic tribe. This, indeed, is not difficult to understand ; but rather this respecting men is obscure, I mean, why they were called *αἰθιωτοί*, *men*. Can you tell the reason ?

HERM. From whence, my worthy friend, should I be able ? And, indeed, if I was by any means capable of making this discovery, I should not exert myself for this purpose, because I think you will more easily discover it than I shall.

than the former. But the masculine genius in the gods, implies the cause of stable power, being, identity, and conversion ; and the feminine, that which generates from itself all-various progressions, divisions, measures of life, and prolific powers. I only add, that as the names of the gods were not only attributed by the antients to *essential* dæmons and heroes, but to men who were such according to *habitude*, on account of their similitude to a divine nature ; we may from hence perceive the true origin of that most stupid and dire of all modern opinions, that the gods of the antients were nothing but dead men, ignorantly deified by the objects of their adoration. Such an opinion indeed, exclusive of its other pernicious qualities, is so great an outrage to the common sense of the antients, that it would be disgraceful even to mention the names of its authors. For,

O'er such as these, a race of nameless things,
Oblivion scornful spreads her dusky wings.

Soc.

Soc. You appear to me to rely on the inspiration of Euthyphro.

HERM. Evidently so.

Soc. And your confidence is proper: for I now seem to myself to understand in a knowing and an elegant manner; and I am afraid, if I do not take care, that I shall become to-day wiser than I ought. But consider what I say. For this, in the first place, ought to be understood concerning names, that we often add letters, and often take them away, while we compose names just as we please; and, besides this, often change the acute syllables. As when we say *Δι φίλος*, a friend to Jove: for, in order that this name may become instead of a verb to us, we take away the other *ιωτα*, and, instead of an acute middle syllable, we pronounce a grave one. But, on the contrary, in others we insert letters, and others again we enunciate with a graver accent.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. This, therefore, as it appears to me, takes place in the name *man*: for a noun is generated from a verb, one letter, *α*, being taken away, and the end of the word becoming more grave.

HERM. How do you mean?

Soc. Thus. This name *man* signifies that other animals, endued with sight, neither consider, nor reason, nor contemplate; but man both sees, and at the same time contemplates and reasons upon that which he sees. Hence man alone, of all animals, is rightly denominated *ανθρωπος*, viz. *contemplating what he beholds*¹. But what shall we investigate after this? Shall it be that, the inquiry into which will be very pleasing to me?

HERM. By all means.

Soc. It appears then to me, that we ought, in the next place, to investigate concerning soul and body; for we call the composition of soul and body, *man*.

HERM. Without doubt.

Soc. Let us, then, endeavour to divide these in the same manner as the former subjects of our speculation. Will you not therefore say, that we should first of all consider the rectitude of this name *soul*, and afterwards of the name *body*?

¹ For every thing receives its definition from its *huparxis*, or summit, which in man is *intellectual reason*; and this is entirely of a contemplative nature.

HERM.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. That I may speak, then, what appears to me on a sudden, I think that those who assigned this name *soul*, understood some such thing as this, that whenever this nature is present with the body, it is the cause of its life, extending to, and refrigerating it with, the power of respiration; but that when the refrigerating power ceases, the body at the same time is dissolved and perishes: and from hence, as it appears to me, they called it soul (*ψυχή*). But, if you please, stop a little; for I seem to myself to perceive something more capable of producing persuasion than this, among the followers of Euthyphro: for, as it appears to me, they would despise this etymology, and consider it as absurd. But consider whether the following explanation will please you.

HERM. Only say what it is.

SOC. What other nature, except the soul, do you think gives life to the whole body, contains, carries, and enables it to walk about?

HERM. No other.

SOC. But what, do you not believe in the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that intellect and soul distribute into order, and contain the nature of every thing else?

HERM. I do.

SOC. It will be highly proper, therefore, to denominate that power which carries and contains nature, *ψυχή*: but it may more elegantly be called *ψυχή*.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And this latter appellation appears to me to be more agreeable to art than the former.

HERM. For it certainly is so.

SOC. But it would truly appear to be ridiculous, if it was named according to its composition.

HERM. But what shall we next consider after this?

SOC. Shall we speak concerning body?

HERM. By all means.

SOC. But this name appears to me to deviate in a certain small degree from its original: for, according to some, it is the *sepulchre* of the soul, which they consider as buried at present; and because whatever the soul

signifies, it signifies by the body; so that on this account it is properly called *σημα*, a *sepulchre*. And indeed the followers of Orpheus appear to me to have established this name, principally because the soul suffers in body the punishment of its guilt, and is surrounded with this enclosure that it may preserve the image of a prison¹. They are of opinion, therefore, that the body should retain this appellation, *σῶμα*, till the soul has absolved the punishment which is her due, and that no other letter ought to be added to the name.

¹ With this doctrine, that the body is the sepulchre of the soul, and that the soul suffers the punishment of her guilt in body, as in a prison, Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans perfectly agree. Thus Heraclitus, speaking of unembodied souls: Ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθρῆκαμεν δὲ τοῦ ἐκείνων ζῆον, i. e. "We live their death, and we die their life." And Empedocles, blaming generation, beautifully says of her:

Ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ζῶων ἐτίθει νεκρά, εἶδε ἀμείβων.

"The species changing with destruction dread,
She makes the *living* pass into the *dead*."

And again, lamenting his connection with this corporeal world, he pathetically exclaims:

Κλαύσα τε καὶ κωκυσα, ἰδὼν ἀσυνήθεια χῶρον.

"For this I weep, for this indulge my woe,
That e'er my soul such novel realms should know."

Thus too the celebrated Pythagorean Philolaus, in the following remarkable passage in the Doric dialect, preserved by Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromat.* lib. iii. p. 403: Μαρτυροῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολογοὶ τε καὶ μαντεῖς, ὡς διὰ τινὰς τεμνωρίας, αἱ ψυχὰ τῶ σωματι συνεζευκταὶ, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σωματι τούτῳ τεθαπται, i. e. "The antient theologists and priests also testify that the soul is united with body for the sake of suffering punishment; and that it is buried in body, as in a sepulchre." And lastly, Pythagoras himself confirms the above doctrine, when he beautifully observes, according to Clemens in the same book: Θάνατος ἐστὶν ὅκοσα ἐγερθέντες ὀρεομεν ὅκοσα δὲ εὐδόντες ὕπνος, i. e. "Whatever we see when awake is death, and when asleep a dream." Hence, as I have shown in my Treatise on the Eleusinian Mysteries, the antients by Hades signified nothing more than the profound union of the soul with the present body; and consequently, that till the soul separated herself by philosophy from such a ruinous conjunction, she subsisted in Hades even in the present life; her punishment hereafter being nothing more than a continuation of her state upon earth, and a transmigration, as it were, from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream: and this, too, was occultly signified by the shows of the lesser mysteries. Indeed, any one, whose intellectual eye is not perfectly buried in the gloom of sense, must be convinced of this from the passages already adduced. And if this be the case, as it most assuredly is, how barbarous and irrational is the doctrine, which asserts that the soul shall subsist hereafter in a state of bliss, connected with the present body.

HERM. But it appears to me, Socrates, that enough has been said concerning these particulars. But do you think we can speak about the names of the gods, in the same manner as we considered the name of Jupiter, and determine the rectitude of their denominations?

SOC. By Jupiter, Hermogenes, if we are endued with intellect, we shall confess that the most beautiful mode of conduct, on this occasion, is to acknowledge that we know nothing either concerning the gods, or the names by which they denominate themselves¹: for it is evident that they call themselves by true appellations. But the second mode of rectitude consists, I think, in calling the gods by those names which the law ordains us to invoke them by in prayer, whatever the names may be which they rejoice to hear; and that we should act thus, as knowing nothing more than this: for the method of invocation which the law appoints appears to me to be beautifully established. If you are willing, therefore, let us enter on this speculation, previously, as it were, declaring to the gods that we speculate nothing concerning their divinities, as we do not think ourselves equal to such an undertaking; but that we direct our attention to the opinion entertained by those men who first fabricated their names: for this will be the means of avoiding their indignation.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to speak modestly: let us therefore act in this manner.

SOC. Ought we not, therefore, to begin from Vesta, according to law?

HERM. It is just that we should.

¹ A modern reader will doubtless imagine, from this passage, that Plato denied in reality the possibility of knowing any thing concerning divine natures, and particularly if he should recollect the celebrated saying of Socrates, "This one thing I know, that I know nothing." But as Proclus beautifully observes, in his book on Providence, Socrates, by such an assertion, meant to insinuate nothing more than the middle kind of condition of human knowledge, which subsists between intellect and sense; the former possessing a total knowledge of things, because it immediately knows the essence of things, and the reality of being; and the latter neither totally knowing truth, because it is ignorant of essence, nor even the nature of sensible things, a knowledge of which is feigned to have a subsistence. So that the Oracle might well call Socrates the wisest of men, because he knew himself to be not truly wise. But who, except a wise man, can possess such a knowledge? For a fool is ignorant that he is ignorant; and no one can truly know the imperfection of human knowledge, but he who has arrived at the summit of human wisdom. And after this manner the present assertion of Plato must be understood.

Soc. What then shall we say is to be understood by this name 'Εστια?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not think it is easy to discover this.

Soc. It appears, indeed, excellent Hermogenes, that those who first established names were no despicable persons, but men who investigated sublime concerns, and were employed in continual meditation and study.

HERM. But what then?

Soc. It seems to me that the position of names was owing to some such men as these. And, indeed, if any one considers foreign names, he will not less discover the meaning of each. As with respect to this which we call *ευσια*, *essence*, there are some who call it *εσια*, and others again *ωσια*. In the first place, therefore, it is rational to call the essence of things 'Εστια, according to one of these names, *εσια*: and because we denominate that which participates of essence 'Εστια, *essence*, Vesta may, in consequence of this, be properly called 'Εστια': for our ancestors were accustomed to call *ουσια*, *essence*, *ωσια*. Besides, if any one considers the business of sacrifice, he will be led to think that this was the opinion of those by whom sacrifices were ordained. For it was proper, that those who denominated the essence of all things 'Εστια (Vesta), should sacrifice to Vesta, before all the gods. But those who called *essence* *ωσια*, these nearly, according to the opinion of Heraclitus, considered all things as perpetually flowing, and that nothing had any permanent subsistence. The cause, therefore, and leader of things, with them, is *impulse*: and hence they very properly denominated this impelling cause *ωσια*. And thus much concerning the opinion of those who may be considered as knowing nothing. But, after Vesta, it is just to speculate concerning Rhea

* The goddess Vesta has a manifest agreement with *essence*, because she preserves the being of things in a state of purity, and contains the summits of the wholes from which the universe consists. For *being* is the most ancient of all things, after the first cause, who is truly super-essential; and Earth, which, among mundane divinities, is Vesta, is said by Plato, in the *Timæus*, to be the most ancient of all the gods in the heavens. This goddess first subsists among the liberated *απολυται*, gods, of whom we have already given an account in our notes on the *Phædrus*, and from thence affords to the mundane gods an unpolluted establishment in themselves. Hence every thing which is stable, immutable, and which always subsists in the same manner, descends to all mundane natures from this supercelestial Vesta. So that, from the stable illuminations which she perpetually imparts, the poles themselves, and the axis about which the spheres revolve, obtain and preserve their immoveable position; and the earth itself stably abides in the middle.

and Saturn, though we have discussed the name of Saturn already. But, perhaps, I say nothing to the purpose.

HERM. Why so, Socrates?

SOC. O excellent man, I perceive a certain hive of wisdom.

HERM. But of what kind is it?

SOC. It is almost ridiculous to mention it; and yet I think it is capable of producing a certain probability.

HERM. What probability is this?

SOC. I seem to myself to behold Heraclitus formerly asserting something wisely concerning Saturn and Rhea, and which Homer himself also asserts.

HERM. Explain your meaning.

SOC. Heraclitus then says, that all things subsist in a yielding condition, and that nothing abides; and assimilating things to the flowing of a river, he says, that you cannot merge yourself twice in the same stream.

HERM. He does so.

SOC. Does he, therefore, appear to you to conceive differently from Heraclitus, who places Rhea and Saturn among the progenitors of the other gods? And do you think that Heraclitus assigned both of them by chance, the names of streams of water? As, therefore, Homer¹ calls Ocean the generation of the gods, and Tethys their mother, so I think the same is asserted by Hesiod. Likewise Orpheus says,

In beauteous-flowing marriage first combin'd
Ocean, who mingling with his sister Tethys join'd².

Behold,

¹ Iliad ix.

² Ocean, according to Proclus, in Tim. lib. iv. is the cause, to all secondary natures, of all motion, whether intellectual, psychical (*ψυχική*) or natural. But Tethys is the cause of all the distinction and separation of the streams proceeding from the Ocean; conferring on each its proper purity, in the exercise of its natural motion. Ocean therefore may with great propriety be called the generation of the gods, as it is the cause of their progressions into the universe, from their occult subsistence in the intelligible order. But it is necessary to observe, that this mutual communication of energies among the gods was called by ancient theologists *ἱερός γάμος*, a *sacred marriage*; concerning which Proclus, in the second book of his MS. Commentary on the Parmenides, admirably remarks as follows: *Ταυτὴν δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν, ποτε μὲν ἐν τοῖς συστοιχοῖς ὁρῶσι θεοῖς (αἱ θεολογοὶ) καὶ καλοῦσι γάμον Ἥρας καὶ Διός, Οὐρανοῦ καὶ Γῆς, Κρόνου καὶ Ρέας· ποτε δὲ τῶν καταλειπτερώων πρὸς τὰ κρείττω, καὶ καλοῦσι γάμον Διὸς καὶ Δημητράς· ποτε δὲ καὶ ἐμπλαῖν τῶν κρείττωνων πρὸς τὰ υφεύμενα, καὶ λέγουσι Διὸς καὶ Κέρης γάμον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ὅλων ἀλλὰ μὲν τισὶν αἱ πρὸς τὰ συστοιχὰ κοινωνίαι, ἀλλὰ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν* *ἀλλὰ*

Behold, therefore, how all these consent with each other in their doctrine, and how they all tend towards the opinion of Heraclitus!

HERM. You seem to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose, but I do not understand what the name Tethys implies.

SOC. But this nearly implies the same, and signifies that it is the occult name of a fountain; for *leaping forth*, and *straining through*, represent the image of a fountain. But from both these names the name Tethys is composed.

HERM. This, Socrates, is an elegant explanation.

SOC. What then shall we next consider? Jupiter we have already spoken of.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Let us, therefore, speak of his brothers, Neptune and Pluto, and that other name by which Pluto is called.

HERM. By all means.

SOC. He, therefore, who first called Neptune *πρωτόδωκ*, appears to me to have given him this name from the nature of the sea, restraining his course when he walks, and not permitting him to proceed any further, as if it be-

αλλαί δε αἰ πρὸς τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα. Καὶ δει τὴν ἑκάστης ιδιότητα κατανοεῖν καὶ μεταγίγειν ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἶδη τὴν τοιαύτην διαπλοκὴν: i. e. "Theologists at one time considered this communion of the gods, in divinities coordinate with each other; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Juno, of Heaven and Earth, of Saturn and Rhea. But at another time they considered it as subsisting between subordinate and superior divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Ceres. But at another time, on the contrary, they beheld it as subsisting between superior and subordinate divinities; and then they called it the marriage of Jupiter and Proserpine. For, in the gods there is one kind of communion, between such as are of a coordinate nature; another, between the subordinate and supreme; and another again, between the supreme and subordinate. And it is necessary to understand the idiom of each, and to transfer a conjunction of this kind from the gods, to the communion of ideas with each other." And in lib. i. in Tim. p. 16, he observes: Καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν (supple θεῶν) ἑτέροις, ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ πλείοσι συζευγνύσθαι, λαβὼς ἂν ἐκ τῶν μυστικῶν λόγων, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀποφρητοῖς λεγομένων Ἱερῶν Γάμων: i. e. "And that the same goddess is conjoined with other gods, or the same god with many goddesses, may be collected from the *mystic discourses*, and those marriages which are called, in the *mysteries*, *Sacred Marriages*." Thus far the divine Proclus; from the first of which admirable passages the reader may perceive how adultery and rapes are to be understood, when applied to the gods; and that they mean nothing more than a communication of divine energies, either between a superior and subordinate, or a subordinate and superior divinity. For none, but a person of the most simple understanding, would ever suppose that the ancient theological poets believed there was any such thing as marriage or adultery among the gods, according to the literal meaning of the words.

came

came a bond to his feet. He, therefore, denominated the ruler of this power *πρωιδων*, as *πρωιδεσμον οντα*, viz. *having a fettered foot*¹. The *ι* perhaps was added for the sake of elegance. But, perhaps, this was not the meaning of its founder, but two *λλ* were originally placed instead of *ι*; signifying that this god knows a multitude of things. And, perhaps, likewise he was denominated *σειων*, i. e. *shaking*, from *σειειν*, to *shake*, to which *α* and *δ* were added. But Pluto was so called from the donation of *πλουτος*, *wealth*, because riches are dug out of the bowels of the earth. But by the appellation *αιδης*, the multitude appear to me to conceive the same as *αιδεις*, i. e. *obscure and dark*; and that, being terrified at this name, they call him Pluto.

HERM. But what is your opinion, Socrates, about this affair?

SOC. It appears to me, that men have abundantly erred concerning the power of this god, and that they are afraid of him without occasion; for their fear arises from hence; because, when any one of us dies, he abides for ever in Hades; and because the soul departs to this god, divested of the body. But both the empire of this god, and his name, and every other particular respecting him, appear to me to tend to one and the same thing.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will tell you how this affair appears to me. Answer me, therefore, Which of these is the stronger bond to an animal, so as to cause its detention, necessity, or desire?

HERM. Desire, Socrates, is by far the most prevalent.

SOC. Do you not think that many would fly from Hades, unless it held those who dwell there by the strongest bond?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them, therefore, as it appears, by a certain desire; since it binds them with the greatest bond, and not with necessity.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. Are there not, therefore, many desires?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. It binds them, therefore, with the greatest of all desires, if it binds them with the greatest of bonds.

¹ See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue.

HERM.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. Is there then any greater desire, than that which is produced when any one, by associating with another, thinks that, through his means, he shall become a better man?

HERM. By Jupiter, Socrates, there is not any.

SOC. On this account, Hermogenes, we should say, that no one is willing to return from thence hither, not even the Syrens themselves; but that both they, and all others, are enchanted by the beautiful discourses of Pluto. And hence it follows that this god is a perfect sophist; that he greatly benefits those who dwell with him; and that he possesses such great affluence as enables him to supply us with those mighty advantages which we enjoy; and from hence he is called Pluto. But does he not also appear to you to be a philosopher, and one endued with excellent prudence and design, from his being unwilling to associate with men invested with bodies, but then only admits them to familiar converse with him, when their souls are purified from all the evils and desires which subsist about the body? for this divinity considered, that he should be able to detain souls, if he bound them with the desire belonging to virtue; but that, while they possess the consternation and furious insanity of body, even his father Saturn would not be able to detain them with him, in those bonds with which he is said to be bound.

HERM. You seem, Socrates, to speak something to the purpose.

SOC. We ought then, O Hermogenes, by no means to denominate αἰδης from αἰδης, dark and invisible, but much rather from a knowledge of all beautiful things¹: and from hence this god was called by the fabricator of names αἰδης.

HERM.

¹ The first subsistence of Pluto, as well as that of Neptune, is among the supermundane gods, and in the demiurgic triad, of which he is the extremity. But his first allotment and distribution is according to the whole universe; in which distribution he perpetually administers the divisions of all mundane forms, and converts all things to himself. But his second distribution is into the parts of the universe; and in this he governs the sublunary region, and perfects intellectually the terrestrial world. His third progression is into that which is generated; and in this he administers, by his providence, the earth, and all which it contains, and is on this account called terrestrial Jupiter. But his fourth distribution is into places under the earth, which, together with the various streams of water which they contain, Tartarus, and the places in which souls are judged, are subject to his providential command. Hence souls, which after generation are purified and punished,

and

HERM. Be it so. But what shall we say concerning the names Ceres, Juno, Apollo, Minerva, Vulcan, Mars, and those of the other gods?

Soc. It appears that Ceres was so called from the donation of aliment, being, as it were, *διδουσα μητηρ*, or a *bestowing mother*¹. But Juno, from being *lovely*, on account of the love which Jupiter is said to have entertained for her². Perhaps also the founder of this name, speculating things on high, denominated the air *ἡρα*; and, for the sake of concealment, placed the beginning at the end. And this you will be convinced of, if you frequently pronounce the name of Juno. With respect to the names *Περσεφαιτα*, or Proserpine, and Apollo, many are terrified at them, through unskilfulness as it appears in the recitation of names. And indeed, changing the first of these names, they consider *Περσεφονη*; and this appears to them as something terrible and dire. But the other name, *Περσεφαιτα*, signifies that this goddess is wise: for that which is able to touch upon, handle, and pursue things which are borne along, will be wisdom. This goddess therefore may, with great propriety, be named *Περσεπασα*, or something of this kind, on account of her wisdom, and contact of that which is borne along³: and hence the wife *αἰδης*,

or

and either wander under the earth for a thousand years, or again return to their principle, are said to live under Pluto. And lastly, his fifth distribution is into the western centre of the universe, since the west is allied to earth, on account of its being nocturnal, and the cause of obscurity and darkness. Hence, from the preceding account of Pluto, since he bounds the supermundane demiurgic triad, and is therefore intellectual, the reason is obvious why Plato characterizes him according to a *knowledge of all beautiful things*; for the beautiful first subsists in intellect.

¹ See the Additional Notes on this Dialogue for an account of this goddess.

² Juno, so far as she is filled with the whole of Venus, contains in herself a power of illuminating all intellectual life with the splendour of beauty. And hence, from her intimate communion with that goddess, she is very properly characterized by Plato as lovely. But her agreement with Venus is sufficiently evident, from her being celebrated as the goddess who presides over marriage; which employment was likewise ascribed by the ancients to Venus.

³ Proserpine first subsists in the middle of the vivific supermundane triad, which consists of Diana, Proserpine, and Minerva. Hence, considered according to her supermundane establishment, she subsists together with Jupiter, and in conjunction with him produces Bacchus, the artificer of divisible natures. But considered according to her mundane subsistence, she is said (on account of her procession to the last of things) to be ravished by Pluto, and to animate the extremities of the universe, these being subject to the empire of Pluto. “But Proserpine (says Proclus, in Plat. Theol. p. 371) is conjoined paternally with Jupiter prior to the world, and with Pluto in the world, according to the beneficent will of her father. And she is at one time said to have been

or Pluto, associates with her, because of these characteristics of her nature. But men of the present times neglect this name, valuing good pronunciation more than truth; and on this account they call her *Φερρὸφαιττα*. In like manner with respect to Apollo, many, as I said before, are terrified at this name of the god, as if it signified something dire. Or are you ignorant that this is the case?

HERM. I am not; and you speak the truth.

SOC. But this name, as it appears to me, is beautifully established, with respect to the power of the god.

HERM. But how?

SOC. I will endeavour to tell you what appears to me in this affair: for there is no other one name which can more harmonize with the four powers of this god, because it touches upon them all, and evinces, in a certain respect, his *harmonic, prophetic, medicinal, and arrow-darting skill*¹.

HERM.

incestuously violated by Jupiter, and at another to have been ravished by Pluto, that first and last fabrications may participate of vivific procreation." According to the same author too, in the same admirable work, p. 373, the epithet of wisdom assigned to this goddess by Plato, in the present place, evinces her agreement with Minerva: and this correspondence is likewise shown by her contact of things in progression: since nothing but wisdom can arrest their flowing nature, and subject it to order and bound. But her name being terrible and dire to the multitude, is a symbol of the power which she contains, exempt from the universality of things, and which, on this account, is to the many unapparent and unknown.

¹ For an accurate and beautiful account of these four powers of the sun, and his nature in general, let the Platonic reader attend to the following observations, extracted from Proclus, on Plato's theology, and on the *Timæus*; and from the emperor Julian's oration to this glorious luminary of the world. To a truly modern reader, indeed, it will doubtless appear absurd in the extreme, to call the sun a god; for such regard only his visible orb, which is nothing more than the vehicle (deified as much as is possible to body) of an intellectual and divine nature. One should think, however, that reasoning from analogy might convince even a careless observer, that a body so transcendently glorious and beneficent, must be something superior to a mere inanimate mass of matter. For if such vile bodies, as are daily seen moving on the surface of the earth, are endued with life (bodies whose utility to the universe is so comparatively small), what ought we to think of the body of the sun! Surely, that its life is infinitely superior, not only to that of brutes, but even to that of man: for unless we allow, that as body is to body, so is soul to soul, we destroy all the order of things, and must suppose that the artificer of the world acted unwisely, and even absurdly, in its fabrication. And from hence the reader may perceive how necessarily impiety is connected with unbelief in ancient theology. But to begin with our account of the powers and properties of this mighty ruler of the world:

The

HERM. Tell me, then ; for you seem to me to speak of this name as something prodigious.

Soc.

The solar sun subsists in Jupiter, the perfect artificer of the world, who produced the hypostasis of the sun from his own essence. Through the solar fountain contained in his essence, the demiurgus generates solar powers in the principles of the universe, and a triad of solar gods, through which all things are unfolded into light, and are perfected and replenished with intellectual goods ; through the first of these solar monads participating unpolled light and intelligible harmony ; but from the other two, efficacious power, vigour, and demiurgic perfection. The sun subsists in the most beautiful proportion to the good : for as the splendour proceeding from the good is the light of intelligible natures ; so that proceeding from Apollo is the light of the intellectual world ; and that which emanates from the apparent sun is the light of the sensible world. And both the sun and Apollo are analogous to the good ; but sensible light and intellectual truth are analogous to supersensational light. But though Apollo and the sun subsist in wonderful union with each other, yet they likewise inherit a proper distinction and diversity of nature. Hence, by poets inspired by Phœbus, the different generative causes of the two are celebrated, and the fountains are distinguished from which their hypostasis is derived. At the same time they are described as closely united with each other, and are celebrated with each other's mutual appellations : for the sun vehemently rejoices to be celebrated as Apollo ; and Apollo, when he is invoked as the sun, benignantly imparts the splendid light of truth. It is the illustrious property of Apollo to collect multitude into one, to comprehend number in one, and from one to produce many natures ; to convolve in himself, through intellectual simplicity, all the variety of secondary natures ; and, through one hyparxis, to collect into one, multiform essences and powers. This god, through a simplicity exempt from multitude, imparts to secondary natures prophetic truth ; for that which is simple is the same with that which is true : but through his liberated essence he imparts a purifying, unpolled, and preserving power ; and his emission of arrows is the symbol of his destroying every thing inordinate, wandering, and immoderate in the world. But his revolution is the symbol of the harmonic motion of the universe, collecting all things into union and consent. And these four powers of the god may be accommodated to the three solar monads, which he contains. The first monad *, therefore, of this god is enunciative of truth, and of the intellectual light which subsists occultly in the gods. The second † is destructive of every thing wandering and confused : but the third ‡ causes all things to subsist in symmetry and familiarity with each other, through harmonic reasons. And the unpolled and most pure cause, which he comprehends in himself, obtains the principality, illuminating all things with perfection and power, according to nature, and banishing every thing contrary to these.

Hence, of the solar triad, the first monad unfolds intellectual light, enunciates it to all secondary natures, fills all things with universal truth, and converts them to the intellect of the gods ; which employment is ascribed to the prophetic power of Apollo, who produces into light the truth contained in divine natures, and perfects that which is unknown in the secondary orders of things. But

* i. e. Mercury.

† Venus.

‡ Apollo.

Soc. This name then is well harmonized as to its composition, as belonging to an harmonical god: for, in the first place, do not purgations and purifi-

the second and third monads are the causes of efficacious vigour, demiurgic effecton in the universe, and perfect energy, according to which these monads adorn every sensible nature, and exterminate every thing indefinite and inordinate in the world.

And one monad is analogous to musical fabrication, and to the harmonic providence of natures which are moved. But the second is analogous to that which is destructive of all confusion, and of that perturbation which is contrary to form, and the orderly disposition of the universe. But the third monad, which supplies all things with an abundant communion of beauty, and extends true beatitude to all things, bounds the solar principles, and guards its triple progression. In a similar manner, likewise, it illuminates progressions with a perfect and intellectual measure of a blessed life, by those purifying and pæonian powers of the king Apollo, which obtain an analogous principality in the sun.—The sun is allotted a supermundane order in the world, an unbegotten supremacy among generated forms, and an intellectual dignity among sensible natures. Hence he has a two-fold progression, one in conjunction with other mundane gods, but the other exempt from them, supernatural and unknown. For the demiurgus, according to Plato in the *Timæus*, enkindled in the solar sphere a light unlike the splendour of the other planets, producing it from his own essence, extending to mundane natures, as it were from certain secret recesses, a symbol of intellectual essences, and exhibiting to the universe the arc anenature of the supermundane gods. Hence, when the sun first arose, he astonished the mundane gods, all of whom were desirous of dancing round him, and being replenished with his light. The sun, too, governs the two-fold coordinations of the world, which coordinations are denominated hands, by those who are skilled in divine concerns, because they are effective, motive, and demiurgic of the universe. But they are considered as two-fold; one the right hand, but the other the left.

As the sun, by his corporeal heat, draws all corporeal natures upwards from the earth, raising them, and causing them to vegetate by his admirable warmth; so by a secret, incorporeal, and divine nature resident in his rays, he much more attracts and elevates fortunate souls to his divinity. He was called by the Chaldeans, the seven-rayed god: and light, of which he is the fountain, is nothing more than the sincere energy of an intellect perfectly pure, illuminating in its proper habitation the middle region of the heavens: and from this exalted situation scattering its light, it fills all the celestial orbs with powerful vigour, and illuminates the universe with divine and incorruptible light.

The sun is said to be the progeny of Hyperion and Thea; signifying by this that he is the legitimate progeny of the supereminent god, and that he is of a nature truly divine. This god comprehends, in limited measures, the regions of generation, and confers perpetuity on its nature. Hence, exciting a nature of this kind with a sure and measured motion, he raises and invigorates it as he approaches, and diminishes and destroys it as he recedes: or rather, he vivifies it by his progress, moving, and pouring into generation the rivers of life. The sun is the unifying medium of the apparent and mundane gods, and of the intelligible gods who surround the good. So far as the sun contains in himself the principles of the most beautiful intellectual temperament, he becomes Apollo, the

purifications, both according to medicine and prophecy, and likewise the operations of pharmacy, and the lustrations, washings and sprinklings employed by

the leader of the Muses; but so far as he accomplishes the elegant order of the whole of life, he generates Esculapius in the world, whom at the same time he comprehended in himself prior to the world: and he generates Bacchus, through his containing the cause of a partial essence and divisible energy. The sun, too, is the cause of that better condition of being belonging to angels, dæmons, heroes, and partial divine souls, who perpetually abide in the reason of their exemplar and idea, without merging themselves in the darkness of body. As the sun quadruply divides the three worlds, viz. the empyrean, the æthereal, and the material, on account of the communion of the zodiac with each; so he again divides the zodiac into twelve powers of gods, and each of these into three others: so that thirty-six are produced in the whole. Hence a triple benefit of the Graces is conferred on us from those circles, which the god, quadruply dividing, produces, through this division, a quadripartite beauty and elegance of seasons and times. Monimus and Azizus, viz. Mercury and Mars, are the attendants of the sun, in conjunction with whom they diffuse a variety of goods on the earth. The sun loosens souls from the bands of a corporeal nature, reduces them to the kindred essence of divinity, and assigns them the subtle and firm texture of divine splendour as a vehicle in which they may safely descend to the realms of generation. And lastly, the sun being supermundane, emits the fountains of light; for, among supermundane natures, there is a solar world, and total light: and this light is a monad prior to the empyrean, æthereal, and material worlds.

I only add, that it appears, from the last chapter of the 4th book of Proclus on Plato's Theology, that the celebrated seven worlds of the Chaldeans are to be distributed as follows: One empyrean; three æthereal, situated above the inerratic sphere; and three material, consisting of the inerratic sphere, the seven planets, and the sublunary region. For, after observing, that of the comprehending triad of gods, one is fiery or empyrean, another æthereal, and another material, he inquires why the gods called Teletarchs, or sources of initiation, are distributed together with the comprehending gods? To which he replies, "Because the first, on account of his possessing the extremities, governs, like a charioteer, the wing of fire. But the second, comprehending the beginning, middle and end, perfects æther, which is itself triple. And the third, comprehending, according to one union, a round, right-lined and mixed figure, perfects unfigured and formless matter: by a round figure, forming that, which is inerratic, and the first matter: but by a mixed figure, that which is erratic, and the second matter; for there (that is, among the planets) circumvolution subsists: and by a right-lined figure, a nature under the moon, and ultimate matter." From this passage, it is evident that both Patricius and Stanley were mistaken, in conceiving the meaning of the account given by Pfellus (in his summary exposition of the Assyrian Dogmata) of these seven worlds; which, when properly understood, perfectly corresponds with that of Proclus, as the following citation evinces: *Ἑπτα δὲ ρασι κόσμους σωματικούς. Ἐμπύρεον ἓνα καὶ πρῶτον. καὶ τρεῖς μὲν αὐτοῦ αἰθερίους: ἑπείτα τρεῖς ὑλαίου, τὸ ἀπλανές, τὸ πλανώμενον, καὶ τὸ ὑποσέπην.* "They assert that there are seven corporeal worlds; one empy-

rean,

by the divining art, all tend to this one point, viz. the rendering man pure, both in body and soul?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Will not then the purifying god, who washes and frees us from evils of this kind, be Apollo?

HERM. Perfectly so.

SOC. According, therefore, to the solutions and washings which he affords, as being the physician of such-like things, he will be properly called *απολυων* or *the liberator*; but according to his prophetic power and truth, he may be most properly called *ἄπλος*, or *simple*, as he is denominated by the Thessalians; since simplicity is the same with truth: for all the Thessalians call this god the simple. But, on account of his perpetually prevailing might in the jaculation of arrows, he may be called *αἰ βάλλον*, that is, perpetually darting. But with respect to his harmonic power, it is proper to take notice, that *α* often signifies the same as together, as in the words *ακολουθος*, *a follower*, and *ακοιτις*, *a wife*. So likewise in the name of this god, *α* and *πολησις* signify the revolution subsisting together with, and about the heavens, which they denominate the pole; and the harmony subsisting in song, which they call symphony. Because all these, according to the assertions of those who are skilled in music and astronomy, revolve together with a certain harmony. But this god presides over harmony, *ομοπολων*, i. e. converting all these together, both among gods and men. As, therefore, we call *ομοκελευθος*, and *ομοκοιτις*, i. e. going together, and lying together, *ακολουθος* and *ακοιτις*, changing *ο* into *α*, so likewise we denominate Apollo as *ομοπολων*, inserting at the same time another *λ*; because otherwise it would have been synonymous with a difficult name. And this many of the present time suspecting, through not rightly perceiving the power of this name, they are terrified at it, as if it signified a certain corruption. But in reality this name, as we just now ob-

rean, and the first; after this, three æthereal worlds; and last of all, three material, the inerratic sphere, the planetary system, and the sublunary region." But Patricius and Stanley conceived the passage, as if the three æthereal and three material worlds were distributed by the Assyrians into the inerratic sphere, the planets, and the sublunary world. It is likewise worthy of observation, that the Assyrians, as we are informed by Julian in his Hymn to the Sun, considered that luminary as moving beyond the inerratic sphere, in the middle of these seven worlds; so that the sun, in consequence of this dogma, must revolve in the last of the æthereal worlds.

served

served, is so composed, that it touches upon all the powers of the god, viz. his simplicity, perpetual jaculation, purifying, and joint-revolving nature.— But the name of the Muses, and universally that of Music, was derived, as it seems, from *μῦσθαι*, *to inquire*, and from investigation and philosophy. But *λητώ*, i. e. Latona, was derived from the mildness of this goddess, because she is *εὐελήμων*, viz. willing to comply with the requests of her suppliants. Perhaps, too, they denominate her as a stranger; for many call her *ληθω*: and this name *ληθω* they seem to have assigned her, because her manners are not rough, but gentle and mild. But *αἰρετις*, i. e. Diana, appears to signify integrity and modesty, through her desire of virginity. Perhaps also the founder of her name so called her, as being skilful in virtue¹. And it is not likewise improbable, that, from her hating the copulation of man and woman, or through some one, or all of these, the institutor of her name thus denominated the goddess.

HERM. But what will you say concerning Dionysius and Venus?

Soc. You inquire about great things, O son of Hipponicus. But the mode of nomination, belonging to these divinities, is both serious and jocose. Ask therefore others about the serious mode; but nothing hinders us from relating the jocose: for these deities are lovers of jesting and sport. Dionysius, therefore, is the giver of wine, and may be jocosely called *διδυνυσος*. But *οἶνος*, wine, may be most justly denominated *οἰνους*, because it is accustomed to deprive those of intellect who possessed it before². But, with respect to Venus,

it

¹ We have before observed, that Diana first subsists in the supermundane vivific triad: and her being characterized according to *virtue*, in this place, evidently shows her agreement with Minerva, the third monad of that triad, who is the first producing cause of all virtues. This goddess, according to her mundane subsistence, is, as is well known, the divinity of the moon; from whence, says Proclus (in Plat. Polit. p. 353), she benignantly leads into light the reasons of nature, and is on this account called *Phœbe*, or *light-bearer*. He adds, that the moon was called by the Thracians, *Bendis*.

² Dionysius, or Bacchus, is the deity of the mundane intellect, and the monad of the Titans, or ultimate fabricators of things. This deity is said, in divine fables, to have been torn in pieces by the Titans, because the mundane soul, which participates of this divinity, and is on this account intellectual, is participated by the Titans, and through them distributed into every part of the universe. But the following beautiful account of this deity by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Commentary on the Phædo, will, I doubt not, be highly acceptable to the Platonic reader: Σπαρττεται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ τῶν μοιῶν δὲ τιτάνων ὁ Διδυνυσος. Κατ' ἐπιβουλὴν δὲ τῆς Ἡμέρας, διότι κινῶν σέως εφορᾷ
π. 2. 65

it is not proper to contradict Hesiod, but to allow that she was called *αφροδιτη*, through her generation from *αφρος*, foam¹.

HERM. But, Socrates, as you are an Athenian, you ought not to neglect the investigation of Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars.

Soc. For such a neglect is, indeed, by no means becoming.

HERM. Certainly not.

ἡ θεὸς καὶ προοδὸν· διὸ καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάσιν ἐξανίστησιν αὐτὴ· καὶ διεγερτοὶ τὸν Δία εἰς προνοίαν τῶν δευτέρων· καὶ γενέσεως ἄλλως εὐφορὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Διόνυσος, διότι καὶ ζωῆς καὶ τελευτῆς· ζωῆς μὲν γὰρ εὐφορὸς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, τελευτῆς δὲ διότι εἰθουσίαν ὁ οἶνος ποιεῖ. καὶ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν δὲ εὐθευσιαστικωτέρως γινώσκει· ὡς δὲ οἱ παρ' Ὀμήρου Προκλὸς, μαντικὸς γεγονὼς περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν, καὶ τὴν τραγῳδίαν, καὶ τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἀνέσθαι φασὶ τῷ Διονύσῳ. τὴν μὲν κωμῳδίαν παίγιον οὖσαν τοῦ βίου· τὴν δὲ τραγῳδίαν ὅλα τα παθῆναι, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν. οὐκ ἀρα καλῶς οἱ κωμικοὶ τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ὡς μὴ Διονυσιακοὺς εὖσιν, λέγοντες ὅτι οὐδὲν ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον. κερῆνοι δὲ τούτοις ὁ Ζεὺς, τοῦ κερῆνου δηλονότι τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν. τυ. ὅτι ἐπὶ τα ἀνὰ κινούμενα. ἐπιστρέφει εἰς αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. i. e. "The form of that which is universal is plucked off, torn in pieces, and scattered into generation and Dionysus is the monad of the Titans. But his laceration is said to take place through the stratagems of Juno, because this goddess is the inspective guardian of motion and progression: and, on this account, in the *Iliad* she perpetually rouses and excites Jupiter to providential energies about secondary concerns. And, in another respect, Dionysus is the inspective guardian of generation, because he presides over life and death: for he is the guardian of life, because of generation; but of death, because wine produces an enthusiastic energy. And we become more enthusiastic at the period of dissolution, as Proclus evinces agreeably to Homer; for he became prophetic at the time of his death. They likewise assert, that tragedy and comedy are referred to Dionysus; comedy, indeed, as being the play or jest of life; but tragedy, on account of the passions and death, which it represents. Comedians, therefore, do not properly denominate tragedians, as if they were not Dionysiacal, asserting at the same time that nothing tragical belongs to Dionysus. But Jupiter hurled his thunder at the Titans; the thunder signifying a conversion on high: for fire naturally ascends. And hence Jupiter by this means converts the Titans to himself."—Thus far the excellent Olympiodorus; from which admirable passage the reader may see the reason of Plato's asserting, that *the mode of nomination belonging to this divinity is both serious and jocose*.

¹ As Venus first subsists in the anagogic triad of the super-mundane gods, her production from the foam of the genitals of heaven may occultly signify her proceeding into apparent subsistence from that order of gods, which we have before mentioned, and which is called *νενος καὶ νορες*, *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellctual*; and likewise from the prolific and splendid power of this order, which the *foam* secretly implies. The nomination, too, of Venus, may be said to be *serious*, considered according to her supermundane subsistence; and she may be said to be *a lover of jesting and sport*, considered according to her mundane establishment; for to all sensible natures she communicates an exuberant energy, and eminently contains in herself the cause of the gladness, and, as it were, mirth of all mundane concerns, through the illuminations of beauty which she perpetually pours into every part of the universe.

Soc.

Soc. One of the names of Minerva, therefore, it is by no means difficult to explain.

HERM. Which do you mean?

Soc. Do we not call her Pallas?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. This name, therefore, we must consider as derived from leaping in armour; and in so doing, we shall, as it appears to me, think properly: for to elevate oneself, or something else, either from the earth or in the hands, is denominated by us to vibrate and be vibrated, and to dance and be made to dance.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. The goddess, therefore, is on this account called Pallas.

HERM. And very properly so. But how will you explain her other name?

Soc. Do you mean that of Athena?

HERM. I do.

Soc. This name, my friend, is of greater moment; for the ancients appear to have considered Athena in the same manner as those of the present day, who are skilled in the interpretation of Homer: for many of these explain the poet as signifying, by Athena, intellect and the dianoëtic power. And he who instituted names seems to have understood some such thing as this about the goddess, or rather something yet greater, expressing, by this means, the intelligence of the goddess, as if he had said that she is *θεωον*, or deific intelligence, employing after a foreign mode α instead of η , and taking away ι and σ . Though perhaps this was not the case, but he called her *θεωον*, as understanding divine concerns in a manner superior to all others. Nor will it be foreign from the purpose to say that he was willing to call her *ηθεον*, as being intelligence in manners¹. But either the original founder of this name, or certain persons who came after him, by producing it into something which they thought more beautiful, denominated her Athena.

HERM.

¹ This whole account of Minerva is perfectly agreeable to the most mystic theology concerning this goddess, as will be evident from the following observations. In the first place, one of her names, Pallas, signifying to *vibrate* and *dance*, evidently alludes to her agreement with the Curetes, of the progressions of which order she is the monad, or proximately exempt producing cause. For the Curetes, as is well known, are represented as dancing in armour; the armour being a symbol of guardian power, through which, says Proclus, the Curetes contain the wholes

HERM. But what will you say concerning Vulcan?

Soc. Do you inquire concerning the noble arbiter of light?

HERM. So it appears.

Soc.

of the universe, guard them so as to be exempt from secondary natures, and defend them established in themselves; but the dancing, signifying their perpetually preserving the whole progressions of a divine life according to one divine bound, and sustaining them exempt from the incursions of matter. But the first subsistence of Minerva, considered as the summit, or, as it were, flower of the Curetes, is in the intellectual order of gods, of which Jupiter, the artificer of the world, is the extremity: and, in this order, she is celebrated as the divinely pure heptad. But as Proclus, in Tim. p. 51 and 52, beautifully unfolds the nature of this goddess, and this in perfect agreement with the present account of Plato, I shall present the following translation of it to the reader.

“In the father and demiurgus of the world many orders of unical gods appear; such as guardian, demiurgic, anagogic, connective, and perfective of works. But the one pure and untamed deity of the first intellectual unities in the demiurgus, according to which he abides in an uninclining and immutable state, through which all things proceeding from him participate of immutable power, and by which he understands all things, and has a subsistence separate and solitary from wholes;—this divinity all theologists have denominated Minerva: for she was, indeed, produced from the summit of her father, and abiding in him, becomes a separate and immaterial demiurgic intelligence. Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as *θεον, or deific intelligence*. But this goddess, when considered as elevating all things, in conjunction with other divinities, to one demiurgus, and ordering and disposing the universe together with her father;—according to the former of these employments, she is called the philosophic goddess; but, according to the latter, philopolemic, or *a lover of contention*. For, considered as unifically connecting all paternal wisdom, she is philosophic; but, considered as uniformly administering all contrariety, she is very properly called philopolemic. Hence Orpheus, speaking concerning her generation, says “that Jupiter produced her from his head, shining with armour similar to a brazen flower.” But, since it is requisite that she should proceed into the second and third orders, hence in the Coric order (that is, among the first Curetes) she appears according to the unpolluted heptad; but she generates from herself every virtue and all anagogic powers, and illuminates secondary natures with intellect and an unpolluted life: and hence she is called *νενη τριτογενής, or a virgin born from the head of Jupiter*. But she is allotted this virgin-like and pure nature from her Minerval idiom. Add too, that she appears among the *liberated* gods with intellectual and demiurgic light, uniting the lunar order, and causing it to be pure with respect to generation. Besides this, she appears both in the heavens and in the sublunary region, and every where extends this her two-fold power; or, rather, she distributes a cause to both, according to the united benefit which she imparts. For sometimes the severity of her nature is intellectual, and her separate wisdom pure and unmixed with respect to secondary natures; and the one idiom of her Minerval providence extends to the lowest orders: for where there is a similitude among partial souls to her divinity, she imparts an admirable wisdom and exhibits an invincible strength.

But

Soc. This divinity, therefore, being φωστής, luminous, and attracting to himself ἦ, is called ἡφαιστος, or the arbiter of light ¹.

HERM. It appears so, unless you think it requires some other explanation.

Soc. But, that it may not appear otherwise to me, inquire concerning Mars.

HERM. I inquire then.

Soc. If you please, then, the name of Mars shall be derived from το ἄρρεν *masculine*, and το ἀνδρῆιον *bold*. But if you are willing that he should be called Mars, from his hard and inconvertible nature ², the whole of which is denominated ἀρράτωρ, this also will perfectly agree with the properties of the warlike god.

But why should I speak concerning her Curetic, daemoniacal, or divine orders, together with such as are mundane, liberated, and ruling? For all things receive the two-fold idioms of this goddess as from a fountain. And lastly, this goddess extends to souls, Olympian and anagogic benefits, exterminates gigantic and generation-producing phantasms, excites in us pure and unperverted conceptions concerning all the gods, and diffuses a divine light from the recesses of her nature "

¹ Light, according to Proclus, and I think according to truth, is an immaterial body, viz. a body consisting of matter so refined, that, when compared with terrene matter, it may be justly called immaterial: and Vulcan is the artificer of every thing sensible and corporeal. Hence this deity, when considered as the fabricator of light, may with great propriety be called *the arbiter of light*. For, since he is the producing cause of all body, and light is the first and most exalted body, the definition of his nature ought to take place from the most illustrious of his works. But this deity first subsists in the demiurgic triad of the liberated gods, and from thence proceeds to the extremity of things. He is fabled to be lame, because (says Proclus, in Tim. p. 44) he is the artificer of things last in the progressions of being, for such are bodies; and because these are unable to proceed into any other order. He is likewise said to have been hurled from heaven to earth, because he extends his fabrication through the whole of a sensible essence. And he is represented as fabricating from brass, because he is the artificer of resisting solids. Hence he prepares for the gods their apparent receptacles, fills all his fabrications with corporeal life, and adorns and comprehends the resisting and sluggish nature of matter with the supervening irradiations of forms; but, in order to accomplish this, he requires the assistance of Venus, who illuminates all things with harmony and union.

² The character of *hard* and *resisting*, which is here given to Mars, is symbolical of his nature, which (says Proclus, in Plat. Repub. p. 388) perpetually separates and nourishes, and constantly excites the contraries of the universe, that the world may exist perfect and entire from all its parts. But this deity requires the assistance of Venus, that he may insert order and harmony into things contrary and discordant. He first subsists in the *defensive* triad of the *liberated gods*, and from thence proceeds into different parts of the world.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Let us therefore dismiss our investigations concerning the names of the gods, as I am afraid to discourse about them. But urge me to any thing else you please, that you may see the quality of the horses of Euthyphro.

HERM. I will consent to what you say, if you will only suffer me to ask you concerning Hermes; for Cratylus says that I am not Hermogenes. Let us endeavour, then, to behold the meaning of the name Hermes, that we may know whether he says any thing to the purpose.

SOC. This name seems to pertain to discourse, and to imply that this god is an interpreter and a messenger, one who steals, and is fraudulent in discourse, and who meddles with merchandise¹: and the whole of this subsists about the power of discourse. As, therefore, we said before, *το εἰπεῖν* is the use of speech: and of this Homer frequently says, *ἐμνηστο*, i. e. he deliberated about it. This name, therefore, is composed both from to speak and to deliberate; just as if the institutor of the name had authoritatively addressed us as follows: "It is just, O men, that you should call that divinity, who makes speech the object of his care and deliberation, *Εἰρήμενος*." But we of the present times, thinking to give elegance to the name, denominate him *Ἑρμῆς*, Hermes. But Iris² likewise is so called, from *το εἰπεῖν*, to speak, because she is a messenger.

HERM. By Jupiter, then, Cratylus appears to me to have spoken well, in denying that I am Hermogenes; because I am by no means an excellent artist of discourse.

SOC. It is likewise probable, my friend, that Pan³ is the bipartite son of Hermes.

HERM. But why?

SOC. You know that speech signifies *the all*; that it circulates and rolls perpetually; and that it is two-fold, true and false.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Is not, therefore, that which is true in speech, smooth and divine,

¹ For an account of Hermes, see the Additional Notes to the First Alcibiades, vol. i.

² "Iris," says Proclus in his MS Commentary on the Parmenides, book v. "is an archangelic deity, the peculiarity of whose essence is to conduct secondary natures to their proper principle, according to the demiurgic intellect, and especially to lead them up to Juno, the ruler of all the mundane divinities of a feminine characteristic."

³ See the last note on the Phædrus, in vol. iii.

and dwelling on high in the gods; but that which is false, a downward inhabitant, dwelling in the multitude of mankind, and, besides this, rough and tragic? For in speech of this kind, the greater part of fables, and the falsities about a tragic life, subsist.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. With great propriety, therefore, he who indicates every thing, and perpetually rolls, is *παναιπιολος*, the biform son of Hermes; who in his upper parts is smooth, but in his lower parts rough and goat-formed: and Pan is either speech, or the brother of speech, since he is the son of Hermes. But it is by no means wonderful that brother should be similar to brother. However, as I just now said, O blessed man! let us leave these investigations of the gods.

HERM. Gods of this kind, if you please, Socrates, we will omit; but what should hinder you from discussing the names of such divinities as the sun and moon, stars and earth, æther and air, fire and water, the seasons and the year?

Soc. You assign me an arduous task; yet at the same time, if it will oblige you, I am willing to comply.

HERM. It will so, indeed.

Soc. What therefore do you wish we should first investigate? Or shall we, agreeably to the order in which you mentioned these, begin with the sun?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. It seems, then, that this would become more manifest, if any one should use the Doric appellation: for the Dorians call the sun *αλιον*. He will therefore be *αλιος*, from his collecting men into one, when he rises; and likewise, from his always revolving about the earth. To which we may add, that this name belongs to him, because he varies, in his circulation, the productions of the earth. But *το ποικιλεν*, and *αιολειν*, have one and the same meaning.

HERM. But what will you say of *σεληνη*, or the moon?

Soc. This name seems to preps upon Anaxagoras.

HERM. Why?

Soc. Because it seems to manifest something of a more antient date,
which

which he lately revived, when he said that the moon derives her light from the sun.

HERM. But how?

SOC. Σελας is the same with φως, *light*.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But this light about the moon is perpetually νεον and ενον, νεω and οld, if what the Anaxagorics say is true: for, perpetually revolving in a circle, it perpetually renews this light; but the light of the former month becomes old.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But many call the moon σελανοιας.

HERM. They do so.

SOC. But, because it perpetually possesses new and old splendour, it may be more justly called σελαεννορεια; but is now concisely denominated σελανοια.

HERM. This name, Socrates, is dithyrambic. But what will you say of month and the stars?

SOC. Μηνς, or month, may be properly so called, from μειουσθαι, *to be diminished*; but the stars appear to derive their appellation from αστρατη, *coruscation*. But αστηρις is denominated from ωπας ανιστηφει, i. e. converting to itself the fight; but now, for the sake of elegance, it is called αστηρις.

HERM. But what is your opinion concerning fire and water.

SOC. I am in doubt with respect to fire; and it appears, that either the Muse of Euthyphro deserts me, or that this word is most extremely difficult to explain. Behold then the artifice which I employ, in all such things as cause me to doubt.

HERM. What is it?

SOC. I will tell you. Answer me, therefore: Do you know on what account πυρ, *fire*, is so called?

HERM. By Jupiter, I do not.

SOC. But consider what I suspect concerning it: for I think that the Greeks, especially such as dwelt under the dominion of the Barbarians, received many of their names from the Barbarians.

HERM. But what then?

SOC. If any one, therefore, should investigate the propriety of these
names

names according to the Greek tongue, and not according to that language to which the name belongs, he would certainly be involved in doubt.

HERM. It is likely he would.

SOC. Consider then, whether this name, *πῦρ*, is not of Barbaric origin: for it is by no means easy to adapt this to the Greek tongue; and it is manifest that the Phrygians thus denominate fire, with a certain trifling deviation; as likewise that *ὕδωρ* *water*, *κύων* *dogs*, and many other names, are indebted to them for their origin.

HERM. They are so.

SOC. It is not proper, therefore, to use violence with these words, since no one can say any thing to the purpose about them. On this account, therefore, I shall reject the explanation of *πῦρ* *fire*, and *ὕδωρ* *water*. But air, O Hermogenes, is so called, because it elevates things from the earth; or because it always flows; or because, from its flowing, spirit is produced: for the poets call spirits *αἶται*, *winds*. Perhaps, therefore, it is called *αἴη*, as if implying a *flowing spirit*, or a *flowing blast of wind*. But I consider æther as deriving its appellation from *always running in a flowing progression, about the air*; and on this account it may be called *αἰθερ*. But *γῆ*, or *earth*, will more plainly signify its meaning, if any one denominates it *γαῖα*. For *γαῖα* may be properly called *γεννητριά*, the *producer*, as Homer says; for he calls *γενναῖσι*, *γεννησθαι*, or *that which is produced in itself*.

HERM. Let it be so.

SOC. What then remains for us to investigate after this?

HERM. The hours, Socrates, and the year.

SOC. But *ώραι*, that is, *the hours*, must be pronounced in the Attic tongue, as that which is more ancient, if you wish to know the probable meaning of this word. For they are *ώραι*, on account of their bounding the winter and summer, as likewise winds and proper occasions subservient to the fruits of the earth. And hence, because they *bound*, *δέχονται*, they are most justly called *ώραι*. But *εἰναυτος* and *ετος*, *the year*, appear to be one and the same: for that which, at stated periods, educes into light the productions of the earth, and explores them in itself, is *the year*. And as in the foregoing part of our discourse we gave a two-fold distribution to the name of Jupiter, and asserted that he was by some called *Ζην*, and by others *Δις*; so likewise, with respect to *the year*, it is called by some *εἰναυτος*, because *it explores in itself*; but

ετος, because *it explores*. But the entire reason of its denomination is because it explores things in itself; so that two names are generated, ενιαυτος and ετος, from one reason.

HERM. But now, Socrates, you have certainly proceeded to a great length.

SOC. I seem, indeed, to have pursued wisdom to a considerable distance.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. Perhaps you will urge me still further.

HERM. But after this species of inquiry, I would most gladly contemplate the rectitude of those beautiful names concerning virtue, such as φρονησις *prudence*, συνεσις *consciousness*, δικαιοσυνη *equity*, and all the rest of this kind.

SOC. You raise up, my friend, no despicable genus of names. But however, since I have put on the lion's skin, I ought not to fly through fear, but to investigate prudence and intelligence, consideration and science, and all the other beautiful names which you speak of.

HERM. We ought by no means to desist till this is accomplished.

SOC. And indeed, by the dog, I seem to myself not to prophesy badly, about what I understand at present, that those antient men who established names, experienced that which happens to many wise men of the present times; for, by their intense investigation concerning the manner in which things subsist, they became giddy, far beyond the rest of mankind, and afterwards, things themselves appeared to them to stagger and fluctuate. They did not however consider their inward giddiness as the cause of this opinion, but the outward natural fluctuation of things; for they imagined that nothing was stable and firm, but that all things flowed and were continually hurried along, and were full of all-various agitation and generation. I speak this, as what I conceive respecting the names which we have just now mentioned.

HERM. How is this, Socrates?

SOC. Perhaps you have not perceived that these names were established as belonging to things borne along, flowing, and in continual generation.

HERM. I do not entirely perceive this.

SOC. And, in the first place, the first name which we mentioned entirely pertains to something of this kind.

HERM. Which is that?

SOC. *Prudence*, or φρονησις: for it is the intelligence of local motion and fluxion. It may also imply the advantage of local motion; so that it is
plainly

plainly conversant with agitation. But if you will, *γνώμη*, or *consideration*, perfectly signifies the inspection and agitation of begetting: for *το νομάν* is the same as *το σκοπεῖν*, to *speculate*. Again, *νοησις*, or *intelligence*, if you please, is *του νεου εως*, or *the desire of that which is new*: but that things are new, signifies that they perpetually subsist in becoming to be. Hence, that the soul desires things of this kind, is indicated by him who established this name *νοησις*: for it was not at first called *νοησις*, but two *η η* ought to be substituted instead of *η*, so as to produce *νοησις*. But temperance signifies the safety of that prudence which we have just now considered: and science, indeed, implies that the soul does not disdain to follow things hurried along with local motion; and that she neither leaves them behind, nor goes before them. On which account, by inserting *η*, it ought to be called *επιστημηνης*. But *συνεσις* appears to be, as it were, a syllogism. And when *συνιεναι* is said to take place, the same thing happens in every respect, as when any one is said *επιστασθαι*, to *know*: for *συνιεναι* asserts that the soul follows along with things in their progressions; but wisdom signifies the touching upon local motion. This, however, is more obscure and foreign from us. But it is necessary to recollect from the poets, that when they wish to express any thing which accedes on a sudden, they say *εσθη*, it *rushed forth*: and the name of a certain illustrious Lacedæmonian was *Σους*, i. e. *one who rushes forward*; for thus the Lacedæmonians denominate a *swift impulse*. Wisdom, therefore, signifies the contact of this local motion, as if things were continually agitated and hurried along. But *το αγαθον*, the *good*, signifies *that which excites admiration*, in the nature of every thing: for, since all things subsist in continual progression, in some swiftness, and in others slowness, prevails. Every thing, therefore, is not swift, but there is something in every thing which is *admirable*. Hence the name *ταγαθον* is the same with *το αγαστον*, the *admirable*. But, with respect to the name *equity*, we may easily conjecture that it is derived from the intelligence of that which is just: but the signification of the *just itself*, is difficult to determine: for it appears that the multitude agree thus far to what we have said, but that what follows is a subject of doubt. For, indeed, such as think that the universe subsists in progression, consider the greatest part of it to be of such a nature that it does nothing else than yield to impulsion; that, on this account, something pervades through every thing, from which all generated natures are produced; and

that this pervading nature is the swiftest and most attenuated of all things: for it would not be able to pass through every thing, unless it was the most attenuated, so that nothing can stop its progression; and the swiftest, so that it may use other things as if in an abiding condition with respect to itself. Because, therefore, it governs all other things *δικαίον*, i. e. by pervading through them, it is properly called *δικαίων*, receiving the power of the *α* for the sake of elegant enunciation. And thus far the multitude agree with us, concerning the meaning of *το δικάιον*, *the just*. But I, O Hermogenes, as being assiduous in my inquiries about this affair, have investigated all these particulars, and have discovered in the *ἀπορρητα*, or sacred mysteries, that *the just* is the same with *cause*. For that through which a thing is generated, is the cause of that thing: and a certain person said, that it was on this account properly denominated *το δικάιον*. But, notwithstanding this information, I do not the less cease to inquire, O best of men, what *the just* is, if it is the same with *cause*. I seem, therefore, now to inquire further than is becoming, and to pass, as it is said, beyond the trench; for they will say that I have sufficiently interrogated and heard, and will endeavour, through being desirous to satisfy me, to give different solutions of the difficulty, and will no longer harmonize in their opinions. For a certain person says that the sun is *the just*, because the sun alone, by his pervading and heating power, governs all things. But when, rejoicing in this information, I related it to another person, as if I had heard something beautiful and excellent, he laughed at me when I told it him, and asked me if I thought that there was no longer any thing just in men after sun-set? Upon my inquiring, therefore, what *the just* was, according to him, he said it was fire. But this is by no means easy to understand. But another person said, it was not fire, but the heat which subsisted in fire. Another again said, that all these opinions were ridiculous, but that *the just* was that intellect which Anaxagoras speaks of; for he said that this was an unrestrained governor, and that it was mingled with nothing, but that it adorned all things, pervading through all things. But in these explanations, my friend, I find myself exposed to greater doubts than before I endeavoured to learn what justice is. But, that we may return to that for the sake of which we entered on this disputation, this name appears to be attributed to *equity*, for the reasons which we have assigned.

HERM.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to have heard these particulars somewhere, and not to have fabricated them yourself.

Soc. But what do you say respecting my other explanations?

HERM. That this is not entirely the case with them.

Soc. Attentively hear then; for perhaps I may deceive you in what remains, by speaking as if I had not heard.—What then remains for us after equity? I think we have not yet discussed fortitude: for injustice is evidently a real hinderance to the pervading power; but fortitude signifies that it derived its appellation from contention, or battle. But contention in a thing, if it flows, is nothing else than a contrary fluxion. If any one, therefore, takes away the δ from this name $\alpha\upsilon\delta\eta\iota\alpha$ *fortitude*, the name $\alpha\upsilon\eta\iota\alpha$, which remains, will interpret its employment. Hence it is evident that a fluxion, contrary to every fluxion, is not fortitude, but that only which flows contrary to *the just*; for otherwise fortitude would not be laudable. In like manner $\tau\omicron\alpha\acute{\rho}\eta\epsilon\nu$, that is, the male nature, and $\alpha\eta\eta\varsigma$ *man*, are derived from a similar origin, that is, from $\alpha\omega\upsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\eta$, or *a flowing upwards*. But the name woman appears to me to imply *begetting*; and the name for the female nature seems to be so called from the pap or breast. But the pap or breast, O Hermogenes, seems to derive its appellation from causing to germinate and shoot forth, like things which are irrigated.

HERM. It appears so, Socrates.

Soc. But the word $\theta\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\nu$, *to flourish*, appears to me to represent the increase of youth, because it takes place swiftly and suddenly: and this is imitated by the founder of the name, who composed it from $\theta\epsilon\nu$ *to run*, and $\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ *to leap*. But do you not perceive that I am borne, as it were, beyond my course, since I have met with words plain and easy? But many things yet remain, which appear to be worthy of investigation.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. And one of these is, that we should consider the meaning of the word *art*.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Does not the word $\tau\epsilon\chi\eta\eta$, then, signify $\epsilon\chi\omicron\nu\eta$, or *the habit of intellect*, taking away for this purpose τ , and inserting ϵ between χ and η , and between η and η ?

HERM. And this in a very far-fetched manner, Socrates.

Soc. But do you not know, blessed man! that such names as were first

established, are now overwhelmed through the studious of tragic discourse; who, for the sake of elegant enunciation, add and take away letters; and who entirely pervert them, partly through ornament, and partly through time? For in the word *κατοπτρῶ*, a *mirror*, does not the addition of the *ρω* appear to you absurd? But such alterations as these are, I think, made by those who care nothing for truth, but are solicitous about the elegant conformation of the mouth: so that these men, having added many things to the first names, at length rendered it impossible for any one to apprehend the meaning of a name; as in the name *Sphynx*, which they call *σφρυγγ* instead of *σφρυξ*, and so in many others.

HERM. This is indeed the case, Socrates.

Soc. Indeed, if it should be allowed for every one to add to, and take away from names, just as he pleased, this would certainly be a great licence; and any one might adapt every name to every thing.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. The truth indeed. But I think that you who are a wise president, ought to preserve and guard the moderate and the probable.

HERM. I wish I could.

Soc. And I also, O Hermogenes, with the same in conjunction with you. But you should not, O demoniacal man, demand a discussion very exact, lest you perfectly exhaust my force: for I shall ascend to the summit of what I have said, when, after *art*, I have considered *artifice or skill*. For *μυχανη*, or *artifice*, seems to me to signify the completion of a thing in a very high degree. It is composed therefore from *μυκος*, length, and *ακνω*, to finish a thing completely. But, as I just now said, it is proper to ascend to the summit of our discourse, and to inquire the signification of the names virtue and vice.—One of these, therefore, I have not yet discovered; but the other appears to me to be manifest, for it harmonizes with all that has been said before: for, in consequence of every thing subsisting in progression, whatever passes on badly will be *depravity*; but this, when it subsists in the soul, badly acceding to her concerns, then most eminently possesses the appellation of the whole of depravity. But it appears to me, that the faulty mode of progression is manifest in *timidity*, which we have not yet discussed; though it is proper to consider it, after fortitude. And we likewise seem to have omitted many other names. *Timidity* therefore signifies, *that the bond of the soul is strong*: for the word

vehement

vehement implies a certain strength. And hence the most vehement and greatest bond of the soul, will be timidity: just as *want* is an evil; and every thing as it appears, which is an impediment to passing on and progression.—*Passing on badly*, therefore, seems, to evince a detention and hindrance of progression: and when the soul is thus affected, she then becomes full of evil. But if the name *vice* is applicable to such things as these, the contrary of this will be virtue; signifying, in the first place, facility of progression; and, in the next place, that the flowing of a good soul ought to be perpetually loosened and free. And hence, that which always flows unrestrained and without impediment, may, as it appears, very properly receive this denomination, αἰσιπότης. Perhaps also, some one may call it αἰσότης, because this habit is the most eligible of all. Perhaps, too, you will say that I feign; but I assert, that if the preceding name *vice* is properly established, the same may be said of the name virtue.

HERM. But what is the meaning of τὸ κακόν, *evil*, through which you explained many things in the word *depravity*?

SOC. It appears to me, by Jupiter, to imply something prodigious, and difficult to collect. I introduce therefore to this also the artifice mentioned above.

HERM. What is that?

SOC. To assert that this name is something Barbaric.

HERM. And, in so doing, you appear to me to speak properly. But, if you think fit, we will omit these, and endeavour to consider the rectitude of composition in the names, *the beautiful*, and *the base*.

SOC. *The base*, then, seems to me to evince its signification plainly, and to correspond with the preceding explanations: for he who established names appears to me, throughout, to have reviled that which hinders and detains the flowing of things; and that he now assigned the name ἀεισχρόουσι to that which always detains a flowing progression. But, at present, they call it collectively αἰσχρον.

HERM. But what will you say concerning the *beautiful*?

SOC. This is more difficult to understand, though they say that the α in this word, is produced only for the sake of harmony and length.

HERM. But how?

SOC.

Soc. It appears that this appellation is the surname of the dianoëtic energy.

HERM. How do you prove this ?

Soc. What do you think is the cause of the denomination of every thing ? Is it not that which establishes names ?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not this cause, then, be the dianoëtic conception, either of gods, or men, or of both ?

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. To call things therefore, and *the beautiful*, are the same with dianoëtic energy.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. Are not, therefore, the operations of *intellect* and the dianoëtic power laudable ; but such things as are not the result of their energies blameable ?

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. That which belongs to medicine, therefore, produces medical works ; and that which belongs to the carpenter's art, carpentry works : or what is your opinion on the subject ?

HERM. The same as yours.

Soc. Does not therefore the *beautiful* produce things beautiful ?

HERM. It is necessary that it should.

Soc. But this as we have said, is dianoëtic energy.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. Το καλον, therefore, or *the beautiful*, will be properly the surname of *prudence*, which produces such things as, in consequence of acknowledging to be beautiful, we are delighted with.

HERM. It appears to be so.

Soc. What then remains for us to investigate, of such like names ?

HERM. Whatever belongs to *the good* and *the beautiful* ; such as the names signifying *things conducive, useful, profitable, lucrative*, and the contraries of these.

Soc. You may find then what το συμφερον, or *the conducive* is, from our foregoing speculations ; for it appears to be a certain brother of science. For it evinces nothing else than the local motion of the soul, in conjunction with things ; and that things resulting from hence should be called συμφεροντα and συμφορα, i. e. conducive, from συμπεριφερειν, or *being borne along in conjunction*.

HERM.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But the name *lucrative* (κερδαλέον) is derived from κέρδος, *gain*. And if any one inserts a $\bar{\iota}$ instead of a $\bar{\epsilon}$ in this name, it will manifest its meaning : for it will thus, after another manner, become the name *for good* ; since he who assigned it this name intended to express that power which it possesses, of becoming mingled with, and pervading through all things, and thus, by placing $\bar{\iota}$ instead of $\bar{\epsilon}$, he pronounced it κέρδος.

HERM. But what will you say concerning λυσιτελεον, or *the useful* ?

Soc. It appears, O Hermogenes ! that this name was not established according to the meaning in which it is employed by inn-keepers, *because it frees from expense* ; but because it is the swiftest of being, and, in consequence of this, does not suffer things to stand still, nor *lotion*, by receiving an end of being borne along, to stop, and rest from its progression : but, on the contrary, it always departs from *lotion*, as long as any end remains to be obtained, and renders it unceasing and immortal. And, on this account, it appears to me λυσιτελεον was called *the good* ; for that which *dissolves the end of lotion* was called λυσιτελεον. But ωφέλιμον, or *the profitable*, is a foreign name ; and Homer himself often uses τῷ οφέλλειν. But this is the surname of *increasing and making*.

HERM. But what shall we say respecting the contraries of these ?

Soc. There is no occasion, as it appears to me, to evolve such as are the negations of these.

HERM. But what are they ?

Soc. The *non-conducive, useless, unprofitable, and the non-lucrative*.

HERM. You speak the truth.

Soc. But may we not inquire concerning ἐλαβεῖν and ζημιαῖος, the *noxious* and *pernicious*.

HERM. Certainly.

Soc. And το ἐλαβεῖν, indeed, or *the noxious*, says that it is ἐλαπτον τον ρεον. But ἐλαπτον signifies *that which wishes to bind* ; and ἄπτειν, *to bind*, is the same as δεῖν : but this it blames in every respect. He, therefore, who wishes ἄπτειν ρεον, i. e. *to bind that which flows*, will be most properly called εὐλαπτερον ; but it appears to me, that, for the sake of elegance, it was denominated ἐλαβεῖν.

HERM. A variety of names, Socrates, presents itself for your consideration ; and you just now appeared to me to have founded a prelude on your pipe,

pipe, as it were, of the melody belonging to Minerva, while you pronounced this name *Εὐλαπτέρων*.

Soc. I am not, Hermogenes, the cause of this, but he who founded the name.

HERM. You speak the truth ; but what will you say about *ζημιοῦδες*, *the pernicious* ?

Soc. I will tell you, Hermogenes, the meaning of this word ; and do you behold how truly I shall explain it, by asserting that men, through adding and taking away letters, very much vary the meaning of names, so that sometimes a very small alteration causes a word to imply the very contrary of what it did before. As, for instance, in the word *το δειν*, *the becoming* : for I understood, and called to mind just now, in consequence of what I am about to say to you, that this beautiful word *δειν* is new to us, and induces us to enunciate *το δειν* and *ζημιοῦδες* contrary to their meaning, and by this means to obscure their signification : but the antient name evinces the sense of both these words.

HERM. How is this ?

Soc. I will tell you. You know that our ancestors very frequently used the *ι*, and *δ*, and that this was not less the case with such women as particularly preserved the antient tongue. But now, instead of the *ι*, they perversely use either *ε* or *η*, and *ζ* instead of *δ*, as being more magnificent.

HERM. But how ?

Soc. Just as, for instance, the most antient men called day *ἡμερα*, and some of them *ἐμερα* ; but those of the present times *ἡμερα*.

HERM. This is indeed the case.

Soc. You know, therefore, that this antient name only manifests the conceptions of its founder ; for, because light emerges from darkness, and shines upon men rejoicing in and desiring its beams, they called day *ἡμερα*.

HERM. It appears so

Soc. But as it is now celebrated in tragical performances, you can by no means understand what *ἡμερα* means ; though some are of opinion that day is called *ἡμερα*, because it renders things *ἡμερα*, placid and gentle.

HERM. So it appears to me.

Soc. And you likewise know that the antients called *ζυγον*, *a beam*, *δυογον*.

HERM.

HERM. Entirely so.

Soc. And ζυγον, indeed, manifests nothing: but that which subsists for the sake of bringing two things together, so that they may be bound, is very justly named δυογον. But it is now called ζυγον; and this is the case with a great variety of other particulars.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. Hence then, the word δεον, when it is thus pronounced, signifies the contrary to all the names which belong to *the good*. For this name being a species of the good, appears to be a bond and impediment of local motion; as being the brother of βλαβερον, the noxious.

HERM. And indeed, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Soc. But this will not be the case if you use the antient name, which it is much more probable was properly founded than the present name. But you will agree with those antient good men, if you substitute $\bar{\epsilon}$ for ϵ ; for δεον, and not δειον, will signify that good which is celebrated by the institutor of names. And thus the founder of names will not contradict himself, but the names δεον, ωφελιμον, λυσιτελουν, κερδαινον, αγαθον, συμφρον, ευπορον, or *proceeding with facility*, will all of them appear to have the same meaning: for he meant to signify and celebrate, by different names, that which adorns and pervades through every part of the universe; and to reprobate that which detains and binds. And indeed, in the name ζημιωδες, if, according to the antient tongue, you substitute $\bar{\epsilon}$ for ϵ , it will appear to you that this name was composed from δουντι το ιον, or binding that which is in progression, and was called δημιωδες.

HERM. But what will you say concerning pleasure, pain, desire, and such like names?

Soc. They do not appear to me to be very difficult, Hermogenes: for *pleasure* seems to be an action tending towards emolument, and on this account to have derived its appellation; but the $\bar{\epsilon}$ was added, that it might be called ηδνη, instead of ηση. But *pain* seems to have derived its appellation from the dissolution of the body, which the body experiences in this passion: and the name *sorrow* was so called from impeding the motion of progression: but the name αλγιδων, i. e. *torment*, appears to me to be foreign, and to be so called from αλγεινος, *troublesome*. Οδυη, i. e. *anxiety*, was denominated from the ingress of pain.

HERM. It appears so.

Soc. But *αχθῆδων*, grief, clearly signifies that it is a name assimilated to the slowness of lation : for *αχθος* is a burthen, and *ιον*, any thing in progression. Joy seems to have received its appellation from the diffusion and easy progression of the flowing of the soul ; but *τερψις*, delight, was derived from *τερπνος*, the pleasant. But *το τερπνον* was so called, from being assimilated to the breathing of delight through the soul ; it was therefore justly called *ἐρπνον*, i. e. inspiring ; but in the course of time, it came to be denominated *τερπνον*. But, with respect to *εὐφροσύνη*, or hilarity, there is no occasion to explain *the why* of its denomination ; for it is obvious to every one, that it was so called from *εὐ* and *συμπερῆσθαι*, that is, from the soul's being well borne along in conjunction with things. Hence it ought, in justice, to be denominated *εὐφρωσύνη* ; but, notwithstanding this, we call it *εὐφροσύνη*. But neither is it difficult to discover the meaning of *ἐπιθυμία*, *desire* : for it evinces a power proceeding to *θυμός*, *anger*. But *θυμός*, *anger*, derives its appellation from *θυπέω*, and *ζέσσω*, *raging* and *ardour*. And again, *ἡμερος*, *amatory desire*, was so called from *ῥῶ*, or *a flowing which vehemently attracts the soul* ; for because it flows excited, and desiring the possession of things, it strongly allures the soul through the incitement of its flowing. And hence, from the whole of this power, it is called *ἡμερος*. But *πῶθος*, *desire*, was so called, from signifying that it is not conversant with present amatorial desire, and its effluxive streams, like *ἡμερος*, but with that which is elsewhere situated, and is absent. But, *ἔρως*, *love*, received its appellation from implying that it flows inwardly from an external source ; and that this flowing is not the property of him by whom it is possessed, but that it is adventitious through the eyes. And hence love was called by our ancestors *εἶρος*, from *εἶρειν*, to *flow inwardly*. But at present it is called *ἔρως*, through the insertion of *α* instead of *ο*. But what shall we consider after this ?

HEM. What *opinion*, and such-like names, appear to you to signify.

Soc. *Opinion*, *δόξα*, was denominated from the *pursuing* which the soul employs in her progressive investigations concerning the nature of things, or else from *the darting of an arrow* ; and this last appears to be the most likely derivation. Hence *αἰσῖς*, *opinion*, harmonizes with *δοξῶ* ; for it signifies the *οἰσῖς*, or ingress of the soul, in considering the *οἶον*, or quality of a thing. Just as *βουλή*, counsel or deliberation, is so called from *βάλῃ*, *hurling forth* : and *βουλεύσθαι*, to be willing, signifies to *ἐπισθῆναι*, to *desire*, and *βουλεύεσθαι*, to *consult*. For all these following *δοξᾶ*, opinion, appear to be certain resemblances

blances of *βολή*, *hurling forth*; just as the contrary of this *αβουλία*, or *a want of counsel*, appears to be a misfortune, as neither hurling forth, nor obtaining that which it wishes for, about which it deliberates, and which is the object of its desire.

HERM. You seem to me, Socrates, to have introduced these particulars with great density of conception; let us therefore now, if it is pleasing to divinity, end the discussion. Yet I should wish you to explain the meaning of *necessity*, which is consequent to what we have already unfolded, and *that which is voluntary*.

SOC. Το ἐκουσιον, therefore, or *the voluntary*, signifies that which yields and does not resist, but as I may say *εἰκον τῷ ἰοντι*, *yields to that which is in progression*; and thus evinces that this name subsists according to *βουλήσις*, *the will*. But το ἀναγκαιον and ἀντιτυπον, i. e. *the necessary* and *the resisting*, since they are contrary to the will, must subsist about *guilt* and *ignorance*. But they are assimilated to a progression through a valley; because, on account of their being passed through with difficulty, and their rough and dense nature, like a place thick-planted with trees, they impede progression. And hence, perhaps, *necessity* was denominated from an assimilation to a *progression through a valley*. But as long as our strength remains we ought not to desert it; do not therefore desist, but still interrogate me.

HERM. I ask you then about things the greatest and most beautiful, viz. *truth*, *falsehood*, and *being*; and why *name*, which is the subject of our present disputation, was so called?

SOC. What therefore do you call *μυεσθαι*?

HERM. I call it *ζῆτειν*, *to inquire*.

SOC. It appears then that this word *ονομα*, *a name*, was composed from that discourse which asserts that *ον*, *being*, is that about which name inquires. But this will be more evident to you, in that which we call *ονομαστον*, or *capable of being named*; for in this it clearly appears that *name* is *an inquiry about being*. With respect to *ἀληθεία*, *truth*, this name seems to have been mingled, as well as many others; for this name appears to have received its composition from the divine lation of being, and therefore implies that it is *θεῖα ἀλη*, *a divine wandering*. But *ψευδός*, *falsehood*, signifies the contrary to lation. For here again the institutor of names blames that which detains and compels any thing

thing to rest. This name, however, is assimilated to those who are asleep; but the addition of the τ conceals its meaning. But *ov*, *being*, and *ουσια*, *essence*, harmonize with truth, by receiving the addition of an *i*; for then they will signify *iov*, or that which is in progression. And again, *το ουν ov*, or *non-being*, is by some denominated *ουν iov*; that is, *not proceeding*.

HERM. You appear to me, Socrates, to have discussed these particulars in a very strenuous manner. But if any one should ask you, what rectitude of nomination there is in the words *iov*, *proceeding*, *πειρ*, *flowing*, and *δουν*, *binding*, would you be able to answer him or not?

Soc. I should perfectly so. And something just now occurred to me, by the mentioning of which I may appear to say something to the purpose.

HERM. What is it?

Soc. That, if we are ignorant of any thing, we should say, it is of Barbaric origin: for, perhaps, this is really the case with some names; and others are, perhaps, inscrutable on account of their antiquity. For, through names being every where wrested from their proper construction, it will be by no means wonderful, if the antient tongue, when compared with the present, is in no respect different from a Barbaric language.

HERM. And, indeed, you say nothing foreign from the purpose.

Soc. I say that, indeed, which is probable; but yet the contest does not appear to me to admit of an excuse. Let us, however, endeavour to consider this affair, and make our inquiry, as follows: If any one should always investigate those words through which a name derives its subsistence, and again those words through which words are enunciated, and should do this without ceasing, would not he who answers such a one at length fail in his replies?

HERM. It appear so to me.

Soc. When, therefore, will he who fails to answer, justly fail? Will it not be when he arrives at those names which are, as it were, the elements both of other discourses and names? For these, if they have an elementary subsistence, can no longer be justly said to be composed from other names. Just as we said above, that *το αγαθον* was composed from *αγαθος*, *admirable*, and *σοος*, *swift*. But *σοος*, we may perhaps say, is composed from other words, and these last again from others: but if we ever apprehend that which

is no longer composed from other names, we may justly say, that we have at length arrived at an element; and that we ought no longer to refer this to other names.

HERM. You seem to me to speak properly.

SOC. Are not the names, then, which are the subject of your present inquiry, elements? And is it not necessary that the rectitude of their formation should be considered in a manner different from that of others?

HERM. It is probable.

SOC. It is probable certainly, Hermogenes. All the former names, therefore, must be reduced to these: and if this be the case, as it appears to me it is, consider again along with me, lest I should act like one delirious, while I am explaining what the rectitude of the first names ought to be.

HERM. Only do but speak; and I will endeavour to the utmost of my ability to speculate in conjunction with you.

SOC. I think then you will agree with me in this, that there is one certain rectitude of every name, as well of that which is first as of that which is last; and that none of these differ from one another, so far as they are names.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But the rectitude of those names which we have just now discussed, consists in evincing the quality of every thing.

HERM. How should it be otherwise?

SOC. This property, then, ought no less to belong to prior than posterior names, if they have the proper requisites of names.

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. But posterior names, as it appears, produce this through such as are prior.

HERM. It appears so.

SOC. Be it so then. But after what manner can first names, which have no others preceding them, be able, as much as possible, to unfold to us the nature of things, if they have the properties of names? But answer me this question: If we had neither voice nor tongue, and yet wished to manifest things to one another, should we not, like those who are at present mute, endeavour to signify our meaning by the hands, head, and other parts of the body?

HERM. How could it be otherwise, Socrates?

SOC. I think, therefore, that if we wished to signify that which is upwards
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and light, we should raise our hands towards the heavens, imitating the nature of the thing itself; but that if we wished to indicate things downwards and heavy, we should point with our hands to the earth. And again, if we were desirous of signifying a running horse, or any other animal, you know, that we should fashion the gestures and figures of our bodies, as near as possible, to a similitude of these things.

HERM. It appears to me, that it would necessarily be as you say.

SOC. In this manner then, I think, the manifestations of the body would take place; the body imitating, as it seems, that which it wishes to render apparent.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But since we wish to manifest a thing by our voice, tongue, and mouth, will not a manifestation of every thing then take place through these, when an imitation of any thing subsists through these?

HERM. It appears to me, that it must be necessarily so.

SOC. A name then, as it seems, is an imitation of voice, by which every one who imitates any thing, imitates and nominates through voice.

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. But, by Jupiter, my friend, I do not think that I have yet spoken in a becoming manner.

HERM. Why?

SOC. Because we must be compelled to confess, that those who imitate sheep and cocks, and other animals, give names to the things which they imitate.

HERM. You speak the truth.

SOC. But do you think this is becoming?

HERM. I do not. But what imitation, Socrates, will a name be?

SOC. In the first place, as it appears to me, it will not be such an intimation as that which takes place through music, although this imitation should be effected by the voice: nor, in the next place, though we should imitate the same things as music imitates, yet we should not appear to me to denominate things. But I reason thus: Is there not a certain voice, figure, and colour, in many things?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. It appears, therefore, that though any one should imitate these, yet
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the denominating art would not be conversant with these imitations: for these are partly musical, and partly the effects of painting. Is not this the case?

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. But what will you say to this? Do you not think that there is an essence belonging to every thing, as well as colour, and such things as we just now mentioned? And, in the first place, is there not an essence belonging to colour, and voice, and to every thing else, which is considered as deserving the appellation of being?

HERM. It appears so to me.

SOC. But what then? If any one is able to imitate the essence of every thing, by letters and syllables, must he not evince what every thing is?

HERM. Entirely so.

SOC. And how would you denominate him who is able to do this? For, with respect to the former characters, one you called musical, and the other conversant with painting. But how will you call this character?

HERM. This person, Socrates, appears to me to be that institutor of names which we formerly fought after.

SOC. If this then is true, as it appears to be, let us consider about those names which are the subjects of your inquiry, i. e. *πον, flowing, ιερα, te go, αχρεσις, habitude*, whether, in the letters and syllables from which they are composed, they really imitate essence, or not.

HERM. By all means.

SOC. Come then, let us see whether these alone belong to the first names, or many others besides these.

HERM. I think that this is the case with many others besides these.

SOC. And your opinion is probable. But what will the mode of division be, from whence the imitator will begin to imitate? Since then the imitation of essence subsists through letters and syllables, will it not be most proper to distribute in the first place the elements? just as those who are conversant with rhythms, in the first place, distribute the powers of the elements, and afterwards of the syllables; and thus at length begin to speculate the rhythms themselves, but never till this is accomplished.

HERM. Certainly.

SOC. In like manner, therefore, ought not we first of all to divide the
vowels,

vowels, and afterwards the rest according to species, both mutes and semivowels? For this is the language of those who are skilled in these matters. And again, ought we not after this to divide such as are capable of being founded indeed, yet are not semivowels, and consider the different species of vowels, with reference to one another? And after we have properly distributed all these, it is again requisite to impose names, and to consider, if there are certain things into which both these may be referred as elements; and from which both these may be known; and whether species are contained in them after the same manner as in the elements. But all these particulars being contemplated in a becoming manner, it is proper to know how to introduce each according to similitude; whether one ought to be introduced to one, or many mingled together: just as painters, when they wish to produce a resemblance, sometimes only introduce a purple colour, and sometimes any other paint: and sometimes again they mingle many colours together, as when they make preparations for the purpose of producing the likeness of a man, or any thing else of this kind; and this in such a manner, I think, as to give to every image the colours which it requires. In the same manner we should accommodate the elements of words to things, and one to one, wherever it appears to be necessary, and should fabricate symbols, which they call syllables. And again, combining these syllables together, from which nouns and verbs are composed, we should again from these nouns and verbs compose something beautiful and entire; that what the animal described by the painter's art was in the above instance, discourse may be in this; whether constructed by the onomastic, or rhetorical, or any other art. Or rather this ought not to be *our* employment, since we have already surpassed the bounds of our discourse; for, if this is the proper mode of composition, it was adopted by the antients. But if we mean to speculate artificially, it is proper that, distinguishing all these, we should consider whether or not first and last names are established in a proper manner; for to connect them without adopting such a method would be erroneous, my dear Hermogenes, and improper.

HERM. Perhaps so, indeed, by Jupiter, Socrates.

SOC. What then? Do you believe that you can divide them in this manner? for I cannot.

HERM.

HERM. There is much greater reason, then, that I should not be able to do this.

Soc. Let us give up the attempt then : or are you willing that we should undertake it to the best of our ability, though we are able to know but very little concerning such particulars ? But as we said before respecting the gods, that, knowing nothing of the truth belonging to their names, we might conjecture the dogmas of men concerning them ; so now, with regard to the present subject, we may proceed in its investigation, declaring that, if these particulars have been properly distributed, either by us or by any other, they ought, doubtless, to have been so divided. Now, therefore, as it is said, it is requisite that we should treat concerning them in the best manner we are able. Or, what is your opinion on the subject ?

HERM. Perfectly agreeable to what you say.

Soc. It is ridiculous, I think, Hermogenes, that things should become manifest through imitation produced by letters and syllables : and yet it is necessary ; for we have not any thing better than this, by means of which we may judge concerning the truth of the first names ; unless, perhaps, as the composers of tragedies, when they are involved in any difficulty, fly to their machinery, introducing the gods, in order to free them from their embarrassment ; so we shall be liberated from our perplexity, by asserting that the gods established the first names, and that on this account they are properly instituted. Will not such an assertion be our strongest defence ? or that which declares we received them from certain Barbarians ? For the Barbarians are more ancient than us. Or shall we say that, through antiquity, it is impossible to perceive their meaning, as is the case with Barbaric names ? But all these solutions will only be so many plunderings, and very elegant evasions of those who are not willing to render a proper reason concerning the right imposition of the first names ; though, indeed, he who is ignorant of the proper establishment of first names cannot possibly know such as are posterior ; for the evidence of the latter must necessarily be derived from the former ; and with these he is perfectly unacquainted. But it is evident, that he who professes a skill in posterior names ought to be able to explain such as are first, in the most eminent and pure manner, or, if this is not the case, to be well convinced that he trifles in his explanation of posterior names. Or does it appear otherwise to you ?

HERM. No otherwise, Socrates.

SOC. My conceptions then, about the first names, appear to me very insolent and ridiculous. If you are willing, therefore, I will communicate them to you; and do you, in your turn, if you have any thing better to offer, impart it to me.

HERM. I will do so; but speak confidently.

SOC. In the first place, then, ρ appears to me to be as it were the organ of all motion, though we have not yet explained why motion is called $\kappaίνησις$. But it is evident that it implies $εἰσις$, *going*; for π was not formerly used, but τ . But its origin is from $\kappaίειν$, *to go*, which is a foreign name, and signifies $εἰναί$. If, therefore, any one could find out its antient name, when transferred to our tongue, it might be very properly called $εἰσις$. But now from the foreign name $\kappaίειν$, and the change of the π , together with the interposition of the τ , it is called $\kappaίνησις$. It ought, however, to be called $\kappaείνησις$, or $εἰσις$. But $\sigmaτασις$, or *abiding*, is the negation of $εἰναί$, *to go*; and for the sake of ornament is called $\sigmaτασις$. The element, therefore, ρ , as I said, appeared to the institutor of names to be a beautiful instrument of motion, for the purpose of expressing a similitude to lation; and hence he every where employed it for this purpose. And in the first place, the words $ρεῖν$ and $ρον$, that is, *to flow*, and *flowing*, imitate lation, or local motion, by this letter; and this resemblance is found, in the next place, in the words $τρομος$ and $τραχὺς$, i. e. *trembling*, and *rough*; also, in words of this kind, $κραίνειν$, *to strike*; $δραίνειν$, *to wound*; $ερχεῖν$, *to draw*; $θρυπτειν$, *to break*; $κερματίζειν$, *to cut into small pieces*; and $ῥεμίζειν$, *to roll round*. For all these very much represent motion through the ρ . Not to mention that the tongue, in pronouncing this letter, is detained for the least space of time possible, and is agitated in the most eminent degree; and on this account it appears to me that this letter was employed in these words. But the institutor of names used the τ for the purpose of indicating all attenuated natures, and which eminently penetrate through all things. And hence this is imitated by the words $εἰναί$ and $εἰσθαί$, *to go*, and *to proceed*, through the τ : just as through ϕ , ψ , σ , and ξ , because these letters are more inflated, the author of names indicated all such things as $\ψυχρον$, *the cold*; $\ζεον$, *the fervid*; $σεισθαί$, *to be shaken*; and universally $σεισμον$, *convulsion*. And when he wished to imitate any thing very much inflated, he every where, for the most part, appears to have introduced such-like letters.

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But he seems to have thought that the power of compressing δ and τ , and the tongue's action in adhering, were useful for the purpose of imitating the words $\delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$, *a bond*, and $\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$, *abiding*. And because the tongue remarkably slides in pronouncing λ , the institutor of names perceiving this, and employing this letter in an assimilative way, he established the names $\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$, *smooth*; $\omicron\lambda\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$, *to slip*; $\lambda\iota\pi\alpha\rho\omicron\nu$, *unctuous*; $\kappa\omicron\lambda\lambda\omega\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, *liquid*; and all other such-like words. But in consequence of the tongue sliding through λ , he employed the power of the τ , and thus imitated $\gamma\lambda\iota\sigma\chi\chi\rho\omicron\nu$, *the slippery*; $\gamma\lambda\upsilon\kappa\upsilon$, *the sweet*; and $\gamma\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, *the viscous*. Perceiving likewise that the sound of the τ was inward, he denominated $\tau\omicron\epsilon\nu\delta\omicron\nu$, *the inward*, and $\tau\alpha\epsilon\nu\tau\iota\varsigma$, *things inward*, that he might assimilate words to letters. But he assigned α to $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu$, *the great*, and η to $\mu\eta\kappa\omicron\varsigma$, *length*, because these letters are great. But in the construction of $\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\gamma\gamma\upsilon\lambda\omicron\nu$, *round*, which requires the letter σ , he mingled ϵ abundantly. And in the same manner the legislator appears to have accommodated other letters and syllables to every thing which exists, fabricating a signature and name; and from these, in an assimilative manner, to have composed the other species of names. This, Hermogenes, appears to me to be the rectitude of names, unless Cratylus here asserts any thing else.

HERM. And, indeed, Socrates, Cratylus often finds me sufficient employment, as I said in the beginning, while he declares that there is a rectitude of names, but does not clearly inform me what it is; so that I cannot tell whether he is willingly or unwillingly thus obscure in his assertions. Now, therefore, Cratylus, speak before Socrates, and declare whether you are pleased with what Socrates has said respecting names, or whether you have any thing to say on the subject more excellent; and if you have, disclose it, that either you may learn from Socrates, or that you may teach both of us.

CRAT. But what, Hermogenes! Does it appear to you to be an easy matter to perceive and teach any thing so suddenly, and much more that which seems to be the greatest, among things which are the greatest?

HERM. To me, by Jupiter, it does not; but that assertion of Hesiod[†] appears to me very beautiful, "that it is worth while to add a little to a little." If, therefore, you are able to accomplish any thing, though but trifling, do not be weary, but extend your beneficence both to Socrates and me.

[†] Opera et Dies, lib. i.

Soc. And, indeed, Cratylus, I do not confidently vindicate any thing which I have above asserted; but I have considered with Hermogenes what appeared to me to be the truth: so that on this account speak boldly, if you have any thing better to offer, as I am ready to receive it. Nor shall I be surprised if you produce something more beautiful on this subject; for you appear to me to have employed yourself in speculations of this kind, and to have been instructed in them by others. If, therefore, you shall assert any thing more excellent, you may set me down as one of your disciples about the rectitude of names.

CRAT. But, indeed, Socrates, as you say, I have made this the subject of my meditations, and perhaps I shall bring you over to be one of my disciples: and yet I am afraid that the very contrary of all this will take place: for, in a certain respect, I ought to say to you what Achilles said to Ajax¹ upon the occasion of his embassy; but he thus speaks: "O Jove-born Telamonian Ajax, prince of the people, you have spoken all things agreeably to my opinion." In like manner you, O Socrates, appear to have prophesied in conformity to my conceptions, whether you were inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some muse, who was latently inherent in you before, has now agitated you by her inspiring influence.

Soc. O worthy Cratylus, I myself have some time since wondered at my wisdom, and could not believe in its reality; and hence I think it is proper to examine what I have said: for to be deceived by oneself is the most dangerous of all things; for since the deceiver is not for the least moment of time absent, but is always present, how can it be otherwise than a dreadful circumstance? But it is necessary, as it seems, to turn ourselves frequently to the consideration of what we have before said, and to endeavour, according to the poet², "to look at the same time both before and behind." And let us at present take a view of what we said. We said then, that rectitude of name was that which pointed out the quality of a thing. Shall we say that this definition is sufficient for the purpose?

CRAT. To me, Socrates, it appears to be very much so.

Soc. Names, then, are employed in discourse for the sake of teaching?

CRAT. Entirely so.

¹ Iliad ix. ver. 640.

² Iliad i. ver. 341; and Iliad iii. ver. 109.

Soc.

Soc. Shall we not therefore say, that this is an art, and that it has artificers?

CRAT. Perfectly so.

Soc. But who are they?

CRAT. Those legislators, or authors of names, which you spoke of at first.

Soc. Shall we then say, that this art subsists in men, like other arts, or not? But what I mean is this: Are not some painters more excellent than others?

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. Will not such as are more excellent produce more beautiful works, i. e. the representations of animals; but such as are inferior, the contrary? And will not this also be the case with builders, that some will fabricate more beautiful, and others more deformed houses?

CRAT. It will.

Soc. And with respect to legislators, will not some produce works more beautiful than others?

CRAT. It does not appear to me that they will.

Soc. It does not therefore appear to you, that some laws are better, and others worse?

CRAT. It certainly does not.

Soc. One name, therefore, does not seem to you to be better assigned than another?

CRAT. It does not.

Soc. All names, therefore, are properly established?

CRAT. Such indeed as are names.

Soc. But what then shall we say to this name of Hermogenes, which we spoke of before? Shall we say that this name was not rightly assigned him, unless something *ἑρμου γενεσέως*, of the generation of Mercury, belongs to him? Or that it was, indeed, assigned him, but improperly?

CRAT. It does not seem to me, Socrates, to have been assigned him in reality, but only in appearance; and I think that it is the name of some other person, who is endued with a nature correspondent to the name.

Soc. Will not he then be deceived, who says that he is Hermogenes?

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for he will no longer be the person whom he calls Hermogenes, if he is not Hermogenes.

CRAT. What is this which you say?

SOC. Is the efficacy of your assertion founded in the opinion, that it is impossible to speak any thing which is false? for this has been said, my dear Cratylus, by many formerly, and is the opinion of many at present.

CRAT. How is it possible, Socrates, that, when any one speaks about any thing, he should speak about that which is not? Or is not to speak of non-being, to speak of things which are false?

SOC. This discourse, my friend, is more elegant than my condition and age require. But at the same time inform me, whether it appears to you impossible to discourse about that which is false, but possible to pronounce it?

CRAT. It appears to me impossible even to pronounce it.

SOC. And are you of opinion likewise, that it is impossible to denominate it? As if, for instance, any one, on meeting you, should in an hospitable manner take you by the hand, and say, I am glad to see you, O Athenian guest, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion, would he not some way or other, by means of voice, express these words? And would it not be this Hermogenes, and not you, whom he thus denominated, or else no one?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that he would enunciate these words in vain.

SOC. Let it be so. But whether would he who pronounced these words, pronounce that which is true or false? Or would some of these words be true, and some false? for this last supposition will be sufficient.

CRAT. I should say, that he sounded these words, moving himself in vain, just as if any one should move brass by striking on it.

SOC. Come then, see, Cratylus, whether we agree in any respect. Do you not say that a name is one thing, and that of which it is the name another?

CRAT. I do.

SOC. And do you not acknowledge, that a name is a certain imitation of a thing?

CRAT. I acknowledge this the most of all things.

SOC.

Soc. And will you not therefore confess that pictures are in a different manner imitations of certain things?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. But come, for perhaps I do not understand sufficiently what you say, through you perhaps speak properly. Can we distribute and introduce both these imitations, viz. the pictures and the names, to the things of which they are imitations? Or is this impossible?

CRAT. It is possible.

Soc. But consider this in the first place. Can any one attribute the image of a man to a man, and that of a woman to a woman; and so in other things?

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. And is it possible, on the contrary, to attribute the image of a man to a woman, and that of a woman to a man?

CRAT. This also is possible.

Soc. Are both these distributions therefore proper; or only one of them?

CRAT. Only one of them.

Soc. And this I think must be that which attributes to each, the peculiar and the similar?

CRAT. It appears so to me.

Soc. Left therefore you and I, who are friends, should fall into verbal contention, take notice of what I say; for I, my friend, call such a distribution in both imitations (i. e. in the pictures and names) right; and in names not only right, but true: but I call the other attribution and introduction of the dissimilar, not right; and when it takes place in names, false.

CRAT. But consider, Socrates, whether it may not indeed happen in paintings, that an improper distribution may take place, but not in names; but that these must always be necessarily right.

Soc. What do you say? What does this differ from that? May not some one, on meeting a man, say to him, This is your picture, and shew him perhaps by chance his proper image, or by chance the image of a woman? But I mean by *showing*, placing it before his eyes.

CRAT. Entirely so.

Soc. But what, may he not again, meeting with the same person, say to him, This is your name? for a name is an imitation, as well as a painting.

But

But my meaning is this: May he not therefore say, This is your name? And after this, may he not present to his sense of hearing, perhaps, an imitation of what he is, and which asserts that he is a man; and perhaps an imitation of a female of the human species, and which asserts that he is a woman? Does it not appear to you, that this may be some time or other possible?

CRAT. I am willing to allow you, Socrates, that this may be so.

SOC. You do well, my friend, if the thing subsists in this manner; for neither is it proper at present to contest much about it. If, therefore, there is a distribution of this kind in names, we must confess that one of these wishes to call a thing according to truth, but the other falsely. And if this is the case, and it is possible to distribute names erroneously, and not to attribute things adapted to each, it will also be possible to err in words. And if words and names may be thus established, this must likewise necessarily be the case with sentences; for sentences are, I think, the composition of these. Or what is your opinion, Cratylus?

CRAT. The same as yours; for you appear to me to speak beautifully.

SOC. If, therefore, we assimilate first names to letters, the same things will take place as in pictures, in which it is possible to attribute all convenient colours and figures; and again, not to attribute all, but to leave some and add others, and this according to the more and the less. Will not this be the case?

CRAT. It will.

SOC. He then who attributes every thing proper, will produce beautiful letters and images; but he who adds or takes away, will indeed produce letters and images, but such as are defective?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But will not he who imitates the essence of things through syllables and letters, according to the same reasoning, produce a beautiful image, when he attributes every thing in a convenient manner? And this beautiful image is a name. But if any one fails in the least circumstance, or sometimes makes an addition, does it not follow that he will, indeed, produce an image, but not a beautiful one? And so that some of the names will be beautifully fabricated, and others badly?

CRAT. Perhaps so.

Soc.

Soc. Perhaps therefore the one will be a good, and the other a bad artificer of names?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. But was not the name which we assigned to this character that of legislator?

CRAT. Certainly.

Soc. Perhaps therefore, by Jupiter, as in other arts, one legislator will be good and another bad, if we only agree in what has been before asserted?

CRAT. It will be so. But do you perceive, Socrates, that when we attribute the letters α and β , and each of the elements to names, according to the grammatical art, if we take away, add, or change any thing, a name indeed is described for us, yet not properly; or rather, it is by no means described, but becomes immediately something else, if it suffers any thing of this kind?

Soc. Let us thus consider this affair, Cratylus, lest we should not contemplate it in a becoming manner.

CRAT. But how?

Soc. Perhaps such things as ought necessarily either to be composed or not from a certain number, are subject to the property which you speak of; as ten things, or if you will any other number, if you take away or add any thing, immediately become some other number. But perhaps there is not the same rectitude of any certain quality and of every image, but a contrary one: for neither is it necessary to attribute to an image every thing belonging to that which it represents, in order to its becoming an image. But consider if I say any thing to the purpose. Would then these be two things, I mean Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, if any one of the gods should not only assimilate your colour and figure, after the manner of painters, but should produce all such inward parts as you contain, and attribute the same softness and heat, the same motion, soul, and wisdom, as you possess; and, in one word, should fashion every thing else similar to the parts which you contain; whether in consequence of such a composition would one of these be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, or would there be two Cratyluses?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that there would be two.

Soc. Do you see then, my friend, that it is necessary to seek after another rectitude of an image than that which we just now spoke of; and that it does not necessarily follow, that if any thing is taken away or added, it will no longer be an image? Or do you not perceive how much images want, in order to possess the same things as their paradigms?

CRAT. I do.

Soc. Those particulars therefore of which names are names, would become ridiculous through names, if they were in every respect assimilated to them: for all things would become double; and the difference between a thing and its name could no longer be ascertained.

CRAT. You speak the truth.

Soc. You may therefore, generous man, confidently own that some names are properly composed, and others not so; nor will you be obliged to attribute every letter to a name, that it may be perfectly such as that of which it is the name: but you will sometimes suffer a letter which is not convenient to be introduced; and if a letter, you will likewise permit an unadapted name in a discourse; and if a name, you will suffer a sentence unadapted to things to be introduced in a discourse; and will at the same time acknowledge, that a thing may nevertheless be denominated and spoken of, as long as the name or sentence contains the effigies of the thing which is the subject of discourse; just as in the names of the elements, which, if you remember, I and Hermogenes just now discussed.

CRAT. I do remember.

Soc. It is well, therefore; for when this effigies is inherent, though every thing properly adapted may not be present, yet the representation may be said to subsist as it ought. But let us now, blessed man! cease our disputation, that we may not be exposed to danger, like those who travel late by night in Ægina; and that we may not, in a similar manner, appear to have arrived at the truth of things later than is becoming. Or at least seek after some other rectitude of name, and do not confess that a manifestation produced by letters and syllables is the name of a thing: for, if you admit both these assertions, you cannot be consistent with yourself.

CRAT. But you appear to me, Socrates, to speak in a very becoming manner, and I lay down the position which you mention.

Soc.

SOC. Since therefore we thus far agree, let us consider what remains. We say then, that in order to the beautiful position of a name, it ought to possess convenient letters?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But it is proper that it should contain such as are similar to things?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Such then as are beautifully composed will be composed in this manner. But if any name is not rightly composed, it will perhaps, for the most part, consist of convenient and similar letters, since it is an image; but it will possess something unadapted, through which it is neither beautiful, nor beautifully established. Shall we speak in this manner, or otherwise?

CRAT. There is no such occasion, I think, Socrates, of contesting; though it does not please me to say, that a name has a subsistence, and yet is not beautifully composed.

SOC. Is this also unpleasing to you, that a name is the manifestation of a thing?

CRAT. It is not.

SOC. But do you think it is not beautifully said, that some names are composed from such as are first, and that others are themselves first names?

CRAT. I think, it is well said.

SOC. But if first names ought to be manifestations of certain things, can you mention any better method of accomplishing this, than their being to formed as to become, in the most eminent degree, such as the things which they render manifest? Or does the method which Hermogenes and many others speak of, please you better, that names are signatures, that they manifest by signatures, and that they are prescient of things? And, besides this, that rectitude of name subsists by compact; and that it is of no consequence whether any one composes them as they are at present composed, or the contrary; calling, for instance, that which is considered at present as small σ , great, and ω , $\omicron$? Which of these modes is most agreeable to you?

CRAT. It is wholly and universally, Socrates, better to evince by similitude that which any one wishes to evince, than by any other method.

SOC. You speak well. If, therefore, a name is similar to a thing, is it not necessary that the elements from which first names are composed should be naturally similar to things themselves? But my meaning is this: Could any one produce a picture, which we have just now said is the similitude of some

particular thing, unless the colours from which the picture is composed were naturally similar to the things which the art of painting imitates? Is it not otherwise impossible?

CRAT. Impossible.

SOC. In a similar manner, therefore, names can never become similar to any thing, unless the things from which names are composed possess, in the first place, some similitude to the particulars of which names are the imitations. But the component parts of names are elements.

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. You therefore now participate of the discourse which Hermogenes a little before received. Tell me, then, whether we appear to you to have determined in a becoming manner, or not, that the letter $\bar{\rho}$ is similar to local motion, to motion in general, and to hardness?

CRAT. In a becoming manner, in my opinion.

SOC. But the letter $\bar{\lambda}$ to the smooth and soft, and other things which we mentioned?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. Do you know therefore that the same word, i. e. *hardness*, is called by us *σκληροτης*, but by the Eretrians *σκληροτηρ*?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Whether, therefore, do both the $\bar{\rho}$ and the σ appear similar to the same thing; and does the termination of the $\bar{\rho}$ manifest the same thing to them, as the termination of the $\bar{\sigma}$ to us: or is nothing manifested by letters different from ours?

CRAT. The word evinces its meaning by both letters.

SOC. Is this accomplished, so far as $\bar{\rho}$ and $\bar{\sigma}$ are similars, or so far as they are not?

CRAT. So far as they are similars.

SOC. Are they, therefore, in every respect, similars?

CRAT. Perhaps they are so, for the purpose of manifesting lation.

SOC. But why does not the insertion of $\bar{\lambda}$ signify the contrary of hardness?

CRAT. Perhaps, Socrates, it is not properly inserted, just as in the names which you lately discussed with Hermogenes, taking away and adding letters where it was requisite. And you then appeared to me to act properly. And now, perhaps, $\bar{\rho}$ ought to be inserted instead of $\bar{\lambda}$.

Soc.

SOC. You speak well. Do we, therefore, according to our present manner of speaking, mutually understand nothing when any one pronounces the word *σκληρον*? And do you not understand what I now say?

CRAT. I do, my friend, through custom.

SOC. But when you say through custom, what else do you think you imply by this word, except *compact*? Or do you call custom any thing else than this, that when I pronounce this word, and understand by it *hardness*, you also know that this is what I understand. Is not this what you mean?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If, then, you know this, when I pronounce it, something becomes manifest to you through me.

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. But what I understand, I enunciate from that which is dissimilar? since λ is dissimilar to the *σκληροτης*, which you pronounce. But if this is the case, what else can be the consequence, but that you accustom yourself to this, and that you derive rectitude of name through compact; since both similar and dissimilar letters manifest the same thing to you, through custom and compact? But if custom is very far from being compact, it will no longer be proper to say that similitude is a manifestation, but this ought to be asserted of custom: for this, as it appears, manifests both from the similar and the dissimilar. Since then, Cratylus, we allow the truth of these things (for I consider your silence as a signal of assent), it is necessary that compact and custom should contribute to the manifestation of what we understand and enunciate. For if, O best of men! you are willing to pass on to the consideration of number, from whence do you think you can be able to attribute similar names to each number, if you do not permit your consent and compact to possess some authority about the rectitude of names? The opinion, indeed, pleases me, which asserts that names should be as much as possible similar to things. But yet I am afraid, lest perhaps, as Hermogenes said, the attraction of this similitude should be very precarious, and we should be obliged, in this troublesome affair, to make use of compact, in order to obtain rectitude of names: since, perhaps, we shall then speak as much as possible in the most beautiful manner, when our speech is composed either entirely, or for the most part, from similars, that is, from things convenient; but

in the most base manner, when the contrary takes place. But still further inform me, what power names possess with respect to us, and what beautiful effect we must ascribe they are able to produce.

CRAT. Names, Socrates, appear to me to teach, and that it is simply true, that he who knows names, knows also things.

SOC. Perhaps, Cratylus, your meaning is this : that when any one knows the quality of a name (and it is of the same quality as a thing), he then also knows a thing, since it is similar to a name. But there is one art of all things which are similar to one another ; and in consequence of this you appear to me to ascribe, that he who knows names, knows also things.

CRAT. You speak most truly.

SOC. But come, let us see what this mode of teaching things is, which you now speak of, and whether there is any other method, this at the same time being the best ; or whether there is no other than this. Which do you think is the case ?

CRAT. That there is no other method than this, but that this is the only one, and the best.

SOC. But whether do you think that the invention of things is the same as the invention of names, and the same as the discovery of those things, of which names are at present significant ? Or do you think that it is necessary to seek and find according to another method, and that this should be learned ?

CRAT. I think that we ought, above all things, to seek after and discover these things according to this method.

SOC. But let us consider, Cratylus, if any one, while seeking after things, follows after names, speculating the quality of each, do you perceive that there is no small danger of his being deceived ?

CRAT. How ?

SOC. Because, evidently, he who first established names fashioned them such as he thought things themselves were. Is it not so ?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If, therefore, he did not think rightly, but fashioned them agreeable to his conceptions, what must we think of those who were persuaded to follow him ? Can it be any thing else, than that they must be deceived ?

CRAT.

CRAT. But this is not the case, Socrates : but it is necessary that he who composed names must have known how to compose them ; for otherwise, as I have before observed, names would never have existed. But you may derive the greatest conviction, that the inventor of names did not wander from the truth, by considering that, if he had conceived erroneously, all things would not have thus corresponded with his conceptions. Or, did you not perceive this, when you were saying that all names were composed according to the same conceptions, and tended to the same thing ?

SOC. But this apology, my worthy Cratylus, is of no weight : for if the founder of names was deceived in the first instance, but compelled other things to this his first conception, and obliged them to harmonize with it ; just as in diagrams, in which sometimes a very trifling and unapparent error taking place, all the remaining parts, which are very numerous, consent notwithstanding with each other : if this be the case, every one ought in the beginning of a thing to employ much discussion and diligent consideration, in order that he may know whether the principle is properly established, or not ; for this being sufficiently examined, what remains will appear consequent to the principle. And yet I should wonder if names harmonized with each other. For let us again consider what we discussed before ; in the course of which we asserted, that, in consequence of every thing *proceeding, hurrying along, and flowing*, names signified us *essence*. Does this appear to you to be the case, or not ?

CRAT. Very much so, and that they properly signify this.

SOC. Let us consider, then, repeating some of these. In the first place, then, this name *ἐπιστήμη*, *science*, is dubious, and seems rather to signify that it stops (*ἵστησιν*) our soul at certain things, than that it is borne along with them ; and hence it is more proper to call its beginning as now, than by the ejection of *ι*, *πιστήμη*, and to insert an *ι* instead of *ι*. In the next place, *το βεβαιον*, *the firm*, is so called, because it is the imitation of a certain *basis* and *abiding*, but not of *lotion*. Again, *ἱστορία*, *history*, signifies that it stops the flowing of things ; and *πιστον*, *the credible*, implies that which produces *perfect stability*. Likewise *μνήμη*, or *memory*, entirely indicates *a quiet abiding in the soul*, and not local motion. And, if you will, *ἁμαρτία*, *guilt*, and *συμφορα*, *calamity*, when these names are attentively considered, appear to be the same with *συνεσις*, *intelligence*, and *ἐπιστήμη*, *science*, and
all

all the other names belonging to things of an excellent nature. But still further, *αμαθεια*, and *ακολασια*, that is, *ignorance* and *intemperance*, will appear to be similar to these: for *ignorance* will signify the progression of one proceeding in conjunction with divinity; but *intemperance* will appear to be a perfect pursuit of things. And thus, those names which we consider as belonging to the basest of things, will appear to be most similar to the names of the most beautiful things. And I think that any one may discover many others of this kind, if he applies himself to the investigation; from which he may be led to think, that the institutor of names did not indicate things proceeding and borne along, but such as stably abide.

CRAT. And yet you see, Socrates, that he signified many things according to the conception of agitation and flowing.

SOC. What then shall we do, Cratylus? Shall we number names like suffrages? And does their rectitude consist in the same thing being signified by the most names?

CRAT. This is by no means proper.

SOC. Certainly not, my friend. But, omitting these particulars, let us consider whether you will agree with us in this, or not. Have we not already acknowledged, that those who instituted names in the several cities, both of Greeks and Barbarians, were legislators, and that the art, which is capable of accomplishing this, is legislative?

CRAT. Entirely so.

SOC. Tell me now, then, whether those who founded the first names knew the things to which they assigned names, or were ignorant of them?

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that they were acquainted with them.

SOC. For, friend Cratylus, they could not accomplish this, while ignorant of things.

CRAT. It does not appear to me that they could.

SOC. Let us then return again from whence we have digressed: for you lately said, if you recollect, that he who established names must have previously known the things to which he assigned names. Are you, therefore, of this opinion at present, or not?

CRAT. I am.

SOC. Will you say, that he who established first names, established them in consequence of possessing knowledge?

CRAT.

CRAT. Yes.

SOC. From what names, then, did he either learn or find out things, since first names were not yet established? But have we not said, that it is impossible to learn and find out things any other way, than by learning or finding out ourselves the quality of names?

CRAT. You appear to me, Socrates, to say something to the purpose.

SOC. After what manner then, shall we say that they possessing knowledge established names? Shall we say, that founders of names existed prior to the establishment of names, and that they then possessed a knowledge of names, since it is impossible to learn things otherwise than by names?

CRAT. I think, Socrates, that the opinion about these particulars is most true, which asserts that a power greater than the human assigned the first names to things; in consequence of which they must of necessity be rightly established.

SOC. Do you think that he who established names, whether he was a certain dæmon, or a god, would establish things contrary to himself? Or do we appear to you, to have just now said nothing to the purpose?

CRAT. But the other sort of these were not names.

SOC. Which sort do you mean, best of men! those which lead to permanency, or those which lead to lation? For, as we just now said, this cannot be determined by their multitude.

CRAT. Your observation is indeed just, Socrates.

SOC. Since names then contest with each other, and, as well these as those, assert that they are similar to the truth, how shall we be able to determine in this affair? Or where shall we turn ourselves? For we cannot have recourse to other names different from these; for there are no others. But it is evident that certain other things, besides names, must be sought after, which may show us, without names, which of these are true; pointing out for this purpose the truth of things.

CRAT. It appears so to me.

SOC. It is possible, therefore, Cratylus, as it seems, to learn things without names, if what we have just now asserted is true.

CRAT. It appears so.

SOC. Through what else, then, do you expect to learn things? Can it be

through any thing else than that which is proper and most just, and through their communion with each other, if they are in any respect mutually allied, and especially through themselves? For that which is different, and foreign from these, will signify something else, and not these.

CRAT. You appear to me to speak the truth.

SOC. But tell me, by Jupiter, have we not often confessed that names, which are properly established, are similar to the things of which they are the names, and are indeed the images of things?

CRAT. Certainly.

SOC. If then it is possible, in the most eminent degree, to learn things through names, and likewise through themselves, which will be the most excellent and the clearest discipline? Will it be possible to obtain this knowledge from an image, if it should be beautifully assimilated, and to perceive the truth, of which this is the image? Or rather, shall we be able from truth to obtain truth itself, and its image, if the image is but properly fabricated?

CRAT. It appears to me, that this must necessarily be obtained from truth.

SOC. After what manner, therefore, it is necessary to learn, or to find out things, is perhaps a degree of knowledge beyond what you and I are able to obtain. It will be sufficient, therefore, to acknowledge this, that things are not to be learned from names, but are much rather to be learned and discovered from themselves.

CRAT. It appears so, Socrates.

SOC. But still further, let us consider, lest this multitude of names tending to the same thing should deceive us, if, in reality, those by whom they were established considered all things as proceeding and flowing; for they appear to me to have held this opinion. But should this be the case, their opinion is however erroneous: for these men having fallen, as it were, into a certain vortex, are themselves confounded, and would willingly, by dragging us along, hurl us into the same whirlpool. For consider, O wonderful Cratylus! that which I often dream about, whether or not we should say that there is any such thing as the beautiful itself, and the good, and so of every thing else.

CRAT. It appears to me, Socrates, that there is.

Soc.

Soc. Let us therefore consider this affair, not as if a certain countenance, or any thing of this kind, is beautiful ; for all these appear to flow : but we ask, whether the beautiful itself does not always remain such as it is ?

CRAT. It is necessary that it should.

Soc. Can it therefore be properly denominated, if it is always secretly flying away ? And can it, in the first place, be said that it is, and, in the next place, that it is of such a particular nature ? Or is it not necessary, in this case, that, while we are speaking about it, it should immediately become something else, secretly withdraw itself, nor be any longer such as it was ?

CRAT. It is necessary.

Soc. How, then, can that be any thing, which never subsists in a similar manner ? For if, at any time, it should subsist in a similar manner, in that time in which it is thus similarly effected, it is evident that it would suffer no mutation : but, if it always subsists in a similar manner, and is the same, how can it suffer mutation, or be moved, since it never departs from its idea ?

CRAT. By no means.

Soc. But neither can it be known by any one ; for, as soon as that which is endued with knowledge accedes to it, it becomes something different and various, so that it cannot be known what quality it possesses, or how it subsists : for no knowledge can know that which it knows, when the object of its knowledge has no manner of subsistence.

CRAT. It is as you say.

Soc. But neither, Cratylus, can there be any such thing as knowledge, if all things glide away, and nothing abides. For if knowledge itself does not fall from a subsistence, as knowledge, knowledge will perpetually abide, and will be always knowledge : but if the form itself of knowledge glides away, it will at the same time glide into something different from the form of knowledge, and will no longer be knowledge ; but if it always glides away, it will always be something different from knowledge : and from hence it follows that neither knowledge, nor the object of knowledge, will have any subsistence. But if that which knows always is, then that which is known will always have a subsistence, together with the beautiful, the good, and every thing else which we are now speaking of ; and none of these, as it appears to me, will be similar either to that which flows, or is borne along.

But whether things of this kind subsist in this manner, or whether as the followers of Heraclitus and many others assert, it is by no means easy to perceive : nor is it very much the province of a man endued with intellect, to give himself up, and his own soul, to the study of names, believing in their reality, and confiding in their author, as one endued with knowledge : and thus, in consequence of possessing no sound knowledge, either concerning the founder of names, or things themselves, considering all things as flowing like earthen vessels, and viewing them similar to men diseased with a rheum, as if every thing subsisted according to flowing and distillation. Perhaps, therefore, Cratylus, this may be the case, and perhaps not. Hence it is proper to consider this affair in a very strenuous and diligent manner, since it is by no means easy to apprehend the truth : for as yet you are but a young man, and in the vigour of your age ; and if you should discover any thing in the course of your inquiries, you ought to communicate it to me.

CRAT. I shall act in this manner. And I very well know, Socrates, that I am not at present without consideration ; but, in consequence of speculating this affair, the truth seems to me to be much more on your side, than on that of Heraclitus.

SOC. Afterwards therefore, my friend, when you come hither again, instruct me : but now, agreeably to your determination, proceed to the field ; and Hermogenes, here, will attend you.

CRAT. Be it so, Socrates : and do you also endeavour to think upon these things.

THE END OF THE CRATYLUS.

THE

THE EPISTLES

OF

PLATO.

THE
EPISTLES OF PLATO.

EPISTLE I.*

DION to DIONYSIUS—Prosperity.

WHILE I resided so long with you, and managed the affairs of your kingdom with such fidelity, that you might be benefited beyond others, I sustained grievous calumnies. For I know you are convinced, that nothing inhuman was ever perpetrated with my consent. And of the truth of this, all those are my witnesses, who governed in conjunction with you; many of whom, through strenuous endeavours, I liberated from no trifling calamities. And when you possessed the sole authority, I often preserved your city; but at length I was dismissed by you, and ordered to set sail, in a more ignominious manner than it becomes you to expel a mendicant; and this, after I had so long resided with you. As to what remains, therefore, I shall consult respecting myself in a more inhuman manner. But you being so great a tyrant, will govern alone. As to the splendid gold, which you gave for my dismissal, I return it you by Bacchius, the bearer of this Epistle: for it was neither sufficient for a viaticum, nor useful for the rest of life. It would likewise procure great disgrace to you as the giver, and not much less to me as the receiver. But it evidently makes no difference to you, either to give or receive as much gold as this; and on its being returned to you, you may make the same present to some other of your associates, as you made to me. For you have paid sufficient attention to me. And now that sentence of Euri-

* This and the fifth Epistle appear to have been written by Dion, the celebrated but unfortunate disciple of Plato, though the Aldine edition ascribes them to Plato.

pides seasonably occurs to my remembrance, "That when affairs happen to be different from what they are at present, you will pray for such a man to be present with you." But I wish to remind you, that the greater part of other tragic poets, when they introduce a tyrant dying through the machinations of some one, make him vociferate as follows: "Miserable that I am, I perish destitute of friends." But no one represents a tyrant perishing through the want of gold. The following poetical sentences, likewise, will not be disapproved by the intelligent: "Not splendid gold, in this miserable life of mortals most rare, not diamonds, nor tables of silver, which are highly valued by men, are so glittering to the sight; nor yet fertile, weighty acres of wide extended land, as the unanimous conceptions of good men." Farewell, and know thus much of us who are far distant, that you may conduct yourself better towards others.

 EPISTLE II.

PLATO to DIONYSIUS—*Prosperity.*

I HAVE heard from Archidemus, that you think respecting yourself, that not only I, but my familiars, Dion alone excepted, ought neither to do you any injury, nor speak ill of you. But this assertion, that Dion is to be excepted signifies that I do not rule over my familiars. For if I had dominion, as well over others, as you and Dion, I think great good would be the result, both to all you and the rest of the Greeks. But now I am great, in rendering myself obedient to the dictates of my reason. I speak in this manner, because Cratistolus and Polyxenus have not given you any genuine information: for they report, that one of these should say, he had heard among the Olympians that many of my associates reviled you. Perhaps he heard more accurately than I did. But it is proper, as it appears to me, that, whenever any thing of this kind respecting my associates is mentioned to you, to write to me respecting the affair: for I shall neither be afraid nor ashamed to speak the truth. But to you and me things are thus mutually circumstanced. Nor are we unknown to any one of the Greeks, as I may say, nor is our conversation passed over in silence; nor should it be concealed from you, that neither will it be passed over in silence by posterity: for those by whom it is received are such, that they are neither few nor obscure. But why do I thus speak? I will now tell you, assuming an elevated exordium.

Wisdom and mighty power naturally tend to the same: and these two always pursue, seek, and unite with each other. In the next place, men are delighted with these, whether they make them the subject of their private conversations, or hear them celebrated in poetical compositions. Thus those who discourse about Hiero, and Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, rejoice to mention the familiarity of Simonides with these men, and to relate what he

did and said to them. In like manner they are accustomed to celebrate Periander the Corinthian in conjunction with Thales the Milesian ; Pericles and Anaxagoras, Cræsus and Solon, as powerful with wise men, and Cyrus as a powerful man. Poets too, in imitation of this, bring together Creon and Tiresias ; Polydus and Minos ; Agamemnon and Nestor ; Ulysses and Palamedes : and, as it appears to me, for the same reason, the first men joined Prometheus with Jupiter. But of these, they represent some as discordant, and others as friendly with each other ; and again, some as at one time friendly, and at another discordant : and they celebrate as well their mutual agreements as their dissensions. But I mention all these particulars, because I am willing to evince that men will not be silent respecting us when we are dead ; so that we ought not to neglect the opinion of mankind. For it is necessary, as it seems, that we should pay attention to futurity ; since it comes to pass, through a certain nature, that the most illiberal of mankind are not at all concerned about the opinion of posterity : but the most worthy men do every thing that they may be justly celebrated hereafter. And this I consider as an argument that the dead have a certain perception of what is transacted here. For the most excellent souls prophesy that this will be the case ; but this is not asserted by the most depraved. And the prophecies of divine men are more powerful than of those that are not divine. I also think, that if it were permitted those deceased persons, of whom I have spoken above, to correct their conversations, they would very earnestly endeavour that better things might be said of them than at present. This, therefore, it is yet permitted us to say, through the favour of divinity, that if we have done any thing unbecoming during our former acquaintance with you, either in word or deed, we may correct it ; that a true opinion may be entertained of us by posterity respecting philosophy ; viz. a better opinion if we are worthy, and the contrary if we are depraved. And indeed, if we pay attention to this, we cannot do any thing more pious, nor is any thing more impious than the neglect of it. But how this ought to take place, and what the justice is which it contains, I will tell you.

When I came into Sicily, I had the reputation of excelling very much in philosophy. I was also willing on my arrival among the Syracusians to have you a witness of my renown, that philosophy might also be honoured for me
by

by the multitude. But my wishes were not crowned with success. I do not however assign as the cause of this, that which is assigned by many, but I attribute it to your not entirely believing in me. But you were willing to dismiss me and call others, and to inquire into the nature of my business, by this as it seems distrustful of me. And those that spoke loudly of these things were many, and who likewise affirmed that you indeed despised me, and seriously applied yourself to other things. Such indeed were the reports at that time.

Now hear however what after these things it is just to do, that I may reply to your question, how you and I ought mutually to conduct ourselves. If then you entirely despise philosophy, you must bid farewell to it. But if you have either heard from another, or have yourself discovered things more excellent than those you have received from me, then honour these. But if our doctrines please you, then you ought highly to honour me. Now, therefore, as from the beginning, do you lead and I will follow. For being honoured by, I will honour you; but not being honoured, I will remain silent. Further still, if you honour me, and in doing this take the lead, you will appear to honour philosophy: and this will procure you that which you ardently desire, the reputation of being considered by the multitude as a philosopher. But if I should honour you, without being honoured by you, I should seem to admire and pursue wealth: and we know that this is considered as disgraceful by all men. In short, if you honour me, an ornament to both of us will ensue; but if I honour you, disgrace to both of us will be the consequence. And thus much for these particulars.

But the little sphere ¹ is not properly made: and this Archidemus will show you on his arrival. It is likewise requisite to render apparent to him the particulars respecting that which is far more honourable and divine than this, and about which you interrogate me through him. For you say, according to his report, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you therefore in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted either by land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents: *All things are situated about the*

¹ What this little sphere was is uncertain. Perhaps it was a kind of orrery.

king¹ of all things; and all things subsist for his sake, and he is the cause of all beautiful things. But second things are situated about that which is second; and

¹ The following observations, extracted from the second book of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, form an excellent comment on the present passage, which is no less deeply mystical than truly admirable:

Plato here evidently neither connumerates the ineffable principle of things with the other principles posterior to him, nor does he coarrange it, as the leader of a triad, with the second and third powers. For in a triadic division, the first monad is the leader of the first orders, and which are coordinate with itself: but the second is the leader of second orders; and the third of those that are third. And if some one should apprehend that the first principle is the leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third allotments, yet the cause which subsists according to comprehension, is different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And all things indeed are subject to the king of all things, according to one reason and one order: but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected according to the same order; and it is necessary that things second and third should be subservient according to their communion with the remaining kings. Is it not evident, therefore, that what is here said in a remarkable manner celebrates the exempt nature of the first cause, and his uncoordination with the other kingdoms of the gods? For Plato says, that the king of all similarly reigns over all things, that all things subsist about him, and that both essence and energy are present with all things for his sake.

Observe too, that Plato calls the first god king, but he does not think proper to give this appellation to the rest. He likewise calls him the king not only of things first, as the second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the cause at once of all being and of all beauty. Hence the highest god precedes the other causes in an exempt and uniform manner, and is neither celebrated by Plato as coordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.

But when Plato a little after says, "This your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful things is as of a nature endued with a *certain quality*," he clearly indicates that neither language nor knowledge is adapted to that which is first: for, as being unknown, it cannot be apprehended by intelligence, and as being uncircumscribed, it cannot be explained by words. But whatever you say of it, you will say, as of a *certain* thing; and you will speak indeed *a'out* it, but you will not speak *it*. For speaking of the things of which it is the cause, we are unable to say, or to apprehend, through intelligence, what it is.

Here, therefore, the addition of quality and the busy energy of the soul remove it from the goodness which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy of its conceptions about it. This likewise draws the soul down to kindred, connate, and multiform intelligibles, and prevents her from receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the participation of *the good*. And it is not only proper that the human soul should be purified from things coordinate with itself in the union and communion with that which is first, and that for this purpose it should leave all the multitude of itself behind, and, exciting its own hyparxis, approach with closed eyes, as it is said, to the king of all things, and participate of his light as much as this is lawful for it to accomplish; but intellect also, which is prior to us, and all divine natures, by their highest unions,

and such as are third in gradation about that which is third. The human soul therefore extends itself in order to learn the quality of these things, and looks to such

unions, superessential torches *, and first hyparxes, are united to that which is first, and always participate of its exuberant fulness; and this not so far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cause of all disseminated in all things impressions of his own all-perfect transcendency, and through these establishes all things about himself, and being exempt from wholes, is ineffably present to all things. Every thing, therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature, finds there the symbol of the father of all. All things too naturally venerate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate mystic impression, divesting themselves of their own nature, and hastening to become his impression alone, and to participate him alone, through the desire of his unknown nature, and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cause, they become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the desire which all things naturally possess of goodness unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and transcendently full. But that what is here said is concerning the first god, and that Plato, in these conceptions, leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other causes, has been, I think, sufficiently evinced.

Let us then in the next place consider each of the dogmas, and adapt them to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these we may comprehend, by a reasoning process, the scope of the whole of Plato's theology. Let then one truth concerning the first principle be especially that which celebrates his ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature; which establishes all things about him, but does not assert that he generates or produces any thing, or that he pre-exists as the end of things posterior to himself. For such a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is established above all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which subsist after him.

Such then being this indication of the first god, and such the manner in which it venerates the ineffable, the second to this is that which converts all the desires of things to him, and celebrates him as the object of desire to and common end of all things, according to one cause which precedes all other causes. For the last of things subsists only for the sake of something else, but the first is that only for the sake of which all other things subsist: and all the natures that subsist between participate of these two idioms. Hence they genuinely adhere to the natures which surpass them, as objects of desire, but impart the perfection of desires to subordinate beings.

The third speculation of the principle of things is far inferior to the preceding, considering him as giving subsistence to all beautiful things. For to celebrate him as the supplier of good, and as end preceding the two orders of things, is not very remote from the narration which says, that all causes are posterior to him, and derive their subsistence from him, as well those which are

* *ὑπερῤῥασις*; *ὑπάρσις*. Proclus thus denominates the superessential unities conformably to what is said of them by Plato in the 6th book of the Republic; for he there considers them as analogous to light.

such particulars as are allied to itself, none of which are sufficient for the purpose. But about the king himself, and the natures of which I have spoken, there is

paternal, and the sources of good, as those that are the suppliers of prolific powers. But to ascribe to him a producing and generative cause, is still more remote from the all-perfect union of the first. For as it cannot be known or discussed by language, by secondary natures, it must not be said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of beings, but we should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly causeless cause which is prior to all causes. If, however, as we endeavour to ascribe to him *the good* and *the one*, we in like manner attribute to him *cause*, and that which is final or paternal, we must pardon the parturition of the soul about this ineffable principle, aspiring to perceive him with the eye of intellect, and to speak about him; but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency of *the one* which is immense must be considered as surpassing an indication of this kind.

From these things, therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order adapted to things themselves. And we may say that the first part of this sentence sufficiently indicates the simplicity, transcendency, and in short the uncoordination with all things of the king of all. For the assertion that all things subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things second, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any connexion with things posterior to it. But the second part celebrates the king of all things as prearranged in the order of *end*. For that which is the highest of all causes, is immediately conjoined with that which is prior to cause; but of this kind is the final cause, and that for the sake of which all things subsist. This, therefore, is posterior to the other, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Platonic doctrine.

Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a species of cause inferior to the final. Whence also Plotinus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first god the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is *the good*. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divinedogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about *the good*, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of cause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed *the good* ineffable, as it is fit it should, but, from the habitude of things posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause: for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of *the good*, it excites in us the conception of the communion and coordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring natures. And the third dogma evinces that *the good* is the cause of all beautiful things. But this is to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and not to abide in the conception of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. For it is not possible to say any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from all things, and at another from the best of things: for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, is first participated by the best of things, and unfolds its own separate union through the idiom of these.

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is nothing of this kind: but the soul speaks of that which is posterior to this. Indeed, O son of Dionysus and Doris, this your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful¹ things, is as of a nature endued with a certain quality. Or rather it is a parturition respecting this ingenerated in the soul; from which he who is not liberated will never in reality acquire truth.

You have said, that you thought of mentioning this to me, in the garden, when we were seated under the laurel trees, and that it was your invention. But I have said, that if this appears to you to subsist in this manner, you have freed me from a long discussion. Nor shall we ever find any other inventor; but about this I shall be very busily employed. Perhaps however you have heard this from some one, or perhaps you have been impelled to advance thus far by a *divine allotment*. You have not however apprehended what a stability the demonstrations of this thing possess; but you spring forward at different times in a different manner, about that which is the object of phantasy, while in the mean time the thing of which we are now speaking is not any thing of this kind. Nor is this the case with you alone: but be well assured that no one, when he first hears me, is in the beginning otherwise affected. And one indeed, finding more difficulty, and another less, they are scarcely at length liberated from parturition. But nearly all of them labour not a little. As this therefore has been, and is the case, in my opinion, we have nearly found that about which you inquire in your letters, I mean, how we ought to be affected towards each other. For after you have discussed these particulars, with the assistance of other persons, and

We ascribe to it therefore *the one* and *the good*, from the donation from it which pervades to all things. For of those things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But *the about which* (το περί ο), *the through which* (το δι ου), *the from which* (το απ' ου), particularly subsist in the intelligible gods: and from these they are ascribed to the first god. For whence can we suppose the unical gods derive their idioms, except from that which is prior to them? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term *about* is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term *through which* pertains to the middle order of intelligibles: for all things subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis perfectly entire. And the term *from which* is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles: for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly.

¹ In all the editions of Plato that I have seen, *κακων* is here erroneously printed instead of *καλων*. I say erroneously, because not only the authority of Proclus but the sense of the passage proves it to be so.

have

have compared them with the opinions of others, and considered them by themselves, then, if your inquiry has been properly conducted, you will accord both with them and us. How then is it possible that these things, and all of which we have spoken, should not take place?

You have, therefore, acted rightly in now sending Archidemus to us. And after he has returned to you and has related my opinion, other doubts will perhaps rise in your mind. If, therefore, you consult properly, you will send Archidemus to me again. But he, as if laden with merchandise, will again return to you. And if you do this, twice or thrice, and sufficiently examine the things which I shall send, I should wonder if you are not much better disposed with respect to the particulars you are in doubt of than at present. You should, therefore, boldly act in this manner: for neither you, nor Archidemus, can engage in any merchandise more becoming or more acceptable to divinity than this. Be careful, however, that these things do not fall among men void of discipline: *for, as it appears to me, there are scarcely any particulars which will appear more ridiculous to the multitude than these; nor again, any which will appear more wonderful and enthusiastic to those that are well born.* But when often repeated and continually heard, and this for many years, they are scarcely at length, with great labour, purified like gold.

But hear the wonderful circumstance which takes place in this affair: for there are many men who have heard these things, who are able to learn and able to remember, who are sagacious in examining and judging, who are now advanced in years, and who have heard these things for not less than thirty years; these men now say, that things which formerly appeared to them to be most incredible, now appear to them to be most credible and perspicuous. And things which were formerly considered by them as most credible, now appear to them to be the very contrary. Looking therefore to this, be careful lest you repent of what you have now unworthily uttered. But the greatest means of defence in this case, consists not in writing, but learning: for things which are written cannot be kept from the public view. On this account, I have never at any time written any thing about these particulars. Nor is there any book professedly composed by Plato, nor will there be. But what has now been said, is to be ascribed

ascribed ¹ to Socrates, who was a worthy character, even while a young man. Farewell, and be persuaded by me; and when you have often read this Epistle, commit it to the flames. And thus much for these particulars.

With respect to Polyxenus, you wonder that I do not send him to you. But I say the same at present as I have formerly said concerning Lycophron, and the others that are with you, viz. that, both naturally and from the method of your discourse, you very much excel them in the art of speaking. Nor is any one of them willingly confuted as some suppose, but unwillingly. And you appear indeed to have used and bestowed gifts upon them sufficiently well. Many other things may be said about these particulars, as well as about others of the same kind. But if you use Philistion, do not spare him. And if you can, employ Speusippus, and dismiss him. Speusippus indeed stands in need of your assistance. But Philistion promised me that he would very willingly come to Athens, if you would dismiss him. You will likewise do well to dismiss him who belongs to the stone quarries. But the request is trifling, both respecting his domestics, and Egeippus the son of Ariston: for in one of your letters to me you say, that if any one either injures him, or his domestics, and you perceive it, you will not suffer a continuance of the injury. Besides, it is worth while to speak the truth respecting Lyficles: for he alone, of those who came from Sicily to Athens, has made no alteration respecting our intimacy with each other, but continually speaks of our past conduct as laudable and good.

¹ Plato means nothing more by this, than that what has been above said is conformable to the doctrine of Socrates.

EPISTLE III.

PLATO to DIONYSIUS—*Health.*

YOU inquire, by your letter, whether it is better in salutations to use the word *health*, or rather to write, as I am accustomed to do in letters to my friends, *prosperity*. For you, as those who were then present relate, flattering the god who is worshipped at Delphi, call him by this very appellation. And as they say, you write *hail*, and yet preserve the voluptuous life of a tyrant. But I address neither man nor divinity with this salutation. Not divinity, because in so doing I should place him in an order contrary to his nature; as he is far removed from pleasure and pain. Nor man, because pleasure often produces detriment and pain, and generates in the soul, indocility, oblivion, stupidity, and insolence. And thus much respecting salutation, which, after you have read, you may take as you please.

But not a few report, that you said to certain ambassadors who were with you, that you intended to reestablish the Grecian cities in Sicily, to rectify the government of the Syracusians, and give them a kingdom instead of a tyranny. You assert, however, that though you very much desired, yet being impeded by me, you had not then an opportunity to put these intentions in execution; that I now teach Dion to do the very same things himself; and that, according to your conceptions of things, we shall subvert your government. You indeed know whether you derive any advantage from such assertions; but you certainly injure me by speaking contrary to the truth: for I am become sufficiently odious both to the mercenary foldiers and the Syracusan vulgar, through Philistides and many others, on account of my residence in the acropolis. For then those that dwelt out of the tower blamed me as the author of every crime, and asserted that you did
every

every thing through my persuasions. However, you most clearly know, that of my own accord I meddled very little with politics, and that this was only at first, when I thought I might in some degree be beneficial, while with a sufficient degree of earnestness I was composing my books of Laws; to which you, or some other person, have made additions contrary to my intention. For I hear that, afterwards, some of you acted in a fraudulent manner with respect to these writings: and these things indeed are manifest to those that are able to distinguish the nature of my disposition. But, as I just now said, I do not stand in need of calumny from the Syracusians, and certain others whom you may have persuaded by these assertions; but I am much more in want of an apology against the former calumny, than that which has now arisen after it, as being greater and more vehement.

Against these two calumnies, therefore, it is necessary I should make a two-fold apology. In the first place asserting, that I very properly avoided engaging with you in political affairs: and in the second place, that my advice was not that which you say it was, and that I did not impede you, when you designed to reestablish the Grecian cities. Hear then, in the first place, the particulars of my first apology. I came to Syracuse, in consequence of being called by you and Dion, who was already approved of by me, and who had formerly been my guest. He likewise had arrived at that period of life which we call a middle age, and in which those that are endued with the smallest degree of intellect, will apply themselves to such affairs as were then the subject of your deliberations. But you were very young, and very ignorant of those particulars in which you ought to have been skilled; and you were likewise perfectly unknown to me. After this, some man, or god, or a certain fortune in conjunction with you, expelled Dion, and you were left alone. Do you think therefore, that at that time I had any communion with you in political affairs; perceiving as I did, that a prudent counsellor was banished by you, and that an imprudent person was left, with a multitude of base men; so that he did not govern in reality, but while he thought he had dominion, he was governed by men of this description? In these circumstances, what ought to have done? Does it not necessarily follow, that I ought to have done what I did do? I mean, to

bid farewell to politics, in order to avoid the calumnies of the malevolent, and to endeavour that you and Dion, who were far separated from, and discordant with each other, might become in the highest degree mutual friends. You are my witness, that I never at any time remitted my endeavours to accomplish this. At the same time, we could scarcely agree that I should return home, and that when the war was finished, in which you were then engaged, I and Dion should come to Syracuse; and that you would call us. These were the transactions which happened when I first came among the Syracusians, and on my returning home with safety.

After this, peace being made, you called me, not, however, according to the agreement, but you wrote to me that I should come alone, and that you would send for Dion afterwards. On this account I did not come, which displeased Dion, who thought it would be better to comply with your request. On the following year a three-banked galley and letters came from you, and in these epistles you say, that if I will come, the affairs of Dion shall be settled according to my mind; but that if I did not come, the very contrary should take place. I am ashamed to say how many letters then came, both from you, and others through you, from Italy and Sicily, to me, and to such as were my kindred and familiars; all of them exhorting and requesting me to comply by all means with your entreaties. It appeared, therefore, to all these, beginning from Dion, that I ought to set sail, and not behave effeminately, though I excused myself on account of my age, and mentioned my doubts that you would not be sufficient to resist my calumniators, and those who wished to sow dissension between us. For I then saw, and now see, with respect to the great and surpassing possessions both of private persons and monarchs, that in proportion to their magnitude, they nourish calumniators, and those that devise noxious pleasures; a greater evil than which neither wealth, nor the power of any other prerogative can produce. However, bidding farewell to all these considerations, I determined to come, that my friends might not accuse me of ruining, through my negligence, the affairs of Dion, when they might have been safe.

You well know all that happened on my arrival. For I indeed thought, according to the compact made by you in your letters, that you would in the
first

first place recall Dion, and restore him to his former familiarity with you. If, as I persuaded you, you had done so at that time, perhaps, as my opinion prophesies, things would have been better for you, and the Syracusians, and the other Greeks. Afterwards, I thought that the property of Dion ought to be restored, and that it ought not to be given to those among whom you thought proper it should be divided. Besides this, I thought that the usual sum of money should be sent to him every year, and that it ought rather to be increased than diminished on account of my being present. But as none of these things took place, I determined to depart. After this, however, you persuaded me to stay for a year, affirming that you would restore all the property of Dion, so that one half would be sent to Corinth, and that the other half should be left for his son. I could relate many other things which you promised to do, but have not performed; but I omit them, on account of their multitude: for as you sold all the possessions of Dion without his consent, though you affirmed you would not unless he consented to it, you have placed a most glorious colophon, O wonderful man, on all your promises. For you devised a thing neither beautiful nor elegant, nor just, nor advantageous; I mean, you attempted to frighten me, as being ignorant of the transactions at that time, that I might cease entreating you to send money to Dion. For when you banished Heraclides, which did not appear just either to the Syracusians, or to me, and I, together with Theodotus and Euribius, requested you to pardon him, making use of this as a sufficient pretext, you said that it had been for some time past evident to you, that I was not at all concerned about you, but only for Dion, and his friends and kindred. And now, as Theodotes and Heraclides are calumniated as being the familiars of Dion, you assert that I endeavour, by every possible device, that they may not suffer punishment. And thus much for the political transactions of you and me. And if you have seen any thing else discordant in me with respect to you, think it is reasonable that all this should have happened, and do not wonder that it has: for I should deservedly appear to be depraved to a man endued with any portion of intellect, if, persuaded by the magnitude of your authority, I should betray my antient friend and guest when acting evilly through you, and yet, as I may say, being in no respect a worse character than you are; and if I should prefer you though acting unjustly, and should do every thing which you enjoin for the sake of accumulating wealth. For if
there

there had been any change in my conduct, no other cause than this would have been assigned of such mutation. And thus much for this; you being the occasion of the deceitful friendship and disagreement between you and me.

But my discourse now nearly brings me in connection to the second part of my apology. Attend therefore diligently, and consider whether I appear to you to assert that which is false, and not the truth: for I say, that when Archidemus and Aristocritus were with you in the garden, about twenty days before I returned home from Syracuse, you reproached me with the very same thing as at present; I mean, that I was more concerned for Heraclides, and every other person, than for you. You likewise interrogated me before them, whether I remembered, on my first coming to Syracuse, that I advised you to reestablish the Grecian cities. But I acknowledged that I did remember: and, even now, it appears to me that it were best to do so. I must likewise relate, O Dionysius, what was said after this: for I asked you, whether I should advise you to do this alone, or something else besides this. But you answered me in an angry and insolent manner; and on this account the injurious reply which you then made me is now become a true vision instead of a dream. But you asked me, in a very undisguised manner, and laughing at the same time if I remember, whether I exhorted you as one properly instructed to do all these things or not. I replied, that you very properly reminded me. You then asked me whether I exhorted you as one learned in geometry, or how? But after this I did not say what I might have said, fearing lest, for the sake of a trifling word, the navigation which I expected should be contracted, instead of being ample. That, therefore, for the sake of which all this has been said by me, is as follows: I am unwilling to be calumniated by you, as having hindered you from reestablishing the Grecian cities, which were subverted by the Barbarians, and assisting the Syracusians, by giving them a kingdom instead of a tyranny. For you cannot falsely assert any thing of me, which less becomes me than this.

Indeed, if there appeared to be any sufficient judgment of this affair, I could adduce other arguments, still clearer than these, to prove that I exhorted you to do these things, but that you were unwilling to do them: for it is by no means difficult to show, in a perspicuous manner, that by thus acting

acting you would have done the best for yourself, the Syracusians, and all Sicily. If, therefore, you deny that you said these things, when at the same time you did say them, this is sufficient to condemn you. But if you acknowledge that you did, think after this, that Stesichorus was a wise man, and imitating his recantation[†], betake yourself from a false assertion to one that is true.

[†] See the Phædrus of Plato, where the circumstance here alluded to is cited at length.

EPISTLE IV.

PLATO to DION of SYRACUSE—Prosperity.

I THINK that my alacrity with respect to casual actions is apparent at all times, and that I very seriously apply myself to accomplish them, not more for the sake of any thing else, than emulation in things beautiful. For I consider it as just, that those who are in reality worthy men, and who act in this manner, should obtain that renown which is their due. At present, therefore, through the favour of divinity, things subsist in a proper manner : but with respect to future events there is the greatest contest. For to excel in fortitude, swiftness, and strength, may appear a thing possible to be accomplished by others ; but to excel in truth, justice, magnificence, and graceful conduct respecting all these, pertains to those, beyond all others, who aspire after the honour attendant on such things as these. Now, therefore, what I say is manifest. But at the same time, we ought to remind ourselves, that it is proper, as you well know, that we should differ more from other men than other men from boys. Hence it is evident that we ought to become such characters as we assert ourselves to be ; especially since, through the favour of divinity, we may say that this will be easy for us to accomplish : for others, in order to effect this, must necessarily wander through many places. But the state of your affairs is such, that this must be accomplished by you in one particular part of the earth ; and in this part the eyes of all men are especially turned towards you. As you are therefore beheld by all men, prepare yourself to exhibit to the world a specimen of the ancient Lycurgus and Cyrus, or any other, who appears to have surpassed in the moral and political virtues ; especially since many, and indeed nearly all, men say, there is great reason to expect that, when Dionysius is taken away, things will be in a ruinous state, through the emulation of you, Heraclides, Theodotus, and other illustrious persons.

If

If, therefore, this should happen to be the case, which we must hope will not, do you apply a remedy, that affairs may be brought to the best condition. It will perhaps seem to you ridiculous that I should mention these things, because you are not ignorant of them: but I see that in the theatres the combatants are incited by boys, and not by their friends, though it might be supposed that these would be induced earnestly to exhort them, through benevolence. Now therefore do you begin the contest, and inform me by a letter if you require my assistance. Affairs here are just as when you were with us. Inform me, likewise, what you have done, or what you are now doing: for though we hear many things, we know nothing; and now letters from Theodotus and Heraclides are come to Lacedæmon and Ægina. But we, as I have said, though we hear many things about these particulars, yet we know nothing with certainty. Think likewise, that you appear to certain persons to be less affable than is proper. Do not therefore forget, that the power of acting arises from pleasing mankind, but that moroseness occasions a desertion of associates. May prosperity attend you.

EPISTLE V.

DION to PERDICCAS.

I HAVE persuaded Euphræus, as you request me in your letter, to pay constant attention to your affairs. But it is just, hospitable, and holy, that I should both advise you respecting other things, and how you ought to use Euphræus. I ought, however, mostly to advise you in that of which you are now indigent through your age, and the scarcity of youthful monitors. For there is a particular sound from the several polities, just as if it were emitted from certain animals, one from a democracy, another from an oligarchy, and another again from a monarchy. Many assert that they understand these voices, but, except a few, they are very far from understanding them. Whichever of these polities therefore emits a proper sound, both towards the gods, and towards men, and produces actions correspondent to its sound, that polity always flourishes and is preserved. But when it imitates another sound, it is corrupted. For this Euphræus will be useful to you in no small degree, though he will likewise possess fortitude in other things. for I hope that he will discover the reasons of a monarchy, not less than your associates. If you employ him therefore for this purpose, you will both derive advantage to yourself, and greatly benefit him.

But if any one, hearing these things, should say, Plato professed to know what is advantageous to a democracy, but though he had an opportunity, in his own city, of speaking to the people, and giving them the best advice, yet he never was known to rise and address them; to this it may be answered, that Plato came late to his country, and that he became acquainted with the people when they were advanced in years, and after they had been accustomed by those prior to him to do many things contrary to his

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his advice : for he would most willingly have consulted for its good, as for that of his father, if he had not thought he should have exposed himself to needless danger. But I think that the same thing will take place with respect to his advice to me : for if we should appear to be incurable, he will bid a long farewell to us, and will abstain from advising either me or mine. May you be prosperous.

EPISTLE VI.

PLATO to HERMIAS, ERASTUS, and CORISCUS—Prosperity.

IT appears to me, that some one of the gods has benevolently and abundantly procured for you good fortune, if you only receive it in a becoming manner: for you dwell near to, and are able to benefit each other in the greatest degree. And to Hermias I say, that neither a multitude of horses, nor any other warlike apparatus, nor even an abundance of gold, possesses greater power, than friends that are stable, and endued with sound manners. But to Erastus and Coriscus I say, though I am an old man, that bestows this beautiful wisdom of ideas, that wisdom is requisite which possesses a guardian and defensive power against the base and unjust: for they are unskilled in fraud, through living for a long time with us, who are orderly, and not vicious men. On this account I have said, that they stand in need of these two kinds of wisdom, lest they should be compelled to neglect true wisdom, and should pay more attention than is proper to human and necessary wisdom. But Hermias appears to me to have received this power from a nature which is not yet connate, and from art through experience. What then do I say? To you, Hermias, I, as being more skilled in the manners and disposition of Erastus and Coriscus than you are, assert, indicate, and testify, that you will not easily find men whose manners deserve greater confidence than these your neighbours. I advise you, therefore, to cultivate an acquaintance with these men as much as possible. And again, I advise you, Erastus and Coriscus, to cultivate in return an acquaintance with Hermias, and endeavour, by mutual offices of kindness, to be united in the bonds of friendship.

But

But if any one of you shall appear to dissolve this union (for human affairs are not altogether stable), send hither to me and mine an epistle containing an accusation of the delinquent. For I think that the reasons which our answer to this letter will contain, unless there has been some great cause for this dissolution, will again bind you in your former friendship and union, more than any incantation. Indeed, if all we and you philosophize as much as we are able, and as far as is permitted to each of us, the things which have now been oracularly delivered will possess their proper authority. But if we do not act in this manner, I will not relate the consequences: for I predict a good omen to you, and I say, that if divinity pleases, you will perform all these good actions. But it is requisite that this Epistle should be read by you three together; or at least by two of you in common, as often as possible; and that you should use it by compact, and an established law; at the same time taking an oath, with an earnestness by no means inelegant, and with discipline, the sister of this earnestness, and swearing by that god, who is the leader¹ of all things present and future, and by the father and lord of this leader and cause: whom, if we truly philosophize, we shall all clearly know, in as great a degree as is possible to happy men.

¹ By that god who is the leader of all things, Plato means Jupiter the artificer of the universe; and by the father and lord of this leader, the ineffable principle of things.

 EPISTLE VII.

PLATO to the Kindred and Associates of DION—Prosperity.

YOU write to me, that it is requisite to think that your sentiments about politics are the same as those of Dion; and that I should be exhorted to join with you as much as possible, both in word and deed. Indeed, if you have the same opinion and desire with him, I shall certainly join with you; but if you have not, it will be requisite to deliberate frequently on the subject. But his thoughts and desire were not such as you conjecture. I, however, as knowing them, can clearly relate what they were.

When I first came to Syracuse, I was nearly forty years old, and the age of Dion was then the same as that of Hipparinus is at present. He has likewise always persevered in the opinion which he then entertained; I mean, that the Syracusians ought to be free, and that they should be governed by the best laws. So that it is by no means wonderful, if some god has caused Dion to accord with him in opinion respecting a polity. But the manner in which this was effected, is a thing which deserves to be heard both by young and old. I will, however, endeavour to relate the affair to you from the beginning: for at present it will be opportune.

When I was a young man I was affected in the same manner as the many. For I determined, as soon as I became my own master, to betake myself immediately to the common affairs of the city. In the mean time, the following political circumstances happened to me: The polity which existed at that time being reviled by many, a change took place. Then one and fifty men being chosen as governors, eleven of them presided in the city, and ten in the Piræus; and each of these directed the affairs in the city. But the remaining thirty were invested with supreme authority. Some of these being my familiars, were well known to me, and immediately called

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on me to attend to politics, as a thing proper for me to study. But the manner in which I was affected was not at all wonderful, on account of my youth: for I thought that they ought to govern the city so as to bring it from an unjust life to just manners. And in consequence of this, I very diligently attended to their conduct. But I perceived that these men, in a short time, evinced that the former polity was golden in comparison with theirs: for, besides acting unjustly in other respects, they sent Socrates, who was my friend, and older than I am, and who, I am not ashamed to say, was the most just of any one then existing; they sent him, I say, together with certain others, in order to bring back one of the citizens by force, that he might be punished with death. They likewise endeavoured to make Socrates join with them in the management of affairs, whether he was willing or not. He refused however to comply, and determined to expose himself to every danger, rather than be a partaker of their impious deeds. All which when I perceived, together with other similar particulars of no small importance, I was indignant, and withdrew myself from the evil men of that time.

Not long after this, the thirty tyrants were cut off, and the whole of the then existing polity was subverted. Again, therefore, I was incited, though in a more moderate degree, to engage in common and political affairs. But many circumstances then took place, at which any one might be indignant, owing to the disordered state of affairs at that time. Nor was it wonderful, that in such mutations certain enemies should be punished in a more severe manner, although those that returned were very equitable. However, through a certain fortune, it happened, that our associate Socrates was brought into a court of justice, and was accused of the greatest impiety, and which pertained to Socrates the least of all men. For some led him along as an impious person, but others gave sentence against him, and condemned him to death, who at that very time was unwilling to partake of the unholy deed respecting the removal of one of his exiled friends. On perceiving these things therefore, together with the men who had the management of political affairs, and their laws and manners, the more I considered them as I advanced in years, by so much the more difficult did the right administration of political concerns appear to me: *for this cannot be accomplished without friends and faithful associates.* But at that time, it was not easy to find

find these : for our city was then no longer governed according to our fathers manners and pursuits ; and it was not possible to obey such as were new, with any degree of ease, in consequence of the written laws and the manners being corrupted.

This likewise was wonderful in the affair, that I, who at first was ardently desirous of engaging in political concerns, when I beheld the disordered state of things, was at length giddy with the view. However, I did not withdraw my attention from them, but determined to see whether something better might not take place respecting these very things, and the whole polity, and always to wait a fit opportunity of acting. At last I perceived that all the cities existing at present were badly governed. For as to what relates to laws, they are nearly in an incurable state, without the assistance of some wonderful apparatus in conjunction with fortune. I am therefore compelled to say, praising *genuine philosophy*, that through this we are enabled to perceive such political concerns as are just, and all the affairs of private individuals. *Hence, the human race will not be liberated from evils, till either the genus of those that philosophize with rectitude and truth obtains the government of political affairs, or those that govern in cities, from a certain divine allotment, truly philosophize.* With this conception, I first came to Italy and Sicily. But on my arriving thither, I was by no means pleased with the life which is called happy ; a life full of the Italian and Syracusan tables, and which consists in repletion twice a day, in never lying alone by night, and such other particulars as follow a life of this kind : for from these manners, no man under the heavens would ever become wise, if he is nourished in them from his youth, however admirable his natural disposition may be : nor will such a one ever become temperate. And the same thing may be said respecting the other virtues. But no city can acquiesce in its laws, while the citizens are of opinion, that it is proper to consume all their possessions in superfluous cost ; and that, neglecting every thing else, they should give themselves up to feasting and venereal delight. For it is necessary that such cities as these should never cease changing into tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies, and that the powerful among them should not even endure the name of a just and equitable polity. With these, and the above-mentioned conceptions, I came to Syracuse : perhaps through the interference of fortune. It appeared indeed, that the administration of the
present

present affairs respecting Dion and the Syracusians, was devised by *some one of the natures more excellent*¹ *than mankind*. And I am afraid, that you, on consulting me a second time, will be less persuaded by me than before. However, I affirm that the beginning of all the transactions was my journey to Sicily. For I associated with Dion who was then a young man; and in my discourse, explained to him, and advised him to do, such things as appeared to me to be best for mankind; not knowing that certain persons were then secretly contriving a dissolution of the tyranny. For Dion being very docile, both with respect to other things, and what was then said by me, he so acutely apprehended, and readily embraced my doctrines, that he surpassed all the young men with whom I was ever acquainted. He was likewise determined to pass the remainder of his life in a manner superior to many of the Italians and Sicilians, viz. in pursuing virtue, rather than pleasure and luxury. Hence he was hated by those, who lived conformably to tyrannic institutes, even till the death of Dionysius.

After this he perceived that the very same conception, which he had framed through the assistance of right reason, did not subsist in him alone, but in certain other persons, though they were not numerous, among whom he thought was Dionysius the younger. He likewise hoped that if this were the case, both his own life, and that of the other Syracusians, would be transcendently more blessed. On this account he thought that I ought by all means to come with the utmost celerity to Syracuse, that I might assist them in their undertakings; remembering how easily, by my conversation, he was inflamed with the desire of leading the most beautiful and best life. If he could but enkindle this desire in Dionysius, as he was attempting to do, he was in hopes that a happy and true life, without slaughter and death, and the evils which exist at present, would flourish through every part of Syracuse.

Dion rightly conceiving that this would be the case, persuaded Dionysius to send for me, and himself requested that I would by all means come with the utmost celerity, before certain other persons, associating with Dionysius, turned him to a life different from that which is best. But it is necessary to relate more fully what he said. Why, says he, should we expect a fitter

¹ Viz. by some one of those who are essentially *dæmons* or *heroes*.

opportunity than that which now presents itself to us through a certain divine fortune? He likewise mentioned the empire of Italy and Sicily, the power of Dionysius in this empire, and his vehement desire after philosophy and erudition. He informed me how much inclined his own kindred and familiars were to the doctrines and mode of life which I inculcated, and that he himself was most sufficient to incite Dionysius to embrace them. He added, that in consequence of this, if at any time, there was now every reason to hope that these persons would become philosophers and rulers of mighty cities. With these therefore, and many other such reasons, did he urge me to comply with his request. But I was fearful of the event; as the desires of young men are hasty, and are often borne along in a direction contrary to themselves.

However, I knew that the disposition of Dion was naturally grave, and that his age was sufficiently mature. Hence, while I was considering and doubting whether I should go and comply with his request, or not, it at the same time occurred to me that I ought to go; and that if ever any one thought of attempting to give perfection to laws and a polity, now was the time to make the attempt. For I considered, that if I could only persuade one person, I should sufficiently produce every good. With this conception and this confidence, and not from the motives which some have thought, I left my home; feeling at the same time in myself the greatest shame lest I should ever appear to myself to be nothing more than a man of words, and should never voluntarily accomplish any thing in deeds. I was likewise fearful, lest the hospitality and friendship of Dion should be exposed to no small dangers; who, if he should fall into any calamity, or be banished by Dionysius, and his other enemies, would fly to us, and thus address us: "I come to you, O Plato, an exile, but am neither indigent of horses nor soldiers to oppose my enemies, but I am in want of words and persuasion, by which I know you are especially able to convert young men to probity and justice, and unite them in friendship and fellowship with each other; through a defect of which on your part I have now left Syracuse, and have betaken myself hither. As to what relates to myself indeed, this will bring you less disgrace: but as to philosophy, which you always praise, and which you say is dishonoured by other men, is it not now betrayed by you together with

with me? If, indeed, we had been inhabitants of Megara, you would have come to my assistance when I had called you, or I should have considered you as the most depraved of all men. But now, excusing yourself through the length of the journey, and the magnitude of the voyage and the labour, you think you shall avoid infamy, though this is far from being the case."

If Dion had thus addressed me, I should certainly have been at a loss for a becoming answer. I, therefore, came to Syracuse, with reason and justice, leaving my own pursuits, which were not unbecoming, under a tyranny, which was neither adapted to my discourses nor myself. But when I came thither I liberated myself, and thus preserved the allotment of hospitable Jupiter, and of a philosopher, unblameable. This allotment indeed would have been disgraceful, if, being in any respect effeminate and timid, I had been a partaker of vicious shame. On my arrival then (for there is no occasion to be prolix) I found all things about Dionysius full of sedition, and calumnies respecting the tyranny of Dion. I defended Dion, therefore, to the utmost of my power, but I was able to effect but little. For, on the fourth month nearly after my arrival, Dionysius accused Dion of endeavouring to obtain the tyranny by stratagem, and disgracefully sent him into exile in a small ship. After this all of us that were the friends of Dion were fearful lest Dionysius should accuse and punish any one of us as cooperating with Dion in his stratagem. It was likewise reported in Syracuse, that I was put to death by Dionysius, as being the cause of every thing that then happened. But he perceiving that we were all thus affected, and dreading lest something of greater consequence should arise from our fear, received all of us benevolently, consoled me, desired me to confide in him, and requested that I would by all means stay; as he would derive no advantage from my flight, but from my continuing at Syracuse. On this account, he pretended to request me very much to stay. However, we know that the requests of tyrants are mingled with necessity.

Contriving, therefore, to prevent my departure, he obliged me to reside in the acropolis, whence no sailor could lead me away, not because he would be hindered by Dionysius, but because he could not accomplish this without his orders. Nor was there any merchant, or provincial magistrate, who, on seeing me leaving the country, would not immediately have brought me back again to Dionysius; especially since the report at that time was con-

trary to that which was circulated before ; for now it was said that Dionysius again received Plato with wonderful kindness. And indeed this was the case : for it is necessary to speak the truth. He behaved therefore to me with increasing kindness every day, and was delighted with my manners and habits. But he wished me to praise him more, and to consider him as my friend in a far greater degree than Dion : and this he strove to accomplish in a wonderful manner. However, he neglected the most beautiful means of effecting his purpose, if it could have been effected, I mean associating and becoming familiar with me, by hearing and learning discourses on philosophy. But this he was fearful of doing, lest, as was asserted by my calumniators, he should be impeded in his designs, and Dion should have the entire management of affairs. However, I endured every thing, persevering in the opinion which I entertained when I first came to Syracuse, and trying if by any possible means Dionysius could be brought to a desire of a philosophic life. But he rendered my endeavours ineffectual by his opposition. And such are the particulars of my first voyage to Sicily.

However, in consequence of the earnest solicitations of Dionysius, I made a second voyage to Sicily. But on what account I came thither, and what I did there, I may reasonably and justly relate to you, when I advise you how it is proper to act in the present state of affairs. I say I may relate this to you, for the sake of those who ask why I came a second time to Sicily. I speak in this manner, that superfluous things may not be preferred by me to such as are important.

I think, indeed, that he who gives his advice to a sick man, and one who uses bad diet, should persuade him in the first place to change his mode of living ; and if the diseased person is willing to comply with him in this, that he should then persuade him to other things ; but if he is unwilling to comply, then I should think that his adviser, if he abandons him, acts like a man and a physician, but if he still continues with him, that he acts like one effeminate and destitute of art. I assert the same thing likewise of a city, whether it has one governor, or many. For if the polity proceeds in a right way, it is the province of a man, endued with intellect, to give it useful advice ; but if the very contrary of this happens to be the case, and the people do not by any means wish to tread in the vestiges of an upright polity, but proclaim to their adviser that he must relinquish his concern about the polity,

polity, and not disturb it, for if he does he shall suffer death ; and at the same time exhort him to be subservient to their wills and desires, and thus advise them how they may always procure pleasures with celerity and ease ; when this is the case, I should consider him who endures to give such advice, as effeminate, but him who does not endure it, as a man.

In consequence of this conception, when any one consults me about one of the greatest concerns of his life, such as about the acquisition of riches, or the attention pertaining to the body or soul, if he appears to me to live daily in an orderly manner, or is willing to be persuaded when I give him my advice, then I readily join with him in consultation, nor do I desist till the affair is brought to a conclusion. But if either he does not at all consult me, or, if he does, obviously neglects to follow my advice, in this case I should not of my own accord give advice to such a one, nor would I be compelled to give it, even if he were my son. But I would voluntarily give advice to a slave, and, if he were unwilling, force him to follow it. I should not however think it holy to force my father, unless he was void of understanding through disease.

Again, if those that consult me live according to an established mode which is pleasing to themselves, but not to me, I would not hate them, because I had admonished them in vain, nor yet flattering be subservient to them, and afford them those means of gratifying their desires, which, if I were to embrace, I should not wish to live. With the same conceptions respecting his country, a prudent man ought to live, exposing its errors, if it appears to him not to be well governed, when this can be done, without speaking in vain, or losing his life. But he should never by violence effect a change in the government of his country, when it cannot be brought to the best condition, without the expulsion and slaughter of the citizens, but in this case, leading a quiet life, he should pray for the good both of himself and the city.

In the very same manner I advise you to act. And I advised Dionysius to live daily in such a manner with Dion, that he might both have the mastery over himself, and acquire faithful friends and associates, that the same thing might not befall him which happened to his father. For his father having obtained the possession of and reestablished many and great cities in Sicily, which had been subverted by the Barbarians, could not establish in the politics

tics of these faithful men, neither from his own associates, nor from among strangers, nor from his younger brothers, whom he himself had educated. Nor yet could he find men worthy to be trusted, either among the private persons whom he had made governors, or the poor, whom he had made very rich. But among these he could not procure one faithful associate, either by persuading or teaching, or the benefits which he conferred. But he was seven times worse than Darius, who neither confiding in his brothers, nor in those that were educated by him, but alone associating with himself in the government of his kingdom a Mede and captive eunuch, he divided seven parts of his dominions between them, each of which was larger than all Sicily, and found them to be faithful adherents, and neither insidious to him, nor to each other. He likewise gave an example how a good legislator and king ought to act. For he established laws by which the Persian government is preserved even at present. To which we may add, that the Athenians, after they had taken possession of many Grecian cities, which they had not founded themselves, and which had been subverted by the Barbarians, preserved their empire over them for seventy years, in consequence of procuring to themselves friends in each of the cities.

But Dionysius having collected all Sicily into one city, and through his wisdom confiding in no one, was with difficulty saved. For he was destitute of friends, and men in whom he could confide, than which there can be no greater sign of vice, as on the contrary the possession of these is the greatest proof of virtue. I therefore and Dion advised Dionysius to procure himself friends from his associates, and such as were his equals in age, and who unanimously cultivated virtue, since, through the situation of his father's affairs, he neither cultivated learning, nor had proper associates. But we particularly advised him to accord with himself. For we asserted that he was in a wonderful manner deficient in this respect, not indeed in perspicuous terms (for this was not safe), but in an obscure manner, contending in our discourse, that when this is the case, every man will become the favourer both of himself and those whom he governs; but that when he does not accord with himself, he will cause the very contrary of this to take place. If therefore, as we said, he was consistent with himself, and acquired prudence and temperance, and if afterwards he restored the desolated cities of Sicily, and bound them together with such laws and politics, that they might

might be friendly both to him and to each other, in resisting the incursions of the Barbarians, then he would not only double, but in reality multiply his paternal kingdom. For thus the Carthaginians would much more readily become subject to his power, than they were to that of Gelon; nor would he on the contrary, like his father, be compelled to pay a tribute to the Barbarians.

This was the substance of what we said, and the advice which we gave to Dionysius, at the very time when it was reported in many places that we were forming stratagems against him. Indeed, the men who raised these reports prevailed over Dionysius, expelled Dion, and threw us into fear. But, in short, Dion, departing from Peloponnesus and Athens, admonished Dionysius in reality. When therefore Dion had liberated and twice restored the city to its inhabitants, the Syracusians were then affected in the same manner towards him, as Dionysius had been before. For Dionysius had endeavoured to educate Dion so as that he might become a king worthy of his kingdom, and be his associate through the whole of life. But those that calumniated Dion, reported that he endeavoured to gain the tyranny by stratagem, and did every thing at that time, that the mind of Dionysius, which was allured by discipline, might neglect the affairs of government, and commit them entirely to Dion, who, by fraudulent usurpation, would expel Dionysius from the empire.

These things being then reported a second time among the Syracusians, vanquished by a very absurd and base victory those who were the causes of the victory. But it is proper that the particulars of this affair should be heard by you, who now call upon me to settle the present affairs. I therefore being an Athenian, the associate of Dion, and one who joined with him in opposing the tyrant, that he might make peace instead of war, was vanquished in opposing the calumniators. But Dionysius, by loading me with honours and riches, endeavoured to persuade me to stay with him, and to make me his friend, that I might serve as a witness that he had not undeservedly expelled Dion. However, he was entirely disappointed in his expectations. But Dion afterwards returning home, brought with him two Athenian brothers, who had not become his friends from philosophy, but from that casual association of most friends, which arises from performing the

the rites of hospitality, and from being mutually initiated in sacred mysteries. From these causes, and from offering to attend Dion in his return to Syracuse, he had contracted a friendship with them. But these men, on their coming to Sicily, when they understood that Dion was calumniated as endeavouring by stratagem to obtain the tyranny, by those very men whom he had liberated, not only betrayed their associate and guest, but becoming as it were perpetrators of murder with their own hands, they assisted the murderers with arms. However, I shall neither pass by in silence, nor relate the particulars of this base and unholy deed: for it has been elegantly related by many others, and will be again in some future period of time.

But I will wipe away the infamy with which the Athenians are branded. For I say, that *he* was an Athenian, who could never be induced either by riches or honours to betray the city. For he was not made a friend through illiberal benevolence, but through the communion of liberal discipline; in which alone, he who is endued with intellect ought to confide, rather than in the alliance of souls and bodies. These men, therefore, are not of consequence sufficient to bring disgrace on the city for killing Dion: for they were men of no renown. But I have said thus much for the sake of giving advice to the friends and kindred of Dion.

I give you likewise the same advice as before, and address you in the same words the third time, viz. that you should neither subject Sicily, nor, in my opinion, any other city, to despotic men, but to the laws; for this is neither better for the governors nor the governed, nor for their children, nor their children's children, but the experiment is perfectly pernicious. But little and illiberal souls delight to seize gain of this kind, understanding nothing of things just and good, human and divine, whether pertaining to the present time, or to futurity. Of the truth of these things, I endeavoured first to persuade Dion, and afterwards Dionysius, and now, in the third place, you. Be persuaded therefore by me, for the sake of Jupiter the third saviour.

In the next place, look to Dionysius and Dion, the former of whom, not following my advice, now lives in an unbecoming manner; but the latter, who acted conformably to my persuasions, died beautifully. For he who aspires after the most excellent things, both for himself and his country, will endure whatever may befall him in an upright and beautiful manner: for no

one of us is naturally immortal¹, nor if this should happen to be the case with anyone of us, would he on that account become happy, as it appears he would to the multitude. For in things inanimate, there is nothing either of good or ill which deserves to be regarded : but good or ill happens to every soul, either during its union with, or separation from, body. But it is always proper thus to believe in antient and sacred discourses, which inform us that the soul is immortal, that it has judges of its conduct, and that it suffers the greatest punishments when it is liberated from the body. On this account it is requisite to think that it is a lesser evil to suffer than to do the greatest injuries. This, indeed, the man who is a lover of wealth, and who is poor in soul does not hear, and if he did hear, he would deride it, in consequence of thinking that he ought impudently to seize on all sides, like a wild beast, whatever he can eat or drink, and whatever can contribute to venereal delight, which is a thing servile and ungrateful, and is not properly denominated pleasure. Such a one being blind, does not perceive that he can never satisfy insatiable desire, nor see what a mighty evil is unholy conduct, nor what the particulars are with which it is always attended in conjunction with every unjust deed. For he who acts unjustly, must necessarily attract to himself impiety, both while he rolls on the earth, and when he accomplishes under the earth a journey, perfectly and in every respect dishonourable and miserable.

When I said these, and other things of the like kind to Dion, I persuaded him of their truth. But I was most justly enraged with his murderers, in the same manner nearly as with Dionysius : for both of them injured me, and all the rest, as I may say, in the highest degree. For they destroyed a man who was willing to use justice : but Dionysius, who did not by any means wish to use justice, through the whole of his government, obtained the greatest power. If, however, under his government, philosophy and power had been united in reality, they would have presented to all men, both Greeks and Barbarians, a true and sufficiently luminous opinion, that neither any city nor any man can ever be happy, unless they pass through life with prudence², and in subjection to justice ; whether they possess these in themselves, or are properly educated and instructed in the manners of holy governors.

The conduct, therefore, of Dionysius in these things was noxious : but other

¹ Viz. the union of the soul with this terrene body is not an immortal union.

² See the General Introduction prefixed to this work for the accurate meaning of this word.

things in which I was injured are small when compared to these. But he who slew Dion, did not know that he had done the same thing as Dionysius. For I clearly know, as far as it is possible for one man to speak confidently of another, that if Dion had retained his government, he would never have changed it into any other form than that which he first gave to his own country, Syracuse, when he delivered it from slavery, caused it to assume a joyful and splendid appearance, and established it in liberty. After this, he would have adorned the citizens, by every possible contrivance, with such laws as are adapted to them, and are the most excellent. And besides these things, he would have diligently endeavoured to make all Sicily inhabited, and free from the Barbarians, by expelling some and subjecting others, more easily than this was done by Hiero. But if these things had taken place, through a man just, brave, temperate, and who was a philosopher, the same opinion of virtue would have been produced among the multitude, as would have flourished among all men, if Dionysius had followed my advice. But now either some dæmon, or some pernicious character, replete with iniquity and impiety, and, what is of the greatest consequence, with the audacity of ignorance, in which all evils are rooted, and from which they germinate and afterwards produce the most bitter fruit,—this dæmon, or this dire person, has a second time subverted and destroyed every thing. However, for the sake of augury, we now ominate good things the third time.

I advise therefore you, my friends, to imitate Dion, and acquire that patriotic benevolence which he possessed, and that temperate mode of living which he adopted. But you have clearly heard from me, what are the auspices by which you should endeavour to accomplish his wish : and if there is any one among you, who is unable to live in a Doric manner, according to paternal institutes, but follows the Sicilian mode of living, and that which was adopted by the murderers of Dion, neither call on him to join with you, nor believe that he will ever be sincere and faithful in any undertaking. But you should exhort the rest to reestablish the whole of Sicily, and introduce both in Sicily and all Peloponnesus equitable laws, without dreading the Athenians : for men are to be found there who surpass all others in virtue, and who hate the audacity of those that slaughter their guests.

But if these things should take place afterwards, and the many and all various seditions and discords which spring up daily urge us to immediate exertion ;

exertion; in this case, every man who, through a divine fortune, partakes, though in a small degree, of right opinion, ought to know, that there will be no end to the evils resulting from sedition, till those who vanquish in battle refrain from slaughtering and banishing their fellow-citizens, and from the remembrance of injuries, and giving respite to their desire of vengeance, become reconciled to their enemies; and till obtaining the empire over themselves, they establish common laws, which no less pertain to themselves, than to those they have vanquished, at the same time compelling them to use these laws. But they should compel them by a two-fold necessity, viz. of fear and shame. By the necessity of fear, evincing their power; in consequence of being superior to them: but by the necessity of shame, through their appearing to surpass them, both in vanquishing pleasures, and in subjection to the laws. For there is no other way by which a city labouring under sedition can find a period to its evils. But seditions, enmities, hatred, perfidy, will always arise in cities, which are thus affected towards themselves. Those, therefore, that have the greatest power in cities, if they desire the welfare of their country, should choose among themselves, in preference to others, such men as they have heard to be the most excellent characters: and, in the first place, they should choose old men, who possess children, wives, and estates, together with such of their progenitors as are most worthy and renowned, and possess sufficient property. But ten thousand and fifty inhabitants will be sufficient for a city of this kind. These should be sent from their places of abode with prayers and the greatest honours: but after they are called from home, they should be bound by an oath, and exhorted to establish laws, that they may not attribute more to the victors than the vanquished, but impart the equal and that which is common to the whole city. All things, however, consist in the establishment of laws. For when the victors are more willing to be subject to the laws than those that are vanquished, all things will be well, and full of felicity, and every evil will be exiled. But if this is not the case, there is no occasion to call me, or any other, to join with him in the administration of affairs, who is not persuaded by the precepts I have now enjoined. For these are the sisters of the things which I and Dion very wisely attempted to accomplish among the Syracusians. They were, however, second attempts: for the first were those common goods, which we attempted to effect in conjunction with Dionysius. But a certain fortune superior to man-

kind frustrated our attempt. Do you therefore now endeavour to accomplish these things more prosperously, through a good destiny, and a certain divine fortune. And thus much concerning my advice and epistle, and my first visit to Dionysius.

But my second voyage to Sicily was both becoming and proper, of which he may now hear an account who is so inclined. For the first time of my residence in Sicily passed away as I have already said, before I could advise the kindred and associates of Dion; but after this I persuaded Dionysius, to the utmost of my power, to suffer me to depart: but we mutually agreed, that when a peace took place (for there was then a war in Sicily), Dionysius should recall Dion and me, as soon as his government was more securely established. He likewise thought it proper that Dion should understand that I was not then banished by him, but was to return to him at a certain time. And I agreed to these conditions:

A peace therefore taking place, Dionysius sent for me, but required that Dion should absent himself, for another year: but he requested me by all means to come. Dion therefore exhorted and entreated me to set sail; for it was very much reported from Sicily, that Dionysius was again wonderfully inflamed with a desire of philosophy: and on this account Dion earnestly requested me to set sail for Sicily. But I, though I knew that many such things happened to young men respecting philosophy, at the same time thought it more safe not to comply with the request of Dionysius and Dion. I therefore answered both of them, that I was an old man, and that nothing which was done at present was according to the agreement. But it seems that after this Archytas¹ had betaken himself to Dionysius: for, before I set sail from Sicily, I had made Archytas, and certain other Tarentines, the guests and friends of Dionysius. There were likewise certain others among the Syracusians who were the auditors of Dion, and among these some who were full of depraved doctrines respecting philosophy, and who appeared to me to endeavour to discourse with Dionysius about things of this kind, as if Dionysius had heard all such particulars as were the subject of my thoughts. But he was not naturally unapt with respect to learning, and was ambitious in a wonderful degree. Perhaps, therefore, he was pleased with the discourse of these men; and he was ma-

¹ A famous Pythagorean philosopher.

nifestly ashamed that he heard nothing from me when I went to see him. Hence he was at the same time inflamed with a desire of hearing me more clearly, and stimulated by ambition. But on what account he did not hear me discourse, when I first came to Sicily, I have related above.

After therefore I had returned home safe, and refused to comply with his second invitation, Dionysius appeared to be perfectly ambitious, and through his desire of renown to be afraid lest I should seem to certain persons to despise him, and that my dislike of his disposition, habits, and mode of living, had induced me to refuse complying with his request. But it is just that I should speak the truth, and endure with equanimity, if any one on hearing the past transactions should despise my philosophy, and think that the tyrant was endowed with intellect: for Dionysius sent to me, the third time, a three-ranked galley, for the sake of procuring me an easy passage. He sent also Archidemus, whom he thought I most esteemed of all the familiars of Archytas that were then in his dominions, together with other illustrious persons in Sicily. But all these announced to us the same thing, viz. that Dionysius was wonderfully given to philosophy. Besides this, he sent me a long epistle, knowing how I was affected towards Dion, and that Dion was desirous I should set sail and come to Syracuse. The letter, therefore, was composed with a view to all these particulars, and the beginning of it was as follows:

Dionysius to Plato: after which followed such things as are usual, and he said nothing after this, except that complying with his request I should now come to Sicily. He then proceeded: "In the first place the particulars respecting Dion shall be accomplished according to your wish; but I know you wish for moderate measures, and that I would accede to them. However, unless you come, your desires respecting Dion will not be gratified, nor yet respecting other things pertaining to yourself." This is what he wrote. But the other parts of his letter were prolix, and foreign to the purpose. Other letters likewise came to me from Archytas, and other Tarentines, praising the philosophic disposition of Dionysius, and adding, that unless I now came their friendship with Dionysius, which had been effected through me, and which was of no small consequence with respect to political affairs, would be entirely destroyed.

As therefore, at that time, I was thus incited to comply with the request of
Dionysius,

Dionysius, some drawing me from Sicily and Italy, and others at Athens impelling me, as it were, by their prayers; and again reason proclaiming, that I ought not to betray Dion, together with the guests and others belonging to Tarentum:—when I likewise considered, that it was nothing wonderful, if a young man who was formerly unwilling to hear respecting things of great moment should become docile, and be inflamed with a desire of the best life, and that it was proper to prove clearly, in what manner he was affected, and not by any means betray him, nor become myself the cause of a disgrace so truly great, if the case with respect to Dionysius was in reality such as it was reported to be;—screened by this reasoning as with a veil, I commenced my journey, fearing many things, and prophesying as it seems not altogether well. I came therefore to Sicily the third time under the protection of the saviour Jupiter. And this voyage I actually accomplished, being again fortunately saved. But for these things I return thanks to Dionysius, after divinity; because when many were willing to slay me, he prevented them, and conducted himself with some degree of moderation in my affairs.

When therefore I came to Sicily, I thought it was proper, in the first place, to try whether Dionysius was in reality enkindled by philosophy as by a fire, or whether the report concerning him at Athens was entirely vain. But there is a certain method of making an experiment about things of this kind, by no means ignoble, but truly adapted to tyrants, and especially to those that are full of depraved doctrines, which, as soon as I arrived, I perceived was very much the case with Dionysius. But to such as these, it is requisite to show that philosophy is a thing of the greatest consequence, and that it is only to be obtained by great study and mighty labour. For he who hears that this is the case, if he is truly a lover of wisdom, and is adapted to and worthy of its acquisition, being a divine person, will think that he hears of an admirable way, that he ought immediately to betake himself to this path, and make it the great business of his life. After this, he will not cease exciting both himself, and the leader of this way, till he either obtains the consummation of his wishes, or receives a power by which he may be able to conduct himself without a guide.

Such a one, therefore, will so live, that all his actions may accord with these conceptions. But before all things he will be perpetually intent on philosophy,

philosophy, and will daily procure for himself such nutriment, as may especially render him docile, of a good memory, and able to reason; living soberly, and hating intoxication.

But those that are not lovers of wisdom in reality, but are coloured over with opinions, like those whose bodies are burnt by the sun, when they perceive what a multitude of disciplines, what mighty labour, and what temperate food are requisite, to the acquisition of philosophy, such as these, thinking that philosophy is a thing difficult and impossible for them to obtain, cannot be brought to make it the object of their pursuit. But some of these persuade themselves, that they have sufficiently heard the whole of philosophy, and that they require nothing further. This mode of experiment is perspicuous and most safe, when employed upon the effeminate, and such as are incapable of enduring labour: for thus they can never accuse him who points out to them the arduousness of the undertaking, but must blame themselves as unable to engage in all that is requisite to the acquisition of philosophy.

This method of examination I employed upon Dionysius; but I neither enumerated all the requisites, nor did Dionysius require that I should. For there were many things, and those of the greatest consequence, in which he pretended to be sufficiently knowing, through the depraved doctrines which he had heard from others. But I am informed that he afterwards wrote about the things which he then heard, as if the composition was the result of his own art, when at the same time it contained nothing of his own. However, I am entirely ignorant as to the truth of this report. But I know that certain others have written about the same things, though without understanding what they wrote.

Thus much however I shall say respecting all those who either have written, or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the objects of my study, (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they have discovered them themselves,) that they have not heard any thing about these particulars conformable to my opinion: for I never have written, nor ever shall write, about them. For a thing of this kind² cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a light as it were leaping from

² Plato here means by *a thing of this kind*, true being, the proper object of intellect.

a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in the soul, and there itself nourish itself. Indeed, thus much I know, that things which have been written or said by me, have been said in the best manner; and I do not feel the smallest degree of pain from things being ascribed to me that are badly written.

But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the multitude by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some small vestiges previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with a lofty and arrogant hope, that they should now learn certain excellent things. I intend, therefore, to speak further about these particulars: for thus perhaps I shall say something clearer respecting them than I have yet said. For there is a certain true discourse which is adverse to him, who dares to write about things of this kind, and which has often been delivered by me before, and as it seems must be delivered by me at present.

There are three things belonging to each of those particulars through which science is necessarily produced. But the fourth is science itself. And it is requisite to establish as the fifth that which is known and true. One of these is the name of a thing; the second its definition; the third the resemblance; the fourth science. Now take each of these, desiring to learn what we have lately asserted, and think as follows concerning them all. A circle is called something, whose name we have just expressed. After this follows its definition, composed from nouns and verbs. For that which every where is equally distant from the extremes to the middle, is the definition of that which we signify by the name of a round, and a circumference, and a circle. But the third is the circle which may be painted, or blotted out, which may be made by a wheel, or destroyed. None of which affections, the circle itself, which each of these respects, suffers, as being of a different nature. But the fourth is science and intellect, and true opinion about these. And the whole of this again must be established as one thing which neither sub-

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fits in voice, nor in corporeal figures, but is inherent in soul¹. It is therefore manifest, that this fourth is different from the nature itself² of the circle, and again different from the three we have previously mentioned. But among the number of these, intellect, by its relation and similitude, proximately adheres to the fifth, while the rest are more remote from its nature. The same may likewise be affirmed of a straight and crooked figure, of colour, and of the good, the beautiful, and the just. And again of every body, whether fashioned by the hand, or the work of nature, whether fire or water, and the rest of this kind; likewise of every animal, and the manners of souls; and of all actions and passions. For unless among these some one after a manner receives that fourth, he will never perfectly participate the science about the fifth. For, in addition to what has been said, these four no less endeavour to evince about every thing the quality which it possesses; but likewise its being, through the imbecility of reasons. On this account, no one endued with intellect will ever dare to consider as equally immutable, things which are the objects of intellectual vision, and such as have a subsistence in corporeal figures.

But again, it is requisite to attend to what we have just now said. Every circle, which by the hands of men is either painted, or fashioned by a wheel, is plainly contrary to our fifth: for it every where participates of the right line. But we must affirm that the circle itself has neither more nor less of any thing whatever; that is, it possesses in itself nothing of a contrary nature. Besides, none of these is endued with any stability of name: for nothing hinders our applying the appellation of straight to that which we now denominate round, and calling the straight by the denomination of the round; nor will there be any less stability in these, when their names are changed into the contrary. The same reasoning is likewise true of definition, since it is composed from nouns and verbs which possess no stability. And in a variety of ways it may be proved, that no one of these four is certain and firm. But the greatest thing of all, as I just before observed, is

¹ Viz. in the dianoëtic part of the soul: for the forms, or essential reasons subsisting in this part, are the objects of science.

² For the circle itself is an *intellectual form*, and is not to be apprehended by the discursive energies of the dianoëtic part, but by the simple projections of intellect.

this, that since there are two things, essence and quality, when the soul seeks to know not the quality of a thing, but what it is, unless it first investigates each of these four, and sufficiently discusses them by a reasoning process and sensible inspection, and this continually through every thing which is asserted and shown, it will be filled, as I may say, with all possible ambiguity and obscurity.

In such things therefore, as through a depraved education we are not accustomed to investigate the truth, but are contented with an image exhibited to our view, we do not become ridiculous to each other, when being interrogated, we are able to discuss and argue about those four. But in such particulars as we are compelled to separate that fifth from other things, and evince its nature, he who wishes to subvert what we have evinced, vanquishes, and causes him who explains this fifth, either by speech, or writing, or answers, to appear to the multitude of his hearers entirely ignorant of the things about which he attempts either to write or speak; men sometimes being ignorant, that it is not the soul of the writer or speaker that is confuted, but the nature of each of the above-mentioned four particulars, when it is badly affected. But the procession through all these, and the transition to each upwards and downwards, scarcely at length produces the science of that which naturally subsists in an excellent condition, in the soul of one naturally well affected. But when any one is naturally ill affected, as is the case with the habit of soul possessed by the multitude, who are badly disposed, with respect to learning, and whose manners are depraved, not even Lynceus himself can enable such as these to see. But in one word, neither docility nor memory will confer on any one the power of perceiving things of this kind, who is not allied to them: for they are not inherent from the first in foreign habits. So that those who are not naturally adapted and allied to what is just, and other things that are beautiful, though they may be docile, and of a good memory with respect to other particulars; and again, those that are allied to the just and beautiful, but are indocile and of a bad memory, will never learn, as far as it is possible to learn, the truth pertaining to virtue and vice. For it is necessary to learn this, and at the same time the falsehood and truth of the whole of essence, with all possible exercise, and a great length of time, as I said in the beginning. But after agitating together the several names and reasons, and sensible perceptions of these things, confuting
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in a benevolent manner, and employing questions and answers without envy, then striving as much as is possible to human power, prudence and intellect about each of these will scarcely at length shine forth.

On this account, every worthy man will be very far from writing[†] about things truly worthy, as he will thus subject himself to envy and ambiguity. But, in one word, it is requisite to know from these things, that when any one sees the writings of another, whether of a legislator on the laws, or on certain other subjects, he will see that these are not such writings as are considered by him to be the most worthy of all others, if he is himself a worthy character: but the objects of his pursuit are situated in a most beautiful region. And if he should find in writings such things as truly deserve the highest regard, it might then be said, that not the gods indeed, but men destroy the intellects of men. And thus much for this fable and digression, which he who acutely follows will well understand.

Whether therefore Dionysius has written any thing about the highest and first natures, or any other person inferior or superior to him, according to my decision, he has neither heard nor learnt any thing sound respecting these natures; for otherwise he would have venerated them in the same manner as I do, and would not have dared to hurl them into incongruity and indecency. For he could not write about them, for the sake of recalling them to his memory; as there is no occasion to fear that any one will ever forget them, when they are once comprehended by the soul: for they lie in the shortest space of all things. But perhaps he did this for the sake of base ambition, either asserting that these doctrines were his own, or as partaking of discipline of which he was unworthy to partake, loving the renown which arises from such participation.

Perhaps, however, we may allow that Dionysius has written about these things, if what he has asserted was produced by one conversation. But, O Jupiter, says the Theban, how was it produced! For I discussed these things with him as I have said, and only once; but never afterwards. In the next place, he who is anxious to find out the cause of what then happened respecting these things, ought to know why we did not discuss them a second and a third time, and often: whether it was that Dionysius, having only heard them

[†] Viz. he will be unwilling to write perspicuously about the most sublime truths, unless the age in which he lives renders it necessary so to do, in order to preserve them to posterity.

once, thought that he knew them, and knew them sufficiently, or that he discovered them himself, or had formerly learnt them from others. Or was it that he thought the things that were said were trifling? Or did a certain third thing happen to be the case, viz. that they were in reality too great for him, who was solicitous to lead a life of prudence and virtue? For if it is said that he considered the things about which he wrote as trifling, this will be opposed by many witnesses who assert the contrary, and who are much better judges about things of this kind than Dionysius. But if he invented them, or learnt them, and they deserve to be made subservient to the discipline of a liberal soul, is it not wonderful that he should so readily despise the leader and master of these things?

But how he despised him I will now relate. Not long after this he would not permit the procurators of Dion to send that portion of his wealth to Peloponnesus, which some time before he had suffered him to possess and enjoy, as if he had entirely forgotten the letter which he wrote to me. For he asserted that this property did not belong to Dion, but to Dion's son, who, as he was his own grandson, was according to law under his protection. And such were the transactions of that time.

From hence, however, we may accurately see how Dionysius was affected towards philosophy; and it is lawful for me to be indignant whether I am willing or not: for it was then summer, and the time for ships to sail. But it seemed that I ought not to be more offended with Dionysius than myself, and with those who compelled me to come the third time to the strait about Scylla, and

“ Dire Charybdis measure o’er again’.”

I was therefore forced to tell Dionysius, that it was impossible for me to stay with him while Dion was used so ignominiously. But he consoled me, and requested me to stay; thinking it would not be well for him that I should be so swift a messenger of such transactions as these: and when he could not persuade me, he said he would prepare my dismissal. However, being enraged, I was determined to depart in a fleet of ships, thinking that I ought to suffer every thing, if he should attempt to stop me; as I was manifestly injured, though I had done no injury. But when he found that I could not by any

¹ Odyss. lib. xii. v. 428.

means be induced to stay, he devised the following mean to retard my departure. On the day after these things had taken place, he thus plausibly addressed me: Dion, says he, and the affairs of Dion, about which we have often disagreed, shall be entirely removed from you and me; for on your account I will act as follows towards Dion. I think it fit that he shall take up his residence in Peloponnesus, not as an exile, but as one who may come hither, when it shall seem good to him, to me, and to you who are his friend. This shall take place, if he forms no stratagems against me; and you, your familiars, and the familiars of Dion, that are here, shall be bound for his fulfilling this agreement. But the money which he may receive shall be deposited in Peloponnesus and Athens, with those you shall think fit: Dion too shall enjoy the benefit of this money, but shall not be authorized to take it away without your consent; for I should not very much believe that justice would be done to me, if he had the entire possession of this wealth, which is not inconsiderable. But I have greater confidence in you and your familiars. See, therefore, whether these things are agreeable to you, and stay for the sake of them this year, at the expiration of which you shall receive this money and depart. I well know, indeed, that Dion will be greatly indebted to you for acting in this manner on his account.

When I heard these things, I was perfectly indignant, but at the same time I said that I would consider the affair, and give him my opinion on the following day. This was our compact at that time. I therefore consulted with myself after this, but in a very confused manner; but the following consideration first presented itself to me, as the leader of my consultation: What if Dionysius intends to do nothing of what he promises to do, but on my departure both he and many others should write in a plausible manner to Dion, what he has now said to me, that he indeed was willing, but that I was unwilling he should act in this manner, and that I entirely neglected his concerns; and besides this, if Dionysius, being unwilling I should depart, should give no orders to any pilot, but should easily signify to all men, that he did not consent to my setting sail, what sailor would be willing to take me on board, from the palace of Dionysius? For, in addition to other evils, I dwelt in the garden which surrounded the palace; from whence the porter would not be willing to dismiss me, without an order from Dionysius. But if I stay another year, I can indeed send an account of these transactions to Dion, and acquaint him with
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my situation and conduct. And if indeed Dionysius should do any thing of what he promises to do, my conduct will be not entirely ridiculous : for perhaps the property of Dion, when rightly estimated, does not amount to less than a hundred talents¹. But if the issue of affairs should be such as it is likely to be, I shall be at a loss how to act. At the same time, it is perhaps necessary that I should stay a year longer, and endeavour in reality to frustrate the machinations of Dionysius.

Thus thinking with myself, I told Dionysius, on the following day, that I thought it best to stay ; but I said he ought not to consider me as possessing absolute authority over Dion. I added, that he should write to Dion in conjunction with me, acquainting him with the compact we had made, and asking him whether he was satisfied with these things, and with me, and whether he wished for any thing further. Lastly, that he should write to him as soon as possible, and should not make any innovation in his affairs. This is what was said, and these are nearly the things in which we agreed.

But after this the ships failed, and therefore it was no longer possible for me to depart. Dionysius, therefore, as if recollecting something he had omitted, said that the half of Dion's property ought to remain with his son, and that the other half should be sent to Dion. This property, he said, he would sell, and when he had sold it, deliver one half to me to be sent to Dion, and keep the other half for his son ; for he added, it will be most just to act in this manner. I therefore, being struck with what he said, thought it would be entirely ridiculous to say any thing further. At the same time, however, I observed to him, that we ought to wait for an answer from Dion, and again send him an account of these particulars. But Dionysius, after this, in a very juvenile manner, told the whole of Dion's property to whom and for what he pleased, without making any mention of it whatever to me : and again I in like manner said nothing to him respecting the affairs of Dion ; for I thought I should be able to do nothing further in them. And thus far I gave assistance both to philosophy and my friends.

But after this, I and Dionysius so lived together, that I like a bird was always looking out, and longing to fly away, but he was devising after what manner he might prevent my flight, and gave up no part of the property of

¹ i. e. upwards of 13,300*l*.

Dion. At the same time, however, we were said to be sociable through the whole of Sicily. But at that period, Dionysius endeavoured to diminish the pay of the mercenaries, contrary to the custom of his father; and the soldiers being enraged, assembled in a body, and declared this should not take place. Dionysius therefore endeavoured to force them to submission, and for this purpose shut the gates of the acropolis: but the soldiers immediately marched to the walls, vociferating a certain barbarous and warlike pæon; at which Dionysius being terrified, granted the soldiers all they desired, and those that carried crescent shields more than their usual pay. But a report was rapidly spread that Heraclides was the cause of this disturbance; upon hearing which, Heraclides immediately disappeared. Dionysius therefore endeavoured to take him; but not being able to discover his place of retreat, he ordered Theodotes to attend him in the gardens, in which at that time I happened to be walking. Other parts, therefore, of their discourse I neither known or heard; but what Theodotes said to Dionysius before me I both know and remember. For he said, Plato, I am persuading Dionysius, that if I were able to bring Heraclides hither, he would answer to the crimes which are now laid to his charge: and if it does not appear fit to Dionysius that he should dwell in Sicily, yet I think it is proper that, receiving his wife and son, he should be permitted to set sail for Peloponnesus, and there reside, not injuring Dionysius in any respect, and enjoying his own property. I have therefore, prior to this, sent, and shall again send for him. But whether he complies with my first or second citation, I think it proper that he should receive no injury, either here or in the suburbs, but that he shall be sent out of the kingdom, till Dionysius shall think fit to recall him; and I request Dionysius to accede to these terms. Do you accede or not? says he, speaking to Dionysius. He answered, I do accede; nor shall he suffer any thing worse than what has now been mentioned, though he should make his appearance in your house.

However, on the evening of the following day, Eurybius and Theodotes came to me in great haste and wonderfully alarmed: and Theodotes said to me, Plato, was you not a witness yesterday to the compact which Dionysius made with me and you respecting Heraclides? To which I replied, Undoubtedly I was. But now, says he, the soldiers with crescent shields are running every where in order to take Heraclides, and there is reason to fear that

that he is concealed at no great distance. Attend us therefore to Dionysius with every possible artifice. In consequence of this, we followed and came to him; and they indeed stood silent and weeping; but I said, These men, Dionysius, are afraid lest you should make some alteration respecting Heraclides, contrary to your compact yesterday: for it appears to me that he is evidently at no great distance from hence. But Dionysius on hearing this was violently enraged, and his countenance exhibited all various colours, such as anger produces: but Theodotes falling at his feet, and taking his hand, wept, and suppliantly implored him not to do any such thing. Then I, resuming the discourse, consoled him and said, Take courage, Theodotes, for Dionysius dares not to act contrary to the compact which he made yesterday. But he looking at me, and in a very tyrannic manner, With you, says he, I made no compact, neither great nor small. To which I replied, By the gods, you promised me, that you would not do the very things, which this man now requests you not to do. Having thus said, I turned from him and left the place.

After this Dionysius endeavoured to find Heraclides: however, Theodotes sent messengers to him, and exhorted him to fly. But Dionysius sent Tifias and the soldiers with the crescent shields, and ordered them to pursue him. Heraclides, however, as it is said, escaped their pursuit, and in the small part of a day fled into the dominions of the Carthaginians. But now, from the enmity towards me which this occasioned, Dionysius appeared to have a pretext for doing that which, for a long time, he had been attempting to accomplish by stratagem, I mean, withholding the property of Dion. And in the first place he sent me from the acropolis, pretending it was requisite that the women should perform a sacrifice, which lasts for ten days, in the gardens in which I resided. He therefore ordered me at that time to take up my residence, out of the acropolis, with Archidemus: but when I was there, Theodotes sending for me, was indignant at many of the then transactions, and complained of Dionysius. But Dionysius hearing that I had been with Theodotes, made this another pretext of enmity towards me, similar to the former, and sent a certain person to ask me, whether I had really been with Theodotes at his request. To which I readily replied, I had. The messenger therefore said, Dionysius ordered me to tell you, that you by no means do well, in always preferring to him Dion and the friends of Dion. This is
what

what was said ; and after this Dionysius never again sent for me to his palace, as it was now clear that I was the friend of Theodotes and Heraclides, and an enemy to him ; and he no longer considered me as well affected towards him, because the property of Dion was entirely consumed.

After this I dwelt out of the acropolis among the mercenary soldiers : but as well others as certain Athenian citizens, who acted as servants to Dionysius, came to me and informed me that I was calumniated by the soldiers. And besides this, certain persons threatened to kill me, if they could apprehend me. I devised therefore the following means of preservation : I sent to Archytas, and other friends at Tarentum, and informed them of my situation : but they, under the pretext of a certain embassy from the city, sent Lamiscus, who was one of my friends, with a galley of thirty ranks ; and he, on his arrival, informed Dionysius that I wished to depart, and desired him by all means to grant my request. To this Dionysius assented, and dismissed me with a passport. However, I neither asked for the money belonging to Dion, nor did any one give it me.

But when I came to Peloponnesus to the Olympic games, I there met with Dion, who was beholding the celebration of them, and informed him of the past transactions ; but he, calling Jupiter to witness, immediately declared to me, and my domestics and friends, that he would prepare to punish Dionysius, both on account of his deceiving me, while I was his guest (for thus he said and thought), and expelling and banishing him unjustly. On hearing this, I persuaded him to call his friends if he were willing. But I said, as to myself, since you have forced me after a manner, together with others, to become the companion and guest of Dionysius, and a partaker with him of sacred rites, he will doubtless think that I ought to conduct myself as an equitable medium between both parties, especially since, when I was accused by many of forming stratagems in conjunction with you against him and his tyranny, he did not put me to death, though he was not prevented from doing so by fear. To this I added, that my age rendered me unfit to engage in the concerns of war ; and that I should act as a mediator between them, if at any time their friendship would require the assistance of a conciliator. But I informed them, that as long as they were averse to each other, they must call others to their assistance. I said these things, in consequence of hating my wandering and adverse fortune about Sicily.

However, as they were not persuaded by the arguments which I adduced, they have been the causes of all the evils that exist at present. Indeed, if Dionysius had given to Dion the property which was his due, or if he had been perfectly reconciled to him, we may say, as far as the condition of human affairs permits us to judge, that nothing adverse would have happened : for I could easily have kept Dion from hostile measures, both by my will and power. But now, being impelled against each other, they fill all things with evils ; though indeed Dion had the same wish, which I should say both I and every other moderate person ought to have, respecting his own power, and that of his friends, and respecting his own city, I mean the wish to benefit when in authority, and when in the greatest power to impart the greatest benefits. But this will not be effected by him who endeavours to enrich himself and his friends, who forms stratagems against the city, and being poor collects together conspirators, and having no dominion over himself is through timidity vanquished by pleasure : who besides this slays those that are wealthy, calling them enemies, seizes their wealth, and at the same time proclaims to his adjutants and associates, that no one ought to accuse him, as he is poor. After the same manner, he who benefits his city will be honoured by it, in consequence of distributing by decrees the property of a few among the many. And this will likewise be the case, when any one governing a great city, and at the same time many lesser cities, unjustly distributes to his own city the wealth of the lesser. For after this manner, neither Dion, nor any other person, would ever voluntarily take upon them an authority, which would always be pernicious to himself and posterity ; but he will endeavour to establish such a polity, and such laws, as are the most just, and the best, and which can be affected by the fewest deaths and banishments.

This conduct indeed was now adopted by Dion, who preferred suffering things impious to the commission of them ; but who, at the same time that he was cautious lest he should suffer them, fell, after he had arrived at the summit of advantage over his enemies. Nor did he in this suffer any thing wonderful : for the soul of a pious man will never be wholly deceived respecting things impious, temperate, and prudent. But neither perhaps is it wonderful, if the same thing has happened to him as to a good pilot, from whom the future storm is not entirely concealed, but who may be ignorant of a sudden tempest, which is of an unexpected magnitude, and by which he may be violently overwhelmed.

overwhelmed. After the same manner, through the fewest circumstances, was Dion deceived: for he was not entirely ignorant that his enemies were bad men, though he was unacquainted with the profundity of their ignorance, and of the rest of their depravity and voracity. Through being deceived in this he fell, and by his fall involved Sicily in infinite grief. What therefore I advise you to do, after the present relation of these particulars, I have already nearly mentioned. But it appeared to me necessary to show on what account I came a second time to Sicily, through the absurdity and irrationality with which this circumstance seems to be attended. If, therefore, what has been now said shall appear to any one to be reasonable, and if he should think that I had a sufficient pretext for undertaking this voyage, the contents of this Epistle will also be sufficient.

EPISTLE VIII.

PLATO to the Kindred and Familiars of DION—Prosperity.

AS I perceive that affairs are in a very prosperous condition, I will endeavour, as far as I am able, to send you a true account of them. But I hope I shall not only, in the first place, give you salutary advice, but, in the second place, all those that are in Syracuse; and, in the third place, your enemies and adversaries, except some one of them shall have been guilty of an impious deed. For these things are incurable, and can never be expiated. But consider what I now say.

The tyranny being dissolved, all Sicily is at strife about these very things. And some wish to restore again the former government, but others to bring the tyranny entirely to an end, while in the mean time the several plans about things of this kind appear to the multitude to be right, so long as they tend to injure their enemies, and benefit their friends, in the highest degree. It is however by no means easy for him who inflicts many evils on others not to suffer many himself. Nor is it necessary, in order to see this clearly, to search for examples at a great distance, since the circumstances which have now taken place about Sicily are sufficient for this purpose: for some attempt to injure, and others to take vengeance on the injurers. But you are sufficiently acquainted with these particulars, to be able to teach them to others. In these things, therefore, there is nearly no difficulty. But what is advantageous to all enemies and friends, or what is the least noxious to both, this it is neither easy to perceive, nor, when seen, to accomplish. Indeed this consultation and inquiry appears to resemble prayer. Let it therefore be in every respect a certain prayer. For *it is requisite to begin every thing from the gods, both in speaking and understanding.* But when brought to a conclusion, it will signify to us the following discourse.

From the time that the war began to the end of it, one alliance nearly ruled over both you and your enemies; an alliance which your fathers once established,

established, in consequence of being involved in the greatest difficulties, at that time when the Sicily of the Greeks was exposed to the extreme danger of becoming the prey of Barbarians, through being entirely subverted by the Carthaginians. For then they chose Dionysius, as being a young man, and strenuous in such warlike affairs as were properly adapted to him. But they gave him as an adviser Hipparinus, who was his senior: and for the safety of Sicily, investing these two with absolute power, they denominated them, as they say, tyrants. And whether any one is willing to think that a divine fortune and a god, or the virtue of the governors, or both, together with the citizens of that time, were the cause of the safety of Sicily, let this be just as he pleases. Safety, however, to the men of that time, was thus obtained. As therefore they conducted themselves in this manner, it is just that those who were saved should return them thanks. But if the tyranny afterwards improperly used any gift of the city, for this it has partly been accused, and partly has suffered punishment. Certain punishments, therefore, have necessarily been properly inflicted on them for their conduct. For if you could either avoid them, without great danger and labour, or they could easily recover the antient government, we should not advise you to do such things as we shall persuade you to do hereafter. But now it is proper that both of you should understand and call to mind, how often you have been in hope of obtaining your desire, and have thought that but little was wanting to the accomplishment of all things according to your intention. However, this little that was wanting became every where the cause of great and infinite evils, and has not yet arrived at any end. But the antient evils always adhere together, and though the end presents itself to the view, yet a new beginning continually springs forth. The whole too of the tyrannic and popular genus appears to have perished under this circle. But if that which it seems reasonable to expect, though of an execrable nature, should take place, all Sicily nearly will become destitute of the Greek tongue, in consequence of being transferred to a certain Phœnician or Opic[†] dynasty and power. All the Greeks, therefore, with all possible diligence and earnestness, ought to bring a remedy for these things. If indeed any one can give better advice than that which I shall give, he may with the greatest rectitude be called a lover of Greece.

† The Opici were the antient inhabitants of Campania.

But I will now endeavour, with all possible freedom of speech, and making use of a certain common and just mode of discourse, to evince to you what appears to me to be the truth. I shall however for this purpose speak in the character of an arbitrator, and according to my antient custom give advice both to him who tyrannizes and him who is subject to tyranny. And now, in the first place, I advise every tyrant to fly from the appellation, and the thing itself, and change his tyranny, if possible, into a kingdom. But it is possible, as the wise and good Lycurgus evinced in reality: for he, when he saw that the race of his kindred in Argos and Messene had arrived from the power of kings to that of tyrants, and that they were destroying both themselves and the city,—he, I say, fearing both for his country and race, applied a remedy, by introducing the government of elderly men, and the division of the Ephori, as the means of preserving the royal government. And it is owing to this that it has been preserved for so many generations with glory; since here law became the proper king of men, and men did not tyrannize over the laws. To effect this indeed my present discourse persuades all men, exhorting those that aspire after tyranny to turn and fly, with an unwearied celerity, from the felicity of hungry and stupid men, and endeavour to transfer themselves to a royal form of government, become subservient to royal laws, and thus obtain the greatest honours with the consent both of men and the laws.

But I advise those that pursue free manners, and avoid a servile yoke as an evil, to be cautious lest, through an insatiable avidity of a certain unseasonable liberty, they fall into the disease of their ancestors, who, through an unmeasured love of freedom, suffered all the evils of extreme anarchy. For those that governed in Sicily before Dionysius and Hipparinus, lived as they thought happily, because they lived luxuriously, and governed even governors themselves. They likewise dissolved the authority of the twelve military chiefs prior to Dionysius, and judged no one according to law, that they might not be subject to any one who governed either with justice or law. But they were in every respect entirely free, and on this account they became subject to tyrannic governments. For both slavery and freedom when they are transcendent, are attended with every evil. But when they subsist according to measure, they are attended with every good. And the service of divinity is attended with measure, but that of men is without measure.

Divinity

Divinity too is the law to temperate men, but pleasure to the intemperate.

Since these things, therefore, naturally subsist in this manner, I exhort that the advice which I give to the friends of Dion be given to all the Syracusians, as the common advice of Dion and myself. But I will unfold what he while living and able said. Though perhaps some one may inquire what the advice of Dion has to do with the present affairs. Hear:—"O Syracusians, receive before all things such laws as appear to you to be neither conducive to gain, nor the gratification of your desires; but as there are three things, viz. soul, body, and riches, it is requisite that the care of the soul should rank in the first place; that of the body in the second place, situated under the care belonging to the soul; and, in the third place, the honour pertaining to riches, as in a state of servitude to both body and soul. The divine institution effecting these things, will be a law rightly established for you, and rendering those by whom it is used truly happy. But the discourse which calls the rich happy, is itself miserable and stupid, is the discourse of women and children, and renders those that are persuaded by it like itself. Indeed, that these things to which I exhort you are true, you will know in reality, if you have tasted of what has now been said by me respecting laws. But a most true examination appears to have taken place respecting all things. However, such laws being received, since Sicily is in danger, and you neither sufficiently vanquish, nor are remarkably vanquished, it will perhaps be just and advantageous to all of you to pursue the middle path, as well for those of you that avoid the severity of government, as for those of you that desire its restoration. For your ancestors formerly, which is a thing of the greatest consequence, preserved the Greeks from the Barbarians; so that it is now lawful to discourse concerning the present polity. For if at that time the Greeks had perished, we could neither have discoursed in any respect concerning them, nor would any hope whatever have remained. Now therefore to some let there be liberty in conjunction with a royal government; but to others in subjection to it; the laws at the same time having dominion not only over the other citizens, but over kings themselves, whenever they are found to act contrary to law. But in all these affairs, establish kings in conjunction with the gods, with a mind sound and free from guile.

And,

And, in the first place, establish my son¹ on a two-fold account, viz. for my sake, and for the sake of my father. For he at that time freed the city from the Barbarians: but I freed it twice from tyrants, as you yourselves can testify. But, in the second place, make him a king, who has the same name² with my father, I mean the son of Dionysius: and this do for the sake of the assistance which he now affords, and on account of his pious manners; for though he is the son of a tyrant, yet he has voluntarily liberated the city; and has thus procured for himself and his race ever-living honour, instead of the transient and unjust renown of a tyranny. In the third place, it is proper to invite willingly to the kingdom of the Syracusians, the city also being willing, Dionysius the son³ of Dionysius, who is now the general of the enemy's army, if he assents to the kingly form of government, fearing the changes of fortune, commiserating his country, and paying due reverence to temples and sepulchres; lest through a love of contention he should involve all things in ruin, and thus gratify the Barbarians by the destruction of his country.

These three kings, therefore, whether you give or deprive them of a Lacedæmonian power, you should by common consent establish after the manner which I have before mentioned to you, and which now again hear. If the offspring of Dionysius and Hipparinus are willing, for the safety of Sicily, that the present calamities should cease, and are thus desirous to procure honours for themselves and their race, both for the future and present time, on this condition, as I have before said, call them to the government, investing with the power of making a reconciliation, such ambassadors as they shall think fit for the purpose, whether they are chosen from among yourselves, or from other cities, or from both; and besides this, as many as they shall choose to allow.

These, in the first place, should establish laws and a polity, in which it will be requisite that the kings should be lords of the sacred, and such other concerns as ought to be entrusted to the benefactors of their country. Guardians of the laws too should be created, thirty-five in number, and

¹ Dion, who is here supposed to be speaking, means his son Hipparinus.

² Viz. Hipparinus, the son of Hipparinus.

³ Viz. the son of the second Dionysius.

these,

these, together with the people and senate, should be the governors of war and peace. There should likewise be different courts of justice: and the thirty-five guardians of the laws should be the judges of death and banishment. And besides these, judges should be chosen from those that acted last in the capacity of governors; so that one who appears to be the best and the most just should be chosen from each government. These too, on the following year, must judge such of the citizens as deserve death, or imprisonment, or exile. But the king shall not be permitted to be a judge of these decisions, as being a priest, and consequently purified from murder, bonds, and exile. While living, I conceived that these things should take place, and I think so at present. And then indeed, in conjunction with you, I should have vanquished my enemies, if foreigners and the furies had not prevented me from effecting what I intended to effect.

In the next place, if the event of things had answered my expectations, I should have caused the rest of Sicily to be inhabited, after having expelled the Barbarians from the places which they now occupy, such of them however being excepted as fought for the common liberty against the tyranny. I should likewise have restored the former inhabitants of Grecian places to their antient and paternal abodes. I therefore advise and call upon all of you to conceive and act in the very same manner at present: and let him who is unwilling to do so, be considered in common as an enemy. But neither are these things such as it is impossible to accomplish: for he who judges those things to be impossible, which subsist in the souls of two persons, and which from reasoning will readily be found to be the best of things, is by no means wise. But by the two, I mean the soul of Hipparinus the son of Dionysius, and the soul of my son. For I think if these two agree, the other Syracusians, and all those who are lovers of their country, will likewise be unanimous. But paying due honours, and praying to all the gods, and to those other natures whom it is proper to reverence in conjunction with the gods, and besides this persuading and inciting both your friends and enemies, benignantly, and in every possible way, do not desist, till by what we have now said, urging you in the same manner as divine dreams urge those that are awake, you obtain clear evidence and prosperous fortune in perfection."

EPISTLE IX.

PLATO to ARCHYTAS the Tarentine—Prosperity.

THE familiars of Archippus and Philonides came to us, bringing with them the letter which you gave them, and relating the state of your affairs. Such things therefore as pertain to the city, they accomplished without difficulty; for they were not in every respect laborious. But as to what relates to yourself, they said that you are indignant because you cannot be freed from an attention to public concerns. That it is indeed the most pleasant thing in life, for a man to attend to his own affairs, especially if he chooses to act in the same manner as you do, is nearly obvious to every one; but you ought also to consider this, that each of us is not born for himself alone; but that our country claims one part of our birth, our parents another part, and our friends the remaining part. Much too must be given to the occasions which occupy our life. As your country, therefore, calls upon you to attend to public affairs, it would perhaps be absurd not to obey its call: for at the same time too, it happens that a place is left for depraved men, who apply themselves to politics, not from the best motives. But of these things enough.

At present we take care of Echecrates¹, and shall do so in future; and this for your sake, and that of his father Phrynon, and for the sake of the young man himself.

¹ This is the person to whom the last discourse of Socrates was related by Phædo. See the Dialogue of that name.

EPISTLE X.

PLATO to ARISTODORUS—Prosperity.

I HEAR that you are now in the most eminent degree the associate of Dion, and that you are at all times most wise with respect to those manners that are subservient to philosophy. For I say that firmness, faith, and integrity, constitute true philosophy. But I think that other wisdom and skill, which tend to other things, when denominated elegant subtilties, will be rightly named. But now farewell ; and continue to abide in the manners in which you now abide.

EPISTLE XI.

PLATO to LAODAMAS—Prosperity.

WE have before written to you, that your coming to Athens is of great consequence with respect to all you say. But as you declare you cannot come, if either I should be able to come, or Socrates, as you mention in your letter, this will be the second plan to be adopted. Socrates however, at present, labours under the infirmity of the strangury; and it would be disgraceful for me to go thither, if the particulars, for the sake of which you incite me to make this journey, are not accomplished: but I have not much hope that they will be accomplished. However, to discuss every particular would require a long epistle. And at the same time my body, through age, is not able to bear the fatigue of wandering, and to encounter all those dangers with which the land and sea are surrounded; especially at the present time, when travelling is full of danger. But I give you as advice, that which Hesiod, through me as the relator, says, "that to opine is vile, but to understand is difficult." For if there are any who think that a city can be well established by the mere promulgation of laws, without some one endued with authority presiding in the city, and attending to the conduct of its inhabitants, in order that both slaves and the free born may be temperate and brave,—those who entertain this opinion do not think rightly.

But again, if there are men among you who deserve this authority, let them obtain it. But if there is occasion for some one to instruct them, I think that neither he who can teach, nor those who are capable of being instructed, are with you. All that remains, therefore, is to pray to the gods: for cities, prior to the present time, have been nearly constituted
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in this manner. And after they have been well peopled, through the intervention of great concerns, which have taken place through war and other transactions, then at such like seasons an illustrious and good man has obtained a mighty power. But prior to this, it is proper and necessary to bestow great attention on these things. Consider what I say, and do not act imprudently, in consequence of thinking that something ought to be done with expedition. May prosperity attend you.

EPISTLE XII.

PLATO to ARCHYTAS the Tarentine—*Prosperity.*

IT is wonderful with what pleasure we received the commentaries which came from you, and how very much we were delighted with the genius of their author. To us indeed, he appeared to be a man worthy of his antient progenitors. For those men are said to have been ten thousand in number; and according to the fable, they were the best of all those Trojans that were excited by Laomedon.

With respect to the commentaries by me, about which you write, they are not yet finished. However, such as they are, I have sent them to you. With respect to guardianship, we both accord in our sentiments, so that in this particular there is no need of exhortation¹.

¹ There is another epistle after this which is ascribed to Plato, but which I have not translated, because it is obviously spurious. That it is so, will be at once evident to the intelligent reader from the following sentence in it, *της μιν γαρ σπουδαίας επιστολῆς θεὸς ἀρχεῖ, θεοὶ δὲ τῆς ἡττον*, viz. "The word *god* is the beginning of a serious epistle, the word *gods* of one that is not so." Very properly therefore in all the early editions of Plato is the reader admonished that this epistle is spurious by the word *θεδύεται*; and it is singular that Fabricius should doubt whether it might not be genuine, because Diogenes Laertius enumerates thirteen epistles of Plato, and this with the preceding makes thirteen. For of the thirteen which are extant, two, as the reader will perceive, are written by Dion.

THE END OF THE EPISTLES.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE CRATYLUS,

EXTRACTED FROM THE MS. SCHOLIA OF PROCLUS ON
THAT DIALOGUE.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE CRATYLUS.

THE scope of the Cratylus* is to exhibit in things last the prolific energy of souls, and the assimilative power, which, essentially receiving, they evince through the rectitude of names. But since the partial energy of souls frequently fails of its proper ends, just in the same manner as a partial nature, hence names indefinite, and which are casually circulated, naturally take place, and all of them are not the offspring of intellectual science, nor do they all regard an alliance with things themselves. Again, the Cratylus is logical and dialectical, not, however, according to the mere dialectic methods of the Peripatetics, but according to the scientific† dialectic of the great Plato, which is only adapted to those whose dianoëtic power is perfectly purified, who have been instructed from their youth in disciplines, have purified the juvenile condition of their manners through the virtues; and, in short, have genuinely philosophized. This dialectic also is the defensive enclosure of disciplines, leads us up to *the good*, the one

* The extracts with which the reader is here presented, comprehend nearly the whole of the Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus. They may be justly called an incomparable treasury of theological information, since they are replete with the most mystic wisdom, and many of the most abstruse dogmas of antient theology are here most satisfactorily and perspicuously unfolded. To him also who is desirous of penetrating the depths of Grecian mythology, they will be inestimable; and genuine elucidations of many parts of Homer, of the Hymns of Orpheus, and of the Theogony of Hesiod, can alone be obtained from these Scholia. And in addition to all this, these Scholia are no less rare than valuable, since a copy of them is not to be found either in the university of Oxford or Cambridge, or in the British Museum, or in any of the universities of Scotland or Ireland; and it is seldom to be met with in the universities on the continent. My copy is a transcript of the manuscript now in the possession of Mr. Heber, of Brazen-nose college, Oxford.

† For an account of this dialectic, see the Parmenides, and particularly the introduction to it.

cause of all things, and was imparted to men through Prometheus, together with a most splendid fire* from the gods. For the analytics of the Peripatetics, and demonstration, which is the summit of this, may be comprehended by all who are not entirely involved in mental darkness, and who have not drank abundantly of the water of oblivion.

Again, intellect is the producer (*προσθετης*) of dialectic, from the whole of itself generating the whole of it; according to the progression of all things from *the one*, giving subsistence to the divisive method; but according to the collective comprehension of every thing in one idiom, to the definitive method; and according to the presence of forms with each other, though which each is what it is, and participates of other forms, the demonstrative method; and generating the analytic method, according to the conversion of all things to *the one*, and their proper principles.

Again, according to Aristotle, there is one rhetoric, and one dialectic, which are able to persuade or confute on both sides; but Plato says it is better to give a two-fold distribution to each. For one species of rhetoric is flattery, and without art, which he reprobates in the *Gorgias*; but the other is the science of things good and just, which he celebrates in the *Phædrus*. And again, he dismisses the dialectic of Aristotle as contentious, but embraces the dialectic, which surveys the principles of things, as a part of philosophy.

The present dialogue makes us to be scientifically knowing in the rectitude of names; and it is necessary that he who intends to be skilled in dialectic should begin from this theory.

As Plato, in the *Parmenides*, delivers the whole of dialectic, but not merely so, but together with the theory of beings, so now he delivers the rectitude of names, together with the science of things.

Plato now wishes to deliver the principles of things and of dialectic, since he delivers names in conjunction with the things of which they are names.

Why is it that Plato says, that by despising names we shall become, in old age, more rich in prudence, and yet now makes the investigation of them the leading object? May we not say, that he considers them, not so far as they are appellations, but so far as they are images of things? For the definitive art is triple; since either beginning from the highest genus, it proceeds through all the media, to the last differences, which the

* See the notes on the *Philebus*.

Elean guest does*, when defining a sophist and politician; or receiving the genus which is near and known, it proceeds through the following differences, such as in this instance, man is an animal pedestrian, biped, and the like; or it uses name alone, such as the becoming is beautiful, and soul is *ψυσιχη αντια*, and the like. For if he who at first established names possessed science, he who uses an established name must necessarily fall upon definition. Hence Plato now makes the investigation about such like names his principal design, and through these as media is extended to things themselves. This inquiry also contributes to demonstration. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato endeavours to show, that the divining art is better than that pertaining to augury, from the name. It likewise contributes to analysis. Thus, in the Phædrus, Plato calls the love which is participated by mortals *flying*, but that which is imparticipable and divine *winged*, through the essence and the energy of the god conspiring into one; and thus he appears to ascend and analyze. Frequently also, this is necessary to division. Thus Socrates shows, by division, that the pleasant is one thing, and the good another, because the names also are two.

That† the persons of the dialogue are Cratylus the Heraclitean, of whom Plato was an auditor, who said that all names are from nature, and that such as are not from nature are not names, just as we say, that he who falsely denominates things says nothing; and Hermogenes, the Socratic, who on the contrary said that there was no name from nature, but that all names are from position; and the third is Socrates, who distinguishing says, that some names are from nature, and others from position; such as are those which are casually made. For the names which belong to things perpetual, rather participate of a subsistence from nature, but those which belong to things corruptible, rather partake of the casual. For he who calls his son Athanasius‡, manifests the confusion of names about things of this kind.

Further still, since names have both form and matter, according to form they rather participate of a subsistence from nature, but according to matter of a subsistence from position. And Socrates indeed, addressing himself to Hermogenes, separates names firmly established in the gods, such as *μυρινη*, and the like, from those which subsist in

* In the Sophista and Politicus.

† Almost all the paragraphs of these Scholia begin with the word *ita*, that.

‡ That is, *Immortal*.

souls, such as *Ξατισσα*. But, addressing himself to Cratylus, he admits, indeed, the relation of names to things, but shews that there is much of the casual in names, and at the same time that all things are not moved.

That the heavens, which partake more of motion, have also permanency after a certain manner, as in the poles, and things of this kind. But the earth, which partakes more of permanency, has also motion through its internal change.

That names which subsist from nature partake also of a subsistence from position, and those which subsist from position partake of a subsistence from nature.

That Cratylus being scientific, and employing the greatest brevity of diction, which was the peculiarity of the Heraclitics, in consequence of enunciations not being able to keep pace with the flowing nature of things, appears to answer, through the whole of the dialogue, from the fewest syllables and words. Hence the most imitative Plato, in the very beginning, represents him as saying *βουλει*. But Hermogenes being doxastic, and venerating the opinions of the many, conformably to his doctrine, that names subsist from position, says, *εἰ σὺ δοκεῖ*, &c. For *δοκησις* frequently belongs to things intelligible, and also to such as are eligible, just as will is of things good alone.

That the whole Apolloniad series is suspended from the government of Jupiter.

That Pythagoras and Epicurus were of the opinion of Cratylus; but Democritus and Aristotle of Hermogenes. Pythagoras therefore being asked what was the wisest of things, said it was number; and being asked what was the next in wisdom said, he who gave names to things. But by number, he obscurely signified the intelligible order, which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms: for there that which is the first and properly number* subsists after the superessential one. This likewise supplies the measures of essence to all beings, in which also true wisdom, and knowledge which is of itself, and which is converted to and perfects itself, subsist. And as there the intelligible, intellect, and intelligence are the same, so there also number and wisdom are the same. But by the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which indeed subsists from intellect, and is not things themselves like the first intellect, but possesses the images, and essential transitive reasons of them, as statues of beings. Being therefore is imparted to all things from intellect, which knows itself and is replete with

* That is, number according to cause, which subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. For number, according to hyparxis, subsists at the summit of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual order.

wisdom; but that they are denominated is from foul, which imitates intellect. Pythagoras therefore said, that it was not the business of any casual person to fabricate names, but of one looking to intellect and the nature of things. Names therefore are from nature.

But Democritus, who said that names subsist from position, inferred this from four arguments: First, From sameness of appellation; for different things are called by the same name. Names therefore are not from nature. 2d, From the variety of names, for if different names are adapted to one and the same thing, they are also adapted to each other, which is impossible. 3d, From the change of names: for why was Aristocles called Plato, but Turtamus Theophrastus. 4th, If names are from nature, but yet from a defect of similars, why do we say φρασεν from φρασις, but from δικαιουση (ουκ εστι παρανομαζειν) we do not derive a word which alludes to this? Names therefore are casual and not from nature. But he calls the first argument πολυσχημος, (i. e. *having a manifold signification*); the second, ισορροπος, (i. e. *equivalent, or equiponderant*); and the fourth, νωρημος, (i. e. *nameless*). In answer to the first of these arguments, some say, that it is nothing wonderful, if one name shadows forth many things, as εως, *love*, both from ρωμη, *strength*, and from πτερον, *a wing*, manifests different things. In answer to the second, it is said, nothing hinders that different names, in a different respect, may manifest the same thing. Thus, for instance, in the words *merops* and *man*, the same thing may be called by the former of these words, according to the possession of a distributed life, and by the latter according to αναδρειν α οπωπεν, *considering what he has seen*. In answer to the third, it is said, that this very thing signifies that names are by nature, viz. that we transfer those that are not properly established, and which are contrary to nature, to a position according to nature. And in answer to the fourth, that it is nothing wonderful, if names which were established at first should fail through a great length of time.

That a subsistence according to nature is four-fold. For it is either as the essences of plants and animals, as well the wholes as the parts; or it is as the energies and powers of these, such as the levity and heat of fire; or it is as shadows and appearances in mirrors; or as artificial images are assimilated to their archetypes. Epicurus therefore thought that names had a subsistence from nature according to the first signification, as works precedaneous by nature, such as voice and sight. And as to see and to hear

hear are according to nature, so also to denominate; so that a name is from nature, as being the work of nature. But Cratylus was of this opinion according to the second signification; and hence he says that the peculiarity of every thing is a name, as being appropriately assigned by the founders of names, artificially and scientifically. For Epicurus said, that the founders of names did not establish them scientifically, but in effecting this were moved physically, like those that snore, howl, roar, and sigh. But Socrates said, that names are from nature, according to the fourth signification, as being the progeny of scientific conceptions, and not of physical appetite (*orexis*), but of the soul energizing according to imagination, and at the same time establishing names from the first, as much as possible, appropriately to things. He likewise said, that, according to form, all names are the same, have one power, and are from nature. For, according to form, they are similar to things, but differ from each other according to matter.

That the name Cratylus appears to have been assigned *παρὰ τῷ περιφρατῆσαι ἀραρίτως τῶν ἡρακλείτου δογμάτων*, from *firmly obtaining the dogmas of Heraclitus*, and that on this account he despised flowing things, as not properly having a subsistence. But the name Socrates is *παρὰ τῷ σωτήρα εἶναι τοῦ κρατοῦς τῆς Ψυχῆς*, from *being the saviour of the strength of his soul*, that is of his reason, and from not being drawn down under the senses.

That things eternal receive their denomination from powers or energies, but things generated from use and communion.

That he who wishes to imitate any thing, ought to be scientifically knowing in two things, viz. the archetype, and demiurgic art.

That the Heraclitics are accused as arrogant, as dissemblers, and as despisers, by Theodorus in the Theætetus, and now by Hermogenes. It must be observed, however, that these two are not philosophers; for the former was a geometrician, and the latter a youth. And a true philosopher has not leisure to consume his time in things of this kind.

That Socrates did not think that the speculation about the rectitude of names was to be despised, but according to the proverb he considered fine things to be difficult.

That investigation is imparted to souls from Maia the mother of Hermes; but invention is from the Hermaic series. For the more total genera of the gods energize prior to, together with, and posterior to, such as are more partial. Hence we see that investigation

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is imperfect, and is as matter previously prepared, from the donation of more elevated causes to their participants, such as form supervening from things inferior.

That sophists rejoice in indicative assertions, but philosophers in such as are dialectic. And again, the sophists, as framers of images, assume the person of one skilled in dialectic; and thus their contentious molestation is produced.

That of the Hermaic gift, some things are intellectual and first goods; but others are secondary, and perfective of the dianoëtic power; and others rank in the third degree, purify the irrational nature, and in a particular manner measure the phantastic motions. Others again give subsistence to the reasons of nature; and others are the suppliers of externally proceeding powers, and of gain. For these are the last and the material gifts of the god, which, as astrologers say, the god imparts in ignoble dispositions (*αδελφους διαθεσειν*).

That it very little belongs to a philosopher, says Plato, to speak about particulars; for it is his business to ascend to the speculation of wholes, and things common.

The reasoning of Hermogenes is as follows: If there is a transposition of names, names are from position, and are the symbols of things. But the first is true, and therefore the second. But the reasoning of Proclus is this: If names are symbols of things, and are from position, we have no longer any occasion for the transposition of names. The first is true, and therefore the second. The followers of Hermogenes therefore speak erroneously; for they look to particulars only, and not also to things eternal. For the names of things eternal are divine and venerable, as being sacred to the gods, whose powers and energies they express. These Socrates, in the Philebus, venerates, and says, that his caution about them is attended with the greatest dread.

That the truth of an enunciative sentence (*του απφραντικου λογου*), means one thing with Aristotle, and another with Plato in the present place, in which he says, that names essentially predicated (*καθ αυτα λεγομενα*) are true. For that of Aristotle speaks of the composition and division of that which is predicated, and has for its subject both the false and the true. But the great Plato knew how to use the significant of truth and falsehood in a fourfold respect. For he uses it either according to the hyparxes themselves of things, as when he says that real beings truly are, but that unreal beings have a false subsistence. Or he uses it according to the passions which are consequent

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to preceding motions, as when Socr  tes, in the *Philebus*, divides pleasure into the true and false. Or according to knowledge, as when he defines false opinions according to the true. Or according to the instruments of the gnostic life, as, for instance, assertions, names, and elements. For in these the true and the false are seen, according to their adaptation and symphony with things. Rhetoricians also have a certain form of diction which they call truth.

That Antisthenes said, that nothing could be contradicted; for according to him every assertion is true. For he who speaks says something. He who says something, speaks of that which has a being. And he who speaks of that which has a being, speaks the truth. In answer to this we must say, that there is also that which is false, and that nothing hinders but that the man who speaks of being may speak falsely. For he who speaks, speaks *about* something, and does not speak *something*.

That bad are more known by good men, than the virtue of good men is by the bad. For vice is blind; and in the first place is ignorant of itself, and in the next place of others.

That the dogma of Protagoras is different from that of Euthydemus. For the former says, that though the subject has no existence, yet it appears to beholders to possess a particular quality, through the commixture of the agent and patient. But the dogma of Euthydemus makes every thing to be all things, and asserts that all things are at the same time always true. As he that says, that a piece of wood is white and black, small and great, moist and dry, and likewise, that all the negations of these are true. Hence beginning from different principles, those sophists end in the same thing.

That the power of the first *infinity* imparts from itself progression to all things whatever which are capable of subsistence; but *bound*, limits and circumscribes every thing, and establishes it in its proper boundaries. Thus in numbers form pervades to all things from the monad and bound; but the never-failing according to progression from the prolific duad; so that every being has a certain nature, bound, idiom, and proper order, through the first bound. There is therefore contradiction in words, which definitely exhibits the false and the true.

That the word $\pi\rho\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\tau\iota\nu$, *to act*, is asserted of those only who energize according to the diano  tic power, but the word $\pi\omega\epsilon\iota\nu$, *to do*, is asserted of those who energize in a different

different manner from this. *Actions* therefore and *makings* have their proper boundaries, instruments, and times; nor does any casual thing do or act any casual thing.

That speech is under action, may be shown from the following division: Every energy of the soul is either effected without body, and this energy is phantasy, opinion, intelligence; or it is effected with body, and this is two-fold. For it is either unattended with free will, and this is sense and involuntary motion, or it is attended with free will, and this is action, under which is discourse.

That Plato coarranges Minerva, Vulcan, and Mars, through that which is common with respect to warlike concerns; through Minerva possessing a kindred art with each of the others; through each of the others being the lover of Venus; and because each was produced from Juno and Jupiter.

That the soul of the world imparts life to altermotive natures: for to these it is the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in the *Phædrus* and in the *Laws*. But the demiurgus imparts life simply to all things, life, divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about bodies.

If names, according to Aristotle *, are from position, and are symbols of things and conceptions, it is necessary that the sentences composed from them, being enunciative from position, should not be said, from this very circumstance, to be assimilated to composite conceptions, nor that they are of themselves the recipients of truth or falsehood. But indeed enunciative sentences (*οι αποφαντικοι λογοι*), possessing essentially the speaking falsely or truly, do not possess this from position. Names therefore are not from position.

If every one who gives a name performs a certain action, but he who performs a certain action, performs it through an instrument; hence he who gives a name, since he gives it through an instrument, uses a name as an instrument. But of instruments some are from nature, as the hand and foot; others from position, as a bridle and a name. And of these artificial instruments, some effect something which is subservient to subsistence, as an ax; but others effect that which contributes to signifying and teaching. A name therefore is a thing of this kind: for it is an instrument which *teaches* and *unfolds into light* the essence of things; the teaching being assumed from him who uses the instrument, but the unfolding into light from the *paradigm*. But a

* See the Introduction to this Dialogue.

name requires, as an instrument, him who uses it, but as an image it requires a reference to its paradigm. So that it is evident from these things, that a name is not a symbol, nor the work of any casual position, but is allied to things, and adapted to them by nature. For every instrument is coordinated to a proper work, and cannot be adapted to any thing else than to that for which it was made. A name therefore, as being an instrument, has a certain connate power, and which coharmonizes with the things signified. As likewise, it is that which teaches, it possesses an order which unfolds conceptions into light; and as giving distinction to essence, it produces in us a knowledge of things.

Again, a name is not the effect of physical instruments: for every name, so far as a name, is significant of something; since *voice* is not the same with name. Physical instruments therefore, such as the tongue, the arteries, and the lungs, give perfection to voice; and though these cooperate in producing a name, through matter, yet the conception of the founder of names, especially gives completion to it, which conception coharmonizes, in a becoming manner, matter to form and paradigm. But he who discourses, uses a name when established: for every instrument has both one who uses it, and one who makes it. Every thing too which is used has a producing cause; and every thing having a producing cause, is ministrant to something with respect to energy.

A name is said to be from nature, both as an effect, and as an instrument; for it becomes by its formation an image of things, and announces them through conceptions as media. Very properly therefore is a name said to be a *doctrinal instrument*, *οργανον διδασκαλικον*; but shortly after it is called the *effect* of the legislator. And this is for the sake of him who discourses: for it is both an end and good to unfold things. Hence Socrates says, it is rather an instrument, considering it according to its more excellent subsistence. Hence too this instrument is a medium between the teacher and the learner.

That a shuttle and an augur are paradigms adapted to a name. For a name separates things from each other, and enters into the learner, through the depth of his conceptions.

That as Socrates, in the *Gorgias*, demonstrates to Callicles, who divides that which is just by law, oppositely to that which is just by nature, that law and nature in that which is just concur with each other, in like manner it is necessary to conceive that

names

names subsist both from law and nature; not however from casual law, but from that which is eternal, and which consists according to eternal reasons. A name therefore, through its producing cause, which is scientific, is both from law and position; but through its paradigmatic cause is from nature.

But if this be the case, how does Socrates afterwards show to Cratylus, that it is not only necessary to call that a name which is rightly framed, but that also which is erroneously established. In answer to this, we must say, that law is contemplative of that which is universal. Such names therefore as are given to things perpetual, are founded by law. But since there are also names of things corruptible, it is by no means wonderful if law, which regards universal, has not dominion over these, and that there should be much of the casual in them, as in the names *Ambrosius*, *Athanasius*, *Polychronius* *, and the like. But what the art is which produces names we will concisely relate; for not every thing in it is a species of the legislative art. That there is then in the soul an assimilative power is evident; for painting and things of this kind are suspended from this power, which assimilates subordinate to superior natures, and things which subsist in composition to such as are more simple. And again, according to the same power, the soul is able to assimilate herself to natures superior to her own essence, viz. to gods, angels, and dæmons. She also, through the same power, assimilates to herself things subordinate to her own nature; and also assimilates them to things superior to herself. Hence she fabricates statues of gods and dæmons. But wishing to give subsistence after a manner to immaterial similitudes of things, and which are alone the progeny of the rational essence, employing from herself the cooperation of phantasy adapted to speech (*λεκτική φαντασία*), she produces the essence of names. And as the telestic art, through certain symbols, and arcane signatures, assimilates statues of the gods, and makes them adapted to the reception of divine illuminations, so the legislative art, according to the same assimilative power, gives subsistence to names, the statues of things; through such and such sounds shadowing forth the nature of things, and having given subsistence to them, delivers them to the use of mankind. Hence the legislator is said to be the lord of the generation of names. And as it is not holy to behave in a disorderly manner towards the statues of the gods, so neither is it becoming to err

* The first and second of these words signify *immortal*; the third, *having an extended duration*.

about names. For a legislative intellect is the artificer of these, inserting in them images of paradigms; and it is proper to venerate them, through their alliance to the gods.

It also appears to me that Plato establishes the legislator analogous to the demiurgus of the universe: for he it is, according to the Timæus, who establishes the laws of fate, and who governs all things conformably to law. According to Plato too, he is the first fabricator of names: for as we learn from the Timæus, he denominated one of the circulations of the universe *same*, and the other *different*. If therefore the legislator is analogous to the demiurgus, must he not necessarily be the lord of the position of names? Hence in this Dialogue Plato calls the legislator, *demiurgus*, and the most rare of demiurgi. Thus also Socrates, in the Phædrus, says, that the name *μῆτις* was given by Jupiter. Of names therefore, some are the progeny of the gods, extending also as far as to the soul; but others are the offspring of partial souls, who are able to frame them through intellect and science; and others again subsist through the middle genera. For some meeting with dæmons and angels, have been taught by them names better adapted to things than such as men have established. It is requisite likewise to know the differences of names arising from their producing causes, and to refer all of them to the one demiurgus, a divinity of an intellectual characteristic. Whence also a name has two-fold powers, the one, that which teaches conceptions, and is the cause of communion; but the other, that which gives distinction to essence; since the demiurgus likewise possesses two-fold powers, the one productive of sameness, the other of difference.

That the assimilative energy of the demiurgic intellect is two-fold; the one, that according to which he gives subsistence to the whole world, looking to an intelligible paradigm; the other, that according to which he promulgates names adapted to things; concerning which Timæus briefly indicates, but theurgists teach more clearly, and oracles* from the gods themselves: "There is a venerable name with a sleepless revolution, leaping into the worlds through the rapid reproofs of the father." And another oracle says, "The paternal intellect disseminated symbols through the world." Thus therefore the legislator also, looking to the whole world, delivers the most excellent polity, and imposes names assimilated to things.

* See my collection of these Oracles in the third volume of the Monthly Magazine.

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That of things artificial there are no definite causes and paradigms, because the effects of such causes and paradigms are essences, and proper measures, have a reference to the universe, and proceed through nature. But every thing artificial is unessential, and is all-variously changed in accommodation to our uses and circumstances, and is separated from things which have a natural subsistence. If, however, some one should call the producing and prolific powers of the gods, which proceed into the universe, demiurgic, intellectual, generative, and perfective arts, we shall not reject a nomination of this kind; since we also find theologists indicating through these divine productions. Hence they call the Cyclops the causes of all artificial production, who also taught Jupiter, Minerva, and Vulcan. But they celebrate Minerva as presiding over other arts, and particularly that of weaving, and Vulcan as the inspective guardian of another art. According to Orpheus, however, the weaving art originates from Minerva, but proceeds into the vivific series of Proserpine: for this goddess and all her choir, abiding on high, are said to weave the order of life, which is participated by all the mundane gods. For the one demiurgus excites all the junior demiurgi to weave together the mortal with the immortal form of life.* But the order of life thus woven ends in the gods who preside over generation, among whom is the Homeric Circe, who weaves all the life in the four elements, and at the same time with her song harmonizes the sublunary realms. Circe therefore is ranked by theologists among these weaving powers. Her shuttle too, as they say, is golden, by this indicating her essence to be intellectual and pure, immaterial and unmingled with generation, and that her employment consists in separating things stable from such as are in motion, according to divine diversity. If therefore, as I have said, so the one recurring to these analogies, calls the powers of the gods the causes of these arts, but their effects the illuminations of these powers pervading through the whole world, he will speak with rectitude. For it is necessary not only to suspend from Minerva the weaving art which is with us, but prior to this, that which energizes through nature, and connects generated with eternal, mortal with immortal, corporeal with incorporeal, and sensible with intellectual natures. In like manner we must survey the whole of the ætæonic, and each of the other arts, as first subsisting in nature. So that the shuttle will every where have an analogous subsistence, separating the genera which con-

* This is asserted in the *Timæus*.

stitute beings, that, together with the connection of them, division may remain, and genuinely preserve their hyparxis. Hence the artists that are with us act under presiding and inspecting gods. They do not however in consequence of this contemplate intelligibles; for they do not operate looking to these, but to the forms which are with themselves, and the reasons of things artificial which they contain; and this by either inventing these, or receiving them from others. For the first artificer of a shuttle conceived in his own mind what kind of a thing a shuttle ought to be, looking to its use, and being led by this, produced in himself that form of a shuttle according to which others are made. But others learning from him, have acquired a knowledge of the form, and conformably to it make the resemblance of the shuttle.

And here we may see how these things are imitations of the demiurgic art, and of intellectual forms: for these forms being always established according to invariable permanency, things corruptible in the world are preserved, and are again renovated through their stable famenefs. And the corruption indeed is derived from matter, but the stable famenefs from an eternal form. Just as in the shuttles which are here, the corruption is from the matter, but the regeneration from the reason or productive principle in the artist. What the shuttle, therefore, is to the artificer by whom it is made, that are names to the legislator, and all mundane natures to the demiurgus. Hence as forms have a three-fold subsistence, viz. intellectual, scientific, doxastic; all sensible natures are derived from intellectual, names from scientific, and shuttles from doxastic forms.

That the fabrication of the universe is two-fold: for the one gives subsistence to reasons which extend to all things, and to forms which have an invariable subsistence, and sustain no mutation; but the other inserts divisible differences in generated natures. Thus, for instance, the human form pervades supernally from the one and whole intellectual fabrication, through the stars as media. Hence this form has a perpetual subsistence, as originating from an immovable cause. But since men differ from each other in magnitude and colour, and things of this kind, these differences arise from the secondary fabrication of the junior gods, and are conversant with much mutability, through being the production of moveable causes. This however takes place, in order that the variety of things may subsist, and that the perpetual generation of particulars may be multiplied. For different celestial periods give completion to, and at different times generate different things,

things, and produce one connection from all things which contributes to the completion of the universe.

That the shuttle* is an image of the separating power of the gods, both of those that preside over wholes, and those that preside over parts; for its operation in woofs represents the energy of this power, and exhibits a symbol of the order of the separating gods. Hence when theologists speak of shuttles as belonging to these gods, they do not speak of the idea of a shuttle, but only symbolically use the name. For why do they rather speak of the shuttle, and not of something else? And is it not absurd that science should casually use names, and these when applied to the gods? But they appear to me to assume things of this kind according to analogy. For what a shuttle is in the weaving art, that separation is in the fabrication of forms. But analogy is not the habitude of idea to an image, nor is it from position alone. Thus Plato† calls certain powers of the soul horses; neither thus denominating them casually, nor meaning that these powers are the ideas of sensible horses, but merely employing analogy. *Hence initiators into the mysteries through an alliance of this kind, causing sensibles to sympathize with the gods, use these instruments as signatures of divine powers; the shuttle as a signature of separating, a cup of vivification, a sceptre of ruling, and a key of guardian power.* And thus they denominate other powers of the gods, using analogy in a similar manner.

That as things are to each other, so also are their names analogously to each other, according to honour and power. Hence the names of the gods are honourable and venerable, and worthy of the greatest fear to the wise. On this account they say it is not proper that the Greeks should use the Egyptian, Scythian, or Persian names of the gods, but such as are Grecian. For the gods who preside over climates rejoice when they are denominated in the dialects of their proper regions.

If he who uses an instrument is better than him who fabricates it as being more architectonic, how does a partial soul use the irrational nature, and the shelly body, which were fabricated by the junior gods? Or does not the soul also contribute to the fabrication of these? And do not the junior gods use these as instruments? And it is necessary to consider these with reference to each other; the whole fabrication, as they say, to the use of the whole, but the divisible to the divisible.

* See p. 495.

† See the Phædrus.

If he who is skilled in dialectic uses the work of the legislator as a more excellent character, but the judge as one subordinate, it appears to be absurd. May we not say that the one uses it as an instrument, the other as a principle? for a partial soul uses a dæmon as a governor and an inspective guardian, but the body as an instrument. For in the paradigms of these, the father of Jupiter is Saturn, but the daughter is Justice. Hence the legislator is analogous to the demiurgus Jupiter, inserting the laws of fate in souls, and promulgating names to the whole circulations. But he who is skilled in dialectic, is analogous to the Saturnian monad. For the mighty Saturn supernally imparted the principles of intelligence to the demiurgus, and presides over the whole fabrication of the universe. Whence also Jupiter in Orpheus calls him a dæmon:

Ορφου δ' ἡΜΕΤΕΡΟΥ ΓΕΓΕΝΗ ΑΡΙΔΕΙΚΕΤΕ ΔΑΙΜΟΝ.

i. e. O illustrious dæmon, direct our offspring.

And Saturn it seems possesses with himself the highest causes of things collected and separated; through the celestial sections* producing into parts the intellectual wholeness, and becoming the cause of generative progressions and multiplications, and, in short, being the leader of the Titanic race, from which the division of things originates. Through absorptions too, he again collects his own progeny, unites them to himself, and resolves them into his own uniform and impartible cause; since also the demiurgus Jupiter receives proximately from him the truth of things, and primarily understands the ideas which he contains: for Night also delivers oracles to Jupiter. But the father Saturn proximately imparts to him all the measures of the whole fabrication of things.

That with respect to intellect, the essential contains in itself the whole true knowledge of things at once in energy; but the intellect of the philosopher not being essential, but an illumination, and, in short, an image of intellect, understands divisibly, and sometimes only touches on the truth.

That there are five habits of men with respect to knowledge, viz. two-fold ignorance, simple ignorance, desire, investigation, invention.

* i. e. Through the sections of that order of gods which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

That

That he who has a scientific knowledge of the methods of invention interprets to the learner, imitating the leading Hermes.

That Socrates is analogous to intellect; but Hermogenes to irrational opinion, aspiring after good; and Cratylus is analogous to the corporeal and material phantasy, on which account he is deceived by the sophists as a slave. But opinion and the phantasy are nearly sisters, as being neighbours (*αγχι Συνοί*).

Why does Plato eject from his Republic the poets about Homer, as imitators, but now* introduces them as divine leaders of the rectitude of names? May we not say, that there the variety of imitation is unadapted to simple and unperverted manners; but that here and every where he admires and embraces their divinely-inspired conceptions? Since however the present discourse is about divine names, it is necessary to speak a little concerning them. And in the first place, let us speak concerning the names which are occultly established in the gods themselves; since some of the ancients said that these originated from the more excellent genera†, but that the gods are established beyond a signification of this kind; but others admitted that names are in the gods themselves, and in those gods that are allotted the highest order.

The gods therefore possess an *hyparxis* uniform and ineffable, a power generative of wholes, and an intellect perfect and full of conceptions; and they give subsistence to all things according to this triad. Hence it is necessary that the participations of those divinities who are of a more elevated order, and who are arranged nearer to *the good*, should proceed triadically through all things to which they give subsistence. It is also necessary that among these, those participations should be more ineffable, which are defined according to the *hyparxes* of the first gods; but that those should be more apparent, and more divided, which are illuminated according to the *intellect* of exempt causes; and that those participations which are between these, should be such as are the effluxions of *prolific powers*. For the fathers of wholes giving subsistence to all things, have diffeminated in all things vestiges, and impressions, of their own triadic hypostasis; since nature also inserts in bodies an exciting principle (*ενουσμα*) derived from her proper idiom, through which she moves bodies, and governs them as by a rudder. And the demiurgus has established in the universe an image of his own monadic transcendency, through which

* See p. 500,

† Viz. angels, dæmons, and heroes.

he governs the world, holding a rudder, as Plato says, like a pilot. It is proper to think therefore, that these rudders, and this helm of the universe, in which the demiurgus being seated orderly disposes the world, are nothing else than a symbol of the whole fabrication of things, to us indeed difficult of comprehension, but to the gods themselves known and manifest. And why is it requisite to speak concerning these things, since, of the ineffable cause of all, who is beyond intelligibles, there is an impression in every being, and even as far as to the last of things, through which all things are suspended from him, some more remotely, and others more near, according to the clearness and obscurity of the impression which they contain? This it is which moves all things to the desire of good, and imparts to beings this inextinguishable love. And this impression is indeed unknown: for it pervades as far as to things which are incapable of knowledge. It is also more excellent than life; for it is present with things inanimate; and has not an intellectual power; since it lies in things destitute of intellectual energy. As nature therefore, the demiurgic monad, and the father himself who is exempt from all things, have disseminated in things posterior, impressions of their respective idioms, and through these convert all things to themselves, in like manner all the gods impart to their progeny symbols of their cause, and through these establish all things in themselves. The impressions therefore of the hyparxis of the higher order of gods, which are disseminated in secondary natures, are ineffable and unknown, and their efficacious and motive energy surpasses all intelligence. And of this kind are the characters of light, through which the gods unfold themselves to their progeny; these characters subsisting unically in the gods themselves, but shining forth to the view in the genera more excellent than man, and presenting themselves to us divinely, and accompanied with form. Hence the gods* exhort "To understand the forerunning form of light." For subsisting on high without form, it becomes invested with form through its progression; and there being established occultly and uniformly, it becomes apparent to us through motion, from the gods themselves; possessing indeed an efficacious energy, through a divine cause, but becoming figured, through the essence by which it is received.

Again, the impressions which are illuminated from powers, are in a certain respect

* Proclus here alludes to one of the Chaldean oracles.

media between things ineffable and effable, and pervade through all the middle genera. For it is not possible for the primary gifts of the gods to arrive to us, without the more excellent genera (i. e. angels, dæmons, and heroes,) previously participating the illuminations which thence proceed. But these illuminations subsisting appropriately in each of their participants, and coordinately in all things, unfold the powers that give them subsistence. Of this kind are the symbols of the gods, which are indeed uniform in the more elevated orders, but multiform in those that are subordinate; and which the theurgic art imitating exhibits through inarticulate evocations (*αδιαφύρατων εκφωνήσεων*).

The impressions which rank as the third in order, which pervade from intellectual essences to all idioms, and proceed as far as to us, are divine names, through which the gods are invoked, and by which they are celebrated, being unfolded into light by the gods themselves, and reverting to them, and producing to human knowledge as much of the gods as is apparent. For through these we are able to signify something to each other, and to converse with ourselves about the gods. Different nations however participate differently of these, as, for instance, the Egyptians, according to their native tongue, receiving names of this kind from the gods; but the Chaldæans and Indians in a different manner, according to their proper tongue; and in a similar manner the Greeks, according to their dialect. Though a certain divinity therefore may be called by the Greeks Briareus, but differently by the Chaldæans, we must nevertheless admit, that each of these names is the progeny of the gods, and that it signifies the same essence. But if some names are more and others less efficacious, it is not wonderful; since of things which are known to us, such as are dæmoniacal and angelic are more efficacious; and, in short, of things denominated, the names of such as are nearer are more perfect than the names of those that are more remote.

Not every genus of the gods however can be denominated: for Parmenides evinces that the god who is beyond all things is ineffable. "For," says he, "he can neither be denominated, nor spoken of." And of the intelligible gods, the first genera, which are conjoined with *the one itself*, and are called occult, have much of the unknown and ineffable. For that which is perfectly apparent and effable, cannot be conjoined with the perfectly ineffable, but it is requisite that the progression of intelligibles should be terminated* in this order; in which there is the first effable, and that which is called by

* The first effable subsists in the god Phanes, or the extremity of the intelligible order.

proper names. For the first forms are there, and the intellectual nature of intelligibles there shines forth to the view. But all the natures prior to this being silent and occult, are only known by intelligence *. Hence the whole of the theistic art energizing theurgically ascends as far as to this order. Orpheus also says, that this is first called by a name by the other gods: for the light proceeding from it is known to and denominated by the intellectual orders. But he thus speaks,

Μῆτιν σπέρμα φέροντα θεῶν κλυτον οὔτε φανήτα,
Πρωτογονον μακαρεὺς καλεῶν κατὰ μακρὸν οὐλύμπον.

i. e. "Metis bearing the seed of the gods, whom the gods about lofty Olympus call the illustrious Phanes Protogonus." In the gods however nomination is united with intellectual conception, and both are present with them through the participation of the light which the mighty Phanes emits to all things. But in our soul these two are divided from each other; and intellectual conception is one thing, and name another: and the one has the order of an image, but the other of a paradigm. In the middle genera there is indeed a separation, but there is also a union of the intellective and onomastic energy. The transpositive name (διαποσθμιον ονομα) of *Iynxes* † (ινγυνων), which is said to sustain all the fountains, appears to me to signify a thing of this kind. Such also is the appellation *teletarchic* (το τελεταρχικον), which some one of the gods ‡ says, "leaps into the worlds, through the rapid reproof of the father," κοσμοις ενθροωσκειν κραταιην δια πατρος επιτην. For all these things are occultly with the gods, but are unfolded according to second and third progressions, and to men that are allied to the gods.

There is therefore a certain abiding name in the gods, through which the subordinate invoke the superior, as Orpheus says of Phanes, or through which the superior denominate the subordinate, as Jupiter, in Plato, gives names to the unapparent periods of souls §. For fathers define the energies of their offspring, and the offspring know their

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.

† The *Iynx*, *Synoches*, and *Teletarchæ* of the Chaldæans, compose that divine order, which is called by the Platonists *intelligible*, and at the same time *intellectual*. This order is celebrated by Plato in the *Phædrus* under the names of the *supercelestial place*, *Heaven*, and the *subcelestial arch*.

‡ This is one of the Chaldæan oracles.

§ See the *Timæus*.

producing causes, through the intellectual impressions which they bear. Such then are the first names which are unfolded from the gods, and which through the middle genera end in the rational essence.

There are however other names of a second and third rank ; and these are such as partial souls have produced, at one time energizing enthusiastically about the gods, and at another time energizing according to science ; either conjoining their own intelligence with divine light, and thence deriving perfection ; or committing the fabrication of names to the rational power. For thus artists, such as geometricians, physicians, and rhetoricians, give names to the things the idioms of which they understand. Thus too poets inspired by Phœbus (*τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ φοῖβόληπτοι*) ascribe many names to the gods, and to human names give a division opposite to these ; receiving the former from enthusiastic energy, and the latter from sense and opinion ; concerning which Socrates now says Homer indicates, referring some names to the gods, and others to men.

That the names which are assigned to things by the gods are smooth, well-sounding, and of fewer syllables, than those which are assigned by men, as, for instance, Xanthus * than Scamander, Chalcis than Cymindis, and Myrine than Batieia. And it seems that the first of these names manifests how the gods comprehend and denominate according to a definite cause the whole of a flowing essence ; but the second, how the gods bound in intellectual measures a life conversant with generation ; and the third, how they divide and permit in a separate manner a life separate from generation. And with respect to Xanthus, Aristotle relates, that the skin of the cattle that drank out of it was yellower than before ; and on this account perhaps the gods, who both produce and know the causes of all things, thus denominate it. But the apparent cause of its appellation perhaps was this, that its water passes through a drain made by the hand (*οτι διὰ τινος χειροποιήτου σκαφῆς διέρχεται το ὕδωρ αὐτοῦ*) ; and thus by men of superficial conceptions was called Scamander. Chalcis, perhaps, was so called from the shrill and canorous, like sharp sounding brass ; for thus certainly the Chaldæans call it, having heard this name from the gods. But Cymindis is from the leaping of the bird (*παρα τὴν σκιρτήσιν τοῦ ὀρνέου*) ; and Myrine, from the soul allotted that place from the gods. Lastly, Batieia perhaps was thus called, through the plant which abounds in it. In these too, we have the three-fold differences of divine and human knowledge ; the effi-

* See p. 500.

cacious and passive, in Xanthus and Scamander; the logical and physical, in Myrine and Bateia; and the enharmonic and unharmonic, in Chalcis and Cymindis.

That if the nature of the gods is unfigured, uncoloured, and unapparent, the dialectic work is not in them, but a thing of this kind is conversant with things that subsist in these inferior realms and about generation.

That of the gods, some are incorporeal, but others use bodies, and these such as are spherical: for the spherical figure is peculiarly adapted to things which are converted to themselves. But of dæmons some are good and divine, and have spheric vehicles; and others are material, and their vehicles are rectilinear.

With respect to our prayers, they are heard both by gods and dæmons, not externally; but both these comprehend in themselves causally our deliberative tendency to things in our power, and have a causal knowledge of our energies.

That there are Pans * with the feet of goats, such as was that which appeared to the courier Philippides, as he was passing over the mountain Parthenion; and also Minerva fawns using various forms, and proximately ruling above men; such as was the Minerva which appeared to Ulysses and Telemachus. But Panic and Minerva dæmons, and much more the gods themselves, are exempt from all such variety.

That it is not because dæmons are allotted certain forms, that the men who are under their guardian protection are allotted, both in common and peculiarly, different characteristic properties, as, for instance, the Scythians properties different from the Æthiopians, and one individual from another. But dæmons that preside over men comprehend all the variety of manners in simplicity, the mutation of figures in fæmefes, and the difference of motions in stable power.

That the names delivered by theologists by which the gods call things, are from the gods, and not from dæmons only. *For the things performed in the mysteries, are performed to the gods themselves, and not to the dæmons suspended from them.*

That the gods signify things to men, not requiring for this purpose corporeal organs, but fashioning the air according to their will: for the air being far more plastic than wax, receives the impressions of divine intelligence; which proceeds indeed from the gods with-

* After essential heroes, there is an order of souls who proximately govern the affairs of men, and are demouical *κατα σκετικ*, according to habitude, or alliance, but not essentially. Of this kind are the nymphs that sympathize with water, and the Pans now mentioned by Proclus.

out motion, but arrives to us through sound and mutation. For thus we say, that oracles are given by the gods, they not speaking, but using us as instruments, and filling the auditory sense with appropriate knowledge, without percussion and without contact. For they associate with each other through intellectual conceptions, and know what pertains to each other intellectually, but not sensibly.

That, as Homer says, the sun sees and hears all things, and the apparent gods have both a vivise and auditory sense, but not externally : for they contain in themselves, prior to wholes, the roots and the causes of all things.

That knowledge does not descend from on high without a medium, but through certain media. For, as in Homer *, the knowledge of the conversation between Jupiter and the Sun, descended to Ulysses through the archangelic Hermes and Calypso as media, so Helenus the prophet perceived the will of Apollo and Minerva, not indeed of the divinities who stand at the head of the Apolloniacal and Minerval series, but of those powers of this series that were proximate to him, and of a dæmoniacal characteristic.

That with respect to the names Aftyanax† and Hector, the philosopher, looking to the form and the thing signified, calls them similar ; but grammarians, directing their attention to the matter and the syllables, will say that they are dissimilar.

That it is necessary the founder of names should establish names looking to the forms of the things denominated. But this will become evident to him who looks to the universe. For as there are many psychical descents to this terrestrial abode, and different souls are disseminated according to different allotments, and engaged in different lives, and since among these some choose lives corresponding to those of their presiding and leading gods ; hence souls of this kind especially appear to venerate the names of their leaders. My meaning is this : souls that proceed from the Minerval series, and preserve unchanged the form of life adapted to this order, at the same time exhibit themselves by an energy and appellation corresponding to the idiom of the goddesses. But souls that descend indeed from this order, and yet choose a life by no means adapted to it, employ likewise foreign and casual names. Hence, as it appears to me, Bacchuses, Esculapiuses, Mercuries, and Herculefes, having the same names with their presiding gods, have pro-

* See the twelfth book of the *Odyssey*.

† See p. 501.

ceeded into these terrestrial places, accompanied with the inspiring influence of the gods, neither changing the form of the life, nor the appellation of their proper leaders. They say then, that Hercules, who was called Alcides by his mortal parents, was called Hercules by the Pythian deity, through his alliance to the Herculean order and divinity. For deity gives an appropriate name to man, looking to his whole series and life, which he produces into energy.

That it is requisite to consider the names of things borne along in generation, either by looking to all causes, as well such as are total, as those that are partial, as well those that are remote, as those that are proximate to generated natures; as, for instance, horse considered as a whole, and that which is proximate and corruptible; or it is necessary to consider them looking only to more excellent and perfect natures, which possess invariable rectitude, and which entirely rule over matter; and of this kind are universals. For when an ox is generated from an horse, the partial nature is subdued, and on this account a horse is not generated; but whole nature vanquishes, and on this account an ox is generated. For whence is the form of the ox derived, unless nature simply considered subdues. Hence Plato does not now simply call things of this kind, τερατα, but as it were τιρατα, as not being entirely contrary to nature.

That he who intends to etymologize ought to know, in the first place, the differences of dialects; and, in the second place, the use of the poets. In the third place, he must distinguish simple from composite names. In the fourth place, he must unfold names in a manner accommodated to things themselves. In the fifth place, it is necessary that he should observe the different use of names. In the sixth place, he ought to know the properties of words, such as apocopies, syncopies, ellipses, pleonasm, and the like. In the seventh place, he ought to know the idioms of the elements; for from these, as extremes, the rectitude of names and their alliance to things is demonstrated. In the eighth place, it is necessary that he should distinguish ambiguities, and such names as are homonymous; for the truth of names is retained through these. Further still, it is necessary to know names which deviate from their origin. And such is the critical knowledge which he who etymologizes ought to possess.

That Socrates now appropriately introduces the words *θεοφιλον** and *μνηστικον*, i. e. dear

* See p. 504.

to divinity, and mindful of divinity; for the alliance of souls to divinity is effected through the love of a divine nature, and the recollection of the hyparxis of deity; and to souls of this kind only does it belong to have paternal and intellectual names. But names, which are the offspring of generation, belong to those who embrace an indefinite and material life.

That names being two-fold, one kind belonging to things perpetual, which are established according to science, and another to things corruptible, and which are the subjects of doubt, it is not likely that fathers should have given their sons inauspicious names, such as Orestes, Atreus, Tantalus, nor is it probable that they foreknew what would be the life of their children in future: for the physiognomic art is attended with great obscurity, and especially when exercised on those that are just born. Of all these doubts, therefore, Socrates delivers to us most clear rules of solution: for men are unacquainted with the unapparent periods of souls, and the appetites (*ορεξεις*) which they possessed prior to generation, in which nearly the whole of actions is comprehended. Hence they are not judges of the rectitude of names coordinate to every form of life. Gods therefore and dæmons, who causally comprehend the powers and energies of souls, clearly know how to impose names adapted to the respective lives of souls. And as they distribute every other allotment to them according to their desert, so also their names. But since we every where consider fortune as the cause of the coordination of things which appear to be disordered, here also this is to be considered as the most proper principle. For fathers, looking to memory or hope, or something of this kind, give names to their children; but fortune gives them names after another manner, through a symphony with their lives. Agamemnon therefore called his son Orestes, not through rusticity of manners, but through impulse (*δια την ορμην*) and facility of motion (*ευκινηστων*), *παρα το ορουν* from *rushing*, or rather from *seeing* (*ορων*) in him such-like marks or tokens of nature; or from wishing that he might become a character of this kind. Fortune, however, after another manner, and more truly, allotted him this name: for it unfolds his whole life. Hence Socrates, from this cause, thinks fit to etymologize his name, but not from a mere human cause; for he saw that this accorded better with the thing. Much more therefore is fortune productive of the proximate cause of the rectitude of names; and when this proximate cause errs, nothing hinders the whole cause, which belongs to fortune, from acting rightly; since the same thing

takes place in nature. For when a partial nature acts rightly, whole nature much more acts with rectitude; but when a partial nature wanders from the mark, whole nature is nevertheless able to act with rectitude. Nor let any one think that this fortune is an irrational and indefinite cause: for its work looks to intellect. And a divine, or dæmoniacal power, leaves nothing destitute of its proper superintendence, but directs all, and the very last of our energies, to a good purpose, and to the order of the universe. For we are supernally moved from more excellent causes, who are able, from our essence, as if from the stern of a ship, to pilot all our concerns. Plato therefore introduces this as one cause of the right position of names; but he considers as another cause poets acting under the influence of divine inspiration, looking to the accidental actions of men, and through these as it were sagaciously analyzing and discovering their proper names. What then hinders but that poets, looking to the bold deed of Orestes towards his mother, may have called him Orestes, as *ορειον*, *mountainous*, and *savage* (*αγριον*), and without fruit (*ακαρπον*), as having cut off the principle of his proper generation; and that they should have delivered this name to the Greeks?

That Plato, in etymologizing, always first indicates by itself the thing signified; and afterwards that which is assimilated to the thing, and which subsists as a vestige of it in the syllables of the name. Thus in the name of Orestes* he first says, that it signifies *the savage and the rustic* (το θηριωδες, και το αγριον), and afterwards he adds, *το ορειον, the mountainous*, which subsists in the syllables. And in the name of Agamemnon, having first said that it signifies to labour and endure, he adds, he was therefore a good man, *δωκε την επιμονην*. And this he does in all the other names.

That Plato, in his etymologies, despising the matter, but being especially attentive to the form of names, says that the name Agamemnon† was composed from the admirable (*παρεν το αγαστον*), and not from the *too much* (*ου παρει το αγαν*). But grammarians, as paying attention mostly to the matter, and not seeing the form of life, very properly etymologize this name from the contrary.

That Plato indicates that our very being is in soul, and not in body, by looking to names from psychical idioms, and not from such as are corporeal.

That the divine Plato in what is here said assists us with respect to our morals, since

* See p. 504.

† See p. 505.

he delivers to us Orestes, Agamemnon, and Atreus, as men vehement, irascible, and avengers. But since the first of these sinned against his mother, and the last towards his children, hence they are very properly blamed. But Agamemnon is called by him admirable and praise-worthy, because he exerted his vehemence on the naturally hostile race of the Barbarians.

That the particulars respecting Pelops teach us, first, to despise appearances, and to look to the whole periods of souls; and to be remiss with respect to human affairs, but strenuous with respect to virtue and things divine. And, in the second place, they teach us that children partake of the punishment belonging to the crimes of their ancestors. For souls, through their coordination * with the unjust, become partakers of injustice; their bodies also consist from base feed; and their external concerns receive their beginning from crimes. Socrates in the Phædrus says, that the telestic art is able to purify these, liberating them from their present evils through the worship of divinity.

That the narration concerning Tantalus † obscurely signifies a soul elevated through contemplation to the intelligible (for the intelligible is the nutriment of the gods); but falling from the intelligible place to earth, and communicating his intellectual life which remains recently perfected (*νεοτελη*) with the multitude of the irrational nature. Hence he is said to be the son of Jupiter. For every recently-perfected soul falls from the court of Jupiter into generation; and on this account, Jupiter is the father of gods and men. Such a soul too, being enfolded with the evils which are here, and associating with images instead of realities, is said to suffer punishment in Hades; having much of the terrestrial, stony, and material suspended from its nature, through which its intellectual part is buried. It is likewise in want of all divine fruits, possessing the mere imaginations of them, and falling from the true and clear apprehension of them.

That the allotment of a certain name to a certain life is the work of the soul, but the general adoption of this name is from Fame. For Fame, according to Homer, is the angel of Jupiter.

That Socrates from divine names, which are statues of the gods, recurs analytically to

* The souls of such children, therefore, as are punished for the crimes of their parents, are, from their coordination, naturally allied to the disposition of their parents; and through this alliance become just objects of punishment.

† See p. 505.

the powers and energies of the gods: for he leaves their effences, as being ineffable and unknown, to be alone surveyed by the flower of intellect*.

That Jupiter is not *said to be*, but *is* the father of those who genuinely preserve the proper form of life, such as Hercules and the Dioscuri; but of those who are never at any time able to convert themselves to a divine nature, he never *is* nor is *said to be* the father. Such therefore as having been partakers of a certain energy above human nature, have again fallen into *the sea of dissimilitude*†, and for honour among men have embraced error towards the gods,—of these Jupiter is *said to be* the father.

That the paternal cause originates supernally from the intelligible and occult gods; for there the first fathers of wholes subsist; but it proceeds through all the intellectual gods into the demiurgic order. For Timæus celebrates this order, as at the same time *fabricative* and *paternal*; since he calls Jupiter the *demiurgus* and *father*. The fathers however who are superior to the one fabrication are called gods of gods, but the demiurgus is the father of gods and men. Further still, Jupiter is said to be *peculiarly* the father of some, as of Hercules, who immutably preserve a Jovian and ruling life during their converse with the realms of generation. Jupiter therefore is triply father, of gods, partial souls, and of souls that embrace an intellectual and Jovian life. The intellectual order of the gods, therefore, is supernally bounded by the king ‡ of the total divine genera, and who has a paternal transcendency with respect to all the intellectual gods. This king, according to Orpheus, is called by the blessed immortals that dwell on lofty Olympus, Phanes Protogonus. But this order proceeds through the three Nights, and the celestial orders into the Titanic or Saturnian series, where it first separates itself from the fathers, and changes the kingdom of the *Synoches*§, for a distributive government of wholes, and unfolds every demiurgic genus of the gods, from all the above-mentioned ruling and royal causes, but proximately from Saturn the leader of the Titanic orders. Prior however to other fabricators (*δημιουργοι*) it unfolds Jupiter, who is allotted the unical strength of the whole demiurgic series, and who produces and gives subsistence to

* That is, by the summit, or *one* of our nature, through which we become united with divinity.

† Plato, in the *Politicus*, thus calls the realms of generation, i. e. the whole of a visible nature.

‡ That is, intelligible intellect, the extremity of the intelligible order.

§ That is, the divinities who compose the middle of that order of gods, which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

all unapparent and apparent natures. And he is indeed intellectual according to the order in which he ranks, but he produces the species and the genera of beings into the order of sensibles. He is likewise filled with the gods above himself, but imparts from himself a progression into being to all mundane natures. Hence Orpheus* represents him fabricating every celestial race, making the sun and moon, and the other starry gods, together with the sublunary elements, and diversifying the latter with forms, which before had a disordered subsistence. He likewise represents him presiding over the gods who are distributed about the whole world, and who are suspended from him; and in the character of a legislator assigning distributions of providence in the universe, according to desert, to all the mundane gods. Homer too, following Orpheus, celebrates him as the common father of gods and men, as leader and king, and as the supreme of rulers. He also says that all the multitude of mundane gods is collected about him, abides in and is perfected by him. For all the mundane gods are converted to Jupiter through Themis,

Ζεὺς δὲ θεμίστα κέλευσε θεούς, αἰγὼν δὲ καλεῖσθαι

—— ἐδ' αἶραι παντὶ

Φοιτῆσασα κέλευσε Δίος πρὸς δαμα κεεῖναι.

i. e. "But Jupiter orders Themis to call the gods to council; and she directing her course every where, commands them to go to the house of Jupiter†." All of them therefore are excited according to the one will of Jupiter, and become *Δίος εἶδον* ‡, *within Jupiter*, as the poet says. Jupiter too, again separates them within himself, according to two coordinations, and excites them to providential energies about secondary natures; he at the same time, as Timæus says, abiding after his accustomed manner,

Ὡς ἐφατο κρονίδης πολέμον δ' ἀλυσστον εἰρῆνιν §.

i. e. "Thus spoke Saturnian Jupiter, and excited inevitable war." Jupiter however is

* As what is here said from Orpheus concerning Jupiter is very remarkable, and is no where else to be found, I give the original for the sake of the learned reader. Δίῳ καὶ Ὀρφεὺς δημιουργοῦντα μὲν αὐτὸν τὴν οὐρανίαν πᾶσαν γένεαν παραδίδωσι, καὶ γλῶσιν ποιοῦντα καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρους θεούς· δημιουργοῦντα δὲ τὰ ὑποσέλην στοιχεῖα, καὶ διακρίνοντα τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἀτακτῶς ἔχοντα πρότερον· σείρας δ' ἐφίσταντα θεῶν περὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνέχτημενας, καὶ διαθεσμοθετοῦντα πᾶσι τοῖς ἐγκοσμίῳ θεοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκνομίας τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ κρονίας.

† *Iliad*. xx. v. 4.

‡ See the 14th line.

§ *Ibid*. v. 32.

separate

separate and exempt from all mundane natures; whence also the most total and leading of the other gods, though they appear to have in a certain respect equal authority with Jupiter, through a progression from the same causes, yet call him father. For both Neptune and Juno celebrate him by this appellation. And though Juno speaks to him as one who is of the same order,

Και γὰρ ἐγὼ θεὸς εἰμὶ· γένος δὲ μοι ἐνθεν ὄθεν σοι

Καὶ με πρεσβυτάτην τέκετο κρονὸς ἀγκυλομήτης*.

i. e. "For I also am a divinity, and Saturn of inflected council endowed me with the greatest dignity, when he begat me." And though Neptune says,

Τρεῖς γὰρ τ' ἐκ κρονου εἰμεν ἀδελφοί, οὓς τέκε Ρέη,

Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Αἰδῶς ἐνεροισιν ἀνασσών†.

i. e. "For we are three brothers from Saturn, whom Rhea bore, Jupiter and I, and the third is Pluto, who governs the infernal realms." Yet Jupiter is called father by both these divinities; and this because he comprehends in himself the one and impartible cause of all fabrication; is prior to the Saturnian triad†; connectedly contains the three fathers; and comprehends on all sides the vivification of Juno. Hence, at the same time that this goddess gives animation to the universe, he also together with other gods gives subsistence to souls. Very properly therefore do we say that the demiurgus in the *Timæus* is the mighty Jupiter. For he it is who produces mundane intellects and souls, who adorns all bodies with figures and numbers, and inserts in them one union, and an indissoluble friendship and bond. For Night also in *Orpheus* advises Jupiter to employ things of this kind in the fabrication of the universe,

Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶν δεσμον κρατερόν περὶ πασι τανύτης*

i. e. But when your power around the whole has spread

A strong coercive bond.——

The proximate bond indeed of mundane natures, is that which subsists through analogy;

* *Iliad*. iv. 58.

† *Iliad*. xv. v. 187.

‡ For the Saturnian triad belongs to that order of gods which is called supermundane, and which immediately subsists after the intellectual order; so that the Jupiter who ranks at the summit of this triad is different from and inferior to the demiurgus.

but

but the more perfect bond is derived from intellect and soul. Hence Timæus calls the communion of the elements through analogy, and the indissoluble union from life, a bond: for he says animals were generated bound with animated bonds. But a more venerable bond than these subsists from the demiurgic will, "For my will," says Jupiter in the Timæus, "is a greater and more principle bond," &c.

Firmly adhering, therefore, to this conception respecting the mighty Jupiter, viz. that he is the demiurgus and father of the universe, that he is an all-perfect imparticipable* intellect, and that he fills all things both with other goods, and with life, let us survey how from names Socrates unfolds the mystic truth concerning this divinity. Timæus then says that it is difficult to know the essence of the demiurgus, and Socrates now says, that it is not easy to understand his name, which manifests his power and energy.

That our soul knows partly, the impartible nature of the energy of the gods, and that which is characterized by unity in this energy, in a multiplied manner: and this especially takes place about the demiurgus, who expands intellectual forms, and calls forth intelligible causes, and evolves them to the fabrication of the universe. For Parmenides characterizes him by sameness and difference. According to Homer two tubs are placed near him; and the most mystic tradition, and the oracles of the gods, say that the duad is seated with him. For thus they speak: "He possesses both; containing intelligibles in intellect, but introducing sense to the worlds." These oracles likewise call him *twice beyond*, and *twice there* (δὲς πρὸς ἐκείνους, καὶ δὲς ἐκεῖ), and, in short, they celebrate him through the duad. For the demiurgus comprehends in himself unitedly every thing *prolific* †, and which gives subsistence to mundane natures. Very properly therefore is his name two-fold, of which διὰ manifests *the cause through which*, and this is paternal goodness; but ζῆναι signifies *vivification*, the first causes of which in the universe the demiurgus unically comprehends. The former, too, is a symbol of the Saturnian and paternal series; but the latter of the vivific and maternal Rhea. So far likewise as Jupiter receives the whole of Saturn, he gives subsistence to a triple essence, the impartible, the partible, and that which subsists between these; but according to the Rhea which he contains in himself, he scatters, as from a fountain, intellectual, psychical, and corporeal life. But by his demiurgic powers and energies, he

* That is, he is not an intellect consubstant with soul.

† And the duad, considered as a divine form or idea, is the source of fecundity.

gives a formal subsistence to these and separates them from forms of a prior order, and from each other. He is also the ruler and king of all things; and is exempt from the three demiurgi. For they, as Socrates says in the *Gorgias*, divide the kingdom of their father; but Jupiter, the demiurgus, at once without division reigns over the three, and unically governs them.

He is therefore the cause of the paternal triad, and of all fabrication; but he connectedly contains the three demiurgi. And he is a *king* indeed, as being coordinated with the fathers; but a *ruler*, as being proximately established above the demiurgic triad, and comprehending the uniform cause of it. Plato, therefore, by considering his name in two ways, evinces that images receive partly the unical causes of paradigms, and that this is adapted to him who establishes the intellectual duad in himself. For he gives subsistence to two-fold orders, the celestial and the supercelestial; whence also the theologist Orpheus says, that his sceptre consists of four and twenty measures, as ruling over a two-fold twelve*.

That the soul of the world gives life to alternative natures; for to these it becomes the fountain and principle of motion, as Plato says in the *Phædrus* and *Laws*. But the demiurgus simply imparts to all things life divine, intellectual, psychical, and that which is divisible about bodies. No one however should think that the gods in their generations of secondary natures are diminished; or that they sustain a division of their proper essence in giving subsistence to things subordinate; or that they expose their progeny to the view, externally to themselves in the same manner as the causes of mortal offspring. Nor, in short, must we suppose that they generate with motion or mutation, but that, abiding in themselves, they produce by their very essence posterior natures, comprehend on all sides their progeny, and supernally perfect the productions and energies of their offspring. Nor again, when it is said that gods are the sons of more total gods, must it be supposed that they are disjoined from more ancient causes, and are cut off from a union with them; or that they receive the idiom of their hyparxis through motion, and an indefiniteness converting itself to bound. For there is nothing irrational and without

* The twelve gods who first subsist in the *liberated* or *supercelestial* order, and who are divided into four triads, are Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan; Vesta, Minerva, Mars; Ceres, Juno, Diana; and Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The first of these triads is *fabricative*; the second, *defensive*; the third, *vivific*; and the fourth, *measuring*.

measure, in the natures superior to us. But we must conceive that their progressions are effected through similitude; and that there is one communion of essence, and an indivisible continuity of powers and energies between the sons of gods and their fathers; all those gods that rank in the second order being established in such as are more ancient; and the more ancient imparting much of perfection, vigour, and efficacious production to the subordinate. And after this manner we must understand that Jupiter is said to be the son of Saturn. For Jupiter being the demiurgic intellect, proceeds from another intellect, superior and more uniform, which increases indeed its proper intellects, but converts the multitude of them to union; and multiplies its intellectual powers, but elevates their all-various evolutions to impartible sameness. Jupiter, therefore, proximately establishing a communion with this divinity, and being filled from him with total intellectual good, is very properly said to be the son of Saturn, both in hymns and invocations, as unfolding into light that which is occult, expanding that which is contracted, and dividing that which is impartible in the Saturnian monad; and as emitting a second more partial kingdom, instead of that which is more total, a demiurgic instead of a paternal dominion, and an empire which proceeds every where instead of that which stably abides in itself.

Why does Socrates apprehend the name of king Saturn* to be *ὑβριστικόν*, *insolent*, and looking to what does he assert this? We reply, that according to the poets *Satiety* (*κορος*) is the cause of *insolence*; for they thus denominate immoderation and repletion; and they say that *Satiety* brought forth *Insolence* (*ὑβριν φασιν τικτεῖ κορος*). He, therefore, who looks without attention to the name of Saturn, will consider it as signifying *insolence*. For to him who suddenly hears it, it manifests satiety and repletion. Why, therefore, since a name of this kind is expressive of insolence, do we not pass it over in silence, as not being auspicious and adapted to the gods? May we not say that the royal series†

of

* See p. 506.

† This royal series consists of Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, Bacchus. "Antient theologists," says Syrianus (in his Commentary on the 14th book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*), "assert that Night and Heaven reigned, and prior to these the mighty father of Night and Heaven, who distributed the world to gods and mortals, and who first possessed royal authority, the illustrious *Ericapæus* :

Τοιον ελων διενειμα θεοις, θνητοισι δε ποσμον
Ου πρωτος βασιλευε περικλυτος ηρικεπαιος.

of the gods, beginning from Phanes, and ending in Bacchus, and producing the same sceptre supernally, as far as to the last kingdom; Saturn being allotted the fourth royal order, appears, according to the fabulous pretext, differently from the other kings, to have received the sceptre insolently from Heaven, and to have given it to Jupiter? For Night receives the sceptre from Phanes; Heaven derives from Night the dominion over wholes; and Bacchus, who is the last king of the gods, receives the kingdom from Jupiter. For the father (Jupiter) establishes him in the royal throne, puts into his hand the sceptre, and makes him the king of all the mundane gods. "Hear me, ye gods, I place over you a king."

ΚΛΥΤΕ ΘΕΟΙ ΤΟΝ Δ' ΥΜΜΙΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ ΤΙΘΗΜΙ

says Jupiter to the junior gods. But Saturn alone, perfectly deprives Heaven of the kingdom, and concedes dominion to Jupiter, cutting and being cut off as the fable says. Plato, therefore, seeing this succession, which in Saturn is called by theologists *insolent* (υβριστική), thought it worth while to mention the appearance of insolence in the name; that from this he might evince the name is adapted to the god, and that it bears an image of the insolence which is ascribed to him in fables. At the same time he teaches us to refer mythical devices to the truth concerning the gods, and the apparent absurdity which they contain, to scientific conceptions.

That *the great*, when ascribed to the gods, must not be considered as belonging to

Night succeeded Ericapaus, in the hands of whom she has a septre :

ΣΚΕΠΤΡΟΝ ΕΧΟΥΣ' ΕΝ ΧΕΡΣΙΝ ΕΡΙΚΕΠΑΙΟΥ.

To Night, Heaven succeeded, who first reigned over the gods after mother Night :

Ος ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΘΕΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ ΝΥΚΤΑ.

Chaos transcends the habitude of sovereign dominion : and, with respect to Jupiter, the Oracles given to him by Night manifestly call him not the first, but the fifth immortal king of the gods :

ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΑ ΘΕΩΝ ΠΕΜΠΤΟΝ ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ.

According to these theologists, therefore, that principle which is most eminently the first, is *the one* or *the good*, after which, according to Pythagoras, are those two principles Æther and Chaos, which are superior to the possession of sovereign dominion. In the next place succeed the first and occult genera of the gods, in which first shines forth the father and king of all wholes, and whom, on this account, they call *Phanes*."

interval,

interval, but as subsisting intellectually, and according to the power of cause, but not according to partible transcendency. But why does Plato now call Saturn *διανοία*, the dianoëtic part of the soul? May we not say, that it is because he looks to the multitude of intellectual conceptions in him, the orders of intelligibles, and the evolution of forms which he contains; since also in the *Timæus* he represents the demiurgic intellect as reasoning, and making the world, dianoëticallly energizing; and this in consequence of looking to his partible and divided intellections, according to which he fabricates not only wholes but parts? When Saturn however is called intellect, Jupiter has the order of the dianoëtic part: and when again, Saturn is called the dianoëtic part, we must say that he is so called according to analogy with reference to a certain other intellect of a higher order. Whether therefore you are willing to speak of intelligible and occult intellect, or of that which unfolds into light (*εκφαντορικος νους*), or of that which connectedly contains (*συνεκτικος νους*), or of that which imparts perfection* (*τελεστιουργος νους*), Saturn will be as the dianoëtic part to all these: for he produces united intellection into multitude, and fills himself wholly with excited intelligibles. Whence also he is said to be the leader of the Titanic race, and the source of all-various separation and diversifying power. And perhaps Plato here primarily delivers two-fold interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Jamblichus and Amelius afterwards adopted. For the one interprets this name from the Titans extending their powers to all things; but the other from *something infertile* (*παρὰ το τι ατομον*), because the division and separation of wholes into parts receives [its] beginning from the Titans. Socrates, therefore, now indicates both these interpretations, by asserting of the king of the Titans, that he is a *certain great dianoëtic power*. For the term *great* is a symbol of power pervading to all things; but the term *a certain*, of power proceeding to the most partial natures.

That the name Saturn is now triply analyzed, of which the first asserting this god to be the plenitude of intellectual good, and to be the satiety of a divine intellect, from its conveying an image of the satiety and repletion which are reprobated by the many, is ejected as insolent. The second also, which exhibits the imperfect and the puerile, is in

* Of these intellects, the first is Phanes, the second Heaven, the third Earth, and the fourth the Sub-celestial Arch, which is celebrated in the *Phædrus*, viz. *νους νοητος ο φανης, εκφαντορικος νους ο ουρανιος, συνεκτικος νους η γη, τελεστιουργος δε νους η υπ' ουρανιος αψις*.

like manner rejected. But the third, which celebrates this god as full of purity, and as the leader of undefiled intelligence, and an undeviating life, is approved. For king Saturn is intellect, and the supplier of all intellectual life; but he is an intellect exempt from coordination with sensibles, immaterial and separate, and converted to himself. He likewise converts his progeny, and after producing them into light, again embodies and firmly establishes them in himself. For the demiurgus of the universe, though he is a divine intellect, yet he orderly arranges sensibles, and provides for subordinate natures. But the mighty Saturn is essentialized in separate intellection, and which transcend wholes. "For the fire which is beyond the first," says the Oracle, "does not incline its power downwards." But the demiurgus is suspended and proceeds from Saturn, being himself an intellect subsisting about an immaterial intellect, energizing about it as the intelligible, and producing that which is occult in it, into the apparent. For the maker of the world is an intellect of intellect. And it appears to me, that as Saturn is the summit of those gods that are properly called intellectual, he is intellect as with reference to the intelligible genus of gods. For all the intellectual adhere to the intelligible genus of gods, and are conjoined with them through intellections. "Ye who understand the supermundane paternal profundity," says the Hymn to them. But Saturn is intelligible, with reference to all the intellectual gods. *Purity*, therefore, indicates this impartible and imparticipable transcendence of Saturn. For the not coming into contact with matter, the impartible, and an exemption from habitude, are signified by purity. Such indeed is the transcendence of this god with respect to all coordination with things subordinate, and such his undefiled union with the intelligible, that he does not require a Curetic guard, like Rhea, Jupiter, and Proserpine. For all these, through their progressions into secondary natures, require the immutable defence of the Curetes. But Saturn being firmly established in himself, and hastily withdrawing himself from all subordinate natures, is established above the guardianship of the Curetes. He contains however the cause of these uniformly in himself: for this purity, and the undefiled which he possesses, give subsistence to all the progressions of the Curetes. Hence, in the Oracles, he is said to comprehend the first fountain of the Amilioti, and to ride on all the others. "The intellect of the father riding on attenuated rulers, they become resplendent with the furrows of inflexible and implacable fire."

Νους πατρός αἰρείαις ἐποχουμένοις ἰδυτηρίσιν
 Ἀκναμπτοῦ ἀστραπτουσιν ἀμείλικτου πυρός ὀλκίαις.

He is therefore *pure intellect*, as giving subsistence to the undefiled order, and as being the leader of the whole intellectual series.

Αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἐκβρωσκανσιν ἀμείλικτοι τέ κερκῆνοι,
 Καὶ περὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ κολποὶ παμφεγγεὸς ἀλκῆς
 Πατρογενούς Ἑκάτης, καὶ ὑπεζῶκος πυρός ἀνθος,
 Ἡδὲ κραταῖον πνεῦμα πολλῶν πυρίων ἐπεκείνω.

i. e. "From him leap forth the implacable thunders, and the preter-capacious bosoms of the all-splendid strength of the father-begotten Hecate, together with the envired flower of fire, and the strong spirit which is beyond the fiery poles."

For he convolves all the hebdomad of the fountains*, and gives subsistence to it, from his unical and intelligible summit. For he is, as the Oracle says, *αμστυλλενος*, uncut into fragments, uniform, and undistributed, and connectedly contains all the fountains, converting and uniting all of them to himself, and being separate from all things with immaculate purity. Hence he is *κορονος*, as an immaterial and pure intellect, and as establishing himself in the paternal silence. He is also celebrated as the father of fathers. Saturn therefore is a father, and intelligible, as with reference to the intellectual gods.

That every intellect either abides, and is then intelligible, as being better than motion; or it is moved, and is then intellectual; or it is both, and is then intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. The first of these is Phanes; the second, which is alone moved, is Saturn; and the third, which is both moved and permanent, is Heaven.

That Saturn, from his impartible, unical, paternal, and beneficent subsistence in the intellectual orders, has been considered by some as the same with the one cause of all things. He is however only analogous to this cause, just as Orpheus calls the first cause *Time* (*χρονος*), nearly homonymously with Saturn (*χρονος*). But the oracles of the gods

* That is, of the whole intellectual order, which consists of Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, the three Curetes, and the separating monad Ocean.

characterize

characterize this deity by the epithet of *the once* (τὴν ἁπαλάν); calling him *once beyond* (ἁπλᾶς ἐπέκεινα). For *the once* is allied to *the one*.

That *Heaven**, the father of Saturn, is an intellect, understanding himself indeed, but united to the first intelligibles; in which he is also firmly established; and connectedly contains all the intellectual orders, by abiding in intelligible union. This god too is *connective*, just as Saturn is of a *separating* idiom; and on this account he is *father*. For connecting precede separating causes; and the intelligible and at the same time intellectual, such as are intellectual only. Whence also *Heaven* being the *Synochus* (συνωχέυς) of wholes, according to one union, gives subsistence to the Titanic series, and prior to this, to other orders of the gods; some of which abide only in him, which he retains in himself, but others both abide and proceed, which he is said to have concealed, after they were unfolded into light. And after all these, he gives subsistence to those divine orders, which proceed into the universe, and are separated from their father. For he produces two-fold monads, and triads, and hebdomads, equal in number to the monads. These things however will be investigated more fully elsewhere. But this deity is denominated according to the similitude of the apparent Heaven. For each of them compresses and connects all the multitude which it contains, and causes the sympathy and connection of the whole world to be one. For connection is second to unifying power, and proceeds from it. In the *Phædrus* therefore Plato delivers to us the production of all secondary natures by Heaven, and shows us how this divinity leads upwards and convolves all things to the intelligible. He likewise teaches us what its summit is, what the profundity of its whole order, and what the boundary of the whole of its progression. Here therefore, investigating the truth of things from names, he declares its energy with respect to things more elevated and simple, and which are arranged nearer to *the one*. He also clearly appears here to consider the order of Heaven as intelligible, and at the same time intellectual. For if it sees things on high, it energizes intellectually, and there is prior to it the intelligible genus of gods, to which looking it is intellectual; just as it is intelligible to the natures which proceed from it. What then are the things on high which it beholds? Is it not evident that they are the supercelestial place, an essence without colour, without figure, and without

* See p. 507.

the touch, and all the intelligible extent? An extent comprehending, as Plato would say, intelligible animals, the one cause of all eternal natures, and the occult principles of these; but as the followers of Orpheus would say, bounded by Æther upwards, and by Phanes downward. For all between these two gives completion to the intelligible order. But Plato now calls this both singularly and plurally; since all things are there united, and at the same time each is separated peculiarly; and this according to the highest union and separation.

With respect to the term *μετεωρολογoi*, i. e. *those who discourse on sublime affairs**, we must now consider it in a manner adapted to those who choose an anagogic life, who live intellectually, and who do not gravitate to earth, but sublimely tend to a theoretic life. For that which is called Earth there, maternally gives subsistence to such things as Heaven, which is coordinate to that Earth, produces paternally. And he who energizes there, may be properly called *μετεωρολογος*, or, *one who discourses about things on high*. Heaven therefore being of a *connelive* nature, is expanded above the Saturnian orders, and all the intellectual series; and produces from himself all the Titannic race; and prior to this, the perfective and defensive orders; and, in short, is the leader of every good to the intellectual gods. Plato therefore having celebrated Saturn for his intelligence, which is without habitude to mundane natures, and for his life which is converted to his own exalted place of survey, now celebrates Heaven for another more perfect energy: for to be conjoined to more elevated natures, is a greater good than to be converted to oneself. Let no one, however, think that, on this account, the above-mentioned energies are distributed in the gods; as, for instance, that there is providence alone in Jupiter, a conversion alone to himself in Saturn, and an elevation alone to the intelligible in Heaven. For Jupiter no otherwise provides for mundane natures than by looking to the intelligible; since, as Plato says in the *Timæus*, intellect understanding ideas in animal itself, thought it requisite that as many, and such as it there perceived, should be contained in the universe; but, as Orpheus† says, with a divinely inspired mouth, “Jupiter swallows his progenitor Phanes, embofoms all his powers, and becomes

* See p. 507.

† Ως δ' Ὀρφεὺς εὐθεὶ στόματι λέγει, καὶ καταπίνει τὸν προγονὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν φαίντα, καὶ ἐγκλιζέται πάσας αὐτοῦ τὰς δυνάμεις ὁ ζεὺς, καὶ γίνεται πάντα νοερώς, ὅσπερ ἡν ἐκεῖνος νοητῶς.

all things intellectuallly which Phœbus is intelligibly." Saturn also imparts to Jupiter the principles of fabrication, and of providential attention to sensibles, and understanding himself, he becomes united to first intelligibles, and is filled with the goods which are thence derived. Hence also the theologist (Orpheus) says, "that he was nursed by Night *." If therefore the intelligible is nutriment, Saturn is replete not only with the intelligibles coordinated with him, but also with the highest and occult intelligences. Heaven himself also fills all secondary natures with his proper goods, but guards all things by his own most vigorous powers; and the father supernally committed to him the connecting and guarding the causes of eternal animal. But he intellectuallly perceives himself, and is converted to the intelligibles which he contains; and this his intelligence, Plato, in the Phædrus, calls *circulation*. For as that which is moved in a circle is moved about its own centre, so Heaven energizes about its own intelligible, according to intellectuall circulation. But all the gods subsisting in all, and each possessing all energizes, one transcends more in this, and another in a different energy, and each is particularly characterized according to that in which it transcends. Thus Jupiter is characterized by providence, and hence his name is now thus analyzed; but Saturn, by a conversion to himself, whence also he is *inflected counsel*, ἀγκυλομητης; and Heaven by habitude to things more excellent, from which also he receives his appellation. For his giving subsistence to a pure and the Saturnian intellect, represents his energy to the other part. But as there are many powers in Heaven, such as the connective, guardian, and convertive, you will find that this name is appropriately adapted to all these. For the connective is signified through bounding the intellectuall gods; since the connective bounds the multitude which he contains. The power which guards wholes subsists through the termination and security of an intellectuall essence. And the convertive power subsists through converting, seeing, and intellectuallly energizing natures, to things on high. But all these are adapted to Heaven. For there is no fear that the gods will be dissipated, and that on this account they require connective causes, or that they will sustain mutation, and that on this account they stand in need of the saving aid of guardian causes; but now Socrates at once manifests all the powers of Heaven, through convertive energy. For this is to behold things on high, to be con-

* Διο και τρεφεσθαι φησιν αυτον ο βιολογος υπο της νυκτος· "ἐκ πάντων δὲ κρονὸν νύξ ἐτρέφει καὶ ἀνιταλάει·"

verted to them, and through this to be connected and defended. And it appears to me that Heaven possesses this idiom according to analogy to the intelligible eternity, and the intelligible wholeness. For Timæus particularly characterizes eternity by this, viz. by abiding in the one prior to it, and by being established in the summit of intelligibles; and Socrates says, that Heaven surveys things on high, viz. the supercelestial place, and such things as are comprehended in the god-nourished silence of the fathers (*καὶ οὕτως ὁ Σοφορῆμμιον σιγῇ περιεληπταὶ τῶν πατέρων*). As therefore Parmenides signifies each of these orders through *wholeness*, the one through intelligible, and the other through intellectual wholeness; in like manner both Timæus and Socrates characterize them by a conversion to more excellent natures. But the conversion as well as the wholeness is different. For that of eternity is intelligible, on which account Timæus does not say that it looks to its intelligible, but only that it stably abides. But the conversion of Heaven is intellectual, and on this account Socrates says, that it sees things on high, and through this converts, guards, and connects all things posterior to itself. Whence also, in the Phædrus, it is said, by the circulation of itself, to lead all things to the supercelestial place, and the summit of the first intelligibles.

That there being three fathers and kings of which Socrates here makes mention, Saturn alone appears to have received the government from his father, and to have transmitted it to Jupiter by violence. Mythologists therefore celebrate the sections of Heaven and Saturn. But the cause of this is, that Heaven is of the connective, Saturn of the Titannic, and Jupiter of the demiurgic order. Again, the Titannic genus rejoices in separations and differences, progressions and multiplications of powers. Saturn therefore, as a dividing god, separates his kingdom from that of Heaven; but as a pure intellect, he is exempt from a fabricative energy proceeding into matter. Hence also the demiurgic genus is again separated from him. Section therefore is on both sides of him. For so far as he is a Titan, he is cut off from the connective causes, but so far as he does not give himself to material fabrication, he is cut off from the demiurgus Jupiter.

That with respect to the supercelestial place, to which Heaven extends his intellectual life, some characterize it by ineffable symbols; but others, after giving it a name, celebrate it as unknown, neither being able to speak of its form or figure. And proceed-

ing somewhat higher than this, they have been able to manifest the boundary * of the intelligible gods by name alone. But the natures which are beyond this, they signify through analogy alone, these natures being ineffable and incomprehensible. Since that god who closes the paternal order, is said by the wife to be the only deity among the intelligible gods, that is denominated: and theurgy ascends as far as to this order. Since therefore the natures prior to Heaven, are allotted such a transcendence of uniform subsistence, that some of them are said to be effable, and at the same time ineffable; known, and at the same time unknown, through their alliance to *the one*, Socrates very properly restrains the discourse about them, in consequence of names not being able to represent their hyparxes; and, in short, because it requires a certain wonderful employment, to separate the effable and ineffable, of their hyparxis and power. He accuses therefore his memory, not as disbelieving in the fables, which assert, that there are certain more antient causes beyond Heaven, nor as not thinking it worth while to mention them. For in the Phædrus he himself celebrates the supercelestial place. But he says this, because the first of beings cannot become known by the exercise of memory, and through phantasy, or opinion, or the dianoëtic part. For we are alone naturally adapted to be conjoined to them, with the flower of intellect and the hyparxis of our essence; and through these we receive the sensation of their unknown nature. Socrates therefore says, that what in them is exempt, both from our gnostic and recollective life, is the cause of our inability to give them a name; for they are not naturally adapted to be known through names. Theologists likewise would not remotely signify them, and through the analogy of things apparent to them, if they could be named, and apprehended by knowledge.

That Homer † does not ascend beyond the Saturnian order, but evincing that Saturn is the proximate cause of the demiurgus, he calls Jupiter, who is the demiurgus, the son of Saturn. He also calls the divinities coordinate with him, Juno, Neptune, and Mars; and he denominates Jupiter the father of men and gods. But he does not in-

* That is Phanes, intelligible intellect, or in the language of Plato, *αυτογνων*, animal itself.

† Homer however appears to have ascended as far as to the goddess *Night*, or the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. See the extracts from Damascius, in the additional notes to the Parmenides.

roduce Saturn, as either energizing, or saying any thing, but as truly *αγκυλωμενης*, in consequence of being converted to himself.

That Orpheus greatly availed himself of the license of fables, and manifests every thing prior to Heaven by names, as far as to the first cause. He also denominates the ineffable, who transcends the intelligible unities, *Time*; whether because *Time* preexists as the cause of all generation, or because, as delivering the generation of true beings, he thus denominates the ineffable, that he may indicate the order of true beings, and the transcendency of the more total to the more partial; that a subsistence according to Time may be the same with a subsistence according to cause; in the same manner as generation with an arranged progression. But Hesiod venerates many of the divine natures in silence, and does not, in short, name the first. For that what is posterior to the first proceeds from something else, is evident from the verse,

“Chaos of all things was the first produced,”

For it is perfectly impossible that it could be produced without a cause; but he does not say what that is which gave subsistence to Chaos. He is silent indeed with respect to both the fathers * of intelligibles, the exempt, and the coordinate; for they are perfectly ineffable. And with respect to the two coordinations, the natures which are coordinate with the one, he passes by in silence, but those alone which are coordinate with the indefinite duad, he unfolds through genealogy. And on this account Plato now thinks Hesiod deserves to be mentioned, for passing by the natures prior to Heaven, as being ineffable. For this also is indicated concerning them by the Oracles, which likewise add, “they possess mystic silence,” *σιγ' εχε μυστικα*. And Socrates himself, in the Phædrus, calls the intellectual perception of them, *μυησις* and *εποπτεια*, in which nearly the whole business is ineffable and unknown.

That, as a discourse concerning the gods is triple, viz. phantastic, like that of Euthyphro†, who irrationally imagined battles and stratagems among the gods; scientific, like that of Socrates; and doxastic, which subsists between these, and which, from the opinion of the founder of names, scientifically rises to the essence of the gods;—hence Socrates, perceiving that the conceptions of the multitude about the gods were equally

* That is to say, the first cause, and bound, which is called by Orpheus, *Æther*.

† For the character of Euthyphro, see the dialogue which bears his name. See also p. 507 of the Cratylus.

depraved with those of Euthyphro, descends from a scientific energy to inferior concerns, but at the same time elevates those who are detained by phantasy to a middle habit of apprehension concerning the gods. Hence, he ascribes the cause of this descent in speculation to Euthyphro; not considering him as the leader of this knowledge, but as one who, through the phantastically prodigious nature of his discourse, excites to the scientific investigation of truth.

That every where, the extremities of a prior, are conjoined with the summits of a secondary order. Thus, for instance, our master Hermes (ὁ δεσποτῆς ἡμῶν ἑρμῆς), being an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a god. But Plato calls the whole extent between gods and men, dæmons; and they indeed are dæmons by nature. Those dæmons however that are now* mentioned, together with the demigods heroes, are not dæmons and heroes by nature, for they do not always follow the gods; but they are only so from habitude, being souls who naturally deliver themselves to generation, such as was the great Hercules, and others of the like kind. But the peculiarity of heroic souls is magnitude of operation, the elevated and the magnificent; and such heroes it is necessary to honour, and to perform funeral rites to their memory, conformably to the exhortation of the Athenian guest. This heroic genus of souls therefore does not always follow the gods, but is undefiled and more intellectual than other souls. And it descends indeed for the benefit of the life of men, as partaking of a destiny inclining downwards; but it has much of an elevated nature, and which is properly liberated from matter. Hence souls of this kind are easily led back to the intelligible world, in which they live for many periods; while, on the contrary, the more irrational kind of souls are either never led back, or this is accomplished with great difficulty, or continues for a very inconsiderable period of time.

That each of the gods is perfectly exempt from secondary natures, and the first, and more total of dæmons are likewise established above a habitude of this kind. They employ however terrestrial and partial spirits† in the generations of some of the human race;

not

* See p. 508.

† Some of these spirits, according to Porphyry, are subject to the power of evil dæmons, as is evident from the following passage, preserved by Augustin:

“Sunt spiritus terreni minimi loco terreno quodam malorum dæmonum potestati subjecti. Ab his sapientes Hebræorum ——— * * (vid. August.) sicut audivisti divina Apollonis oracula quæ superius dicta

not physically mingling with mortals, but moving nature, perfecting its power, expanding the path of generation, and removing all impediments. Fables therefore, through the similitude of appellation, conceal the things themselves. For spirits of this kind are similarly denominated with the gods, the leading causes of their series. Hence they say, either that gods have connexion with women, or men with goddesses. But if they were willing to speak plainly and clearly, they would say that Venus, Mars, Thetis, and the other divinities, produce their respective series, beginning from on high, as far as to the last of things; each of which series comprehends in itself many essences differing from each other; such as the angelical, dæmoniacal, heroical, nymphical, and the like. The lowest powers therefore of these orders, have much communion with the human race:

dicta sunt. Ab his ergo *Hebræi* dæmonibus pessimis et minoribus spiritibus vetabant religiosos, et ipsis vacare prohibebant: venerari autem magis cælestes deos, amplius autem venerari deum patrem. Hoc autem et dii præcipiunt, et in superioribus ostendimus, quemadmodum animadvertere ad deum monent, et illum colere ubique imperant. Verum indocti et impiæ naturæ, quibus vere fatum non concessit a diis dona obtinere, neque habere Jovis immortalis notionem, non audientes deos et divinos viros; deos quidem omnes recusaverunt, prohibitos autem dæmones non solum nullis odiis insequi, sed etiam revereri delegerunt. Deum autem simulantes se colere, ea sola per quæ deus adoratur, non agunt. Nam deus quidem utpote omnium pater nullius indiget: sed nobis est bene, cum eum per justitiam et castitatem, aliasque virtutes adoramus, ipsam vitam precem ad ipsum facientes, per imitationem et inquisitionem de ipso. Inquisitio enim purgat, imitatio deificat affectionem ad ipsum operando." Porphy. ap. August. de Civit. Dei. lib. xix. cap. 23.

i. e. "There are terrene spirits of the lowest order, who in a certain terrene place are subject to the power of evil dæmons. From these were the wise men of the Hebrews ——— * * (see Augustin), as you have heard the divine oracles of Apollo above mentioned assert. From these worst of dæmons therefore and lesser spirits of the *Hebrew*, the Oracles forbid the religious, and prohibit from paying attention to them; but exhort them rather to venerate the celestial gods, and still more the father of the gods. And we have above shown how the gods admonish us to look to divinity, and every where command us to worship him. But the unlearned, and impious natures, to whom Fate has not granted truly to obtain gifts from the gods, and to have a knowledge of the immortal Jupiter,—these not attending to the gods and divine men, reject indeed all the gods, and are so far from hating prohibited dæmons, that they even choose to reverence them. But pretending that they worship god, they do not perform those things through which alone god is adored. For god indeed, as being the father of all things, is not in want of any thing; but it is well with us, when we adore him through justice and continence, and the other virtues, making our life a prayer to him, through the imitation and investigation of him. For investigation purifies, but imitation deifies the affection by energizing about divinity."

for

for the extremities of first, are connascent with the summits of secondary natures. And they contribute to our other natural operations, and to the production of our species. On this account, it frequently is seen that from the mixture of these powers with men heroes are generated, who appear to possess a certain prerogative above human nature. But not only a dæmoniack genus of this kind, physically sympathizes with men, but a different genus sympathizes with other animals, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags, or serpents.

But how is it that at one time the gods are said to have connexion with mortal females, and at another time mortal females with the gods. We reply that the communion of gods with goddesses gives subsistence to gods, or dæmons eternally; but heroic souls having a two-fold form of life, viz. *doxastic* and *dianoëtic*, the former of which is called by Plato in the *Timæus* *the circle of difference*, and the latter, *the circle of sameness*, and which are characterized by the properties of *male* and *female*;—hence these souls at one time exhibit a deiform power, by energizing according to the masculine prerogative of their nature, or *the circle of sameness*, and at another time according to their feminine prerogative, or *the circle of difference*; yet so, as that according to both these energies they act with rectitude, and without merging themselves in the darkness of body. They likewise know the natures prior to their own, and exercise a providential care over inferior concerns, without at the same time having that propensity to such concerns which is found in the bulk of mankind. But the souls which act erroneously according to the energies of both these circles, or which, in other words, neither exhibit accurate specimens of practical or intellectual virtue—these differ in no respect from *gregarious* souls, or the herd of mankind, with whom the circle of sameness is fettered, and the circle of difference sustains all various fractures and distortions.

As it is impossible, therefore, that these heroic souls can act with equal vigour and perfection, according to both these circles at once, since this is the province of natures more divine than the human, it is necessary that they should sometimes descend and energize principally according to their doxastic part, and sometimes according to their more intellectual part. Hence, one of these circles must energize naturally, and the other be hindered from its proper energy. On this account heroes are called *demigods* (*ημιθεοι*), as having only one of their circles illuminated by the gods. Such of these therefore as have the circle of sameness unfettered, as are excited to an intellectual life,

and

and are moved about it according to a deific energy,—these are said to have a god for their father, and a mortal for their mother, through a defect with respect to the doxastic form of life. But such, on the contrary, as energize without impediment according to the circle of difference, who act with becoming rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time *enthusiastically*, or, in other words, under the inspiring influence of divinity,—these are said to have a mortal for their father, and a goddess for their mother. In short, rectitude of energy in each of these circles is to be ascribed to a divine cause*. Hence, when the circle of sameness has dominion, the divine cause of illumination is said to be masculine and paternal; but when the circle of difference predominates, it is said to be maternal. Hence too, Achilles in Homer acts with rectitude in practical affairs, and at the same time exhibits specimens of magnificent, vehement, and divinely-inspired energy, as being the son of a goddess. And such is his attachment to practical virtue, that even, when in Hades, he desires a union with body, that he may assist his father. While, on the contrary, Minos and Rhadamanthus, who were heroes illuminated by Jupiter, raised themselves from generation to true being, and meddled with mortal concerns no further than absolute necessity required.

That heroes are very properly denominated from Love, since Love is a great dæmon†: and from the cooperation of dæmons, heroes are produced. To which we may add that Love originated from Plenty as the more excellent cause, and from Poverty as the recipient and the worse cause; and heroes are analogously produced from different genera.

That according to Plato το κομψον signifies both *the elegant and the appropriate* (το κομψον και οκσιον); and again it signifies *the persuasive and the deceitful* (το πιθανον και απατηλον): but το κεκομψευμενον signifies *μεμπησανμενον*.

That as in the universe angels purify souls, freeing them from the stains produced by generation, and elevating them to the gods; and as certain material dæmons also purify by chastising souls looking to matter, tearing them on thorns, as in the Republic they are represented doing to Aridæus;—so indeed the ministers of sacred rites, angelically

* Let it however be carefully observed, that this divine cause illuminates, invigorates, and excites these circles in the most unrestrained and impassive manner, without destroying freedom of energy in the circles themselves, or causing any partial affection, sympathy or tendency in illuminating deity.

† See the speech of Diotima in the Banquet.

remove from us every thing which impedes our perception of more excellent nature; but sophists, through exercising us dæmoniacally by arguments on both sides, cut off the injury which we sustain from false opinion; not doing this that they may benefit through doubting those who are confused, but for the sake of a life phantastic, and conversant with the imitation of opinion. For sophists assume the character of those that are truly scientific and skilled in dialectic. And in like manner the last of dæmons afflict souls, not that they may make them lovers of real being, but because they are allotted a nature defensive of material and image-producing bosoms, but punishing the souls that fall into that place.

That many dæmons have thought fit to unfold the nature of the gods, and have also delivered names adapted to the gods. Thus*, too, the gods themselves not only unfolded the intelligible and intellectual orders to the theurgists under the reign of Marcus Antoninus, but also delivered names of the divine orders declarative of their characteristic properties, by which theurgists invoking the gods in the worship adapted to them, were favourably heard by the divinities. Many dæmons also, in appearing to men of a more fortunate destiny, have unfolded to them names connascent with things themselves, through which they have rendered the truth about beings more conspicuous.

That of names some belong to perpetual, and others to corruptible things. And of those which belong to things perpetual, some are devised by men, but others by more divine causes. And of those which are the production of more divine causes than men, some are established by the gods themselves, but others by dæmons. And of those which are devised by men, some are the offspring of science, but others are effected without science. Again, of names which belong to things corruptible, some are produced according to, but others without art; and of those produced without art, and the dianoëtic energy, some subsist according to an unknown divine cause, such for instance

* Οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ ΜΑΡΚΟΥ γενομένοις Θεουργοῖς, οἱ θεοὶ ὡς νοήτας καὶ νοεράς τάξεις ἐκφαίνοντες, οὐράματα τῶν θείων διακοσμῶν ἐξαγγελτικὰ τῆς ιδιότητος αὐτῶν παραδεδωκάσιν, οἷς καλοῦντες ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς θεοὺς ἐν ταῖς προσήκουσαις θεραπειαῖς τῆς παρ' αὐτῶν ευηκείας ἐτυχάνον. This is a very remarkable passage, from which the antiquity of the greater part of the Chaldæan Oracles that are now extant may be ascertained. See my collection of those Oracles, in the Supplement to the 3d volume of the Monthly Magazine.

as the name *Orestes* ; but others without such a cause. And of those without a cause, some subsist according to hope, others according to memory, and others according to neither of these. But of those which are denominated according to art, some subsist according to things present, others according to things past, and others according to things future. Thus according to things present *Aristocles* was called *Plato* ; but according to things past *Antiochus* was denominated *Philopater*, through having encountered danger for the sake of his father. And names subsist according to things future, as when some one fore-knowing through skill in astrology that his son will become renowned, calls him *Pericles*. There is also a kind of names mixed from fortune and art, and which through this is two-fold. One division of this takes place, when some one knows the power of a name, but is ignorant of the nature of the thing of which it is the name. Thus *Xanthippus* knew that the name *Pericles* signifies *renown*, but he did not know that his son *Pericles* would be most renowned, and therefore did not in consequence of this knowledge thus name him. On the contrary, another division of this happens, when some one is ignorant of the power of the name, but knows the essence of the thing, as in the instance of him who denominated *Theseus*, *Hercules* : for he knew that *Theseus* resembled *Hercules*, but he was ignorant* that the name *Hercules* was alone adapted to *Hercules*, in consequence of *Juno* becoming the cause to him of so many labours, and of the renown which he afterwards acquired through those labours.

That with respect to the intellections of the soul, some abide in wholes, and comprehend these ; but others alone energize on more partial genera ; and others are busily employed about the divine conceptions of eternal individuals. Those who contemplate the Saturnian and defensive series are the paradigm of the first of these ; those whose conceptions are employed about supercelestial natures, and him† who there drives his winged chariot, are the paradigm of the second ; and those who diligently observe and judge of the effects proceeding into generation from the sun and moon, of the third.

That it is the peculiarity of the strange inhabitants of Greece of the present time,

* Ηγνείε δε το γρακλής ονομα, οτι επι μόνου χρησθε το γρακλέους, δια το τῆς γρᾶς αὐτῆς γενέσθαι αἰτίαι τῶν ποσειδων ἀγωνῶν, καὶ τοῦ δια τῶν ἀγωνῶν ὑστέρου κλέους.

† Viz. Jupiter. See the *Phædrus*.

neither to confider the fun nor moon as gods*, nor to worship the other celestials, though they are our favours and guides, leading upwards immortal, and fabricating and giving subsistence to mortal souls. *I should say however that those who have the bardings to entertain such an audacious and absurd opinion concerning the celestial gods, belong to souls who are hastening to Tartarus, and to that which is most dark and disordered in the universe†. Let these however remain where they are ranked by Justice.*

That the name GOD‡ is rationally ascribed not only to the apparent, but also to the supercelestial, intellectual, and intelligible causes. For Socrates in the Republic speaks of *swiftness* itself and *slowness* itself in intelligible numbers; on which account also the liberated rulers of wholes, who are supercelestial, are celebrated in the Phædrus as driving winged chariots. And theologists say that prior to these the intellectual gods ride in chariots of this kind; that Heaven itself, which connectedly comprehends the intellectual gods, possesses its intelligence in *circulation*; and that the intelligible causes prior to this, though these are ineffable, have a *rapid motion*, and unattended with time. For the Oracles § also call these *swift*, and say that "proceeding from the father they run to him." But Orpheus thus speaks about the occult order of the gods:

"Unwearied, in a boundless orb it moves."

This name may also be interpreted after another manner; since it manifests the producing and fabricative causes of all things: for *ῥεῖναι* and *ῥήσω* are assumed for *το ποιεῖν*.

* This also has been the peculiarity of what are called the *civilized* nations of the earth for upwards of a thousand years!

† Ψυχῶν ἂν ἐγὼ γε φαίην εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν τάρταρον, καὶ τὸν ἀβέγγεστατον τοῦ παντός, καὶ ἀτακτοτάτον ἐπειγόμενων, τὴν τοιαύτην τολμᾶν, καὶ τὴν παραλογὸν ταύτην οἰσὶν πρὸς τοὺς οὐρανίους ὑπερβασυμένων ῥεῖν; ἀλλ' οὗτοι μὲν ἐστῶσαν ὅπου περιτὰ χέγησαν ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης. Proclus in saying *this* will doubtless appear in the light of a most uncharitable bigot, to most readers. It must however be observed that the doctrine of eternal punishment has no place in the Pagan creed; and that, according to the same creed, divinity benevolently punishes the offending soul, in order to purify it from guilt.

‡ See page 508.

§ Θεῶς γὰρ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰ λόγια καλεῖ καὶ προΐστας ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ῥεῖν ἐπ' αὐτὸν. By the Oracles, Proclus means the Chaldaean.

That

That there is nothing debile, nothing inefficacious in the gods, but all things there are energies and lives, fervid, and eternally energizing. Of the genera, therefore, posterior to the gods, and which are indeed their perpetual attendants, but produce in conjunction with them mundane fabrications from on high, as far as to the last of things,—of these genera some unfold generation into light; others are transporters of union; others of power; and others call forth the knowledge of the gods and an intellectual essence. But of these, some are called angelic, by those that are skilled in divine concerns, in consequence of being established according to the hyparxis itself of the gods, and making that which is uniform in their nature commensurate with things of a secondary rank. Hence the angelic tribe is *boniform*, as unfolding into light the occult *goodness* of the gods. Others among these are called by theologists dæmoniacal, as binding the middle of all things, and as distributing divine power, and producing it as far as to the last of things: for δαίσασι is το μερισαι. But this genus possesses abundance of power, and is multifarious, as giving subsistence to those last dæmons who are material, who draw down souls, and proceed to the most partial and material form of energy. Others again are denominated by them heroic, who lead human souls on high through love, and who are the suppliers of an intellectual life, of magnitude of operation, and magnitude of wisdom. In short, they are allotted a converse order and providence, and an alliance to a divine intellect, to which they also convert secondary natures. Hence they are allotted this appellation as being able to *raise* and *extend* souls to the gods (ὡς αἰρῆιν καὶ ἀναστεινῆιν τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ θεοὺς δυναμένους). These triple genera posterior to, are indeed always suspended from the gods, but they are divided from each other. And some of them are essentially intellectual; others are essentialized in rational souls; and others subsist in irrational and phantastic lives. It is also evident, that such of them as are intellectual, are allotted a prudence transcending that of human nature, and which is eternally conjoined with the objects of their intellection. But such of them as are rational, energize discursively according to prudence: and the irrational kind are destitute of prudence; for they dwell in matter, and the darkest parts of the universe. They also bind souls to shadow-producing forms (καὶ συνδῆι τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς εἰδωλοποιῖς καλποῖς), and strangle such as are brought into that region, until they have suffered the punishment which is their due. These three genera, therefore, which are more excellent than us, Socrates now calls dæmons. But if he displeases the

material tribe of dæmons by this etymology, you must not wonder. For the etymology is transcendent, and perhaps το μερίζω is παραι το δαίω, as rejoicing in division.

That the hyparxis of the more excellent genera being triple, viz. intellectual, logical, phantastic, the golden* age is analogous to the intellectual genus. For gold, as theologists say is referred to the first of the worlds, the empyrean † and intellectual. But the silver age is analogous to the rational genus: for silver is referred to the middle and ethereal world. And the brazen age is analogous to the irrational and phantastic genus. For the phantasy is a figured, but not a pure intellect; just as brass appears to have the colour of gold, but possesses much of the terrestrial and resisting, and a great alliance with things solid and sensible. Hence this age is analogous to the solid and brazen heaven, or, in other words, to the sensible world, the proximate demiurgus‡ of which is represented as fabricating it from brass. But the fourth and heroic genus, is subordinate to some of those natures who belong to the above-mentioned three genera, but is superior to others. For the heroic genus touches upon action, and a providential attention to secondary natures, and is inferior to a life which is void of habitude. But it possesses magnitude of operation, and exhibits the magnificence of its proper virtue. And the fifth and very passive human age, is that which is assimilated to much-laboured and black iron, through the material and dark condition of its life. It also exhibits erroneous actions, and such as are distorted and irrational.

That Plato now speculates § about dæmons and heroes, not those which subsist according to habitude, but those which are beyond our essence. He recurs however, through analogy, from those which subsist according to habitude, to those of a more elevated order. But he passes by the material genus of dæmons.

That in the ancient tongue *dæmons* were called *damons*, is evident from *a* being then used instead of *αι* ||.

* See p. 510.

† According to the Chaldeans there are seven worlds, one empyrean and the first; after this three ethereal; and then three material worlds, which consist of the innarrative sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. This last is called by them the *hater of life*, containing likewise in itself matter, which they call a profundity.

‡ Viz. Vulcan.

§ See p. 510.

|| Οτι το εν τη αρχή φωνη τους δαίμονας, δαμονας λεγέσθαι, δηλοι οτι τω α, αντι της αι εχρωστο.

That

That syllables and letters appear to have the relation of essence in names, but acute and grave accents are certain powers of names.

That the intellect in us is Dionysiacal, and is the true image of Bacchus. He therefore who acts erroneously with respect to it, and Titannically divulges its impartible nature through manifold falsehood, certainly sins against Bacchus himself, and more than those who sin against the external statues of the god, because intellect is more than any thing else allied to the gods.

That we are more able to understand the more total genera of the gods, than such as are more partial. For in the leading and ruling gods, we can obtain a clearer knowledge of that which is total in their subsistence, and extends to all things, than in the liberated order of gods. And we more easily learn that the mighty Jupiter is the supplier of life to all things, and that he is the demiurgus, than we learn the nature of that Jupiter who imparts life to things celestial alone. And that there is one whole demiurgus is evident to all; but that there are three demiurgi more partial than this, it is difficult to understand.

That each of the gods, so far as he knows himself, and all the other divine genera, and participates of all things, and is bounded according to his proper hyparxis, so far he gives subsistence to divine names which are to us unknown and ineffable; since all intellectual and divine natures subsist in us psychically. But if conceptions do not subsist in the soul coordinately to intellect, but after the manner of an image, and in subjection, much more must the soul become perfectly giddy in energizing intellectually about the gods. For it can only receive conceptions about the essence and the nomination of divinity, after the manner of an image (*εικονικως*).

That as he who supplies all mundane light from himself is called the sun, so the divinity who supplies truth from himself is called Apollo.

That according to the analogous of essences and knowledges in the gods, angels, daemons, and souls, the mutation also of divine names subsists. For the more subordinate natures of daemons, or heroes, or souls, do not call the gods and themselves in a superior and more intellectual manner, as angels do. "Youths celebrate Vesta as the oldest of the gods,"

Προΐστατην δὲ θεῶν ἐστὶν καλεῖσθαι κοῦρη.

For in prayers they are called upon to celebrate Vesta * before the other gods.

* See p. 515.

That Saturn, in conjunction with Rhea, produced Vesta and Juno, who are coordinate to the demiurgic causes. For Vesta imparts from herself to the gods an uninclining permanency, and seat in themselves, and an indissoluble essence. But Juno imparts progression, and a multiplication into things secondary. She is also the vivifying fountain of wholes, and the mother of prolific powers; and on this account she is said to have proceeded together with Jupiter the demiurgus; and through this communion she generates maternally, such things as Jupiter generates paternally. But Vesta abides in herself, possessing an undefiled virginity, and being the cause of sameness to all things. Each of these divinities however, together with her own proper perfection, possesses, according to participation, the power of the other. Hence, some say that Vesta is denominated from essence (*απο της ουσιας*), looking to her proper hyparxis. But others looking to her vivific and motive power, which she derives from Juno, say that she is thus denominated, *ως ωσείας ουραν αυτιαν*, as being the cause of impulsion. For all divine natures are in all, and particularly such as are coordinate with each other, participate of, and subsist in each other. Each therefore of the demiurgic and vivific orders, participates the form by which it is characterized, from Vesta. The orbs of the planets likewise possess the sameness of their revolutions from her; and the poles and centres are always allotted from her their rest.

That Vesta does not manifest essence, but the abiding and firm establishment of essence in itself; and hence this goddess proceeds into light after the mighty Saturn. For the divinities prior to Saturn have not a subsistence in themselves and in another*, but this originates from Saturn. And a subsistence in *self* is the idiom of Vesta, but in *another* of Juno.

That the theology of Hesiod from the monad Rhea produces, according to things which are more excellent in the coordination, Vesta; but, according to those which are subordinate, Juno; and according to those which subsist between, Ceres. But according to Orpheus, Ceres is in a certain respect the same with the whole of vivification, and in a certain respect is not the same. For on high she is Rhea, but below, in conjunction with Jupiter, she is Ceres: for here the things begotten are similar to the begetters, and are nearly the same.

* See this explained in the notes on the Parmenides.

That

That we ought to receive with caution what is now * said concerning effluxions and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material flowing of Heraclitus; for this is false†, and unworthy the dianoëtic conceptions of Plato. But since it is lawful to interpret things divine analogously, through appropriate images, Socrates very properly assimilates fontal and Saturnian deities to streams; in so doing jesting, and at the same time acting seriously, because good is always derived, as it were, in streams from on high, to things below. Hence, according to the image of rivers, after the fontal deities, who eternally devolve streams of good, the deities, who subsist as principles, are celebrated. For after the *fountain* of a river, the place where it *begins* to flow is surveyed.

That those divinities who are peculiarly denominated total intellectual gods, of whom the great Saturn is the father, are properly called fontal. For “from him leap forth the implacable thunders,” says the Oracle concerning Saturn. But concerning the vivific fountain Rhea, from which all life, divine, intellectual, psychical, and mundane, is generated, the Chaldaean Oracles thus speak :

Ρῆι τῶν νοερῶν μακαρῶν πηγὴ τε ροή.

Πάντων γὰρ πρώτη δυνάμεις κολποῖσιν ἀφραστοῖς

Δεξαμένη, γένεσιν ἐπὶ πᾶσι προχέει τροχῶσάν.

i. e. “Rhea § is the fountain and river of the blessed intellectual gods. For first receiving the powers of all things in her ineffable bosoms, she pours running generation into every thing.”

For this divinity gives subsistence to the infinite diffusion of all life, and to all never-failing powers. She likewise moves all things according to the measures of divine motions, and converts them to herself; establishing all things in herself, as being coordinate to Saturn. Rhea therefore is so called from causing a perpetual influx of good, and through being the cause of divine *facility*, since the life of the gods is attended with ease (Θεοὶ βεῖα ζῶντες).

* See p. 517.

† That is to say, it is false to assert of intellectual and divine natures, that they are in a perpetual flux; for they are eternally stable themselves, and are sources of stability to other things.

§ Gesner, misled by Patricius, has inserted these lines among the Orphic fragments, in his edition of the works of Orpheus.

That

That Ocean * is the cause to all the gods of acute and vigorous energy, and bounds the separations of the first, middle, and last orders; converting himself to himself, and to his proper principles, through swiftness of intellect, but moving all things from himself, to energies accommodated to their natures; perfecting their powers, and causing them to have a never-failing subsistence. But Tethys imparts permanency to the natures which are moved by Ocean, and stability to the beings which are excited by him to the generation of secondary natures. She is also the source of purity of essence to those beings who perpetually desire to produce all things: as sustaining every thing in the divine essences which, as it were, *leaps forth* and *percolates*. For each of first causes, though it imparts to secondary natures a participation of good, yet, at the same time, retains with itself that which is undefiled, unmingled, and pure from participation. Thus, for instance, intellect is filled with life, being, and intelligence, with which also it fills soul; but establishing in itself that which in each of these is genuine and exempt, it also illuminates from itself to beings of a subordinate rank, inferior measures of these goods. And vigour of energy indeed is present with more antient natures, through Ocean; but the leaping forth and percolating through Tethys. For every thing which is imparted from superior to subordinate natures, whether it be essence, life, or intelligence, is *percolated*. And such of these as are primary, are established in themselves; but such as are more imperfect, are transferred to things of a subject order. Just as with respect to streams of water, such of them as are nearer their source are purer, but the more remote are more turbid. Both Ocean and Tethys therefore are fountal gods, according to their first subsistence. Hence Socrates now calls them the fathers of streams. But they also proceed into other orders of gods, exhibiting the same powers among the gods who rank as principles or rulers, among those of a liberated, and those of a celestial characteristic; and appropriately in each of these. Timæus however celebrates their sublunary orders, calling them fathers of Saturn and Rhea, but the progeny of Heaven and Earth. But their last processions are their divisible allotments about the earth; both those which are apparent on its surface, and those which, under the earth, separate the kingdom of Hades from the dominion of Neptune.

* See p. 517.

That

That Saturn is conjoined both to Rhea and Jupiter, but to the former as father to prolific power, and to the latter, as father to intelligible * intellect.

That Ocean is said to have married Tethys, and Jupiter Juno, and the like, as establishing a communion with her, conformably to the generation of subordinate natures. For an according coarrangement of the gods, and a connascent cooperation in their productions, is called by theologists *marriage*.

That Tethys is denominated from *leaping forth* and *straining* or *cleansing*, being as it were *Diatethys*, and by taking away the first two syllables, *Tethys* †.

That Saturn is the monad of the Titanian order of the gods, but Jupiter of the demiurgic. This last divinity however is two-fold, the one exempt and coordinated with Saturn, being a fontal god, and, in short, ranking with the intellectual fathers, and convolving the extremity of them; but the other being connumerated with the sons of Saturn, and allotted a Saturnian summit and dominion in this triad; concerning which also the Homeric Neptune says,

Τρεῖς γὰρ τ' ἐκ Κρονου εἰμεν ἀδελφοὶ οὓς τέκε Ρειή†.

As brother gods we three from Saturn came,
And Rhea bore us.

And the first Jupiter indeed, as being the demiurgus of wholes, is the king of things first, middle, and last, concerning whom Socrates also had just said, that he is the ruler and king of all things; and life and salvation are imparted to all things through him. But the ruling Jupiter, who ranks as a principle, and who is coordinate with the three sons of Saturn, governs the third part of the whole of things, according to that of Homer

Τριχθα δὲ πάντα δεδασται §.

A triple distribution all things own.

He is also the summit of the three, has the same name with the fontal Jupiter, is

* Proclus here means that there is the same analogy between Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, as in the intelligible triad, between father, power, and intellect.

† Οτι ὠνομασται ἡ Τηθύς παρα τὸ διαττομενον καὶ τήνυμενον, οἷον Διαττήδης, καὶ ἀφαιρήσει των πρώτων δυσσλλαζων Τηθύς.

‡ Iliad xv. ver. 187.

§ Ibid. 189.

VOL. V.

4 U

united

united to him, and is monadically called Jupiter. But the second is called, dyadically, marine Jupiter and Neptune. And the third is triadically denominated, terrestrial Jupiter, Pluto and Hades. The first of these also preserves, fabricates, and vivifies summits, but the second, things of a second rank, and the third those of a third order. Hence this last is said to have ravished Proserpine, that together with her he might animate the extremities of the universe.

That the Titanic order dividing itself from the connecting order of Heaven, but having also something in itself abiding, and connascent with that order, Saturn is the leader of the separation, and on this account he both arms others against his father, and receives the scythe * from his mother, through which he divides his own kingdom from that of Heaven. But Ocean is coordinated with those that abide † in the manners of the father, and guards the middle of the two orders; so far as a Titan being connumerated with the gods that subsist with Saturn; but so far as rejoicing in a coordination with Heaven conjoining himself with the Synoches. For it is fit that he who bounds the first and second orders, should be arranged in the middle of the natures that are bounded. But every where this god is allotted a power of this kind, and separates the genera of the gods, the Titanic from the connecting (των συνεχικων), and the vivific from the demiurgic. Whence also antient rumour calls Ocean the god who separates the apparent part of Heaven from the unapparent; and on this

* See the Theogony of Hesiod, v. 176, &c.

† Proclus here alludes to the following Orphic verses cited by him in his Commentary on the Timæus, lib. v. p. 296.

Βαθ' οὖν τ' ὠκεανὸς μὲν, ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐμμένει
 Ὀφθαλμῶν ποτέρῳσε νοῦν τραποῖ, ἢ πατέρα
 Ὀν γυνῶν τε βίης, καὶ ἀτασθαλίᾳ δαΐσασαίτο
 Σὺν κρείνῃ, πῶδ' ἀλλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, οἱ πεπιθόντο
 Μητρὶ φίλῃ, ἢ τοὺς γὰρ λήπων, μένει ἐνδὸν ἐκλήδος
 Πλάττει δὲ πορφύρῳ, μένει παῖδες ἐν μεγάροισιν
 Σκυζόμενος τῇ μητρὶ, κασιγνήτοισι δὲ μάλλον.

i. e. "But Ocean remained within the ample house, considering how he should act, whether he should deprive his father of his strength, and basely injure him, together with Saturn and the rest of his brethren, who were obedient to their dear mother; or, whether leaving these, he should stay quietly at home. After much deliberation, he remained quietly at home, being angry with his mother, but more so with his brothers."

account

account poets say, that the sun and the other stars rise from the ocean. What is now said, therefore, by Plato, comprehends all the Titannic order through these two conjunctions; this order abiding and at the same time proceeding. And through the Saturnian order indeed, it comprehends every thing separated from the fathers; but through that of Ocean, every thing conjoined with the connecting gods. Or, if you had rather so speak, through the Saturnian order, he comprehends every maternal cause, but through the other, every thing subservient to the paternal cause. For the female is the cause of progression and separation, but the male of union and stable permanency.

That of the demiurgic triad* which divides the whole world, and distributes the indivisible, one, and whole fabrication of the first Jupiter, the summit, and which has the relation of father, is Jupiter, who through union with the whole demiurgic intellect, having the same appellation with it, is for this reason not mentioned here by Plato. But Neptune† is allotted the middle, and that which binds together both the extremes; being filled indeed from the essence of Jupiter, but filling Pluto. For of the whole of this triad, Jupiter indeed is the father, but Neptune the power, and Pluto the intellect. And all indeed are in all; but each receives a different character of subsistence. Thus Jupiter subsists according to *being*; but Neptune according to *power*, and Pluto according to *intellect*. And though all these divinities are the causes of the life of all things, yet one is so *essentially*, another *vitally*, and another *intellectually*. Whence also the theologist Orpheus says, that the extremes fabricate in conjunction with Proserpine things first and last; the middle being coarranged with generative cause from his own allotment, without Proserpine. Hence *violence* is said to have been offered to Proserpine by Jupiter; but she is said to have been *ravished* by Pluto (διο και φασι την κορην υπο μεν του διος βιαζεσθαι, υπο δε του πλουτωνος αρπαζεσθαι). But the middle is said to be the cause of motion to all things. Hence also, he is called *earth-shaker*, as being the origin of motion. And among those who are allotted the kingdom of Saturn, the middle allotment, and the agile sea (η ευκληνης θαλασσα) are assigned to him. According to every division, therefore, the summits are

* That is, of the first triad of the supermundane, which subsists immediately after the intellectual order.

† See p. 518.

Jovian, the middles belong to Neptune, and the extremes to Pluto. And, if you look to the centres, such as the east, that of mid-heaven, and the west; if also you divide the whole world, as for instance into the inerratic, planetary, and sublunary spheres; or again, if you divide that which is generated into the fiery, terrestrial, and that which subsists between; or the earth into its summits, middle and hollow, and subterranean parts, this triad every where distributes the first, middle, and last differences of things fabricated in demiurgic boundaries.

That the name Neptune is now triply analyzed. For Neptune is the trident-bearer, and the Tritons and Amphitrite are the familiars of this god. And the first analyzation of his name is from the allotment over which he presides, and from souls coming into generation, in whom the circle of fames is fettered; since the sea is analogous to generation. But the second is from communion with the first:

*Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γέγονει, καὶ πλείονα ᾔδει **.

But Jove was born the first, and more he knew.

For a Jupiter of this kind, is the proximate intelligible of Neptune. But the third analysis of his name, is from his energy in externals. For he is motive of nature, and vivific of things last. He is also the guardian of the earth, and excites it to generations.

That Neptune is an intellectual demiurgic god, who receives souls descending into generation; but Hades is an intellectual demiurgic god, who frees souls from generation. For as our whole period receives a triple division, into a life prior to generation, which is Jovian, into a life in generation which is Neptunian, and into a life posterior to generation which is Plutonian; Pluto, who is characterized by intellect, very properly converts ends to beginnings, effecting a circle without a beginning, and without an end, not only in souls, but also in every fabrication of bodies, and, in short, of all periods;—which circle also he perpetually convolves. Thus, for instance, he converts the ends to the beginnings of the souls of the stars, and the convolutions of souls about generation, and the like. And hence Jupiter is the guardian of the life of souls prior to generation.

* Hom. Iliad.

That some badly analyze the name of Pluto into wealth from the earth, through fruits and metals; but Hades into the invifible, dark, and dreadful. Thefe Socrates now reprobates*, bringing the two names to the fame fignification; referring the name of Pluto, as intellect, to the wealth of prudence, but that of Hades to an intellect knowing all things. For this god is a fophift, who purifying fouls after death, frees them from generation. For Hades is not, as fome improperly explain it, evil: for neither is death evil; though Hades to fome appears to be attended with peturbations (*εμπάως*); but it is invifible, and better than the apparent; fuch as is every thing intelligible. Intellect, therefore, in every triad of beings, convolves itfelf to being, and the paternal caufe, imitating in its energy the circle.

That men who are lovers of body, badly refer to themfelves the paffions of the animated nature, and on this account confider death to be dreadful, as being the caufe of corruption. The truth however is, that it is much better for man to die, and live in Hades a life according to nature, fince a life in conjunction with body is contrary to nature, and is an impediment to intellectual energy. Hence it is neceffary to divest ourfelves of the flefhy garments with which we are clothed, as Ulyffes did his ragged veftments, and no longer like a wretched mendicant, together with the indigence of body, put on our rags. For as the Chaldaean oracle fays, “ Things divine cannot be obtained by thofe whofe intellectual eye is directed to body; but thofe only can arrive at the poffeffion of them, who, ftript of their garments, haften to the fummit.”

That Plato contemplates defire †, according to each part of the foul. For the irafcible part afpires after honour or victory, and the rational after virtue. In like manner he wifhes to furvey confidence, good hope, pleafure, and the contraries of thefe, about each part of the foul.

That with the love and will of the gods, the neceffity which is with them concurs, againft which no god contends.

That the divine Plato knew that there are three kinds of Sirens ‡: the *celestial*, which is under the government of Jupiter; *that which is productive of generation* (*γενεσιουργον*), and is under the government of Neptune; and that which is *cathartic*, and is under the government of Pluto. It is common to all thefe, to incline all things through an

* See p. 518.

† Ibid. 519.

‡ Ibid. 520.

harmonic motion to their ruling gods. Hence, when the soul is in the Heavens, the Sirens are desirous of uniting it to the divine life which flourishes there. But it is proper that souls living in generation should sail beyond them, like the Homeric Ulysses, that they may not be allured by generation, of which the sea is an image. And when souls are in Hades, the Sirens are desirous of uniting them through intellectual conceptions to Pluto. So that Plato knew that in the kingdom of Hades there are gods, dæmons, and souls, who dance as it were round Pluto, allured by the Sirens that dwell there.

That Plato knew how to attribute the name *sophist** to a venerable thing: for he thus denominates him who is able to convert other things to himself, such as Jupiter, Hades, and Love.

That not all souls, after being liberated from the body, are thought worthy to associate with Pluto, but such only as are of superior worth: for those that are more corporeal are liberated from vice, by certain cathartic dæmons or angels, laboriously, and accompanied with pain.

That the demiurgic Jupiter, and who is also the ruler of all the demiurgi, wishing to suspend all the series of fabricators from the Titannic series, is very properly said to bind Saturn, as being converted to this divinity, and depending from him; and as surveying the length and breadth of the Saturnian place of survey (*πειρωπη*), and establishing in a Jovian manner Saturn in himself. Jupiter therefore binds Saturn in himself firmly and stably; and Jupiter is in a similar manner bound in Saturn.

That the ascent of the soul is two-fold †; the one according to an elevation to true being, and a purification from things connascent with generation, which the bonds of Pluto afford after death; but the other according to the soul having now arrived at the intelligible, through the purification of Hades, and revolving according to the life and transiſion of intellections which are there, and which the bonds of Saturn effect through a conjunction with Jupiter. For the soul, placing as it were a vestige of her feet in the intelligible, passes through the extent of intelligibles which is there, and

* See p. 520.

† That is, the ascent of the soul may either be considered as taking place while she is ascending to true being, or as that superior energy which she exerts after she has ascended.

surveys those blessed spectacles, as Socrates teaches us in the *Phædrus*. And this is a posterior ascent, greater and more perfect than the former. Not only the bonds of Hades therefore are incapable of holding and elevating to the dominion of Jupiter, souls that are astonished about body, but neither can the bonds of Saturn effect this, though these as being of the father are evidently stronger.

That Neptune when compared with Jupiter is said to know *many* things; but Hades compared with souls to whom he imparts knowledge is said to know *all* things; though Neptune is more total than Hades.

That as it is necessary to analyze Pluto, not only into the obvious wealth from the earth, but also into the wealth of wisdom, so likewise Ceres must be analyzed not only into corporeal nutriment; but, beginning from the gods themselves, it is requisite to conceive her to be the supplier of aliment, first to the gods themselves, afterwards to the natures posterior to the gods; and, in the last place, that the series of this beneficent energy extends as far as to corporeal nutriment. For the characteristic of love shines forth first of all in the gods: and this is the case with the medicinal and prophetic powers of Apollo, and with those of every other divinity. But nutriment, when considered with reference to the gods, is the communication of intellectual plenitude from more exalted natures to those of an inferior rank. Gods therefore are nourished, when they view with the eye of intellect gods prior to themselves; and when they are perfected and view intelligible beauties, such as justice itself, temperance itself, and the like, as it is said in the *Phædrus*.

That the design of the great Plato, in the *Cratylus*, is not to celebrate the first, middle, and last orders of the gods, but only those idioms which are apparent in their names.

That, according to Orpheus, Ceres is the same with Rhea: for Orpheus says, that subsisting on high in unproceeding union with Saturn, she is *Rhea*, but that by emitting and generating Jupiter, she is *Ceres*. For thus he speaks,

Ρεινη το πριν εουσσαν, επει διος επλετο μητηρ
Γεγονε δημητηρ*.

i. e: The goddess who was *Rhea*, when she bore
Jove, became *Ceres*.

* This Orphic fragment is not to be found in Gesner's collection of the Orphic remains.

But

But Hesiod says that Ceres is the daughter of Rhea. It is however evident, that these theologists harmonize: for whether this goddess proceeds from union with Saturn to a secondary order, or whether she is the first progeny of Rhea, she is still the same. Ceres therefore thus subsisting, and receiving the most antient and ruling order from the whole vivific Rhea (της ολης ζωογονου ρεας), and comprehending the middle centres of whole vivification (της ολης ζωογονιας), she fills all supermundane natures with the rivers of all perfect life, pouring upon all things vitally, indivisibly, and uniformly.

Prior however to all this, she unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect (Jupiter), and imparts to him the power of vivifying wholes: for, as Saturn supplies her from on high with the cause of being; so Ceres from on high, and from her own prolific bosoms, pours forth vivification to the demiurgus. But possessing herself the middle of all vivific deity, she governs the whole fountains which she contains, and comprehends the one bond of the first and last powers of life. She stably convolves too, and contains all secondary fountains. But she leads forth the uniform causes of prior natures to the generation of others. This goddess too comprehends *Vesta* and *Juno*: in her right hand parts *Juno*, who pours forth the whole order of souls; but in her left hand parts *Vesta*, who leads forth all the light of virtue. Hence, Ceres is with great propriety called by Plato *, *mother*, and at the same time the *supplier of aliment*: for, so far as she comprehends in herself the cause of *Juno*, she is a mother; but as containing *Vesta* in her essence, she is the supplier of aliment. But the paradigm of this goddess is *Night*: for *immortal Night is called the nurse of the gods*. Night however is the cause of aliment intelligibly †: for that which is intelligible is, according to the Oracle ‡, the aliment of the intellectual orders of gods. But Ceres first of all separates the two kinds of aliment in the gods, as Orpheus says:

Μησατο γαρ προπαλους, και αμφιπελους, και επαδους*

Μησατο δ' αμβροσιην, και ερυθρου νεκταρος αβρον"

Μησατο δ' αγλαα εργα μελισσαιωι ερβομεων §.

* See page 521.

† Because Night subsists at the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order, and is wholly absorbed in the intelligible.

‡ That is, according to one of the Chaldaean Oracles.

§ These verses likewise are not in Gesner's collection.

- i. e. She cares for pow'rs ministrant, whether they
 Or gods *precede*, or *follow*, or *surround* :
Ambrosia, and *tenacious nectar red*,
 Are too the objects of her bounteous care.
 Laft to the bee her providence extends,
 Who gathers honey with refounding hum.

Ceres, therefore, our sovereign mistress (*δεσποινῶς*) not only generates life, but that which gives perfection to life; and this from supernal natures to such as are last: *for virtue is the perfection of souls*. Hence mothers, who are connected with the circulations of time, bring forth their offspring in imitation of this two-fold and eternal generation of Ceres. For, at the same time that they send forth their young into the light, they extend to them milk naturally produced as their food.

That the conjunction of the demiurgic intellect with the vivific causes is triple: for it is conjoined with the fountains prior to itself; is present with its kindred coordinate natures; and coenergizes with the orders posterior to itself. For it is present with the mother prior to itself, *convertively* (*ἐπιστρέπτικως*); with Proserpine posterior to itself, *providentially* (*προνοητικως*); and with Juno coordinate to itself with an *amatory energy* (*ἐρασμως*). Hence Jupiter is said to be enamoured of Juno,

Ὡς σὺ νῦν ἐράμην *——

As now I love thee——

And this love indeed is legal, but the other two appear to be illegal. This goddess, therefore, produces from herself, in conjunction with the demiurgus and father, all the genera of souls, the supermundane and mundane, the celestial and sublunary, the divine, angelic, dæmoniacal, and partial. After a certain manner too, she is divided from the demiurgus, but in a certain respect she is united to him: for Jupiter is said, in the Philebus, to contain a royal intellect and a royal soul. For he contains uniformly the paternal and maternal cause of the world; and the fountain of souls is said to be in Jupiter; just as again the intelligence of Jupiter is said to be first participated by Juno. For no other divinity, says Jupiter in Homer, knows my mind prior to Juno. Through

* Iliad. xiv. ver. 328.

this ineffable union, therefore, of these divinities, the world participates of intellectual souls. They also give subsistence to intellects who are carried in souls, and who together with them give completion to the whole fabrication of things.

That the series of our sovereign mistress Juno* beginning from on high pervades to the last of things; and her allotment in the sublunary region is the air. For *air* is a symbol of *soul*, according to which also soul is called a *spirit* (πνευμα); just as *fire* is an image of *intellect*, but *water* of *nature*, by which the world is nourished (της κοσμοτροφου φύσεως); and through which all nutriment and increase are produced. But *earth* is the image of *body*, through its gross and material nature. Hence Homer, obscurely signifying this, represents Juno suspended with two anvils under her feet: for the air is allotted two heavy elements beneath itself. For

Ἥλκεν δ' ἀκαμπάτω βωώπις ποτνια ἥνη
Πεμψεν ἐπ' ὀκεανοιο ποταῖς—†

i. e. "Fair-eyed venerable Juno sent the sun to the streams of the ocean,"—is from the same conception: for he calls the thick cloud produced by Juno, the setting of the sun. The assertion likewise that the end of this name will be conjoined with the beginning, if any one frequently repeats the name of the goddess, evinces the conversion of rational souls to her which proceed from her; and that voice is struck air. On this account also the voice of rational animals is especially dedicated to this goddess, who made the horse of Achilles to become vocal. But Socrates now delivers these three vivific monads in a consequent order; viz. Ceres, Juno, Proserpine; calling the first the mother, the second the sister, and the third the daughter of the demiurgus. All of them however are partakers of the whole of fabrication; the first in an exempt manner and intellectually; the second in a fontal manner and at the same time in a way adapted to a principle (αρχικώς); and the third in a manner adapted to a principle and leader (αρχικώς και ηγεμονικώς).

Of these goddesses the last is allotted triple powers, and impartibly and uniformly comprehends three monads of gods. But she is called *Core* (καρη) through the purity of her essence, and her undefiled transcendence in her generations. She also possesses a first, middle, and last empire. And according to her summit indeed she is called *Diana* by

* See p. 521.

† *Iliad*. xviii. ver. 240.

Orpheus; but according to her middle, Proserpine; and according to the extremity of the order, Minerva. Likewise, according to an hyparxis transcending the other powers of this triple vivific order, the dominion of Hecate is established; but according to a middle power, and which is generative of wholes, that of Soul; and according to intellectual conversion, that of Virtue*. Core, therefore, subsisting on high, and among the supermundane gods, uniformly extends this triple order of divinities; and together with Jupiter generates Bacchus, who impartibly presides over partible fabrication. But beneath, in conjunction with Pluto, she is particularly beheld according to the middle idiom: for it is this which, proceeding every where, imparts vivification to the last of things. Hence she is called Proserpine, because she especially associates with Pluto, and together with him orderly distributes the extremities of the universe.^o And according to her extremities indeed she is said to be a virgin, and to remain undefiled; but according to her middle, to be conjoined with Hades, and to beget the Furies in the subterranean regions. She therefore is also called Core, but after another manner than the supermundane and ruling Core. For the one is the connective unity of the three vivific principles; but the other is the middle of them, in herself possessing the idioms of the extremes. Hence in the Proserpine conjoined with Pluto you will find the idioms of Hecate and Minerva; but these extremes subsist in her occultly, while the idiom of the middle shines forth, and that which is characteristic of ruling soul, which in the supermundane Core was of a *ruling*† nature, but here subsists according to a mundane idiom.

That a lover of piety to the gods ought earnestly to embrace the rectitude of divine names, lest, like those who err concerning Proserpine and Apollo, being ignorant of the analysis of names, he should be subject to the same reproof from Socrates.

That Proserpine is denominated either through judging of forms and separating them from each other, thus obscurely signifying the ablation of slaughter (*δια το κρῖναι τὰ εἶδη καὶ χωρίζειν ἀλλήλων, ὡς τοῦ φόνου τὴν ἀναίρεσιν ἀνιπτομένον*), or through separating souls perfectly from bodies, through a conversion to things on high, which is the most fortu-

* Proclus says this conformably to the theology of the Chaldeans: for he informs us in his 6th book on the Theology of Plato, p. 372, that, according to that theology, the first monad of the vivific triad is *Hecate*, the second *Soul*, and the third *Virtue*.

† That is, of a supermundane nature: for the *ruling* are the *supermundane* gods.

nate slaughter and death, to such as are worthy of it (η δια το χωριζειν τας ψυχας τελως εκ των σωματων δια της προς τα ανω επιστροφης, οπερ εστιν ευτυχιστατος φοβος και θανατος ταις αξιουμεναις ταιτου). But the name Φερεφαιττα, *Pherephatta*, according to a contact with generation, is adapted to Proserpine; but according to wisdom and counsel, to Minerva. At the same time however all the appellations by which she is distinguished are adapted to the perfection of soul. On this account also she is called Proserpine, and not by the names of the extremes; since that which was ravished by Pluto is this middle; the extremes at the same time being firmly established in themselves, according to which Core is said to remain a virgin.

That very rationally after Proserpine, Plato* now analyzes Apollo: for there is a great communion between the Coric and the Apolloniad series; since the former is the unity of the middle triad of rulers (i. e. of the supermundane gods), and emits from herself vivific powers; but the latter converts the solar principles to one union: and the solar principles are allotted a subsistence immediately after the vivific. Hence, according to Orpheus, when Ceres delivered up the government of Proserpine, she thus admonished her:

Αυταρ Απυλλωνος Σαλευρον λεχος εισαιαεσα,
Τεξεται αγλαα τεκνα πυρπλεγεθοντα προσωποι†.

That is,

But next Apollo's florid bed ascend;
For thus the god fam'd offspring shall beget,
Refulgent with the beams of glowing fire.

But how could this be the case, unless there was a considerable degree of communion between these divinities?

It is necessary, however, to know thus much concerning Apollo, that, according to the first and most natural conception, his name signifies the cause of union, and that power which collects multitude into one; and this mode of speculation concerning his name harmonizes with all the orders of the god. But Socrates alone considers his more partial powers: for the multitude of the powers of Apollo are not to be

* See p. 522.

† These verses are not in Gesner's collection of the Orphic fragments.

comprehended, nor described by us. For when will man, who is merely rational, be able to comprehend not only all the idioms of Apollo, but all those of any other god? Theologists indeed deliver to us a great multitude of Apolloniæal idioms; but Socrates now only mentions four of them. For the world is as it were a decad, being filled from all productive principles, receiving all things into itself, and being converted to the proper principle of the decad, of which the tetrad proximately contains the cause, but in an exempt manner, the monad. And the former without separation and occultly, but the latter with separation; just as Apollo proximately unites the multitude of mundane natures, but the demiurgic intellect exemptly. Why then does Socrates use an order of this kind? For, beginning from the *medicinal* power of the god, and proceeding through his *prophetic* and *arrow-darting* powers, he ends in his *harmonic* power. We reply, that all the energies of this god are in all the orders of beings, beginning from on high and proceeding as far as to the last of things; but different energies appear to have more or less dominion in different orders. Thus, for instance, the *medicinal* power of Apollo is most apparent in the sublynnary region; for

There slaughter, rage, and countless ills beside,
Disease, decay, and rottenness reside*.

And as these are moved in an inordinate manner, they require to be restored from a condition contrary, into one agreeable to nature, and from incommensuration and manifold division, into symmetry and union.

But the *prophetic* energy of the god is most apparent in the heavens; for there his enunciative power shines forth, unfolding intelligible good to celestial natures, and on this account he revolves together with the sun, with whom he participates the same intellect in common; since the sun also illuminates whatever the heavens contain, and extends a unifying power to all their parts. But his *arrow-darting* energy mostly prevails among the *liberated* † gods; for there, ruling over the wholes which the universe

* These lines are from Empedocles, and in the original are as follow :

Εὐλα κτος τε φονος τε ηαι ἄλλων εἶνεα κτην,
Αὐχμηραι τε ἰουσι, καὶ σφεις, ἐργα τε βρυστε.

† For an account of this order of gods, see the notes on the Parmenides.

contains, he excites their motions by his rays, which are always assimilated to arrows, extirpates every thing inordinate, and fills all things with demiurgic gifts. And though he has a separate and exempt subsistence; he reaches all things by his energies.

Again, his *harmonic* power is more predominant in the *ruling supermundane order*; for it is this divinity who, harmonizing the universe, establishes about himself according to one union the choir of the Muses, and produces by this mean, as a certain theurgist says, “*the harmony of exulting light*.” Apollo therefore, as we have shown, is *harmonic*, and this is likewise the case with the other Apollos * which are contained in the earth and the other spheres; but this power appears in some places more, and in others less. These powers too subsist in the god himself in an united manner, and exempt from other natures, but in those attendants of the gods who are superior to us, divisibly, and according to participation; for there is a great multitude of medicinal, prophetic, harmonic, and arrow-darting angels, dæmons, and heroes, suspended from Apollo, who distribute in a partial manner the uniform powers of the god.

But it is necessary to consider each of these powers according to one definite characteristic; as, for instance, his *harmonic* power, according to its binding together separated multitude; his *prophetic* power, according to the enunciative; his *arrow-darting* power, according to its being subvertive of an inordinate nature; and his *medicinal* power, according to its perfective energy. We should likewise speculate these characteristics differently in gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, men, animals, and plants; for the powers of the gods extend from on high to the last of things, and at the same time appear in an accommodated manner in each; and the telestic (i. e. mystic) art endeavours through sympathy to conjoin these ultimate participants with the gods. But in all these orders we must carefully observe, that this god is the cause of union to multiplied natures: for his *medicinal* power, which takes away the *multiform* nature of disease, imparts *uniform* health; since health is symmetry and a subsistence according to nature, but that which is contrary to nature is multifarious. Thus too, his *prophetic* power, which unfolds the simplicity of truth, takes away the variety of that which is false; but his *arrow-darting* power, which exterminates every thing furious and wild, but prepares that which is or-

* See the Introduction to the *Timæus*.

derly and gentle to exercise dominion, vindicates to itself unity, and exterminates a disordered nature tending to multitude; and his *musical* power, through rhythm and harmony, places a bond, friendship, and union in *wholes*, and subdues the contraries to these.

And all these powers indeed subsist primarily, in an exempt manner, and uniformly in Jupiter the demiurgus of wholes, but secondarily and separately in Apollo. Hence Apollo is not the same with the demiurgic intellect; for this comprehends these powers totally and paternally, but Apollo with subjection, imitating his father; since all the energies and powers of secondary gods are comprehended in the demiurgus according to cause. And the demiurgus fabricates and adorns the universe according to all these powers, and in a collected manner; but the other deities which proceed from him cooperate with their father according to different powers.

That purification being seen not only in the medicinal, but also in the prophetic art, evinces, that the cathartic power of Apollo comprehends the two powers: for it illustrates the world with the glittering splendors of light, and purifies all material immoderation by Pæonian energies; which physicians and prophets among us imitating, the former purify bodies, and the latter through sulphureous preparations render themselves and their associates pure. For, as Timæus says, the gods purify the universe, either by fire or water; and prophets also in this respect imitate the gods. In the most sacred of the mysteries too, purifications are employed prior to initiation into them, in order to take away every thing foreign from the proposed sacred mystery. We may likewise add, that the referring multiform purifications to the one cathartic power of the gods is adapted to him. For Apollo every where unites and elevates multitude to *the one*, and uniformly comprehends all the modes of purification, purifying all heaven, generation, and all mundane lives, and separating partial souls from the grossness of matter. Hence the theurgist, who is the leader of the mysteries of this god, begins from purifications and sprinklings:

Αὐτὸς δ' ἐν πρώτοις ἱερεὺς πυρὸς ἐργὰ κυβερνῶν,
Κυματὶ ρινισθῶ παγερῷ βαρυχέτες ἀλμύης.

i. e. "The priest in the first place governing the works of fire, must sprinkle with the cold water of the loud-sounding sea," as the Oracle says concerning him. But the assertion that the god presides over simplicity according to knowledge, and unfolds

truth

truth into light, presents him to our view as analogous to *the good*, which Socrates celebrates in the Republic; in which place he calls the sun the progeny of *the good*, and says that the former is analogous to the latter. Apollo therefore being the source of union, and this to the mundane gods, is arranged analogous to *the good*; and through *truth*, he unfolds to us his similitude to it, if it be lawful so to speak. For *the simple* is a manifestation of *the one*, and the truth which subsists according to knowledge is a luminous representation of superessential truth, which first proceeds from *the good*. But *the perpetually prevailing might of the god in the jaculation of arrows*, evinces his dominion, which vanquishes every thing in the world. For on high, from the supercelestial order, he scatters the rivers of Jupiter, and pours his rays on the whole world: for his arrows obscurely signify his rays. Again, the assertion that he presides over music, represents to us that this god is the cause of all harmony, both unapparent and apparent, through his ruling supermundane powers, according to which he generates, together with Mnemosyne and Jupiter, the Muses. But he orderly disposes every thing sensible by his *demiurgic powers*, which the sons of *theurgists* denominate *hands*; since the energy of the harmony of sounds is suspended from the motion of the hands. He likewise orderly disposes souls and bodies through harmonic reasons, using their different powers as if they were sounds; and he moves all things harmoniously and rhythmically by his demiurgic motions. The whole of this celestial order too, and motion, exhibit the harmonious work of the god; on which account also partial souls are no otherwise perfected than through an harmonic similitude to the universe, and abandoning the dissonance arising from generation; for then they obtain the most excellent life, which is proposed to them by the god.

From discoursing about king Apollo, Plato proceeds to the Muses*, and the name of music: for Apollo is celebrated as Musagetes; and he indeed is a monad with respect to the harmony in the world, but the choir of the Muses is the monad of all the number of the henriad (i. e. nine). From both likewise the whole world is bound in indissoluble bonds, and is one and all-perfect, through the communications of these divinities; possessing the former through the Apolloniacal monad, but its all-perfect subsistence through the number of the Muses. For the number nine, which is generated from the first perfect number (that is 3), is, through similitude and sameness, accom-

* See p. 527.

modated to the multiform causes of the mundane order and harmony; all these causes at the same time being collected into one summit for the purpose of producing one consummate perfection. For the Muses generate the variety of reasons with which the world is replete; but Apollo comprehends in union all the multitude of these. And the Muses give subsistence to the harmony of soul; but Apollo is the leader of intellectual and impartible harmony. The Muses distribute the phenomena according to harmonical reasons; but Apollo comprehends unapparent and separate harmony. And though both give subsistence to the same things, yet the Muses effect this according to number, but Apollo according to union. And the Muses indeed distribute the unity of Apollo; but Apollo unities harmonic multitude, which he also converts and comprehends. For the multitude of the Muses proceeds from the essence of *Musagetes*, which is both separate, and subsists according to the nature of *the one*; and their number evolves the one and primary cause of the harmony of the universe.

That such being the etymology of the name of the Muses, since Plato calls philosophy the greatest music, as causing our psychical powers to be moved harmoniously, in sympathy with real beings, and in conformity to the orderly motions of the celestial orbs; and since the investigation of our own essence and that of the universe leads us to this harmony, through a conversion to ourselves and more excellent natures,—hence also we denominate the Muses from investigation. For *Musagetes* himself unfolds truth to souls according to one intellectual simplicity; but the Muses perfect our various energies, elevating them to an intellectual unity. For investigations have the relation of matter, with reference to the end from invention; just as multitude with respect to *the one*, and variety with respect to simplicity. We know, therefore, that the Muses impart to souls the investigation of truth, to bodies the multitude of powers, and that they are everywhere the sources of the variety of harmonies.

That *Latona** is a vivific fountain comprehended in *Ceres*: and hence, according to the Grecian rites, she is worshipped as the same with *Ceres*, these rites evincing by this the union of the goddesses. But this goddess emits the whole of vivific light, illuminating the intellectual essences of the gods, and the orders of souls: and lastly, she illuminates

* See p. 527.

the whole sensible heaven, generating mundane light, and establishing the cause of this light in her offspring, Apollo and Diana; and causes all things to glitter with intellectual and vivific light. She imparts likewise to souls the consummation of virtue, and an illumination which leads them back to the intellectual port of their father (Jupiter), hastily withdrawing them from the winding paths* of matter, the entanglements of vice, and the roughness of the passage over the sea of generation. It appears to me indeed that theologists, considering this, denominated her *Λητώ*, Latona, on account of her extending to souls *smoothness* of manners, a voluntary life, and divine gentleness and ease. For to such as raise themselves to her divinity, she imparts an ineffable energy, a blameless life, gentleness of manners, serenity, and intellectual tranquillity. Whether, therefore, she is called *Leto*, from a voluntary life; for *λω* signifies *το βουλομαι*, *I am willing*; or from *το λειον*, *the smooth*; her name will perfectly evince, through both these, the powers which she possesses. For the compelled energies of the soul take place through material roughness; and the obliquity of a life in generation diminishes the soul's voluntary life. But an ascent to the gods imparts a smooth and gentle, instead of a hard and rough, and a voluntary, instead of a compelled life.

Why then is it necessary to call, as some do, Latona matter, as capable of being easily turned, and subsisting as an express resemblance of all forms, like a mirror receiving the representations of all things; and to say that she is the cause of oblivion to those that look into her? Why is it necessary to call Apollo harmony, as subsisting from Latona and Jupiter? For thus the god would be inseparable from matter, and not the cause of the harmony in the universe. It is better, therefore, to say, that Latona is not the receptacle of Apollo, but that she is the mother and fountain of all vivific light, which preserves all things by heat: but that Apollo, who is a separate divinity, is the supplier of all harmonic life, and of all those mundane reasons by which the universe is indissolubly bound. But you may say that Socrates derives her name from *Lethe*, because she peculiarly causes in souls an oblivion of evils, and of the roughness and storms in generation; of which, while the soul retains the memory, she cannot possibly establish herself in intelligibles: for memory, says Plotinus, leads to the object of memory. And as Mnemosyne excites the memory of intelligibles, so Latona imparts an oblivion of material concerns.

* Of these winding paths the *Dedalean labyrinth* is an image.

That of our sovereign mistress Diana*, Plato delivers three idioms; the undefiled, the mundane, and the anagogic. And through the first of these indeed the goddess is said to be a lover of virginity; but through the second, according to which she is perfective of works (*τελειουργος*), she is said to be the inspective guardian of virtue; and through the third she is said to hate the impulses arising from generation. Of these three likewise, the first is especially adapted to the progression of the goddess, according to which she is allotted an *hyparxis* in the vivific triad of the supermundane gods; whether we call this deity Hecatic, as theurgists say, or Diana with Orpheus. For there being established, she is filled with undefiled powers from the gods called *Amiliati*†. But she looks to the fountain of virtue, and embraces its virginity. For the virginity which is there does not proceed forth, as the Oracle says, but abiding gives subsistence to Diana, and to supermundane virtue, and is exempt from all communion, conjunction, and progression, according to generation. Hence Core also, according to the Diana and Minerva which she contains, is said to remain a virgin; but according to the prolific power of Proserpine, she is said to proceed forth, and to be conjoined with the third demiurgus, and to bring forth, as Orpheus says, “nine azure-eyed, flower-producing daughters,”

*Ενθα Δρυατῆρας γλαυκωπιδας ανθεσιουργος**

since the Diana and the Minerva which she contains preserve their virginity always the same. For the former of these is characterized according to her stability, but the latter according to her convertive energy. But that which is generative is allotted in her a middle order. They say too, that she aspires after virginity, since the form of her is comprehended in the vivific fountain, and she understands fontal virtue, gives subsistence to supermundane and anagogic virtue, and despises all material sexual connexion, though she inspects the fruits arising from it. She appears also to be averse to the generations and progressions of things, but to introduce perfections to them. And she gives perfection indeed to souls through a life according to virtue; but to mortal animals she imparts a restitution to form. But that there is a great union between Diana, the mundane Hecate, and Core, is evident to those that are in the least degree conversant with the writings of Orpheus; from

* See page 527.

† That is, the Corybantes.

which it appears that Latona is comprehended in Ceres, and together with Jupiter gives subsistence to Core, and the mundane Hecate. To which we may also add that Orpheus * calls Diana Hecate. So that it is nothing wonderful, if we should elsewhere call the Diana contained in Core, Hecate.

That Plato coarranges the mundane Bacchus † with the mundane Venus, in consequence of her love of Bacchus, and her fashioning, as an image of him, Adonis much honoured in Cilicia and Cyprus. And it is evident that a love of this kind in Venus, which is thus beneficent and providential, must be considered as exerted by a superior to an inferior divinity.

That the young man appears to inquire about our sovereign master Bacchus, as if it were about things of small importance, and on this account he is silenced ‡ by Socrates. And he does not indeed hear concerning the occult, but only the last and mundane progressions of the gods. These indeed the wise man venerates, though, as he says, they are sports, through these gods being lovers of sport. For, as he says of the terminations of the other gods, that they are terrible, and that they avenge and punish, and thus give perfection to souls; as, for instance, that Justice follows Jupiter, the avenger of the divine law, and that this divinity is benevolent to those whose manners are orderly, and who live according to intellect, but that she is baneful to those who mingle their life with insolence and ignorance, until she has entirely subverted them, their houses, and cities;—in like manner, he venerates the terminations of Bacchus and Venus, which produce *γλυκυθυμία*, *sweetness of sensation*; every where purifying our conceptions concerning the gods, and preparing us to understand that all things look to the best end, whatever it may be. For, because the terminations of these divinities strengthen the infirmity of the mortal nature, and recall corporeal molestation, on this account the gods, the causes of these things, are *φιλοπαιγμονες*, *lovers of sport*. Hence, of statues, they make some of them laughing and dancing, and exhibiting relaxation, but others austere, astonishing, and terrible to the view, analogously to the mundane allotments of the gods.

* Ηδ' ἀρ' ἐκὰς παιδὸς μέλη αὐτὴ λυπούσα
 Λήτους ἐπιλαχμαῖο κορὴ προσέειπ' αἰὲν ὀλίμπων.

† See p. 527.

‡ This is implied by Socrates telling him that he inquires about *great* things.

That theologists frequently call Bacchus *wine*, from the last of his gifts, as, for instance, Orpheus,

ΟΙΝΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΜΕΛΗ ΚΟΣΜΩ ΛΑΪΣ, ΚΑΙ ΜΟΙ ΕΝΙΚΕΙ.

i. e. "Take all the members of wine (that are distributed) in the world, and bring them to me."

But if the god is thus denominated, certainly his first and middle energies will be thus called, as well as his last; so that Socrates, now looking to this, calls the god *διδωνσος*, beginning from wine, which, as we have said, manifests all the powers of the god. Thus also in the Phædrus, Socrates calls love in common *great*, both that which is divine, and that which is a lover of body. By this epithet *wine* therefore, we must understand that the idiom of a partial intellect is in common presented to our view. For the word *οιον*, *such as*, is nothing else than intellectual form separated from a total intellect, and in consequence of this becoming participated, *particular* and *alone*. For an all-perfect intellect is all things, and energizes according to all things with invariable sameness; but a partial and participated intellect is indeed all things, but this according to one form, such as a solar, lunar, or mercurial form. This therefore, the idiom of which is to be separated from the rest, wine indicates, signifying an intellect *such as*, and *particular* (*σημαινων του οιον και τινας νουν*). Since therefore every partial fabrication is suspended from the Dionysiacal monad, which distributes participated mundane intellects from total intellect*, many souls from one soul, and all sensible forms from their proper totalities; on this account theologists call both this god and all his fabrications *wine*: for all these are the progeny of intellect; and some things participate of the partial distribution of intellect in a more distant, but others in a nearer degree. *Wine* therefore energizes in things analogous to its subsistence in them: in body, indeed, after the manner of an image, according to a false opinion and imagination; but in intellectual natures, according to an intellectual energy and fabrication; since, in the laceration of Bacchus by the Titans, the *heart* of the god is said to have alone remained undistributed, i. e. *the indivisible essence of intellect*. Οτι τον δεσποτην ημων Διουσον, οι θεολογοι πολλακις,

* With respect to intellect, it is necessary to inform the reader, that one kind is imparticipable and total, such as all intellects unconnected with soul; but another participable indeed, but essentially so, such as the mundane intellect, and the intellects of all the mundane gods and beneficent dæmons; but a third is participable, and subsists as a *hulit*; and to this class our intellects belong.

και απο των τελευταιων αυτων δωρων ονον καλουσιν.—Οστις ως ειρηται πασων εστι δηλωτικός των του Θεου δυναμεων. Ωσπερ και εν Φαιδρω τον μεγαν ερωτα κοινως λεγει, τον τε Ξειον, και τον Φιλοσωματον. Ο ουν ονος ουτος κοινως εξακουσμενος, την ιδιοτητα του μερικου νου παριστῃσιν ημιν. Το γαρ οιον, ουκ αλλο τι εστιν ἢ το διηκμενον απο του ολου, και μετεχμενον ηδη νοερον ειδος, και οιον, και μονον γενομενον. Ο μεν γαρ πατελης ιους παντοι' (*lege πανται*) εστι και ενεργει κατα παστα ωσαυτως. Ο δε μερικος και μετεχμενος παντα μεν, αλλα καθ' εν ειδος, οιον το ηλιακον, η το σεληνιακον, ἢ το ερμιακον. Επειδη τεινυ η μεριστη δημιουργια παστα της δικυσιακης εξηρηται μοναδος, διαιρυστα τους μεν μεθεκτους εν τω κοσμῳ νοας απο του ολου νου, τας δε πλλας ψυχας, απο της μιας, τα δ' ειδη τα ακυθητα παντα απο των οικειων ολότητων, δια δι τρυτο και αυτον τον Θεον ονον προσηκασιν οι Ξεολογοι, αυτον τε, και παστα τα δημιουργηματα αυτου. Παστα γαρ εγγονα του νου. Και τα μεν παρρωτερον, τα δ' εγγυτερον μετεχει της μεριστης του νου διανομης. Αναλογως ουν εν τοις ουσιν ο ονος εγγινεμενος ενεργει. Εν μεν τῃ σωματι ειδωλικως, κατα οησιν, και φαντασιαν ψευδη. Εν δε τοις νοεροις το κατα νουν ενεργειν, και δημιουργειν. Επει και εν τη διασπαρραξει των τιτανων μογη η καρδια αδιαμετος μειναι λεγεται τρυτεστιν η αμερης του νου ουσια.

That from sportive conceptions about the gods it is possible for those to energizeentheastically, or according to a divinely inspired energy, who apply themselves to things in a more intellectual manner. Thus, for instance, according to the material conceptions of the multitude, Venus derives her origin from foam; and foam corresponds to feed. Hence according to them the pleasure arising from this in coition is Venus. Who, however, is so stupid *, as not to survey primary and eternal natures, prior to such as are last and corruptible? I will therefore unfold the divine conception respecting Venus.

They say then that the first Venus was produced from two-fold causes, the one as that *through which* †, cooperating with her progression, as calling forth the prolific power of the father, and imparting it to the intellectual orders; but Heaven as the maker and cause unfolding the goddess into light, from his own generative abundance. For whence could that which congregates different genera, according to one desire of beauty, receive

* A countless multitude we may say, O Proclus, of the present day are thus stupid; and few, very few indeed, have entertained a different opinion for upwards of a thousand years.

† This cause is Saturn, who according to the fable cut off the genital parts of Heaven. See the Theogony of Hesiod,

its subsistence except from the *synochical* power of Heaven? From the foam therefore of his own prolific parts thrown into the sea, Heaven produced this goddess, as Orpheus says. But the second Venus Jupiter produces from his own generative powers, in conjunction with Dione: and this goddess likewise proceeds from foam, after the same manner with the more ancient Venus, as Orpheus evinces. These goddesses therefore differ from each other, according to the causes of their production, their orders, and their powers. For she that proceeds from the genitals of Heaven is supermundane, leads upwards to intelligible beauty, is the supplier of an unpolled life, and separates from generation. But the Venus that proceeds from Dione governs all the coordinations in the celestial world and the earth, binds them to each other, and perfects their generative progressions, through a kindred conjunction. These divinities too are united with each other through a similitude of subsistence: for they both proceed from generative powers; one from that of the connectedly containing power of Heaven, and the other from Jupiter the demiurgus. But the sea signifies an expanded and circumscribed life; its profundity, the universally extended progression of such a life; and its foam, the greatest purity of nature, that which is full of prolific light and power, and that which swims upon all life, and is as it were its highest flower.

That theologists especially celebrate two powers of our sovereign mistress Minerva *, the *defensive* and the *perfective*, the former preserving the order of wholes undefiled, and unvanquished by matter, and the other filling all things with intellectual light, and converting them to their cause; on which account Plato also in the *Timæus* analogously celebrates Minerva as *philopolemic*, and *philosophic*. But three orders of this goddess are delivered by theologists; the one fontal and intellectual, according to which she establishes herself in her father Jupiter, and subsists in unproceeding union with him; but the second ranks among the supermundane gods, according to which she is present with Core, and bounds and converts all the progression of that goddess to herself. And the third is *liberated*, according to which she perfects and guards the whole world, and circularly invests it with her powers, as with a veil; binding together all the mundane summits, and giving subsistence to all the allotments in the Heavens, and to those which proceed into the sublunary region. Now therefore Socrates celebrates her *guardian* power, through the name of *Pallas*; but her *perfective* power through that of *Minerva*. She

* See p. 529.

is the cause therefore of orderly and measured motion, which she first imparts to the Curetic order, and afterwards to the other gods. For Minerva, according to this power, is the leader of the Curetes, as Orpheus says, whence also, as well as those divinities, she is adorned with empyrean arms, through which she represses all disorder, preserves the demiurgic series immovable, and unfolds dancing through rhythmical motion. She also guards reason as it proceeds from intellect; through this power vanquishing matter. For the visible region, says Timæus, is mingled from intellect and necessity, the latter being obedient to the former, and all material causes being in subjection to the will of the father. It is this goddess therefore who arranges necessity under the productions of intellect, raises the universe to the participation of Jupiter, excites and establishes it in the port of its father, and eternally guards and defends it. Hence, if the universe is said to be indissoluble, it is this goddess who supplies its permanency; and if it moves in measured motion, through the whole of time, according to one reason and order, she is the source of this supply. She watchfully surveys therefore all the fabrication of her father, and connects and converts it to him; and vanquishes all material indefiniteness. Hence she is called *Victory* and *Healer*; the former because she causes intellect to rule over necessity, and form over matter; and the latter, because she preserves the universe perpetually whole, perfect, exempt from age, and free from disease. It is the property therefore of this goddess to elevate and distribute, and through an intellectual dance, as it were, to connect, establish, and defend inferior natures in such as are more divine*.

* These admirable Scholia on the Cratylus end here; being unfortunately, like most both of the published and unpublished writings of Proclus, incomplete. These very Scholia too appear to be nothing more than extracts from a copious commentary of Proclus which is lost.

THE END.